

Qiaowu

Chinese Overseas

HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND SOCIETY

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Qiaowu

Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese

By

James Jiann Hua To



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Preface

This book is based upon my doctoral dissertation—the product of five years of intensive research into a subject that is very close to my heart. It first began as a study of finding my own identity as an ethnic Chinese person living in New Zealand. My research then gradually took on a regional focus by examining case studies throughout the Pacific. In the end, it evolved into an examination of the ramifications and implications of the connections between all Overseas Chinese (OC), China, and Taiwan in an international context. Several of the examples cited come from my own firsthand experience in the OC community and my participation in international OC organizations, but I attribute many of my findings to my vast network of family, friends, and colleagues throughout New Zealand and around the world.

Some of the information in this book has been previously published—the major examples being “Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese,” in *Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan & the South Pacific*, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (World Scientific, 2010); “Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart: Thought Management and the Overseas Chinese,” in *Thought Management: China’s Modernized Propaganda Work*, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (Routledge, 2012); and “Beijing’s Policies for Managing Han and Ethnic Minority Chinese Communities Abroad” in *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2012.

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge and thank my primary supervisor Assoc. Prof. Anne-Marie Brady. She has provided me with plenty of encouragement, constructive comments, and criticism throughout my under and postgraduate years at the University of Canterbury. She was instrumental in patiently guiding me through my research methodology—particularly in finding my focus, highlighting the crucial aspects of my topic, offering advice for accessing essential data, and giving me the opportunities to present my research to a wider audience.

I also wish to thank my secondary supervisors: Assoc. Prof. John Henderson, who introduced me to the topic of China in the Pacific, and has since provided useful advice concerning my thesis presentation; and Assoc. Prof. Alex Tan, who offered inspiration and ideas in the early days of my research—particularly with connecting me with his contacts in Taiwan. It was a great privilege to study under the guidance of such a knowledgeable supervisory team.

I also must thank both of my external examiners for my original dissertation Prof Flemming Christiansen and Prof Mette Thuno, who provided me with valuable feedback by identifying areas for improvement and clarification. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer of my manuscript, who made many useful suggestions which led to the final publication of my research.

I would like to make a special mention of thanks to Dr Bruce Harding. In addition to proof-reading my manuscript, he also played an important role in developing my communication skills as my English teacher at Christchurch Boys' High School, for which I will be eternally grateful.

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Finally, I would like to make a special acknowledgement to the Poll Tax Heritage Trust, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Asia New Zealand Foundation, and the New Zealand Asia Studies Society for granting funding assistance towards travel and accommodation expenses associated with the research.

Notes on the Romanization of Chinese Language

The content of this book spans over a century of OC affairs, overseen by different government regimes, and consequently, different publishing conventions. As such, the romanization of certain Chinese words may be inconsistent, depending on their origin and usage. The majority of personal names, terms, and titles used in this study follow the commonly accepted PRC phonetic system of *hanyu pinyin* 汉语拼音. However, names that are widely recognized under the Wade-Giles system or some variant of it (particularly those connected to Taiwan, such as the Kuomintang 国民党, Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石, or Ma Ying-jeou 马英九) have not been changed so as not to confuse the reader with different spellings. Finally, the author takes full responsibility for the accuracy of translation from the original Chinese language source materials.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	China Central Television
CPD	Central Propaganda/Publicity Department
CPPCC	Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference
CSSA	Chinese Student and Scholar Association
CTS	China Travel Service
CYC	China Youth Corps
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DVD	Digital Versatile Disc
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLG	Falungong
GADP	Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace
GOCAO	Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
HK	Hong Kong
HSK	<i>Hanyu shuiping kaoshi</i>
ICP	Indonesian Communist Party
KMT	Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOC	Ministry of Culture
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation
MSN	Microsoft Network
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NPC	National Peoples' Congress
NTDTV	New Tang Dynasty Television
NZ	New Zealand
NZCA	New Zealand Chinese Association
OC	Overseas Chinese
OCAC	Overseas Chinese/Compatriot* Affairs Commission

* The first 'C' in OCAC changed in official ROC documentation from 'Chinese' to 'Compatriot' in 2006; in September 2012, it changed to "Overseas Chinese Affairs Council"; in November 2012, the acronym changed yet again to "ROC (Taiwan) Overseas Community Affairs Council".

OCAO	Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
OFP	Office of Foreign Propaganda
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PRCA	Peaceful Reunification of China Association
ROC	Republic of China
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SI	Solomon Islands
TECO	Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
UF	United Front
UFWD	United Front Work Department
UN	United Nations
US/USA	United States of America

Introduction

Following the violent crackdown on students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, tens of thousands of sympathetic ethnic Chinese and nationals of the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) from across the globe (hereafter described as the Overseas Chinese or OC)¹ unified in protest against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or *gongchandang* 共产党). While some were too afraid to speak out, others were much more critical and antagonistic by calling for democratic reform on the mainland.² Fearing an escalation of anti-CCP sentiment amongst a diaspora crucial to its national interests, Beijing promptly intensified its propaganda and management work for the OC in order to deal with the precarious situation. It employed a foreign legion of diplomats, attachés from various government ministries, and specialist cadres to aggressively manage and control strategic OC communities under a comprehensive set of influential tools and persuasive techniques.³ This effort is known as “OC affairs work” (*huaqiao shiwu gongzuo* 华侨事务工作) and hereafter abbreviated as *qiaowu* (侨务).

Over the next two decades, the CCP continually developed and improved *qiaowu* to the extent that it has become more successful with these methods in the current period than any other era—particularly so with new migrants and foreign students from the PRC. Such prowess became apparent in 2008, when large numbers of these OC took to the streets in major cities around the world. This time their response was not in defiance of the regime, but in strong support of China and its leaders.

How has *qiaowu* been able to influence and manage the OC in this way? Why have *qiaowu* efforts worked with such success? Why has the CCP become so confident in advancing OC work since the crisis of 1989? This book explains

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- 1 This book uses the term Overseas Chinese (OC) in a generic manner to include ethnic Chinese living outside of China. The term OC does not include those living in the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong (HK) and Macau, and those living in Taiwan. Where specific types of OC are referred to, the term will be qualified. See Chapter Four for a detailed explanation.
 - 2 Franka Cordua-von Specht, “Discourse on the China Crisis: Three Perspectives,” *Ubysses* 8, no. 1 (5 July 1989): 5, http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/pdfs/ubyssey/UBYSSEY_1989_07_05.pdf, (accessed 30 September 2009).
 - 3 Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought-work in Contemporary China* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 163–164.

the nature and development of *qiaowu*, details its specific work methods, and analyzes the platforms employed to advance relations with the OC diaspora. By assessing a wide range of Chinese language references, primary source policy documents, and internal memoranda, the author argues that despite decades of counter-efforts from rival political factions, gradual cultural assimilation, changes in OC demographics, technology, and the international geo-political climate, the practice of *qiaowu* has served as an accomplished and necessary component of the CCP's modernized propaganda and thought-work system for influencing, managing, and unifying a heterogeneous population of OC for Beijing's national and international interests.

1.1 Diasporas and Transnational Loyalties

Amongst the various definitions and typologies concerning the description of classical and modern diasporas, the general consensus encompasses the concept of any population that has migrated from its country of origin and settled in a foreign land, but maintains its continuity as a community by maintaining strong sentimental and material links with its home country.⁴ Those sharing such links of solidarity have the potential to be politicized and mobilized in order to influence political, economic, diplomatic, and military outcomes for the home or host country.⁵ Combined with modern logistical technology and information flows, a diaspora can be a highly coordinated ethno-nationalist force with transnational loyalties.⁶

For example, during the Second World War, ethnic Japanese who identified themselves as compatriots (*doho* 同胞) or as Japanese naturalized or

4 Gabriel Sheffer, "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics," in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, 1–15; Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London: UCL Press Ltd., 1997); Daniel J. Elazar, "The Jewish People as the Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis," in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 212–257.

5 For a general discussion of ethnic groups and their influence upon home/host country foreign policy, see J. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); J. Bertelsen, *Non State Nations in International Politics: Comparative System Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1980); Milton Esman, *Diasporas in the Contemporary World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 120–132; Yossi Shain, *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 3; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Chris Ogden, "Diaspora Meets IR's Constructivism: An Appraisal," *Politics* 28, no. 1 (2008): 1–10.

6 Arjun Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures," *Public Culture*, no. 5 (1993): 411–429.

born abroad but owing first allegiance to Japan and the emperor (*dokokujin* 同国人) were employed for propaganda purposes to demoralize allied forces.⁷ To advance Israeli interests abroad, American Jewish and Zionist lobbies in the United States (US) are widely acknowledged to influence Washington's Middle East policy.⁸ Britain, Greece, France, and Germany all have government level ministries or representative agencies to project or advance their political and cultural interests throughout the world with help from their overseas populations.

For facilitating domestic economic development, the Israeli government created the Jewish Agency for Israel in 1948 for encouraging Jewish immigration to Israel and other political and cultural interests.⁹ Similarly, the governments of Iraq,¹⁰ India,¹¹ Vietnam,¹² and the Philippines¹³ actively embrace and attract their diaspora for the same purpose. Mexico has used dual state membership to keep the ties of its expatriates alive for business and election processes.¹⁴ More recently, Russia has attempted to institutionalize identity politics in order to take advantage of its diaspora following the breakup of the former Soviet Union.¹⁵

7 "Life in Shadow of 'Tokyo Rose,'" *Press*, 7 October 2006, D19.

8 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

9 Daniel J. Elazar and Alysa Dortort, eds. *Understanding the Jewish Agency* (Jerusalem and Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1986); The Jewish Agency homepage, www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Home (accessed 30 September 2009).

10 Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq homepage, www.iraq-iri.org/ (accessed 30 September 2009).

11 Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs homepage, www.moia.gov.in/ (accessed 30 September 2009).

12 Dang Nguyen Anh, "Enhancing the Development Impact of Migrant Remittances and Diaspora: The Case of Vietnam" (paper presented at the Regional Seminar on the Social Implications of International Migration, Bangkok, 24–36 August 2005), www.unescap.org/esid/psis/meetings/SIIM/VietNam.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009).

13 Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Langhorne: Gordon and Breach, 1993), 225–257.

14 Agustín Escobar Latapi and Eric Janssen, "Migration, the Diaspora and Development: The Case of Mexico," discussion paper DP/167/2006, International Institute of Labor Studies, Geneva, 2006, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp16706.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2009); Thomas Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 278.

15 Neil Melvin, *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

However, these efforts pale in comparison with the CCP's *qiaowu* effort. *Qiaowu* comprises of a multi-level bureaucratic superstructure—consisting of governmental, diplomatic, and non-governmental agencies and organizations providing formal and informal avenues for participation and incorporation for a target group of 48 million ethnic Chinese across the globe.¹⁶ The OC Affairs Office of the State Council (hereafter OCAO or *guowuyuan qiaowu bangongshi* 国务院侨务办公室) has attachments in PRC embassies, consulates, and representative agencies in countries and major cities where sizeable OC communities reside.

The OCAO has developed and implemented *qiaowu* policies with a special consideration of the people-to-people methods typical of the CCP's dealings with the masses.¹⁷ Under a systematic approach of persuasion, influence, and manipulation, the CCP has been successful in guiding and directing key groups of OC around the world to be supportive of Beijing; and where it cannot do so, to at least seek to change their perceptions so that they are favourable towards the PRC. No other government initiative can match *qiaowu's* scale of operation or sophistication, nor profess to reach the level of success that China has enjoyed under a wide variety of specialist programmes and activities.

The only other government able to come close to making a claim of reaching out to so many millions of people is that of Taiwan. In representing the Republic of China (ROC), the Kuomintang (KMT or *guomindang* 国民党) Nationalist party sought to continue its anti-communist struggle through its historical association with the OC following the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Under its own *qiaowu* efforts, Taipei dominated OC communities around the world for decades, dictating the management of OC education and their organizations up until the 1990s. However, after this period, a process of Taiwanization (advanced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or *minjindang* 民进党) and the independence movement) saw Taipei's focus shift solely to pro-Taiwan OC (*Taiqiao* 台侨), while efforts with long-established OC groups (such as *laoqiao* 老侨) waned. In this context, the PRC's rival *qiaowu* effort took to the fore, and has continuously gained ground to become the leading form of extra-territorial engagement with the OC diaspora in the contemporary period.

16 “2008 huayi baogao: 4800 wan huaqiao huaren fenbu zai shijie gedi 2008 华裔报告: 4800 万华侨华人分布在世界各地 [2008 Ethnic Chinese Report: 48 Million OC and Ethnic Chinese Spread Around the World],” *Zhongxinwang*, 2 February 2009, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 30 March 2009, 2.

17 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 12, 156–170.

1.2 Diasporas and International Relations Theory

Understanding the relationship between governments and diasporic populations entails some theoretical consideration. While the study of migration, transnationalism, and other global trends related to people movement are addressed through anthropological, historical, and economic frameworks, the specific examination of diasporas as a unique field of conceptual and empirical research of international relations is relatively lacking.¹⁸ This gap in the literature has been addressed in recent years by a steady growth of interdisciplinary approaches to resolving previous analytical challenges.¹⁹

There are four main contextual aspects concerning the state-diaspora relationship—all of which are acknowledged and referenced throughout this book in order to explain the CCP's management of its OC connections. The first aspect explores how sending and receiving states incorporate diasporas into a host society. The relevant literature mostly concerns international social, immigration, migration, and transnationalist theory.²⁰ The examination of organizational structures and policy discourses concerning these disciplines can be adapted to understand the connections between a sending-state and its diaspora. As such, sociologist Yasemin Soysal's statist-corporatist model (according to a centralized apparatus under a top-down mode of operation supplemented with intermediary structures for migrant participation) can serve to map and analyze the complex *qiaowu* administrative superstructure and its various participatory platforms for dealing with the OC diaspora (see Chapters Three, Four, and Nine).²¹

18 Latha Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 18; Robert W. Glover, "Constructing the 'Domestic Abroad': Re-examining the Role of Diasporas in International Relations," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 16, no. 1/2 (Spring/Fall 2007): 273–284.

19 Myra A. Waterbury, "Bridging the Divide: Towards a Comparative Framework for Understanding Kin State and Migrant-Sending State Diaspora Politics," in *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, eds. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010): 131–148; Andreea Lazar, "Transnational Migration Studies: Refining Sociological Imagination and Research," *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology* 2, No. 2 (Fall 2011): 69–83.

20 Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound*; Thomas Faist, "Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 2 (2000): 189–222.

21 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): 136–162.

The second aspect revolves around theories explaining the construction of diaspora identity, and is mostly based upon liberal-constructivist and post-colonial frameworks. The former argues that a diaspora's norms, motives, identity, and behaviour are the product of complex social construction by both state and non-state actors, migration processes, domestic politics, and influence—rather than rational interests of the state alone.²² Similarly, post-colonial theories also treat diasporas as an inherent challenge to state nationalism. These arguments suggest that participation in politics, negotiation of membership, and assertion of identity can all take place despite territorial displacement, and without a necessary reference to shared nationhood.²³

In an age of globalization, transnationalism, and migration, traditional notions of sovereignty and a nation-state based upon territorial boundaries have been rendered obsolete. A state is able to project influence and advance its national interests throughout the world via its relationship with its diaspora communities. Migrants forge a transnational status and identity through organizational activity in a recontextualization of 'nationness' whereby the dimensions of territoriality and citizenship become irrelevant.²⁴ The traditional contention of the nation-state is replaced by other formations for allegiance and identity shaped by non-sovereign and non-physical social formations (see Chapters Five, Six, and Seven).²⁵

Such organizational processes surrounding identity formation leads us to the third aspect of study, which investigates how diasporas can influence the policies of both the sending or host state. Again, constructivist and liberalist approaches are used to explain this relationship by examining cohesion, perceptions, balance of power, and levels of influence between state and diaspora. Peggy Levitt and Rafael de la Dehesa explore the social movement literature to explain how political opportunity structures of the state and institutional settings of diasporas either encourage or impede participation in

22 Roxanne Doty, "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity," in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, eds. Thomas J. Bierstecker and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 125–127; Emmanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism and World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 334–336; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press): 4–6; Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1998): 171–200.

23 Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures," 411–429.

24 Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*, 136–162.

25 Ogden, "Diaspora Meets IR's Constructivism," 1–10.

transnational processes.²⁶ According to Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, diasporas are independent actors that can be broadly divided into active or passive elements. Passive members become involved in international relations unwillingly or beyond their control; they act according to the wishes of their leaders, or remain silent or inactive, and possibly mobilizing in the event of a crisis.²⁷ Active members may organize themselves in order to influence foreign policies. In this case, their scope of activities is determined by the resources, opportunities, and support structures available to them, and their inclinations and motivation to maintain solidarity for exerting group influence.²⁸ As such, diasporas become the subject of elimination, control, cultivation, or expansion in terms of the home or host state's interests (see Chapters Two, Three, and Seven).

This leads us to the fourth aspect, and the main objective of this book—investigating a sending-state's outreach beyond its territorial borders in attempting to capture and mobilize its diaspora for state interests. In this context, researchers such as Varadarajan, Adamson, and Demetriou suggest that states actively assert their role as neo-liberal hegemonists. State and non-state actors cultivate relationships with their diasporas through transnationalist projects that reassert, reinforce, and strengthen notions of the nation-state agenda and national identity through the demands of domestic economic elites for the purposes of advancing global capitalism, trade liberalization, and export-led growth (see Chapter Four).²⁹

Other academics go beyond this neo-liberal position, and argue that the state-diaspora relationship is driven by power politics—that it is in the state's interest to retain supremacy over its diaspora for national security.

26 Peggy Levitt and Rafael de la Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26, no. 4 (2003): 587–611.

27 Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 449–479.

28 Milton Esman, "Diasporas and International Relations," in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, 335–226; Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia," *International Security* 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999–2000): 108–138.

29 Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad*; Fiona B. Adamson and Madeline Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (2007): 489–526; Robert C. Smith, "Diasporic Memberships in Historical Perspective: Comparative Insights from the Mexican, Italian and Polish Cases," *The International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003): 724–759.

Francesco Ragazzi uses a mix of Foucauldian genealogical methodology³⁰ and contributions from the ‘Paris School’ of security studies³¹ to explain diasporic policies not simply as a calculus of capitalist economic or short term interests, but how government rationalities and modalities of power adapt to changes in order to preserve state security and prosperity.³²

Ragazzi identifies three types of relationships between the state and its diaspora: the first facilitates the return of diasporic populations through providing incentives, encouraging patriotism, or fostering sentimentalism in order to rebuild the country (see Chapter Four). The second views émigré communities not as friendly, but as potential threats who therefore must be placed under surveillance, or dealt with by force through the state’s security agencies (see Chapter Seven). The third relationship looks to ‘gathering a nation’ across borders, by promoting an ‘official’ national identity that seeks to advance anti-assimilationist objectives amongst diasporic communities, and unifying them for purposes of state interest—essentially to prevent their integration and instead maintain them as foreign policy instruments (see Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine).

These relationships are not discrete; policies take into account the counter-practices and responses of diasporic populations and their sub-groups based upon their level of loyalty or resistance. The interplay between successive Chinese governments and the OC in constructing (and reconstructing) loyalties is no different. Historian Hong Liu combines historical, international relations, and diaspora frameworks to argue that Beijing’s resilience with domesticating diaspora issues have established new platforms for the OC to participate

30 Foucault’s methodology conceptualized power through the various ways in which the state operated through society in dealing with problems, and that these multiple methods of governance were in constant conflict for different categories of society, conditions and objectives. See Michel Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours au Collège de France (1977–1978)* (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004).

31 The ‘Paris School’ of thought is based around the work of Didier Bigo in describing the constructivist approach to discourse analysis, and the role of material conditions of emergence and styles of government, and how this affects immigration, transnationalism, and modalities of power. See Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27 (Special Issue, 2002): 1–37; Phillipe Bonditti, “From Teritorial Space to Networks: A Foucauldian Approach to the Implementation of Biometry,” *Alternatives* 29, no. 4 (2004): 465–482; C.A.S.E Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (2006): 443–487.

32 Francesco Ragazzi, “Governing Diasporas,” *International Political Sociology* 3 (2009): 378–397.

in China's socio-economic, political, and diplomatic policy processes.³³ This book expands on these ideas, and examines how Ragazzi's three typologies explain the CCP's extra-territorial policies for the OC as a greater quest for hegemonic domination of the Chinese diaspora through political, economic, and cultural channels.

1.3 Introduction to the Extant Literature

The Chinese state is a unitary bureaucratic administrative enterprise enjoying centralized control and organization over the polity and decision-making processes. In contrast to predictions that it would fall to democratization, the CCP has successfully reconsolidated itself since the turmoil of 1989. Many of the reasons for this transformation are due to its pragmatic approach to regime institutionalization—a concept based upon Samuel Huntington's theory of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of state organizations.³⁴ This development of coherent institutionalization is partly discernable from studying how China has dealt with the OC over the years—including the anthropological, socio-economic, and historical aspects of Chinese immigration,³⁵ their integration in host societies,³⁶ and their relationship with China.

Amongst the relevant literature pertaining to these concerns is Stephen Fitzgerald's comprehensive study *China and the OC—A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949–1970*, which focused specifically on the PRC's influence upon Chinese abroad in a domestic context during the 1950s and 1960s. Fitzgerald argued that *qiaowu* policy changed constantly, with their treatment veering from left to right, and alternating between severity and leniency depending on the political environment.³⁷

33 Hong Liu, "An Emerging China and Diasporic Chinese: Historicity, State, and International Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 72 (November 2011): 813–832.

34 Andrew J. Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6–17; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968): 12–24.

35 Lea E. Williams, *The Future of the OC in Southeast Asia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

36 Lawrence W. Crissman, "The Segmentary Structure of Urban OC Communities," *Man* 2 (New Series, 1967): 185–204; Anthony Reid, ed. *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Edgar Wickberg and Harry Con, eds. *From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982).

37 Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the OC: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy, 1949–1970*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 54.

Other academics agreed that these changes were largely dependent upon the domestic and international geo-political situation. Pingping Zhu Lincoln described China's three regimes of OC patriotism;³⁸ Wang Gungwu identified a four-stage relationship between OC and the Chinese government;³⁹ similarly, Frank Pieke suggested Four Models of OC Relations.⁴⁰ Each of these experts observed that during the Qing dynasty, court officials viewed the OC as a political threat and tended to avoid responsibility for them, isolate, or reject them altogether; a second period saw a Nationalist government embrace the OC through patriotism and *jus sanguinis* during the early half of the twentieth century; then, under the communist regime, OC policies became incoherent, resulting in neglect during the Cultural Revolution; finally after 1978, the CCP regime recognized the importance of the OC for contributing towards China's modernization and development both domestically and abroad, and welcomed them back for this purpose.

However, while illustrating these apparent changes in policy, they did not account for the underlying premise that has pervaded *qiaowu* all throughout China's modern history. Although Harold Hinton was incorrect by arguing that Beijing would protect the OC at any cost,⁴¹ David Mazingo⁴² and Leo Suryadinata⁴³ both accurately asserted that it was national interests which would determine Beijing's actions.

Since Deng Xiaoping's (邓小平) economic reforms after 1978, PRC scholarship on OC affairs has enjoyed increased levels of attention. An enormous amount of interest and research amongst mainland academics during the 1980s indicated the state-driven directive to find out how the OC could fit into assisting China's plans for modernization. Studies included methods for mobilizing OC technological expertise and investment; techniques for connecting with and winning over the OC after years of injustices; reclaiming the OC under ethnic and cultural considerations despite their foreign nationalities;

38 Pingping Zhu Lincoln, "Towards a Theory on Sino-Southeast Asian Relations," *NUCB Journal of Language, Culture and Communication* 7, no. 2 (2005): 55–67.

39 Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," *China Quarterly* 136 (1993): 937–938; Wang Gungwu, *China and the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991).

40 Frank N. Pieke, "Four Models of China's OC Policies," *China Information* 2, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 8–16.

41 Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

42 David Mazingo, "China and Indonesia," in *China in Crisis*, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 333–356.

43 Leo Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985).

and how to write OC history in an accommodative fashion both domestically and abroad without causing controversy. PRC scholars also assisted *qiaowu* policy development by examining the OC in the context of their contributions to China from abroad, and their social integration in host countries.⁴⁴ These programmes continue today and are primarily located in the OC universities at Jinan and Xiamen—complete with special staff, libraries, and think tanks dedicated to providing qualitative and quantitative research.

Following the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, the CCP recognized that it had a serious problem with maintaining its legitimacy amongst the OC diaspora. The CCP quickly put in place a comprehensive strategy to reclaim hearts and minds. Over the subsequent decades, and into the contemporary period, a new generation of observers has focused upon this state-sponsored facilitation of the OC relationship. They note that the CCP exploit business, cultural, and ancestral links for the purpose of imparting state ideology, encouraging dual anchored identity, and promoting dual allegiance—all in the hope of influencing their actions and creating politically active citizens under an engagement of “long distance nationalism.”⁴⁵ In this manner, Chinese migrants who

44 Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, “1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he zhengce de bianhua 1978 年以来中国政府对华侨华人态度和政策的变化 [Changes in PRC Government Attitudes and Policies Towards OC and Ethnic Chinese Since 1978],” *Nanyang wenti yanjiu* 103, no. 3 (2000); Cheng Xi 程希, “Guanyu muqian huaqiao huaren yanjiu ruogan wenti de guancha yu sikao 关于目前华侨华人研究若干问题的观察与思考 [Observations and Reflections on Current Issues Related to OC Studies],” *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, no. 4, (2002): 1–6; Cheng Xi, “The ‘Distinctiveness’ of the OC as Perceived in the PRC,” in *Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China*, ed. Mette Thuno, 49–64 (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007); Wang Gungwu, “South China Perspectives on OC,” *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 3 (January 1985): 69–84; Wang, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, 242.

45 Pal Nyiri, “The New Migrant: State and Market Constructions of Modernity and Patriotism,” in *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism*, eds. Pal Nyiri and Joanna Breidenbach (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 141–176; Pal Nyiri, “The Yellow Man’s Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission,” *China Journal*, Issue 56 (July 2006): 83–106, <http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=268668219785151;res=IELHSS> (accessed 30 September 2009); Hong Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no.43 (May 2005): 291–316; Hong Liu, “Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalisation of OC Voluntary Associations and Its Implications,” *China Quarterly* 155 (1998): 582–609; Mette Thuno, “Reaching Out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-Territorial Scope of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century,” *China Quarterly* 168 (2001): 910–929; Elena Barabantseva, “Trans-nationalising ‘Chineseness’: OC Policies of the PRC’s

strongly identify with the motherland can assist China's external development in a way that does not depend on political structures.⁴⁶

1.4 Aims of This Book

Although there exists a wealth of scholarship concerning China's efforts to connect and benefit from the OC (such as attracting contributions, resources, and support through instilling ethnographic or nationalistic sentiment amongst them),⁴⁷ the literature still lacks a comprehensive and systematic examination of *qiaowu* methodology and its wider implications for international and regional relations.

This book builds upon and updates the existing research in a modern context, resulting in an original detailed study illustrating precisely how the CCP has strengthened its presence throughout the OC diaspora for China's national and foreign policy interests. It looks beyond the argument of nationalism and patriotism as central to China's evolution of modern OC policy, and explains how the CCP has achieved such a successful relationship with the OC.

Each chapter works towards exhaustively dissecting *qiaowu* down to its core attributes and philosophies on every aspect of the OC relationship in order to make a complete and thorough assessment. The study takes an investigative approach that uncovers, describes, and links *qiaowu* policies to the OC situation under different conditions and periods. While one is able to glean

Central Government," *ASIEN* 96 S. (July 2005): 7–28, www.asienkunde.de/articles/Barabantseva96.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009); Elena Barabantseva, "The Party-State's Transnational Outreach: OC Policies of the PRC's Central Government," Greater China Occasional Papers no. 2, Institute of Chinese and Korean Studies, University of Tuebingen, August 2005, www.uni-tuebingen.de/sinologie/sino/gcs/papers/paper2.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009); Jia Gao, "Transnationality of Settled Migrants and the Evolving Nature of their Transnational Lives: A Case Study of the Mainland Chinese Migrants in Australia," (paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, May 10–14 2004): 19, <http://www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/documents/GaoJia.doc> (accessed 30 September 2009).

46 Tom Dusevic, "The Quiet Revolution," *Time*, 25 April 2005, 14–26.

47 John Kao, "The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business," *Harvard Business Review* (March–April 1993): 24–36; Masaki Yamaguchi, "The Emerging Chinese Business Sphere," *Nomura Asian Perspectives* 11, no. 2 (July 1993); David Shambaugh, "Introduction: The Emergence of 'Greater China,'" *China Quarterly*, no. 136 (December 1993); Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variation, and Reservation," *China Quarterly*, no. 136 (December 1993).

many of these aspects by examining various case studies, *qiaowu* and its underlying philosophies and inner workings remain shrouded in bureaucracy and secrecy.

As such, this book offers a descriptive attempt to understand the existence and importance of this relationship by analyzing the evolving nature, scope, and patterns of the PRC's *qiaowu* administration, strategies, and policies in order to illustrate the CCP's continued and strengthening transnational influence over the OC, and the implications and challenges of managing and dealing with the world's largest ethnic group. Essentially the research focuses on how and why the PRC's OC policies and methods have developed in serving China's national interests both domestic and foreign since 1949—in particular the period between 1989 and 2008. Whether it be to secure its territorial borders, advance economic development and modernization, or expand its soft and hard power spheres of influence, the OC are key links to the aims and interests that help legitimize the CCP regime.

Despite a sometimes turbulent relationship with the OC, Beijing's intention was always to retain access to their political and economic resources for facilitating China's domestic development, extending its foreign policy, boosting its international image, and challenging political rivals. As such, this study compares and contrasts China's *qiaowu* efforts with those of Taiwan, and how that has changed as a result of Taipei's own domestic and international geopolitical situation.

From this summary, various research questions can be generated:

1. To what extent, if any, are the OC a tool of China's comprehensive national power?
2. What is the role of the OC in the CCP-led Party-State system?
3. How and why are the OC managed, influenced and mobilized to serve this purpose?
4. How are the OC used as agents of political leverage for Beijing's interests?
5. How and why are the OC used as public relations devices for China?
6. Why has *qiaowu* work been strengthened in recent years?
7. What are the limits to China's influence over the OC?
8. How has Taiwanization affected China's approach to *qiaowu*?
9. How has *qiaowu* policy developed in accordance with modern migration patterns?
10. What are the implications of China's *qiaowu* policy for other countries?

Each of the above questions address a different facet of the PRC-OC relationship—the target groups, the specific methods, the reasons and

ideology, the constraints, the rivalry with Taiwan and other challengers, and how *qiaowu* has been affected by the wider geo-strategic environment.

1.5 *Qiaowu* and Foreign Relations

Qiaowu offers numerous suggestions for improving migrant policies in terms of coordination, organizational structure, communications, and ethnographic reconnection. China's use of ethnic linkages, patriotism, economic opportunity, and social mobility are several areas of analysis that can help answer these questions. In an age of transnationalism and mobile identities, governments may find certain aspects of the study of *qiaowu* useful for maximizing the untapped potential of their own diasporas.⁴⁸

Under the theme of "thinking globally, acting locally" *qiaowu* has attempted to unify a heterogeneous population of OC in support of the PRC's interests. In addition to its traditional embrace for the wider diaspora, Beijing has sought to target and coopt select groups of elite and new migrant OC to raise both its own status as a responsible international power, and the status of the OC themselves. These developments have seen a revitalization of *qiaowu* activity reflected throughout China's re-emergence as a world power.

These aspects of *qiaowu* present larger questions and implications for international relations. Firstly, do diasporas play a significant role in determining foreign policy? As China specialists Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross noted, it is not clear what, if any, political and economic preferences the OC can bring to this process.⁴⁹ It depends on how permeable the policy making system is, and how much control the state can exercise over the diaspora.⁵⁰ An analysis of the evolution of *qiaowu* policies in Chapters Three and Four shows that it has historically been, and continues to be, subordinate, and directly related to, China's foreign policy interests.⁵¹ Furthermore, the OC have a wide

48 Chen Jihui 陈继辉, "Yindu qiaomin buyuan huiguo touzi, Yindu zhengfu huyu 'xuexi huaqiao' 印度侨民不愿回国投资, 印度政府呼吁 '学习华侨' [Overseas Indians Don't Wish to Return for Investment, Indian Government Calls on Them to Learn from the OC]," *Huanqiu shibao*, no. 15, 11 January 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 20 March 2007, 17.

49 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 410.

50 Shain and Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," 449–479.

51 Chuang Hsi-chuan (vice-chairman of the PRC OCAC) in a report to the inaugural All-China Returned OC Association, 17 October 1956, as noted by Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, 25.

range of platforms to engage with the state (both real and perceived) in regards to the policy development process. Evidently clear is Beijing's desire to exert hegemony and state supremacy in the relationship.

How the CCP engages with the OC, therefore, remains a significant cause of concern and interest—particularly for countries with large OC populations.⁵² Does the increase in the numbers of the OC settling or working around the world, and their links with China, indicate a specific strategy of using them to advance Beijing's national interests? Although this study does not seek to propagate or sensationalize theories of a "yellow peril", a "China threat", or "fifth column" activity as some other observers have alluded to,⁵³ it does highlight the potential political and social implications of *qiaowu* for host governments and receiving countries. These issues point to a new understanding of OC affairs in a context that is specific for the twenty-first century, incorporating themes such as globalization and modern migrational trends.

The future direction of *qiaowu* points towards key goals: improving China's international image, promoting China's domestic and foreign advancement, and raising the status of the OC in their places of residence. However, these objectives face several stumbling blocks: a revival of the "OC problem," acculturation, migration, illegal migration, and transnational crime. An analysis of these issues in Chapters Eight and Nine contributes to the understanding of China's wider relationship with the OC, and also how external actors and opportunities can impact upon China's foreign policy development.

1.6 *Qiaowu* and Social Control

To what extent does the CCP influence the OC? Since 1989, the CCP has placed renewed efforts of using *qiaowu* as a form of pro-active cooptation and incorporation as tools for OC social control and management (see Chapter Three). In the current period, the main thrust of China's *qiaowu* policy has not changed—the methodology has been modernized to suit new demographics, migration patterns, and the globalized geo-political environment; accordingly CCP policies have evolved in scope, methods, and sophistication.

52 Wang Gungwu, "External China as a New Policy Area," *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 1 (1985): 28–43.

53 David S. G. Goodman, "Are Asia's 'Ethnic Chinese' a Regional-Security Threat?" *Survival* 39, Issue 4 (Winter 1997/1998): 140–156; Elizabeth Feizkhah, "How to Win Friends: Beijing is Courting Tiny Pacific Nations," *Time (Pacific Edition)*, 4 June 2001.

China has become increasingly confident over the past twenty years in dealing with both the OC and the host governments of countries in which they reside. Underscoring this confidence is a sense of revitalized pro-Beijing sentiment amongst the OC that encourages them to participate in China's re-emergence economically, culturally, and politically. The CCP has been successful in cementing amongst China's domestic population and certain factions of the OC diaspora (mainly new migrants and PRC foreign students) the concept of equating patriotism with love of China and its communist leadership. These groups have likewise consolidated and strengthened their relationship with *qiaowu* agencies and PRC diplomatic representatives. This implies their willingness to be embraced by China and its leadership, and hence their political subservience.⁵⁴ Moreover, this interaction signifies a move from traditional ethnographically based associations to quasi-political platforms.

Beijing has continued to cite its policy of non-interference, yet expanded and intensified its influence and dominance over the OC populace to incorporate methods for best utilizing "old" and "new" OC populations, to promote economic integration, and to deter or quash any threats to the CCP regime. These advances in *qiaowu* have consolidated warm relationships with new migrant OC and PRC students studying abroad, and consequently achieved a new sense of legitimacy for the CCP regime by increasing its influence over OC communities as a form of soft power foreign policy; at the same time, any threats are identified, managed, or eliminated through more aggressive methods that expose sinister features of the CCP.

Qiaowu provides a clear demonstration of the methods behind the CCP's attempt at social control over the OC community by serving as a strategic antidote against anti-CCP behaviour. It seeks to gain and secure the loyalty of the OC before others do. Strategic groups of the diaspora can then be mobilized as channels for Beijing to pursue its interests and expand an ethnically conscious source of support throughout the world. The CCP has actively utilized sophisticated cultural and ethnonationalist channels in order to advance its interests, while confronting risks to its own legitimacy and hold onto power.

While all ethnic Chinese are considered to be the subject of *qiaowu*, the diaspora itself cannot be described as a single collective—it is a heterogeneous population composed of discrete and interlinking subset communities, each with different agendas. This diversity has increased in recent years, facilitated by modern migration patterns, liberalized immigration and multi-cultural policies of receiving countries (particularly following trade, cultural,

54 Flemming Christiansen, *Chinatown, Europe: An Exploration of OC Identity in the 1990s*, (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 127–128.

and political relations), and the proliferation of illegal migration. In response, the PRC divides the OC community on sub-national lines, with provincial, professional, commercial, sporting, or religious demarcations for the purposes of effective and efficient management.⁵⁵

The OC, composed of autonomous individuals, groups, and organizations, create issues, problems, and pressures that *qiaowu* policy makers must address. While some groups are more easily influenced and guided, other groups present significant difficulties for management. For example, during the Mao years, governments in Southeast Asia regarded any appeals from Beijing towards the OC as suspicious. This resulted in decades of careful and strategic measures so as to reassure neighbours that the “OC problem” was resolved; in the contemporary period, illegal migrants to the Pacific, Africa, and Eastern Europe have tarnished China’s cultivated national image as a ‘responsible’ power.

Therefore, the Chinese government proceeds with caution—ensuring that it is not to be perceived by others as interventionist, invasive, or exploitative, but as a helpful and cooperative friend and partner by bringing ‘win-win’ benefits for all. This raises the question of whether China is simply adapting to global norms for tactical benefit, or if it is genuinely learning?⁵⁶ Findings from this research show that tactical benefit and the pursuit of national interests remains Beijing’s foremost consideration for *qiaowu* policy development.

Can extra-territorial direction and control of the OC be proven? There is no way of measuring the complex attitudes of the Chinese authorities towards the OC; moreover, the PRC-based ascription of citizenship and the unofficial but powerful ethnicity-based perceptions of ‘Chineseness’ remains vague (this point is discussed in Chapter Five which examines the role of nationalism and patriotism in *qiaowu* policy development). Similarly, it is difficult to measure the extent to which *qiaowu* has been effective. As such, this research does not lend itself to quantification. While there is no true measure of ‘effectiveness’, there has been a distinct and significant shift of attitudes amongst OC, amplified by larger numbers of mainland Chinese migrants over the past few decades since 1989. Therefore, the aim of this book is to show how *qiaowu*

55 Pal Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic? The New Discourse on ‘New’ Migrants in the PRC and Identity Construction Among Recent Migrants from the PRC,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 635–653.

56 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” *China Journal*, no. 35 (January 1996): 27–62; Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing, “Tactical or Fundamental Change?” in *China’s New Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?* eds. Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 229–245.

policies have evolved and assisted with this shift, and highlight case studies of significance for explaining the PRC-OC state-diaspora relationship.

1.7 Methodology

Evaluation of ethnographic fieldwork within discourse research is prone to subjectivity—a natural result of the selective process of data gathering. As such, the objectivity, validity, and reliability of data often come into question. Ethnographic studies seek to reconstruct and understand specific situations, but not to replicate them. Quality of research, therefore, must be evaluated along lines of transparency, suitable case studies, and reliance upon a range of different sources in order to support one's conclusions.

The author has gathered data from a wide range of sources as both a researcher and long-serving member of the OC community. He has been an executive member of various OC organizations (both pro-Beijing, pro-Taipei, and neutral groupings), and thus a regular participant in activities organized or hosted by the PRC embassy, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO or *Taipei jingji wenhua daibiaochu* 台北经济文化代表处) and *qiaowu* agencies at various levels (including international forums, tours, and youth programmes).

Moreover, such a broad scope of engagement has provided the author with access to crucial resources and contacts, and ultimately a unique insight into how the *qiaowu* polity, bureaucracy, and institutions interact with OC communities and their leaders. Therefore, assumptions about the effects of *qiaowu* policies on personal matters (such as identity construction and ethnic affiliation) throughout this book are based upon the author's extensive experiences and observations derived from specific situations and circumstances over different time periods.⁵⁷

The author's conclusions have been complemented and supported by the personal views of those directly involved in *qiaowu* (such as government officials, academics, and OC community leaders). Fieldwork was done in the form of open-ended casual discussions and conversations rather than a qualitative interview, questionnaire, or survey. These included personal communications

57 Content and details from such meetings, private conversations, and participation in *qiaowu* activities are woven into the narrative as examples, descriptions, analysis, and insight of various situations. Other comments or situations may have appeared too trivial to reference. In managing the huge volume of information, the author has selected mostly traceable written sources.

with numerous OC leaders and members of community groups in the Pacific Islands and New Zealand (NZ) as well as cadres and officials in China and Taiwan. Formal interviews were avoided as they might have raised suspicions about the author's intentions. For example, cadres in Guangzhou were wary of divulging too much information; academics and community leaders were fearful of speaking out due to political sensitivities.

This research employs a wide range of Chinese language primary source materials accessed from a dedicated private *qiaowu* depository in Beijing (which functioned to monitor, collect, and collate news of OC affairs from China and around the world) and the library for OC research at Jinan University in Guangzhou. In both cases the author had full access to classified (*jimi* 机密) information not normally available to the general public—specifically internal (*neibu* 内部) and secret (*mimi* 秘密) *qiaowu* policy documents deemed too sensitive for open source publication. The typology and origin of these empirical data sources confirms existing knowledge or assertions, and also provides a deeper and wider understanding of *qiaowu* policy.

The main primary source document cited throughout this book is *Qiaoping* (侨情), a classified publication issued by the State Council concerning anything about *qiaowu*. It is intended for distribution only amongst the relevant government ministries, agencies, and high-level *qiaowu* cadres. *Qiaoping* is made up of advisory papers, memoranda, and reports from all provincial, county, city, and town levels of the *qiaowu* bureaucracy, as well as additional input from relevant research bodies (such as universities and think tanks). It highlights important findings and statistics, outcomes of policy implementation, as well as policy recommendations. *Qiaoping* is, therefore, the single most important document that indicates the internal attitude and position of the State Council towards OC affairs during any given period.

The author also refers to various compilations of relevant policies, speeches, editorials, reports, and commentary published by *qiaowu* authorities. The research also uses a variety of internal handbooks and manuals written by experts at the OCAO. These are intended for use by cadres and illustrate the specific methodology, techniques, and philosophies surrounding *qiaowu* and its implementation. The content of these materials is significant because they highlight exactly how cadres are to deal with OC in accordance with the relevant policies—and therefore exposing the true nature of *qiaowu* at the frontline.

Chinese language secondary sources—such as journals, newspapers, newsletters and magazines, discussion and working papers (some scholarly and non-scholarly) also provided useful information. Some are published by *qiaowu* agencies, both at the national and provincial level. Those manuscripts

intended for open publication are first vetted by the CCP United Front (UF) Department (*Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhanbu* 中共中央统战部), which ensures that the audience receives ‘appropriately worded’ material—so that policies, personalities and the Party are ‘accurately’ portrayed; and that secret material is not revealed. Other sources, however, remain classified. For example, *Qiaoqing jianbao* (侨情简报) is a *neibu* electronic compilation of *qiaowu* news items, stories of interest (taken from newspapers both inside and outside China), policy updates, reports, and statistics intended for OC researchers and *qiaowu* cadres. While some of these items may reflect a pro-Beijing stance, they can be regarded as indicative of the materials used by *qiaowu* analysts in their policy formulation.

There were also large amounts of policy documents and communications taken from the open online sources of *qiaowu* organizations (both national and provincial, and from the PRC and ROC), PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and consular offices/embassies around the world. These sources outline the public information and policies surrounding *qiaowu*. In addition, the author refers to declassified US State Department telex communications from the early 1970s in order to gauge international reaction towards OC affairs during the Cold War period.

A large volume of media sources was also used. Most of these were mainstream publications and are widely accepted as independent and accurate. However, others are the mouthpieces of political movements (such as propaganda materials by pro-CCP, pro-KMT, and the Falungong (FLG or *falungong* 法轮功) movement)—written with intentions to incite fear or distaste for rivals, or to support their own agendas. The challenge of this study was to carefully sort through scattered and unsubstantiated evidence that might have led to invalid or inaccurate assessments. For example, the author accessed articles concerning the Olympic Torch rallies from web postings and blogs by participants. While these types of sources were not of a scholarly nature, they clearly demonstrate the methods that students utilized to mobilize themselves. They also reveal the strong emotions and feelings that PRC students experienced during this period, and their level of commitment to supporting China and its leaders.

Although some of these particular sources may have been unreliable for backing assertions about the *qiaowu* administration itself, they were used only in instances to demonstrate how rival regimes and organizations may have sought to engage with their OC targets. While some sources may appear to be jingoistic in nature, they have been carefully selected to demonstrate their different points of view concerning OC affairs and their particular intentions with reaching out to strategic groups of the OC diaspora. Overall, the context of

the evidence put forward reflects the same attitudes expressed in reliable primary sources issued by policy makers and commentators during each period in China's modern history.

1.8 Layout

To answer the research questions in the context of *qiaowu's* importance for facilitating China's economic, political, and great power-status aspirations, this book is divided into three sections. Each is described and compared in the context of Taiwan's own rival *qiaowu* effort, as well as how *qiaowu* has evolved as a result of modern migration and China's emerging role on the global stage.

The first section links historical, government, and policy documents and other empirical evidence with specific examples from OC history to show how and why China's *qiaowu* policies and methods have continually evolved since 1949—in particular between 1989–2008. It details the background and nature of *qiaowu*: Chapter Two begins with a broad overview of China's management of the OC since 1989. This sets the scene for Chapter Three, which details the specific nature and applications of *qiaowu*. This is followed by an analysis of the *qiaowu* bureaucratic structure in the historical context of OC policy since the late-nineteenth century until the contemporary period; Chapter Four investigates how the OC have been viewed by various governments of China, and the policies that have resulted over different periods as a result of these evolving definitions. The findings from these chapters conclusively demonstrate that the overall goal of Beijing's *qiaowu* policies have never really changed, but have been strategically adapted to the geo-political environment.

The second section analyzes the tools and methodology for implementing *qiaowu* policy, given the challenges of a diverse OC diaspora: Chapter Five explains how China has reconnected with the OC beyond its geographic borders by employing an articulate reconstruction of common identity, cultural traditions, and emotional connection through education; Chapter Six examines how China has influenced specific OC populations through youth work, media, and propaganda; Chapter Seven describes how the OC are managed and mobilized to contain, subvert, or eliminate threats to the CCP regime. This section shows how *qiaowu* cadres attempt to cope with diversity and view the OC diaspora on different lines—"thinking globally and acting locally".

The third section examines *qiaowu* in the context of China's foreign interests in a twenty-first century geo-political environment—both in terms of its national security and its international relations: Chapter Eight examines the role of consular protection and evacuation as an integral part of Beijing's

overall embrace of ethnic Chinese; Chapter Nine suggests a new model for *qiaowu* work developed from Beijing's own views on modern migration, and analyzes the resulting challenges for host countries. It also explains how *qiaowu* methods have evolved in response to transnational social mobility, and its role in China's aspirations to become a respected global citizen. From this evidence, it is clear that Beijing views the OC and their resources as a key means to advance China's national interests; moreover, it highlights the potential political and social implications behind Beijing's appeals to those OC participating in China's re-emergence.

Mobilizing the OC in the Twenty-First Century

This chapter explains the CCP's shift in attitudes and strategy towards the OC by highlighting two important periods of its relationship with them—namely the OC reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests and the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay rallies. Driven by a need to reclaim hearts and minds following the events of June 4, 1989, the Chinese authorities focused upon a strategy that engaged with the OC through ethnographic, cultural, and economic appeal. The CCP has continually developed these methods to incorporate patriotic and nationalistic sentiment, culminating in a set of programmes that stimulates support for the CCP regime itself.

By strengthening and managing relationships with a growing overseas population of students and new migrants from the PRC over three decades, the CCP has effectively recruited a friendly pro-Beijing force to facilitate China's rise throughout the world, to support its objectives, and to challenge any threats. The scope of such *qiaowu* efforts indicates the extent of the CCP's influence over the OC community, and also reveals a darker side to this relationship.

2.1 Capitalizing on the Olympic Spirit

The CCP recognized the Olympic movement as a potent source of national pride for the OC everywhere and sought to use it for drawing them together by the millions.¹ PRC officials described the successful bid for the 2008 Summer Games as the “joint efforts made by the OC throughout the world” and a “tremendous spiritual force pushing the Chinese people forward” for China's

* Extracts of this book were revised for inclusion in “Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart: Thought Management and the OC,” in *Thought Management: China's Modernized Propaganda Work*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Oxon: Routledge, 2012): 164–182.

1 Ya Ming 亚明, “Hongyang Aoyun jingshen huhuan shijie heping 弘扬奥运精神呼唤世界和平 [Enhance the Olympic Spirit, Call Out for World Peace],” *Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu*, no. 3 (2008), <http://qwgzzyj.gqb.gov.cn/aypd/142/1137.shtml> (accessed 7 June 2009); “Nimen de shengli, jiushi women de shengli, geng shi quanqiu huaren de shengli! 你们的胜利，就是我们的胜利，更是全球华人的胜利！ [Your Victory is Our Victory, Moreover is all the World's OC's Victory!],” *Fujian qiaobao*, 10 September 2004, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 20 September 2004, 1.

unity, prosperity, and rejuvenation.² Giving the OC an opportunity for joint input into its affairs and development through the Olympics was another way of getting them to identify with China—and they were extremely positive in their response. 330,000 OC from around the world gave more than 900 million yuan towards the effort. Beijing welcomed proposals for the construction of sports venues, with the ‘Watercube’ swimming complex representing the foremost symbol of the collective OC contribution.³ Tickets were allocated to OC communities around the world, including those from Taiwan. Furthermore, Beijing specifically extended invitations to OC of foreign citizenship to participate as volunteers in Beijing, under a special effort to recruit support from abroad.⁴ With such a feeling of ‘ownership’, many of those who identified themselves as ‘Chinese’ considered any negative comments or behaviour about the Olympics as a direct attack not only to China, but as a personal insult as well.

This surge of pro-China sentiment (both domestic and external) was evident in the months prior to August 2008. Fostering these emotions was a key means to strengthening CCP authority within China, where indignation, frustration, and anger resulted following foreign protests against the Olympic Torch relay, racist comments aired on Cable News Network (CNN), and a perception that riots in Tibet were being misreported by the Western media. Demonstrators alleged that the French retail chain Carrefour was supporting the Dalai Lama, and held large-scale protests near its various outlets, the French Embassy, and the Beijing French school. These rallies served to legitimize the CCP position on dissidents (such as cracking down on Muslim cells in Xinjiang and jailing human rights activist Hu Jia (胡佳) under the premise of national integrity) without raising criticism.

However, after a couple of days of heated protest, the government issued a front page editorial in the *People’s Daily* urging citizens to cherish patriotism but to express it in a “rational” way. It cited the need to maintain focus on economic development by converting “full-hearted patriotic zeal into

2 Zhao Xiangling (Auckland Consul General), “Celebrations on Beijing’s Successful Bid for Hosting the 2008 Olympic Games,” Consulate-General of the PRC in Auckland, 14 July 2001, www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwdt/t44155.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).

3 “Guojia youyong zhongxin ‘Shuilifang’ huo gangaotaiqiao juanzi jiangchao jiuyi 国家游泳中心‘水立方’获港澳台侨捐资将超九亿 [National Aquatic Centre ‘Watercube’ Captures Almost Over 900 Million Yuan from OC Donations],” *Xinjingbao*, 7 November 2007.

4 “Beijing aoyunhui xuyao huayi qingnian zhiyuanzhe 北京奥运会需要华裔青年志愿者 [Beijing Olympics Require Ethnic Chinese Youth Volunteers],” *Ouzhou shibao*, 1 September 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 20 September 2006, 1.

patriotic action.”⁵ Following this line, senior Chinese intellectuals also called on the public to “choose a rational way to express their love for the country.” They suggested that a better way to win understanding and support around the world was to introduce the positive side of the country and its people, to show its friendliness, and to “win those holding bias” against China.⁶ This reflected a similar government response to the Belgrade embassy bombing in 1999 and the Hainan spy-plane incident in 2001, which saw Beijing allow its citizens to briefly vent nationalistic feeling, but then moving quickly to curb it. While putting an end to any over-zealous outbursts was aimed to prevent a possible protest at the Chinese government itself, an additional purpose was to restore a peaceful international image of China (in light of the Dafur⁷ and Tibet issues), and therefore ensure its economic security in a globalized market environment.

The situation overseas, however, was quite different. Pro-Tibetan and FLG movements both presented themselves as potential threats and embarrassments to China’s efforts to successfully host the Olympics. Therefore, nationalism and patriotism amongst the OC were to be managed in terms of the CCP’s interests. Strategic groups of OC in major cities throughout the world soon mobilized to demonstrate their support for the Beijing Games, promote national unity, oppose Tibetan independence, and to protest against distorted Western reporting. The majority of these supporters were young and educated. They proudly wore red T-shirts or raised banners emblazoned with slogans such as “One China, One Family” or “One World, One Dream”, sang patriotic

5 Li Bin 李斌 and Liao Yi 廖翊, “Xinhua shiping: jiang aiguo reqing qingzhu dao fazhan xingdong Zhong qu 新华时评: 将爱国热情倾注到发展行动中去 [Xinhua Commentary: Pour Patriotic Zeal Into China’s Development],” *Xinhua*, 17 April 2008, <http://www.dongtai.gov.cn/dtxb/XWZX/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1940> (accessed 5 March 2012).

6 “Zhuanjia, wangmin tan dizhi Jialefu: yi lixing taidu biaoda aiguo qinggan 专家,网民谈抵制家乐福: 以理性态度表达爱国情感 [Experts and Netizens On the Boycott of Carrefour: Reasons for Attitudes that Express Patriotic Feeling],” *Xinhua*, 17 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-04/17/content_7998084.htm (accessed 5 March 2012); “Experts Say Patriotism Understandable, but Urge People to be Rational,” *Xinhua*, 19 April 2008.

7 Beijing was criticized for its involvement in Dafur and refusing to put pressure on the Sudan government to end the humanitarian crisis. See Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvring on the Question of Dafur,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, no. 54 (February 2008): 71–84; Jane Macartney, “China Lashes Out Against Dafur Critics in Olympic Row,” *Times Online*, 14 February 2008, www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3367440.ece (accessed 30 September 2009).

songs, and chanted “Go Beijing!”⁸ How was this apparent level of widespread support for Beijing generated and sustained amongst the OC? The answer lies in the CCP’s continuous efforts to guide and manage their perceptions and behaviours—a set of techniques collectively described as *qiaowu*.

2.2 The 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests

To understand the attitude towards Beijing amongst strategic populations of the OC during 2008, one has to look back in history to 1989. The Tiananmen Square Massacre had sent shockwaves throughout the OC diaspora. Vehement protests against the CCP erupted all across the globe. Most (if not all) of these demonstrations were led and dominated by OC groups. Beijing saw an urgent need to win back their confidence and loyalty, and immediately went into damage control. Provincial governments mobilized those with family and business connections overseas to make contact with their OC counterparts and explain the incident. In addition, the CCP dispatched delegations worldwide to visit OC communities, whereby diplomats attempted to “preserve the harmony” (*baohé* 保和) by presenting their ‘official’ version of events. Cadres supplemented these activities by distributing specially-produced propaganda materials.⁹ The purpose of these measures was not only to strengthen relations, but also to continue the flow of OC investment in the face of trade sanctions from the West. After 1989, the CCP would base its legitimacy on maintaining economic growth; more importantly, it would return to a renewed emphasis on the propaganda and thought work methods it had used between the late 1920s to the late 1970s.¹⁰

One group deserved special attention. State-sponsored PRC students in overseas universities were supposed to be the agents of change for China in

8 “OC Rally in Support of Beijing Olympics, Against Western Media’s Biased Coverage,” *Xinhua*, 21 April 2008, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6395679.html> (accessed 30 September 2009).

9 Chen Xitong, *Report and Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion* (Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1989); Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 163.

10 Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, “Address to Officers at the Rank of General and Above in Command of the Troops Enforcing Martial Law in Beijing,” *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* 邓小平文选 [Deng Xiaoping Selected Works], Vol. 3, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp> (accessed 30 September 2009) as noted by Anne-Marie Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” *China Quarterly*, 197 (March 2009): 3.

the context of its scientific and technological modernization.¹¹ However, in the wake of Tiananmen, they became a liability for Beijing. As a result of the *Emergency Immigration Relief Act of 1989 for Chinese Nationals following the June 4th Incident*, Washington accorded PRC students in the US special immigration conditions¹²—precipitating the potential problem of thousands of China’s elite graduates choosing to remain abroad and not return to participate in China’s development, or worse yet, engage in anti-CCP activities. Of the 50,000 PRC students living overseas at that time, 80 percent were in North America, and 10 percent were actively anti-CCP. As a key target group for China’s national interests, these students were the focus of a “fierce political struggle over human talents.”¹³

Thus began a new phase in OC relations, whereby PRC students became the targets of aggressive methods comprising of group management, extra-territorial influence, counter-infiltration, and counter-subversion. For example, the PRC consul in Vancouver had identified student leaders and demanded that they stop their pro-democracy demonstrations. When they arrived to collect their scholarship cheques, he showed them the ‘official videotape’ of the crackdown and indirectly threatened their relatives by reminding them of their contractual obligations.¹⁴ In March 1990, the PRC State Education Commission convened a meeting of education counsellors in Chinese embassies and consulates, instructing diplomats to expand their influence over student organizations by strengthening CCP ideology amongst them, winning their support, and isolating or eliminating reactionary factions. In December 1990, senior foreign propaganda official Zhu Muzhi (朱穆之) suggested rectifying any negative feelings of PRC students by encouraging the most patriotic

11 Cheng Xi, “Non-Remaining and Non-Returning: The Mainland Chinese Students in Japan and Europe since the 1970s,” and Li Minghuan, “A Group in Transition: Chinese Students and Scholars in the Netherlands,” in *Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia*, eds. Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002), 158–172, 173–188.

12 Canada, Australia and New Zealand (NZ) passed similar legislation allowing students to remain as refugees, and later as permanent residents.

13 Appendix I “Summary of the Meeting of Educational Counselors (Consuls) in Chinese Embassies and Consulates” and II “Directive on Policy Toward Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States and Canada, March 1990” in Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 117–139.

14 Franka Cordua-von Specht, “Chinese Students Fear Spies,” *Ubysssey* 8, no. 1 (5 July 1989) http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/pdfs/ubyssey/UBYSSEY_1989_07_05.pdf, (accessed 30 September 2009).

ones to return to China, while strengthening the patriotism of those choosing to stay abroad.¹⁵

To facilitate this, a 1992 order by the State Council Administrative Bureau provided amnesty to those who engaged in acts against the PRC or its interests upon returning to China.¹⁶ The remainder staying abroad would be categorized dependent on their loyalty to Beijing; each group was to be addressed with specific measures. Relationships with pro-CCP students would be maintained and strengthened; to win over those less patriotic, propaganda methods would be used; and finally, any elements deemed a danger to PRC national interests would be exposed and attacked. This would ensure that PRC students would remain a controllable asset for the CCP.¹⁷

2.3 The CCP's Ideological Work and Influence on PRC Students

Domestically, Beijing stepped up its recruitment and ideological work on China-based college students after 1989.¹⁸ The CCP placed importance on boosting the level of domestic nationalism amongst China's youth by initiating a campaign for national unity. In 1994, the CCP Propaganda Department (*zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu* 中共中央宣传部) continued this effort by strengthening patriotic ideas and spirit.¹⁹ Three concepts arose from this: a traditionalist discourse emphasizing Confucian and Chinese culture in order to maintain political order; a neo-conservative (*xinbaoshou zhuyi* 新保守主义) discourse that promoted gradual societal reform over revolutionary means in

15 Zhu Muzhi 朱穆之, "Jiaqiang dui liuxue ren yuan de xuanchuan gongzuo 加强对留学人员的宣传工作 [Strengthen Propaganda Work Towards Foreign Students]," 15 December 1990 in Zhu Muzhi, *Zhu Muzhi lun duiwai xuanchuan* 朱穆之论对外宣传 [Zhu Muzhi Discusses Foreign Propaganda] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1995), 292–293.

16 Order no. 44, as noted by Qian Ning 钱宁, *Liuxue Meiguo* 留学美国 [Studying in America], (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1996): 285.

17 Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, 117–139.

18 Gang Guo, "Party Recruitment of College Students in China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 43 (May 2005): 371–393. For a KMT analysis of political thought-work on students in the late 1980s, see Wu Tsai-kuang, *A Study of Communist China's Intensification of 'Political Thought-work' Among University Students* (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, 1987).

19 Zhao Shuisheng, "A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302.

order to consolidate power; and a populist “Say No” attitude that reflected a growing frustration towards the West.²⁰

Externally, maintaining influence over them after their move abroad continued to be an important part of *qiaowu* work. In a 1992 State Council ruling, diplomats were to support students abroad and attempt to raise their patriotism for China.²¹ One of these efforts included ‘guiding’ PRC students abroad through consultation and assistance. PRC embassies and consulates provided funding, planning, finance, and management for various pro-Beijing groups.

Although students initially formed their own organizations, since 1989 PRC embassies (through Ministry of Education (MOE) attachés) have been instrumental in establishing branches of the Chinese Student and Scholar Association (CSSA or *Zhongguo xuesheng xuezhe lianyihui* 中国学生学者联谊会) on various university campuses around the world as a means of coordinating various student groups under one umbrella.²² Furthermore, the PRC embassy support and guide their activities together with other pro-Beijing organizations and business groups for increased influence and exchange of information.²³ For example, at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2008, the local chapter protested against an impending visit by the Dalai Lama and

20 Chen Zhimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 35–53; Jia Qingguo, “Disrespect and Distrust: The External Origins of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 11–21.

21 “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zaiwai liuxue renyuan youguan wenti de guiding 国务院办公厅关于在外留学人员有关问题的规定 [State Council Office’s Rules about Problems Concerning Foreign Students],” in *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu—falutiaoli zhengce juan* 华侨华人百科全书—法律条例政策卷 [Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas: Volume of Laws, Regulations and Policies] ed. Jiang Shujuan (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2000), 151.

22 CSSA homepage, <http://umdcssa.org/> (accessed 30 September 2009).

23 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao 赴新西兰调研后的新思考 [New Thoughts Following Research in NZ],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 11 (1 March 2004): 8; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Beimei qiaoqing xin bianhua 北美侨情新变化 [New Changes in North American OC Affairs],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 56 (20 December 2003): 8; Wu Zhiling 吴智玲, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de ‘luse tongdao’ 加大力度 铺设引进海外人才的‘绿色通道’ [Increase Strength for Laying the ‘Green Passage’ in Attracting Overseas Talent],” OCAO, 6 March, 2003, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2003/0306/1/321.shtml (accessed 5 March 2012); Pal Nyiri, *New Chinese Migrants in Europe: The Case of the Chinese Community in Hungary* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999), 111–115.

pressured campus officials to prevent him from speaking on political issues.²⁴ Alternatively, the CSSA works to boost positive sentiments for China-related issues, such as fundraising for humanitarian concerns or helping natural disaster recovery efforts.

Much of this effort involves building personal relationships with leading student figures. Activities include hosting meetings and dinners, or sending embassy representatives to attend functions. Diplomats use these opportunities to express their concern and care for students while stoking patriotism and enthusiasm for the homeland.²⁵ They remind students how they could strengthen this relationship in combination with diligent study in order to make their parents' hopes and dreams a reality—and therefore make the Chinese nation proud of their success.²⁶ As a result, many of them feel a responsibility to do well in representing their country. They are ready and willing to act when called upon, or when mobilized with incentives or inducements.²⁷ They are eager to enhance their political connections for access to benefits, resources, prestige, and status provided by the embassy. Some openly demonstrate their willingness to seek and accept 'guidance' from PRC diplomats, and show their support for the CCP regime by organizing and supporting marches, protests, and demonstrations.²⁸

Since the 1990s, the PRC authorities have played a leading role in orchestrating various pro-Beijing events outside of China by using a systematic process of micro-management of the OC.²⁹ Embassy attachés (such as those from the

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- 24 Larry Tung, "With Rallies and Protests, Many OC Back the Olympics," *Gotham Gazette*, 12 May 2008, www.gothamgazette.com/article/immigrants/20080512/11/2520 (accessed 30 September 2009).
- 25 "Aozhou guoli daxue juban 'qingqian aoyun xinxi Zhongguo 澳洲国立大学举办情牵奥运心系中国 [Australia National University Organizes 'Love Leads the Olympics, Hearts Tied to China]," Eduwo.com, 31 August 2007, www.eduwo.com/eduwo/news/10/hotnews/ProviderNews/files/1719.shtml (accessed 30 April 2008).
- 26 Embassy of the PRC, "Liuxuesheng qieji: jiazhangmen wei ni qianchang guadu! 留学生切忌:家长们为你牵肠挂肚 [Foreign Students Remember: Parents Are Concerned About You!]," *NZ Messenger*, 17 November 2004.
- 27 Phil Mercer, "Chinese Diaspora: Australia," BBC, 3 March 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4311063.stm> (accessed 30 September 2009).
- 28 "Haiwai huaqiao huaren gonghua fazhan daji 海外华侨华人共话发展大计 [Cooperative Development Strategy for the OC]," CCTV, June 22 2001, www.cctv.com/overseas/chinareport/200106/22.html (accessed 3 November 2009); Pal Nyiri, *Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia: A Middleman Minority in a Transnational Era* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 106–107, 118; Nyiri, "The New Migrant," 141–176.
- 29 Pal Nyiri, "From Class Enemies to Patriots: OC and Emigration Policy and Discourse in the PRC," in *Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia*, eds. Pal Nyiri and Igor

MOE, MFA and Ministry of State Security (MSS)) work with *qiaowu* agencies to ensure a perfect and trouble free welcome by dictating precise details (such as the preparation, specifications, and wording of large banners, or in some cases requesting special songs and cultural performances).³⁰ Likewise, the logistical arrangements for dinners and other social functions follow specific protocols set down by the visiting delegations. Consequently, pro-Beijing groups always give high-level PRC officials a warm reception.

In many cases, such mobilization is not only designed to please the visitors, but to completely overwhelm any expected opposition. For example, in anticipation of noisy demonstrators during Hu Jintao's (胡锦涛) visit to London in October 2005, Chinese officials wearing red armbands directed hundreds of PRC students drafted in from across Britain to challenge anti-China protestors.³¹

2.4 The 2008 Olympic Torch Rallies

The CCP's involvement in the 2008 Olympic Torch relay was no different. With a high level of domestic support stemming from years of patriotic education, the chair of the Beijing Olympics News Propaganda Work Coordinating Group, Li Dongsheng (李东生), asserted that there was "basically no chance" of the regime ever losing power because of a mass-led democratic transition.³² These same pro-China feelings have been successfully exported, transplanted, and entrenched into new *xinqiao* (新侨) migrants and PRC students abroad (see Chapter Four) through the OC media, the Internet, and the wider *qiaowu* framework.

In April 2008, CCP officials labelled Australia and Japan as "relatively dangerous" destinations for the relay due to the anticipated presence of pro-Tibetan independence and FLG protestors. Internet postings warned that the "weak" number of OC in Canberra would surely be outnumbered by crowds of opponents. The OC in these areas were described as "the last sentry" and organized to prevent a repeat of the embarrassment in London and Paris days earlier.³³

Saveliev (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002), 219–219; Penny Edwards, "Time Travels: Locating *xinyimin* in Sino-Cambodian Histories," *ibid.*, 254–289.

30 "Hu Winds Up US Visit Amid Protests," *Stuff*, 22 April 2006, www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3645313a12,00.html (accessed 27 April 2006).

31 "Cheers and Jeers Greet Chinese President," *Press*, 10 November 2005.

32 Brady, "Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction," 16, 23.

33 Paul Walker and David Batty, "Olympic Torch Relay Cut Short Amidst Paris Protests," *Guardian*, 7 April 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/07/france.olympic.games2008> (accessed 30 September 2009).

To ensure that PRC students would swamp out their rivals (those groups had been consistently labelled as a ‘minority’ by the state media), thousands of supporters were recruited on short notice to ostensibly “support the Beijing Olympics, propagate Olympic spirit, and promote Sino-foreign friendship.”³⁴

A patriotic call to rally descendants of the Yellow Emperor, no matter what their nationality or origins, was launched.³⁵ Chinese language websites used the Olympic spirit to unite all OC both nationalistically and ethnically, and to stand up and be heard as part of mainstream society.³⁶ This effort showed that it was Beijing’s intention to gather as many voluntary supporters as possible, rather than attempt an indoctrination of the masses.

There were also many incentives offered in order to attract the numbers required. Some from the San Francisco rally were reportedly paid,³⁷ while other pro-Beijing student groups were ferried to rallies on chartered buses and provided accommodation—all courtesy of the PRC.³⁸ CSSA leader Zhang Rongan confirmed the consulate had offered such facilities for the Canberra rally.³⁹ In Japan, rally organizers charged participants a 2000 yen flat fee, while the PRC embassy in Tokyo advised the local police to look after the safety and

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- 34 “Zai Ri huaren liuxuesheng aoyun shenghuo shengyuan huodong lakai weimu 在日华人留学生奥运圣火声援活动拉开帷幕 [In Japan, Chinese Foreign Students’ Support of Olympic Flame Lift Open Curtain],” boxun.com, 17 April 2008, <http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/intl/2008/04/200804170715.shtml> (accessed 5 March 2012).
- 35 Liu Jun 刘俊, “Aodaliya huaren shouhao shenghuo ‘zuihou yiban gang’ 澳大利亚华人守好圣火‘最后一班岗’ [Australian Chinese Guarding the Olympic Flame the ‘Last Sentry’],” *Guoji xianqu daobao*, 25 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2008-04/25/content_8046086.htm (accessed 5 March 2012).
- 36 Zhang Yingqin 张应钦, “Huang yiyuan, Huolushi, Wang Xiansheng: qing chuxi 4.27 jihui! 黄议员、霍律师、王先生：请出席4.27集会！ [Member of Parliament Wong, Lawyer Huo, Mr Wang: Please Attend the April 27 Rally!],” n.d., www.nzchinese.net.nz/news.asp?p=561933 (accessed 5 March 2012).
- 37 “Fed: Evidence Emerges of Well-Organized Chinese Campaign,” *AAP General News Wire*, Document no. 1467531751, 24 April 2008.
- 38 Jesse McKinley, “Olympic Torch Route Changed in San Francisco,” *New York Times*, 10 April 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/us/10torch.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq=torch+protest&st=nyt&oref=slogin (accessed 30 April 2008).
- 39 John Garnaut, “Students Plan Mass Torch ‘Defense,’” *Age*, 16 April 2008, www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/04/15/1208025189581.html (accessed 30 April 2008); Sydney Eat Drink Fun Club 悉尼吃喝玩乐俱乐部, “Mianfei daba Kanpeila Beijing aoyun shenghuo chuandi zi lu 免费大巴堪培拉北京奥运圣火传递之旅 [Free Coach for Canberra Beijing Olympic Torch Relay Trip],” 7 April 2008, Ozchinese.com, www.ozchinese.com/bbs/archiver/tid-150584.html (accessed 5 March 2012).

security of the 70 busloads of students travelling to Nagano.⁴⁰ Protest paraphernalia from China (such as thousands of Chinese flags and red T-shirts) was sent to organizers in the form of ‘donations’.⁴¹ Other gifts for participants included Olympic souvenir items and certificates.⁴² Local OC businesses seeking a closer relationship to Beijing provided or subsidized some of these items.

To ensure that the demonstrations proceeded smoothly, students were warned of the repercussions for anyone attempting to spark anti-China disturbances.⁴³ This level of control reflects previously-noted CCP practices whereby participants had signed declarations acknowledging that they would be fined if they caused any unapproved behaviour, would inform officials if contacted by anti-Beijing groups, and would waive all rights to protest with any other groups.⁴⁴ Such strict measures demonstrate the level of paranoia surrounding high profile China-related events, and highlight the obsessive lengths that the CCP will go in order to ensure a triumphant result.

Reports concerning this mobilization effort soon surfaced in the international media. Accusations of the PRC employing ‘rent-a-crowds’ to denounce pro-Tibetan protestors could not be allowed to persist. Beijing was obliged to make a public ‘about face’ on openly supporting the OC. Consequently, *Xinhua* reports emphasized that students had mobilized themselves and established

40 “Zai Ri huaren liuxuesheng aoyun shenghuo shengyuan huodong lakai weimu.”

41 An attempt to send 2000 flags and 3500 T-shirts failed when Japanese Customs intercepted and held the consignment until after the protests ended. See Liu, “Aodaliya huaren shouhao shenghuo ‘zuihou yiban gang.’”

42 Organizers also listed bank accounts and direct credit details to encourage donations. Hai Dao 海盗, “Gedi liuxuesheng huwei aoyun shenghuo: women de xin yu zuguo xiangyi 各地留学生护卫奥运圣火: 我们的心与祖国相依 [Foreign Students Everywhere Protect the Olympic Flame: Our Hearts and the Motherland are Interdependant],” sohu.com, 24 April 2008, <http://2008.sohu.com/20080424/n256483814.shtml> (accessed 5 March 2012); “Zai Ri huaren liuxuesheng aoyun shenghuo shengyuan huodong lakai weimu”; NZ Chinese Students in Support of Beijing Olympics 新西兰华人华侨留学生支持北京奥运集会, “4.27 jihui xuzhi! Qing wubi zixi yuedu! Yange zunshou! 4.27 集会需知! 请务必仔细阅读! 严格遵守! [Important Notice for April 27 Rally! Please Be Sure to Read Carefully! Observe Strictly!],” baidu.com, 22 April 2008, <http://hi.baidu.com/%CD%B5%B5%C3%B0%EB%C8%D5%CF%D0/blog/item/a27910bf2da8a40f19d81f34.html> (accessed 5 March 2012).

43 Lin Li 林立, “Yun huojun weidao Aozhou, huaren shetuan yishi xiaoyan miman 运火炬未到澳洲, 华人社团已是硝烟弥漫 [Before the Torch Reaches Australia, Smoke of OC Group Gunpowder Already Fills the Air],” boxun.com, reposted on sina.com, 15 April 2008, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5123530701008ru6.html (accessed 5 March 2012).

44 Ann Lee, “How the Chinese Government Came to Dominate Chinese Language Media in the United States,” *Chinascopie* (June 2005): 16.

the rallies at their own will.⁴⁵ Likewise, PRC officials either denied any involvement or deflected questions surrounding the embassies' provocation of OC nationalism or offering of support to protestors.⁴⁶ Furthermore, student groups were instructed to deny any links between the rallies and the embassy. They removed previous Internet postings, and Zhang Rongan retracted his earlier statement, instead claiming that students paid for all expenses themselves.⁴⁷

Despite this cover-up, relations between the embassy and consulates and PRC student groups continued. After the London relay, representatives of the United Kingdom chapter of the CSSA were among guests invited to an official function at the PRC embassy.⁴⁸ After the Canberra demonstrations, an embassy statement thanked mainland students for successfully supporting the Olympic spirit and maintaining China/Australian relations—it singled out their “exceptional management and organization efforts” as a point of high praise.⁴⁹

2.5 Another Evolution in Qiaowu

In the weeks following, Beijing was well aware of the negative fallout surrounding these noisy and heated protests. If such elements were to strengthen and proliferate amongst the OC, their efforts could easily backfire in the face

45 “Aodaliya Zhongguo liuxuesheng qidai aoyun huoju chuandi huodong 澳大利亚中国留学生期待奥运火炬传递活动 [Australian Chinese Foreign Students Look Forward to Olympic Torch Relay],” *Xinhuanet*, 22 April 2008, <http://2008.qq.com/a/20080422/000420.htm> (accessed 5 March 2012).

46 Shen Jun 沈珺, “Aodaliya bufen meiti feinan huaren canyu aoyun huoju chuandi 澳大利亚部分媒体非难华人参与奥运火炬传递 [Some Australian Media’s Reproach of Chinese Participation in Olympic Torch Relay],” *Xinhua*, 25 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2008-04/25/content_8049791.htm (accessed 5 March 2012); “NZ Students ‘Enticed by Free Food and Travel,’” *Stuff*, 26 April 2008, www.stuff.co.nz/print/4497123a10.html (accessed 30 April 2008).

47 “Chinese Students Say Huge Crowds Made for Successful Relay,” *Xinhua*, 24 April 2008, www.chinadaily.com.cn/.../24/content_6642166.htm (accessed 30 April 2008).

48 “Zhongguo zhu Ying shiguan juxing qing aoyun huoju chuandi zhaodaihui 中国驻英使馆举行庆奥运火炬传递招待会 [PRC Embassy in England Hosts Olympic Torch Relay Ceremony],” *Yingzhong shibao*, 24 April 2008, www.ukchinese.com/www/18/2008-04/590.html (accessed 5 March 2012).

49 Zhang Junsai 章均赛, “Zhi zaiAo huaren huaqiao he liuxueheng pengyou de yifeng xin 致在澳华人华侨和留学生朋友的一封信 [A Letter to Australian Chinese, OC, Foreign Students and Friends],” PRC Embassy in Australia, 24 April 2008, <http://au.china-embassy.org/chn/sgfyrrth/dangan/t428847.htm> (accessed 5 March 2012).

of public opinion.⁵⁰ For example, during the 2009 Melbourne Film Festival, efforts to prevent the screening of the pro-Uyghur documentary *The Ten Conditions of Love* also ended in violence between rival OC groups. Such high profile outbursts pointed toward a more mature development in managing patriotic zeal amongst PRC students abroad. CSSA leaders realized that the more they protested, the more attention their opponents would enjoy. Therefore, their new stance was to remain collectively inactive, and instead move toward more dialogue and communication as the primary tool for promoting the 'real' China. This strategy achieved a positive response in France, where the French National Assembly invited PRC students to present reports and their views on Sino-Franco relations. State media described this as a powerful method to "influence the influential opinion leaders."⁵¹

Efforts to promote a less aggressive image, yet tempered with the same level of crowd management techniques, were also evident during Vice Premier Li Keqiang's (李克强) visit to Christchurch, NZ, in November 2009. Visiting parties of PRC officials tend to attract high-profile disruptions from protest groups. So in that instance, the PRC embassy had secretly and selectively notified leaders of key pro-Beijing groups to form a welcome party outside the hotel where the vice premier and his entourage would be staying.⁵² The invitation attracted about 200 OC, who turned up in force with large red banners. However, FLG practitioners also caught wind of the visit and staged their own silent protest right next to the welcome party. Fearing a potential scuffle between the rival groups, the leader of the local branch of the Peaceful Reunification of China Association (PRCA or *Zhonghua heping tongyi cujinhui* 中华和平统一促进会) used a loudhailer to keep excited participants in line, while colleagues circulated amongst any rowdy PRC supporters, quietly reminding them not to engage in any boisterous activity.

50 Geremie Barme, "Torching the Relay," China Beat, 5 April 2008, <http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/search/label/2008%20Tibet> (accessed 30 April 2008).

51 Qi Fei, "The Patriotic Road for Students Abroad: From Protest to Dialog," *Xinhua International Herald*, 15 August 2009, <http://justrecently.wordpress.com/2009/08/15/the-patriotic-road-for-students-abroad-from-protest-to-dialog/> (accessed 30 April 2008).

52 A secret welcome would ensure a much more hospitable result following a previous visit to the city by Jiang Zemin (江泽民) in 1999, which required a full-scale police blockade to shield the president from chanting crowds demanding more human rights in Tibet.

2.6 Conclusion

As a crisis point for the CCP, the global reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests served as the catalyst for reviewing and revising the methods for managing the OC diaspora for China's interests. Through *qiaowu*, the CCP has increased its efforts and resources to consolidate the OC diaspora (particularly the new migrant and student groups) through directly and indirectly guiding their activities in the context of its own political discourse.

Qiaowu demonstrates Beijing's ability to mobilize tens of thousands of OC for its interests—a dramatic and significant breakthrough for the CCP since 1989. The Olympic Torch rallies and subsequent protests highlight the existence of the CCP's continuously evolving strategy to deal with the OC—the heart of which seeks to manage, and ultimately control, their perceptions and behaviour. The CCP remains wary of anti-China elements that threaten to damage or embarrass it. By keeping a tight control over OC activities, the CCP has attempted to prevent anything that might question or challenge its leadership. The last twenty years has seen an increase in the level of sophistication and scope of activity—attuned to modern demographics, migration patterns, and new levels of Chinese nationalism. To maintain control, the CCP has taken a structured and systematic approach to regulate the behaviour of participants so that they reflect their desired image of China and the Chinese overseas.

Unveiling *Qiaowu*

Having illustrated some of the successes of *qiaowu* in mobilizing strategic groups of the OC during the 2008 Olympic Torch rallies, the following chapters examine the reasons, techniques, and philosophies underscoring China's relationship with the OC diaspora in a historical, contemporary, and future context. The CCP, in classic totalitarian fashion,¹ attempts to impose a wide extension of social order upon the OC both inside and outside of China, involving the absorption or destruction of social groups that obstruct its complete control. *Qiaowu* methodology (in particular the micro-management techniques of controlling various aspects of OC behaviour) demonstrate the CCP's desire for manipulation and influence over its targets, as well as its obsession to eliminate any potential threats amongst them. This chapter explains why *qiaowu* is a necessary component of China's international relations, and how it has evolved according to its geo-political and economic situation.

3.1 The Role of the OC for the CCP-Led Party-State

While their stereotypical image is often characterized as introverted and passive, the OC have always been useful “envoys of communication” for implementing China's international strategy.² Throughout history, the OC have been a significant source of support for various governments of China by serving to extend its foreign policy abroad and by being politically active for Chinese interests through boycotts, protests, sabotage, and direct political intervention.³ The social movements that shaped China in the modern historical period (such as the Ming loyalist movement, the Fujian Incident in the 1930s,⁴ and Sun Yat-sen's (*Sun Yixian* 孙逸仙 or *Sun Zhongshan* 孙中山) Republican

1 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: 1956).

2 Gordon C. K. Cheung, “Involuntary Migrants, Political Revolutionaries and Economic Energisers: A History of the Image of OC in Southeast Asia,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 64.

3 Robert S. Elegant, *The Dragon's Seed: Beijing and the OC* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1959), 9, 17.

4 William F. Dorill, “The Fukien Rebellion and the CCP: A Case of Maoist Revisionism,” *China Quarterly*, no. 37 (January–March 1969): 31–53.

movement)⁵ all found their roots and strength from beyond its geographical borders. Those OC facing discrimination and exclusion in their adopted countries were also active in building a strong China. They believed that in doing so, it would lead to better treatment for themselves and their motherland.

For the CCP, the OC played a significant role in its early years of development. Firstly, the CCP was forged from various OC communities based all over the world. These included groups of seafarers, migrants, students, and workers in France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the US who widely identified with political causes for internationalism.⁶ The OC have since been a source of support for protecting and maintaining the CCP's dominance within the Chinese state system. Although the OC were viewed with suspicion during the Mao years, their financial and political relationship with China was always valued. The CCP viewed the contribution of the OC towards the development of the PRC as necessary and coopted them into the Chinese political system, albeit sometimes in an ambiguous, symbolic, or indirect manner as returned OC (*guiqiao* 归侨). The CCP is fully aware of their role as part of China's development strategy and foreign policy, and has continuously raised *qiaowu* to the highest levels of national importance.⁷

To promote better integration of the OC and their affairs with government concerns, at the 1954 National Peoples' Congress (NPC) *qiaowu* official He Xiangning (何香凝) acknowledged that all agencies should play a coordinated role.⁸ These views continue into the contemporary period, whereby top CCP leaders emphasize the common responsibility of government (and hence the Party) to take advantage of OC resources.⁹ For example, in 2001, Vice Premier

5 Wang Jingzhi 王京治, ed. *Qiaowu zhishi shouce* 侨务知识手册 [Handbook of OC Affairs Knowledge], (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1989), 49.

6 Gregor Benton, *Chinese Migrants and Internationalism: Forgotten Histories, 1917–1945* (Oxon, London: Routledge, 2007), 118–120; Josephine Fowler, *Japanese and Chinese Immigrant Activists: Organizing in American and International Communist Movements, 1919–1933* (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2007).

7 Christiansen, *Chinatown, Europe*, 10–11, 138–139; Cheng, “The ‘Distinctiveness’ of the OC,” 53–59; Zhuang Guotu, “The Factor of Chinese Ethnicity in China-ASEAN Relations as Mirrored in Investments from Southeast Asia in Fujian,” (paper presented at the China and Southeast Asia symposium, Xiamen University, 24–25 September 2004).

8 “Qiaowu gongzuo ‘shehuihua’ de zhiyi 侨务工作‘社会化’的质疑 [Query into OC Work and Socialization],” in Wang Tang 王棠 ed. *Qiaowu chunqiu* 侨务春秋 [Spring and Autumn of OC Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongguo guojiguangbo chubanshe, 1997), 73–74.

9 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance 专家咨询委员会为侨务工作献计献策 [Specialist Advisory Committee Offer Suggestions for OC Work],” *Qiaoping*, no. 8 (15 March 2005): 9–10.

Qian Qichen (钱其琛) called for progress in “bringing into full play the advantages of OC under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee with President Jiang Zemin as the core.”¹⁰ In 2005, Hu Jintao looked to the tens of millions of ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living abroad who were “talented, have sound economic power, and a special affiliation with China” and “uniting these people to contribute to the building of a moderately affluent society, curbing the Taiwan independence attempts and enhancing friendly exchanges.”¹¹ Similarly, at the Eighth National Congress on Returned OC in 2009, politburo member Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国) urged his audience to unite closely with the CCP in advancing China’s national interests under the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng Xiaoping thought, and Jiang’s “Three Represents”; they were also told to “struggle with one mind” and revitalize the Chinese nation.¹²

In short, the OC can assist China by creating a friendly environment in which Beijing can pursue its international interests, moderate anti-CCP activity, and promote pro-CCP goals around the world. Hence, *qiaowu* is not only a ministerial and provincial level matter, but one for the wider state and party level to address.¹³

3.2 Political Mobilization

The OC take a special place in the political, economic, and great nation aspirations of the PRC.¹⁴ Although they account for only about 2.5 percent of China’s own total population, the OC remain indispensable to its national interests. As such, *qiaowu* analysts describe them as a “vital treasure trove of

10 “Forum on Deng Xiaoping’s Views About OC Affairs Held,” *People’s Daily*, 7 January 2001, http://english.people.com.cn/200101/07/eng20010107_59770.html (accessed 30 September 2009).

11 “President Stresses Unity of Chinese People,” *Xinhuanet*, 1 March 2005, www.in.china-embassy.org/eng/zgbd/t185181.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).

12 “Senior Official Speaks at Congress of Returned OC,” *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 17 July 2009, reprinted in *Xinhua*, 14 July 2009.

13 Wu Ruicheng 吴锐成, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing 侨务工作具战略性前瞻性 [Strategic and Forward Looking Nature of OC Work Tools],” *OCAO*, 15 February 2007, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0215/1/3993.shtml (accessed 5 March 2012).

14 Cheng Xi 程希, “Liuxuesheng de zhiliu yu Zhongguo zhengfu de duice 留学生的滞留与中国政府的对策 [PRC Students Remaining Abroad and the PRC Government Response],” *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, no. 2 (1999): 63–76.

human resources.”¹⁵ This is because the OC are part of China’s comprehensive national power and are intimately related to its development and to the international environment.¹⁶ They feature strongly in three of China’s grand strategic goals: as a diplomatic vanguard for promoting China’s integration with the world (*tuishou* 推手), as a lobby group opposing Taiwanese independence, and as soft power promoters of Chinese pride, culture, and confidence.¹⁷ In other words, the OC are characterized as having a purpose for bringing about political, economic, and societal change around the world.¹⁸

In terms of China’s international relations, the OC are “a unique advantage” that can be used as a bridge for promoting mutual understanding.¹⁹ They serve to improve foreign perspectives of things Chinese as their social status and community clout improves.²⁰ For example, the OC act as economic, cultural, and political intermediaries with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members to strengthen China’s regional relationships.²¹ In these contexts, the OC are complimentary to China’s other platforms for international relations²² (such as hard power, aid, and financial assistance) and hence

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- 15 Wu Zhiling 吴智玲, “Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo 做好新时期侨务工作 [Succeeding with New Age OC Work],” OCAO, 12 February 2003, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2003/0212/1/311.shtml (accessed 6 March 2012).
- 16 All-China Women’s Federation, “Director Chen Yujie: Love for OC Affairs,” 27 June 2006, www.womenofchina.cn/people/politicians/5507.jsp (accessed 21 August 2006).
- 17 “Hu Jintao shou ti qiaowu ‘sange dayou zuowei’ 胡锦涛首提侨务‘三个大有作为’ [President Hu Jintao Mentions Three Grand Goals of OC Work],” *Qiaoping jianbao*, 25 December 2005, 1.
- 18 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun* 侨务工作概论 [Outline of OC Work], (Beijing: Guowuyuan qiaoban qiaowu ganbu xuexiao, October 1993), 2–7.
- 19 Embassy of the PRC in the USA, “OC Key Force in Nation’s Revival,” 21 July 2004, www.china-embassy.org/eng/qwgz/t143663.htm (accessed 30 September 2009); *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 33; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan ‘du’ cutong jianyan xiance 海外华侨华人踊跃为反‘独’促统建言献策 [OC Enthusiastically Oppose Independence, Promote Unification, Offer Advice],” *Qiaoping*, no. 17 (2 June 2005): 4–5.
- 20 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 2–7.
- 21 Deng Shichao 邓仕超, “Zhongguo-dongmeng ziyou maoyi qu dui dongnanya huaren zhengzhi de yingxiang shixi 中国-东盟自由贸易区对东南亚华人政治的影响试析 [Preliminary Analysis of the Impact of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area on the OC in Southeast Asia],” *Dongnanya yanjiu*, no. 3 (2003): 64–68 as noted by Christopher Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for Southeast Asia,” *Pacific Review* 18, no. 1 (2005): 119–135.
- 22 *Qiaolian* official, interview by author, Beijing, 9 November 2007.

cannot be separated from the broader spectrum of foreign affairs work (*waijiao shiwu* 外交事务 or *waishi* 外事).²³

Waishi is different from traditional foreign affairs work because it encompasses issues beyond matters pertaining to diplomacy alone—it extends to dealing with anything related to things foreign to China or overseas.²⁴ This work includes cultivating people-to-people relations for advancing national interests. For example, PRC officials contend that new migrant *xinqiao* (see Chapter Four) are a friendly force in developed Western countries.²⁵ They possess Western education, work experience, values, culture, and mindsets. They are knowledgeable about foreign political systems, and understand how to make the best use of them for their purposes.²⁶ Therefore, OC associations, lobby groups, and media serve as conscious or unconscious fronts for China's public "multi-track diplomacy"²⁷ for winning the trust of or influencing the policy and opinions of other governments.²⁸ Diplomats regularly call upon local OC communities and issue them with pro-Beijing material (such as DVDs and literature) in the hope that they will transmit their contents amongst their membership and onto the wider public.²⁹

As such, Beijing has used strategic groups of the OC to intervene in foreign politics.³⁰ For example, media reports alleged that Beijing offered members of the American OC community unofficial protection from the People's

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- 23 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance," 9–10.
- 24 Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003): xi.
- 25 State Council, "Opinion on Unfolding New Migrant Work," as noted by Bertil Lintner, "In Changing Times, the New Face of Chinese Emigrants," *Hankyoreh*, 27 November 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/174466.html (accessed 30 September 2009).
- 26 Ellen D. Wu, "America's Chinese: Anti-Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural Diplomacy During the Cold War," *Pacific Historical Review* 77, no. 3 (2008): 391–422.
- 27 John W. McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," in *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, eds. Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201–220.
- 28 C. Y. Chang, "OC in China's Policy," *China Quarterly* 82 (June 1980): 303.
- 29 "Tigao waixuan youxiaoxing de wudian jianyi 提高外宣有效性的五点建议 [Five Suggestions for Raising Effective Foreign Propaganda]," *Zhongguo jizhe*, 2004, <http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-23.htm> (accessed 6 March 2012).
- 30 Robert S. Ross, "China and the Ethnic Chinese: Political Liability/Economic Asset," in *ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship*, eds. Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee and Soedjati Djwandono (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Affairs, University of California, 1988), 147.

Liberation Army (PLA) for their business interests in exchange for channeling Beijing money into US Democrat election campaigns during the Clinton era;³¹ that their access to military technology resulted in the Donorgate scandal between 1992 and 1996;³² and that US authorities identified key fundraisers as Chinese spies, or found that they reported directly to Beijing.³³

Since the 2000s, *qiaowu* specialists have suggested a broader approach for political mobilization. According to an internal 2004 report entitled “Chinese Political Participatory Strength in American Elections Revealed,” cultivation of an ethnic Chinese voting bloc and supporting ethnic Chinese candidates for public office was an area cited for further development. As populations of the OC increase and become integrated in local society as an economic and consumer force, more of them will be aware and active in political participation.³⁴ The OC needed to be emboldened about this in order to raise their status and position in society.³⁵ To this end, the PRC conducted an investigation on OC voting habits, patterns, and demographics. It found that they tended to vote for personalities, and not specific parties; that they did vote for OC candidates; that voters could be mobilized if sufficient organizational work was done (such as the “80/20” movement);³⁶ and that the OC media played

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- 31 Abraham Riesman, “Olympics Expose a Rift in Manhattan’s Chinatown,” *New York Sun*, 1 August 2008, www.nysun.com/new-york/olympics-expose-a-rift-in-manhattans-china-town/83035/ (accessed 30 September 2009); Stanislav Lunev, “China’s Intelligence Machine—Overseas Intelligence Activities,” *BNET*, 17 November 1997, www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml571/is_n42_v13/ai_19986874/pg_1 (accessed 30 September 2009).
- 32 Michael Chang, *Racial Politics in an Era of Transnational Citizenship: The 1996 “Asian Donorgate” Controversy in Perspective* (Lanham: Lexington, 2004); L. Ling-chi Wang, “Race, Class, Citizenship and Extraterritoriality: Asian Americans and the 1996 Campaign Finance Scandal,” *Amerasia* 24, no. 1 (1998): 1–21.
- 33 Fred Thompson, “The China Connection,” *National Review* 50, Issue 11, 22 June 1998; William Safire, “The China Connection,” *New York Times*, 25 May 1998; “The China Connection,” *Economist* 342, Issue 8008, 15 March 1997, 30.
- 34 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Meiguo daxuan huaren canzheng liliang zhanlou 美国大选华人参政力量崭露 [Chinese Political Participatory Strength in American Elections Revealed],” *Qiaoping*, no. 51 (1 December 2004): 1.
- 35 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoping 深入社会, 探究侨情 [Penetrate Chinese Society, Investigate OC Affairs],” *Qiaoping*, no. 27 (5 August 2005): 3–4; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing.”
- 36 The 80/20 Initiative encourages Asian Pacific Americans to form a voting bloc and thus signal to major political parties their political influence and demand for equal opportunities. See 80/20 website www.80-20initiative.net/about/organization.asp (accessed 30 September 2009).

an important part in facilitating them with voting and the success of ethnic Chinese candidates.³⁷

However, the research also concluded that there was still much more work to do. For example, the standard of education amongst the OC was low (35 percent had no high school education and 23 percent were unskilled). Furthermore, many of them were not engaged in the Western democratic system and did not think that it affected them as a minority group. Finally, language difficulties, self-reliance, and a reluctance to deal with local government made it difficult to mobilize the OC in a single direction.³⁸ These issues pose significant difficulties for a quick mobilization of the OC as a pro-Beijing voting bloc. The purpose of *qiaowu* in addressing these challenges is to slowly guide the OC as a part of China's long-term effort to amplify its influence abroad.

3.3 Espionage

To achieve this goal, it is important that the *qiaowu* administration maintains a benevolent public face. It therefore concentrates on inclusive forms of cooptation and 'transformation work' involving methods of gradual influence and persuasion to seek their sentimentality, loyalty, and support (see Chapter Seven). While *qiaowu* includes intelligence gathering on the OC and their activities, the boundaries between the *qiaowu* administration and the state become blurred when mobilizing the OC for national interests that go beyond its mandate. In these cases the *qiaowu* administration prefers to leave aggressive and coercive practices for other agencies to handle.

One such area that is not necessarily a part of *qiaowu* includes mobilizing OC for industrial espionage or theft of commercial secrets.³⁹ Various companies have caught some of their OC employees disclosing confidential company trade information to PRC buyers or facilitating the export of sensitive technology.⁴⁰ The Cox Report alleged that the PRC actively identified

37 Xiao Hui 萧慧, "Meiguo xuanjuri jingzheng jilie, jiazhou duoming huayi canxuan zhengchuang lishi 美国选举日竞争激烈,加州多名华裔参选争创历史 [Fierce Competition on American Election Day, More Californian OC Strive to Make History]," *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 7 November 2007, <http://dlfl.banzhu.net/article/dlfl-2-2809359.html> (accessed 6 March 2012).

38 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Meiguo daxuan huaren canzheng liliang zhanlou," 1–5.

39 Neil A. Lewis, "Spy Cases Raise Concern on China's Intentions," *New York Times*, 10 July 2008.

40 John Diamond, "China Broadens Espionage Operations," *USA Today*, 18 May 2006.

and enlisted OC scientists, businessmen, and others with access to sensitive information.⁴¹ For example, Royal Dutch Shell uncovered a group of Chinese nationals meeting socially after work—these meetings were in fact a PRC-sponsored recruiting front for obtaining confidential pricing information.⁴²

Information is usually gathered through monitoring or infiltration of labour movements, trade unions, student associations, or seemingly legitimate front-organizations.⁴³ US intelligence officials suspect that amongst the hundreds of thousands of legitimate visitors, students, and business people around the world operating trading companies, manufacturers, banks, and other enterprises, recruits act as intelligence gathering stations under a special decree of the Politburo.⁴⁴ An unclassified PRC government handbook for would-be spies provides some guidance: using open source information, official publications, direct contact, and exchange with government agencies, research offices, corporate enterprises, academic institutions, libraries, and information offices.⁴⁵ As China's 'Thousand Grains of Sand' (*shali yuanli* 沙粒原理), PRC nationals and those of Chinese descent abroad are prompted to provide information or technology for China's development in the form of decentralized micro-espionage.⁴⁶ Targets are often unaware that they are the subject of

41 House Report 105–851, “Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the PRC, submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman,” (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1999). www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851/ (accessed 30 September 2009).

42 James Rossiter, “Chinese Hackers Target Rolls-Royce and Shell,” *Press*, 4 December 2007, C9.

43 Huang Tai-lin, “Lu Warns Women’s Groups to Beware ‘United Front’ Ploy,” *Taipei Times*, 10 June 2005, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/06/10/2003258670 (accessed 30 September 2009).

44 Paul Moore (former FBI Chief Analyst for Chinese Intelligence) “Biased Prosecution?” interview by Jim Lehrer, *News Hour*, Public Broadcasting System, 14 December 1999, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec99/wenholee_12-14.html (accessed 30 September 2009); Bill Gertz, “Chinese Dragon Awakens,” *Washington Times*, 27 June 2005.

45 Huo Zhongwen 霍忠文 and Wang Zongxiao 王宗孝, *Guofang keji qingbaoyuan ji huoqu jishu* 国防科技情报源及获取技术 [Sources and Techniques of Obtaining National Defense Science and Technology Intelligence], (Beijing: Kexue jishu wenxuan chubanshe, 1991), English translation available, www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/sources.html (accessed 30 September 2009); Bill Gertz, “Chinese Espionage Handbook Details Ease of Swiping Secrets,” *Washington Times*, 26 December 2000, www.washingtontimes.com/national/default-20001226232548.htm (accessed 12 June 2007).

46 Sreeram Chaulia, “The Age of the Immigrant Spy,” *Asia Times*, 3 April 2008, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JD03Ad02.html (accessed 30 September 2009).

such manipulation. Many respond positively and voluntarily, while others may require more persuasion, incentive, or corrective tools to ensure obedience.

How are certain OC mobilized to act in this way? The answer lies in the specific techniques and methodologies used for recruitment. The first is to appeal to their ethnic pride and sympathies in “helping the motherland advance.”⁴⁷ PLA and MSS units recruit potential candidates for intelligence gathering before they leave China or offer favours for their cooperation. Money does not always change hands—rather, experts suggest that they are not necessarily asked to spy illegally, but simply invited to share information.⁴⁸ Once abroad, handlers with links to these units cultivate relations with them through Chinese friendship and cultural groups.⁴⁹

The second method employs incentives or deterrents. Recruiters may offer targets a job and housing upon their return, and provide stipends while abroad. If they refuse to assist, they might be bullied. In one case, MSS authorities told a Japanese national of Chinese ancestry that he was subject to Chinese law as a Chinese citizen despite his foreign passport. They threatened him with jail or execution and told him that his son would never leave China if he did not cooperate. Similarly, the Canadian *Globe and Mail* reported that PRC authorities pressured Chinese students to be “sleeper” agents by using threats concerning their relatives in China, visa issuance, and future job prospects.⁵⁰ Attachés from the MOE deal with OC schools or liaise with PRC student organizations as part of their scope of work; the MSS and MFA play a key role in determining the outcome of visa and passport applications pending orders from their political leaders, who also dispatch MSS officers to check on the progress of consular staff.

The CCP uses such aggressive or clandestine methods of mobilizing those OC identified as potential sources for information for espionage and fifth column

47 Public Broadcasting System, “Four Chinese Espionage Investigations,” *Frontline*, 15 January 2004, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/spy/spies/four.html (accessed 30 September 2009); RCMP-CSIS Joint Review Committee, “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads Financial Links in Canada,” *Prime Time Crime*, 24 June 1997, www.primetimecrime.com/Articles/RobertRead/Sidewinder%20page%201.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).

48 Richard Sisk, “Pentagon Analyst, Chinese Immigrant Busted for Chinese Espionage Plots,” *New York Daily News*, 12 February 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world/2008/02/12/2008-02-12_pentagon_analyst_chinese_immigrant_buste-2.html (accessed 30 September 2009).

49 Jeff Sallot and Andrew Mitrovica, “Beijing’s Spies Stole Canadian Nuclear Secrets with Ease,” *Globe and Mail*, 24 January 2000.

50 Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, 57–71; David Harris, “Beware the Threat of Chinese Spy Games,” *Globe and Mail*, 5 September 1995, A21.

activity where the aim is to enhance China's security, scientific, technological, or commercial interests. Most successes have been with first generation OC, foreign students, or new migrant OC who still hold strong cultural and sentimental affinity with China. They have been less fruitful with gaining the support of the second and third generation of OC who have mostly identified with their host countries.⁵¹ Thus for the vast majority of the OC, *qiaowu* is executed in the context of cultural and economic development, and as such, appears completely benign.

3.4 Unveiling *Qiaowu*

Qiaowu is ostensibly a comprehensive effort that seeks to maintain, protect, and enhance the rights and interests of the OC. In addition, *qiaowu* seeks to attract OC talent and contributions to satisfy domestic needs within China, as well as to facilitate external efforts for international exchange, integrate with other OC, and therefore lead them towards a better lifestyle and development abroad.⁵² Tasks include propagating OC policies, promoting OC affairs, researching their needs, and resolving their problems.⁵³

In practice, however, *qiaowu* works to legitimize and protect the CCP's hold on power, uphold China's international image, and retain influence over important channels of access to social, economic, and political resources both domestically and abroad by managing OC communities vital to maintaining and enhancing China's national interests around the world.⁵⁴ To achieve this, *qiaowu* is conducted in view of two aims: to attract the OC back into

51 I. C. Smith (special FBI agent (retired)), Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009, www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/hr09_04_30.php (accessed 1 November 2009).

52 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 66, 109–110.

53 Wu Ruicheng 吴锐成, "Zhangwo xinfangfa, kaituo Guangdong qiaowu xinjunian 掌握新方法, 开拓广东侨务新局面 [Master New Techniques, Open Up New Phase of Guangdong OC Work]," OCAO, 30 August 2007, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0830/1/6401.shtml (accessed 6 March 2012).

54 Wu, "Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo"; Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 69–70; *Qiaowu zhengce wenda* 侨务政策问答 [Questions and Answers Regarding OC Affairs Policy], (Xiamen: Fujian qiaofangbao, 1983): 1; *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 1, 13; Gu Xiling 顾锡铃, ed. *Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda* 侨, 台, 民族, 宗教政策问答 [Questions and Answers Regarding OC, Taiwan, Ethnic and Religious Policy], (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 1996): 1.

the fold of the Chinese nation-state, and to convey and project to them the nation-state agenda.⁵⁵

Qiaowu policy is divided into two categories: policy for the OC inside China, including *guiqiao* (returned OC) and *qiaojuan* (侨眷 relatives and dependents of PRC nationals living abroad); and secondly, policy for the external Chinese diaspora—referring to PRC nationals living abroad (*huaqiao* 华侨) and ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality (*huaren* 华人).⁵⁶ For the former group, *qiaowu* policies offer rewards and privileges in order to attract contributions to China. For the latter group, cadres tailor specific methods of management for each subset, depending upon their level of loyalty to the regime and cultural connection with the motherland.

Qiaowu is essentially a pro-active effort to take advantage of the economic, political, and cultural opportunities between China and the OC. There are six tasks that *qiaowu* is charged with. These include strengthening ‘Chineseness’ and ethnic affinity amongst the OC; strengthening *qiaowu* propaganda, cultural exchange, and activities; continually strengthening economic relations both in and outside of China; encouraging the OC to support peaceful reunification and oppose independence; protecting the rights and interests of returned OC; and finally, to protect the rights and interests of the OC in their countries of residence and integrating them into local society.⁵⁷

Implicit in these goals is the elimination of potential threats and rival discourses that may challenge the CCP and its hold on power. As such, *qiaowu* can be described as a massive operation involving incorporation and cooptation of the OC at every level of society, and managing their behaviour and perceptions through incentives or disincentives to suit the situation and structural circumstances that the CCP desires.⁵⁸

55 Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 302–303.

56 Wang Cangbai, Wong Siu-Lun, and Sun Wenbin, “*Haigui*: A New Area in China’s Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 2, no. 2 (November 2006): 300–301.

57 “Li Haifeng: Shenru guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan 李海峰：深入贯彻落实科学发展观 [Li Haifeng: Views to Deepening Practical Implementation and Scientific Development],” *Qiushi*, no. 16 (2007), reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 27 September 2007, 2.

58 For a general discussion of cooptation, see Edward J. Lawler, George A. Youngs Jr. and Michael D. Lesh, “Cooptation and Coalition Mobilization,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 8, no. 3 (1978): 199–214.

3.5 Service for the OC: *Qiaowu* Cadres and Their United Front Duties

One of *qiaowu*'s core responsibilities is 'service' for the OC.⁵⁹ The methodology is based upon emotional exchange and integration according to basic human sensibilities, needs, and desires. In this context, *qiaowu* developed as a continuous and evolving effort employing social and psychological tools that seek to influence the choices, direction, and loyalties of the OC by dispelling their negative suspicions and misunderstandings concerning China, and replacing those thoughts with a positive understanding instead.⁶⁰ Such elements of *qiaowu* fall into the CCP's wider external propaganda effort towards the OC.⁶¹

CCP's *qiaowu* procedures and processes can be traced back to the Third Office of the UF Work Department (UFWD) and is based upon Marxist-Leninist mass line tactics, techniques, and strategies.⁶² As a coordinated effort for all levels of class, society, government, party, and organizations both inside and outside of China, UF work aims to win over non-CCP community leaders, neutralize Party critics, build temporary alliances of convenience, and systematically shut down adversaries.⁶³ Therefore, *qiaowu* is a shared duty for all government agencies (including diplomats, ministerial attachés, party cadres, and the *qiaowu* system itself), coordinated as part of a common responsibility to take advantage of OC resources.⁶⁴

Positive feelings for the CCP amongst the OC are not manifested by heavy-handed indoctrination; instead, *qiaowu* efforts focus on racial, cultural, economic, or political forms of attraction and guidance in order for the OC to connect with China, and ultimately elicit actions of their own volition. In this context, *qiaowu* mostly appears as a relatively simple and straightforward attempt to stoke transnational cultural interest and ethnic awareness, promote business opportunities, and attract financial and technological contributions.

59 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 9.

60 "Guanyu qiaowu gongzuo xingzhi wenti de tantao 关于侨务工作性质问题的探讨 [Enquiry Into Quality of OC Work]," 1986 in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 63–64.

61 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 12, 157, 162.

62 Arthur H. Steiner, "Current 'Mass Line' Tactics in Communist China," *The American Political Science Review*, 45, no. 2 (June 1951): 422–436.

63 Holly Porteous, "Beijing's United Front Strategy in HK," *Commentary*, no. 72 (1998), <http://www.csis-scrcs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm72-eng.asp> (accessed 30 September 2009); Gerry Groot, *Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 124, 129.

64 "Qiaowu gongzuo 'shehuihua' de zhiyi 侨务工作'社会化'的质疑 [Query into OC Work and Socialization]," in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 73–74; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance," 9–10.

During a period in which suspicions of Tiananmen remained fresh amongst the OC, these principles strengthened *qiaowu* as an effective tool for intensive behavioural control and manipulation—yet appearing benevolent and helpful. These methods have not changed in the twenty-first century. According to top OC affairs official Li Haifeng (李海峰), pragmatic and scientific methodology was the key to developing and deepening *qiaowu*.⁷⁰

Cadres are instructed to use sincerity and substance to win the trust of the OC (*yong zhenxin yingdele xinren, zhazha shishi wei huaqiao huaren fuwu* 用真心赢得了信任, 扎扎实实为华侨华人服务). To facilitate a solid connection with targets, *qiaowu* remains full of warmth (*qinqing qiaowu* 亲情侨务), without which it cannot penetrate hearts and minds.⁷¹ The OC should feel as if they are treated with genuine interest. The goal is to form strong bonds of friendship based upon mutual exchange in which targets can appreciate the motherland's love, develop a sense of patriotism, and foster a desire to contribute back to China.⁷² In short, OC must feel as if they are receiving a 'service' in order to achieve a 'win-win' result.⁷³

Manuals also describe the specific methods, manner, and protocol of *qiaowu*—including personal presentation, deportment, and etiquette. Precise instructions include the finer points of receiving, welcoming, and introducing guests through written correspondence or personal contact. Regular contact in the form of letters, e-mails, and greeting cards in order to ensure warm sentiments continue long after face-to-face meetings.⁷⁴

Cadres spend considerable time and effort studying step-by-step instructions designed for every conceivable scenario concerning the OC. As part of this direction, cadres maintain a sense of flexibility and efficiency with their time and resources, taking full advantage of opportunities while reducing

70 "Li Haifeng: Shenru guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan," *Qiushi*, reprinted in *Qiaqing jianbao*, 27 September 2007, 2.

71 Li Haifeng 李海峰, "Yongqing yongxin yongli zuohao qiaowu gongzuo 用心用力用心用力做好侨务工作 [Use Kindness, Use Heart, Use Strength to Achieve OC Work]," *Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu*, no. 2, 2008, <http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/bqch/141/1095.shtml> (accessed 2 May 2009); Wu Qingcai 吴庆才, "Huadong liusheng yishi qiaoban changdao 'qinqing qiaowu' nuanqiaoxin 华东六省一市侨办倡导'亲情侨务'暖侨心 [Chinese Southern Six Provinces and One City Propose Warm Hearted OC Work]," *Zhongxinwang*, 8 December 2007, reprinted in *Qiaqing jianbao*, 21 December 2007, 12.

72 "Guanyu qiaowu gongzuo xingzhi wenti de tantao," in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 63–64.

73 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao," 3.

74 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 79–116.

inconvenience and personal cost to the target.⁷⁵ For example, they make note of cultural peculiarities and the appropriate topics of conversation in order to prevent embarrassment or offense. Any action should take care to respect and maintain their rights and interests, and focus upon appealing to and exploiting their sentimentality and patriotic ‘understanding’ of China.⁷⁶

Qiaowu is backed by a philosophy of serving the OC on a large scale.⁷⁷ To enlarge its scope and therefore best harness OC of various backgrounds, origins, and levels of society, cadres conduct continuous investigation into their local circumstances all across the globe. To build a strong knowledge base, the PRC regularly send out fact-finding delegations at the state, provincial, and local levels.⁷⁸ OC associations serve as useful points of contact for gathering information and recruitment for transnational networking.

Qiaowu officials pay attention to variations in OC attributes and tailor work to suit accordingly.⁷⁹ For example, Overseas Exchange Association officials determine the attitudes, feelings and needs of OC community members and ascertain their position on various China-related issues (see below). They engage them on multiple levels, aspects, and issues, and do not restrict themselves to the traditional channels and groups. OC who return to China are also encouraged to make reports to authorities.⁸⁰ From this information, *qiaowu*

75 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 2, 4–5, 13–15, 218–219.

76 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 46–47.

77 “Qiaowu gongzuozhe yao yi ‘da qiaowu guan’ tongling qiaowu gongzuo 侨务工作者要以‘大侨务观’统领侨务工作 [OC Cadres Must Work by Following the Philosophy of OC Work on a Large Scale],” *Zhongxinwang*, 21 April 2004, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 26 April 2007, 13.

78 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo 深入侨社,拓展非洲地区侨务工作 [Penetrate OC Society, Develop African OC Work],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 24 (15 July 2005): 9.

79 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 55–56; OCAO Propaganda Department, “Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang 创新外宣策略,传播国家形象 [Bring Forth New Overseas Propaganda Tactics, Disseminate the National Image],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 22 (14 August 2007): 14–15; “OC Affairs Officials Told To Work Harder in New Century,” *People’s Daily*, 8 January 2001, www.china.org.cn/english/6115.htm (accessed 30 September 2009); Li Jing 黎静, Ma Biwen 马碧雯, and Ouyang Fu 欧阳伏, “Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi 对华人宗教组织的新认识 [New Knowledge Regarding OC Religious Organizations],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 7 (14 March 2007): 8–9; “OC Encouraged to Help Increase Sino-Foreign Exchanges,” *Xinhua*, 28 February 2003.

80 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 2–3; OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 6.

agencies are able to reinforce pro-China feeling amongst their targets by organizing activities tailored to the needs of specific OC groups.⁸¹

3.6 The CCP's 'Guiding Hand'

Being outside of China, the OC are not under any jurisdiction or obligation to follow directives from the CCP. Instead, a 'guiding hand' serves to maintain a loose, yet still powerful, means of social control. In a shared duty but with distinct responsibilities (explained below), *qiaowu* cadres and diplomats seek to gain and consolidate trust amongst their OC targets, actively manage them, and supervise their behaviour under the "Three Dos and Don'ts" principle mentioned above.

In order to avoid being seen as interfering with OC communities, methods of influence may be indirect and inferred. For example, the PRC embassy might indicate its disapproval by giving disobedient groups the cold shoulder or withholding invitations to official functions. During the early 2000s, PRC diplomats perceived any OC attending Double Ten ROC National Day celebrations as political supporters of Chen Shui-bian's (陈水扁) regime and withdrew various benefits as a clear signal that such behaviour was unacceptable.

Other forms of the 'guiding hand' can be more direct. For example, *qiaowu* agencies are responsible for providing logistical advice and offering suggestions to OC community leaders for implementation. These may comprise of gentle reminders from diplomats or *qiaowu* cadres, personal communications, e-mails, telephone calls, or even being communicated to in speeches by PRC officials. In the most overt circumstances, attachés from the Ministry of Culture (MOC), MOE and MFA may hand out propaganda material at diplomatic social functions.

Consequently, OC groups (particularly pro-Beijing organizations) are well aware of the limits and scope of behaviour under which they are able to deal

81 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Liebian chongzu xinsheng ronghe 裂变重组新生融合 [Split, Reconstitute, New Born, Fusion]," *Qiaoqing*, no. 11 (1 March 2004): 9, 12–15; OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru shehui, tanji qiaoqing," 1–12; OCAO Propaganda Department, "Disanjie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Wuhan chenggong juban 第三届世界华文传媒论坛在武汉成功举办 [Third Global Chinese Media Forum Successfully Held in Wuhan]," *Qiaoqing*, no. 37 (8 October 2005): 1–5; Lü Weixiong 吕伟雄, "San ge jianchi' quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo '三个坚持' 全面拓展侨务工作 [Three Perseverances for Comprehensive Development of OC Work]," OCAO, 22 February 2006, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2006/0222/1/1925.shtml (accessed 14 March 2012).

with Chinese issues and the CCP authorities. These obliging OC groups tactfully avoid taboo subjects; they are also aware of their role for protecting and advancing China's interests. Their cooperative behaviour ensures continued access to the embassy, its services, and resources.

A 'guided' relationship is desirable because activity and responses are voluntary and consenting, rather than compelled. This system of implicit protocols and inferences makes *qiaowu* an effective tool for intensive behavioural control and manipulation, yet appearing benign, benevolent, and helpful. These aspects are inherently part of a discourse that is concealed from the wider public. The OC are denied access to knowledge that may affect the success of *qiaowu* work. The CCP cannot reveal the true purpose of *qiaowu* for fear of damaging the imagined 'service' that is the policy's public face. To this end, embassies and consulates are instructed to protect the confidentiality of OC information, and prevent classified *qiaowu* documents and policy from outside scrutiny.⁸² Accordingly, *qiaowu* cadres selectively impart to the OC only what the latter need to know.⁸³

3.7 A Brief History of *Qiaowu* Organizational Structure

The PRC's *qiaowu* administration evolved from infrastructure established by previous Chinese governments since the latter half of the nineteenth century. Traditionally, Qing dynasty law prohibited migration from China. Authorities considered those who moved abroad as outcasts and denied them any recognition or assistance when in trouble.⁸⁴ However, their role for China's political and economic interest was soon apparent in an emerging age of globalized trade.⁸⁵

Efforts to develop an official relationship with the OC began in 1858, when Qing officials established bureaus in Guangdong, Xiamen, Tianjin, and Ningbo

82 GOCAO, Clauses 27–28 of *Guowuyuan qiaowu bangongshi keti guanli banfa* 国务院侨务办公室课题管理办法 [State Council OC Affairs Office Task Management Guidelines], 13 September 2006, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2006/0913/1/3149.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009).

83 OCAO Internal Affairs Department, "Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan 国务院侨办信访团赴欧洲四国调研 [State Council OCAO Fact-finding Delegation Go to Four Nations for Research]," *Qiaoping*, no. 54 (5 December 2005): 5.

84 Shozo Fukuda and George Hicks, *With Sweat & Abacus: Economic Roles of Southeast Asian Chinese on the Eve of World War II* (Singapore: Select Books, 1995) 20–22.

85 Harley Farnsworth McNair, *The Chinese Abroad: Their Position and Protection—A Study in International Law and Relations* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1924).

to deal with “British Chinese” following the opening of treaty ports after the Opium War.⁸⁶ Emigration policies were gradually relaxed after 1868, and Chinese diplomats began actively courting the OC with the prime objective of securing their loyalty to the empire.⁸⁷ Tasks included attracting contributions to advance China’s interests, and to prevent revolutionary groups from threatening the imperial regime. To facilitate these objectives, special delegations were sent abroad to conduct extensive research of strategic OC communities.⁸⁸ It was during this period that the term *huaqiao* emerged to describe the OC and their connection with China—first appearing in an 1883 letter addressed to court official Li Hongzhang (李鸿章).⁸⁹

In order to formalize the embrace of ethnic Chinese overseas, the 1909 *Law of Nationality* acknowledged the OC as a special grouping.⁹⁰ It defined anyone born to a Chinese father and/or mother as a Chinese citizen under the principle of *jus sanguinis*. This law also granted dual nationality to all Chinese and their descendants living in foreign countries. A broad definition gave the Qing court the capacity to claim OC with foreign citizenship as its own nationals, and implied that it could exercise extra-territorial rule over any OC. In this context, OC communities could be considered as *de facto* colonies of China, and hence subject to its jurisdiction.⁹¹ As such, the Qing government used the term *huaqiao* to rally OC sojourners residing temporarily away from home to identify with China and its civilization.

86 “The Historic Track of OC Affairs,” *Haihua*, no. 87 (April 1992): 60–62.

87 Yen Ching-hwang, *Studies in Modern OC History* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995), 139; Wang, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, 245; Wang Gungwu, “Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren,” in *The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas*, ed. Elizabeth Sinn (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), 18; L. Ling-chi Wang, “The Structure of Dual Domination: Toward a Paradigm for the Study of the Chinese Diaspora in the United States,” *Amerasia* 21, no. 1 & 2 (1995): 157.

88 Anthony B. Chan, “Chinese Canada: Reflections on Historical Eras and Watersheds,” *Polyphony: The Bulletin of the Multicultural Historical Society of Ontario* 15 (2000): 1–12.

89 Zhuang Guotu, “Southeast Asian Research in China: A Historical Review,” ICS Working Paper no. 2006–10, University of Malaya, 2006, <http://ics.um.edu.my/umweb/ics/workingpaper/2006-10.pdf> (accessed 30 September 2009).

90 Cai Renlong 蔡仁龙, “Yindunixiya huaqiao guoji wenti de chansheng ji qi yanbian 印度尼西亚华侨国籍问题的产生及其演变 [The Emergence and Transformation of the Nationality Problem for Indonesian OC],” *Huaqiao lishi luncong* no. 2, (1985/86), quoted by Man-Houng Lin, “OC Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk (1895–1935)” *Modern Asian Studies* 35, no. 4 (2001): 985–1009.

91 Ling-chi Wang, “Double Trouble in Dual Citizenship,” *Huaren E-Magazine*, Issue 8 (May 2005): 10–14; Linda Low, “The OC Connection: An ASEAN Perspective,” *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 23, no. 2 (1995): 96.

Following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Republican Beiyang government, headed by Yuan Shikai (袁世凯), retained the 1909 principle of *jus sanguinis* and subsequently passed an amendment in 1912 which added that those born in China, as well as those born with at least one parent who held Chinese nationality, could claim Chinese nationality.⁹² Anyone wishing to revoke this status had to apply to the relevant authorities; otherwise, the Chinese government deemed them to remain as Chinese citizens.⁹³ Moreover, the government passed legislation allowing OC representation in China's domestic politics. In other words, the OC remained a prized asset, and not to be forsaken under any means.

The issue of the OC became even more significant for Beiyang policy makers as a result of their participation in World War One. Despite opposition from President Li Yuanhong (黎元洪) for China to break ties with Germany, Premier Duan Qirui (段祺瑞) was an advocate for entering the Great War in the hope that his country could gain some international prestige with the Allies. By sending Chinese workers to Europe in July 1916, Duan expected some form of reciprocity—such as revocation of concessions and indemnities incurred from signing unequal treaties in the past. Laws to protect the Chinese Labour Corps were discussed between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, and Commerce. Consequently, the State Council of the Beiyang government (headed by Duan) set up the Bureau of OC Workers in September 1917.⁹⁴ This Bureau continued until December 1921, when it was dissolved and re-organized in January 1922 as the State Council OC Affairs Bureau in order to accommodate a broader scope of OC matters.⁹⁵

In the following year Sun Yat-sen established his revolutionary government in Guangzhou and also set up the first OCAO under his direction.⁹⁶ This demonstrates the different agendas between the rival governments of Beiyang and Guangzhou—protection of the rights of OC workers in Europe in the context of China's international relations, versus the protection and care of returnee sojourners. The latter reflected Sun's attempt to mobilize and control OC

92 Yen-Fen Tseng, "From 'Us' to 'Them': Diasporic Linkages and Identity Politics," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 9 (2002): 383–404.

93 Lin, "OC Merchants and Multiple Nationality," 995–996.

94 Guoqi Xu, *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005), 35, 116.

95 "The Historic Track of OC Affairs," 60–62; Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 48.

96 Philip Kuhn, *Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 267.

loyalties and resources for realizing his republican vision of a free, prosperous, and powerful nation.

In 1925, the Second KMT Nationalist Party Conference announced its first policies to persuade the OC to invest in China, provide facilities for their youth to study in China, and protect them against discriminatory laws abroad.⁹⁷ These policies would set in motion the guiding principles of *qiaowu*. In the following year, the KMT government established the ROC OC Affairs Commission (OCAC or *Zhonghua minguo qiaowu weiyuanhui* 中华民国侨务委员会) which continued under similar polices to its predecessor;⁹⁸ in 1932 (at the urge of returned OC) it was made subordinate to the Nationalist government under the Executive Yuan as a cabinet level unit.⁹⁹ Through these developments, *qiaowu* evolved into a comprehensive set of regulations, laws, and policies overseen by a framework of government and non-governmental bodies, organs, and offices.

The KMT continued its OCAC operations from Taiwan after 1949. The No. 3 Section of the KMT Central Committee (later known as the Overseas Work Committee after 1972) influenced all *qiaowu* processes. In fact, between 1952 and 1958, the same person headed both the OCAC and the No. 3 Section.¹⁰⁰ This arrangement ensured that anti-communist ideology and nationalist sentiment dominated the complete spectrum of OCAC activity.¹⁰¹

As the key targets, strategic OC communities around the world felt the full brunt of this agenda. In the West, many OC found themselves the direct subject of over-zealous consular demands—such as recognizing the Double Ten anniversary of the founding of the ROC as a holiday, singing the ROC national anthem at gatherings, and performing other pro-KMT rituals. In the face of

97 C. Y. Choi, *Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1975), 37.

98 Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, 7.

99 OCAC, "History," n.d., www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=707&no=707&level=B (accessed 30 September 2009); Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 107; Government Information Office, *Taiwan Year Book 2004* (Taipei: Government Information Office of ROC, 2004).

100 OCAC work during the 1950s was implemented under guidelines set down by Zheng Yanfen (郑彦棻) a long time KMT loyalist and OCAC Chairman). See Chen San-Ching, "Scholar, Official and Politician: The Three Careers of Zheng Yanfen," n.d., www.lcsc.edu/hstcc/chensanab.htm (accessed 8 July 2008).

101 Wing Chung Ng, "Taiwan's OC Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s," in *East Asia Enquiry, Selected Articles from the Annual Conferences of the Canadian Asian Studies Association 1988–1990*, eds. Larry Shyu, Min-sun Chen, Claude-Yves Charron and Matsuo Soga (Montreal: Canadian Asian Studies Association, 1991): 265–286.

racially discriminatory attitudes and a pervasive Cold War environment in their adopted homelands, the fear of being labeled a communist for non-compliance, publicly named and shamed, or ostracized for being unpatriotic, were all driving factors in ensuring their obedience.¹⁰²

No. 3 Section activities with the OC were later downscaled so as not to make the OCAC appear as a direct instrument of the KMT. However, the MFA continued to have a limited but important role in formulating and executing OC policy by working to promote exchange and contact through diplomatic organs, pro-KMT organizations, media, and schools. As such, ROC embassies served as the front line for the KMT's *qiaowu* effort, with consular officials and ambassadors cultivating strong relations with leaders of OC communities. Under this structure, the ROC would continue to dominate OC communities throughout the world for the next several decades (for an analysis of the OCAC in the contemporary period, please see Chapter Four).

3.8 Origins of the PRC OC *Qiaowu* Bureaucracy

Back on the mainland, the CCP had inherited the ROC's *qiaowu* apparatus—this bureaucracy served as the basic framework for the PRC's own rival effort to manage and influence the OC after 1949. Over the next few decades, the CCP and the KMT were direct competitors for the loyalty and support of millions of OC around the world.

Although the CCP had maintained relations with sympathetic OC groups since the 1920s, it did not establish specific organs to liaise with the wider OC populace until some time later. The first, in September 1940, was the Association of OC National Salvationists (*Ting'an huaqiao jiuguo lianhehui* 延安华侨救国联合会), later renamed as the China Liberation Association of Returned OC (*Zhongguo jiefangqu guiguo huaqiao lianhehui* 中国解放区归国华侨联合会). In 1942, the CCP set up an Overseas Affairs Committee to implement communist missions amongst the OC.

After its founding in 1949, the PRC's own *qiaowu* policy was somewhat confused due to inactivity and a lack of long-term planning. It was further hampered by the CCP's commitment to class struggle and proletarian revolution in ex-colonial countries, as well as the strength of emerging nationalism amongst

102 Him Mark Lai, "China and the Chinese American Community: The Political Dimension—The Huangling Du Community in Northern California" in *Chinese America: History and Perspectives 1999* (1999): 1–21; David Fung, *History of the NZ Chinese Association (Inc): 1935–2010* (forthcoming).

Southeast Asian governments. At the same time, the CCP was in direct competition with the KMT for winning sympathy and support from the OC.¹⁰³

Despite making a declaration that all KMT reactionary laws were to be abolished and that its own OC policy was distinct from that of its rival, the CCP retained both the KMT's *qiaowu* policy and its nationality law. The CCP still considered the OC to be an extension of the PRC under the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Article 58 of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1949 iterated the PRC's intention to "protect the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad." Furthermore, the 1953 census showed that 11.5 million OC were included as part of China's population. Beijing also accepted all OC wishing to return to China, and allowed their election to the NPC.¹⁰⁴

The PRC's own version of the OCAC was a high-level unit with direct access to Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来). This body was charged with all matters relating to external *huaqiao* development and consisted of four departments: International Liaison, Foreign Affairs, Propaganda, and UF Work. The other major agency for *qiaowu* dealt with the domestic issues of returned OC. The All-China Federation of Returned OC Association (*Zhongguo quanguo guiguo huaqiao lianhehui* 中国全国归国华侨联合会 or *qiaolian* 侨联) was established in June 1956 to oversee and influence a variety of domestic and returned OC constituencies, such as women, youth, workers, scientists, writers, artists, and cultural workers. This agency helped to integrate and unite returned OC and OC abroad with the CCP by assisting with patriotic national reconstruction through education and welfare policies.

Like its ROC counterpart, the PRC *qiaowu* system was also a complex web of interlinked organizations. As a result, many prominent *qiaolian* officials were also PRC OCAC officials. Consequently, coordination and duties in the two administrative organs were almost identical.¹⁰⁵ For example, both bodies served routine frontline affairs. These included policy development and UF activities, resettlement of OC returnees and their families, procurement of OC investment, promotion of education, and attracting OC to return to China for study, establishment of a front for patriotic unification, and expansion of

103 Milton Esman, "The Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia," in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, 130–163.

104 Zhuang Guotu, "The Policies of the Chinese Government Towards OC (1949–1966)" in *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1*, eds. Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998): 18.

105 Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, 29–32, 197.

New China's international influence by reforming the beliefs and practices of OC to fit the CCP's socialist ideology.

3.9 The "OC Problem"

Washington's containment policy to isolate China from Southeast Asia meant that by the mid-1950s Beijing had to change its foreign policy direction from spreading socialism to identifying with the Third World. However, because it did not distinguish between PRC nationals and ethnic Chinese, this ambiguity caused concerns for countries with large OC populations. Governments of these nations feared that their OC residents might become a source for communist infiltration.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, Beijing could not assume that the OC would respond positively to its *qiaowu* efforts. Thus dealing with the question of OC loyalty and its implications for China's international relations (described as the "oc problem") would determine Beijing's policies towards ethnic Chinese for the next fifty years.¹⁰⁷

In 1955, Beijing appeared to have temporarily brushed the OC aside in an effort to address the issue of dual nationality.¹⁰⁸ In April of that year, both the PRC and Indonesia signed the Bandung Dual Nationality Treaty,¹⁰⁹ introducing concepts of the modern nation-state and doing away with the principles of dual nationality and *jus sanguinis*.¹¹⁰ Beijing encouraged the OC to take local citizenship and give up their PRC citizenship voluntarily—in other words,

106 Katrine R. C. Greene, "Repatriating China's Expatriates," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 4 (25 February 1948): 44–47.

107 Cheng Xi 程希, *Qiaowu yu waijiao guanxi yanjiu: Zhongguo fangqi "shuangchong guoji" de huigu yu fansi* 侨务与外交关系研究: 中国放弃"双重国籍"的回顾与反思 [OC Affairs and Diplomatic Relations: Retrospect on China's Abandoning of its Policy of "Dual Nationality"] (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2005).

108 "Zai Yafei huiyi quanti huiyi shang de buchong fayan 在亚非会议全体会议上的补充发言 [Additional Remarks from the Plenary Session of the Asia-Africa Conference]," 19 April 1955, in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 3–5; "Zai Wanlong jiejian Xizhaowa qiaoling de jianghua 在万隆接见西爪哇侨领的讲话 [Speech from the Interview with West Javan OC Leader at Bandung]," 19 April 1955, *ibid.*, 3–5.

109 "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he yindunixiya gongheguo guanyu shuangchong guoji wenti de tiaoyue 中华人民共和国和印度尼西亚共和国关于双重国籍问题的条约 [Dual Nationality Treaty Between PRC and Indonesia]" (22 April 1955), *Renmin ribao*, 26 April 1955, reprinted in Qiaowu baoshe 侨务报社, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji* 侨务政策文集 [Collection of OC Policy], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957), 20–25.

110 Williams, *Future of the OC in Southeast Asia*, 65.

to become *huaren* (foreigners of Chinese descent). If they chose to take this option, they were no longer considered to be under the jurisdiction or responsibility of the PRC, and had to clearly distinguish themselves by not joining *huaqiao* groups; however, if any country denied that person local citizenship, equal rights, or expel them, Beijing reserved the right to their repatriation.¹¹¹

Beijing instructed the minority of the OC who chose to remain as Chinese citizens abroad not to interfere in local politics, not to persist in patriotic activity, and not to promote political issues.¹¹² Elsewhere, the PRC worked to persuade foreign governments that it had disassociated itself from the external OC population, embarking on a process of “decolonization” after 1957.¹¹³ The UFDW, *qiaolian*, and state media not only downgraded matters pertaining to OC affairs, but contended that the OC had assimilated with their places of abode; moreover, Beijing urged OC schools to teach youth the local language, history, and geography, and respect the culture of the countries of residence, and to abandon Chinese language and culture. Instead, Beijing expected these *huaqiao* to assist in improving relations and unity between other OC and locals by abiding to local laws and customs, using the local language, and serve as good citizens for promoting a stable livelihood. If *huaqiao* wished to organize CCP groupings and activities, they were to do so only back in China.¹¹⁴

Effective implementation of the Bandung Treaty, however, was fraught with difficulty. Internal rival factions within the Indonesian government and military meant ratification did not take place until 1960; and it was ultimately repealed altogether in 1969. Nevertheless, the treaty provided Beijing

111 “Zhou Enlai zongli dui Miandian huaqiao de jianghua 周恩来总理对缅甸华侨的讲话 [Premier Zhou Enlai Speaks to Myanmar OC],” (18 December 1956), *Qiaowubao*, no. 2 (1957), reprinted in Qiaowu baoshe, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 1–10; Tao-Tai Hsia, *Peking’s Policy Toward the Dual Nationality of the OC* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976).

112 “Zai quanguo renda changweihui dibashijiuci huiyi shang de jianghua 在全国人大常委会第八十九次会议上的讲话 [Address from the 89th Session of the National People’s Executive Conference],” 30 December 1957, in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 29–30.

113 “Yu Yindunixiya wajiaobu Meizhoushi sizhang Monuonutu de tanhua 与印度尼西亚外交部美洲司司长莫诺努图的谈话 [Conversation with Indonesian Foreign Affairs American Division Director Monuonutu],” 2 October 1957, *ibid.*, 29.

114 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui He Xiangning zhuren guanyu shuangchong guoji wenti de tiaoyue de tanhua 中华人民共和国华侨事务委员会何香凝主任关于双重国籍问题的条约的谈话 [PRC OC Affairs Commission Director He Xiangning’s Speech about the Dual Nationality Treaty],” (26 April 1955), *Renmin ribao*, 28 April 1955, reprinted in Qiaowu baoshe, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 34–38; “Zai quanguo renda changweihui dibashijiuci huiyi shang de jianghua,” in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 29–30.

with legal and tactical disengagement from the “OC problem” by establishing China’s credentials as an independent nation, and fostering goodwill with its neighbours.¹¹⁵

Although the treaty served to allay suspicions of external interference, Beijing’s real intention was to sever only the political relationship—internally, it wished to maintain a strong friendly connection with the OC. Thus Zhou Enlai was quite clear that China would not abandon *huaren* in Southeast Asia, but that they remain as “close relatives” (*haoqinqi* 好亲戚) abroad.¹¹⁶ This was because OC resources were much-needed for China’s development. As a communist state, the PRC found that foreign exchange and overseas investment from OC sources had decreased substantially as a result of US economic sanctions. Any foreign money going into ‘Red China’ was deemed a criminal offence under the *Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917*.¹¹⁷ Beijing had to ensure that the financial relationship continued by providing guarantees of return for investors and maintaining standards of living for dependants—thus making foreign investment a purely material or business connection without any political commitment.¹¹⁸ Remittances made through clan and hometown association channels were the most significant form of overseas income during this period.

Secondly, the OC remained a frontline force for Beijing’s interests abroad. While it claimed non-interference in local affairs, in practice Beijing quietly continued to provide indirect assistance for the purposes of maintaining OC as a resource for communist revolution, economic development, and technical advancement. They were expected to unite and maintain a friendly relationship with China, but not allow their activities to damage the CCP position with

115 In countries where the PRC had not signed dual nationality agreements, ethnic Chinese in that country were still considered PRC citizens. Beijing referred to those of Chinese descent with dual nationality as those with Chinese bloodlines (*Zhongguo xuetong* 中国血统). See Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States*, 2–4. At the time, the PRC had no specific term to describe ethnic Chinese who were foreign nationals. See Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, x.

116 “Zai Miandian huaqiao huanyinghui shang de jianghua 在缅甸华侨欢迎会上的讲话 [Speech at the Burma Huaqiao Welcome Party],” 18 December 1956, in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 11–12.

117 Andrew Hsiao, “The Hidden History of Asian-American Activism in New York City,” *Social Policy* 28, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 23.

118 Charles P. Fitzgerald, *The Third China: The Chinese Communities in South-East Asia* (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd. for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1965), 78.

sensitive Southeast Asian countries (such as Indonesia).¹¹⁹ The blurred lines between *huaqiao* and *huaren* policies are examined in greater depth in the following chapter.

3.10 Domestic Returned OC Work and Internal Chaos

Between 1949 and 1956, the focus of *qiaowu* was to attract and convince the OC to participate in China's modernization. In general, most OC in Western countries were careful to stay away from the political rivalry between the two Chinas and kept their heads down.¹²⁰ Some maintained a staunch anti-communist attitude and supported the KMT. For example, OC leaders in the US worked with US and ROC government officials in order to suppress their pro-Beijing opponents.¹²¹ However, other OC were disillusioned at the corruption and ineptitude of Chiang Kai-shek's (蒋介石) regime, and changed sides. The CCP gained support amongst those who identified with socialism and regarded Mao Zedong (毛泽东) as an impressive nationalist hero.¹²² Moreover, ethnic Chinese tended to dominate the membership of communist parties in Southeast Asia. Most of their members were educated students attracted towards an internationalist movement that transcended local racial and political issues.¹²³ For this group, the PRC represented an alternative attraction to bourgeois Western civilization.¹²⁴ CCP relations with these OC blossomed, making use of their leaders and representatives by persuading them to return

119 "Heping xieshang jiejie guoji wenti de youyifanli 和平协商解决国际问题的又一范例 [Another Example of Peaceful Consultative Resolution of an International Problem]," *Renmin ribao*, 23 April 1955, reprinted in Qiaowu baoshe, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 39–43.

120 Stuart W. Greif, "Political Attitudes of the OC in Fiji," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 11 (November 1975): 977.

121 Wu, "America's Chinese," 391–422.

122 Ningkun Wu and Yikai Li, *A Single Tear: A Family's Persecution, Love and Endurance in Communist China* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993).

123 Fitzgerald, *The Third China*, 62–64; Benedict Anderson, *Spectres of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 1998): 289.

124 For personal accounts of life in China as an OC during the early years of the PRC, see Esther Cheo Ying, *Black Country Girl in Red China* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1980); Pamela Tan, *The Chinese Factor: An Australian Chinese Woman's Life in China from 1950 to 1979* (Sydney: Rosenberg Publishing Pty, 2008).

and accept their training.¹²⁵ Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the PRC supported them as political revolutionaries.¹²⁶

Those OC who returned to the mainland were initially welcomed as *guiqiao*. Despite its leftist leanings, the *qiaolian* was quite successful in facilitating foreign investment, attracting OC to return to study in China, and gaining the support of returned OC and their families.¹²⁷ PRC authorities resettled about 200,000 *guiqiao* on specially established OC farms. However, Beijing viewed these returned OC with suspicion. Resettlement (rather than integration with the local community) was a conscious strategic effort to better manage them in isolation, and transform them into working people living off their own labour.

The main issue in dealing with returned OC was contending with their political ideology. During this period, officials stated that *qiaowu* policy should comply not only with the needs of the domestic class struggle, but also with the needs of an international class struggle under an eight-character principle “treat equally with appropriate preferential treatment” (*yishi tongren, shidang zhaogu* 一视同仁, 适当照顾). According to the CCP, the OC were seen to be mainly of working class peasant origin.¹²⁸ They were to be accorded special privileges and exemptions as an incentive for engaging in socialist reconstruction, and to present China in a favourable light abroad so as to attract more remittances.

Beginning in 1950, Land Reform was supposed to remove the feudal exploitation of landlords.¹²⁹ However, its implementation was marred by ideological confusion and contradiction over what the OC represented to socialist China, and how both conformity and privilege could be simultaneously promoted.¹³⁰ Swept up in a tide of radicalism, local cadres failed to distinguish between landlords and *qiaojuan* (relatives of OC) households renting out their land while their men were overseas. Some early methods included extortion,

125 Yu-sun Lu, “Programs of Communist China for OC,” *Communist China Problem Research Series* EC12 (1956), 7–9.

126 Cheung, “Involuntary Migrants,” 55–66.

127 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 49–50.

128 Chang, “OC in China’s Policy,” 281–303.

129 Zhuang, “The Policies of the Chinese Government Towards OC (1949–1966),” 22.

130 Michael R. Godley, “The Sojourners: Returned OC in the PRC,” *Pacific Affairs* 62, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 330–352; Glen D. Peterson, “Socialist China and the Huaqiao: The Transition to Socialism in the OC Areas of Rural Guangdong,” *Modern China* 14, no. 3 (July 1988): 309–335; Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, 54.

blackmail, and ‘taxes.’¹³¹ In acknowledgement of the mistakes made during the Land Reform, in 1954 and 1955 OC landlords were given new class status, granting them protection and immunity from socialist transformation, guaranteed the protection of remittances, and won investment privileges aimed to mobilize OC financial resources for China’s development.¹³² In 1957, Beijing established a Special Commission for Handling Outstanding Problems of OC Houses to resolve disputes. However, these measures were only a temporary reprieve—much more aggressive forms of treatment towards the OC were yet to come.

Throughout the late 1950s, the CCP continued to view *guiqiao* with suspicion. Their connections abroad and entrepreneurial nature meant that they became the target of discrimination and oppression. A 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign targeted anyone with foreign contacts as class enemies or agents of imperialism. Discrimination against the OC became widespread. Local authorities criticized their undesirable capitalist tendencies. Worse yet, they were branded as “imperialists,” “spies,” and “counter-revolutionaries”.¹³³ Intense pressure included extortion and wholesale removal of the benefits and programmes that the OC had previously enjoyed.¹³⁴

During the Cultural Revolution, OC affairs suffered numerous attacks from radical elements. Red Guards stormed the OCAC, *qiaolian*, and UFWD offices in Shanghai in 1966; domestic OC publications and traditional announcements were suspended; references to special treatment for OC were removed from buildings and restaurants. The PRC abandoned its policy of attracting the OC, and *qiaowu* organizations ceased to function. The OCAC had neither responsibility nor power, and OC properties were confiscated and their relatives persecuted. In such chaotic and violent circumstances, many of the OC

131 G. William Skinner, “OC in Southeast Asia,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 321 (January 1959): 143; Elegant, *The Dragon’s Seed*, 26–32; Lu, “Programs of Communist China for OC,” 69–70.

132 “Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce 关于国内侨务工作的若干政策 [A Number of Policies Regarding Internal OC Work],” (8 June 1956), *Renmin ribao*, 10 June 1956, reprinted in *Qiaowu baoshe, Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 47–65.

133 Anne-Marie Brady, “The War That Never Was, or, NZ-China Relations in the Cold War Era,” in *Lenin’s Legacy Down Under: NZ and the New Cold War History*, eds. Aaron Fox and Alex Trapeznik (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2003), 12; Godley, “The Sojourners,” 330–352.

134 Chan Ngor Chong, “PRC Policy on the OC,” in *ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship*, eds. Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordien Sopiee and Soedjati Djwandono (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Affairs, University of California, 1988), 134; Zhuang, “The Policies of the Chinese Government Towards OC (1949–1966),” 18–37.

had to contemplate settling permanently abroad and adopting foreign citizenship. Not surprisingly, about 400,000 OC left China between 1967 and 1972.¹³⁵ The OCAC itself dissolved in 1968 and became defunct in 1970.¹³⁶

3.11 The OC and Their Role in UF Work Abroad

Despite the situation at home, the OC always had an equally important role to play in Beijing's UF operations abroad. As mentioned earlier, the vague line between UF work and *qiaowu* meant that they were often the same thing. As a part of this effort, prominent OC in local communist parties and the business sector abroad were given "Three Unities" to accomplish: promoting patriotic unity; developing economy, culture, and a spirit of internationalism in their localities; and serving as a diplomatic front for China. By setting up UF-guided associations in major cities all over the world to host public relations campaigns, conferences, forums, and special briefings, these associations sought to advance friendship and pro-China sentiment amongst the OC and to wear down support for Taipei.

One example was NZ resident Young Tong-Shing (or Yang Tangcheng 杨汤城) who supported the CCP government during the early 1950s by distributing newsletters, showing propaganda films, and asking for trade with China to be channeled through his personal business concern. The ROC Consul-General viewed Young's activities as a political issue and prompted an investigation.¹³⁷ Police subsequently identified Young's business as a contact point between the NZ Communist Party and the local Chinese community. While on a visit to Hong Kong (HK) in 1951, authorities informed Young that he and his family would not be welcome back in NZ. He resettled in China where he was initially welcomed as a returned OC, and consequently acquired many official

135 After 1973, the PRC liberally issued exit permits for returned OC wishing to leave and facilitated those wishing to emigrate to Canada and Australia, but cut down on entry visas to OC as a means of relieving themselves of a liability. This suggested that an influx of OC "posed too great a risk for internal stability despite its obvious foreign policy value." US Consulate HK, "Beijing and the OC," State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1973HONGK11347, 12 November 1973.

136 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 49.

137 Local OC found themselves in a hostile environment if they were in any way supportive of the PRC. NZCA (Otago/Southland) member, personal communication with author, Wellington, 18 June 2006.

connections with the CCP.¹³⁸ The Party often appointed prominent returned OC as special consultants to advise it on OC affairs and regional matters.¹³⁹ However, during the Cultural Revolution he became a target, and only after years of oppression was finally able to leave China under the revised policy of “freedom to come and go” (*laiqu ziyou* 来去自由).¹⁴⁰

With the domestic situation becoming increasingly chaotic during the late 1960s, Beijing shifted the focus of *qiaowu* onto external UF work. The CCP made a brief attempt to export the proletarian revolution abroad. For example, in 1967 the PRC embassy in Rangoon issued Mao badges to OC students in Burma, and followed this with a mass demonstration.¹⁴¹ By 1970, the CCP began efforts to break its isolation from the global community by repositioning its UF strategy from Southeast Asia to Japan and the US, with HK and Macau acting as relay stations.

Because of its geographical proximity, China chose Canada as a base to infiltrate the US—especially before diplomatic relations with Washington began. To further its exposure on the West coast, Beijing sought approval for the establishment of a consulate in Vancouver, which hosted a large population of OC.¹⁴² Attempts to connect with them were cautious not to portray Beijing as directly interfering in local activities or causing overt hostility amongst the Canadian OC community.

The main objective of the UFWD was to use propaganda and other activities to confuse the OC and discredit the KMT. This was done by currying favour and

138 Yang Tangcheng 杨汤城, *Xinxilan huaqiao shi* 新西兰华侨史 [History of NZ Chinese], ed. Ding Shenzun (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2001): 110–111.

139 Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, 34.

140 While he fundraised extensively for the war effort against Japanese aggression, Young was pre-occupied with his business ambitions and attracting investment from his peers. He established the Jian Hua Trading Company in 1946 with branches in Australia and HK. He later moved to China in 1950 after securing considerable investments from local Chinese in Dunedin and Napier. Young stayed in China for 26 years. Upon his return to Napier, the local Chinese community never forgot his lofty aspirations for elitist officialdom in China. Some NZCA members were wary of his children's intentions of joining their Association. On a visit to Guangzhou in 1984, one member was able to collect on his investment by presenting a share certificate to the Bank of China. Those who did not see a return were less forgiving. Young passed away in 2000. Personal communication with various NZCA members, Christchurch and Wellington, May/June 2006; Brady, “The War That Never Was,” 11–12.

141 Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relationship with Revolutionary Movements* (New York: Praeger, 1976): 208–233.

142 US Consulate HK, “Beijing and the OC.”

expanding influence amongst target groups.¹⁴³ In pursuing the ‘Three Unities’, OC communities were instructed not to directly confront pro-KMT organizations, but to take control of them through their elective processes; moreover, in order to maintain secrecy, they were to only contact diplomats by writing or by telephone, rather than making personal visits. According to KMT propaganda of the time, these attempts to manipulate the broader OC community were largely futile, as few cared for political involvement, or kept quiet out of fear for the safety of their relatives still in China.¹⁴⁴

The geo-political circumstances of this Cold War period resulted in contradictory situations for the OC. Maintaining warm relations with them was important for China’s national interests, so diplomats were instructed to act more cordially and amiable towards OC abroad. For example, the OC had priority to visit China over non-ethnic Chinese.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, while they were welcomed back for short trips, they were actually discouraged from visiting China for long periods. In light of the domestic upheaval and a pre-occupation with preventing unwanted foreign influences from entering China, Deng was reluctant to accept any more OC returnees. He pointed out that they might not be accustomed to China’s lower living standards, and that they could “produce greater results working in foreign lands.”¹⁴⁶ In fact, Mao’s guiding principle of “internally tightening, externally loosening, and root-taking” subjected *guiqiao* to further scrutiny and surveillance.

On a geo-political level, Beijing still believed that the Soviet Union, US, and Japan all posed an imperialist threat. In 1973 Zhou remarked to Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, that it was “a matter of basic principle” that the PRC would support peoples’ revolutions.¹⁴⁷ At an OC reception later that

143 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 60–61.

144 Wang Chun, *Chinese Communist United Front and Economic Plunder of OC* (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League (China Chapter) and Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League (ROC), 1980), 42–43.

145 The embassy in Ottawa and liaison office in Washington both had staff set aside for offering free visa applications and priority service to the OC. See Jan Wong, *Red China Blues* (New York: Anchor Books, 1996).

146 “Huijian Taiwan tongbao, lüri lüMei huaqiao, Meiji huaren de tanhua 会见台湾同胞, 旅日旅美华侨, 美籍华人的谈话 [Meeting with Taiwanese Compatriots, Japanese and America Tourists, American OC],” 6 October 1972, in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 46; US Consulate HK, “Teng Hsiao-Ping’s October Meeting with OC,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974HONGK13174, 6 December 1974.

147 US Consulate HK, “Beijing and the OC,”; US Embassy Canberra, “Sir Keith Waller’s Observations on Chou-Whitlam Conversations,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1973CANBER06095, 9 November 1973.

same year, CCP leaders urged the OC to advance revolutionary pro-communist activity abroad and continue building relations between China and the world. Thus, foreign governments remained skeptical of where OC loyalties laid.¹⁴⁸

3.12 Post-Revolution *Qiaowu* Policy

Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the need for OC contributions to continue China's modernization was paramount. Deng's meeting with OC delegates during the 1977 National Day celebrations and making OC affairs part of the official agenda indicated that the CCP had renewed its focus on *qiaowu*.¹⁴⁹ In December of that year, Beijing hosted an "All Nation OC Conference" to dispel any previous suspicions, resulting in calls for the revival and reinforcement of *qiaowu* under the slogan "all patriots are one family."¹⁵⁰ The meeting saw the Gang of Four blamed as the cause of the failure of OC programmes and previous criticism of *guiqiao* as bourgeoisie, reactionary, or foreign spies redressed by making various policy changes.

Widespread party-state support for OC affairs was evident from a *Renmin ribao* editorial arguing that more attention should be paid to *qiaowu*. It noted that the OC were "part of the Chinese people" and served as vital links in developing foreign relations and contributing to the PRC's modernization. This sought to change the previous view of the OC by contending that they were mostly labourers oppressed by imperialists and capitalists.¹⁵¹ The *Beijing Review* supported this opinion by translating *Zhongguo minzu* (中国民族) as "Chinese nation", thus indicating that Beijing viewed the OC as part of its own.¹⁵² At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978, Deng emphasized the importance of the OC.¹⁵³ Furthermore, OCAC chairman Liao

148 US Embassy Wellington, "NZ Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and OC," State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1973WELLIN02425, 11 September 1973.

149 Chan, "PRC Policy on the OC," 136–137.

150 Chang, "OC in China's Policy," 281.

151 "Bixu zhongshi qiaowu gongzuo 必需重视侨务工作 [OC Work Must be Taken Seriously]," *Renmin Ribao*, 4 January 1978.

152 Michael R. Godley, "Reflections on China's Changing OC Policy," *Solidarity*, no. 123 (July/September 1989): 108–112.

153 Porteous, "Beijing's United Front Strategy in HK."

Chengzhi (廖承志) commended the positive role of the OC, and brought their persecution to an end.¹⁵⁴

The CCP then promptly reinstated pre-Cultural Revolution *qiaowu* policy and re-established the OCAC as the OC Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAO or *qiaoban* 侨办) in January 1978; similarly, the All-China Federation of Returned OC Association (*qiaolian* 侨联) resumed in April that same year.¹⁵⁵ A further two OC conferences were held in late 1978 to determine the level of OC involvement in facilitating China's socialist agenda.¹⁵⁶ From the outcome of these meetings, the OC no longer served in China's international revolutionary struggle. Instead, bourgeois OC became "workers for socialism" and the National UF Work Conference declared that patriotism would unite and harness the talents and skills of transformed classes to support the motherland in a new UF of social modernization and economic construction.¹⁵⁷

Methods to attract OC resources targeted those traveling to China as tourists or visiting relatives, short-term study and exchange, and investors.¹⁵⁸ Through *qiaowu*, they would serve China's "Four Modernizations,"¹⁵⁹ national reunification, and advance CCP interests.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, *qiaowu* cadres called upon *guiqiao* to fulfill "Four Expectations". These included contributing towards China's modernization, its reunification, promotion of Chinese culture, and the development of international friendship. To facilitate this, domestic OC administrative work (*guonei qiaozheng gongzuo* 国内侨政工作) sought to educate them in order to unite, organize, and develop a connection between their place of

154 Liao Chengzhi 廖承志, "Pipan 'siren bang' suowei 'haiwai guanxi' wenti de fandong miulun 批判'四人帮'所谓'海外关系'问题的反动谬论 [Criticize the 'Gang of Four's' Reactionary Fallacy of the So-Called 'Overseas Connections' Problem]," in *Bixu zhongshi qiaowu gongzuo* 必需重视侨务工作 [OC Work Must be Taken Seriously], (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1978).

155 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 53–54.

156 These were the All OC Affairs Conference and the Second All Nation Conference of Returnee Delegates. See Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 496–499.

157 Barabantseva, "Trans-Nationalising 'Chineseness'," 9–10.

158 "Zai yici yewu zuotanhui shang de fayan," in Wang, *Qiaowu chungui*, 123.

159 By accelerating export-led economic growth, foreign trade and investment to make advances in agriculture, industry, science and technology and the military, the Four Modernizations were a reversal of Mao's policy of economic self-reliance. In the early 1990s, this term was tactfully reworded for OC audiences as "revitalizing China." See *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 8–9.

160 "Zai yici yewu zuotanhui shang de fayan," in Wang, *Qiaowu chungui*, 118.

origin and their outside links for the purposes of China's development under socialism with Chinese characteristics (see Chapters Four, Five, and Six).

The first step was to regain the trust and confidence of the OC. This involved reforming policies that would rectify past abuses in the form of re-establishing official linkages.¹⁶¹ Domestic OC work was conducted according to a revised sixteen-character UF principle of “treating everyone the same without discrimination, while paying attention and care according to particularities” (*yishi tongren, bude qishi, genju tedian, shidang zhaogu* 一视同仁, 不得歧视, 根据特点, 适当照顾) as announced in December 1978. Under this policy, despite their overseas connections, foreign habits, and customs, *guiqiao* were no different from other PRC citizens with the same rights.¹⁶² Over the next ten years, the PRC government issued various policies and undertook a number of programmes to attract the OC back to China.

Politically, the CCP reinstated *qiaowu* policy and expanded patriotic UF work. Those who had previously participated in communist movements abroad (such as in Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, or India) were given special attention. Domestic *qiaowu* united all these target groups under the slogan “long-term co-existence, mutual supervision, treat with sincerity, sharing the good times and the bad.” It also promoted “one country, two systems” with regard to the Taiwan issue. In addition, Beijing made explicit that the intelligentsia were both part of the working class and together with workers and farmers were the strength of Chinese socialism. It also rectified ‘leftist’ wrongs and concepts of ethnicity as a class problem, and sought to manage religious activity.¹⁶³ Without these measures, its target audience might have otherwise dismissed OC work and policy as ‘false propaganda.’¹⁶⁴

Economically, on the state-run OC farm projects, *guiqiao* workers received special tax breaks. Various propaganda programmes were designed to inform returnees of OC laws, linking them with various government agencies to develop “village-related” work, and implemented methods for gathering more contributions and donations.¹⁶⁵ Authorities accorded those OC adversely affected during the Cultural Revolution or land reforms measures for the

161 Godley, “The Sojourners,” 349–352.

162 “Guojia dui guonei qiaowu gongzuo de 16 zi fangzhen 国家对国内侨务工作的十六字方针 [The State's 16 Character Principle for Domestic OC Work],” in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 147.

163 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 59, 61–62.

164 “Zai yici yewu zuotanhui shang de fayan,” in Wang, *Qiaowu chungiu*, 121–122.

165 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 12, 132–156.

return of confiscated property.¹⁶⁶ When farmers complained, officials justified the reversal by describing the decision as a “historical right”.¹⁶⁷

In March 1983, the CCP announced various policies providing benefits and privileges for housing and education for the OC and their children.¹⁶⁸ This heralded a string of other policies aimed to attract the OC back to the mainland. During this same period, however, thousands of students were leaving China to study abroad. The next few years saw a loosening and tightening for those departing, with particular attention to counter the ‘brain drain’. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and subsequent sanctions by the West, *qiaowu* policy focused upon preserving links with the OC in order to continue the inflow of much-needed foreign investment.

These efforts to attract the OC had to appear genuine. Thus the rights and interests of OC investors and talent became legally protected, and processes for redress speedily facilitated through specially established special consultative committees.¹⁶⁹ The *1990 Law of Protecting Rights and Interests of OC and their Relatives* guaranteed that they would be treated “adequately” by the state.¹⁷⁰ Over the next decade, various provincial governments also passed their own provincial policies spelling out the additional benefits and privileges for the OC.¹⁷¹

In 2000, Beijing made several amendments to the 1990 legislation.¹⁷² These included: protection of their remittances, farms, houses and property; guidance, and support of their donations, investments, and contributions; clauses welcoming their return to China and for settlement; promoting their participation in China’s modernization; facilitation of their employment;

166 Shang Wen 尚文, Gu Anlin 谷安林, and Li Kunrui 李琨瑞, eds. *Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce* 党的工作方法手册 [Handbook on CCP Work], (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992), 551–557; Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 164–167.

167 “Yao heqing heli jiejie lishi yiliu de huaqiao fangwu wenti 要合情合理解决历史遗留的华侨房屋问题 [Must Fairly Resolve the Historical Problem of OC Property],” 1983, in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 126–131.

168 Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 137–138.

169 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 109–110.

170 NPC Standing Committee, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohufa 中华人民共和国归侨侨眷权益保护法 [PRC Law for the Protection of Rights and Interests for Returned OC and the Relatives of OC],” 7 September 1990, in Zhongguo qiaolian quanyi baozhangbu, *Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian* 侨务常用法律法规选编 [Selection of Commonly Used OC Laws and Regulations], (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2004), 236–238.

171 *Ibid.*, 700–834.

172 *Ibid.*, 236–238.

encouragement for youth to study and the elderly to settle down in China; and also simplification of their entry/exit by ensuring speedy approval and a warm reception.¹⁷³ In later years, other benefits and incentives included exemption from the one-child policy,¹⁷⁴ retirement perks,¹⁷⁵ burial rights,¹⁷⁶ and foreign property ownership allowances,¹⁷⁷ amongst others.¹⁷⁸

3.13 Political Structure of the *Qiaowu* Administration in the Contemporary Period

How are the *qiaowu* authorities integrated into the Chinese political system in the contemporary period? Yasemin Soysal examined the role of organizational structure and policy discourse in constructing an incorporation regime. In her study of immigrant Turkish guestworkers living in Germany, Soysal identified a range of specialist education programmes, social services, and support structures provided by the host country including officially stated policy goals, instruments, administrative structures for policy implementation, legal frameworks that defined the status and rights of migrants, as well as their participatory schemes. Soysal described the German-Turkish diaspora relationship as a hybrid statist-corporatist pattern of action and authority—a centralized state apparatus with a top-down mode of operation supplemented with a wide range of intermediary political opportunity structures for participation.¹⁷⁹

173 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 70, 143–145; *Qiaowu zhengce wenda*, 3–4.

174 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “For China-Born US Citizens, Visiting Homeland Has Risks,” *New York Times*, 1 May 2001, A1.

175 Yang Qing 杨清, “Zhongguo re shi haiwai huaren mianlin guoji shenfen xuanze 中国热使海外华人面临国籍身份选择 [China Fever Causes OC to Confront Choice over Citizenship],” *Nanfei huarenbao*, 8 October 2007.

176 *Qiaoqing jianbao*, no. 4, 2004, 12.

177 NPC Standing Committee, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohufa,” in *Zhongguo qiaolian quanyi baozhangbu, Qiaowu changyong falu faqiu xuanbian*, 236–238.

178 Zhu Zhe, “More Help to be Given to Returned Chinese,” *China Daily*, 29 June 2007, 3.

179 Social movement literature highlights the importance of institutional settings for migrant incorporation. See William Gamson and David Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 275–290; Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979,” *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (1996): 153–170.

She concluded that even without formal citizenship in Germany, the Turkish diaspora could be incorporated into various legal and organizational structures of the host society.¹⁸⁰

For the purposes of this study, Soyal's statist-corporatist model is adapted to clarify and analyze the relative role of various state administrations and key nodes of the *qiaowu* system as a transparent and explicit sending-state apparatus for dealing with the OC diaspora. As Figure 1 shows, the vast *qiaowu* bureaucracy incorporates the OC into China's national interests through a complex web of ministries, agencies, and organizations that share vast inter and intra-level connections.

The PRC's power structure is composed of three systems (namely the CCP, the government, and the military) which operate vertically with central, provincial, prefecture, county, and township levels. Across these systems are six sectors (military, legal, administrative, propaganda, UF, and mass-organization affairs) each again sectorally divided and supervised by a committee or non-standing organ, such as a Central Leading Group headed by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Although these groups are not decision-making bodies as such, their policy preferences and recommendations carry significant weight in the final decision. Leading groups and committees do not have permanent staff, and therefore rely on executive bodies to implement and coordinate policy. This system allows centralized control over the entire political system and its policy making process, with a high level of power concentrated within the CCP.¹⁸¹

Qiaowu is no different and shares many similarities with China's other *xitong* (系统) bureaucratic frameworks, whereby all organizations in the system follow centrally established policies, while specialized bureaus handle specific aspects. The CCP and the State Council share leadership for the key management functions—instructing and guiding the entire *qiaowu* apparatus by formulating relevant policy and ideological direction. Subordinate units attend to the practical aspects of jointly implementing these policies. Overall, there are five major *qiaowu* organizations that work together closely at

180 Soyal, *Limits of Citizenship*: 29–44, 77–79; see also Jurgen Fijalkowski, “Conditions of Ethnic Mobilization: The German Case,” in *Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-Cultural Europe*, eds. John Rex and Beatrice Drury (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994): 123–134.

181 Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 39–60.




FIGURE 1 Relationships between the qiaowu apparatus and the extended state bureaucracy

all administrative levels to achieve this.¹⁸² Two operate under central government structured lines, while the other three are intimately linked with the CCP and the UFWD.

The first of these major organizations is the OCAO, a unit directly under the State Council. In 1978 it re-emerged as the leading OC affairs organ for the PRC, and is known to cadres as the ‘family home’ (*nianqjiaren* 娘家人) of OC affairs.¹⁸³ It serves as the national level government body devoted to the coordination and implementation of OC policy through provincial and county level representation.¹⁸⁴ The OCAO of the State Council is currently under the direction of Li Haifeng, who is assisted by four deputy directors.

According to its website, the OCAO is responsible for several strategic and administrative tasks: firstly, drafting *qiaowu* policy and planning, drafting interrelated laws and regulations, drafting, supervising, inspecting, and implementing policies related to OC affairs.¹⁸⁵ Secondly, it has a role for intelligence gathering and dissemination: performing research on domestic and external OC affairs, and delivering this information to the CCP and the State Council; it is also responsible for circulating analysis to other relevant divisions of government. Thirdly, the OCAO assists the State Council executive in handling OC matters, overall planning and coordination of OC work with other relevant government divisions and social organizations. This includes guiding and working with them—often through the MFA, consular offices, and embassies around the world. This latter aspect will be discussed in further detail below.

In terms of its frontline work, the OCAO works to support the OC with domestic matters by organizing and coordinating *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* with other OC and ethnic Chinese for upholding their legitimate rights and privileges; it also assists relevant government divisions with supervising OC contributions, and helps relevant divisions with human resource management for *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* representatives. The OCAO is responsible for external matters as well: guiding and developing friendly relations and service work with OC, ethnic Chinese and their organizations abroad, developing relations

182 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 209–213.

183 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren shetuan lianhehui di 13 jie nianhui ji Aierlan, Fenlan qiaoping 欧洲华侨华人社团联合会第13届年会暨爱尔兰, 芬兰侨情 [13th European OC Federation Annual Meeting and Ireland and Finland OC Affairs],” *Qiaoping*, no. 33 (12 September 2005): 2.

184 Kim Kwang-yong, “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia,” *Institute of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1999), http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol11_1/kimkwangyong.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).

185 OCAO, <http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node22/node23//index.html> (accessed 31 May 2010).

with compatriots in HK and Macau, and working with relevant divisions for advancing Taiwan (anti-independence) work. It works to procure their talents and resources for China's benefit—such as promoting economic, scientific, and technological cooperation and exchanges.

The OCAO also has a clear soft power agenda through guidance, coordination, solidarity, and friendship with the OC mass media, cultural societies, and schools to carry out cultural communications.¹⁸⁶ This includes promoting OC propaganda, facilitating cultural exchange and Chinese language education work. The OCAO assumes that many of the OC are unfamiliar with it and its policies, and works to resolve this concern by providing information, contact, gifts, and resources in order to make them more knowledgeable about China.¹⁸⁷

To carry out these tasks, the OCAO is divided into eight departments:

- 1) Secretariat
- 2) Policies, Laws, and Regulations
- 3) Internal Affairs
- 4) External Affairs (including HK, Macau, and Taiwan)
- 5) Economic, Science, and Technology
- 6) Propaganda
- 7) Culture
- 8) Organization and Human Resources

Each division has close relations to the relevant CCP Central Committee Departments and various government ministries and agencies. Links of the OCAO are extensive, and filter down to provincial and city/town levels. Accordingly, local OCAO units work with their same-level corresponding organs of the Foreign Affairs Office (which operate under the MFA), Foreign Economic and Trade Commission (responsible for managing, attracting, and supervising foreign investment, and enterprises), the UFWD and the Propaganda Department. Offices exist in every province (except Tibet),¹⁸⁸ city or town.

186 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo," 10–11.

187 OCAO Internal Affairs Department, "Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan," 1.

188 Zhuang, "1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he zhengce de bianhua," 7.

While lower level agencies may not be expressly delegated authority for policy formulation, they enjoy sufficient space to move within the broad framework set out by the central government. Motivated primarily by economic considerations, these subordinate agencies exploit new opportunities and maximize their interests. For example, in recent years the provincial level OCAOs have enjoyed both increased influence over *qiaowu* policy development as well as the authority to set their own agendas. In Guangdong, the importance of OC affairs is so great that the number of its office staff exceed that of the Foreign Affairs Office.¹⁸⁹ The delegation of power to provincial level OCAO offices has a significant role to play in explaining the Chinese political arrangement and is discussed in further detail below.

The second major *qiaowu* organization is the All-China Federation of Returned OC Association (*qiaolian*). This body is ostensibly a national non-governmental organization under the CCP leadership for rallying and uniting all OC for China's national interests. In the same spirit before its dissolution in 1968, the *qiaolian* seeks to protect the legitimate rights and interests of *guiqiao*, their family members, ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality and compatriots by implementing policies and laws formulated by the state following investigation into their affairs. It is also charged with managing donations and remittances, resettling them in China, directing their education abroad, receiving and sending delegations for visits, trade, and sightseeing, maintaining and fostering patriotic spirit amongst them, encouraging contribution to China's modernization, national reunification, and international influence.¹⁹⁰

Connecting *guiqiao* and the OC down each level of the *qiaolian* and *qiaoban* network are various provincial and city/town associations, chambers, conventions, companies, and mass organizations responsible for frontline activities. These participatory schemes comprise an array of commercial, friendship, education, investment, tourism, scientific, and technological exchanges that operate through a variety of mechanisms to ensure the widest outreach: OC banks, stores, the China Travel Service (CTS) (Holdings) Corporation of China (originally established as the OC Travel Service),¹⁹¹ OC universities, specific research facilities (such as the Institute of OC Study at Jinan University,

189 Peter T. Y. Cheung and James T. H. Tang, "The External Relations of China's Provinces," in Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, 102.

190 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 54; Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 211–213.

191 China Travel Service (CTS), www.ctsgroup.com.cn/en/about/index.php?path=2-10 (accessed 30 September 2009).

the Research School of Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen University, and the Centre for OC Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing), OC schools (see section on OC education), *guiqiao* farms, and the OC Investment Company.¹⁹² In short, the *qiaoban*, *qiaolian*, and their affiliates share the general responsibility of representating the public face of *qiaowu* both inside and outside of China—advancing various aspects of *qiaowu*, managing the framework, formulating technique and policy, and implementing those designs.

3.14 CCP Influence over *Qiaowu* Affairs

The real guiding power over *qiaowu* (as with all other aspects concerning China's national interests) lies with the CCP, which acts in an ideological and advisory capacity to set its direction. The CCP Central Committee oversees five Departments—four of which deal with *qiaowu* affairs. Firstly, to manage communications with the OC, the CCP Central Propaganda/Publicity Department (CPD) works through the State Council Information Office and the Office of Foreign Propaganda (OFP or *duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi* 对外宣传办公室). These offices provide the appropriate content for the *Xinhua* News Agency and other state-controlled media to disseminate amongst the OC, including articles that foster pride and sentimentality for the homeland, and to 'clarify' any negative opinions they may have.¹⁹³ Pro-Beijing OC newspapers and other OC media platforms seeking to strengthen allegiances with Chinese authorities and diplomats by looking to the PRC embassy for guidance and prestige bolster this work.¹⁹⁴ This aspect will be accorded further analysis in Chapter Six.

The second is the International Department, whose responsibilities include developing relations with other communist organizations and local political parties around the world, facilitating UF work, and advancing external propaganda work concerning Taiwan and China's international image. Although

¹⁹² *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 213–216.

¹⁹³ Zhu Muzhi 朱穆之, "Chaoshan dui wai xuanchuan yao zuo hao huaqiao gongzuo 朝山对外宣传要做好华侨工作 [Chaoshan Should Do their Best with OC Work for Foreign Propaganda]," 28 February 1991, in Zhu, *Zhu Muzhi lun duiwai xuanchuan*, 297–302.

¹⁹⁴ Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 12, 157, 162; "Tigao waixuan youxiaoxing de wudian jianyi," *Zhongguo jizhe*, 2004; "Guangdong Encourages Media to Operate Overseas," *China Daily*, 1 October 2003, www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/01/content_269049.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).

difficult to substantiate, it works closely with the MSS for assisting PRC diplomatic attaches with intelligence gathering on foreign political matters and agent recruitment.¹⁹⁵ This work includes assessment, monitoring, and addressing threats and challenges amongst the OC. While the International Department is different and independent of government institutions with related agendas, it is not responsible for their policies in general, but works with them through PRC embassies and consular offices.

The third is the Organization Department (which deals with human resource, personnel control, and social issues of the state) and helps determine the policies for recruitment of OC talent, and particularly addressing the concerns of returned OC and allocating them to suitable positions of employment. As such, it works with the relevant government ministries and OCAO to achieve its objectives.

The last of the four Departments responsible for *qiaowu* under the CCP Central Committee is the UFWD. The UFWD is central to ensuring that *qiaowu* is implemented according to the wishes of the CCP. Its leaders are mostly selected by the CCP or are themselves CCP members. It has been instrumental in bringing together powerful pro-Beijing OC organizations and business elite seeking to maximize their relations with China by forming a “Chinese people’s patriotic” UF organization.¹⁹⁶ For example, one such ‘front’ organization for maintaining external relations is the Chinese National Association for Overseas Liaisons.

However, it is with domestic relations with the returned OC that the UFWD holds most influence through guiding two other major *qiaowu* organizations—both of which share similar goals. One of its most important achievements was the re-establishment of the CPPCC—an organ for the development of multi-party cooperation, political consultation, and a forum for promoting socialist democracy in the Chinese political system under the leadership of the CCP.¹⁹⁷ To engage and coopt the OC, the advisory level OC Committee of the CPPCC (*zhengxie qiaowei* 政协侨委) was established in 1983 as the third

195 David Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party,” *China: An International Journal* 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 26–54.

196 “Backgrounder: Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” *Xinhua*, 2 March 2001.

197 Bill Brugger, *China, Liberation and Transformation, 1942–1962* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981): 51–53; China Internet Information Centre, “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” n.d., www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/27750.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).

major *qiaowu* organization for political consultations concerning state policies and issues with other member parties, organizations, and representatives.¹⁹⁸

The mechanism for linking the OC with this Committee is its subordinate China Overseas Friendship Association, which together with the OCAO, works to consolidate contacts between people of various sectors in the mainland and others living in Taiwan, HK, and Macau, as well as those of Chinese origin living abroad. The major tasks of the Association are to enhance contacts, increase understanding, development and friendship, and develop UF work by publicizing CCP policies, promoting socialist achievements, China's modernization, and seeking consensus with the OC concerning reunification with Taiwan and the 'one China' principle.

The UFWD is also responsible for the fourth major *qiaowu* organization—the *Zhigong* Party (致公党 or China Party for Public Interest), which seeks to influence, guide and manage its members (mostly returned OC and their relatives, experts, scholars, and those with overseas relations). As a member of the CPPCC, it is one of the eight legally recognized political parties in China and follows the direction of the CCP. The *Zhigong* Party, with its political connections, is another unit that assists the OCAO and the China Overseas Friendship Association with their shared goals.¹⁹⁹

The fifth major *qiaowu* organization is the legislative level OC Committee of the NPC (*renda qiaowei* 人大侨委), chaired in the contemporary period by Gao Siren (高祀仁) along with nine other vice-chairpersons. This Committee is one of nine special committees working under the direction of the NPC, or under its Standing Committee when it is not in session. Its role is to review bills and proposals concerning OC affairs for deliberation by the Standing Committee. While it may appear that this special OC committee enjoys a high level of importance with the Chinese government, it has no real power as its activities are confined to discussions and approval of measures that are decided upon within higher echelons of the CCP.

198 The CPPCC also established a HK, Macau, and Taiwan OC Affairs Commission (*zhengxie gangaotai qiaowei* 政协港澳台侨委) for similar purposes. See Barabantseva, "Trans-Nationalising 'Chineseness,'" 11.

199 "Luo Haocai: Zhigongdang yao nuli kaituo haiwai lianyi gongzuo xinjumian 罗豪才致公党要努力开拓海外联谊工作新局面 [Luo Haocai: Zhigong Party Must Strive to Enter a New Phase of Foreign Relations Work]," *Zhongxinwang*, 11 December 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 25 December 2006, 10; CPPCC, "China Zhi Gong Dang," 14 February 2007, www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brief_intro_non_comm/200702140128.htm (accessed 30 September 2009); Groot, *Managing Transitions*, 38–39.

3.15 *Qiaowu* and Intra-Governmental Bureaucracy

Subject to the transcendent CCP political discourse, the *qiaowu* administration enjoys a relatively wide scope of independence, which grows and reacts methodically and strategically to the assorted issues that it faces. As such, the *qiaowu* bureaucracy develops its own rationale, takes on additional functions where required, and is constantly seeking to assume more power within the leadership hierarchy. However, because *qiaowu* falls under the scope of China's external work, the *qiaowu* administration's activities and objectives often become intertwined with the policy objectives of other government bodies. Personnel from various authorities take on shared duties and responsibilities for matters related to the OC. As mentioned earlier, China's relationship with the OC goes beyond the parameters of the *qiaowu* administration itself. Various agencies have specific objectives to achieve—involving, engaging, and mobilizing the OC for their own ends—but the roles and duties are quite distinct.²⁰⁰

The OCAO (through its state and provincial level offices) contact and communicate with OC community leaders directly on matters relating to OCAO activities. State, diplomatic, and ministerial matters pertaining to the OC, however, are handled through PRC embassies and consular offices. While the ambassador and higher level consular staff work to build up personal connections with OC leaders, ministerial attachés deal with specific responsibilities under their respective portfolios under instruction from Beijing. For example, MOC attachés promote propaganda and information about China and responds to anti-China/CCP forces); MOE attachés liaise with PRC students, prescribe textbooks and learning materials for OC schools, and work with Confucius Institutes (see Chapter Five).

In addition, the Ministries of Finance, Public Security, State Security, Personnel, Commerce, and Science and Technology each have a stake in ensuring that they can derive the necessary talents, skills, and financial resources from *guiqiao* and other OC. These ministries produce jointly developed policy documents and regulations for these purposes. While these ministries are not part of the *qiaowu* administration *per se*, their scope of activity clearly includes *qiaowu* issues and affairs because they are dealing with the OC as part of their broader mandate.

However, each ministry operates with different agendas, accountabilities, and perspectives. The complex intra-relationships and lines between *qiaowu*

200 The author owes a debt of gratitude to Flemming Christiansen, who provided a useful critique highlighting the nature of the *qiaowu* administration and its position in the Chinese bureaucracy. Personal communication with the author, December 2009.

matters and the *qiaowu* administration therefore become blurred despite separate career paths and command structures. Different *xitong* superstructures have different operating systems, logic, ideological training, and management skills. Training takes place in special universities, while intelligence-gathering and policy development processes are performed at special research facilities. Internal administrative matters, such as the recruitment of cadres, budgeting, and implementing specific programmes are their own concerns. They also have affiliated companies with semi-commercial objectives (such as publishing services) and quasi-governmental and non-governmental associations for people-to-people activity.

This organizational arrangement tends to spur different *xitong* to pursue their own interests—resulting in systemic horizontal and vertical conflict and competition between the administrative organs of the central state and the subordinate local government level agencies. Such interaction within the Chinese political system can be analyzed through interest group theory. This examines how power has been decentralized, with the central government converting the ‘demands’ of interest groups into policy. The organizational structures that they belong to, how they operate, the decision-making processes, and the manner in which policies are implemented all help to explain the Chinese socio-political system.²⁰¹

Governments move from one (or more) rationality to another, the nature of which may sometimes overlap or compete between bureaucracies.²⁰² In general, while the Politburo and State Council make decisions on which issues and policies are to be pursued, subordinate bodies also have significant input with these concerns. Political leaders from different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy negotiate with each other to reach a consensus that is translated into policy. The process sees various *xitong* and the central bureaucracy defining their position, bargaining with local level bureaucracies, competing, or consolidating with each other to preserve its interests while expanding its political and economic capital and influence. As such, this process may not necessarily fall in line with the central government’s grand strategy. However, behaviour is moderated by shared values, set practices, and frameworks as conflicting interests are weighed out against each other.²⁰³

201 Peter Ferdinand, “Interest Groups and Chinese Politics,” in *Groups and Politics in the PRC*, ed. David Goodman (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1984), 10–23.

202 Ragazzi, “Governing Diasporas,” 378–397.

203 This model is useful for understanding the formal networks of power and how they work, but lacks a representation of the actual and informal political processes. See Flemming

Thus a feature common to crucial *xitong* structures in CCP work is the ‘double-hatting’ of prominent CCP personalities in multiple roles. For example, in the 2000s, Liu Yunshan (刘云山) held concurrent titles of Politburo Member, Director of the CPD, Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Propaganda (Publicity) and Ideological Work, Vice Chairperson of the Central Guidance Committee on Ethnic and Cultural Construction (Civilization Steering Committee), Member of the Central Group for Constitutional Amendment, Deputy Head of the State Leading Group for Informationalization Work, and Head of the National Anti-Pornography and Anti-Illegal Publications Work Group). As noted by China analyst Anne-Marie Brady, by “holding everything in one hand” the CCP is able to enforce its influence over multiple sectors under the control of one person.²⁰⁴

Furthermore, conflicts of interest between different *xitongs* and different hierarchical levels over a given policy area may require intervention (in the form of committees and leading groups) to create balance, and ensure that overall, the core policies and strategies are maintained. While the state maintains control over subordinate government ministries through ‘leadership’ (*lingdao* 领导) relationships (which can be interpreted as direct intervention, governance, and control), many other links in the intra-governmental apparatus (particularly those connecting ‘non-government’ affiliated groups) operate under ‘guided’ (*zhidao* 指导) relationships. In these circumstances, broad-stroke ideology is set by the CCP Central Committee and its Departments.

With *qiaowu*, the OC Affairs Committee of the NPC (although not having real power as such) is tasked with policy planning, reconciling subordinate agencies, and ensuring that these efforts follow the CCP’s grand strategy. Coordinated under the State Council, instructions from the Committee are issued through guiding documents that provide the latest developments, regulations, important speeches, suggestions, recommendations, and warnings that cadres should be aware of. Guidance can also take place through special schools, providing cadres with the appropriate education and management training. As such, the potential for intra-bureaucratic conflict is minimized due to a shared ideology advanced from the highest levels of the regime.

Because Beijing as a whole is in agreement with the basic assumptions of *qiaowu* policy, competing political and bureaucratic interests that may result in intra-level conflict in a consensus-orientated policy making process have not affected the fundamental direction of OC policy. As mentioned earlier,

Christiansen and Shirin Rai, *Chinese Politics and Society: An Introduction* (London: Prentice Hall, 1996), 19–20.

204 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 23.

qiaowu has the ability to integrate with these other state and party administrations, both centrally and locally. This integration is particularly evident with the ‘emergency response mechanism’, where the *qiaowu* administration jointly operates with MFA, local provincial government officials, and the backing of top-tier leaders (examined in detail in Chapter Eight).

3.16 Decentralization of Power in *Qiaowu* Operations

Qiaowu has become relatively decentralized and its activities more widespread during the contemporary period, albeit remaining under the ‘guiding hand’ of the CCP. In contrast to the ‘double-hatting’ observed above, concentration of power under one individual is not evident in *qiaowu* affairs. For example, during Hu Jintao’s leadership, there were no Politburo members in any of the principal *qiaowu* agencies. Neither Gao Siren nor Li Haifeng held other significant titles—however there were three other high ranking *qiaowu* officials holding multiple roles: Ge Zhenfeng (葛振峰), Vice-Chairperson of the OC Affairs Committee of the NPC, Central Committee Member, and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff; Wan Gang (万钢), Chairperson of the *Zhigong* Party Central Committee, Minister of Science and Technology, and Standing Committee member of the 10th and 11th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The third, Yang Bangjie (杨邦杰), held two positions of which both are directly related to *qiaowu* (Vice-Chairperson of the OC Affairs Committee of the NPC and Vice-Chairperson of the *Zhigong* Party). The significance of their roles in advisory bodies indicates that *qiaowu* policy operated under the overarching influence of the CCP.

Of the three, Wan had the highest level of overall power, with a diverse range of responsibility at the top tiers of the hierarchy; Ge also shared a broad portfolio, but was edging closer towards retirement from his military post. Yang was able to directly influence *qiaowu* affairs from strategic positions—both at the policy recommendation stage, as well as with its implementation. Wan and Yang’s links to the *Zhigong* Party are of particular significance—while the *Zhigong* Party is ostensibly non-governmental in nature, the presence of both officials illustrate the direct relationship between the state and *qiaowu* affairs. Links to the *Zhigong* Party also mean connections to the UFWD, OC publications, and other frontline apparatus for communication and propaganda geared towards the OC. Key aspects of *qiaowu* remain subject to CCP ideology and its political discourse.

The same situation has also occurred elsewhere in the hierarchy. As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and open-door policies after 1978,

economic power and international interaction passed from the central level down to the provincial level. This increased the assertiveness of provincial authorities and created a new dynamic in central-provincial relations for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, resulting in more complex and consultative processes. At the same time, except for grand strategy decisions (which remain the preserve of top leaders), power has moved down to subordinate agencies, and from Beijing to the provinces.²⁰⁵

Decentralization of *qiaowu* occurs at the provincial level according to geographic location, central government policy, and local development strategies. Guangdong and Fujian were early recipients of preferential policies after 1979, given that they were both important points of origin and return for the OC, and also directly connected to Beijing's objectives with HK and Taiwan. Coastal development of the 1980s gradually moved to other regions in the 1990s. In the contemporary period, various provinces have their own programmes competing for OC investment, skills, and resources as an integral part of their domestic development strategies.²⁰⁶

Provincial level *qiaowu* efforts have gone from strength to strength in recent years as a result of increased migration abroad and the intense effort to attract OC investment in a competitive environment.²⁰⁷ Delegations visit, exchange gifts, and stimulate closer relationships with OC communities. Their role is to showcase China's modern developments—particularly to those who have resided outside of China for extended periods and are unaware of changes over recent years. Meetings between OC community members and visiting PRC officials are a common staple of state visits, comprising both a social and economic agenda.

With a significant number of OC originating from its shores, the Guangdong OCAO (GOCAO) is one of the leading provincial level units.²⁰⁸ Its efforts provide

205 David M. Lampton, "China's Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?" in Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, 1–36.

206 Cheung and Tang, "The External Relations of China's Provinces," 91–120; Nyiri, "From Class Enemies to Patriots," 217, 227.

207 As OC origins become more diverse, offices have expanded to provinces outside the traditional regions of Guangdong and Fujian. For example, the Guizhou Province Foreign Affairs Office has responsibility for OC from its jurisdiction. See its website, www.gzgov.gov.cn/enggov/pages/government-44.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).

208 About 20 million Chinese nationals and ethnic Chinese overseas (excluding those living in HK, Taiwan and Macau) originate from Guangdong, accounting for 70% of all OC worldwide. GOCAO, "OC & Foreign Affairs," 10 June 2006, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/brief/200406100026.htm> (accessed 30 September 2009).

the State Council with new and original concepts and proposals for *qiaowu* policy development and opportunities for OC participation; in turn, other provincial offices have adopted and adapted many of the GOCAO's programmes and strategies as part of their own *qiaowu* activities. Initiatives include The Guangdong Returned OC Association, Guangdong International OC Chamber of Commerce, the Youth OC Association, and the Guangzhou Convention of OC Scholars in Science and Technology.²⁰⁹

The GOCAO has also pioneered an important and direct means of connection with the OC—achieved through provincial Overseas Exchange Associations (*haiwai jiaoliu xiehui* 海外交流协会). These Associations have special economic, science, and technology divisions to facilitate exchanges with OC scientists and technical experts, and to gather intelligence on them for strategic purposes. They also have a key mobilization role by appointing and coopting directors from leading OC organizations to advance *qiaowu* influence abroad. Without formal diplomatic representation, provincial authorities rely on these semi-official channels for establishing and maintaining links overseas. Directors act as quasi-ambassadors for China, charged with furthering the Chinese connection with local governments and raising China's soft power and influence at the people-to-people level.

The KMT had its own system of managing OC communities by appointing commissioners (*qiaowu weiyuan* 侨务委员) to promote its interests overseas before 1949.²¹⁰ Under *jus sanguinis*, commissioners were responsible not only for the legal protection of all OC, but also legal control over them as well.²¹¹ In contrast, the PRC does not seek jurisdiction over its diaspora, but simply confers honorary positions. Their selection is based on education, talent, and age—with a preference for younger, skilled OC with connections in local government or organizations, and not necessarily those with economic prowess. While most originate from larger countries, the hope is to increase this pool

209 GOCAO, "Guangdong Returned OC Association to Invite More Members," 12 July 2005, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200507120006.htm> (accessed 30 September 2009); GOCAO, "The 8th Guangzhou Convention of OC Scholars To Be Held," 7 July 2005, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200507070027.htm> (accessed 30 September 2009).

210 Chen Jie, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia*, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), 178. Commissioners are still appointed in the contemporary period, but act in a liaison capacity between *Taiqiao* and Taipei (see Chapter Four).

211 McNair, *The Chinese Abroad*, 27.

to include those from less-represented areas of the diaspora in order to form a truly global network.²¹²

Directors are mobilized at four levels: small groups for specific tasks, international groups for larger projects at the national/regional level, industrial/occupational groups for specialist knowledge tasks, and an internal China group for facilitating more exchange with other overseas directors.²¹³ To keep them energized and loyal, the Association holds regular activities to maintain their interest. Directors are inspired to organize functions back home and report back to the Guangdong authorities. Cadres reward their work with five-star treatment during return visits, and lavish praise upon them at conferences and in newsletter articles. As such, these elite OC are eager to serve closely with *qiaowu* and state authorities.

The directors' role is important for frontline *qiaowu* operations as they themselves are the leaders of strategic local OC organizations, and hence instrumental towards shaping the behaviours and responses of their members. Serving in this middle-man capacity, the constituency may be unaware that some of the instructions they receive are actually from the OCAO (and ultimately the CCP) itself. Under a decentralized but 'guided' relationship for participation, responsibilities are passed down the chain, relieving the OCAO of the work, costs, and resources that would otherwise be required. At the same time, it loses none of its influence for mobilizing strategic groups.

3.17 *Qiaowu* as a Political Opportunity Structure

As per Soysal's hybrid statist-corporatist pattern of action and authority, the *qiaowu* system can be accurately described as a centralized state apparatus with a top-down mode of operation supplemented with a wide range of decentralized intermediary structures for participation.²¹⁴ These platforms provide the channels for the state to incorporate the OC, while the OC also have opportunities to engage with the state in a transnational context. Integrated into

²¹² Lü Weixiong 吕伟雄, "Lishi dangjia, wutai zaiwai, neiwai wudong, gongchuang gongying 理事当家,舞台在外,内外互动,共创共赢 [Directors as Family, Stage on the Outside, Work Both Inside and Out, Initiate and Prosper Together]," speech presented at the 15th Anniversary of Guangdong Overseas Exchange Association, Guangzhou, 23 November 2007.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*: 29–44, 77–79; Fijalkowski, "Conditions of Ethnic Mobilization," 123–134.

the Chinese political system, a multi-faceted incorporation regime of specialist programmes, social services, and support systems supported by officially-stated policy goals and legal frameworks work to incorporate the OC for advancing Beijing's national interests on many levels.

With reference to the latter, Gamson, Meyer, and Kurzman explain such relationships in terms of social movement theory, arguing that such institutional settings provide political opportunity structures for migrant elites to participate in home country politics. Such participation can spread to the broader migrant community given the appropriate facilitation of consensus—such as media efforts to promote and frame the cause (see Chapter Six), or resolving internal differences amongst diverse cohorts within the diaspora (see Chapter Seven).²¹⁵

Hong Liu tracks the efficacy of these state-sponsored structures in incorporating the OC by examining Beijing's resilience in dealing with national and security interests measured against the cost of (real and potential) diplomatic problems generated by the diaspora. Liu argues that the successful domestication of these problems by the state—culminating with the institutionalization of opportunity structures and policies based upon convergence of political and cultural identity—has provided for new channels for diasporic involvement in China's diplomacy and international relations. The remainder of this book illustrates and supports many of Liu's findings: that there has been convergence of cultural and political identities between the Chinese state and the OC, and that state supremacy over the OC will remain the key pattern in this relationship.²¹⁶

3.18 Conclusion

The OC have always been an important resource for Beijing to draw upon. While they were welcomed under Mao for their contribution to China's development, radical elements within the CCP meant that the relationship was often troubled. This chapter has demonstrated that following years of contradictory and confused policy, *qiaowu* has evolved into a systematic and coherent apparatus of persuasion and influence.

The key to *qiaowu*'s success is its set of specific psychological tools for managing the OC. The *qiaowu* administration enjoys an institutionalized workforce

215 Gamson and Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," 275–290; Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement Theory," 153–170.

216 Liu, "Emerging China and Diasporic Chinese," 813–832.

comprised of cadres who are expert in developing person-to-person relationships. By seeding pro-Beijing sentiment amongst the OC, the CCP seeks to preempt any challenge to its power. Various techniques developed over the years demonstrate that China prefers to have the OC voluntarily support Beijing by encouraging positive feelings for the regime. By emphasizing care and sincerity as the core of *qiaowu* work, support for China (and hence the CCP) has resonated strongly amongst various elements of the OC diaspora.

Cadres receive regular instructions to improve their work; state, provincial, and local authorities are heavily engaged in building links with the OC; and the OC themselves are increasingly eager to further their access to educational and cultural resources, as well as economic opportunity. As such, aided by an ever-growing superstructure and a favourable environment under a shared ideology *qiaowu* has, and will continue to, deepen in scope and penetration.

Targets and Subjects of *Qiaowu*

Given the importance of the OC for China's national interests, this chapter examines exactly how the Chinese diaspora is defined. Some use the term OC as casual shorthand to describe both Chinese nationals living outside of China, as well as ethnic Chinese of foreign citizenship.¹ Such ambiguity has led to disagreement amongst academics, given the patriotic and nationalistic connotations which the term may carry.² As such, political scientist Flemming Christiansen argues that although the OC share common origins of a 'community' based upon their race, history, economic situation, culture, personalities, and social behaviours, boundaries marking the distinction of belonging to the group are obscure, and hence make formalistic categorization of the OC a difficult process.³

In addition, Beijing and Taipei's own definitions have developed over subsequent periods. While Taiwan has moved away from its traditional position of embracing all OC to focusing only upon *Taiqiao* during the DPP period, the PRC has become more confident in connecting with ethnic Chinese no matter what their origins. Post-colonial theories suggest that such participation in politics, negotiation of membership, and assertion of identity can all take place despite territorial displacement, and without a necessary reference to shared nationhood.⁴ In an age of globalized transnationalism, formations for allegiance and identity are shaped by non-sovereign and non-physical social formations.⁵ This chapter shows how the CCP has successfully targeted certain cohorts of the OC by adapting to the changes in the geo-political environment, responding quickly and effectively to their concerns, and by capitalizing on Taipei's weaknesses and mistakes with its own rival *qiaowu* policies.

1 Those of Cantonese origin (particularly the older generation) use the term *huaqiao* loosely to include all ethnic Chinese of any nationality but perhaps adding their country of residence. See Wang, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, 257; Low, "The OC Connection," 96.

2 For a selection of definitions, see Lu, "Programs of Communist China for OC," 1; Lynn Pan, ed. *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Dudley L. Postin Jr., and M. Y. Yu, "The Distribution of the OC," in *The Population of Modern China*, eds Dudley L. Poston Jnr. and D. Yaukey, (New York: Plenum Press, 1992).

3 Flemming Christiansen, "Chinese Identity in Europe," in *The Chinese in Europe*, eds. Gregor Benton and Frank Pieke (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998): 43–46.

4 Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures," 411–429.

5 Ogden, "Diaspora Meets IR's Constructivism," 1–10.

4.1 ROC Definition of the OC

A diaspora's ascription to a definitive identity is the product of complex social construction relating to migration processes, domestic politics, and negotiation between both state and non-state actors based upon rational interests.⁶ From 1911 until the late 1990s, under the principle of *jus sanguinis*, the ROC criteria for classification as an OC was largely based on ethnicity, and included all people of Chinese descent regardless of their citizenship.⁷ This definition came into question in the 1970s when Vietnamese refugees claimed that they were ROC nationals based on the fact that they were ethnic Chinese.⁸ Until 1990, the ROC automatically granted citizenship to all ethnic Chinese upon their 'return' to Taiwan as part of the great Chinese diaspora.⁹ Even into the early 1990s, Taipei continued to define the OC as "any person of Chinese descent living outside the borders of the ROC," and accommodated them in its *qiaowu* policy as it felt a "historical debt of gratitude" and sought to serve their interests in "whatever ways deemed appropriate and feasible."¹⁰

However, Taipei's answer for separating ROC nationality from actually being allowed to live in Taiwan lay in its *Domicile Act 1973*. Under this legislation, there is no automatic right for ROC nationals who live overseas to enter or reside on the island.¹¹ Such legislation spared Taipei from having to deal with a massive influx of refugees seeking to enter Taiwan based on their ethnic

6 Doty, "Sovereignty and the Nation," 125–127; Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," 334–336; Katzenstein, "Alternative Perspectives on National Security," 4–6; Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism," 171–200.

7 Sen-Dou Chang, "The Distribution and Occupation of OC," *Geographical Review* 58, no. 1 (January 1968): 97.

8 Tang Lay Lee, "Stateless Persons and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action Part 1: Chinese Nationality and the ROC (Taiwan)," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 1, no. 2 (1995): 201–231; Garth Alexander, *Silent Invasion: The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: MacDonald & Company (Publishers) Ltd, 1973), 195–212.

9 Tseng, "From 'Us' to 'Them,'" 383–404.

10 Government Information Office, *ROC Yearbook 1993* (Taipei: Government Information Office of ROC, 1993), 187; Frank Ching, "China, Taiwan Vie for Support of Chinese in North America," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 July 1993, 28.

11 In 2009, Taiwanese authorities passed an amendment to the Immigration Act of 1999 that gave stateless OC (mostly Tibetan OC and descendants of former KMT soldiers in Myanmar and Thailand) already living in Taiwan legal status and protection. See Ellen Ko, "Immigration Act Change Passes," *Taiwan Today*, 16 January 2009, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=47556&CtNode=428> (accessed 18 November 2009).

origins, yet allowed it to maintain jurisdiction over those OC considered as important to its interests.

As OC demographics changed following the relaxation of ROC migration policy in 1989, Taiwanese migrants abroad (imbued with a growing distinct Taiwanese consciousness) were not content with being grouped together with other *huaqiao*. They demanded a more accurate form of terminology to describe themselves, and hence preferred the term *Taiqiao*. This implied that they supported Taiwan, while *huaqiao* suggested only possessing Chinese roots.¹² Since 2002, the *Overseas Compatriot Identity Certification Act* has precisely articulated the modern definition of ROC citizenship. An OC is defined not as an ‘Overseas Chinese’ but as an ‘Overseas Compatriot’—that is, a ROC national without registered permanent residence in Taiwan but holding a valid ROC passport and overseas resident status; or was born abroad or has been living overseas for more than four years and has acquired permanent residency abroad; or a former PRC national but living overseas for more than four years and has permanent residency or citizenship of that country and a valid ROC passport.¹³

In other words, the current ROC definition of an OC is someone with Taiwanese connections, and not simply someone of ethnic Chinese descent. Thus in all of its contemporary announcements and policy, the OCAC is careful to avoid the term *hua* in order to clearly differentiate Taiwanese *qiaomin* (侨民)—referring to *Taiqiao*—from ethnic Chinese (referred to as *huaren*).¹⁴ Such terminology clearly signifies how Taipei views the OC and their relationship with Taiwan, and how it intended to distance itself from other ethnic Chinese altogether.

4.2 Taiwanization of ROC *Qiaowu* Operations

After 1949 the KMT was in a battle for its political and diplomatic survival. It sought international support by presenting itself as a staunch defender against

12 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 189–190.

13 OCAC, “Overseas Compatriot Identity Certification Act,” 18 December 2002, <http://www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=7070&no=7070&level=C> (accessed 30 September 2009).

14 See statistical information from the OCAC website, <http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public.asp?selno=944&no=944&level=C> (accessed 30 September 2009); “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons,” *Liberty Times*, 16 June 2000, www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20000616/20000616p7.html (accessed 24 May 2006).

communism. Because the KMT saw future reunification with the mainland as its primary aim, it placed emphasis on promoting Chinese commonalities with the OC (with Taiwanese identifying as Chinese nationals). Although the ROC could not claim Taiwan to be their ancestral homeland, it acted instead as the “protectors and orthodox bearers” of Chinese tradition and values, and sought to persuade the OC that the Communists had abandoned them. The KMT regime took on the role of guardian for Chinese high culture in order to legitimize itself as the true government of China—or at least to perpetuate the myth and concept of a political and cultural “Great China on Taiwan”.¹⁵

However, a longing amongst some Taiwanese (especially those with an inclination for pro-independence) to project their distinct identity eventually took hold in Taiwan’s domestic politics. These sentiments were likewise manifested in Taiwan’s OC affairs. By the late 1970s, ROC *qiaowu* had already begun focusing on pro-ROC/KMT organizations that made explicit affiliation with Taiwan and Taiwanese affairs.¹⁶ The political direction of the ROC changed profoundly as it embraced a post-nationalist identity in a process of ‘Taiwanization’ (sometimes referred to as localization or *bentuhua* 本土化).¹⁷ Rather than a rediscovery of its indigenous consciousness as the term might suggest, ‘Taiwanization’ evolved from a political movement against KMT hegemony and its reactionary antiquated values.¹⁸ Moreover, it reflected that fact that greater numbers of indigenous Taiwanese had entered into the ranks of the KMT power structure, local government offices, and the Legislative Yuan—thus diluting ‘Chineseness’ as a Sinophile identity.¹⁹ The pro-independence movement brought into focus an assertion of Taiwanese ethnic consciousness in its government policies.²⁰

In this environment, the ROC’s *qiaowu* effort was torn between KMT and DPP ideologies; it faced declining support from traditional *laoqiao* groups, and attracted increasing frustration from *Taiqiao*. Hence, its direction was often unclear and contradictory due to differences between the governing powers

15 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 174–177; Gary D. Rawnsley, *Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 90.

16 Brett de Bary and Victor Nee, “The KMT in Chinatown,” in *Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America*, ed. Emma Gee (Los Angeles: Asian American Studies Center, 1976), 147.

17 Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 155.

18 Allen Chun, “Fuck ‘Chineseness’: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity,” *boundary 2*, 23, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 127.

19 Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan as a Factor in China’s Quest for National Identity,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 15, no. 49 (November 2006): 671–686.

20 Ian Buruma, “Taiwan’s New Nationalists,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 77–91.

and the agency implementing the policy—the OCAC. From the KMT perspective, it historically cherished *laoqiao* connections in the context of *jus sanguinis*, even into the second or third generation abroad. Throughout the early 1990s, the OCAC continued to proclaim: “OC, no matter how long they live overseas, are considered as one.”²¹ President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), despite his pro-independence position and abandoning the claim for Taiwan to represent all of China, also described the relationship with the OC as “unbreakable.”²² The importance of the Chinese diaspora to maintaining Taiwan’s legitimacy, irrespective of their origins, was clear to the KMT.

This view endured constant opposition from the DPP, and the OCAC faced intense pressure from pro-independence forces both domestically and abroad. Throughout the 1990s, various legislators sought to push different policies for those of Chinese descent and *Taiqiao*, or to abolish the OCAC altogether.²³ This was because groups representing native-born Taiwanese viewed the OCAC as a KMT preserve, and that it only served Cantonese (the majority of the *laoqiao* population).²⁴ They complained that many beneficiaries had little or no relationship with Taiwan at all, and did not contribute anything back (such as taxes or national service).²⁵ Influential *Taiqiao* associations were equally opposed to the OCAC’s anti-independence policy and how it was obliterating Taiwanese identity.²⁶ As one of his pre-election platforms, DPP leader Chen Shui-bian appealed to these groups by advocating combining the OCAC with the MFA into a Ministry of External Affairs, and making *qiaowu* an integral part of Taiwan’s foreign policy.²⁷ To remain in favour, the OCAC enhanced relations with *Taiqiao* and pro-Taiwan OC, whereby OC investors were encouraged to share in the Taiwanese identity.²⁸

21 Tseng Kwang-shun (OCAC Chairman) as quoted in “The Historic Track of OC Affairs,” 60–62.

22 China Informed, “Lee Wishes Chinese Everywhere a Happy New Year,” 27 January 1998, www.chinainformed.com/current.html (accessed 30 September 2009).

23 “New Legislature Lineup Brings Expectation,” *Haihua*, no. 102 (July 1993): 62–64; “ROC’s OCAC Not to be Abolished,” *Central News Agency*, 10 December 1998, 1.

24 Maureen Pao, “The Call of Home,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 June 2001, 25.

25 Neil Lu and Ed Chen, “Fierce Debates Expected at First OCAC Meeting Under New Government,” *Central News Agency*, 12 November 2000.

26 Maubo Cheng, “Would-Be Head of OCAC Vows to Serve Pro-ROC OC,” *Central News Agency*, 4 May 2000.

27 Democratic Progressive Party, “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century,” 28 November 1999, www.taiwandocuments.org/dpp02.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).

28 Tseng, “From ‘Us’ to ‘Them,’” 383–404.

Although many DPP members were ambivalent to the OC issue and could not accept a relationship between Taiwan and non-Taiwanese *huaren*, those links had to continue—because millions of OC (particularly in strategic countries such as the US and Japan) remained an important political asset for Taipei. Thus, prior to the 2000 presidential elections, DPP officials toured around the world in order to solicit support from these *laoqiao* communities. They vowed to them that they would not close down the OCAC (as threatened by some of its senior members) but would strengthen services for them instead.²⁹ As such, the director general of the TECO in Los Angeles referred to his organization as a “surrogate consulate” for over a million ethnic Chinese throughout California.³⁰ As the KMT had long recognized, the DPP also had to acknowledge and respect the importance of the OC diaspora.

4.3 “Three Classifications”: The ROC’s Redefinition of *Huaqiao*

Such efforts to maintain support from the whole spectrum of OC began to waiver as the independence movement in Taiwan took hold. The appearance of the DPP in 1986, the Taiwanization of politics and society, and the changes in the governing party were all significant reasons for causing a significant deterioration in the OC relationship.³¹ The most controversial changes occurred after the handover of power to the DPP in 2000, when the DPP-appointed ROC OCAC chairwoman Chang Fu-mei (张富美) announced that its target groups were those who “identified with and loved Taiwan”—irrespective of their political affiliation or ethnic grouping.³² Moreover, Chang remarked that the OCAC should provide services according to a priority system based on “three

29 Neil Lu and Victor Lai, “DPP Candidate: Party Will Not Scrap OCAC If It Wins Election,” *Central News Agency*, 31 January 2000.

30 John Patrick Ford, “US in Asia: Taiwan Takes Its Time,” *San Diego Daily Transcript*, 17 February 2000, <http://www.sddt.com/Search/article.cfm?SourceCode=20000217tza> (accessed 1 October 2009).

31 Wu Yu-Shan (Director of Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica), interview by author, Taipei, 24 October 2005.

32 Under the DPP, the term ‘Taiwanese’ meant “any overseas compatriot who identifies with Taiwan and supports our independent sovereignty.” Chen Shui-bian, “Interview with Chen Shui-bian: Bring a New Party to Power, Democratize Taiwanese Politics,” interview by David Mayer, *Taiwan Panorama*, 2000, http://www.sino.gov.tw/en/show_issue.php?id=200038903022e.txt&cur_page=1&distype=text&table=2&hl=&h2=&search=1&height=1&type=0&scope=3&order=1&keyword=David%20Mayer&1stPage=17&num=10&year=2000&month=03 (accessed 1 October 2009).

classifications”³³—maintaining ties with only those who shared an interest, supported, or paid tax to the ROC.³⁴

As a result, *qiaowu* was subsequently dispensed in a *Taiqiao*-centric fashion, whereby budgets and resources for activities varied for different groups and regions depending on their size and level of political importance.³⁵ In 2002, of the 9294 OC associations registered with the OCAC, only 45 percent (mainly comprising of *Taiqiao*) received guidance and close contact.³⁶ While powerful pro-independence Taiwanese in California received comparatively more resources, Taiwan looked upon other ethnic Chinese around the world with an “open view,” and accorded them only limited support; pro-Beijing groups that did not actively support Taiwan were not included at all.³⁷

Politically, the OCAC would foster relations with both individuals and organizations to promote OC “citizen diplomacy”. This included encouraging elite OC to participate in local Taipei politics and spread awareness of Taiwan’s situation abroad. It emphasized Taiwan’s democratic environment and criticized the moral violations in China.³⁸ The OCAC would manage them and their associations for helping to resolve the cross-Strait issue, and to persuade the international community to accept Taiwan into international organizations. The mechanisms to achieve this included registration, planning, preparation, and coordination policy according to two guidelines: the “Measures on Providing Guidance to OC Associations” and the “Main Points on OC Association Liaison and Registration”.³⁹

33 Neil Lu and Flor Wang, “OCAC Chairwoman Asks for Forgiveness from OC,” *Central News Agency*, 24 July 2000.

34 Cheng, “Would-Be Head of OCAC Vows to Serve Pro-ROC OC.”

35 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*.

36 Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2002* (Taipei: Government Information Office of ROC, 2002), www.taiwan.com.au/Polieco/Policies/OverseasChinese/report01.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

37 See article 4 of Government Information Office, “Haiwai huaqiao tuanti lianxi dengji zuoye yaodian 海外华侨团体联系登记作业要点 [Main Points on OC Association Liaison and Registration],” OCAC, 2004, <http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public.asp?selno=343&no=343&level=P> (accessed 8 March 2012); Lin Jih-Wen (Research Fellow at Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica), interview by author, Taipei, 24 October 2005.

38 Maureen Pao, “Wanted: OC,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 June 2001, 24–25.

39 Government Information Office, “Haiwai huaqiao tuanti lianxi dengji zuoye yaodian” and “Haiwai huaqiao tuanti fudao banfa 海外华侨团体辅导办法 [Measures on Providing Guidance to OC Associations],” OCAC, 2004, <http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public.asp?selno=343&no=343&level=P> (accessed 8 March 2012); Taipei Representative Office in Germany, “Qiaomin ji qiaotuan lianxi yu fuwu 侨民及侨团联系与服务 [Relations

Culturally, Taipei's *qiaowu* effort would enhance the understanding of Taiwan's situation and distinct culture amongst those OC unfamiliar with things Taiwanese (such as the second and third generation of ethnic Chinese abroad). ROC education services centres would promote Taiwanese activities (such as youth tours and going to Taiwan for higher study), and provide communication on *Taiqiao* matters through propaganda, television, and the Internet.⁴⁰ Economically, the OCAC would assist the OC to invest in Taiwan and promote its exports.⁴¹ In this context, *qiaowu* services gravitated towards assisting Taiwanese to emigrate abroad (such as providing advice and seminars for prospective migrants) and integrating business interests between old and new migrants.

Chang's announcement drew strong criticism from *laoqiao* communities (particularly those in the US), to the extent that some large associations threatened to boycott or withdraw from OCAC affairs and functions altogether.⁴² Those who had previously supported the ROC and the KMT as an alternative to communism consequently felt alienated, angry, and frustrated with Taipei's move to cut traditional ties.⁴³ Others simply found a DPP government too difficult to accept.⁴⁴ They argued that the "three classifications" was an attempt to discriminate against mainland born and KMT-affiliated ethnic Chinese—accusations that Chang flatly countered as necessary due to "limited resources".⁴⁵ These comments would set the tone of Taiwan's OC relations for the next eight years, most of which were fraught with animosity.

and Service for OC and OC Organizations], n.d., www.roc-taiwan.de/info/yb_c/yearbook/htdocs/rocyb86c/86060903.html (accessed 6 April 2007).

- 40 OCAC, "Qiaowu weiyuanhui jiushisanniandu shizheng fangzhen 侨务委员会九十三年度施政方针 [OCAC Administrative Policy for the 93rd Year]," www.ocac.net/policy/policy04.asp/ (accessed 6 April 2007); Government Information Office, "Foreign Relations," *ROC Yearbook 2002* (Taipei: Government Information Office of ROC, 2002), www.roc-taiwan.org/taiwan/5-gp/yearbook/2002/chpt09-5.htm#22 (accessed 6 April 2007).
- 41 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Minjindang zhizheng houtai 'qiaowehui' de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang 民进党执政后台'侨委会'的主要工作及发展方向 [Essential Development and Direction of Taiwan's OCAC Following the DPP Ascent to Power]," *Qiaoping*, no. 29 (15 August 2000): 4–11.
- 42 David Tseng and Flor Wang, "OCAC Head Apologises Again for Inappropriate Rhetoric," *Central News Agency*, 8 February 2001; Neil Lu and Ed Chen, "OCAC Head Says Left-Wing OC Trying to Sow Discord," *Central News Agency*, 13 August 2000.
- 43 Jane H. Lii, "The New Blood in Chinatown," *New York Times*, 22 June 1997, 13.
- 44 John Chen (TECO representative to NZ), personal communication with Anne-Marie Brady, 1 May 2007.
- 45 Pao, "The Call of Home," 25.

The manner in which the ROC OCAC functioned during the DPP period clearly reflected the effects of Taiwanization. It worked to assist the OC in elevating their social status through acceptance in overseas societies with the aim of getting them to reciprocate through political involvement and influence in order to assist Taiwan's political situation, international status, and security.⁴⁶ Operating upon principles of "reform, innovation, foresight, and pragmatism" the OCAC appealed to its target audience by presenting a progressive Taiwan that held democracy, freedom, and human rights as its core values.⁴⁷ These were values that many OC and *Taiqiao* who favoured independence (particularly strategic populations in the US) could identify with. Thus it was clear that the OC, albeit a more selective cohort, remained very important to the DPP.

4.4 Damage Control

However, the DPP still acknowledged the need to maintain longstanding historical ties with *laotiao* groups—even if they were not Taiwanese. In the context of its rivalry with Beijing for international recognition, Taipei needed all the help it could muster. The *laotiao* communities based in the US and Japan remained a stronghold of political support.⁴⁸ The OCAC continued to emphasize that its top priority was to boost unity amongst the OC populace through promoting traditional Chinese family and educational values, as well as the resolution of Taiwan's relationship with China.⁴⁹

The frustration with Taiwan's OC affairs during the DPP era was that its policies were implemented through an organization deeply entrenched in KMT values. While it was resistant to accepting certain DPP directives, the OCAC had no choice but to bend to the demands of its political master. DPP legislators continued to undermine the OCAC and its KMT supporters by questioning the

46 Chen Yu-pin and Alice Liang, "OC Policy to be More Service-Oriented," *Central News Agency*, 17 July 2000; Oscar Chung and Flor Wang, "OC Policy Unchanged: OCAC Official," *Central News Agency*, 17 July 2000.

47 OCAC official, interview by author, Taipei, 27 October 2005; KMT official, interview by author, Taipei, 25 October 2005; "OC Return to Vote in Doves," *Taipei Times*, 26 February 2004, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/02/26/2003100181 (accessed 1 October 2009).

48 Press Division of TECO in New York, review of *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia*, by Chen Jie, TECO New York, no. 028 (November–December 2002), www.taipei.org/book/1112/foreign.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

49 Christiansen, *Chinatown, Europe*, 144; Chung and Wang, "OC Policy Unchanged: OCAC Official."

legality of OCAC-controlled assets and KMT-affiliated activities,⁵⁰ and accused it of subsidizing non-patriotic activity.⁵¹ The future of the OCAC appeared bleak.

The OCAC thus began a delicate balancing act of satisfying the pro-independence movement while trying not to upset decades of hard work with *laoqiao* by saying one thing while doing another. Consequently, Taiwan's *qiaowu* effort with these groups was often on the back foot. For example, in response to her "three classifications" remark, top-level officials (including the vice chairman of the OCAC and vice president of the Legislative Yuan, both of whom condemned Chang's comments as "inappropriate" and "misguided")⁵² personally delivered a letter from Chang asking for forgiveness from OC leaders. However, Chang later argued that left-wing OC groups had exploited her remarks as an opportunity to sow discord amongst the community. Chang consequently apologized again, citing her previous comments as a "misunderstanding".⁵³ The OCAC made continued efforts to assure *laoqiao* that they were still important to Taiwan. Diplomats maintained they would never give up on the OC because they were their "own flesh and blood".⁵⁴ Chang herself made a special visit to OC communities in the US to remind them of their importance, saying that anything to do with Taiwan's future "will include OC input."⁵⁵

Likewise, the OCAC denied any major change or difference in their relationship with the OC. Diplomats contended that there were neither budget cuts nor reduction of facilities and services to the OC, irrespective of their political

50 Crystal Hsu, "KMT Youth Corps Given 'Unfair Break,'" *Taipei Times*, 19 September 2002, www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/09/19/168625 (accessed 1 October 2009).

51 Melody Chen, "OC Official Denounces TVBS Report," *Taipei Times*, 14 October 2004, www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp?parentid=15847 (accessed 1 October 2009); Max Hirsch, "Commission Rebuts Tsai's Japanese Claim," *Taipei Times*, 19 October 2006, www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/10/19/2003332376 (accessed 1 October 2009).

52 Lu and Wang, "OCAC Chairwoman Asks for Forgiveness from OC."

53 Tseng and Wang, "OCAC Head Apologises Again for Inappropriate Rhetoric."

54 David Hu (ROC Ambassador to Panama) and Alex Chiang (KMT representative to South America) as quoted by Vanessa Hua, "Playing the Panama Card—The China-Taiwan Connection," International Reporting Project, 30 June 2002, <http://www.internationalreportingproject.org/stories/detail/658/> (accessed 1 October 2009); Sanguan Khumrunroj, "Taiwan Leader Seeks Help," *Nation*, 29 November 2000.

55 Kai Lui, "Bay Area Chinese Want More Say in Taiwan," *Sing Tao*, 4 February 2002, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=2fecac54bab4cb5d8c4125025f8a3aa9 (accessed 1 October 2009).

or ethnic alignment.⁵⁶ However, Taiwan's *qiaowu* effort had clearly narrowed to serve only *Taiqiao*, attract their youth to study in Taiwan, all the while relinquishing attention towards *laoqiao* groups.⁵⁷ For example, it either discontinued or did not sufficiently publicize activities for non-Taiwanese and second/third generation OC (such as conferences/forums/trips for *laoqiao* youth, scientists, or business people).⁵⁸ When questioned on these developments, OCAC representatives avoided criticism by arguing that *laoqiao* tended to be less active than *Taiqiao* in pursuing these programmes.⁵⁹

Furthermore, it was clear that Taipei was only interested in supporting those OC who were loyal to Taiwan. In addition to gathering *Taiqiao* statistics from around the world, the OCAC increased its collection of data on the wider ethnic Chinese populace (particularly in the US and other Western countries).⁶⁰ This indicated its willingness to maintain and deepen links, as well as gaining a better understanding of the nature and direction of various groups so that it could better identify those of interest and value to Taiwan. In line with the "three classifications", those *laoqiao* actively seeking friendly links with Taipei continued to receive invitations to dinners, support for cultural activities, and opportunities for economic and technological development in an effort to dispel any suspicion of political bias.⁶¹

4.5 Name Changes

Another example of the OCAC's reluctance to accept DPP directives was the difficulty and delays surrounding the alteration of its own name. Changing

56 "OCAC Official Talks Tough," *Taipei Times*, 25 August 2003, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/08/25/2003065144 (accessed 1 October 2009); Government Information Office, "Foreign Relations: OC,"; Neil Lu and Ed Chen, "OCAC Chairwoman Explains Goals," *Central News Agency*, 25 January 2002.

57 OCAO Policies, Law, and Regulation Department, "Taiwan daxuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang 台湾大选对我侨务对台工作的影响 [Effect of Taiwanese Elections on Our OC and Taiwan Work]," *Qiaqing*, no. 28 (23 June 2004): 4–6, 8–9.

58 KMT official, interview by author, Taipei, 25 October 2005.

59 OCAC official, interview by author, Taipei, 27 October 2005.

60 Chang Fu-mei 张富美, "Dangqian qiaowu shizheng baogao 当前侨务施政报告 [OCAC Current Administrative Report]," report presented at the Fifth Session of the Fifth Legislative Yuan Meeting, 25 February 2004, www.ocac.net/policy/policy01-1_03.asp (accessed 6 April 2007). See also annual ROC Yearbook statistics on OC that show *huaren* and *huaqiao* statistical data from the Taiwan Government Information Office.

61 Cheng, "Would-Be Head of OCAC Vows to Serve Pro-ROC OC."

the title of the OCAC had been under discussion since 2002, following concerns that some sections of the public were incorrectly perceiving it as a unit that served PRC citizens.⁶² While it was prepared to differentiate itself from its mainland equivalent, the OCAC did not wish to go as far as declaring a separate Taiwan identity for fear of offending *laoqiao* organizations. For example, the suggestion of changing the ‘C’ for ‘Chinese’ to a ‘T’ for ‘Taiwanese’ in its title was rejected by Chang Fu-mei who suggested that the many OC who did not view themselves as Taiwanese would “spark an outcry.”⁶³ She also remarked that most *laoqiao* would not shift their allegiance to China as long as Taiwan maintained the ROC name.⁶⁴ Others feared the change of title might provoke China, or that Taiwanese citizens residing abroad might feel they owed a duty to Taiwan, which was not the case.⁶⁵

In the end, Taipei decided on a compromise—the English acronym would remain unaffected, but the second word “Chinese” became “Compatriot.”⁶⁶ The OCAC did not substitute *qiao* (侨) in its Chinese title with the more literal translation of *tongbao* (同胞), however. *Tongbao* remains a patriotic term used by the PRC for uniting OC and those living in HK, Macau, and Taiwan. Instead, the OCAC makes clear its independent stance by having *Taiwan* clearly emphasized (*Zhonghua minguo (Taiwan) qiaowu weiyuanhui* 中华民国(台湾)侨务委员会).

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- 62 Chang Fu-mei 张富美, “Jiushiernian qiaowu weiyuanhuiyi shizheng baogao 九十二年侨务委员会施政报告 [2003 OCAC Administrative Report],” 19 November 2003, www.ocac.net/policy/policy02_04.asp (accessed 6 April 2007); Promotion Committee for Building English Living Environment, “Minutes of the first Meeting of Promotion Committee for Building English Living Environment,” 12 December 2002, www.bless.nat.gov.tw/prg/er_view01.asp?act=report&autoid=47&id=20&s=3 (accessed 6 April 2007).
- 63 Melody Chen, “Commission Asks for Name Change to Avoid Confusion,” *Taipei Times*, 21 November 2003, www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/11/21/2003076652 (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 64 “OCAC Says Most OC Still Loyal to ROC,” *Taipei Times*, 5 May 2004, www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/05/05/2003154180 (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 65 Wang Pei-lin, “Magazine Alters Name to Include Taiwan,” *Taipei Times*, 5 February 2006, www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/05/2003291625 (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 66 Using the term “Compatriot” accommodated the fact that many Taiwanese may not see themselves as “Chinese”; secondly, “Compatriot” referred to more than just “Chinese.” The argument was that although the ministerial body had changed its name, doing so did not affect its dispensation of resources—the term “Compatriot” meant that the OCAC was able to offer its services to a broader range of people. John Chen (TECO Representative to NZ), address to NZCA, Wellington, 17 June 2007.

Moreover, while other ministries were making name changes to reflect new government policy,⁶⁷ the OAC and other frontline OC organs remained defiant. A proposal to change the ‘T’ in TECO to ‘Taiwanese’ failed, as did a plan to include ‘Taiwan’ in re-naming its Service Centres abroad.⁶⁸ Correcting this took action from the highest level of the DPP regime—in December 2004 Chen Shui-bian pledged to change the names of all government agencies to include ‘Taiwan’ within two years.⁶⁹ The Taiwanization effort was in full swing—all overseas missions were obligated to highlight their ‘Taiwanese’ identity in official engagements, while mission chiefs were to identify themselves as ‘ambassadors from Taiwan’ in order to defend their “national sovereignty and dignity as well as to distinguish themselves” from their PRC counterparts.⁷⁰

It was not until mid-2006 that Taiwanese authorities finally (and very quietly) revised Internet web pages, letterheads, and other official documentation for the OAC.⁷¹ Other ROC government agencies had their official titles amended to include the word ‘Taiwan’ in both Chinese and English in official documents. Moreover, reference to the ROC has been increasingly relaxed, as long as its status as an independent entity is recognized.⁷² For example, Taiwanese literature for the OC (while still worded with terms such as ‘compatriot’ and ‘motherland’ in order to appeal to ethnic Chinese sensitivities) emphasizes

67 The ROC MOE referred to Taiwanese government-funded Chinese schools in Southeast Asia as “overseas Taiwan Schools” in line with government policy. Ko Shu-ling, “Yu Backs Chen’s Call to Use ‘Taiwan’ in Agency Names,” *Taipei Times*, 7 December 2004, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/12/07/2003214073 (accessed 1 October 2009).

68 Chang Yun-ping, “Organizers Hope for 2 Million at Name-Change Rally,” *Taipei Times*, 19 June 2004, <http://taiwantt.org.tw/taipeitimes/2004/06/20040619.htm> (accessed 1 October 2009).

69 Huang Tai-lin, “Chen Stands by Name Change,” *Taipei Times*, 7 December 2004, www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/12/07/2003214058 (accessed 1 October 2009).

70 Sophia Wu, “Chiefs of ROC Overseas Missions Fully Support ‘Name-Change’ Plan,” *Global Security.org*, 10 December 2004, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2004/taiwan-041210-cna02.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

71 For example, the 2007 TECO calendar gifted to OC communities was the first to clearly note “Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission ROC (Taiwan)”, with the Chinese characters remaining the same (*Zhonghua minguo (Taiwan) qiaowu weiyuanhui* 中华民国 (台湾) 侨务委员会). The calendar made a note of emphasizing Taiwanese culture and its distinction from “those of other ethnic Chinese.”

72 Tuan Y. Cheng, “The ROC’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in *Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s*, ed. Gary Klintonworth (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1994), 68.

the name “Taiwan”.⁷³ The DPP had achieved its goal of redefining the image and role of the OCAC to suit its objective of serving only those OC prepared to contribute to Taiwan’s interests.

However, this success was only temporary. Following the KMT’s re-election campaign for a second term in January 2012, the official English name changed to “Overseas Chinese Affairs Council” without prior notice in September 2012—both a clear acknowledgement of its mandate towards traditional OC groups, but more so a direct political statement to reverse the DPP administration’s 2006 decision that sought to appeal to politically neutral Taiwanese “compatriots” divided by issues of national identity.

The internal struggle with the DPP’s unrelenting de-sinicization policies with Taiwan’s OC agencies continues. In November 2012, under pressure from DPP legislators threatening to freeze the OCAC budget, OCAC Minister Wu Ying-yih (吳英毅) agreed to compromise by again re-naming the OCAC to the “ROC (Taiwan) Overseas Community Affairs Council”.⁷⁴

4.6 ROC OC Organs in the Contemporary Period

In the current period, the ROC OCAC comprises of a minister, a deputy minister, a vice minister and five departments: Policy Research and Development, OC Network Services, OC Education, OC Business, and OC Student Counseling. There are also five offices: Secretariat, Personnel, Ethics, Accounting and Information Management. Additional divisions include an OC News Agency and a Legal Affairs Committee.⁷⁵

The OCAC has a staff of over 350 in Taiwan, with another 60 based elsewhere in the world.⁷⁶ In addition, numerous volunteers assist with domestic OCAC activities. There are also 180 OCAC commissioners (mostly one per country) around the world to assist *Taiqiao* groups and promoting Taiwanese matters

73 Chang Fu-mei, introduction to *Spring Hope: 2005 Lunar New Year Goodwill Mission of Taiwan, Oceania Group Program* (Taipei: OCAC, 2005); OCAC official, interview by author, Taipei, 27 October 2005.

74 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “DPP slams OCAC’s use of Simplified Characters,” *Taipei Times*, 13 November 2012, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/11/13/2003547576> (accessed 27 April 2013).

75 OCAC, www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=707&level=C&no=683 (accessed 14 February 2014).

76 The OCAC Organic Statute was revised in 1981 in which personnel was increased to 354 staff. See OCAC, “History.”

amongst the community.⁷⁷ Unlike the jurisdictional role that they performed before 1949, today they act only as channels of communication between the ROC government and their OC constituencies. Their political appointment often reflects their loyalty to the regime and their status in the local *Taiqiao* community.

Where an embassy is not accredited, the ROC MFA operates out of a TECO that represents the ROC on Taiwan. It has the same function as an embassy except in name—serving and protecting the interests and welfare of Taiwanese in foreign countries. It also promotes economic, trade, cultural, educational, scientific, and financial exchanges between Taiwan and other countries.⁷⁸ TECO also provides cultural and educational resources for OC groups.

In addition, special OC Culture and Education Services Centres serve Chinese communities around the world (particularly those with large *Taiqiao* populations). They are attractive to those wishing to learn more about Taiwan without having an overt political connection.⁷⁹ In the past, Centres promoted ROC interests (such as the Double Ten October 10th anniversary of the founding of the ROC and ROC Youth Day) and used posters and artwork to highlight historic events of nationalist importance and bolster ethnic solidarity.⁸⁰ By 2002, 31 Centres (staffed mainly by volunteers) provided ‘contemporary OC affairs work’ around the world with an emphasis on Taiwanese affairs.⁸¹

Despite these provisions, Taiwan’s level of *qiaowu* infrastructure, financial support, and manpower are all clearly much less than what the PRC enjoys. Furthermore, the OCAC operates under the lingering threat of budget cuts.⁸² Today, only seventeen of the Culture and Education Services Centres remain.

77 Their acceptance of appointment is voluntary, with no payment provided. Many duties are performed at the Commissioner’s own cost, with limited access to funding from the OCAC.

78 TECO in NZ, <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/mp.asp?mp=217> (accessed 1 October 2009).

79 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 178.

80 Laura Li, “With a Little Help From Your Friends—Chinese Seniors’ Associations Are Booming in the US,” trans. Jonathan Barnard, *Sinorama*, May 1998, http://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/show_issue.php?id=199858705036E.TXT&cur_page=1&distype=text&table=2&h1=&h2=&search=1&height=1&type=0&scope=3&order=0&keyword=Jonathan%20Barnard&lstPage=7&num=10&year=1998&month=05 (accessed 1 October 2009).

81 Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2002*.

82 In 2001, the annual budget was \$US56 million. By 2008, this was reduced to \$36.9 million. See Chen Rong-ye, Vice Minister of OCAC, as quoted by Crystal Hsu, “OCAC Tries to Combat China’s Propaganda,” *Taipei Times*, 23 May 2001, www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/05/23/86921 (accessed 1 October 2009); Shih Hsiu-chuan, “OCAC

As such, it campaigns as the underdog and trumpets success notwithstanding its economic constraints.⁸³ Nevertheless, Taiwan finds itself in a severely weakened position when attempting to reach out to the OC. Not only does it lack the resources required to engage with a massive target audience, the DPP approach towards OC affairs had left many *laoqiao* quite bitter towards Taiwan. Groups once friendly with Taipei and the KMT vented their frustrations by turning to Beijing instead, while pro-Beijing groups became even more closely aligned with the CCP regime by supporting the anti-independence movement.

4.7 Rebuilding Links

These frustrations came to a peak in 2006 when Taiwanese diplomats were slow to react to OC affected during riots in Honiara in the Solomon Islands (SI) (a detailed analysis appears in Chapter Eight). While the DPP was largely ambivalent towards *huaren* and *laoqiao* OC, it also acknowledged that they still carried useful political weight.⁸⁴ Taipei had no choice but to salvage what it had left of its relationship with these OC. It was not an easy task. The ROC embassy's offer of US\$100,000 to the SI Chinese Association was initially rejected.⁸⁵ Money was later accepted only after emphasizing that the funding was not compensation, but for the "clean up exercise".⁸⁶ To meliorate rapport, diplomats actively helped with facilitating the Chinatown reconstruction process by working together with the local council and OC leaders. The embassy also offered local OC representatives a sponsored trip to Taiwan.

Despite these attempts to patch up relations, it was clear that the future of Taiwan's *qiaowu* effort amongst *laoqiao* communities under the DPP was in jeopardy. The KMT offered some hope for improvement. Throughout the eight years that it was not in power, the KMT maintained that there was, and never would be, any change in its policy towards the OC. In the spirit of *jus sanguinis*, the KMT promised that it would continue its traditional connection

Escapes Inclusion in Foreign Ministry," *Taipei Times*, 19 April 2009, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/19/2003441459 (accessed 1 October 2009).

83 Hsu, "OCAC Tries to Combat China's Propaganda."

84 Press Division of TECO in New York, review of *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*.

85 Joy A. Rikimae, "Chinese Group in Solomons Rejects Taiwan Aid," *Solomon Star*, 5 June 2006, <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/June/06-05-09.htm> (accessed 18 August 2006).

86 "Taiwan Gives \$100,000 for Honiara Cleanup," *Solomon Star*, 6 July 2006, <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/July/07-06-12.htm> (accessed 18 August 2006).

with all ethnic Chinese and reinstate the previous OC policies that the DPP had removed. However, it did acknowledge that while *laoqiao* groups could look forward to improved links with a KMT-led Taiwan, they could not be assured of enjoying a full restoration of pre-2000 policy. It conceded that while the KMT would endeavour to do its best to assist the OC, it could not take care of them as well as before. This reflected the modern geo-political and economic situation of the OC, who no longer relied on support from the KMT due to their own improving economic situation; it also reflected the limited resources that Taiwan had available for them.⁸⁷

Since the KMT was re-elected to government in 2008, Taiwanese diplomats have moved away from the politically motivated relationship of the DPP years. Instead, they returned to the old KMT style of supporting the OC prosperity and encouraging building pragmatic relations with them. Although these changes may have signalled some improvements with *laoqiao*, it is clear that Taiwan can never return to the level of relationship that it enjoyed in times past. No matter how Taipei viewed the ethnic Chinese in their definition of OC, its relationship with them was constantly called into question.

Despite its earlier promises, Taiwan's *qiaowu* effort was still very much influenced by its domestic political situation. Reports that Ma Ying-jeou's (马英九) administration intended to scrap the OCAC soon surfaced. Not long after, Ma announced that the OCAC (served through sixteen offices) would merge with Taiwan's MFA in order to provide "better services" through its larger network of 121 offices.⁸⁸ The OCAC itself was hesitant for such a merger, given that it would alienate Taiwan from many *laoqiao* (predominantly non-*Taiqiao*) supporters, and create practical limitations for both OCAC and diplomatic personnel.⁸⁹

In the same way that they reacted to the DPP's "three classifications," *laoqiao* groups around the world again sent petitions of protest and threatened to boycott Taiwanese exchanges and visits if the merger was to go ahead. The KMT was well aware of the potential damage that could arise from losing the

87 The KMT views all Chinese, no matter what their origin, as the same. Interview with KMT official, Taipei, 25 October 2005 and 19 April 2008.

88 International Community Radio Taiwan, 25 March 2009, <http://english.csie.ncnu.edu.tw/modules/iWSML/Ben/html/200903250950.html> (accessed 1 October 2009).

89 Flor Wang, "OCAC Head Reserved About Combining Agency with Foreign Ministry," *Central News Agency*, 11 June 2008, <http://english.cna.com.tw/SearchNews/doDetail.aspx?id=200806110024> (accessed 1 October 2009).

support of these OC groups.⁹⁰ Finally in April 2009, Ma made a last minute change to the proposal, and the OCAC was able to continue with its functions fully intact.⁹¹ The constantly looming threat of Beijing's rival *qiaowu* efforts to reclaim the OC was clearly a major factor in influencing this outcome.

Taipei's failure to capture the hearts and minds of these aggrieved OC can be explained by examining the limited and selective capacity of the ROC's corporatist intermediary structures for linking them and their interests to the state and its administrative organs.⁹² Under Soysal's statist-corporatist framework, the state is a bureaucratic administrative unit that centrally organizes the polity and decision-making processes and provides, initiates, and intervenes in societal function. In the case of Taipei, that refers to defining who is or is not an OC, and therefore their eligibility to receive OCAC services. By offering only exclusive channels for corporatist participation, only some parts of the diaspora (mostly limited to *Taiqiao* and OC with historical links to Taipei) are successfully incorporated; while most other non-*Taiqiao* OC remain subject to the whims of Taipei, and effectively isolated. As per Hong Liu's modelling of the state-diaspora relationship,⁹³ Taipei has not demonstrated the same level of resilience as Beijing in its domestication of OC issues, due mostly to a factionalized internal and external populace and a troubled *qiaowu* infrastructure—and hence unsuccessful with developing appropriate policies for facilitating effective participation.

In the contemporary period, Taiwan simply does not have the resources or the political support to deal with such a large and diverse diaspora; nor does it possess a sufficiently robust or attractive enough platform for the wider ethnic Chinese diaspora to readily identify with—particularly after a long period of Taiwanization. This emerging chasm signaled fresh opportunities for the CCP to exploit. Beijing's competing *qiaowu* efforts have received a much more favourable response from a significantly diverse and growing audience.

90 KMT News Network, "Merger of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission Opposed," 11 March 2009, www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=5891 (accessed 30 September 2009).

91 Shih, "OCAC Escapes Inclusion in Foreign Ministry."

92 Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*, 29–44.

93 Liu, "Emerging China and Diasporic Chinese," 813–832.

4.8 PRC Definition of the OC

Since 1949, the PRC's definition of the OC diaspora has also undergone complex social construction and negotiation by both state and non-state actors in the context of migration processes, domestic politics, and influence. Like Taipei, the extent of Beijing's corporatist intermediary structures for linking the OC and their interests to the state and its administrative organs also strengthened or weakened depending on its level of state supremacy and convergence with the political interests and identity of the diaspora; in addition, this calculus also weighed up the costs and benefits of implementing these policies in the context of China's international relations.

Beijing's modern definition of the OC includes those Chinese nationals of the PRC (including Taiwan, HK, and Macau without the right of abode elsewhere) living overseas and sojourners intending to return to China (*huaqiao*),⁹⁴ Chinese naturalized abroad (*huaren*), and those born abroad of Chinese descent (*huayi* 华裔). The first group can be further distinguished as *tongbao* 'compatriots'—those Chinese eligible for PRC citizenship but living in HK, Macau, or Taiwan (*gangao tongbao* 港澳同胞 and *Taiwan tongbao* 台湾同胞 respectively). *Huaren* describes ethnic Chinese in general, and may be further qualified as *waiji huaren* (外籍华人), used for foreign nationals of Chinese descent and those former PRC citizens who have taken foreign citizenship, and their descendants. The terms *huaren* and *huayi* also include *huabao* (华胞) and *qiaobao* (侨胞)—ethnic Chinese compatriots living outside of China, HK, or Macau).⁹⁵ The country in which they reside is often added for clarity.⁹⁶ However, while stipulating foreign nationality, these terms retained an ambiguous racial and cultural link to the mainland.⁹⁷

Consequently, throughout the 1960s and 70s, American diplomats noted that Southeast Asian countries remained skeptical of the "OC problem," which

94 See Article 2 in NPC Standing Committee, "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohufa," in Zhongguo qiaolian quanyi baozhangbu, *Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian*, 236–238.

95 An ill-defined External China (*waihua zhengce* 外华政策) policy in the mid-1980s raised complex issues concerning not only those Chinese nationals outside the PRC, but also those related to them inside China. This necessitated new policy to describe returned OC as *guiqiao* (returned OC for permanent settlement) and *qiaojuan* (OC dependants and relatives of *huaqiao* and *guiqiao*). See Wang, "External China as a New Policy Area," 28–43.

96 Chen Youzheng 陈友政, ed. *Gongmin shouce* 公民手册 [Citizens' Handbook] (Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 1988), 360–361; *Qiaoping jianbao*, no. 9, 2004, 11.

97 Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logistics of Transnationality* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1999), 43.

was a major consideration in resuming diplomatic relations.⁹⁸ Beijing had to take careful steps to advance its national interests with neighbouring powers while ensuring that it could preserve its relationship with the diaspora. This required a two-pronged approach: in the public arena, Beijing had to clearly define the relationship; yet in practice when dealing with the OC, the definition remained quite vague. This ambiguity continued until the late 1990s and precipitated racial tensions throughout the region (see Chapter Eight). Beijing had to make some hard decisions concerning who it could and could not assist according to the geo-political climate.

4.9 Distinguishing *Huaqiao* from *Huaren*

Huaqiao (as PRC nationals abroad) remained representatives of China and things Chinese overseas. Beijing expected them to demonstrate patriotism and to participate in its modernization and reunification, and mobilized them on several fronts to unite the OC for self-development. These included promoting OC unity, strengthening OC intellectual work, and treating returned OC with special care and warmth.⁹⁹ However, in the late 1970s, *huaqiao* totaled only 5 percent of the global OC population. If China was to reach out to the wider OC populace as sources of much-needed capital and expertise, it needed to widen its scope to accommodate both Chinese nationals and foreign ethnic Chinese (*tongbao* and *huaren*).

In this neo-liberalist context, Beijing actively cultivated relationships with the OC diaspora through transnationalist projects that reasserted, reinforced, and strengthened notions of the nation-state agenda and national identity for the purposes of advancing global capitalism, trade liberalization, and export-led growth.¹⁰⁰ Beijing's diasporic policies also worked to facilitate the return of OC through incentives, encouraging patriotism, or sentimentalism in order to rebuild and modernize the country.¹⁰¹

To cast the widest net possible, *huaren* were a major target for *qiaowu*. While they were clearly distinguished from *huaqiao* as foreign nationals, Beijing

98 US Embassy Jakarta, "Malik on China," State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1973JAKART04895, 26 April 1973.

99 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 70–71; *Qiaowu zhengce wenda*, 2–4; Gu, *Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda*, 3; Shang, Gu and Li, *Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce*, 519–520.

100 Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad*; Adamson and Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries," 489–526; Smith, "Diasporic Memberships," 724–759.

101 Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas," 378–397.

never had any intention to forsake them or their resources.¹⁰² Apart from the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution, *huaren* were very much a part of China, and warmly welcomed into its embrace.¹⁰³ *Huaren* were also growing in numbers throughout the world. They comprised of the millions in Southeast Asia who had been established there for centuries, those who had gone elsewhere and were emerging into their second and third generations, and other recent migrants who had adopted foreign nationality. *Qiaowu* analysts noted that these OC had become an important and powerful pool of resources for China. Many of them had achieved status in society and participated in local politics, and therefore could be tapped as a trade network and export market for Chinese-made products.¹⁰⁴

Thus China's *qiaowu* policy after 1978 was no longer based upon solely promoting revolutionary ideology, but for advancing economic development with *huaren* upon the premise of ethnographic connection—in particular, targeting those from the 'little dragon' economies. A large volume of academic study exists concerning the role of the OC in making foreign direct investment (FDI) into China.¹⁰⁵ Their technical knowledge, managerial skills, and transnational

102 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 2, 11.

103 "Buyao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian 不要混淆华侨,华人的概念 [Do Not Confuse The Notions of Huaqiao and Huaren]," 1995, in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 90–92.

104 "Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua 华侨,外籍华人社会结构的变化 [Changes in the Structure of OC Society]," 1982, *ibid.*, 84–89.

105 Estimating the exact amount of FDI going into China can be difficult, as it is calculated using national origins, and most of the capital is transferred via HK. Data can be sourced from FDI statistics produced by MOFTEC, Customs, the *China Statistical Yearbook*, WTO International Trade Statistics and OECD studies. For an overview, see Yingqi Wei and Xiaming Liu, *Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and Impacts* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2001); Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, "Main Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investments on China's Economy," Working Paper on International Investment, No. 2000/4, December 2000, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/23/1922648.pdf> (accessed 10 April 2010); Chung Chen, Lawrence Cheng and Yimin Zhang, "The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China's Post-1978 Economic Development," *World Development*, 23, no. 4 (1995): 691–703. One study suggests as much as 80–90% of foreign investment enterprises and invested capital in China originated from OC sources from around the region. See Noel Tracy, "The Making of a New Little Dragon: The OC and the Transformation of Guangdong," Asia Research Centre Working Paper no. 36, Murdoch University, Australia; Zhuang Guotu, "China's Relations with Ethnic Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia: A Research Agenda," *NIASnytt*, no. 3 (September 2004): 22–24; Lewis M. Simons and Michael Zielenziger, "Enter the Dragon: Building the Chinese Powerhouse," *San Jose Mercury*, 26 June 1994, <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/texts/chinprss.html> (accessed 30 September 2009);

networks are widely understood to have contributed greatly to China's economic revolution.¹⁰⁶

In 1980, Beijing authorities announced *The Nationality Law of the PRC*.¹⁰⁷ The significance of this legislation was that while it clearly defined the nature and conditions of PRC nationality (and hence the difference between *huaren* and *huaqiao*), it underscored the importance of respecting *huaren* ethnic sentimentality.¹⁰⁸ Although they existed outside the legal jurisdiction of the PRC and had their own set of loyalties and values, *huaren* were not to be regarded or treated the same as 'ordinary foreigners' (*yiban waiguoren* 一般外国人).¹⁰⁹ *Huaren* maintain Chinese bloodlines, language, culture, traditions, friends, and family in China. They have a strong ethnic affinity for China and share the same hope that it can become strong and prosperous. These attributes and feelings do not diminish just because they hold a different passport.¹¹⁰ Thus in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping remarked that anyone of Chinese descent was a "big advantage" for China's growth.¹¹¹

At a 1984 provincial conference concerning OC in Beijing, officials noted that efforts and responsibilities for *huaren* did not go far enough. The scope of *qiaowu* failed to accommodate them; there was also insufficient research into their needs and requirements.¹¹² As a result, OC associations, schools and media were becoming disconnected from China both culturally and ideologically. *Qiaowu* had to resolve this issue, with policies addressing these concerns in the context of cultural unity and competition with Taiwan's own *qiaowu* effort—which at the time was far superior and dominant in comparison.

Xiao-huang Yin and Zhiyong Lan, "Why Do They Give? Change and Continuity in Chinese American Transnational Philanthropy Since the 1970s," Harvard Global Equity Initiative, May 2003, http://fas.harvard.edu/~acgei/PDFs/PhilanthropyPDFs/Phil_Why_Do_They_Give.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009).

106 Wang, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, 240; Kim, "The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia."

107 "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojifa 中华人民共和国国籍法 [PRC Nationality Law]," in Zhongguo qiaolian quanyu baozhangbu, *Qiaowu changyong falu faqiu xuanbian*, 33–34; "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojifa 中华人民共和国国籍法 [PRC Nationality Law]," in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 634–635.

108 Zhao Heman 赵和曼, *Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu* 少数民族华侨华人研究 [Research on OC Ethnic Minorities], (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2004), 283.

109 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 10–11.

110 Wu, "Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo."

111 "OC Praised for Role," *Xinhua*, 22 June 2001, <http://www1.china.org.cn/English/2001/Jun/15152.htm> (accessed 2 May 2007).

112 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 9.

While recognizing the rights of foreign nationals, the PRC continued to cultivate the cultural, political, emotional, and ethnic sentiments of the OC towards China. A May 1989 State Council *qiaowu* conference expanded policy for exchanges between *qiaowu* offices and the OC, including those of foreign nationality.¹¹³ This basic strategy was a deliberate and calculated effort to reconnect with all OC, and it continues unchanged into the contemporary period. Hence, when referring to *qiaowu*, the terms “foreign nationals of Chinese descent”, “foreigners of Chinese origin”, and “people of Chinese origin residing abroad” are often used interchangeably with “Chinese nationals overseas”.¹¹⁴

However, efforts to incite emotional and cultural connection for the purposes of reaching out to OC resources conflicted with issues of citizenship and loyalty.¹¹⁵ Western commentators criticized PRC pronouncements concerning the OC as “deliberately vague” when they did not distinguish between various kinds of Chinese abroad, but to call all of them OC and declaring them as “part of the Chinese nation”.¹¹⁶ Southeast Asian governments again became concerned.¹¹⁷ For example, in the 1980s the Singapore government sought to disempower the ethnic Chinese elite and their links with China by preserving only the politically inoffensive cultural aspects of various OC clan associations. In the early 1990s, both prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew and his successor Goh Chok Tong expressed their fear of potential racial discord should OC respond to PRC’s line of a common Chinese culture.¹¹⁸

To placate these suspicions, Beijing reverted to its earlier stance at Bandung, by maintaining that ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality were different

113 “1989 nian Zhongguo guowuyuan qiaowu gongzuo huiyi 1989 年中国国务院侨务工作会议 [1989 State Council OC Work Conference],” in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 489–490.

114 “OC Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century,” *People’s Daily*, 8 January 2001.

115 Leo Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: OC, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?” in *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*, ed. Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 15–19.

116 David Bonavia, “The OC,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 16, 1978, 18 and Wang Gungwu, “China and the Region in Relation to Chinese Minorities,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 1, no. 1 (May 1979): 40, as quoted by Paul J. Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000): 62–63.

117 Chan, “PRC Policy on the OC,” 135, 138.

118 Lee Kuan Yew, “The Loyalty of OC Belongs Overseas,” *International Herald Tribune*, 23 November 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/23/opinion/23iht-nulee.html?scp=1&sq=The%20Loyalty%20of%20Overseas%20Chinese%20Belongs%20Overseas&st=cse> (accessed 1 October 2009).

to its own nationals abroad. For example, in March 1992 *qiaowu* officials commented that grouping *huaren*, HK, and Macau compatriots as *qiaobao* was not appropriate at a *qiaobao* festival in which OC delegates of all classifications would be represented.¹¹⁹ Similarly, in 1993, PRC foreign minister Qian Qichen publicly denied that a ‘Greater China’ existed, even to the extent of remarking that ethnic Chinese in the region were different to those in HK and Taiwan.¹²⁰

Thus *huaqiao* work during this period again aimed to dispel the “OC problem”: opposing dual citizenship, opposing forceful change of citizenship, encouraging *huaqiao* to voluntarily take local citizenship; protecting their rights and interests, and demanding local authorities do the same; and educating them to respect local laws and customs in order to promote bilateral development and friendship.¹²¹ As such, a distinct sense of non-responsibility for *huaren* prevailed throughout the 1990s. *Qiaowu* officials warned that an emotional relationship could not replace specific *huaqiao* policy—*huaqiao* work was strictly for *huaqiao*, and *huaren* work was strictly for *huaren*.¹²²

However, the entire OC diaspora was still needed to help realize China’s national interests.¹²³ Thus *qiaowu* officials advised cadres that “some things” (referring to connecting with *huaren*) could only be “acted upon but could not be spoken about.”¹²⁴ Therefore, internally at least, both *huaren* and *huaqiao* were the same. *Qiaowu* had to ensure that work for both groups appeared distinct from each other through tactical disengagement and propaganda. By remaining unclear when referring to its treatment of *huaren* yet explicit in its policy for its own nationals residing abroad, Beijing attempted to disguise its pre-occupation with the OC, minimize other countries’ sensitivities about OC loyalty, and ensure that *huaren* maintained a safe livelihood abroad.

119 “Dui ‘Zhongguo qiaobaojie’ yi’an de yidian yijian 对 “中国侨胞节” 议案的一点意见 [A Comment Concerning the Proposed China Overseas Compatriots Festival],” 1992, in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 93–94.

120 Xie Yining 谢一宁, “Qian Qichen jieshou benbao zhuanfang changlun Zhong-Mei guanxi 钱其琛接受本报专访畅论中美关系 [Qian Qichen Receives a Visit from this Paper to Discuss Chinese-American Relations],” *Qiaobao*, 17 November 1993 as quoted by Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese*, 115.

121 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 10.

122 “Bu yao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian,” in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 90–92.

123 Document no. 11, 2002 as quoted by GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 10; *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 8–9.

124 Zhuang, “1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he zhengce de bianhua,” 8.

4.10 *Xinqiao*—Leading the Change in OC Demographics

Following relaxation of immigration policies between sending and receiving countries throughout the final decades of the twentieth century, *xinqiao* migrants (mostly from the PRC) changed the traditional demography of the OC diaspora.¹²⁵ After establishing diplomatic relations with Washington in 1979, Beijing had to review its policies for non-official travel for private citizens and allow emigration abroad in order to qualify for “most-favoured nation” status. Consequently, PRC authorities streamlined migration procedures from China, with increasingly less requirements needed for obtaining a passport.¹²⁶ For example, after 1985 Beijing adopted legislation liberalizing travel, allowing PRC Chinese migrants to go abroad for work, study, join their relatives, or go for business if they had a sponsor. On the receiving end, changes in local immigration policies intended to advance economic development meant those satisfying certain criteria could gain entry.¹²⁷ As in the 1950s, while the PRC government advocated that new migrant *huaqiao* accept foreign citizenship, they were to remain as “kinsfolk and friends” and thus ethnically and emotionally still a part of China’s family.¹²⁸ This generation of *xinqiao* OC would usher in a new era of *qiaowu*.

Over the last 30 years, and more so in the last decade, growing numbers of *huaqiao* and *xinqiao* have changed the demographic makeup and outlook of the OC diaspora. *Xinqiao* are most likely to be born, brought up, and educated in China (particularly from urban centres). They tend to be younger and maintain close links with family, friends, and business contacts there. In addition, they strongly maintain their Chinese language, values, and

125 “Old” Chinese include those who migrated from China to non-traditional receiving countries prior to the relaxation of immigration policies, and from HK and Taiwan between 1950 and the late 1980s. See Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 292–293.

126 Li Minghuan, “Brokering Migration from Southern China,” *IIAS Newsletter*, no. 42 (Autumn 2006): 12–13, www.iias.nl/nl/42/IIAS_NL42_1213.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009); Frank N. Pieke et al., *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe* (Stanford University Press, 2004), www.anth.mq.edu.au/maa/unit_pages/805/ANTH805_Chapter2_TransnationalChinese.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).

127 Manying Ip, *Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: The Chinese in NZ* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003): xii; Manying Ip, “PRC Migrants and Returnees: New Trends in Globalisation,” (paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, 10–14 May 2004) 2–3; Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 296–297.

128 “Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua,” in Wang, *Qiaowu chungui*, 84.

culture, and have a tendency to live in metropolitan areas. Consequently, they do not view themselves as a minority outside of China, but rather as a part of it overseas. Moreover, they have an emotional and psychological need to participate in activities associated with their ancestral homeland.¹²⁹

The connections between new migrants and Chinese authorities have never been broken. *Xinqiao* continue to use and expand their networks with them for business and social development.¹³⁰ With the availability of Chinese language newspapers, television, radio, and the Internet, many share a deeper interest in, or wish to be involved with Chinese affairs, policies, standards, and opportunities than previous generations.¹³¹ As such, *xinqiao* organizations offer transnational networking opportunities with China for business, career, cultural, educational, and social advancement in a PRC context. The emergence of these new groups provided the ideal environment for Beijing to push forward with its strategy of identifying, targeting, and reclaiming them for China's national interests.

4.11 Elite OC

Skilled migrant *xinqiao* (as opposed to uneducated labourer-class migrants) are representative of a new mobilized Chinese diaspora throughout the world.¹³² They possess high-level capacity in science and technology, investment, capital, and more importantly, a new sense of OC nationalism.¹³³ Also described as quintessentially skilled and talented OC elites, *jingying* (精英) are the ones ideally suited to develop and integrate other OC into mainstream society, and thereby to raise the status of China and their community.

129 Gao, "Transnationality of Settled Migrants"; Nyiri, *New Chinese Migrants in Europe*; Lintner, "In Changing Times, the New Face of Chinese Emigrants."

130 Nyiri, "The New Migrant," 141–176; for an examination of new migration to the Pacific, see Tetsu Ichikawa, "Chinese in PNG: Strategic Practices in Sojourning," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 2, no. 1 (May 2006): 111–132.

131 Liu, "New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism," 305.

132 Mobilized diasporas are defined as ethnic groups that enjoy higher levels of material and cultural advantages when compared with other multiethnic polities. John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 2 (June 1976): 393–408.

133 Liao Yiyang 廖赤阳, "Xinhuaqiao—shenme shi xin de, shenme shi jiu de 新华侨—什么是新的, 什么是旧的? [*Xinhuaqiao*: What is the New? What is the Old?]", n.d., http://eurasia.nias.ku.dk/issco5/documents/Liao_000.doc (accessed 9 March 2012).

Jingying comprise of four groups: the first are the high profile leaders of well-established and dynamic representatives of influential OC organizations. They tend to be in touch with what is going on in China—either through frequent visits there, or through participation in various OC forums. Many have the potential to become persons of influence, prestige, and power in their home countries.

The second group is made up of the millions of OC youth, particularly those from the second, third, and fourth generation of *laoqiao*. The CCP places great importance upon this group, as the fruits of working with them can be passed down their generations, thus making OC work easier to do in future.¹³⁴ These include those of ethnic Chinese descent who have grown up outside of China, as well as ethnic Chinese children adopted overseas.¹³⁵ The CCP acknowledge that these *huaren* youth have a strong sense of identification with their country of residence, are unable to speak Chinese, and may not share “familiarity with the motherland.”¹³⁶ They are therefore all targets for general reconnection. This includes strengthening their ethnic pride through immersion in Chinese culture, stories, legends, and other forms of propaganda disseminated in a variety of languages.¹³⁷ Various programmes (such as camps, tours, and cultural and language classes) coax from them a willingness to contribute back to their homeland in the form of remittances and donations.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the CCP invites them to network with their mainland colleagues (often those who hold high connections within the CCP, such as youth party secretaries or student

134 Zhang Yinglong 张应龙 and Huang Chaohui 黄朝晖, “Yindu qiaomin zhengce yanjiu 印度侨民政策研究 [Indian Expatriate Policy Research],” *Qiaoping*, no. 49 (23 November 2004): 18–19; Dong Huifeng 董会峰, “Guangdong qiaowu buzuo ‘chunlai chaguan’ 广东侨务不做 ‘春来茶馆’ [Guangdong OC Affairs Will Never Disregard the OC],” OCAO, 16 January 2001, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2005/1216/1/126.shtml (accessed 14 March 2012).

135 Over 62,000 Chinese children have been adopted into American homes. OCAO Propaganda Department, “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaying 在美中国孤儿华夏行 [Traveling With American Chinese Orphans to China],” *Qiaoping*, no. 42 (19 October 2005): 1; L. A. Chung, “China Declares: Welcome Home,” *Mercury News*, 22 July 2006, www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/15099265.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).

136 *Zhongguo rencai* 中国人才 [China Human Resources], August 1999 as quoted by Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “China: Media Report Continuing Efforts to Recruit Overseas Scientists,” December 1999, www.ncix.gov/archives/nacic/news/1999/dec99.html (accessed 6 April 2007).

137 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 71.

138 Flemming Christiansen, “Beyond Chinese Statehood? Authoritative Representations of Nation and Ethnicity in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s,” Department of East Asian Studies, University of Leeds, n.d., 7, www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~chifc/nation.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).

body officials nominated by the All China Youth Federation). A comprehensive examination of these methods follows in Chapter Six.

The third group of *jingying* are those PRC students who are sent abroad to gain knowledge and experiences before returning to China and help with its development. Commonly referred to as *haigui* (海归) (a homonym for sea turtle, but literally translated as “return from overseas”) this transnational group is the subject of a relatively new policy area of the PRC. The term *haigui* first appeared in Internet discussions during the late 1990s, later in everyday usage, and finally became an official category of OC in 2002.¹³⁹

The *haigui* phenomenon deserves some historical explanation. In 1978, as part of its efforts to speed modernization, the CCP sent 480 state-funded students abroad for study. Numbers increased significantly over the following years (4000 between 1979–1980, and 10,000 in 1981–1982). As early as October 1980, at the Meeting on the Work of Returned Students, some quarters had described the situation as a ‘brain drain’ (*rencai wailiu* 人才外流) but the CCP decided to continue to send students.¹⁴⁰ Children of high-level officials benefited from a prestigious foreign education, and gathering skills for China’s modernization was paramount. However, by the end of 1982 there were over 1000 cases of PRC students seeking political asylum in the US; by 1983, of the 18,500 state-funded students, only 7000 returned. Numbers traveling to study abroad dropped down to 3000 in 1983 following concerns about the high cost of student education, lack of suitable facilities for them upon their return, and poor academic performance.¹⁴¹ However, numbers picked up again after 1984, when Beijing decentralized the allocation of foreign exchanges to individual universities and relaxed policies for self-funded students, fanning a trend of studying abroad in the mid to late 1980s.

139 Wang, Wong and Sun, “*Haigui: A New Area in China’s Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?*” 294–309; Helene Le Bail and Wei Shen, “The Return of the ‘Brains’ to China: What are the Social, Economic, and Political Impacts?” Institut des Relations Internationales, November 2008, www.ifri.org/files/centre_asie/AV11_ENG.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). See also various references to research on *haigui* by David Zweig below.

140 Zhuang, “1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he zhengce de bianhua,” 10; Hou Wenrou, “China’s International Migration Policy,” *Asia and Pacific Migration Journal* 10, no. 3–4 (2001).

141 Another 7000 self-funded students also failed to return, but they were of less interest to the PRC. Wang Shao-nan, “Why the CCP Decreases Its Students Abroad,” *Asian Outlook*, July 1984, 27–30.

Following new legislation in 1983¹⁴² and State Council provisions in March 1985,¹⁴³ Beijing began intensive efforts to attract the pool of OC intellectual talent and their investment resources back to China. These comprised of using newspaper and print advertising, television spots in the OC media, establishing OC liaison offices, and holding OC conferences.¹⁴⁴ By 1987, the topic of sending students abroad received mixed views at the top level of the CCP. General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) viewed the thousands settling abroad as a potentially beneficial case of “storing brainpower overseas”.¹⁴⁵ Others, such as political rival Vice Premier Li Peng (李鹏), argued otherwise. Consequently, Beijing officials tightened policies for going abroad as more students preferred not to return. Beijing appealed to the US government to encourage students to return, but these measures had little impact. The events of June 4th 1989 only worsened the situation, and Beijing continued to make efforts to limit the numbers leaving after Washington and other Western countries accorded them special immigration conditions.¹⁴⁶ As mentioned earlier, this was a sensitive and stressful period for PRC students abroad.

In 1992, Beijing authorities announced a new policy featuring incentives, improved services, and support for returnees. It placed emphasis on welcoming all students—no matter what their past political attitudes were, as long as they renounced their links to anti-governmental groups and their activities. Other efforts to attract returnees continued with flexible measures concerning where they could work under regulations set down by provincial level authorities.¹⁴⁷ Another change in policy occurred in 1993, when the PRC

142 “Guowuyuan guanyu yinjin guowai rencai gongzuo de zanxing guiding 国务院关于引进国外人才工作的暂行规定 [State Council Provisional Regulations Concerning Work for Attracting Overseas Talent],” in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 158–159.

143 “1985 nian quanguo qiaowu gongzuo zuotanhui 1985 年全国侨务工作座谈会 [1985 National Symposium on OC Work],” in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 490–491.

144 Ip, “PRC Migrants and Returnees,” 28, 30–31.

145 David Zweig and Chen Changgui, *China’s Brain Drain to the United States: Views of OC Students and Scholars in the 1990s* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1995), 17.

146 Ibid., 21; David Zweig, “Competing for Talent: China’s Strategies to Reverse the Brain Drain,” *International Labour Review* 145, no. 1–2 (Spring-Summer 2006): 65–90.

147 State Council, “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zaiwai liuxue renyuan youguan wenti de tongzhi 国务院办公厅关于在外留学人员有关问题的通知 [State Council Office Notice Regarding People Studying Abroad],” 12 August 1992, in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 151.

supported self-funded study abroad, welcomed students to return, and gave them freedom to come or go as they pleased.¹⁴⁸ Most preferred to stay overseas.

By 1994, under the *1992 Chinese Student Protection Act*, US authorities approved 49,000 applications for US green card residency.¹⁴⁹ Given this development, in 1996 the notion of “returning and serve the motherland” changed to simply “serve the motherland”. Rather than encouraging them to come back permanently, officials felt that students could still contribute to China’s development from abroad under a flexible relationship of transnational mobility (*rouxing liudong* 柔性流动).¹⁵⁰ In this context, those with suitable skills and resources could enjoy the convenience of coming and going, while the CCP could extract benefit without formal relationships.¹⁵¹ In short, these measures served to rework the ‘brain drain’ so that the OC could contribute to China from abroad.¹⁵²

Faced with the reality that tens of thousands of its students remained overseas meant an alternative strategy was required. In the late 1990s, state media acknowledged that bringing OC scientific talents into full play was vital to promoting China’s exchanges with foreign countries. A localization strategy of hiring former PRC students and Chinese specialists with foreign citizenship in order to advance the interests of Chinese transnational firms received support in a December 1997 state mouthpiece journal article.¹⁵³ In the face of regionalism and globalism, government departments created the necessary

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- 148 “Guanyu Zhongguo gongmin zifei chuguo liuxue de guiding 关于中国公民自费出国留学的规定 [Policy Regarding Self-funded Chinese Nationals Leaving for Foreign Study],” in Jiang, *Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu*, 139.
- 149 Zweig and Chen, *China’s Brain Drain to the United States*, 22–23; David Zweig and Stanley Rosen, “How China Trained a New Generation Abroad,” Scientific and Development Network, 22 May 2003, www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 150 Cheng, “Non-Remaining and Non-Returning,” 169–170; Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 314–315.
- 151 Xiang Biao, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks (The Case of PRC),” (report written for the Asian Development Bank, Oxford: ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), March 2005, www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/GCF/reta6117-prc.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 152 Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 291–316.
- 153 “Jianli haiwai liuxue ren yuan ‘liang ge jidi’ moshi de tantao 建立海外留学人员 ‘两个基地’ 模式的探讨 [Enquiry Into Establishing an Overseas Students ‘Two Bases’ Model],” *Kexuexue yu kexue jishu guanli*, December 1997 as quoted in Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “China: Media Report Continuing Efforts to Recruit Overseas Scientists.”

conditions to ensure continued knowledge transfer and collaboration.¹⁵⁴ This included offering them support,¹⁵⁵ funding for study abroad,¹⁵⁶ and encouraging programmes for linking students, Chinese institutions, and government (such as joint research, exchange visits, and international conferences.)¹⁵⁷ In addition, universities spent billions of dollars to lure top foreign-educated and overseas-born Chinese as academic staff.¹⁵⁸

Such policies continue today. China offers preferential treatment to ethnic Chinese, no matter their place of birth.¹⁵⁹ Different provinces and cities compete in attracting *haigui* OC experts and investment by offering different incentives. For example, Beijing and Shenzhen offer more lucrative policies than those at the national level in an effort to secure the best talent.¹⁶⁰ Elite OC may be invited to China and offered high-level positions at prestigious institutions with the freedom to come and go from their permanent job back home, as well as other privileges designed to persuade them to stay in China for a longer period (such as free education for their children). Other local governments offer cheaper rent, lower taxes, cash grants, office space, reduced staff costs, and special hi-tech parks.¹⁶¹ Some have taken a pro-active approach. In 2003 Shandong provincial officials appointed 100 'business soliciting agents' to seek out influential OC.¹⁶²

154 Young Rok Cheong, "Chinese Business Networks and their Implications for South Korea," Insititute for International Economics, n.d., www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/365/3iie3586.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).

155 *Xinhua*, 24 August 1999, 18 October 1999, 29 September 1999, as quoted by Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, "China: Media Report Continuing Efforts to Recruit Overseas Scientists."

156 Wu, "Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo."

157 Cheng Xi 程希, "Gaige kaifang yilai Zhongguo zhengfu xuanpai liuxuesheng de zhengce yange 改革开放以来中国政府选派留学生的政策沿革 [The Evolution of Chinese Government's Policies on Selecting and Sending Students Abroad Since China's Opening to the World]," *Huaqiao huaren shi yanjiu*, no. 1 (1999): 43.

158 Pallavi Aiyar, "China Hunts Abroad for Academic Talent," *Asia Times Online*, 18 February 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HB18Cb05.html (accessed 3 March 2008).

159 Wendy Chen, "A Man with a Mission," *Beijing Review*, 2004, [www.bjreview.com.cn/200439/Business-200439\(B\).htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200439/Business-200439(B).htm) (accessed 9 August 2007).

160 Alysha Webb, "Back to the Motherland," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 August 2002, 60.

161 "Returnees Offered Incentives," *People's Daily*, 22 August 2007, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6245230.html#> (accessed 1 October 2009); Shanghai OCAO, <http://qwb.sh.gov.cn/gb/shqb/english/index.html> (accessed 1 October 2009).

162 "Shandong to Choose 100 OC Business Soliciting Agents," *Xinhua*, 29 July 2003, www.trade.gov.cn/english/php/show.pho?id=321 (accessed 6 April 2007).

Given these developments, the PRC is eager to promote their *qiaowu* policies as a success. A survey conducted by the China *Zhigong* Party and the Beijing Science and Technology Committee in 2000 showed that 81 percent of PRC students abroad were ready to return to China for work. 50 percent were motivated by “a sense of responsibility to contribute to the motherland,” and 45 percent because of kinship ties.¹⁶³ Since the 2000s, the growth of China’s economy and the relative decline in the West has seen more and more PRC students wishing to return.¹⁶⁴ In 2008, there were 179,800 students overseas—69,300 of whom returned after their studies. The economic crisis during that period saw a 55.95 percent increase in the number of returnees over the previous year. This was a result of difficulty in finding employment overseas, and the offer of special funds to support research in China.¹⁶⁵

4.12 Dual Nationality and the OC

The fourth target group of *jingying* are former PRC students who have taken foreign citizenship and other talented *huaren* OC who wish to live and work in China. However, China’s laws have prevented them from doing so on a permanent basis. Article 3 of the PRC’s *1980 Nationality Law of the PRC* clearly states that China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national. An increase in the number of OC wishing to work, invest or live in China under long-term residency visas, and those reconsidering their choice of nationality¹⁶⁶ have prompted calls for Beijing to revise the relevant legislation.¹⁶⁷

163 China Zhi Gong Dang and Beijing Science and Technology Committee, “Absorbing OC Students to Come to Beijing to Establish Hi-Tech Enterprises” as quoted in “Beijing, First Choice of OC Student Entrepreneurs Back in China,” *People’s Daily*, 22 February 2000, <http://english.people.com.cn/english/200002/22/eng20000222U101.html> (accessed 2 October 2009).

164 “OC Heading Home,” *China Daily*, 9 December 2008; “China Sees Tide of Returning Talents,” *People’s Daily*, 28 June 2002. www.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/28/eng20020628_98732.shtml (accessed 6 April 2007); Yin and Lan, “Why Do They Give?”

165 “China Sends 180,000 Students Overseas in 2008,” *Xinhua*, 26 March 2009.

166 Yang, “Zhongguori shi haiwai huaren mianlin guoji shenfen xuanze,” *Nanfei huarenbao*, 8 October 2007.

167 Huang Jianming 黄建明, “Xinxilan qiaobao chenshu huqiu shuangchong guoji 新西兰侨胞陈书呼吁求双重国籍 [NZ Chinese Request Dual Citizenship],” *NZ Mirror*, 10 December 2004, http://www.gzpf.gov.cn/program/html/news_content/php?ItemID=250135855&ID=6791 (accessed 9 March 2012).

While the State Council has expressed interest in doing further research to resolve this issue, it is well aware of the implications and suspicions that it might raise with other countries and is therefore reluctant to act. OCAO director Chen Yujie (陈玉杰) remarked that not recognizing dual nationality was for the sake of protecting OC interests.¹⁶⁸ *Qiaowu* specialists recommend that cadres take pragmatic measures: such as emphasizing that authorities should not reprint, sensationalize, or propagate the internal position, and must only explain dual citizenship from Beijing's official perspective.¹⁶⁹ This stance reflects the long-held concerns for the CCP in wishing to minimize suspicions regarding OC loyalty in host countries.

To address this situation, Beijing has allowed exceptions in facilitating residency for those OC who do not possess PRC citizenship. Initially, residency for foreigners was only provided for a maximum of five years, and rarely granted. Since 1986, various cities have conferred the title of 'emeritus citizen' (*rongyu shimin* 荣誉市民) to hundreds of OC in acknowledgment of their contributions.¹⁷⁰ For example, the GOCAO offers such tokens in the hope that doing so will invigorate a sense of nationalist identity for the recipient, resulting in them making greater contributions to China.¹⁷¹ While this method achieved its aim of identifying, rewarding, and holding onto the loyalty of a select few, attracting a much wider scope of the OC was still required.

After 2001, authorities reformed the permanent residence system to allow those with the desired skills and resources to maintain their foreign nationality while working and living in China. In 2003, they issued residence permits (valid for two to five years with multiple entries and exits) to investors, qualified workers, academics, and their families. In 2004, PRC authorities launched the

168 "Not Recognizing Dual Nationality is for the Sake of Most Overseas Compatriots," *China Daily*, 9 June 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/09/eng20050609_189401.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

169 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance," 12.

170 The Guangzhou government awarded honorary titles to 345 OC between 1986 and 2004. "Rongyu shimin shouyu banfa yiru tuichu jizhi 荣誉市民授予办法移入退出机制 [Honorary Citizens Conferred Mechanism for Coming and Going]," *Nanfang ribao*, 25 February 2004, www.gzpf.gov.cn/program/html/news_content/php?ItemID=250135855&ID=6791 (accessed 6 April 2007).

171 GOCAO, "2006 Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo yaodian 2006 年广州市侨务工作要点 [Guangzhou City OC Affairs Work Main Points]," 15 December 2006, http://www.gzqw.gov.cn/gzqb/zwgk/zwgk_View.jsp?ID=73 (accessed 9 March 2012); Choe, "National Identity and Citizenship," 102.

most significant development for permanent residency—a ‘green card’ that provided skilled OC with the same benefits as locals (such as subsidized education, investment, and obtaining jobs).

This was Beijing’s solution for allowing the OC long-term residency rights and by-passing the problem of dual nationality. It is what *qiaowu* specialists termed as a “way out” (*chulu* 出路) of the debate.¹⁷² Every year, thousands of OC have applied under this scheme,¹⁷³ and numbers are set to rise as more provinces follow suit by giving OC (particularly those from Taiwan) “convenience”.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, in 2006, the OCAO indicated its desire to attract even more OC into China by articulating its desire for relevant agencies to relax thresholds for obtaining a ‘green card’.¹⁷⁵ As the labour market globalizes and a transnational lifestyle becomes increasingly common, China can be expected to continue developing measures to attract and secure more talent while minimizing local concerns. This shows that China is prepared to engage directly with talented OC, provide them with the necessary incentives for their development and mutual benefit, and hence reclaim them in a context that is acceptable to CCP objectives.

Recognizing that the OC are mobile and that they can contribute to China no matter where they are located has led to significant changes to modern *qiaowu* policy. Beijing understands that fostering strong OC populations in foreign countries can be more efficient than having them return—the CCP now considers those who stay overseas as ‘patriotic’.¹⁷⁶ By contributing to China from abroad because of certain innate Chinese moral qualities and loyalty to China, migrants represent a new quintessential mobile modernity

172 Dai Ruijun 戴瑞君, “Shuangzhong guoji wenti zai sikao 双重国籍问题再思考 [Re-thinking the Problem of Dual Nationality],” *People’s Daily*, 25 January 2006, <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/4061473.html> (accessed 9 March 2012).

173 “Qunian qianyu haigui shenling Beijing lüka 去年千余海归申领北京绿卡 [Over 1000 OC Returnees Apply for Beijing Green Card],” *Beijing chenbao*, 8 February 2005, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 10 March 2005, 7.

174 PRC Ministry of Commerce, “Preferential Policy Concerning the Administration of Entry and Exit,” March 2007, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/business/lanmue/200703/20070304501378.html> (accessed 6 April 2007).

175 “Chen Yujie: qiaoban yuanyu youguan bumen xieshang tiaodi Zhongguo lüka menkan 陈玉杰：侨办愿与有关部门协商调低中国绿卡门槛 [Chen Yujie: OCAO Hopes Relevant Agencies Will Consult to Reduce Chinese Green Card Threshold],” *Qiaoping jianbao*, 26 June 2006, 1.

176 Zweig and Rosen, “How China Trained a New Generation Abroad.”

of 'Chineseness'.¹⁷⁷ For the purpose of encouraging cooperation within and amongst various OC groups to efficiently distribute resources and talent, *qiaowu* has helped raise a legion of *xinqiao* migrants and PRC students capable of advancing China's foreign interests.¹⁷⁸

4.13 Conclusion

Taiwan's historical relationship with the OC and the effects of the independence movement is central to how China's rival *qiaowu* operation has responded and developed over the past twenty years. Similarly, the scope of China's efforts has changed according to the evolution of the OC diaspora. Initial attempts that reached out to *laogiao* migrants and sojourners capitalized upon common dialectical and provincial origin. After the Second World War, with changes in citizenship laws, *qiaowu* had to broaden its reach to connect with all ethnic Chinese. As these populations assimilated into local society, the emergence of a new migrant population saw yet another change of focus, but retaining the emphasis on connecting with all OC. Furthermore, geo-political concerns, differences in ideology, and fears of a 'brain drain' have all affected how the CCP has implemented, handled, and domesticated *qiaowu* matters over different periods.

This chapter has demonstrated how the CCP has taken advantage of the DPP's failure to connect effectively with the wider OC populace. The formation of a distinct Taiwanese identity and Taipei's revised definition of the OC, as well as Beijing's own internal and external sensitivities, have all contributed towards developing China's modern *qiaowu* approach. In order to achieve the most promising results, China has actively sought to target and attract specific groups of skilled and talented OC for its development by offering incentives, privileges, and market opportunities. Although Beijing has an official criteria for determining who can be considered as *huaqiao* (in order to satisfy the concerns of some governments, and to protect its own interests in the event of a legal challenge) it continues to view all of the OC as part of its national family—just as it has always done.

In this context, the question of how Beijing chooses to officially define an OC makes no difference at all; as long as they are ethnically Chinese and willing to contribute to its development, it will find a way to embrace them.

177 Nyiri, "Yellow Man's Burden," 83–106.

178 Wu, "Zhangwo xinfangfa, kaituo Guangdong qiaowu xinjunian."

Their participation in politics, negotiation of membership, and ascription and assertion of an OC identity, reaffirm Appadurai's and Ogden's arguments that a state-diaspora relationship can be shaped and sustained by non-sovereign and non-physical social formations despite territorial displacement.¹⁷⁹ In guiding their behaviour into the twenty-first century, *qiaowu* has never before enjoyed a more receptive audience throughout the world.

179 Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures," 411–429; Ogden, "Diaspora Meets IR's Constructivism," 1–10.

Cultural Work: Reconstructing ‘Chineseness’

Both the PRC and ROC governments, at some time or another, have had the “primary preoccupation, if not the sole obsession” of seeking to produce their own version of Chinese cultural identity for the OC in an effort to win their political and economic loyalty.¹ In the context of its rivalry with Taipei, the next two chapters illustrate and examine the role of *qiaowu* in Beijing’s construction and projection of an ideal version of OC identity in order to secure the support of the OC diaspora.

The CCP’s articulation of OC identity has mostly centred around the concept of national unity. However, modern OC demographics hinder the promotion and acceptance of this concept.² Globalization, regionalization, and most importantly, diversity of socio-economic background, origin, language, and talent have increased the complexity of addressing, planning, and coordinating *qiaowu* policy.³ Hong Liu argued that because of the deterritorialized nature of migration flows, capital, and ideas, it was unlikely that the OC could ever unite into a major Chinese nationalist movement.⁴

A primary goal of *qiaowu* is to challenge this argument by attempting to boost unity under two major themes. Firstly, *qiaowu* seeks to substitute and prevent alternative ideologies and loyalties from taking root amongst the OC by building up and exporting a singular mindset of unified ‘Chineseness’.⁵ The CCP has promoted its own version of ethnic nationalism and belonging in an attempt to articulate its hegemony over this issue. This is a CCP interpretation incorporating idealistic elements of history, civilization, tradition, culture, and common biological traits that link ethnicity with nationalism.⁶ As such,

1 Wang, “The Structure of Dual Domination,” 155–160; Him Mark Lai, “China Politics and the U.S. Chinese Communities,” in *Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America*, ed. Emma Gee (Los Angeles: Asian American Studies Center, 1976) 152–159; de Bary and Nee, “The KMT in Chinatown,” 146–151.

2 “OC Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century,” *People’s Daily*, 8 January 2001.

3 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 55.

4 Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 291–316.

5 Transnational Communities Programme, “The Past Decade of Migration from the PRC to Europe and Asia,” workshop organized by Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, Budapest, 26–27 May 2000, www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/wwwroot/Nyiri.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

6 Live Yu-Sion, “The Sinwa of Reunion: Searching for a Chinese Identity in a Multicultural World” in Thuno, *Beyond Chinatown*, 234–253.

qiaowu exploits sentimentality for home and village, economic opportunity, and cultural needs.⁷

The second theme of *qiaowu* work prompts the OC to contribute and benefit from a transnational relationship with a modernized China.⁸ Tasks include improving their understanding of China's political and economic situation, its economic liberalization, its views and position in the international community, and socialism with Chinese characteristics.⁹ CCP leaders call on all OC to advance China's interests, with the assumption that they share in these goals as a part of the Chinese family.¹⁰ The OC are reminded of their cultural or ancestral advantage in making China strong.¹¹ Over the past two decades, increasing numbers of them have responded positively to this invitation.¹²

Why has China been more successful than Taiwan in obtaining the support of the OC? Does the type of regime matter? Are policies the determining factor? This chapter examines these questions by highlighting the breakthroughs that the CCP has achieved in working with fundamental aspects of OC culture and identity, including educational, religious, and sentimental appeal. The historical background to these developments demonstrates how the CCP has taken advantage of changes in the geo-political environment and delivered a particular version of 'Chineseness' which appeals to a broad audience.

5.1 Theories of Ethnic Belonging

National identity, according to political economist Max Weber, refers to the nation-state and its differentiation from other states, and how its subjects are expected to demonstrate political loyalty to it.¹³ While most diasporic groups will recognize that they have an obligation of demonstrating loyalty to their host country (or at least their affinity with their homeland/religion without leading to acts of treason) there remains a sense of ethnic identity that serves

7 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 38–41, 84–85.

8 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao," 6.

9 Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

10 "State Council Discusses Work Concerning OC," *Xinhua*, 7 July 2004.

11 Simons and Zielenziger, "Enter the Dragon," "Exploits Unprecedented Honor World Chinese Businessmen," *People's Daily*, 18 September 2001, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200109/18/eng20010918_80485.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

12 Shang, Gu, and Li, *Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce*, 531–532.

13 Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964), 154.

as a resource of 'tactical necessity' for defending and pursuing their own particular interests.¹⁴ Anthropologist Fredrik Barth argued that this was the most decisive characteristic for self-ascription to a group.¹⁵ Similarly, according to sociologist Beatrice Drury, a heightened sense of identity/group consciousness towards a situation perceived to be of significance to its concerns/existence (such as being denied equal opportunities, access to resources, or social/economic mobility) was the key factor for ethnic mobilization.¹⁶ For example, one Muslim organization suggested that while they should live within the local laws in Britain, British Muslims should give their first loyalty to Islam.¹⁷

Contrary to conventional Marxist and liberal theories that suggest a gradual substitution of ethno-national identity through class affiliation and engagement with a host country over time, displacement from one's homeland can instead generate "powerful attachments to ideas of homeland that seem more deeply territorial than ever."¹⁸ As such, the "supreme political loyalty to the nation-state and a strong sense of cultural belonging to the real and/or imagined homeland" through notions pertaining to territory, history, and ethnic affinity can exist beyond fixed geography.¹⁹

What is the sending state's role in fostering such identity interpenetration, multiple loyalties, and transnational norms?²⁰ Ragazzi explains diasporic policies by how government rationalities and modalities of power adapt to changes in order to preserve state security and prosperity. The state looks to 'gathering a nation' across borders, by promoting an 'official' national identity

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- 14 John Rex, "Ethnic Mobilization in Multi-Cultural Societies," in *Ethnic Mobilization in a Multi-Cultural Europe*, eds. John Rex and Beatrice Drury (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994), 4–6.
 - 15 Fredrik Barth, ed. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 14.
 - 16 Beatrice Drury, "Ethnic Mobilization: Some Theoretical Considerations," in Rex and Drury, *Ethnic Mobilization in a Multi-Cultural Europe*, 13–22.
 - 17 Kalim Siddiqui, "The Muslim Manifesto: A Strategy for Survival," London: The Muslim Institute, 1990, <http://www.muslimparliament.org.uk/MuslimManifesto.pdf> (accessed 11 May 2010).
 - 18 Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Modernity* (London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 177; Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman, "Dynamics of Disintegration: Diaspora, Secession and the Paradox of Nation-States" *Nations and Nationalism* 4, no. 3 (1998): 321–346.
 - 19 Liu, "New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism," 301; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 40–49.
 - 20 Ogden, "Diaspora Meets IR's Constructivism," 1–10.

that seeks to advance anti-assimilationist objectives amongst diasporic communities and unify them for purposes of state interest—essentially to prevent their integration and instead maintain them as foreign policy instruments.²¹ This is the state's realist effort to exert hegemony over its diaspora.

Socio-linguistics specialist Norman Fairclough defined hegemony as “leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, cultural, and ideological domains of a society” but “never achieved more than partially and temporarily, and thus exists in a state of ‘unstable equilibrium.’” Secondly, hegemony is about “constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating sub-ordinate classes, though concessions or through ideological means to win their consent.”²² A large part of this “hegemonic struggle” for hearts and minds involves constructing a sense of belonging. This ‘belonging’ can be understood as national identity and ethnic identity—both of which are constantly open to various interpretations and challenges defined and understood through studying the ascription and behaviour of groups and their membership.²³

Processes to stimulate ascription may not always be successful. For example, the Turkish attempt to effectively engage with its diaspora reveals severe limitations. Turkey has 36 different government bodies to deal with its diaspora, but they all lack effective coordination. Moreover, discontinuity and lack of comprehensiveness and understanding of diaspora policy by successive governments has meant the relationship was never given consistent priority.²⁴ In addition, the Turkish government has failed to articulate a sense of identity and nationhood over its diaspora. Second and third generation Turks have no formal memory of ‘home’. Subsequent findings by historian James Helicke illustrate how the Turkish (mis)understanding of ‘nation’ has

21 Ragazzi, “Governing Diasporas,” 378–397.

22 Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (Harlow: Longman Group Limited, 1995): 75–81, 91–96.

23 Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, 13–16; Thomas Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 36–58; See also discussions on cultural identity in Aghop Der-Karabetian, “Relation of Two Cultural Identities of Armenian-Americans,” *Psychological Reports* 47 (1980): 123–128; D. A. Rosenthal, “Intergenerational Conflict and Culture: A Study of Immigrant and Non-Immigrant Adolescents and Their Parents,” *Genetic Psychology Monographs* 109 (1984): 53–75.

24 Burcu Mirac Diraor, “How to Mobilize the Turkish Diaspora as a Political and Economic Actor In the EU Accession Process,” Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Working Paper, 2009, www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/gsw/2009/.../Diraor%20PAPER.pdf (accessed 16 March 2010).

resulted in migrant Turkish communities not connecting to either their host or homeland, but instead through religious interpretations. As a result, many Turks outside Turkey exist ‘between’ states and result in a large number of fragmented Turkish associations representing different political stances.²⁵

Because of their numbers, heterogeneous nature, and diverse political affiliations, the issue of loyalty has also been historically contentious and problematic for the OC—particularly for second and third generation members, and especially for those in Southeast Asia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some ethnic Chinese may not consider themselves as Chinese first and foremost (such as those living in Singapore). As for loyalty to the PRC, many of the OC may not agree with the CCP’s ideals and values for material and pragmatic reasons.²⁶

Given this situation, *qiaowu* works to pursue successful ascription and identity convergence amongst the OC through a structured apparatus of ethnographic reconnection. For welcoming and reclaiming those OC who have drifted outside the orbit of China’s embrace, and to strengthen bonds with those already loyal to it, the CCP has promoted a common ethnic consciousness based upon biological attributes,²⁷ cultural and religious values/icons,²⁸ traditions, rituals, myths, historical humiliation, and anti-Chinese racism in seeking to deepen its attachment with the OC.²⁹ In this context, advancing a nationalist discourse and identity as constructed by the CCP was the response of the power elite to maintain their power inside and outside of China.³⁰ ‘Chineseness’ therefore serves as the ideal emulsion by which to unify, mobilize, or influence the OC.³¹

25 James Helicke, “Turks in Germany: Muslim Identity ‘Between’ States” in *Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible*, eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2002): 175–191; Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*, 107–111.

26 Guo, “Party Recruitment of College Students in China,” 371–393.

27 Christiansen, *Chinatown, Europe*, 9–12.

28 Chun, “Fuck Chineseness,” 116–118.

29 Yen, *Studies in Modern OC History*, 137.

30 For a general discussion about nationalism and political legitimacy, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983).

31 Philip Bowring, “Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia Have Cause to be Careful,” *International Herald Tribune*, 29 January 1993, www.ihf.com/articles/1993/01/29/edbo_4.php (accessed 1 October 2009).

5.2 'Chineseness'

As an ethnic identity, 'Chineseness' is open to transmutation and manipulation. It undergoes continual flux across geographical and political boundaries—a perpetually fluid reconfiguration and rearticulated sense of identity that cannot be defined in a singular and fixed racial or ethnic context.³² Over different periods and contexts, there have existed various articulations of 'Chineseness' aimed at reaching the widest 'community' possible. For example, revolutionary elements used both nationality and common ethnic and racial identity to enhance patriotism and unity. The late nineteenth century saw the emergence of nationhood amongst Chinese. Monarchist reformer Kang Youwei (康有为) stressed common ancestry and race as his discourse of 'Chineseness'. His disciple, the influential scholar-official Liang Qichao (梁启超), developed the ideology of a nation-state by emphasizing common historical identity rather than traditional allegiance to the emperor, thus allowing a new kind of patriotism in which the OC could participate.³³

Republican revolutionaries exploited the 1909 *Law of Nationality* and its principle of *jus sanguinis* to promote a range of nationalist activity—encouraging Chinese identity, formation of OC organizations, and education of Chinese language. Sun Yat-sen's principle of racial nationalism (one of "Three Principles of the People") became a part of official KMT policy. By postulating the Han Chinese as a pure race with common blood from a single direct mythological ancestor, Sun claimed that only nationalism would forestall racial extinction.³⁴ On this platform, he established a stronghold of moral and financial support from the OC as "mothers of the Revolution".³⁵ Thus patriotic OC described themselves as *huaqiao*, as it brought to them a sense of political awakening and cultural connection.³⁶

Moreover, supporting China's cause in an economic or political manner during periods of weakness served to define OC loyalty throughout its modern

32 Ma and Cartier, *The Chinese Diaspora*; Ien Eng, "The Differential Politics of Chineseness," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 22 (1994): 72–79.

33 Nick Young and June Shih, "The Chinese Diaspora and Philanthropy," Harvard Global Equity Initiative, May 2003, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~acgei/PDFs/PhilanthropyPDFs/Phil_Chinese_Diaspora.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009).

34 Sun Yat-sen 孙逸仙, *Sanminzhuyi* 三民主义 [The Three Principles], (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1927): 4–5; see also Frank Dikotter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992): 123–125.

35 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 176.

36 Williams, *Future of the OC in Southeast Asia*, 6.

history.³⁷ The KMT continued to rouse Chinese consciousness and nationalist sympathy and secured OC contributions towards the May 30th Movement of 1925 and the Northern Expedition of 1926–27.³⁸ The Sino-Japanese war provided an opportunity for a fractured KMT to reunite against a common enemy,³⁹ bringing both the OC and those in China together in a plan for future security.⁴⁰

After the CCP victory in 1949, a significant change in the way that the OC viewed their political loyalties took place. While some looked favourably towards China for internationalist inspiration, many other OC groups in the West shunned the PRC as a backward nation⁴¹ and were unsupportive of a communist regime in a Cold War environment.⁴² Those in sensitive parts of Southeast Asia were cautious of describing themselves as OC for fear of offending their host government.⁴³ Others refocused their interest away from China and began to identify with their country of residence.⁴⁴ While certain groups of Chinese maintained their values, culture, and mores,⁴⁵ most of them assimilated into local society.⁴⁶ Sojourners, their families, and descendants became ethnic Chinese living abroad (*huaren*). Some academics argued that this phenomenon signaled the end of OC nationalism.⁴⁷

37 Wang, "The Structure of Dual Domination," 155–157; Wang Gungwu, "A Single Chinese Diaspora? Some Historical Reflections," in *Imagining the Chinese Diaspora: Two Australian Perspectives*, by Wang Gungwu and Annette Shun Wah (Canberra: Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, 1999), 6.

38 Elegant, *The Dragon's Seed*, 6.

39 Lai, "China Politics and the U.S. Chinese Communities," 156.

40 Yin and Lan, "Why Do They Give?"

41 Yen, *Studies in Modern OC History*, 148.

42 Ip, "Immigrants and Transnationals in NZ," 350; Brady, "The War That Never Was," 11.

43 *Laoqiao* in Singapore and Malaysia advised Deng Xiaoping during a regional visit in 1978 that they preferred not to be referred to as *huaqiao*, but as *huaren*, *huayi* or *huazu*. Surjit Mansingh, "Beijing and the OC," *China Report* 27, no. 4 (1991): 311, 319.

44 Chan, "PRC Policy on the OC," 131–133.

45 David Yen-ho Wu, "The Chinese in PNG: Diaspora Culture of the Late 20th Century," in *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume II*, eds. Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998): 206–216.

46 Ng Bickleen Fong, *The Chinese in NZ* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1959), 62–63; Manying Ip, "Chinese," Te Ara—the Encyclopedia of NZ website, updated 4 March 2009, www.teara.govt.nz/NewZealanders/NewZealandPeoples/Chinese/en?print=true (accessed 1 October 2009).

47 Yen, *Studies in Modern OC History*, 149.

5.3 ROC Cultural and Educational Work

Operating from Taiwan after 1949, the ROC desperately needed support for its political survival and legitimacy. The OC was a major source of this. With the backing of the US, Taipei seized upon cultural and educational work amongst the OC diaspora as its key channel for their socialization.⁴⁸ The prime objective was to make the ROC the corridor of OC sinicization (*zhongguohua zhi zoulang* 中国化之走廊),⁴⁹ with OC youth as the main target.⁵⁰ Governments desiring closer links with the US (such as the Philippines) endorsed this work as an effort to promote anti-communist beliefs amongst their own OC populations.⁵¹

Using education as a means of managing OC communities was done at two levels: attracting students to study in Taiwan, and controlling OC schools abroad. In regards to the former, since the 1950s Taiwan had successfully recruited a large number of *qiaosheng* (侨生) made up mainly of students from pro-KMT families, or those with some relationship with Taiwan to study on the island. In its effort to secure their loyalty, *qiaosheng* initially had to accept ROC citizenship, do military training, and take an oath of allegiance.⁵² The KMT gradually abandoned these requirements during the 1960s and 1970s following fears of political interference.⁵³ However, even up until the mid-1980s, the specific workings and direction of *qiaosheng* activity continued through handbooks issued to students upon their arrival.⁵⁴ After returning home, this

48 Washington provided financial aid to encourage OC to study in "Free China." See Williams, *Future of the OC in Southeast Asia*, 55; Coral Lee, "An Invisible Bridge: Malaysian Students in Taiwan," trans. Christopher Findler, *Sinorama*, May 2005, http://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/show_issue.php?id=200559405008e.txt&cur_page=1&distype=text&table=2&h1=&h2=&search=1&height=1&type=0&scope=0&order=0&keyword=Malaysian%20students%20in%20Taiwan&1stPage=1&num=10&year=2005&month=05 (accessed 1 October 2009).

49 Liang Ziheng 梁子衡, "Sanmin zhuyi 'qiaoxue' shilun 三民主义 '侨学' 始论 [A Preliminary Discussion on 'OC Study' under the Three People's Principles]," in *Qiaozheng lunwen xuanji* as quoted by Ng, "Taiwan's OC Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s," 270, 274.

50 *Huaqiaozhi tongzhi* 华侨志通志 [General Gazetteer of the OC], (Taipei: Huaqiaochi Editorial Committee, 1956), 530 as quoted by Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, 8.

51 Edgar Wickberg, "Chinese Organizations in Philippine Cities Since the Second World War: The Case of Manila," in Wang and Wang, *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1*, 238.

52 Alexander, *Silent Invasion*, 189.

53 Wang, "The Structure of Dual Domination," 157–158.

54 OCAC, *Qiaosheng fudao shouce* 侨生辅导手册 [OC Students Instruction Manual], (Taipei: Qiaosheng fudaoshi, 1985).

group constituted a strong and well-organized alumnus.⁵⁵ Taipei expected that *qiaosheng* graduates voice their support for Taiwan by assisting its public diplomacy and business development efforts.⁵⁶

For OC communities abroad, the KMT promoted full formal Chinese education after 1961.⁵⁷ Cantonese was initially one of the languages taught, but as a result of acculturation the programme was reduced to Mandarin and Chinese arts after the late 1960s.⁵⁸ Activities included patriotic rituals (such as flag raising and singing of the ROC national anthem), and a nationalistic curriculum (encouraging them to be good citizens for China) that emphasized cultural chauvinism through the teaching of Chinese heritage and civilization.⁵⁹ These efforts remained static for decades. Even into the early 1990s, textbooks promoted Chinese scientific achievements and examples of historical patriotism.⁶⁰ The ROC continued as the dominant education provider amongst *laogiao* up until this period, and remains so in staunchly pro-ROC communities or countries officially recognizing Taipei.⁶¹

Taiwanization completely changed the manner of Taipei's cultural work with the OC. In the early 1990s, the OCAC and the MOE (through its Overseas Compatriot Educational Committee) had continued to assist OC youth to study in Taiwan and strengthen their Chinese identity. These agencies sent specialists all over the world to administer examinations and provide advice about privileges and subsidies. However, authorities cut these provisions following complaints of favouritism from the pro-independence lobby.⁶² As such, during the DPP period after 2000, Taiwan's cultural diplomacy for the OC became more "service-oriented" in a "systematic and transparent manner."⁶³ This reflected a Taiwanized approach that emphasized its own distinct culture

55 Chen, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 179, 213–215, 217.

56 ROC MOE, "What is the ROC's Educational Policy for Overseas Compatriots?" 13 June 2006, <http://english.moe.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=635&ctNode=1181&mp=2> (accessed 1 October 2009).

57 "The Historic Track of OC Affairs," 60–62.

58 Ng, "Taiwan's OC Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s," 270, 274.

59 Such rituals continue in countries where Taiwan is officially recognized, such as Guatemala and Panama.

60 *Haihua*, no. 89 (June 1992): 60; Some examples include Mo Sung-nien, preface to *Stories of the Chinese People in Pictures* (Taipei: OCAC, 1983); *The Good Youths of Chung Hua* (Taipei: OC News Agency, 1973).

61 Hua, "Playing the Panama Card—The China-Taiwan Connection."

62 William Li, "A Reciprocal Relationship," *Taiwan Journal*, 9 October 1990, <http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xitem=9929&CtNode=122> (accessed 6 April 2007).

63 Chen and Liang, "OC Policy to be More Service-Oriented."

over traditional ROC 'Chineseness'. For example, TECO dance teachers offer indigenous mountain dancing as well as the traditional Chinese styles; similarly, examples of aboriginal dress are included with costumes lent out to OC groups wishing to showcase 'Chinese' fashion. TECO also promote and fund numerous arts and cultural festivals (such as Taiwan Week and Asian Tradition Month) so as to enhance its unique image abroad.⁶⁴

With education, Taiwan offers scholarships, opportunities to work part-time, and emphasizes a free and open environment.⁶⁵ For example, Taiwanese universities claim to have a higher standard of teaching than in the mainland, and offer English tuition at some colleges. Externally, the OCAC sponsors and subsidizes more than 200 schools and organizes workshops for teachers through an OC Culture and Education Foundation.⁶⁶ In 2005, there were 17000 students enrolled in Mandarin language and vocational training through the Chung Hwa Correspondence School and the Global Chinese/Taiwanese Language and Culture Online Centre, both of which facilitate correspondence and computer-aided instruction for Mandarin, Taiwanese, and Hakka language. TECO assist by providing books and other educational material for OC community libraries, language, art and dance teachers, teacher training, and public relations materials. Due to Taiwanization during the DPP era, these resources mostly found their way to *Taiqiao* and pro-Taipei OC communities, but not other OC groups.

In the contemporary period, Taiwan intends to reassert itself as a leading provider of Chinese education and culture for the OC. The main themes for Taiwan's 2009 Overseas Compatriot Chinese Education strategy included the evaluation of teaching materials, strengthening the relationship between the OC and the mainstream community, the use of digital technology in education, and innovation and revitalization of OC youth work.⁶⁷ In addition, Ma Ying-jeou's administration announced the establishment of two Taiwan Academies (also known as 'Institutes of Taiwan') in the US (and ultimately a total of

64 Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2002*.

65 OCAC statistics show that 9357 OC students received tertiary education in Taiwan in 1998, increasing to 11,033 in 2000. See Edward Chen, "More OC Students Applying to Study in Taiwan: OCAC," *Central News Agency*, 25 October 2001; ROC MOE, "What is the Difference Between Overseas Compatriot Students, Students from HK and Macao, and Students of Foreign Nationalities?" 13 June 2006, <http://english.education.edu.tw/ct.asp?xItem=636&ctNode=2680&mp=12> (accessed 1 October 2009).

66 Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2002*.

67 OCAC, "Through Culture, Taiwan Academy Will Communicate with the World," OCAC, 5 August 2009, www.ocac.gov.tw/english/unit/unit_pop.asp?no=1423&unit_type=1 (accessed 1 November 2009).

34 around the world) to showcase Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics, and as a form of direct competition against the PRC's Confucius Institutes (see below). The choice of basing both Academies in the US was no coincidence. North America has the strongest base of OC in the world; and it is home to a very strategic *Taiqiao* community.

Taipei wishes to reconnect, strengthen, or rebuild damaged political and cultural links following the DPP years. With a reinvigorated agenda, the KMT has attempted to make up for lost ground. However, learning traditional Chinese language in Taiwan faces increasingly limited appeal given the standardized and simplified Chinese writing system that is universally promoted by Beijing. Thus, Taipei sought to reach out to the wider OC populace by printing booklets in simplified script.⁶⁸ Ma also proposed that OC schools and mainland scholars should be encouraged to recognize traditional characters while writing simplified forms, advocating compilation of a “grand Chinese dictionary” displaying both systems.⁶⁹

However, these initiatives have come much too late. Pre-occupation with Taiwanization during the DPP period caused major setbacks for its educational outreach. As such, China's efforts have since eclipsed Taiwan's status as the leader of Chinese education amongst OC communities. While it may still attract some support from *Taiqiao*, *laoqiao*, and other students wishing to study traditional Chinese, Taiwanese education of Mandarin and traditional culture has suffered an overall decline in popularity due to Taiwan's weaker international status and the aggressive advancements of China's education work abroad.

5.4 PRC Educational Work

PRC education work for the OC both at home and abroad has also seen significant developments over the past several decades—many of which reflected the chaotic situation on the mainland. To attract the OC to study in China during the 1950s, authorities offered them special admission criteria, allowances,

68 David Young, “Ma Dispels Misunderstanding Over Views on Traditional Chinese Script,” *China Post*, 20 June 2009, www.chinapost.com.tw/print/212940.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

69 “Ma Sets Record Straight on Great Chinese Debate,” *United Daily News*, 22 June 2009, www.roc-taiwan.org/be/ct.asp?xItem=96211&ctNode=463&mp=1 (accessed 1 October 2009).

and set up special schools and universities.⁷⁰ Like Land Reform, while the CCP acknowledged that the returned OC should have received better care,⁷¹ there remained logistical and practical difficulties in accommodating their 'bourgeois' lifestyle. In 1957, although not opposing any students who wanted to return, *qiaowu* officials suggested that the OC should stay in their own countries for study.⁷² Those who did go to China found themselves participating in a "rectification campaign" and became the subject of envy or disdain from locals.⁷³

The Cultural Revolution resulted in both major OC universities (Jinan and Xiamen) closing between 1970 and 1978. However, China still required scientists and technicians for its development, and OC youth were suitable recruits. In late 1971, all ethnic Chinese, no matter what their nationality, were publicly welcomed to study in China without discrimination. Taiwanese, American, and Japanese students were specially targeted and offered freedom to come and go as they pleased.⁷⁴ In reality, however, little had changed from previous policy. For example, authorities announced generous scholarships as a ploy to attract students—recipients still had to pay for their tuition and lodging. In addition, the selection process favoured those majoring in disciplines of benefit to China.⁷⁵

Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, it was clear to PRC officials that demand for study in China remained very limited. Thus the emphasis during this period was on external policies—to promote and improve 'Chinese-ness' amongst the OC by raising the level of propaganda concerning ancestral connections and improving the standard of Chinese education, teachers, and materials.⁷⁶ This strategy did not change until the early 1980s, when OC students were again persuaded to study in China by offering them incentives. For

70 Elegant, *The Dragon's Seed*, 33–35.

71 "Dui jiedai anzhi huiguo huaqiao zhishi 对接待安置回国华侨指示 [Instructions for Receiving and Accommodating Returned Huaqiao]," 2 February 1960 in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 43.

72 "Zai quanguo renda changweihui dibashijiuci huiyi shang de jianghua," *ibid.*, 42–43.

73 "Tong Miandian Naiwen de tanhua 同缅甸奈温的谈话 [Conversation with Burma's Ne Win]," 11 August 1971, *ibid.*, 44.

74 "Huijian Taiwan tongbao, lüri lüMei huaqiao, Meiji huaren de tanhua," *ibid.*, 46.

75 Wong, *Red China Blues*.

76 "Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua," in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 87–89; "Huawen jiaoyu de bianhua yu fazhan 华文教育的变化与发展 [Changes and Developments in Chinese Language Education]," 1988, *ibid.*, 96–103; "Zhuanguizhong de Huawen jiaoyu 转轨中的华文教育 [Chinese Language Education in the Midst of Change]," 1989, *ibid.*, 104–108.

example, they were able to enter the high school of their choice, and enrol at the re-opened OC universities.⁷⁷ Following graduation, they were offered special provisions for work, study, or were free to return home.⁷⁸ Returned OC, however, still faced certain limitations if they wanted to continue study overseas (depending on their age and field of acceptable study).⁷⁹ Such talent was required to remain in China for its modernization.

After the 1990s and into the contemporary period, Chinese schools and universities actively wooed the OC student market.⁸⁰ In addition to offering scholarships, other benefits were provided to returned OC and their families, such as admission to higher level academic institutions.⁸¹ This was in line with calls from the national and provincial level government for strengthening the promotion of Chinese language education for OC youth.⁸² For example, the MOE instructed institutions to make special provision for children of returned scholars, as well as offering language coaching for those with Mandarin as a second language.⁸³ Since 2005, children of *guiqiao* (including those of foreign citizenship) no longer have to pay extra fees for attending government-funded schools.⁸⁴ Some institutions automatically award OC applicants extra points to their university entrance examination grades.⁸⁵ These methods, coupled with the popularity of learning Mandarin, has seen a trend of increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese going to China for study.⁸⁶

77 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 155; *Qiaowu zhengce wenda*, 17.

78 Shang, Gu and Li, *Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce*, 549–550.

79 *Qiaowu zhengce wenda*, 19.

80 For example, Wuyi University in Guangdong has a special Foreign Affairs Office that coordinates and receives OC students and attracts donations. See its website, www.wyu.edu.cn/fao/index6_en/gjian.htm (accessed 19 December 2007).

81 Nyiri, “The New Migrant,” 141–176.

82 GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo’shiyiwu’ guihua 广州市侨务工作 ‘十一五’ 规划 [Guangzhou City OC Affairs Work ‘10-1-5’ Plan], 15 December 2006, www.gz.gov.cn/vfs/content/newcontent.jsp?contentId=452864&catId=4100 (accessed 3 November 2009).

83 Zhongguo qiaolian quanyi baozhangbu, *Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian*, 239–243.

84 “Equal Schooling For All,” *Xinhua*, 9 March 2005, www.humanrights-china.org/zt/situation/200402005712114606.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

85 Wang Houhong, “A Fresh Start for Hainan Island,” interview by *Asian Affairs*, Autumn 2000, www.asian-affairs.com/China/wanghouhong.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

86 Numbers of OC students from Malaysia increased from 841 to 1800 between 2003 and 2006. See “Weng Shijie: xiyin daMa huayisheng, Zhongguo daxue yingzeng jiangxuejin 翁诗杰:吸引大马华裔生,中国大学应增奖学金 [Weng Shijie: Attract Malaysian Ethnic Chinese Students, Chinese Universities Should Increase Scholarships],” *Xingzhou ribao*, 5 July 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 15 July 2007, 13.

In the contemporary period, the PRC has emerged as the dominant provider of Chinese language education. The OCAO oversees several institutions for this purpose: the Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College (specializing in Chinese language and culture for OC, as well as holding special training courses for overseas teachers) and Huaqiao University (designated for the educational needs of the OC and the children of returned OC, and marketed as China's major base for foreign Chinese language and culture education). The board of trustees for the latter is composed of celebrities and professionals of OC origin, HK, Macau, and returned OC. In 2000 the OCAO approved Nanjing Normal University as another base for Chinese language education for the OC.⁸⁷

Students from HK, Macau, and *waiji huaren* are special targets for *qiaowu* and Chinese education. The CCP believes that OC studying and living in China can help establish valuable networks amongst classmates and locals, while raising their awareness, sensitivity, and appreciation about Chinese society, culture, history, and politics. As a result, they provide a valuable source of foreign exchange and also serve as an instrument of statecraft. As the next generation of OC intellectual, technical, and political elites, the CCP hopes that their experience in China will make them more accommodating of Beijing's demands.⁸⁸

To deepen their sense of appreciation and (hopefully) patriotism for China, *qiaowu* officials suggest that OC students should be given more support and care during their stay.⁸⁹ In addition, they should be seeded with pro-China ideology so that they can act as a friendly force upon returning home—where they should be placed under continued efforts of management and coordination.⁹⁰ The significance of targeting OC youth for experience in China demonstrates the importance that the CCP is placing on younger targets for *qiaowu*. Influencing them from an early age has become more and more evident in recent years (see Chapter Six).

87 Sheng Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 122–123.

88 David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 78.

89 *Qiaoping jianbao*, no. 1–2, 2004, 23.

90 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuokuan haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian 做好留华同学会工作, 不断拓宽海外侨务工作的点与面 [Do Well with Work on OC Student Groups Studying in China, Unceasingly Open Up Areas of OC Work]," *Qiaoping*, no. 51 (14 November 2005): 14–16.

5.5 PRC External OC Education

From 1949 until the 1970s, the CCP's purpose for promoting OC education outside of China was not simply to foster OC scientific and technological resources for China's modernization, but also for implementing a wider UF strategy to advance China's revolutionary interests overseas.⁹¹ It was no surprise, therefore, that governments (such as India and Indonesia) feared interference and banned such schools in the 1950s. In response, Beijing played down its links with OC schools, suggesting that locals should manage them instead.⁹² However, while the Chinese authorities were careful not to overtly operate OC schools themselves, they did place them under their guidance and manipulation. Methods included subsidizing or buying schools out, and getting influential pro-Beijing OC figures to run classes using CCP-approved textbooks and activities.

Furthermore, it began an effort to stimulate assimilation and learning of local languages in the hope of improving bilateral relations with Southeast Asian countries.⁹³ In the 1980s and 1990s Beijing continued to use cultural work to boost positive feelings, instill an accurate socialist image, dispel the effects of foreign propaganda about China amongst the OC, and promote the CCP goal of peaceful reunification.⁹⁴

In the contemporary period, *qiaowu* officials acknowledge culture as one of mankind's basic spiritual needs, and seeks to exploit it as part of a strategy for managing the current and future generations of the OC.⁹⁵ In accordance with the work set out in the MOC's 12th Five-Year Plan for Cultural Construction, promoting Chinese language and culture through exchange and cooperation with foreign countries is paramount in the CCP's goal of extending Chinese influence around the world. By embracing the OC as part of its 'community', this CCP objective has support from a wealth of policies and infrastructure, capital resources, staff training, and assistance from national and provincial level government agencies, embassies, and consulates.⁹⁶

91 Fitzgerald, *China and the OC*, chapters 3 and 7.

92 "Yu Yindunixiya waijiaobu Meizhousi sizhang Monuonutu de tanhua 与印度尼西亚外交部美洲司司长莫诺努图的谈话 [Conversation with Indonesian Foreign Affairs American Division Director Monuonutu]," 2 October 1957 in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 40.

93 "Fang Jianpuzhai huitan shi de tanhua 访柬埔寨会谈时的谈话 [Conversation Regarding Kampuchean Talks]," 22 November 1956, *ibid.*, 39.

94 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 80–81.

95 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoping," 10.

96 Wen Yi, "Opportunities and Challenges in the Future," PRC MOC, 16 September 2009, www.culturalink.gov.cn/focus/2009-09/16/content_349202_3.htm (accessed 1 November 2009).

5.6 Confucius Institutes

Promoting Chinese language and culture is one means of creating a positive climate of public opinion for the CCP. The foremost example of China's current global public diplomacy and cultural outreach effort is the Confucius Institute programme. Following the establishment of a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in March 2004, the first one opened in Seoul, South Korea in November 2004. Over 280 Institutes have opened since, particularly in cities where large populations of ethnic Chinese reside.

While a large component of their student bodies and wider audiences may be non-Chinese, the OC themselves are also a target market.⁹⁷ For example, in addition to holding language and cultural classes, Institutes serve as gathering points for a wide range of OC activities (such as hosting dance and drama performances, celebrating festivities and exchanges, and as venues for Chinese government officials, diplomats, and consular staff to meet with members of the OC and wider community). Moreover, Institutes have taken a leading role as mouthpieces for the PRC government to promote OC policies, opportunities, incentives, and procedures, as well as propagate CCP objectives through seminars and press releases.⁹⁸

Consequently, traditional OC schools and their provision of cultural and education services are under threat as the growing number of Institutes gradually encroach upon, and ultimately dominate these community organizations. Given their direct links to the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (*Hanban* 汉办), the MŌE, and other government departments, Confucius Institutes threaten to replace (or at least marginalize) traditional OC associations by acting as the PRC-sanctioned authority for OC cultural affairs. Secondly, Institutes actively promote *putonghua* (普通话) Mandarin, and therefore sideline other dialects (such as Cantonese) and certainly challenge traditional Chinese notation (as used in Taiwan, HK, and *lao-qiao* communities) with its system of simplified characters and *pinyin* (拼音) pronunciation methods. Finally, teaching Chinese language is instrumental to re-sinicizing the OC so that once educated in Mandarin, they can understand

97 In February 2009, propaganda chief Li Changchun (李长春) commented that those countries with larger numbers of OC would be ideal for strengthening China's global cultural outreach strategy. Ibid.

98 "Jinbabuwei Kongzi xueyuan yuanzhang: huaqiao huaren yao xuexi dangdi yuyan 津巴布韦孔子学院院长:华侨华人要学习当地语言 [Zimbabwe Confucius Institute Principal: OC Must Study Local Language]," *Xinhuanet*, 27 September 2009, www.china.press.net/huajiao/2009-09/27/content_249085.htm.

officially promoted versions of Chinese history and participate effectively in patriotic activities. The objective is to gather a wide spectrum of support for China in order to influence the development of host country foreign policy so that it is favourable to Beijing.⁹⁹

The rapid establishment of Confucius Institutes all over the world demonstrates the PRC's active and aggressive outreach to OC communities. By partnering with local academic institutions, they have the resources and clout to challenge or subsume rival educators of Chinese. Institutes also have the potential to become the leading providers of learning materials and teachers for OC organizations. In the contemporary period, it is too early to say whether Confucius Institutes have had this effect on Chinese education. However, strategic policies designed to achieve such a goal are already in place.

5.7 Problems Regarding PRC OC Education

According to internal reports, *qiaowu* officials recognize three fundamental problems regarding Chinese education amongst OC communities: a lack of teachers, poor quality and limited teaching materials, and finally, a lack of funding. Educationists realize these concerns cannot be addressed by simply providing more resources, but they should be providing the 'right' resources. Therefore, the aim is to allocate more efficiently and to match particular needs rather than offering a blanket solution.¹⁰⁰ To address the lack of teachers, OC officials suggest increasing the level of professional guidance, improving relations with current teachers, and seeking new teachers for the short term or for training purposes.¹⁰¹

99 Geoff Maslen, "Warning—Be Wary of Confucius Institutes," University World News, 2 December 2007, www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20071130094503100 (accessed 1 November 2009).

100 "Haiwai huawen jiaoyu zhi kun: shiyuan nanmi jiaocai shao 海外华文教育之困:师源难觅教材少 [OC Chinese Education's Difficulties: Hard to Source Teachers and Few Teaching Materials]," *Renmin ribao*, 7 April 2006, reprinted in *Qiaqing jianbao*, 25 April 2006, 15.

101 OCAO Propaganda Department, "Aodaliaya, Xinxilan, Taxiti huawen jiaoyu, huawen chuanmei jinkuang 澳大利亚,新西兰,塔希提华文教育,华文传媒近况 [Recent Situation of Chinese Media and Education in Australia, NZ, Tahiti]," *Qiaqing*, no. 13 (15 March 2004): 8–9.

China uses a “Welcome In, Go Outside” strategy (*qingjinlai zouchuqu* 请进来 走出去)¹⁰² whereby the *qiaoban* welcome local teachers into China through invitations to attend workshops and camps specializing in OC cultural development.¹⁰³ Professional artisans and performers train visitors in a variety of activities including language education, dance, craftwork, and music. Alternatively, the *qiaoban* “go out” by sending teachers overseas to provide similar services. For example, after a strict screening process, experienced staff are dispatched abroad to assist local teachers with materials and techniques for standardizing Chinese language teaching.¹⁰⁴

The strategy of “Welcome In, Go Outside” has two major benefits for China. Firstly, it seeks to replace a formerly ROC-dominated system with a PRC version that emphasizes modern China and CCP Chinese concepts.¹⁰⁵ By “going out” cadres work with various agencies to organize more festivals, trade shows, and exhibitions for propaganda products, and thereby penetrate deeper into foreign arts exchange circles.¹⁰⁶ This serves various purposes: to enhance relations between pro-Beijing groups, the embassy, and *qiaowu* cadres; to provide a tangible benefit for OC communities and deepening their understanding and appreciation of OC work; to enhance and develop OC organizational capacity by active participation, cooperation, and exchange; and to infuse a PRC-friendly version of ‘Chineseness’.¹⁰⁷ Secondly, the strategy improves bilateral relations at the state level. For example, after decades of an Indonesian government-imposed ban on Chinese language and culture, since

102 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang 近年来侨务对台工作情况 [The Situation of OC Work Towards Taiwan in Recent Years],” *Qiaoping*, no. 31 (October 23 2007): 6–9.

103 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Aodaliaya, Xinxilan, Taxiti huawen jiaoyu, huawen chuanmei jinkuang,” 9.

104 “Chinese Learning Fervour Gathers Momentum,” n.d., www.clta-gny.org.chineselearning/fervor.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).

105 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chengong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu 韩国华校校长团成功来华研修交流 [Korean OC School Masters Successfully Visit China for Study and Exchange],” *Qiaoping*, no. 33 (12 September 2005): 11–17; OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 4–5.

106 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 101.

107 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Qinqing de guanhuai zui neng dadong qiaobao de xinling 亲情的关怀最能打动侨胞的心灵 [Close Care is the Best for Moving the Hearts of Compatriots],” *Qiaoping*, no. 34 (12 September 2005): 1–7.

2005 the Indonesian MOE and GOCAO have worked together to develop cultural resources.¹⁰⁸

On the second issue concerning teaching materials, OC experts suggest practical methods to ease childrens' learning of Chinese characters, raise their understanding of textbooks, improve their aural comprehension, and improve their motivation for learning Chinese culture. For example, in 2000, efforts began with projects such as the "Overseas/Ethnic Chinese China ABC". Its purpose was to promote Chinese language, life, history, and geography under a set of "China ABC Popularization Standards" formulated specifically to "carry forward traditional Chinese culture and promoting unity" amongst the OC.¹⁰⁹ The programme includes tours to China and scholarships.¹¹⁰ In recent years, alternative non-traditional methods of teaching have also become popular—such as encouraging self-learning through song and other interactive techniques.¹¹¹ For example, in 2005, cartoons were suggested to promote Chinese culture and language amongst OC youth.¹¹² In keeping with the practice of tailoring solutions to specific groups, educationists advocate that modern teaching materials (such as DVDs) be designed in accordance to geographical location and the age of students in order to gain the best results.¹¹³

With regards to funding, these solutions are initiated at the state level: money either trickles down to pro-Beijing schools and foundations, or directly

108 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Daxuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo 大选后的印尼华人及我对印尼侨务工作 [Indonesian Chinese After the Election and Our OC Work]," *Qiaqing*, no. 51 (1 December 2004): 15, 18–19; Howard W. French, "Another Chinese Export is All the Rage: China's Language," *New York Times*, 11 January 2006; Hanban, "Indonesian Minister of Education Held a Farewell Ceremony for Chinese Volunteer Teachers," 23 June 2005, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/423707.htm> (accessed 6 April 2007).

109 Cui Ning, "Hanyu Across the World, Chinese Revise Textbooks," *China Daily*, 22 November 1997.

110 "'Overseas/Ethnic Chinese China ABC' Project Launched," *People's Daily*, 30 April 2000, http://english1.people.com.cn/english/200004/30/eng20000430_40068.html (accessed 6 April 2007).

111 OCAO Propaganda Department, "'Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshi yanxiutuan' laihua yanxiu jiaoliu '美国西部中文教师研修团'来华研修交流 [Southern US Chinese Teachers Study Group Come to China for Exchange]," *Qiaqing*, no. 41 (19 October 2005): 2–3.

112 "Zhang Weichao: haiwai huawen jiaoyu zhengzai tansuo 'katong' xinlu 张伟超: 海外华文教育正在探索 '卡通' 新路 [Zhang Weichao: OC Language Education Now Probing New 'Cartoon' Methods]," *Zhongxinwang*, 26 May 2005, reprinted in *Qiaqing jianbao*, 18 June 2005.

113 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao," 7.

from state-controlled agencies. For example, since 2006, Beijing has ensured a direct channel of control over the management of funding for Confucius Institutes.¹¹⁴ The external section of the CCP Propaganda Department sends money through to the MOE for Institute activities.¹¹⁵ Other examples of funding include the China OC Language Education Foundation,¹¹⁶ or the Kong Linghe Scholarship (established by a direct descendant of Confucius himself);¹¹⁷ in addition, the China Chinese Cultural Education Foundation promotes Chinese education as a matter of “personal responsibility for each and every OC.”¹¹⁸ At the frontline, commercialization is seen as the key. The *Zhigong* Party (through its *qiaowu* cadres and education attachés) has a central role in promoting Chinese language and culture through a variety of marketable products for the OC community.¹¹⁹ The PRC embassy and consulates regularly offer grants and donations to OC schools for books and buildings.

5.8 Challenging Alternative Forms of ‘Chineseness’

Cultural and education aspects of *qiaowu* operate in an environment full of rival alternative discourses. For the PRC to achieve ethnic and cultural unity, the CCP believes that it is necessary to embrace only one language and one culture.¹²⁰ Cultural work had to be exclusively mainland Chinese—clearly distinct from that of Taiwan or HK.¹²¹ For those OC of Cantonese origin, the

114 “Kongzi xueyuan zhongfang zijin guanli banfa (zanxing) chutai 孔子学院中方资金管理暂行办法(暂行)出台 [Provisional State Management of Funding for Confucius Institute Announced],” *Guojia hanbanwang* n.d, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 23 November 2006, 10.

115 David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy,” *The China Journal*, no. 57 (January 2007): 49–50.

116 Guo Nei, “Closer Bonds with OC,” China Education and Research Network, 2001, www.edu.cn/20010101/21945.shtml (accessed 6 April 2007).

117 “Tuidong haiwai huaqing xue Zhongwen 推动海外华青学中文 [Promoting OC Youth to Study Chinese],” *Qiaobao*, 30 September 2007.

118 “Qiaobao daibiao yu zhichi huajiao 侨胞代表吁支持华教 [Compatriot Representatives Call for Support of Chinese Education],” *Nanmei qiaobao*, 3 October 2007.

119 “Zhigongdang yu jiasu Zhonghua wenhua chanpin shuchu tuidong shijie huawen jiaoyu 致公党吁加速中华文化产品输出推动世界华文教育 [Zhigong Party Calls on Speeding Up Chinese Cultural Products for Export, Push Global Chinese Education],” *Shanghaishi zhengfuwang*, 13 December 2005, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 25 December 2005, 12.

120 “Huawen jiaoyu de bianhua yu fazhan,” in Wang, *Qiaowu chungou*, 97–98; “Zhuanguizhong de Huawen jiaoyu,” *ibid.*, 104–108.

121 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 100–101.

commercialized values of the then-British administered colony of HK defined what was ‘Chinese’ for many OC communities after 1949, and even up until the 1990s (such as popular culture, language, music, mannerisms, and attitudes). PRC cultural and education work also had to challenge Taiwan as the guardian of Chinese ‘high’ culture, and conducted it as part of the overall ‘service’ to the OC by exporting its own resources, materials, support, and content.¹²²

Although China capitalized immensely from ‘Taiwanization’ during the 2000s (in which many former pro-Taiwan OC groups drifted towards Beijing for cultural and educational support) *qiaowu* cadres maintained that Taiwan’s cultural efforts were still much more advanced than its own. PRC educationists acknowledged that their methods were simplistic and monolithic in comparison.¹²³ They suggested better and more attractive tools to compete—such as offering privilege, incentive, entertainment, scholarships, funding, education, and culture to foster positive feelings for China amongst OC youth and their desire to study in China.¹²⁴ They added that they had to do more work with high-level, influential OC groups in order to establish and work through permanent cultural centres, libraries, and depositories.

The CCP’s ultimate goal is to put Chinese language education under Beijing’s complete domination. In situations where it cannot exclusively do so, China reluctantly accepts a compromise. For example, Beijing acknowledges that embracing simplified Chinese characters requires the support of all the OC, and hence it must respect their wishes in order to succeed. Thus in the early 1990s, notices directed towards strategic groups of the OC were still issued in traditional script so as not to upset them.¹²⁵ This policy continues in the contemporary period. For example, in 2005, China announced its willingness to use traditional characters and to discuss teaching Chinese as a second language with experts in Taiwan “as long as they do not intend to split the

122 Wu, “Zhangwo xinfangfa, kaituo Guangdong qiaowu xinjunian,”; Live, “The Sinwa of Reunion,” 234–253.

123 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Beimei qiaoqing xinbianhua 北美侨情新变化 [New Changes in North American OC Affairs],” *Qiaoping*, no. 56 (20 December 2003): 7.

124 Liao Xiaojian 廖小健, “Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai ‘fandu cutong’ 做好亲台侨团工作,促进海外‘反独促统’ [Do Good Work with Groups Close to Taiwan, Promote Overseas Anti-Independence and Promote Reunification],” *Qiaoping*, no. 38 (8 October 2005): 10–11.

125 “Haiwai huawen xuexiao de hanzi jianhua jiaoxue 海外华文学校的汉字简化教学 [The Teaching of Simplified Chinese Script in OC Schools],” 1990 in Wang, *Qiaowu chungiu*, 112–113.

country.”¹²⁶ This strategy ensures that by entering into dialogue with Taiwan, the PRC has another mechanism for influence into previously Taiwanese-dominated activity.¹²⁷

The Yat Sen School in Suva, Fiji provides the most distinct and unique example of this rivalry—the secondary school is managed by PRC authorities using simplified characters, PRC texts and mainland teachers; yet the primary school (located on the same shared site) remains funded and coordinated by Taiwan using traditional script with Taiwanese teachers and texts.¹²⁸ PRC diplomats explained this unusual co-existence by saying that Taiwan was a part of China, and therefore the situation reflected cooperation rather than rivalry.¹²⁹

However, such accommodation is only intended as a temporary measure. *Qiaowu* officials concede that persuading pro-Taiwan schools to turn towards China is a difficult process. A 2005 report noted that Taipei spared no effort to control pro-Taiwan schools, organizations, and people. For example, South Korean OC schools were under the influence of Taiwanese authorities until 1992, but many still used Taiwanese resources in traditional script; moreover, simplified PRC textbooks were hardly used and put into storage.¹³⁰ Therefore the key task of PRC education work seeks to extricate OC schools from rival ROC methodology, influence, and teaching materials.¹³¹ Likewise, OC in the Philippines (also known as Chinoy or Tsinoy) and in particular those *laoqiao*

126 Liu Zepeng (Deputy Director of OCAO) as quoted in “Beijing Willing to Cooperate with Taiwan in OC Teaching,” *Xinhua*, 17 June 2005, www.edu.cn/20050617/3141150.shtml (accessed 6 April 2007).

127 Shih Hsiu-Chuan, “Beijing Expanding its Propaganda Efforts: OCAC Chief,” *Taipei Times*, 6 October 2005, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/10/06/2003274626 (accessed 6 April 2007).

128 Fijian OC have maintained a strong connection with Taiwan since KMT branches were established throughout areas of ethnic Chinese concentration during Sun Yat-sen’s republican movement. After the vice-consul’s office closed down following Britain’s recognition of the PRC in 1949, Beijing experienced difficulty in forming good relationships with *laoqiao*. See entries by Bill Willmott and Christine Inglis in Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, 292–298; Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan,” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 8 (1989): 800–815; Bessie Ng Kumlin Ali, “Quong Tart and Early Chinese Businesses in Fiji,” *Journal of Pacific Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 88.

129 PRC diplomat, interview with author, Suva, September 2007.

130 Some Korean OC children maintain ROC passports in order to facilitate their study in Taiwan. OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 4–5, 9.

131 Zhou Hong 周虹 (OCAO External Affairs Department), “Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji 新老侨团良好合作, 华文教育再现生机 [Good

historically aligned to the KMT, are mostly versed in the traditional script. Efforts to introduce newspapers using simplified characters in the 2000s failed. Consequently, two Confucius Institutes were established in an effort to change this situation. In Fiji (where *laoqiao* remain staunchly pro-Taiwan) local OC educationists were very wary of any attempts for China to establish an Institute at the University of the South Pacific.

China's strategy is to patiently and gently change *laoqiao* views of China without being overtly forceful (which might create sympathy for Taiwan).¹³² Evolving from discrete efforts such as guidance and manipulation in the 1950s, its modern methods reflect an assertive stance that attempts to place China as the leading authority of 'Chineseness'. MOE cadres liaise with pro-Taiwan OC and *laoqiao* and meet with teachers to discuss issues and identify areas for work.¹³³ The next stage seeks to persuade education committees and school teachers to change entirely to the PRC system, such as using simplified characters and *pinyin* over traditional script and Taiwanese pronunciation methods,¹³⁴ and promoting Beijing's HSK (*hanyu shuiping kaoshi* 汉语水平考试) test as a recognized standard with support from local government education ministries.¹³⁵ In 2007, Fijian OC claimed that the PRC embassy was attempting to influence the Fiji-based Chinese Education Research Group by getting pro-Beijing *xinqiao* onto the Yat Sen School board of trustees.¹³⁶ This

Cooperation Between New and Old OC Groups, Produce New Opportunities for Chinese Education], *Qiaqing*, no. 34 (2 August 2004): 7.

- 132 Liao, "Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai 'fandu cutong,'" 5; OCAO Propaganda Department, "Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chenggong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu," 11–17.
- 133 "Zhongguo qiaolian fangwentuan dida Niuyue, jiji tuiguang haiwai huawen jiaoyu 中国侨联访问团抵达纽约, 积极推广海外华文教育 [Qiaolian Delegation Arrive in New York to Positively Promote OC Education], *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 20 October 2007, <http://www.tcf-info.com/post/2533.html> (accessed 13 January 2013).
- 134 OCAO Propaganda Department, "Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshi yanxiutuan' laihua yanxiu jiaoliu," 6–7; OCAO Propaganda Department, "Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chenggong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu," 11–17; OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo," 4–5.
- 135 "Zhongguo qiaolian fangwentuan dida Niuyue, jiji tuiguang haiwai huawen jiaoyu," *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 20 October 2007; OCAO Propaganda Department, "Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshi yanxiutuan' laihua yanxiu jiaoliu," 1.
- 136 *Laoqiao* OC believed that the embassy was using pro-Beijing *xinqiao* to "infiltrate" the board of trustees. Fijian OC academic, interview by author, Suva, September 2007; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Jiada lidu quanfangwei kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo 加大力度 全方位开展侨务对台工作 [Increase Strength in Developing All Directions of OC Taiwan Work], *Qiaqing*, no. 15 (6 June 2007): 8, 11–12.

strong and steady approach demonstrates Beijing's growing confidence in achieving dominance over OC education.

Many OC schools (particularly those that are under-funded and rely heavily on voluntary assistance) are very much dependent on China for providing teachers, materials, and financial support. In a sense, these schools and the OC associations that run them often look to the PRC for their ensuring their continued survival. While schools could continue using Taiwanese materials aided by local teachers (but who may be limited in experience or unavailable in smaller communities), the general trend and popularity is for teaching simplified Chinese. Turning to China and its obliging *qiaowu* agencies is the most convenient and accessible resource for maintaining OC education abroad.

5.9 OC Church Work

In addition to education, the CCP also attempts to instill positive feelings for China through covert methods of targeting and infiltrating key groups—in particular, religious organizations.¹³⁷ According to internal studies, the State Council estimates that more than half of all OC are religious in some way or another.¹³⁸ Moreover, many well-known dissidents who fled China after 1989 later converted to Christianity.¹³⁹ Because the CCP officially promotes atheism in China,¹⁴⁰ *qiaowu* cadres initially overlooked churches as a target for OC

137 "Foreign Affairs Minister Cites Investigation of Chinese Communist Regime Spy," *Sunday Star Times*, 14 July 2005, <http://clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2005/7/14/62895.html> (accessed 1 October 2009).

138 Li, Ma and Ouyang, "Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi," 1–9; Liu Quan 刘权, "Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng 美国华人基督教信仰团体的社会功能 [The Social Power of American Chinese Christian Religious Groups]," *Qiaoping*, no. 58 (23 December 2005): 11, 13–14.

139 Yuting Wang and Fenggang Yang, "More Than Evangelical and Ethnic: The Ecological Factor in Chinese Conversion to Christianity in the United States," *Sociology of Religion* 67, no. 2 (2006): 179–192.

140 Since 1949 and throughout the Mao years, the CCP viewed religion as a class enemy and suppressed it during the Cultural Revolution. Although greater freedoms were permitted under Deng's Open Door policy in the 1980s, all activities were conducted within a limited spectrum. Since then, the CCP has controlled five recognized religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and Taoism). The Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council allocate resources to eight national organizations for monitoring purposes, and ensures that all recognized religious movements operate strictly according to CCP regulations. See Beatrice Leung, "China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the Modern Era," *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 33 (2002): 773.

work. There was limited contact towards them and work methods tended to be passive. However, after the 1980s, the PRC took a stronger interest in them. *Qiaowu* specialists now view churches not as a place for religious gathering, but as another target for OC work and exploiting those with quintessential talent and skills.

OC cadres believe that religion provides potential channels for effectively dispensing *qiaowu*. Few OC organizations can match the size, scope, and resources of OC churches.¹⁴¹ Churches are different to ordinary OC organizations because their membership tends to share a much deeper level of involvement in their activities, beliefs, and outlooks. As such, these OC have more likelihood of being effectively guided. The church network is an ideal medium for influencing OC behaviour, managing their morals and ethics, and hence the way in which they integrate and participate in local society. Church activities often strengthen links with non-Chinese groups and the media, serving as a very useful platform for spreading China's soft power efforts to a wider audience.

According to State Council reports, the objective for *qiaowu* cadres is to actively infiltrate, investigate, and "sinify" (*huarenhua* 华人化) OC church groups, by seeking to attract, influence, and mobilize them through spreading the CCP's interpretation of 'Chineseness' and 'spiritual love'.¹⁴² These strategies build on the existing and historically social networks of Chinese communities that are focused around the church.¹⁴³ Specifically, *qiaowu* church work includes encouraging the OC into unifying as non-denominational units (rather than split them into Catholic or Anglican, for example). Further strategies use them for promoting social exchange and diversity of influence (such as extra activities, meals, or cultural celebration after the service), and spreading Chinese culture (adding Chinese language, art, dance, or music classes for youth). The goal is to accommodate all types of demographics and occupations (such as holding special services for restaurant workers and the elderly, or providing after-school care).

In sum, the CCP has sought to take advantage of the trust and faith that religious OC place in their churches for their family and social development. Given that these OC believe that "children who grow up in the church don't turn out to be bad," the CCP has attempted to usurp these channels for making significant inroads into determining their feelings towards China and what it

141 Liu, "Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng," 11, 15.

142 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Liebian chongzu xinsheng ronghe," 17–18; Li, Ma, and Ouyang, "Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi," 2–3.

143 Fong, *The Chinese in NZ*, 53–55.

means to be Chinese.¹⁴⁴ Under the guise of religion and cultural connection, the CCP has sought to achieve direct engagement with important OC by satisfying their social and psychological needs, and accordingly, instill its political messages. For example, some OC church websites feature anti-independence rhetoric interspersed with religious references.¹⁴⁵

5.10 Earthquake Diplomacy

Fostering and capitalizing on this concept of 'love' for China has been a significant development of *qiaowu* policy in recent years. Many *qiaowu* projects now incorporate 'love' as its central premise (*qiao'ai gongcheng* 侨爱工程). For example, the *Zhigong* Party has a central role in organizing conferences, courses, cooperative ventures, and root-seeking programmes for OC youth (see Chapter Six).¹⁴⁶ The aim of these activities is to promote a positive view and embrace for China, and hence often themed as "Love for Country and Homeland activities" (*aiguo aixiang huodong* 爱国爱乡活动).¹⁴⁷ These efforts began in 1994, when OC officials in Sichuan launched the "OC Heart Project" (*qiaoxin gongcheng* 侨心工程) raising large sums of donations to "OC Heart Schools" for primary education in China. This has since developed into a larger voluntary framework for other development work.¹⁴⁸

During the DPP years, much of this work was aimed at opposing independence and promoting reunification. "Love China" was an ideal

144 Li, Ma, and Ouyang, "Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi," 6–7; Liu, "Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng," 14.

145 National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China and the China Christian Council, "Statement on the Taiwan Issue," NZ Presbyterian Church, 11 June 2001, www.presbyterian.org.nz/1250.0.html (accessed 6 April 2007); John K. Chang, "Striving Towards the Chinese Century," n.d., www.chsource.org/Striving.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

146 "Zhongguo Zhigongdang zhengxie ti'an: guanyu jiaqiang haixia liangan huawen jiaoyu minjian jiaoliu de jianyi 中国致公党政协提案:关于加强海峡两岸华文教育民间交流的建议 [China Zhigong Party Proposes Views Concerning Strengthening Cross-Strait Chinese Cultural and Educational Exchange]," *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 21 March 2008, 17.

147 "Haiwai huaqiao huaren disanci daguimo aiguo aixiang yundong 海外华侨华人第三次大规模爱国爱乡运动 [Third OC Great Love of Country and Homeland Campaign]," *Zhongguo Taiwan wang*, 7 October 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 25 October 2007, 2.

148 "300 yi 'qiaojuan' zhutui Zhongguo jiaoyu 300 亿 侨捐助推中国教育 [30 billion of OC Donations Assist Education in China]," *Xinhuanet*, 8 May 2005, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 14 May 2005, 5.

platform for resolving cross-Strait relations, as Taiwanese could put aside their pro-independence feelings and become compatriots.¹⁴⁹ *Qiaowu* officials capitalized on a burst of OC patriotism and sentimentality with ‘earthquake diplomacy’ following the Sichuan disaster in April 2008. This event sparked a massive mobilization effort amongst OC communities in sending money and help to China under the “OC Love Project—Fighting the Earthquake Disaster with Warmth” (*qiao'ai gongcheng—kangzhen jiuzai wennuan xingdong* 侨爱工程—抗震救灾温暖行动).¹⁵⁰ *Qiaowu* cadres sustained momentum for over a year through continuous activities such as the “OC Love for Homeland” project (*qiao'ai jiayuan* 侨爱家园)¹⁵¹ and support from the OC media.

When the political drive for Taiwanese independence faded after the KMT re-took power in the 2008 elections, the “Love China” effort then moved to oppose other threats to the CCP, such as responding to the Tibetan independence movement and other anti-China forces. This was evident in the “Red Heart” campaign leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Beijing’s goal of inspiring nationalist activity and unity amongst pro-Beijing *xinqiao* and PRC students through the Internet has reaped successful results for the CCP (see Chapter Six).

5.11 Evaluation of Nationalism and the OC

Although there are difficulties in evaluating various types of *qiaowu* efforts in bolstering nationalism amongst the OC, general themes do arise. The majority of *huaren* remain detached from political matters in China, given their assimilation and integration into their host societies over generations. For them, *qiaowu* serves mostly to facilitate cultural and ethnic interest, rather than any ‘love’ for China. On the whole, however, OC of the twenty-first century show

149 “Sichuan dizhen zhenkai liangan jumian, ‘tongbao’ chongpo ‘taidu’ jinguzhou 四川地震震开两岸局面‘同胞’冲破‘台独’紧箍咒 [Sichuan Earthquake Shakes Open a New Phase of Cross-Strait Relations, ‘Compatriot’ Breaks the Curse of ‘Taiwanese Independence’],” *Xinmingwang*, 5 May 2008, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 25 May 2008, 2.

150 “Wen Jiabao ganxie huaren dui Zhongguo kangzhen jiuzai de dali zhichi yu xiezhu 温家宝感谢华人对中国抗震救灾的大力支持与协助 [Wen Jiabao Thanks Chinese for Strongly Supporting China’s Fight Against the Earthquake Disaster],” *Renmin ribao*, 27 May 2008, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 25 May 2008, 1.

151 Wang Meng 王萌, “Sichuan dizhen zaiku ‘qiaoai jiayuan’ benyuedi jiangzai Qingchuan jiancheng 四川地震灾区‘侨爱家园’本月底将在青川建成 [Sichuan Earthquake Disaster Zone ‘OC Love Homeland’ will be Established in Qingchuan at the End of This Month],” *Zhongxinwang*, 12 April 2009, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 28 April 2009, 10.

much less bias than their Cold War predecessors, and have less antagonism toward the CCP than earlier generations. While this change in attitude amongst the OC can most likely be attributed to China's improved global position, there are other explanations and events that illustrate how developments in the articulation and implementation of *qiaowu* policies have affected the way in which the OC may view their connections with Taiwan and China. Pro-Beijing sentiments have developed in the context of several major changes to both the geo-political environment and OC demographic landscape since 1989.

The memories of the older generation who experienced firsthand the wrath of communism have faded, and most OC would prefer to see stability and economic development in China rather than bloodshed.¹⁵² Many welcome the opportunity to participate economically and politically in China's re-emergence. Various events facilitated these feelings: China's entry into the World Trade Organization, the 2008 Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition, and China's space programme. These OC do not feel ashamed of China as the poor and sick man of Asia, but actively draw upon it as a great source of strength, regardless of the regime. As such, the cultural and social stigma attached to favouring the PRC has largely disappeared.

The KMT no longer enjoys the grip that it once held over OC communities between the 1950s and 1980s.¹⁵³ By the 1990s, Taiwan had entered a "competing stage" for OC loyalty.¹⁵⁴ The OC are no longer reliant on Taiwan for financial or political support; they are increasingly urbanized and distributed amongst the general population—removed from the Chinatowns once dominated by the pro-KMT merchant elite. Moreover, during the DPP period, some strategic *laoqiao* groups could not reconcile their pro-KMT beliefs with a DPP ideology, were alienated and frustrated because of Taiwanization, or disappointed that Taipei was not doing enough to maintain links with them.¹⁵⁵ This was a perfect opportunity for the CCP to step up its *qiaowu* efforts to reclaim these despondent OC. In this context, *laoqiao* groups have since accepted or shifted their

152 Yvonne Lee, "Have OC Forgotten the Tiananmen Square Uprising?" *Sing Tao Daily*, 10 June 2004, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=0cbf9eaa0a2e451aa63abf9d3c9ba59e (accessed 3 February 2006).

153 Him Mark Lai, "Organizations Among Chinese in America Since the Second World War," in Wang and Wang, *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1*, 293–344.

154 Chiao Jen-ho (Minister of OCAC) as quoted by Flor Wang, "OCAC Head Urges Increased International Publicity," *Central News Agency*, 7 April 1999.

155 Roger Canfield, "Terror in Chinatown," *New American*, 17 April 2006, www.thenewamerican.com/artman/publish/article_3676.shtml (accessed 6 April 2007); Li Tu, "Murder of Chinatown Leader a 'Complicated Case,'" *Association for Asian Research*, 10 March 2006, www.asianresearch.org/articles/2845.html (accessed 6 April 2007).

support toward Beijing in return for access to benefits offered by the mainland. China has taken advantage of Taiwan's relatively poor economic performance and political uncertainty in recent times. State Council reports show that Beijing is confident that this trend for the OC to turn away from Taiwan is increasing, and has seized upon this opportunity by focusing much of its *qiaowu* work around persuading OC to embrace the PRC.¹⁵⁶

As mentioned in Chapter Four, growing numbers of new migrant OC has meant that in some cases, *xinqiao* outnumber their *laoqiao* counterparts. *Xinqiao* are more likely to look to the PRC embassy for prestige, status, and as a resource for their cultural activities and extended political networks. These OC groups openly demonstrate their acceptance of *qiaowu*. They respond positively to *qiaowu* delegations and state/provincial leaders making 'friendship visits'. In order to demonstrate this affiliation and strength of the relationship, they invite the OC media to help promote these bonds in newspaper articles (with pictures of toasting with officials, joining welcome parties, and taking part in workshops/tours). Building on these warm sentiments, visiting *qiaoban* cadres and government officials appeal for "powerful backing" from their OC audience for creating a strong China and active participation in its reunification.¹⁵⁷

Cultural events staged in their adopted homelands (often facilitated with support from *qiaowu* cadres in the form of decorations, promotional materials, and funding) such as Chinese National Day and Lunar New Year celebrations also work to restore a sense of pride and dignity amongst the OC.¹⁵⁸ These examples reflect Anderson's argument of language and ritual as an important component of maintaining the 'imagined community'.¹⁵⁹ Activities portray a

156 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Taiwan daxuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang 台湾大选对我侨务对台工作的影响 [Effect of Taiwanese Elections on Our OC and Taiwan Work]," *Qiaoping*, no. 28 (23 June 2004): 2–3; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Beimei qiaoping xinbianhua," 1.

157 Consulate-General of the PRC in Auckland, "China's OCAO of the State Council Delegation Visit Auckland," 19 November 2003, www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwtd/t44141.htm (accessed 30 September 2009); "Zhongguo qiaolian daibiaotuan fang maoliqiusi yu qiaojie daibiao zuotan 中国侨联代表团访毛里求斯与侨界代表座谈 [Qiaolian Delegation Visits Mauritius and Symposium with OC Representatives]," *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 22 October 2007, www.chinaqw.com/zgqj/cfj/200710/22/91973.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009).

158 John Garnaut, "Rally Around Flag, China Tells Diaspora," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 July 2009, www.smh.com.au/world/rally-around-flag-china-tells-diaspora-20090726-dxin.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

159 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 40–49.

very CCP side of Chinese culture—particularly nationalistic songs, to which the audience sing and clap along in time. PRC officials also encourage flag raising ceremonies amongst OC organizations in order to invigorate their sense of national pride and unity. The CCP uses the PRC flag as a symbol to isolate and oppose Taiwanese independence and any other perceived threats to the CCP regime.¹⁶⁰

There were also specific events that provoked outrage and frustration both inside and outside of China after 1989. These included the 1993 *Yinhe* Incident,¹⁶¹ Beijing losing its bid to host the 2000 Olympics, Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to Cornell,¹⁶² the Belgrade bombing in 1999, and the Hainan spy plane incident in 2001. The perception that Western media was biased only inflamed these feelings. In 1996, various groups of the OC protested against NBC for making anti-China remarks as the PRC contingent marched during the opening ceremony of the Atlanta Olympics. The PRC MFA sought an official apology, and the OC media fanned anti-US sentiment.¹⁶³ Similar feelings were again evident during Western coverage of the Olympic Torch rallies in 2008. Mostly *xinqiao* and PRC students, these groups demonstrated the effect of years of *qiaowu* relations in spectacular fashion—wishing for China to take its rightful place on the world stage, and they defended this view vigorously.

Xinqiao OC are also more likely to look to the PRC embassy for diplomatic protection. Following its evacuation of OC from the SI and Tonga after violent riots in 2006, *qiaowu* officials noted that the OC were actively looking to

160 Consulate-General of the PRC in New York, “Zhongguo zhu Niuyue zhonglingshi Liu Biwei chuxi Feicheng qiaotuan huodong 中国驻纽约总领事刘碧伟出席费城侨团活动 [PRC Consulate General to New York Liu Biwei Attends Philadelphia OC Organizational Activities],” February 19 2006, www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/chn/qwbh/t236227.htm (accessed 12 March 2012).

161 In July 1993, US authorities accused the PRC-flagged vessel *Yinhe* of carrying chemical weapons to Iran and forcefully conducted a search despite Beijing's objections. Although no weapons were found, the US refused to make an apology. See Yann-Huei Song, “Declarations and Statements with respect to the 1982 UNCLOS: Potential Disputes Between the United States and China After US Ascension to the Convention,” *Ocean Development and International Law* 36 (2005): 261–289, www.southchinasea.org/docs/Song,%20UNCLOS,%20US,%20&%20China.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).

162 In May 1995, the PRC condemned the US Congress for urging the Clinton administration to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa to make a ‘private’ visit to Cornell University. See “Lee Teng-hui now welcome to the USA . . .” *Taiwan Communiqué*, no. 66 (June 1995), www.taiwandc.org/twcom/66-no1.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).

163 Wanning Sun, preface to *Media and the Chinese Diaspora*, ed. Wanning Sun (New York: Routledge, 2006): xi.

Beijing for assistance. OC migration to non-traditional destinations (such as the Pacific, Africa, and Eastern Europe) has meant that Beijing has begun to pay more attention to the OC and their interests (see Chapter Eight).

The most important aspect of all, however, has been Beijing's exploitation of the ethnographic connection and how that is linked to China's rise. By drawing upon the ideology of loyalty to one's ancestral homeland, and by virtue of its size, history, culture, and rising influence, China has and will continue to have a profound influence over the formation of OC identity.¹⁶⁴ In accordance with its economic development over the past decade, China became increasingly confident in dealing with OC affairs and the OC themselves. For example, when members of the NZ Chinese Association (NZCA) visited the PRC embassy in Wellington in 2009, ambassador Zhang Limin (张利民) enthusiastically greeted his *laogiao* audience (most of whom were either naturalized, local born or second or third generation New Zealanders) with the declaration "Welcome home!"¹⁶⁵

5.12 Conclusion

Encouraging affinity with the motherland has been an extremely productive method of building patriotism, sentiment, and 'Chineseness' amongst the OC—particularly in light of China's re-emergence as a world power. Manifesting positive feelings for the CCP amongst groups of the OC has not been achieved by heavy-handed indoctrination; instead, *qiaowu* efforts focus upon racial, cultural, economic, or political forms of attraction and guidance in order for the OC to reconnect with China, and ultimately elicit actions of their own volition. By focusing on religious, emotional, and psychological platforms that transcend the traditional cultural channels, *qiaowu* has successfully reached out to strategic groups of the OC.

Qiaowu encourages the OC to identify and converge with their imagined national communities through active maintenance and celebration of Chinese culture and language.¹⁶⁶ In turn, these methods have brought more of the OC into China's embrace by facilitating nationalistic and patriotic feeling. The CCP has reconstructed and popularized a singular PRC-directed discourse of 'Chineseness' that is attractive and acceptable to the OC. The result has produced attitudes amongst them that are supportive and defensive of China (and hence

164 Wang, "The Structure of Dual Domination," 149–169.

165 Zhang Limin (PRC Ambassador to NZ), address to NZCA, Wellington, 20 June 2009.

166 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 40–49.

its leadership). By 'gathering a nation' across borders, promoting an 'official' national identity that seeks to advance anti-assimilationist objectives, and unifying them for state interest as foreign policy instruments, *qiaowu* is a clear demonstration of the state's attempt to exercise governance over its diaspora.¹⁶⁷

Qiaowu demonstrates how various Chinese governments have created rival political discourses that transcend their territorially defined borders. The KMT promoted its own version of 'Chineseness' in the latter half of the twentieth century in an effort to empower itself, assert its rule, and to subordinate certain indigenous groups to the nationalist nation-state.¹⁶⁸ However, Taiwan's once-dominant relationship with the OC has since faltered, and continues to lose ground against a well-resourced and attractive PRC *qiaowu* effort. Increasing numbers of OC are active in securing access to China for these benefits, and as a result, are not shy to align themselves with Beijing. This illustrates a sense of confidence on the part of both Beijing and its intended targets.¹⁶⁹ In short, overall OC identification with 'Chineseness' has become deeper and more pronounced than during any other period in the CCP's history.¹⁷⁰

167 Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas," 378–397.

168 Andrea Louie, "Re-territorializing Transnationalism: Chinese Americans and the Chinese Motherland," *American Ethnologist* 27, no. 3 (2000): 645–669.

169 Edwards, "Time Travels," 254–289.

170 Purnendra Jain and Gerry Groot, "Beijing's 'Soft Power' Offensive," *Asia Times*, 17 May 2006; Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power," *Policy Brief*, Issue 47, June 2006, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/P13-47_FINAL.pdf (accessed 6 April 2007).

Cultural Work: Reconnection

In addition to OC education, the PRC uses a variety of other strategies for engagement to deepen a sense of ‘community’ with the OC. First and foremost, *qiaowu* seeks to encourage the OC to promote the PRC/CCP stance and thinking while reducing mutual “misunderstanding”;¹ it also works to spur nationalistic patriotism based on common ancestry, culture, friendship, and sentimental village connections.² As such, *qiaowu* has placed significant emphasis on the notion of *luoye guigen* (落叶归根 “falling leaves return to their roots”).

While the platforms have remained consistent to achieve these two objectives, the target groups and methodologies have changed over time. This chapter tracks the development of two specific areas of *qiaowu*: firstly, specially organized programmes that maximize firsthand participatory experience in China itself; and secondly, where direct interaction is not possible, the growth of OC media and telecommunications. Both play a significant role in framing and propagating the CCP’s version of ‘Chineseness’ amongst the OC, and seek to build support for the regime. The phenomenal growth of these two areas of *qiaowu* highlights the acceleration of efforts with key target groups amongst the OC: their youth, *xinqiao*, and PRC students abroad.

6.1 Active Reconnection: Tours and Root-Seeking

Both Beijing and Taipei have used personal tours and visits as key methods for reconnection with the OC. Taipei’s initial efforts sought to attract the OC for opposing communism, promoting foreign investment, and advancing substantive relations. It was most effective with attracting participants during the height of the KMT years in the 1980s,³ but numbers waned with the onset of Taiwanization. Beijing, however, has gone from strength to strength, by targeting a wider range of OC and providing specific groups (*huaren*, *xinqiao*, as

1 OCAO Policies, Laws and Regulations Department, “Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 9–12.

2 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 73–74.

3 17,641 OC went to Taipei for national day celebrations in 1982. “Chinese Overseas Patriotism for Their Motherland,” *Asian Outlook*, November 1982, 20–23.

well as non-Han minorities) with specially tailored activities.⁴ Although more than fifty years have passed since Beijing first invited select groups of the OC to the PRC as visitors, the basic premise has not changed significantly. The core aspects and purpose of tours as tools of investigation and influence remain the same, as do the themes—which continue to emphasize cultural and economic opportunity, ethnographic connections, and to challenge potential threats to the CCP and China's national integrity.

Tours to China began on a small scale and have gradually expanded in scope and size over several decades. In the early 1950s, the OC were warmly welcomed back to China, either as returned OC or as visitors to see the “superiority of socialism”. Tours were an effort to improve their sense of patriotism and unity, engage in socialist participation, and to rally against the KMT.⁵ Their *qiaoban* minders gave them handbooks that outlined how they could embrace and contribute to this effort.⁶ The concept of “great patriotic unity” (*aiguo da tuanjie* 爱国大团结) sought to promote China's revolutionary diplomacy abroad, using the OC to make “outstanding contributions to China's revolution and construction.”⁷ This theme of modernizing China in a socialist context would set the tone of activities for the next thirty years.

During and immediately after the Cultural Revolution, restrictions on movement meant that OC tourism was limited. A few OC were approved at the highest levels of the CCP to travel and study in China.⁸ Most other OC wishing to travel to China had to be invited by the OCAO directly through official connections; it was also possible for invitations to be issued by OC front agencies. For example, the OC Travel Service (later re-named CTS) was solely responsible for OC tourism.⁹ Another front agency was the OC Bank in HK, whereby staff with OCAO affiliations would ask OC if they were interested in going to the mainland for a visit (sometimes for up to a month or more). A brief interview took place (with questions such as their length of time in the host country,

4 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 101; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de ‘luse tongdao’”.

5 “Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce,” *Renmin ribao*, 10 June 1956.

6 Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui 广州归国华侨联谊会, *Guiqiao shouce* 归侨手册 [Handbook for Returned OC], (Guangzhou: Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui, 1955).

7 Some OC contributed to the International Committee for the Promotion of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (ICCIIC or Gung Ho International Committee), which was initiated in Shanghai by New Zealander Rewi Alley in 1937. From the ICCIIC website, www.icciic.org.cn/en-danye.php?id=11 (accessed 1 October 2009); *Life and Life Styles* (China Handbook Series) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1985), 153.

8 Wong, *Red China Blues*.

9 CTS, n.d., www.ctsgroup.com.cn/en/about/index.php?path=2-10 (accessed 27 May 2008).

field of occupation, and salary to vet their potential for contributing to China) before issuing them with the necessary travel documents.

The OC on these early tours were made to feel very important throughout the trip, meeting with provincial officials and attending state functions. However, activities were carefully orchestrated, visiting only specific places of importance (such as Mao's birthplace, historic, or scenic spots), locations that showcased China's scientific achievements, and viewing spectacular cultural shows. Participants would not experience aspects of China that might cause embarrassment, nor were they allowed to make private visitations, or conduct one-to-one meetings with locals.¹⁰ Trips to the ancestral village were also managed. To ensure this, visitors were accompanied and monitored by OCAO cadres (fluent in Cantonese—the dialect of the majority of visitors). Their job was to investigate the OC situation by asking about life abroad, exchanging information of cultural interest, and soliciting donations for local education, welfare, and other charitable causes.¹¹ There was no effort to pressure participants with CCP ideology or make undue requests. Rather, if participants appeared bored or complained, they were taken aside, asked why, and the situation then remedied. Participants were to return home with only happy and positive memories of the 'New China'.

In the late 1970s, OC tourism was managed in the context of the PRC's rivalry with Taiwan. For example, strategic groups of OC (such as Japanese OC who held ROC passports) were invited to visit the mainland. In the early 1980s, China looked to cultural tourism as both a platform for reopening to the outside world, and as part of the propaganda machine to cement the success of socialist reconstruction in OC minds.¹² In 1986 Deng Xiaoping noted that "Chinese living abroad and persons of Chinese descent are welcome to come back for a visit. For one thing, they will be able to understand our country better. For another, they will see what projects they can participate in and how they can contribute. I believe they will enthusiastically support our efforts to build the country."¹³

10 1973 tour participant, personal communication with author, Christchurch, 15 August 2005.

11 Zhuang, "The Factor of Chinese Ethnicity in China-ASEAN Relations."

12 See Wong, *Red China Blues*, 25.

13 Deng Xiaoping, "For the Great Unity of the Entire Chinese Nation," excerpt from a talk to members of the Rong family delegation to China, *People's Daily*, 18 June 1986, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/cl530.html> (accessed 30 August 2006).

6.2 *Xungen*—Falling Leaves Return to Their Roots

For many years, thousands of OC have made their way to Guangzhou or Fujian for cultural reconnection.¹⁴ Since 1978, increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese have travelled to China in search of understanding their origins. *Qiaowu* authorities promote root-seeking (*xungen* 寻根) activities through extensive propaganda efforts showcasing China's economic development, business opportunities, and feelings of homeland as efforts to welcome them back 'home'.

By exceeding the context of conventional tourism, root-seeking tours serve to complete one's identity by providing an authentic and fulfilling experience.¹⁵ Tours are personally significant in that the participants actually engage in ritualistic exchange. Activities include visiting the *qiaoxiang* (侨乡) villages and houses which their forefathers came from, rebuilding ancestral halls, restoring graves, and re-establishing bonds with local government authorities (such as receiving honorary titles). Museums, textbooks, and publications seek to re-educate the OC with a PRC interpretation of China's national history.¹⁶ China is touted as one of the great human civilizations with an extensive contribution to world history and tradition, and the OC are invited to continue this legacy.¹⁷

Most of this work was pursued for economic reasons. After 1978, advancing development was at the forefront of the CCP's agenda.¹⁸ Therefore, *qiaowu* worked to provide information on investment policy and how the OC could contribute either financially or technically to China. At the heart of this effort was the use of ancestral villages as a platform for building better links with the

14 Andrea Louie, *'Chineseness' Across Borders: Renegotiating Chinese Identities in China and the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

15 Andrea Louie, "When You Are Related to the 'Other': (Re)locating the Chinese Homeland in Asian American Politics Through Cultural Tourism," *Positions* 11, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 735–763.

16 William H. Callahan, "Diaspora, Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: OC and Neo-Nationalism in China and Thailand," Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series no. 35, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, October 2002, www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/WP35_02_Callahan.pdf (accessed 14 March 2006).

17 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 87; Mo Hong'e, "OC Youth Urged to Promote Communication Between China and World," *Xinhua*, 13 July 2006, <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t262882.htm> (accessed 6 April 2007).

18 Zhuang, "The Factor of Chinese Ethnicity in China-ASEAN Relations."

OC.¹⁹ Therefore, dedicated offices at the provincial government²⁰ and university level²¹ worked to satisfy OC interest in rediscovering their heritage.²² In 1980 the CPPCC proposed that “Special Economic Zones” near *qiaoxiang* areas be established on the eastern coastline to encourage more FDI from the OC.

From discussions with Shantou officials in Guangdong province in 1991, senior propaganda official Zhu Muzhi noted the importance of using the geographic, cultural, and historical features of the ancestral village for appealing to the OC. In seeking donations for building infrastructure, the OC were not made to feel as if they were being exploited, but to believe that their contributions to the village would ultimately bring them benefit too.²³ In the 1990s, authorities began to increase their scope and targeted those beyond the traditional areas of emigration, and established fifteen OC business organizations for those originating from other provinces and cities.²⁴ By 2006, under the direction of the *qiaolian*, over 14000 organizations had emerged to embrace the OC.²⁵

This work continues into the contemporary period. The *2004 Blue Book of Research Results Concerning China's United Front Theory* listed the key issues that cadres should focus upon: enhancing the cohesion of Chinese nationality, cultural identity, and hometown sentimentality in order to bring about patriotism and socialism for China amongst the OC—with strengthening the

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- 19 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Liebian chongzu xinsheng ronghe,” 9, 12–15; OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 1–12; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing”; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de ‘luse tongdao’”.
- 20 GOCAO, “Root Searching Program,” n.d., <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/rootsearching/> (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 21 Wuyi University Foreign Affairs Office, www.wyu.edu.cn/fao/index6_en/gjian.htm (accessed 19 December 2007).
- 22 Harry Mok, “Finding Roots in China's Soil: Chinese Americans from the Bay Area Visit the Villages of their Ancestors in Genealogy Program,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 21 January 2001, www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/01/21/MNL160221.DTL (accessed 30 August 2006).
- 23 Zhu, “Chaoshan dui wai xuanchuan yao zuo hao huaqiao gongzuo,” 297–302.
- 24 “Zhongguo 15 ge shengshi chengli le huashang zuzhi 中国15个省市成立了华商组织 [15 Provinces and Cities in China Have Established OC Commercial Organizations],” *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 19 December 2004, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 25 December 2004, 6.
- 25 “Zhongguo qiaolian zuzhi fazhan dao yiwansiqian duoge 中国侨联组织发展到一万四千多个 [Qiaolian Organizations Reaches Over 14000],” *Xinhuanet*, 19 September 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 25 October 2006, 11.

attractiveness of the CCP at the heart of this effort.²⁶ Moreover, methods have become much more efficient. For example, *qiaowu* officials carefully monitor the movement of migrants by polling villages, researching special directories maintained by OC groups abroad, and inviting business and community leaders to assist.²⁷ The OCAO, together with local government authorities under the guidance of the relevant CCP Central Committee Departments, all work together in promoting the flow of economic benefit to the villages and towns through better information exchange, personal networks, and good relationships. Cadres attract OC to invest, initiate, and set up public welfare causes, as well as ensuring that these efforts meet domestic capabilities and requirements.²⁸ In this manner, root-seeking has turned into a lucrative industry for driving local economies.

6.3 Building Links

In addition to the economic benefits of reconnecting with the OC, the core objective of visits to China is to promote unity and challenge threats. In this regard, activities seek to either strengthen support for the CCP, or otherwise attempt to change their opposing views through various soft power techniques. *Qiaowu* agencies work actively to reinforce pro-China feeling by organizing activities tailored to specific OC groups.²⁹ These can take the form of forums or conferences, and can attract hundreds of people. For example, the 2001 New Century OC Associations' Forum attracted over 200 leading OC representatives

26 Guangdong Institute of Socialism, "Zhongguo tongyi zhanxian lilun yanjiu chengguo lanpishu' shouci jiang woyuan yanjiu chengguo lieru hexin neirong '中国统一战线理论研究成果蓝皮书' 首次将我院研究成果列入核心内容 [Blue Book of Research Results Concerning China's UF Theory Includes Our Institute's Findings as Core Content]," 9 September 2005, www.gdsy.com.cn/new7.htm (accessed 12 March 2012).

27 Vanessa Hua, "Homeland Never Lost on OC," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 27 June 2004.

28 GOCAO, "Donation Confirmation Certificates Awarded," 20 August 2004, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200408200001.htm> (accessed 30 September 2009); *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 109–110; GOCAO, "Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo'shiyiwu' guihua."

29 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Liebian chongzu xinsheng ronghe," 9, 12–15; OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing," 1–12; OCAO Propaganda Department, "Disanjie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Wuhan chenggong juban," 1–5; Lü, "San ge jianchi' quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo."

from 60 countries. Participants took this opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity and loyalty to the CCP and its objectives.³⁰

Where the OC may not be so politically inclined, other events seek to embrace them through emotional connections. For example, by appealing to sympathies for China as a result of historical foreign aggression, a 2005 festival marked both the centennial of a famous anti-Japanese composer's birth and the 60th anniversary of the end of the war against Japan.³¹ A similar event held in HK in the same year attracted over 1000 representatives from 100 OC organizations.³² In 2002 the Huanghuagang 72 Martyrs Cemetery was renamed and designated a "China OC Federation Patriotic Education Centre" to commemorate those OC who had returned to China and sacrificed their lives for the Revolution.³³ *Qiaowu* activities seek to infuse and romanticize these sentiments in order to deepen nationalistic impact.

Where an overt political connection is not desirable, *qiaowu* employs indirect and seemingly benign contexts for reconnection—such as promoting cultural and economic exchange. For example, in 2007 hundreds of well-known OC artists and experts from around the world attended a special 'Artists Forum' that ostensibly sought to raise cultural standards amongst overseas communities and propagate the "culture of the motherland".³⁴ It was a UF effort to unify OC artists known for producing dissident art.

In the same manner, *xungen* events also seek to attract non-Han OC. As a part of building national unity and to prevent separatist feeling, representatives from ethnic-minority groups are regularly invited to showcase their unique music, song, dance, and art through international arts festivals celebrating diversity within Chinese culture.³⁵ Alternatively, special delegations from the

30 CCTV, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren gonghua fazhan daji 海外华侨华人供话发展大计 [Cooperative Development Strategy for the OC]," CCTV, June 22 2001, www.cctv.com/overseas/chinareport/200106.22.html (accessed 3 November 2009).

31 Beijing This Month, "OC to Join 'Singing on the Yellow River,'" 1 June 2005, www.btmbeijing.com/contents/en/btm/2005-06/wah/singing (accessed 1 October 2009).

32 "HK Holds Meeting to Commemorate Victory of War Against Japanese Aggression," *Xinhua*, 3 September 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200509/03/eng20050903_206159.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

33 GOCAO, "OC & Foreign Affairs."

34 OCAO Propaganda Department, "Wenhua Zhongguo, mingjia jiangtan: tuijie Zhonghua wenhua de xinpinpai 文化中国,名家讲坛:推介中华文化的新品牌 [Cultural China Artists Forum: Promoting New Brands of Chinese Culture]," *Qiaqing*, no. 23 (23 August 2007): 6–8.

35 "Delegation of Taiwan Ethnic Minorities to Visit Chinese Mainland," *Xinhua*, 19 August 2009, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6732429.html#> (accessed 1 October 2009); OCAO Propaganda Department, "Jiaqi qiaowu wenhua gongzuo,

PRC “go out” as performance troupes or hold exhibitions to show OC minorities that China is benevolent, accommodating, and supportive of all its peoples (see Chapter Seven).

Another attempt to reconnect with the OC is through a tangible means of linking personal histories with China as the ancestral homeland. In the late 1990s, the GOCAO first proposed the establishment of an OC museum to open in 2009—deliberately coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.³⁶ In April 2009, shortly before its grand opening, the GOCAO sent a letter to OC associations around the world detailing the purpose of the museum, and called on them to promote this project to the wider community. The second purpose was to invite OC associations to contribute writings, photographs, and other artifacts of historical interest for inclusion in its exhibitions. The letter reaffirmed the important connections between the OCAO and OC organizations, and the significant role that the OC played. *Qiaowu* officials were clear that the main purpose of this museum was to “invigorate ethnic spirit and enthusiasm.”³⁷ The museum was effectively a platform for showcasing to the OC their role and development in the CCP context of ‘Chineseness’.

This wide scope of activity shows that the CCP is very clear in its intent to unite the OC, no matter their origins or political sentiments. The development of themes for tours and interactive projects has moved beyond demonstrating the positive aspects of China and its leaders through history and sightseeing. *Qiaowu* has since incorporated important aspects of modern OC lifestyle interests that can assist with effectively grounding a set of emotions and sentiments that are desired by the CCP.

6.4 ROC OC Youth Work

Some of the most important targets for reconnection work are second and third generation OC youth.³⁸ As mentioned earlier, *qiaowu* officials acknowledge

xuanchuan hongyang Zhonghua wenhua 加强侨务文化工作, 宣传弘扬中华文化 [Intensify OC Cultural Work, Propagate and Enhance Chinese Culture],” *Qiaqing*, no. 16 (24 May 2005): 1–5.

36 GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo’shiyiwu’ guihua.”

37 GOCAO, “Guanyu xiezhu zhengji huaqiao huaren lishi shiwu ziliao de han 关于协助征集华侨华人历史事物资料的函 [Letter Concerning Assisting Collection of OC Historical Materials and Information],” letter to OC organizations, 16 April 2009.

38 Li Dehua 李德华, “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao 对加强新形势下新疆籍华侨华人工作的思考 [Thoughts on Strengthening Xinjiang OC Work In Light of a New Situation],” *Qiaqing*, no. 14 (6 June 2007): 1–6.

that managing the youth today will ease work for the next generation.³⁹ Both the PRC and ROC have made special efforts with this demographic for this reason. However, they have only enjoyed mixed results, and authorities from both governments have adjusted their methodologies accordingly.

The ROC began its efforts through a specially established unit, The China Youth Corps (CYC) or China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps (*Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan* 中国青年反共救国团) in 1952. It was a KMT propaganda arm to uphold anti-communist doctrine through mobilizing young people into organized military training camps. The KMT directly sponsored the CYC until 1989. With assistance from the OCAAC and university student bodies, the CYC organized regular OC Youth Study Tours beginning in the mid-1950s for the purpose of strengthening ties with OC from a young age. Tours ranged from twenty days to six weeks. Various government agencies (including the MOE, the OCAAC, the Mainland Affairs Council, and the MFA) supported and almost completely subsidized youth work over this period.⁴⁰ Ministerial officials would personally address participants and emphasize their common cultural traits. For example, during the 1990s, US participants (because of their political importance to Taiwan) were greeted with “welcome back to your homeland”—despite many of them having no connection at all with Taiwan, apart from being ethnically Chinese.⁴¹

Activities included cultural immersion in Chinese language, arts, and sports at a dedicated training facility. However, the primary objective of the Study Tour (up until 2000 at least) was to bolster support for the KMT regime. Thus visits to pro-KMT tourist landmarks (such as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the National Palace Museum) promoted the ROC as protector of traditional Chinese high culture and arts as mentioned earlier. After the ROC lost its United Nations (UN) membership in 1971, participants were bombarded with overt messages calling for support of Taiwan’s anti-communist stance and reunification with the mainland. For example, they met and lunched with soliders at military installations, viewed martial arts demonstrations, and took

39 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Hanguo huaxiao xiaozhangtuan chenggong laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 17.

40 Vanessa Hua, “A Cultural Awakening: Program Lets Young Chinese Americans Discover Their Identity,” 6 July 1998, www.huaren.org/diaspora/n_america/usa/docs/0798-04.html (accessed 6 April 2007). See also the Government Information Office, *ROC Yearbook 1997* (Taipei: Government Information Office of ROC, 1997).

41 Ellen D. Wu, “Chinese American Transnationalism Aboard the Love Boat: The OC Youth Language Training and Study Tour to the ROC,” *Chinese America: History and Perspectives* (Annual 2005): 51–65.

part in patriotic activities such as flag-raising and singing the ROC national anthem.⁴² However, participants (with Westernized mindsets) mostly dismissed these attempts as propaganda, and the KMT's efforts to instill nationalist spirit amongst them failed to take root.

Furthermore, like all of Taiwan's *qiaowu* efforts during the 2000s, Taiwanization took its toll upon ROC Youth Study Tours. After the DPP took power, the CYC became increasingly independent from the KMT, rejecting KMT-approved candidates for its leadership positions.⁴³ In 2001, the CYC changed its Chinese name to reflect Taipei's new objectives.⁴⁴ Up to 2008, its strategy was not to educate youth about the old ideology of "One China" but to encourage learning about Taiwan's achievements, promotion of international cooperation, exchange, and interaction between local and OC youth.⁴⁵ Thus while traditional Chinese culture still plays a minor role, the emphasis is on raising awareness and interest in understanding Taiwanese native folk culture, history, tradition, and language—and of course its emergence as a democracy.⁴⁶

Another consequence of Taiwanization was that *laoqiao* were no longer the target group. Local politicians criticized the cost of subsidizing foreigners, arguing that the money would be better spent on domestic affairs.⁴⁷ While there was a US\$15 million endowment for the OC Culture and Education Foundation that allowed 3000 OC youth to go to Taiwan to attend language and cultural seminars,⁴⁸ the focus was on *Taiqiao* children. Through an OCAC-sponsored Local and Overseas Taiwanese Youth Action Forum, Taiwan mobilized them as part of its international engagement, considering them a key to facilitate

42 David Chen, "All Chinese Should Help ROC," *Taiwan Journal* 18 August 1988, <http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4189&CtNode=122> (accessed 30 August 2006).

43 Hsu, "KMT Youth Corps Given 'Unfair Break.'"

44 Before 2001, the CYC's Chinese name was Chinese Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps (*Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuquotuan* 中国青年反共救国团). After 31 October 2001, it was changed to the China Youth National Salvation Corps (*Zhongguo qingnian jiuquotuan* 中国青年救国团)—dropping the reference to anti-communism and its militaristic past. See "China Youth Corps Set to Visit Chinese Universities for First Time in 50 Years," *Taipei Times*, 27 December 2001, www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/12/27/117489 (accessed 1 October 2009).

45 China Youth Corps, www.cyc.org.tw (accessed 1 October 2009).

46 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Minjindang zhizheng houtai 'qiaowehui' de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang," 5–6; Application Form for 2006 Overseas Compatriot Youth Summer Formosa Study Tour to Taiwan, www.occroc.org/occc/ApplicationForms/2006_FormosaAct.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).

47 Chung and Wang, "OC Policy Unchanged: OCAC Official."

48 Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2002*.

direct dialogue and exchange, and therefore raise the level of youth activity in Taiwan's public affairs abroad.⁴⁹ Because of these moves, *laoqiao* and *huaren* youth had little choice but to turn to the PRC for cultural reconnection during the DPP period.

6.5 PRC OC Youth Work

PRC root-seeking camps for youth first began in 1980 when the programme attracted 158 participants. By 1986, this had grown to 5753 from 32 countries.⁵⁰ In the contemporary period, tens of thousands of OC youth participate in various *xungen* activities each year. Often being state-funded programmes, they are not designed to extract profit,⁵¹ but to influence the OC using persuasive techniques of integrating play and education (*youjiao jiehe, yujiao yuyou* 游教结合, 寓教于游). The trend of China's public diplomacy and outreach efforts is to foster an image of China as a sincere and responsible country that is committed to reform and opening up, unified and dynamic, and upholds equality and friendship. This format has not changed since the earliest tours. Participants learn about China's opportunities with the hope that they will promote its interests and strengthen filial relations amongst themselves and with China.⁵²

Goals listed in the Retrospective of Guangdong Province's Summer Camps for Youths of Chinese Descent included:⁵³

1. Propagate Chinese culture and strengthen the national consciousness.
2. Deepen knowledge of the motherland and strengthen national recognition.

49 "Overseas Taiwanese to Teach at English-language Summer Camps," *Taipei Times*, 4 June 2004, http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=21068 (accessed 30 August 2006).

50 "Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying 华裔青少年夏(冬)令营 [OC Youth Summer (Winter) Camps]," 1990 in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 109.

51 State-organized events are almost always partially or fully subsidized. These differ to privately run forums, which have no official connection with the state, nor can they be considered *qiaowu*. While government leaders may be present at these private forums, they are only invited as guests to lend credibility to the event; furthermore, private forums demand participants pay their own way entirely—suggesting a purely profit-driven agenda.

52 "Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying," in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 109–110.

53 Louie, "Re-territorializing Transnationalism," 651.

3. Foster participants' attachment to their native village and arouse their nostalgic emotions.
4. Intensify cooperation and exchange between Chinese and foreign youths and enhance solidarity and friendship.
5. Advance OC affairs.

Camp organizers employ a work philosophy embracing persuasion through kindness and sound argument (*yiqing dongren, yili furen* 以情动人, 以理服人), whereby they study the differences of their targets (such as demographics, situation, habits, and interests) and provide activities and locations that evoke feelings of cultural affinity and common cultural heritage while minimizing feelings of both geographical and ideological distance with China.⁵⁴

Given that OC youth are not expected to be proficient in Mandarin, the focus is not so much on classroom learning, but to expose them to firsthand activity and observation in an effort to facilitate accelerated absorption. For example, martial arts training involves the learning of *wushu* (武术) values and skills through intensive practice, movement of body, and mental discipline.⁵⁵ Campers perform in a cultural show attended by *qiaowu* officials, who inspect the fruits of their investment.⁵⁶ Participants also visit military and scientific facilities. After spending many days together in this environment, these youth enjoy a sense of united 'Chineseness'.⁵⁷

6.6 Comparison of Youth Work

Over the years, both Chinese and Taiwanese youth strategies focused upon promoting ideologically-based content. Both versions sought to reconnect youth with a distinct version of 'Chineseness'. For the ROC during the DPP years, it was about promoting Taiwan's indigenous culture, goals for international status, and technical achievements abroad in an effort to distinguish

54 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Zuohao xinyimin shetuan gongzuo zhongzai guli he yindao 做好新移民社团工作重在鼓励和引导 [Succeed in New Migrant Association Work Through Encouragement and Guidance]," *Qiaoping*, no. 15 (29 April 2005): 6–11; "Huayi qingshaonian xia (dong) ling ying," in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 110–111; *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 70.

55 "OC Seek Roots," *China Daily*, 15 August 2002, www.china.org.cn/english/international/39525.htm (accessed 30 August 2006).

56 Camps are subsidized by the local provincial OCAO or by a national entity such as the State Council OCAO or the China Association for Overseas Exchanges.

57 Louie, "Re-territorializing Transnationalism," 651.

itself from China. For the PRC, camps seek to advance their trust of China, educate them about the ‘special characteristics’ of CCP leadership and OC policies by dispelling any negative imagery, to guide and influence their behaviour, and to raise their patriotic spirit and enthusiasm.⁵⁸ They can then be mobilized, networked, and guided along lines of Chinese ethnicity and culture for China’s national interests.⁵⁹ With a better ‘understanding’ of China, OC youth could promote progress with national reunification, disseminate Chinese culture, and serve as a friendly bridge between China and the world.⁶⁰

Taiqiao and pro-Taiwan OC youth are therefore specifically targeted and invited to attend rival PRC camps in order for them to formulate a new ‘objective’ view of China, while reducing ‘misunderstandings’ owing to their ‘limited’ Taiwanese (or other foreign) perspective. This “Welcome In” approach seeks to challenge foreign propaganda and turn them towards Beijing.⁶¹ For *xinqiao* youth, the work has reinforced patriotic feelings for China and its leadership; for others who may be more sceptical, camps seek to change their perceptions and feelings of alienation from China.⁶² No matter where they were born, OC youth are made to feel as if they have returned ‘home’.⁶³ Participants are likely to receive comments about their ‘Chineseness’—such as their “yellow skin,

58 OCAO Economics, Science, and Technology Department, “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye 互动发展助侨兴业 [Mutual Action for Development, Helping OC Develop Industry],” *Qiaoping*, no. 10 (5 April 2005): 2–3.

59 “Fahui qiaojie qingnian zuoyong, licu liangan heping yu fazhan 发挥侨界青年作用, 力促两岸和平与发展 [Make Best Use of OC Youth for Urging Cross-Strait Peace and Development],” *Qiaoping jianbao*, 26 April 2007, 13.

60 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 70.

61 OCAO Propaganda Department, “‘Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshi yanxiutuan’ laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 4–7; OCAO Propaganda Department, “‘Nanfei huayi xiaojie fanghuatuan’ fanghua xiaoguo hao ‘南非华裔小姐访华团’访华效果好 [Good Results for South African Young OC Women’s Delegation to China],” *Qiaoping*, no. 41 (19 October 2005): 10–11.

62 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sango huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao 关于法, 荷, 英三国华侨华人融入主流社会情况的调研报告 [Investigative Report of the Situation Concerning Integration of French, Dutch and English OC in Mainstream Society],” *Qiaoping*, no. 24 (5 September 2007): 14–15.

63 OCAO Propaganda Department, “‘Nanfei huayi xiaojie fanghuatuan’ fanghua xiaoguo hao,” 8–9.

black hair, and common blood of the dragon.”⁶⁴ In many cases, for many OC youth, camps and tours are life-changing experiences.⁶⁵

However, both the ROC and PRC have achieved only mixed results in their efforts to influence young OC in a political context. Before the onset of larger *xinqiao* populations after the 1990s, the largest market for root-seeking youth tours was the *laoqiao*. Then and now, China’s attempt to reconstruct their OC identity is often hampered by conflict with Western beliefs and assumptions, as well as their inability to speak Mandarin.⁶⁶ Most participate with an apolitical mindset dominated by social priorities—and as such, camps are often viewed as subsidized vacations and an opportunity to find one’s future spouse.⁶⁷ These issues frustrated Taiwan’s efforts to mobilize OC youth *en masse* for direct political activism. Camp activities sometimes did not meet participants’ expectations. For example, instead of learning about their ancestral history, they sat through a seminar on local economic development or viewing the remains of a spaceship.

In short, OC youth (particularly those of the second and third generation) hold firmly to their foreign nation-state identities with little patriotic sentiment, unlike the portable transnational identities of newer Chinese migrants. As a result, using biological, cultural, and nostalgic links as a basis to form a politically conscious identity is often a failed ritual.⁶⁸

6.7 Development of Youth Work

Although such tours to China may achieve cultural objectives, root-seeking has not been successful when viewed in a political context of bringing the OC closer to the CCP. While the overall policy suggests that there should be a

64 Rosanna Wong (Director of Dragon Foundation and Executive Director of the HK Federation of Youth Groups), presentation to the Dragon 100 Forum, HK, 22 August 2005.

65 Zhao, *Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu*, 302.

66 The OCAO expected participants to be fluent in Chinese and to specialize in some particular area of Chinese culture during the camp. David Tai (NZCA National President), Annual President’s Report 2004, presented at the NZCA Conference (19–20 June 2004), 76.

67 The tours are often referred to as ‘Love Boat’ tours. Wu, “Chinese American Transnationalism Aboard the Love Boat,” 51–65; Schenley Chen, “A Common Thread,” in *The Gilded Path* (forthcoming), n.d., www.click2asia.com/studytour/studytourfeature.html (accessed 30 August 2006).

68 Louie, ‘*Chineseness’ Across Borders*; Louie, “Re-territorializing Transnationalism,” 645–669.

broader outreach to all OC (reflected in a recent proliferation of events), the actual focus of resources falls on strategic groups. As a result, state-sponsored tours now follow a top-down, centralized, and pro-active approach. This move reflects the desire of *qiaowu* officials to address the failings of previous programmes and to better manage the activities in a context that is free of anything that might detract from CCP objectives.

For example, events emphasize activities that have a tangible pay-off for the hosts either in terms of knowledge gathering or profitable enterprise.⁶⁹ For example, camps run for *laogiao* organizations with financial and logistical assistance from the GOCAO have had their funding withdrawn or reduced under a “user pays” scheme. *Qiaowu* officials argue that not only does this relieve financial pressure on Chinese authorities, but also that because participants pay their own way, they are expected to have more enthusiasm to learn, and therefore engage in a deeper and more meaningful way.⁷⁰

The proliferation of camps targeted at different types of OC youth shows that there is a clear determination to succeed with youth work. However, in the contemporary period, it is those groups receptive to embracing a PRC-friendly identity who form the new target for state-sponsored events. As numbers of *xinqiao* increase, organizers now often assume that participants are able to speak, read, and write in Chinese.⁷¹ While *laogiao* are still invited to attend, promotional material is all in Mandarin—indicating that these camps are aimed squarely at *xinqiao* and those who are more likely to deliver the results expected.

The second approach is to target certain groups who are receptive to embracing a PRC-friendly identity, such as elite OC youth, or those interested in economic, cultural, and scientific advancement. For example, special tours for OC adoptees living with Western parents (and therefore limited exposure to ‘Chineseness’) have the theme “Seeking Roots Through Culture, Learning Through Travel” emphasizing daily family life or practical Chinese arts and crafts.⁷² For other OC youth, career ambitions, opportunities for personal development, and interest in foreign languages also serve as attractive

69 Xiang, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 63–63.

70 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaying,” 5–7.

71 At a 2006 OC Associations Centenary Celebration of 240 delegates from 26 countries, all proceedings and speech notes were in Mandarin (with some Cantonese) without English translation. Kai Luey (NZCA President), personal communication with author, 13 December 2006.

72 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaying,” 5–7.

platforms.⁷³ *Qiaoban* cadres persuade them to view their ethnicity as an advantage during China's re-emergence.⁷⁴ For example, Vice Premier Qian Qichen remarked that "foreigners of Chinese origin" were welcome to share in opportunities brought about by China's globalization and modernization.⁷⁵

Another significant development is the deliberate focus on younger OC. In the early years of the 2000s, the GOCAO launched a new initiative—targeting those aged 16 and under. This is a pre-emptive attempt to influence OC youth before they have the opportunity to participate in rival tours (particularly those organized by the Taiwanese OCAC), secure pro-CCP feelings early on, and foster these sentiments throughout their lifetime. Such camps remain completely under the control of GOCAO, and consist of pre-arranged tours based on cultural, educational or sightseeing themes. Participants must follow these schedules without deviation and often without parental supervision.

These methods show the direct hand of the CCP in influencing the development of OC communities through their youth. By targeting specific groups at a younger age, their hope is to secure pro-CCP feelings early on, and then to foster these sentiments throughout their lifetime. After several years of achieving only limited results, the CCP has taken such steps to ensure that future reconnection provides the desired outcome. This move to a centralized approach is also evident in China's other outreach efforts—in particular its efforts to dominate the OC media.

6.8 Soft Power and the OC Media

Where firsthand participation is not possible, the next best way to reconnect with the OC is through the media and other virtual platforms for interaction. Benedict Anderson argued that "long distance nationalism" explained the political loyalties of migrants regardless of the state, place, or period in which they resided. He described national identity as an artificial or social construct based upon a deep horizontal comradeship linked by fraternity, power, and time—and converged through print technology and capitalism as

73 Dong Ping 董平, "Jiangmenshi qiaowu gongzuo qiuxin qiubian 'sanxin renshi' cheng zhongdian 江门市侨务工作求新求变'三新人士'成重点 [Jiangmen City OC Work Strive for New Change for 'Three New Personages' as Focal Point]," *Jiangmen ribao*, 12 March 2008, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 21 March 2008, 12.

74 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuokuan haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian," 14–16.

75 "Representatives of OC Groups Meet in Beijing," *Xinhua*, 20 June 2001.

an ‘imagined community’.⁷⁶ Moreover, the role of the media is vital in helping build consensus amongst the diaspora, through framing and promoting the relevant issues necessary for convergence with state interests.⁷⁷

For decades, the CCP has used newspapers, radio, television, and other media sources to influence the perceptions and behaviours of the OC. Media work is crucial as a direct method of communicating with target groups, by seeking to defy the hegemony of host country national culture while attempting to re-sinicize its audience.⁷⁸ Beijing’s main objective with the OC media is to encourage reunification, stimulate nationalist pride, and to oppose anti-CCP movements.⁷⁹

In the 1950s, CCP propaganda techniques included uniting and enlisting OC support for the PRC, exposing and opposing the KMT, protecting the OC, expanding relations with the OC through education and cultural activity, and promoting CCP and Maoist ideology through Chinese language publications.⁸⁰ Content was not so much pro-communist, but pro-China and respectful of sub-regional culture. Propaganda received by OC groups included official statements in print and radio, or featured in magazines such as *People’s Pictorial* and *China Reconstructs*.⁸¹ As mentioned earlier, the activities of Young Tong-Shing served in this capacity.

76 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 40–49.

77 Gamson and Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” 275–290; Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement Theory,” 153–170.

78 Supang Chantavanish, “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and Identity Shifts Among the Chinese in Thailand,” in Suryadinata, *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*, 242; Chang-yau Hoon, “A Hundred Flowers Bloom: The Re-emergence of the Chinese Press in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Sun, *Media and the Chinese Diaspora*, 112.

79 Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impact on US National Security,” (testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009), www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_04_30_wrts/09_04_30_brady_statement.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).

80 The Indonesian Communist Party of the 1950s comprised mostly of OC, leading to President Suharto’s banning of Chinese-language schools and publications in 1965—this ban was not lifted until 1999 by President Wahid. See Cheung, “Involuntary Migrants,” 57, 61–64.

81 PRC MFA, “Zhu mianlan lingshiguan guanyu shukan fenfa, dianying fangyin ji huaqiao baozhi gongzuo de baogao” 驻棉兰领事馆关于书刊分发, 电影放映及华侨报纸工作的报告 [Report by the Medan Consulate on the Distribution of Books, Magazines, Movies and Newspapers for OC], Archive File no. 118-00560-05, 1956.

Receiving such information was initially popular, but over time, firsthand news from mainland Chinese relatives informed them of the harsh realities—such as the heavy taxation and capital levies imposed upon them, various invasions of freedom (such as forced confession and expounding of the Party line), and having to perform demeaning tasks. Thus, although pro-PRC literature was available and accepted by some, it was not widely accepted amongst those communities that tended to prefer staying out of politics, or those who wished to be perceived as anti-communist during the Cold War period.⁸²

For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, mainstream OC media operations were based mainly in Taiwan and HK (such as the *Independence Daily* and *Sing Tao* newspapers). During this period, Beijing's attempts to forge links with the OC were constrained by the ROC's dominant position. While there were a few exceptions,⁸³ the KMT sponsored the majority of OC newspapers in an effort to promote its interests and influence amongst strategic OC communities.⁸⁴ However, in the wake of increased *xinqiao* migration after the mid-1980s, the emergence of the Internet, and polarization of the community due to localization of Taiwanese politics, PRC state-run media concerns were able to break into the market.

These companies not only revitalized a stagnant industry, but quickly dominated it as the key sources of news and information by catering to a new generation of migrants, PRC students abroad, and *laoqiao* educated in the Chinese language. The absence of local government interference allowed the OC media to develop their own identity.⁸⁵ This resulted in a torrent of minor papers catering to audiences with specific content.⁸⁶ Since the late 1990s, free advertorial newspapers distributed by scores of PRC-friendly media companies have virtually eliminated Taiwanese and HK-backed OC newspapers.⁸⁷

82 In Thailand, PRC support came from leftist newspapers, but members of the OC mercantile community denied any connection; in Vietnam, there were no communist papers due to the strict authoritarian control over the press, while in Malaya the communist terrorist campaign complicated the attitude of OC toward the PRC.

83 Xiaojian Zhao, "Disconnecting Transnational Ties: The *Chinese Pacific Weekly* and the Transformation of Chinese American Community after the Second World War," in Sun, *Media and the Chinese Diaspora*, 26–41.

84 Victor Purcell, "OC and the People's Republic," *Far Eastern Survey* 19, no. 8 (October 25, 1950): 194–196.

85 Manying Ip, "Chinese Media in NZ," in Sun, *Media and the Chinese Diaspora*, 198.

86 Min Zhou, Wenhong Chen, and Guoxian Cai, "Chinese-language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada," *ibid.*

87 Lin Yang, "The Desert is Now Being Flooded: A Study of the Emergence of Chinese-language Media in NZ" (master's thesis, University of Canterbury, 2005).

Research by the Jamestown Foundation in 2001 found that the PRC either directly or indirectly controlled three of the four major Chinese language newspapers published in the US (*Sing Tao Daily*, *China Press*, and *Ming Pao Daily*). The fourth (*World Journal*) had Taiwanese connections that had eventually given in to mainland pressure.⁸⁸ Elsewhere around the world, the sole Taiwanese-funded newspaper *Independence Daily* ceased operations in 2005.⁸⁹ By 2008, the only notable exception in print media able to communicate with OC on a global scale was the FLG-backed *Epoch Times* (*Dajiyuan* 大纪元). However, this paper lacks credibility and objectivity in the eyes of some China-watchers. The same situation occurs in television media. While New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) (also funded by the FLG⁹⁰ and during the DPP years by Taiwanese government agencies⁹¹) and Taiwan's Macroview Television remain independent from PRC influence, their broadcast reaches only limited sections of the OC diaspora and cannot compete with the wider distribution channels that China Central Television (CCTV) and other pro-Beijing media enjoys.

6.9 Borrowing Ships to Go to Sea

Beijing's overwhelming dominance over the OC media occurred because of intensive *qiaowu* efforts in persuading them to accept the PRC influence and accordingly cultivate a standard discourse that either fosters pro-China sentiment or demonizes groups that challenge the regime. 'Cooperation' with the

88 Mei Duzhe, "How China's Government is Attempting to Control Chinese Media in America," *Jamestown Foundation China Brief* 1 Issue 10 (November 21, 2001), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=28481&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=191&no_cache=1 (accessed 1 October 2009).

89 Julie Middleton, "Pro-Taiwan Newspaper Takes a Lengthy Breather," *NZ Herald*, 12 March 2005, A8; Joseph Berger, "Newspaper War, Waged a Character at a Time," *New York Times*, 10 November 2003, www.nychinatown.org/articles/nytimes031110.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

90 Gaiutra Bahadur, "China's Clash with Reporters Reverberates Here," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 16 February 2004, www.asianresearch.org/articles/1904.html (accessed 1 October 2009); Szabolcs Toth, "Chinese News Network in US Finds Perils of Facing Beijing," *Boston Globe*, 24 August 2003, www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2003/08/24/chinese_news_network_in_us_finds_perils_of_facing_beijing (accessed 1 October 2009).

91 The 2005 NTDTV New Year Global Gala held in Taipei was sponsored by the OCAC, ROC Council for Cultural Affairs, ROC MFA, ROC MOE, Taiwan Government Information Office and the *Epoch Times*. NTDTV, 2005, <http://newyeargala.ntdtv.com/2005/en/venues/taipei.htm> (accessed 6 April 2007).

OC media is one of *qiaowu's* core goals.⁹² Following a meeting of propaganda officials in 1992, provincial authorities called upon PRC media companies to establish partnerships abroad for exporting more cultural products from China.⁹³ This method is known as “borrowing ships to go to sea” (*jiechuan chu-hai* 借船出海) in order to take advantage of established channels to disseminate CCP messages.⁹⁴

The first strategy was for PRC companies to publish special overseas editions. For example, the *China Daily* has a special edition printed and distributed in North America;⁹⁵ the Fujian OC newspaper (*Fujian qiaobao* 福建侨报) in New York is an off-shoot of its parent publication in China (*Zhongguo qiaosheng* 中国侨声).⁹⁶ The second strategy was to encourage OC companies to join with their PRC counterparts through joint ventures, both in China and abroad. For example, at the Second World Chinese Language Media Forum held in Changsha in 2003, OCAO vice president Liu Zepeng (刘泽彭) called upon the OC media to take advantage of the growing market opportunities in China—thus both growing their own operations while extending the reach of PRC media throughout the world.⁹⁷

OC media companies were also advised to join state-controlled international media groups (such as the World Chinese Language Press Institute, World Chinese Media Forum, and the World Chinese Newspaper Association).⁹⁸ As members, they are obliged to carry officially-approved content from the OFP

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- 92 Lin Lin 林琳, “Nuli cujin yu haiwai qiaobao guanxi de hexie 努力促进与海外侨胞关系的和谐 [Endeavour to Accelerate Harmonious Relations with OC],” *Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu*, no. 3, 2008, <http://qwgzjy.gqb.gov.cn/bqch/142/1149.shtml> (accessed 13 March 2012).
- 93 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 12, 157, 162; “Tigao waixuan youxiaoxing de wudian jianyi,” *Zhongguo jizhe*, 2004; “Guangdong Encourages Media to Operate Overseas,” *China Daily*, 1 October 2003.
- 94 Zhao, *Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu*, 304.
- 95 Yang Lei 杨蕾, “Zhongguo ribao—Meiguoban’ zhengshi chuankan 中国日报-美国版’正式创刊 [China Daily—American Edition Officially Launched],” *Xinhuanet*, 24 February 2009, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 30 May 2009, 5.
- 96 “Guanyu women 关于我们 [About Us],” *Zhongguo qiaosheng*, n.d., <http://www.thevoiceofchinese.com/AboutUsChinese.html> (accessed 13 March 2013).
- 97 Zhang Yu 张宇, “Huawen chuanmei luntan bimù: Liu Zepeng yu liyong diyuan youshi moushangji 华文传媒论坛闭幕: 刘泽彭呼吁利用地缘优势谋商机 [Chinese Language Media Forum Concludes: Li Zepeng Encourages Taking Advantage of Superior Commercial Opportunities],” 23 September 2006, www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-09-23/26/349925.html (accessed 13 March 2012).
- 98 In 2001, Global China Group (owner of the *Sing Tao* group) entered partnerships with Xinhua News Agency and the *People’s Daily*. See also Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach,” 23.

or simply reproduce pro-CCP content directly from mainland mouthpieces such as China News Agency (*Zhongguo xinwenshe* 中国新闻社) and *Xinhua* News Service. In 2007 during the 60th anniversary of the establishment of *Xinhua's* foreign bureaus, CPD director Liu Yunshan praised it for the special role it played in disseminating propaganda overseas.⁹⁹

Since 1989, the CCP has acknowledged that the outdated practice of heavy doses of indoctrination is not productive—rather, its propaganda methods have sought to promote patriotism over politics.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, animating feelings of nationalism and pride for China are part of a larger external propaganda effort overseen by the OFP and implemented by provincial level offices. For example, the GOCAO specifically endorses the use of OC media to enlarge the scope of its own propaganda and influence through joint projects and exchange.¹⁰¹ As a result, *qiaowu* officials instruct the OC media to emphasize China-related issues such as traditional festivals, geography, village sentimentality, and particularly China's international relations with larger countries.¹⁰²

This work is not overtly directed by the CPD as with China's own domestic propaganda methods, but like all *qiaowu*, is euphemistically described as “guided by service”.¹⁰³ In practice, the CPD manipulates them by using techniques that fund, influence, and manage friendly Chinese media outlets, or by using methods that make things difficult for dissenters.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, PRC officials work to promote OC media companies as part of China's wider family. For example, diplomats personally visit OC newspapers, meet their editors, pose for photos, and praise them for their cooperation. Officials advise their targets to strengthen their relations with the embassy, and consequently, many papers become public relations devices for reducing the distance between the PRC and the local community.¹⁰⁵ These include publishing biographic details

99 “Xinhuashe juxing zhuwai jigou jianli 60 zhounian jinian zuotanhui 新华社举行驻外机构建立60周年纪念座谈会 [Xinhua Holds Symposium for 60th Anniversary of Establishment of Foreign Bureaus],” *Xinhua*, 31 May 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2007-06/01/content_6184004.htm (accessed 14 March 2012).

100 Stanley Rosen, “Chinese Media and Youth: Attitudes Towards Nationalism and Internationalism,” in *Chinese Media, Global Contexts*, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (New York: Routledge, 2003): 107.

101 GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo‘shiyiwu’ guihua.”

102 “Tigao waixuan youxiaoxing de wudian jianyi,” *Zhongguo jizhe*, 2004.

103 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 83, 88–89.

104 Toth, “Chinese News Network in US Finds Perils of Facing Beijing.”

105 “Zhang dashi cangan benbao qiwang Zhongwen meiti chuancheng Zhonghua wenhua goujian yulun pingtai 张大使参观本报期望中文媒体传承中华文化构建舆论平台 [Ambassador Zhang Visits Newspaper, Hopes Chinese Language Media Can Disseminate

of consular personalities, news of upcoming embassy activities, travel advice, and answering frequently asked questions (such as visa application processes). As the diplomatic face for *qiaowu* activities, ambassadors and consular staff continually seek to raise their profile amongst OC communities.¹⁰⁶ One of the first tasks after their posting is for ambassadors and consular staff to swiftly cultivate relationships with local media and pro-China organizations by assisting with anniversary and traditional celebrations or recognizing members' achievements.

The domination of Chinese language programming is also the result of funding or provision of resources from China. For example, OC radio stations receive re-transmission fees for broadcasting content.¹⁰⁷ Other incentives include subsidies, paid advertising, and access to free content. To remain economically viable, OC newspapers have little choice but to place a good relationship with China over the quality of their editorial content and choice of employees and managers. In return, newspapers expect prestige in being associated with diplomatic figures and the opportunity to tap into the lucrative mainland market.¹⁰⁸ For example, local government and OCAO officials treat OC media representatives to entertainment and lavish hosting when they visit.¹⁰⁹ Such events symbolically reaffirm the strength of that relationship.¹¹⁰

Those OC media companies choosing to remain independent or publish non-approved content become the targets of an aggressive campaign of elimination or control. For example, in 2000, the consul general of the PRC consulate in Melbourne invited media leaders to a dinner during which he repeatedly warned them not to carry FLG content, or else have it first vetted by

Chinese Culture and Construct a Platform for Public Dialogue],” *NZ Chinese Herald*, 6 May 2006, B3.

106 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Beimei qiaoqing xinbianhua,” 8; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de ‘lüse tongdao’.”

107 Jia Gao, “Radio-activated Business and Power: A Case Study of 3CW Melbourne Chinese Radio,” in Sun, *Media and the Chinese Diaspora*, 168.

108 Viveca Ellis, “Chinese Language Media Deals with Censorship,” *Langara Journalism Review*, 2005, www.langara.bc.ca/ljr/archive/LJR2005/chinese2.html (accessed 25 April 2007).

109 Xu Mingyang, “Thai Chinese Journalists Enhanced Cooperation,” GOCAO, 11 June 2004, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200406110013.htm> (accessed 30 August 2006).

110 S. Jayasankaran, “Chasing the World’s Chinese Readers,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 August 2003, 37.

the consulate for approval.¹¹¹ PRC diplomats regularly issue warnings or make threats to advertisers and distributors if they support the *Epoch Times* in any way (see Chapter Seven).¹¹² Likewise, they instruct performers, guests, and satellite providers not to cooperate with NTDTV.¹¹³ PRC authorities blacklist and shut out non-accredited reporters from covering pro-PRC functions (such as diplomatic events and state visits).¹¹⁴ Otherwise, they stage rival functions designed to confuse participants and audiences—sometimes at the same venue, but only days or even hours apart.¹¹⁵

The CCP has also resorted to using militant methods against the *Epoch Times* and other FLG practitioners. For example, FLG practitioners accused CCP agents of attacking staff of the *Epoch Times* and destroying computer equipment.¹¹⁶ These efforts aim to send a tough message to other OC media about the consequences of acting outside the boundaries of what is acceptable to the Chinese authorities. Although internal *qiaowu* memoranda do not allude to resorting to illegal and violent methods, they do prescribe using “intense pressure” (*qiangda yali* 强大压力) as the key to stifle OC media operations unwilling to respond to Beijing’s cues. For example, PRC diplomats shut down a Fijian OC newspaper that advocated Taiwanese independence.¹¹⁷

111 “An Investigation Report on the Use of Propaganda and Penetration Abroad to Extend the Persecution of Falun Gong Overseas,” n.d., www.zhuichaguoji.org/en/upload/docs/State-Run%20Media/Overseas%20Media%20report.doc (accessed 1 October 2009).

112 Rowan Callick, “Defector Opens Door on Chinese Australia,” *Australian Financial Review*, 2 August 2005, www.fofg.org/news/news_story/php?doc_id=1127 (accessed 25 April 2007).

113 Luo Ya, “Communist Party Hinders Australian Officials from Attending New Year Gala,” *Epoch Times*, 24 January–6 February 2006, 4.

114 Bahadur, “China’s Clash with Reporters Reverberates Here,”; Vanessa Hua, “Dissident Media Linked to Falun Gong: Chinese-Language Print, Broadcast Outlets in U.S. Are Making Waves,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 18 December 2005, www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/12/18/MNGGAG8MTA1.DTL (accessed 1 October 2009).

115 Richard C. Morais, “China’s Fight with Falun Gong,” *Forbes*, 9 February 2006, www.forbes.com/home_europe/technology/2006/02/09/falun-gong-china_cz_rm_0209falungong.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

116 Television NZ, “Meeting Over Journalist’s Ejection,” 4 April 2007, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/news_politics_story_skin/1049022 (accessed 1 October 2009); Reporters Without Borders, “Journalist with the *Epoch Times* Assaulted in Atlanta: the Newspaper Accuses Chinese Authorities,” 14 February 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=16436 (accessed 1 October 2009).

117 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Jiada lidu quanfangwei kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 9–10, 16.

In this oppressive environment, most OC media operations oblige, constrained by the fear of retaliation if they behave otherwise.¹¹⁸

6.10 Managing OC Reporters

As well as influencing the way that the OC media operates, the CCP also seeks to control news gathering and production. In this regard, PRC authorities carefully manage OC reporters visiting China—particularly those perceived as a threat.¹¹⁹ Anyone working independently and wishing to cover sensitive issues are required to get authorization for every reporting trip made outside of Beijing; if they are caught without clearance, they may be subject to detention or expulsion. For example, security personnel attacked photographer Ng Han Guan after taking a picture of a colleague being man-handled by police in 2004.¹²⁰ BBC producer Bessie Du and her assistant were strip-searched after visiting a riot in Dingzhou in 2006.¹²¹ Others may be barred from entering the country altogether.¹²² Despite their ethnicity, those OC reporters considered dangerous are treated without sympathy and no different to other reporters that threaten to expose issues that may embarrass China.

For those journalists working under the supervision of *qiaowu* minders, a more direct but subtle approach is used—mostly by providing regular training and guidance.¹²³ Under these methods, cadres treat OC journalists with pragmatism by ensuring their “safety and satisfaction”.¹²⁴ For example, in the early 1990s, cadres accompanying their targets were instructed to answer any

118 Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy,” 29, 44; Yvonne Lee, “Raids on Seven HK Newspapers Criticized by OC,” *Sing Tao Daily*, 10 August 2004, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=f4a73e5cf708e8565126aac527189830 (accessed 1 October 2009).

119 Jan Wong, *Jan Wong’s China: Reports from a Not-So-Foreign Correspondent* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999): 78–80.

120 Jonathan Watts, “Beijing Blues,” 9 August 2006, *Guardian*, http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/jonathan_watts/2006/08/jonathan_watts.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

121 “BBC Beijing reporter, Cameraman Briefly Detained, Searched,” *Kyodo News International*, 19 July 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2005_July_25/ai_n14940601/ (accessed 1 October 2009).

122 Reporters Without Borders, “Chinese Government Bans Two Canadian Journalists with Chinese-language TV Station,” 18 January 2005, www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12320 (accessed 1 October 2009).

123 Lü, “‘San ge jianchi’ quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo.”

124 Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 103–109.

questions by explaining circumstances from a third-party perspective, with essential information delivered in a succinct manner, free of strong propaganda overtones.¹²⁵ Moreover, minders were to avoid false and boastful statements, regurgitate from script, use excessive pleasantries, or appear cold. Such demands have not changed in the contemporary period. *Qiaowu* cadres continue to deliver information to their interlocutors in a warm-hearted and friendly manner.¹²⁶

The other method to influence OC journalists so that they present a CCP-approved version of China is to invite them to participate in international media conferences, symposia, and tours that showcase the historical grandeur and economic progress of a post-revolutionary 'New China'.¹²⁷ Following the 1989 crackdown, there was an emphasis to update foreign and OC perceptions of contemporary China, as opposed to dwelling upon cultural history.¹²⁸ Their reports were to dispel old conventions and methods, and instead continuously explore and address the needs of the OC. Since the 1990s, the role of the OC media and journalists has been to foster patriotism and a united spirit amongst the OC. Tasks include propagating various themes: a modern perspective of China, the friendly intentions of China and its leaders, commentary on global issues, and its Taiwan policy.¹²⁹

In the contemporary period, propaganda for the OC continues to promote this positive image.¹³⁰ Provincial foreign affairs staff tailor activities and locations specifically to the different political and environmental perspectives,

125 Zhu, "Chaoshan dui wai xuanchuan yao zuo hao huaqiao gongzuo," 297–302.

126 OCAO Propaganda Department, "Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang," 10–11.

127 OCAO Propaganda Department, "Lianluo goutong haiwai huawen meiti, yingzao lianghao guoji yulun huanjing 联络沟通海外华文媒体, 营造良好国际舆论环境 [Contact OC Media, Create a Good International Media Environment]," *Qiaoping*, no. 44 (1 November 2005): 5.

128 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 157, 160, 166.

129 Wu, "Zhangwo xinfangfa, kaituo Guangdong qiaowu xinjunian," "Haiwai huaqiao huaren he huawen meiti gaodu pingjia Zhonggong shiqi da zhaokai 海外华侨华人和华文媒体高度评价中共十七大召开 [OC and Chinese Media Make a High-level Appraisal of 17th CCP Conference]," *Xinhuanet*, 18 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/17/content_6898124.htm (accessed 14 March 2012); *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 213.

130 Zhao Haiyan 赵海燕, "Shoujie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Nanjing bimu 首届世界华文传媒论坛在南京闭幕 [First Chinese Media Forum Concluded in Nanjing]," *Chinanews.com*, 18 September 2001, www.fcm.chinanews.com.cn/2001-09-18/2/257.html (accessed 14 March 2012).

desires, and interests of journalists. Reporters are inspired to write positive, fair, and objective articles about China in order to improve compatriot connections, and inform and guide the OC to make more contributions. For example, minders invited foreign commentary on preparations for the 2008 Olympics in an effort to portray China as “clean” and “civilized”—especially after Beijing’s response to the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak that consequently damaged China’s international reputation.¹³¹

Qiaowu therefore manages exactly how reporters receive information and produce content. Cadres ensure that a selective manner of exposure reveals only those aspects of China that are deemed desirable. By guiding these processes under supervision and influence, the CCP has control over the most vital component of outreach to OC communities. With such power over the dissemination of mainstream OC news, the CCP has few problems in promoting its message to a wide audience. In order to appeal to them on an even broader scale, the CCP has invested heavily in alternative forms of media, in particular new technologies such as audio, video, and the Internet.

6.11 New Technology: Television and Radio

In the past, information had to be relayed through personal, oral, and written networks and the print media. Now anyone can acquire and transmit information swiftly and directly. New multi-media and electronic platforms have the advantage of vast and effective delivery over traditional platforms—particularly for ethnic Chinese and second or third generation OC.¹³² For this purpose, Beijing has sought to produce a “multi-faceted cultural product” to reach as many of the OC as possible.¹³³ According to State Council reports, since the early 2000s the goal has been to develop the OC media into a ‘New Chinatown’—a comprehensive “supermarket of ‘Chineseness’ and OC work”, which together with advertisements and articles, is used to the full extent for

131 Beijing OCAO, “Yaoqing haiwai huawen meiti xuanchuan Beijing aoyun 邀请海外华文媒体宣传北京奥运 [Invite OC Media to Propagate Beijing Olympics],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 23 (23 August 2007): 1.

132 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang,” 15; Wu, “Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo.”

133 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Lian Song fangwen Dalu dui haiwai qiaoshe de yinxiang ji wo gongzuo duice 连宋访问大陆对海外侨社的影响及我工作对策 [Effects on OC Society Arising from the Lien Soong Visits to China and Our Countermeasures],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 19 (27 June 2005): 9–10.

conducting and promoting *qiaowu*.¹³⁴ It employs both indirect methods (such as exhibitions on China's development) and direct methods (such as news media). OC media companies supplement these efforts by tailoring content to suit the tastes of local audiences.¹³⁵ Lastly, *qiaowu* also attempts to guide these organizations to connect with and to influence mainstream media abroad in order to improve foreign perceptions of China.¹³⁶

Qiaowu specialists believe that audio-visual propaganda has been particularly effective in reaching out to their audiences.¹³⁷ For example, China Radio International specifically targets OC audiences by broadcasting in 38 languages, as well as Mandarin and four other Chinese dialects.¹³⁸ Similarly, CCTV began a global growth plan aimed specifically at the OC in 1992. A dedicated channel, CCTV-4, is broadcast to 98 percent of the world twenty-four hours a day, through satellite and cable technology on uncoded frequencies.¹³⁹ While the exact number of viewers is difficult to gauge, in 2006 CCTV-4 had over 15 million subscribers (approximately one third of the world's OC population).¹⁴⁰ To reach those without subscriptions, CCTV purchases time or broadcasts free of charge on local public/private stations, and contributes to various US university campus stations.¹⁴¹ An initiative in 2006 between CCTV, the local embassies/consulates, and OC media companies resulted in a special television service targeted at OC specifically. The *Zhonghuaqing* media service

134 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, "Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao," 6.

135 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan 'du' cutong jianyan xiance," 10–11.

136 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao," 14–15; Beijing OCAO, "Yaoqing haiwai huawen meiti xuanchuan Beijing aoyun," 2–3; OCAO Propaganda Department, "Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang," 10–11.

137 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 87–89; Gao, "Transnationality of Settled Migrants," 18.

138 Chinavista, "Mass Media," n.d., www.chinavista.com/entravel/show_culture-193.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

139 Gao Wei 高伟, "CCTV-4 fugai 98% diqiu CCTV-4 覆盖98%地球 [CCTV-4 Covers 98% of the World]," 2007, <http://qkzz.net/magazine/1671-2536/2007/06/1073785.htm> (accessed 14 March 2012).

140 Zhu Hong 朱虹 (PRC State Administration of Radio, Film and Television news spokesperson) as quoted by reporters in, "Woguo guangbo yingshi zhouchuqu jinru quanmian fazhan de xin jieduan 我国广播电视走出去进入全面发展的新阶段 [Entering a New Phase in the Overall Development of 'Going Out' in Our Nation's Television Broadcasting]," PRC State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, 3 November 2006, www.sarft.gov.cn/article.do?articleId=20070910174338600875 (accessed 14 March 2012).

141 Lee, "How the Chinese Government Came to Dominate Chinese Language Media in the United States," 9; Mei, "How China's Government is Attempting to Control Chinese Media in America."

(featuring local and Chinese news, arts, and cultural items) is aimed specifically at OC and foreign students.¹⁴²

The CCP's reach extends beyond its own state broadcasting company. Phoenix TV (a private television company that has a large following amongst both OC and domestic elites) gave a 10 percent stake to CCTV as a symbolic gesture to show it would not oppose the CCP.¹⁴³ Consequently, while it has a reputation as being a more 'truthful' and 'objective' alternative to the state broadcaster, for fear of being shut down by censors it refrains from airing sensitive stories, criticism of party leaders, support for independence, or pushing for democratic reform.

Despite these comprehensive propaganda efforts, *qiaowu* specialists believe that only a minority of the OC actually 'understand' China—these mostly being *xinqiao* migrants who have yet to assimilate with mainstream society. *Xinqiao* tend to be more vulnerable and responsive to nationalist propaganda and ethnic chauvinism than established *laoqiao*. This latter group (particularly third and fourth generation OC) are understood to have doubts and misgivings about China owing to their Western perspectives and philosophies. Special propaganda work is therefore necessary for them, given that many may not have a strong grasp of the CCP version of the Chinese situation.¹⁴⁴ The emerging popularity of the Internet in the late 1990s has facilitated these ambitions.

6.12 *Qiaowu* and the Internet

The medium most effective for managing, mobilizing, and sustaining a nationalist spirit amongst a diverse population of OC has been the Internet. It provides an indiscriminating platform for "deterritorialized transnational interaction" whereby all OC are able to share knowledge freely. They are also able to assert, maintain, and demonstrate cultural and political identification, and hence unify for various causes under a sense of virtual 'Chineseness'.¹⁴⁵ For example, news of protests outside Indonesian consulates and embassies

142 "You Zhongguoren de difang jiu you Zhonghuaqing 有中国人的地方就有中华情 [Where there are Chinese, there is *Zhonghuaqing*]," *NZ Mirror*, 15 September 2006, 1, C5.

143 Philip Pan, "Walking a Tightrope," *Washington Post*, 20 September 2005, www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=20&art_id=1638&sid=4642389&con_type=1 (accessed 1 October 2009).

144 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 81–83, 85.

145 Kwok Kian-Woon, "The New 'Global Chinese Community'?" (paper presented at the 5th World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, Melbourne, 7 October 1999), <http://english.wcbn.sg/index.cfm?GPID=26> (accessed 22 September 2009).

after the riots in 1998 spread quickly throughout cyberspace;¹⁴⁶ in 2005, OC supported an online petition opposing Japan's bid for joining the UN Security Council.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the Internet allows effective communication despite diversity of dialect, culture, and interests amongst OC groups and minorities by using a variety of local languages and images.¹⁴⁸

The PRC has taken advantage of these benefits for much of its modern *qiaowu* communication and mobilization efforts. For example, *xinqiao* websites disseminate general information, policy, and recruitment details. Content tends to focus upon the strategic issues of OC affairs and development of international relations.¹⁴⁹ *Laoqiao* websites promote ethnic, historical, religious, nostalgic *qiaoxiang* ancestral issues, and investment opportunities.¹⁵⁰ They include English translations in order to reach a larger audience.¹⁵¹ For example, the GOCAO website provides information concerning its services, conducts surveys, and has interactive features that welcome views, comments, and ideas.¹⁵² These websites are, in effect, the modern virtual renditions of the Special Economic Zones that appealed to Guangdong and Fujian migrants who wished to engage more with China during the early 1980s.

PRC portals and Chinese-language websites (such as *Guangdong qiaowang* 广东侨网) have become popular sources of mainland and OC news and information amongst the OC.¹⁵³ Some of these websites are linked directly to state-controlled mouthpieces, which promote PRC government initiatives, policies,

146 Felix Soh, "Tragedy and Technology Makes OC Unite," *Straits Times*, 20 August 1998, www.huaren.org/aboutus/news/082098.html (accessed 23 August 2007).

147 Antoaneta Bezlova, "China's Quandary Over Japan's UN Bid," *Asia Times*, 7 April 2005, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD07Ad06.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

148 Li, "Dui jiaqiang xinxiangshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao," 1–6.

149 Anna Shu-ju Chiu, "The Chinese Overseas Organizations on the Internet, with a Note on the Socio-Cultural Phenomena Beyond the Webscape," *Zixun shehui yanjiu*, no. 9, July 2005, 359.

150 Ann Shu-ju Chiu and Chee Beng Tan, "Old Chinese Overseas Communities and New Chinese Migrants on the Internet," (paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, 10–14 May 2004). http://192.38.121.218/issco5/documents/ChiuandTan_002.doc (accessed 1 October 2009).

151 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan 'du' cutong jianyan xiance," 10–11.

152 GOCAO, "English Channel of GOCN Opened on 18 June 2004," June 18, 2004, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/2004061800021.htm> (accessed 23 August 2007).

153 Lü, "San ge jianchi' quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo," "Dui wai xuanchuan baodao youxiaxing de jiben pingjie 对外宣传报道有效性的基本评价 [Report on Effectiveness of Overseas Propaganda]," *Zhongguo jizhe*, n.d., <http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-18.htm> (accessed 14 March 2012).

and news. In this manner Beijing can pool and coordinate various materials onto centralized servers before distribution as a standard narrative to the world's OC.¹⁵⁴

Although the information age was supposed to have popularized democracy, transparency, and freedom of speech, this has not been the case in China. The CCP is able to police and combat threats against itself by controlling all domestic online content. Within China, the Internet remains tightly monitored under a highly resourced apparatus that is supported by laws and regulations, surveillance measures, and technological advances so that only the positive benefits are achieved, while any negative impacts are minimized.¹⁵⁵

Externally, the OC are not bound by state censorship or policing of their online activity. Where the CCP cannot control OC cyber-activity, any groups that threaten the CCP become the target of social malware attacks. While it is difficult to prove that the PRC government is responsible for ordering the interception and theft of electronic files and e-mails from computer servers belonging to groups such as the Office of the Dalai Lama, investigations show that the source addresses used for spreading the viruses were located in Xinjiang—where special police and intelligence units dealing with independence issues are based.¹⁵⁶

In contrast to such aggressive methods, a warmer and inclusive means of rallying other OC groups over the Internet is the hope of unifying them as a single pro-Beijing “Global Chinese Village.”¹⁵⁷ The “Red Heart” campaign demonstrated how this could be achieved. The popular practice of adding a red heart icon next to one’s avatar (symbolizing love for China) was initiated

154 Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic?” 635–653.

155 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 125–149; Robert Marquand, “China Cracks Down on Web and Expats,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 June 2005, www.csmonitor.com/2005/0610/p01s02-woap.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

156 Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson, “The Snooping Dragon: Social Malware Surveillance of the Tibetan Movement,” University of Cambridge Technical Report No. 746, March 2009, www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-746.html (accessed 1 October 2011). See also the Information Warfare Monitor, “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network,” Munk Centre for International Studies and the SecDev Group, Report JR2-2009, 29 March 2009, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network> (accessed 17 January 2012); Ethan Gutmann, “Hacker Nation: China’s Cyber Assault,” *World Affairs Journal*, May–June 2010, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/hacker-nation-chinas-cyber-assault> (accessed 17 January 2012).

157 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Minjindang zhizheng houtai ‘qiaoweihei’ de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang,” 6–7, 10.

by users themselves and later adopted as a branding strategy for MSN China.¹⁵⁸ *Xinhua* was fully supportive of the effort, calling for netizens to maintain an “open mind against anti-China propaganda while keeping patriotic.”¹⁵⁹ Large numbers of *xinqiao* and PRC student groups abroad responded by adding pro-China and anti-Western media comments alongside their ‘heart’; they shared videos or songs criticising CNN and BBC, such as the “2008 China Stand Up!” video (which first circulated domestically on Sina.com and later around the world on Youtube) to defend China’s honour.¹⁶⁰ Soon after, however, such venting of nationalistic fervour also evolved into extreme forms of online activity—“human flesh search engines” that tracked down OC ‘traitors’ (those who were perceived to support pro-Tibetan or anti-China efforts) in a virtual witch-hunt, ultimately resulting in real physical attacks.¹⁶¹

These OC netizens have assisted the CCP regime with promoting its political agenda, image, and objectives throughout the world, and consequently strengthened these elements amongst their own communities. For example, it was through Chinese language websites, blogs, and chatrooms that provided the detailed instructions used to mobilize participants for the 2008 Olympic Torch rallies. They were specifically told when and where to meet, how to dress, what to bring, and what to do—so as to present the Chinese protestors as civilized, friendly, and peaceful.¹⁶² Similarly, PRC students in NZ featured postings discussing and organizing protests against Rebiya Kadeer’s visit to Auckland University in 2009.¹⁶³ In this manner, the CCP has been effective in guiding behaviour and influencing perceptions both in reality and in virtual cyberspace.

158 “‘Red Heart China’ Appears in Netizens’ MSN Signatures,” *Xinhua*, 18 April 2008, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6395205.html> (accessed 30 April 2008).

159 Zhang Yuke 张玉珂, “‘Hongxin China’ xijuan MSN women gai zenyang biaoda aiguo reqing “红心 CHINA” 席卷 MSN 我们该怎样表达爱国热情 [‘Red Heart China’ Sweeps Across MSN, How Should We Express our Patriotic Zeal?]” *Xinhua*, 17 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-04/17/content_7997010.htm (accessed 30 April 2008).

160 Evan Osnos, “Angry Youth: The New Generation’s Neocon Nationalists,” *New Yorker*, 28 July 2008, www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/28/080728fa_fact_osnos?currentPage=all (accessed 30 September 2009).

161 Shailla Dewan, “Chinese Student in US Is Caught in Confrontation,” *New York Times*, 17 April 2008.

162 “Fed: Evidence Emerges of Well-Organized Chinese Campaign,” *AAP General News Wire*, Document no. 1467531751, 24 April 2008; NZ Chinese Students in Support of Olympics, “4.27 jihui xuzhi! Qing wubi zixi yuedu! Yange zunshou!”

163 Lincoln Tan, “Activist to Face Chinese Protests,” *NZ Herald*, 10 October 2009.

Raised under the influence of CCP rhetoric, values, and nationalism, *xinqiao* have a better ‘understanding’ of modern China and a greater potential to align more closely with Beijing than other ethnic Chinese. After many years of patriotic education at home, and later reinforced externally through Chinese language media, modern communications, and traditional rituals, *haigui* specialist David Zweig found that PRC students who returned from study overseas were “no less jingoistic than those who have never gone abroad.”¹⁶⁴

6.13 Conclusion

The aim of *qiaowu* is to gather support for China and its leaders by getting the OC to identify positively with their motherland. OC reconnection work (whether it involves guiding the OC media, through propaganda efforts, or through *xungen* tours) seeks to penetrate OC communities and individuals, and instill amongst them nationalistic, patriotic, or ethnographic sentiment that converge with Beijing’s political identity. While the OC may have unrestricted access to news when outside of China, their choice of Chinese language newspapers remains very much influenced by pro-Beijing sources. Moreover, the CCP’s methods of reconnection with the OC have become much more sophisticated—utilizing modern technologies, adapted for their cultural and economic situation. The Internet has been a key platform for not only linking them with China, but also spreading and sustaining nationalism abroad. As a result, domination of these channels means that news and perceptions of China are likely to pass through CCP filters before reaching their intended audience.

With reconnection activity, while the overall policy suggests that there should be a broader reach out to all OC, the actual focus of resources falls on specific groups. The reasons are both economic and political. Root-seeking tours are hosted at huge expense, but may not produce the desired results. Thus in recent years, subsidies have been gradually removed for *laoqiao* groups. For specific groups that hold promise of producing positive results for the CCP, they may enjoy fully subsidized activity. These measures also reflect the intensified efforts for centralized control following conflicting agendas amongst participants from previous years.

This chapter demonstrates that although certain segments of the OC diaspora do not respond to *qiaowu* in the way that the CCP may desire,

164 Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt, “Rise of the Sea Turtles: China’s Most Modern Citizen Aren’t Drawing It Any Closer to the West,” *Newsweek*, 15 August 2008, <http://en.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18876> (accessed 1 October 2009).

reconnection methods will continue to develop as the OC become increasingly diverse and localized. As such, more resources will be required to deal with their larger numbers—necessitating more funding and active planning from *qiaowu* officials. At the same, there is no shortage of eager OC media companies willing to align themselves with Beijing, or OC groups wishing to reconnect with their ancestral homeland—allowing Beijing an even firmer foothold into the heart of OC communities.

External Work: Threats & Challenges

In describing long-distance nationalism, Benedict Anderson argued that values and information flowed from the outside to the inside.¹ As such, the OC play a key role in shaping the political and cultural future of China by transmitting Western values and ideologies back to their place of origin.² They are able to use international relations, technology, and legislation to maximize, exploit, and manage their relationship with China for their own welfare, protection, and economic advancement. The OC can act as bridges between East and West, as resources for China to draw upon in order to strengthen itself, or as defenders of Western or Chinese ideals.³ Ultimately, the OC are either challengers or supporters of homeland policies.⁴ They are therefore a potentially influential force to promote liberal values, together with freedom of thought and speech within China.⁵ Could the OC usher democratic reform within China as some commentators have predicted?

In 1989, American scholar Francis Fukuyama contended that Western-educated PRC students would return to change China.⁶ However, his assertion never materialized. Returned OC are mostly technocrats who lack commitment towards democratic transition. At most, they serve only to espouse Western political values in an indirect manner in their roles as advisors or administrators outside the key political and propaganda system.⁷ Fukuyama

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1 Benedict Anderson, *Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics*, (Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1992); Anderson, *Spectres of Comparison*, 73–74.

2 Tu Wei-ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” *Daedalus* 120, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 1–32; “A World of Exiles,” *Economist*, 2 January 2003.

3 Wang, “Upgrading the Migrant,” 28–29.

4 Shain and Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” 449–479; Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553.

5 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “For China-Born US Citizens, Visiting Homeland Has Risks,” *New York Times*, 1 May 2001, A1.

6 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *National Interest* (Summer 1989).

7 He Li, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” *Asian Perspective* 30, no. 2 (2006): 5–29.

later maintained that nationalism would decline as liberalism and free markets rendered national differences irrelevant.⁸ By extension, economic liberalization and the influence of the OC would lead to democratic freedom in China. As described in Chapter Two, the events of 2008 proved yet again, that Fukuyama was wrong in his prognosis.

The CCP is not immune to conflict with interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational groups.⁹ As Ragazzi argues, the state-diaspora relationship is driven by power politics—it is in the state's interest to retain supremacy over its diaspora for national security. In this context, the state may view cohorts of its overseas population as a potential menace, and who therefore must be placed under surveillance or dealt with by force through its security agencies.¹⁰

7.1 The OC as Threats to the CCP

While their ethnicity may provide them with convenient access into and throughout China, the OC do not necessarily receive protection if they come into conflict with state interests. Those engaging in any activity outside those parameters as defined by the CCP may find themselves the subjects of scrutiny. Their origin, irrespective of nationality, means that their behaviour could be perceived as treacherous or traitorous, and therefore subject to even harsher treatment than their non-Chinese colleagues. These OC are not necessarily the beneficiaries of a warm embrace as widely promoted by the Chinese state. Instead, they are identified as suspicious threats or cast as convenient scapegoats.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are numerous examples of OC journalists who have found themselves in this situation. Similarly, OC academics, writers, and businessmen involved with matters considered as 'sensitive' while visiting China may undergo "returnee interviews" and warned about how they should behave, or threatened with consequences to their family in China should they not oblige.¹¹ Others might be accused of spying and dealt

8 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992).

9 Doak A. Barnett, *Communist China: The Early Years 1949–1955* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

10 Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas," 378–397.

11 Kang Zhengguo, "Arrested in China," (trans. Perry Link) *New York Review of Books* 48, no. 14, 20 September 2001, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14501> (accessed 2 October 2009).

with under strict rules and procedures concerning national security.¹² For example, CCP authorities charged David Wei Dong and Zhao Yan with leaking state secrets.¹³ Journalist Ching Cheong was arrested when trying to obtain the memoirs of former pro-reform leader Zhao Ziyang—he was charged with setting up a spy network and selling military secrets to Taiwan, and eventually received a five-year jail sentence for espionage.¹⁴ NZ reporter Sun Gang (representing a pro-democracy group called the China Federation Party) was accused of intending to “commit violent and terrorist acts” by exploding a hot air balloon over Tiananmen Square and scattering pro-democracy leaflets.¹⁵ In 2004, Wang Bingzhang (an American advocate of labour rights in China) was kidnapped during a visit to Vietnam, forcibly transported to China, and detained by PRC authorities who charged him with terrorist activities.¹⁶

Chinese authorities have arrested or imprisoned hundreds of other OC for economic crimes (such as tax evasion or bribery)—often as retaliation for business deals that have caused embarrassment for the State. For example, under the direction of MSS officials, triads kidnapped Australian James Peng Jiandong in Macau and spirited him to the mainland in 1993 on accusations of embezzlement following a dispute with a state-owned company linked to the niece of Deng Xiaoping. Despite insufficient evidence, a Chinese court sentenced Peng to eighteen years in jail but eventually freed him six years later.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the plight of these OC is hardly given any media attention, and victims suffer in silence.¹⁸ In April 2001, the US State Department issued a

12 Ann Scott Tyson, “Disappeared in China: 100 Days and Counting,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 June 2001; “Other Chinese Literati Jailed By Their Homeland,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 June 2001, <http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?durable/2001/06/05/pls4.htm> (accessed 9 March 2007).

13 “OC Accused of Spying for Taiwan,” *Taiwan News*, 17 August 2004, www.etaiwannews.com/Taiwan/2004/08/17/1092708512.htm (accessed 9 March 2007); “Beijing Tried a HK Journalist,” *International Herald Tribune*, 16 August 2006, 3.

14 Reporters Without Borders, “Ching Cheong Completes Six Month in Detention on Spying Charge,” 21 October 2005, www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15380 (accessed 2 October 2009).

15 “Beijing Detains 2 Ethnic Chinese Foreigners for Plotting Terror,” *Voice of America*, 27 May 2003, www.voanews.com/tibetan/archive/2003-05/a-2003-05-27-5-1.cfm (accessed 2 October 2009).

16 BBC, “China ‘Snatched Exiled Dissidents,’” 26 July 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2153101.stm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

17 Wanda Szeto, “Fleeing Peng’s Fate,” *Standard*, 13 July 1997, www.thestandard.com/hk/archive_news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&art_id=6752&sid=&con_type=1&archive_d_str=19970713 (accessed 7 March 2007).

18 John Kamm, “Free on the Fourth of July,” *Wall Street Journal*, 4 July 2008.

travel advisory to China-born American citizens and green card holders to take care if they had Taiwanese links, or engaged in activities critical of Chinese policies.¹⁹

Where it cannot persuade cohorts to align with it through inclusive processes, the CCP demonstrates anxious (if not obsessive) behaviour, and resorts to calculated and divisive techniques to challenge, isolate, or eliminate threats. Such work lies outside the mandate of the *qiaowu* administration (which must appear benign and benevolent), so is implemented through other government agencies (see below).

Those elements requiring special attention are politically active OC—particularly those in countries with governments that have political, ideological, and geo-strategic concerns about the rise of China and the success of a CCP state; or in countries whose governments are sympathetic to their cause and therefore allow their anti-CCP or anti-PRC activities to continue. Specific groups of interest include the OC pro-democracy, Taiwanese independence, Falungong (FLG), Tibetan Buddhist, and Xinjiang independence movements.²⁰ This chapter summarizes Beijing's policies and techniques for managing these different subsets of the OC over the last three decades. It argues that the CCP's *qiaowu* methods have successfully unified cooperative groups for its own interests through cooptation, while other methods have sought to prevent hostile ones from eroding its grip on power.²¹

7.2 The OC Pro-Democracy Movement

As mentioned in Chapter Two, vehement and widespread protests against the CCP erupted around the world following the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989—the majority of which were dominated by OC groups, often led by student dissidents who either had escaped from China or were sent into exile. They ended up in different universities across the globe and formed a variety of pro-democracy organizations. Other (mostly state-sponsored) PRC students already overseas also became a liability for Beijing. Many of them were able

19 Rosenthal, "For China-Born US Citizens, Visiting Homeland Has Risks," A1.

20 Callick, "Defector Opens Door on Chinese Australia."

21 See discussions by Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese*, 92–101; Maria Hsia Chang, "Greater China and the Chinese 'Global Tribe,'" *Asian Survey* 35, no. 10 (October 1995): 955–967; Gerald Segal, "A Many-Splendored 'Greater China,'" *International Herald Tribune*, 11 January 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/11/opinion/11iht-edsegal.html> (accessed 2 October 2009).

to gain permanent residency or citizenship in their countries of adoption. Despite being outside of China, these OC still constituted a potential threat to the CCP, which closely monitored their activities.

The CCP immediately went into damage control to aggressively eradicate, prevent, or pre-empt subversive discourses from rising amongst the OC diaspora. For the next two decades, members of the OC pro-democracy movement were subjected to intensified efforts to unify them through mind and spirit with Beijing. Coupled with growing nationalism for China throughout its re-emergence as a world power, and boosted by increasing numbers of pro-Beijing PRC students and *xinqiao* migrants living overseas, *qiaowu* has worked to successfully isolate and influence key leaders of this cohort for the benefit of the regime.

7.3 The Taiwanese Independence Movement

A second threat to the CCP is the Taiwanese independence movement—made up mostly of Taiwanese compatriots and *Taiqiao*. Peaceful reunification is fundamentally linked to the CCP's legitimacy and survival, and therefore elevated to the highest level as a nationalist project.²² While the CCP argues that this issue should remain an internal concern, with sufficient support of the OC around the world, China can claim their loyalty and legitimacy over Taiwan.²³ In other words, *qiaowu* officials consider the OC as an external key to influencing Taiwan's domestic political direction.²⁴ Irrespective of their origin or political orientation, the CCP calls upon all ethnic Chinese as “sons and daughters of the dragon” to support the principle of peaceful reunification, to oppose Taiwanese independence,²⁵ and to accept Beijing's “one country, two systems” policy.²⁶

The main obstacle in achieving this goal is the Taiwanese independence movement. The major pressure groups are the World United Formosans for Independence, Formosan Association for Public Affairs, and the World

22 Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 240–241.

23 Pao, “Wanted: OC,” 24.

24 Wu, “Zhangwo xinfangfa, kaituo Guangdong qiaowu xinjunian.”

25 “OC Firmly Back Chinese Gov't Statement on Cross-Straits Ties,” *People's Daily*, 20 April 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200405/20/eng20040520_143887.html (accessed 2 October 2009).

26 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 1–4; Embassy of the PRC in the USA, “OC Key Force in Nation's Revival.”

Taiwanese Congress. Their aim is to advance a non-Chinese identity amongst Taiwanese state-owned corporations, overseas representative offices, and within government itself. They were particularly active in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when they lobbied to boost foreign arms sales to Taiwan and campaigned for high-level Taiwanese government figures to visit the USA.²⁷ Various *qiaowu* strategies to deal with these Taiwanese OC groups have been successful—assisted by China’s rapidly improving economic situation and the change of political direction in Taipei since the KMT’s return to power in 2008. Consequently, the Taiwan independence issue has since been overshadowed by other political threats—particularly the Tibetan, Uyghur, and FLG movements.²⁸

7.4 Falungong

Originally supported by the Chinese authorities as a means to improve the spiritual condition of China’s populace, FLG was registered under the umbrella of the China Society for Research on *Qigong* Science in 1992. With a widespread following (including senior CCP members and military officials attracted by its health benefits) and distributed over many branches throughout China and over 200 contact points around the world, FLG eventually became a major opposition force and irritant to the CCP. The FLG showed itself to be very capable of mobilizing quickly and effectively to threaten CCP interests. In 1997 FLG was de-registered following a CPD ban on all publications written by its founder, Li Hongzhi (李洪志). In 1999, the PRC passed a law to suppress heterodox religion (*xiejiao* 邪教) and legitimized the CCP crackdown on the FLG movement as an evil cult.²⁹

Although the CCP has been ruthless in its attempt to shut them down entirely within China, FLG members continue to practice abroad freely as an extreme anti-CCP movement outside the control of the Religious Affairs Bureau. The FLG uses a variety of methods to promote its cause. These include writing letters to major newspapers, holding demonstrations outside PRC embassies and

27 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, *Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 72.

28 “Baijia huawen meiti ping shida Zhongguo xinwen he haiwai huaren shequ xinwen 百家华文媒体评十大中国新闻和海外华人社区新闻 [One Hundred Chinese Media Comment on the Top Ten News Items from China and OC Communities],” *Zhongxinwang*, 29 December 2008, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 29 December 2008.

29 Leung, “China and Falun Gong,” 761–784.

consulates, protesting against visiting CCP leaders, performing exercises in public areas, and making use of modern communications technology and the Internet to mobilize practitioners. They also assist members of the CCP, the PLA, or other CCP-sponsored groups to sever their allegiances with the communist regime. To gather public support, the FLG distributes anti-CCP material in the form of DVDs and free copies of its newspaper (the *Epoch Times*), and hosts spectacular cultural performances. Those seeking further information can participate in “Bible study”-style meetings, dinners, and casual seminars discussing the *Nine Commentaries* (*jiuping gongchandang* 九评共产党).³⁰

Because of its anti-CCP activities, the FLG movement is the target of mostly coercive strategies from PRC embassies, consulates, and pro-Beijing groups. Propaganda attacks and intense pressure have inflicted severe damage upon the FLG membership, its operations, and legitimacy in the public eye. As its primary mouthpiece, the *Epoch Times* lacks credibility; its members have been forced underground due to fear of retaliation; and public support for them is weak. The FLG has also lost significant support and financial backing with the changing political environment in Taiwan (see below). Nevertheless, it still remains a viable threat to the CCP by repeatedly embarrassing the Party on human rights issues, and by exposing negative aspects of the regime.

7.5 Tibetan Buddhism and the Xinjiang Independence Movement

The global population of ethnic-minority OC is approximately seven million. Despite not being of Han ethnicity, the CCP still considers them Chinese, based on the concept of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu* 中华民族) and its official discourse of “unity of the nationalities” (*minzu tuanjie* 民族团结).³¹ However, the CCP highlights their ethnic or geographic origins, and differentiates them from the Han majority by using terms such as *guowai zangbao* (国外藏胞 foreign Tibetan compatriots), *Xinjiangji haiwai huaren huaqiao* (新疆籍海外华人华侨 Xinjiang ethnic-Chinese OC), *Weiwuerzu huaqiao* (维吾尔族华侨 Uyghur OC), or simply *shaoshu minzu qiaobao* (少数民族侨胞 ethnic-minority compatriots). Moreover, the specific policies relating toward ethnic minorities are labelled accordingly—for example, *shejiang shezang qiaowu gongzuo* (涉疆涉藏侨务工作 work concerning Xinjiang and Tibetan OC).

30 Zheng Yichun 郑贻春, *Jiuping gongchandang* 九评共产党 [Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party], (Gillette: Yih Chyun Corp., 2004) is an expose and criticism of the CCP.

31 Nyiri, “From Class Enemies to Patriots,” 220.

These terms are carefully chosen to emphasize the relationship between these groups and the Chinese nation: *hua* (华) acknowledges their ties to China and ‘Chineseness’; *qiao* (侨) implies a political or nationalist connection; and *bao* (胞) denotes a compatriot link.

Publicly, *qiaowu* officials ensure that ethnic minorities are accorded respect and that they feel welcome by acknowledging their importance for China’s international friendship and relations, its economic development, societal advancement, and as a key component of the Chinese people. They play down the issue of separatist and independence activity in their commentary, claiming that the majority of ethnic-minority OC are patriotic, support reunification, and oppose independence.³²

However, some ethnic-minority OC do not consider themselves *huaqiao*.³³ These non-Han groups do not see a *qiaobao* (OC compatriot) connection between themselves and China or the PRC government. According to Tibetan activist Namlo Yak, 85 percent of overseas Tibetans qualify as “hostile forces” by giving their support to the Tibetan Government in Exile.³⁴

As a result, while Beijing views non-Han OC as part of the wider OC population and praises them with positive rhetoric, it treats them with caution. Throughout China’s modern history, ethnic-minority groups have been directly linked to China’s national defence of its border regions. The growing influence of Islamic states and religious affiliation in these areas raises concerns that minorities might support claims for independence, such as the “Free Tibet” or Xinjiang separatist movements.

Between 1950 and 1959, the CCP attempted to undertake domestic ‘social reform’ measures by systematically dividing and weakening local rule. In addition to military occupation, the CCP worked to cultivate the elite classes of Tibetan society and groomed the younger generations to accept the CCP.

32 “Diwujie shijie huaqiao huaren shetuan lianyi dahui zai Beijing juxing 第五届世界华侨华人社团联谊大会在北京举行 [Fifth Global Ethnic and OC Organizations Friendship and Networking Conference Held in Beijing],” OC Commercial, Investment and Industrial Association, 10 May 2010, www.chinaocea.com/XinWenZhongXin/QiaoJieYaoWen/3508.html (accessed 1 October 2011); State Council Information Office, “Press Conference of the PRC State Council Information Office for Contacts Between Central Government and Dalai Lama,” PRC Embassy, 11 February 2010, www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t657987.htm (accessed 24 August 2011).

33 Minghuan Li, “Myths of Creation and the Creation of Myths: Interrogating Chinese Diaspora,” *Chinese America: History and Perspectives* (Annual 2004): 1–7.

34 Namlo Yak, “Beijing’s Policy Towards Tibetan Exiles,” *China Rights Forum*, No. 4, 2006, www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/.../CRF-2006-4_Exile.pdf (accessed 24 August 2011).

These efforts failed, and an uprising in March 1959 culminated in violence. Throughout this period, approximately 150,000 Tibetans had fled to India, Bhutan, and Nepal—amongst them the Dalai Lama. In exile, many of them joined resistance movements (such as the Tibetan Relief Association) to rally the masses in the homeland against the CCP. Similarly, in 1962, about 50,000 Kazakhs and Xinjiang Uyghurs moved to the Soviet Union following PRC efforts to introduce communes and alter nomadic habits. In the late 1960s, because of questions surrounding their loyalty, Beijing regarded minority groups in border areas as potentially subversive.³⁵

At the same time however, non-Han OC possessed attributes that were useful to the Chinese authorities—such as their economic, cultural, and political advantages.³⁶ After the US normalized relations with the PRC in 1979, the CCP sought to entice Tibetan OC to return. It established a special committee promising to guarantee their religious rights and mobility. They were also offered preferential treatment (such as settlement, financial assistance, and property protection) not unlike the redress offered to other *guiqiao* of the period. These efforts were viewed with suspicion and not readily taken up. To Beijing's chagrin, the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan OC continued to appeal to the UN, eliciting sympathy and support for their right to self-determination.³⁷

In the 1990s, policies directed specifically toward Tibetan OC had two aims: first, to attract and encourage support for Beijing; and second, to silence and delegitimize threats from anti-Beijing forces—in particular, the Tibetan Government in Exile. The OCAO gauged OC attitudes towards the Tibet issue and opinions of the Dalai Lama through detailed questionnaires and surveys. In addition to their views and understanding of these matters, questions also included specific demographic data and their connections with OC groups. Following a study of their different situations, work was designed to be flexible and adjusted accordingly.³⁸

35 Lucian Pye, "China: Ethnic Minorities and National Security," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, eds. Nathan Gkazer and Daniel Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976): 489–512.

36 Louisa Schein, "Minorities, Homelands and Methods," in Nyiri and Breidenbach, *China Inside Out*, 99–140.

37 Wang Hsuan-chih, *The True Features of Chinese Communist 'Tibet Model'* (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, 1982).

38 Tenzin (deputy-secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee), "Tibet Autonomous Region Conference on External Propaganda Work Document No. 8," (speech presented at the Regional Conference on External Propaganda Work, Beijing, 11 March 1993), <http://caccp.freedomsherald.org/bp.html> (accessed 24 August 2011).

Similar policies applied to Uyghur and Xinjiang OC. In March 1996, the CCP Central Committee issued specific directives aimed at tightening control over Xinjiang, eliminating subversive separatist activity, and encouraging Han migration into the area. With particular reference to its external operations, embassies and consulates were to establish bases in areas with large OC populations and collect information on any developments concerning these issues. Diplomats had to be especially vigilant with preventing the internationalization of the Uyghur problem.³⁹

These policies continue today. *Qiaowu* seeks to prevent separatism and internationalism of these issues by attempting to unite the Uyghur OC for the motherland, and by opposing foreign (mostly Western) pressure to weaken China.⁴⁰ Otherwise, more aggressive strategies include stifling the spirit of independence movements, attacking Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces, and defeating the Xinjiang independence movement.⁴¹

The FLG, Tibetan, and Xinjiang OC remain under the close watch of the CCP. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Beijing's response to the 2008 Olympic Torch rallies was based upon the fear that these elements enjoyed a large following around the world. The likelihood for them to escalate independence and human rights issues on the international stage was of major concern. To limit their outreach, CCP strategies either sought to unify these OC in a desirable context, or attempted to cripple or incapacitate any hostile elements.

7.6 Cooptation

The CCP's primary method for managing various groups of the OC through inclusionary or exclusionary strategies is essentially a process of active cooptation. According to William Gamson, cooptation can be classified as non-selective (which refers to attempts to absorb dissident elements into a common organization) or selective (which refers to inducements given to

39 CCP Central Committee, "Guanyu wei hu Xinjiang wending de huiyi jiyao, zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuanhui 7 hao wenjian 关于维护新疆稳定的会议纪要, 中央政治局委员会7号文件 [Records of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP: Regarding the Protection of Xinjiang's Stability—Document No. 7]," 19 March 1996.

40 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Dazao pinpai huodong, zengjin shaoshu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de liaojie 打造品牌活动, 增进少数民族侨报对中国的了解 [Hitting the Right Brand of Activity, Promote Understanding of Ethnic Minority OC Towards China]," *Qiaoping*, no. 22 (14 August 2007): 1–9.

41 Zhao, *Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu*, 315–323.

certain individuals or groups in an effort to “divide-and-rule”).⁴² In turn, both can employ coercive or consensual techniques, advancing either goals of homogeneity or pluralism. Coercive methods might include genocide, expulsion, population transfer, forced assimilation, exclusion or subordination; consensual methods include induced assimilation, power sharing, coalition, or inclusionist methods.⁴³ Of these methods, the consensual approach of both selective and non-selective cooptation of the OC within and outside of China has enabled the CCP to enjoy high levels of acceptance over the past two decades. In these cases, *qiaowu* has sought to bring in, influence, and subsume targeted groups of OC for particular outcomes—mostly to avert threats to its stability and existence.

As demonstrated in previous chapters, the manner in which the CCP implements the cooptation of OC groups or individuals takes three forms: firstly, ideological (such as the hegemonic Marxist, neo-Marxist perspectives that involve coopting diverse groups into a common belief system as proposed by Gramsci, Therborn, Laclau, and Mouffe);⁴⁴ psychological (the creation, maintenance, and encouragement of common patterns of thought via language and ritual as proposed by Michels and Edelman);⁴⁵ and finally institutional (such as functionalist approaches whereby private individuals, groups or representatives are formally incorporated into state decision-making as advisors, informants, or colleagues as proposed by Selznick).⁴⁶

In the context of *qiaowu*, these forms of cooptation are conducted through two platforms: formal (such as the OCAO administration, which exists to establish the legitimacy of authority and administrative accessibility for the relevant audience); or informal (such as bestowing honorary titles on elite OC in order to adjust to the pressures of power within the community to suit the CCP). To support these mechanisms, the CCP has established various ‘front’ organizations to strengthen public solidarity and to legitimize their representation of government. These state-sponsored specialist organizations seek to promote

42 W. A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1968).

43 Milton Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 259–260.

44 A. Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971); G. Therborn, *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?: State Apparatuses and State Power Under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism* (London: Verso, 1980); E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, trans. W. Moore and P. Cammack (London: Verso, 1985).

45 Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1915); Murray Edelman, *Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

46 Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

and defend linguistic, cultural, religious, and economic interests in both host and home countries.⁴⁷

The crux of cooptation is that the sharing of power is not substantive. While it may appear that the OC enjoy a high level of prestige with links to the highest echelons of power, such status is only symbolic.⁴⁸ Actors from the OC community play a strictly advisory role in the policy making process. As mentioned in Chapter Three, functional power is retained within the State Council, its ministries, and the CCP. This aspect of corporate pluralization gives the OC community the impression that their interests are being taken into account, while the elite decision makers receive a greater diversity of views. Coopted elements must remain under control so as not to encroach upon the actual arena of decision-making. In this capacity, the CCP has been largely successful with formal, informal, selective, and non-selective cooptation both within and outside China.⁴⁹

Domestically, the CCP has taken measures to ensure that *guiqiao* and OC investors serve only to advance economic policy, but not political reform in China.⁵⁰ Although *qiaowu* strategies may attempt to persuade these groups that they are returning to a country that warmly welcomes them, the many incentives and privileges offered to attract them target only those who can contribute in ways specified by the CCP. To prevent them from inciting any undesirable behaviour once back within China, authorities seek to manage returned OC by organizing various gatherings. For example, *qiaowu* cadres design activities to promote pro-CCP, pro-China, and pro-socialist ideals in order to “satisfy their political needs” while stifling undesirable “outside influences” and the spread of liberalist views.⁵¹ Various *qiaowu* agencies promote benefits and policies through hosting seminars (such as OC Laws Propaganda

47 Sheffer, “Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” 1–15.

48 Christiansen, *Chinatown, Europe*, 12.

49 Various academics have identified such engagement as “extending ethnic chauvinism,” or the “projection of an authoritarian regime’s influence beyond its borders.” See Benedict Anderson, “The New World Disorder,” *New Left Review* (1992); Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron, “Terrains of Blood and Nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 2 (1999): 340–366; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound*, 3.

50 He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” 5–29.

51 Luo Keren 骆克任, “Woguo Dalu renkou guoji qianyi de xianzhuang, qushi ji xiangguan duice jianyi 我国大陆人口国际迁移的现状,趋势及相关对策建议 [Current Situation of China’s Global Migrant Population, Countermeasures and Recommendations for Trends and Implications],” *Qiaqing*, no. 24 (5 September 2007): 18.

Months or *qiaofa xuanchuan yue* 侨法宣传月).⁵² Other economic and social organizations (such as the Chamber of Commerce of the Western Returned Scholars Association, Chinese Merchants Association, China Association for the Returned OC, and Association for Chinese Students Returning from Abroad) function to draw returned OC together under semi-official groupings monitored and regulated by the Party-State.⁵³

These inclusive methods function to strengthen a CCP-friendly attitude amongst the *guiqiao* population—and given that they are mostly back in China for career, family, education, and business reasons, it is unlikely that they would wish to sabotage opportunities for their future advancement by engaging in sensitive or undesirable activities.

Although *guiqiao* may respond positively to certain policies and programmes, patriotism and ethnographic connections are not the sole reasons for OC wishing to return to China.⁵⁴ The central tenet of cooptive strategies is the existence of sufficient common interests and opinion amongst potential allies.⁵⁵ The aligning factor is often economic or business interest.⁵⁶ Research by Zweig, Chen, and Rosen in 2004 found that it was economic opportunity that mostly attracted *haigui*—the desire to contribute to China played only a limited role.⁵⁷ Similarly, an All China Youth Federation survey in 2005 showed that the decision of returning to China after study abroad was based more upon practical considerations. Respondents cited preferential policies, a growing economy, familiar culture, and reuniting with family as attractions.⁵⁸

52 “Quanguo gedi kaishi ‘qiaofa xuanchuan yue’ 全国各地开始‘侨法宣传月’ [OC Laws Propaganda Month Begins Everywhere Throughout China],” *Renmin ribao*, 13 July 2004, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 20 September 2004, 8.

53 He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” 5–29; Wang, Wong, and Sun, “*Haigui*: A New Area in China’s Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?” 300–301.

54 Marie-Sybille de Vienne, “For a Tentative Modelization of the Economic Weight of OC at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium,” (paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, 10–14 May 2004).

55 For a discussion of macrosociological and social psychological theories see R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

56 Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic, 1977).

57 David Zweig, Chen Changgui, and Stanley Rosen, “Globalization and Transnational Human Capital: Overseas and Returnee Scholars to China,” *China Quarterly*, 170 (2004): 756; Barbara Howard, “Ethnic Chinese Find New ‘Land of Opportunity,’” *Voice of America*, 24 April 2004.

58 Xiao Qiao, “Pros and Cons of Overseas Study,” *China Today*, April 2005, www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/e2005/e200504/p36.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

Another study in 2006 found that 88 percent of OC surveyed wanted to return to China, but 40 percent of those would only do so if they could earn at least 10,000 yuan a month (five times Beijing's average income). Returned OC either found it difficult to find a satisfactory job, or refrained from doing so because of their excessive expectations.⁵⁹ As such, *huaqiao* keep their options open by treating their PRC nationality as a tool of convenience.⁶⁰

Cooptive approaches have worked somewhat differently for *huaren* OC outside of China. Given the diversity amongst the millions of OC, responses are quite mixed and difficult to measure, but some generalizations can be made. For the majority of *huaren*, their indifference and detachment towards political matters in China means *qiaowu* serves little more than to entertain cultural and ethnic pursuits—such as acknowledging and fostering links pertaining to their origins, through to making donations back to their ancestral villages, or perhaps doing nothing at all. Other OC may look to *qiaowu* as a channel for satisfying self-interest, as a means to enhance their prestige and status, or as a chance to ingratiate themselves to diplomats or leaders in China. For example, several OC groups in NZ preferred to give their Sichuan earthquake donations directly to the PRC embassy, rather than to the charitable organizations doing the actual recovery work. Similarly, OC businesses wishing to develop market opportunities in China seek favour with the CCP by contributing materials or funding for various OC activities.

However, such relationships do not necessarily imply a political connection—they serve mostly to boost individual egos, or to enhance personal favouritism with Chinese officials, rather than facilitating outright political influence amongst entire OC communities. Ong and Nonini described this response as a Third Culture of mobile and varied 'Chineseness'—a mobile identity formed in accordance with an "ungrounded empire" evasive of any manipulative state power, and based more upon a continual desire to seek economic opportunity.⁶¹ Therefore, demonstrating support for the CCP (either through involvement or

59 "Chinese Living Abroad Want to Return," *Shanghai Daily*, 25 March 2006, www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/zgbd/t242245.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

60 Cheng, "Non-Remaining and Non-Returning," 166–67.

61 Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, (New York: Routledge, 1997); William A. Callahan, "Nationalism, Civilization and Transnational Relations: The Discourse of Greater China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 43 (May 2005): 284–285.

identification with Chinese authorities) occurs as a pursuit of material interest, rather than a conviction to ‘Chineseness’ or assumed Han chauvinism.⁶²

Beijing’s cooptive approach with these groups of OC, while succeeding with achieving economic objectives, largely fails with gaining their political loyalty. As noted earlier, mobilizing the OC for widespread political involvement is largely hindered by a lack of interest amongst large sections of the population. *Laoqiao* in the Pacific region are a good example of this. Historically, amongst the influential pockets of KMT supporters in OC communities throughout Fiji, most others were indifferent towards political matters—particularly after 1949 when the Nationalist government was exposed for its corrupt practices, and anti-communist attitudes prevailed. The majority preferred to integrate with the local lifestyle free of interference.⁶³ Rather than being manipulated, the majority of the Pacific OC actively use their biological heritage for their own gain. Sir Thomas Chan and son Laurie Chan of the SI, Sir Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Jim Ah Koy of Fiji have all used their ‘Chineseness’ to benefit their political careers. While their ethnicity might work to facilitate their government’s relationship with China and/or Taiwan, they themselves are clearly not political pawns for either Beijing or Taipei.

7.7 We Are Family: “Grand Unification Nationalism”

Given the mixed successes of cooptive methods, the CCP is not able to influence the majority of OC for political activity. *Qiaowu* cadres considered that most of their work was targeted too narrowly and had effect on only a few; furthermore, efforts to influence hearts and minds were neither direct nor overt enough—there needed to be more diverse and deeper work at the mainstream level.⁶⁴ Specific management techniques used to deal with these groups vary at two extremes—warm and inviting to those that it wishes to strengthen and maintain relationships with, and aggressive towards elements that it perceives as threats. Such a range of techniques can be found in China’s anti-independence efforts—particularly towards *Taiqiao* and pro-Taiwan OC.

62 Simons and Zielenziger, “Enter the Dragon,”; Phar Kim Beng, “OC: How Powerful Are They?” *Asia Times Online*, 10 December 2002, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DL10Ad04.html (accessed 2 October 2009); Goodman, “Are Asia’s ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional-Security Threat?” 140–156.

63 Greif, “Political Attitudes of the OC in Fiji,” 977.

64 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang,” 11–12.

Beijing viewed Taiwan's *qiaowu* efforts as promoting an alternative discourse that directly threatened China's national integrity. Such assertions intensified during the DPP period between 2000 and 2008. PRC analysts correctly noted that as long as Chen Shui-bian was in power, the quest for Taiwanization would continue. They argued that Taipei would retain its own *qiaowu* organization (the OCAC) for grassroots and 'Track Two' diplomacy that promoted Taiwanese independence and a pro-Taiwanese spirit. Furthermore, cultural centres, propaganda, influential OC, and political bodies promoting independence would receive more resources and actively mobilized for these purposes.⁶⁵

One of the pro-Taiwan bodies given official DPP support was the Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace (GADP or *quanqiao minzu heping lianmeng* 全侨民主和平联盟). The GADP was established in 2002 as an OCAC-sponsored off-shoot to promote Taiwan's pursuit of freedom, democracy, and human rights in major cities around the world. Members were mostly pro-DPP *Taiqiao* and those seeking closer relations with the Taiwanese government. The GADP received financial and administrative support for 99 branches in 49 countries, effectively making it another diplomatic voice for a DPP-led Taiwan, which represented an overt political challenge to the CCP. As such, it rallied behind Taiwanese independence groups and enjoyed friendly relations with the Chinese pro-democratic and FLG movements.⁶⁶

In the face of these developments, Beijing quickly began intensive "prevent independence, promote unification work" (*fandu cutong gongzuo* 反独促统工作) through the coordination of PRC consulates and embassies under three main themes: convincing the OC that they are family, winning over the moderates among them, and converting the hardened ones to accept reunification.⁶⁷ Accordingly, the CCP established various pro-Beijing and pro-unification organizations amongst OC communities around the world for the sole purpose of opposing and challenging Taiwanese independence movements.⁶⁸ For

65 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Minjindang zhizheng houtai 'qiaowehui' de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang," 4–5, 9, 12.

66 Taiwanese representatives supported an anti-CCP rally that acknowledged FLG, Tibetan, and democratic movements. Falun Dafa Information Centre, "Taiwanese Falun Gong Practitioner Speaks at GADP Conference in Houston," 11 August 2003, <http://faluninfo.net/displayAnArticle.asp?ID=8009> (accessed 30 August 2007).

67 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang," 5, 13; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan 'du' cutong jianyan xiance," 8–9; Zhou, "Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji," 7.

68 "Beijing Wooing OC Away from Taiwan: Officials," *Taiwan News*, 30 May 2002, www.taiwansecurity.org/News/2002/TN-053002.htm (accessed 30 August 2007).

example, there are 170 branches of the PRCA in over 80 countries. Such groups seek to convince *Taiqiao* experts, academics, youth, and business people that the PRC embraces them as friends and compatriots. They issue press releases or hand out pamphlets to explain and justify the CCP perspective.⁶⁹

Together with the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification, *qiaowu* agencies and an army of diplomatic staff actively coordinate re-unification activities for OC groups.⁷⁰ For example, *qiaowu* cadres invite OC groups to participate in embassy events emphasizing reciprocal cross-Strait cultural and trade relations.⁷¹ PRC embassies call upon the OC media to report on PRCA activities and distribute these statements to foreign government agencies and media outlets.⁷²

7.8 China Embraces All OC: Winning Over the Moderates

In response to the moderate middle elements (that is, pro-reunification and pro-KMT pan-blue *laoqiao*, *Taiqiao*, and other non-threatening groups), efforts to promote China had to be gentle, without arousing sympathetic feelings toward Taiwan.⁷³ One task simply sought to change their interpretation of “One China” from that of ‘Republic of China’ to ‘People’s Republic of China.’⁷⁴ *Qiaowu* officials encouraged OC groups to increase their participation in cross-Strait cultural, trade, and technological exchanges.⁷⁵ These methods were complemented with efforts to foster patriotism (such as PRC national flag raising or glorifying the Beijing Olympics) while actively isolating or extinguishing Taiwanese ‘independence’ by rousing dissatisfaction with a DPP-led Taipei

69 Radio Australia, “‘One China’ Group Set Up in Tonga,” 20 January 2004, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/january/01%2D20%2D12.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009); “OC Support Anti-Secession Law,” *PLA Daily*, 20 March 2005, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2005-03/20/content_162833.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

70 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang,” 3.

71 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Yige Zhongguo, heping fazhan 一个中国，和平发展 [One China, Peaceful Development],” *Qiaqing*, no. 18 (21 June 2007): 1–7.

72 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 4; “South Pacific Body Set Up to Oppose Taiwan Independence,” *People’s Daily*, 24 April 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200404/24/eng20040424_141388.shtml (accessed 30 August 2007).

73 Liao, “Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai ‘fandu cutong,’” 5.

74 “Taiwan daxuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang,” 4–6, 8–9.

75 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Dazao pinpai huodong, zengjin shaoshu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de liaojie,” 1–9.

(such as criticizing the “Three Classifications” announcement,⁷⁶ or by arguing that Taipei cared only for *Taiqiao* and not other OC groups).

As such, *qiaowu* attempts to persuade Taiwanese and *Taiqiao* of China's concern and warmth for them and their livelihoods. PRC government statements and media remind Taiwanese compatriots that they are entitled to the same protection offered to all Chinese nationals.⁷⁷ Examples commonly cited by officials include evacuating ethnic Chinese out of Kuwait in 1990, extending sympathies to Taiwanese affected by the Hanshin earthquake that hit Japan in 1995, and assisting Taiwanese during the civil war in Cambodia.⁷⁸ Pro-Beijing media follow these propaganda lines closely in order to persuade pan-green (pro-independence and pro-DPP) *Taiqiao* of China's benevolent intentions.⁷⁹ For example, the PRC actively supported OC efforts to help Taiwan on humanitarian matters—such as reconstruction efforts after the devastation caused by typhoon Morakot in 2009. It approved and encouraged OC communities to fundraise for victims and had its embassies set up special bank accounts for lodging funds (despite TECO already having its own facilities in place).

7.9 Pre-Emptive Subversion

In contrast, Taipei's attempt to push its pro-independence agenda on the wider OC populace during the DPP period of the 2000s was largely a failure due to a limited target audience, a lack of frontline diplomatic resources, and a much stronger PRC *qiaowu* effort. First, Taiwan's domestic political situation had weakened and became polarized as a result of Taiwanization. Although

76 Please see Chapter Four concerning “The ROC's Redefinition of Huaqiao.”

77 Huang Xianmu 黄贤模, “Zuohao renda qiaotai gongzuo de jidian sikao 做好人大侨台工作的几点思考 [A Few Thoughts on Succeeding with *Taiqiao* Work],” OCAO, 12 February 2003, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2003/0212/1/312.shtml (accessed 13 March 2012); “China To Offer Consular Protection to Taiwan Compatriots if Requested, Says Diplomat,” *Xinhua*, 29 April 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200604/29/eng20060429_262013.html (accessed 2 October 2009).

78 Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” 21 February 2000, <http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgtwwt/wp/t211261.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

79 “Lin Zhaoshu hui jian Taiwan nanbu xiangqin Jinghu fangtuan jiwang zuguo tongyi 林兆枢会见台湾南部乡亲京沪访团寄望祖国统一 [Lin Zhaoshu To See Southern Taiwan Villagers Delegation in Beijing and Shanghai, Hope for Reunification],” *Zhonghua qiaowang*, 7 November 2007.

it actively supported some PRC activists, scholars, and students who sought asylum abroad, in many cases the DPP funded only those dissidents who made pro-independence demands. Second, Taipei's efforts were stymied by a lack of frontline diplomatic resources. While Taiwan's OCAC sought to extend its outreach to *xinqiao* and their associations following increased migration from mainland China, it provided them with service only if they were willing to support and recognize Taiwan. The students themselves were critical of the lack of formal relations with TECO officials.⁸⁰ Taiwanization had left Taipei without the flexibility and resources required to deal with these groups.

Third, Taipei was already too late in reaching out to strategic *xinqiao* OC communities. In 2003, Taiwan's OCAC dispatched representatives to North America in an effort to raise awareness of democracy amongst those groups. However, the majority of these pro-Beijing OC refused to accept Taiwan's right to self-determination, as they supported the CCP discourse that argued sovereignty and economic development were more important than democratization. This was the result of years of counter-subversion efforts by the CCP—*qiaowu* cadres had been particularly active since the early years of the 2000s by sending out their own delegations to liaise with OC in strategic areas to promote peaceful reunification.⁸¹ Beijing's pre-emptive *qiaowu* effort with *xinqiao* and PRC student groups ensured that these buds of "grand unification nationalism" had blossomed.⁸²

7.10 "Welcome In"

As mentioned in the previous chapters, reconnection work incorporates classic *qiaowu* themes (Chinese culture, friendship, sentimentality, and village affiliations)⁸³ to promote the PRC/CCP stance and thinking while reducing mutual misunderstanding and spurring emotional nationalistic patriotism

80 Rawnsley, *Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda*, 92.

81 Liu, "New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism," 303; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan 'du' cutong jianyan xiance," 6–7; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Beimei qiaoqing xinbianhua," 4; Selig S. Harrison, "Taiwan After Chiang Ching-kuo," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 800.

82 Chiou Chwei-liang, "Old China Versus Modern Taiwan," *Taipei Times*, 24 September 2003, 8, www.taipeitimes.com/Newz/editorials/archives/2003/09/24/2003069059 (accessed 3 February 2006).

83 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 73–74.

based on a common ancestry.⁸⁴ These techniques are also used for OC communities with links throughout southeastern coastal parts of China and Taiwan. These groups commonly worship Mazu, the goddess of the sea. Mainland-based organizations such as the China Mazu Cultural Exchange Association work to improve relations between *Taiqiao* and China as part of religious exchange with the 'homeland'.⁸⁵ In this manner, Beijing hopes that the world's OC can come together "hand-in-hand, heart-to-heart".⁸⁶

With cooperation from the UFDW and pro-Beijing organizations such as the China Overseas Tibetan Association, 'patriotic' overseas Tibetans (those who wish to return and help their home towns and publicly acknowledge their support for Beijing) arrange visits to Tibet on the pretext of cultural, artistic, and religious exchange.⁸⁷ They are then briefed on the development, changes, and achievements of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and encouraged to pass on their observations to other overseas Tibetans abroad.⁸⁸ Similarly, those OC in sensitive border areas of China that might harbour potential flashpoints for ethnic tension or independence (such as Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) are also key targets for "welcome in" activities. The CCP targets

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- 84 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Lian Song fangwen Dalu dui haiwai qiaoshe de yinxiang ji wo gongzuo duice," 9.
- 85 Xu Xueyi 许雪毅, "Mazure' zai huaren shehui buduan shengwen '妈祖热' 在华人社会不断升温 [Mazu Fever Heats Up in Chinese Society]," *Xinhuanet*, 9 May 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, May 31, 2007, 12; "Cross-Strait Relations Irresistible," *People's Daily*, 13 January 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200501/13/eng20050113_170564.html (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 86 "Meizhou mazu haixia luntan: chuancheng mazu wenhua hongyang mazu jingshen 湄洲妈祖海峡两岸论坛: 传承妈祖文化弘扬妈祖精神 [Meizhou Motherland Taiwan Straits Forum: Propagating Motherland Culture for Enhancing Motherland Spirit]," *Xinhuanet*, 31 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tai_gang_ao/2007-10/31/content_6982915.htm (accessed 14 March 2012); OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan 'du' cutong jianyan xiance," 1.
- 87 Lina Yang, "China Overseas Tibetan Association Established in U.S.," *Xinhua*, 25 February 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-02/25/content_13045101.htm (accessed 24 August 2011); see also the website of the Association: <http://www.cotibet.com/index.html>.
- 88 "Liu Yandong hui jian lu Ao aiguo zangbao canguantuan 刘延东会见旅欧爱国藏胞参观团 [Liu Yandong Meets Delegation of Patriotic Tibetan Compatriots from Europe]," *Xinhua*, 24 July 2006, <http://www.zyztb.org.cn/zyztbzw/newscenter/benwang/80200607250001.htm> (accessed 14 March 2012); "80,000 Overseas Tibetans Visit Tibet Since 1980," *China Tibet Online*, 30 May 2011, www.eng.tibet.cn/2010home/news/201105/t20110530_1059487.html (accessed 24 August 2011).

specific groups for friendly exchange to raise their pride and love for China—also in the form of sightseeing tours aimed to evoke a sense of appreciation that China is doing as much for them and their culture as possible.⁸⁹

As mentioned in the previous chapter, representatives from ethnic-minority OC communities are regularly invited to showcase their unique regional music, songs, dance, and other art forms through international festivals celebrating the diversity within Chinese culture.⁹⁰ Under its policy of “all patriots belong to one family, no matter when they join” (*aiguo yijia, aiguo bufen xianhou* 爱国一家, 爱国不分先后), the CCP welcomes “anyone who no longer promotes or believes in the independence of Tibet,” even though they have previously engaged in separatist activities.⁹¹

However, while the CCP acknowledges cultural diversity amongst ethnic minorities, it does so in the context of China’s political unity. Although their differences are celebrated as part of the PRC cultural fabric, ethnic minority OC are to be gradually assimilated into the dominant culture and brought closer to the CCP’s version of ‘Chinese’ identity. This strategy follows the same discourse of the Maoist period, in which the Han were representative of the dominant ethnic group to lead China towards economic and cultural development.⁹²

At the Fifth Global Ethnic and OC Organizations Friendship and Networking Conference held in Beijing in 2010, OCAO chairwoman Li Haifeng outlined several imperatives: expanding social, economic, cultural, and sporting relations with Uyghur, Tibetan, and other minority OC in order to deepen those groups’ understanding of the motherland; advancing Xinjiang and Tibetan issues through media and exchanges amongst Uyghur, Tibetan, and other minority OC so these groups can become ardent propaganda agents for China; and supporting Uyghur, Tibetan, and minority culture while highlighting Chinese culture and language.⁹³ These strategies seek to maintain unity of the

89 Li, “Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao,” 1–6.

90 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshi yanxiutuan’ laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 1–5.

91 Such events exclude blacklisted Tibetan OC. See “Overseas Tibetans Welcomed Back,” *People’s Daily*, 6 February 2002, www.china.org.cn/english/26535.htm (accessed 24 August 2011).

92 Frank Dikotter, “Race in China,” in Nyiri and Breidenbach, *China Inside Out*, 177–204.

93 “Li Haifeng: Zhongguo qiaowu bumen wucuooshi jiaqiang shejiang shezang qiaowu gongzuo 李海峰：中国侨务部门五措施加强涉疆涉藏侨务工作 [Li Haifeng: China OC Affairs Office’s Five Measures Concerning Xinjiang and Tibetan OC Affairs Work],” *China News*, 7 May 2010, <http://www.chinanews.com/hr/news/2010/05-07/2269809.shtml> (accessed 14 March 2012).

nationalities under an overarching emphasis on the dominant CCP-approved version of ‘Chineseness’.

In this vein, while special classes are provided for ethnic-minority OC youth to study their own language, *qiaowu* officials stress that Mandarin is the key tool of communication in China—particularly in an age of economic growth.⁹⁴ They suggest that helping all OC youth to develop Chinese language skills is an important part of developing interest in Chinese culture, and thereby maintaining unity amongst the diaspora.⁹⁵ Accordingly, *qiaowu* officials invite teachers, students, industrial and commercial leaders, and youths of ethnic minority Xinjiang groups into China for sightseeing tours and acculturation. In some cases, long-term programmes last up to one year and focus on improving Mandarin and Chinese culture through dance, martial arts training, and competitions.⁹⁶ This highly intensive effort is a slow and gradual attempt to influence a small number of ethnic-minority youth from significant and strategic border regions, who are then sent back to their homelands as ambassadors for promoting and projecting PRC values and culture in a non-invasive manner.

7.11 “Going Outside”

Just as reconnection can be facilitated by “welcome in” strategies, attempts to instil positive feelings for China are also managed through external, “going outside” methods. Since the early 1990s, the CCP sought to change negative views toward Beijing amongst the OC by reinforcing propaganda. At that time, the CCP viewed a Tibetan uprising as a significant challenge to its national integrity and legitimacy, and the focal point of the CCP’s campaign was based

94 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Dazao pinpai huodong, zengjin shaoshu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de liaojie,” 1–9; Li, “Dui jiaqiang xinxiingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao,” 1–6.

95 GOCAO, “Recruitment of OC Language Education Volunteer,” 11 June 2004, <http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200406110023.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009); Ma, *Questions and Answers About China’s National Minorities*, 64–65.

96 “Zhongyang minda disanqi Xinjiangji haiwai huaqiao huaren ziniu Zhongwenban jieye 中央民大第三次新疆籍海外华侨华人子女中文班结业 [Central University for Nationalities Third Xinjiang Ethnic and OC Children’s Chinese Classes Completed],” *China Daily*, 14 June 2011, www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqsj/shbt/2011-06-14/content_2894429.html (accessed 1 October 2011).

around building support for China's stand on the Tibet issue.⁹⁷ One public relations strategy was to use cultural exhibits to advance imperceptible infiltration and influence.⁹⁸

An example was the Florida Splendid China theme park, which opened in 1993. Situated near Walt Disney World in Kissimmee, Florida, this facility was an ambitious attempt to showcase China and its ethnic minorities in the most positive light to foreign audiences. Florida was chosen due to the high number of visitors to the state, and as a popular tourist destination. Moreover, the USA is a major source of support for the Tibetan cause, and therefore a significant target for propaganda work.

The park was jointly owned and operated by the OCAO and CTS—both leading agencies for dealing with the OC, and indicating that the OC were the principal target. The park was comprised of scale models of famous landmarks (such as the Potala Palace), replicas of historic treasures, and figurines depicting each ethnic grouping in China, while live-action acrobatic shows and restaurants provided additional cultural and culinary amusement. The aim was to show visitors the symbols of Chinese unity and highlight Beijing's inclusive attitudes. However, while its sister park in Shenzhen was a success in attracting visitors, the Florida operation eventually closed down in December 2003 due to a drop in tourists.

Because such large-scale operations are expensive to maintain and operate, the CCP has returned to traditional “going out” strategies, employing conventional and cost-effective methods of mobilizing direct interaction with foreign audiences. Propaganda officials instructed delegates at a 1993 work conference to accord greater and more frequent coverage of the Tibet issue over other provinces in China. *Qiaowu* cadres produced handbooks, videos and pamphlets that showcased homeland development and sentiment, while advocating Beijing's minority and religious policies. Given that they appear to be relatively objective in their reporting than the Chinese state-controlled media, foreign journalists were selected to visit China and used to convey those

97 “Conference on the Work of External Propaganda on the Question of Tibet Document No. 5,” (speech presented at the Discussion of the External Propaganda Work on the Question of Tibet, Beijing, 10 March 1993), <http://caccp.freedomsherald.org/bp.html> (accessed 24 August 2011).

98 Zeng Jianhui, “Conference on the Work of External Propaganda on the Question of Tibet,” (summary speech presented at the Seminar of the External Propaganda Work on the Question of Tibet, Beijing, 11 March 1993), <http://caccp.freedomsherald.org/bp.html> (accessed 24 August 2011).

messages abroad.⁹⁹ Other agitprop methods included sending Tibetan cultural and academic experts overseas, or using consular and diplomatic resources to promote exhibitions, articles, speeches, and television programmes in a PRC-friendly light. These special delegations were encouraged to “go out” and show OC minorities that China is friendly, accommodating, and supportive of all its peoples.¹⁰⁰

Little has changed over the last twenty years. Overseas Tibetans, scholars, and other influential groups abroad in areas with large concentrations of OC or political significance are to be won over with “positive propaganda”—such as content concerning Tibet’s improving economic situation.¹⁰¹ To reach out to these groups on a non-threatening people-to-people level, the CCP sends high-profile pro-Beijing personalities abroad to liaise with its targets. For example, Living Buddha Dengde Wangzhi is a council member of the Buddhist Association of China, and also a Standing Committee member of the Sichuan Provincial Federation of Returned OC. He actively calls upon overseas Tibetans to be patriotic and supportive of reunification efforts.¹⁰²

Both “welcome in” and “going out” strategies have some success with those groups who are willing to accept the CCP message. However, given that the majority of overseas Tibetans still support the Tibetan Government in Exile, and that Xinjiang and FLG groups retain staunch anti-CCP attitudes, *qiaowu* work struggles to deal with reconciling issues related to ethnicity and nationalism. While ethnic minorities are to be celebrated as part of the social fabric of the PRC, external policies and implementation occasionally clash with one another. As one example, in 2003 and 2005 PRC diplomats hindered those of Tibetan and Taiwanese origin from participating in ‘Chinese’ beauty pageants.¹⁰³ Such actions aimed to ensure the portrayal of a CCP-approved representation of ‘Chineseness’ while preventing highlighting independence issues that

99 Zeng, “Conference on the Work of External Propaganda on the Question of Tibet.”

100 Tenzin, “Tibet Autonomous Region Conference on External Propaganda Work Document No. 8.”

101 “Tibetan Legislators Update OC in US on Tibet’s Development,” *Xinhua* 16 March 2011, reprinted in PRC NPC website, www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Events/2011-03/17/content_1647786.htm (accessed 24 August 2011).

102 “Living Buddha Urges Overseas Tibetans to be Patriotic,” *Xinhua*, 13 July 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/13/content_11700003.htm (accessed 24 August 2011).

103 Deborah L. Madsen, “Performing Community Through the Feminine Body: The Beauty Pageant in Transnational Contexts,” (paper presented at the Network Swiss Graduate Programme in Gender Studies, University of Zurich, October 2005), http://home.adm.unige.ch/~madsen/Zurich_pageants.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

members of such communities could be associated with. Throughout the history of *qiaowu*, realist political imperatives have always taken priority—rival discourses cannot be allowed to flourish.

7.12 Transformation Work

In situations where the OC cannot be “welcomed”, or persuaded to side with Beijing, they are to be “transformed” (*zhuanbian* 转变). Transformation work aims to influence hardened pro-Taiwan *laoqiao* and pro-independence pan-Green *Taiqiao* communities with robust connections to ROC investments, politics, and industry. In a bid to siphon off sources of traditional support, *qiaowu* cadres work to propagate the one China policy, persuade targets to promote the PRC/CCP position, and reduce mutual misunderstanding.¹⁰⁴ These methods involve intensive propaganda programs and using generous financial incentives to entice them to switch allegiance.¹⁰⁵ The CCP has successfully managed to attract support, isolate, or threaten interest groups through such techniques.¹⁰⁶

Transformation work began in the 1970s as “Welcome In” strategies for *Taiqiao* following the Diaoyutai Island protests in which thousands of OC students (mainly Taiwanese in the US) rallied against Japan over the disputed territory.¹⁰⁷ The CCP seized on this opportunity to utilize OC with ROC links as intermediaries to spread “peace talk” about Taiwan. Beijing offered them with incentives to study in China, while using ping-pong diplomacy to attract Japanese Taiwanese to Beijing.¹⁰⁸ At that time, Chinese officials openly promoted the idea for *Taiqiao* and OC to go to the PRC in order to better understand mainland China and its ways of life.¹⁰⁹ This also served as a method to investigate these

104 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Lian Song fangwen Dalu dui haiwai qiaoshe de yinxiang ji wo gongzuo duice,” 9.

105 Chen Jie, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan*, 188.

106 Joel Wuthnow, “The Integration of Cooptation and Coercion: China’s Taiwan Strategy Since 2001,” *East Asia* 23, no.3 (Fall 2006): 22–45.

107 Hungdah Chiu and Wang Ke-wen, “Diaoyutai Controversy,” in *Modern China: An Encyclopaedia of History, Culture and Nationalism* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1998) 97–99.

108 US Consulate HK, “Peking and the Taiwanese,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1973HONGK08157, 14 August 1973.

109 “Huijian Taiwan liuMei xuesheng ‘baodiao’ yundong diqu fuzeren de tanhua 会见台湾留美学生‘保钓’运动地区负责人的谈话 [Talks from the Meeting with American-based Taiwanese Foreign Student Diaoyutai Protest Area Leader],” 17 November 1971 in Wang, *Qiaowu chungju*, 44.

groups following their return and to improve work methods with them.¹¹⁰ In 1973, Beijing encouraged 50,000 stateless OC in Japan to adopt PRC citizenship as an effort to improve relations with the large Taiwanese community there.¹¹¹

Like other forms of *qiaowu*, transformation work is an intensive psychological effort that involves smooth, quiet, subtle, and imperceptible methods for challenging rival discourses while promoting positive feelings about the PRC.¹¹² Cadres seek to gain and consolidate trust amongst their targets, actively manage them, and supervise their behaviour under the “Three Dos and Don’ts” principle (see Chapter Three). For example, tactics at cultural events include actively engaging with pro-independence OC to reduce their sense of distance with China, and encouraging intensive mutual exchange while accommodating and respecting their political attitude. Such efforts seek to persuade and influence them into doing things supportive of China without actually realizing it. These tactics are essentially a bombardment of small soft power efforts to reduce Taiwan’s scope of activity and influence.¹¹³

Those OC with strong links to pro-Taiwan organizations have leading roles in this effort.¹¹⁴ *Qiaowu* delegations travel to strategic areas such as the US and Japan, and inspire pro-unification *Taiqiao* groups to contact with the mainland and lobby Taipei for speedy reunification.¹¹⁵ For example, Malaysian OC who studied in Taiwan tend to maintain strong relations with TECO and Taiwan.¹¹⁶ By capitalizing on good relationships with them, the aim is to build a consensus of ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘anti-independence’ amongst these OC, and

110 “Huijian Taiwan tongbao, lüri lüMei huaqiao, Meiji huaren de tanhua 会见台湾同胞, 旅日旅美华侨, 美籍华人的谈话 [Meeting with Taiwanese Compatriots, Japanese and America Tourists, American OC],” 6 October 1972, *ibid.*, 38.

111 US Consulate HK, “Beijing and the OC.”

112 “Taiwan daxuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang,” 2–9; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Beimei qiaoqing xinbianhua,” 1; OCAO Economics, Science, and Technology Department, “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye,” 20.

113 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Jiada lidu quanfangwei kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 6–16.

114 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 33.

115 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan ‘du’ cutong jianyan xiance,” 6–7; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Beimei qiaoqing xinbianhua,” 4; Harrison, “Taiwan After Chiang Ching-kuo,” 800.

116 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuokuan haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian,” 11–13.

then to mobilize them externally in order to promote these goals internally within Taiwan.¹¹⁷

Another part of Beijing's Taiwan policy was to fight efforts to internationalize the situation by emphasizing that it was a domestic matter. Propaganda methods included breaking down Taiwanese consciousness both in Taiwan and abroad using both inclusive and exclusive methods. For example, state-controlled media coverage of KMT visits to Beijing in 2005 served as icebreakers for promoting closer cross-Strait relations and party-to-party exchange, compatriotism, and a "new face of Taiwanese leadership and wisdom at the highest level." Such reports attempted to persuade the OC of Taiwan's "official change" in its position towards China.¹¹⁸ To whip up fear surrounding Taipei's "plot" for independence, Beijing spread negative sentiments and sabotaged Taiwan-organized events¹¹⁹ by claiming that "international anti-China forces" sought to threaten peace and stability and damage OC interests.¹²⁰

Transformation methods have been very successful—particularly in regard to OC groups actively pursuing closer (economic) links with China. For example, in 2005, one of Chen Shui-bian's strongest corporate supporters switched over to Beijing, praised its anti-secession law, and endorsed the "One China" policy. Other Taiwanese business associations also moved to back Beijing and criticized plans for independence.¹²¹

117 Liao, "Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai 'fandu cutong,'" 5–6; OCAO External Affairs Department, "Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang," 1–2; "Taiwan daxuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang," 1, 9.

118 Embassy of the PRC in the USA, "More OC, Media Hail Hu-Lien Meeting," 5 April 2005, www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t194165.htm (accessed 2 October 2009); OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan 'du' cutong jianyan xiance," 1; OCAO External Affairs Department, "Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang," 6–9.

119 Liao, "Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai 'fandu cutong,'" 1, 6–7; OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Jiada lidu quanfangwei kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo," 6–16.

120 Guoguang Wu, "Identity, Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing's Responses to Offshore Chinese Democracies," *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 51 (May 2007): 295–313.

121 Van Vranken Hickey, *Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan*, 72.

7.13 Coercion

Subtle methods of persuasion, transformation, or root-seeking are ineffective in dealing with strongly resistant OC groups. For those OC posing an obvious threat to China and the CCP, coercive approaches may be required to ensure control both domestically and externally. CCP authorities resort to direct interference by harassing, blacklisting, or attacking hostile elements. Such work goes beyond the scope of the *qiaowu* administration, and is implemented through other government agencies such as the MFA and the MSS.

As preparation for a potential dissent on the part of PRC students abroad after 1989, the MSS dispatched agents posing as students, faculty members, or business people to observe their behaviour and correspondence and to report on their activities. These agents sometimes even directly warned or threatened to pressure their families back in China.¹²² While there are some OC academics who are not intimidated by these actions, many practice self-censorship, or at least demonstrate conservatism in order to maintain access to fieldwork in China and to avoid retribution, banishment, or detainment.¹²³

To convince the public of the potential threat that the FLG posed, the CCP stepped up its propaganda campaign in July 1999. During exchanges with OC groups, consular attachés from the MOC, MOE, and MFA handed out anti-FLG material, or inserted them into Chinese language school learning materials. Fearing that their relations with the embassy might be compromised, OC leaders often cooperated with PRC diplomats on these activities.

To crack down on the FLG directly, the CCP Central Committee created the “610 Office”, in which all CCP agencies were coordinated. PRC diplomats were tasked with gathering information on practitioners.¹²⁴ They also acted to suppress FLG activities and their public statements, stopped media coverage of their events, and urged members of local government, community leaders,

¹²² Bill Gertz, “Beijing Devoted to Weakening ‘Enemy’ U.S., Defector Says,” *Washington Times*, 27 June 2005, www.washtimes.com/national/20050627-010217-7779r.htm; Craig S. Smith, “Reaching Overseas, China Tries to Tether Its Own,” *New York Times*, 3 August 2001.

¹²³ Perry Link, “The Anaconda in the Chandelier: Chinese Censorship in China Today,” (paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 24 October 2001; originally entitled “Scholars Under Siege? Academic and Media Freedom in China”), www.gov.textonly/txlink.htm (accessed 2 November 2009); Ross Terrill, “China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations,” (testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009, www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/hr09_04_30.php (accessed 1 November 2009).

¹²⁴ Brian Laghi, “Chinese Diplomat Sent Packing; Harper Meeting Still Up in Air,” *Globe and Mail*, 17 November 2006.

and media organizations not to support the movement as a matter of policy.¹²⁵ A FLG report alleged that MOE attachés organized PRC students to watch anti-FLG videos or attend seminars that directly pressured Chinese student associations to act against FLG, and manipulated elections to prevent practitioners from becoming leaders of OC associations.¹²⁶ PRC consular officials confiscated the passports of Chinese nationals known to be FLG members, or refused to issue visa extensions.¹²⁷ These aggressive methods and scare-tactics have been successful in undermining public support for the FLG movement.

7.14 “Divide-and-Rule”

Another technique to weaken hostile forces by actively isolating their leadership and preventing their accumulation of power is a “divide-and-rule” strategy. After June 1989, Beijing prevented individual organizations amongst the OC pro-democracy movement from consolidating against it. As mentioned in Chapter Two, diplomats sought to isolate or eliminate reactionary factions. Any elements deemed a danger to PRC national interests would be exposed and attacked.¹²⁸ The CCP’s efforts were aided by infighting, rivalry, and recrimination between student leaders. Dissidents accused each other of self-aggrandizement and self-interest.

At the same time, the CCP stepped up its effort to coordinate and consolidate pro-Beijing activity amongst splintered student groups. Branches of the CSSA were established to manage and draw various PRC student groups, local OC organizations, and business associations under one umbrella in order to increase levels of influence and exchange.

125 Luo Ya, “Chinese Diplomat Says OC Media Fear CCP Retaliation,” *Epoch Times*, 7 June 2005, www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-6-6/29348.html (accessed 2 October 2009); Soyung Ho, “Chinese Authorities Suppressing Falun Gong Movement in the US,” *Columbia News Service*, 7 July 2002, www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/cns/2002-07-07/199.asp (accessed 30 August 2007).

126 World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, “Investigation Report on the Jiang Regime’s Persecution of Falun Gong Outside China,” 13 May 2004, www.zhuichaguoji.org/en/index2.php?option=content&task=view&id=84&pop=1&page=0 (accessed 2 October 2009).

127 Chen Yonglin, “Chinese Defector Details Spy Claims,” interview by Tony Jones, *Lateline*, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 20 June 2005, www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1396471.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

128 Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, 117–139.

Despite efforts to re-organize in the late 1990s (such as the Wei Jingsheng Foundation and OC Democracy Coalition), the pro-democracy movement remained fragmented and polarized due to individual personalities and rivalry for financial resources. Eventually, many activists lost their influence or lacked the capacity to lead—either because of the conditions of their release, or because they were no longer interested in promoting their former political ideals. Others who were once critical of the CCP during the 1990s fell into the embrace of ‘New’ China—reflecting the results of various cooptive strategies. Beijing’s offer of material wealth and status through various *qiaowu* incentive policies diluted their criticism for the regime and ideals for democracy.¹²⁹ While some OC remain critical of the CCP over its human rights record and attitude toward religious freedom, most prefer a “constructive engagement” with China for commercial and political interests.¹³⁰ Ultimately, without a charismatic leader and public support amongst the wider OC diaspora, the democratic movement suffered.¹³¹

Similar strategies were applied to both Tibetan and Xinjiang OC groups. In the 1990s, policies aimed specifically towards Tibetan OC continued under two aims: first to attract and gather support for Beijing; and secondly to shout down and de-legitimize threats from anti-Beijing forces, in particular the Tibetan Government in Exile.¹³² Beijing’s goal was to eradicate ‘splittist forces’ by a strategy of “dividing and tearing them apart” under a “long-term struggle”—by launching hard line offensives, using conflicts to divide them, using economic construction to serve the open policy of enabling the world to better understand Tibet, and enabling Tibet to open to the world.¹³³

From its handling of the 2008 Olympic Torch rallies in major cities around the world, the CCP was actively involved in building up factions of pro-Beijing OC to face-off against other non-compliant OC. At a critical period for China’s

129 Zhang Boli, “China Embracing Capitalism, But Trampling on Democracy,” interview by Crystal Hsu, *Taipei Times*, 25 June 2001, www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/06/25/91430 (accessed 1 October 2009).

130 Hannah Beech, “The Exile and the Entrepreneur,” *Time*, 7 June 2004, 30–36; Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Chance,” *Prospect Magazine*, Issue 108, March 2005, www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=6736 (accessed 3 February 2006).

131 Simon Beck, “Dissent in Dissidents Circles,” *Standard*, 31 January 1999, www.thestandard.com.hk/archive_news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&art_id=23158&sid=&con_type=1&archive_d_str=19990131 (accessed 3 February 2006).

132 “Conference on the Work of External Propaganda on the Question of Tibet Document No. 5.”

133 Tenzin, “Tibet Autonomous Region Conference on External Propaganda Work Document No. 8.”

re-emergence on the international stage, the CCP was basing its image and legitimacy upon national unity. Beijing feared that hostile groups such as the Tibetan, Xinjiang, and FLG movements would escalate global attention toward sensitive human rights issues. As noted in Chapter Two, the CCP resorted to mobilizing thousands of pro-Beijing supporters in Canberra, San Francisco, and Nagano for an overwhelming show of patriotism in order to drown out dissenters.

In the *2011 Annual Report on OC Study*, academic Zhong Darong emphasized the need to work on Xinjiang and other ethnic minority returnee OC in border regions. Specific goals include improving public diplomacy, expanding the common acknowledgement of China and ethnic unity amongst ethnic-minority groups, while criticizing foreign forces that seek to damage national stability and hurt its international image.¹³⁴ These points reflected propaganda efforts at the Eighth National Congress of Returned OC and their Relatives in July 2009, where senior CCP official Wang Zhaoguo called upon delegates to embrace national unity and reject separatism.¹³⁵ He informed delegates that the violent riots that killed over 200 in Urumqi were caused by outside separatists rather than internal conflict.¹³⁶ However, what these OC were told was different from what was actually happening. By constricting the flow of accurate information, the CCP was working to fuel chauvinist sentiment amongst the majority Han Chinese while alienating those with grievances.¹³⁷

7.15 Diplomatic Pressure

Beijing also uses diplomatic, economic, or political pressure on other governments in order to extract leverage on OC issues. For example, to demonize the Xinjiang independence movement, Beijing attempt to paint Uyghur groups

¹³⁴ Zhong Darong 钟大荣, "Huaqiao huaren de teshu qunti: guiqiao, qiaojuan 华侨华人的特殊群体: 归侨, 侨眷 [The Special Group of OC: Returned OC and Their Family Dependants]," in *Huaqiao huaren lanpishu: huaqiao huaren yanjiu baogao (2011)* 华侨华人蓝皮书: 华侨华人研究报告 (2011) [Bluebook of OC: Annual Report on OC Study (2011)], ed. Qiu Jin (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011): 264.

¹³⁵ "Senior Official Speaks at Congress of Returned OC," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 14 July 2009.

¹³⁶ Garnaut, "Rally Around Flag, China Tells Diaspora."

¹³⁷ John Garnaut, "No Challenge to Communist Rulers' Hegemony is Too Trivial," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 July 2009, <http://business.smh.com.au/business/n0-challenge-to-communist-rulers-hegemony-is-too-trivial-20090726-dxj5.html> (accessed 2 October 2009).

abroad as terrorists. In April 2006, Beijing urged Washington to “properly handle” Chinese nationals accused of terrorist activity held in Guantanamo Bay by dealing with suspects in a “prudent, responsible, and proper manner”. It advised US authorities to take into consideration the importance of China-US relations, and to abide by international law.¹³⁸ While this may have appeared to demonstrate China’s respect for the international judicial system, it was a veiled attempt to legitimize its own crackdown on East Turkistan Islamic Movement terrorists. Following the closing of the camp, Beijing pressured foreign governments to extradite Uyghur prisoners back to China for trial under PRC law. With those governments that refused to cooperate (such as Albania, which accepted five Uyghurs from Guantanamo in 2006), Beijing retaliated both diplomatically and economically.¹³⁹

In many cases, the threat of diplomatic and political pressure has worked—particularly with those afraid of compromising commercial interests with Beijing. In July 2002 the Chinese embassy and consulate both successfully pressured Auckland International Airport to remove a pre-paid, contracted billboard advertisement promoting FLG principles.¹⁴⁰ In 2009 the University of Auckland (a Confucius Institute partner financially dependent on fee-paying foreign students) initially cancelled a visit by Uyghur leader Rebiyah Kadeer, citing security concerns.¹⁴¹

In 2003, the Chinese ambassador to Fiji Zhang Junsai (章均赛) made an appearance on local television speaking against FLG distributing pamphlets and banners in Suva. He mobilized local pro-Beijing OC groups to provide information and organized a protest at the police station. Fijian officials promptly arrested the practitioners and ordered them to leave.¹⁴² In 2006, NZ prime minister Helen Clark said she would not consider a request by the FLG

138 “US Urged to ‘Properly’ Handle Chinese Terrorist Suspects at Guantanamo,” *Xinhua*, 21 April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/20/content_4454091.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

139 Ritt Goldstein, “Diplomatic Memos Reveal Chinese Effort to Block Guantanamo Prisoner’s Asylum Bid,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 May 2009.

140 Louisa Cleave, “Falun Gong poster shift under fire,” *NZ Herald*, 18 July 2002, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=2098262 (accessed January 23, 2012).

141 “Chinese Dissident ‘Re-Invited’ to Auckland Uni,” *Otago Daily Times*, 11 October 2009.

142 Radio NZ International, “Fiji Police Arrest Falun Gong Members at Games,” 3 July 2003, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/july/07%2D03%2D09.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009); OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Jiada lidu quanfangwei kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 6–16.

to refuse entry to a Chinese official.¹⁴³ Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer issued certificates prohibiting fixed banners and amplified noise after Beijing complained about protests outside its embassy in Canberra.¹⁴⁴ Australian immigration officials were also cautious regarding granting political asylum to defector Chen Yonglin (陈永林).¹⁴⁵ In Nepal, anecdotal evidence cites Chinese authorities pressuring local officials to contain the Tibetan independence movement through a system of informants, and preventing traditional worship. The Nepalese government supports the crackdown on and arrest of Tibetan refugees in return for much-needed economic and infrastructural aid.¹⁴⁶

The most significant example of a government bowing to Beijing on OC issues is that of Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou demonstrated his willingness to concede to PRC demands by changing the ROC's nomenclature in return for observer membership in international bodies (such as the World Health Organization and Asian Development Bank), preventing the display of symbols demonstrating Taiwanese nationhood during a visit by PRC officials,¹⁴⁷ and refusing to meet with pro-democracy activists.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, although they had previously enjoyed a close relationship with anti-CCP OC groups (such as the Free China Society),¹⁴⁹ both TECO and the OCAC reassessed their position. For example, the newly appointed OCAC minister Wu Ying-yih was clear that his Commission would cease giving an annual subsidy of US\$100,000 to the GADP for its political activities;¹⁵⁰ similarly, TECO indicated that it would

143 Martin Kay, "Plan to Embarrass Premier," *Press*, 4 April 2006, A4.

144 Mike Steketee, "The Price is Rights," *Australian*, 1 April 2006, www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,18669046-7583,00.html (accessed 30 August 2007).

145 Tom Dusevic, "Fair-Weather Friends," *Time*, 20 June 2005, 64.

146 Hannah Beech, "Tibet's Next Incarnation," *Time*, 10 October 2011, 14–19.

147 J. Michael Cole, "Beijing's Bid to 'Internalize' Taiwan," *Taipei Times*, 22 December 2008, www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/12/22/2003431795 (accessed 2 October 2009).

148 "Taiwan DPP to Propose Tiananmen Motion as Dissident Wang Dan Fails to Meet President," *Taiwan News*, 24 May 2009, www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=957998&lang=eng_news (accessed 2 October 2009).

149 Steve Hoadley, "NZ and Taiwan: The Policy and Practice of Quasi-Diplomacy," Occasional Paper no. 7, NZ Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, October 1993, 24–25.

150 Hermia Lin, "Wu Ying-yih Shares His Plans for Working with Compatriots," *Taiwan News*, 9 July 2008, www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=688410&lang=eng_news&cate_img=logo_taiwan&cate_rss=TAIWAN_eng (accessed 3 November 2009).

no longer support the FLG and pro-Tibet movement despite their repeated requests for assistance.¹⁵¹

Moreover in May 2009, Ma called on rival OC to end their confrontation by saying that “we won’t oppose OC groups, which support us, to engage with China.”¹⁵² Consequently, the first steps towards improving cross-Strait OC relations took place in the form of an agreement between Taipei and Beijing-based returned OC that suggested holding a series of forums, visits, and other forms of cooperation. This apparent détente between the two Chinas resulted in diplomats from both sides considering organizing joint celebrations for traditional festivals.¹⁵³ However, these developments represented a declaration between private organizations and not state level policy; nor did it reflect the views of the wider OC community.¹⁵⁴

While Ma demonstrated that he was willing to work with mainland officials by improving economic and cultural links with China, he was careful in dealing with the political ramifications of closer relations. Sooner or later, Taiwan will have to address the issue of reunification conditional upon terms acceptable to Beijing. Pressure from Taiwan’s domestic constituency and the OC are key drivers for when this might happen, but they remain split over support for the KMT and the DPP. For the meantime, the desire to maintain friendly state-to-state political and economic relationships takes priority on both sides of the Strait. These developments do not suggest that *qiaowu* efforts to isolate Taiwan are no longer required; merely that they can be relaxed given that the threat of Taiwanese independence has eased under a KMT government.

151 TECO official, personal communication with author, Wellington, 5 July 2009.

152 Maubo Chang, “President Calls for End to Confrontation Between OC,” *Central News Agency*, 5 May 2009, http://daily.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=940070&lang=eng_news (accessed 2 October 2009).

153 TECO in the USA, “Harmony Between OC Groups Urged,” 15 July 2009, www.roc-taiwan.org/US/fp.asp?xItem=99322&ctNode=2295&mp=12 (accessed 2 October 2009); “Taiwan, China Expatriates May Hold Joint Celebrations,” *Central News Agency*, 24 July 2009, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1011924&lang=eng_news&cate_img=logo_taiwan&cate_rss=TAIWAN_eng (accessed 2 October 2009).

154 Jorge Liu, Chu Lu-sheng, and Rachel Chan, “Ethnic Chinese ROC Supporters in US Split Over China,” *Taiwan Today*, 24 July 2009, www.taiwantodaynews.com/index.php/ethnic-chinese-roc-supporters-in-us-split-over-china (accessed 2 October 2009); Darin Moriki, “Cheers, Jeers Greet Taiwan’s President,” *Star Bulletin*, 6 July 2009, www.starbulletin.com/news/20090706_cheers_jeers_greet_taiwans_president.html (accessed 2 October 2009).

7.16 Conclusion

Qiaowu has evolved over many decades as the CCP's frontline effort to connect with and manage OC communities around the world. By embracing common themes of Chinese unity and modernity, and implemented through a comprehensive set of programmes and policies underscored by techniques of articulate persuasion and systematic management, *qiaowu* has resonated positively with certain groups of the OC diaspora to become stronger than ever before in building support for the regime.

Referring to Gamson's typologies of cooptation, social management, and control techniques, *qiaowu* has sought to bring in, influence, subsume, or isolate targeted groups of OC for particular outcomes. For those seeking to align themselves with Beijing, *qiaowu* employs non-selective consensual measures of rewarding them with economic, social, and cultural benefits. These are assisted by a broad scope of participatory schemes built upon a shared cultural and political identity with which those groups can converge upon.

While some of these OC are eager to forge a closer relationship with CCP leaders, many others find it difficult to reconcile aspects of a PRC-defined 'Chineseness' with their own Westernized identities. These groups still view the CCP with some distrust and therefore constitute a ready target for cultural outreach, reconnection, or transformation. For those who may be less willing to accept the CCP's message, *qiaowu* authorities seek not to indoctrinate, but to expose their membership to a fresh perception of China in the hope that they might look toward it with renewed interest—igniting sentimental love and pride for China as an attempt to cast aside (or at least dilute) any suspicions amongst them. For these groupings, transformation work through non-selective cooptation methods attempt to absorb these elements into a common identity.

The remaining groups of anti-CCP OC are much more difficult to deal with. However, techniques of inclusion or exclusion continue to work steadily against them. Selective cooptation methods use inducements in a "divide-and-rule" effort so that pro-Beijing individuals or groups consolidate in order to face off against and attempt to thwart other non-compliant OC cohorts. By 2008, threats such as the pro-democratic and Taiwanese pro-independence movements had been largely subverted, and remain only a partial cause of concern. Similarly, FLG have been largely isolated and discredited, while the Tibetan and Xinjiang separatist movements find themselves overwhelmed by a wave of Chinese nationalism. Although a dedicated core of supporters and activists continue to keep their movements alive by relying on private business interests and civil society to support their cause through media and outreach

objectives, dissidents have been forced underground due to fear of retaliation, while official and public sympathy for them has withered away.

Given that the majority of Tibetan and Uyghur OC hold particularly resolute attitudes against the regime, and that past policies directed toward them have failed miserably, the chances of successfully “transforming” such groups are slim. Despite their weakened state, groups of staunchly anti-CCP OC elements (no matter how big or small they may be) remain a potential source of embarrassment for the CCP. In these situations, aggressive coercive methods or diplomatic pressure is used in an attempt to silence them.

As such, despite pockets of resistance scattered amongst the OC diaspora, there is no single coordinated effort strong enough that can effectively challenge the CCP in the contemporary period. Furthermore, as the numbers of pro-Beijing OC increase as a natural consequence of migration and intensified *qiaowu* efforts, they have the potential to eventually dominate those groups preferring independent thought. Attempts to cultivate the OC for China’s interests continue to expand and strengthen, but face significant obstacles that cannot be resolved by carrots and sticks alone.

External Work: Diplomatic Assistance

This next section investigates *qiaowu* as a continually developing and expanding process for dealing with new demographic patterns in the mass movement of OC. Beijing's relationship and policies have evolved in accordance with OC migration over recent decades. According to the Migration Policy Institute, there were 12.7 million OC in the 1960s, 22 million in 1985, and by early 2000 there were 33 million.¹ ROC OCAC statistics revealed that this number had grown to over 38 million in 2005.² A 2008 report by the China News Agency showed that the population of ethnic Chinese and PRC nationals living outside of China totaled 48 million.³ According to analysts, another 30 million Chinese citizens travel or work abroad each year—and this figure is expected to increase to 100 million by 2020.⁴

This chapter examines the developments and breakthroughs for China's consular affairs in the context of these increasing numbers, and demonstrates how and why the CCP has enlarged its embrace and protection of the OC. Despite including them in its nationalist rhetoric, Beijing accords consular assistance to the OC only on a selective basis. The CCP finds itself in a predicament whereby it must carefully balance regional concerns and the promotion of its desired international image against further deepening its relationship with the OC.

8.1 The PRC and Protection of the OC

As noted throughout this research, *qiaowu* plays a leading role in China's foreign relations. Its nature and direction is constantly subject to China's national interests, its diplomatic rivalry with Taipei, and addressing suspicions

* Parts of this chapter were revised for "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the OC," in *Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan & the South Pacific*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010): 49–82.

1 Susanna Ng, "Seeing Red in Canada," *asia!*, Issue 9 (2007): 12–19.

2 The OCAC maintains comprehensive statistics based on decades of regularly updated research, empirical surveys, quantitative data from official census results, and reports from diplomatic staff. Government Information Office, *Taiwan Year Book 2004*; de Vienne, "For a Tentative Modelization of the Economic Weight of OC at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium."

3 "2008 huayi baogao," *Zhongxinwang*, 2 February 2009.

4 "Protect Our Compatriots," *China Daily*, 26 April 2007, 10.

of political interference. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Beijing appeared to put the interests of the OC behind its desire for international recognition. This was a strategic move to relieve itself of the “OC problem”. OC affairs were publicly downgraded as part of its *détente* efforts with Southeast Asia, and the OC were urged to assimilate and cooperate in their localities—indicating to the world that they had shed their political links with the mainland.⁵ Continuing ethnic and political tensions during this period ensured that there were many opportunities to demonstrate Beijing’s position towards the OC—but only when it suited its interest.⁶

Geo-political circumstances have always played a major role in influencing Beijing’s treatment of the OC. For example, anti-Chinese/anti-communist feeling spurred the Indonesian government to pass anti-alien legislation in 1959, so that ethnic Chinese and their property were open to seizure. Nearly 100,000 OC fled to China to escape the violence. Beijing did not directly criticize Jakarta, as it was a leftist ally at the time. Instead, it attempted to resolve the situation through quiet diplomacy, urging thousands to return to China where they could participate in “socialist reconstruction”. The PRC OCAC supported the decision to receive all returned OC, no matter how many there were.⁷ Beijing sent naval vessels to repatriate them.

When the new anti-Beijing Suharto regime moved to destroy the ethnic Chinese-dominated Indonesian Communist Party (ICP) in 1965, Beijing again decided to use the OC issue to send political signals.⁸ It wasted no time in demanding that Jakarta protect the OC and again dispatched ships to collect them.⁹ This action caused Southeast Asian nations to believe that China was still championing the cause of the OC—despite the 1955 Bandung agreement. Only 10,000 ethnic Chinese chose to leave on this occasion, as most preferred to stay on as Indonesian-Chinese. Relations between Beijing and Jakarta continued to deteriorate. In 1966, Beijing closed down its three main consulates in Indonesia, recalled its ambassador, and cancelled economic aid; moreover, it

5 Measures included recommending local investment and cooperation with local business instead of emphasizing remittance and foreign investment; and refraining from holding elections amongst OC as representatives in the National People’s Congress. See Skinner, “OC in Southeast Asia,” 136–147, 298.

6 Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, 401; Fitzgerald, *The Third China*, 105.

7 David Mazingo, *Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949–1967* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976): 171, 172.

8 “Beijing Uses OC for Political Aims,” *Beijing Informers* 36, Issue 12 (1978): 1–4.

9 Michael Vatikiotis, Matt Forney, and Ben Dolven, “Compatriot Games,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 August 1998, 20.

reversed all previous foreign policy. When Beijing endorsed the Maoist line of the ICP in 1967, it suspended diplomatic ties altogether.

The Bandung Treaty was repealed in 1969, leaving the status of millions of Indonesian ethnic Chinese in question. Newly independent countries had developed their own citizenship laws, and the OC were under pressure from host governments to formalize their citizenship.¹⁰ China's priority was to advance normalization, and hence it continued to play down its ties with the OC and publicly endorsed their integration. During this period, Beijing argued that any ethnic Chinese without PRC nationality were outside its jurisdiction, and therefore not its responsibility.¹¹ Only those OC who were registered with China as legitimate *huaqiao* would receive protection by PRC embassies.¹²

In 1973 Beijing announced that it had abolished its OCAC bureau and explained to the OC that they should be loyal to their country of residence.¹³ Zhou Enlai repeated that the PRC would continue to oppose the KMT policy of dual nationality, would encourage agreements on the nationality of OC, and would promulgate a law that gave OC of foreign citizenship no claim to PRC nationality.¹⁴ Likewise, during a National Day celebration that year, Deng Xiaoping added that he approved of the decision for the OC to acquire foreign citizenship.¹⁵

Eager to restore relations with Jakarta in 1973, China chose not to intervene during anti-Chinese rioting in Bandung, with *Xinhua* issuing only one late report without criticism of the Indonesian government.¹⁶ Beijing made it clear that it had severed all ties to the OC. A 1974 *South China Morning Post* editorial reaffirmed that Beijing had set itself apart from ethnic Chinese communities and renounced guerilla organizations that operated under PRC support. Beijing signed agreements not to recognize dual citizenship with Malaysia in

10 Mansingh, "Beijing and the OC," 318–319, 321.

11 "Tong Miandian Naiwen de tanhua," 44; "Yu Malaixiya zongli tibie guwen Mohaer de tanhua 与马来西亚总理特别顾问莫哈尔的谈话 [Conversation with Special Advisor to the Malaysian Prime Minister Mohaer]," 19 November 1972 in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 18.

12 "Huijian Maerjiashen waijiaobuzhang Laqilaka de tanhua 会见马尔加什外交部长拉齐拉卡的谈话 [Conversation from Meeting with Madagascan Foreign Minister Ratsiraka]," 6 November 1972, *ibid.*, 34.

13 US Embassy Jakarta, "Foreign Minister Malik's Weekly Press Conference," State Department cable to US Department of State, US National Archives, 1973JAKART03851, 31 March 1973.

14 Wang, *Qiaowu chungqiu*, 18–22.

15 US Consulate HK, "Beijing on OC Taiwan," State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1973HONGK09864, 1 October 1973.

16 US Consulate HK, "Beijing and the OC."

1974, and the Philippines and Thailand in 1975.¹⁷ However, as always, Beijing did not cut humanitarian links by adding that it could not be expected to eschew comment or unclassified action through international channels in cases where Chinese minorities were subjected to “unreasonable or discriminatory measures”.¹⁸

During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing continued to act according to political sensitivities or logistical practicality, and not for the protection of the OC. For example, it was reluctant to involve itself in the deportation of ethnic Chinese Vietnamese from HK in 1974.¹⁹ Similarly, when the Pol Pot regime persecuted and killed hundreds of thousands of OC in Kampuchea (Cambodia), Beijing offered little acknowledgement—preferring to seek the support of the Khmer Rouge instead of an increasingly hostile pro-Moscow Hanoi.²⁰

In 1976, Hanoi again attempted to register the OC as Vietnamese or else subject them to discriminatory measures if they retained their ROC citizenship.²¹ The PRC claimed that Hanoi had unilaterally violated a 1955 agreement between the CCP and the Vietnamese Workers’ Party.²² Following anti-ethnic Chinese activity in 1978,²³ Beijing argued that “the Vietnamese authorities have now returned evil for good by using despicable means to persecute Chinese and evict them *en masse*.”²⁴ It dispatched ships with capacity for 5000 evacuees—but this time, almost quarter of a million OC wanted to leave.

17 Chen, *Gongmin shouce*, 360–362.

18 US Consulate HK, “Media Reaction—China’s Relations with her Neighbours,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974HONGK06255, 4 June 1974.

19 US Consulate HK, “HK Government Deportation of Ethnic Chinese Residents in South Vietnam,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974HONGK06952, 19 June 1974.

20 Ian Lamont, “China’s Emerging OC Policy in the Late 1970s and Implications for Ethnic Chinese Communities in Vietnam and Kampuchea,” 17 May 2005, www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ilamont/alm/final_paper.pdf (accessed 9 December 2006).

21 When Vietnam sought to forcibly naturalize OC in 1955 and 1956, Taipei protested this move as a violation of the UN Charter. However, both the UN and US were not supportive of Taiwan’s demand that these OC be given right of free choice to determine their nationality. In 1957 Taipei declared that all Vietnamese OC unwilling to accept local citizenship were eligible to resettle in Taiwan. Over 52,000 registered, but only 3000 were able to leave because of Hanoi’s uncooperative attitude.

22 PRC MFA, “Statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry on Expulsion of Chinese Residents by Vietnam,” *Beijing Review*, 16 June 1978.

23 Chang, “OC in China’s Policy,” 291–296, 301; Lamont, “China’s Emerging OC Policy in the Late 1970s.”

24 “Beijing Uses OC for Political Aims,” 1–4.

However, Beijing could not agree on the terms of repatriation.²⁵ As a result, the vessels were moored outside Vietnamese territorial waters for several weeks, and ultimately recalled. Moreover, China declined to respond to the matter of 26,000 OC refugees who had escaped from Cambodia.²⁶ In July 1978, Beijing closed the borders to Yunnan and Guangxi to Vietnamese refugees. China accepted some boatpeople on Hainan Island and in Guangdong, housing them in special camps. But because of its weak economic and political position in the late 1970s, Beijing could offer no more than lip service and rhetoric, having little practical capability to halt abuses against the ethnic Chinese abroad.

Throughout the 1980s, renewed anti-Chinese activity in Indonesia, Mongolia, and Rangoon all met with a weak response from Beijing. *Qiaowu* appeared to have been put aside owing to political sensitivities. It was not until 1990 that relations between Beijing and Jakarta resumed. In a series of meetings in 1992 to determine the status of 300,000 ethnic Chinese (which included those who had resided in Indonesia for decades, illegal migrants, and others who wanted to leave during the 1960s but could not due to insufficient space on the ships sent to repatriate them) the PRC offered to provide them with Chinese passports. At the same time, the Indonesian minister of justice allowed those who had lived in Indonesia to become naturalized citizens.²⁷

Throughout this period, it was clear that Beijing wanted to clearly separate *huaqiao* from *huaren* affairs.²⁸ In 1994 Jiang Zemin promised Indonesian authorities that China would never use the ethnic Chinese *huaren* in Indonesia for its own political or economic gain.²⁹ In the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis in February 1998, observers noted that locals laid blame on ethnic Chinese for the increase in basic commodity prices.³⁰ While the Indonesian government did not condone the popular resentment, nor did it condemn it.

25 Vietnam did not oppose the ships being sent, but only permitted *Hoa* (those Vietnamese of Chinese origin or ethnic Chinese of Vietnamese nationality) approved by Vietnamese authorities to leave.

26 Hungdah Chiu, "China's Legal Position on Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam," *American Journal of International Law* 74, no. 3 (July 1980): 685–689.

27 Tan Chee Beng, "Comments on 'Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: OC, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?'" and Teresita Ang See, "The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos," in Suryadinata, *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*, 36–38, 166.

28 "Buyao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian," in Wang, *Qiaowu chungqu*, 90–92.

29 "Jiang on OC," *Xinhua*, 18 November 1994 as noted by Bolt, *China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese*, 124.

30 Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia Alert: Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of Ethnic Chinese," 11 February 1998, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/02/11/indone8880.htm> (accessed 1 October 2009).

As such, Beijing was also silent, preferring not to jeopardize its warming relationship with Jakarta.

8.2 1998 Indonesian Riots: A Turning Point in OC Affairs

In May 1998 as the Suharto regime ended, ethnic tensions towards the OC spilled over into violent riots. 1200 OC were killed, dozens of OC women raped, and their properties torched. Beijing was slow to react, making only a brief mention in the state controlled media, and not addressing it as a matter of foreign policy. China had to distance its sentimental and ethnic connection with the *huaren* diaspora, and stood firmly by its policy to separate them from *huaqiao*.³¹ Competing visions of policy direction and domestic power struggles trumped any putative duty that Beijing might have felt towards those foreigners with a shared language and culture.³²

Beijing was responsible only for the safety of PRC citizens. Under Articles 50, 70, 89 of the current PRC Constitution, its embassies are responsible for protecting the legitimate rights of Chinese nationals residing abroad, and the rights and interests of returned OC.³³ In other words, Beijing officially extends diplomatic and consular protection only to *huaqiao* (that is, those carrying Chinese passports, and compatriots from Taiwan, HK, and Macau).³⁴ While reports noted that the PRC embassy in Jakarta was quietly assisting its nationals on a case-by-case basis, Beijing declared that the violence in Indonesia was a domestic issue and declined to intervene.³⁵

Publicly and officially, the situation was Jakarta's own affair and not the concern of Beijing.³⁶ Beijing referred to ethnic Chinese as "members of

31 "Buyao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian," in Wang, *Qiaowu chunqiu*, 90–92.

32 King and Melvin, "Diaspora Politics," 108–138.

33 "Constitution of the PRC," 4 December 1982, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html> (accessed 1 October 2009).

34 Ding Ying, "Close to the People: OC Nationals Get Better Support System," *Beijing Review*, 2004, [www.bjreview.com.cn/200434/Nation-200434\(A\).htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200434/Nation-200434(A).htm) (accessed 14 November 2006); Wang, "Upgrading the Migrant," 18.

35 Chu Bangzao (PRC Foreign Affairs spokesman) as quoted by Leo Suryadinata, "China's Hands-Off on Indonesia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 April 1998, 31; Jonathan Mirsky, "A Problem for Beijing: Should It Stand Up for OC?" *International Herald Tribune*, 4 February 1998, www.nytimes.com/1998/02/04/opinion/04iht-edjon.t.html (accessed 1 October 2009).

36 Beijing stated that it would not protest or arrange evacuation because "there is no good reason to do so as the majority of the Chinese in Indonesia are Indonesian citizens." The

the Indonesian family” and whom it had no obligation to protect.³⁷ Beijing maintained that governments should treat ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality as citizens of their domicile—any action that would suggest otherwise might provoke suspicions of interference in the region.³⁸ Within China, those who tried to protest were rendered silent, and any news coverage quickly suppressed.³⁹ Overseas, such inaction resulted in a massive public outcry amongst the OC. They felt that China (or Taiwan in some cases) had to take responsibility over the issue.⁴⁰ Demonstrations outside PRC embassies and Taiwanese representative offices across the world indicated that the OC wanted these governments to intervene on their behalf.⁴¹

Finally on 3 August 1998, PRC foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) voiced the PRC’s official concern by saying that China was closely monitoring the actions of Indonesian authorities, demanding that they make investigation, and take effective measures for the protection and safety of ethnic Chinese and their interests. This was only a cautious response, given that the majority of those OC had Indonesian citizenship.⁴² Soon after, an editorial in the *People’s Daily* called for Jakarta to punish those responsible and to protect

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- Chinese ambassador to Indonesia added “it was the responsibility of the Indonesian Government to protect its own citizens, including the citizens of Chinese descent.” Chen Shiqiu quoted from “Dubes RRC Sesalkan Terjadinya Perkosaan Saat Kerusuhan [PRC’s Ambassador Deplores Raping During Riots],” *Suara Pembaruan*, 7 July 1998 as noted by Leo Suryadinata, “China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-Cold War Development,” in *ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects*, eds. Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun and China Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 361–362; Ruan Ci Shan, “Zhongguo zai Yinni luanjuzhong jintui liangnan 中国在印尼乱局中进退两难 [China is in a Dilemma in Turbulent Indonesia],” *Lianhe zaobao*, 25 February 1998.
- 37 “Asia: Is Chinese Blood Thinner Than Water?” *Economist*, 22 August 1998, 31.
- 38 Michael Richardson, “Singapore and Malaysia Watch with Alarm: Indonesia’s Neighbours Fear Wave of Refugees,” *International Herald Tribune*, 11 February 2000, www.nytimes.com/1998/02/11/news/11iht-pacif.t_0.html (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 39 The CCP did not allow protests inside China, resulting in the expulsion of three Beijing University students who demonstrated outside the Indonesian embassy; posters of the only newspaper that published a story on the riots were torn down. Beijing was “unnaturally silent during this period.” Anne-Marie Brady, personal communication with author, Christchurch, 14 April 2007. See also Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 52.
- 40 Vatikiotis, Forney, and Dolven, “Compatriot Games,” 23.
- 41 L. Ling-chi Wang, “What Chinese Overseas Can and Should Do,” 20 March 1999, www.exodusnews.com/editorials/editorial-025.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).
- 42 Yang Hongshan 杨宏山 (OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department), “Yinni zhengfu ji guoji shehui ruhe kandai Yinni 5 yue baoluanzhong huaren shou pohai 印尼政府及国际社会如何看待印尼5月暴乱中华人受迫害 [How the Indonesian

the safety and property of Chinese.⁴³ Other papers followed with similar reports, and non-government organizations and student groups were finally able to voice their opinion.⁴⁴

While China was now comfortable with making the Indonesian riots a public issue, the extent of the concern remained vocal. There was no effort to send vessels, arrange an evacuation, or to demonstrate direct diplomacy with Jakarta—ethnic Chinese were left to fend for themselves. While this strategy worked to persuade Indonesian leaders that Beijing was pragmatic and non-interventionist,⁴⁵ the OC remained frustrated that they had received no assistance or support at all. How would Beijing maintain sentimental connections with its diaspora in this antagonistic environment?

As pressure from OC groups mounted across the globe, a significant turning point in *qiaowu* policy took place. Since the debacle following the Indonesian riots of 1998, Beijing has demonstrated a surge of confidence in bringing all ethnic Chinese directly into the fold of PRC affairs, with an “international moral obligation to try and protect Chinese people overseas”.⁴⁶ The early 2000s saw a comprehensive reassessment of how Beijing would respond to OC caught in trouble. During this period, China’s economic situation was increasingly sound, and it was assuming a leading role as a regional power.

As such, Beijing does not necessarily abandon OC of foreign nationality in times of distress. On several occasions during 2006, diplomatic assistance was extended to non-PRC citizens as a matter of humanitarian aid. Diplomats maintained that although it would prefer not to see instability around the world, China had a “responsibility” to assist the “sons and daughters of the yellow emperor” as part of the “motherland”.⁴⁷ More importantly, the DPP’s rise to power in 2000 meant Taipei had revised its attitudes towards the OC to favour *Taiqiao*. In this context of political rivalry, Beijing recognized and seized another vital opportunity to reach out to the OC.

Government and International Society Regard the Ethnic Chinese Victims of the Indonesian Riots in May],” *Qiaoping*, no. 34 (15 November 1998): 3.

43 Mary Kwang, “Violence Against Chinese,” 4 August 1998, www.icanet.org/public/News/n2_080498%20Punish%20the%guilty2 as noted by Leo Suryadinata, “China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN,” in Saw, Sheng and Wah, *ASEAN-China Relations*, 361–362.

44 Yang, “Yinni zhengfu ji guoji shehui ruhe kandai Yinni 5 yue baoluanzhong huaren shou pohai,” 4.

45 Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007), 123.

46 Zhang Yunling (academic at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) as quoted by Vatikiotis, Forney, and Dolven, “Compatriot Games,” 23.

47 Zhang Yuanyuan (PRC Ambassador to NZ). Question and answer session at the NZCA Annual Conference, Wellington, 17 June 2006.

8.3 ROC Protection for OC

The ROC once openly extended diplomatic assistance to anyone of ethnic Chinese descent under the principle of *jus sanguinis*. For example, it helped Korean-based OC in 1950, transported 40,000 OC from North to South Vietnam in 1954–55, and repatriated 3000 Vietnamese OC in 1957. This policy shifted in the 1960s and early 1970s when the ROC's increasingly weakened diplomatic position rendered it powerless to offer any practical assistance. In Malaysia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines (where Taipei placed priority on preserving friendly relations) the ROC failed to protect OC interests altogether—in particular, the issue of repatriation. Taipei had also recognized the “OC problem” and insisted to Southeast Asian nations that its policy of continued ties with the OC was a “mistake”. Taipei noted that the PRC was gaining favour amongst these nations by encouraging OC allegiance to their host country, and therefore it should do the same.⁴⁸ This was evident when Vietnamese refugees sought to enter Taiwan during the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁴⁹

At the same time, Taipei was in heated rivalry with Beijing for support from the OC for its political survival. In late 1979, a propaganda magazine announced that the ROC had accepted and resettled more than 11,000 refugees, and donated over 30,000 tonnes of rice.⁵⁰ In October 1982, an OCAC meeting resolved to make closer and frequent contact with Vietnamese OC.⁵¹ While there was a prerogative for Taipei to protect legal ROC nationals abroad, there was also a humanitarian obligation to assist overseas *huaren*, *huaqiao*, and *laoqiao* communities.⁵² In such cases, the ROC OCAC has donated money and offered credit loans to OC victims of natural disaster and rioting.⁵³

48 Of the 1.6 million non-resident Chinese in Indonesia, only 66 held ROC passports; the remainder were either stateless or held PRC passports. US Embassy Jakarta, “ROC and Indonesia,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974JAKARTO6903, 6 June 1974; Suryadinata, *China and the ASEAN States*, 63.

49 Tang, “Stateless Persons and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action Part 1,” 201–231; Ng, “Taiwan’s OC Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s,” 273.

50 Lloyd Lo, “ROC Government to Strengthen Relief for Indochinese Refugees,” *Asian Outlook*, December 1979, 40–42.

51 “Chinese Overseas Patriotism for their Motherland,” *Asian Outlook*, November 1982, 20–23.

52 The ROC Constitution mandates the protection of the rights and interests of its citizens residing abroad, including economic, cultural and educational undertakings. See Government Information Office, *Taiwan Year Book 2004*.

53 “OCAC Sends Relief Funds to Florida,” *Haihua*, no. 93 (October 1992): 62; “OCAC Sends Relief Funds to Los Angeles,” *Haihua*, no. 89 (June 1992): 62.

However, between 2000 and 2008, DPP concerns dictated Taiwan's OC policy. During that period, Taiwanese government channels asserted that it offered humanitarian aid regardless of political background⁵⁴ and there was no official instruction to differentiate between OC of Taiwanese origin and others. This was in stark contrast to what was actually happening on the ground. Diplomatic support would be extended to *Taiqiao* or those OC with strong Taiwan connections, while other ethnic Chinese were assisted only in times of extreme crisis, and then only at the discretion of local representatives.⁵⁵

With ambassadorial and representative appointments granted on their pro-DPP affiliations,⁵⁶ diplomats were hesitant in taking unpopular action that showed them to be anything else but distinctly Taiwanese. For example, while it had assisted “so-called ethnic Chinese” during the 2000 SI riots,⁵⁷ priority was given to ROC nationals. During that event, Taipei was careful not to overstate the situation and did not acknowledge the need to assist—only to “stand by” in the event of a more serious incident.⁵⁸ It denied an evacuation was necessary, and only acted to register and move some OC to a temporary refuge. The ROC OCAC claimed otherwise, saying that it was willing to help PRC citizens find emergency shelter, and enlisted the help of Taiwan's naval fleet (coincidentally docked in Honiara on a friendship visit)⁵⁹ for emergency evacuation out of humanitarian concern.⁶⁰ This highlighted the conflicting attitudes held by the OCAC and DPP government towards the OC.

In that instance, the vessels left promptly on 8 June 2000 with only seven ROC nationals aboard. This was not because the evacuation had been suspended, but because the naval squadron was asked to leave by the SI political opposition, arguing that the visit might be perceived as military and moral

54 “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons,” *Liberty Times*, 16 June 2000.

55 John Chen (TECO representative to NZ) communication with Anne-Marie Brady, 1 May 2007.

56 OCAC commissioner, personal communication with author, Christchurch, June 2007.

57 In June 2000, SI prime minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was taken hostage by rebel forces and key installations seized during an attempted coup. Riots quickly ensued. A Taiwanese official commented that while Beijing and Taipei should not be at odds over OC affairs, there was little likelihood of diplomatic cooperation due to poor cross-Strait relations. Chen Jung-chieh (Former Deputy Secretary of the Straits Exchange Foundation) as quoted in “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons,” *Liberty Times*, 16 June 2000.

58 Catherine Sung, “Taiwan Navy on Solomons Standby,” *Taipei Times*, 9 June 2000, www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/06/09/39298 (accessed 24 May 2006).

59 The embassy subsequently cancelled the marine performance and various functions on board the naval vessels. SI Broadcasting Corporation, “Taiwan Navy Update,” 7 June 2000, <http://maorinews.com/karere/solomons/solo008.htm> (accessed 24 May 2006).

60 “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons,” *Liberty Times*, 16 June 2000.

support for the standing government.⁶¹ Again, politics took precedence over assisting the OC in times of trouble. Following Taipei's line, the navy downplayed the crisis, noting that the situation was not as tense as reported.⁶² Taiwanese authorities explained that things had calmed down, and about fifty expatriates and 600 ethnic Chinese "wanted to stay."⁶³ A similar situation occurred again in 2006, as detailed below. The DPP's ambivalent stance regarding consular assistance towards non-Taiwanese was apparent, and further damaged its estranged relationship with the OC.

It would be unfair to say that Taipei was unwilling to offer any help at all, as concerned individuals from the embassy personally visited victims of the 2006 Honiara riots.⁶⁴ They were not as heartless as made out by the PRC media (see below), but their demonstration of sympathy was too little too late. The majority of OC not only felt neglected, but complained that ROC consular staff had acted arrogantly towards them.⁶⁵

There were several explanations for such treatment. Firstly, Taiwan lacked the necessary capacity to assist. ROC officials explained that there were limitations to what Taipei could do for PRC nationals, given its isolation from the wider diplomatic community and the mainland itself. Even Taiwanese nationals have been known to seek help from the PRC embassy instead of Taiwan's representative office when it was unable to provide assistance.⁶⁶ In some circumstances, diplomats were unwilling or unable to assist *Taiqiao*.⁶⁷ Furthermore, under the DPP, PRC refugees could not be taken to Taiwan nor

61 SI Broadcasting Corporation, "Oppo—Taiwan," 8 June 2000.

62 Brian Hsu, "Navy Justifies Mission to Solomons," *Taipei Times*, 14 June 2000, www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/06/14/39944 (accessed 24 May 2006).

63 Monique Chu, "Taiwan Fleet Returning From the Solomons," *Taipei Times*, 10 June 2000, 1, www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/06/10/39431 (accessed 24 May 2006).

64 ROC embassy staff often assisted non-ROC OC in a private capacity, such as donating towards medical costs of victims. OC residents, personal communication with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007.

65 While the relationship between *laoqiao* and the ROC embassy was good during the 1990s (such as official financial support for Double Ten celebrations), rapport declined significantly during the DPP years. Some locals complained that they had difficulty with getting multiple entry visas to Taiwan, while others mentioned their cool acquaintance with embassy officials. Local OC leaders, personal communication with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007. See also "Jewelry Dealer Felt 'Neglected,'" *Solomon Star*, 2 May 2006.

66 Richard Shih (ROC MFA Spokesman) as quoted by Fiona Lu, "Businessman Admonishes MOFA," *Taipei Times*, 2 July 2003, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/07/02/2003057694 (accessed 24 May 2006).

67 Several Taiwanese OC made an official protest to the embassy complaining of the lack of assistance. Local OC leaders, personal conversation with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007.

airlifted directly to the mainland under travel restrictions at the time. Even if they were relocated to Taiwan, diplomats had no idea what to do with them, or for how long before they could be sent back.⁶⁸ If they chose to offer assistance, it would set a precedent. Countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan tend to be poor and administered by unstable governments, and there could be expectations that such assistance be rendered time and time again. Thus when the ROC embassy in Honiara was advised of the arrival of PRC diplomats to arrange an evacuation in April 2006, it raised no objection.

Secondly, ROC diplomats have mostly offered to help the OC when there was political value in doing so. For example, in 2003, the ROC ambassador in the Marshall Islands gave PRC dissident Xu Bo (徐波) a work permit and employment with a Taiwanese company.⁶⁹ During the 2000 coup in Fiji, it was Taiwan that first offered to evacuate Chinese nationals.⁷⁰ Yet in April 2006 Taiwan quickly distanced itself from the ethnic Chinese connection and any political interference in the SI,⁷¹ claiming that there were only two Taiwanese businesses and both were unaffected by the rioting.⁷² Rather than expressing humanitarian concern, its official press release focused on the fear that SI politicians might switch to Beijing.⁷³ The statement came over a week after the incident, and only after (pro-Taipei) SI Prime Minister Snyder Rini stepped down and rival Manasseh Sogavare threatened to shift ties if he was elected.⁷⁴ Taiwan was in the Pacific region to challenge China for zero-sum diplomatic survival;

68 ROC diplomat, interview by author, Taipei, May 2008.

69 Aenet Rowa, "Marshall Islands Gives Refuge to Chinese Dissident Xu Bo," Yokwe website, 14 June 2003, www.yokwe.net/index-php?name=News&file=article&sid=439 (accessed 24 May 2006).

70 Fiji officially recognizes Beijing. See Radio Australia, "Taiwan Warships to Pick Up Chinese from Fiji," 9 June 2000.

71 "Suoluomen daxuan baodong gongji Huashang, Taiwan waijiaobu founen jieru xuanju 所罗门大选暴动攻击华商,台湾外交部否认介入选举 [Solomon Election Rioting Attacks Chinese Merchants, Taiwan Foreign Ministry Denies Election Intervention]," *Yahoo News*, 20 April 2006, <http://tw.news.yahoo.com/060420/195/31xn7.html> (accessed 24 May 2006).

72 "Envoy Slams Australian Accusations," *Taipei Times*, 21 April 2006, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/04/21/2003303801 (accessed 24 May 2006).

73 Antonio C. S. Chan (ROC Ambassador to SI), "ROC Press Release," SI Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet website, 4 May 2006, www.pmc.gov.sb/?q=node/261 (accessed 24 May 2006).

74 Ray Lilley, "SI's PM Resigns, Likely Successor Mulls Cutting Ties with Taiwan," *Associated Press*, 27 April 2006, http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=288422&rel_no=1 (accessed 24 May 2006); Nick Squires, "Land of Confusion," *NZ Herald*, 29 April 2006, B3.

hence its foreign policy interests took precedence ahead of any OC concerns. In light of the DPP's weak response towards the OC, the CCP promptly took advantage of this situation to capture more hearts and minds.

8.4 Modern PRC Diplomatic Protection

Following the lessons learnt from 1998, Beijing revised its policy from non-interference to one of pro-active assistance and protection of the OC. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, it recognized the public relations value of providing diplomatic assistance to the OC, and capitalized upon the first of many opportunities when riots broke out in the SI in 2000. In that instance, Chinese authorities arranged to take 116 PRC nationals to Guangzhou, while others were airlifted with assistance from Australia and NZ.⁷⁵ Beijing wasted no time in proclaiming that this evacuation “fully demonstrated the care from the Party and the government to the OC compatriots.”⁷⁶ Similarly, riots in Central Kalimantan and Riau in Indonesia during 2001 sparked an immediate response.⁷⁷ In every case, Beijing has demanded local governments ensure the life, property, and safety of “OC and foreign citizens of Chinese origin” during times of crisis.⁷⁸ Where it was once cautious not to cause suspicions, these developments reflected Beijing's growing sense of confidence in the international arena.

In 2004, attacks on Chinese workers in Afghanistan provided the impetus for Beijing to protect its overseas nationals as a “new subject for the Chinese government and its foreign policy.”⁷⁹ Since then, its diplomatic work has moved from “purely handling affairs between governments to enhancing the

75 “China Evacuates Nationals from Solomons,” *People's Daily*, 14 June 2000, http://english.people.com.cn/english/200006/14/eng20000614_42966.html (accessed 24 May 2006).

76 Yang Jiechi (PRC Vice Foreign Minister) as quoted in “Efforts in Evacuating Chinese Nationals in Solomons Praised,” *People's Daily*, 7 January 2001, http://english.people.com.cn/english/200007/04/eng20000704_44568.html (accessed 24 May 2006).

77 Zhang Qiyue (PRC MFA spokeswoman) as quoted in “China Hopes Indonesia to Protect Ethnic Chinese from Riots,” *Xinhua*, 27 February 2001, <http://202.84.17.11/english/htm/20010227/378774.htm> (accessed 1 October 2009).

78 “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman on Argentine Situation,” *Xinhua*, 20 December 2001; Srikanth Kondapalli, “Tsunami and China: Relief with Chinese Characteristics,” *Asian Affairs*, 17 January 2005.

79 Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?” 22 June 2004, <http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t140336.htm> (accessed 1 October 2009); Embassy of the PRC in Canada, “Afghan Terror attack Sounds

maintenance of OC people's interests."⁸⁰ For example, it increased security spending and international cooperation to protect the OC from kidnapping, terrorist threats, and natural disaster.⁸¹ In addition, diplomatic staff received special training on effective planning, communication, and international information exchange regarding the OC.⁸² Beijing accelerated relevant legislative processes by ratifying the *Convention on the Safety of United Nationals and Associated Personnel*.⁸³ It followed this by establishing a special Department of External Security Affairs, consisting of 140 staff in Beijing and over 600 consular officials overseas. It is now the biggest department in the PRC MFA and is responsible for formulating, coordinating, and managing policy recommendations and implementation, guiding the operations of PRC diplomatic missions, and managing the activities of foreign non-government organizations in China.⁸⁴

To deal with the steadily increasing number of OC traveling abroad who required assistance, the MFA established a Division of Consular Protection in 2006 (and later upgraded it to a Consular Protection Centre in 2007).⁸⁵ In addition, a special Emergency Response Office was also set up to deal with urgent OC issues. With such infrastructure in place, the PRC has the capability to monitor OC affairs throughout the world—in particular matters concerning anti-Chinese sentiment or natural disaster. Moreover, the PRC is prepared to go “all out” to protect the OC from racism, harassment, and damage to property.⁸⁶

In April 2006, the PRC put these measures into action.⁸⁷ Hundreds of ethnic Chinese (including SI citizens, “old”, and “new” migrants) had fled to Honiara's

Alert on Security of OC,” 14 June 2004, <http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/xwtd/t132623.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

80 “Guard Citizens Overseas,” *China Daily*, 9 December 2005, 4.

81 “Security Mechanisms Set to Protect Overseas Workers,” *Sun*, 17 May 2007, 12.

82 Xia Liping, “Citizens Abroad Better Protected,” *China Daily*, 24 May 2005, 4.

83 Jin Canrong (Deputy Director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University) as quoted by Ni Yanshuo, “Feeling Safe Outside China,” *Beijing Review*, 2005, www.bjreview.com.cn/05-05-e/World-2005-4.htm (accessed 15 April 2007); For a detailed report, see Consulate-General of the PRC in Gothenburg, “Deputy Director General Wei Wei of the Department of Consular Affairs of the MFA Accepts an Interview with the China Youth Daily on the Issue of Consular Protection,” 29 December 2005, www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cggb/eng/gyzg/xwtd/t229139.htm (accessed 15 April 2007).

84 “Protect Our Compatriots,” *China Daily*, 26 April 2007, 10.

85 In 2007 there were 34 million PRC nationals overseas, with over 30,000 requiring assistance. See “China Sets Up Consular Protection Centre,” *sina.com* website, 23 August 2007, www.amchamchina.org/article/index.1209 (accessed 3 November 2009).

86 “Guard Citizens Overseas,” *China Daily*, 9 December 2005, 4.

87 For a complete commentary of the SI events from the PRC perspective, see the special edition of *Qiaoping jianbao*, 29 May 2006.

Rove Police station for protection as angry rioters set fire to OC homes and businesses. When the ROC embassy was unwilling to offer assistance, a local OC leader made a direct telephone call to GOCAO director Lü Weixiong (吕伟雄), and briefed him on the situation.⁸⁸ Beijing promptly authorized a launch of the “emergency response mechanism” (a coordinated system comprising of direct diplomatic aid from various regional governments and agencies).⁸⁹ PRC diplomats immediately went to investigate and provide further assistance.⁹⁰ Local OC greeted them with a large red banner proclaiming “PRC Ambassador, You Have Finally Come!”⁹¹—clearly indicating their sincere support for the PRC and openly venting their frustrations towards Taiwan. SI OC then promptly announced that they wanted China to send a plane to pick them up.⁹² Despite more half of them being SI citizens,⁹³ a diplomat said their livelihoods were “finished” and so they “had to go.”⁹⁴

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- 88 “Guangdongsheng qiaoban zhuren Lü Weixiong zhidian weiwen Suoluomen qundao zhong xiangqin 广东省侨办主任吕伟雄致电慰问所罗门群岛众乡亲 [GOCAO Director Lü Weixiong Calls to Console Solomon Folk],” *Huashengbao*, 20 April 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, Vol. 5/30, 29 May 2006, 10–11.
- 89 Luan Shanglin, “Hu Calls to Ensure Safety of Chinese Citizens in Solomon,” *Xinhua*, 24 April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/24/content_4464942.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 90 Luan Shanglin, “China Takes All Measures to Protect its People in SI,” *Xinhua*, 21 April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/22/content_4459185.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 91 “Paying the Price for Backing Taiwan,” *Press*, 26 April 2006, B5; Michelle Nichols, “Chinese Fear for Their Lives in Troubled Solomons,” *Reuters*, 21 April 2006.
- 92 Michael Field, “Pacific Chinese—Who Next to Face the Rioters?” Michael Field’s website, 22 April 2006, www.michaelfield.org/solomons21.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 93 Only 100 of the 380 OC were understood to hold PRC passports. “Zhongguo shiguan guanyuan dida Suoluomen qundao weiwen dangdi huaqiao huaren 中国使馆官员抵达所罗门群岛慰问当地华侨华人 [Chinese Consular Officials Arrive in SI to Console Local OC and Ethnic Chinese],” *Huashengbao*, 22 April 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, Vol. 5/30, 29 May 2006, 5, 7.
- 94 Gao Feng (PRC diplomat sent from PNG to assist evacuation) as quoted by Ray Lilley, “Chinese Nationals Flee SI,” *Associated Press*, 22 April 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsourc.com/national/1106AP_Solomon_Islands.html (accessed 24 May 2006). Two days later, Gao qualified his statement by saying many of the evacuees might return to the SI if the situation became stable. See Phil Mercer, “Hundreds of Ethnic Chinese Flee Troubled SI,” *Voice of America*, 24 April 2006, www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-04/2006-04-24-voa13.cfm?CFID=32027076&CFTOKEN=38371726 (accessed 2 October 2009).

The Guangdong provincial government gladly responded. In addition to Chinese nationals and HK citizens,⁹⁵ foreign-born OC, and foreign citizens of Chinese descent, and “any Chinese people on the islands who want to come back” all received help under clear instructions from officials.⁹⁶ This demonstrated convincingly that Beijing was prepared to assist all ethnic Chinese, no matter what their nationality. Once back in China, evacuees were welcomed by a special workgroup comprising of MFA officials, Ministry of Public Security, OCAO, and the HK and Macau Affairs Office.⁹⁷ According to communications with SI OC, evacuees were accommodated in hotels, given their own mobile phone with RMB1000 of free calling, and medical checks. Those arriving in HK were given an additional \$HK8000 stipend and offers to stay at a resort. Additional privileges included access to local education for the children of evacuees, while those without travel documents were allowed exit back to the SI at any time to rebuild their lives. In addition, Guangdong authorities gave visa extensions and assistance with finding work to those OC holding SI passports.⁹⁸

In November 2006, a similar process occurred again following riots aimed at OC in Nuku'alofa, Tonga. 37 OC holding Tongan passports initially sought help from the PRC embassy, but were told it could only help its own nationals.⁹⁹ They then moved onto the NZ High Commission residency. Staff members there were reluctant to help, stating that they could assist only Samoan, British, and NZ citizens, but not Tongan nationals. Salvation Army officers subsequently arranged their escape to an outlying village.¹⁰⁰ Finally, in a turn of

95 Ling Zhu, “37 HK Compatriots Back to Home,” *Xinhua*, 25 April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/25/content_4473110.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

96 Luan Shanglin, “OC Fly Back from SI,” *Xinhua*, 23 April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/24/content_4464933.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

97 Yang Lei, “Plane Set to Fetch OC in SI,” *Xinhua*, 24 April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/24/content_4466728.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

98 “Guangdongsheng qiaoban jieda Suoguo fanxiang qiaobao yiwen cheng jiang tuoshan jie jue 广东省侨办解答所国返乡侨胞疑问称将妥善解决 [GOCAO Answer Solomon Returnee Questions and Seek an Appropriate Resolution],” *Huashengbao*, 26 April 2006; “Qiaoban jiji xietiao zai sui Suoluomen qiaobao ziniu you wang chaban dushu 侨办积极协调在穗罗罗门侨胞子女有望插班读书 [OCAO Cooperate with OC Children Wanting to Study],” *Huashengbao*, 29 April 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, Vol. 5/30, May 29, 2006, 12.

99 Michael McBryde (NZ High Commissioner to Tonga), interview by author, Nuku'alofa, 28 August 2007.

100 Lois Watson, “Kiwi SOS: Get Us Out of Tonga,” *Stuff*, 19 November 2006, www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3866247a12,00.html (accessed 6 April 2007).

events, the PRC ambassador changed his mind and agreed to take them in.¹⁰¹ The embassy then chartered an aircraft to evacuate victims back to China. An embassy official later reaffirmed that while diplomatic assistance is normally only extended to its own nationals, all ethnic Chinese remain *tongbao* and therefore part of the Chinese “family”.¹⁰²

In both of these instances, China’s consular assistance was a full-scale effort to embrace and reclaim all the OC both physically and emotionally. The amount of resources put into achieving this result was unprecedented, and demonstrates a significant push to raise China’s consular protection efforts to a whole new level. When compared with its response to the Indonesian riots of 1998, this abrupt turn in China’s *qiaowu* policy reflected the desire to restore a tangible bond with the OC. Beijing wanted to press several key issues: that it could and would assist the OC; to ensure their gratitude, loyalty, and support for the CCP; and more importantly, to quash any remnants of support for Taipei’s independence effort that may have existed amongst them.

These efforts were not limited to those being evacuated, but extended towards OC all around the world. For example, in the S1 case, the OC Chinese language media was fully mobilized to spur on nationalism and patriotism by detailing China’s prowess, capability, and benevolence as a responsible, “people first” power through diplomacy (*waijiao weimin* 外交为民) while criticizing Taipei’s failure to respond.¹⁰³ Pro-Beijing media attacked Taipei for its reluctance to send help, accusing it of “selfishness and cold-bloodedness” in drawing political boundaries by offering aid to Taiwanese but not other ethnic Chinese.¹⁰⁴ Another paper even suggested that Taipei had a hand in

101 Salvation Army, “Tongan Salvationists Help After Civil Unrest,” Scoop, 21 November 2006, www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0611/S00297.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

102 PRC diplomat, interview with author, Nuku’alofa, 29 August 2007; Radio Australia, “China Sends Expat Evacuation Flight to Tonga,” 22 November 2006, www.abc.net.au/ra/news/stories/sl1795185.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).

103 Qin Jize and Liang Qiwen, “310 Chinese Back Home from Solomons,” *China Daily*, 25 April 2006, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/25/content_575798.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

104 “Suoluomen saoluan bao Tai dangju lengxue Dalu cheqiao tuxian waijiao xinfeng 所罗门骚乱曝台当局冷血大陆撤侨凸显外交新风 [Solomons Riot Exposes Cold Blooded Taiwan Authorities, China Evacuation Highlights New Style of Diplomacy],” *Huashengbao*, 24 April 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, Vol. 5/30, May 29, 2006, 7; “Xunsu che qiao tuxian waijiao xinfeng 迅速撤侨凸显外交新风 [Speedy Evacuation of OC Shows Foreign Ministry’s New Image],” *Wen Wei Po*, 24 April 2006, www.wenweipo.com/news.phtml?cat=057PL&news_id=PL0604240001&PHPSESSID=0c053065e9aa282115b6cf0189d4c57b&PHPSESSID=5eadaac2ebe2caa301a198d75938a970 (accessed 15 March 2012).

directing the rioting towards rival PRC Chinese as a means of political warfare.¹⁰⁵ A PRC publication distributed amongst SI OC criticized Taiwan for its weak diplomatic response, and how this resulted in widespread denouncement from OC all over the world.¹⁰⁶

To boost China's positive image, OC newspapers published photographs of PRC embassy staff busily exercising "the state power for the benefit of the people,"¹⁰⁷ complemented with pictures of cheering evacuees holding colourful banners or waving red flags and flowers.¹⁰⁸ Chinese sources openly acknowledged these measures were to prop up the "national pride and dignity of those who have been assisted."¹⁰⁹

As such, *qiaowu* had moved beyond simply offering humanitarian assistance, but sought to advance inherent political and psychological objectives. At the height of criticism surrounding chequebook diplomacy in the Pacific, Beijing went to great lengths to demonize the DPP government while elevating itself in the eyes of the OC. This was particularly important in the SI, which held official diplomatic relations with Taipei. In this case, the OC community there were a potential source of strategic support for a switch in recognition. Moreover, a growing OC community elsewhere across the Pacific (and accordingly a rise in ethnic tensions throughout the region) meant that Beijing had to pay increased attention to the OC, their affairs, and interests.

From the aftermath of ethnic rioting during 2006, the CCP had learnt several new lessons regarding consular protection. First was the realization that the OC were actively looking towards Beijing for assistance in times of trouble. Secondly, as China's presence grew around the world, and as the OC population increases and diversifies, China's consular work will increasingly focus upon OC affairs. In this context, *qiaowu* specialists recommended that PRC

105 "Cong Suoluomen saoluan paihua kan liangan dangju zuowei! 从所罗门骚乱排华看两岸当局作为! [Looking at Cross-Strait Authorities' Conduct Concerning SI Racial Riots]," *Sing Tao*, 24 April 2006, www.peacehall.com/news/gb/intl/2006/04/200604242016.shtml (accessed 15 March 2012).

106 GOCAO, *Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi...* 从所罗门唐人街被烧说起... [Speaking of the Burning of Chinatown...], (Guangzhou: GOCAO, 2006), 24.

107 Li Yongran, "Shenye, jinji cheqiao jinxingzhong... 深夜, 紧急撤侨进行中 [In the Middle of the Night, Emergency Evacuation of OC Takes Place...]," *NZ Mirror*, 21 April 2006.

108 "Suoluomen yueji huaqiao di Sui 所罗门粤籍华侨抵穗 [Solomons Cantonese Arrive in Guangzhou]," *Nanfang ribao*, 24 April 2006, <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/jwxy/200604240115.asp> (accessed 24 May 2006).

109 "Protect Chinese Overseas," *China Daily*, 25 April 2006, 4.

diplomats increase their coordination with *qiaowu* agencies.¹¹⁰ For example, diplomats advise OC and affiliated companies to develop closer contacts with the Chinese embassy and consulates, and unite for better self-protection.¹¹¹ In this manner, Beijing intends to assert itself as the leading force for assisting OC in trouble, over and above the local authorities, police, and traditional OC voluntary or benevolent associations (see next chapter).

8.5 The Limits of PRC Consular Assistance

Despite generating support from the OC for consular assistance, there were major ramifications for *qiaowu* if such rescue efforts were to occur again. Months after the 2006 Honiara riots, one diplomat publicly praised China's evacuation of OC as a "successful practice" and that the PRC was "better prepared as time goes by."¹¹² His words were an attempt to place a positive spin on what was viewed quite differently back in Beijing. *Qiaowu* officials maintained that the "emergency response mechanism" was only a stop-gap measure, and that it was something China would rather not activate. They were concerned that locals would view the OC as outsiders if they continued to receive help from China.¹¹³ In turn, such ethnic tensions would hinder China's own state-to-state relations.

Secondly, these *qiaowu* officials argued that consular protection took up extensive resources, manpower, and coordination efforts. It also set into motion a culture of expectation for diplomatic assistance amongst the OC if they ever found themselves in crises. Moreover, it was a costly exercise, and sometimes abused. Some 'refugees' from the Honiara riots stayed at the Rove Police Shelter purely for show—ensuring that their plight was covered by the media, then packing up and going to their friend's house for the evening, rather

110 He Jimeng 贺继孟, "Shilun Sun Zhongshan qiaowu sixiang de xianshi yiyi 试论孙中山侨务思想的现实意义 [Opinion of the Real Significance of Sun Yat-sen OC Thought]," OCAO website, 20 September 2007, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0920/1/6646.shtml (accessed 15 March 2012).

111 Embassy of the PRC in the USA, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao's Press Conference on 8 November 2005," 8 November 2005, www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t220541.htm (accessed 2 October 2009); "China Concerned About Crimes Against Nationals in South Africa," *Xinhua*, 9 February 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-02/09/content_4159791.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

112 Zhang Yuanyuan (PRC Ambassador to NZ). Question and answer session at the NZCA Annual Conference, Wellington, 17 June 2006.

113 GOCAO, *Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi . . .*, 17–30.

than endure the crowded conditions. Others simply took advantage of the food and hospitality that was offered. Similar events occurred in Nuku'alofa where the PRC embassy was overflowing with OC riot 'victims'.¹¹⁴

Another aspect surrounding consular assistance was how Beijing could dispense it without attracting criticism or suspicion. Since 2000, PRC evacuation efforts have been conducted on a relatively small scale of less than 500 persons, and from small isolated countries lacking adequate resources. These factors reduced logistical concerns over transport, resettling, and international scrutiny. A large-scale operation elsewhere might receive a different response.¹¹⁵ For example, China would be hesitant to offer evacuation in a developed Western country, or countries with large numbers of OC—both legal and illegal. For example, there are reportedly up to 30,000 ethnic Chinese in Fiji¹¹⁶ and thousands living in PNG.¹¹⁷ In June 2009, the OC were the targets of riots in Port Moresby. In that instance, the PRC embassy decided that an evacuation was not necessary. Diplomats explained that the local government had the necessary capability for containing the unrest and to protect those at risk.¹¹⁸ An evacuation might have exposed China's illegal migration problem and subjected its government to humiliation. In other cases where the extraction of large populations might be required, dispatching PLA naval vessels would send uncomfortable signals of battleship diplomacy into the region and therefore compromise China's attempt to promote a friendly and benevolent image.

This indicates the limits to Beijing's stance on consular assistance. Although the PRC has a duty to protect its nationals abroad, and despite its eagerness to reclaim the OC as its own, China still remains selective on how it responds to those in trouble, and then only on a case-by-case basis. For example, PRC officials are unwilling to offer help to those OC perceived as a liability—particularly those involved in labour disputes or criminal behaviour. While they admit some "bad eggs" turn up amongst the two million Chinese overseas

114 Various OC residents, interviews by author, Honiara and Nuku'alofa, September 2007.

115 Evacuation of OC is provided only after careful consideration of the local geo-political situation. *Qiaolian* official, personal communication with author, Beijing, 9 November 2007.

116 Michael Field, "Violence May Drive Chinese Intervention," *Stuff*, 20 November 2006, www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3866439a12,00.html (accessed 6 April 2007).

117 Bertil Lintner, "Chinese Advance in the South Pacific: Entrepreneurs Undaunted by PNG Dangers," Japan Focus website, 5 December 2006, www.japanfocus.org/-Bertil-Lintner/2288 (accessed 6 April 2007).

118 PRC diplomat, personal communication with author, Wellington, 20 June 2009.

travellers each year,¹¹⁹ diplomats either refuse to cooperate or delay the process of repatriation for deported PRC nationals by citing bureaucratic red tape. For example, the PRC embassy will take action only if notified within four days of an arrest, and “if proven to be Chinese nationals.” Without travel documents, criminals are not allowed to re-enter China, even as deportees.¹²⁰ When criminals are confirmed as PRC nationals, diplomats contend that they are not responsible for their activities. As the internal domestic issues of a foreign government, the embassy argues that it can only grant limited assistance.¹²¹ For example, PRC diplomats in Suva referred to the arrest of 41 Chinese allegedly involved in illegal gambling and prostitution as the responsibility of the local immigration department and police.¹²²

Where it has no official representation, Beijing may choose to distance itself from complications concerning OC altogether. Even though there are large numbers of PRC nationals working in Saipan, Beijing has yet to establish a consulate on the island state.¹²³ As such, Chinese garment workers based in northern Pacific sweatshops have no avenue for resolving their grievances.¹²⁴ Similarly, Chinese nationals jailed in the pro-Taipei Marshall Islands have also failed to receive assistance.¹²⁵ In other cases, Beijing has also argued it

119 Radio NZ International, “China’s Ambassador to Fiji Accuses Media of Bias in Crime Reporting,” 10 December 2003, www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?id=7752&op=read (accessed 2 October 2009).

120 Liang Zhenqua (PRC Consul in Los Angeles) as quoted by Cookie B. Micaller, “Another Chinese Immigrant Boat Diverted to Tinian,” *Saipan Tribune*, 26 April 1999, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/april/04%2D27%2D02.html> (accessed 19 February 2007).

121 “Boat People Seen in PNG’s National Capital District,” *Post Courier*, 3 September 1999, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/september/09%2D06%2D04.html> (accessed 19 February 2007).

122 Craig Skehan, “Fiji to Crack Down on Foreign Prostitutes Posing as Students,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 February 2005, www.smh.com.au/news/World/Fiji-to-crack-down-on-foreign-prostitutes-posing-as-students/2005/02/24/1109180047381.html (accessed 2 October 2009); “Fiji Investigates Asian Sex Trade In Garment Industry,” *Fiji’s Daily Post*, 24 March 2000, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2000/march/03%2D27%2D14.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

123 Jude O. Marfil, “Rota Hotel Operator Protests China Travel Ban,” *Marianas Variety*, 20 December 2004, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/december/12%2D20%2D11.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

124 “Chinese Garment Workers on Hunger Strike,” *Agence France Presse*, 7 March 2000.

125 Giff Johnson, “Lawyer Alleges Abuse of Marshall Islands Chinese,” *Marianas Variety*, 11 May 2006, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D12%2D14.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

could not be responsible for accepting deportees from non-Approved Tourist Destinations.¹²⁶

China's lack of a response towards those OC viewed as a liability demonstrates that it has focused its efforts on cases where embarrassment is minimized and public relations value is maximized. Therefore consular assistance and *qiaowu* methods for the twenty-first century focus upon monitoring developments and investigating methods of preventing a recurrence rather than placing efforts on actual rescue.¹²⁷ *Qiaowu* experts propose that *qiaowu* should seek to minimize the internal differences of the OC, strengthen OC society as a whole, and thereby reduce reliance on Beijing at times of difficulty.¹²⁸ This is indicative of a new evolution in OC policy that seeks to "upgrade the migrant" in order to fit China's desired international image. As the future of *qiaowu*, this subject is the topic of the next chapter.

8.6 The OC and Implications for PRC Foreign Policy

How Beijing chooses to respond to matters concerning increasing populations of OC will affect its bilateral relations with foreign governments of the countries in which they reside. There are various contexts to how these relationships might unfold. As Chinese investment abroad grows, Beijing might consider naval diplomacy or military protection to oversee assets under OC control, or intervene when OC are in trouble.¹²⁹ For example, it has advocated dispatching PRC police officers to assist the investigations of foreign law enforcement

126 This term is addressed in the next chapter. See also Micaller, "Another Chinese Immigrant Boat Diverted to Tinian."

127 Lü Weixiong 吕伟雄 and Zheng Jianmin 郑建明, "‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo ‘怨侨’事件是谁惹的祸 [Who is the Unfortunate Victim of Anti-Chinese Incidents?]", *Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu*, no. 2 (2007): 23, <http://qwgzzyj.gqb.gov.cn/135/865.shtml> (accessed 15 March 2012); GO CAO, *Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi...*

128 Yan Xi 雁溪, "Suoluomen cheqiao shimo yu sikao 所罗门撤侨始末与思考 [Evacuation of Solomons OC: Analysis from Start to Finish]", *Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu*, no. 3 (2006): 18–20, <http://qwgzzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjyt/130/102.shtml> (accessed on 15 March 2012).

129 Shi Zhiquan 施志全 and Li Yuting 李玉婷, "Jiyao ‘qiaoli weiguo’ yeyao ‘guoli weiqiao’" 既要‘侨力为国’也要‘国力为侨’ [As Well As OC Strength for Helping China, China's Strength Should Help the OC], *Renmin zhengxiewang*, 17 September 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 27 September 2007, 18; "Somalia Welcomes Chinese Naval Deployment Off Its Coast," *Xinhuanet*, 18 December 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/18/content_10522689.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

agencies following attacks on OC; similarly it has considered the possibility of sending China's own security personnel for protection.¹³⁰

In the meantime, China desires acceptance in the international community and refrains from demonstrating what might be perceived as aggressive behaviour. For example, it has been hesitant to send in uniformed assistance, chartered commercial aeroplanes instead of sending military aircraft, and dispatched good-will naval visits. Any demonstration of hard power has been approved under the UN (such as in the form of peace-keeping forces in Sudan.)¹³¹ Beijing prefers to play a cooperative leadership role (such as coordinating humanitarian relief efforts, sending medical supplies, and asking for assistance from third parties). In this manner, China can be rated as "the region's most trustworthy and responsible friend" during times of need.¹³²

To improve bilateral relations, regional governments may be called upon for assistance where China is unable (or unwilling) to act alone. China expects and demands that countries protect its nationals (and by implication, *huaren*) in trouble. For example, Beijing thanked Syria, Greece, and Cyprus for their efforts in evacuating 143 Chinese from Lebanon in 2006.¹³³ In the Pacific, Australia, NZ, and PNG were praised for their role in the SI and Tonga.¹³⁴ In this context, some experts suggested that NZ and Australia might have served as unwitting proxies for China's interests in the region.¹³⁵

130 Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, "How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?"

131 Su Qiang and Le Tian, "Peacekeeping—A Rising Role for China's PLA," *China Daily*, 24 July 2008, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/24/content_5442172.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

132 Drew Thompson, "Tsunami Relief Reflects China's Regional Aspirations," *Jamestown Foundation Brief* 5, Issue 2 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3708 (accessed 2 October 2009).

133 "Another Batch of OC Evacuated from Lebanon," *Xinhua*, 20 July 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200607/20/eng20060720_285068.html (accessed 2 October 2009) and "China Evacuates 82 Citizens from Lebanon," *Xinhua*, 19 July 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200607/19/eng20060719_284415.html (accessed 2 October 2009).

134 Embassy of the PRC in the USA, "Chinese Government Helped Its Citizens in Tonga Return to China with a Chartered Plane," 22 November 2006, www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t281398.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

135 Anne-Marie Brady and John Henderson, "NZ, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead," in *Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010): 189–223.

In contrast, China may berate or criticize local inadequacies concerning the treatment of OC in trouble.¹³⁶ For example, it had nothing to lose by criticizing the pro-Taipei SI government after the 2006 riots.¹³⁷ Moreover, in late 2005, four ethnic Chinese women detained at Kuala Lumpur Airport as suspected prostitutes resulted in their unlawful detainment, assault, and humiliation. Before the authorities had even confirmed whether the complainants were Chinese or Malaysian nationals, Beijing reacted strongly. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei (武大伟) summoned the Malaysian ambassador to lodge a protest, demanding that his government immediately investigate and punish those responsible.¹³⁸ Newspapers in China printed negative stories about the incident contributing to a 49 percent drop in Chinese tourism. In response, the Malaysian government tried to resolve the situation by sending Interior Minister Azmi Khalid to Beijing for damage control.¹³⁹

Similarly, other governments have placed OC affairs as an important part of their bilateral relationship with Beijing. After a spate of murders and crimes against PRC nationals in South Africa in 2006 resulted in negative publicity and a 14.9 percent decline in Chinese tourists, South African ambassador Vusi Koloane quickly reassured Beijing that there was “no organized effort” against Chinese, and that his government was doing everything possible to completely eliminate crimes.¹⁴⁰ When Zambian opposition presidential candidate Michael Sata threatened to evict OC companies out of the country (but more importantly recognizing Taiwan) in 2006, the PRC embassy threatened to sever ties with the African nation if he won.¹⁴¹ In 2007, the PRC embassy called on Pakistan to offer better protection for OC after seven Chinese hostages accused of prostitution were abducted from an acupuncture clinic in Islamabad. They were later released in the interests of maintaining friendly relations.¹⁴²

136 “Attacks on Fiji Chinese Raise Concern,” *Fiji Times*, 31 May 2005, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/june/06%2D02%2D04.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

137 Issac Nicholas, “China Condemns Inaction,” *Solomon Star*, 2 May 2006.

138 Embassy of the PRC in Australia, “China Asks Malaysia to Probe Assault Cases,” 29 November 2005, www.chinaembassy.org.au/eng/xw/t223932.htm (accessed 24 May 2006).

139 China CSR, “Chinese Journalists Invited to Review Malaysia’s Security Situation,” 6 December 2005, www.chinacsr.com/2005/12/06/chinese-journalists-invited-to-review-malaysias-security-situation/ (accessed 2 October 2009).

140 “S. Africa: ‘No Organized Effort’ Against Chinese,” *Xinhuanet*, 13 February 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-02/13/content_4175370.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

141 Joshua Kurlantzick, “How China Controls African Politics,” *TNR Online*, 10 May 2006, www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?I=w061002&s=kurlantzick100506 (accessed 24 May 2006).

142 “China Calls on Pakistan to Better Protect Chinese,” *Reuters*, 27 June 2007.

In all these cases, the treatment of OC has served as a geo-political barometer indicating the strength of Sino-foreign relations. As mentioned previously, *qiaowu* is effectively a core part of China's foreign affairs. Just as it did with Vietnam and Indonesia during the 1960s, Beijing has continued to use the OC as convenient bargaining chips in its international relations. As demonstrated above, the manner and timing in which *qiaowu* is implemented depends entirely on Beijing's strategic interests. Like Taiwan, China is only prepared to act on behalf of the OC if the issues have enough political importance or public relations value for enhancing its international image.

8.7 Conclusion

Handling the affairs of the OC has been a historical cause of concern for both Beijing and Taipei. The logistical, financial, and human resources invested in consular protection for ethnic Chinese have often come into conflict with regional suspicions, domestic opposition, and national interests. Between the 1960s to late 1990s, China's stance was extremely cautious—responding to OC affairs as contentious issues that threatened to undermine regional political relationships. Similarly, Taiwan's relationship with the OC had deteriorated to the extent that it enacted legislation to ensure that it only had limited responsibility towards them; the rise of Taiwanization meant that consular assistance focused only upon *Taiqiao*. For much of the mid to late 1990s, OC caught in ethnic tension or trouble had no-one to turn to at all.

Following the aftermath of 1998, Beijing attempted to reclaim trust and respect of the OC by boosting its consular protection efforts. The 2000s saw a massive implementation of new legislation and infrastructure designed to show that China was capable of protecting its nationals. To maintain its emotional and ethnographic connection with the rest of the OC, Beijing was obligated to demonstrate that it could also offer humanitarian assistance to them as well. Evacuations and the way in which they were reported both point towards a strategic and conscientious effort to bring as many of the OC as possible under its embrace. This was particularly evident during the DPP years when pro-independence efforts were at their apex.

Despite these developments, political and national interests continue to take priority over those of the OC. Beijing remains in the predicament of finding a balance between securing loyalty of the OC against maintaining its international relations. The latter is dependent on external concerns and whether there is any benefit for China. This chapter has demonstrated that *qiaowu* is dictated and limited by the scope and robustness of China's international

relations. Where it is dominant and not perceived as a threat, Beijing is quite confident of extending its hand; otherwise, it is much more hesitant to inflame the situation or invite embarrassment. For the meantime, Beijing is careful not to over-stretch itself. Managing the large numbers of OC is, and will continue to be, a critical factor in maintaining stability and security throughout the world, and an important factor in Beijing's foreign policy.

Doing so, however, is dependent on China's national interests at any given point in time. *Qiaowu* authorities are careful to portray China's actions as purely humanitarian; the government seeks to avoid the risk of appearing interventionist for fear of stirring up ethnic tensions or regional suspicions, and consequently hindering its state-to-state relations. Although the PRC has a duty to protect its nationals abroad, and despite its eagerness to reclaim the OC as its own, Beijing remains selective on how it responds to those in trouble, and then only on a case-by-case basis. Again, realist assumptions of the state take priority.

The Future of *Qiaowu*

Each of the preceding chapters has illustrated a specific aspect of *qiaowu* and examined its development in both a historical and contemporary context. This chapter examines the future strategic direction of *qiaowu*, and projects how it will develop. Current policies concerning the spread of *xinqiao* migrants reflect the rationale behind a new model of *qiaowu* which recognizes that OC society is constantly evolving, and that the CCP wishes to be the key driver in its development. Moreover, *qiaowu* seeks to capitalize on the upwardly mobile social trends amongst certain groups of elite OC, and to use this group for rebranding the public face of China abroad. The ultimate objective, however, is to guide their behaviours towards a CCP-friendly outlook.

The goals of China's *qiaowu* efforts have remained largely consistent up until the mid-1980s: realizing the long-term development of the OC; promoting ethnic unity for political stability, economic modernization, and development; fostering Sino-foreign friendship; and mobilizing revolutionary liberation.¹ The immediate years after 1978 through to 1989 saw a shift of focus to repairing the damaged relationship with returned OC, and providing incentives or building links with the OC to attract investment. After 1989, the CCP had to revise this strategy and concentrate on better management of the OC diaspora for maintaining its political legitimacy. In the 2000s, China's *qiaowu* strategy looked at the OC from a wider perspective—not only as a source of economical, cultural, and political support, but also for improving China's soft power and international image in the modern era.

Contemporary *qiaowu* policy thrives in a context of transnationalism and globalization. In this context, China mobilizes both “old” and “new” OC communities at the forefront of efforts to promote economic and cultural development, as well as political integration with a growing China. To reassert itself as an economic power, China has actively promoted tourism, trade, and enterprise amongst the OC as a key aspect of its “Going Out” strategy.² Since the late 1990s, China has used migration as a tool to further its national interests by engaging with and cultivating the OC through dedicated bureaucratic structures.

1 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 16.

2 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 11.

This chapter will bring all of these factors together in describing *qiaowu* for the twenty-first century—specifically for two quickly emerging groups at opposite ends of the OC spectrum: working class migrants and ‘new’ elite migrants. The increase in the numbers of both these types of OC has, and will have, profound implications for both receiving host governments and Beijing. As such, *qiaowu* methods continually adapt to address these concerns.

9.1 OC Trade, Investment, and Migration

There are several causes for the spread of ethnic Chinese communities throughout the world. Trade and investment have facilitated OC movement abroad for centuries. In this respect, the OC are involved in enterprises ranging from multi-million dollar mining ventures to small shops and restaurants,³ and have quickly staked out dominant positions in local industries.⁴ Throughout the Pacific, Taiwanese OC own large retail facilities or have fishing interests and control prominent industries. Malaysian OC are involved in much of the region’s logging and mineral extraction business.⁵ OC investment also includes accommodation, cuisine, news media, education, finance, and other services for the ethnic Chinese market.⁶

China’s own development and security strategies also provide an explanation. “Going Out” and migration from China carry not so much an intention of expansionism or colonialism, but the prime objective of improving China’s situation from abroad. Beijing’s emphasis on promoting migration is consistent with its foreign policy of forging stronger links with countries rich in resources. An international forum of OC in 2001 sought to establish

3 Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” *Policy* (Winter 2005), www.cis.org.au/Policy/winter05/polwin05-5.htm (accessed 2 October 2009); Frank Frost, “Directions in China’s Foreign Relations—Implications for East Asia and Australia,” Department of Parliamentary Services Research Brief no. 9, 5 December 2005, www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/RB/2005-06/06rb09.pdf (accessed 28 January 2007).

4 Giff Johnson, “Chinese Visa Abuse Vexes Marshall Islands,” *Marianas Variety*, 16 January 2006.

5 Samantha Magick and Floyd K. Takeuchi, “Power 10: Who Has the Real Power?” *Pacific Magazine*, May, 2006, www.pacificmagazine.net/pm52006/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid-0013 (accessed 28 January 2007); David Robie, “Newspapers Say Foreign Loggers in PNG Now are ‘Laughing All the Way to the Bank,’” *Pasifik Nius*, 27 December 1998, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/january/01%2D13%2D18.htm> (accessed 28 January 2007).

6 Peter Wagner, “Tonga’s Dateline Hotel Plans Convention Center,” *Pacific Islands Report*, 30 November 2005.

transnational entities and investment overseas for securing access to essential resources and increasing exports of Chinese-manufactured goods.⁷

In 2006, following years of denying any strategic interest in the region, Beijing finally revealed its pro-active stance for economic development in the Pacific by establishing a comprehensive set of measures to encourage trade and tourism there.⁸ “Going Out” was supposed to promote an environment conducive to its continued growth and development by projecting a non-threatening image.⁹

However, in some situations, this has not been the case. Tourism and migration paves the way for a wider scope of ethnic Chinese influence.¹⁰ This has inevitably raised ethnic tensions—demonstrated most vividly in the burning of OC businesses in Honiara and Nuku’alofa (see Chapter Eight). Migration also provides another channel for the expansion of other undesirable groups of OC—particularly those involved in transnational criminal activities. It is these elements that have caused security concerns for both the PRC and regional authorities. Issues include illegal migration, drug trafficking, and prostitution. All three are inter-linked, with mass movement of new migrant OC being the common factor.¹¹ Beijing’s response to the Pacific context is representative of its wider *qiaowu* policies towards OC elsewhere in the world (such as Africa or

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- 7 Vilia Gelbras, “Chinese Migration into the Russian Regions: A New Phase,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/copyof-russian-regional-perspectives-journal/copyof-rrp-volume-1-issue-2/chinese-migration-into-the-russian-regions-a-new-phase/> (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 8 Pliny Han, “Chinese Firms Encouraged to Invest, Run Operations in Fiji,” *Xinhua*, April 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/04/content_4384135.htm (accessed 2 October 2009); Yehiura Hriehwazi, “Chinese Plan South Pacific Trade Push Via PNG,” *National*, 4 June 2001, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2001/june/06%2D05%2D06.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 9 Zhang Yongjin, “China and the Emerging Regional Order in the South Pacific,” *Australia Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 3 (September 2007): 367–381.
- 10 Bertil Lintner, “A New Battle for the Pacific,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 August 2004; James Brooke, “China Sees Chances for Fun and Profit Offshore,” *New York Times*, 25 November 2004, <http://travel.nytimes.com/2004/11/25/business/worldbusiness/25islands.html?ex=1166677200&en=255eaf9768e47e8f&ei=5070> (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 11 Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a Commodity,” *Asian Affairs, an American Review* (Fall 1995); Michael Field, “Currency of Persuasion,” *Listener* 198, no. 3391, 7–13 May 2005, www.listener.co.nz/issue/3391/features/3950/currency_of_persuasion,2.html;jsessionid=185F35BFD774DA2CD41E47234608B224 (accessed 2 October 2009).

Eastern Europe) and serve to indicate the emerging trends for China's future foreign policy development.

9.2 Illegal Migration and Transnational Criminal Activity in the Pacific

Due to its clandestine nature, accurate statistics detailing the scale of people smuggling and illegal migration from the PRC are elusive and often unreliable due to the political nature of the topic. Data comes mostly from estimates based on reports of arrests, court proceedings, and deportations. However, there are some widely accepted estimates representative of the broader situation.¹² China appears at the top of the list as the source for illegal migration and unauthorized arrivals in the Asia-Pacific region.¹³ The problem is so big that Fijian authorities have lost track of controlling them.¹⁴ Island nations with poor immigration controls are commonly used as back doors to enter more developed countries.¹⁵ They are flown in, dropped off by fishing boats, or arrive under the guise of tourists. Some of them become local residents after receiving coaching on how to evade immigration controls.¹⁶ Such large influxes of illegal migration and people smuggling are a frustrating issue for border management agencies of the receiving country. It also puts stress on local infrastructure, and raises bilateral questions for China.¹⁷ For example,

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- 12 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Fact Sheet 81, "Unauthorised Arrivals by Air and Sea, 2002," from *Year Book Australia 2002*, (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002) <http://www.yprl.vic.gov.au/cdroms/yearbook2002/cd/wcd00001/wcd00127.htm> (accessed 22 May 2010).
 - 13 Andreas Schloenhardt, "Organized Crime and Migrant Smuggling: Australia and the Asia-Pacific," Australian Institute of Criminology Working Research and Public Policy Series, No. 44 (2002): 42, <http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/9/7/E/%7B97EFC2BE-3D43-4E9B-B9D0-4AC71800B398%7Drpp44.pdf> (accessed 22 May 2010).
 - 14 Kalinga Seneviratne, "Islanders Welcome Chinese Cash, But Not Chinese," *Inter Press Service*, 13 September 2002, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/D117Ad04.html (accessed 2 October 2009).
 - 15 "Concern over Chinese Visitors to Rarotonga," *PACNEWS*, 12 August 1997, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1997/august/08%2D14%2D03.html> (accessed 2 October 2009).
 - 16 Philip Kepson, "Probe Into Illegal Entry of Taiwanese into PNG Hits Snag," *National*, 1 July 1999, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/july/07%2D02%2D07.html> (accessed 2 October 2009).
 - 17 Ulysses Torres Sabuco, "Chinese Visitors Pose CNMI Security Problem," *Marianas Variety*, 22 October 2004, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/october/10%2D22%2D05.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

during the late 1990s, hundreds of PRC migrants were housed temporarily in fenced compounds in Guam, raising health, hygiene, and security concerns.¹⁸

Human trafficking is predominantly coordinated through internationally organized triad crime rings. Immigrants going through these channels may end up indentured to pay for their legal bills, smugglers' fees, and their transportation costs associated with leaving China—and as a result, some resort to working illegally.¹⁹ Hence, prostitution is a widespread problem throughout the Pacific. In the Northern Marianas, 90 percent of the 1500 prostitutes in Saipan are Chinese.²⁰ Some arrive on valid papers for employment in garment factories, but end up overstaying and working without permits (in nightclubs, bars, and restaurants) to repay their recruitment fees and living expenses. At least forty 'Chinese only' brothels exist in Suva, staffed by Chinese on visitor or student visas working on the side while trying to gain entry into Australia.²¹ A similar situation occurs in Samoa.²²

OC migration also facilitates the illegal trafficking of drugs and other contraband. The Pacific is a popular transshipment destination with relatively lax legal structures, impotent monitoring systems, and ineffective punitive measures; moreover, the possibility of a short jail sentence or extradition is a small price to pay for the potentially lucrative gains resulting from illegal activity. Illicit goods are smuggled unchecked, often aided by customs, immigration, and police officers with a "good relationship" with Chinese business people. Moreover, the many wharves and marinas have poor border security, with authorities relying solely on the captain's declarations of cargo and number

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- 18 Cookie B. Micaller, "CNMI Governor Tenorio Calms Worries About Illegal Chinese Nationals," *Saipan Tribune*, 20 April 1999.
- 19 Eric Jackson, "Panama's Chinese Community Celebrates a Birthday, Meets New Challenges," *Panama News*, 2004, www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v_10/issue_09/community_01.html (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 20 From a survey conducted by Northern Marianas College. Hawaii Public Radio website, 6 December 2006, www.hawaiipublicradio.org/hulsen/pacific.htm (accessed 19 February 2007).
- 21 Robert Keith-Reid, Samisoni Pareti and Mere Tuqiri, "Chinese Galore," *Islands Business*, August 2002, 12; Craig Skehan, "Fiji to Crack Down on Foreign Prostitutes Posing as Students," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 February 2005, www.smh.com.au/news/World/Fiji-to-crack-down-on-foreign-prostitutes-posing-as-students/2005/02/24/1109180047381.html (accessed 2 October 2009).
- 22 "Observer Newspaper Says Chinese Mafia Likely in Samoa Too," *Samoa News*, 2 January 2002, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/january/01%2D05%2D14.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

of people on board.²³ There are also reports of mothership vessels loaded with contraband by their company supply vessels while at sea.²⁴ Payment to crewmen for smuggling is arranged by way of radio communication to China.²⁵ In response to the high number of incidents concerning undeclared goods in 2005, the Fijian Customs Department imposed a 100 percent search on all containers imported by Chinese nationals, deeming them a high risk.²⁶

Transnational criminal activity is a sophisticated operation, and backed by powerful multinational elements. Furthermore, there are big 'push and pull' factors concerning illegal immigration that are beyond the control of Chinese and local authorities. Coupled with insufficient monitoring and enforcement at both the point of origin and destination, the situation requires a significant amount of resources and management that is unavailable due to economic constraints and other pressing priorities. Governments in the Pacific lack the infrastructure to deal effectively with these concerns, and Beijing does not demonstrate an urgent need to resolve them either. The next section reveals why the PRC has not considered illegal immigration an important issue to address. The answer lies at the very core of China's long-term global strategy for the OC.

9.3 Passing on Responsibility for Migrant Behaviour and Illegal Migration

The increase in illegal OC migration is a long-standing problem, and Chinese authorities are fully aware of the implications. An internal State Council report concerning migration and population issues noted that the number of illegal migrants from China exceeds that of legal ones.²⁷ For its part, China has made some efforts to combat illegal migration. Laws and regulations prohibiting this practice include Articles 176 and 177 of the *1979 Criminal Law*. In 1985,

23 "Asian Boats Said Evading Fiji Customs," *Fiji Sun*, 19 December 2002, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/december/12%2D20%2D11.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

24 "Taiwanese Man's Trial Transferred to ENB," *Solomon Star*, 3 August 2006, 10.

25 Benhur C. Saladores, "Chinese Youth Pleads Guilty to Guam Alien Smuggling," *Saipan Tribune*, 25 January 2000, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2000/january.01%2D26%2D18.htm> (accessed 19 February 2007).

26 "Fiji Targets Chinese for Illicit Imports," *Fiji Times*, 3 May 2005, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/may/05%2D03%2D05.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

27 Long Denggao 龙登高, "Shijie huaqiao huaren de renkou guji 2005 nian 世界华侨华人的口估计2005年 [2005 Estimate of Global OC Population]," *Qiaoping*, no. 32 (10 September 2006): 18.

PRC authorities passed legislation regarding migration, passport, and border control.²⁸ In 1992, the OCAO and other government ministries issued their first document outlining illegal migration from China, describing the situation and addressing how it could damage China's national interests. In 1993, Beijing authorities issued a second document to curb illegal migration along the southern coastal regions.²⁹ Since then, the PRC has promised (at the state and provincial level) to cooperate with international and regional bodies (such as the International Organization for Migration) and immigration authorities through the issuance of official statements.³⁰ It also holds discussions between concerned parties.³¹ Domestically, police impose fines and imprisonment for smugglers, investigate and rescue women and children coerced into prostitution, and hold prevention campaigns using education materials.

However, these measures are mostly ineffective and penalties are not a deterrent.³² Ambivalent local officials hardly care to enforce directives from Beijing.³³ From their perspective, illegal migration helps solve unemployment concerns, and money sent back assists with building infrastructure.³⁴ Consequently, they usually "keep one eye open and close the other."³⁵ As for transnational crime perpetrated by illegal PRC migrants, the reaction of PRC officials is equally mixed. China absolves itself of any responsibility and blames the situation on macro-economic disparity, criminal gangs, and

28 *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa* 中华人民共和国刑法 [Criminal Law of the PRC], (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 1979).

29 James K. Chin, "Reducing Irregular Migration from China," *International Migration* 41, no. 3 (2003): 61–62.

30 "Nation Steps Up Efforts in Illegal Migration Fight," *People's Daily*, 12 June 2001, http://english.people.com.cn/200106/12/eng20010612_72445.html (accessed 2 October 2009).

31 Cookie B. Micaller, "China Seeks Stronger Partnership with Saipan," *Saipan Tribune*, 3 February 1999, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/february/02%2D04%2D09.html> (accessed 19 February 2007).

32 James K. Chin, "Gold from the Lands Afar: New Fujianese Emigration Revisited," in Nyiri and Saveliev, *Globalizing Chinese Migration*, 242–253.

33 James K. Chin, "Trends and Government Policies: Reducing Irregular Migration from China," n.d., http://ctool.gdnet.org/conf_docs/Chin-Paper.doc (accessed 17 May 2008).

34 Li Minghuan, "Transformation of Contingency into Meaning: Emergence of a New Qiaoxiang in South China," (paper presented at the CCTR conference "People on the Move: The Transnational Flow of Chinese Human Capital at HK University of Science and Technology, 21–22 October 2005, http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/conference/conference/papers/Li,Minghuan_paper.pdf (accessed 2 October 2009).

35 Ko-lin Chin, *Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999): 152.

the immigration policies of receiving countries.³⁶ Furthermore, PRC officials argue that the numbers of illegal immigrants are an exaggeration, and instead prefer to deflect concerns by promoting the positive aspects of new migrant (*xinyimin* 新移民) migration to the local economy.³⁷

Because of Beijing's failure to effectively address and combat people smuggling and transnational crime, some observers argue that there is official support, or at least tacit recognition, from the PRC authorities.³⁸ The historical link between Chinese criminal gangs, the CCP, and *qiaowu* can be traced back over several decades. In 1984, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that not all triad crime syndicates were bad, and some were good and patriotic.³⁹ In 1993, the PRC minister for public security Tao Siju (陶驷驹) commented that as long as triads were patriotic and concerned about the stability and prosperity of HK, the CCP should join forces with them because "the more people we unite the better."⁴⁰ In this regard, the CCP worked with such groups in bringing stability leading up to the 1997 handover by dominating OC communities throughout North America.⁴¹ Similarly, the OCAO has worked with criminal gangs in order to maintain OC affairs in Southeast Asia. In 2000, director of the Beijing office of the OCAO Guo Dongpo (郭东坡) met Teng Bunma (a leader of the Cambodian Chinese community and suspected drug dealer) to ask for his assistance in controlling unruly mainland gang activity in the region.⁴²

Furthermore, PRC government officials, law enforcement authorities, and military personnel face accusations of helping gather illegal migrants, procuring travel documents, and facilitating their transit.⁴³ They allegedly collaborate with consular officials and triad snakeheads in forging documents for illegal

36 Biao Xiang, "Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective," *International Migration* 41, no. 3 (2003): 35.

37 Edwards, "Time Travels," 276, 283.

38 Anna Powles and Brendan Taylor, "Double Headed Dragon," *Diplomat*, June/July 2005: 32–33.

39 Frederic Dannen, "Partners in Crime," *New Republic*, 14 and 21 July 1997, 24.

40 Dan Biers, "China's Top Cop Says He Sees Cooperation with Triad Gangs," *Associated Press*, 8 April 1993.

41 Bertil Lintner, *Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 9, 357–361, 368–369.

42 *Ibid.*, 11.

43 Ko-Lin Chin and Sheldon Zhang, "Transnational Chinese Organized Crime Activities," (paper presented at the Second International Conference on Criminal Intelligence Analysts, London, March 1–3, 1999), 4, as quoted by Greg Talcott, "The Context and Risk of Organized Illegal Immigration to NZ," Centre for Strategic Studies Working Paper no. 15/00, Victoria University, 2000; Ko-lin Chin, "The Social Organization of Chinese Human

immigration, trafficking, and other criminal activity in order to fund PRC foreign intelligence operations.⁴⁴ There are suspicions that PRC diplomats cultivate criminals to spy, corrupt, and infiltrate.⁴⁵ An increase of OC migrants is suspected to be part of a deliberate expansionist effort, or as a fifth column tool mobilized by Beijing.⁴⁶ Of course, Beijing vehemently denies such allegations.⁴⁷

9.4 PRC Views on Illegal Migration

Beijing seeks to manage migration in the context of its own internal situation and for serving China's development.⁴⁸ Encouraging migration (whether it be legal or illegal) has advantages for China. In addition to the benefits mentioned above, it relieves domestic population and environmental pressures, and provides a channel to promote Chinese interests abroad.⁴⁹ For Beijing, while illegal migration frustrates international relations, it does not consider it as an important issue to address.⁵⁰

As long as there is no major negative impact upon its own interests, Beijing does not care about illegal migration from its shores. For example, an internal report cited that the majority of Americans felt that "underground black work" (*dixia heigong* 地下黑工 or undesirable occupations) performed by illegal migrants was acceptable as long as they did not encroach on the livelihoods of

Smuggling," in *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives*, eds. David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001).

44 Lintner, *Blood Brothers*.

45 Powles and Taylor, "Double Headed Dragon," 32–33.

46 Nyiri, "From Class Enemies to Patriots," 230.

47 China researcher Amanda Darling Tobias argued that China used non-state actors such as triads and piracy to keep regional governments irritated and occupied in the Pacific in a war of "utter deniability." "Economic Growth Sees Rise of Crime Syndicates," interview by Graeme Dobell, Australian Broadcasting Corporation website, n.d., www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/sl783293.htm (accessed 12 January 2008).

48 Qiu Liben 丘立本, "Zhongguo guoji yimin qushi tantao 中国国际移民趋势探讨 [Inquiry into Chinese International Migration Trends]," *Qiaoming*, no. 54 (5 December 2005): 7–16.

49 Ethnic Minorities & Great Power Strategies in Asia Conference at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Strategic Studies, "Conference Executive Summary," 12–14 October 2004, www.apcss.org/core/Conference/CR_ES/ethnconexecsum2.doc (accessed 2 October 2009).

50 Teresita Ang See, "Influx of New Chinese Immigrants to the Philippines: Problems and Challenges," in Thuno, *Beyond Chinatown*, 157.

locals.⁵¹ Similar research found that while there was opposition towards illegal migrants in some countries, others were mostly sympathetic to them.⁵² Given these opinions, Chinese authorities maintain a lax attitude towards policing the issue. For them, this contradiction between official policy and the demand for cheap labour abroad, coupled with the economic benefits, make illegal migration an acceptable practice.⁵³

The PRC government is well-versed about illegal migration. It is aware of how migrants evade authorities, their diversity of origin, destinations, and even the numbers involved.⁵⁴ State Council reports reveal that rather than seeking resolution, authorities assume and accept that illegal migration from its shores is inevitable. Beijing views migration and globalization of ethnic Chinese as a natural phenomenon of human societal development whereby OC society and organizations are constantly internationalizing and regionalizing.⁵⁵ From a human resources perspective, their integration and development in society has profound implications for the unity of groupings, division of labour, exchange, and competition.

Therefore, *qiaowu* cadres suggest that policies should emphasize how to better accommodate illegal migrants now, because in ten or 20 years time, they will have become established as part of the general OC population.⁵⁶ OCAO cadres conduct empirical research about illegal migration not for putting an end to it, but for accurately forecasting and mapping changes in demographics and labour movements in order to guide future *qiaowu* policy development.⁵⁷

51 Li Aihui 李爱慧 (OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department) "2006 nian haiwai qiaoping zongshu 2006 年海外侨情综述 [Summary of OC Affairs in 2006]," *Qiaoping*, no. 11 (23 April 2007): 19.

52 "Haiwai Zhongguo feifa yimin diaocha 海外中国非法移民调查 [Investigation into Illegal Chinese Migrants Abroad]," *Huanqiu shibao*, 8 September 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 23 November 2006, 6.

53 Li, "Brokering Migration from Southern China," 12–13.

54 Luo, "Woguo Dalu renkou guoji qianyi de xianzhuang, qushi ji xiangguan duice jianyi," 16–17, 19.

55 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 2–7.

56 "Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo gongxian ji xiance 专家咨询委员会为侨务工作贡献及献策 [Specialist Advisory Committee Offer Contributions and Suggestions for OC Work]," *Qiaoping*, no. 8 (15 March 2005): 12.

57 Long, "Shijie huaqiao huaren de renkou guji 2005 nian," 20.

9.5 “Unqualified” Chinese

Although it chooses not to adequately address illegal migration, the residual implications remain a significant irritant for Beijing. One area of migration that has received recent attention is the phenomenon of lower-class, uneducated migrants who have left China for economic reasons. As mentioned previously, their movement is poorly regulated, and they tend to be the most visible component of Chinese abroad—particularly in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Pacific. Migrants to these (mostly) less-developed parts of the world often do not possess academic or technical expertise. Furthermore, their behaviour is characterized as selfish and insular, which cause difficulties and conflict with locals.

Some *qiaowu* specialists are extremely critical of these ‘new’ migrants, saying that they lack not only education, but also ethics and values. Their presence serves only to add to a low-end economy rather than to strategic economic and social development.⁵⁸ For China, they are another liability for its desired international image, and hence described as “unqualified” Chinese.⁵⁹ In other words, this group has become the modern reiteration of Beijing’s “OC problem”.

“Unqualified” Chinese hinder China’s aspirations to become a respected global citizen. Much of how the world perceives China depends on the image of the ethnic Chinese. China cannot attain its goal of becoming a “responsible great nation” or winning the world’s trust if certain groups of the OC continue to act undesirably. *Qiaowu* seeks to alleviate these concerns by actively presenting a benevolent face—emphasizing cooperation and friendship by promoting the benefits of Chinese aid projects and making local residents feel China is sincere in helping them.⁶⁰ The task is to operate pragmatically and flexibly without upsetting bilateral relations.

Beijing suggests that these issues should not be politicized, but dealt with using pro-active methods of education and capacity-building—“upgrading the software of migrants.”⁶¹ From the perspective of some *qiaowu* officials,

58 Anatolii M. Shkurkin, “Chinese in the Labour Market of the Russian Far East: Past, Present, Future,” in Nyiri and Saveliev, *Globalizing Chinese Migration*, 74–99.

59 GOCAO, *Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi . . .*, 17–30.

60 Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?”

61 Lü Weixiong 吕伟雄 and Zheng Jianmin 郑建民, “Baoyang rexin juanzeng gongyi shiye de qiaobao tixian wo zhengfu de guanxin houai 褒扬热心捐赠公益事业的侨胞体现我政府的关心厚爱 [Praise for Enthusiastic and Public Minded OC Compatriots, Embodying Our Government’s Care and Kindness],” *Qiaoping*, 2007/1 (8 January 2007): 22.

migrants are simply another type of export commodity—and like any other product, there should be standards put in place. Therefore, the interests of these lower class OC must receive attention.⁶² They must take responsibility for their own actions and raise their ‘quality’. These include improving their attributes and behaviour, such as manners, hygiene, discipline, education, morals, and lifestyle.⁶³

To facilitate such integration between new OC and local populations, the state arranges induction efforts to manage migrants before they depart—teaching them local customs, laws, and policies in order to “prepare the migrant.”⁶⁴ Upon completion of training by approved agencies, migrants receive a certificate to prove that they meet the requirements.⁶⁵ In practice however, such attempts have had a poor response. Training is subject to a charge (and therefore often avoided); furthermore, not all migrants go through these official channels (many prefer less bureaucracy and security checks); finally, these brief and superficial efforts may not be effective in truly grounding ethnic sensitivities.

9.6 Raising China’s Image: Getting Along Together

China also works at the destination countries by seeking to integrate migrants and locals in a way that promotes a positive image of China and Chinese abroad.⁶⁶ However, ethnic tensions ensure that achieving this goal remains problematic. Historically, locals often accused OC mercantilists (particularly those in Southeast Asia) for having pro-Beijing allegiances. They therefore became a target for discrimination whenever regional tensions arose.⁶⁷ From

62 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Daxuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 19.

63 Lü and Zheng, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23.

64 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Xibanya shaoxie shijian” de fansi yu qishi” ‘西班牙烧鞋事件的反思与启示 [Reflections and Thoughts on the Spanish Shoe Store Fire Incident].” *Qiaoping*, no. 51 (1 December 2004): 13; Lü and Zheng, “Baoyang rexin juanzeng gongyi shiye de qiaobao tixian wo zhengfu de guanxin houai,” 23–24; Lin, “*Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu*,” 6; Li, “Transformation of Contingency into Meaning.”

65 Li, “Brokering Migration from Southern China,” 12–13.

66 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Xibanya shaoxie shijian ‘de fansi yu qishi,’” 13.

67 Goodman, “Are Asia’s ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional-Security Threat?” 140–156.

Beijing's perspective, in competing for limited resources or market share, conflict and ethnic tensions are inevitable and expected to continue.⁶⁸

While consular protection for OC was an issue that was subject to the geopolitical environment, one goal of *qiaowu* has always been consistent. *Qiaowu* seeks not to make ethnic divisions nor cause suspicion, but to improve mutual trust and affinity with the objective of integration and cooperation.⁶⁹ As early as 1951, the MFA instructed its ambassadors to emphasize commonality and promotion of China's achievements—and the OC were the leading vehicle to facilitate this.⁷⁰ In the 2000s, these policies have not changed.

The duties of consular offices and embassies include protecting the interests and well-being of ethnic Chinese, raising their quality of life, promoting their long-term existence, and integrating them into local society by reducing perceptions of China and the OC as being exploitive.⁷¹ For example, a joint effort between the OC, the PRC embassy and local government and law enforcement agencies in South Africa saw the establishment of Police-Citizen Cooperation Centres as a visible contribution to society.⁷² At official functions, PRC diplomats praise the long history of Chinese involvement in local development and friendly exchanges between peoples.⁷³ Community gatherings serve to remind the OC of their obligations by making friendly efforts towards locals,

68 Lü and Zheng, "Baoyang rexin juanzeng gongyi shiye de qiaobao tixian wo zhengfu de guanxin houai," 22.

69 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 80–81, 93–95, 99; Wang, *Qiaowu zhishi shouce*, 70–72; Chen, *Gongmin shouce*, 362; Gu, *Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda*, 2.

70 PRC MFA, "Waijiaobu jiu Dongnanya huaqiao guoqing qinghu huodong xiang youguan shiguan zhishi 外交部就东南亚华侨国庆庆祝活动向有关使馆指示 [MFA Instruction to Concerned Embassies on OC National Day Celebrations in Southeast Asia]," Archive File no. 117-00081-08, 1951.

71 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Kaizhan dui huaren wenti mingan guojia de qiaowu gongzuo xu jiji, shenshen 开展对华人问题敏感国家的侨务工作须积极, 审慎 [Positively and Cautiously Develop OC Work in Countries with Ethnic Chinese Sensitivities]," *Qiaoping*, no. 8 (15 February 2004): 1–12.

72 "OC in South Africa Set Up Anti-Crime Fund," *Xinhua*, 23 December 2006; "Zhongguo qiaolian fuzhuxi Lin Mingjiang fang Nanfei cangan jingmin hezuo zhongxin 中国侨联副主席林明江 访南非参观警民合作中心 [Qiaolian Vice President Lin Mingjiang Visits South Africa and Police-Citizen Cooperation Centre]," *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 25 October 2007.

73 "Chinese Residents Told to Maintain Good Relations with PNG," *Post-Courier*, 3 October 2000, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2000/october/10%2D04%2D16.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

earning their money through honest labour, abiding by the laws of the land, and respecting their local colleagues.⁷⁴

In this context, *qiaowu* officials call for mutual cooperation and development amongst the OC business community in order to improve the “made in China” image by way of media, training, and exchange.⁷⁵ Firstly, the OC media is the key to changing the perceptions of foreign media (particularly in the West, Africa, and the Pacific), which often label the OC as a problem.⁷⁶ Propaganda efforts seek to reduce jealousy or fears of economic or political domination amongst locals by underscoring China’s liberalization and economic development. Similarly, references to sensitive historical matters (such as mobilizing OC for local politics, propagation of socialism, the concern of Chinese goods conflicting with local products, and China’s growing sphere of influence) are either downplayed or avoided altogether.

In this context, the state-controlled OC media prohibit public disclosure of the amount of OC investment or their contributions to China’s economic development.⁷⁷ Similarly, Beijing tones down any news of successful OC economic development in the foreign media.⁷⁸ *Qiaowu* cadres suggest consolidating the talents and skills of industrial representatives and elite OC business people in dispelling the “Chinese Economic Threat”.⁷⁹ Chinese news providers receive guidance for promoting OC investment or assistance in local industries not as a one-way injection, but as a ‘win-win’ result that goes beyond monetary terms.⁸⁰ For example, *qiaowu* cadres suggest that the OC pursue

74 “Chinese Ambassador Zhao Concerned Over Another Port Moresby Killing,” *Post-Courier*, 11 September 2002, <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/september/09%2D12%2D05.htm> (accessed 2 October 2009).

75 Zhu Lingfeng 朱凌峰, “Qianxi Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren jingji xianzhuang ji fazhan qushi 浅析欧洲华侨华人经济现状及发展趋势 [Analysis of Trends and Development of the European OC Economic Situation],” *Qiaoping*, no. 49 (8 November 2005): 1–13.

76 Pal Nyiri, “Global Modernisers or Local Subalterns? Parallel Perceptions of Chinese Transnationals in Hungary,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 4. (July 2005): 659–674.

77 Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 163–164.

78 Kim, “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia.”

79 OCAO Economics, Science, and Technology Department, “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye,” 6–7, 12.

80 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Kaizhan dui huaren wenti mingan guojia de qiaowu gongzuo xu jijj, shenshen,” 1–12.

better relations through mutually beneficial platforms and legitimate regional frameworks such as the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.⁸¹

To reduce ethnic and racial division, the OC media advise their audience to avoid an “us versus them” mentality by using the correct salutations.⁸² In the same vein, *qiaowu* cadres make sure to refer to the OC as ‘ethnic Chinese’ (*huazu* 华族) rather than *huaqiao* in order to avoid connotations of a political relationship.⁸³ Although love for the ancestral homeland is widely encouraged by *qiaowu* officials, they contend that it is too one-sided. *Qiaowu* should not be ethnographically focused on solely promoting the premise of “I am Chinese” or ‘Chineseness’—this would only reinforce chauvinistic thinking amongst the OC.⁸⁴ Instead, Beijing prefers the notion that the OC should act as “members of the world’s family”.⁸⁵ In the same way as “upgrading their software” OC should be educated about local legislation and policies as well as the availability of public funding and state support in order to maintain their rights, interests, and organizational activities.⁸⁶ These measures have gained importance in recent years following ethnic tensions between the OC and local populations.⁸⁷

81 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Daxuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 19.

82 Guo Yimei 郭亿美, “Yinni huaren buying zaishuo ‘tamen Yinniren’ 印尼华人不应再说‘他们印尼人’ [Indonesian Chinese Should Never Say Again ‘Those Indonesians’],” *Guoji ribao*, 14 April 2009, reprinted in *Qiaqing jianbao*, 28 April 2009.

83 *Huazu* is a term more acceptable to locals than *huaqiao*, which connotes a political connection. See OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Daxuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 15, 18–19.

84 Lin Lin 林琳, “Jianchi yi qiao weiben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu 坚持以侨为本, 努力构建和谐侨务 [Uphold OC as the Priority, Diligently Build Harmonious OC Relations],” *Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu*, no. 6 (2006): 5, <http://qwgzzy.gqb.gov.cn/zhg/133/780.shtml> (accessed 15 March 2012).

85 Lü and Zheng, “Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23.

86 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaqing,” 5–6, 12; GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Liebian chongzu xinsheng ronghe,” 14–15; *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 66.

87 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Xibanya shaoxie shijian ‘de fansi yu qishi,’” 6–14; Sun Jincheng 孙金诚, “Zhongguo qiaolian chengli haiwai lushituan jiaqiang weiwei haiwai qiaobao quanli 中国侨联成立海外律师团加强维护海外侨胞权利 [Qiaolian Establishes Overseas Lawyers Group to Strengthen Defense of OC Rights and Interests],” *Zhongxinwang*, 26 November 2008, reprinted in *Qiaqing jianbao*, 30 November 2008.

Over the past few decades, many governments have adopted liberal policies of “ethnic cultural preservation”.⁸⁸ *Qiaowu* officials advise OC groups to take advantage of these policies and use them to build enthusiasm for China and Chinese cultural products amongst non-Chinese audiences. Cadres suggest that the OC use the celebration of traditional festivals to engage with local politicians and to interact with authorities and law enforcement agencies. These events all seek to dispel anti-Chinese feelings amongst the wider population by improving the image, status, and social awareness of the OC.⁸⁹

While China may not always directly initiate or orchestrate OC behaviour, it actively assists in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing links with them through guidance and funding of their organizations.⁹⁰ Such efforts are coordinated with help from the PRC embassy, through its cultural and education attachés.⁹¹ In this manner, Chinese authorities relieve themselves of the logistical effort of actually doing the work themselves; and more importantly, they are not seen as the ones directly pushing outreach or cultural diplomacy, and therefore diluting any sensitivity towards *qiaowu*.⁹² For the OC, they enjoy a sense of achievement and first-hand appreciation of their efforts. By way of such training, OC associations have become experts in facilitating Beijing’s soft power objectives abroad as initiators and organizers of bilateral exchange.⁹³

OC associations therefore play a vital role in linking the OC with *qiaowu* and its implementation. According to a GOCAO report, there are three new strategic aspects for policy development aimed at working with OC organizations: strengthening root-seeking and ethnic affinity with elite *jingying* OC; encouraging exchange with these groups; and finally, capacity-building

88 Kerry Burke, *Review of Immigration Policy*, Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 1986–87. Wellington: NZ Government Printer, 1987.

89 Lü and Zheng, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23; Lin, “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu,” 5; OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 3–4, 11–12.

90 “Ministry to Continue Protecting Chinese,” *China Daily*, 30 September 2006, www.china-daily.com.cn/china/2006-09/30/content_700236.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).

91 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Xuanwei haiwai qiaobao, hongyang Zhonghua wenhua 宣慰海外侨胞弘扬中华文化 [Encourage Overseas Compatriots, Advance Chinese Culture],” *Qiaoping*, no. 37 (8 October 2005): 6–12.

92 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 95.

93 OCAO Propaganda Department, “Jiaqiang qiaowu wenhua gongzuo, xuanchuan hongyang Zhonghua wenhua,” 3–5.

and training for youth and middle aged OC.⁹⁴ This involves the coordination, consolidation, and upskilling of diverse OC groups in order to benefit from their combined attributes.

9.7 From “Three Knives” to “Six Masters”

Historically, *laoqiao* associations existed to look after their fellow countrymen, maintaining a sense of responsibility to those who possessed the requisite origins. They were based upon clan/kinship, regional/county, or quasi-political ties steeped in parochial traditions, values, and principles.⁹⁵ The goals of such associations were internally focused to determine the survival of the OC community.⁹⁶ Associations were established to provide leadership and social cohesion for their members, providing social and financial services, education, and cultural maintenance in the face of discrimination, oppression, and hardship throughout the late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century.⁹⁷ More importantly, many of these *laoqiao* groups had strong ties to the KMT.

By the 1980s, “old” OC associations were mostly in a state of stagnation unless they could replenish their membership—the majority of who are described by *qiaowu* analysts as the “Three Knives”: lowly-educated market gardeners, restaurateurs, and clothiers/cobblers—working class labourers who relied on the ‘knife’ for their livelihoods. Young *laoqiao* were Westernized, tended not to subscribe to traditional cultural themes, and contributed little to organizational growth. While *qiaowu* cadres acknowledge that “old” migrants and their descendants had entered mainstream society and raised their social status from modest beginnings, they criticize *laoqiao* for not engaging in cooperative activity and a poor distribution of human resources due to their insular social structure.⁹⁸ In this new demographic context, *laoqiao* organizations do not reflect the modern archetypal image of the OC as desired by the CCP.⁹⁹

94 “Jiefang sixiang tuidong Guangdong qiaowu gongzuo kexue fazhan 解放思想推动广东侨务工作科学发展 [Liberate Thinking, Promote Scientific Development of Guangdong OC Work],” *Guangdong qiaowang*, 21 February 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 21 March 2008, 2.

95 Liu, “Old Linkages, New Networks,” 585; Fong, *The Chinese in NZ*, 61, 94.

96 Crissman, “Segmentary Structure of Urban OC Communities,” 194–195.

97 Ip, “Immigrants and Transnationals in NZ,” 348–351.

98 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 15–16.

99 Nyiri, “The New Migrant,” 141–176.

Instead, Beijing prefers to propagate the construction of a *xinqiao* migrant culture by actively avoiding the *laoqiao* “Three Knives” image, and thereby shedding the “stain of boorishness inherent in their rural Southern origins.”¹⁰⁰ In 2007, *qiaowu* specialists called for looking beyond the “Three Knives” and Chinatowns to targeting the “Three News”: “new” migrants of PRC nationality and ethnic Chinese, “new” OC organizations, and the “new” generation of elite OC and youth of ethnic Chinese descent.¹⁰¹ These target groupings are emboldened to feel as if they have moved on from being a labourer class, or even a professional class, and to become an important force of technological and scientific development.¹⁰²

Various elements of the wider *qiaowu* superstructure support this objective by promoting the *jingying* concept amongst the wider OC community. *Qiaowu* academics describe these modern archetypal OC as the “Six Masters” (lawyers, engineers, doctors, accountants, professors, and scientists).¹⁰³ The OC media plays a major role in showcasing examples of these migrants in order to “promote China’s national vitality and spread Chinese culture.”¹⁰⁴ Newspapers have sections advising readers on modern daily life, information on important local issues, regulations, and laws to facilitate their advancement abroad.¹⁰⁵ In turn, *xinqiao* OC equate this connection with China as another form of patriotism.¹⁰⁶ Mass media has enabled convergence of long distance nationalism amongst the OC diaspora.¹⁰⁷

100 Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic?” 635–653.

101 Lü, “Lishi dangjia, wutai zaiwai, neiwai wudong, gongchuang gongying.”

102 Nie Chuanqing 聂传清, “Chaoyue chuantong ‘sanbadao’ haiwai xinhuaqiao huairen zhuangong zhuliu hangye 超越传统‘三把刀’海外新华侨华人转攻主流行业 [Transcending the Traditional ‘Three Knives’: OC and Ethnic Chinese Change into Mainstream Industries],” *Peoples Daily*, 11 September 2007.

103 Li Jiaqi 里家齐, “Cong ‘sanbadao’ bianwei ‘liugeshi’ Aohuaren zhuliu yishi zenqiang 从‘三把刀’变为‘六个师’澳华人主流意识增强 [From ‘Three Knives’ Transformed Into ‘Six Masters’ Consciousness of Australian OC Mainstream Strengthened],” *Qingnian cankao*, 4 December 2007, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 21 December 2007, 4.

104 Wei Jingjing, “Guangdong Weishi ‘Xinxilan de Zhongguoren’ Jiducheng kaiji 广东卫视‘新西兰的中国人’基督城开机 [Guangdong Satellite Television’s ‘NZ Chinese’ Takes Off in Christchurch],” *Sun*, 17 November 2005, 4.

105 Stephen H. Riggins, *Ethnic Minority Media: An International Perspective* (London: Sage Publications, 1992), as quoted by Manying Ip, “Chinese Media in NZ,” in Sun, *Media and the Chinese Diaspora*, 198.

106 “Haiwai Huaren ye shi yizhong guojia liyi 海外华人也是一种国家利益 [OC Are Also a Benefit to the Nation],” *Nanfang dushibao*, 25 April 2006, reprinted in *NZ Mirror*, 21 April 2006.

107 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 40–49.

9.8 “Old Friends”, “New Friends”

Although they are no longer the sole representation of OC, *laoqiao* remain an important group for China’s soft power efforts. For example, when meeting with them, diplomats often express praise for their contribution to society, their native language ability, and how they relate easily with locals. One important aspect of *qiaowu* is uniting “old” *laoqiao* with “new” *xinqiao*. The former possess years of accumulated experience and kudos in their host society, yet are deeply acculturated and entrenched in local values and outlooks; the latter (particularly *xinqiao jingying* groups) are skilled, dynamic, and more importantly, responsive to political and emotional cues from Beijing.¹⁰⁸ *Xinqiao* can inject a considerable amount of cultural knowledge and experience into a previously geographically and politically isolated *laoqiao* society—thereby reviving enthusiasm for ‘Chineseness’.¹⁰⁹

“New” migrants can also influence “old” OC by enhancing their sentimentality and reducing their suspicions about China.¹¹⁰ Therefore, *qiaowu* cadres inspire *xinqiao* associations to draw prominent *laoqiao* into their ranks and to work with them for mutual benefit and development.¹¹¹ As such, *xinqiao* groups bestow honorary membership, organize attractive activities, and fundraise for causes relevant to *laoqiao*. Various platforms (such as study groups or networking conferences) are used to facilitate more cultural and ethnic cooperation.¹¹² For example, traditional festive celebrations serve as popular opportunities for bringing distinct groups together. Such efforts seek to dispel internal political differences, participate in assisting their own and their children’s education, and ultimately increase community spirit and unification.¹¹³

Together, both *laoqiao* and *xinqiao* can be a powerful force for advancing CCP interests. *Qiaowu* officials acknowledge and embrace all OC under the

108 Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of OC Nationalism,” 300; Anne Henderson and Andrew Trlin, “New Chinese—Changing Characteristics: A New Settlers Programme Profile,” Chinese in NZ website, n.d., <http://www.stevenyoung.co.nz/The-Chinese-in-New-Zealand/Chinese-in-Australasia-and-the-Pacific/New-Settlers.html#3.1%20New%20Chinese%20%E2%80%93%20Changing%20Characteristics:%20A%20New%20Settlers%20Programme%20Profile> (accessed 1 October 2009).

109 Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic?” 635–653; Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach,” 20.

110 He, “Shilun Sun Zhongshan qiaowu sixiang de xianshi yiyi.”

111 *Qiaowu gongzuo gailun*, 66.

112 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren shetuan lianhehui di 13 jie nianhui ji Aierlan, Fenlan qiaoqing,” 114.

113 Liu, “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng,” 15.

premise “old friends are not to be forgotten, while relations with new friends are to be expanded.”¹¹⁴ “New friends” refers to *xinqiao* who have gradually exerted their dominance over *laoqiao*, both in numbers and organizational capacity. As such, *qiaowu* seeks to address these concerns by working closely with these groups and encouraging more participation.¹¹⁵

This is because “new” OC also have their weaknesses. *Qiaowu* analysts note that *xinqiao* organizations tend to have limited resources, finances, and scope of activity. Many ‘new’ groups lack assets or even a permanent physical address; nor do they have substantial institutional and governance experience. Often they are nothing more than ‘shells’—having plenty of vigour to begin with, but fizzling out soon after due to diminished capacity and low enthusiasm.¹¹⁶ Groups tend to be insular and think of themselves first. An investigative report by the State Council found that many *xinqiao* organizations are weak and unstable—with internal rivalry and problems with management being the most common malaise.¹¹⁷ Small sub-groups have conflicting agendas, causing splits throughout the wider OC community.¹¹⁸ Such complications prevent the formation of the unified OC society that Beijing strives for.¹¹⁹

In order to bring different cohorts of the OC together, modern *qiaowu* policy has sought to institutionalize its own designs upon diverse organizations so as to fuse a single overarching homogenous spirit.¹²⁰ In a 2004 internal report, officials suggested that groupings had to reflect the increasing trend of OC to be internationally mobile (both geographically and industrially), and have sister branch groups all over the world to facilitate networking, support, and advice through a large and varied membership. Large associations should install a modern hierarchical structure with a democratically elected core executive to

114 Zhou, “Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji,” 4.

115 Lü, “‘San ge jianchi’ quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo.”

116 Zhang and Huang, “Yindu qiaomin zhengce yanjiu,” 19.

117 Chen Zetao 陈泽涛 and Xiao Weiheng 肖炜衡, “Guigu diqu xin huaqiaohuaren qunti ji qi shetuan qingkuang fenxi 硅谷地区新华侨华人群体及其社团情况分析 [Situational Analysis of Overseas and Ethnic Chinese Groups and Societies in the Silicon Valley Area],” *Qiaoping*, no. 14 (25 April 2005): 12–15.

118 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoping,” 1–12; Wu, “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing.”

119 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Jiada lidu quanfangwei kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,” 7.

120 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Liebian chongzu xinsheng ronghe,” 14.

handle day-to-day activities, and have a permanent secretariat to coordinate large-scale activities and arrange functions and forums.¹²¹

For the OC organizations themselves, such a unified structure is attractive because it can improve the efficiency of running their affairs, as well as being recognized as a leading and representative OC organization (both to local authorities and those in China). To achieve this level of critical mass, these organizations require (and often secure) the backing and patronage of influential and respected figures (such as diplomats or CCP officials)—as a result, they are able to make the connections required for sourcing further funding and support.¹²² For Beijing, the main benefit is the ease of mobilization. *Qiaowu* cadres guide these associations with a common vision of service and contribution under a PRC-friendly political discourse that reflect the policies and propaganda of the CCP.¹²³ These developments indicate the emergence of stronger, more robust organizations amongst the OC, with the potential for worldwide interconnectedness.

With unity however, comes a loss of individual identity. OC groups are retrofitted with CCP-friendly modes of operation and behaviours that *qiaowu* officials expect to see demonstrated at every opportunity. For example, groups normally using provincial dialects make a distinct effort to communicate in Mandarin with *qiaowu* and CCP officials as a show of deference (even if those officials are fluent in the dialects themselves). Likewise, protocol and other unique aspects of their organizational culture also become subject to specific guidelines set down by Beijing. The methods and values of traditional OC organizations face possible extinction if these trends are to continue.

9.9 Capacity-Building

In addition to providing the appropriate structures to better manage the OC, the CCP also offer them the necessary tools to further their relationship with China. Modern *qiaowu* policies for the OC find their roots in China's domestic situation. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has sought to raise its "socialist spiritual and material civilization" and 'population quality' for achieving a "well-off society" (*xiaokang shehui* 小康社会) in recognition of China's post-Mao modernity. In 1996, Jiang Zemin launched the first nationwide spiritual

121 Chen and Xiao, "Guigu diqu xin huaqiaohuaren quanti ji qi shetuan qingkuang fenxi," 10–12.

122 Liu, "Old Linkages, New Networks," 582–587.

123 Nyiri, "Expatriating is Patriotic?" 635–653.

civilization construction movement (*jingshen wenming jianshe* 精神文明建设), which achieved further traction following the 2002 16th CCP Congress.¹²⁴ As a form of mass social education, the spiritual civilization project sought to construct a new set of values that reflected China's modern economic situation and infrastructure.¹²⁵

CCP leaders included *xinqiao* as part of this government agenda. *Qiaowu* officials saw a need to acknowledge the modern face of Chinese around the world and to break down old concepts of 'Chineseness'. OC societies had evolved into modern and mobile bodies—in accordance, *qiaowu* cadres argued that their work should not be stuck in post-revolutionary ways.¹²⁶ For the twenty-first century, OC affairs officials assume that the majority of the OC will remain in their host countries for extended periods—from “falling leaves return to their roots” (*luoye guigen*) to “growing roots after settling down” (*luodi shenggen* 落地生根).¹²⁷ This view is substantiated by evidence that *qiaowu* is increasingly used to help the OC by raising their own status in local government and society. For example, *qiaowu* cadres pay more attention to providing assistance to the development and subsistence of the OC, serving them well through protecting their legitimate rights, and promoting unity, cooperation, and exchange.¹²⁸

To reach the heart of OC communities and directly influence them on a global scale, *qiaowu* officials target leaders of pro-Beijing organizations and select individuals of influence for participation in fully subsidized organizational development work and capacity-building in China.¹²⁹ Embassies and

124 Fu Tengxiao 傅騰霄, “Yimin wenhua yu wenhua xiandaihua 移民文化与文化现代化 [Migrant Culture and Cultural Modernization],” *Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanities and Sciences)*, no. 5 (2003): 64–65 as quoted by Nyiri, “Yellow Man's Burden,” 88–89.

125 Brady, “Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” 17–19.

126 GOCAO NZ Research Delegation, “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 3, 6.

127 Wang Ling-chi, “On *luodi shenggen*,” in Wang and Wang, *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1*, x–xi.

128 “OC Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century,” *People's Daily*, 8 January 2001.

129 “OC Elites Invited to ‘Hi-Tech Week’ in China,” *People's Daily*, 20 April 2000, http://english.people.com.cn/english/200004/20/eng20000420_39378.html (accessed 2 October 2009); “OC Seeking for Development in Motherland,” *People's Daily*, 17 April 2000, http://english.people.com.cn/english/200004/17/eng20000417_39098.html (accessed 2 October 2009); OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sango huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao,” 14–15.

the OCAO act as gatekeepers by extending invitations to selected individuals and then vetting applicants in order to prevent undesirable consequences.¹³⁰

Qualified candidates are made aware of their China connection. For example, elite *jingying* OC representing a younger, talented, modern generation enjoy fully subsidised capacity-building—linking them to a dynamic China full of career opportunities. Top academic, community, and business leaders are invited to attend conferences, workshops, and training courses that promote networking, management and team-building under CCP methods. These programmes have the objective of directly influencing the development of OC communities—educating their future administrators on how to manage their associations in the context of the *qiaowu* infrastructure and philosophy.¹³¹

These efforts have received greater attention in recent years. Specific measures include direct connections with Overseas Exchange Association Directors to receive regular guidance through international forums, workshops, surveys, and activities. In addition, the “Plan to Enhance China, Benefit and Assist OC” (*xingguo liqiao zhuqiao jihua* 兴国利侨助侨计划) aims to promote interaction amongst “old” and “new” OC and China through its website, trade fairs, and university courses.¹³² Both hosts and participants perceive these kinds of events as prestigious platforms for managing OC affairs.¹³³

Such programmes directly influence the development of OC communities so that they are confident and capable of working with Beijing. This is achieved by educating their future leaders about how to manage their associations and how to build capacity in the context of the *qiaowu* infrastructure and

130 OCAO Internal Affairs Department, “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan,” 5; Xiang, “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 55.

131 Lü Weixiong 吕伟雄 (OCAO director), letter to OC leaders, June 26, 2008; OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 11.

132 Qin Xin 秦欣, “Guo Dongpo: Jinian guoqiaobanjiang shishi ‘xingguoliqiaozhuqiao jihua’ 郭东坡: 今年国侨办将实施‘兴国利侨助侨计划’ [Guo Dongpo: This Year the OCAO Implements the Plan to Enhance China, Benefit and Assist OC],” *Zhongxinwang*, 29 March 2002, <http://www.chinanews.com/2002-03-29/26/173652.html> (accessed 19 March 2012); “Huayi xinshengdai qiyejia Zhongguo jingji gaoji yanxiuban 华裔新生到企业家中国经济高级研修班暨南大学开班 [High Level Chinese Economic Research Course for New OC Entrepreneurs Begin at Jinan University],” *Zhongxinwang*, 17 May 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 28 May 2006, 12–13.

133 “247 Students of Chinese Origin to Visit Mainland,” *People’s Daily*, 10 July 2002, www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jul/36566.htm (accessed 2 October 2009); OCAO Propaganda Department, “Disanjie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Wuhan chenggongjuban”, 1–5.

philosophy.¹³⁴ Like other state-sponsored visits to China, these events have similar goals: firstly, to improve networking and unity with other OC groups, and to link them with mainland cultural, industrial, commercial, or political partners for mutual benefit.¹³⁵ In this regard, cadres advise participants of the latest *qiaowu* economic policies—summarized under themes of building China for their benefit (*xingguo liqiao* 兴国利侨), mutual action for development (*hudong fazhan* 互动发展) and helping them develop industry (*zhuqiao xingye* 助侨兴业). These events seek to support OC businesses both in China and abroad as an attractive product of business development, service, and networking for a ‘win-win’ result.¹³⁶ Chinese industry can develop and modernize, while the OC can continue to develop their own industrial talent, benefit financially from their investment, gain trust and understanding of China, and raise their status and integration abroad.¹³⁷

The ultimate goal of these programmes is to enhance foreign perceptions of all things Chinese.¹³⁸ Upgrading OC business practices is another example of capacity-building. State Council delegations sent to Europe in 2004 and 2005 noted the falling standard of Chinese cuisine in an under-developed and fiercely competitive industry. Moreover, chefs were substandard, and many restaurant owners were looking for quick profits and not a long-term investment.¹³⁹ This situation further deteriorated after French television aired a show about poor hygiene in certain Chinese restaurants. Confusion over which establishments

134 OCAO External Affairs Department, “Shenru qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 3–4.

135 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao,” 14; “Guangzhoushi rongyu shimin he qingnian caijun fangwentuan fangsui 广州市荣誉市民和青年才俊访问团访穗 [Guangdong Honorary Citizens and Talented Youth Delegation Visit],” *Zhongguo qiaowang*, 17 October 2006, reprinted in *Qiaoqing jianbao*, 25 October 2006, 11–12.

136 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, “Beimei qiaoping xinbianhua,” 5.

137 OCAO Economics, Science, and Technology Department, “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye,” 1, 6–7, 12, 22.

138 “Yiqiao yinqiao, yiqiao yinwai: Zhejiang qiaowu gongzuo zai kaituozhong qianjin 以侨引侨，以侨引外：浙江侨务工作在开拓中前进 [Use OC to Attract OC, Use OC to Attract Foreigners: Zhejiang OC Work Moves Forward with Development],” *Zhejiang ribao* 12 June 2007, reprinted in OCAO website, 12 June 2007, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0612/1/5372.shtml (accessed 19 March 2012).

139 OCAO External Affairs Department, “‘Zouchuqu’ fuwu haiwai qiaobao, tigao Zhongcanye shuizhun ‘走出去’服务海外侨胞提高中餐业水准 [‘Going Out’ to Serve Overseas Compatriots, Raising the Standard of Chinese Restaurants],” *Qiaoqing*, no. 53 (15 December 2004): 7–14; Zhu, “Qianxi Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren jingji xianzhuang ji fazhan qushi,” 2.

were good or bad led to a poor image for the entire industry. As a result, overall turnover dropped up to 60 percent, causing some eateries to close down or be sold off. In turn, other unrelated OC businesses were also affected. The State Council acknowledged that the behaviour and practices of new migrants was often to blame.¹⁴⁰

To rectify this perception, in 2007 *qiaowu* officials suggested that OC associations, guided by the PRC and its embassies, could develop standards and norms of behaviour within the industry.¹⁴¹ They proposed ideas such as training chefs to improve culinary skills through special events and performances, actively propagating and magnifying the influence of Chinese cuisine culture and its uniqueness, and generally raising the level and standing of Chinese restaurants.¹⁴² In 2009, the establishment of such an association in Europe sought to reignite acknowledgement and understanding for China—not only for locals, but also amongst the OC themselves who had become localized in their outlook.¹⁴³

This example shows that *qiaowu* has institutionalized major aspects of the OC relationship in accordance with Beijing's expectations. China's effort to redefine the OC and their image is an on-going effort. By working step-by-step with various organizations, the CCP aims to draw together a diverse grouping of OC. With an obliging target amongst *xinqiao* and PRC students, these efforts may find fruition quicker than expected; however, there are still other OC groupings that prefer sticking to their old ways and therefore require continued attention.

9.10 Conclusion

The policies and methodology highlighted in this chapter shows that China's *qiaowu* administration has the infrastructure, programmes, resources, and most importantly, the ambition, will, and desire to further links and relations

140 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoping," 5–6, 12.

141 OCAO Policies, Laws, and Regulations Department, "Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan baogao," 12–13.

142 OCAO External Affairs Department, "Shenru shehui, tanjiu qiaoping," 12; OCAO External Affairs Department, "Zouchuqu' fuwu haiwai qiaobao, tigao Zhongcanye shuizhun," 7–14.

143 "Aodili huaren canyin fuwu lianhe zonghui chengli 奥地利华人餐饮服务联合总会成立 [Austrian Chinese Food and Drink Service Central Association Established]," *Ouzhou huaxinbao* (Austria), 19 February 2009, reprinted in *Qiaoping jianbao*, 30 March 2009, 14.

with the OC in a PRC-friendly context. These measures forge both personal and institutional connections with key sections of the OC diaspora, guiding them directly into the extended *qiaowu xitong* structure in the appropriate hierarchical context.

After a period of concentrating on attracting the OC for assisting the development of China's economy and infrastructure between the late 1970s and 1990s, contemporary *qiaowu* policies for the OC have moved towards *huaren* and *huaqiao* development with a 'win-win' objective in mind—to improve China's international image by enhancing the status and lifestyle of the OC abroad. To achieve this, their livelihoods must remain stable and prosperous.

This goal remains distant and confounded by complications. For example, in the Pacific, ethnic tensions continue to threaten stability. Over two years had passed since riots in Honiara and Nukua'lofa, when violence broke out again in PNG in June 2009. This indicates that illegal migration, illegal activity, and other problems associated with "unqualified" migration continue to proliferate despite measures outlined at the state level. Unfortunately, PRC officials do not consider efforts to 'upgrade' these migrant a priority. In addition, OC agencies implement measures poorly, and target the wrong groups. To rectify this particular concern, there needs to be much work done over a long period, supplemented with the appropriate resources. Given these difficulties in achieving a desirable outcome, China has looked to strategic groups of OC who offer the promise of concrete results.

The projection of *qiaowu* policies for the twenty-first century looks towards soft power methods for shaping public opinion. Two aspects of this are evident: improving the status of the OC and China by improving their relationship with local authorities and taking advantage of politically correct liberal government policies for promoting multiculturalism; secondly, to improve the sustainability and management of important OC groups through active capacity-building and soothing inter-group tensions. By fostering the consolidation of OC societies for ease of management and encouraging them to forge a closer relationship with China through its embassies and other government links, China has sought to re-institutionalize contacts between the new generation of OC and the PRC.

By thinking globally and acting locally, *qiaowu* has tailored efforts to develop the OC through their associations, led by an elite generation. Trained and guided according to PRC methods, this group has the potential to act together with embassies and other OC agencies to direct their local communities to act in support of Beijing. By gathering a nation across borders, by promoting an 'official' national identity that seeks to advance anti-assimilationist

objectives, and unifying them for purposes of state interest, *qiaowu* essentially works to maintain the OC as foreign policy instruments.¹⁴⁴ The Olympic Torch relay protests demonstrated how such strategies might play out. The success with this latter effort has highlighted to the CCP the appropriate areas of *qiaowu* to focus upon.

144 Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas," 378–397.

Conclusion

Qiaowu is the CCP's most effective tool for dealing with the world's largest ethnic grouping. While it faces both opportunities and challenges, the CCP has shown that it is capable of retaining a significant level of control and influence over specific targets. This study has exhaustively dissected *qiaowu* down to its core attributes and philosophies concerning every aspect of China's relationship with the OC in order to make a complete and thorough assessment of how they form an integral part of China's comprehensive national power. As the OC population increases throughout the world, their presence and influence naturally change the demographic, social, economic, cultural, and ultimately, political context of their host countries. They serve as a financial and skilled resource, and increasingly, as a ready supply of soft power to advance or support Beijing's outreach throughout the world.

The relationship between China and the OC is maintained through a shared political and cultural identity based upon strong sentimental and material links, and supported by a complex *qiaowu* administrative superstructure consisting of a central top-down bureaucracy flanked with numerous decentralized participatory platforms. Combined with media and information flows that foster solidarity, the OC have the potential to become politicized and mobilized as a highly coordinated ethno-nationalist force with transnational loyalties to influence political, economic, diplomatic, and military outcomes.

The state's efforts to reinforce a sense of long-term membership amongst the diaspora are determined by the various costs and benefits of maintaining such a relationship. This book has extensively documented the benefits that the OC can make in terms of political, economic, and cultural contributions to China. Given these incentives, the CCP has been particularly active in mobilizing platforms and developing policies for these areas. Where costs are low, one expects broader implementation. The widespread use of symbolic and cultural platforms illustrates this logic. In some cases (such as root-seeking events or 'upgrading' migrants) policies and formats may be adapted to ensure better returns on investment. As for political cost, appearing interventionist (through evacuations or overt political mobilization) may preclude certain actions; in other cases, the state may choose to act discretely without raising attention—thus highlighting the limits of the relationship. In high profile cases, the costs of not acting might allow rival forces from making unwanted advances, and therefore prompting the CCP to take preventative measures. In all situations,

a realist perspective based upon ensuring the CCP's legitimacy and survival frames and determines the final decision.

Beijing's relationship with the OC is driven by power politics—largely through cooptive methods which facilitate the return of the OC through incentives, encouraging patriotism, or sentimentalism in order to contribute towards a modern China. Alternatively, it monitors potential threats amongst the OC, and manages them through a variety of coercive and collective methods. For these purposes, the CCP promotes an 'official' national identity that seeks to advance unify a heterogeneous diaspora. These processes take into account counter-practices and responses of the OC and their sub-groups based upon their level of loyalty or resistance. Accordingly, the CCP's extra-territorial policies for the OC can be understood as a greater quest for hegemonic domination of the Chinese diaspora through political, economic, and cultural channels.

In this context, the main thrust of Beijing's OC policy has never really changed. Despite some periods of chaotic and contradictory behaviour, it was always Beijing's intention to retain the support of the OC, and more importantly, to coopt and secure access to their political and economic resources for China's national interests and geo-political positioning. Therefore, although there was a turbulent relationship with ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia during the Cold War years (with Beijing continuously making public reassurances and demonstrations of non-interference in local affairs), the OC remained part of China's extended family. Similarly, although domestic *qiaowu* activity was seriously impaired during 1966 to 1970, external UF efforts with strategic OC communities in the West continued. During the late 1990s, Beijing was careful not to get involved with ethnic Chinese tensions in Indonesia, yet it was determined to use selected OC for influencing elections in the US. Into the twenty-first century, Beijing has continued to actively rally the OC in support of the CCP, boost Chinese pride, challenge threats to its national integrity, and quietly mobilize some others for covert missions. Beijing has continued to expand and intensify its extra-territorial influence and dominance over the OC populace for these purposes.

10.1 From Strength to Strength: The Evolution of *Qiaowu*

As such, *qiaowu*'s true objectives are carefully shrouded in secrecy, preferring to show a benevolent face. Efforts have worked with such efficacy because of the continued improvement of its techniques and activities over many years. Embracing the common themes of unity and modernity, and implemented with articulate persuasion and systematic management, *qiaowu* policies have

enjoyed considerable success with strategic groups of the OC. These efforts may be overt and active with some, or more subtle and suggestive with others.

Armed with a set of comprehensive programmes, activities, responses, and policies, the CCP has gradually built up a positive public image of how *qiaowu* can serve the OC by making significant increases in resources for consular protection, capacity-building, and reconnection efforts. In addition, *qiaowu* authorities have closely examined areas requiring improvement and dealt with those challenges by upgrading or taking a more centralized approach to its management and organization. Whether it provides educational materials or facilitates an evacuation, Beijing has demonstrated that it is capable of taking care of its people. In the contemporary period, *qiaowu* ensures that anyone of ethnic Chinese descent has unprecedented access to cultural, economic, and political development in a PRC-friendly context. In many cases, OC organizations and schools depend on *qiaowu* as a matter of their survival.

Methods of control and influence over the OC have expanded significantly according to the changes in OC demographics, transnational migration patterns, technological innovation, economic developments, and even popular trends in culture. A new generation of policies for a new generation of transnational OC has given rise to a new model for *qiaowu*. Having evolved and strengthened over the last twenty years to the extent that it has become a major influence for determining the future direction of the OC diaspora, *qiaowu* has significant implications for the host and receiving countries, and of course, the OC themselves.

10.2 Consolidating Power and Eliminating Rivals

The CCP has consistently used inducement and punishment as tools for the management, elimination, and isolation of OC challenges and threats as a means of extending China's foreign policy objectives. Since 1989, the CCP has become increasingly confident with advancing *qiaowu* as a result of a broader acceptance for China and its leaders amongst the OC. The regime has tightened its grip on *guiqiao* and OC investors by ensuring that they do not promote political reform. For the OC outside of China, despite counter-efforts from rival political factions, alternative ideologies, and their gradual assimilation into local society, *qiaowu* has deterred potential threats and unified a heterogeneous diasporic population in support of Beijing's interests.

As the only serious contender in challenging China's relationship with the OC, Taiwan has failed to connect with the wider OC diaspora by focusing only on *Taiqiao* and the pro-Taiwan cohort. The PRC took advantage of this by suc-

cessfully grounding “grand unification nationalism” sentiment amongst OC communities around the world. As a result, the majority of pro-Beijing OC embrace the CCP discourse that places sovereignty and economic development above democratization. At the same time, *laoqiao* and pro-unification OC leant even closer to Beijing as a result of Taiwanization. After the KMT retook power in 2008, the independence movement lost traction as cross-Strait relations warmed.

Other rivals have been mostly rendered impotent in challenging China’s better resourced, more attractive, and generously subsidized *qiaowu* efforts. FLG has been largely isolated, weakened, and dismissed as a cult by the CCP, while separatist movements have either been subdued or shouted down. In short, China’s *qiaowu* effort simply has no effective alternative. *Qiaowu* works to capture the hearts and minds of the OC in a pre-emptive effort to challenge rival groups, and has become the dominant force for prescribing the behaviour and direction of strategic OC groupings.

Qiaowu is also an investment for the CCP. For minority and rival OC groups the return has been poor, and in many cases damaging; for *laoqiao* groups, the results quite mixed; but with *xinqiao* and PRC students abroad, the CCP has made substantial advancements in securing their loyalty and support. As such, Beijing targets specific cohorts of the OC community—particularly the younger, talented, and ambitious OC and their associations (the ‘Three News’). Although these OC groups may not totally identify with CCP-sanctioned ideals and values because of materialism and pragmatism, they tend to retain patriotism and sentimentality for their homeland despite having been away for many years. Raised under the influence of CCP rhetoric, values, and nationalism, they have at least a better ‘understanding’ of modern China over *laoqiao* and other ethnic Chinese overseas—and hence the potential to align closer with Beijing. Consequently, they do not require specific instruction on how to behave, but act upon their own initiative given the appropriate opportunities under a ‘guiding hand’. As their numbers increase as a natural consequence of migration and intensified *qiaowu* efforts, they have the potential to eventually dominate those groups preferring independent thought.

10.3 Implications for the World

The relationship between Beijing and the OC has implications for the rest of the world. In a globalized world of transnationalism and export labour, *qiaowu* serves as a useful framework for human resource planning and strategy. Many countries are experiencing their own brain drain situation and struggle to deal

with the loss of skilled and talented diasporic citizens from their shores. This book provides many illustrations of China's success in reversing or benefitting from such trends.

Beijing remains adamant in "going out" as part of its global strategy. In response, regional governments will seek to better manage and engage with their migrant populations, and actively find ways of enhancing their integration and of dealing with their related concerns (such as transnational crime and ethnic tension). For example, they could take note of China's efforts to 'upgrade' the migrant to reduce the possibility for conflict through education. Responses might include sponsoring induction programmes that could give rise to enhancing local civic culture; alternatively, they could advance multicultural programmes amongst their own populations to accept and embrace foreign values. Ultimately they may have to put pressure on Beijing to contribute towards a mutually agreeable resolution.

Qiaowu shows that diasporic populations can play a significant role in the determination of foreign policy. The OC participate directly or indirectly in many aspects of China's soft power objectives abroad; moreover, Beijing and its handling of OC issues can be seen as a geo-political measure of Sino-foreign relations. Beijing has continued to use the OC as convenient bargaining chips in its international relations. The manner and timing in which *qiaowu* is implemented depends entirely on Beijing's strategic interests. Like Taiwan, China is only prepared to act on behalf of the OC if the issues have enough political importance or public relations value for enhancing its international image. As regional and international interests with China and the OC become more interwoven through trade, migration, and social development, *qiaowu* policy also becomes more complex. Its formulation and implementation therefore requires a strategic cost-benefit analysis of opportunities and constraints in the international arena.

Finally, to what extent are the OC influenced by the CCP? Ultimately, the limits to the CCP's influence over the OC lie in their own personal feelings towards China and their willingness to offer voluntary support for the regime. While the CCP would like to see the OC contribution to China's economic, social, and political affairs as a demonstration of nationalistic loyalty (and hence support for the regime), the evidence shows that such participation cannot be confused with their desire to identify as being 'Chinese'.

While many pro-Beijing groups will have no hesitation in aligning themselves with China and its leaders, other OC organizations have reached a crossroad. They can rely on their own internal strength and cohesion to continue for as long as they can; they can seek support from alternative sources, such as Taiwan; or alternatively, they can pursue a stronger, more independent

approach and simply choose aspects of 'Chineseness' that they wish to maintain and preserve. However, given that *qiaowu* is continually growing in strength, such groupings will eventually find themselves up against a dominant pro-CCP effort that seeks to subsume them.

Therefore, *qiaowu* does not necessarily broaden the scope of OC activity and knowledge, but actually restricts their behaviours, outlooks, and identities by promoting only aspects acceptable to the CCP. In this context, the OC must clearly recognize the issues and implications at hand, and make some serious decisions concerning their future aspirations. For their own sake, if the OC wish to demonstrate loyalty to their chosen or adopted place of residence, they should continually seek to improve their reputation in that society, and so raise their capabilities and resources on their own merits. They should consider ceasing to rely solely upon, or at least selectively limit their acceptance of *qiaowu* as a primary resource for their personal and organizational development.

While cooptation of the OC does not necessarily enhance the CCP's own legitimacy with them, Beijing's actions reflect upon ethnic Chinese everywhere. No matter whether they are *huaren*, *huaqiao*, *laogiao*, or *xinqiao*, their ambiguous relationship with China means that all OC are potential targets for *qiaowu*. As such, they may find themselves in an awkward situation of attempting to balance their allegiance between China and their host country. Historically, fears of fifth column activity surrounded OC communities during the Cold War. To maintain relations with them, Beijing welcomed the OC under conflated and blurred definitions of *huaqiao* and *huaren* so as not to officially breach the principles set down at Bandung.

To a lesser degree, these suspicions have continued into the contemporary period with threats of espionage and spying for China as reported regularly in the media. Beijing's continued refusal to recognize dual nationality coupled with its issuance of 'green cards' for permanent residence illustrates this deliberately vague embrace of the entire diaspora. The OC have an obligation to ensure that fears surrounding them and their ultimate loyalty do not materialize, or else they could face a discriminatory response from their host country. Commentators have long sought to disconnect the ethnic Chinese from China and its leaders for this precise reason.

10.4 Conclusion

Through an institutionalized apparatus driven by centrally controlled bureaucracy, the *qiaowu* administration actively creates, fosters, maintains, and develops interpersonal relations for China's economic, cultural, and political

interest. In attempting to harness this collective power, *qiaowu* is not merely a short term opportunistic attempt to take advantage of OC skills and resources. Nor is *qiaowu* simply a means of encouraging domestic development. Nor is it just a platform for promoting and projecting Chinese nationalism and identity. Rather, it is an interdisciplinary strategic approach to pro-actively guiding, fostering, manipulating, and influencing OC identity and behaviour for the purposes of constructing an international environment friendly to China's global ambitions. *Qiaowu* is ultimately a key component for helping advance Beijing's foreign policy.

Qiaowu efforts will continue to expand with China's stunning re-emergence and buoyant national pride. Increased levels of confidence accumulated over recent times have led to Beijing's growing assertive stance with the OC. By raising the capacity of selected elite and new migrant OC, Beijing seeks to improve China's image in the eyes of the world as a responsible global citizen and partner. By taking advantage of its surging economy, geo-political might, and a long history, the CCP has prompted the OC to acknowledge the importance of being Chinese, and rallied them to advance China's development as part of its extended Chinese 'family'. *Qiaowu*, as a pragmatic and attractive means of 'service to the OC', has been and will continue to be, a significant frontline strategy for advancing China's relationship not only with the Chinese diaspora, but also the rest of the world.

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