# Introduction: Death in Shanghai

The summer of 1929 was a bad time for the Communist movement in China, in official parlance "a trough between two waves." There had been talk at the CCP Congress in Moscow the previous year of an inevitable new tide of revolution and of the need to meet it both in the cities and in peasant soviets. But now twelve months later in Shanghai, the CCP, its back turned on the countryside, was moving into tracks that would ignore the lessons of the Canton Commune and once again end in failed urban uprisings.[1] That such a line was doomed could be seen from simple membership figures. Li Li-san, whose line it was, himself admitted that peasants made up 70 to 80 percent of the Party; and after the debacle in 1930, Chou En-lai had to report a mere 2,000 from the proletariat.[2] As for 1929 and Shanghai, said Chou, "we have been unable to gain control of the spontaneous activities of the workers."[3] Reformism, not Communism, was the motivation: the "Yellow" Unions scored over the Red by going straight for better living standards. In sum, the awakened masses were not to be found in Shanghai.[4]

It must be said that great zeal went into the search for them. The Annual Report of the Shanghai Municipal Council noted the efforts of the local Communists to arouse hostility to the KMT by demonstrations and propaganda. Some forty demonstrations were held, 500 kinds of handbills were distributed, 123 strikes took place, and arson and murders were committed.[5] On August 1, a demonstration was held in the French Concession to commemorate the Nanch'ang Uprising. The French police seized over one ton of pamphlets and posters from what was apparently a central Propaganda Bureau of the CCP, together with pistols, rifles, and ammunition. The

*North China Herald* reporter declared the Communist organization in Shanghai to be "so complete, that it excites the admiration even of the men who are fighting to overcome it."[6]

During one of these raids in the French Concession two top Party leaders, P'eng P'ai and Yang Yin, were picked up. Both men were Politburo members, the one a national peasant leader and the other a security specialist. They were seized at a meeting of the Military Committee of the Kiangsu CP, both having been assigned stopgap duties in the provincial party. On August 26 they were taken to the Public Security Bureau, and on the 28th they were transferred to police headquarters at Lunghua. Chou En-lai sent a special unit to attack their escort, but when it reached its target area at Shanghai's North Gate the group found that the weapons secreted there beforehand were soaked in paraffin. Before the guns could be cleaned, the police van had already passed.[7]

At first P'eng pretended to be his alias, one Wang Tzu-an from Nanhai, Kwangtung, but he was identified by an acquaintance. Canton and Hong Kong newspapers carried the story of the arrest, but at the same time sent telegrams to Shanghai asking for confirmation—they had been misled many times before. Special Branch in Shanghai wired back the desired confirmation.[8]

The Haifeng branch of the KMT also cabled Shanghai demanding the immediate execution of P'eng P'ai, for this "would make people rejoice." The KMT Committee of the City of Canton sent a similarly worded telegram. Shanghai for its part asked the Kwangtung government to instruct the Haifeng County government to disburse the ¥10,000 bounty on their prized captive."

Communist sources portray P'eng as showing total defiance toward his captors. He denounced the KMT for betraying the revolution and sang the praises of the CCP. In a speech to the court he made a full declaration of his work, from before his entry into the Party up to the establishment of the Soviet in Hai-Lu-feng. He concluded: "We in Hai-Lu-feng killed a lot of KMT counterrevolutionaries like you. There is no need to question me further: just take me out to be shot."[10] Prison security must have been somewhat lax, for he was able to smuggle out letters and was clearly hoping that the soldiers stationed at Lunghua would be persuaded into the revolutionary camp. Another source describes him as conducting propaganda among them, so that before long, soldiers were forbidden all contact with him. It

does not appear that either P'eng or his friends were ill-treated or tortured. But some sources do claim that he was beaten up until he fainted many times, and that he was savagely tortured, his tongue being cut off, his eyes gouged out, and his tendons stretched until he died.[11] Another account states that after being tortured on August 30 he went around comforting his fellow prisoners. He painted a dragon on his cage and told the others, "I am going to Heaven." Just before his execution, the source claims, he comforted his friends with these words: "This is to be expected. Strengthen yourselves and fight to the end, to make Communism flourish and bear fruit in China."[12]

P'eng managed also to send a letter to the CCP Central Committee, addressed specifically to "Kuan Sheng," the code name for Chou En-lai:[13]

Dear Kuan Sheng and all young and old at home:

We cannot save ourselves from the White Terror this time. Three of us have openly admitted [our] identity and have done [our] best to extend [our] propaganda work. All those with us, soldiers and prisoners alike, have expressed their sympathy. In particular, when the soldiers heard us they began breathing heavily and became angry [with the authorities]. Our spirits are high. Dear brothers, do not be downhearted and sorrowful at our sacrifice. We wish you all good health. The others are still strongly denying their identity.

—[Aliases]

This was to be the last thing written by P'eng P'ai: he was executed on August 30, 1929, at the personal command of Chiang Kai-shek, once his friend. The execution took place at Lunghua Police Headquarters. P'eng P'ai was 33 years old.[14]

Communist sources say he died shouting slogans, and that KMT members and the soldiers attending felt upset. Another source states that the KMT decided to kill him in secret for fear of a popular revolt. He was given a glass of wine and while he was drinking it all the prisoners cheered him. In the execution yard, he addressed the firing squad, after which they refused to obey orders. An officer then took up a rifle and shot him. This source claims that three others died too.[15]

In Hong Kong, P'eng Tse learned of his brother's death from the newspapers and then conveyed the news to their mother. An eyewitness states that she wept and cried out: "I could not tell, but in my heart I knew there would be such a day."[16]

Chou En-lai was one of the first to announce the executions. On behalf of the Central Committee, he wrote a public declaration "Use the Masses'

Revolutionary Struggle to Respond to the Massacre by the Counterrevolutionaries." Angry and sorrowful, Chou pronounced a eulogy and urged the people to fight on to complete the martyrs' work.[17]

P'eng P'ai would not in his last hours have allowed himself any notion that his own work might already be completed. To see it in the book of the revolution as a self-contained chapter secure against detractions and jealousies was for a later time—or for a later time to attempt. Nevertheless, it is true that at one moment in the revolutionary story to 1929 he had been the savior and final hope.

The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, for all that its class-awareness was crude, its land policy botched, and its peasants quick to revert to old ways, stood for three months as a much-needed proof of possibility for the Communist movement. The KMT did not, it showed, run the countryside after all. A peasant and worker soviet on Chinese soil could be built from below. The Comintern's orders, just this once, were of a kind that could live with Chinese realities even if the outcome, belonging as it did to local happenstance as much as to any plan of the leadership's making, was not what either side expected. Hai-Lu-feng indeed for many months ran ahead of its basis in dogma—the idea whose time had not yet come. When the ideologists admitted to needing it, there it was, requiring only authentication and blessing to exist in every sense.[18]

With fitting irony, the most effective answer to Chinese Communism's problem of where and how to awaken the masses in the 1920's came from the leader whom it troubled least of all. For P'eng's peasant movement, the countryside was supreme. It imposed on the city its rural justice and sense of fairness through its welfare organizations, social struggle, and finally political confrontation (a policy of economic blockade, as P'eng called it in 1923). This demanded total identity with the peasants—with their well-being; their education, historical pride, and self-awareness; even with their excesses and childishness. As to the ideological dilemma facing Marxism in noncapitalist, nonurban China, with its masses in the wrong place, there was quite simply no problem. The proletariat demanded by revolution, the "new proletariat," was none other than these very peasants, away from the corrupting atmosphere of the city. P'eng reconciled these masses with Party dogma by putting the peasants first, creating the conditions in which they would realize their strength and, independent of outside forces, become capable of self-government. When as so often the peasants went after their

own interests with total disregard for anything bigger, P'eng was unsurprised. Political success lay in making these interests coincide with Party policy, and for a brief period that was what he achieved.[19]

After 1930 and the failure of Li Li-san's city strategy, the Party, left with no alternative, turned to peasants in the countryside and shrewdly played its cautious game, round after round, with these supporters and much on their terms.[20] Slowly the CCP grew again in the eyes of millions in the countryside into the figure of universal savior, as the Red Army became the *fu-mu-chün* (father and mother army). It was the same old pattern of Hai-Lu-feng and Kwangtung in the 1920's unraveled once more, but in a different and national setting, during the 1930's and 1940's. The new peasant movement behind the Red Armies was again much conditioned by the same basic peasant mentality that dictated modes of conduct and means for action to all concerned, while accepting for the common good the Party's high directives, which were far from being a pure Communist program.[21]

It is now possible—and much easier, perhaps, in this long perspective—to see why the ultimate cause of the peasant revolt in Hai-Lu-feng, which as a Communist author declares influenced Kwangtung and the whole of China,[22] may be described as in essence ideological. The making or breaking of any peasant attempt at revolt or Communist effort in revolution could in the end come only from their ideological interpretation of reality, as related to the perception of their rights and duties in a given political and economic context.[23]

This perception and this context, no less than the hero's life itself, form the subject of this biography. At many points the story seems to stray, so wild are outsiders' *mis*perceptions, from anything to do with flesh-and-blood peasants. At such points P'eng's own voice may often be quiet: his temperament was not that of the typical Party theoretician. But he was present at, voted in, and survived a whole series of such meetings. Their enactments went straight into his life. And follies which, in the words of one witness, could leave the Party Politburo uncertain whether to laugh or cry,[24] govern the Chinese rural scene in the 1920's as much as did the peasant movement's founder with his clear-eyed and practical wisdom.

# Part One

## The Peasants as Peasants

# I

# The World of Hai-Lu-feng

Once united under the name Lu'an, the counties of Haifeng and Lufeng are generally referred to as Hai-Lu-feng. Both counties are in eastern Kwangtung, separated from the East River valley by a spur jutting out from the Nanling range. (See Maps 1 and 2 on pages ix and x.) Water and mountains characterize Hai-Lu-feng. Haifeng's 2,080 square kilometers of land area is 70 percent mountainous. The coastline of 180 kilometers includes many bays, the largest being Bias Bay (Hung-hai wan) with its good anchorage. The population of this "faraway place near the sea" in the 1920's was some 420,000.[1] The sister county of Lufeng is roughly half again as large but had a smaller population (391,000). It too is predominantly "mountain and sea, a large land with scattered people."[2]

All the mountain ranges in Hai-Lu-feng originate from the Lienhua-shan, the highest mountain in the area, which separates Haifeng from Hui-yang county. This barrier helped to shape the history of Hai-Lu-feng, since it increased the need for self-sufficiency and nurtured strong feelings of localism. Land access to the region was only through difficult passes in the thickly forested mountains, whose steep slopes thundered with precipitous rivers. All the rivers follow the basic contours of the ranges and run in a southwesterly direction, and they are navigable over certain distances. The largest river in Haifeng is the Lung-chin, which streams through Haifeng city. It is fifteen meters wide just outside the city to the east, where it is spanned by an old stone bridge leading to the suburb of "Ch'iao-tung" (East Bridge). It was there that the "Ch'iao-tung P'eng" (the P'eng lineage of Ch'iao-tung) lived, so numerous that the saying went: "Throw a stone into the air and it will land on the head of a P'eng."[3] In Lufeng the largest of the

three rivers, the Chiao-t'o, traverses the whole county. Tributaries and canals provide a network of water communications that give access to the sea.[4]

Generally speaking, the soil of Hai-Lu-feng is not of great fertility, though there are large areas of deep and rich alluvial soil in the coastal regions. There the land is fairly well irrigated with wet-fields and sand-fields. Inland and along the hills, dry-fields predominate and the fertility is lower. Water conservancy in the 1920's was still primitive or nonexistent. Haifeng paddy and farmland depended in the main "on the sky," and droughts or floods were normal. Generations of hard work and ingenuity had bequeathed a legacy of small reservoirs and wells for the cultivation of small plateaus or tiny terraces. In Haifeng 40 percent of all cultivated land is such mountainous terrain; in Lufeng more than 50 percent is.[5]

Rainfall is heavy in the region. The summer winds from the ocean bring 80 percent of the annual rainfall between April and September. Winter is the dry season, from November to February. From May to November typhoons of devastating force may strike inland, causing death and destruction. Another kind of disaster results from any delay in the early spring rain, which means drought.[6] The climate is fairly even throughout the year, with the principal differences in temperature between the highlands and the coast. The region is subtropical, with the average temperature ranging between 10°C and 20°C, sometimes falling to 5°C in winter and touching 35°C in summer. Snow is extremely rare, but there is an occasional frost. The damp south boasts luxuriant vegetation and flowers all year, whereas the drier mountainous north has hotter summers and cooler winters. The gazetteers of both counties confirm that places of interest and natural beauty abound.[7] One observer wrote: "I have never seen any place with such natural beauty as Hai-Lu-feng, though I have seen Hangchow and Soochow and Japan. The river ride from Kungp'ing to Haifeng is unimaginably beautiful."[8]

The natural produce of Hai-Lu-feng was substantial, justifying the area's name of "sea and land wealth." Double or even triple cropping of rice was general in the far south. Rice planting started in March or April and harvest came in June or July; immediately there followed the second transplanting for the second harvest, which occurred prior to the Autumn Festival or in November at the latest. In wet-fields another rice sowing was then done for the winter crop; in other kinds of fields this crop was usually wheat or sweet potatoes.[9] Other crops included peanuts, sugarcane (widely cultivated, especially in Lufeng), taro, hemp, cotton, and maize. Small quantities

of tea were produced, the "Lienhuashan" variety being highly rated, and indigo was also met with, used largely for dyeing. Lychee, lung-ngan, and shek-lau were common fruits, along with bananas, mangoes, and pineapples; some peaches, pears, and oranges were also cultivated around Kung-p'ing. Jackfruit and persimmons were grown in Lufeng. Pines and fir trees provided lumber from mountain forests, as did some redwoods. Bamboo was everywhere. Nonetheless, with no afforestation policy, on many hills that had been cut over all trace of vegetation had disappeared.

The buffalo was important in the southern wet-fields and the yellow cow in the highlands: both were put to work plowing and were seldom slaughtered for their meat, in contrast to pigs. All types of fowl were raised, and the many streams and ponds in the region meant that ducks and geese were to be found in large quantity. Wild mountain boars were hunted, as were wolves and stags; there were also some leopards and tigers and all kinds of birds and waterfowl. Fish were plentiful enough both for local consumption and for export, with fish from rivers, marshes, and ponds augmenting the sea harvest. Oyster beds were farmed along the shallows of river mouths and coastal lowlands, and lobsters were also caught in quantity.[10]

For purposes of administration, the county of Haifeng was divided into nine districts (*ch'ü*), five of which had coastal zones. (See Table 1.1) The county seat was Haifeng city, 309 kilometers from Canton and 174 from Swatow. In the 1920's the city had a population of 40,000 and boasted ten restaurants and scores of teahouses. As a county capital Haifeng had a history dating back to the Yüan dynasty. Its earthen walls had given way to brick walls during the Ming, reinforced by five towers. The city housed the county magistrate's *yamen*, with police headquarters, prison, and garrison.[11] One visitor in 1911 noted: "The number of houses may be less than a thousand. The busiest street is Tung-men-chieh (East Gate), which is mostly paved with stones and about a quarter of a mile long. It looks clean by Chinese standards, but commercial stores are few and the majority of the people seem to be peasants."[12] By the 1920's a sprawling market had grown up outside the walls, full of small low houses. Just inside the East Gate stood the Confucian temple, with on its right the Bureau of Education and on its left the Sericulture Department. The City God's temple was also within the walls. From this gate the main street crossed the Lung-chin River over the old stone bridge leading toward Ch'iao-tung-she, the suburb where, as we have seen, the P'eng clan predominated. Beyond the West Gate lay the sub-

TABLE 1.1

## The Administration of Hai-Lu-feng in 1928

HAIFENG COUNTY

| District | No. of subdistricts | No. of villages | Population | Distance from county city | Principal town |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 35 | 279 | 85,419 | — | Haifeng city |
| 2 | 12 | 315 | 59,828 | 10km | Kungp'ing |
| 3 | 8 | 208 | 57,571 | 15km | Meilung |
| 4 | 2 | 103 | 12,709 | 40km | Ch'ihshih |
| 5 | 5 | 54 | 43,722 | 28km | Swabue (Shanwei) |
| 6 | 15 | 122 | 48,594 | 45km | Ch'ingk'eng |
| 7 | 9 | 119 | 67,246 | 35km | Chiehsheng |
| 8 | 7 | 62 | 25,901 | 28km | Ch'ingts'ao |
| 9 | 2 | 50 | 19,601 | 35km | Hot'ang |
| *Total* | 95 | 1,321 | 420,591 | | |

LUFENG COUNTY

| District | Population | Distance from county city | Principal town |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 134,000 | — | Lufeng city |
| 2 | 77,000 | 28km | Chiehshih |
| 3 | 100,000 | 35km | Chiatzu |
| 4 | 80,000 | 50km | Hot'ien |
| *Total* | 391,000 | | |

SOURCE: PKC 106, 112.

urban community of Tung-hu-she, where the Ch'en clan lived. This district was largely rebuilt in the 1910's and 1920's by its most illustrious son, Ch'en Chiung-ming, whom we will encounter later in this chapter. Many of the new three-story buildings here were occupied by officials.[13]

The second important urban center was Swabue (Shanwei), 28 kilometers from the capital, the best market in the county and its ocean port with a deep and sheltered harbor. Fish curing, boat building, and salt panning were important industries, and the town in 1911 was described as one of the cleanest and healthiest in the county. Swabue had a municipal council, a district court, a post office, and a salt custom office. The active presence of foreign missionaries was evidenced by primary and secondary schools and by a hospital opened in 1904. In the 1920's the town benefited from Ch'en Chiung-ming's modernization efforts with a new district and the Fungshan public garden.[14]

Other important towns included Chiehsheng, Ch'ihshih, Meilung, and Kungp'ing. Chiehsheng was a fortified citadel and former garrison town

protecting the Chiehsheng peninsula. The capital of the seventh district, it had many rich citizens and a tradition of culture. It also had a close-knit population that was in the habit of feuding with the peasants in the surrounding countryside. Another garrison town was Ch'ihshih, the capital of the fourth district and the key to communications between Haifeng and Huichou.[15] Meilung was a market town in the center of the county's rice basket, the fertile plain southwest of Haifeng. The saying was that "when Meilung has a good harvest, the county has a sufficiency of grain." The Lin clan predominated here, renowned for their academic achievements and for their wealth from trade. Kungp'ing was an important market for mountain products, about 10 kilometers north of Haifeng city on the main route through the mountains to the East River valley.[16]

Lufeng county was divided administratively into four districts, Lufeng city being capital of the first as well as county seat. In the 1920's Lufeng city's population was about 45,000. It was an old city with little sign of modernization, and the ancient part contained the yamen and the City God temple walled off from the rest. It had by 1911 expanded into a market toward the east, divided by the main street Chin-ma-chieh, a mile long and paved.[17] The county also boasted two fortified citadels along the coast—Chiehshih, the larger, capital of the second district, and Chiatzu, capital of the third district near the border with Huilai county. As with Chiehsheng, there was no love lost between the inhabitants of Chiehshih and Chiatzu and the people of the surrounding countryside. These two districts, rich in fish and rice, were home to almost half the county's population.[18] The fourth district was in the north, and its capital and chief market center was Hot'ien. It had a strong lineage in the P'eng, who made up almost half the population of the district and were united and powerful.[19]

Communications in Hai-Lu-feng relied heavily on waterways. Water traffic included flat-bottomed sailboats and oar-driven boats of shallow draft, and on the smaller streams and canals light pirogues pushed by bamboo poles. Roads were few, and transport along them was largely on foot or by sedan chair. On the imperial highway, the 35 kilometers between Haifeng and Lufeng could be covered in a day but included some stretches by boat. Only in 1923 was an all-land highway built from Haifeng to Lufeng, known as the Lu'an public road; it was later extended to Swatow. Another road linked Swabue to Kungp'ing through Haifeng city. The overland route to Hong Kong was a long and arduous journey of five to six days and was not without hazards from bandits.[20] Difficulties of communication inland fostered self-sufficiency and intense local loyalties. These came out in dia-

lects: "A ridge of hills may be the only separation between people who say 'ng' and those who say 'ni,' " commented a missionary.[21] The easiest way to the outside world was by sea, to Hong Kong, Swatow, or Canton. The trip to Hong Kong, 144 kilometers away, took two or three days by fishing junk, trawler, or salt boat. The first steamboat service between Hong Kong and Swabue started in 1898, the year service also started between Swabue and Swatow. The steamboat greatly cut the time needed for the trip, taking only one night to reach Hong Kong from Swabue.[22]

Hai-Lu-feng held a variety of peoples, the result of intermingling among successive waves of migratory groups and the indigenous stock. Archaeology has revealed habitation in Neolithic times by seafarers. In historic times, we have records of the entry into the region in 334 B.C. of the "Yüeh people" during a period of general unrest. The Yüeh left notable traces of their culture. With the annexation of the area by the Ch'in empire in 214 B.C., the Han peoples intensified their southward migration, and the differing times and routes of Han arrivals explain much about the diverse dialects of the region.[23]

The people now known as Cantonese, who arrived probably during the T'ang, made their home along the East River in the rich area around Canton and either displaced or absorbed the native people there. The Cantonese dialect became the basic tongue of the *pen-ti* (local people). Very few Cantonese settled in the remote southeast of the province, however; those who did in Hai-Lu-feng could be found among the fishing population and sometimes among the merchants.[24]

The Cantonese were followed by the Fukienese, who came south as part of the movement of the "Ho-lao," or "the old people from Honan." During the Southern Sung some Fukienese moved farther south into Kwangtung, where the Cantonese called them "Fuk-lo," or "the (old) people from Fukien." This Cantonese appellation was rendered "Hok-lo" in a local dialect, and as such they are still known. The Cantonese already held the best land, so the Fukienese occupied the coastal areas, including Hai-Lu-feng, where they came to make up almost 70 percent of the population.

The Hakka, as their name implies, were the last to arrive in Kwangtung as emigrants from the north. (Because they were on the scene late, the Cantonese and the Fukienese called them "Hakka" (*k'o-chia*), or "guest people.") Originally from Shantung and Shansi, they came to the mountain regions first of Kiangsi and Fukien and then of Kwangtung. Their permanent

settlement in the highlands of Kwangtung occurred only during Ming times, and in eastern Kwangtung they formed a wedge between the Hoklo and the Cantonese.[25] In Hai-Lu-feng the Hakka were much in evidence in the north and northwest mountain areas and made up almost 30 percent of the population. Hakka and Hoklo generally got along well together, owing to their common northern origin, their striking similarities in character, and their position as fellow minorities in Kwangtung province. There were many instances of Hakka in effect becoming Hoklo and assimilating customs and dialect.[26]

Two tiny minorities in Hai-Lu-feng remain to be mentioned. The first were the Tanka, a sea people who lived on boats along the coasts of Kwangtung and earned their living by fishing and pearl-diving. In Hai-Lu-feng there were only a few thousand of the estimated 300,000 Tanka in the province. Tanka women were notorious as prostitutes, and in general the Tanka were viewed as a pariah class—"vermin on land, veritable dragons afloat," as the local saying went. Their small numbers and their nomadic life-style precluded organization; as a group they had very few rights and virtually no status.[27] The second minority were the Yao, who dwelt on the border between Haifeng and Huiyang counties on the slopes of Ch'etzu mountain. In 1918 there were only 600 of them, and by 1928 a mere 280. They lived in mud and straw huts, used stone utensils, and subsisted on potatoes, roots, and a little rice and wheat. The Yao wore few clothes even in winter, were devoid of culture, and spoke their own language. They were accordingly an object of curiosity in the area.[28]

The various ethnic groups in Hai-Lu-feng, though distinct from each other, shared a common feeling of independence from the people of Kwangtung at large and a deep attachment to this particular corner of southeast China that had become their home.

"P'eng" is a Hakka surname, and the P'eng lineage was therefore probably Hakka, though P'eng P'ai himself seems to have had little command of the language. The P'eng of Kwangtung may have arrived in Ch'aochou, Kaying (Meihsien), and Huiyang as early as in Sung times. During the Ming a lineage from the county of Hsingning settled in Hot'ien, Lufeng, where it eventually became very numerous. A P'eng from this lineage, a leader in Lufeng, entered the historical record in 1894 by forewarning the incoming magistrate Li Chung-chüeh of the misconduct of officials in the county.[29]

The Haifeng P'eng of Ch'iao-tung originally came from Chik'ang in Lu-

feng. Despite their wealth, they were not considered a scholar family, nor did they enjoy any gentry status among the local lineages. In fact, they were relative newcomers, as is evidenced by their lack of an ancestral hall. The first lineage member to achieve scholar status was P'eng Hui-jen, an uncle of P'eng P'ai whom the warlord Ch'en Chiung-ming made a magistrate in Ch'üchiang.[30]

As a rule, descendants of a single ancestor living in a certain number of villages located in a specific area made up a lineage or clan. Emigrant groupings were not rare, however, and in Hai-Lu-feng members of the same clan could be found living even in the neighboring county. But common ties were always acknowledged and clan interests safeguarded. Many villages in Hai-Lu-feng were composed entirely of members of the same lineage. For example, near Meilung was the village of Shuik'ao with its thousand inhabitants all surnamed Kao; the 40 families that constituted Mafulung village were all named Ch'iu; and the 400 people in Wangsha all belonged to the Ch'en lineage. Lüching village had a population of about 5,000 but with only two lineages, the Ts'ai and the Lü.[31]

Leading lineages in Haifeng county were the Ch'en, the Chung, the Ma, the Wang (represented by the scholar-magistrate Wang Tso-hsin, an important figure in this story), the T'ai of Hsik'eng village near Kungp'ing, the Ts'ai and Lü of Lüching village (a reactionary place with the highest proportion of landlords in the county), the Tseng of Shakang, and the Yeh of Nanfang. But the greatest of all Haifeng clans were the Lin of Meilung, with their trademark "Kuei-feng." They arrived in Haifeng in the early part of the eighteenth century and began reclaiming land around Meilung by diking the marshes near the sea, eventually adding 20,000 *mou* to their property. By the early nineteenth century the clan had 3,000 adult members in Meilung alone, controlled more than 80 villages, owned much of the land in the third district (of which Meilung was the capital), and derived a great income from rents. The clan as a whole was estimated to receive over 10,000 piculs of rice in rent annually—a colossal amount in those days. Such wealth afforded members the freedom to follow literary pursuits, and the clan became famous for the number and influence of its scholars. Even in the post-Ch'ing period they clung to their old way of life, proud of their gentry status and acting like genuine nobility.[32] A local saying went: "In Heaven is the Duke of Thunder, on earth are the 'Kuei-feng' landlords."[33]

Related lineages were to be found in Lufeng, where the situation was much the same as in Haifeng, both counties in the past having been united.

The P'eng clan was prominent especially in the mountainous area of Hot'ien district. They spent much time and energy battling nearby villages of the Lo, a rich, well located, and well armed clan.[34]

The clans of Hai-Lu-feng were notoriously turbulent and aggressive, so much so that the government, hard pressed to collect taxes and put down rebellions, could describe them only as "barbaric." Indeed, as Maurice Freedman has written, "the distaste with which officialdom looked upon the villages of southeastern Kwangtung was also caused by the frequency and intensity with which local groups took up arms against one another."[35] Such *hsieh-tou* (feuds) were fought over lineage or village claims to land and water rights, or over some real or imagined offense. Clan battles could embroil up to 120 villages for months or years and leave roads unsafe, fields devastated, and houses plundered. While battle raged, "hatred was to the death," and so rabid did participants become that "the hearts of captured enemies would be sliced up and served round with garlic for condiment."[36] During these feuds the magistrates were as a rule helpless; in any event, they preferred to intervene only when the feuding parties were exhausted, usually to capitalize on the situation.

Thus the local community was by and large left to look after its own affairs, provided taxes were paid and an appearance of public order kept up. Local leadership was in the hands of three groups of people: clan elders, scholars, and natural leaders whose influence derived from sheer force of personality and proven ability. These groups were responsible for village government. Status and wealth told when it came to selecting officials for the clan or the village community, and oligarchic and aristocratic elements predominated. The gentry and the heads of wealthy families usually took the lion's share of appointments. There were no open elections, no popular vote, in fact no ballot at all—names were put forward and accepted informally.[37]

Since in eastern Kwangtung lineage and village tended markedly to coincide, the rules of clan government applied equally to the village, so that the village community remained one controlled "by old men for old men."[38] Clan and village leaders were in charge of group security, safeguarded the rites of the ancestors, and enforced the clan rules, acting as trustees of the common funds to be used for the community's welfare. Peasants looked on them as the guarantors of the protection and security expected from the kinship and village relationship. The great power and trust invested in these leaders were not conducive to a fair distribution of benefits, however, since

powerholders "formed an inner circle of mutual defense."[39] In a village this meant mutual assistance in squeeze and graft, as was true everywhere.[40]

A process of expropriation of land belonging to clans began in the mid-nineteenth century. Sometimes land was lost to the clan as a whole but recovered in one of the families that composed it. The growth of these few powerful and self-fattening families within a clan became an additional source of unrest.[41] Another easy channel of covert squeeze lay in the collection of taxes, and the sorry state of the *i-ts'ang* (charity granaries) reflected the greed of the leaders managing them—as in the case of Lufeng, where "not one kernel was left."[42] Peasants in difficulty who appealed to their clan leaders were denied help or turned into permanent debtors through heavy loans. As a result, their trust in the kinship group began to wane and they started to organize their own welfare groups such as "Parents' Associations" and "Loan Societies." The peasants of one village even preferred to seek aid from other villages rather than from their own leaders. Many peasants joined the secret society known as the Triad, a cross-clan and intervillage organization offering security and aid.[43] The weakening of clan allegiance reached the point where impoverished clan members would respond to a call for arms from whatever quarter, if there was anything in it for them. Gunmen from different clans and villages were available for hire in Lufeng, and disgruntled natural leaders or "amoral gentry" were willing to use their services in a cause outside law and custom. Fights now occurred between lineages and even between families within the same lineage—an anomaly that reflected how greatly the traditional system had collapsed.[44] One local observer noted that feuds would be "between village and village, irrespective of clan, sometimes between two clans of the same village and sometimes between two branches of the same clan."[45] P'eng P'ai was to boast in 1923 that he had "knocked the clan system dead long ago,"[46] but in truth it fell apart on its own. Even P'eng himself had to admit the persistence of some of its remnants, still there as a social category providing some measure of psychological security—more wishful remembrance than working reality.

It was P'eng Nan-chin (P'eng Fan) who had built up the family fortunes and brought the family some standing. His father, P'eng K'uei-ch'i, had opened a business in Ch'iao-tung-she with the trademark "P'eng Ming-ho." Nan-chin was generally known as "Old P'eng." The family business began by dealing in pigs and went on into the production and sale of lime. It was when Old P'eng branched off into grinding peanuts for oil that trade and

profits expanded rapidly. He opened a large timber company, which with the lime factory provided Haifeng with much of its building material. He also dealt in real estate and collected rent from 60 shops in Haifeng.[47] His business success eventually enabled him to purchase much land and to become one of the largest private landowners in Haifeng. In Ch'iao-tung-she, his was the leading family. As a rich merchant-landlord, Old P'eng was eager for the family status to be enhanced through his sons' devoting themselves to studies and gentry pursuits.

P'eng P'ai described his family's situation as follows: "In 1922 our family could be considered one of the big Haifeng landlords. It took in over 1,000 piculs annual rent and managed a total of no fewer than 1,500 peasants, men, women and children. Our family came to 30 people at most."[48] Another (and more accurate) family estimate put the P'eng estate's annual rents at 1,440 piculs.[49]

Apparently the "P'eng Ming-ho" treatment of tenants left much to be desired, for when P'eng P'ai met some of them in Ch'ihshan, they complained: "If we owe the landlord a pint measure or a few ounces, we are chained and beaten." One angry tenant called him a braggart: "Talk about reducing rent! If you 'Ming-ho' people would stop hounding us for arrears, then I'd believe you are telling the truth."[50] Like all other landlords, the P'eng left rent collection in the villages to underlings who were generally harsh. It is possible that many of the illustrations of poor landlord-tenant relations later used by P'eng P'ai came from his personal experience within his family. According to stories, as a boy he was scolded by his grandfather for failing to collect rent when he saw how wretched the tenants were, and by his father for offering tea to a hungry tenant who had come to pay rent. This may have been the origin of the poor impression of his father that P'eng P'ai held all his life.[51]

Traditional landlord-peasant relationships were based on the notion that peasants had a right to subsistence, a notion that over time gained the force of law and was supported in official documents. When disaster struck, taxes were expected to be waived and rent reduced by 10 or 20 percent, or even more. Landlord and tiller were not merely parties to a business contract; they were often members of the same clan and thus subject to special relationships within the Confucian ethic. Gentry and landlords were not supposed to accumulate wealth to the detriment of the peasants and were expected to meet the cost of various social duties and functions.[52] In nineteenth-century Haifeng, land was mostly under collective landlords

and belonged to the clan or village. Both private and collective landlords were normally supposed to maintain stable rents, grant lengthy tenures, and supply equipment, special clothes, and refreshments during hot weather. Permanent tenure was a common feature: in 1880 two-fifths of the peasants in Haifeng held their land permanently. Now and then a tenant would become owner of the land he tilled when, after much subletting, the original owner lost sight of it. Rents were generally modest and peasants could be economically independent. The land market was very active, the registry being hardly able to keep track of transactions. Roughly half of the landowners in Lufeng in the 1890's failed to pay any tax at all. Freeholders had an opportunity to climb up the social ladder through study, a little business, and thrift. Such people were the natural leaders in their areas and could be looked to for local public needs.[53]

But Hai-Lu-feng also had its share of *t'u-hao* (local bullies) and *lieh-shen* (evil gentry), who had no scruples about stealing land, imposing levies, and oppressing peasants at will: together they constituted the local robber barons. Any village or clan head could easily fall into this role.[54] Sometimes the tables were turned, as in Shakang village, where a rich clan had employed workers of another clan to till extensive property. In the early nineteenth century the poor but cunning tenants ousted their oppressive masters and took over the fields themselves. A century later, in 1920, their descendants still had a reputation for aggressiveness, for it was reported of them that "the magistrate cannot do much with them."[55] In Hai-Lu-feng gross ill-treatment of peasants by landlords on a large scale occurred only in Chiehsheng (by the Ho clan) and in Meilung (by the Lin). In general, at the end of the century life was good in the villages.[56]

Religion was another important facet of the lives of the people of Hai-Lu-feng. The official worship of the establishment was centered on the City God, before whom the magistrate entering office took his oath and from whom he received a measure of supernatural sanction under the all-pervading Confucian ideology. The magistrate was *ipso facto* the chief priest, expected to conduct rites at the temple of Confucius and other temples and to preside at public prayers in times of disaster.[57] But in the county capital, as Feuchtwang has put it, "popular religion met and contrasted with official religion, the market contrasted with the yamen."[58] For there were many religious practices other than those involving the established form and the cult of the ancestors. A missionary remarked: "The religion of the Hoklo is a

great mixture of all beliefs—Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Animism."[59] The official *Records* of Haifeng county include as "religion" a series of fairy tales and a list of miraculous and strange events; this is indicative of the nature of the religious tradition of the place.[60]

One observer remarked: "The Hoklo are faithful followers in religious practices and do not request many explanations. They are ready to believe anything, provided it serves a purpose."[61] The vast majority of the people were superstitious and believed in spirits. Temples to local deities were to be found everywhere in astonishing numbers, and all were well patronized, especially on feast days. However, Haifeng was not outstanding for its pagodas or temples. Ch'ihshih was the site of a famous temple visited by thousands of pilgrims every year. Another celebrated shrine was on a small island facing Chiehsheng, a pagoda dedicated to Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy. A hundred goats roamed freely around it and were considered sacred animals.[62] The Lufeng magistrate in the 1890's lamented the general swindling of worshipers at local temples and the opium-smoking within the sacred compounds; when a Triad center was discovered in one temple he arrested the leaders and razed the temple to the ground. In 1928 his successor was complaining that there were "no means to eradicate superstitious practices, and [that] people were beseeching spirits and the Buddha for their life." There were also a number of monasteries and convents in Hai-Lu-feng, especially in the mountain areas, but by the 1920's monks and nuns were few. At Wup'oling a famous temple to Wen T'ien-hsiang, the Sung dynasty official revered for his honesty, housed a number of monks.[63]

Superstition loomed large, especially among the peasants. P'eng P'ai was advised by his early peasant friends "not to oppose their gods."[64] Believers drew lots, divined the future through palmistry or face-reading, observed *feng-shui* rules, and followed the indications of the horoscope. After all the campaigns against superstitious beliefs and the pressures put on the peasants by enlightened leaders, a survey of 1928 conceded that Haifeng was beyond redemption in this regard.

A site with good feng-shui sold for a great sum because of the expected bounty to the family. Contentions arising from feng-shui were frequent and could lead to long-lasting feuds. The Lung-she-p'u along the east bank of the Lung-chin River was a large tract of land outside Haifeng city left idle because geomancers held that to build on or to farm it would spoil the "dragon's back," and so physically harm people and livestock.[65]

Like the popular superstitions just described, secret societies were an-

other bane to the Confucian social order, and to the authorities their members were close to bandits. Although the secret societies pretended to mystical origins and professed religious beliefs and political interests, they were in effect undercover mutual-aid organizations. The Ch'ing had long since proscribed the societies, but Kwangtung and Fukien were renowned for them. In Hai-Lu-feng the coexistence of powerful secret societies and strong lineage organizations has puzzled observers, since both demanded absolute allegiance from their members.[66] Fei-ling Davis views the lineage–secret society relationship as a kind of "seesaw force," with strong lineages making secret societies fade away or vice versa. She also argues that such coexistence maintained a balance between interlineage conflicts and anti-state activities, preventing too great a movement in either direction. Maurice Freedman was instrumental in establishing that these two types of organization flourished together, and it was he who showed the importance of the Triad (the San-ho-hui, or "Three Harmonies Society") in the southeast.[67] In Hai-Lu-feng the Triad stood for rebellion and for the protection of local interests—aims common to the lineage—and this gave it a measure of respectability. The Flags, as the outward manifestations of the Triad there were known, had long existed on an interlineage basis.* They were outlets for dissent within the lineages and were strong enough to check abuses by the big lineages through banding together weak ones. They afforded protection against clan and state oppression, keeping a balance of power within society. Locally the Red and Black Flags were mortal enemies; when they came to blows, they fought a life-and-death battle.

Explanations differ about the origins of such groupings. Local opinion in the nineteenth century held that they arose around the end of the Hsien-feng reign (1851–62) as alliances among weak lineages in order to resist the strong ones attacking them. Some sources put the origins of the Flags at the time of the Taiping Rebellion, when Taiping supporters raised the Black Flag against the Red Flag of the Ch'ing. Others speak more vaguely of "a faraway time." The disorders under the Hsien-feng emperor enabled the Red Flags to capture the county of Huilai. The Lufeng magistrate secured the Black Flags' services in attacking the Red: "at this time the Red Flags were the bandits and the Black Flags were the braves." As a result of this betrayal, according to this account, "the eternal enmity between the two

*Indeed, they still existed in Hai-Lu-feng in 1980. An expert resident rural worker, having researched them locally, said that the Flags were still very much alive among the peasants, with fights regularly breaking out every year. The Communist police have been unable to control them.

Flags came about." During these Flag feuds bitter resentments were stirred up, and spasms of revenge perpetuated the division of the area into the two main groups.[68] There were people "who preserved the blood-stained clothes to this day [1894], to show to their sons and grandsons in order to urge them to take revenge."[69] The antiestablishment spirit stayed with the Red Flag, which had its Haifeng headquarters in Shakang, a township of 10,000 people all with the same surname. It was described as a kind of communist village—the clan owning all the fields, which were divided equally among the members. The people had taken the fields from their former masters and were described as being "a law unto themselves." The Black Flag was based at Nant'u.[70]

Perhaps military descent may explain the traditional urge to march under a banner. The missionary-archaeologist Fr. R. Maglioni gives a vivid account of a Flag battle:

> When a fight starts between two groups, the reasons must have been approved by the headquarters of both Flags. War trumpets sound. Women gather as for a show in their best attire. Everybody gets ready for battle, since nobody is a coward. First come the fusiliers followed by the spearsmen, the majority, and then others with swords, tridents, clubs, and sticks. There is enormous shouting and howling: the sound of trumpets, gongs, horns, and drums is deafening. Flags on poles are rotated before the enemy to taunt them and verbal abuse is exchanged. Then a fusilier stands out and, without taking much aim, fires at the enemy. Others follow his lead. . . . The fighters run into thousands, while on high ground nearby, more women and children watch and encourage their own side, yelling and spurring their own fighters on. . . . For the period of battle the ties of blood, marriage, and familiarity are cast aside. All that matters is the Flag and its honor, for which they are prepared to die. They are expert at taking vital points, masters in the art of strategy, totally unscrupulous in their methods. . . . In short they wage war for the sake of it and for no other reason. Cannibalism is practiced on a small scale, out of either bloated pride or terrible shortage of food . . . [and] they cannot cultivate the fields or go fishing during these protracted wars. At some point or other, the headquarters of the two Flags declare an armistice, or the magistrate imposes a settlement. When this happens, they befriend one another as before, neither harboring hatred, nor seeking revenge. On the contrary, new bonds of kinship are forged and new business partnerships established. . . . Those who suffer most are the inhabitants of remote hamlets, which cannot resist sudden enemy assaults. At times, these small villages are entirely destroyed.[71]

A factor in these feuds was that martial arts had great prestige among the Hoklo. Even Christians boasted of their good fighters and during clashes

hired the best available boxers from different clubs.[72] The masters of these clubs, which existed in all villages, came to exercise a strong influence over village policy, because local defense was in their hands. An observer noted that "the male population are trained from boyhood to fight and wrestle, to box and use spears, to lift weights, to jump, to run, to shoot, and to do all kinds of sports."[73] Another important factor in the feuds was the easy availability of weapons. Spears, lances, and large knives were commonly found at the local martial arts club, and there were also plenty of guns, mostly of local manufacture, though some were imported from Hong Kong and Macao or from other centers such as Hop'o. There were even some primitive cannons. Shooting accidents were common because of the extreme carelessness with which people handled guns; moreover, the poor quality of local weapons meant that at times they exploded on being fired. The area thus resembled a militarized zone, making it a ready-made base for instant revolution that anti-Ch'ing agitators were quick to put to good use. For example, the Huichou Uprising in 1900 triggered a series of rebellions by the local people, long since united in facing up to the central authorities and ready to try their luck.[74]

Sun Yat-sen's Hsing Chung Hui ("Revive China Society") counted on massive support from the secret societies, and Sun himself composed a song for their forces. After the failure of the Huichou Uprising and another fiasco in 1907 in Swabue, the Triad forces rallied in 1911 for revolution. They provided the money (allegedly 300,000 silver dollars) and an "instant army" for victory. With the advent of the Republic, the Triad felt justified in claiming a share of the spoils and came out into the open in the belief that it could acquire considerable political power. But the new masters, the bourgeoisie, responded by taking measures to suppress it.[75] As had happened before, the Triad simply went underground again or worked from lodges overseas. P'eng P'ai noted that debacles suffered by the Triad in earlier times had made everyone aware of the power in its secret groups. The Triad was to remain a source of inspiration for those peasants in the 1920's seeking to resist in traditional ways. In Haifeng they set up an incense-table and took a blood oath of brotherhood before heaven—Triad fashion—still awaiting "the chosen son of heaven" who would bring peace and "immediately become emperor."[76] Triad aspirations and rituals inspired certain peasants to see themselves mounting the throne,[77] as in the village of Kangweihsü in Haifeng, where a peasant who dreamed of becoming emperor drew a large following by behaving and dressing like one. Similarly, in Kwangning in the

West River area, one Chu Wen-kuang proclaimed himself "Son of Heaven" in the 1920's and led an army of thousands in attacks on towns.[78]

In Hai-Lu-feng another secret society was the *Pai-lien-chiao-hui* ("White Lotus Sect"), which had Buddhist affiliations and had originated during the Southern Sung. It was regarded as the parent organization of the Triad, and with its belief in Maitreya (the Buddha to come) had strong utopian and messianic elements. White Lotus members were called "the Incense Army," since long-haired monks in white clothes burned incense during battles; the sect was also known in Lufeng, where it was strong, as the "Long Hair Society." Incense and long hair had long been a mark of secret societies and rebel groups. "Incense-burning bandits" were seen in Haifeng in 1635, and "Red Turbans," members of the same sect with red bands on their heads, rebelled there during the nineteenth century.[79] One military rule of the sect was always to advance and never to retreat—a common practice among peasant groupings.[80]

Spiritually, the secret societies made a continuous religious appeal, keeping the faith alive in readiness for a new cycle of life following cosmic disaster. When their social role was taken over by more modern organizations and by political parties, however, they degenerated into "black societies," altogether criminal in character though cloaked in secret religious rites. In Hai-Lu-feng this was the case in the towns, where in the 1920's the Triad victimized people, extorted money from traders, and fixed the market—all under the control of the gentry and landlords. In the rural areas, though, its original spirit lingered on as a dream and aspiration despite the fact that the old Triad and its Flags were no longer active in organizing and protecting harassed peasants. Something was needed to fill this tremendous psychological and social vacuum.[81]

Another form of religious life in Hai-Lu-feng that increased in importance during the nineteenth century was Christianity. The Christian churches in Hai-Lu-feng were but one of the many facets of the relationship between this "faraway place" and the outside world. In fact, contacts between this southern corner of China and Hong Kong, the gateway to the Western world, were easy. Christianity at first ranked as a *hsieh-chiao* (heresy), and people were ordered by Article 7 of the Sacred Edict to shun "false doctrines," which included the White Lotus Sect as well as Catholicism. There was indeed a certain affinity between the secret societies and the newly arrived Christianity in the mid-nineteenth century. In Hai-Lu-feng, Christianity was definitely considered a sect or a society among the rest.

Catholic missionaries—from the "Missions Étrangères de Paris"—began working in Kwangtung in 1850 and eventually established the Swatow Apostolic Vicariate, which also included Lufeng. A teacher from Haifeng who sought the help of one Fr. Bussac in a dispute with relatives became the first Catholic convert from Haifeng. He established a small Christian community in his village (Ts'aits'uo) and received from Bishop Raimondi of the "Pontificio Istituto Missioni Estere di Milano" in Hong Kong the first priests for Haifeng (which was under the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Vicariate). Fr. Liang was the first to arrive, in April 1877, followed by Frs. Piazzoli and Sasso. Soon a community was also started in Swabue after the intervention of the Church had freed the son of a wealthy family jailed for salt smuggling.[82]

The Presbyterian English Missionaries began working in Swatow in the 1860's and moved out (mainly among the Hakka) into twelve counties. By 1902 the Presbyterians had eleven stations in Swabue and 200 members. Both churches were soon embroiled in local court cases and looked upon by many as powerful "societies."[83] The Christians also started feuding among themselves, and became engaged in endless litigation over their refusal to contribute toward the cost of festivals. Attacks on Christians were responded to in kind, the Catholics under the protection of the French consul in Swatow and the Presbyterians under that of the British. The Catholic Church expanded throughout Hai-Lu-feng, and in 1895 a robber-chief among many others sought sanctuary to avoid the magistrate. Interfaith clashes between the churches, creating cross-clan cleavages similar to those between the Flags, grew more frequent after the arrival from Swatow of the American Baptists and from Huiyang of the Basel Mission Society, the *Pa-ling-hui*. In 1900 the Boxers, incited by local monks and jealous secret-society members, made all Christians a particular focus of attack.

The common danger from the Boxers and their supporters drew Catholics and Protestants together. In 1904 they even pooled resources toward the cost of building the Presbyterian hospital in Swabue—an advance for the Catholics, who usually put conversion before social work. When conversions did occur, they were at times more out of interest than religious conviction: for example, Fr. Pozzoni won an important court case against a bully landlord in 1903 and 10,000 people applied to enter the Church. In such cases poor peasants saw the missionary as their protector. There were even reports of converts attending both Catholic and Presbyterian churches to gain the good offices of both.[84]

P'eng P'ai was ambiguous in his own attitude to Christianity, as a report from the Swatow British consul concluded: "What is his personal position is impossible to tell. To Christians he says that he too is a Christian, but does not declare himself; to others he says that he has given up Christianity."[85] For many in Hai-Lu-feng, religious affiliation was simply the fulfillment of a need for some kind of association that would help them gain security and achieve worldly and personal aims. For many a Christian—though not for all—their church was no different from other societies or groups in providing help directed more to local circumstances than to eternal truths.

It is very possible that the P'eng family were aware of how badly their tenants were treated. After all, Old P'eng had come up the hard way himself, and P'eng P'ai's mother complained about "how difficult it was for grandfather."[86] But he had made it, and had even managed to secure a girl from the Wang lineage as first wife of his son P'eng Shou-yin. Magistrate Wang Tso-hsin thus became the maternal uncle of P'eng P'ai. Shou-yin later took as concubine a girl named Chou Feng, purchased at the age of sixteen from a peasant family in Kungp'ing. The first wife bore two sons, P'eng Ying-p'ei and P'eng Ta-wu. Chou Feng had five children: P'eng Han-yüan, P'eng Han-yü (P'eng P'ai), P'eng Tse, P'eng Shu, and a child who died young. The family also had one adopted son, P'eng Fang, and a daughter, probably also adopted. Shou-yin was Old P'eng's second son. He was a good student and became a businessman in charge of a large store in the main street of Hai-feng. He was broadminded and scholarly, but probably not a degree-holder. The exact date of his death is not known, but he was still fairly young.[87]

Chou Feng was a well-built woman of an old-fashioned cast of mind that led her later to yearn for P'eng P'ai to settle down and become an official. She could of course never enjoy equal status with the legal wife, least of all one from such a lineage.[88]

The concubine was a status symbol for a man of means. Usually attractive, she was subordinate to the wife but higher than a servant. When she gave birth to a son her status rose, especially if the wife were childless. Concubines did not come cheap, and to afford more of them at a cheaper price, great families raised the status of the *mui-tsai* (other families' unwanted girl children farmed out to them) to that of "foster daughters" so that they could then be sold to other households without anyone suffering any loss of face. In this way *mui-tsai* became a capital investment for their owners and could rise above their normal status of slave girls. Purchased by rich families for

"a few tens of dollars," they were lucky to have a roof over their heads and something to eat. Their status was different from that of child-brides, who were completely absorbed into the household. In Haifeng, men of around 60 with concubines of sixteen were not hard to find.[89] The powerful landlord Ch'en K'ai-t'ing, along with Ch'iu Ching-yün, a member of the gentry, made a business out of buying girls for sale later as concubines.[90]

P'eng P'ai's mother had actually begun as a maidservant. How much her poor family background influenced her children is a matter for speculation. Far from being the champion of her son's ideas, at the outset at least she was "against" what P'eng was doing. Informed of what he had written, she had "crying fits, declaring that she would beat him to death." She branded him as "a son who destroys the family."[91]

As long as their father managed affairs, the many brothers continued living together. The eldest, Ying-p'ei, was a drunkard and an opium smoker who was left to his devices. He was apparently bad-tempered, for P'eng P'ai remembers how one day "he was just about ready to kill me." P'ai's description of how young landlords behaved may well have been colored by his experiences with him. When the grandfather died, apparently having outlived his son Shou-yin, P'eng Ta-wu and P'eng Han-yüan assumed control of the family finances. Han-yüan was shrewd and somewhat arrogant. He had real political skill and intelligence, becoming his brother P'ai's champion and counselor, and he stood by him in thick and thin. He and P'eng Tse were the only two who did not oppose P'eng P'ai in his attempts to start a peasant movement. Apart from these two, "they all hated me like poison."

P'eng Shu played the role of the typical scion of a wealthy rural family. He completed a primary schooling but nothing more. At 20 he was still at home taking his ease and enjoying himself, to no one's objection. After all, Han-yüan, too, had shown little sense of responsibility before he turned over a new leaf and joined P'eng P'ai. Only the latter could get away with reprimanding P'eng Shu, whom he castigated as lazy and good-for-nothing. P'eng Tse was rather timid and not much interested in business. He liked to study and later joined P'eng P'ai at Waseda University, graduating in Civil Administration. His thinking was open-minded rather than revolutionary.[92]

P'eng P'ai was born on October 22, 1896, in the twenty-second year of the Kuang-hsü emperor's reign. He was named P'eng T'ien-ch'üan, but on entering primary school his name was changed to P'eng Han-yü, and at the

start of his secondary education he chose for himself the name P'eng P'ai (The Turbulent).[93] All accounts describe him as good-looking, with a round face, striking mouth, straight nose, flashing eyes, and beautiful eyebrows. He most resembled his mother of all her children. From an early age he showed intelligence: at five he was using clamshells to form characters on the ground, at seven he could recognize several hundred characters, and at nine he was producing couplets for the New Year. He was his grandfather's favorite, and the old man expected great things of him, praising him in front of guests as a *ch'ien-li chü* (a young hero). He was probably about ten when his father died. In the course of growing up, P'eng P'ai acquired a dynamic personality that was charming, warm, but somewhat quick-tempered. Painting was one of his talents, and he could produce picturesque landscapes with a few strokes of the brush. He was also a born orator.[94]

A typical childhood in Hai-Lu-feng was shaped by local customs and habits. Ordinarily children roamed around half-dressed and did as they pleased. Later on, they looked after the buffalo or cow, caught egrets, reared songbirds, collected crickets and butterflies, and went fishing. "There was little difference between the children of Haifeng and the savage children of Africa or the Indians of America."[95] Aside from the usual antics and games, a boy could enjoy only his meals, sweets and fruits, and the simplicity of a rather spartan life. The staple food for all was potatoes, heavily garnished with hot herbs and salted fish; rice and meat were less common. There was a local saying, "*San-shu chia i-mi*" (three parts of sweet potatoes to one part of rice),[96] but even it was true only along the coast; in the mountains rice was far rarer. Pork and fowl were also eaten, along with dog meat. Beef was rarely encountered, since cows and oxen were used as work animals. A local specialty was "salted tea," a brew of ground tea leaves and salt with an addition of sesame and peanuts. It was taken as a breakfast and afternoon drink and was invariably offered to callers.[97]

A lot of taro was also consumed, and a large variety of vegetables. Rice noodles, steamed bread from millet, stuffed cakes, and roasted peanuts were also popular. Everybody drank tea, the rich enjoying varieties kept for many years whereas the poor had ordinary tea or a concoction of fruit leaves. A rough rice wine was also available. The poor could eat well only on occasions such as weddings, funerals, and the New Year. A resident described the poor as "without any control in their food and diet . . . taking as much as they could, when given a chance." For another local they were "sufficiently nourished."[98] Starvation did occur when the harvest failed or when disaster

struck. At such times one could find "on all routes small groups of people leaning on sticks. They are pale and skeletal and now and then some fall, never to stand again."[99]

P'eng P'ai owed his later skill at stage-managing the important occasion to close study of scenes familiar to him from earliest childhood. There were in Hai-Lu-feng recurrent festivals the year round and local celebrations. A township, a large village, or a rural area had its own festivities in which all the people took part. On festival days the local associations and sport clubs took part in the procession, each with its own idol and pennants. Firecrackers and gun salutes augmented the din from instruments of every kind, and people gathered to enjoy the shows and to gamble openly. A celebrated occasion was the Dragon Boat Festival in Haifeng city, with its rowing contest normally marked by intergroup violence. Rich lineages would sponsor teams to bear their colors in the race, and a crowd would gather along the river on the slopes of Lungshan; as the race went on, the cannons boomed and the crowds cheered their favorites. The contest usually ended in serious brawls that left dead and wounded on the ground.

The climax of all the festivals was the Chinese New Year, which lasted a full fifteen days and was characterized by family reunions and merrymaking. There was ancestor and idol worship, exchange of gifts and distribution of *li-shih* (lucky money), gargantuan meals, and the auspicious lion-dance to the sound of firecrackers, gongs, and drums. Brand-new clothes were worn "to appear all rich," large-scale generosity was in order, and debts had to be settled. Doors were decorated with strips of red paper inscribed with auguries in the form of couplets. Peach blossoms and flowers evoked a longing for utopia. There were also sideshows performed by small groups, with storytelling, singing, magic, boxing, or fencing. Songs were popular, especially among the Hakka, and impromptu song contests always drew crowds: someone would offer a challenge in music, the lyrics invented on the spot, and others would be expected to respond in kind. The Hoklo, always extravagant in their rejoicing and friendships, spared no expense in celebrations.[100] It is hard to conceive of the effect of all these ceremonial and social activities on a family budget. In Nanhai county in the Delta, for example, taxes for religious parades and festivities meant that some people had to "pawn their possessions and sell their daughters."[101] Defaulters on such contributions in Haifeng would have their houses and fields destroyed and suffer beatings too.

For the boy P'eng P'ai, though, such disasters struck at a certain remove,

for money was not lacking in his family. But whatever delights came his way as a child, life became serious as soon as school began, for in the P'eng family education was a vital matter: it was the only way to add prestige to affluence.[102]

P'eng P'ai probably began formal schooling when he was about seven. Dressed in a white suit, he was sent with an ink-box and brush to meet the teacher at Tao-sang Primary School. There, according to his contemporary Ch'iu Kuo-chen, he would first have to bow to the teacher and then, after the burning of candles and joss sticks at the shrine of Confucius, kneel for the "three genuflections and nine bows" with the rest of the class. Then the teacher would formally take up his silver-tipped brush, open the primer, and read a passage, ordering the boys to repeat it. The rote was started and the cycle went on until the whole text was memorized.

The teacher was normally old or middle-aged and had charge of some twenty boys. At first everybody studied diligently because they had been selected and much admonished to that end, but after about six months many dropped out. When a boy showed exceptional promise, he would be considered by his relatives or elders for further education—a momentous decision for a boy and his family. Learning (*tu-shu*) was the preserve of the gentry and led to all the best in life and society, but the method of teaching consisted of rote learning pure and simple; there was no explanation even of the characters memorized. Such learning was no fun at all, and failure meant severe punishment: having one's back beaten from top to bottom with a beaded stick, having one's arms struck with a pallet, or being caned all over. There was also detention until a passage was learned by heart—usually on one's knees before the shrine of Confucius wearing a cangue, or, even worse, kneeling on clamshells with atop the cangue a glass of water not to be spilled. There was of course much crying, and many pupils were so frightened that they took to playing truant. Children from rich households were better treated, better motivated, and received all possible assistance.[103] As for the peasants, P'eng P'ai records:

> They had only private tutors in the villages. A pedant of 60 or 70 was engaged to teach a bunch of small village children with pallid faces, skinny limbs, and swollen bellies. They read what Sung dynasty Neo-Confucianists had written and poems from *The Book of Odes*. Those who could not pronounce the characters were made to kneel and had their palms flogged and their fingers racked. All this did was to kill the children off a little more quickly. The peasants not only saw nothing wrong

with it, but requested the teacher to come again because such rigorous treatment made their children docile at home. Some schools were simply prisons to put a stop to peasants' complaints of cold and hunger. Under the legend "Center of Learning: Idlers Not Welcome," educational institutions shouted their slogans of compulsory education with the roar of painted tigers.[104]

The first school in Haifeng dated back to the Sung dynasty, and little had changed in education since that time. The apex of education was the County School in Haifeng city, but leading up to it was an educational ladder that began at the village level. There, clan or village funds enabled private tutorial schools to give the most promising boys an opportunity to educate themselves for the benefit of the whole community. For the ruling class and the imperial system there was a political motive, too, because the education given would facilitate the control of huge masses of people by a small number of officials in the administration. Their training in fact discouraged anything alien to the monolithic orthodoxy of the Confucian ideology, and bound them together in service to the state.[105]

Administration in Hai-Lu-feng in general differed little from that in other counties. The magistrate was the highest authority and in Confucian tradition he was the *fu-mu-kuan* (Father and Mother Official), expected to solve all problems and to help people to be virtuous through persuasion and pressure. Since there was no separation of powers, the magistrate was in charge of everything. To assist him he had both a personal and a local staff, and together they constituted the *yamen*, the administrative center of the county.

The yamen had the greatest impact on people's lives since it was the most immediate and familiar form of imperial authority. This authority was wielded by officials alone as an exclusive and watched-over monopoly of the state. Ch'ing policy was expounded in the Sacred Edict designed to ensure obedience, payment of taxes, and mutual control in the *pao-chia* system.[106] In Hai-Lu-feng, though, its implementation was rather lax and the magistrate's "nourishing" of his people combined pleas with threats and sometimes "cutting and maiming."[107] One of the main responsibilities and a major headache for the magistrate was the collection of taxes. Magistrate Li Chung-chüeh of Lufeng realized what a sorry mess the land registers were in, but he could do little to change the situation. Other magistrates turned the situation to their profit, since emoluments were "barely enough to pay for their secretaries."[108] Hai-Lu-feng was a salt-producing area, and there was scope for shady practices: the charges brought against the magistrate in

1909 totaled no fewer than fifty.[109] The tax quotas fell more on the *hsiao-hu* (small) than on the *ta-hu* (great households), because "the more powerful they became, the less they paid."[110]

For running the place the magistrate had to rely heavily on his staff of varying rank. All of them—officials, clerks, and registrars, down to runners and jail wardens—could make handsome amounts from fees charged for public services. The system had inbuilt provisions to fatten out a meager salary that it was not easy to separate from blatant extortion or bribery; but there were certain limits such as prompted Magistrate Li to dismiss some of his staff. In Haifeng and Lufeng the magistrate was further hampered by a language barrier: "he was in much the same position as a district officer in a colonial administration."[111] He was kept even further from the peasants, because, as P'eng P'ai noticed, "even a man who spoke their dialect, unless he had lived in their villages for a long time, could not easily understand them."[112] To help him at the grass-roots level, the magistrate could call upon the *yüeh-cheng* (area chief), a local resident, usually from a great lineage, who was expected to maintain law and order locally. With his police power and minor administrative role, this man could not only line his own pockets (having paid for his appointment) but also become a petty local despot or even the leader of predatory bands. He might also head the *pao-chia*, and was liable to incur displeasure from above and resentment from below.[113] Magistrate Li reminded his people that "the *pao-chia* is to do away with violent acts and adultery and to investigate criminals,"[114] but by the end of the century the system had completely broken down.

Despite their abuses, the gentry were indispensable; without their aid no magistrate could hope to collect taxes, police districts, or run the charity granaries so essential in times of disaster. These duties were entrusted to them because of their supposed moral superiority, but various kinds of fraud were common. Nonetheless, in times of order their support was vital; in times of crisis it was crucial. Magistrate Hsü Keng-pi of Lufeng failed to conduct a much-needed land reregistration in the south because "if the gentry object to a program or even if they merely take a negative attitude, the administration faces an impasse."[115] The balance of power between magistrate and gentry was maintained through mutual need: the Confucian polity provided inbuilt restraints on both official and unofficial powerholders.

In rural education the *I-hsüeh* (charity schools), which were endowed by the local gentry, were available for children of poor families to prepare themselves for the county examination. The *She-hsuëh* (community

schools) in the rural areas made elementary education available at public expense, but there were never enough funds for every place. Magistrate Li of Lufeng had to shelve his intention to open more of these free schools for lack of funds. In Haifeng examination results were good, and during the years 1851–79 the county took third place in the whole province with 85 graduate degrees.[116] As a boy, P'eng P'ai saw in Haifeng "numerous elegant degree-bearing, test-taking gentlemen in fancy-dress shoes."[117] The many "villas" and private "libraries" in Haifeng testified to the presence of a number of successful scholars. As for Lufeng, in the 1920's there were 3,800 scholars, about one percent of the population.[118] But the "vulgar behavior of the scholars" and the dearth of "talented and eminent Confucians" had earlier shocked Magistrate Li, who complained that since 1840 Lufeng had not had even the smallest success in the public examination. He noticed only greed for "fame and profit" and was grieved by the fact that the degradation of scholars in his area had reached such a pass. Scholars were expected to set the pace for the people to follow; instead, in Hai-Lu-feng they were on the whole arrogant, much aware of privilege and of their influence as teachers, doctors, geomancers, and leaders.[119]

Only a small minority benefited from this elitist education. For the majority the *Hsiang-yüeh* ("Rural Covenant") had to do. This took the form of biweekly open lectures presided over by the gentry of note and worth. The aim was to explain the Imperial Edicts by dilating upon the good and evil deeds of the populace and denouncing behavior not consistent with established principles. Edification, rather than the removal of illiteracy, was the main purpose. The *Hsiang-yüeh* lectures were not well organized, were only partly understood, and became defunct in many places.[120] Nonetheless, as P'eng P'ai noted, they provided "a formal philosophy of life, wherein resistance (revolution) was a vice, obedience (contentment) a virtue. What the old learning (of Ch'ing dynasty pedants) taught [was] be contented with your lot, mind your own business, obey landlords, revere the Emperor."[121] The whole system of rural indoctrination was an instrument of state control in support of the *pao-chia* and the *li-chia*; it provided the ideology for collective responsibility and tax contribution. In the long run, though, the effect of the *Hsiang-yüeh* was to give the peasants an opportunity to gather on a regular basis to decide on matters of common interest.

The *She-hsüeh* also developed into social centers, but they assumed defense functions.[122] To protect their own peculiar perception of the social order, the peasants in Hai-Lu-feng had undergone a long process of militar-

ization that perfectly suited their temperament and fitted in with their traditional customs. Rural mobilization had by custom always been a part of community defense under gentry leadership. The local phenomenon of militarization was an aspect of the larger reality that had shaped Kwangtung since the Opium War, and that was seen in peasant militia units run by gentry during the Taiping Rebellion.[123]

Hai-Lu-feng illustrates clearly this process of militarization, with local clans relying on their armed groups and being so exclusive as to become bullies against weaker clans or predatory units in the countryside. In walled-off cities and fortified villages, they led their own life in which religion as ancestor worship, economy as granary and pawnshop, and security as tower and blockhouse were the basis for all their activity. At the turn of the century such stone-walled, fortified villages could seem stronger than the county city.[124] In accounts by visitors of the time, the county appeared in a state of siege, with villages "like garrison fortresses, inhabited by one large family or clan and feuding with all the nearby villages and clans."[125] Every male had to join the militia and fight under the clan or village banner. To uphold local interests all means were justified, and members were eager to earn their share of honor by fighting for the common good. When necessary, "a handsome reward was reserved and agreed on in advance for the wounded; and those who died of wounds had their tablets entered into the ancestral hall, and their widows and children were given a part of the *ch'ang-tsu* (fixed ritual rent) collected from the clan ritual land attached to the ancestral hall."[126] Some went so far as to submit willingly to capital punishment by the authorities after a clan rebellion. They were standing in for the real culprits, their leaders, at the price of guaranteed continued security for their families.

It was largely for these reasons that Hai-Lu-feng was described as "barbaric." The official administration at the turn of the century looked totally undermined; its orders were flouted with impunity and its forces were inadequate to cope. Beyond the official administration and its troops lay a rural social order with its own code and local forces that, when needed, joined into associations drawing on clan members from far and wide for what could be a fight to the finish.[127]

The first Western-style school to be set up in Haifeng was the modern Normal School in 1904. The abolition of the public Civil Service examination a year later was described as a social revolution and one that "closed the door to the past on the younger generation forever."[128] There were now

many landlords, some of them almost illiterate, seeking to join the ranks of the scholars. They paid a few hundred dollars to get a title and be able to dress up in long gowns to enter the yamen. Then, when involved in litigation with the peasants, they henceforth were able to speak directly to the officials.[129]

The admission of irregulars into the gentry through the purchase of degrees started the decline of that group: one buyer in Lufeng was the head of the local Black Flag. No longer were gentry automatically the eyes and ears of the magistrate in the countryside. As the system came into disrepute, so the balance of power, duties, and vested local interests shifted. The gentry were subjected to a different set of qualifications required by the "new learning," and from this emerged the "new gentry." In the early years of the century thousands were flocking to Japan or enrolling in the "modern schools" with a view to establishing themselves, and the "returned students" were making their presence felt as early as 1904. Traditional education was not discarded in Hai-Lu-feng, however, and continued especially in the villages.[130]

The "modern school" was the result of the new forces at work in society that sought to meet the impact of the West, which was particularly strong in Kwangtung. The new setup along modern lines included in Haifeng a High Primary School—the highest center of modern education in the county—and in other towns primary schools, sometimes not fully developed. In the villages there were normally no schools of the new type. In large villages there might be what was then called a *Meng-hsüeh* (school for beginners). There were also private schools, such as the two run by the Presbyterians.[131]

It was not until 1915, however, that the first year of the public Middle School commenced, in the same building as the public High Primary. In 1916 the school moved to Wen T'ien-hsiang's shrine at Wup'oling and became known as the Haifeng Middle School. All public schools were under the county "Office for the Promotion of Education" (*Ch'üan-hsüeh-so*), which reported to the Commission for Educational Affairs in Canton.

Most of the newly established modern schools were at the lower primary level. The one in Hsiakang village, run by the local village district association, was a fair example of such institutions. The building contained two connecting classrooms, a room for the teacher and another for the boarders, and a kitchen. Outside were a small playground, a garden, a brook, and rice

fields. One teacher was in charge of the three classes (each with 50 to 70 students).

By the fourth year, students already familiar with the classics were aged about eleven, and developing talents beyond those encouraged by the curriculum.[132] Such was the case with P'eng P'ai, whose artistic skills came to the fore at about this age. "The Hoklo," declared one resident, "seem to have a special inclination for painting," which was evidenced by the flowers and animals adorning their temples, halls, and even small teahouses—"a custom unknown elsewhere."[133] By the fifth year, a boy would have progressed to be among the few well-educated persons in the district, and his teacher would assume the role of father. The best teachers, usually elderly, would remain with their students all day and would share their life, tell tales of history, bring them up to date on the latest events, and generally treat them as their own children. Fortune-telling, geomancy, and medicine were additions to his learning for which a scholar was greatly respected. Constitutional reforms were in the air as early as 1908, but discussion of these or any other political, social, and scientific matters was out of the question—as inappropriate, according to some teachers, "as thunder to doves." The result was an education separated from life. Nonetheless, local intelligentsia often used the schools as forums for revolutionary ideas, and any students who paid attention could learn a lot from them.[134]

National events had already started to involve the region. During the Huichou Uprising launched by the Hsing Chung Hui under Sun, Cheng Shih-liang, the Hakka put in charge of the revolt, made contact with the Haifeng Triad. His small force of 600 was swelled by 20,000 peasants as it moved toward the coast in Haifeng to provide a landing base for the expedition sponsored by Sun in Taiwan. The force from Taiwan failed to arrive, however, and a series of errors gave the Huichou garrison and local landlords' mercenaries the opportunity of crushing the peasants. Hai-Lu-feng thus missed the opportunity of becoming a republican revolutionary base, though Sun's movement learned from the experience that peasant unrest could be profitably utilized.[135]

In Haifeng the Hsing Chung Hui could also count on the support of a number of young intellectuals who, though versed in traditional culture, had also steeped themselves in Western ideas. Ch'en Chiung-ming was one of them, and was typical of the group. They were receptive to the new ideas disseminated in *Min-pao* (*People's Review*), ideas that had been brought to

Haifeng by Japan-trained teachers on the staff of the newly established modern Normal School. Being all sons of the landed gentry, they shied away from drastic changes to begin with, putting their faith rather in the self-government movement. Ch'en was born in 1878, of a degree-holding father, and himself obtained his degree at the age of twenty. In 1906 he organized the "Society for Righteousness" with his friends Ma Yü-hang, Ch'en Ta-sheng, Chung Hsiu-nan, Lin Tou-wen, and many others. In the same year Ch'en entered the Canton Academy of Law and Political Science, where he was influenced by Japanese teachers and Chinese "returned students." Back in Haifeng after graduation in 1908, he was already in touch with the "T'ung Meng Hui" (Alliance Party), the successor to the Hsing Chung Hui. With 30 friends, Ch'en pledged secretly to work for a democratic revolution.[136]

The T'ung Meng Hui added to the old platform of the Hsing Chung Hui (expulsion of the Manchus, restoration of Chinese sovereignty, and establishment of a republic) a fourth plank: the equalization of land rights, whereby all unearned increments in land value would go to the state. By 1908 its membership numbered in the thousands, many from eastern Kwangtung. The East River area seethed with discontent, the peasants being increasingly taxed and oppressed and the leading class blaming the Ch'ing for failing to deal with the foreigners and for their slow pace in decentralizing authority. One important revolt among many was the one attempted by Hsü Hsüeh-ch'iu with Sun Yat-sen and Triad members in 1907. The plan called for shipping arms purchased by Sun's agent in Japan to Swabue, which was deemed an excellent starting point for the operation. On the arrival of the ship, thousands of Party and secret-society members were to show up and take the arms ashore. But when the *Kona Maru* arrived at dawn, there was not a soul to welcome it. The ship had been expected by thousands the night before, but for lack of news they had left, and a Ch'ing patrol eventually forced the ship to sail hurriedly for Hong Kong. Another great opportunity was lost.[137]

While still at law school, Ch'en Chiung-ming made a name for himself in 1907 when he protested against the abuse of police powers by the magistrate of Huichou. In the same year 4,000 people took part in rice riots in Haifeng blaming the authorities for prices. The Alliance Party itself did almost nothing to capitalize upon the widespread and growing discontent among the peasants. Ch'en, looked upon as the leader of eastern Kwangtung, then founded the "Society to Recover the Nation's Rights," a protest movement against British gunboats patrolling the West River. In November

1907 the "Kwangtung Association for the Study of Self-Government" had established branches in Huichou and Haifeng. There the *Hai-feng tzu-chih pao* (*Haifeng Self-Government Newspaper*), started by Ch'en in April 1909, became a vehicle of new ideas and the instrument for his local leadership. In the elections for the Kwangtung Assembly in the summer of 1909, Ch'en was chosen with Ch'iu Feng-chia to represent East Kwangtung. In the new Assembly he led the campaign against gambling and corruption.[138]

As an illustration of the difficulties facing reformers in early modern China, Ch'en's efforts to fight opium can stand for many other similar attempts. Opium-smoking was widespread, seen as a right to be enjoyed by those able to afford it rather than as anything vicious; by the late nineteenth century the demand formed a lucrative trade. Ch'en had two uncles (one of them Ch'en K'ai-t'ing, the clan head) who set the fashion for opium among the rich, but the number of poor addicts was also great. In 1910 Swabue hospital was called on to help with treatment, but those weaned from the drug generally relapsed after a few months.[139] The youthful group of reformers around Ch'en vowed in 1908 to set up a department for the abolition of opium-smoking, and Ch'en's personal repugnance for the habit perhaps reflects the size of the problem in Hai-Lu-feng itself. But all was in vain: the anti-opium campaign proved a farce, and the efforts of "Mr. Clean" (as Ch'en became known in the province) a failure. An official report in the 1920's dwelled on the "bad habits" of the people of Hai-Lu-feng, especially opium-smoking and gambling—habits much in evidence, since "the Hoklo are unable to pretend or to hide anything and they do things in the open."[140] As late as 1928 opium was still the "most penetrating poison," which only a drastic shortage of money could eliminate.[141]

Education played a key role in the preparation for the Revolution of 1911, since much of the groundwork for it was laid in students' associations and discussion groups. Radicalism, militarism, and nationalism were encouraged by certain teachers. Sun Yat-sen recalled how his teachers had extolled the Taiping: "childhood heroes glorified by village legend."[142] Schools were the seedbed of Chinese radicalism.

But even in the ninth year at school in Haifeng the classics were still repeated; and though more exposition took place, understanding left much to be desired. The copying of characters in literary pieces remained the only form of written work. Astronomy, astrology, and other forms of fortune-telling such as the "Eight Diagrams" were introduced, along with the litur-

gical texts for various gentry-performed rites. Even though a boy might be sixteen and ready to begin his life as a married man and to assist his father in work or business, as a student he was just beginning composition. Studies would continue to preoccupy a boy's life for several more years, with the ancient books gone over again along with such subjects as calligraphy, drawing, and a little arithmetic. There would also be some composition, Chinese history, and local Chinese geography, with a bit of poetry added. The mechanics of poetry were especially practiced for the composition of couplets (*tui-lien*) used during festivals and celebrations—an art expected of teachers and students. Students burned the midnight oil and had to rise early. The teacher would resume lessons after dinner in the form of a survey of history and of current events in China and in the world. There was comment now about political affairs, especially the activities of republican revolutionaries, so that the growing young class of intellectuals in the county could feel ready for change or revolution with a patriotic spirit. Schools subscribed to the *Hai-feng tzu-chih pao*, which carried revolutionary ideas and was eagerly read by the students.[143]

Ch'en, conscious of his position of leadership, established a revolutionary base in Hong Kong. The attack on the governor-general's residence in Canton engineered by the Alliance in April 1911 failed and 86 rebels were killed.[144] One of those killed was identified as a Haifeng peasant who belonged to one of the many bands gathered early in 1911 by Ch'en under the name of "People's Armies" and recruited mainly in Huiyang and Hai-Lufeng. When the Revolution finally arrived on October 10, 1911, Ch'en Chiung-ming could count on immediate support in the East River from thousands of Party members and from many more organized by the Triad. Included in these were the 100,000 soldiers of the People's Armies, a mixture of lineage and village armed forces, Triad members, bandit groups, and disciplined Red and Black Flags.[145]

In Haifeng the garrison held out after Canton's independence was declared on November 9. Ch'iu Kuo-chen, then a seventeen-year-old who took part in the action, later recalled how groups of students led by their teachers joined with the People's Armies one cold night to attack Haifeng. But before the motley array, armed with a variety of weapons, could reach the city, word came that the magistrate had fled during the night. All was soon over, the peasant troops marching into the city at dawn. After Huichou capitulated, the huge People's Army marched to Canton. This Army was in fact a congeries of small local fighting units each with its own leader, so that the com-

manders at the top were part of a chain. All were inextricably linked with the secret societies, which provided common beliefs and mores. A declaration by one Triad leader voiced the real aspirations of the masses. After proclaiming the dominant anti-Manchu and antiestablishment sentiments, he called for positive goals that evoked the "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" of the French Revolution.[146]

The new experience in the big cities failed to change the peasants' mentality, just as the glorious successes of the Revolution failed to alter their customary social status. Yet the basic aims of the Revolution, as interpreted by the peasants, did coincide with their traditional aspirations. The republican ideals of the T'ung Meng Hui squared perfectly with their long-cherished yearnings and dreams inspired by the secret societies. The very words "People's Army" called up a righteous and revolutionary force acting on behalf of the suffering people in challenging the oppressive rulers. The peasants in general showed a sincere commitment to the popular apotheosis of *Min* (People). The *Min-chün* (People's Army) was also called *I-chün* (Righteous Army), or *Tzu-chih-chün* (Self-Government Army). The flag of Ch'en's People's Army was a telling symbol: the *ching-t'ien* (well-field) grid emblazoned on it represented justice and equality.[147]

In the prevailing state of insecurity and discontent, thousands of Hai-Lu-feng peasants found in the Triad groupings, under the Red and Black Flags, their much-needed protection. It often transcended that of the clan. In truth, "an insurrectionary potential lurked behind the normally placid villages," ready to manifest itself whenever the peasants felt that the world was due for a change—that is to say, when their only experience of *res publica*, at the village and clan level, was a bitter one.[148] Their new hope was Ch'en Chiung-ming, a countryman they deemed honest and trustworthy: "Better still if he became Emperor!" they used to say. As in the past, they saw their specific duty as providing the element of militarization needed to recover and protect the social order that had failed them. To others a new order was definitely at hand, brought about by the Republican Revolution; but the peasants merely wanted to restore the ancient security of the clan and village system.[149]

In East Kwangtung the fact that many villages were of a single lineage, and that clans were grouped in a rural area, made for ease of recruiting. But if lineages could be exploited for the purpose of militarization, it is also true that militarization could assist the traditional bonds of kinship. A political consequence of this militarization was the development of warlordism on

a small scale, since it became easy for anybody with a grievance or a cause to gather an army and take on the state forces. Support of the East River lineages was a crucial factor in Ch'en Chiung-ming's drives toward Canton in 1911 and in 1916. Rural militarization then assumed a national relevance, and the step into large-scale warlordism became a short one.[150]

In Haifeng an eyewitness report described the social unrest in late 1911: everything was upset and everybody was in flight, business was at a standstill, bandits were on the rampage, and "all seemed to have lost their head in those days." Armed peasants occupied the towns, prisoners were set free, and robbers joined in ransacking the houses of the former leaders. The new elite was out for personal power and revenge, whereas the peasants, indifferent to new instructions, exploited the chaos to pay off old scores. Fr. Robba remarked: "Nobody can tell the blood that flowed in those days!"[151] Many villages were destroyed. Swabue also saw a fierce feud between Red and Black Flags, calmed only by the arrival of a battleship with troops. The Catholics in Aomen took the opportunity to throw the Lutherans out of the market, and Red and Black Flags were on the rampage everywhere. In Swatow brief truces were periodically shattered as fighting broke out between Ch'aochou and Hakka or Nationalist Party and Alliance. Life became so bad that many sought refuge abroad through emigration.[152]

The Revolution affected schooling, with many youngsters ready to enlist in the Kwangtung Army of Ch'en, their local leader. Some actually moved to Canton in search of glory, only to return soon. In 1912 all the schools in Haifeng were closed because teachers were caught up in the Revolution.[153]

In the mind of P'eng P'ai, Ch'en exemplified "those who used the power of the Triad to seize the major positions personally—military governor, provincial governor, general of the army, commander-in-chief."[154] Once in office, Ch'en implemented his cherished dream of modernization by demolishing the walls of Canton, adopting the *yüan* as the unit of currency, and reorganizing the taxation system. In Hai-Lu-feng Ch'en was the conquering hero: on the door of his modest paternal home he hung a red paper strip on which were inscribed the two golden characters "Brother General"—a touch of Triad jargon.[155] P'eng noted: "As soon as Ch'en Chiung-ming had seized control of Kwangtung, all members of the Ch'en clan of Haifeng, naturally, by virtue of his nepotism, filled the posts of political and military power. . . . Thus Ch'en's personal position was consolidated."[156] Small, out-of-the-way Haifeng county, now definitely on the map of Chinese history, basked in the glory of its most prestigious son. To the rural folk, Ch'en ap-

peared as heir to the Ming. He contributed much to his native county: new schools were opened, a number of youngsters were sent abroad to study, roads were repaired, streetlights were installed, and foreign dress was widely adopted. Localism prevailed over the fledgling spirit of national concern.[157]

Political democracy, social equality, and economic development proved elusive, however. The gentry in control of the assemblies were holding sway; the merchants found themselves little profited by the revolution; but it was the peasants who were the real losers.[158] In Haifeng, "under Ch'en Chiung-ming's parochial regime they did not have one speck of luck, and still could not get away from the landlords' clubs, the gentry's fans, and the courthouse chains." P'eng P'ai also notes that the Triad "did not know that the bourgeoisie, after overthrowing the Manchu emperor and taking power, would suppress them."[159]

In early February 1912 Ch'en ordered the People's Armies disbanded. This stimulated a conspiracy that led to outright rebellion by some units in favor of a "second revolution"; but the movement was soon quashed. Some peasants received a gratuity, a medal, a certificate, and traveling expenses home. Many went to swell the ranks of the bandits, for there was a widespread feeling of betrayal. The peasants' rejoinder to the events of early 1912 is summed up in a manifesto of the summer that read: "Alas, heaven does not bless Kwangtung. The people still suffer injustice and cruelty."[160] The writers proclaimed their goal to be not the destruction of the promises of the revolution, but rather their fulfillment.

The Revolution of 1911 was far from successful in bettering the peasants' lot. In 1919 Ch'en Tu-hsiu would describe the Chinese Republic as a "false signboard" that had been hanging up for eight years, "but it is still the old medicine being sold."[161] In Hai-Lu-feng social relationships continued to follow the traditional pattern. A resident later observed that "the economic condition of the villages was poor and backward and their culture was equally backward and traditional."[162] In fact, P'eng P'ai even noted a deterioration: "Before the 1911 revolution, landlords used good manners because the legislation was still to be finalized, but after the revolution they became rude, and Ch'en Chiung-ming in the East River behaved like a king."[163]

Part of the problem was that the revolution was too short-lived. When Yüan Shih-k'ai usurped power, he made short work of ideals and reforms. However, in the field of education, at least, some of the hard-won improve-

ments managed to survive. The Provisional Government in Canton had introduced more relevant textbooks, had emphasized normal training (including paramilitary training, physical exercise, and current affairs), and had thrown out the classics from the Lower Primary curriculum. P'eng of course missed that last reform, but he could still benefit from others in the schooling that remained for him.[164]

P'eng P'ai entered the High Primary School in 1913 at the age of seventeen, after eight years of Lower Primary (1903–11) and one year without schooling in 1912. The High Primary, the top educational institution in Haifeng, was spacious and airy, with rooms for boarders, a kitchen, showers, toilets, and two large sports areas, one of them indoors. The school was well run and had four grades, each with one class of 50 students. The principal, Chou Pu-hsi, was from Ch'iao-tung-she; the literature and arithmetic teacher, Mr. Lin, was from the city; Mr. Cheng from Kungp'ing taught history, geography, biology, and chemistry; and Mr. Hung from Chuyüan looked after physical education. There were a number of well-known scholars among the staff, though the older ones were being replaced in compliance with Ministry of Education directives of 1912 prohibiting the teaching of the classics or the veneration of Confucius in government-registered schools.

In 1915 the Middle School started in the same premises; the next year it moved to its new location and P'eng P'ai joined it. There were no fees or uniforms, and the students had to buy their own food, books, and other necessities. The Association for the Promotion of Literature ran two competitions in spring and autumn, with students from the whole county participating. There was an annual exhibition of art. Physical education was widely practiced and included also paramilitary training. The county magistrate came often to the new school to set examination topics, preside at parades, and distribute prizes. He once handed out pistols and live cartridges and made the students march to Wup'oling for target practice. He was thus unwittingly giving weapons training to the future leaders of the peasants and providing them with the elementary principles and methods of military organization.[165]

P'eng P'ai came to the fore as a student leader during an episode that agitated Haifeng in 1915. The old gentry, seeing their world crumbling around them and desperate for a savior who might restore their status, looked to Yüan Shih-k'ai and his local lieutenant, General Lin Kan-ts'ai,

who had been sent to put down troublemakers. They accordingly began addressing General Lin as "Lord General" or "Celestial Prince," in line with Yüan's imperial pretensions. They went so far in their adulation as to erect a statue to Lin in the very place where stood that of the venerated Wen T'ien-hsiang—for, as their spokesman put it, "every dynasty has its great men and now there was General Lin." The first to protest was Li Yüeh-t'ing, Principal of the Middle School, and all his staff and students were behind him. P'eng P'ai led the student campaign that flooded Haifeng with anti-Lin leaflets and posters. When hired thugs beat one of the student protesters, the entire school went on strike, and the incident was reported to the Provincial Government. P'eng P'ai and the students struck back by disfiguring the statue one night, with the result that it had to be dumped in Chiehshih Bay.[166]

Such activities united the student body and made them even more determined to struggle for democracy. The most radical of them founded a "Society of the Progressive Masses," with P'eng P'ai as leader and Ch'en Fu and Ch'en K'uei-ya as active members. This was in effect the birth of what became the Student Union in Haifeng, officially established in 1919.[167]

Before his emergence as a student activist, however, P'eng P'ai had accepted the role of husband. In 1912, the year the schools were closed, P'eng P'ai at sixteen was married to a girl from Lüching named Ts'ai Su-p'ing. Most accounts place her age at fifteen, though one source claims that she was not even 30 when she died in 1928. The pretty bride, a distant relative of the P'eng from a rich peasant family, came from a very conservative background and was old-fashioned in outlook, Lüching being known as an extremely reactionary village. It was an arranged marriage, but P'eng P'ai soon converted Su-p'ing to his ideals, had her throw away her foot-bindings, and marched with her hand in hand down the main street of Haifeng, thus creating a scandal. The girl had received no schooling, but after tuition from her husband she could soon read the newspapers and write letters. She thus became the first student to benefit from P'eng P'ai's educational skill. In the P'eng family she was called "Fourth Auntie," since she was the wife of the fourth brother. Su-p'ing was a normal housewife, not too strong, not very talkative, but kind to the people. She and P'eng P'ai were a happy couple and loved each other dearly. When P'eng P'ai left for Japan and the university, they promised each other to look up at the moon, which would act as a shared focal point for their love. P'eng would kiss her picture every night and even take it into bed with him. One night the glass in the frame broke

and P'eng cut himself badly—an incident that went the rounds of all the Chinese students in Japan.[168]

P'eng P'ai had shown himself to be of independent mind, receptive to outside influences, and not afraid to take a stand. After his marriage he considered himself to be very much on his own, going his own way, and it was in this spirit that he embarked on higher education. He was a budding modern scholar and, like his peers, was bent on learning new ways of life and new modes of thought.

Despite republican idealism, Hai-Lu-feng remained a Flag battleground. From the beginning of the Republic the government had dealt severely with Flag fighting, but the feuds were far from over. In 1915 a Chinese pastor complained that in Swabue "clan fights and yamen cases" obstructed his ministry.[169] It was on account of these circumstances that Hai-Lu-feng, for security reasons, now got its own brand of *Min-t'uan* (People's Corps or Militia) called the *Pao-wei-t'uan* (Guards Corps) or *Pao-an-tui* (Security Corps). These had been unnecessary before, because of the total militarization of the populace. The core elements of the Flags became the nucleus of the Guards Corps, led as ever by the gentry and again much at their service. These t'uan supplemented the security forces of the authorities—police, rangers, and army garrison. Their numbers were boosted through recruitment of bandits and discharged soldiers, and they soon became the personal armies of the local elite. In Hai-Lu-feng the saying went: "The t'uan are robbers, the robbers are t'uan." They were composed of the same kind of people they were meant to control.[170] P'eng P'ai said: "In Hai-Lu-feng the Pao-wei-t'uan are the camp of the landlords and gentry, with power to imprison peasants."[171]

In this new situation a different form of rural militarization was taking place, one from which the peasants as such were for the first time excluded. They felt utterly disoriented without their leaders and Triad links. The "new gentry" and much of the student population were also chafing under the oppressive administration. Resentment against troops and an overbearing authority rose to a danger point when payment was demanded in 1915 of taxes not due until 1920. Such burdens and localist feelings reunited peasants and gentry. Secret organizations and underground links were revived, and a new outburst was felt to be imminent.[172]

The crisis came in December 1915. Ch'en Chiung-ming had been abroad since 1914 collecting money in Singapore and Malacca, and on his return he put the overseas money to good use by gathering a mercenary army in East Kwangtung. The "Old Commander" found a ready welcome, and on Jan-

uary 6, 1916, he took the title of "Military Commander of Huichou." On March 30 Swatow and Ch'aochou declared independence. While Ch'en was still laying siege to Huichou, Yüan Shih-k'ai died, and Ch'en complied with the cease-fire order from the new President in Peking. Ch'en's ties with the East River communities once again served him well. Many of the peasants rallying to him, and their leaders, were from Haifeng.[173]

When in July 1916 Sun Yat-sen came back to Canton to take up the post of Generalissimo of the Military Government, Ch'en Chiung-ming was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army. In December 1917 Ch'en marched to Fukien in an attempt to uphold the Constitution there against the local warlord, and by August 1918 he had set up his headquarters in Changchou: his authority in Fukien and East Kwangtung was undisputed. By protecting Sun (who in the meantime had been expelled from Canton by the Kwangsi clique), Ch'en became the only hope for the revolution. In all these activities Haifeng figured prominently. In the city Ch'en was simply called "the Commander," and people would say proudly "the General is from here."[174]

Ch'en's penchant for reform and modernization came out again. He founded radical and anarchist publications. He hailed the Russian Revolution and in 1919 the May Fourth Movement in Peking. He made a name for himself as a leading federalist and a capable social reformer. Students from Peking visited his headquarters in Changchou and described the city as "the Moscow of South Fukien" and Ch'en as a man devoted to revolution. His stature was such that Lenin sent an envoy to study with Ch'en how best to serve the revolution in China and to offer Russian aid. In a letter to Lenin, Ch'en stressed the need for the revolution to rely on local support; the Bolsheviks considered him a "convinced communist," a great general, and a brilliant organizer who carried the masses with him.[175]

The role of the gentry was essential to the republican government, as it had been to the imperial one. Ranks and posts in the service of Ch'en Chiung-ming were indeed—as P'eng P'ai noted at an earlier time—given wholesale to Hai-Lu-feng gentry, even the old gentry, when it was a question of clan relationships. The power of gentry and officials was now centered in the newly built "Commander's Office" at the South Gate of the city, with Ch'en's widowed mother and his opium-addicted uncle Ch'en K'ai-t'ing (called "the emperor of Haifeng") in charge. In P'eng's words: "Matters of administration, courts, schooling, various exorbitant taxes, forced requisitions and commercial transactions, the death of someone's dog or cat—all had to go through the Commander's Office."[176] The slender dis-

tinction between officials and gentry was now gone, and the gentry had become the only masters. Government departments "developed quite naturally into a major base for warlords, aristocrats, politicians, new officials, the compradore class, rotten gentry, big wheels, new landlords, and their relatives and flunkeys."[177] The peasants had to face a power bloc of officials, gentry, and landlords backed up by their guards and troops. If they went for redress to their "Old Commander" they were let down; some took a blood oath to die rather than again work the fields of the Ch'en lineage. The power of this bloc was so pervasive that even "the Commander" was not in real control and his orders were flouted: "I am frightened because my sixth uncle is one of them," Ch'en confessed.[178] The gentry had completed their own revolution by destroying the Ch'ing yamen only to build a modern one in a palatial style at the South Gate, where they became more despotic than the former rulers. Ch'en had to conclude, "These gentry are disgusting!"; and he advised P'eng P'ai, "You must know that the present 'new society' is but a 'gentry society.' "[179]

Admission to the Commander's Office was the privilege of a select few. The most powerful members of this coterie were the Ch'en landlords from Tung-hu-she led by Ch'en Yü-k'o, "the seventh old master." Ch'en Chiung-ming's own family were but poor relations to these wealthy lineage mates, who now were exacting a return after helping Ch'en to success. They were ready to exploit anyone, even their own lineage members, "from incredible self-interest," as P'eng P'ai recorded.[180] Two other important landowning families were the Ma, kin to the Ch'en and led by Ma Yü-hang, Ch'en Chiung-ming's right-hand man; and the Chung, with their family house at the South Gate, led by Chung Hsiu-nan, Ch'en's finance minister, highly respected by Sun Yat-sen. Chung Hsiu-nan's second brother, Chung Ching-t'ang, became a leader of the Kwangtung Army and was known as "the tiger" for his ruthlessness. These three great families were the most politically involved in Haifeng, kept close through intermarriage, and made sure that only their choices were appointed to office.[181]

This picture of the elite in command in Hai-Lu-feng is complete only if the merchants are also included, since they came now to be on a par with the others. Theoretically gentry and merchants were poles apart, since the Confucian ethos deplored the spirit of acquisitiveness; though in China money had always been important, "there did exist a genuine official animus" against merchants.[182] What had forced merchants and gentry into alliance was the common interest: money was needed first to lead imperial China into the modern world, and later as a platform to republican political power.

In Canton early in the century, relations between gentry and merchants had been good. In Haifeng the Lin clan of Meilung, renowned as merchants, had become notable gentry-landlords. Commerce no longer stood among the despised professions. Hard realities were also pressing the gentry to invest in business, and there developed the hybrid category of *shen-shang* (gentry-merchants).[183]

In Hai-Lu-feng merchants were a small minority (in Lufeng only 2.7 percent of the population), and they were active in the normal rural trade and also especially in the salt and fish business.[184] They were not above sharp practices at times. In 1883 Magistrate Hsü of Lufeng was compelled to take action because the price of rice tripled after merchants from Huichou and Ch'aochou made a great purchase of it.[185] The "compradore class" exported to the main ports in the area—Hong Kong, Swatow, and Canton. Salt was lucrative, the trade running into millions of dollars; fish, sugarcane, and timber were also widely traded. There was also a market for land in Hai-Lu-feng. Transactions in real estate were significant and many merchants invested in property. The Lin of Meilung had amassed considerable wealth as merchants near Ch'aochou before settling in Haifeng as landlords. P'eng P'ai's grandfather was also a leading entrepreneur who became a respected landlord. A small merchant from a modest freeholding peasant family, through thrift and hard work, could at the turn of the century save money to buy some land and rent some more, making an annual net profit of 40 piculs of rice. A peculiar agricultural and commercial enterprise was the renting out by gentry and merchants of tracts of land from the original private or collective landlord to sublet to others at a higher rent. This commercialized use of land was tolerated as long as the rent took into account other social realities; but later such activity turned into pure commercial speculation. The grain market was also manipulated by merchants (with the connivance of landlords) through fixing prices and exchange rates. Also, the pawnshops slowly deteriorated from offering a service to trapping peasants in economic servitude.[186]

Gentry-landlords and gentry-merchants came to have a foot in two worlds—the rural and the urban, the agricultural and the mercantile. "Once they became city dwellers, interested in Western-style urban and political modernization, their concern for the peasantry was limited to an interest in the prompt payment of rent and taxes."[187] The need to make money displaced the obligation to maintain traditional village or clan ties, and the business outlook was in absolute command. Relationships with the "compradore class" in Canton were filled out by those with Hong Kong, where

commercial links could easily be established through the Haifeng Countrymen's Association. This body served as the *hui-kuan* (association center) in the Colony for all the Haifeng merchants and was at one time headed by Chung Hsiu-nan. Many merchants from Hai-Lu-feng were operating abroad, and their remittances home put money to work in land and property.[188]

In the rural environment, business and bank dealings assumed greater prominence, for as the political horizon expanded it became clear that land alone—that is, without commercialized use of it—could not guarantee wealth and power. Thus, through a fundamental transformation of Chinese society the gentry-landlords were able to maintain their influence until the 1920's by means of their Bursary Offices or Rent Halls, each of which was "a state within the state." Once again the local elite bent with the wind, and scholars turned into landlords, now graciously seated behind a teller's counter. The merchants resented these commercial upstarts but were gratified by the enhancement of their status that resulted from such intrusions. If bad feelings existed, it was because the powerholders did not want to share much of their authority with the merchants after using their wealth to gain it. As we shall see, the relationship between the Ch'en and the P'eng clan in Haifeng was a case in point. Eventually, all distinctions between gentry, landlords, and merchants disappeared: wealth alone was measured, and wealth alone brought respect.[189]

The outcome of these changes was to transform a traditional and personal rural society into one dominated by the impersonal cash nexus. This was a catastrophe for the peasants, and a threat also for those of the elite not yet modern and sophisticated enough to have the requisite entrepreneurial skills to survive the transition. The incentive to hold onto land and to acquire more was related not only to the security land provided but also to the new and profitable returns it brought. According to Muramatsu Yuji, landlord income, taxes, and expenditures had maintained a certain equilibrium up to 1905, but from 1905 to 1911 rents rose sharply while taxes and expenditures did not. There was a consequent increase in net profits, which went into the purchase of more land; it was only after 1919 that this trend evened off and eventually began to decline.[190] Hence land, already much in demand, became a favored investment; and when actual possession was not possible, the gentry sought to control land through the "common landlord system," with the result that clan land was virtually appropriated by them

as private land. Merchants also purchased land so as to be "not different from other people . . . and to do what others were doing with money."[191] The land hunger not only threatened stable land tenure by the peasants but also set off a rent spiral. To make matters worse, there was an urge to display modernity, and foreign goods were shipped in from Hong Kong as costly status symbols.[192] One Protestant missionary appraised the situation in Haifeng as one of "cold materialism and consequent haste to become rich."[193] The peasants' right to subsistence, the "fundamental social morality" in the undermined Confucian order, was given short shrift or ignored altogether. Barrington Moore has rightly remarked: "When the old agrarian aristocracy fails to cultivate a commercial impulse within its own ranks and fails to integrate the peasantry into commercial arrangements, [it leaves] the rural poor both with inadequate subsistence agricultural arrangements and with inadequate capitalist market choices—a situation highly conducive to peasant revolt."[194]

There was a steady worsening of relations between landlords and peasants after 1911: "landlords and peasants ceased to be part of a single vertically integrated rural community and all sense of mutual trust was lost."[195] P'eng P'ai saw clearly the changes in his home area before and after the revolution, and especially during Ch'en's time. Rents had almost tripled in a decade. The peasants had become merely a source of income for the new gentry-landlords, a means of feeding their political interests and aspirations.[196] Land was now a much-coveted commodity, and the old saying "Land breeds no land," meaning that land-owning could not guarantee power and wealth, was no longer true. In fact, according to P'eng, the new officials were not only bent on buying land elsewhere "but they did the same thing in their hometowns."[197]

Once they achieved full control after 1911, the gentry-landlords turned politicians, and through the Commander's Office were able to get all the land they wanted at their own price or simply by appropriation when ownership was in doubt. "The various small landlords could no longer maintain their status and one by one had to sell their land to the Commander's Office." The gap between rich and poor was widening, and peasants had no means of redress or even of being heard: "it was harder to enter the Commander's Office than to enter the Emperor's palace." Only a madman would dare to go up to the office of Ch'en K'ai-t'ing, because he could only be kicked out. The peasants' resentment hardened in the face of such betrayal by their former patrons, creating a potentially dangerous situation.

To control the peasants, landlords used police, troops, and also private guards empowered to arrest, beat, and imprison them. "Money for the trip and for the palanquin" was expected by police and guards when collecting rent. "Moreover, they called in lepers and drug addicts to press the debts on behalf of the landlords: they would go to the peasants' houses asking for food, and if not satisfied would take down the ancestors' tablets and throw them on the ground, hurting the peasants extremely." When in a lean year rent was due at Yanma village, police were sent in and the peasants fled. The police ransacked the wretched houses, taking off with them women's ornaments worth a few yüan, children's tattered clothes, and the small amount of precious rice that still remained. P'eng remarked: "It was not merely the economic power of the landlords—their system of exploitation—that grew, it was their political power as well." He defined this power of the "new" landlords thus: "Formerly when an argument arose between peasant and landlord, the landlord merely asked officials to handle it. But now the new landlord class uses direct action, mercilessly beating, arresting, and imprisoning peasants. The landlords also directly seize goods in default of rent or forcibly impose military tax."

Tenants had to endure terrible exploitation. To pay the high rents, they incurred further debts, pawned tools and clothing, and subsisted on inadequate food. Sometimes a peasant had to sell his wife and children, and some oppressed peasants resorted to suicide. Many fled to other places to become coolies, bandits, soldiers, or *chu-tzu* ("piglets," that is, emigrant coolies). In the village of Chaoch'ung in Haifeng a landlord forced peasants to sell their children to pay rent and praised them for their "honesty," since doing so would allow them to pay rent and have fewer persons to feed. Peasants in debt did not dare be seen buying things, not even at the New Year; when they did they were waylaid on their return from the market and stripped bare of their meager purchases.

Some landlords tortured the peasants in debt to them. In Kaosha village in the second district of Haifeng, peasants were like "landlords' slaves." There the rent was collected in a Rent Hall equipped with ladders, ropes, chains, whips, rods, and other instruments of torture. A peasant in arrears was locked in there and even strung up in the "monkey hang" pending the selling-off of his ox or son or the marrying-off of his wife. The gentry-landlords used naked physical force to the point where P'eng could charge them with "being after blood every day and driving peasants to death." Some landlords went so far as to collect rent even from tenants who had refused

to work their fields, and they got the support of Ch'en Chiung-ming in this. "The peasants could not say a word."[198]

Landlords lived a life of ease in fine town houses or in spacious and protected mansions in the countryside. Normally theirs was an environment of "modern habits of luxury and social ambitions." They would get up late and when receiving peasants "had to curse them." The peasants were to address landlords as *t'ien-fu* ("land father"), whereas they themselves were *t'ien-tzu* ("land children")—names reminiscent of former ties but pointing now only to bonds of submission and inferiority. When it was time for the collection of the rice rent, landlords "had to show off their wealth," frequently beating tenants if according to their measure the amount was not correct.[199] Landlords had become so "unreasonable" that one of them, Ch'en Hsiao-lun, declared after a sudden change of heart: "People like that are pitiful, disgusting!"[200]

In all this, the only restraint resulted from the recognition that a starving populace could not produce and would very likely become a public menace. As landlords withdrew from their obligations in the patron-client bond, all tenants came to be treated alike, shuffled from one landlord to another through new contracts. Consequently tenants "began to identify all landlords as alike," a class of exploiters.[201] The peasant mentality remained much the same as before, and there was great resentment at the amorality of the gentry-landlords. Even in the early 1920's the fatalistic submission of tenant to landlord was still the rule, under the influence of traditional morality.[202] However, there were examples in Haifeng of tenants hating their landlords so much that when the latter sought refuge in a village during an emergency, the peasants seized their belongings and scattered or destroyed them. Such instances made P'eng P'ai assert: "The villages of those days knew only two fronts: one was the landlords' and one was the peasants'."[203] It would be premature to say that the formation of social classes was taking place at this stage, but by abandoning their tenants, the landlords had certainly driven a wedge between themselves and the peasants.[204]

The alternatives open to the peasants were few indeed. One obvious recourse was to organize in the way they had always done in critical times, with blood oaths—and this was exactly what the 40 peasant families at Yanma did after the police visit. This traditional response was a prelude to confrontation. The lines of battle were being drawn up.[205]

# 2

# New Gentry, New Comrades

P'eng P'ai left for Japan in 1917, motivated both by ideals and by personal ambitions and encouraged by an old family friend who was able to persuade the family to let him go. After the incident of the statue of General Lin, a spell outside the county also seemed opportune.[1]

Students from Haifeng had been going to Japan since 1900, and there were in fact more Chinese students from Kwangtung in Japan than from any other province. The majority stayed for only three to six months, after which they were awarded a fancy and expensive diploma that gave them the cachet of being "foreign-trained students."[2] In the face of this practice, it is worth noting that an observer remarked that "two years were needed for the study of the language, and five years at least for a decent education."[3] It was,only after the Revolution of 1911 that such intellectual tourists were gradually displaced by more serious-minded students. Nonetheless, even before 1911 the student in Japan was exposed to an avalanche of Chinese translations of Japanese and Western works introducing all kinds of contemporary ideas—among which socialism loomed large. By 1916 it was estimated that more than two-thirds of all eminent Chinese were former students in Japan.[4]

There were a number of reasons for this attraction to Japan. It was near and inexpensive; it shared cultural similarities with China; key Western works were already available there in translation; and its defeat of Russia in 1905 showed what modernization might achieve for China, too.

It is unlikely that P'eng was sent to Japan at the expense of Ch'en Chiung-ming, despite claims to the contrary; the P'eng family had funds enough to support him. He may well have done some studying in Canton before set-

ting off abroad. When P'eng P'ai arrived for his four-year stay, he found the Chinese students well organized. He met Haifeng students already in Japan, among whom was Yang Szu-chen. Other Haifeng natives joined him later, including Li Kuo-chen, Lin Su, Lin T'ieh-shih, and his brother P'eng Tse. His best friend during his years in Japan was Li Ch'un-t'ao from Ch'aochoufu, with whom he shared many ideals. Li and P'eng remained close in much of their later life.[5]

P'eng P'ai first entered the Sejō Academy (*Sejō gakkō*) in Tokyo, where he was a boarder. Discipline was strict and much time was dedicated to learning the Japanese language. Still, he found time to become involved in the political activities of the Chinese students in Japan. Shortly after P'eng graduated from the Sejō Academy in May 1918, a crisis gripped the student community when news reports indicated that Japan was pressuring China to sign an anti-Bolshevik military pact. The Chinese students in Japan reacted angrily, and the authorities forbade them to assemble in protest. They ignored the ban and met secretly in Tokyo on May 5. P'eng P'ai and two others, all ardent patriots, circulated a photograph of a coffin representing the proposed agreement with the caption "Here is the picture of the funeral of our country! Look at it and feel revenge!" The meeting resolved that all students should return to China before May 20 to do all in their power to prevent a sellout of Chinese interests to Japan. There was another secret meeting on May 16, the day Prime Minister Tuan Ch'i-jui signed the pact; this time 46 student leaders were discovered by the police and beaten and arrested.[6]

P'eng P'ai was not among those seized on May 16, though he may still have been in Japan. In any event, he was soon among the 3,000 Chinese students who returned home, for we next find him in Shanghai, where he assisted in the founding of the *Chiu-kuo jih-pao* (*National Salvation Daily*) and wrote an article for the *Kuo-min jih-pao* (*Republican Daily*) entitled "Declaration of the Returned Students Weeping with Their Compatriots," in which he urged intellectuals, peasants, workers, and merchants to unite against Japan.[7] P'eng then returned via Canton to Haifeng, where he set about organizing local groups among the students to spread propaganda against Japan. When the Peking government ordered the students back to Japan after the summer vacations, P'eng P'ai found that he was on the police blacklist and subject to constant surveillance. Nonetheless, he enrolled at Waseda University on September 30, 1918, as a student at the Semmombu ("Special Division"). He was down to read political science and economics, and his

referee was Hung T'ui, the Kwangtung government's student supervisor in Japan.[8]

Waseda University was a unique institution in that it advocated an independent spirit of learning with a critical approach and invited creative, even rebellious activities. It had been privately founded with the express purpose of creating an elite outside the bureaucratic order to provide a check on it. P'eng began his work there before the imposition of a curriculum reform in April 1919. Waseda was popular for journalism and law, with notable political activists among its alumni, and it was also strong on agrarian problems, eventually turning out many of the finest agrarian leaders in the country.[9]

P'eng P'ai entered Waseda at a critical time in Japan's history. The first party cabinet was in office, the World War had just ended, and in Russia the Bolshevik Revolution was being consolidated. The democratic principles of President Wilson were a beacon for progressive elements in Japan. When Professor Yoshino Sakuzō of Tokyo Imperial University published his declaration on "Democracy," the response from intellectuals was tremendous. Socialist journals sprang up and in December 1920 the Japanese Socialist Federation was formed with two dominant groups—the Anarcho-Syndicalists and the Bolsheviks. Postwar inflation resulted in labor unrest and the growth of unions, and the gap between rich and poor was great.[10]

In the countryside a peasant movement had begun in 1916–17, and by 1920 there were 408 local peasant associations with a membership of over 37,000. Better education, political awareness, and a new sense of their hardships and rights spurred the peasants to join the associations. In 1917, for instance, tenants managed to have their rent reduced after a bad harvest by threatening to quit the fields. The peasant associations were able to resolve 50 percent of the disputes between landlords and tenants, and were a force to be reckoned with.[11]

Students were in the van of every social movement, disseminating ideas and giving practical assistance. A new radical society, the Shinjinkai ("New Men Society"), was founded at Tokyo Imperial University in November 1918 with internationalism as its watchword and ideas drawn from the Russian Revolution and Wilsonian democracy. In emulation, Waseda founded in February 1919 the Minjindōmeikai ("People's League"), which included democrats, syndicalists, and socialists. The more moderate elements eventually broke away and formed the Kensetsushadōmei ("Builders' League") under the leadership of Wada Iwao, with Kitazawa Shinjirō, a professor of

economics, as adviser. The Builders' League adopted a moderate and realistic line that looked to a rational social democracy that would be neither communism nor radical syndicalism, and it held that labor and peasant unions were forces for change.[12] P'eng P'ai in a letter to his friend Li Ch'un-t'ao later recalled his membership in the Kensetsushadōmei under the leadership of Wada, "its founder and our friend-in-arms in the class struggle, and above all the promoter and leader of the peasant movement."[13]

Though in Japan the prevailing radical creed was initially anarcho-syndicalism, by 1919 the communists were gaining ground. Marxist-influenced societies, journals, and activities started to appear, and at the Imperial University the first anniversary of the founding of the Shinjinkai was celebrated in November 1919 with lectures on Marx, Kropotkin, Lenin, Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg. At Waseda the new Gyōminkai ("Dawn of the People Society") formed the nucleus of the first Communist Party in Japan. But this was a time of conflicting currents for the Japanese radical movement. The anarchists at first applauded the Russian Revolution, then later repudiated it for its methods and the authoritarianism it soon displayed.[14]

The Kensetsushadōmei held summer sessions in 1920 and 1921 in order to spread socialist ideology, promote the abolition of capitalism, and foster the development of a rational society. It sponsored various political, social, and economic activities under the blanket slogan of the Bolshevik Revolution: "to the people." The Shinjinkai also became more radical, urging members into greater involvement with the people and collaborating with the Yuaikai ("Friendship Society"), a mutual-aid organization for workers.[15]

P'eng P'ai joined one of these Friendship Society groups and was very active. With Li Ch'un-t'ao and Yang Szu-chen, he set up for his fellow students the Ch'ih-hsin-she ("Red Heart Society"), which had a magazine of the same name; communist literature was greatly discussed. P'eng also attended lectures given by the most famous Japanese Marxist, Kawakami Hajime. In November 1920 the Red Hearts enrolled themselves into a "Cosmos Club" founded by a Japanese and a Korean. The aim of the international club was to discuss solutions for the problems of China and the world. It was influenced by the anarchist Osugi Sakoe and came under special police surveillance.[16]

The Kensetsushadōmei members also were watched by the authorities, and P'eng P'ai was spied upon. From a later time, a secret report lists P'eng P'ai as belonging to the Builders' League, adding: "at that time he was al-

ready identified by the Yadobashi Police Station as a special-surveillance person." Only a few members of the League could recall P'eng's activities, however, and that may indicate that he was not overmuch involved. One member, Kiyake Shoi, remembered him as attending the "study group" quite often.[17]

The Builders' League concentrated on agrarian problems, Wada Iwao being greatly concerned about peasant problems. In 1920 he returned to his home prefecture of Gifu, where an ex-soldier from Siberia had led the tenants in a confrontation with the landlords that resulted in the latter being compelled to reduce rents. Students began a movement to organize the peasants in the Kanto area. P'eng P'ai spent ten days or more assisting with this activity, but, as he later wrote to his friend Li Ch'un-t'ao, it was a dreadful experience. He had gone without sleep, returned exhausted and sick, and almost despaired of his life. When Builders' League members finished Waseda, their involvement with the peasants intensified, partly because, as radicals, the graduates had great difficulty in securing employment. Kitazawa advocated "going to the peasants" and creating a real movement. He regarded the Japan Peasant Union, founded in April 1922 at the YMCA in Kanda, as merely a welfare organization based on Christian humanism. On October 14, 1922, another independent Peasant Union was founded under the sponsorship of the Kensetsushadōmei (Kantō branch), and its aim was to free peasants from exploitation and oppression.[18]

P'eng P'ai could not have been immune from the highly radical influence of all these events and ideas around him. But in his search for a "rational society" he also became a Christian, believing that China's salvation lay in Christianity. This hope did not last long, however, for he later took pains to convince others that Christianity was of no value and that Christians were backward people because they preached love and submission. To hasten social changes, he decided to put his trust in socialism and set himself to wholehearted study of it. His friend Li Ch'un-t'ao and his brother P'eng Tse confirmed his Christian period in Japan.[19]

An incident with the police turned P'eng into an internationalist. He was one of 200 Chinese students among a university population of almost 13,000. He resented being informed on by a Japanese fellow-student for the simple reason that he was "Chinese." He told his brother that to love only one's own country was not enough, indeed would lead to hurting other countries. Although he joined the "Love China" movement, he therefore made a point of being active also in the "Love Korea" movement and of

joining the May Day celebrations in Tokyo. His Cosmos Club membership was in line with his internationalism, which also found support in anarcho-communist ideologies and Marxism.[20]

For all that, while in Japan P'eng P'ai must have been constantly exercised by the problems of his own country—the very reason for his being there at all. As he put it: "The first duty of a Chinese . . . is to save his country."[21] Li Ch'un-t'ao claims that it was this that led P'eng to despise Japan for its policies against China. Such feelings were shared by the other Chinese there, who experienced the humiliation of their country yet more when in May 1919 the Versailles Peace Conference handed over Tsingtao to Japan. They immediately organized a mass rally in Tokyo to protest and to petition the several embassies involved. The Chinese Legation in Tokyo, consulted for the use of its grounds for the rally, was noncommittal. After news came of the May Fourth Movement in Peking, the students decided to hold the rally come what may; 27 students were seriously wounded and 35 arrested. P'eng P'ai is listed as number 18 among the wounded: "scalp, arms, and legs hurt and bleeding." By May 29 all were released, except two who got prison terms. The Japanese insisted that they had attacked the students at the request of the Chinese Acting Minister and the supervisor of the Chinese students.

For P'eng P'ai the incident and his wounds gave grounds for pride, and he sent the Haifeng Student Union a square of cloth inscribed in his own blood with the phrase "*wu-wang kuo-ch'ih*" ("do not forget the national humiliation"). The message was put on the bulletin board of the Middle School in Haifeng where the Union had its headquarters. Unable to bear Tokyo any longer, P'eng P'ai returned to Shanghai later that May and joined the patriotic movement engendered from May Fourth. He went home to Haifeng to make propaganda against militarism and warlordism and to organize student groups in a boycott of Japanese goods in Haifeng and Swabue. It was autumn before he left again for Japan.[22]

Once back there, he plunged into radical activities within the Kensetsu-shadōmei. The Chinese students who had to tolerate their country being reviled by Japanese classmates found solace in working with the radical Japanese students, whose resentment of their own government matched their chagrin. It is not known whether P'eng P'ai joined the communist Gyōmin-kai, whose leader Takatsu Seidō was also a member of the Shina Kyokai ("China Association"), an on-campus body with several Japanese student radicals among its members.[23]

P'eng P'ai's graduation certificate was issued on July 28, 1921, his overall

result below "B average." He had attended three years: the first ending in July 1919, the second in July 1920, and the third in July 1921.[24] The precise date of his return home is uncertain. One contemporary states that he was back in Haifeng in mid-1921 for the funeral of his grandmother. What is beyond doubt is that he was in Japan on May Day that year, for his description of it appears in the obscure journal *Shuang-chou p'ing-lun* (*The Fortnightly Critique*), a Wuhsi (Kiangsu) publication. Other sources have him visiting Russia, which seems improbable.[25]

Ch'en Chiung-ming meanwhile had continued in more or less close involvement with Sun. In August 1920 he finally agreed to Sun's reiterated requests for a campaign against the Kwangsi clique, and began his drive toward Canton under the banner: "Kwangtung governed by the Kwangtung people." Hai-Lu-feng was solidly behind the Kwangtung Army led by Ch'en and Teng K'eng: people cheered the soldiers and provided porters. By the end of October the army was in Canton. It was then that the fundamental differences between the ideology and the objectives of Ch'en and Sun emerged.[26] The *North China Herald* summed up these divergencies nicely: "Sun wants liberation in the name of constitutionalism. Ch'en preaches self-government, provincial autonomy, and a federation of self-governing provinces."[27] After mediation by the leftist leaders Wang Ching-wei and Liao Chung-k'ai, Ch'en on November 1, 1920, became Governor of Kwangtung and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Sun was allowed back to Canton on November 28. The *North China Herald* commented: "Sun went back to Canton as a liberator, Ch'en as a conqueror."[28] On April 7, 1921, Sun was elected Extra-ordinary President, despite Chen's objections. In the event Ch'en was willing to give him a try. On May 5 Sun proposed a Northern Expedition aimed at unifying China by force. Ch'en took a neutral stance when Sun in November reached Kweilin, kept himself aloof, and made sure that the funds from the treasury remained under his control.[29]

In Canton Ch'en again pursued his modernization program and invited Ch'en Tu-hsiu to head the new Kwangtung Board of Education. The new chairman transferred his famous journal *Hsin ch'ing-nien* (*New Youth*) to Canton and busied himself also with socialist and communist organizing work. When Ch'en was informed about it, he smiled and remarked: "Foreigners are prone to grow a little hysterical at the mere word 'Bolshevism.'"[30]

The British Diplomatic Service did indeed grow quite alarmed at the

"Bolshevik publications" that were everywhere in Canton, emanating from Hong Kong; other material was distributed in Swatow "apparently from Ch'en Chiung-ming's yamen." Ch'en appeared at this time to the British as having "an extreme socialist turn of mind" and as being "in fact almost a Bolshevik" since his Fukien days, and "an earnest patron of the Chinese anarchist and communist societies." The consul-general in Canton reported that a Japanese adviser was assisting Ch'en "in the establishment of local Soviets." Ch'en at the peak of his achievements radiated self-assurance and was helped by competent men.[31] Liao Chung-k'ai restored the city's finances, commerce and industry developed, and provincial revenue rose from ¥18 million in 1920 to ¥31.8 million in 1921. Kwangtung was slowly becoming the model province in South China.[32]

Hong Kong naturally took an interest in all the important events on the mainland, and at times the Colony's influence went so far as to condition the outcome of power-conflicts there. In the early 1920's Ch'en Chiung-ming's good offices were sought in the social upheavals and labor unrest then plaguing the Colony. In return Ch'en was given indirect assistance in consolidating his power in Canton. "Hong Kong has become the headquarters of all antirevolutionary forces," declared Borodin later, and added: "Canton, in fact all of Kwangtung, Swatow, the southern parts of Hunan and at least a part of Kwangsi, gravitate economically toward Hong Kong. It is their point of contact with the outside world and with foreign imperialism." He compared the Colony to a giant spider. "Kwangtung and bordering provinces are in the economic thralls of the little British island metropolis."[33]

True it was that Ch'en's associates and the new rich in Hai-Lu-feng salted away their money in foreign banks. They also had a penchant for foreign luxury goods and apparel. In 1913 a missionary observed that "foreign dress is becoming common, with summer straw hat and winter felt hat." The gentleman "has his collars and cuffs, his studs and links, shoes and stockings."[34] P'eng P'ai later noticed "gold-rimmed eyeglasses, gold watch and gold chain" on the landlords in session. His own family, too, was the proud owner of a gramophone, "a huge box with a great horn" costing at that time some 35 ounces of silver. Other families would have a piano or the latest gadgets and appliances to be found on the market in Hong Kong.[35]

In 1921 Ch'en began a communications system to extend through all Kwangtung with wireless links: in 1922 he announced plans for new railways, while starting a large road network. There had been a telegraph between Canton, Hong Kong, and Shanghai since 1884, and by 1908 Kwang-

tung was served by 1,000 kilometers of wire.[36] A 1911 report gives Haifeng as having "a telegraph station" while Swabue could boast a post office "with an English-speaking postmaster." Swabue got electric light in 1923 and Haifeng the telephone, which only reached Lufeng five years later. In 1924 bus service between Haifeng and Swabue and then also Kungp'ing was inaugurated. Ch'en had already introduced mechanization into local industry, and built an arsenal. The "Commander's Office" had its own power station near the river, though Haifeng city was to be still lit by oil lamps for a few years more. Ch'en published the first Haifeng newspaper in 1909, but following the May Fourth Movement a better one, the *Lu'an jih-k'an* (*Lu'an Daily*), appeared along with other magazines from the local printing press.[37]

Influence from abroad was stepped up by emigration, and by emigrants returning home. These were bona fide emigrants; but there were also bad characters fleeing the law. The economic and social situation in Hai-Lufeng at times was such that to go abroad was often the only means of survival. People made for Hong Kong, Macao, and Swatow, from where they could also reach further into the Nanyang ("Southern Ocean"), often exploited in this by the go-betweens whose practices were known as *mai chu-tzu* ("selling piglets").[38]

As a returned student P'eng P'ai enjoyed a special status and had the outlook peculiar to his kind. According to a 1923 article, the students back from Japan—in contrast to those from Europe and America, who were generally conceited—remained good Chinese: "We can say that from Chinese students in Japan comes a new hope."[39] There is some reason, judging from the enlistment roll of Republican revolutionaries and later of the Communist Party, to think that the students from Japan were more responsive to radical ideology and to calls for social action. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that P'eng P'ai, like the others, was greatly influenced by the ideologies and organizations he had met, especially the Kensetsushadōmei with its involvement in peasant affairs. Although an article of 1922 branded the Japanese peasant movement as much hot air and little action, it was nonetheless "marvelous for its spirit and worth all praise and wholehearted allegiance." The article pointed out that the peasants had to rely on themselves rather than on the bombast of the intellectuals and that land nationalization was the key to solving their problems. The article amounted to a blueprint for action in China in advocating similar measures there. The *Tung-fang tsa-chih* carried an important addition to it which concerned "peasant educa-

tion." It was this that gave "spontaneity" to the movement in Japan, for it fostered "awareness of classes." Since in China peasants had been for centuries without education, this deficiency had to be made good for any success with them.[40]

A KMT document, "Kao nung-min-shu" ("Letter-declaration to the peasants"), asserted two years later, with reference to Japan, that helping the peasants required political will and appropriate legislation. In Japan, the document noted, despite cooperatives and credit unions it had taken 40 years to improve the peasants' lot without government assistance. It was obvious that social power came from political power.[41]

The returned students at the start of the 1920's realized that they could not "wait for angels to come and save China." Japan had become "the fountainhead of the radical movement, both anarchist and Marxist in the Far East at that time." After the May Fourth Movement there was a sharp turn to the left, along with the need for reform which took on an urgency that could brook no delay.[42] When P'eng P'ai arrived home he was a convinced radical and a willing revolutionary. However, the Japanese experience, though influential, was not the only factor that set him on his revolutionary course: his own previous cultural background cannot be ignored. In this respect it must be said that P'eng P'ai never once openly gave credit to his Japanese years for anything he later planned or did. Japan confirmed him in his radicalism because Haifeng and its particular milieu had made him a revolutionary already. The cultural world of Tokyo refined what he had assimilated in Haifeng. The cherished ideal, the embraced vocation became crystallized in the national cause, to be upheld even to the shedding of blood.[43]

The influences that had worked upon P'eng P'ai in Japan were paralleled by similar forces prevailing in Hai-Lu-feng, for Ch'en Chiung-ming himself had given them rein. The social world of Haifeng was abruptly broken into by the new-fangled values so bumptiously advocated by the "new gentry." Anarchism was now all the rage.[44] It had been first introduced into China in 1903 by a pamphlet of that title—in Chinese, *Wu-cheng-fu chu-i*. Anarchism developed out of the belief that man is by nature good and that, if left alone, he will build a just and good society. Coercive authority and state or other divisions hinder this process. The anarchism that appealed to the young intellectuals of China encompassed not only pure individual freedom but also total collectivism. Bakunin (1814–76) and Kropotkin (1842–1921)—the latter with his *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*—had made the

greatest impression on the Chinese anarchists, who were mesmerized by the vision of a communist order established on the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[45]

Embracing wholeheartedly the new theories, and carried away by his discovery of Social Darwinism, Ch'en Chiung-ming went so far as to change his name to "Ching-ts'un" ("struggle for life"). Chu Chih-hsin was his mentor in anarchism and revolutionary thinking; under his tutelage Ch'en became a man with a new life-style.[46] As described by the *North China Herald* in 1922, he was reticent, serious, devoted to his family and duties, not given to extravagance, and without personal capital or private fortune, since he took no thought for himself. He did not drink and was against opium and gambling—in short, an ardent reformist of principle with complete faith in anarchist tenets. His was "a kind of radicalism whose intensity is in inverse proportion to its practical possibilities, the radicalism of impotence."[47] He became the protector of the anarchists in Kwangtung and of their societies, the "Cock-Crow" and "Conscience Society," and he himself took lessons in Esperanto, the movement's language. Before long Canton became the anarchist center of China, and the journal *Min-sheng* (*Voice of the People*) was full of syndicalist ideas and translations of Kropotkin.[48]

Later, in Fukien, Ch'en again surrounded himself with old anarchist cronies. In a Foreword to the first issue of the paper *Min-hsing pao* (*Fukien Star*), which he founded in Changchou, Ch'en shows the drift of his thoughts. Social Darwinism and Kropotkin-style anarchism would bring about a progressively better society until the continuum of evolution arrived at utopia. Final victory would come more through mutual aid than through personal struggle for survival. Revolutionaries in Shanghai spoke in the early 1920's of Fukien as the place where new ideas, writings, and people would be welcomed.[49] The leading intellectuals in the country were at this time anarchists. Mao Tse-tung in 1919 also regarded Kropotkin as superior to Marx.[50] Students were convinced, says one commentator, that "there was no higher political teaching in the world than anarchism," which became "the religion of the new Chinese intelligentsia."[51]

Anarchism also took root in the labor movement with a "Mutual Aid Society" launched in October 1920 in Canton, and a Canton Tea-house Labor Union inspired by anarcho-syndicalist ideas. Ch'en Chiung-ming himself pursued a progressive, though not radical, labor policy.[52]

In 1922 Ch'en's government was thought to be soft on the laboring class; and Canton, it was said, was fast becoming the danger spot of China. A

*North China Herald* headline read: "Ch'en Chiung-ming's flirtation with the Communists."[53] He had already in 1921 been described as a Chinese Bolshevik, and when Sneevliet, one of the early Comintern envoys, visited him later that year Ch'en was considering a new socialist party to implement his federalist ideas. He also seemed keen on obtaining some kind of agreement with Soviet Russia and on securing Russian military advisers for the army. He promised that a Comintern office could be set up in Canton. (We have noted the British consul's remark about Bolshevik literature in Swatow.) In 1922, when Ch'en was at odds with Sun, he was praised for his sympathetic attitude toward socialism by members of the CCP.[54]

Ch'en indeed could fit all these descriptions. It must be remembered that, as in Japan, the lines between anarchism, socialism, and communism were at that time far from clear in the minds of Ch'en, his admirers, and his critics. Up to 1911 many Chinese intellectuals thought of anarcho-communism as the essence of socialism, and before 1921 many Chinese writers looked upon Bolshevism as a faction of anarchism rather than of Marxism. Some Chinese socialists believed that socialism contained two branches: the collectivism of Marxist philosophy, and the communism (that is to say the anarchism) of Kropotkin. The Chinese anarchist organization in Japan was called the "Society for the Study of Socialism," and its declared aim was the implementation of anarcho-socialism. This is not to say that communism in China derived from anarchism, since the influence of the latter on the former has not been clearly established. There are those who in Meisner's words hold that "the birth of Marxism in China . . . owed more to the Western liberal and democratic tradition (more precisely to the disillusionment with that tradition) than to the earlier anarchist movement."[55]

P'eng P'ai returned from Japan in the summer of 1921 to a hero's welcome and soon found himself leader of the young elite. There is no record of any special activities undertaken by this elite in Haifeng during the last period of his absence, except that many youths joined the army of Ch'en and that the Student Union was launched in Hai-Lu-feng in the wake of May Fourth. With this movement radicalism became respectable, particularly in Hai-Lu-feng where the long tradition of political activism had made the local elite especially prone to it.

The ideological mood of the times is the key to understanding the mentality and activity of the "new comrades," who were part of the new wave of concerned youth—mainly an intellectual elite—asking for drastic mea-

sures to solve China's problems and assure its independence from foreign domination.[56] A modern Chinese writer has noted that between the last decade of the nineteenth century and the 1920's at least two generational shifts had taken place: a first one from the generation that reached its intellectual maturity in the 1890's and 1900's to that which became prominent in the 1910's; and a second from this "middle generation" to the student activists of the 1920's. "These student leaders were increasingly skeptical about the effectiveness of the prescriptions that the vanguard intellectuals of the 1910's offered for China's problems." The older group had believed that "meaningful political action would become possible only when the spiritual ailments of the Chinese people had been cured."[57] The young were impatient, convinced of the efficacy of personal engagement and direct action, and of the urgency of the situation. They spoke increasingly about revolution, a term which they endowed with an almost mystical significance. Their faith was in communism, the logical consequence of all that the new gentry had advocated. They were, however, drifting more and more apart from this new gentry, and sought an identity of their own as "new" people in a "new" Haifeng. They gave this "newness" their own special sense, one much more radical than that intended by their elder mentors, the "comrades" of 1911, as the result of their revolution. For this reason we call them the "new comrades." The anarcho-communism of the old comrades had failed: it was time to try the Marxist-Communism of the new comrades.[58]

There was disillusionment after the May Fourth Movement, now seen as just a firework. The "era of mingled skepticism, romanticism, liberalism, realism, and anarchism" came to an end.[59] It was the turn of Marxism, if not as a totally understood ideology then at least as a political doctrine. At the end of 1919 socialism in a variety of forms was all the rage among youths and intellectuals. There was a spate of translations of works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin; magazines and newspapers everywhere encouraged the trend. The main question asked was why the Russians had succeeded in their revolution, and the answer, as Chang Kuo-t'ao noted in 1920, invariably was "socialism." Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, the two men largely responsible for the introduction of communism into China, represented the prime needs of the movement in their own persons: Ch'en was "a tradition-smasher" and Li symbolized the call "Go to the people."[60]

There was also great admiration for Russia itself for being antiexpansionist and antiimperialist, and for fending off so well the threats of outside imperialism. Chang Kuo-t'ao saw the "Manifesto on China" delivered by

Lev Karakhan on July 25, 1919, as the turning point. Russia became a friend to China and a model to be followed. Analogies between the two countries were constantly being drawn. Such Soviet slogans as "National Liberation" and "Peace, Land, and Bread" were as attractive as the French "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."[61] Besides, for the future, the one sure thing appeared to be the need for action, and this factor again focused attention on Marxism. Marxism seemed to be both scientific and anti-Western, a compound that ideally suited the temper of the times. In the Chinese Marxist movement there was one single towering aim: that China should once again be independent and respected among the nations of the world. There was in general a craving for a sense of national identity, and this together with a history of service to the state and a rejection of capitalism lent appeal to Marxism.[62]

These were the ideological forces at work in Hai-Lu-feng among the young when P'eng P'ai came back from Japan, equally convinced that the solution lay in a revolution of the communist type. In a letter to Wen Liang, dated September 7, 1923, he writes: "Before, I firmly believed in anarcho-communism, but two years ago I started believing in Marx."[63] His previous contacts with the Student Union, enhanced by his aura of a patriotic hero and his prestige as a returned student, allowed him to have a great impact on it. The Hai-Lu-feng Union had nationwide connections but a special affinity with the Swatow chapter, where communist publications were particularly in demand. The Ch'aochou Students' Association, originally only for students from that area, extended its membership in the early 1920's to Meihsien, Haifeng, Lufeng, and elsewhere. Its main aim was to boycott Japanese goods. This body was extraordinarily powerful and took second place only to the army. With such a link, the young intelligentsia in Haifeng continued along their radical way when Ch'en Chiung-ming moved to Canton and adopted a more cautious stance.[64]

As we have seen, Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1920 was invited to Canton to run the Board of Education in Kwangtung, and by this time his magazine *Hsin ch'ing-nien* had made him a national figure. He had had previous experience in the job as Commissioner for Education in Anhwei. Ch'en took the opportunity to spread the ideas of the New Culture Movement and socialism. Ch'en Chiung-ming treated him with great deference and asked him to set up a "Propaganda Training Institute."[65]

Ch'en Tu-hsiu founded a communist nucleus in Canton in January 1921. Its secretary was T'an P'ing-shan, its organizational head was Ch'en Kung-po, its propaganda chief was T'an Chih-t'ang, and it included among its

members the anarchist Ou Sheng-pai. This group published weekly the *Lao-tung-sheng* (*Labor Herald*) and spread communism among school students. Ch'en also started a *She-hui ch'ing-nien t'uan* (Socialist Youth Corps, hereafter SYC) unit in Canton, the founders of which included P'eng P'ai, Lo Ch'i-yüan, and Juan Hsiao-hsien.[66] Some believe that P'eng P'ai was involved in the communist movement from the time he came back from Japan, but it must be remembered that the SYC was not the Chinese Communist Party as such. Probably P'eng was not yet a Party member at this time: Chou Fo-hai, who represented the Chinese students in Japan at the inaugural meeting of the CCP in Shanghai in July 1921, states that, apart from himself, "the only other CCP member among the Chinese students in Japan then was Shih Ts'ung-t'ung, on his own in Tokyo."[67] According to P'eng's letter to Li Ch'un-t'ao, his friend from Japan days, when he arrived in Canton in 1921 he met the main leaders from Haifeng and for two months preached to them anarcho-socialist principles larded with Marxist and patriotic tenets such as he later made public in his "Declaration to My Countrymen." They understood what he meant but "preferred to keep silent," was P'eng P'ai's sad comment. Those who formerly thought well of him were disappointed at his extremism and complained that he had gone to Japan "to learn bad ideas."[68]

Once back home, an observer records, he linked up again with students of the Middle School and his former classmates. P'eng reveled in being with them and in reviving the way of life he had enjoyed in Japan. There was no generation gap among them, and "the echoes of the May Fourth Movement still reverberated in this remote corner of China, where students could read magazines such as *New Youth*, *Creation*, *New Tide*, along with new novels and poetry." P'eng himself had brought home stacks of books on socialism from his sojourns in Japan, Shanghai, and Canton. There is no doubt that he was popular with the students: his personal magnetism soon made him a reliable and trusted figure among them. His democratic methods of handling them and running discussions assured him of leadership. It was not long before he had organized a Society for the Study of Socialism based at the Mien-te-t'ang, a Ch'en lineage hall in Luang-huo street. Its 70 members included young people from the Haifeng Middle, the Lu'an Normal, and the Sericulture School, together with graduate students and progressive-minded intellectuals such as Cheng Chih-yün, Li Lao-kung, P'eng Yüan-chang, Ch'en K'uei-ya, Ch'en Shun-i, Lin Tao-wen, Yang Wang, and the returned students (from Japan) Li Kuo-chen and Lin Su. These people were

to become the revolutionary core in Hai-Lu-feng. Whether it was pressure from this group that secured for P'eng the job of Haifeng Director of Education is not known, but it is significant that the new Society worked out of one of the Ch'en lineage halls. P'eng P'ai also organized at this time a Workers' Friendship Society, which was probably similar to the one he had joined in Japan.[69]

Some biographers describe the Society for the Study of Socialism as a cover for the Socialist Youth Corps. Chung I-mou, one of those who believe that P'eng was already a communist at this time, says he was planning to form a CCP cell with his intimates through secret meetings at a large rock on the slopes of Lungshan known as Hsien-t'a-shih ("fairy foothold rock"). Chung adds: "This, of course, was something known only to a few people."[70]

P'eng P'ai's involvement with the SYC, at least, is certain. Its members have been described as a motley crowd of malcontents, ranging from anarchists to antimilitarists and anti-Confucianists. After the founding of the Corps in Shanghai by Ch'en Tu-hsiu (assisted by another Comintern man, Grigory Voitinsky) in August 1920, its numbers grew rapidly. Chang T'ai-lei was the liaison officer with the parent body, the International Youth Organization in Moscow. In November 1921 all noncommunist members were expelled and the units were reorganized. Intended as the junior arm of the CCP, the SYC nevertheless was allowed a measure of independence and went its own way. By the time of its First Congress in May 1922, it had seventeen units with some 5,000 members in the age range 15 to 28, which made it larger than the CCP.[71] Chang Kuo-t'ao found it appropriate that SYC members were the first Chinese communists to be interested in the peasant movement: the unit in Canton was particularly active in this respect. The SYC came to be known also as the Communist Youth Organization and especially the Communist Youth Corps, and the latter was in fact ruled the official title at the Third Congress in February 1925.[72]

A foreign observer noted that "the Communist Youth in villages are mostly the sons of small capitalist freeholders and especially of small freeholder peasants."[73] The aspirations of these youngsters in Hai-Lu-feng went far beyond what their education, provided by the "new gentry," could offer them. There was much questioning of and pointing out of new ways to their elders, whose present political success was seen as social failure. The Student Union decided to express its own views in a journal *Hsin Hai-feng* (*New Haifeng*) which in name and content showed the difference in pro-

gram and in outlook of the "new comrades" from that of the "new gentry" and their earlier *Hai-feng tzu-chih pao*. The enrollment of students into the SYC went on apace, with activists busy winning converts and supplying communist literature. In Canton in 1921, for example, it was a student from Haifeng who pressed his old classmate Ch'iu Kuo-chen, serving there in Ch'en's army, to join.[74]

"Haifeng has to change along with everything else. It is not enough to change the structure and the external appearance: the spirit must change too." So ran a leading article in *Hsin Hai-feng*'s first issue in September 1921.[75] The "new gentry" had done much in their day, but now that day was done and discontent was rife because of the divergence between their words and deeds. Li Ch'un-t'ao recorded that, at the old guard's stubborn rejection of his new ideas, "P'eng P'ai also felt totally dejected."[76] Structures had changed, but how far and to what purpose, if "outsiders are unable to recognize anything new in Haifeng?" In fact the place was different only as a result of the new organization and cultural movements that the new magazine represented, and the "new comrades" were taking all the credit. They also assumed responsibility for a change of spirit in Haifeng: "Because we are new, we come to a new Haifeng, to make a new life, free and peaceful . . . to which end, all in Haifeng must become new." They did not despise the Haifeng that existed; keeping the uninterrupted line of thought and action with their elders, they simply said that it was not enough and that much more had to be done. The second leading article in the same issue lauded the press and its power to condition public opinion and promote culture.[77] "Today there are newspapers and magazines under the control of bureaucrats and a small number of the leading class, running-dogs exploiting them for their interests and to dominate national life. . . . Some of them function simply to heap praises on a handful of leaders or to air the views of a single individual."[78] It was quite clear who was being attacked: Ch'en had his *Lu'an jih-k'an* in Haifeng and other papers in Hong Kong. "The Old Haifeng is the past and present: the new Haifeng is the one to come. . . . New Haifeng society must get rid of darkness, dirt, conservatism, class divisions, and its condition of prostration; it must turn on the light, become clean and progressive, there must be equality, it must stand erect."[79] In principle this was not very different from what the editors' immediate predecessors had proclaimed but complacently forgotten. Therefore "the *New Haifeng* is the morning bell and the county drum sounding to wake up those who sleep day and night." The article ended with a ringing proclamation which did not

leave any doubt about the sincerity and determination of the new comrades: "We wish to take this opportunity to struggle for progress. We heed neither suffering nor loss. We do not fear suffering. We shall push social development to the stage of perfection, and this is the purpose of publishing our magazine."[80]

Was this the opening salvo of a revolution in the making, or mere rhetoric combined with the Confucian belief that enlightened men are always receptive to good intentions? The latter is perhaps the case; youth magazines of the time were full of strong words, and P'eng P'ai and his young student friends were not ready yet, as we shall see, to initiate a real social movement involving the people. In this respect they differed little from their counterparts elsewhere in China, whom Li Ta-chao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and others were urging to "go to the people" but who stayed talking, reluctant to make a move.

We must not exclude the possibility that besides lofty ideals there were ulterior motives in the stand the "new comrades" took. The young graduates certainly did feel frustrated and ignored by their overbearing elders and were possibly jealous of them for holding all the positions. "Post hoc ergo propter hoc" is surely wisdom too easily bought; but it is worth noting that a month after *New Haifeng* first appeared, P'eng P'ai was appointed to the job that all the students had requested for him.[81]

The "Table of Contents" of *Hsin Hai-feng* introduces the young writers by name. There are two pieces by Cheng Chih-yün, who as secretary of the Union must have been prominent in the editing and production of it. A gifted student, Cheng had been at Haifeng High Primary and Middle School, and he later became a teacher at Haifeng Number 6 Primary School inside the Lin family ancestral temple, very near to where he had been born. He was shy, particularly about speaking in public, but P'eng P'ai esteemed him and trusted him greatly. It was Cheng, according to a resident, who helped P'eng write articles when he was at the Education Bureau, and judging from the volume of his contributions to *New Haifeng* he was a man of many ideas. Eventually he became the secretary of the CCP in Haifeng, responsible for internal affairs and underground activities. It could be said that Cheng and P'eng complemented one another perfectly: P'eng was impulsive and given to emotion, whereas Cheng was phlegmatic and thoughtful.[82]

After Cheng's two pieces comes Li Kuo-chen's "My Idea of Human Life." All three articles are very serious in tone. There follows P'eng P'ai's

"*Kao t'ung-pao*" (Declaration to My Countrymen), a lengthy and forceful exposition of why radical change is necessary. In what appears to be a manifesto for the "new comrades," P'eng reveals an impulsive, clear-cut, transparent character that abhors half measures and circumlocution:[83]

> The surgeon's knife is called for. This is none other than the "socialist revolution," the instrument whereby the healing power of "socialism" is applied.
>
> There are many brands of socialism, both in theory and in practice, yet all of them have the same two goals: to destroy the oppression, misery, and ignorance of the existing society and to build a new world where life is good and men are happy. The enemies of socialism equate communism with "the equal distribution of wealth," a popular but erroneous belief. The equal distribution of wealth means that the private wealth of each individual must be gathered together and then shared out to all equally. This is but Private Property under another guise. In communism, however, everything in society is owned in common by society. All contribute their utmost and all receive according to their need. No one, we repeat, no one is permitted to own anything, and therein lies the deathblow to Private Property.

Small wonder that, according to Chung I-mou, Ch'en Chiung-ming took special note of the "Declaration."[84] After it comes "The Liberation of the Widows" by P'eng Tse, another returned student. Later on we find "Why We Should Overthrow the Government"—a title explosive enough in itself—and "A New Soldier Car-Driver and an Old Cart-Conductor Who Abandoned Military Life," possibly a tirade against army service. Ch'en Hsiu contributed "Concerning Some Research on Primary School Teachers," a subject students could claim to know well. "My Idea of Women" and "My Outlook on the Sufferings of the Poor" come next. Female emancipation is further dealt with in the unsigned "What Should We Think of the Old-time Wives?" and in Ts'ai Chia-pang's "Why Girls Should Study." The concluding articles in the main body of contributions are "The Family Name—Is It Justified? Our Special Approach to This Question"; and Chung I-mou's "My Feelings Regarding the *New Haifeng*."[85]

The "Declaration to My Countrymen" epitomizes the ideological stand taken by the "new comrades" and contains the essence of P'eng's philosophy at 25 years of age. It is a plan of action for the immediate future and a blueprint for student intervention in the social and political life of the country. More than that, its clarity and emotivity, its anarcho-communist strain, and its apocalyptic vision and radical call to action lift it from the realm of expository prose to the sphere of great oratory.

It is clear from its content that the "Declaration" alluded primarily to the Haifeng situation and that, ideologically, the last days of the new gentry were drawing nigh. They had preached anarchism, and their children were taking this to its logical and practical conclusion. The keynote was "the world belongs to all and must be shared equally by all," a refrain common to the socialists of the time, including Sun Yat-sen. And since the "Declaration" was but an extension of the anarcho-socialist ideas propagated for so long by the very people the document attacked, the local authorities had no choice but to tolerate it. "It was only when P'eng P'ai dared to act on these ideas, in which he firmly believed, that he got into trouble," notes a contemporary.[86]

For P'eng P'ai the main issue was obviously the land question, and its solution would be one of the first tasks of his revolutionary activity. It is not clear exactly what he meant by the term "socialist revolution," but he was certainly aware that there were several forms of socialism, of which communism was one. He took pains, however, to distinguish clearly between the "sharing of wealth" and the "common ownership of wealth," and it does seem that he was advocating a communist revolution. Indeed, his defense of the true communist doctrines, together with his accurate perception of them, strongly suggests a convinced believer.

The Chinese, despite their reputed patience and pragmatism, can also display an impatience and radicalism that have often in fact prevailed in emergencies. The new comrades shared this latter trait—as did most of their contemporaries—and it expressed,itself in what a modern writer has seen as an "overconfidence that what they thought was correct and good, might be achieved in China in a short space of time."[87] For them, evolutionary and piecemeal changes were out. They wanted the job done "before their very eyes"; in fact, they would be the ones to do it.[88]

Although the authorities tolerated the young radicals, it is still surprising that P'eng P'ai was made Haifeng's Director of the Office for the Promotion of Education (as it was still called in 1921). Some say that he was appointed directly by Ch'en Chiung-ming, who after all had formerly had an anarchist in charge of education in Changchou and even now employed the communist Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Canton. The local magistrate Weng Kuei-ch'ing, a family friend, is said to have invited him to take the post, surely with Ch'en's consent. Chung I-mou, though, offers another plausible explanation: "On August 12, 1921, a number of students expressed the desire that P'eng P'ai should head the Education Office."[89] If that is the true cause, the

Haifeng Student Union must indeed have been very powerful. In fact the students had already protested the lack of work done by the incumbent, Ch'en Ch'ung-yüeh, a foreign-educated relative of Ch'en Chiung-ming. In any event, Ch'en Ch'ung-yüeh resigned and was transferred to Canton to take over the Education Bureau from Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and P'eng P'ai duly took office. Why no hand was raised in objection to his appointment after he had become known as a firebrand must remain something of a mystery. Perhaps one answer lies in what we have seen already: that the new gentry in Haifeng found nothing really untoward in the ideology or behavior of their juniors, who were simply continuing a long-established revolutionary tradition.[90]

By October 1, 1921, P'eng P'ai was installed in the Ch'üan-hsüeh-so (Office for the Promotion of Education), thereby becoming at 25 an official of the yamen and a subordinate of Ch'en Chiung-ming. Like his predecessors in office, P'eng maintained a villa (named "Te-ch'ü") as befitted his scholar status. He soon began distributing posts to old and trusted friends. Li Ch'un-t'ao became a teacher at the First High Primary School, and Yang Szu-chen, also a friend from Japan, became its headmaster.[91] Kindred spirits, Li and P'eng both sported well-tailored Western suits, Japanese summer hats, and canes. They played tennis every weekend on a special court and embodied all the modern dreams of the young.

Commissioner P'eng replaced many of the old school directors and quickly made enemies among the entrenched gentry. Of his friends whom he knew to be "progressive," he retained Li Yüeh-t'ing at the Middle School and invited Ch'en K'uei-ya, Li Kuo-chen, and some others to head schools or to assist him in the office. Another of his intimates, Wu Huan-t'ang, was made principal of the Third High Primary School, recently opened in the Liu lineage ancestral hall. One of P'eng's first official activities was to increase the number of schools, beginning with the Second and the Third High Primary Schools in Haifeng city. He also opened schools in towns in the more densely populated areas of the countryside, and established the Haifeng First Public Girls' School in the ancestral hall of the Wang family in Tung-hu-she.[92]

The Education Office was responsible for coordinating all educational work within the borders of the county, and though its chief was appointed by the magistrate, he could select local men to serve as education promotion officers in the school districts. P'eng was also empowered to convert com-

munity property into property of the state school system. There was no problem in using clan or lineage halls for school buildings. "The establishment of schools depended upon [the Education Offices'] endeavor," but financial viability and the schools' survival "came to depend upon their willingness to impose local surtaxes."[93] Haifeng's education funds came from the renting out of hundreds of *mou* of land and from special education taxes, the brunt of which were borne by the peasants. In 1921 the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Education decided that "Office for the Promotion of Education" was no longer an appropriate title, and a change was authorized to "Education Bureau" (Chiao-yü-ch'u). On January 1, 1922, the name was changed accordingly in Haifeng as elsewhere, and the Bureau, from being the preserve of the local gentry, came to be run by professionals instead.[94]

The educational system of which P'eng was now an official representative had progressed to the point where by 1922 all the schools could become modern. Organization was now in evidence. In P'eng's words:

> School inspectors often came to the village to observe classes, throwing children and pedant into great fear and trembling. In the end the Education Commissioner replaced the pedant with a graduate "instructor," raised tuition fees, and added an "agricultural products tax." Today mathematics was taught, tomorrow general science, the day after history, geography, the classics, and physical training. Savage punishments were abandoned in favor of milder penalties, such as standing face to wall, demerit marks, and lowered grades. How grand it was to see the pale-faced children relieved of the burden of plowing through the Sung dynasty Neo-Confucianists and extracts from *The Book of Odes*![95]

At the time of P'eng's appointment, Haifeng had come to have a middle school, a normal school (the Lu'an Normal School) a high primary school, and several ordinary primary schools, the last being compulsory. The public Wup'oling Middle School had served both Haifeng and Lufeng since 1916 and contained about one hundred students. Specialized schools such as the Commercial School, the Industrial School, and the Sericulture School were quite small, as was the Midwifery School at the civic hospital. Ch'en Chiung-ming supported all these educational institutions. He had sent many students abroad for studies and had even financed the "Lyons University," a school in France for Chinese students, which never developed fully.[96]

The Sericulture School eventually became the Professional School, commonly known as the "work-study school" after that practice adopted there. The principal was Ch'eng Shu-shun from Meilung district. There were a

number of missionary schools particularly in the Swabue area. The Presbyterian Middle School in Swabue had over 300 students and offered a four-year course at ¥10 per year. For some years the Presbyterians had been running seven primary schools, some quite small but with girl students, and one high primary; the Catholics also had four primary schools. In 1921 the Presbyterians opened a proper girls' school with 100 students, and in 1922 the Catholics opened their first middle school, also in Swabue. Enrollment in the latter was around 200 and the expenditure ¥2,000 per year, but this school soon closed for lack of funds.[97]

A provincewide survey made in 1923–24 showed that there were not many public middle schools in the East River area. The Lu'an Normal School had by this time 159 students (male), nine teachers, and twelve administrative staff. There were four classes and the annual operating cost amounted to ¥15,000. As for Lufeng, a survey some years later gave the number of boys in public primary schools as 1,040, in private (tutorial) primary schools as 566, and in popular (village) schools as 784, making a total of 2,390 boys in all. There were also 34 girls in public primary schools. Operating costs were ¥13,360. The rate of elementary literacy for the county was put at 20 percent, though P'eng P'ai noted: "Fewer than 20 percent of the peasants could write their own names, and the other 80 percent could not even do that!"[98] All such figures were unrealistic, however, as is the notion of schooling being in any way "compulsory." In the 1930's the number of children with no schooling in each county might well have been around 70,000, and the illiteracy rate may have been as high as 90 percent.[99]

Girls were at a disadvantage where education was concerned, despite some advances in Swabue; even there the issue was "not a passion." The first group of girl students (four, one of them P'eng's cousin) entered Haifeng Middle School in 1916. By 1921 there were more girls at school and P'eng P'ai could "call all the students of the county, boys and girls who were mostly from rich families," for a parade in the county city. But education for girls was presumably still a low priority in 1921, as witness the *New Haifeng* article by Ts'ai Chia-pang on "Why Girls Should Study."[100]

The current modern system of education, derived in large part from Japan, lasted until 1922 when it was "found in some ways unsuited to China's needs."[101] In the magazines *Hsin chiao-yü* and *Hsin ch'ing-nien* educational problems were hotly debated, as they were by the National Association for the Advancement of Education. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was in Kwangtung in charge of education, and Ch'en Chiung-ming was pushing hard for reforms. Un-

der his sponsorship more than 200 primary and high primary schools were set up in Canton alone. The 1,100 private schools in the province were also inspected by specialists in modern education. The reforms attracted so much attention that the National Association decided to hold its October 1921 plenum in Canton. A fundamentally new system of education was approved, with emphasis on the need to create "a new spirit," to develop a democratic outlook and a practical training to suit China's situation.[102]

The peasants "feared the new learning the way they feared tigers: just mention it and their expressions changed. Why was this?" P'eng P'ai had the answer to his question when he became Education Commissioner: the education had changed but the spirit had not. The Education Bureau remained a "government office" with no idea of what was suitable education for the peasants, and it offered them no advice when they wished to set up schools on their own. In any case peasants had no money for expensive teachers, and the children were needed to supplement family income without wasting time trotting off to school. Moreover, the idea of compulsory or enforced education frightened the peasants.[103] A KMT document of 1924 bluntly stated that "peasant education is impossible." The children of peasants would probably have fared poorly on purely physical grounds, since "they were deprived of nourishment, with pale faces, yellowish eyes, and no strength to study."[104] P'eng P'ai often remarked that "the intelligentsia came largely from the families of big and small landlords, local bullies, gentry, and landlords' relatives." Republican China was not egalitarian in education. Yet it was the peasants who bore the cost of education for bourgeois children, P'eng P'ai claimed. The greater part of taxation fell on them—"from 50 to 75 percent . . . though they had no idea what education was." In Haifeng 80 percent of education costs were met from taxes and levies on rural produce.[105]

As for the teachers, they were not a privileged body and their discontent played a key role in preparing a young revolutionary generation in Haifeng. Modern school graduates found only a limited number of government posts open to them, and teaching was the only alternative. The old classics teachers by 1920 had mostly become something of a joke and were banned from the schools, yet the status of the profession could not have been lower and teaching was still considered one of the "Four Olds," the other three being poverty, sickness, and death. There was no stimulus to professionalism and much room for resentment. Such people provided fertile ground for any kind of revolutionary seed.[106]

But with the professionalism that at least surrounded him in the Bureau, Commissioner P'eng felt more free to act: he had the self-assurance that came from superior training, belonged to a wealthy family, and enjoyed the support of the local magistrate Weng Kuei-ch'ing. He went around "dressed like a Japanese and with the deportment of an official, wearing black in winter and white in summer. Never forgetting his cane, he strutted around like someone in power." People sneered, "He wants everyone to know he has studied in Japan." Yet P'eng was just behaving according to the long-established tradition of all officials in Haifeng, and it may well be that in his arrogance and getup he was intentionally parodying custom and tradition.[107] Be that as it may, Commissioner P'eng and his family did seem to be overreaching themselves in their desire to make a mark, for the Lung-shan Pavilion, a large eight-sided edifice constructed a kilometer away from the P'eng family mansion, went up at this time. It was a prestige monument sponsored most probably by the "P'eng Ming-ho."

Another project that brought the family enormous "face" was P'eng P'ai's establishment of an opera troupe. P'eng P'ai was evidently courting public favor in doing this as well as thumbing his nose at the old gentry, who formerly had the management of such things. He went a step further in wanting a troupe modern in style and in repertoire, so that it might serve as a vehicle for contemporary culture. He accordingly opened a School of Drama at an annual cost that promised to run into thousands of dollars. P'eng Han-yüan, as administrator of "P'eng Ming-ho," approved the plan, which he saw as an opportunity to enhance the family name. Before long the "Lung-chin chü-t'uan" (Lung-chin Drama Company) was ready for its première on a stage set up in the Ch'iao-tung-p'u, the large meadow in front of the P'eng mansion. The play thrilled everyone and the costumes came in for special praise. In keeping with the new trend, the performance was in *pai-hua* (oral idiom). The actors were mostly students, female roles being played by males, a concession to tradition that P'eng P'ai in his opening remarks promised would not be observed in future. P'eng himself acted the part of a Japanese girl, complete with kimono. The play ran for several days and thousands of people attended. The company had another two plays ready, but so great was the outcry from conservatives that a tour of the rural areas had to be canceled and the troupe was soon obliged to dissolve. Some of the gentry even sent a petition to Ch'en in Canton requesting the resignation of P'eng P'ai on the ground that he had demeaned his office by performing as a *hua-tan*, the disreputable actor taking the female role. "Then in all the

streets this song was heard: 'P'eng T'ien-ch'üan [P'eng P'ai] plays the *hua-tan*; the young shake their heads, the old hide their faces.' " P'eng had to bear with children chanting this as he passed.[108]

Nonetheless, P'eng persevered in projects certain to antagonize the old gentry. Prior to the theater exploit he had organized an All-County Sports Meet at the Lung-she-p'u, the tract of ground near Haifeng unused for *feng-shui* reasons. The "stadium"—with field, track, and stands bedecked with flags—was a spectacle for Haifeng, especially with the county's best young athletes gathered there and then paraded through town.[109] P'eng also wanted to demolish the city walls. Where Ch'en had been amenable to reason and had compromised on this matter, P'eng was of a different breed altogether. He seemed to delight in and have a flair for humiliating his enemies: "Let them wait and see who I am"[110]—that at least was the impression he gave to a contemporary. Magistrate Weng sat on the fence, aware of Ch'en's attitude. The young were not advocating anything startling: Ch'en Chiung-ming had already seen to such innovations elsewhere, and Swatow was experiencing "great changes" through road-widening. But the Haifeng walls had taken on a symbolic meaning and against their huge stone blocks the young radicals battered their arguments. Tiring of endless debate and not in the least overawed by the old gentry, P'eng and his followers decided that the city walls must come down, together with that bastion of superstition in Haifeng, the City God temple. But they underestimated the opposition: the old gentry organized an "Association for the Protection of the Walled City" and appealed to Ch'en's superstitious mother, who together with Ch'en K'ai-t'ing held sway in the Commander's Office. The walls and the temple of the City God won a reprieve, leaving the new comrades for the first time at a loss.[111]

P'eng took the lesson to heart. He realized that before walls could be demolished they must first be undermined. He therefore intensified his efforts to educate the next generation, particularly the illiterate and superstitious poor. To this end he opened a Popular Evening School in town, as well as classes for teaching elementary reading and writing in the villages. The teachers and students of the Third High Primary School volunteered their services; there were no fees, and textbooks were provided by the Education Bureau. The Committee for Popular Education that P'eng organized had its office in the front portion of the nearby Confucian temple, refurbished for the purpose.[112] What P'eng P'ai was doing in Haifeng was in line with the Mass Education Movement launched in 1920 by James Yen, who insisted

that "the program will and must emanate from the middle class."[113] At this stage P'eng thought the same, though an observer remarked that "during his term of office, P'eng P'ai saw to it that people learned many things outside the official textbooks."[114]

Commissioner P'eng felt at ease among students and did much to better their lot. He made a habit of meeting and talking with them, and gained their confidence quickly; in the modern phrase, he had "charisma." He used his artistic talent to help put across his political message: he gave some of the art lessons at the Middle School and, after drawing pictures of Marx and Lenin for the students, would start a discussion on the October Revolution. Visitors to his "Te-ch'ü" villa could admire such couplets as "The sky rains down the seeds of freedom—watching and waiting for the coming explosion."[115] He would not entertain people he considered to be reactionary or exploitative, and he and his colleagues derived great amusement from his cartoons showing their common enemies, the bad landlords and evil gentry. P'eng also rebuffed anyone offering gifts or seeking favors; but to teachers and students his door was always open. At all this, the nicest comments his enemies could make were: "The Commander doesn't know how to select people for office"; "The Commissioner is an ingrate"; "No idea of how to enhance his position."

Many of the students were poor and P'eng P'ai began to develop great sympathy for and interest in their plight, especially in the countryside. He began to appear in the new drab uniform of the returned student, and one observer says, "His life was simpler and more severe than when he came back from Japan." One story goes that he could not even afford a haircut; since this seems highly unlikely, long hair must have been his own choice. As Commissioner he was a public figure much spoken about, and with time the comments mellowed somewhat: "He looks rich but he is poor at heart," people would say. They began to call him "bronze-faced P'eng P'ai," hinting by this at his disregard for convenience in favor of justice.[116] The stories may well be apocryphal, but they do match P'eng's outlook at this time: "I was still dreaming of starting out from education to achieve a social revolution." There were regular accusations made to Ch'en Chiung-ming about him, and the leader returned home in February 1922 to what undoubtedly was a chorus of complaints from the old gentry. Yet when he visited the Education Bureau he found himself admiring what the Commissioner was doing, for P'eng caught the imagination of many.[117]

As for Ch'en himself, his policy of "Kwangtung to the Kwangtung people" regained for him the affection of the Cantonese and the trust of the merchants. On the national scene, the general impression was that "all hopes for China were on Ch'en"; but his pledge of faithfulness to Sun was soon threatened by their disagreements, and his avowed "pupilship" grew strained.[118]

In late March of 1922, Teng K'eng, who had served as a kind of intermediary between Ch'en and Sun, was assassinated, and his death soon led to an open break between the two leaders. In April Sun dismissed Ch'en from his offices. On April 22, two days before Sun was due to arrive in Canton, Ch'en took 10,000 of his soldiers to Huichou with all the arms and funds available. Ma Yü-hang was dispatched to Shanghai and Peking to reiterate Ch'en's avowed intention never to embroil himself in a northern expedition. Attempts at mediation by Wu Chih-hui, Wang Ching-wei, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu failed, and the Kwangtung Army in Kwangsi led by generals faithful to Ch'en marched on Canton. On June 5 these generals openly demanded Sun's resignation and the return of Ch'en. On June 15 Sun was obliged to take refuge on a battleship and, after the troops of his supporters from Fukien were defeated, went again into exile. On August 15 Ch'en was invited back to Canton by his generals Yeh Chü and Hung Chao-lin.[119]

In Haifeng there was great jubilation: the "Old Commander" had got the better of the "Big Gun," as Sun Yat-sen was called on account of his martial boasting. Haifeng was now in the forefront of the whole province, because the key government departments were manned by Haifeng people. For example, Chung Hsiu-nan ran the treasury, the mint, and the provincial military headquarters; Ma Yü-hang headed the Finance Ministry and the Kwangtung Bank; Ch'en Ta-sheng was in charge of public works; Ch'en Yen-sheng was Minister for Electricity and Productivity; Ch'en Ch'ung-yüeh and Ch'en Po-hua headed the Education Ministry; Chung Sheng was a leader of the Provincial Assembly and the principal of the law school. In addition, nine out of twelve other high civil posts were held by Haifeng men. Five officers from Haifeng commanded the army, with Yeh Chü from Huichou as Chief of the General Staff. It was claimed of Ch'en by his detractors that "his eyes did not see and his ears did not hear anything but Haifeng." He was described as proud and selfish; because of his strong and partisan hold on the provincial administration, it was natural for resentment to arise.[120] Even in Haifeng there were those who felt that Ch'en and his cronies

had become too powerful and that, even more so than in 1911–12, they were all lining up for posts and big money. P'eng P'ai recalled: "Overnight Haifeng grew immeasurably in the warlord, bureaucrat, new-official, politician, aristocrat, and up-and-coming-landlord class (which was both landlord and warlord)." In popular local parlance, "Of magistrates the streets are full, by generals the dogs are matched."[121]

In those days to hail from Haifeng was a passport to instant respect—a far cry from the contempt of former times. In the army, membership in the "General's family" opened all doors: his cousin General Ch'en Chiung-kuang wielded great power though not yet 30 years old. The officers and soldiers from Haifeng kept very much to themselves, corruption was rampant, and the army was viewed as a quick way to riches. Ch'en Chiung-kuang bought a piano for show and once had his sword changed because its gilt was not bright enough for the New Year's parade. Ch'en Ch'i-ying, head of the provision office, built a huge mansion in Haifeng complete with a regal-sized audience hall. It was common for all of Ch'en Chiung-ming's satraps to own large tracts of land.

Veneration for the Old Commander knew no bounds. In the eyes of many, Ch'en retained his early image of incorruptibility, of being "a good honest man" who never smoked or drank and whose moral life was beyond reproach. He was the idol of the peasants, and it was natural for them to assume that some of his own good luck would come their way: "Better still if he took the throne!" was said of him again.[122]

Besides new schools, Haifeng city was given a library, a public garden, and a hospital. The Sericulture Department and its school, set up to exploit the market in silk, date from this time, as does an arsenal in Swabue. Yet for all the improvements, the countryside was still plagued by bandits and there was no end to feuding. The windfalls and the glory Ch'en brought to the county were only for the benefit of a privileged few, not for the peasants; as P'eng P'ai noted, "The higher their hopes, the bigger their disappointment. Under Ch'en Chiung-ming's parochial regime, they did not have a speck of luck."[123]

Provincial unrest remained at a substantial level, and People's Armies, now in sympathy with Sun, were active in the countryside. Ethnic considerations and local interests were important in the growing tension. The British consul in Swatow was informed that since Ch'en was the champion of the Hakka, people in Hakka areas were happy that Sun was out of the picture. By contrast, Sun's supporters were predominantly Cantonese, who

felt that no longer was Kwangtung governed by the Kwangtung people, as proclaimed in 1920—instead it was "by the Hoklo of Haifeng!"[124] The split between Sun and Ch'en also had far-reaching political consequences in that Sun had to reorganize his Revolutionary Party, and it is possible that his leftward turn resulted from this temporary setback. As for Ch'en himself, he realized full well how much his position depended on the generals who had put him back in power. Besides the enemy armies of Hsü Ch'ung-chih, a constant threat to his regime also came from Wang Ta-wei and Li Fu-lin. There was a flurry of political activity through contacts with the north aimed at countering the influence of Sun and his party and at breaking the isolation of the Canton government, but it was too late.[125] Ch'en, it was said, had never really cared much about party matters, but he did take pains to enforce the order against opium and gambling. The measure cost him a great deal of goodwill, since without that tax revenue it was impossible to meet the high living standards of the army officers. However, he was adamant: "Where the Kwangtung Army is, there will be no gambling."[126] By this time Ch'en was viewed as "a domineering, strong character with high regard for himself" and there was intense criticism of him in many quarters.[127]

By the start of 1923 three armies favoring Sun were ready to march on Canton: the Yunnanese of Yang Hsi-min, the Kwangsi Army of Liu Chen-huan (both in the west), and the Second Kwangtung Army of Hsü Ch'ung-chih (in the east). Ch'en's inability to raise enough money to pay his army proved decisive, and on January 15 he resigned his positions and left for Hong Kong by way of Haifeng.[128] The British consul's verdict was that Ch'en was "a man after all but second rate," to be considered "definitely eliminated as a factor in local politics." Anxiety gripped everyone in Haifeng, and when Bishop Pozzoli arrived there for a visit, many people had already fled for fear of the revenge of Sun Yat-sen. But nothing sinister happened. "Haifeng city, with its new palaces built by Ch'en for himself and his officers and families, was not disturbed."[129]

P'eng P'ai's enemies were only waiting for him to make a false move, and they did not have long to wait. "In May 1921, I was the Haifeng Education Commissioner," P'eng P'ai wrote (getting the year wrong). "I called all the students of the county, girls and boys, mostly the children of the rich, to the county seat to demonstrate on Labor Day, May 1, for the first time in the history of Haifeng."[130] This demonstration may have been scheduled to

coincide with the opening of the All-China Labor Congress in Canton, and in Canton a similar Labor Day parade had been held since 1918. But in Haifeng "not a single worker or peasant attended." The pupils of the First Primary High School marched through the streets waving red flags on which was written "Go Red."[131] The whole affair was carefully managed by P'eng and his friends, and P'eng had even composed special words for a song that was taught in music lessons at all the schools:

> What is today? The First of May, Labor Day.
> The day we remember the workers' parties,
> Joining hands in a worldwide strike.
> Work is the most sacred reality:
> The time is ripe for Socialist Revolution:
> Brothers and sisters, let us never forget
> The two words "lao-tung"—Labor.[132]

At the rally before the parade, P'eng spoke about the history and meaning of May First. The children roared their approval and marched off distributing leaflets hailing nationalism or socialism. P'eng P'ai marched at the head of the parade carrying a red flag; trumpets blared, drums rolled, and the students waved countless small red flags. One eyewitness later reported: "Nothing like this Labor Day celebration had ever taken place before in Haifeng. Landlords, gentry, and officials were scared at what P'eng P'ai described as a childish and amusing demonstration." P'eng P'ai himself commented: "This was really the height of naïveté! The Haifeng gentry thought we were about to communize property and wives, and rumors spread like wildfire." The impact of the demonstration "so shocked the bad gentry and old-fashioned teachers that they thought Haifeng would 'go Red' in no time."[133]

An avalanche of complaints poured in to Ch'en Chiung-ming and the offices of Ma Yü-hang, Chung Hsiu-nan, and Chung Ching-t'ang. The *Lu'an jih-k'an* charged that the people at the Education Bureau were using education to spread despicable ideas. "Repeated accusations about us were laid before Ch'en Chiung-ming, until he dismissed us." On May 9, 1922, Magistrate Weng accepted the resignation of P'eng P'ai. He had served for just over seven months as Commissioner of Education. "Principals and instructors who had any new ideas also stepped down." For the new comrades it was a crushing defeat, and in their minds the image of Ch'en Chiung-ming as a credible and reliable leader was shattered; to them, "new gentry" had become totally indistinguishable from "old gentry." Not all of P'eng's

friends resigned, however; Li Yüeh-t'ing and Yang Szu-chen were two who stayed at their posts and kept in contact with P'eng. The P'eng lineage suffered tremendous loss of face, which may have been just what their enemies were seeking.[134]

A contemporary recalls that it was out of spite that gentry officials and landlords pressed Magistrate Weng to take action against P'eng P'ai. Li Ch'un-t'ao states that a telegram from "an official" in Canton warned Weng that if P'eng P'ai did not resign, someone capable of forcing him to do so would surely be found. Weng could not help complying, but he in turn was not long for his post, because by 1923 the county magistrate was Lü T'ieh-t'so.[135] "Sixth uncle" Ch'en K'ai-t'ing was apparently instrumental behind the scenes in forcing P'eng P'ai out of office. The mind of the opposition can be sampled in an extract from one document: "The naive students acclaimed his [P'eng's] 'communal property' and 'communal wives' doctrines. People in the county were imbued with Marxist phraseology and thought; they used offensive expressions, were prone to assault others, interfered with politics, and upset society in every conceivable manner." A local missionary also reported disapprovingly that P'eng was full of Bolshevik ideas and passed them on to his students: "This communist teaching spread to other schools, and the young adhered to his ideas."[136]

Despite his ouster, P'eng P'ai was determined to give the local reactionaries no quarter. The ideological duel continued as the new comrades set up the Hsin-sheng hui ("New Life Society") with its own magazine. (For some reason, *New Haifeng* had ceased publication, perhaps as early as after its second issue.) P'eng P'ai describes what happened: "At this time, we started a wild battle of ideas with the *Lu'an jih-k'an*. Comrade Li Ch'un-t'ao and I put out several issues of the *Ch'ih-hsin chou-k'an* (*Red Heart Weekly*), claiming to be the voice of the worker and peasant masses, though we did not have the backing of so much as half a worker or peasant. The workers in the towns and the peasants in the villages did not know what we were up to."[137] P'eng returned to the name of the magazine and society he had started in Japan, and the call for socialist revolution took on even clearer tones. First published on May 14, the magazine initially was only stenciled. It was so radical that after listening to one of her son's articles, P'eng P'ai's mother "had a crying fit and wanted to beat [him] to death." She asked him: "If this keeps up, won't the family be ruined?" This was a question that the other wealthy families must also have posed.[138] Many students in fact were becoming sympathetic to P'eng P'ai, and he himself was more and more stubborn. The

fourth issue of *Red Heart Weekly* (June 2, 1922) carried an article by P'eng P'ai entitled "Who Has the Duty to Come Out and Uphold Socialism?," which reveals the antiestablishment stand he had come to take openly, as well as his personal understanding of socialism at this stage. At the same time, as Li remarks, it points to his increasing resolve to start the social revolution through a peasant movement, a movement of the poor:

> Last year someone from the Office for the Promotion of Education told me: "I much agree with socialism and it is right that you come out to uphold it: in fact you are the scion of a rich family. As for myself it is impossible because I come from a poor family." A few days ago there was also a newspaper reporter who told me: "I really sympathize with socialism. I heard that you are also spreading socialism but I am afraid that you do not yet understand in full its meaning. You live in a Western-style house, what you eat is the white rice produced by the sweat and blood of the peasants: do you think that you are worthy of upholding socialism? You do not seem to be honest! You do not have the right to come and spread socialism!" . . .
>
> The feelings of these two friends can represent the common feelings of many people in our society toward socialism. . . . But the socialist doctrine does not mean the change of only a part of society, it means the change of the totality of it. . . . This transformation is not the one promoted by the social welfare groups, a step-by-step betterment. . . . Socialism rather selects a destructive method . . . the social revolution. Therefore all those who in the present social system live and die, be they of royal nobility or poor sons of town or village, provided that they are indignant at injustice are in fact advocating the social revolution and can obviously come out to uphold socialism.[139]

P'eng and Li were themselves writing the articles, cutting the stencils decorated with drawings by P'eng P'ai, and printing and distributing the magazine from "Te-ch'ü" villa. The only way for the other faction to counterattack was through something lighter than the *Lu'an jih-k'an* that would catch the attention of the young people. To this end, Chung I-mou recalls, "for art's sake and to interest youth," and in effect to oppose the "reform movement" of P'eng P'ai, there was founded the *Hai-t'ien chou-k'an* (*Sea-Sky Weekly*). The editors of this magazine "were a group from the capitalist class and had nothing to do with scholarship, writing instead about 'the flowers,' 'the moon,' one's love for others, and similar rubbish." There was a special number of the weekly to mark the "Triple Tenth" (the tenth day of the tenth month of the tenth year of the Republic: October 10, 1922). Articles commemorating the success of the Revolution and the advent of peace and prosperity appeared both in the *Lu-an jih-k'an* and in the *Sea-Sky*

*Weekly*. P'eng and Li responded in pamphlets by blasting out at the real and current evils of rampant warlordism and narrow-minded, outdated national ideology.

The editors of the *Sea-Sky Weekly* made a great fuss about "communal property and communal wives" and took to describing their enemies as "Red slaves who had strayed from their country and had got lost," or as "a Red calamity like the deluge of wild beasts." But they were no match for the pen and artistry behind the *Red Heart Weekly*. P'eng's cover design showed a globe surrounded by an iron chain, with a bare-chested worker poised to sever the chain with an ax, symbolizing how the world had to be set free. The *Sea-Sky* editors wondered how the earth could be encircled by a chain and where the worker could stand to cut it. Such literal-mindedness dismayed P'eng P'ai and his group: they began to see that argument with such people was useless. Faced with enemies of this kind, P'eng could feel quite superior, comparing himself to a petrel flying against wind and rain. "We are not afraid of suffering," as *New Haifeng* had declared earlier and as P'eng now repeated. His one-against-all attitude[140] is clearly shown in a poem from one *Red Heart* issue entitled "Myself," the closing stanza of which reads:

> In this imperial village,
> Who dares to sing a song of revolution?
> Myself, it is myself![141]

P'eng nevertheless realized that his struggle was in vain: those in power were too entrenched to be shifted. In the end, "we abandoned the meaningless verbal battle with the *Lu'an jih-k'an* and decided to go to the villages to start a real movement." The sixth issue of the *Red Heart Weekly* at the end of June was the last one. Li Ch'un-t'ao recalls that from that time "P'eng P'ai started to be serious about the peasant movement."[142]

The decision to go to the villages seemed inevitable for P'eng. He was excluded from the gentry-landlord class he had attacked; the students came mainly from gentry-landlord families and could not take a clear stand; and many of his friends had sought security within the establishment, or were looking for a position. His only base of support could be "the workers in the town and the peasants in the villages." He had to rally them for the real battle after alluding to them so often during the battle of words. "I am convinced that the peasants can unite." P'eng's mother fell to weeping again on hearing of his decision, whereas he thought that the peasants would have been "highly pleased."[143] The final issue of the *Red Heart Weekly* had another

"poetical and meaningful cover . . . the last silent taunt against the *Sea-Sky Weekly* and all it stood for," as Chung I-mou put it. It showed the moon embraced by a delicate white cloud, its light shining on the stormy waves of the wide ocean. P'eng commented that there were those who looked at the Lung-chin River and thought it was the open sea, who planted a foot on Hsien-t'a-shih ("fairy foothold rock") and thought they had scaled T'ai Mountain. In other words his enemies were like frogs in the well, believing that the whole world was contained therein.

The light that P'eng P'ai had brought as a spur to social betterment had been snuffed out; those who enjoyed the comfortable status quo preferred to shun their responsibilities. It was time for P'eng to enlighten the poor about their rights, and he was ready to go to them on his own.[144]

The term "peasant" defies precise definition, but in this book peasants are considered as one entity without further division into kinds or classes. The common denominator in accounts of them seems to be that the term "peasants" covers "all low-status rural cultivators." The term "movement" is, for peasants, "any collective reaction to such low status," and is qualified by four factors: common consciousness of the same fate; collective action; instrumentality of action toward a goal; intensity of action because of "low status" or for religious, national, or other reasons.[145]

All these factors are relevant to the peasant movement that P'eng P'ai was about to initiate. He was not acting in a vacuum, for ideas, suggestions, and directives about transforming the lot of the peasants had already been heard in many places. Yet his start was unique in many respects, for he was envisaging a "New Haifeng," a place where social development would be pushed "to the stage of perfection."[146] His dream of changing the system by working from above in an official capacity had shattered. He had tried what Sun Yat-sen also attempted when as a young man he petitioned Li Hung-chang to collaborate with him, "hoping sincerely to join the gentry reformers," as his biographer remarks.[147] P'eng discovered early that facts, not words, counted; or as Dewey put it, "Facts have the power to make laws: laws have not the power to make facts." (This was also the axiom, incidentally, that turned Ch'en Tu-hsiu into a Communist.[148]) "When Ch'en Chiung-ming, the 'warlord in decline' in his retreat at Laolung, continued blathering on about the best doctrine for China, P'eng retorted: 'No more about "isms" for China right now. What matters is to liberate the peasants and workers

from their misery.' "* Li Ch'un-t'ao states that at this stage P'eng grew weary and bitter from the lack of feeling of the leading class and the selfishness of his family members, thinking: "Man has no fault, the system is at fault." Alone now, after the intelligentsia had scattered, he relied only on himself and on his unshakable determination and "joined the honest system of the peasant class which has no knowledge and no wealth."[149]

P'eng P'ai had already started to "go to the people" when back in Haifeng in the summer of 1921. At the headquarters of the Society for the Study of Socialism he spoke to more than three hundred workers and shophands, introducing to them "The Situation of the World Federation of the Workers' Movement." He had also addressed the peasants in the yam market on "The Social Question and Socialism" and "The Peasant Livelihood and the Question of Land Rent." On July 30, 1921, he organized the Workers' Friendship Society with enrollment taken at the headquarters of the Society for the Study of Socialism. The aim of this new society was to express sympathy with the workers, in particular by giving them equality through opportunities for education.[150]

It was not just ideology or pragmatism that motivated P'eng, however. He may well have turned to the peasants for want of better means along with genuine concern. They were the last resort for a man who had lost his base of support in the community. His decision to go to the peasants must have been a sudden one, though, and when he visited his own tenants in Ch'ihshan nobody recognized him. In this tangle of motives it would be surprising if lineage and clan considerations did not play their part. The P'eng had money but little real power or status, and the great hopes P'eng P'ai had raised, along with the clan's expectations, now lay in ruins. Li Ch'un-t'ao refers to this situation: "His family, though not extremely rich, in Haifeng was rated as a family with means. They had used not a little money to help him to study abroad, and when he came back they were bound to want him to become an official and start making some money. On the contrary he began by saying that he wanted to use the family wealth to start a movement of social revolution: to that his family could promise nothing."[151] He eventually became the object of their rage, and only his two brothers P'eng Han-

*P'eng P'ai in 1923 declared to Li Lao-kung his belief in socialism and his sympathy for Marxism, but he declined the use of any "ism." "Our present struggle is in taking seriously the peasants' sufferings. We are not calling the peasants to join any ideology, but we select an ideology in order to help the peasants" (PL 316).

yüan and P'eng Tse remained sympathetic to his efforts. Later success, though, saw the whole family and clan united behind him; even the clan members across the border in Lufeng rallied to their new leader. P'eng P'ai claimed to have "knocked the clan system dead long ago," but to his good fortune he had not. Indeed, the old reactionary gentry thought he was "using the peasants" partly to realize his aims for the family. They were so far convinced of this that when P'eng returned home in early 1924 endowed with some prestige, Magistrate Wang Tso-hsin appealed to his being P'eng's uncle and General Chung selected a P'eng clansman as mediator. P'eng Han-yüan would later take on peasant duties more or less as a family responsibility.[152]

There was also the "grudge" factor, if not in P'eng P'ai then at least in the students who soon were following him again. Many educated youngsters believed that they had no chance while the entrenched families of the old gentry and new gentry had sole access to the Commander's Office. Although when P'eng P'ai broached his new radical social scheme his "closest local friends were all opposed," soon they saw in his antiestablishment stand certain opportunities for themselves. Historians have written of the important part played by disillusioned intellectuals in the Taiping movement. The same can be said of the intelligentsia who collected around P'eng P'ai, and it is even possible that P'eng himself sublimated a personal resentment in his newfound ideal.[153]

As to when the movement started, the time of this differs according to which year is held to be the date of P'eng's return from Japan. Telling evidence exists for 1921 and for 1922—P'eng himself incongruously specifies both years—and it is indeed possible that there was a fully fledged peasant movement in Haifeng in 1921 as one authority claims, though it is extremely unlikely that P'eng P'ai could have been involved in it. Certainly the recently started SYC took "great interest in the Haifeng peasants," as is stated by a reliable CCP document. The same document asserts: "In 1921–22 the SYC began the peasant movement and the peasants organized spontaneously."[154] One eyewitness reports that P'eng formed "speakers' groups" in 1921 that were sent out to several places. It may be valid to speak of an "informal" start in 1921 and a "formal" relaunching in the summer of 1922, when the first modern Peasant Union was started.[155]

There is also the matter (just touched on) of spontaneity. Before P'eng P'ai got involved, there was a peasant from P'ingkang near Kungp'ing who was recognized as a natural leader by the local peasants. This was Yang Ch'i-

shan, a Hakka, who eventually became vice-chairman of the Union and a personality in the movement. He had a fair knowledge of written characters and frequently visited Haifeng and Kungp'ing on peasant business. He was also a good boxer in the old Flag tradition, a fact that would have encouraged his emergence as a leader. However, "after finding P'eng P'ai he followed another road," ready with his fellow peasants already organized to submit to the new charismatic leader.[156] P'eng arrived on the scene when he was most needed, and the peasants were ready for him. He had already come to the conclusion that "peasants could unite" and that they were not the bumpkins that city folk made them out to be. Soon P'eng P'ai could write on November 18, 1922, to his friend Li: "The peasants are not people lacking in intelligence. They have a lively and burning feeling toward the organization of the Peasant Union. Slowly they are now taking up class awareness and building up a solid class bastion. They even can make propaganda in other areas and lead other areas to stand up and join in."[157]

His young associates, though, had found the peasants to "have no cohesion" and to be "incapable of organization, besides being ignorant." The disillusioned young people around P'eng told him: "It will not be easy to spread your ideas; it will be simply a waste of effort." Indeed, P'eng even told Li that he was "on the point of giving up the idea" in the face of so many difficulties. But that was not because of the peasants, as Li pathetically described it: "After the group of boys and girls in Western outfits left Lungshan and Lungchin, there was silence and feelings of loneliness: only P'eng P'ai remained, holding a book in his hand and calling the doubly wretched peasants to come and quickly to revolt." P'eng P'ai nevertheless persevered and pushed on ahead alone.[158]

P'eng P'ai had accepted all the implications of his decision, first among which was the odium of his family. The third (Han-yüan) and fifth (Tse) brothers apart, "they all hated me like poison, my elder brother being just about ready to kill me. As well as these, the members of our clan and village detested me." "I ignored them," he observes laconically. Only his wife openly supported him.[159] As an outcome of this row it is probable that P'eng obtained his share of the patrimony, to be free to do with it as he pleased. This "household division was not simply a division of a domestic unit, it was a formal separation of both heart and land."[160] The exact time of the share-out is not given, but a biographer states that "when P'eng P'ai started the peasant movement he began living 'the peasant way' with his wife at 'Te-ch'ü' villa"; another source says that at this time "he divided with his broth-

ers the fields inherited from his father, he gathered his tenants and gave them back the title deeds." The two actions may have followed one another at some interval, but they did occur quite early. It seems, though, that the distribution of title deeds came after the peasant movement had started, because when P'eng first went to Ch'ihshan "wearing a student-style white Western suit and stiffened white cap," his approach was still patronizing and for all his sincerity his dress showed that he was not yet ready to be "one of them." P'eng P'ai at that time was still part of the exploiting group with an assured rent.[161]

As soon as he began talking about the peasants' "hard life," one of his Ch'ihshan tenants cut him short: "It is fate that our life is hard." P'eng was invited in to drink tea. Another peasant came along, "more alert-looking" but still unable to recognize P'eng, mistaking him for an official or army officer. Ch'ihshan was not far from the "P'eng Ming-ho" headquarters and he should have known his landlord, if P'eng had ever cared to keep in contact with his peasants. P'eng realized that his manner of dress was the problem and he explained that he "was a student" and that his purpose was "to become good friends with you people." "The peasant laughed incredulously, offered the polite invitation to tea, and made off." P'eng met with the reaction his friends had predicted, and hence felt "as if wasting my effort. I was greatly upset." When he got to the next village, all the doors were locked, seemingly offering no welcome. He tried another village, until with sunset he felt ill at ease and returned home. His reception there was cold: "I might just as well have been among enemies," and his diary entry for the day "remained a blank page." There was much soul-searching during the night, but his decision had been made and the next morning he was back at one of the villages of the day before. A middle-aged peasant took him for a debt-collector, whereupon P'eng, much to the man's astonishment, said: "I've come to help you collect debts." P'eng then expounded the arguments against the landlords, as he had done in his "Declaration." The peasant did not deny their cogency, but returned to the traditional theme: "Rent-collectors have been rent-collectors for ages, and farmers have been farmers." The man did not wish to give his name, for his name was legion and his thinking was that of his fellow peasants. Despite visiting several villages, P'eng once more "got no results."[162]

Then it struck him, "suddenly," that to the peasants "the language of an educated man was completely incomprehensible. In fact, peasants' speeches have head but not tail, or tail but not head, or neither head nor tail. They live in one village and they use one language, but they cannot understand what

other people say." P'eng now began blaming himself for the peasants' inability to respond, and from thinking about how ideas were transmitted to them he ended up realizing that in every way he had to become one of them. It is in this that much of his merit lies: he had to make the transition to the world of the peasants not as a sympathetic leader, but simply as someone like them. This was "madness," yet it was the basic requirement and logical consequence of his revolutionary endeavor, entailing a total change of mind.[163] P'eng P'ai later excused himself on one occasion for not writing about the peasant movement by stating that "he had become a member of the illiterate class and therefore could not write an article."[164] P'eng had realized that he was wrong starting with his clothes: "My appearance and dress were different from those of the peasants, who were accustomed to look on people of different mien and dress as their oppressors and swindlers. In their eyes I was an enemy."[165] The clothes were a symbol, and not a trivial one. The SYC in their initial forays among the peasants had not learned this lesson, and they had failed. The CCP made the same mistake when they sent some Peking University students among the workers in Shanghai.[166] P'eng's discoveries reached others through *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien* (*Chinese Youth*), the official SYC organ, in which Yün Tai-ying hammered home findings such as P'eng's throughout 1924.[167] Mao Tse-tung was aware of this need for oneness when "at first he drew close to the workers," and he took to going barefoot or in straw sandals, with rough short trousers and a jacket.[168]

P'eng P'ai also had another important insight as a result of wandering about the villages: he could accomplish nothing in one-to-one encounters but needed a reasonable-size audience. The lone peasant was cautious and noncommittal; the peasants thought and talked in a group, and only together could they muster courage. So he would wait for them at Lung-shan-ma temple, where "thousands of peasants passed by every day and stopped for a rest." At first he canvassed "only a few people, but the number grew until the canvassing became more like a speech." He spoke about "the causes of hardship and ways of alleviating it," stressing "how it was necessary for the peasants to unite." In many cases his words fell on deaf ears, although the few who did pay attention were consolation enough. He could say "Now we are getting somewhere." For half a month he "stood in the road talking or lecturing to passing peasants." P'eng had "relatives coming to the house to ask about my illness," and one of the family hired hands told him "People are all saying you are mentally sick." P'eng took it all with a laugh. Yet many peasants in the villages also thought he was crazy,[169] with his peasant dress and long hair. His quick wits sometimes seemed to give substance to this

impression. Once during a gathering he shouted out "Tiger! Tiger!", causing the peasants to scatter. When they came back after discovering the hoax, he told them in all seriousness that he had seen a "tiger" collecting rent and taxes; the rapacious man-eating tigers were the landlords.[170] At other times he used the gramophone—a great novelty for the country folk, which he called the "Foreign Devils' Theater." He also taught children vernacular songs of his own composition that bore a message.[171] P'eng was surely an object of curiosity, for there he was, an ex-official and a landlord, calling for rent reduction and declaring that "landlords could but await their defeat" as soon as peasant unity was achieved. One of his peasants named him "big mouth"; peasants wanted action, not words, and they thought "he had time to waste, and with good meals and a heap of money went around talking revolution." Some saw him as a kind of snake oil salesman.[172]

P'eng P'ai realized that his own family was no different from other exploiting households. He had been told to his face: "If you 'Ming-ho' people would stop hounding us for back rent, then I could believe you." To show that his were not empty words, P'eng came to a decision to distribute land to his peasants. He was about to open his mind on this subject when a young peasant suddenly started defending him by saying that even rent reduction, good enough in itself, would not solve the basic problem, which was lack of unity. "With unity, not only one's own problem but also people's problems in general could be settled."[173] P'eng P'ai became convinced, though, that facts speak louder than words, and against what he had formerly argued in the *Red Heart Weekly* he realized that to uphold socialism convincingly he had to give back the land deeds to his tenants. But some of these tenants were suspicious and feared that the deeds would soon be reclaimed and the recipients very likely punished. In the face of their refusal to accept the deeds, P'eng decided to burn them outside the "Te-ch'ü" villa, announcing that the land his peasants were cultivating was henceforth their own. "That flame ignited not only the title deeds, but also the entire East."[174] The peasants now had no more doubts about the integrity of P'eng P'ai, who became the talk of the villages, the hope of the peasants, and the dread of the landlords. It might have been this incident that won over Yang Ch'i-shan, for "he himself went to find P'eng P'ai and not vice versa, becoming the backbone of the early Haifeng Peasant Union." It was Yang who later defended P'eng before Magistrate Wang: "P'eng P'ai is not using us. He sacrifices his own interests to work for the good of the peasants."[175] Through his inspired gesture, P'eng had single-handedly started a revolution: he had infringed "the rule of

heaven and the principle of earth, that property is for the owner to administer."[176]

The young peasant who had defended P'eng P'ai by arguing so well on the need for unity was enough reward to P'eng for his sacrifice: the man had vindicated his confidence in the peasants' ability to comprehend him. "When I heard these words, I could have jumped for joy, and I thought, 'Here is a comrade.' " It was at this instant and at this level that peasant goals and the modern revolutionary outlook impinged on one another, a development that would have far-reaching significance for the course of the Chinese revolution. The young man's name was Chang Ma-an, but he could have been any Haifeng peasant. "I invited him to come to the office that evening for a talk." It was to be the first meeting in an "urban" setting, the "Tech'ü" villa, between a motivated "comrade" and the first "peasant cadre," a meeting that would establish a pattern whereby urban intellectuals seeking social change embraced peasant aspirations as their own and sought to mobilize peasants into an organized mass.[177]

Before long, peasants themselves took to spreading "the word" and "going to the villages to argue with people." It was not a case of convincing people so much as one of dispelling their mistrust. But soon those already busy canvassing reported that they "really believe what you [P'eng] say," thus displaying the remarkable awareness and desire to unite that was characteristic of the alert Haifeng peasantry. Indeed, that very first evening, when Chang told P'eng that some of his friends did not believe his assurances, P'eng told him to go and fetch them too, then and there, while P'eng made more tea for them all. This first meeting took place on July 29, 1922, and the five who came were Chang Ma-an, Lin P'ei, Lin Huan, Li Lao-szu, and Li Szu-hsien—"young men below 30 and lively in speech and actions." The point about age is important. Where the older peasants lived shut away in their traditional world, the younger ones were more amenable to new ideas and more ready for action. Though sharing many of the same basic aspirations as their elders, the younger generation had been brought up under the Republic and may have entertained some of the democratic ideas certain to be encountered, for example, if they had served in the Kwangtung Army.

It was on this occasion that P'eng P'ai adopted the tactful method that was to become the hallmark of his dealings with the peasants, showing respect for their suggestions and appreciation of their point of view. He referred to his difficulties and asked: "What do you suggest?" Lin P'ei then confirmed

that peasants could not only understand but also analyze a situation and offer a clear comment and suggestions. Lin told P'eng that in his approach to the peasants his timing and jargon were wrong, and that he had not been introduced "by anyone they knew." Lin gave him another surprise: he advised P'eng "not to oppose their gods." But the biggest shock was when Li Lao-szu said: "Hey! Let's set up a Peasant Union right now!" The suggestion, it is important to note, came from a peasant, and P'eng P'ai reports the fact honestly.[178]

It is not clear what Li had in mind. Perhaps he was thinking of the old Agricultural Society, although this is unlikely, for it had been a failure everywhere. It is more probable that he envisaged what P'eng had already described, something resembling the labor unions of Hong Kong, which emigrant workers might have spoken to him about. There were already some one hundred such unions in Hong Kong in 1922, and Canton had about eight. The point was that P'eng P'ai had achieved his basic aim. A rudimentary "mass line" had also been established: "We are only taking our orders from the people," P'eng would henceforth tell the peasants.[179]

The morning after the "Te-ch'ü" villa encounter, the Peasant Union started operations on a highly informal basis. "If others join, well and good; if no one else joins, we will remain together"—such had been the simple proposition of Li Lao-szu. "Success is on the way," P'eng P'ai had jotted down in his diary that night. Chang Ma-an and Lin P'ei took on the job of introducing P'eng to the peasants, a tactic that proved decisive in altering their mood, for now they "felt friendly toward me and talked quite sincerely." When he had a chance to speak to some of them at night, he found an eager audience. He spoke of "the source of their hardships, the heavy pressure from the landlords, and how they should help themselves," the same key points he had been repeating again and again. The audience "approved of what was said, and I came to know that they had the power of understanding." He also confided to Li Ch'un-t'ao that in all his pains and hardships the Ch'ihshan peasants were "his consolation." Despite his sincerity, though, P'eng could not resist the subtle impulse to display his superior knowledge. He had used theater with the city people and his own artistic skill with the students; now with the peasants he was using his "magic tricks," which made them "clap and cheer." Many soothsayers and peddlers employed similar tactics, so there was ample reason for P'eng, consciously or not, to do likewise. In an effort to gain greater credibility, he also took to working alongside the peasants in the fields, or playing with their children and teaching them songs.[180] One of the early songs mastered by the

children was P'eng's "The Tenants Curse the Landlords," the tune of which was a familiar nursery rhyme:

> Tung-ya! Tung! Tung! Tung!
> The tenants curse the landlords
> The tenants work the land to death
> The landlords sit at home enjoying the white rice!
> Workers stumble down in hunger
> Lazy people stumble down in self-content!
> It is you who are muddle-headed!
> It is not that your fate is bad![181]

The financial situation of P'eng and his associates was far from good, and the families of some of his friends resented the loss of a wage earner. "P'eng P'ai is in no danger of starving to death, but you might well be!" their parents yelled at Chang Ma-an and Lin P'ei. But in truth P'eng himself was far from solvent: he had debts amounting to upwards of ¥700, and Li Ch'un-t'ao states that there were creditors chasing after him. Only his stubborn determination kept him on course toward the villages. Lin P'ei and Chang Ma-an both "made rapid progress and they were even good speakers." For all their dedication, it must have been natural for them to suppose that the Peasant Union would eventually "have money in it," as Lin explained things to his mother. But "when it came to asking the peasants to join the Union, that was the hardest thing of all," for no peasant wanted to be the first to "cross the river," as P'eng P'ai put it. "On this bank misery, on that bank happiness." The secret was "to cross the river together, going forward hand in hand; if someone sinks, the chain of hands will pull him up. In the Peasant Union we support one another, in an organization as close as brothers." The resourceful P'eng hit on a magic word with "brothers," thus evoking the only society that recognized the peasants as such—the Triad and its Flags. "Yes, we will join, we will join!" was the response.[182]

That "mutual help" was the key role at this stage is apparent in an incident at Yünlu village. The child bride of one of the members of the Union had drowned accidentally and was in her coffin before the relatives could investigate what had happened—something contrary to local custom. The angry relatives threatened the husband with death and the whole affair looked as though it would develop into a feud. P'eng P'ai, who happened to be present, began jotting down the names "of every man and woman," a ruse often used by landlords to frighten peasants with the specter of a court action. He shouted: "Now you will answer before the court." The area chief, who came

to take the side of the girl's family, was driven off by the Peasant Union men. "We were doing this for a relative," the onlookers told P'eng. "What business is it of yours?" This was P'eng's opportunity. He told them, "Don't you know that we have a Peasant Union, the poor man's Union, organized and close-knit like brothers? The other man's trouble is my trouble, and mine is his. When our peasant brothers are in trouble, we will risk our lives to help them." To the listeners it seemed as though a new Flag had been established. P'eng went on: "Some day you should join the Peasant Union. If you do, you will be helping yourselves in the same way." They left "with their heads down"; as for the onlookers, "many peasants saw that the brothers of the Peasant Union were completely trustworthy and capable of helping one another. We made propaganda out of it." The lesson that unity was the way to avoid being bullied went home.[183]

The first indirect clash with the landlords happened when "peasants were contesting farmland among themselves, and landlords were raising rents and evicting tenants." The Union stipulated that "no one might contest the land of a Union member, unless he had that member's consent and the approval of the Union"; everyone infringing the rule would be "severely punished." Where compliance with the rule would cause hardship, the Union would provide for the member. In consequence "there was not a single fight between Union members, and landlords did not dare to raise rents where tenants belonged to the Union." Unity and discipline came to pay off, bearing out what Chang Ma-an had replied to some peasants: "It is a lot like chess: the better strategy wins." The Union declared a "No-Farming League" in one emergency, and the landlord had no alternative but to "give back the land to the original tenant."[184] (Actually, the Triad itself had earlier used the withholding of cultivation on more than one occasion, and peasants had also tried it, for example, in Yanma village.[185]) Besides being bullied by the landlords, the peasants were squeezed by the city folk. For instance, peasants had to pay a 20-cent fee when docking at the city quays. "The Peasant Union announced the abolition of the system" and simply initiated an anticity movement. "One method was a straight tit for tat: boats from the city were stopped in the countryside and forced to pay. If they would not pay us, we would not pay them. Thus the docking fee vanished."

In the space of a few months the Union, in upholding peasant rights, achieved great success and fame. The "new brotherhood" made its stand even clearer when the Union declared that it was assuming judicial power, and that all members were obliged to resolve differences through the Union and not through the "gentry and officials who exploited any peasant con-

flict." As before, infringement of this rule would mean expulsion, and "the Union will use all its power to help the other party."[186] This move was designed to clip the wings of the Commander's Office, for the court system was controlled from there and "existed in name only," so that "going there with an appeal to conscience was damned stupid."[187] The Union thus attacked the status quo and put itself above the law, though there were as yet no "deliberate, explicit, or even systematic expressions of defiance or subversion of the state structure," as there had been with the Triad.[188] No wonder that "the police and judges hated the Peasant Union," and that the peasants saw "political power in the villages shift to the Union." The countryside was beginning to stand up and assert itself against the city. The old Triad had had its major power base in the urban areas, and its leadership also was urban; the Peasant Union sought to lay its foundations in the rural areas and under rural leadership.[189]

In the space of four months the Union had joined battle with the law, clan power, partisan authorities, unjust landlords, local bullies, and city people, and already it was a force to be reckoned with. By September 1922 "there were something over 500 members, most of them from Ch'ihshan (28 villages)." P'eng P'ai must be given most of the credit for the "madness" that brought this success; but he himself laid the emphasis in his "Report on the Haifeng Peasant Movement" published early in 1926 on how much the Union owed to the peasants themselves.[190] His collaborators proved "intelligent," caught on to his design and even his tricks, gave him sound advice, and were dedicated to the common cause. Remarkably, ordinary peasants too showed a willingness to join and a readiness to abide by "Regulations" and "Notices." This indicates that the peasants of Haifeng were not an ignorant and passive mass. A resident attributes this partly to the fact that some of them had worked in Hong Kong. These villagers had "seen the world" and on their return were regarded as "people with experience and knowledge."[191] But apart from that, there was among the Haifeng peasants a desire for the organization and leadership lost after the suppression of the Triad and the decline of the Flags. In its language, attitudes, and activities, the Union was the "new Flag," offering the protection the peasants longed for. The Union was therefore welcome, since its leadership had proved itself worthy of trust. Created out of the peasant movement, the Peasant Union had come to stay.

3

# The Peasant Union

City walls, whose strength P'eng P'ai had come to know in his campaign against the reactionaries of Haifeng, are a good symbol of the conflict that shaped his career among the peasants from the fall of 1922 on. Within the city lay the center of bureaucratic and economic power in the hands of officials, gentry, and landlords, an elite that the Ch'ing administration had reinforced to the point where it could no longer act as father to the people, its sons. Cities were severed from their surrounding countryside. P'eng remarked on the difference in appearance between city folk and village folk, for it seemed as though they wore the uniforms of two contrasting societies: "When the villagers saw me, they thought I was one of their enemies."[1] In Haifeng, peasants were forbidden the large bamboo hat and stood out in their own distinctive headgear. The two camps ate different food and often scarcely understood each other's speech. "The peasants coming to town felt like tigers in the public garden," awkward and uneasy within the walls and treated with derision by their masters in the yamen.[2]

Fortified cities in particular brought out this separateness. Citadels such as Chiehshih and Chiehsheng, with their populations made up largely of descendants from garrison soldiers, were a byword for military oppression of surrounding areas. Peasants, "the devils in the villages," were despised and swindled.[3] Clans could exert a similar tyranny. In P'uning, 30 villages around the county capital were fleeced of an annual 6,000 yüan reward-indemnity by the Fang (backed up by 600 foreign guns) for help given in putting down a revolt in the past.[4]

The Peasant Union was not slow to take up the peasant cause, and in the early 1920's it initiated a nonviolent attack against the "republican" walled

city. This represented a break with tradition, for in former times peasants would occasionally storm towns but would then, after looting, withdraw or establish an order identical to the one they wanted to change.[5] Real changes were occurring in Hai-Lu-feng, as district Peasant Unions were set up to encircle the county city "north, south, east, and west." The whole of P'eng's "Report" is about how the countryside moved to conquer the town in order that it might complete the "unfinished Republican Revolution." Unfortunately, townspeople were safe behind their walls of arrogance, whereas peasants were cut off and excluded by their own lack of self-esteem, thinking of themselves as "useless people not up to the sons of fine officials." P'eng P'ai tried hard to pull down the psychological walls, and yet "A townsman never stood aside for a villager, rather the peasant with his load stepped aside for the empty-handed townsman."[6]

But what of the countryside outside the city walls? Whose were the endless fields and paddies of eastern Kwangtung? Was the peasant's situation really so desperate? It is by no means easy to obtain an objective picture of the household economy in the lower strata of this rural society. Most surveys and descriptions convey a sense of a grim scene, and some scholars have implied or endeavored to prove that revolution was inevitable. Let us try to examine the reality in Haifeng as presented by P'eng P'ai himself and others.

There was a chronic shortage of land in Hai-Lu-feng. Since most of the rural population lived by working the land, considerable under-use of labor was one result. The peasants of Haifeng were estimated in the 1920's to total 280,000, approximately 66 percent of the population, whereas those in Lufeng were 147,000, or 37 percent. The average land cultivated in Haifeng per peasant was 2.14 *mou*, making 10.70 *mou* per household, the latter taken as five persons and the *mou* as 0.166 acres. In practice, land area in Haifeng was usually calculated by the amount of seed that could be planted on a given parcel. Thus, a normal family in Haifeng cultivated as much land as could be sown with a picul of rice seeds. The picul (130 pounds, or approximately three American bushels) sowed some 10.3 standard *mou*.[7] P'eng P'ai cites six peasant families working 30 *mou* among them, making an average of 5 *mou* per family. But he further states that one able-bodied peasant could farm an area of roughly 7 *mou*, so an ordinary household could thus have farmed much more land without difficulty. The size of areas worked did of course vary with the nature of the terrain, the type of land, and the irrigation available. In Haifeng, farms on mountain terrain amounted to 40 percent of

the total cultivated area of around 600,000 *mou*—that is, 240,000 *mou*. Cultivated land on flat ground included much of the sand-field type. Dry-fields were unpopular because of the great deal of capital required to make them productive, and mountain fields also proved expensive.[8]

Most of the land rented out belonged to the "collective landlord," which was technically the clan or lineage, the village, a public body, or a charitable organization. Clan land predominated in Hai-Lu-feng. Those who managed land that was collectively owned (about half the cultivated land at this time) did well for themselves. As usual, gentry and landlords were in the forefront as treasurers, secretaries, or rent collectors. Embezzlement and the renting out of the best land to important people were common. Those already well off became richer, some of the incumbents remaining in office virtually for life and the property of large clans amounting to several thousand *mou*. Clan land was usually rented out first to lineage tenants and only then to others; if a clan member had had a bad year, he was given priority on renting clan land at a favorable premium.[9] The prime example of a clan estate was that of the Lin of Meilung, who according to P'eng P'ai collected some 10,000 piculs of rent per annum, which would mean an area of about 6,600 *mou*. The managers of such estates often wielded the real power, the control of the land rather than its ownership being the key to influence. Ironically, any peasant who sought a rent reduction had a better chance with the private landlords than with the clan landlords, since the latter were quite unscrupulous and "greatly to be feared."[10] Haifeng had much land under collective landlords, and with such management the peasant became "only a cog in the machine which ground for others."[11]

"Private landlords" included all single persons or families who owned land for renting out, and especially those who leased land without cultivating it. A Haifeng resident states that generally the owner-cultivator freeholders had from 3 to 4 *mou* and were considered middle or poor peasants, depending on the quality of the land. Distinctions between the various categories were very fine.[12] All surveys stress the fact that China was a land mainly of smallholdings. In Kwangtung the average was 7.8 *mou* per family, which explains why after the Nanch'ang Uprising the slogan "Confiscate land over 200 *mou*" was resented by the Kwangtung troops: in their province there were almost no landlords with so much. This smallness of plots resulted from population pressure and the principle of equal partition of land among heirs. In Meilung, for instance, the seven children of a rich peasant were each bequeathed 5 *mou* of land providing 7 piculs' worth of rent.[13]

In Haifeng, according to the Agriculture Department of the Kwangtung Provincial University, part-owners and tenants together made up 65 percent, which leaves the freeholders at 35 percent. This is supported by the 1917 Statistical Annual, which put owners at 33.5 percent, part-owners at 29.2 percent, and tenants at 37.3 percent. P'eng P'ai's own data give markedly fewer owners and many more tenants, but since landlords were so rare his figures are suspect.[14]

The private land in Haifeng amounted to 38 percent. That would mean some 200,000 *mou*, which, when divided by the 60 percent combined round figures for freeholders and part-owners in a peasant population of 280,000, would mean an average of 1.2 *mou* for 168,000 peasant-owners, or an average of 5 *mou* for a landed family. But the average is misleading: according to P'eng P'ai, "villages that twenty years ago had ten freeholding families now have only two or three." That meant much accumulation and much reduction in tenancy.[15]

Some landlords in Haifeng were called "dependent households." These were usually landlords' descendants who lived off rents derived in some cases from land bought by emigrant families—a practice that contributed to the scarcity of land on the market and its increase in price. The biggest landlord in the 1920's was the Commander's Office, that is, Ch'en Chiung-ming and his clan members, to whom "the various small landlords . . . one by one had to sell their land." This incorporation of land may account for the pessimistic figures provided by P'eng P'ai and for the pull toward tenant status.

The picture that emerges, then, is of an area with a high concentration of land in the hands of a few large landlords, a scattering of small landlords, a declining number of freeholders, and ever greater totals of part-owners and especially of tenants. The polarization of interests was under way.[16]

Soaring land prices were the first indication of this polarization. According to the Russian experts Volin and Yolk, between 1916 and 1926 the price of land in Kwangtung rose anywhere from 60 percent to 300 percent. With money on an inflationary trend, a Haifeng saying had it that "*chih tou k'o pao*" ("papers [i.e. title deeds] can also fill your belly").[17] Prior to the establishment of the Peasant Union, land prices went ever upward, "the business of land transaction going on every day." But with the Peasant Union active, many landlords grew fearful of peasant power, "auctioned off their land, and put their capital into business. . . . So land values dropped daily." That was yet another proof that gentry-landlords turned entrepreneurs were in

the land business only for the cash, with no thought for lineage and village duties.[18] Land transactions came to a halt and the scores of middlemen all disappeared. It was beginning to dawn on the landlords that renting-out was losing its profitability: in the 1920's income could hardly keep ahead of expenditure.[19]

There was no standard price for land, but normally the "purchase period" of a *mou*, that is to say, the amount of rent required for its purchase, was ten to fifteen years. But landlords could double their holdings in just a few years, an indication of the rapid accumulation of property that needed no involvement in its productive use. It was this that P'eng P'ai strove to get across to the peasants: "The landlord is deep in debt to you. He loafs all year round, while you work yourself to death in the fields. He takes the rent-grain from you. His piece of land is worth ¥100 at most and you people have farmed it for centuries. Try to figure out how much grain he has collected from you. If you think about it, it is really unfair."[20]

P'eng P'ai was speaking here of the prime land and wet-fields in Haifeng that fetched upwards of ¥100 per *mou*. Its annual rent (at one-half the yield) was around 7 piculs. Assuming that the farmer was able to keep the entire other half of his yield—that is, in P'eng's figures, 7 piculs at ¥6 per picul—it would take roughly two and a half years for a peasant to purchase his plot. But this of course ignores living and other expenses. In real terms a peasant might be able to save 2 piculs of grain per year, let us say one-quarter of his income. That would be ¥12, which would mean slightly more than eight years to make the purchase. But even this calculation is on the optimistic side: the Kwangtung average of ten years is more believable. P'eng P'ai held that, whatever the period, the peasants were making a free gift of rent to the landlord since they had worked the fields for generations. This applied even more to second- and third-grade land. The second grade was bought in Haifeng at ¥80 to ¥90 per *mou* at an average rent of 5 piculs, in Lufeng ¥70 at 4 to 5 piculs. Third-grade land was between ¥60 and ¥70 at 4 piculs' rent in Haifeng, and ¥50 at 3 to 4 piculs' rent in Lufeng.

Dry-fields in Haifeng cost ¥30 to ¥40 per *mou* with 5 to 6 yüan rent for first-class, ¥20 with 4 yüan for second-class, and ¥10 with 2 to 3 yüan for third-class land. In Lufeng prices were slightly lower. Wet-fields were the land of real value, and it was this that made the south and north of both counties so different in income and living standards. The low yield of the dry-fields pushed the counties' overall average yield per *mou* down to 3 to 4 piculs, which equaled the average of the low-grade wet-fields.[21]

The greater part of the peasant population thus depended on large landowners for a living. Remembering that these big owners enjoyed the lion's share of the collective landlord business, we can see why for P'eng P'ai this was "the most irrational social system": "A minority group owns an abundance of land and huge places, while the poor do not have a piece of land to settle down on." This, together with the exceptionally harsh tenancy conditions, scarcely made for tranquillity among the rural classes in Haifeng.[22]

P'eng P'ai described the conditions of the "petty landowners" as "pretty good"; those of the part-owners "came next." They were "the two self-sufficient types among the peasants." Even those of them with only a few *mou* of good land could make ends meet. "No one was worse off than the tenants, the most numerous group."[23] The percentage of tenants in Kwangtung varied with place, but in Haifeng tenancy ran about 70 percent—in line with the average for Kwangtung but below P'eng's quoted 80 percent.[24] In earlier years the tenants had been much better placed. Forty years before, for instance, two-fifths of the peasants held land in permanent tenure, "a system hundreds of years old" and, as long as rent was paid, unalterable. By 1920 this two-fifths still existed, but tenancy contracts had become weak and the peasants' security in their landholdings had decreased sharply, landlords being interested in better returns through higher rent. The other tenants were part-owners renting only some of their land.[25]

Half a dozen or more different types of agreement governed tenancy in Hai-Lu-feng. Common to all was a rent generally taken in grain and based on a proportion of the yield from one or more harvests. Another general feature (where the terms of agreement were expressed in a renewable contract) was the negative effect this system had on land productivity: as the contract drew near to expiry, the tenant would find a variety of reasons for neglecting his land or at least for cutting back his improvement of it. Two types of agreement were the direct focus of the next phase of P'eng's work with the Peasant Union.[26]

First was the time-honored contract of *fen-chih* (contract on fertilizer). Tenants under this treated their fields as "manure investment" because "their ancestors had given the landlord silver as security and gained rights to the fields. Unless the rent was in arrears, the landlord could neither reclaim his rights nor increase the fairly low rent, a state of affairs so favorable that a number of tenant families had been working the land for several centuries." The system was beneficial to both landlord and tenant, and in the eyes of the tenant such land was virtually his own. After subletting by the

tenant, at times "the landlord does not know any longer where his land is. . . . The tenant could become little by little the effective landlord." Even taxation became difficult to allocate, especially with deeds "improperly maintained, worm-eaten, or lost in transmission."[27]

The second type that concerns us is the *pao-t'ien* agreement, which provided for certain nominal tenants to re-let land to the real tenant cultivators, squeezing the maximum from their sublessees. Estates of the collective landlord were too large for ordinary peasants or small capitalists to enter into tenancy contracts, so rich landlords and merchants would take tenancy and rent out parcels of the land to others. This became a means for exploiting and not assisting the community. The worst landlords were those managing ancestral and educational land. In Haifeng there was a certain Mr. Lin, nephew of the county security commissioner, who sublet land for the Education Bureau. He himself was a merchant. He sublet 67 *mou*, which meant a rent of ¥600, part of which he handed back to the Bureau. No ordinary tenant could have commanded such a sum.[28]

Whatever form of agreement applied, rent due under it was normally collected during the fifth and sixth months of the Chinese calendar in summer, and the tenth and eleventh months in winter. In Haifeng in the 1920's, "to collect rent in the villages, guards or police were always sent well-armed." The peasants, however, felt it a moral duty to comply with rent payments. Their outlook was: "Fate decides it, and rent collectors have been rent collectors for ages, as farmers have been farmers."[29] Payment might be made in cash or kind, depending on the contract. Where fruit, cotton, and vegetables were grown in dry-fields, it was usually cash; where rice, it was grain. Only two crops per year were taxed; if a third crop was grown in Haifeng, it was rent-free.

Landlords preferred to receive rents in rice rather than in cash. Many bags of grain "gave them much face"; rice was a commodity open to price increase through manipulation of the market; and loans of rice commanded high interest. To guarantee the quality of the rice collected, landlords used special equipment such as the *feng-ch'e* ("wind machine"), the *feng-kuei* ("wind box"), or the *ta-shan* ("great fan"). These winnowed the good kernel from the light or empty husk. Additionally, the landlords often used their own large measures, making sure that the rice was thoroughly compressed by pounding it with the squared, short stick employed to level off the rice in the measure: the process was called *san-hsia k'ai* ("three blows of the stick") and the Landlords' Society was nicknamed by the peasants the "Society of

the Three Big-Stick Blows." This compression technique was a cause of genuine resentment, since the rice packed tight required extra catties to be added. Further catties could also be demanded by local variations in the measure.[30] But not all tenants took this lying down. Grain could be made heavier or swollen out by moistening, or by adding sand. Empty husks from mud-laden fields could be roasted dry and clean, and made to resemble full husks. Tenants collectively could have put up some form of resistance, but the principle that rent should be paid proved stronger than their fury at the landlord's behavior when collecting it. "They not only want to clear the rent, but also to bring him empty husks for rent." In bad years they reluctantly sought rent reduction, telling the landlord: "We would be sorry not to be able to pay you a rent." The peasants were precluded from going too far in their reaction not only by their mentality, but also because they would lose their tenancy, and possibly be imprisoned, beaten up, or have their possessions seized.[31]

As to rent reduction itself, where the agreement was of the type that required the tenant to pay an agreed rent, in normal years it might allow him to seek a 10 or 20 percent reduction in bad years; in case of total calamity the peasant could ask the landlord to divide the harvest standing in the fields. Rent reductions were left to the landlord to decide, and sometimes human nature would prevail over considerations of fairness. A period of grace might be granted, but if by the next harvest rent was not paid, the landlord could resume the land.[32]

Rent rates were everywhere increasing. P'eng P'ai complained in 1924 that "ten years ago every picul of land planted [about 10 *mou*] required a rent of 5, 6, or at most 7 piculs. Now every picul of land planted has gone up to 20 piculs of rent." With an average yield per *mou* of 3 piculs, that could mean two-thirds of the harvest. A rent of 50 percent of a rice harvest "was not unusual" in Haifeng. P'eng says that "rent rates were from 50 to 75 percent," and in some cases peasants had also to pay rents for their houses.[33] Where there was no deposit on the rent agreement, gifts and contributions were customary. Sometimes the deposit itself was called the "feast fee," to entertain the landlord after the harvest, and was paid along with customary gifts. These included cooked hen and duck, rice, and cash. Gifts of fowl were also called *t'ien-t'ou chi* ("foreman's chicken") and were meant to serve as compensation for grain lost during transport by the landlord's agent: a chicken supposedly fattened on this rice was handed over for the feast. The original goodwill gesture came to be a shabby means of exploitation on the

part of the landlord. Another gift was the *huo-t'ou chi* ("cook's chicken"), meals served to the landlord's men sent to collect rice-rent. In the end this also became a customary perquisite. When the Soviet was established in Haifeng, no fewer than 26 such customary gifts and levies were done away with.[34]

Taxation was yet another way of fleecing the peasants. It was taken for granted that "tax payment was a common duty of peasant and landlord."[35] In Hai-Lu-feng taxes were levied on the basis of land cultivated and the number of people in the household. There were other taxes, the most important of which was the salt tax. The land deed or "red deed" (*hung-ch'i*) guaranteed possession as long as the tax was paid. The land's fertility, location, and use determined the amount payable, ranging from 20 cents for hilly or poor land to ¥1.50 for good. Exactions for alienations on the sale of land were heavy, so "white deeds" (*pai-ch'i*) were commonly accepted as evidence of ownership. This and the poor state of tax registers led to much evasion. Only 60 percent of households at most were performing their duties, since for more than a century purchasers of land had not had legal ownership transferred.[36] Taxation of land at the county level was still an "impenetrable mystery" in the 1930's.[37]

Tax collection was farmed out, and many landlords were paying only 10 percent of their assessments. Tax collectors had to go under armed guard, and even so were rebuffed. At the gates of villages they were confronted by peasants waving flags and taunting them. If they were bold enough to enter, the peasants "seized and beat them and gathered in great numbers to resist."[38] But later, especially in Republican times, collection time meant open season for oppressing the peasants, and yamen runners, clerks, and constables had a field day. Tax collection was known as "seizing the pig": it was the peasant, beaten up and made to pay many times more than was due, who squealed.[39]

In P'uning county in the 1920's, for instance, the Fang lineage collected taxes for the entire place, using "the cover of government to increase taxation." P'eng P'ai declared that "rich people are happy to grease palms, corrupt officials are happy to get money, and the bulk of the public debt has been shifted onto the shoulders of ordinary poor people. Evil gentry and local bullies gang up with corrupt officials."[40] Sun Yat-sen himself admitted in 1924: "The government cannot help asking for taxes mainly from the peasants, not from rich landlords." This was an indictment of the failure of the Republic. Ch'en Chiung-ming's tax allocation, in the East River area par-

ticularly, exempted the wealthy, both merchants and landlords, whereas in poor families "even a three-year-old child has to pay." P'eng could state: "Between 50 and 75 percent of county revenue comes from the peasants."[41]

In the Haifeng of the 1920's, land taxes collected amounted to 30,000 *liang* (¥120,000) and were assessed by the magistrate against the annual harvest. There were national, provincial, and local taxes in Kwangtung, which according to the *Statistical Monograph* was one of the richest provinces in the country.[42] High military spending and the resulting levies were typical: in 1926 military expenditures amounted to well over ¥72.9 millions out of a total provincial revenue of ¥100 million; by contrast, only some ¥1.2 million went on education. P'eng P'ai stated that army taxes were what the people feared most. In Haifeng, "the variety of military levies with which villages were burdened became too numerous to itemize."[43]

Peasants bore the brunt of these army expenses. In 1923, with the Kwangtung Army back from Canton, General Li Lieh-chun increased all taxes by 30 percent, appointed as new magistrates men who had bribed him, manipulated government loan bonds, "borrowed" ¥50,000 from the Chamber of Commerce, obtained ¥100,000 on the security of the house-rent tax, and collected in advance all the 1923 land tax.[44] In Haifeng we saw how in 1915 army taxes had already been collected up to 1920 by General Lin Kan-ts'ai; in 1925 they had been paid up to 1930 into the Commander's Office.[45]

The peasants were also expected to pay an education tax, the benefit of which went to bourgeois children, according to P'eng. But in Hai-Lu-feng the tax that really swelled the coffers was the salt tax. One hundred catties of salt could be produced for 36 cents in Kwangtung, but they retailed for thirty times that sum. In 1928 the salt tax was ¥2.50 per 100 catties, but with additional taxes totaled ¥9.02. The average person used about twenty catties of salt per year and would therefore be paying ¥1.50 in tax. Smuggling of salt naturally flourished. When in 1926 a salt tax official tried to take action in Ch'ingk'eng, the peasants gave him a thrashing and locked him up.[46] P'eng P'ai affirmed that "the exorbitant taxes borne by the peasants were extraordinarily heavy. The hardships of village life increased so that income did not cover expenses. To cope with the hard times, people had to sell their land until it was all gone and they had become tenants—gradually transformed into a proletariat."[47]

One way out was to seek loans that could be obtained from the collective or private landlord and from pawnbrokers. Much of the money of the new rich in Haifeng circulated as "usury capital," the interest rates being high

(from 20 to 40 percent). These unsecured loans had to be repaid within two to four months, failing which compound interest was applied. Loans went under various names. One kind was "Nine out and Thirteen back" whereby the peasant got 90 cents for every yüan but repaid the full yüan plus 30 percent interest. Another was called "Interest of the Sugar-room" and was taken out by those wishing to perform urgent superstitious practices, to have their fortune told, or to buy fertilizer. The interest rate was 65 percent compounded after six months, to the point where the interest would finally exceed the amount loaned. There was also "Selling the Green Seedling": a picul of rice would be loaned in March, and in June was to be returned plus 8 pecks, that is, at 80 percent interest.

Security could include fields, houses, gardens, and livestock. Land was mortgaged to raise loans by lodging the deed with the person advancing the cash. Default meant that after two years the creditor could post a notice prohibiting the peasant from working the land so mortgaged. Normally the peasant had then to sell to the creditor—a heavy price to pay for a loan.[48] In China "mortgage of land meant total loss," and in Kwangtung "at least 70 to 80 percent of landless peasants have lost some of their land through mortgage."[49]

Poor tenants with little security could only resort to the pawnshop, pledging their tools or clothes. Moneylenders have been a recurrent feature in all agrarian societies, and Haifeng was no exception: there were thirty pawnshops there. They usually charged 30 percent interest per month, though this fell to 20 percent in winter. Pawned equipment would be redeemed at harvesttime.[50]

Peasants were generally in debt—as a common saying put it, "Not to be in debt would be sufficient blessing." In the East River this meant seven out of ten peasant households. In Haifeng, debt cases brought before the Peasant Union made up 20 percent of its briefs. Borrowing was apparently a way of life for rich and poor alike.[51] P'eng reported that peasants "would rather default on their landlord's rent than dare not to pay back their debt to the grain-lender, for fear that they might be unable to borrow again the following year."[52] In the end creditors would refuse loans to peasants already dispossessed. P'eng P'ai gives a moving description of how the average Haifeng peasant, having tried his utmost on the "active side," resorted to the "passive side" to try to pay the balance of his debt. He had to mortgage land, huts, and tools, but when these failed had to pawn the clothes off the backs of his parents, wife, and children, and reduce their already poor diet to gruel.

Family tension mounted as despair increased. If after all that "he still could not fill the bottomless well of debt," then "he took the next step: married off his woman to another man and sold his children." Left alone to fend for himself, "he could only leave his village and go to the market town as a laborer, or become a soldier, a bandit, or a coolie. Other than that, the road led only to death."[53]

A contract for tenancy was hardly worth the paper it was written on; but when a landlord broke an agreement, recourse to the law was pointless, for "no landlord ever lost a case." Later a Haifeng magistrate admitted that "the treatment of tenants was not good" and that this contributed to the outlook of the revolt.[54] In elaboration of the magistrate's comment come the 1923 findings of the Haifeng County Peasant Union: "The fields a peasant farms require capital investment every year—seed, fertilizer, farm tools, wages, the hire of oxen. They need a lot of hard-earned capital before a grain of rice will grow. Without lifting a finger to help, the landlord takes away a good half of the harvest. Who knows how much capital peasants like us have lost and for how many generations?"[55]

According to P'eng P'ai, a poor tenant family's finances could be set out in the form of a profit-and-loss statement as shown in the accompanying tabulation.[56]

| | |
|---|---|
| INCOME | |
| A year's crop from 1 picul of seed = 27 piculs, half of which went as rent, leaving 13.5 piculs at ¥6/picul | ¥81 |
| Rice-stalks | ¥3 |
| *Total* | ¥84 |
| EXPENDITURES | |
| Fertilizer | ¥30 |
| Seed | ¥5 |
| Depreciation of tools | ¥5 |
| Living expenses | ¥54 |
| *Total* | ¥94 |
| *Deficit* | ¥10 |

The figures as set out by P'eng P'ai vary with the differing versions of his "Report" and betray an effort to prove his point. Furthermore, they ignore the possibility of a third harvest of rice or some other crop, and also leave out other common extra sources of income we will look at later. P'eng's statement is thus not really comprehensive.[57] Two variants of it are given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, based on market prices of the 1920's.

TABLE 3.1

## Income and Expenditures of an Average Tenant Family of 5 People with 10 *mou*

| | |
|---|---|
| INCOME | |
| 1. Winter harvest of either | |
| A. Rice (half yield only) = 15 piculs at ¥6/picul | ¥90 |
| B. Peanuts (3 piculs/*mou*) = 30 piculs at ¥3/picul | ¥90 |
| 2. Two main harvests of rice = 30 piculs at ¥6/picul | ¥180 |
| *Total* | ¥270 |
| EXPENDITURES | |
| Rent (50 percent on 2 harvests of rice) | ¥90 |
| Fertilizer | ¥30 |
| Seed | ¥5 |
| Depreciation of tools | ¥5 |
| Living expenses | ¥54 |
| Miscellaneous (clothes, celebrations, etc.) | ¥50 |
| *Total* | ¥234 |
| *Surplus* | ¥36 |

SOURCES: HFNY:3–5; LFNY:9–11; PEM 1935:17; "Kwangtung agricultural statistics" (1928):332.

NOTE: Yield per *mou* is calculated at the minimum, and the winter rice crop at half a main one, though it was often more. Left out of the calculations is income from farm produce; a farm of this size might make ¥30 from vegetables and meat alone.

TABLE 3.2

## Income and Expenditures of a Subsistence Level Tenant Family of 5 People with 5 *mou*

| | |
|---|---|
| INCOME | |
| 1. Winter harvest of either | |
| A. Rice (half yield only) = 7.5 piculs at ¥6/picul | ¥45 |
| B. Peanuts (3 piculs/*mou*) = 15 piculs at ¥3/picul | ¥45 |
| 2. Two main harvests of rice = 15 piculs at ¥6/picul | ¥90 |
| *Total* | ¥135 |
| EXPENDITURES | |
| Rent (50 percent on 2 harvests of rice) | ¥45 |
| Fertilizer | ¥15 |
| Seed | ¥3 |
| Depreciation of tools | ¥3 |
| Living expenses | ¥54 |
| Miscellaneous (clothes, celebrations, etc.) | ¥30 |
| *Total* | ¥150 |
| *Deficit* | ¥15 |

SOURCES: Same as for Table 3.1

NOTE: Yield per *mou* is calculated as in Table 3.1. Farm produce, left out of these calculations, might make up much if not all of the deficit; moreover, since there would normally be much extra work capacity in a family of 5 farming only 5 *mou*, part-time work off the farm might bring in as much as ¥10 in the high season.

The picture that emerges from Table 3.2 is different from that shown in P'eng's figures, but one cannot disregard the experts on rural China in the 1920's and their pessimism about an average peasant family's ability to make ends meet. Beyond that it becomes hard to draw firm conclusions. Certainly, any family working ten *mou* in Hai-Lu-feng was in a relatively good position, especially if it actually owned two or three *mou* of plot. But ownership, though a key factor, was not the sole factor. As a recent Chinese writer has said: "The owner of a small plot of land might have less income than the tenant-farmer working a large rented farm. . . . Tenancy was not necessarily a sign of poverty."[58]

Inflation bedeviled the farmer and made it harder for him to gain his livelihood. P'eng P'ai explains it thus: "Fettered by the imperialists' customs policy, prices of goods rose daily, whereas prices for farm produce could at best be maintained at their original level. Thus in farming villages the cost of living rocketed and income sank."[59] Farm produce did rise in price, too, but it was the landlord rather than the peasant who benefited, for the latter had little to sell; moreover, when the peasant did sell, the pawnbroker and the moneylender could ensure that the price he got was below market. Besides this, rural markets were in the hands of merchants who manipulated them.[60] In 1923 rice was ¥6 per picul and in 1928 up to ¥10, but the increase never reached the peasant. Peasants might spend days on the journey to the capital city, and then not clear enough from the sale of their produce to buy essentials such as fertilizer.[61]

The only way to balance the budget, whether it be P'eng P'ai's or one we have suggested, was to take on additional work. In Haifeng, "besides working the fields, the tenant either planted a hillside or grew fruit; raised oxen, pigs, and chickens; cut kindling from the hills; or worked as a boatman or as a sedan-chair porter." Cottage industry was a standby. A resident noted that "in farmers' homes, baskets, buckets, hoe-handles, carrying poles, straw sandals, and coarse cloth are made."[62] A scholar family in Shuik'ou made charcoal for extra income. Fish-farming was widespread: "In every small village there were two artificial ponds, one at the front and one behind. One pond was for domestic purposes and irrigation, one for rearing fish." Grass-cutting for sale was generally handled by the womenfolk. Tree-felling was another sideline, especially in mountain areas.[63]

But why did peasants work their plots even at a loss? To grasp the underlying motive of this life we perhaps must put aside the values of a Western-style economy where land and labor are a variable of capital. In a peas-

ant economy, labor is the constant that determines the change in volume of both capital and land. To rent land for more than its potential income may appear to us senseless, but it was not for a Haifeng peasant family that otherwise would be left with unemployable members, and that by exploiting itself could still attain a clean balance sheet.[64] P'eng P'ai might declaim: "Don't you have to wear clothes as well as eat? When something is wrong with the house, don't you have to fix it? Isn't the lamp lit at night? Don't you have to raise a son to take your place when you are old and weak? As I see it, you can't neglect these things and so you put yourself deeper and deeper in debt."[65] But P'eng would have had to admit that the peasants had "active" and "passive" ways for attending to such important matters, ways the simple balance sheet need not touch upon. Tenants lucky enough to be farming 10 *mou* got by well enough in normal times, and the 60 percent of peasants who were freeholders or part owners could be better off still and indeed were so, according to P'eng P'ai. Admittedly a percentage of tenants working 5 *mou* lived on the poverty line. Even here, though, the roots of distress were not purely economic but included social and political grounds. Festive occasions, weddings, and funerals were costly in Hai-Lu-feng, and though it is not sound to argue that peasants were victims of their society more for what they valued than for what they got, both economic and social factors were responsible for the hardships in their life. Feuds and court cases also took a heavy toll, along with customary gifts and random levies—not to speak of rents and taxes. Inflation gave little chance of saving, and a typhoon could wipe out an entire crop.[66]

Poor beyond all arguing were those who were unable either to own or to rent land. In Haifeng, agricultural laborers and hired peasants were very few, "not even 500 in the whole county." They could count only on their wages and could be contracted on yearly, monthly, or daily terms. The year contract fetched ¥40 in Haifeng and ¥30 or upward in Lufeng, plus board and lodging. During the peak season male casual workers got 50 cents and females 30 cents a day; in the off-season they got 30 cents and 20 cents, respectively. As P'eng P'ai remarked, "under the disparate and complicated conditions of peasant labor, it is difficult to calculate wages in mathematical terms." Still, if we allow ¥54 for food given and ¥40 for wages, a yearly contract worker would be earning ¥94; a day worker earning on average 40 cents would make some fifty dollars more if working for the whole year.[67]

Many of the landless laborers remained unmarried, by force of financial circumstances. "They were objects of ridicule and pity in the eyes of the villagers, whose life centered on the family."[68] In the past, these luckless men,

"bare sticks" as they were called, would have found a "family" in the secret societies and bandit gangs, but in the Haifeng of the 1920's such organizations had disappeared. As with everyone else in Kwangtung, these peasants and laborers were at the mercy of superior forces: house rent, taxes, prices, and interest rates, to name but a few. Landlords and clan officials lived off the rent, bureaucrats and military men off the taxes, traders and compradores off price manipulation, and usurers off their exorbitant interest.[69]

A ballad by P'eng P'ai sings of the economic situation of the peasants of Haifeng:

> The mountain song is full of sound and fury,
> How wretched is the peasant's lot!
> A bowl of potato-broth for breakfast,
> A bowl of potato-soup for dinner.
>
> Half starved, ill fed, undernourished,
> Living in a hovel with no beams in the roof,
> Or in a couple of thatched huts,
> The straw so lean that moonlight pours in.[70]

After so much activity and success, there was no reason to delay the official establishment of the Peasant Union. Accordingly, the inaugural meeting of the Ch'ihshan Area Peasant Union took place (by the Western calendar date) on October 25, 1922. The membership, from an initial seven in July, increased to 30 by the end of August and stood at over 50 by late October. "The entire membership attended," and the school principals Li Yüeh-t'ing and Yang Szu-chen were present to address the gathering.[71] The nucleus of the leftist intelligentsia was there too: they had resumed fringe activities with the peasant movement. "The most open of them, such as P'eng Han-yüan and Cheng Chih-yün, joined the Peasant Union; other students such as Li Lao-kung, Lin Tao-wen, and Ch'en Shun-i looked after propaganda." To these another source adds Ch'en K'uei-ya, Lin Su, and "many other sons of well-to-do families." This blend of peasants and scholars was in line with tradition: political power in China was recognized as resting on the consent of the peasantry and the support of the scholar class.[72]

To P'eng P'ai is due much of the credit for arousing student interest in peasant affairs. This occurred partly through his involvement with the Socialist Youth Corps, which did much of the pioneering work of mobilizing the peasants.[73] But this role of the SYC in the countryside was rather the exception, because an article of 1923 reviewing the current "back-to-the-land" movement declared that "the intellectuals and students do not like to go to the rural areas. They would rather starve than return to the villages."

In Haifeng things at first were no different, because after an initial effort to conduct a rural survey (perhaps in 1921), the students immediately gave up, calling it "a great sacrifice with little reward." It was P'eng who gave them fresh courage and motivation.[74]

It is here that the real aims and ideology of the SYC members who were behind this rural involvement become apparent: in the view of an observer, the peasant movement was "self-running and autonomous"; far from being a Communist endeavor, it had the connotations of a social welfare movement. At this early date the Youth Corps was hardly Communist anyway, and the CCP was scarcely interested in the peasants at all. The young bourgeois intellectuals in the countryside would not have welcomed any CCP domination; later they actually resisted it.[75] Nor did the peasants join the Union because of Communist beliefs, as is admitted by an important Communist document of 1926 on the peasant movement:

> The greatest reason for the start of the peasant movement is peasant awareness. Without that, were we to go to the villages and do peasant-movement work, it would be like going to speak of rent reduction to a freeholder. . . . This awareness of suffering is essential. Therefore we in the villages, after speaking to them for half an hour, get them to establish the Peasant Association . . . because [they] already have awareness. . . . Up to now no one has told them how to organize and get united, and so they are ignorant of ways and means to stave off suffering. But now people come to lead them, saying "Become united and stand up," and this they readily accept.[76]

In a letter to Li Ch'un-t'ao of July 19, 1923, P'eng P'ai wrote: "In the villages of old, this class outlook of resistance was already there from early times; but there was nobody to wake it up and to make it come alive and active." He sees it as "a pure class outlook in the villages against the landlords and capitalists" and describes it as "very deep."[77] No matter what P'eng's opinion was, this (as Communist historiographers concede) was only a natural awareness of "exploitation by their own landlords," not an awareness of "the landlord system of exploitation." Real class-consciousness was still a long way off.[78] Teng Chung-hsia puts it thus: "When shown how they were despised by the landlords, the peasants in Hai-Lu-feng clapped their hands. They were aware!" The intellectuals in the countryside had merely played the catalytic function of creating the greater awareness that produced organization. In the view of P'eng P'ai, the peasants had to work out their ends and means unaided. In his mind, "it is not helping others but poor men helping themselves."[79]

To live up to his ideal, P'eng P'ai encouraged a local peasant to take charge of the first Peasant Union, and Huang Feng-lin was duly elected chairman. The members left the meeting full of excitement because this was peasant recognition and a peasant success. It was expected, though, that the more extensive and national—and the more permanent—the peasant movement became, the less likely it was that the leadership would remain peasant. Years later this did indeed prove to be the case, when the movement was invaded by radical intellectuals. The difference was that these intellectuals, unlike P'eng P'ai, seldom became one with the peasants.[80]

The students who joined P'eng in Haifeng came predominantly from well-to-do households, and the teachers around him already enjoyed leadership status in the villages. Wu Huan-t'ang, for example, whom P'eng had made principal of the Third High Primary School, was from Wuts'ouwei village just north of Haifeng and belonged to a leading family there. He established the Peasant Union in the village, but "because of his work as principal rarely went there and was helping P'eng P'ai only in propaganda and organization. He was little known to the peasants." Wang Hung-wen was another from a rich family. He gave P'eng support and undertook campaign work among the students. Lin Su sported a gold watch. All these friends had the best intentions and strove to help the peasants, but they scarcely took on peasant attitudes or goals. Ch'en K'uei-ya came to be known as "King of P'uning": he had assumed full command of the movement and did not care to train his peasants.[81]

It was undoubtedly the large number of intellectuals associated with it, however, that helped the movement enjoy relative safety after it expanded beyond the P'eng family estate. In the words of a contemporary:

> The peasant movement was alarming the gentry and the local officials, but they hesitated to suppress it because the peasants had been careful to avoid conflicts with the landlords, and because there were many students and teachers with high-school prestige locally among the leaders. They were protected by a false analogy, which ranked them with the old-time Chinese scholars—their persons being regarded by all classes as almost sacred and their opinions as entitled to peculiar respect—so that they were able to engage in seditious propaganda, even mild rioting, for which others would be imprisoned and shot.[82]

Under this cover the Union was expanding. "Our influence grew in every village, and the number of applicants increased to an average of ten people a day," reported P'eng. Dues were 20 cents a year, as with other societies, an initial entry fee having been canceled owing to peasant doubts about the

need for it. (The peasants for the first time had imposed their own views on the leadership, who had bowed to their wishes—a small event, but an example of the accommodation on the part of the intelligentsia that was to mark later relationships.) For the leadership, patience was the key: "We will be able to change this only when all peasants have enrolled and undergone lengthy training." The peasants could lay down the law on important matters, too, when they so wished, as in fact they later did when they realized that their leaders had aims different from theirs.[83]

The number of Unions established soon warranted the founding of a Haifeng General Peasant Union. "By October there were about twenty new members a day," and soon "more than ten regions had set up Area Unions." First after Ch'ihshan was P'ingkang, where the P'eng had some land.[84] Yang Ch'i-shan operated there and had already brought all the peasants over to P'eng P'ai. Yang had a strong personality and "when P'eng P'ai was subject to sudden fits of temper, his colleagues would send for Yang to subdue P'eng's fiery explosions." He became the vice-chairman of the General Peasant Union; P'eng actually wanted him to be chairman, but the membership insisted on P'eng himself taking this position. In the opinion of a contemporary, "Yang was not a Bolshevik extremist and had in his veins the traditional conservatism of the village people." During the Soviet, Yang would many times deplore the wholesale slaughter and call upon P'eng P'ai to halt it.[85]

Another early Union set up by local peasants was in the villages around Meilung. This Union resisted the exploitation by the Lin clan and asked for a 25 percent cut in rents, failing which the Lin fields would not be worked. The landlords surrendered.[86] Unions were also established in Yinchen, Ch'inghu, Hok'ou, Hsiho, Kungp'ing, Chiuhsi, and elsewhere. P'eng P'ai gave Li a sketch of the village members of the Union encircling Haifeng. In a letter to a friend dated February 9, 1923, P'eng makes clear his intention to attack the capital city from the countryside through a policy of economic blockade. "In three days victory will surely be ours."[87] The Union was the start of a rural power base that overcame the pull of the market town in the rural area; in the villages, political power "shifted from the big wheels and gentry to the Peasant Union." For the first time a true Peasant Union, pursuing peasant interests, worked in a peasant environment. Lufeng now also sent delegates to ask for the start of the Union there. "A marvelous opportunity!" exclaimed P'eng P'ai, who regretted being unable to take on everything. Still, Lufeng had its Union by May 1923.[88]

Chung I-mou points out that all these Peasant Unions were organized by

the best peasant leaders. Their rapid success gave P'eng P'ai "great consolation" and showed that the peasants were far more "aware," even at this early stage, than either the landlords or the intelligentsia had estimated.[89] By early 1923 landlords were beginning to be concerned at Union strength: "We thought they were unable to succeed and mere loudmouths. We never expected this." The powers that be had realized the potential threat posed by P'eng and his Union. When he was having "a hard life," as he reported to Li, he was summoned to the house of an official of the Ch'en lineage, who told him that Ch'en Chiung-ming was much interested in him and in his work, and that he could assure him a position in Canton. P'eng, however, refused to go to Canton and announced that he had no intention of becoming an official, excusing himself by saying that he preferred to stay at home and study. The truth was he did not want "to leave the peasants he loved and the fledgling Union."[90]

A further reason for the establishment of the General Peasant Union was the realization that separate Unions, acting independently under local leadership alone, were not enough to meet the challenge of the landlords. In Meilung district, landlords had already formed a Society to Protect Production, with the aim of standing together to oppose the Union's demand for a 25 or 30 percent reduction in rents. So the peasants now decided to take a leaf out of the landlords' book. The pooling of membership and resources brought together a stated 20,000 households; assuming the usual average of five persons per household, this would mean 100,000 people, a good quarter of the county's population, either in or under the Union.[91] But P'eng wrote privately to Li with very different figures: 2,760 households in 98 villages at six persons per household, which makes 16,560 members. It would have been physically impossible in any case for membership to have increased so much in so short a time from the inaugural meeting in late October. The exaggeration of figures started here by P'eng P'ai was to become a constant feature of peasant-movement statistics.[92]

The inaugural meeting of the Haifeng County General Peasant Union on January 1, 1923, was attended by "60 district delegates" probably representing the Unions in 98 villages of the Haifeng, Kungp'ing, and Meilung districts, where the Union was strong. It was very formal, with an elaborate agenda: chairman's opening reports from delegates, review of the preparatory process, elections, constitution, suggestions, a dinner-cum-entertainment. The agenda strongly suggests democracy. Certainly P'eng wished the peasants to share in the Union's leadership, as can be seen also from the elected executive, all of whom except P'eng were peasants: P'eng P'ai, chair-

man; Yang C'hi-shan, vice-chairman; Lan Ching-ch'ing, treasurer; Lin P'ei, secretary for general affairs; Chang Ma-an, inspector.[93] The meeting approved provisional regulations that were modeled on the Student Union's constitution. P'eng P'ai wrote to Li in February that he had intended to have it done according to the "Soviet" organization and law, but that "I myself am still not clear on the details of this kind of organization, and besides, the intellectual level of the peasants being in general rather low and their ways of thinking very simple, they were scared of the term, so difficult to remember: *Su-wei-ai*."[94]

The first item on the agenda was "Union dues should be increased," as the leadership wanted; but up to July the fees were as before. Applicants who came in person for enrollment were persuaded to accept "our ideas" and were issued with a Union card giving full rights, including a say in elections. The card evoked for the peasants the old sign of secret-society membership, but now in a modern setting. It was seen as representing a form of economic and social security, and indeed would eventually be the pass to a 50-percent cut in medical fees, to reduced rent, and to the allotment of land—making it a precious possession. "In court cases, when arguing against army tax and the order to transport army supplies, or in street-corner disputes, a peasant would bring out his membership card. . . . Everyone feared the power of peasant solidarity." No wonder that when the Union was dissolved, soldiers had to be sent to force peasants to surrender their membership cards "at several yüan each." The size of a calling card, it bore the slogan "No work, no food: one in heart, one in strength," together with the holder's name, village, and district, and the date of issue. On the reverse was the great seal of the General Peasant Union.[95]

The Union was now interclan and interdistrict, democratically established with an approved constitution by a process allowing for report, discussion, and recommendations. In short, it was a serious organization, like a government of the countryside or "a government in exile," which, though still excluded from the city, had already established its "jurisdiction."[96] The General Union organization chart suggested a real government structure running parallel with the official one in the county seat. Certainly everything here points to a power structure designed to achieve even greater power; but power of a different kind was in view, since the anarchist in P'eng P'ai was interested in an anarcho-communist revolution and working toward what he called "socialism." In his letters to Li, P'eng repeatedly expressed his aim to lead the Peasant Union to the stage of revolution.[97]

As well as Union dues, financial matters discussed at the meeting also included measures for seizing control of the yam market from the gentry and thugs. The Haifeng market was worth up to ¥4,000, but to avoid a conflict the resolution on this subject rejected a showdown with the gentry, noting that "it was best to negotiate." Caution was the watchword; the Union during its early stages preferred moderation and action within the law in a reformist movement. The gentry, as was expected, opposed Union meddling in the market, and objected to its use of standard scales for weighing yams. The Union reacted by notifying the peasants to set up the yam market near its own office in Ch'iao-tung-she and by strictly forbidding business at the old market. The new peasant market was established at a large compound near the river, some 300 meters from the bridge. The affair went off peacefully and another victory was scored by the Union.[98]

A political problem of another kind involved the colors of the Union flag and their significance for the peasantry. This matter was by no means trivial. P'eng realized that the old Flags still had great appeal, and that the Union would perforce have to unite both colors if all the peasants were to be brought in. "So we did not use [only] the black [or the] red, but both, thus representing the combined fighting spirit of the old days." The flag was "four fields of red and black," the two colors which had earlier divided villages and even families in Haifeng. Eventually "peasant loyalties to Red or Black Flag disappeared and they all used the single peasant flag."* This is further evidence that when peasants enrolled in the Union, they did so with their own particular ideas and aspirations. The "brothers" of the Union were just as earnest and dedicated as the Triad brothers had been. In times of crisis they now once more could shout: "Alive, we are Union men; dead, we are Union ghosts."[99] P'eng remarked that among the new recruits in January 1923 there was no dearth of men with revolutionary spirit, the backbone of the former Triad and Flag units. The old Flags had been suppressed only ten years before, so it was relatively easy to revive the sentiments they inspired. P'eng and his Union provided both encouragement and a framework, and for provocation the Commander's Office never failed.[100] The religious outlook of the former secret societies was another element present, despite P'eng's objections. The peasants looked upon him as the source of their strength: they called him "Prince P'eng" or "P'eng *P'u-sa*"—after the

*The importance of the appeal to the Flags was shown in 1928 by the gentry-landlords who raised the White Flag, which they thought capable of rallying Black and Red Flag peasants against the "new Red Flag" (CHP:47).

bodhisattva who refrains from entering Nirvana so as to minister to the needs of the suffering on earth. The Flags, as events proved, had never really disintegrated but had only gone underground, ready to be mustered in the right circumstances.[101]

The Flag tradition very likely facilitated the spread of the Union; the quick increase in enrollment was probably due to the various Flag units deciding to join en masse and on a local basis. Yang Ch'i-shan may have taken his peasants into the Union on these grounds, once they realized that it resembled their secret organization and was wielding considerable power. Though operating in the open, the Union had its share of secrecy in that it was working against the establishment and that it used a different set of slogans for internal and external consumption.[102] Even the use of signs was retained. P'eng introduced a hand sign "as in the past the Triad had done for identifying members." Since the Union was known as the "party of the poor," the sign involved the thumb and index finger (similar to the character *pa* ["eight"], which stood for *p'in* ["poor"]), the index and middle finger (*jen* ["man"]), and the five fingers (*tang* ["party"]).[103]

As described in an internal report, the composition of the Union came close to secret-society elements: "victims of the political, economic, and military crisis, . . . dissident members of the privileged class, and nonconformist gentry."[104] The Union's enemies, too, differed little from those the secret societies had had to confront: Li Ch'un-t'ao reports P'eng describing Union policy as "facing up to the landlords and taking to task the authorities."[105] The Union was treading the Triad path, since the radical intelligentsia and the lower classes joined it in "a kind of solidarity" that typically "expressed an opposition to the state, characteristic of the poor and the peasantry."[106] P'eng and his collaborators among the intelligentsia might have been of a different mind altogether, but to the thousands of enrolling peasants the Union was a revival of the Flags, now under one banner. They saw no contradiction between the two.

An early leaflet explaining why peasants should join the Union listed seventeen points—all heavily loaded with welfare provisions. Union county-level plans were also along these lines—higher living standards, improved cultivation and production, village self-government, and universal education. The Union's main activities clearly centered on welfare, though at the same time the Union faced up to the sociopolitical tasks that this brought.[107]

One of the first welfare schemes was a Funeral Aid Society, which was

established by P'eng P'ai before even the Union itself.[108] The superstition of the people was especially manifested at death. Chinese geomancy holds that if a man is buried in a properly sited grave, his descendants will prosper. A funeral was thus a special opportunity for showing filial piety with no expense spared. A simple burial had to have a few gongs and a repast; a good one required an imposing funeral procession, with two lavish banquets at sometimes a hundred tables. Mourning was a common affair;[109] as the saying had it, "When a man dies, the whole village stops cooking."[110]

To meet such expense families formed Burial Associations, which through contributions from their members provided loans in the event of a death. In Haifeng it was the "Parents' Association." The practice dated back to 1812 when the Association was a cover for the clandestine operations of the Triad "Society of Heaven and Earth." By the 1920's the Association was just one more form of exploitation. P'eng P'ai restored it within the social undertakings of the Peasant Union, to save families from a financial slough from which they could never extricate themselves.[111]

This form of welfare must have been a highly attractive measure, just what the peasants wanted. There were at first 150 members, each paying 20 cents when a parent died. Its utility was evident the first day of its establishment, with the funeral of the father of one of the members. The peasants were impressed when P'eng P'ai himself conducted the ceremony and read the ritual prayers; he also gave an address, thus "turning the occasion into a piece of propaganda." Unfortunately, "within ten days of its starting, five or six people died." The Society was not in a position to cover death on this scale, and a general meeting declared "its temporary suspension until sufficient funds were available."[112]

The next welfare activity was a peasant pharmacy and clinic opened right in the center of Haifeng city on the main street.[113] People in Hai-Lu-feng were generally robust, but economic disaster and social unrest influenced the general well-being. The Presbyterian missionaries reported in 1911 from their new 60-bed hospital in Swabue that tuberculosis "was rampant in all its forms." Anemia was common, and malaria, splenomegalia, beriberi, peripheral neuritis, and trachoma were prevalent. Cholera was a regular scourge: in 1926–27 both it and bubonic plague were rife. Leprosy was such a frequent problem that the Catholics in Swabue established a leper colony.[114]

Chinese medicine, much respected and very popular, was the form of medical treatment normally practiced. Some doctors handled it expertly,

but others were quacks. In matters of health there was great superstition and much resort to sorcery. At the height of cholera epidemics, gongs were beaten to frighten away the spirits, and sorcerers were called in to dispel evil influences. As for Western medicine, there was a Catholic hospital in Hui-chou in addition to the Presbyterian one in Swabue, and Hong Kong offered yet another choice for those who could afford it. The Presbyterians pioneered the training of local people in Western medicine: Dr. Sandeman had eight students under him in 1909, of whom two were ready to practice. In 1910 a Chinese doctor opened a Western pharmacy in Haifeng city and in the early 1920's Ch'en Chiung-ming built a civic hospital there, with a School of Midwifery taking 22 students and run by the Presbyterians. Other clinics were opened by newly graduated doctors such as Ma Chao-p'ing and Lü Ch'u-hsiung.[115]

The Union clinic on Great Street was run by Dr. Lü, "who was enthusiastic about the peasant movement." P'eng P'ai won him over to doing peasant-movement work after a casual talk in a restaurant. He joined up with P'eng, the two together visiting villages from early in the morning to late at night, and he was instrumental in winning over many peasants to the Union. The clinic became the official address of the Peasant Union. Treatment of members was not subject to charge, though medicine was, at half the usual price (the other half coming from the Union and from donations). In any event, no card-holding peasant paid out more than 20 to 30 cents. Dr. Lü was assisted by his wife Liu En-ch'üan, a midwife. "A lot of people came for medicine and deliveries," and there was some abuse with nonmembers borrowing members' cards. To eliminate this, the Union card was made nontransferable and expensive to replace if lost. To offset the costs of the medical service, money from the new market income was used.[116]

With the Union in full operation at the county level and the welfare work stepped up, the Peasant Union gained increasing support from Middle and Higher Primary students and the more enlightened of the intelligentsia. In Haifeng many students had genuine sympathy for the peasants: it was to such people that the work of propaganda was assigned.* By the methods soon laid down there would first be a "scheduled speech" on request, the speaker being nominated by the propaganda department. Next came "circulating propaganda," with activists moving around in the villages, and also short-notice speeches "on the occasion of a religious procession or an opera."

*An observer sneered: "The backbone of the Peasant Union, apart from P'eng P'ai, is formed by a limited number of young riffraff and extremist students" (PL:323).

Propaganda topics encapsulated in slogans were already fixed at the first General Peasant Union meeting. For internal use they were these: reduce rent; abolish "the three blows of the stick" and the foreman's chicken, duck, rice, and cash; eliminate bribes to the police. For external use they were improve agriculture, increase peasant knowledge, and perform charitable work.[117]

Long before the Russians set up their propaganda machine in Canton in the 1920's, P'eng P'ai was already using propaganda effectively. Ch'en Chiung-ming had also done so, but P'eng P'ai now strove for direct contact with the illiterate masses themselves, not just the intelligentsia or bourgeoisie. He achieved this through the use of theater, which had already proved successful and was not an innovation, for it had played a part in Triad initiation rituals: "by means of play, deeds of injustice could be portrayed and a sense of revenge could be aroused."[118] Earlier, theatrical groups had gone on behalf of the T'ung Meng Hui to the masses of the Canton Delta. P'eng P'ai is reported to have made theater into a forceful instrument for the peasant movement, personally coaching his performers. Related to the slogans that Chinese ideograms easily transmit were the cartoons that P'eng P'ai excelled at and that found a firm place in the magazines he published. Finally, there were also the songs P'eng composed, again very much liked by the Haifeng people.[119] He would give old tunes new words, as with a "reactionary" Hakka mountain song that he transformed into a "revolutionary" ballad. The original told of an emigrant who went overseas to earn money and brought back jade bracelets and gold earrings to his sweetheart. In P'eng's adaptation the lover goes off to fight, is victorious, and returns with a pistol and grenade.[120] It is commonly acknowledged that "P'eng P'ai was responsible for the great output of revolutionary songs in Hai-Lu-feng, and it was for the making of revolution that he used his considerable artistic and literary talent."[121] As for his colleagues, the propaganda department can be seen as the prototype of the Peasant Movement Training Institute. Short training courses were probably given to students and peasants engaged in spreading the Union's ideas and in organization, and the touring teams of propagandists served as a model for the peasant-movement cadres later dispatched by the peasant department in Canton.[122]

The enormous problem of peasant literacy was in the hands of the education department. Knowing that education might make or break the peasant movement, "the Peasant Union circulated a slogan—'Peasant Education'—which meant to run a peasant school." In this field again P'eng P'ai

was a pioneer; he was one of the first to work seriously to educate the peasants.[123] Though Mao Tse-tung had established a workers' night school in Ch'angsha in the autumn of 1917 where workers were expected to master elementary reading, writing, and arithmetic, Mao's slant at this time was toward the intelligentsia, and he admitted that he identified himself with the general run of foreign-style students and teachers, "feeling that the peasants were somehow wrong." His People's School set up in 1920, and his involvement in the Mass Education Movement in Hunan in 1921, centered on evolutionary changes rather than on revolution in education.[124]

P'eng, on the contrary, saw both the old and the new education as "time- and energy-wasting," a system whereby the exploiting class had "the peasants as slaves from generation to generation" under the guise of "loyalty to master and love of country." He was not the first to think like this, but he was surely one of the first to do something about it.[125] The launching of the Peasant School by P'eng P'ai was an entirely new approach to rural education, motivated by direct experience in the villages that other leaders and reformers could not match. As for what he proposed, "the peasants approved . . . they liked it even more." The peasants knew what was best for their children and accepted P'eng's new plans, giving the lie to the common complaint that "illiterate peasants do not take school education very seriously."[126] Temples and ancestral halls were used apparently without difficulty and rules were laid down. The Union found "inexpensive teachers" and "the provision was made that classes were free," although Union policy demanded that funds were to come from "the village where the Peasant School was set up." Following established practice, "education fields were rented from the landlord in the name of the school" and were cultivated by the peasants and their pupil children, assisted by the Union. The Union also supplied funds for "seeds and fertilizer, whereas tools, oxen, and labor were provided by the pupils' fathers and brothers, who shared the work of plowing, breaking the soil, and planting." At weeding time, pupils with their teachers would get into the fields and (as one source puts it) "the weeds were soon gone." Harvesttime saw another common effort, and the net income after rent provided the teachers' salaries.

Within a month there were ten Peasant Schools open, together with many night schools, all of them under the guidance and supervision of the education department. All sought "to teach peasants how to keep accounts so as not to be cheated by landlords, how to write letters, use the abacus, and write the names of foodstuffs and farm tools, and how to run a Peasant Union."

P'eng noted happily that "over 500 children previously shut off from education were now attending classes." Numbers soon rose dramatically, and P'eng P'ai notified his friend Li that the more than twenty Peasant Schools outnumbered the schools run by the county's Education Bureau.[127] This type of school later became a basic feature of the education system after adoption by the Peasant Association in Canton. Mao Tse-tung in 1927 commended this village education: "See how the peasants, who hitherto detested the schools, are today zealously setting up evening classes . . . which they call Peasant Schools. . . . They regard them, and only them, as their own."[128]

The agricultural department's various activities, by contrast, met with little success, for neither the leaders nor the peasants were "agricultural experts." Besides this, the peasants lacked interest, since as tenants "land was not something of their own, and they did not bother to use sufficient fertilizer . . . [because] any agricultural improvements would serve only the landlords." So the Union merely endeavored "to promote a communal attitude among the peasants." It initiated a tree-planting scheme—mulberry trees in particular, since silk was a worthwhile business. But even this did not succeed, because the peasants were afraid to be left without rice for rent.[129] The head of the sericulture department, Ch'eng Shu-shun, decided to plant pine trees instead, and a forest was developed at the foot of Yingp'ingshan. "A good, honest man" from Meilung, a graduate's son who was sympathetic toward the Union, Ch'eng eventually became Principal of the Professional School that developed out of the sericulture department. The Peasant Union took up promotion of tree-planting because of a law that brought bare hills, once planted, into common ownership. The peasants naturally were against the "town capitalists" having any hand in the matter, but "they could not do it on their own," so the Union provided the capital for seedlings and Union members the labor: "Once begun, every village that had hills welcomed the Union's planting."[130] This was the first time that the Union had taken over a government duty at the county level, acting on behalf of all the peasants at the village level. The peasants thus came into their first public property, and the communal attitude took shape on economic grounds. For all this, rural fairness and aspirations demanded that "when profits were shown, those who had done the work would get a bigger share." There was no hint of a wish among the peasants for the communal possession of land or for equal sharing of returns such as some of their leaders—P'eng P'ai for one—had advocated in anarcho-communist terms totally foreign to them.

Even their engagement with the landlords at this stage was conservative: "As for reduction of rent, we were prepared to carry that out after five years of training. It could not be done at the moment."[131]

The Union was thus usurping local organizational power, the traditional role of the gentry, to a disturbing extent. Its arbitration department actually took over several such roles: "that of the village gentry as representatives of villages in their contacts with the government, that of lineage elders as go-betweens in family squabbles, and that of the yamen runners and court bailiffs in investigating and prosecuting crimes."[132] It was common knowledge that in public trials in Haifeng money had the last word, but even there with Union cases the judges were very susceptible to Union pressure. The department dealt with many marriage cases (almost a third of its business), debt actions, landlord-tenant disputes, contested property divisions, and matters involving superstition such as *feng-shui*. There are no records of how cases were dealt with or what sanctions were applied, but it is probable that long acquaintance with Triad practices and customs accepted by the "village government" would encourage litigants to accept any Union verdict as final.[133]

The welfare undertakings of the Union were therefore very substantial, and the rapid successes achieved point to the willingness of the peasants to be organized and to their concern for their own well-being. The Union path had been relatively smooth up to now, for it had taken a cautious line and stayed within the law. P'eng was able to comment: "The man then in power in Haifeng, Ch'en Chiung-ming's most trusted county magistrate Weng Kuei-ch'ing, did not approve of the Peasant Union, but he did not break it up or prohibit it, so we had freedom to expand." It was, in short, a real welfare organization.[134]

By developing so quickly, the Union could not but attract much public attention. It also gained confidence in its power and had a seal designed as a symbol of its authority. This was circular in shape, "the peasants being afraid of the square seals, that is, government seals . . . which meant official notice to exploit." The wish for an authority of a different type was strong within the Union, and that could only arouse hostility among the gentry and landlords. Even Magistrate Weng felt uneasy at the new developments, but he was soon gone.[135]

As P'eng P'ai stated, the Union intended to take up the challenge of the landlords and to stand up to them first, then to deal with the magistrate's office. The strategy was thus to begin with the economic struggle, proceed

through social confrontation, and finally enter into a political showdown. That the goal was so distant, with even the start of rent reduction five years away, shows a commendable maturity and statesmanship on the part of the Union and its members. "All these activities prospered in an atmosphere peculiarly devoid of hostility,"[136] since it was a question of moderate aims. What mattered most to the peasants was fairness within the existing system, fairness and respect: they were particularly against the humiliating "three blows of the stick."

As 1922 gave way to 1923 the Union had every reason to feel buoyant and to celebrate. The Chinese New Year was at hand and "groups of singers and troupes of lion-dancers came from every village with congratulations." February 16, 1923—New Year's Day—witnessed a personal triumph for P'eng P'ai, as his "Te-ch'ü" villa was thronged with peasants paying him their respects, according to custom, as to a great benefactor. The unexpected demonstration may also have been behind his idea for the Union to organize a "Peasants' New Year Celebration." This was held on March 3, outside the Union headquarters in Ch'iao-tung-she. It was a mammoth celebration attended by "over 6,000 members and 3,000 nonmembers," the first great gathering of Union peasants in Haifeng. The proceedings included an opening address, speeches, songs and music, a lion-dance, firecrackers, and cheering—all the features of a former Flag gathering. P'eng P'ai as Union chairman, Vice-Chairman Yang Ch'i-shan, and the chairman of the first Peasant Union in Ch'ihshan, Huang Feng-lin, were the main speakers. In their addresses they referred to an ominous "revolution" (*ke-ming*), before whose arrival "no year will be a happy one for the proletarian masses." They hammered home the fact that "New Year's Day is the day for exploiters to exact debts." Thus an occasion for rejoicing was put to work for propaganda: "This is simply a chance to let our enemies see how many we are."[137] If that was indeed the aim they had great success; even the Hong Kong *Hua-tzu jih-pao* (*Chinese Daily*) took note, reporting that in addition to the speeches the propaganda department put on a vernacular peasant play entitled *Two Pecks of Rent*, which "drew loud applause from the sorrowful and angry audience." An undertone of revenge marked the celebration, which was seen as an opportunity "to rouse our revolutionary spirit, to prepare death for our enemies"—saber-rattling common to Flag gatherings. The real significance of the celebration was that the Union, by organizing a festival in the first place, had once again usurped the prerogatives of the authorities.[138]

"Over 2,000 people joined the Peasant Union that day, and afterward there were still a hundred joining daily." This created training and preparation problems: the membership chart still showed fewer than 10,000, but "the Union was always behind schedule in interviewing new members." Its headquarters became like a peasants' yamen, or a shadow government: "About 300 peasants came every day to ask questions, sit and talk, or join, [so that] things were really busy." Ch'en Chiung-ming had heard of the Union's strength and successes, and in early January had passed through Haifeng on his way to Hong Kong. He took no measures against it, however, for he was himself in a delicate political position following his withdrawal from Canton.[139]

Whatever Ch'en's sympathies were, the local old gentry and landlords were definitely hostile to the Union. They had never really taken much to the new gentry, and the new comrades with their extremist utterances and bold actions were even more a thorn in their flesh now that the political situation was precarious. P'eng P'ai's old foe Ch'en Yüeh-po "had plans to eliminate the Peasant Union, claiming that it was working toward communal wives and property." He had been successful with these charges the year before over P'eng's handling of the Bureau of Education, but he failed to realize that circumstances had changed in the meantime. When he asked General Chung Ching-t'ang to use his troops to break up the Union, the General pointed out that his troops were already demoralized after losing a battle and that their fire "would not be enough to light the peasants' cigarettes." The political situation in Haifeng was so tense and military power so unsure that many gentry-landlords had already fled to Hong Kong and more were making similar plans. A Kwangtung Army officer returning to his native village in Meilung district noticed "a slackening of business and a general unease." All old Ch'en Yüeh-po could hope for was a miracle; "he was highly superstitious, praying to spirits and Buddhas every day for the disappearance of the Union." P'eng P'ai noted with pleasure the futility of his efforts.[140]

Such was the atmosphere and the disposition of strengths as the first conflict between landlords and peasants approached. This incident marked the start of Union-sponsored peasant rebellion in an organized and modern form. Its roots were in a concern for social justice rather than any political aims—a fact that should be noted, for this constituted the basic pattern of future developments in the nationwide struggle, despite all the ideological

motivations that would be raised by the Peasant Association propaganda and all the revolutionary intentions of the urban leadership.

Toward the end of March 1923, "a certain Chu Mo, a foul landlord always on good terms with officials and enjoying substantial influence," wanted to increase the rent on some 30 *mou* of land cultivated by Yü K'un and five other tenants. The tenancy was of the *fen-chih* type, and for this reason the rent, unless in arrears, was pegged to a low figure. The fields were in Huang-nit'ang village in the district of Kungp'ing. The landlord's demand "was so unreasonable that they ignored it." At this, Chu Mo instructed his underlings to harass the families of those concerned. Yü K'un referred the matter to the Peasant Union, which accepted the case. "Angrier still," Chu demanded all the land back, knowing full well that if they handed over their land "no one in the neighborhood, no matter what kind of peasant, would dare to farm it." The tenants indeed "handed over the full amount," only to be charged in court the next day with "destruction of landlord's property." The magistrate in that division of the court, Chang Tse-p'u (a former schoolmate of P'eng P'ai), sent three constables to serve the summons, and the villagers, behind locked doors, were "so scared that the police were like foxes pretending to be tigers."* The constables tried to extort from the six peasants "¥6 for shoe leather, ¥2 for lodging expenses, and an ounce of silver or four Mexican dollars as a summons fee." The victims could not pay, were taken to Kungp'ing market, and had their clothes pawned to provide tea money for the police. Yü K'un had to ask a merchant to be his guarantor and bail him out; "only then was he released."[141] The incident, in itself not spectacular or out of the ordinary, became a *cause célèbre*, for it was the first great court case the Peasant Union took up and it split the whole of Haifeng into two camps. In open court the magistrate criticized Chu for bringing "a false accusation, there being no evidence." Chu was "speechless" and offered to provide proof "next time." He was quick to inform his fellow landlords of the decision: "No landlord has ever taken a peasant to court and lost, but I have just done so." He warned that "if we do not act soon to close down the Union, there will really be a crisis."[142]

Ch'en Yüeh-po, still smarting from his rebuff at the hands of General Chung Ching-t'ang, led the call to action and convened "a feast" attended

*This unusual phrase apparently means that the constables, though boasting and swaggering, were at heart afraid of the peasants, as foxes usually are of men.

by some 500 people, among them Ch'en K'ai-t'ing and the commissioner of local security. P'eng wrote a satirical description of the gentlemen at the meeting in their expensive modern attire. Chairman Ch'en Yüeh-po "announced the Peasant Union's criminal record: working for communal wives and property, bribing judges, and bullying landlords." In his address Ch'en also described P'eng P'ai as "a worm" feeding on incitement of the ignorant peasants and concocting devious schemes to threaten the property of landlords, who "spend money on land and pay taxes to the government." He continued: "It is a rule of heaven and a principle on earth that property is for the owners to administer." Ch'en then hinted strongly to the new gentry and all those with socialist leanings that "any injury to us property owners" would endanger their own chances of government, since if no taxes were collected the government would lose economic viability and the peasants "would be able to rebel at will." To this exposition of the rationale behind the old order "everyone clapped in agreement." But the meeting saw that naked force on its own would not work. The new gentry could not be counted on and Ch'en Chiung-ming was in enough difficulties. It was Ch'en's former teacher Wang Tso-hsin who proposed that they should fight fire with fire: "Since the peasants have a Peasant Union, we property owners must also unite in a society to counter it." The suggestion was immediately seconded by Chu Mo, who called for a "Landlord Society." Showing more political finesse, Ch'en Yüeh-po pointed out that such a title would not sufficiently involve the government; he advocated the name "Society to Guarantee Taxation and Production," a proposal that met with unanimous approval. The three big men in Haifeng—Ch'en Yüeh-po, Wang Tso-hsin, and Ch'en K'ai-t'ing—were elected officers, "with the constitution to be drafted by the chairman."[143]

The new county magistrate Lü T'ieh-ts'o, "an evil old member of the gentry who opposed the Union in his heart," thought it best to remain aloof from the conflict. Nor did the Commander's Office intervene, because there were fears that the peasants might rise up en masse. Indeed, the peasants soon took to calling the landlords' group "the Society of the Three Big-stick Blows,"[144] and P'eng P'ai named it "the Society of Old Rent-Collectors Worthy of Being Beheaded."[145]

What P'eng had argued for with the peasants proved correct: in unity was strength. But money, too, meant power, and the landlords here were at a great advantage. Ch'en Yüeh-po worked out that from 100,000 piculs of rent around the county capital alone, a levy of one yüan per picul would secure

"at least ¥100,000," and "we can use that money to bury them." The Peasant Union for its part realized that "Union dues should be increased." Ch'en K'ai-t'ing opened the conflict with a broadside against Chang Tse-p'u, the judge who "takes Peasant Union bribes." He proposed that the whole body of snubbed landlords should confront him and compel him to imprison the peasants, "or else we shall give him what he deserves." The Haifeng grandees marched "in single file to the courthouse," effectively intimidating Judge Chang. Ch'en cursed him and ordered him "to put the peasants in jail immediately," and Chang agreed to reopen the trial. The six peasants were again summoned, and a meeting of the Peasant Union executive board decided to let the defendants go to court accompanied by as many Union staff as possible (this being a civil suit, detention of the accused prior to the verdict was ruled out). The other camp was also making contingency plans. A peasant reported the landlords to have "over a hundred hooligans lying in ambush at the east and north gates of the town," adding "if you go into town, you will get hurt." A Union spy was sent to check. The stage might have been set for an old Flag battle. When the trial began, the six peasants found themselves facing some eighty landlords in the courtroom. Under this pressure, Judge Chang "simply instructed the guards to throw the peasants in jail, handcuffed and chained."[146]

This illegal treatment by "a man of law breaking the law" gave the Union its greatest opportunity yet, leaving the people "compelled to resort to force." Union leaders set about presenting the whole regime as a fraud, called an emergency meeting, and sent out word to mobilize for the next day. It was decided to use the same tactics as the enemy had employed: the peasants would petition the court and intimidate the judge in the name of justice. "Forty peasants were sent out. They spread out along the four roads, north, south, east, and west, and informed every village comrade of the next day's 10 A.M. assembly at Lung-she-p'u."

P'eng P'ai rejoiced the next day when he saw more than 6,000 peasants assembled. He took command and addressed the crowd. "Our peasant friends are innocent; the judge has broken the law. This is no mere personal matter of Yü K'un alone, but one for our peasant class. . . . In this vital crisis, we ask every man to go and petition. I am with you in life and death." No one needed persuading of the issue at stake, for P'eng made it clear: "If Yü K'un loses, 100,000 peasants all lose. If Yü K'un wins, 100,000 peasants win." After P'eng, the chairman of the Ch'ihshan Peasant Union also spoke: "Their 100,000 yüan, even were it millions, is nothing to be feared, because

the rent is in grain and the grain is in our peasant houses, not in their houses." The prospect of a violent confrontation with the landlords excited the applauding crowd, and Huang Feng-lin went over into Flag language: "I hope no brother will allow himself to be frightened. This little brother of yours has his own strategy. . . ." In the event of war, the peasants were to destroy all the boundary marks, leaving the landlords to fight each other over their property. "Everyone cheered with delight." The atmosphere was one of unity, power, and jubilation. P'eng announced: "Our Union has rice-soup ready for over 6,000."[147] If "Flag" had replaced "Union," then the call for a fight to the death, the strategy, the common meals, and the mobilization would have been the same. There is no reference to the carrying of arms, but it is unlikely that peasants would go bare-handed, especially with hoodlums waiting for them. Ch'en Chiung-ming later spoke of revolvers being borrowed for the action of forcibly releasing criminals, but the accuracy of the reports reaching him is open to question.[148]

Flags in hand and posters and placards held high, the crowd went off from Lung-she-p'u under the control of Union pickets and shouting slogans. On their approach, shopkeepers closed and barred their doors from fear. This time it was no longer a bunch of schoolboys that P'eng was leading along the streets of Haifeng: the marchers were grim and resolute. A representative sent by the judge to discuss matters was ignored, and the crowd charged through a cordon of rangers around the courthouse, the troops "not daring to fire." Behind his bolted doors, Chang Tse-p'u permitted twenty peasant representatives to approach. Their petition sought freedom for the detained peasants, who were to be escorted out with drums and firecrackers and a full apology from the magistrate. Chang appealed to his friendship with P'eng, but the Union leader would have none of it: "There can be no talk of friendship today. I am here as a peasant representative." Chang was assured that the peasants had no intention of storming the jail—"That is not our idea." They wanted justice only, and "Chang had no alternative but to release the prisoners." Thereupon shouts of "Long live the peasants! Down with the landlords!" shook the whole town. The freed peasants were lifted shoulder-high and paraded around like trophies. Then the crowd moved down the main street in heavy rain, the peasants "cheering all the more at the response from heaven." At the street corners, waiting students unfurled another red banner: "Welcome to the peasants freed from jail." Firecrackers spattered in the air, and a resounding victory was recorded.

Union success had reached a peak and P'eng was eager to capitalize on it. At headquarters he addressed his followers in familiar dialogue fashion.

"Today we have been able to free six peasants from jail. I ask you by what power?" The audience responded that P'eng P'ai, the Union, and the farming comrades had saved the day. P'eng then dismissed the idea of any personal merit as "a colossal mistake," and declared that neither the Union nor the comrades could have frightened the officials into action. The correct answer was that "the Union could show six or seven thousand peasants how to unite in one place and act together." The recipe for present and future success was for "all of us to try for greater unity, to increase and expand our influence." After this, more and more peasants regarded the Union as "an organization representing the peasants' struggle for their own interests." The need for protection was evidently a key factor in attracting peasants to the Union, for every time a victory was scored, enrollment shot up.[149]

This great Union success (described with relish by P'eng P'ai), though undoubtedly colored in the telling by P'eng's didactic purpose, seems fully believable. The formula of massive parades proved successful, and was immediately taken up for May Day. Representatives of Haifeng, Lufeng, and Kueishan (in all 8,000 peasants), 100 boatbuilders from Swabue, and 1,000 students met on that day at the vegetable market for a great commemorative rally and parade. A "May Day Declaration" and "Report on the Labor and Peasant Day" expressed the peasants' determination to fight for their rights—though in a vocabulary redolent of Marxist jargon familiar to the intellectuals who drafted the documents but certainly not to the peasants who signed them.[150] The term "class" occurs more frequently now in the text of P'eng P'ai's "Report," stating that "peasant hostility to the landlord class was intense."[151] P'eng P'ai was definitely thinking along these lines, as his correspondence with Li Ch'un-t'ao shows, but for the peasants "class" had only a vague meaning of the enemy in the other camp. The May Day "Report" claims no fewer than 10,000 taking part in the rally. At the head of the parade a large red banner held by peasants announced: "The Great Parade in Commemoration of Labor Day." This was followed by the flag of the Peasant Union and many other banners inscribed not only with slogans against rent extortion but also with such slogans as "Down with International Capitalism," "Down with the Warlords," and "Let Us Go Red."[152]

Immediately after the establishment of the Haifeng General Union, Peasant Unions were also founded in Lufeng and Kueishan. Union prestige spread to all the neighboring counties. Crowds of applicants were turning up, but "it was impossible to enroll them all." It cannot be said too emphatically, however, that peasant aims remained predominant in this rapid ex-

pansion of the Union. If "new peasant members daily increased," it was only because they saw in the Union the promotion of their own interests. The Haifeng General Union reorganized itself into the Huichou Associated Peasant Union, and each county set up its Associated Union branch. However, as P'eng P'ai told Li, in Huiyang the war was in progress, which ruled out further advances there; Union organizers consequently pushed toward Tzuchin county, where a new Union was established. By March 1923, the Union had expanded into Tzuchin, Ch'aochou, P'uning, and Huilai. By the summer there existed a Kwangtung Provincial Peasant Union, with a branch in nearly every county of the East River area.[153]

It was at this point that Ch'en Chiung-ming sought to bring the Union under his aegis. Chung Hsiu-nan told him: "P'eng P'ai now has over 200,000 supporters and is even more powerful than you." These inflated figures were given by P'eng P'ai also to Li, when he reported on May Day that "the Peasant Union has already more than 70 districts, 500 villages, and 200,000 members." Ch'en wrote inviting P'eng to Hong Kong, and in June he went. There he was given ¥100 from Ch'en's dwindling funds and a promise of support: "When I return to Haifeng I will definitely reduce rents. You may carry on." P'eng made the most of this commitment by Ch'en, who thus "acknowledged the Union," even though it was more because the political situation was not going well for him than because of "his real feelings." Ch'en for his part came to admit that he needed the Union's support.[154]

The Kwangtung Army, reduced in numbers since some regiments chose to stay behind in Canton, had moved to East Kwangtung and was divided into two commands: the Kwangtung general headquarters in Huichou and the Ch'ao-Mei headquarters in Swatow. Kwangtung had switched its allegiance once again to Sun, and Hu Han-min was Civil Governor. The Kwangtung Army was in a state of decay, and was little more than an amalgam of personal and local interests. Loyalty to Ch'en held it together, but Ch'en was unable to provide it with a clear policy and aim. An early recruit who remained faithful to the end, Ch'iu Kuo-chen, noted that "there were no ideals worth fighting for." Ch'en made no attempt to convince his men of the value of his federalist notions, and battles were fought and won or lost without the soldiers understanding the significance of them. Promotions were made without system, nepotism and localism generally determining matters, so that there was much discontent. Once the pride of Hai-Lu-feng, the Army was now part of the machinery of oppression against the lowly. The soldiers who returned to Haifeng in 1923 behaved differently, exacting cash and provisions since they were paid only a fraction of their former sal-

ary.[155] Writing that summer, P'eng could see how real were the peasants' complaints: "Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops have made this place miserable. They steal anything in sight, they rob and rape, so that even ghosts are scared when soldiers turn up." The Army wanted money, and landlords and gentry knew how to get it; when the peasants protested, "the Army went and imprisoned them."[156] At the mercy of bandits, held to ransom by the police, despoiled by the troops, the peasants had become hopelessly disoriented and leaderless before the spread of the Union. They were looking for someone to lead them on again after Ch'en's betrayal, and to restore their dignity as clan and village members and their honor as fighters for a Flag.[157]

The Union's success in the Yü K'un case left the Landlord Society stunned and "afraid to move." Ch'en Yüeh-po took to drawing lots at the City God temple. The medium's message was that "the Peasant Union is assured of victory," a prognostication that led the old man to call a meeting of the Society and to submit his resignation. He also referred to a poem whose last line ran: "Let Han-yü have his way." ("Han-yü" was P'eng P'ai's childhood name.) Ch'en declared that in compliance with the oracle he himself would be departing for Hong Kong in a matter of days. This face-saving device, notes P'eng, was found acceptable, and Ch'en Hsiao-lun was then delegated to find out what the Peasant Union was really up to, in order to work out if possible a modus vivendi. Since Ch'en Chiung-ming had apparently given the Union his blessing with an eye to using its forces, the landlords could only seek clarification of "whether communized property was envisaged for the future." The Union replied: "We are working for the peasants' interests, which in fact augurs well also for the landlords' wallets." The Union's reasoning took the form of a terse statement of social economy. If peasants were oppressed and starved, it would be difficult if not impossible for landlords to collect any rent; given a decent life, peasants would never turn to theft and landlords could sleep peacefully in their beds; therefore a good life for the peasants meant contented work for the landlords and an end to hostilities. There were "so many advantages for the landlords." Ch'en Hsiao-lun was convinced by this, saying the landlords were "pitiful and disgusting people." He attributed the conflict until then to an enormous misunderstanding on both sides: "Before I heard what you have said, I also opposed you, but now I understand. I must explain it to them." The only bastion of conservatism still adamantly opposed to the Union was the *Lu'an Daily* group, joined by Wang Tso-hsin and Ch'iu Ching-yün, both former teachers of Ch'en Chiung-ming. They were in frequent touch with Ch'en, regularly denouncing the Peasant Union and especially the peasants' recent

petition, so that Ch'en eventually was persuaded that the court victory "turned prominent people against the Peasant Union."[158]

With so many areas falling under Union control it was imperative to train staff. The branch county organizations, save in Haifeng and Lufeng, were all shaky, the reason for this being "the dearth of comrades and skilled help."[159] P'eng P'ai described such branches as "signboards," real only in name. He wrote to Li in July of his recurring dream that he was searching everywhere for help: "Ah! Where are the comrades?" Membership was evidently scattered in the rural areas rather than concentrated in towns. The new Provincial Peasant Union, its executive committee and constitution notwithstanding, was a mere façade.[160] For example, when P'eng P'ai visited Tzuchin's county capital he could not find one union member to give him some financial assistance. One reason for the directions the Union's expansion took may have to do with the salt trails leading from Haifeng, for people in villages along the trails must have been kept informed of Union achievements. There were also local bandits who began siding with the Union and protecting its members—a fact not lost on the reactionaries, who were quick to cable denunciations to Ch'en Chiung-ming. Clearly the Hakka links, the salt-trail connections, the Triad ramifications, and the bandit connections in general furthered Union growth. To them might be added the lineage and clan relationships that went beyond the county boundaries.[161] The P'eng in Lufeng, for instance, could not be deaf to calls from the new leader in Haifeng: later during the Soviet they would form the backbone of the Hakka Army. Lin Su urged that "as long as the clan system is of some use to our work, we should exploit it."[162] But outstanding among all the reasons for the peasants was surely the example of P'eng P'ai himself, a man of means who had become one of them. There is no doubting the veneration accorded to P'eng throughout East Kwangtung. All these reasons were far from ideological, as the "comrades" would have had them be.[163]

In the early summer of 1923, Ch'en Chiung-ming returned from Hong Kong and reassumed his old authority in his home area. A new struggle now arose over the election of a county magistrate to follow Lü T'ieh-ts'o. On Lü's departure, Ch'en gave the post temporarily to his old teacher Ch'iu Ching-yün, a man much disliked in educational circles. The teachers and students opposed to Ch'iu quickly convinced the Peasant Union that its own interests were in jeopardy, but that together they could keep Ch'iu out. "A big meeting of citizens was called." In the mind of the Union leaders, "the man who might be a magistrate and who would also show a little interest in

the peasants did not exist." However, the intellectuals persuaded the peasants that their nomination did have a chance of being accepted, but that "if the Union could not find a suitable man, the office would naturally fall into the hands of the gentry." Who was better qualified than P'eng P'ai? Indeed the *Lu'an Daily* was busy spreading rumors of his candidacy already, perhaps to scare the reactionary camp into action and preempt any favorable consideration of P'eng on the part of Ch'en Chiung-ming. The Union wisely decided that an all-out political engagement at this stage would be inopportune, and that a compromise was preferable. "To solve the question quickly, we proposed Ma Huan-hsin," the head of the Union's education department. Acceptable in educational circles, he had gentry connections as a relative of the powerful Ma Yü-hang, hailed from a landlord family, and was a petty-landlord himself. But the reactionary camp could not afford another defeat, and after much lobbying arranged things so that when the time came for the citizens' meeting, Ch'en Chiung-ming had already appointed Wang Tso-hsin as magistrate. The fiat of the Old Commander avoided an awkward situation. The intelligentsia had at least prevented Ch'iu from retaining the post, so there was partial consolation. But the Union had hoped to use the citizens' meeting to show its strength, and the low turnout of peasants (a few hundred) was a clear indication of where the peasants' real concerns lay. The Union put down the dismissal of Ch'iu to its slogan "By the power of the people," but it had failed in its plan "to choose a county magistrate at the meeting." The peasants showed no interest, and thus the first political enterprise of the Union led by its intelligentsia was a failure.[164]

A brighter note was the promulgation of a constitution for the Provincial Peasant Union, set out with its ten chapters and 33 sections in P'eng's letter to Li of July 7, 1923.[165] Though in practice the organization was often threadbare, the new constitution marks the consolidation of the Union's expansion, and shows clearly the nature and aims of the Union during its early development. In his letter, P'eng P'ai reveals that the constitution was patterned after the one adopted by the SYC. As with the former county and area constitutions, the pull toward leftist blueprints was strong, but it was checked by reality. The articles of the constitution, as well as the mode and conditions of their application, confirmed the Peasant Union to be a social movement rather than a purely political one. The aims clearly reflected practical needs of the peasants; but the openness to intellectual advice also made the Union amenable to political involvement, which was surely intended by the drafters.[166] It accommodated the traditional peasant outlook

yet left room for the modern perspective of intellectuals bent on revolution. Only when we look at the Provincial Union leadership is any bias apparent. The balance between peasant and intelligentsia is evident enough in the executive committee, but of the ten departments only two (Finance and Research) were chaired by peasants. This was a portent of the Union's later development.[167]

The Union was now so conspicuous, and its fame so great, that emissaries were sent to P'eng P'ai from Canton inviting him there for a discussion with Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The idea of using the Peasant Union in the East River area, mainly directed by SYC members, for the political purpose of undermining Ch'en Chiung-ming was surely in the minds of the leaders in Canton. Significantly, P'eng was by now close enough to the Communists to use Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Party alias in writing about the proposed meeting, and also to be quoted in an internal Party communication as having promised them "a full report."[168]

At this point, however, nature intervened to give the peasant leadership a leftward impulse it would never lose. On July 26, a tremendous typhoon struck the Haifeng area with more than twenty hours of continuous gales and rain. Houses and trees fell; floodwaters killed livestock and wrecked the autumn harvest. A local missionary compared it to an earthquake.[169] P'eng P'ai was packing for his journey to Canton when the blow came, but Union leaders at once set to work to meet the emergency.[170]

Normally in such circumstances there would be a reduction in rent as part of the relief measures. But it seems that this time, perhaps because of Union involvement in their relations with the peasants, the landlords were reluctant to agree to rent reduction or to observe the crop-splitting tradition. Still, very few wanted to press for their rent or take on the Union, and a fair number were in doubt about the whole matter. The peasants recognized their duty and as usual wished to pay: it was a question of how much. Here the Union saw its opportunity. Attracted by the zeal the Union was bringing to the relief work, peasants were joining "in hundreds daily" and looking to the leadership for a stand on the rent issue.[171]

The Union executive committee met urgently. Some delegates had to come in from Lufeng, and so in their absence the others began informally. Two factions soon emerged. One wanted the Union to sanction free agreement reached by peasant and landlord individually, with no bringing forward of the rent-reduction campaign that had been postponed for some

years to permit training and preparation. The other argued that present circumstances justified implementing the campaign now: "Opposing unreasonable landlords with strengthened peasants was the first means to certain victory." The local police were weak, said this faction; Magistrate Wang was unlikely to intervene; and the worst they could face—court action—would surely go the Union's way after the Yü K'un fiasco. This second faction, labeled "adventurist" by the first in an early use of this historic term, was clearly thinking of the effective takeover of political power in the area and was encouraged in this by the SYC—acting perhaps locally, perhaps with support from Canton and from the Communists there.[172]

However that may be, the latecomers from Lufeng, who were mainly student radicals, gave an entirely different meaning to "adventurism." The debate that followed their arrival was held in secrecy and led to heated exchanges. "No rent at all" was this third faction's proposal. It accused the "weak-kneed" moderates of the first faction of resorting to "fair words to fool the peasants," and accused the second faction of not going far enough. What was required now was revolutionary spirit: "those who would rather be spared it had better not advocate class struggle or ask for revolution." Even if the no-rent movement failed it would not matter, argued the third faction, since next time the stride forward would be longer; there would merely have been a pause on the way to success. P'eng himself shared this view.

The second faction then proposed a compromise. They requested a 70 percent rent reduction by all landlords, against the radicals' insistence that this would mean death for peasants unable to find even 30 percent after the disaster. A vote was taken and the compromise won: "30 percent at most" became the slogan, implying that if a peasant could not afford that figure he would still be allowed a proportionate reduction. This slogan was endorsed at the later public meeting attended by over a thousand peasants, despite the fact that P'eng P'ai spoke for the no-rent radicals.[173]

This affair is important in the long term more for what it reveals of the strategy of moving left than for any actual shift itself. Hard though disaster had struck, the picture was not so dark as it was painted. A rent-reduction law had in fact been passed that very month. Only certain of the landlords were refusing the crop split; some had given loans or agreed to reductions already, where indeed they had not been paid in full from the year's first harvest. Most of the 12,000 households in the Union (as the vote showed) were in favor of a traditional form of solution. The typhoon itself may not have

been of major proportions—many more had died in the previous year's typhoon at Swatow, where relief measures had been competently handled by the gentry. This year the main problem was a shortage of food, but there was still time to plow for a winter crop.[174]

The conclusion is inescapable that the Peasant Union found the Haifeng typhoon a heaven-sent opportunity. A contemporary report said that the Union used rent reduction "as the first condition to deal with the capitalists."[175] Li Ch'un-t'ao asked himself what special aim P'eng had in pushing ahead with the struggle against the landlords. He answered his own question by saying that rent reduction meant class struggle rather than economic gain, and that it was even better, because more meaningful, if it was carried out during a year of good harvest. The special aim in fact was "the overthrow of the present capitalist system," and the means to realize that aim was "the socialist revolution." A clear commitment is visible here. The success or failure of the peasant movement, staked only on the possibility or not for the peasants to accept class awareness and class struggle in Communist terms, had to mean the imposition of ideological and organizational constraints on the peasant masses to harness their potential for revolution. Later events, under these same conditions, were to prove the whole endeavor a tragic failure. For the moment what worried P'eng was that too few comrades were available to get the peasants to fight the landlords according to plan.[176]

With the decision made, the Union's executive went into action. Propagandists had first to spread word of the policy adopted, and to this end they issued a "Declaration to the Peasants on Rent Reduction" summarizing the old anarcho-communist views on property and exploitation by the landlords. Clear diagrams showed the peasants how landlords, especially in bad years, swindled them out of their due: to pay only 30 percent rent was reasonable, and some circumstances would justify paying no rent at all.[177] The Union sent a warning to police units in all districts against arbitrary judgment on or imprisonment of peasants engaged in conflicts with landlords. Telegrams also went to national organizations for support. To forestall any surprise from Ch'en Chiung-ming, the Union dispatched to his mountain base in Laolung full details of the disaster in an effort to persuade him to their cause. Finally, to show that it was fully backed by the peasants, the Union scheduled a countywide meeting. The leadership was aware of the possibility of drastic countermoves, but the radical faction was hoping that

the peasants could be won over to a revolutionary engagement, the ultimate victory of their own proposal.[178]

The workers were "highly sympathetic toward the peasants"; the merchants were generally neutral, except for those who were also landlords; but the other people who mattered in the county "were all on the side of the landlords." Even some students earlier in favor of the movement were feeling the pinch of its economic measures against their families and ended by opposing the Union. The executive committee received a shock when its education director, Ma Huan-hsin, in compliance with clan orders, denounced the "30 percent at most" resolution. He was at once expelled. The Union's enemies were as eager for a confrontation as the radicals. Wang Tso-hsin, Lin Tou-wen (the commissioner for security), and Ch'iu Ching-yün secretly revived the Landlord Society and concocted plans and slogans promising the end of the Union. One charge was that the Union's action would reduce to starvation "dependent households" whose only income was rent; another revived the old specter of Communism and accused the Union of working in league with bandits. The Union replied that starving tenants outnumbered "dependent households"; as for Communism, their own man Ch'en Hsiao-lun already had the Union's position clearly stated, albeit without prejudice to any future development. The charge of links with the bandits the Union let pass as useful for intimidation.

Certainly the Union pickets sent out as special envoys and troubleshooters were at times behaving like bandits. Another nephew of Ma Yü-hang, a teacher normally very sympathetic toward the Union, went to Wushihhsü village to collect full rent, as his clan had instructed. Pickets threatened him so badly that "he got scared, came to the Union to apologize, and complied with the 30 percent policy." In another instance a part-owner who paid 50 percent was escorted to Union headquarters by pickets and punished.[179]

The landlord bloc decided that its hour had come when a violent incident built up around one Mr. Lin, a nephew of Lin Tou-wen. This gentleman claimed that on government land allotted to education under the *pao-t'ien* type of tenancy, rent was not subject to reduction. On August 9 he took steps to enforce his opinion, only to be driven out of one village and beaten up in another. The action may have been a deliberate provocation. Lin at once went to Magistrate Wang, who sent some twenty rangers to teach the offending peasants a lesson. The peasants were severely handled and made to pay extortion money, and "three elderly people" were thrown into prison.

When Union representatives visited Wang, he held that the case was not a civil one because it involved government rent—a serious interpretation, for he could now show Ch'en Chiung-ming that the Union was usurping government rights and that its members acted like bandits. The case was cunningly engineered, since the default on rent due for education would antagonize the intelligentsia, as well as be in open defiance of the authorities; moreover, Lin belonged to a powerful clan and was a merchant, so that would cost the Union the sympathy of the merchants also. The Union executive, wishing to avoid a clash, decided "not to take [the episode] too seriously." For the moment they had been outfoxed; a compensation of ¥10 for the families and food expenses for the prisoners was granted, but there was a danger that Union credibility and the rent-reduction campaign would be undermined. So the call went out for an all-county meeting of peasants. This meeting was in fact already slated, but in the new situation the authorities could only see it as a gathering for battle.[180]

The day of the rally arrived. On Magistrate Wang's order, notices appeared throughout Haifeng: "The bandit chief P'eng P'ai has planned a rebellion for today. Let no villager be fooled and bring disaster upon himself!" This proclaimed the Union and its leaders as now beyond the pale, with no right to petition. Peasants tore down the notices and drove away the policemen stationed at street corners. Despite Wang's efforts, some five thousand peasants had assembled at the vegetable market by 10 A.M., ready for action. Wang cabled General Chung Ching-t'ang in Swabue for assistance, but the general claimed that he had too few troops to intervene. Wang pressed again for assistance, employing the formal request for military intervention. "Bandits have appeared in Haifeng." Chung "then sent every available soldier, over one hundred men, to the county seat."[181]

The Union's original plan of marching to the yamen to petition was dropped when lookouts reported soldiers on their way. Instead, a rally was held at noon, and 20,000 people attended. Speeches were delivered by P'eng P'ai and others. Meanwhile, the magistrate's office thought that the peasants were coming, and when the rally ended with a roar of "Long live the peasants!," the magistrate, troops, and constabulary fled in fear. The peasants could have taken over then and there, had the Union urged them to do so, but for some reason nothing happened. The opposition was amazed that things stopped where they did, and felt "greatly puzzled" that the peasants were content merely to shout their heads off with slogans. The failure to act decisively may have been the outcome of factionalism within the leadership,

for the moderate leaders—Yang Ch'i-shan and P'eng Han-yüan among them—may well have balked at such a drastic step as seizing the yamen. The majority by vote had chosen a heavy rent reduction, but not rebellion or the radical leaders' "revolution." It may also have been that the sudden prospect of tangible power paralyzed the Union's leaders, since revolution had been only a theoretical question up to this point.[182]

Whatever the explanation, the Union leadership deserves credit for being able to control such a large gathering and for getting it to disperse quietly after the rally. As in the past, a decision by Flag headquarters could halt a raging feud. "In reality we did not prepare for a battle and we did not expect any danger," assures P'eng P'ai. Other sources, however, insist that there was a real attempt to revolt. Chung I-mou states that Magistrate Wang telegraphed Ch'en Chiung-ming in Laolung for reinforcements. Wang apparently claimed that more than 100,000 "peasant bandits" were up in arms in Haifeng city, continually shouting "Death to landlords!," "Death to officials!," "Death to the bad gentry and their bully boys!"[183] P'eng P'ai did admit later that the Union had some arms for self-defense, but he added that, as for peasant weapons, a war could not be waged with them. Certainly Union leaders considered "riots and the preparation of weapons" as the last resort. Though Ch'en later came to believe that "they had not formed groups to disturb the peace," a contemporary source states that officials were of the opinion that the Union wished to stage a coup and reproached P'eng P'ai for "plotting a rebellion." General Chung "had the incident investigated and came to the conclusion that P'eng P'ai was out for a revolt."[184] Whether the ultra-radicals had any backing from Canton also remains unknown, for all P'eng's contacts there and his intended trip. Whatever its intention, the incident remained in the memory of the peasants: they and their leftist leaders would later commemorate it with the "Festival of the Red Heart," at which they ate a special soup containing glutinous rice balls sprinkled with red powder.[185]

The next day when Union leaders met to assess the situation, P'eng Han-yüan bluntly reiterated his disapproval of the whole affair. The army had been the crucial factor, as P'eng P'ai acknowledged when he later told General Chung: "If you had not sent troops then, Wang Tso-hsin would not have dared cause trouble." The irony was that the soldiers themselves refused to enter the city until assured that the thousands of peasants had dispersed.[186]

As public relations officer of the Union, P'eng Han-yüan met the chairman of the county Assembly to sound out reactions and mend fences. Both

parties sought a face-saving settlement, but the Union had the upper hand, as the opposition knew all too well. It was this fact that prompted Wang Tso-hsin to convene a gathering of gentry-landlords by night. One of the 50 or so who attended spoke for everyone when he demanded action once and for all against the Union. To that end, at dawn on August 16—the "5th day of the 7th month" (as the incident became known)—a joint force of guards, rangers, and troops, 300 in all, led by Magistrate Wang's brother, surrounded the Union headquarters in Ch'iao-tung-p'u. The main door was blown in and the Union leaders fled for their lives across the roof. A melee ensued in which Yang Ch'i-shan was able to keep some of the attackers at bay long enough to enable P'eng P'ai and a few others to make good their escape, but the fracas ended with 25 prisoners being marched through the streets to the cheers and taunts of the gentry-landlords. The Union building was closed and all its papers impounded.[187]

Wang was determined to bring down the full weight of the law upon the rebels, and began his proceedings by accusing P'eng P'ai, in absentia, of "using all of you to make rebellion." With the wit and strength of a natural leader, Yang declared that on the contrary the peasants were using P'eng, "for what P'eng P'ai does is not in his own interest. . . . As for the rebellion, I do not deny it." Was not Magistrate Wang himself rebelling by helping "big landlords and capitalists to oppress the poor in a bad year?" Wang was incensed and declared that what had happened merited capital punishment: "You arrogantly advocate communal property and wives in common." Yang's response to this was both evasive and provocative. He stated that social progress would lead inevitably to communal property; as for having women in common, rich men already shared prostitutes, and men like Magistrate Wang had made themselves "communal husbands" by having two wives. On hearing this the magistrate could not contain himself and ordered the miscreants beaten and thrown into prison.[188]

A large number of Union leaders, including P'eng and his brother, Lin Su, Lan Ching-ch'ing, Chang Ma-an, and Li Lao-kung, took refuge in the Hsiao-yen Temple on Tachang Mountain, where the Taoist monk Lü gave them a friendly welcome. Lü and Comrade Hung of the Union had once fought side by side against Ch'en Chiung-ming; it was Hung who led the escapees into the mountains, "the topography making the place excellent for defense." Moreover, "the peasants everywhere were Union partisans," some of them "serving as sentries at the approaches and on the peaks of the mountains." Many bandit-peasants in Hai-Lu-feng had used this base in the past,

and the Union was later to profit from this experience. The remaining leaders' prime task was to decide upon immediate policy, and again debate was along two lines. P'eng P'ai and the majority favored a bloody revenge "by calling up a large peasant army to counterattack . . . then we would be in a position to reason with them." His brother, however, spoke for the moderates, arguing that "killing them would give us full satisfaction, but afterward peasants would be killed." There was a danger, he felt, that Union gains would be thrown away in a rash and futile gesture: "If we wish to continue our hard work, that is not how we should act." He put forward his own scheme—a diplomatic offensive to win the support of Ch'en Chiung-ming, whom several of the peasant leaders seem to have regarded as the movement's best hope. Ch'en's backing would be a stepping-stone toward peasant power and political leadership; it could be achieved peacefully; and it seemed within reach, for Ch'en had recently expressed "great satisfaction" with the Union, albeit because "he wanted to make use of us."[189] The plan called for P'eng P'ai to visit Ch'en's headquarters at Laolung, where he would lay before Ch'en four requests. Two involved the release of the arrested peasants and the rent reduction specified by the Union; if these were granted the leaders would "consider it a victory." The third request, restoration of the Union, could be done in secret if it were otherwise unacceptable to Ch'en. The fourth, punishment of Wang and members of the Landlord Society, though "obviously unobtainable," was worth a try. P'eng Han-yüan concluded: "If neither the first nor the second is met, then let there be riots." This rider bought off the extremists, and Lin Su, in seconding the proposal, demanded that Han-yüan and the peasants should secure arms for use if necessary.

The alternative, *pao-tung* ("rebellion"), the "last resort," was clearly not excluded. If it came to that, the Union would be face to face with Ch'en Chiung-ming's army. Yet with the peasants behind it the Union might win, even as Ch'en and his peasant army had triumphed in 1911 and 1915. The Union was definitely seeking a political confrontation: the "5th day of the 7th month" had set the peasants and their leaders on a collision course with authority. Their reasons matched but their aims differed—a trend we will see become only too familiar with the Peasant Union.[190]

On August 17, immediately after the debate, P'eng P'ai, Lin Su, and Lan Ch'en-jun put on beggar's clothes, took 10 yüan and some dried vegetables, and set out for Laolung. The peasants gave them a send-off with shouts of "Fight on!" and one volunteered to escort the travelers, pistol in hand, to the

Haifeng county border. It would take upwards of a week to reach Laolung, and they would have to cross through three counties. Laolung occupied a strategic position on the right bank of the East River in Hoyüan county, near the border with Fukien and Kwangsi but at a safe enough distance from Fukien. P'eng reports the journey in detail, with vignettes intended to show the peasants' determination to fight, their unity and generosity in the common cause, and their willingness to endure any hardships to aid their fellow Union members. The 290 kilometers were walked in six days, mostly under cover of darkness, and the experience obviously made a great impression on P'eng P'ai.[191] He comments on the spirit of the Union, which is "poor men helping themselves," the leaders serving rather than exploiting, "taking orders only from the people—this is what we like to do."[192] Such an attitude was unique, and P'eng P'ai and his peasant movement were its originators. The Communist Party took years to discover it; there was no such spirit in traditional Chinese organizations, not even the secret societies.

Ch'en was well briefed for the meeting. When he and P'eng came face to face, each accused the other of having behaved imperiously. P'eng played on the necessity for a sharp break with tradition, especially in regard to crop-splitting, though he insisted that the "30 percent maximum" amounted to a compromise. Ch'en could not but recall his own ideals as he sat listening to the "young comrades," and he nodded his head in agreement; the rent-reduction matter was no great obstacle. But the accusations against the Union of staging rebellion and gathering arms were graver matters. Fortunately Ch'en said: "Of course, I do not believe them." He was, however, worried that the Union's demands (the fourth of them already altered to "payment of compensation") would "make it more likely for them [the old gentry] to oppose me," and he feared intimidation by sixth uncle Ch'en K'ai-t'ing. Ma Yü-hang had sent a telegram to Ch'en praising P'eng P'ai's "fortitude and great promise" and recommending that he be sent to Russia for training: "he will be useful to us later." Another telegram arrived from P'eng Han-yüan to the effect that Magistrate Wang was forcing peasants to surrender their Union cards and closing down the clinic and peasant schools; that Society members were harassing peasants for rent; and that with everyone enraged "an explosion" threatened.

Ch'en now dispatched his own telegram: he agreed that rent reduction was "proper in bad years" and that "crop-splitting made peasant losses excessive"; but he stated that the 30 percent payment "could not be a general rule in every case." The matter should be settled at a general meeting of peas-

ant and landlord representatives, to be chaired by ex-magistrate Lü T'ieh-ts'o. As for the prisoners, "since they have not formed groups to disturb the peace, they should be released forthwith lest more damage occur." For the Union leaders these concessions were not the best; but "we were quite satisfied," for morale and public standing would be restored.[193]

The meeting over, P'eng and Lan set out for Haifeng again, leaving Lin Su, in poor physical shape, as liaison officer at Laolung. They returned by way of Wuhua, passing through Ch'aoan. In Ch'aochoufu, P'eng met his friend Li Ch'un-t'ao, and at his home the two assessed the situation, concluding (as after the "5th day") that setbacks were normal for a revolutionary movement and that they would have to try again. They decided to appeal to other revolutionary groups for support; they wanted people to know the facts, which possibly had been distorted by the official press. P'eng asked Li to write and distribute a "Declaration of the Peasants of Haifeng to Their Countrymen."[194]

The travelers continued on their way to Swatow, perhaps by train, and after "another four or five days" reached Lufeng, where Li Lao-kung was busy working—safely—since Ch'en's military situation had worsened and Haifeng was in a state of panic.* By dawn the next day they were all secretly in Haifeng and P'eng Han-yüan had been contacted. It was now September and the Yunnanese army had swooped down on P'ingshan, threatening the stronghold of Swabue. The arsenal there was shifted to Swatow and Ch'en was rushing in reinforcements. He was said to be on the scene himself, having arrived at Haifeng on September 2.[195] P'eng now heard more about Wang and the landlord-gentry's tyranny. Peasants had been bullied, money extorted, the imprisoned leaders tortured and robbed of food and cash. The establishment newspapers were giving slanted reports and Magistrate Wang had paid no attention to Ch'en's telegram, a circumstance that P'eng P'ai later viewed as meaning that Ch'en must have had a hand in the dissolution of the Union, though at the time he thought it was surely in Ch'en's interests to gain Union support. For their part, too, the Union leaders still were of a mind to have Ch'en and his more enlightened friends (some of whom were in Hong Kong) on their side. Clearly the ideological gulf between the old guard and the new gentry was as wide as ever.[196]

*Li Lao-kung was a young student who gave up schooling to follow P'eng P'ai. He wrote an article on his experience with the early peasant movement in Haifeng. He later entered the CCP and graduated from the First Class at Whampoa Military Academy. Subsequently he became the Commander of the Peasant Army in Haifeng. He was killed in action on September 14, 1925 (PP:51; *PL*:315–28).

The Union leaders soon realized that Ch'en Chiung-ming's fortunes were in decline, and that he could not control his subordinates. They had considered seeking support in Canton but had never pursued this line. That Ch'en might well be toppled by the mercenary armies of Canton presumably did not occur to them. They still preferred to be in his camp. He was one of them, and local problems should be solved locally; turning to outsiders should be considered only as a last resort. Again, if the Union were to collaborate with Canton, it might in P'eng's words "be labeled a party of rebellion, with all caught in one net and the Union left with no chance of survival." So now, to lessen the general risk, the leadership split into two groups, one under P'eng Han-yüan to work among the peasants throughout Haifeng, the other under P'eng P'ai and Li Lao-kung to start activity in the Swatow and Hong Kong areas. Going to Canton would mean absolute secrecy. In Haifeng the peasants, far from being dismayed, were excited at the prospect of a confrontation. P'eng P'ai tells of Yang Ch'i-shan's wife and another comrade's mother "understanding matters and giving me comfort"; they declared that their menfolk being in jail "was not important and we should not worry."[197]

With the decision reached to bring about revolution by "political means," P'eng and Li set out on their mission. Since the money raised for the comrades in jail had run out, financial aid was sought in Hong Kong, but "donations were not forthcoming, because we had few acquaintances and no one was in sympathy" with us. Certainly that was true of the Haifeng Countrymen's Association, but the rickshaw-pullers were different. Mostly from among Haifeng's unemployed peasants, the majority also were Union members and proved generous when P'eng asked for contributions: the total collected was ¥80.[198] P'eng spent some time in Hong Kong on journalism. The local *Hsin-wen pao* (*Daily News*) printed attacks by Ch'en Yüeh-po on the Peasant Union and P'eng wrote refutations of them, spurred on perhaps by the fact that the paper's editor, Ch'en Po-hua, was another target of the Haifeng students. But soon he concluded that "political means were useless," and after one month he decided to go back to Laolung for something more like action. In Swabue, Ma Yü-hang lent his party ¥50 and via Swatow they reached their destination in a week. Ch'en Chiung-ming, busy preparing for an attack on Canton, described the old gentry's behavior as disgusting: they had sentenced the peasants to six months in jail and had even blamed the Old Commander for allowing himself to "be incited" by P'eng P'ai. It had been his sixth uncle and Magistrate Wang who had "dis-

regarded his orders." Ch'en admitted being afraid of them and declared: "The present 'new society' is 'gentry society.' . . . It is very difficult to do anything."[199]

Ch'en definitely wanted P'eng and the Union on his side, going so far as to invite the leader "to help me here in the office." He had few people working for him, he confided, and even those were irresponsible. The Union leaders saw "a warlord whose downfall was imminent." But he still aimed to eliminate the new "warlord" Sun Yat-sen, who was now "even advocating *kung-ch'an* (Communism)." It was not very discreet of Ch'en to mention *kung-ch'an*, for the aspersion was one commonly hurled against the Union leaders. For the Union and the CCP both, the real revolution (*ke-ming*) lay in "liberating peasants and workers, the bulk of the nation, from their misery." Where Ch'en differed from them was more in the means than in the end, and he was worried that their more leftist approach was having greater success with the peasants than his own. How, in his "new society," to do anything? Here already we can see the two lines of policy running ahead to where the peasant masses, and those for whom "the liberation of peasants and workers" meant *kung-ch'an*, could collaborate against the entrenched powers of a "new society." Indeed, this confusion of terms and roles persists to a later time.[200]

The likelihood is that P'eng P'ai joined the Communist Party at this point in late 1923. There is much disagreement on the matter. He may have entered the Party immediately on returning from Japan: he was in Canton in the summer of 1921 and is said to have done propaganda work there, but if so then it is strange that he is not mentioned in any documents. At the Third CCP Congress (June 1923), Mao had never heard of him.[201] In his letter of September 7, 1923, to Wen Liang, P'eng P'ai states: "I do not much understand the CCP, I am afraid it is of no proper use (*shih wu tang-yung*)." This may be construed as showing that at this stage he still had not entered the Party. In another letter (January 20, 1924, to Liu Jen-ching) P'eng writes: "The situation is an opportunity for us to sow the seeds; the SYC and CCP must hurry up a bit to find the means to have more comrades come to the villages." This again only shows P'eng concerned about CCP engagement, but it is probable that by this time he had already joined.[202] A telling indication comes from Chou En-lai in his commemorative articles of 1930: P'eng P'ai "before entering the Party" was engaged in the peasant movement in Hai-Lu-feng: "he entered the CCP in 1924."[203] The memories of old com-

rades in Haifeng all point to his entering the CCP after the "5th day of the 7th month" incident. A reasonable conclusion thus would be that up to that time (mid-1923) P'eng had worked from within the SYC and had kept in contact also with the Canton CCP group. Perhaps significantly, the first time the Communist organ *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* (*Guide Weekly*) mentioned the Haifeng peasant movement was on October 17, 1923, when it reported harassment by Ch'en Chiung-ming. In any event, P'eng P'ai up to mid-1923 was still something of an outsider for the CCP, and his views on the peasants had little impact on its leadership.[204]

Late in October, Ch'en began his drive against Canton. The Union leaders who joined him on his journey to Swatow found that he saw the Union as a real political party. He certainly had a high opinion of P'eng: "Your conduct is noble and you work hard at your duties, something I have always respected." He was obviously courting him for his support. P'eng, for his part, was trying to exploit Ch'en to further the aims of the Union. At any rate, both friends and foes of P'eng saw him as one on the way to becoming "a big official."[205]

In Swatow Ch'en continued to woo P'eng P'ai, even giving him ¥20. After hasty counsel with the others, P'eng agreed to follow Ch'en, since staying with him could afford opportunities to help the Union and would keep its enemies in Haifeng off balance and hence make them less oppressive. But his heart was not in this majority decision. He favored action and realities: "a peasant movement's basic method is to develop the peasant movement." When he arrived at Ch'en's headquarters he felt "burned up" at the sight of the retinue: "all I wanted was to wipe out the lot of them with a machine gun." When Li Lao-kung brought up the problem of shortage of funds, P'eng suddenly felt justified in going against the majority. He excused himself on account of a sudden illness of his mother. Once away from Ch'en, "his spirits brightened up." This was the second time that he had taken a lone stand against all his friends in order "to go to the peasants."[206]

Peasants relied on group action; nobody would do anything on his own. P'eng P'ai right from the beginning, therefore, was primarily interested in expanding the movement and its membership. In contemporary Republican China no other party or political group was as yet open to mass membership, even the labor unions being petty factions. P'eng in this respect also was a pioneer, and he later helped both the KMT and the CCP to become people's parties. Counter to the idea that "armed revolution against the warlords" must come first, P'eng held that "the people must be the strength and

support of the revolution before it can triumph. . . . When the revolution is divorced from the majority of the people, the result is always failure." Mass pressure and power in numbers were concepts fundamental to the orientation of the peasant movement. P'eng firmly believed in them, and on leaving Ch'en moved to spread his message throughout Kwangtung. "I immediately began to organize at Swatow the Hui-Ch'ao-Mei Peasant Union."

With political astuteness, P'eng P'ai sought to give the impression of great power "so as to help the peasants of Haifeng" and to win donations "for those imprisoned."[207] To build up membership, the handful of leaders in Swatow fanned out into nearby counties, P'eng P'ai being welcomed by local officials "because I was from Haifeng." P'eng showed few scruples. He was trading on his connections with Ch'en to foster aims that his sponsor would not entirely favor. Many of the new Unions he was founding were but old Agricultural Societies brought into the new organization. These Agricultural Societies, though underused, were numerous in the area and thus formed a valuable basis for what P'eng P'ai had in mind. In each of the counties, his group contacted and linked up the old-style Agricultural Societies. They opened a Swatow office in preparation for a General Union and made contact with Wuhua. P'eng admitted that "not everything is quite in order internally," but he was happy that the Union existed and that "it can still impress people."[208]

Later, the shallowness of their foundations was to be revealed,[209] but for the time being the "Hui-Ch'ao-Mei" bluff worked, and "we fixed the date for a meeting of all-county delegates." There were ten counties: Haifeng, Lufeng, Huiyang, Tzuchin, P'uning, Huilai, Ch'enghai, Ch'aoyang, Ch'aoan, and Wuhua. After registration and the dispatch of a self-congratulatory telegram to Ch'en, the Union went around "to various organizations for contributions." It was extremely hard going, since the people had already been hit by a plethora of taxes. But from Huichou a telegram came from Ch'en, the wording of which suggested wholehearted endorsement; this was used to elicit donations from the reluctant. Ch'en was persuaded of a rate of expansion with numbers estimated in six figures. He deluged P'eng with telegrams, urging P'eng to join him. The relaunching of the movement by P'eng P'ai in Swatow lent it a more political color. In the hands of the small intellectual group there, the Union, from being ostensibly a purely welfare body, became a political tool close enough to a party for Ch'en to think it was one. P'eng P'ai, after his meeting with Ch'en, had come away with the inspiration and the opportunity for an unexpected breakthrough.

The only people not consulted were the peasants themselves, in whose name all these developments were being promoted.[210]

Ch'en Chiung-ming persisted in sending telegrams, "a good dozen," until finally one arrived politely instructing P'eng P'ai "to leave for Huichou," since there was "an important matter to discuss immediately." P'eng could hardly have refused: the "important matter" was the organization of a party, Ch'en believing himself "still of the Revolutionary Party, still for revolution, and wishing to discuss policy."[211] So P'eng and Li Lao-kung duly set off, stopping first in Haifeng. They did not fear arrest: Ch'en's telegrams and the publicity surrounding the activities of the Union in Swatow now made them figures of importance. P'eng P'ai certainly showed how adept he was in using propaganda. His arrival in Haifeng found officials and gentry somewhat uneasy. Magistrate Wang divulged that the imprisoned peasants were about to be released; he boasted of being maternal uncle to P'eng and "a good relative all along." General Chung Ching-t'ang sent a trusted P'eng clan man to assure P'eng P'ai of his great respect and to convey his opinion that "unions are actually good, although people of an older frame of mind do not understand." To verify Chung's interest in and concern for the Union, P'eng accepted an invitation to visit him. Chung inquired about his business in Huichou, to which P'eng responded: "Revolutionary strategy . . . something very important." Chung thereupon heaped praise on the Union and on socialism, but cautioned that "there must be stages"; he echoed the general opinion that P'eng was "too hasty" and "should take it easy." To explain his own repressionist zeal on the "5th day" he volunteered that he had been concerned for security and had been misled into believing that there was a bandit uprising in Haifeng, not merely a meeting of the Peasant Union, against which he would never have sent soldiers. As for the later attempt to capture P'eng, "that was Wang Tso-hsin's idea, not mine." P'eng informed Chung that "everyone is angry with you," Wang having put all the blame on him; he added with deliberate exaggeration: "200,000 peasants will forgive you." Already on bad terms with Wang over private money matters, Chung shouted: "Wang Tso-hsin is bad!" He went on to hint that, as kingmaker, he had been unable to find a suitable alternative to Wang before, but now would happily topple him. P'eng felt satisfied: "Let the arrested peasants free and on my arrival in Huichou I can report the matter to the Commander."[212]

Far from feeling disappointed and low in spirits, the peasants were in a pugnacious mood: in Meilung the landlords were resisted and in Kungp'ing

and Huiyang 300 new members were enrolled. The peasants demanded the immediate reactivation of the Union, their schools, and their clinic, and they "were insisting on weapons for self-defense."[213] Their experience in the People's Armies and in the early Kwangtung Army had taught the peasants a valuable lesson. They had left their homes for a period of time, had been exposed to new ideas, and had gained a certain discipline and training in rudimentary battle skills. Now a new kind of peasant militarization was in the making. They were ready once again to stand up and be counted, their traditional fighting spirit enhanced by a taste of modern warfare.[214] All that was needed was a new organization and a new leader. The call for weapons matched P'eng P'ai's vision of "a large peasant army" and was an early conception of the Peasant Army. The aims of this militarization, however, were not the same in the minds of peasants and leaders, the former thinking only of self-defense or local and personal interests, the latter wanting revenge after the attack on Union headquarters and an instrument whereby Union demands could be imposed.[215]

P'eng now urged the revival of the Union. Before long, he received a letter from General Chung which, by being addressed to "the Chairman of the General Union," thus recognized its existence. The letter stated that Magistrate Wang had signed the order for the release of the arrested peasants. When they stepped out of prison, they were cheered by lines of their comrades. Things seemed to bode well for the Peasant Union. However, on his drive toward Canton, Ch'en Chiung-ming ran into difficulties and the military situation became unstable.[216]

In November 1923 the Kwangtung Army Swatow headquarters under General Lin Hu joined the Huichou headquarters under General Yeh Chü for an attack on the provincial capital. Sun's mercenaries had to retreat, and the left wing of the Kwangtung Army, under Hung Chao-lin, was soon within reach of Canton. By this time, however, the enemy forces had reorganized; they counterattacked, and the Kwangtung Army had to make a stand in Hoyüan. In January, Ch'en Chiung-kuang, a divisional commander and a cousin of the Commander, caught pneumonia and died. His funeral was to be on January 24, in Haifeng city, and P'eng decided to await the Commander's return to Haifeng for the occasion. Local support mattered more than ever for Ch'en, and Union leaders thought that at last the opportunity for forcing him openly to recognize the Union had come. They therefore intensified their propaganda and organization work, setting up a temporary office at the "T'e-ch'ü" villa.[217]

When Ch'en arrived in Haifeng for the funeral, P'eng staged a welcome that demonstrated again his new flair for bluff. The peasant members of the Union, displeased with Ch'en and weary of trotting out for things political that did not interest them, behaved as they had with the magistrate election and did not show up. One thousand flags made in advance were distributed to some dozens of peasants working nearby, who were drafted in and paid. At the right moment a few hundred curious villagers attracted by P'eng's firecrackers, songs, and speeches came to swell the numbers and were kept just long enough for Ch'en, in passing through, to notice them and be told by Yang Ch'i-shan that they represented the peasants of every village. Ch'en, asked to permit the peasants to establish a Union, gave a solemn and diplomatic reply: "Workers, merchants, and students all have Unions; how can peasants be without a Union?"[218]

This was enough for the leaders to swing into action. They decided "to work from the bottom up," from village to district to county. So elated were they that at a New Year rally in Chiehsheng they declared: "It is the Peasant Union that saves poor men. Anyone who opposes it is a criminal." Since circumstances favored the official reactivation of the Union, March 17, 1924 was fixed as the date for it.[219] The membership situation is revealing. After the authorities attacked the Union headquarters in August, the peasants appear to have shied away from active involvement; from 40,000 "households" (P'eng P'ai spoke of 200,000 members at 5 persons per household), the Union was down to a mere 1,300 members by winter and added only a thousand more by March. P'eng P'ai's continued claim of 10,000 "members" perhaps takes into account the existence of former members still holding cards. Yet the gap between the former 40,000 "households" and the present 10,000 "members" P'eng claimed is undeniable. Obviously the great majority of peasants in the Union did not like political squabbling that jeopardized their security. As usual, they were following the winning Flag, ready for a comeback as soon as the Union could regain the upper hand.[220]

Not even Ch'en's endorsement of the Union could stop the reactionaries for very long, and when P'eng P'ai returned from Chiehsheng on February 10, he was summoned to see Ch'en at his "Po-yüeh" villa. There he was faced with the full range of his enemies—Ch'en K'ai-t'ing, Wang Tso-hsin, and about twenty others, "every one of them landlords and gentry opposed to the Union." Only Ch'en Chiung-ming was on P'eng's side. He had already privately advised him against reviving the Union, "because society is still 'gentry society,' their power is great and they are criticizing you every day,

making it difficult for me since I must still rely on them." P'eng attended the meeting in a mood of disappointment, frustration, and anger, although it was still a great honor to be invited as an equal among the county leaders. Ch'en himself rose at his entrance, and the others also "shifted around in their seats." The meeting may have been meant as one of reconciliation, but Wang Tso-hsin was the first to turn it in another direction. "You are a good man, Mr. P'eng, and I respect you, but your work, such as promoting rent reduction and riots, is too extreme. That is wrong."[221]

The gathering immediately became a "trial" of P'eng, who had endured much slander recently as it was: for example, a totally unfounded rumor had gone around to the effect that he had staged an opera in Chiehsheng at a time when the Commander was in mourning. So he was obliged to defend himself, reiterating all the arguments he had used with Ch'en and countering Wang's statement by pointing out that it was the gentry-landlords themselves who were "becoming more and more extreme," having dealt unjustly with the peasants in a time of great calamity. The Commander, by maintaining a neutral stance as arbiter, appeared to P'eng to be encouraging his bringing his own accusations against his enemies, particularly of corruption, about which Ch'en was known to be particularly sensitive. Wang riposted that "the Peasant Union had privately manufactured thousands of spears and swords. What for, if not for rebellion?" P'eng replied that with such weapons "only children can be fooled." Then, addressing one of his own former teachers who was present, he declared his new revolutionary ethos to be above clan and family: "turning one's back on the interest of the majority is a great betrayal." In his opinion, when institutionalized violence was the order of the day, extreme measures were justified. P'eng took the line that compromise would merely bolster the status quo, a situation that was "driving the peasants to their death." He issued a warning: "The peasants are waking up and you would be wise to bully them no longer. More intimidation will be just self-deception." The meeting broke up with P'eng and the gentry leaders still irreconcilably divided. Only the two peasant bodyguards of Ch'en, who had heard the whole debate, "saw the light" and were won over to the Union. They declared themselves eager "to kill that band of vampires to the last man." As the Union leadership put it, "the victory this time was that we won over Ch'en Chiung-ming's bodyguards." Both "old" and "new" gentry now realized that the new comrades meant revolution and the end of an era; the peasants, once coalesced into an angry fighting force, would bring doom on them. Any recognition of the Union

would be a concession of defeat; the power of peasant solidarity was already bringing about a fall in land values and the collapse of their world.[222]

There was a month to go before the Union celebrated its official reopening, and the leaders were busy organizing the peasants. Meanwhile the Union's enemies besieged Ch'en, having also enlisted his mother's help. In the end "after pestering him for a long time, they got him." On March 16, the day before the celebration, Ch'en tried to convince P'eng that it was unseemly for the Union to stage a three-day opera and hold a celebration in Haifeng city that would make Magistrate Wang "lose much face." The opera could be held in one of the villages. P'eng was adamantly against any change and termed the suggestion "an unreasonable oppression," recognizing that the point was not so much the opera as the whole question of "whether the Union would be reactivated." Ch'en had expressed his wishes and for the first time the Union had demurred. This upset the situation again, and accusations and slander were rife once more.[223] One particularly damaging slur was that the Union "was connected with the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party." Perhaps the existence of the United Front between the Communists and the Nationalists (though only two months old) and the awareness that Canton had moved toward their own line emboldened the Union leaders. Ch'en Chiung-ming's position was weakening, the political situation having changed drastically for him within a few months. It is possible that P'eng and his allies saw new and more potent political protection at hand. In any event, on the evening of March 16 the opera went ahead as scheduled, and on the 17th, 7,000 peasants turned up for the festivities with their representatives.[224] The atmosphere was one of great enjoyment, and there were no fiery speeches or attacks on the authorities, only a report on recent events. The only incident occurred when two elderly peasants climbed onto the stage and roundly cursed the government for dissolving the Union.[225]

But meanwhile the Landlord Society had warned Ch'en that assassins were in town, sent by the provincial government in Canton to strike down prominent leaders of the Commander's regime. Ch'en was thoroughly frightened and came to suspect that "P'eng P'ai had assembled 7,000 peasants in town to create trouble"—in other words, to stage a revolt. All this was reported to P'eng by one of his cousins who worked for Ch'en. The fact that the CCP journal *Guide Weekly* had recently published an article accusing Ch'en of massacring peasants and concluding that Haifeng people must "unite and beat compatriot Ch'en," who exploited good people to pro-

tect his own clan interests, led the Commander to see P'eng's Union as a potential or actual subversive force in his midst. As the Union's celebrations continued, Ch'en decided to abandon all attempts to win the Union over to himself. He ordered his remaining allies, the gentry: "Very well, you break it up."[226]

The magistrate's pretext, that "bad elements from outside were stirring up trouble and spreading rumors to arouse people and endanger public security," was fully adequate; in addition, there was the obligatory canard that the Union was promoting "communal wives and property." On March 21 Wang Tso-hsin posted a notice dissolving the Union. There may well have been some truth in the allegations of revolt, since P'eng writes of immediately calling a secret meeting and "preparing troops." It is not impossible, too, that there were indeed by this time underground links with Canton: "Some comrades reported that Ch'en had evidence from coded telegrams sent from or received at Swatow by P'eng, that the latter was definitely in contact with the CCP and KMT."[227] Diplomatic reports believed P'eng to have been instructed by Sun, "in or about 1923," to organize the peasants in East Kwangtung "primarily with the object of combating the influence of General Ch'en Chiung-ming." The Union therefore went underground, for "the gentry were bent on investigation and punishment, and Ch'en had already given his consent." All Union documents were transferred to a distant village for safekeeping, and P'eng and the other key leaders moved there also. The magistrate's decree forbade public organization and ordered P'eng P'ai and Li Lao-kung to leave Haifeng. P'eng, for his part, departed from his village hideout for Canton on March 26.[228]

The peasants, very likely confused by their leaders' failure to explain matters, were "enraged at Ch'en Chiung-ming for dissolving the Union again." That the leaders might have had strong political motives for letting it happen would have been lost on most of them. The peasants had been pawns in a power play between contending factions and did not comprehend what was happening. They were after economic and social security, a dream that had motivated them to shift their allegiance first from the Flags to Ch'en Chiung-ming and then to P'eng and his Union, both of which they saw from within the Flag context. When the Union was transformed into a political instrument, they were left high and dry once more.[229]

# Part Two

## The Peasants as Power

# 4

# Ideas for a Revolution, 1920-1924

Marxism in China, as its historians have noted, takes on a special coloring of peasant messianism. Peasants are the revolutionary class *par excellence*, their glorious tradition seen as peculiarly Chinese.[1] Hai-Lu-feng in its early communist revolution may suggest a different reading of the peasant mind in its modern revolutionary efforts under the CCP.[2]

Strictly speaking, Haifeng was not the first region in China where peasants joined in a new form of association after 1911. Kiangsu had its Thousand Men Society[3] and Chekiang its Land League in the early years of the Republic,[4] and the 1920's saw noticeably more modern-style foundings at P'inghsiang[5] and Yachien, the latter with strong ideas for education.[6] But Haifeng alone had the ideology and organization to endure where others quickly failed. Wider considerations apply. We must assess Haifeng's influence on ideas within the whole peasant movement and national political life—that is, how much the Union found waiting for it and how much it developed and passed on into general circulation within the KMT or CCP.[7] To grasp this requires an ideological overview such as the present chapter, together with Chapters 6 and 8, will provide.

Republican notions, as set out by the KMT, had important implications for the land question, as was already clear from the 1905 manifesto of the T'ung Meng Hui mentioning *p'ing-ch'ün ti-ch'üan* ("equalization of land rights"). For Hu Han-min this meant the collectivization and nationalization of land; for Sun Yat-sen, a better share for the nation against monopoly or speculation in land development; for Huang Hsing, the Hunan activist, a land revolution pure and simple.[8] The young socialists around Sun were concerned for the peasants and took charge of rural reform in Kwangtung.

Sun himself, in his third address to the Chinese Socialist Party, announced that "land is a product like air or sunshine and cannot be privately owned"—although he never opted for the Marxist solution, opposed as he was to the theory of class struggle.[9] It was only his expulsion from Canton by Ch'en Chiung-ming that turned him to Russia, "the sole true friend."[10] In this, however, there was still no hint of class struggle or Bolshevization. The Republican radicals accepted the principle of social justice for the peasants, but they scarcely put it on their agenda.[11]

When in January 1923 Sun returned to Canton, his need for funds added urgency to the reform of land ownership, and he began with some punitive tax and confiscation measures (one of them requiring that a property's title date back to the Ming dynasty).[12] But in the following year, his power secured, Sun could adopt the slogan "Land to the Tiller." One reason why the KMT had no success with land reform, however, was that many KMT members had no grasp of or belief in its principles; and that slogan was soon to acquire a different meaning and political relevance anyway.[13]

In expounding the "three principles of the people," Sun acknowledged that it was the peasants, representing 80 percent of China's population, on whom the economy rested. He agreed that they were exploited by landlords, and went so far as to assert that capitalism and "the people's livelihood" could not coexist. But he also believed that change could come only slowly.[14]

This was heresy to the CCP and the Socialist Youth Corps, who saw change as urgent. Early on, the SYC had much greater influence than the official CCP and often took a tack somewhat to the left of it.[15] Admittedly, before it became the Communist Youth Corps its members were mainly students from rich families, but they were still the first to "go to the peasants."[16] Yün Tai-ying, their acknowledged leader and editor of *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien*, had done peasant-movement work in Hupeh in 1921.[17] His cadres were to spend summer vacations teaching peasants how to read, write, and handle weapons, always using "peasant language" and avoiding such terms as "revolution" and "bloodshed."[18] The Corps won Sun Yat-sen's admiration for daring to enter among the masses, for he desired the KMT to have a mass base and become a mass party. Communists to him were always "youngsters"; but he welcomed their power as a leaven, and this favor gave them a foothold among both workers and peasants.[19]

The rural activity of the Corps went beyond CCP directives, which were for concentration on the workers. (The December 1920 "Declaration to the Chinese Peasants" had been a cry in the wilderness, uttered possibly by an

SYC member.)[20] Thus, the First CCP Congress (July 1921) focused almost entirely on the Chinese working class: despite a call for the confiscation of land and its passing into social ownership, mass organization at that time was virtually synonymous with labor organization.[21] And again, the Second CCP Congress (July 1922) classed peasants with shopkeepers and artisans as "petty bourgeois" who would have to enlist in the workers' ranks for revolution. Aside from demands for the abolition of *likin* and extra taxes, and for laws to restrict land rents, the policy statements of this Congress centered on labor-union work.[22] True, Li Ta-chao, a leading CCP founder, had in 1919 urged China's youth to emulate their Soviet counterparts and "go to the countryside."[23] In general, though, Chang Kuo-t'ao, another founder, spoke for all when he declared: "The peasants take no interest in politics. All they care about is having a true Son of Heaven to rule them and enjoying a peaceful, bumper year."[24]

In July 1923 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Secretary-General of the CCP, wrote at length about the Chinese peasants, calling them a great force for the national revolution. He attempted a rudimentary class analysis of rural people and set out areas for work among them, including education, propaganda, and the creation of tenant associations and village self-government bureaus, all with the aim of limiting rents and size of holdings.[25] Peasant unrest was attracting the Party's attention. But also in 1923 Ch'en could be heard arguing that "in a small-peasant country like China, over half the farmers are petty-bourgeois landowners with firmly rooted concepts of private ownership. How can they accept Communism?"[26]

At the Third CCP Congress in June 1923, however, the peasant problem had come to the fore and been treated very fully.[27] The Comintern had sent a document stating that the national revolution would succeed only if it managed to attract the basic element in the Chinese population, the peasantry: "Thus the central question of all [CCP] policy is the peasant question."[28] And yet still the generally pessimistic view of peasant potential obtained, for Ch'en Tu-hsiu was quoted by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai as maintaining that "the communist social revolution easily contradicts the interests of the peasants and even of the landless tenants."[29] In line with the Marxist-Leninist blueprint, Ch'en said that the national revolution must come first, bringing about widespread capitalization in agriculture and thereby an increase in the rural proletariat, which only then would lead to the communist social revolution.[30]

Mao Tse-tung pointed out, however, that with KMT forces established

in only a corner of the one province of Kwangtung, "the CCP should concern itself with the broad masses of peasants throughout the country."[31] Chang Kuo-t'ao reported that the peasant movement alone seemed a new factor, though the doings of P'eng P'ai did not rate a mention at the Congress. Indeed, as we have seen, Chang later said that Mao knew nothing of P'eng at this time; hence "like the other delegates [he] could but touch vaguely on the peasant question."[32] Mao must certainly have known of the Hunan peasant movement, but he did not refer to it at the Congress and was two years away from recognizing the political usefulness of the peasants.[33]

Nonetheless, the peasant question loomed large. Backed by the Comintern, Ch'en Tu-hsiu managed to get the Party to agree that mass movements, especially among peasants, should be shared with the KMT. The KMT apparatus was efficient enough to build a social awareness among the masses,[34] whereas the relatively small CCP group would concentrate on working as the "bloc within" the KMT, "preserving still our own organization."[35] This decision formed the basis for the United Front and formally cemented the bargain struck early in 1923 by Sun and the Soviet negotiator Joffe, under which a KMT-led national revolution would get Soviet aid.[36] Chang Kuo-t'ao successfully opposed the idea that the KMT might be allowed to have influence among the working masses, as the Congress was willing to permit; but nobody objected to KMT control over the peasant movement. The old view that it was but an adjunct to the "socialist revolutionary party" of the workers still prevailed.[37]

The outcome of the Third Congress was not exactly what the Comintern had advocated, which was "an alliance between workers and peasants" to be achieved through slogans about agrarian revolution; redistribution of private land; an end to starvation, rents, and the existing tax system; and "the setting up of local organs of self-government among the peasants."[38] None of this emerged from the Congress; but at least the peasants had been on the agenda. Partly as a result of Russian pressure, the peasant question became a major issue within the United Front.

That the CCP was slowly turning its attention to the peasantry through Russian influence says much about the situation of the world Communist movement at the time, in particular about the ideological reflection and redirection after the failure of Europe to follow Russia in revolution.[39] Lenin, though opposed to the early Populists, was among the first theorists to believe in the peasants, in both the Russian and the Chinese context. He ranked them with the proletariat in his "democratic dictatorship," even though he

stressed that any rural movement would require a period of tutelage. As to that, and the whole question of leadership, his ideas were firm.[40] Revolution required control by professional revolutionaries of intellectual-bourgeois origin.

When in 1919 it became clear that Hungary and Germany could offer him nothing, Lenin turned to Asia in the belief that Communism might succeed in less developed countries.[41] The adaptation it would need was set out in materials he presented to the Second Comintern Congress the following summer. A two-stage revolution was to be planned. Its first, or "bourgeois-democratic," stage would be led by the bourgeoisie supported by an alliance of workers and peasants, and would oppose the imperialists and indigenous reactionary elements. The bourgeoisie would leave the Communists to train and organize the peasantry, which if overseen by professional revolutionaries would rise to the level expected by the workers' leadership. Lenin noted the lack of an industrial proletariat in the less developed countries, and was of the opinion that it was the peasants, not the workers, who had first to form soviets where possible. During this first stage, the peasants were to pursue their antifeudal struggle against the landlords, but the workers were to limit their own actions to "reformism," so as not to antagonize the bourgeoisie. In the second stage, however, workers and peasants would join in an all-out socialist attack on both the rural power-holders, by now somewhat weakened, and the middle-class nationalists. Increasingly revolutionary slogans (such as for land distribution) would impel the upper elements of the middle class to "go over to the imperialists," and later on certain petty-bourgeois elements would follow them there. This was the line of revolution "from above."[42]

M. N. Roy, the Indian delegate, however, mistrusted the bourgeoisie, calling for a much-reduced scale of cooperation with it, and then only at the outset of a "national" revolution (his preference over "bourgeois-democratic"). He further believed in revolution "from below," which led to long discussion. Eventually the Congress approved both lines.[43] Trotsky later also challenged Lenin, arguing that the bourgeoisie would fail in revolutionary endeavor without a large proletariat to back it up. The great debate raged for years, split the Russian camp in two, and subsequently divided the CCP also.[44]

As to the Chinese peasants, within a short time the Communist leadership generally was taking a dim view of their capacity for revolution. At the Fourth Comintern Congress of November 1922 it was concluded that only

the workers in China offered any hope.[45] Liu Jen-ching, the CCP delegate, concurred with this judgment and made no mention of work among the peasants.[46] In January 1923 the Comintern issued instructions on the attitude the CCP was to take toward the KMT, which called for concentration on organizing the working class with the aim of "establishing a base for a powerful mass Communist Party."[47]

A change came within a month as a result of the "February 7 Incident," when Wu P'ei-fu ruthlessly broke a railroad workers' strike and thus revealed the weakness of the Chinese labor movement. April 1923 saw Bukharin advocating Lenin's idea of a peasant revolution in China, the peasants being described as "the gigantic reserve of revolutionary infantry."[48] Their numbers were crucial. Important directives from the Comintern in May 1923 reflected the new emphasis on the peasantry, which was to achieve the agrarian revolution inevitable after the national revolution. Thus it was that the peasant question became, for the CCP at its Third Congress, "the central question of all policy."[49] July brought it further advice on how to go about promoting peasant demands. The Party should open a peasant department and infiltrate peasant political organizations. Rent reduction, tax reforms, and similar issues should be pressed for.[50]

This excursus may throw some light on the autonomy of the Haifeng peasant movement. Sun Yat-sen and the KMT, in policy statements at least, recognized the need to engage the peasantry. The Socialist Youth Corps pioneered work among the peasants, but their involvement did not create anything lasting, and what they did was "for" rather than "with" the peasants. The CCP did not oppose activities among the peasants but remained indifferent to a real political commitment from that quarter—as Mao admitted, "very little was done."[51] Hence, the first achievements of P'eng P'ai in Hai-Lu-feng and those of the early peasant leaders were given scant attention by Communist ideologues.[52] Perhaps this disregard was mutual? Chang Kuo-t'ao put it officially: "P'eng P'ai's first aim was not the achievement of any kind of land revolution and he had no thoughts of an armed uprising of peasants. His one idea then was the relief of some of the personal suffering of the peasants."[53] This is not to say that the communist national and social revolution would bypass the peasantry altogether, for Communist and peasant aspirations frequently coincided. But the peasant line was independent: it resorted to other means for other ends, avoided the curb of theoretical tenets, and would not slip nicely into the framework of any ideology.[54]

It cannot be claimed, therefore, that P'eng P'ai was motivated by the

debate going on in the Communist ideological world. He pushed his own peasant movement far beyond what seemed already a great concession to the peasants within the CCP. Chang Kuo-t'ao would have P'eng influenced and encouraged by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, but from what Ch'en was saying in 1923 it would appear that the reverse was more likely the case.[55] The fact that the Haifeng Peasant Union was established long before the CCP focused on the peasant movement in 1923 is sufficient evidence that it developed independently.

P'eng's ideas for the peasant movement were in any case somewhat unorthodox in relation to Communist doctrine. There is his odd letter of November 18, 1922, which claims, according to its recipient Li Ch'un-t'ao, that the peasant movement enjoyed several advantages over the workers' movement in towns and cities: landlords lived far away from the peasants and knew little of what they were doing; the peasant movement had a spirit of justice and loyalty to compensate for poor training; strikes were easily conducted on open fields; rising land prices meant competition in owning, hence more conflict; and the inflated cost of goods ensured a constant wish to overthrow the existing order.[56]

What made P'eng and his movement unique, however, was the belief that the peasants were capable of standing on their own, to the point of making revolution for and by themselves.[57] The impact of the Hai-Lu-feng peasant movement on Sun Yat-sen during his war with Ch'en Chiung-ming in 1923, according to a Communist source, was such that "there he came to know the peasants' strength, and to decide then on the KMT reorganization."[58]

The United Front was formally endorsed in 1923, and in September Borodin arrived in Canton as an adviser to the KMT with Comintern authority behind him. Sun, refused the maritime customs income of the area he claimed to rule, declared openly: "We no longer look to the Western powers. Our faces are turned toward Russia." Reorganization began in earnest.[59]

United Front policy brought in the peasants, especially since the Comintern, and Borodin personally, believed that in countries such as China their support was essential. The KMT also realized the importance of peasant support after the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming nearly captured Canton in October and November. Borodin pressed home the moral that failure to distribute any land to the peasants was one reason why the KMT could never count on any help from them in an emergency. He went on to propose a decree allowing peasant committees to appropriate landlord holdings

with or without compensation. This met with the strongest objections from landed interests within the KMT, and its effect on the whole of the party was negligible. But Sun, aware of the disillusionment among his troops and the dissatisfaction of Moscow, then came out with a law requiring a 25 percent reduction in rent and permitting the establishment of peasant unions.[60] Though a substantial gain for the peasants on paper, this law came to nothing at the time, though it may explain the reactivation of the Haifeng Union in January 1924.[61]

The KMT took the peasant question seriously, and with their sheer numbers the peasants were seen as even more important for the revolution than the workers: KMT documents normally speak of *nung-kung* ("peasants and workers") rather than the *kung-nung* favored by the CCP. Sun was much interested in what was going on in the peasant movement.[62] The Communist *Guide Weekly* had reported on its progress and setbacks in 1923 and had stressed the need for organization and political work, a point not lost on the Nationalist leadership.[63] Eventually the KMT accepted wholesale the early Peasant Union, though it called for greater political consciousness and stricter control, both of which in the main were the Russian contribution to the indigenous Chinese movement.[64] Borodin, lecturing to KMT members in 1925, ventured to declare that without the peasants, any Chinese revolution would fail.[65]

Central to the program of the First KMT Congress in January 1924 was the land question (and here we can see Borodin's hand again). In accordance with the "three principles," the demand was for "equalization" but not nationalization. Landlords would not have their property confiscated, but they would have to declare its value and be taxed accordingly. Improvements in rural organization and the lot of the peasants were called for, and a manifesto of workers' and peasants' rights was drawn up.[66] Yet once again the radical land policy foundered amid the endless objections of the right wing. Nonetheless, a peasant department was established by the 24-member central executive, the real power behind the KMT.[67]

In July the KMT issued a "Declaration on the Peasant Movement" that clearly reflected a new orientation. It stated the need for Peasant Associations—as the Unions would be called—and the duty of the peasants to run their own Self-Defense Corps. It assured the protection of the law to peasants in their economic struggles, and granted them certain powers against government officials. The KMT would assign special personnel to see to it

that peasants could air their views and receive help. Thus the doctrine of the "three principles" would be respected. Two later declarations confirmed the KMT's guardianship of the peasantry, a role that greatly boosted the launching of the peasant movement.[68] But perhaps little credit would have been given to the revolutionary potential of that movement without the example set by P'eng P'ai within Ch'en's territory.[69] And so it came about that the relatively humble Peasant Union of Haifeng, after being partially politicized in the later half of 1923, found itself thrust into the center of national politics at the capital of the national revolution, taking on a new name and a new function.[70]

The strict control imposed on the Peasant Association sought to make it the KMT's long arm among the rural masses. Contrary to earlier Russian advice, the Association's regulations did not distinguish between classes of peasants; indeed, all the peasants were now in one class, much as the former Union had envisaged. The very name *nung-min hsieh-hui* ("Peasant Association") differentiated the new body from all previous peasant organizations and made it clear that it included all rural workers who had a stake in the KMT-led revolution.[71]

As we have just noted, the new Association was a blend of Russian revolutionary expertise in organization work and native ingenuity in meeting Chinese peasant needs. It bore the very visible mark of Borodin and P'eng P'ai. Though both were Communists, they had different points of emphasis in what they did and even different political aims. Borodin was an emissary of Moscow sent to protect Russian interests; P'eng was a son of the Chinese countryside bent on fostering peasant welfare. The seed of "the sinification of Marxism" as a rural phenomenon for revolution was sown at this time.[72] We have seen the ambiguity of aims developing in the peasant movement in Haifeng; now, with the arrival of the Comintern and its United Front policy in China, a fresh ambivalence was created. The CCP was to identify itself with the peasant drive for revolution; but simultaneously it was to acknowledge the priority of the workers and to respect the patronage of the KMT over the peasant movement. Moreover, the clash between town and country now took on a new and larger dimension. The town was represented by Canton and the county capitals, the centers of power of the KMT; the country was the realm of the peasants under their new leaders, the organizers of the Peasant Association (who proved to be chiefly CCP members working under the United Front). A confrontation soon threatened—however

carefully masked by avowals of unity—between the KMT right wing and the extremists in the CCP. In the ensuing struggle, neither side was content simply to look after peasant interests, even though the peasants were recognized as being politically essential. Rather, each side seemed concerned only about the contribution that the peasants could make to the national revolution, on the one hand, or to the socialist revolution, on the other.[73]

# 5

# In the United Front

When P'eng P'ai arrived in Canton at the end of March 1924, he found the regime of Sun Yat-sen in the process of reorganization following the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in January. *The Times* described the city as resembling "a great European capital," another report in the same paper stating that in 1923 tax revenue amounted to 120 million yüan of which only 30 million were allocated for public use, the rest being spent on troops.[1] A resident there wrote: "The Canton we knew was probably the most misgoverned city in China, if not in the world."[2] Lin Tsu-han (Lin Po-ch'ü), the Hunanese CCP founder, headed the KMT's new peasant department,[3] and most other departments were either run by or heavily infiltrated with Communists. As Tsou Lu (a rightist) remarked: "At that time, only the youth department [led by Tsou] and the less important women's department were able to prevent extensive Communist penetration."[4] Lin, on good terms with Sun, was one of the first CCP members to join the KMT, and he had been elected an alternate member of the Central Executive Committee at the First Congress three months earlier. He had no experience in peasant affairs and stayed in the post only until April, when he was sent to Hankow. Still, he must have approved the appointment of P'eng P'ai to the secretariat of the department before he left.[5]

In March the peasant department had not moved beyond the planning stage. Nonetheless, P'eng P'ai was immediately named secretary of the department. How this came about is uncertain. One contemporary source claims that P'eng was introduced to influential KMT members by T'an P'ing-shan and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and it may be that T'an, then head of the organization department and an early CCP member in Canton, engineered

his appointment.[6] Another source says that Liao Chung-k'ai, head of the workers' department, had observed the progress of the Haifeng peasant movement and asked P'eng P'ai to start a Peasant Association in Canton.[7] The most plausible explanation is given by Chiang Kai-shek: "After Lin Tsu-han became head of the department of farmers [peasant department], he recommended one P'eng P'ai, a Communist, as secretary. Later he himself resigned in order not to attract attention to Party members. P'eng P'ai stayed on as secretary, despite repeated changes at the top."[8]

Tasks for the department had already been set out. It was to investigate peasant conditions—land and tenancy in particular—and the state of existing peasant organizations. After examination of the tax structure, a policy plan was to be drawn up and congresses prepared for. There was to be publishing both on and for the peasantry, as well as regular coverage of peasant affairs in the KMT press (in collaboration with the propaganda department).

Organization in the peasant department was very simple: Lin was head, P'eng was secretary, and there was one assistant. P'eng was undoubtedly the best man for the job, especially since it was the secretary who did most of the real work, and he set about it with his customary dedication, motivated by the desire to aid both the peasants generally and his colleagues back home. There was, too, the added spur of exacting vengeance. When Lin departed for Hankow, his first successor proved too ill to involve himself in the department's affairs,[9] so that for a time P'eng P'ai ran the department assisted only by Franke, the representative of Moscow's Krestintern (Red Peasant International) and Sun's adviser on peasant affairs. Soon Franke himself fell ill and returned to Russia, leaving P'eng working virtually alone until August, when a new man was appointed head.[10] This man, too, did not stay long, Huang Chu-su being designated head in September. It is claimed that Huang, resentful of P'eng P'ai's authority, demanded his resignation. P'eng is said to have retorted: "Those not willing to follow my directions are unable to survive as department heads." T'an P'ing-shan was deluged with calls for P'eng's dismissal, but Borodin and the CCP protected him and it was Huang instead who had to go. Presumably P'eng and Borodin, with their similar views on enlisting peasant support in the revolution and on the need for organization,[11] had become friends; Borodin's quarters were just across the street from the peasant department office, in the building that housed the Central Executive Committee (CEC).

In May the CEC approved a "Constitution" for the peasant department

(involving such things as membership, finance, and reporting) that kept the executive very much in control.[12] The following month the Constitution for the Peasant Association was drafted, with fifteen chapters and 83 articles. This provided the guidelines for setting up Associations in and around Canton, which P'eng P'ai had already begun to work on soon after his arrival.[13] The Introduction defines the term "peasant" as applying to freeholders, part-owners, tenants, peasant laborers, rural handicraft workers, and all those engaged in physical labor in the villages. Detailed procedures for establishing Peasant Associations at various levels are given, with the village level being acknowledged as the most important despite the fact that a county-level Association was required first. Membership in a Peasant Association was barred to freeholders with over 100 *mou* of land, and to those who exploited peasants by imposing heavy rents, who preached religion, who were lackeys of foreign imperialists, or who smoked opium or gambled.

At the village level, the Association was enjoined to investigate the living and cultural conditions of the peasants, to establish day and evening peasant schools, to set up a committee for the improvement of rural production, and to organize groups of tenants, laborers, and artisans. The Association's political rights included those of issuing warnings and filing complaints, collecting land taxes for the government, resolving land-tax problems, and requesting the removal of despotic officials. All these rights, however, had to be exercised through the corresponding government office and not directly.

Peasant Self-Defense Corps were to be established—volunteer village armies composed of Association members only, under military-style discipline. These were to be the sole recognized peasant forces in the villages, and had the right and duty to disarm all villagers not belonging to the Association. They would be subject to strict government supervision, but the government could not use them for purposes other than village security.[14] It was Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai who were the leading advocates of an independent peasant force in 1924, for they wanted a counterweight to the powerful "Merchant Corps," which at that time was threatening the KMT government. Sun called the forces he had in mind *nung-min tzu-wei-chün* ("Peasant Self-Defense Armies"), whereas Liao opted for *nung-t'uan* ("Peasant Corps"). The former term came to be associated with a nonprofessional force of local people, the latter with a professional force enlisted from the peasantry but independent of it.[15] The term Peasant Corps became more common, but P'eng P'ai insisted on using Sun's term. In any event, Liao's

Provisional Government urged all magistrates to establish Peasant Associations and to assist them fully in forming peasant forces. By May, Liao and Borodin were able to attend the inauguration of the Peasant Corps at Foshan.[16]

The Constitution was intended to be standard for any Peasant Association in Kwangtung—and indeed throughout China. It was issued by Sun Yat-sen, a fact that led a Communist document of 1926 to describe it as inviolable, since Sun had drawn it up personally.[17] According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, however, "the major points of the regulations for the Peasant Association had been approved by Sun Yat-sen in the spring of 1924"—a far cry from his having composed them.[18] It was probably P'eng P'ai who did all the groundwork, from his experience of having drafted various constitutions in Haifeng. He alone had practical knowledge of rural life.[19]

There is a striking similarity between this Constitution and the 1923 Constitution of the Provincial Peasant Union. The most evident policy change is the downward-leading structure from the county to the village, an indication of the new political emphasis of the Association as compared with the Union. P'eng P'ai had already brought this to the Hui-Ch'ao-Mei Union. The new trend brought many problems of organization, however, and in 1926 was reversed, at least in principle.[20]

The CEC decided at the end of June 1924 that the Peasant Association should have offices both in Canton and in certain key counties—Kwangning, Shunte, Tungkuan, Foshan, and Hsiangshan—that had already been the scene of peasant-movement work and were of military or political importance. Twenty people were to be dispatched to start the Peasant Associations in those counties as well as in some villages around Canton, but they would first undergo a month-long course in a proposed Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI), to be set up with separately drafted regulations. The Peasant Association was to be functional by September, complete with Self-Defense Corps, song, and flag (a white plow on a red ground, with the KMT emblem at the masthead).[21]

The decision to establish the PMTI was historic, in that it was the first formal government-sponsored training institute for rural political activists. Its founding owed much to three influences: the realization of the potential of the peasants; the encounter with Russian planning; and the experience of P'eng P'ai. The last was of prime importance. KMT political aims were behind the decision, since the organization of the peasants for revolution could be speeded up only with trained men working in the field.[22] The

KMT propaganda department sent letters out to party cells asking them to nominate students to attend the PMTI. As for the CCP, P'eng had often lamented the absence of "comrades" in peasant-movement work, and the training of cadres would meet such a need. Neither party wanted to make direct use of the old Agricultural Societies or the secret societies, and it was therefore logical for the new Association to have its own training center to create a new and more politically oriented staff. The Institute was officially opened on July 3, 1924, in Canton in the Huichou Association headquarters at 53 Yüeh-hsiu nan-lu, with P'eng P'ai as Director.[23]

When in 1924 the United Front adopted the policy of organizing mass movements, there was no difficulty in finding experienced people to lead the workers. For the peasant movement, however, only P'eng P'ai stood out. P'eng had set the peasant-movement model with Haifeng, and it was this model and not the one outlined by Borodin that was to be followed. Within four months of his arrival in March, P'eng had planted Peasant Associations in Huahsien, Tungkuan, Shunte, Paoan, Chungshan, P'anyü, and Nanhai, the tempo designed to convince the authorities that peasant support was viable and the methods used correct. With SYC and other assistance, there were 47 Peasant Associations by August.[24] The peasants were receptive, eager to have their grievances redressed. For example, peasants were not allowed to vote for the Canton city council, so P'eng, who had set up an Association in the city, got its members to hold a grand parade in October to press for equal voting rights. The peasant department also lobbied the CEC, and in the end the demand was granted. Mass pressure from without and political maneuvering from within became a favorite tactic after this first victory. Furthermore, it marked "the first time the Association had joined a political movement."[25] P'eng also began organizing the Canton rickshaw-pullers—jobless peasants to him—many of whom were from Haifeng.[26]

P'eng was fortunate in having prominent people in the government on his side. Sun Yat-sen himself made a point of attending the first encounter between the KMT and peasant representatives on July 28;[27] Liao Chung-k'ai was sympathetic from the beginning; and T'an P'ing-shan put forward the formal proposal to establish the Canton City Peasant Association and, with P'eng and the PMTI students, was instrumental in establishing a Peasant Association in Hsiangshan.[28] Indeed, T'an was a stalwart supporter and may have been a longtime friend of P'eng, familiar as he surely was with P'eng's work in Hai-Lu-feng. T'an was engaged in setting up labor-union

cells in the counties around Canton, especially in Shunte,[29] but the work necessarily entailed contact with the peasants, and indeed T'an viewed his enterprise as combined worker and peasant activity. The SYC, who were also involved, "saw their liberation efforts not merely as a rural movement but as a significant workers' movement as well."[30]

In August 1924 the KMT issued its *Kao nung-min-shu* ("Letter-Declaration to the Peasants"), in which P'eng P'ai no doubt had a hand. The content reflects his experience and ideology, and seems intended for peasants in the East River. (At this time peasant support in East Kwangtung was especially being sought.) The "Letter-Declaration" cited Japan as an example of peasant advancement and stressed the need for unity, for a political will, and for new laws to help peasants, as had happened there. Only the warlords stood in the way, but the KMT would soon deal with them; for the rest, "All depends on politics." Politics controlled all cultural, economic, and social development, and "social power is political power." The Peasant Associations and Self-Defense Corps were needed because "organization is the key and base of a republican democratic China." The "Letter-Declaration" proposed a definite course of action, which over a three- to five-year period would establish peasant power. Hardships and strife were inevitable, but eventually the blue skies and radiant sun of the KMT would shine upon the dark world of ghosts and demons.[31]

This vision served to inspire many, especially students. In Canton, where the radical intelligentsia had concentrated on the workers' movement, activists—seen as "patronizing intellectuals"—were encouraged to branch out into peasant-movement work. Both movements were already witnessing the trend toward "professional revolutionaries," who assumed leadership "on behalf of" both workers and peasants.[32]

The Peasant Associations owed much to the young leftists working for them. Among these, Lo Ch'i-yüan stood out. In November 1924 he became secretary of the peasant department after P'eng moved to the organization department, where his talents were of greater use. Lo had proved his worth as director of the second class at the PMTI and was particularly articulate and dedicated. Other key figures were Juan Hsiao-hsien and Chou Ch'i-chien, the latter active in the West River area.[33] In the summer of 1924, P'eng, Lo, Juan, and Chou constituted the *nung-wei* ("peasant movement committee"), a secret body under the CCP Regional Committee whose purpose was to oversee all peasant department work. Part of the "bloc within" strategy through which the CCP hoped to control the peasant

movement under the United Front, the *nung-wei* was empowered to deal with all peasant problems apart from key policy decisions (which were reserved for the Regional Committee), to direct local activities, and to investigate rural conditions.[34]

On August 11, P'eng and Juan visited Tungkuan for a peasant meeting. They were greeted by 500 armed, flag-waving people who were eager to establish an Association. The next day's general meeting saw 4,000 resolved to enroll. There were cheers for the KMT, the peasants, and P'eng and Juan, who both made speeches.[35]

The need for armed and organized peasants was uppermost in the minds of Sun Yat-sen and other KMT leaders, to counterbalance the Merchant Corps. By August 1924, the situation in Canton was becoming explosive and the Peasant Army was seen as a must.[36] The first major engagement of the fledgling Army was with the Merchant Corps in the October 10, 1924, Incident. The Merchant Corps had been established thirteen years earlier by the 80-odd Canton guilds and charitable associations under an influential compradore, Ch'en Lien-po. Reorganized in 1923 and 100,000 strong, it was still under the command of Ch'en and represented a major threat to the newly established KMT government. When the KMT sought support from Russia, the Canton merchant class was disturbed, even though they had resented the systematic extortion practiced by Sun's predecessors and their mercenaries. Ch'en Lien-po set about rectifying the situation; British interests in Hong Kong seemed better served with Ch'en Chiung-ming restored. On August 10, 1924, a large consignment of arms was shipped to Canton but was impounded. A tug-of-war ensued between merchants and government.[37]

On October 10, the Merchant Corps mobilized in the city and attacked a procession of students, workers, and peasants. This signaled the start of an organized revolt against the KMT. The Corps was able to muster some 30,000 men, some of them *min-t'uan* sent in from the countryside; the shipment of arms had been released on the very day of the attack. The government had no confidence in its hired troops and counted instead on Chiang Kai-shek's recently organized Whampoa cadets, on troops of General Hsü, and on the *kung-t'uan-chün* (Workers' Army Corps) and *nung-t'uan-chün*.[38] The last two had official sanction, which meant that "for the first time, the Chinese proletariat had an armed force of its own."[39]

The cadets and regulars put down the Merchant Corps in a few days, though leftist sources hailed the part played by the Workers' and Peasants'

Armies, claiming that the vigilance of the Peasant Associations and Corps around Canton was instrumental in the victory. In fact the armies of the peasants and workers were badly defeated, 110 workers and 80 peasants being taken prisoner.[40] P'eng P'ai was glad that Sun had chosen to stand up to Ch'en Lien-po and the merchant volunteers and rural militia behind him, and was glad also that he had recognized "their counterrevolutionary stance."[41] With perhaps too much wishful thinking, a Russian observer commented: "The Chinese masses are proceeding rapidly forward on the road of class-consciousness, and are exerting pressure upon the democratic KMT by rendering this incident more revolutionary." Sun was portrayed as struggling for the interests of the workers and peasants—an early example of how the Kremlin leaders made political reality in China fit a preconceived pattern.[42]

The "Merchant Corps Incident" gave a boost to the formation of the Peasant Corps; moreover, it awakened the CCP to the need for a military force for the masses and a leftist, revolutionary army.[43] Tsou Lu alleged that "the CCP took over government power and helped the Peasant Self-Defense Corps oppress the *min-t'uan*," citing what happened in Kwangning in support of his point.[44]

Kwangning provides a revealing story of how P'eng went about his work in the peasant department's first year in regions other than those he was familiar with.[45] This isolated county in the northwest of the province, three days' journey from Canton, had suffered much from the passage of armies from Kwangsi. It was poor—only 10 percent of its land was cultivable—and lost much of its population through emigration. Yet despite the many Kwangning natives in Canton and Hong Kong, the county had few of the contacts that had made the East River area so responsive to the call of the modern world. Also unusual was the extent of landlord oppression: Kwangning's tenancy rate was 60 percent, as was the rent rate, and rent irregularities included a guaranteed ¥20 per *mou* and particularly harsh customary gifts.[46]

It was the SYC who began the peasant movement in Kwangning. Their leader, Chou Ch'i-chien, was an early KMT recruit who, with his fellow students Lo Kuo-chieh and Ch'en Po-chung, spent vacations there organizing Party cells. In 1924 he began working among the Canton oil workers, many of whom were from Kwangning, and decided to start a peasant movement in the county with funds from the oil workers. More students joined him,

throwing themselves into propaganda against warlords, rotten gentry, and landlords, speaking at markets, and going from house to house. When they showed their KMT letter of accreditation to the magistrate, Li Chi-yüan, he told them bluntly that he took orders from the provincial, not the central, government. On cabling the governor for a letter, they were answered by P'eng P'ai to the effect that they should not bother with formalities but start work.[47]

The 3,000 Kwangning families who had undertaken to join the Peasant Association now had second thoughts, seeing that official support was not forthcoming. Landlords and gentry also mounted a campaign of slander and intimidation against the activists from Canton. Even when Chou secured the governor's order for registration of the Peasant Association, Magistrate Li would take no notice. Nonetheless, many peasants did join; but there continued to be many problems, and at some point Chou and his comrades apparently requested P'eng's help.[48]

P'eng P'ai embarked on his first Kwangning mission in May, but even in his capacity as a government official he was unable to secure an audience with the magistrate. He therefore spent his time recruiting—successfully. As Chou later remarked, "The influence of P'eng P'ai's propaganda stays indelibly in the mind of Peasant Association members in Kwangning." In five districts where the Association had got off the ground, "within two weeks, family membership increased from 4,000 to 7,000." After giving some rapid training to the local leaders, P'eng P'ai returned to Canton in early June, determined to improve the preparation of cadres.[49]

The Kwangning landlords, like their Haifeng counterparts, had initially looked on developments among the peasants as "children's business." But P'eng's success made them reassess the situation, and at a meeting in early June they decided to send the *min-t'uan* against the Association in two districts and to order it to disband in the three others. On June 10, the Chiang-t'un Peasant Association office was ransacked and the T'anpu office burned down. In both places some members were imprisoned. Only the sudden arrival of news that Magistrate Li had been dismissed by the governor on June 4 checked the landlords and stopped the letters disbanding the other Associations from going out.[50]

On June 13, Chou Ch'i-chien, who was in Canton, prepared a report on the Kwangning incidents from accounts provided by leaders who had fled. His report, sent to the peasant department and the provincial government, prompted a telegram to the Kwangning authorities declaring that those who

had dared to attack peasants organizing freely under KMT auspices were counterrevolutionaries and ordering that peace should be restored and losses compensated for. On June 15, the Canton CCP also telegraphed the Kwangning Peasant Association, declaring that what had happened was tantamount to "oppression of the whole peasant class," and encouraging unity for a class struggle. The new tone of the government's telegram was the result of Liao Chung-k'ai's having taken over as governor on June 13.[51] A leftist who made no secret of his friendship with Borodin, Liao was closely linked with the peasant department and P'eng, and in a speech at the PMTI in late 1924 was to declare that "the key task of the national revolution is to awaken the peasantry, and have them under our Party's banner, if the revolution is to succeed."[52]

The telegrams from Canton put courage into the Kwangning members and were followed up with further support. On June 20, Liao demanded that those responsible for peasant sufferings be brought to trial, and on July 4 the governor sent a notice for countywide posting declaring the Kwangning Peasant Association to be a legally recognized body under official protection. At the same time, the Association leaders were not slow to acknowledge that their own inexperience was also partly to blame for the initial debacle. They had thrown the Association into political struggle far too early, an "infantile action." They had not initiated action at the village level and had made no contingency plans. Henceforth cadres should be instructed on the proper ways of dealing with the peasants, giving them greater self-reliance and self-confidence. In short, the leaders showed their willingness to turn their defeat into a useful experience for the future. All this suggests the influence of P'eng P'ai, either during his visit or in talks with the leaders who fled to Canton. Certainly it reflected the kind of cadre training by now in progress at the PMTI.[53]

Despite the orders from Canton, Magistrate Li refused to vacate his office and prepared to defend his position using his own troops and members of the "Divine Strike Society" (*Shen-ta-t'uan*), a local secret society in league with the Great Knives (*Ta-tao-hui*).* On June 27 Li and his 800 men were routed by troops from the Third Division garrisoning the county, but Li was not finished and was soon making plans to storm Kwangning city. He suc-

*These secret societies were the West River's equivalent of the Flags of Hai-Lu-feng, but with greater religious overtones. The Great Knives had a central temple and altars in various villages. In battle they believed that the truly pure would be invulnerable, and they consequently attacked with great emotion and refused to retreat.

ceeded in laying siege to the county seat for four days in mid-July, and on the establishment of a truce was allowed to withdraw to the northeast of the county, where he persisted in causing trouble. Nonetheless, during July the Association reestablished itself according to the new Constitution and continued to grow.

In October, after elaborate preparations, delegates from 57 village Associations in 19 districts convened for a meeting of the countywide Peasant Association in Kwangning city. To show that the government was really behind the Association, the county Academy was decked out with portraits of Sun Yat-sen, flowers from various Canton organizations, and KMT declarations and slogans. Juan Hsiao-hsien gave a speech on behalf of the peasant department, and later there was a parade with lion-dances, slogans, and firecrackers. The festivities ended with a banquet.[54]

Unfortunately, Li Chi-yüan still controlled the northeast of the county and had the backing of the landlords and gentry there. The Peasant Army of some 300 was badly armed and in no condition to fight, and a request to the CEC for rifles and a modest subvention brought no results. It had also been a bad year and now that winter rents were due, peasants were seeking reductions. The call was for a 40 percent reduction, 30 percent to be retained by the peasants, the balance going to the Association. The peasants were being intimidated in many places into paying the full rent, and in T'anpu the landlords set up their own grouping, which soon spread to all districts under the new name of "Society for the Protection of Landlords." In Kwangning city the first meeting was deliberately held in the building that housed Association headquarters. The Society soon called for an 800-man force designed to crush peasant resistance to assemble on November 22 and then attack Hsikang and Cheshih on the 24th. The Peasant Army was heavily outnumbered, but suddenly the Great Knives, fearing a punitive expedition, offered reinforcements. The Peasant Army commander Ch'en Pochung, who had been trained at the first PMTI class, had personally bought a dozen guns in Canton and these too were made available.[55]

Uncertain of their strength, the leaders of the Peasant Association decided to temporize. On November 16, the Association issued a Declaration urging "our dear landlords to be kind, pay heed to our welfare, open your understanding, and display mercy, as befits the principle of justice. Save us poor peasants and do not reject our lawful right to rent reduction. We peasants will be grateful and give due honor to such virtue. . . . Confucian gentlemen will surely understand." The conciliatory gesture to the land-

lords was matched by strict rules for the peasants: Association members could not change fields, resist landlords independently, make secret deals, or pay just part of the rent due. With conciliation, though, went mobilization: the Peasant Army was ordered to muster for training and possible action on November 20. As one observer commented, "the peasants have decided to challenge the landlords and both sides are making preparations."[56] An appeal was also sent to Canton and P'eng P'ai.

On the 26th, P'eng arrived in Kwangning to find everything ready for battle. The day before, landlord forces had assaulted the Peasant Association headquarters in T'anpu. P'eng and the Association leaders in Kwangning decided to call a general assembly in early December to plan for the future and prepare the Peasant Army for a counterattack on T'anpu. Prompted to belated action, the new county magistrate, Ts'ai Huo-p'eng, called a meeting of landlords and peasants for December 1. The dozens of peasant delegates were kept waiting for days because the landlords would not attend, and even as they waited the landlord forces actually attacked the Shekang Association office. At the urging of P'eng and Chou Ch'i-chien, the magistrate reluctantly agreed to order his rangers to investigate. Then while P'eng and Chou were pressing Ts'ai for firmer action, they heard that the T'anpu landlord forces had attacked the Peasant Army on December 2.[57]

The situation looked grim for the peasant forces, for in T'anpu the Huang and Chiang lineages, the two most powerful there, were firmly behind the landlords. P'eng soon learned that a brigade of troops of the Third Army was on its way from Canton—a result of Borodin's making a plea to Governor Liao. While awaiting these reinforcements, P'eng kept himself busy traveling through the troubled area persuading the peasants of their cause and the need for self-reliance.[58] "If rent is not paid to landlords, it is not right," they had been told; but P'eng pressed home his idea that "rent reduction is justice," since the rich landlord does nothing but gets the lion's share of the harvest. "Even no payment of rent is justice"—a concept that Sun Yat-sen himself had advocated. P'eng was interpreting for the peasants ideas proposed by the KMT leader; he even convinced them that "mercilessly killing landlords interested only in money is right."[59] He also arranged a meeting on December 10 to petition the magistrate and issue a further declaration on rents. Hundreds of representatives from many areas, plus women and children, heard P'eng explain why peasants lost even their capital working the land. When all the speeches were done, flag-carrying petitioners marched to the county office, where P'eng presented himself as

from the peasant department. When the magistrate began defending and excusing the landlords, P'eng used his old trick of noting down what was said. When Ts'ai observed this he changed his tune; in fact, after P'eng had spoken in terms of KMT doctrine, he acquiesced to the petition, which demanded punishment of the landlords, disbandment of their forces, compensation, and the specified rent reduction.[60]

Meanwhile, the brigade from Canton was approaching via Ssuhui. P'eng and Chou decided to meet it on December 11 in T'ungyüan, where they urged the commander, Liao Ch'ien-wu, a CCP member, to go to Shekang immediately to resolve the T'anpu affair, since the brigade could only be spared from Canton for one week. That night, Liao, P'eng, and the leaders of the Peasant Association planned their strategy: the Peasant Army forces were to spearhead the attack and do most of the fighting, with the brigade intervening only in emergencies. This was designed to make the peasants the victors, boost their self-confidence, and "train them for revolt."

Peasant Army commander Ch'en Po-chung surrounded T'anpu the next day. The first clash was indecisive, but after considerable fighting the peasants gained the upper hand and the landlord forces fled to the blockhouse-fort of the Chiang lineage, which was linked with that of the Huang lineage. This refuge was impregnable to all but heavy cannon fire, and an assault with local cannon only resulted in one of them exploding. Meanwhile, the landlords were buying the services of bandits and even offering ¥6 apiece to the hitherto neutral garrison troops to fight, and they struck again at the Peasant Army, the Association, and (on December 13) even at the brigade. Belatedly the magistrate banned their Society. To complicate matters still further, the commander of the Third Division of the Kwangtung Army, Cheng Jun-ch'i, now sent two companies from Ssuhui to reinforce the garrison. These troops were feted by both the landlords and the Peasant Association leaders, and their commanders and brigade commander Liao argued the situation heatedly. In the end the new troops preferred not to take sides.[61]

It was at this point that P'eng and his local associates organized "the first grand meeting of peasants and soldiers in the history of China." This was at Shekang on December 19, 1924. The 5,000 present were mostly peasants, but some 80 brigade troops and 60 men from the two new companies came, together with their commanders. P'eng P'ai delivered the main address, which succeeded in "moving the Third Division commanders to collaborate with the peasants." All the speeches stressed the kinship between peas-

ants and soldiers and the fact that many troops were former peasants set to fight their brothers who in turn were forced to contribute taxes for the army. Both were underdogs who needed to unite and liberate themselves. Once united for real revolution, there would be food, clothing, and shelter enough for all, and then only would "the revolution be successful." The common exploiters were landlords, gentry, and warlords, whose destruction would be accomplished if only the oppressed united. P'eng then led the crowd in a burst of "Long live the Chinese Republic! Long live the KMT! Long live the union of Peasants and Soldiers!"[62]

The news of the battle at T'anpu on December 12 meanwhile reached Canton,[63] and Liao Chung-k'ai instructed the Third Division to send an artillery piece to bombard the Chiang lineage blockhouse so that order could be restored quickly, for Ch'en Chiung-ming, then in the East River, might take advantage of a protracted campaign in the west to decide to attack. Liao proposed a Pacification Committee composed of Magistrate Ts'ai, P'eng P'ai, brigade commander Liao, and a staff officer of the Third Division to be selected by its commander. The first meeting of the Pacification Committee was scheduled for December 27, with P'eng responsible for procedure. The outcome was that the eight landlords behind all the trouble were named and the landlords were told to reduce their armed forces. The brigade was to stay on and issued a notice that it would protect the peasantry.[64]

The Committee received invitations to a round of dinners in Kwangning, one of these even coming from the head of the *min-t'uan*, who had a record of oppressing the peasants. P'eng was in two minds about attending until news of peasant deaths in T'anpu reached him, whereupon he and brigade commander Liao hatched a plot to kidnap the militia leader and hold him hostage in Shekang.[65] This bold coup succeeded and gave the Association more time for propaganda and training. P'eng was also courting the Divine Strike Society all the while. He sent Lo Kuo-chieh to organize an Association in Huangtung, where the secret society was based. Lo met the Divine Strike leaders in their temple and tried to convince them that their own interests were similar to those of the peasants. He spent a day and two nights arguing, in the manner that the CCP later adopted for such negotiations, but all he could gain was a promise that the Society would remain neutral.[66]

By this time, because of the necessity of providing its forces with food rations, the Association was running low on funds, which came from a percentage of the rent-reduction rate. It was accordingly decided to seize some stored grain belonging to the worst landlords to meet the need. On January

5, news arrived that landlords of the Ch'iu clan in Yulait'ang, relatives of the Chiang clan of T'anpu, were exacting full rent at gunpoint. Ch'en Po-chung went there to organize the Peasant Army and, with some help from the brigade, surrounded the Ch'iu blockhouse. An officer sent to parley was shot dead, and the enraged peasants and soldiers proceeded to storm the fort. With prisoners, guns, and ammunition they then returned to Shekang.[67]

On January 8, news came from Canton that Liao Chung-k'ai and Chiang Kai-shek had sent a Guards Artillery Regiment to deal with the T'anpu blockhouses and that it would arrive at T'anpu within a day. Plans were made at once to welcome the troops, mobilize the peasants, and start hostilities forthwith. The Guards arrived at T'anpu at 9:00 A.M. on the 9th, the peasants attacked, and the regiment placed its cannons in position. When the guns were ready, the commander, one Lu Chen-liu, instructed the peasant fighters to withdraw. To their dismay, however, and to the humiliation of the artillerymen, the subsequent shelling failed to do much damage to the sturdy old buildings. Only six rounds were fired to target in two days, and when all the ammunition was gone the forts were still standing. Lu then ordered a five-day armistice, and called for a meeting with the landlords. The brigade commander, Liao, argued with Lu that a meeting could serve no purpose, and the Peasant Army refused to budge, declaring to Lu that the T'anpu blockhouses with their few bandits had wreaked greater havoc than had the entire Merchant Corps in Canton. P'eng also sent Lu a stiff letter demanding full support. The artillery commander remained adamant, however, and since he had been put in complete command of the operation, there was nothing to be done.[68]

Meanwhile, despite the armistice, militiamen supporting the landlords continued to attack the peasants, and with the aid of ex-magistrate Li Chi-yüan's forces were even able to fight their way through the blockade to reinforce the blockhouses. Lu's request for a meeting with the landlords—repeated on January 14—was ignored, yet that did not appear to trouble him. Indeed, on the 16th, he attended a banquet given by the Huang lineage and was told that the reason why no landlords had gone to the parley was that the Peasant Army kept watch along all the roads. Lu accepted this at face value and then ordered the peasants off the roads and forbade them to fire their rifles, on pain of a ¥2 fine for each shot. That the KMT Declaration permitted peasants to be armed, and that the circumstances fully justified it, left him unmoved. When the landlords attacked yet another Association office and made off with its seal and flag, P'eng and the artillery regiment's

political commissar hurried to Canton to seek Lu's dismissal. They sent Lu a letter accusing him of siding with the landlords and repeated the charges in telegrams to Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k'ai, Chiang Kai-shek, and even Sun Yat-sen in Peking.[69]

On January 21, Lu was ordered to report to Canton, and on the 23rd, P'eng returned to Kwangning with good news: Lu had been dismissed and Hu Han-min and Liao Chung-k'ai had appointed P'eng, brigade commander Liao Ch'ien-wu, and the new artillery commander as a "Restoration and Pacification Committee." Liao would represent the Party for the regiment and the brigade, the new artillery commander would protect the peasants, and a military commission would run operations. P'eng could not have secured better terms and must have had high standing with the Canton authorities.[70] Lu, despite his claims to be "Left KMT" and "a revolutionary," had been told by Hu Han-min that he was "confused and stupid."[71] P'eng also reported from Canton that war was imminent in the East River and that the artillery would soon be needed back in Canton.

Many in the Guards Artillery Regiment resented P'eng's efforts in securing Lu's dismissal, so P'eng and Chou Ch'i-chien decided to invite the officers and cadets to a banquet in an attempt to explain themselves and heal the grudge. The evening was enough of a success that in the end the nine cadets from the Whampoa Academy at least were won over. This was important, for these cadets had been instructed to give an account of the Kwangning situation to Chiang Kai-shek. This they did, informing their commandant that the use of the army to quell the rebellion had been necessary and justified and that they found ex-commander Lu's behavior inexplicable.[72]

Despite the pace of his activities, P'eng still found time to organize with his friends a commemoration on the first anniversary of Lenin's death on January 21. Amidst the 1925 New Year festivities then in train, they fraternized with the brigade troops and pressed again for unity between soldiers and peasants.

The new artillery commander proved almost as dilatory as his predecessor, and it was not until the 31st that all was in readiness again for an attack on the T'anpu blockhouses, which was set for the next day.[73] The plan was to have the brigade and the regiment attack the flanks, while the Peasant Army guarded the rear and acted as support. P'eng himself was to lead a party of sappers in digging a tunnel under a section of the wall that was then to be blown up. The fighting began on February 1 and continued for three days. P'eng and his sappers faced fierce counterattacks and heavy gunfire,

but they finally completed the digging by the evening of February 3. The blast was set by an expert from the Guards Artillery, and an exhausted but elated P'eng clambered back to his lines to await the result. There was a grand explosion, but when the dust settled, the blockhouse was still standing. P'eng fainted and was rushed to Shekang, where he slept through the night.[74]

The debacles gave heart to the Landlord Society and discouraged the battered Peasant Army, whose inadequacy was now very evident. Not only were the peasants undertrained and poorly equipped but they lacked unity; and though ready to fight to the death in their home areas, they had little spirit for a general war. Morale picked up, however, when the Guards Artillery Regiment burned the Huang lineage's village to the ground and threatened to do the same to the Huang blockhouse. Fearing this new development, the T'anpu merchants requested mediation to persuade the Chiang lineage to come to terms and accept rent reduction. There was a meeting on February 12, after which the Chiang blockhouse surrendered, whereupon the Huang blockhouse yielded also. This was timely, for both the brigade and the regiment were shortly recalled to Canton, hostilities in the East River having begun. Both the contending parties were called to Canton to settle the affair.[75]

It would be pleasant to say that this was the end of armed conflict in Kwangning, but on February 16, the very day the order to travel to Canton to settle matters was received, militia, Divine Strike, and Great Knives groups refused to lay down their arms and attacked both the peasants and army forces. "Reflecting the sun like snowflakes," the secret society men danced around and fought ferociously; but their blockhouse fell and many were captured. The peasants burned the blockhouse but released the prisoners, after trying to convince them of the justice of their cause. This magnanimous gesture on the part of the peasant leaders stemmed from the recognition that the secret society men were kindred spirits duped by their masters. In future conflicts similar gestures were to be the rule, though less from humanitarian than from propaganda motives. The Divine Strike at least responded by swearing to support the Peasant Association and never to fight the peasants again. They did not always keep their promise, neither then nor later. Ultimately, however, they were defeated and formed with the peasants a "Poor Devils' Alliance."[76]

The troops, now recalled to oppose Ch'en Chiung-ming, were given a tremendous send-off by the peasants. When they reached Canton, the peasant

department feted them and the local Peasant Associations organized a party for them. In Kwangning, the military commission and the Peasant Association jointly declared the end of hostilities and a general amnesty. Incredibly, nearly all the landlords and others who had opposed the Association accepted the terms it set out, and the Association was reestablished and now stood on its own feet.[77]

Almost at once, Kwangning became a model of how the Association should operate. Its dealings with political authority, both at the local and at the provincial level, seem to us extraordinarily deft and flexible (now this magistrate, now that commander, is tested, found wanting, and rendered harmless). The peasants too display good political sense: these activists with their claims on Canton—wait until word comes from the city. Interestingly though—and here a Communist internal report has no reason for missing a trick—what P'eng and his associates had done "was chiefly an economic rather than a political work." It was good that the Party "was known" in Kwangning, and "many had joined" there. But the Communists still for a while yet would be toiling anonymously ("no signboard up," as they put it) while the KMT got the credit.[78]

When P'eng returned to Canton, the Eastern Expedition was well under way. The KMT was determined to crush Ch'en Chiung-ming's Kwangtung Army once and for all and to impose political unity on Kwangtung to facilitate the Northern Expedition. The Kwangtung Army was in virtually complete disarray in mid-1924 when Ch'en resigned as commander-in-chief and retired to Haifeng. Career officers of any caliber quit; Ch'iu Kuo-chen, for example, moved to Hong Kong in June. P'eng invited those old classmates disenchanted with Ch'en to join him in the revolution, and several (among them Lü Shun-chieh, general secretary of the Army) did so. Others such as Li Kuo-chen and Lin T'ieh-shih had already crossed to P'eng's camp.[79] Yet the Kwangtung Army was subsequently shored up by an infusion of ¥400,000 from local merchant associations. With funding for a new campaign, Ch'en moved east to Swatow in November and resumed command. There he issued yet another declaration of his federalist aims and set up a "Kwangtung Provincial Assembly" as his political arm. In early January he shifted his army from Swatow to Tungkuan and Shihlung, thus threatening Canton.[80]

Late that month, the new Revolutionary Army of the KMT embarked on a counterattack toward East Kwangtung. Trained by Russians at Wham-

poa, it was well disciplined, did not suffer from desertions, and was well supplied so that the local population did not need to contribute to its upkeep. On February 13, T'anshui fell to KMT troops.[81] A missionary commented: "The new arrivals are different from the previous ones. . . . They are well dressed, well equipped, cleaner, and generally seem more civilized. . . . I have seen the Red Army. You would have thought it a European army well-equipped for war. The soldiers wore a distinctive bright-red tie and were led by Russian officers. We saw many of them and when they saw us [the missionaries], they looked the other way." Both this "Red Army" and the Whampoa Cadet Army treated the people well and were equally well received, with food and transport offered by peasants and workers.[82]

The top Russian adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, General Galen, was responsible for much of the strategy, but in effect the First Eastern Expedition was run less on military might than on enthusiasm and goodwill.[83] Aside from battles at P'ingshan and T'anshui, the KMT forces hardly had to fight at all until Huichou was reached. Here the city walls were breached by artillery, and after the city was taken the huge walls of this prefectural capital were ordered pulled down—a practice repeated elsewhere henceforth.

The armies of Ch'en and Chiang passed quickly through Huiyang with little fighting, but behind the KMT force came "a large band of red-ties" doing propaganda work for the peasant movement. P'eng P'ai had arranged for students of the third PMTI class to lay the groundwork for the Huiyang Peasant Association.[84] One account speaks of them distributing 500,000 proclamations to enemy troops (probably deserters or stragglers from the retreating Kwangtung Army), plus 50,000 copies of revolutionary songs and 100,000 posters and proclamations to peasants. The proclamations declared "the good of Bolshevism and the need for unity between peasants and soldiers," this last idea being endorsed by Chiang Kai-shek.[85] Incredulous, a missionary in P'ingshan summarized the message: "Land for the peasants, equality for the workers, paradise for the soldiers." He went on: "They also have something else in their program that I have heard or read about, but that I cannot possibly believe—women in common. But it is indeed one of their proposals and they are not ashamed to preach it in the streets." Because "these things are rejected by the people," he concluded, Bolshevism would not stand a chance in China.[86]

Much of the propaganda for the Eastern Expedition had been prepared by the CCP peasant committee in Canton and by comrades in the East River.

P'eng had asked Li Lao-kung and Lin Wu-nung to take 30 rickshawmen from Canton to act as guides for the KMT army, and P'eng himself, when he returned from Kwangning, traveled everywhere with the army to restore local Peasant Unions, as they were still called. Wherever he went, he spoke for resisting the landlords.[87] As an accompanying journalist wrote: "He always receives a warm welcome from peasants and at each meeting there are over ten thousand people, many coming extremely long distances, for he is well known as a peasant leader throughout Hai-Lu-feng and the East River region. He walks ten miles a day, speaking everywhere, fearing no hardships, always enthusiastic. He has the power to move people deeply, especially the East River people. With my own eyes, I have seen Mr. P'eng arouse the peasants single-handedly."[88] "Local Peasant Armies" sprang up everywhere, and the Peasant Association's message spread far and wide.

General Hsü Ch'ung-chih of the KMT army sought to follow established military precedent and commandeer peasants for army duties. The CCP *nung-wei*, however, stood firm on three points: no exaction of taxes or provisions; no requisition of private houses for billeting; and no impressment of coolies. Peasants were, however, directed to help the army in any way possible, whether by voluntarily providing transport, acting as guides and spies, or by undertaking guerrilla warfare against Ch'en through sabotage of his communications and supply lines.[89] This policy had great results in winning the favor of the local people, and indeed, "peasants expressed solidarity with the Party Army," which had in turn been ordered to "express love for the common people."[90]

The value of peasant engagement in the war has been questioned, but the guerrilla activities of the Hai-Lu-feng peasants were of undoubted importance. Organized as for feuds, under their Union leaders Cheng Chih-yün, P'eng Han-yüan, Yang Ch'i-shan, and Ch'en K'uei-ya (assisted by students back from Canton),[91] and armed with crude weapons, they waited for Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops retreating from Huiyang and Laolung. When they were sighted, the guerrillas began destroying bridges, setting mountain slopes ablaze, blocking routes, blasting off cannons, blowing trumpets and horns, and banging gongs. Hundreds of red flags had been hoisted on the hills. The weary enemy troops, finding for the first time no welcome in their home territory, had little spirit for a fight.[92] Another key guerrilla operation involved P'eng P'ai himself. A force of 1,800 KMT troops were blocked at the mountain pass northwest of Haifeng by a strong enemy garrison, and P'eng was instructed to attack Haifeng city and threaten the mountain gar-

rison from the rear. He and some peasants slipped into the city and mustered a small peasant army with the promise of expropriating all enemy-owned land, distributing it fairly, and reducing rent. While this force moved against the mountain garrison, other peasants were busy in town. Rumors were spread to the effect that the attack on Haifeng had already begun, real and mock skirmishes broke out, and the telegraph lines to the front were cut, so that "Ch'en's troops at the front thought that those in the rear had been defeated, and vice versa." They had come to dread the KMT army and to believe that they would also face a ferocious Russian unit. As a result of his efforts, P'eng had the pleasure of watching Ch'en's men flee the county capital, which was thus effectively liberated before KMT soldiers even arrived.[93] Elsewhere, in a valley on the border between Lufeng and Chiehyang, peasants ambushed 4,000 dispirited troops of General Lin, who all surrendered and threw down their guns. The Cadet Army's log of February 27, 1925, states that Ch'en, already despairing of victory, had left Swatow for Hong Kong, and that this fact was communicated to the local populace. It was probably this more than anything that induced the full retreat of his forces, their sole concern being to secure a passage north toward Swatow, the only place where they might survive as an army.[94] Haifeng was taken on February 27, and the next day KMT troops arrived. They met no resistance en route from Chiehshih and Meilung. The log runs: "Never since the beginning of the expedition did anyone welcome us as much as the people of Meilung and Haifeng. The peasants who had suffered most from Ch'en's army gave us the greatest support and assistance."[95]

The adulation accorded the peasants in the aftermath of the campaign was more a political ploy than an objective assessment, for reports and declarations suggest that peasant assistance, though useful, had not been decisive. But the line in Canton was that the peasants not only "had to be" involved in the revolution, but also "had to be" pivotal to its success. The Communist *Guide Weekly* carried an article that set the tone for understanding the campaign: "Two groups were actually responsible [for the success of the campaign], the Whampoa Cadet Army and the East River peasants who aided the KMT army." The KMT army itself, the article claimed, "did little." The peasants were said to have shown courage because they wanted revenge against their oppressors; the Cadets, children of workers and peasants, acted heroically because they had received political education. The conduct of the troops and the course of the campaign set welcome precedents.[96] Every political statement on the peasant movement over the next

year and a half echoed these sentiments.[97] P'eng himself described the peasants' role: "They acted as a fifth column for the Party Army within the territory of Ch'en Chiung-ming, or came out to help directly as assault troops, porters, guides, and spies. [They] intercepted or ambushed Ch'en's troops. . . . There was nothing that they did not do happily."[98] Even Chiang Kai-shek, at the May 1926 Peasant Congress, declared that the peasants had been more important than the soldiers in the Eastern Expeditions because of their vast numbers.

The liberation of Haifeng caused great rejoicing there, as P'eng P'ai records:

> When we entered the Meilung area, peasants gave our Army a splendid reception, with the white-star-on-blue flag raised here and the Peasant Union flag there. We were constantly offered tea and water, to shouts of "Long live the revolution." On my arrival in Haifeng on February 28, I was asked when the Peasant Union would be restored. To welcome me were hundreds of peasants who had endured three years of oppression under Ch'en Chiung-ming. On March 1, some ten thousand came from Lufeng, Huiyang, and Huilai to the Union office and I was unable to get any rest. On March 3, 30,000 attended the "Welcome the Army" celebration and T'an P'ing-shan, General Galen, and General Hsü gave speeches to thunderous applause, the mass of peasants waving flags and shouting slogans all the while.
>
> Hsü announced that half the Ch'en property would go to the Peasant Union, 30 percent to the Labor Union, and 20 percent to the Student Union.[99] Mopping-up operations continued to the east, and on March 4, the remnants of Ch'en's army abandoned Swatow. Street-corner orators preached the socialist message, one dissenter to this being General Hsü, who asserted that what was being sought was a "revolution of the people, not a revolution of society" and that the Russian advisers subscribed to KMT principles. Borodin, Galen, Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, and others who had followed the course of the expedition no doubt felt differently.[100]

As for P'eng P'ai himself, he was exuberant. One year after being chased out of his home county like a fugitive, he had returned triumphant, the new leader. Ch'en had gone, P'eng wrote, and "from now on I am the leader of Haifeng. Our immediate duty is to wipe out all traces of the old order."[101] Many leaders passed through Haifeng en route to Swatow, among them Chou En-lai, then political commissar of the First Army Corps under Chiang Kai-shek. He and P'eng were reputedly "blood brothers," having met each other the previous August on Chou's return from France. He lived in P'eng's quarters in Canton then, and stayed at the "Te-ch'ü" villa in the

aftermath of the Eastern Expedition. Chou, it was said, had agreed to become foster-son to P'eng P'ai's mother, Chou Feng.[102]

On April 1, P'eng organized the Hai-Lu-feng CCP special section, whose members included Cheng Chih-yün, Li Lao-kung, Lin Su, Wu Chen-min, Chang Wei, and Lin Wu-nung; P'eng himself served as secretary. He also started a special youth corps branch. At a "semisecret" meeting chaired by T'an P'ing-shan, six leading CCP members in Haifeng agreed on their policy aims. The Peasant Union was to be reestablished; a 25 percent rent reduction was to be implemented; and a Peasant Army was to be established under Li Lao-kung and Wu Chen-min, both Whampoa graduates, with weapons provided by Canton. This was to be the first fully independent and countywide Peasant Army in Kwangtung, well-trained, autonomous, and uniformed.[103]

Because the hated "Commander's Office" had been burned down, the new political center of Haifeng shifted to P'eng clan ground, for the first time outside the capital city and at a Peasant Association headquarters.[104] At his villa, too, P'eng met a stream of peasants every day, coming to air grievances, express good wishes, and offer gifts. They arrived also from Lufeng, Huilai, and Huiyang to see him, and P'eng confidently exclaimed: "The development of the Peasant Association in the East River area is not a problem any more."[105]

A county peasant congress soon took place, with 300 delegates and ten Lufeng observers. P'eng P'ai was elected chairman and Yang Ch'i-shan vice-chairman, and the policies outlined at the "semisecret" CCP meeting were endorsed. Lin Tao-wen, Yang Wang, and P'eng Yüan-chang were three of those specifically assigned to reorganize the Union and train the local Peasant Self-Defense Corps. After the Kwangtung Provincial Peasant Association Congress in May, the Haifeng Union became the Peasant Association, although to the peasants it always remained the *nung-hui* (Peasant Union); also, the new KMT Peasant Association flag replaced the old red-and-black flag. The change was significant, for now the Haifeng peasant movement was in the mainstream of the national revolution, encountering from above the effects of the ideals it had been the first to expound from below in 1923. Events had indeed come full circle.[106]

The county peasant congress also determined to round up all local reactionaries and deal with them severely. For P'eng, revenge was mixed with a clear sense of the political reality of the time: the Kwangning experience had shown him that it was necessary to break the power of the local gentry and

landlords before the departure of the army. Huang Ch'in-hsüan, chairman of the county assembly and one of the perpetrators of the "5th day of the 7th month" incident, was put on trial at Association headquarters. P'eng left the peasants to decide his fate and rejected his mother's appeal for clemency, telling her "he would not let private feelings prevail."[107] Among the powerful clans, the Lin of Meilung, "poison" to the peasants, were particularly affected. Given a free hand, the peasants set to with a vengeance, rounding up all those they hated and bringing them to the Association for punishment. The unfortunates were paraded through the streets, and "the thousand-year-old privileges of this feudal class" were thus destroyed.[108]

A local missionary reported that many churches and chapels were converted into Peasant Association offices. Christians were severely persecuted, and the missionaries took refuge in Swabue, "safe under the protection of a Christian general."[109] According to Father Rey, many Lufeng Christians had already joined the Union for their "bodily and spiritual welfare," since no superstitious practices were imposed upon them.[110] But Father Robba branded many Christians as "traitors" and lamented that "the good boys of the priest" had now become "the good boys of the Bolsheviks." The anti-religious attacks did not affect only the Christians: idols and pagodas were smashed; cult practices were forbidden; and fortune-tellers, monks, and nuns were driven from their temples and monasteries, which were taken over.[111]

In Lufeng, where the Association's power was less strong, it was engaged in a number of lawsuits. But in May P'eng P'ai undertook to remedy the situation by calling a meeting of people's representatives to approve the dismissal of the reactionary county magistrate and his replacement with Liu Ch'in-hsi, a Communist.[112]

The peasant movement spread throughout the East River and Huiyang, but its success was not unqualified. In some places with particularly strong lineages, the elders and heads of leading families forbade the other families to join the Association. Such villages, their populations augmented by bandits and stragglers from Ch'en Chiung-ming's army, posed a danger of clan feuds, P'eng noted. Many partisans of Ch'en still waged guerrilla warfare against the KMT army, especially around Swatow. Landlord troops were being organized by one of Ch'en's officers, Ts'ai T'eng-hui, and by a local bandit leader.[113] The *North China Herald* reported that young men were being formed into commando squads. "The rising of Chinese townspeople and agriculturalists for self-defense is really a new feature in Chinese life,

especially on such a large scale," the rather naïve correspondent commented.[114] But clan influences cut both ways, for the P'eng of Lufeng and in particular of Hot'ien district joined the peasant movement en masse when P'eng P'ai returned with the KMT army. P'eng Han-yüan also realized his dream of becoming county magistrate at this time, which suggests that it was the clan along with the movement that dominated the situation.[115]

With most of the former oppressors on the run to Hong Kong and Macao, the 25 percent rent reduction was implemented smoothly enough. But now the peasants demanded greater reductions and were ready to rebel. They wanted the Association to secure more arms for them, to denounce the remaining landlords and bring them to trial, to do away with old traditions and customs, and to hold "all power." Far from objecting, P'eng was all in favor, since it was such mass action that he desired. All the documentation available points to the conclusion that, from 1925, Hai-Lu-feng was to all intents and purposes controlled by the people through the Peasant Association. The Association was in turn controlled—sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly—by the Communist Party, represented by P'eng P'ai.[116] A missionary declared: "They were all, right in this county, turned Bolshevik! They had authority; P'eng P'ai was in command, obeyed and feared like a king."[117]

So engrossed was P'eng P'ai in his new society that he had no time to attend the First Kwangtung Peasant Congress in Canton on May 1, 1925. The Congress officially established the Peasant Association of Kwangtung Province and also voted to join Krestintern, after Russian representatives of that body had spoken.[118] May Day in Haifeng, too, was celebrated on a grand scale, and there is a rare photograph showing P'eng addressing a huge crowd.[119] The Association was by now operating again in many counties that had suffered Ch'en's depredations—for example Lufeng, Wuhua, and P'uning, which had suffered so much also under the Fang clan.[120] In Ch'aochou, too, several Associations and Self-Defense Corps were set up; some magistrates, such as Tao Feng-shun, even "turned to Bolshevism and announced the formation of a Peasant League under KMT auspices." In May 1925, the Red Flag was hoisted in Swatow for the first time.[121]

In eastern Kwangtung, it was the devotion of the special agents (mainly students) that lay behind the Association's expansion. Many of the early student leaders—such as Li Lao-kung, Cheng Chih-yün, Lin Tao-wen, and Yang Wang—had curtailed their schooling to join the revolution.[122] Yang

Wang was from Haifeng and was to inherit the mantle of P'eng P'ai in both the CCP and the local peasant movement in time to come. Younger than P'eng, he had attended the Haifeng Upper Primary School. He was born into an old landlord family in Ho-hsi-she just outside Haifeng city, but the family fields were of poor quality and he had to augment the family income by making umbrella parts. When he left school at eighteen he went to the Canton PMTI, and on his return with the KMT army P'eng employed him as a roving special agent. Being more of a peasant than a student, with his bamboo hat, old trousers, and bare feet, he did much better than other movement workers, who came mostly from the Lu'an Normal School. Next to P'eng himself, Yang was most loved by the peasants.[123] A right-wing contemporary has described him as "a man of great courage, going without shoes even in winter, inured to hardships, a true Communist." He would not sacrifice peasants lightly when an attack on a landlord's village was planned, and when he felt the price of victory was likely to be too high he would even stand up to P'eng.[124]

With such young idealists, the peasant movement forged ahead. In order to train them and induce them to join the CYC or CCP, P'eng set up a local PMTI, together with the special Peasant Army training class. In charge was Wu Chen-min, a Hunanese and Whampoa graduate.

Haifeng city had a "Student Union" similar to the one that had long existed there but now with a distinct leftist flavor. Workers also had their "Labor Union," at first only for the dyeing and metal industries, later for others. Eventually, an all-union office was established. A women's movement also got off to a good start when some progressive female students and workers from the Nan Fang Weaving Factory got together. Again, it was P'eng P'ai who set them on course. The Women's Liberation Association, as their grouping was called, defined its main task as being to contact peasant women and persuade them to join the rent-reduction movement as members of the Association. The student leaders were sometimes called "the Seven Stars," a derogatory term suggesting their opposition to tradition and advocacy of freedom to marry and divorce. The Women's Liberation Association itself was derided by conservatives as the "Bureau of Divorce and Remarriage."[125]

The Peasant Army, in charge of local security, was under the command of Li Lao-kung, who divided it into three units under P'eng Kuei, Huang Ch'iang, and Ch'en Chuang—all Canton PMTI graduates. The Army was developed out of the Peasant Pickets, an organization active in the Peasant

Union since 1923. Peasant Self-Defense Corps units were speedily established. The Army's political commissar was Yang Wang. It was poorly equipped (according to P'eng, its arms were taken from Ch'en's soldiers) but proved the scourge of landlord power and was generally dreaded.[126] Ch'en Chiung-ming described it at an August interview in Shanghai as consisting of "loafers, secret society members, and lackeys of the Red Army, which had supplied it with arms and ammunition." The "so-called Peasant Army," he said, "is of no importance." Since Ch'en was well acquainted with the county and its people, there may have been some truth in what he said.[127]

In the event of a return of Ch'en's forces, even P'eng P'ai was pessimistic about his Peasant Army's chances. For maintaining local security, though, the peasants were satisfied with it. A foreign observer took a different view: he saw its members as "the worst elements of the villages." In some parts of Huilai and Lufeng, he reported, "bands of brigands" calling themselves "soviets of peasants" were plundering and torturing the rich and promising to redistribute land. In June and July especially, they opposed payment of rent and attracted many recruits. The Peasant Army was above the law, abusing anyone it pleased, mission stations included.[128]

One episode involved Fr. Lawrence Bianchi, whose residence in St. Joseph's village (a Catholic village) had been sacked by "a bandit from the sacristy," a local Catholic turned Communist. The priest fled, but after some days decided to return. He set off on horseback, but was soon waylaid by fifteen Reds carrying revolvers and sticks. He was abused, detained in their P'inch'ing office (a Protestant chapel), and then carted off to Haifeng, bound and with a six-man escort despite having identified himself. The Catholic community made a strong protest, while in Swabue Father Robba sought the aid of the local military commander, the magistrate, and even "the CCP chief." After spending the night in a village inn tied to a bed, Bianchi was brought before his "old friend, the head of the Party in Haifeng," who exclaimed in broken English: "Mistake." He then apologized and set the priest free, making good assurances already given to Father Robba. However, before long a better relationship developed between those Catholic missionaries who remained at their posts and the government; instructions were circulated to the effect that churches were to be respected.[129]

But peasant-movement workers found their own safety endangered too. Besides reactionary groups and clan bands, the area was infested with smugglers and opium-runners. Haifeng's county garrison took advantage of the unsettled conditions to revive old habits—such as providing protection for

drug-traffickers—and in the summer of 1925 Lin Tao-wen and another activist were ambushed by such soldiers while crossing a mountain pass in Kungp'ing. Lin escaped but the other man was killed. News of what had happened distressed P'eng immensely, but rather than force a confrontation, he settled on a strong protest instead, demanding punishment of the killers. This was "the first comrade in Haifeng to die for the peasant movement" and P'eng organized for him a hero's funeral, the coffin draped with the Association flag. One story has it that P'eng went himself to Kungp'ing with three comrades to deal with the assassins, that there was a vitriolic meeting, and that P'eng then shot the murderers dead himself. Whatever the outcome of this incident, though, it soured relations between the Association and the KMT army.[130]

By the summer of 1925 the East River situation was complicated anew by a revolt against the KMT regime in Canton. Generals Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan, with mercenary armies from Yunnan and Kwangsi, respectively, were opposed to the growing CCP influence within the Canton regime and the power of Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Chung-k'ai. They made their move on June 6, but were soon routed and forced to retreat from the province.[131] General Hsü was asked to remain and protect East Kwangtung, but, jealous of Chiang, he preferred to move his forces to Canton for a power struggle with his rival. P'eng was sent to Canton with the army, his mission being to ensure that the troops returned posthaste. Prior to leaving, he held a council with all the cadres. He told them that after so brief a training the Peasant Army, even assisted by the Self-Defense Corps, could not defeat the forces of a resurgent Ch'en Chiung-ming. To make matters worse, arms and ammunition were in short supply. The landlords would exploit the situation and join in against the peasants. The only sensible solution was to disperse the cadres and the Peasant Army among the mountain bases for guerrilla activities.[132]

A missionary recalls riding his horse through a village near Haifeng city and noticing a general exodus of people with baskets, boxes, and children. It was sheer panic, with everybody scattering, even the "Red" magistrate. Ch'en Chiung-ming did in fact come down from the north to take revenge, and any local leaders unlucky enough to be caught by soldiers or civilians were put to death. The houses of P'eng's family, clan members, and friends were destroyed. As Father Bianchi put it: "As for us, we could only remain spectators. It seemed that we had turned from Bolshevik Russia to old China

again and that the time was not ripe for the acceptance of Communism."[133] The British consul at Swatow reported that the advancing forces had dealt drastically with "the so-called Agricultural Society." Many of the leaders had been shot, and "members of the Society are no longer permitted to pay into the Society's funds the rent due to their landlords, as was the case last July." Ch'en even changed the name of his army to "The Chinese Anti-Red Army."[134]

In Haifeng, landlord and clan forces, their morale boosted, swooped down on the village Self-Defense Corps and Associations. General Chung Ching-t'ang resumed command of the county, assuming "dictatorial powers to purge the villages" in the old imperial style. Some of the Peasant Army, heedless of P'eng P'ai's advice, had tried to resist, and Chung and his few hundred troops were determined to exact a terrible vengeance. He announced: "it is better to kill one thousand by mistake than to let one Communist escape," and he had a number of long knives made for decapitating any Association leaders caught.[135]

Throngs of landlords returned from exile and went about demanding reparations. They made league with local bandits and groups such as the Long Hairs, whom they encouraged to pillage, kidnap, and hold peasants to ransom. During a peasant attack Li Lao-kung, a close friend of P'eng P'ai and a leader of the Peasant Army, met his end. He was captured by the notorious landlord Ch'en Ping-ting and killed.[136] Chung did not have it all his own way, however; peasant resistance was sometimes fierce, and landlord forces and regular troops did not have great success against guerrillas. In Machu, a village in Kungp'ing, inhabitants fended off a company led by Chung himself and held out for as long as they could, believing that the KMT army would soon return.[137]

P'eng meanwhile, charged with ensuring this return, had found Canton in a tumult of activity. The May Thirtieth Movement, with its antiforeign demonstrations, had begun to sweep the country, and P'eng made his own contribution to the blockade of Hong Kong by organizing patrols along the coast of Haifeng to make it effective. On August 4 he addressed one of a series of strikers' meetings and referred to the special help given by Hai-Lu-feng peasants in denying food to the Colony. He also spoke at a commemorative rally for Liao Chung-k'ai, assassinated on August 20, and the following month took part in the congress of Huahsien's Peasant Association. As late as mid-October he was still away, advising in a newspaper article how the government should handle the East River situation and reporting to the

strikers again. Otherwise, little is known of his day-to-day activities during this period.[138]

By October 8, the Second Eastern Expedition had set off to rid the East River of Ch'en Chiung-ming once and for all. As it moved, peasants gathered to it, for Ch'en's troops had caused unbearable hardships. Indeed, delegations of refugees from Wuhua and Hai-Lu-feng had gone to Canton to press the government to regain the East River. Once again, the peasants amazed everyone by the way they took part in the Expedition.[139] P'eng P'ai noted: "All the regular soldiers acknowledged the peasants' determination to resist the warlords and support the revolution."[140] Peasants had been instructed to "steal arms for themselves," this being also in the interests of the CCP, especially since the KMT had let the peasants down on two occasions—a failure that led them "not to trust the Government or the Association," as Lo Ch'i-yüan observed.[141] The success of the Expedition was rapid and total.

P'eng P'ai, back in Haifeng by October 22, assumed again the secretaryship of the local CCP committee, which now had branches in both Haifeng and Lufeng. Victory festivities were muted: too many had perished.[142] P'eng grieved in particular for Li Lao-kung: "Drop by drop, the blood of our first martyrs will be repaid by the blood of our enemies." Yet despite such calls for revenge, heard again from peasant representatives on the 25th when they met to prepare a new rent-reduction campaign, after an initial period of retribution the mood changed and grew more restrained.[143] A reporter wrote: "The most extravagant of the Peasant Union's experiments with Communism in Hai-Lu-feng has for the time being been abandoned in the interest of law and order."[144]

# 6

# New Roles for the Rural Tradition

The Peasant Association of Kwangtung Province was officially founded at the First Peasant Congress in May 1925. For P'eng P'ai, it was his old Peasant Union although large, modernized, and with broadened aims. Those who had suffered so greatly had "now attained awareness"; the new Association, "unlike the former Union," was a political organ, born of the revolution, weaving its way through the United Front and treading a balance between KMT and CCP influences. The National Revolutionary Army had achieved victory in eastern Kwangtung, helped by its peasant allies. The peasants of Kwangtung were engaged in the fight for "liberation" of all China and had become part of Chinese history.

In ideal terms, this was true. But despite their vague perceptions of grander things, the peasants were more concerned with making their lives better here and now, with reducing rent and taxation in their own locales. There was thus the danger that local authorities would be pressed by landlords and gentry to persuade the peasants to compromise, which might explain why the new "Declaration of the Congress" stated: "Peasant Comrades! The organization of the Peasant Association is founded totally on the class doctrine." That oppressive landlords continued to produce Association "martyrs" seemingly bore this out, for compromise was more like surrender; if peasants desired liberation, they had "to rely on peasant unity and on their personal strength for battle."[1]

The Peasant Association was thus engaged on two fronts: the national revolution and the social revolution. It was the second of these, however, that was of prime concern for the peasants. For the time being, the CCP was content to ride the tiger of peasant discontent through social reforms, in the

belief that sooner or later the wrath of the peasant masses could be turned against an unyielding KMT bourgeoisie. The blueprint for this was drawn up by the CCP Kwangtung Committee and put in the hands of the "Standing Committee of the Kwangtung Peasant Association" (December 1925), which was dominated by CCP peasant-organizers such as P'eng P'ai, Lo Ch'i-yüan, and Juan Hsiao-hsien. These men were active in the KMT peasant department, the PMTI, and the peasant committee of the regional CCP. They were the real controllers of the movement, calling the tune through their twice-weekly meetings. The Provincial Association acted as the general staff for the Kwangtung peasant movement with complete autonomy even from the government CEC, and was therefore free to further its own plans. P'eng, Lo, and Juan were between them "the soul and spirit of the movement": nothing of policy or action did not pass through their hands. In the summer of 1926, the standing committee became the "executive committee," but the three were still there, augmented by Chou Ch'i-chien from Kwangning, who was also on the regional CCP peasant committee, and by Ts'ai Yu-p'ing.[2]

The executive committee thus had the broad peasant masses in its hands, but at the lower levels peasants could prove slippery indeed. To maintain and tighten its hold, the Association was organized into seven regional offices more or less in line with the KMT political committee's division of the province: the North, East, and West River offices; the South and Central Route offices; the Hainan office; and the Canton office. Chou Ch'i-chien looked after the West River, Huang Hsüeh-tseng the South River, Lo Ch'i-yüan Canton, and P'eng P'ai the East River. The Association headquarters in Canton were lodged in a fine Western-style house in Tung-p'ing Boulevard once owned by a wealthy landlord from Foshan.[3] A foreign visitor compared new with old:

> Not very long ago, the provincial office of the peasant organizations had just two old tables covered with papers in disorder, some rickety chairs, a poor desk, and a poorly paid copyist, who, having too much to do, could finish nothing. When I visited the headquarters of the Peasants' Union in May 1926, there were five Departments working regularly, organization, propaganda, economic, and military departments, and the secretariat. Besides voluntary workers there were twelve paid clerks.[4]

Busy with other things as he was, P'eng P'ai devoted much of his attention to the East River and its Ch'ao-Mei-Hai-Lu-feng area office in Swatow, from which seventeen counties were controlled. In twelve of them the As-

sociation was already fully established, with the greatest number of districts, villages, and members in the entire Kwangtung Association, thanks to P'eng P'ai's efforts. Swatow was the administrative and military center of the area and was readily accessible by land or sea.[5] January 21, 1926, was a public holiday in Swatow and Ch'aochoufu to mark the second anniversary of Lenin's death and to express gratitude for Russian aid. There was a memorial gathering, with pictures of Lenin and Sun, Russian and Chinese flags, and a eulogy delivered by P'eng P'ai. He was a man of influence in Swatow.[6]

In Swatow P'eng P'ai fell in love with a student girl, Hsü Yü-ch'ing.* This was another reason for his tarrying there. Eventually, when both returned to Haifeng, she lived with P'eng and his first wife, Ts'ai Su-p'ing. Hsü was totally devoted to the cause and was a lively, very modern-looking woman with short bobbed hair and a penchant for horseback riding. They had one daughter.[7]

One of the first problems to face P'eng was the situation in P'uning county, whose Peasant Union he had established and which had welcomed the Association after the Eastern Expedition. The Fang lineage controlled virtually all P'uning, and its heavy hand made itself felt in politics, economics, and the judiciary. There was dire poverty among the peasants, and the county had the province's highest suicide rate for peasants. The situation did not change very much after Ch'en Chiung-ming's lieutenant was driven out, since half of the county city population, some 10,000 people, belonged to the Fang lineage and localist sentiment was deeply ingrained. The city took a stance against the villages, and the Fang were preparing to thwart the Association by means of armed force, including the *pao-wei-t'uan* (security guards). Peasants therefore looked to the Association to take up their cause.[8]

In January 1926, one of the Fang was taken to court on a theft charge. The lineage countercharged that the daughter of a clan member had been violated by peasants in Linweishan. During the proceedings, an Association member selling vegetables in town was beaten up by the Fang and could not obtain redress. Other Fang and the *pao-wei-t'uan* then assaulted four more peasants. The Association brought three Fang thugs to the magistrate, whereupon the whole lineage became enraged and accused the Association of kidnapping. On January 15 fighting erupted, with peasants severing the

*Hsü had joined the CCP in 1926 and was working in the Swatow Office with P'eng P'ai. She followed him to Shanghai and after his death became in 1931 a member of the CCP "East Special." She was betrayed and killed in Swatow in the autumn of 1933 (*PL*:335).

city's water supply and withholding food. News went out that "bandits" were attacking the city, and even the Cha'o-Mei area office swallowed it. Other strong lineages and landlords seized the opportunity to strike at the Association, and the magistrate had to wire for troops from Swatow to quell "the revolt of some 7,000 peasants besieging the county capital." Units of the First Regiment arrived only to find that the "bandits" were peasants; they would not intervene. Fatalities were many: the peasants slew ten hostages. When order was restored, a meeting of representatives from both sides was called and guns were confiscated.[9]

The peasants felt hopeful and united, enjoying as they did the full support of nearby Associations. The landlords were chastened and decided to set up an organization of their own, but little came of it because the government was sympathetic toward the peasants. They then formed a Sun Yat-sen Association, and went about claiming that the KMT could disband the Peasant Union. However, the peasants had shown their determination to stand up to the Fang, and many lineages adopted a neutral position. The peasants now had their own market outside town and could set about organizing their Self-Defense Army in preparation for the next confrontation. In this, they were following the example set by Haifeng; indeed, many of their leaders, such as Ch'en K'uei-ya, were from there and had done well in showing the peasants how to fight. The weak link was the executive committee of the county Association, which under its present leader was corrupt and inefficient. This committee had to be changed. The area office accordingly appointed members to a temporary committee charged with arranging new elections. These men were largely from the Haifeng Association propaganda unit, and they were Communists as well. Language difficulties created resentment against them, as did their unwillingness to trust the local leaders with Association funds. Ch'en K'uei-ya provoked much ill-feeling, for all his long record in the movement: he had a savage temper and simply wanted all landlords killed immediately.[10]

The situation remained tense, the peasants were now confused, and the Fang proved obdurate. P'eng P'ai was asked by the CCP regional committee to straighten things out in P'uning.* The Association there prepared him a great welcome: for the first time, they made slogans, posters, and leaflets, formed band groups, and drilled armed peasants for a grand parade. The

*The initiative taken by the CCP was enacted through the Provincial Peasant Association. The "Peasant Committee" of the regional CCP and the "Standing Committee" of the Peasant Association were made up of the same people.

landlords, aware of P'eng's reputation, were not disposed to arrange any similar show, and the day before his arrival they sent representatives to discuss pacification terms with the Association. It was agreed that the Fang ringleaders were to be punished (with various individuals dismissed from office, jailed, and fined), but that the ¥1,500 compensation demanded by the peasants was to be reduced to ¥1,000 and all litigation withdrawn; medical damages were to be less than asked. The tribunal would then proclaim an end to clan oppression.[11]

The peasants desired equality before the law, which would allow them self-respect and freedom of action, matters of greater importance to them than economic benefits, much as the latter were welcome. But a commentator, borrowing from P'eng P'ai, concluded that they had won only a "superficial victory," there were no "really great gains" such as abolition of customary dues and rent reduction. In his view the landlord class had given them, as though they were small children, "some candy and cookies" while it made ready the next assault.

When P'eng arrived, 7,000 peasants, many with guns, turned out to greet him. Women held their children aloft and shouted: "Look! Here is the Eternal One!" P'eng spoke in his usual manner. He congratulated them on the agreement, which he called a triumph for peasant unity and strength. The landlords had capitulated on hearing of the imminent arrival of the Association envoy, who represented 800,000 peasants. The "candy and cookies" should not lull the peasants into a false sense of security, however, and unity should be consolidated, weapons bought, and preparations made for the final confrontation. P'eng took pains to stress the need for maintaining the armed struggle and strengthening the Association; for him and the other Communist leaders class war was the ultimate goal, and the compromise reached was in effect a setback. He managed to bring the peasants around to accepting a resolution to attack the Sun Yat-sen Society and resist the KMT.[12]

By May 1926, the P'uning Association was established in seven districts with 144 villages and 14,944 members. Peasant interest was centered on gaining economic and social power, especially after the success of their independent out-of-town market, which had ruined the city one. They planned to open a peasant bank with 50,000 yüan in capital and intended to subsidize a peasant cooperative and schools. They had no real interest in class struggle, only a desire for respect and economic stability—and this despite the fact that the P'uning peasants were among the most oppressed in

the East River. On the other hand, since the Communist leaders and the peasants were facing a common enemy and sharing the ideals of justice and equality, it was not difficult for determined leaders, after gaining their trust, to nudge the peasants along the CCP line.[13]

July saw the start of the Northern Expedition by eight KMT armies. This effort would require peasant support all the way to the Yangtse. One of the worst expressions of exploitation during the Expedition was the way public-debt bonds were assigned to the East River peasants. For the two Eastern Expeditions, the peasantry had spontaneously raised one million yüan, an undertaking peasants considered "their duty." Now, gambling and opium were back because of the need to raise funds, and the peasants found themselves saddled with a public debt of some two million, exorbitant on any score.[14] Lo Ch'i-yüan and P'eng P'ai wrote an article in the Association's magazine *Plowshare* (August 4) on the continued exploitation by landlords and officials in the area.[15]

Lo had just prepared the draft article when P'eng arrived in Canton for the Enlarged Meeting of the Association. They discussed the matter. Lo had written that the "revolutionary base" in Kwangtung had willingly borne hardships in hope of some future benefit to themselves and the still-enslaved peoples. The masses and the army must be united: without the masses, the army "would achieve very limited results," and without the army, "how could the masses start a revolution?" But the rich, not the poor, should pay for the Expedition, and in the East River the reverse was happening. The ¥2 million debt bonds were assigned at the rate of ¥200,000 for large counties, ¥150,000 for medium, and up to ¥70,000 for small ones—fair enough, considering that the East River had the province's richest merchant families. These, however, escaped. The magistrates allocated the bonds at the county level, and the gentry and *min-t'uan* did so at the district level. The only exception was in Hai-Lu-feng: there the peasants were organized, had power, and made their own arrangements.[16] Elsewhere peasants, and in particular members of the Association, were being forced to pay an inflated quota because the collectors demanded their share. Failure to comply led to peasants being branded as counterrevolutionaries. Peasants wanted to quit the Association for fear that membership would entail a greater tax burden, and rumors were afloat that Ch'en Chiung-ming would soon be back. Lo suggested a three-point solution: funds must be collected quickly, the maximum possible must be raised, and those disgruntled by the fund-raising

must be kept few. The Association proposed that allocation should be taken out of the hands of local bullies and gentry and that peasants with less than 10 *mou* should be exempted altogether; others should pay according to their income.

Lo's account of the situation shows once again where the peasants' interest really lay when they joined the Association and how they would give their allegiance to those who could deliver. In the East River, the KMT government, by defaulting on its obligations, was allowing the counterrevolutionaries and Ch'en lackeys to cause disaffection among the peasants. Revolt could ensue, and "if that happens, whose fault is it?"[17]

It was this problem that brought P'eng P'ai to Canton. For him, the only people who welcomed the imposition were those who could profit from it. Corrupt officials converted the redeemable bonds into outright army tax and declared that this was done at the behest of the commander-in-chief, which meant strict enforcement and a populace cowed into submission. A summer typhoon had ravaged the whole area from Hai-Lu-feng to Huilai and Wuhua; but this did not deter the militia and rangers of Huilai from demanding payment for bonds. Any peasants who did not pay this "Northern Expedition Army Tax" would be imprisoned. The collectors even requested "shoe-leather fees." Thus, while those with plenty evaded everything, in poor families "even a 3-year-old was not exempted."

The Peasant Association was hard hit too. A larger portion of bonds was allocated to its members, "especially to those villages where the revolutionary peasants are more in number and stronger," since these members were "so willing for the revolutionary army to march on in the Northern Expedition." The Association was even accused of obstructing collection, and magistrates were asked to take action. An official telegram branded the Association itself as "counterrevolutionary." The cadres in the villages had to bear the brunt of peasants' reactions, especially when the Association proved helpless. "To say in this case that the government is behind the Peasant Association, is to make peasants have strong doubts." The Ch'en remnants had a field day lampooning revolutionary slogans. The peasants' cheer *Kuo-min-tang wan-sui* ("May the KMT live 10,000 years") was changed in mockery to "The government is taking your 10,000 taxes" ("*shui*" sounding like "*sui*"). Peasants were told that their money went to "Red Army" officers for the purchase of rank and promotion, but that if the peasants joined Ch'en, there would in future be no such taxes or payments. P'eng admitted that "some of the most aware peasants are tempted by their propaganda, and

most of those not yet aware are confused by the rumors spread by the rebel Party." If this went on, he felt, the success of the Expedition would be at risk: "This is indeed a really important problem!"[18] In mid-September, the press reported a "request to all counties in the Ch'ao-Mei area, including Haifeng, to pay the taxes within three days," so P'eng and Lo had achieved nothing.[19]

In the Meihsien area, the Association witnessed its best development in Wuhua. But it was in this county that the difficulties just referred to were sharpest: apparent betrayal by the government and a national revolution in danger from old enemies. Wuhua had only 17 percent tenancy and 10 percent peasant laborers, all other inhabitants being freeholders or landlords, so that the difficulties were not chiefly owing to peasant hardship. With government support, propagandists from Haifeng had entered the county and were making a strong appeal to the younger male population, which was larger than in the adjacent counties. The Association there devoted much of its energies to developing village education, especially in the evening for women who, following Hakka custom, worked during the day. Small industrial enterprises were set up to help poor peasants and youngsters make extra money; there were peasant banks and credit unions, too. The observer from whom most of this information is derived, and who must have been closely involved, had to remark, however, that "we know a social movement cannot be directed by just a handful of intellectuals."[20]

There was also a Peasant Self-Defense Corps, with instructors from the Provincial Association. The Wuhua Corps was particularly strong, and after the Eastern Expedition the government recognized its bravery and provided 100 guns against the Ch'en remnants. This made it bolder than ever, and under the leadership of the Association envoys Ku Ta-ts'un and Wei Kung-chieh it detained people for public trial, contrary to government orders, for transporting rice out of the county. When police attempted to release the detainees, Corps members shot them rather than give them up. Ku had close links with P'eng and was starting to set himself up as a peasant leader in preparation for his later career as a Communist insurgent leader and high Party official.

The press began to make much of the power of the rebellious Peasant Army in Wuhua, and gentry and landlords rallied behind Magistrate Hu Chun to protect themselves. The lines for a confrontation were drawn once more, although the CCP regional committee took the Association leaders to task for their extremism. P'eng was sent to sort things out again. However,

he sided with the Association and encouraged the leaders to stand their ground.[21] In one of his articles on the affair, entitled "A Precious Piece of Paper" (October 1926), he blamed Hu Chun and accused him of collusion with "a small number of callous merchants" in the rice incident. There had been a typhoon in July, the harvest was poor, and rice exports should have been banned. He also charged Hu Chun with dismissing peasant demands for a 20-percent rent reduction.[22]

Meanwhile, shielded by the military authorities and the militia commander, the forces of reaction were denigrating the Association as a revival of the "Three Dots Society" of Ch'ing times. The Association was also accused of spreading Communism among the masses, who in consequence were refusing to pay army tax and were delaying supplies. P'eng countered that the real culprit was Hu Chun, who was doing the KMT a disservice by presenting the public-debt bonds as army bonds, thereby discouraging people from buying them for fear they would not be honored. P'eng's chief blast, however, was against Hu's obduracy over the request for rent reduction, a reduction allowed in Haifeng, Kwangning, and elsewhere. "People should not be given cause to say that the Party program is merely empty talk," P'eng told the higher authorities in the East River Administration. "This official should be stripped of his titles and never given further employment." As P'eng saw it, by attacking the Peasant Association, the magistrate was attempting to destroy the main organization that aimed at improving the peasants' lot; therefore, he was harming the whole nation. P'eng's comments continued in a vein similar to his Haifeng "Declaration" of some years before, all the while stressing that "with a slightly lower rent, the peasants could be assisted to maintain a dignified livelihood"—the alternatives being banditry, vagrancy, and beggary. The solution lay in the Association, which was "designed to create a foundation for autonomy at the village level and, through mutual aid, to help those who have lost land to till." He denied that the peasants were turning Communist; rather, it was that "peasants have become aware of the true situation and this has angered the landlords and bourgeoisie." The government should promote agriculture and support the peasants, as it had promised in its second Declaration.

P'eng P'ai's article points to the fact that it was the refusal to reduce rent in an emergency that had really roused the peasants in Wuhua. The leading class had shaken off their duties and responsibility in this respect; the old anarchist view that the land belonged to all, on which P'eng harped, could

still make its appeal. From the realities of Wuhua, P'eng abstracted a national political-economic case for the peasants and their interests, which in the context was quite valid.[23]

The government, however, did not pay great heed to his plea. The Ch'en remnants continued to pillage, allegedly with the connivance of the authorities, and the *min-t'uan* remained a tool of the landlords. The Association's repeated attempts to get the government to eliminate "all reactionary, rebel bandits" proved futile, which "threw doubt on government sincerity." When peasants took preemptive measures, the Association was accused of "trespassing on government power and interfering with the administration."[24] P'eng had to compose an article "A Lament for the Peasant Friends of Wuhua" (December 1926), mourning the torture and mutilation of peasants by "the sharp knives of the counterrevolutionaries." And all this was taking place "under the 'blue sky and shining sun' [the KMT flag]. Let the followers of Sun Yat-sen pay heed to my plea on behalf of the peasants of Wuhua." The whole KMT was put on trial for failing to meet "just and reasonable demands" from the peasants, despite "hundreds of telegrams and repeated petitions."

The enemies of the peasants became bolder and intensified their slander campaign, "their sole objective being to make the National Government slay its peasant friends on the same battle line." Rice was still being moved out of the county under armed escorts appointed by Hu. The Association had to put up with outrageous denigration. The drought and typhoon of July had ruined the harvest, but enemy "policy was even more implacable" and no rent reduction was forthcoming.[25]

Magistrate Hu complained to the East River administrator, Yü Fu, that the Association was going Communist, at which P'eng commented: "Such nonsense would not deceive children." Yü was taken in, however, and declared rent reduction detrimental to the Northern Expedition. Under false names, Ch'en supporters lodged complaints with the peasants' and workers' department in Canton, and department head Liu Chih-wen asked the Provincial Association to investigate, at the same time dismissing charges against the magistrate. The central government was now paying attention, but after an investigation Yü informed the magistrate that he had a free hand to restrain the Association. For P'eng P'ai the struggle in Wuhua was a continuation of the battle against Ch'en Chiung-ming, and the government's policy a betrayal of Sun and the Party.

September saw bandit attacks on the Association in a number of districts,

with Association officers being taken prisoner, the cows and pigs of members rustled, and houses destroyed. P'eng asserts that the local constabulary turned a blind eye to these attacks. There was no alternative but to crush "the very roots of warlord power," the counterrevolutionaries in the villages. "We have learned our lesson from the frightful calamity in Wuhua," and if the reactionaries could be stamped out, the national revolution would already be half won. KMT resolutions had called for support of the peasants, and therefore hope remained that a policy incorporating such support would be implemented. P'eng was skeptical and warned the peasants of Wuhua "not to think that once Ch'en Chiung-ming was gone, there would be no other oppressors. We have the example of Hu Chun, Yü Fu, and Liu Chih-wen. Therefore, continue the fight! Final victory will be yours!"[26]

P'eng spent from July to September coming and going, doing his utmost to mitigate peasant hardships. The situation dragged on, and in early December the Provincial Association convened a special meeting to discuss the East River situation, attended by representatives of the KMT peasant department, peasants' and workers' department, the army, and the party. Peasant department propaganda—reports, investigations, and press releases—had exerted some pressure on the Canton authorities and had borne some fruit: the *Kuo-min hsin-wen* (*People's News*) of November 5, 1926, had stated that there would be a 25-percent cut in rent. P'eng did not shun criticizing government officials, and while apparently upholding KMT ideology he was able to undermine that party's credibility and urge the peasants to stand their ground. The Northern Expedition gave him an opportunity to press the KMT left to pursue the social revolution. Charges that the peasants were turning to Communism were dismissed as "nonsense"; yet the peasants were being given to understand that their only real friend, and the one through whom final victory would be achieved, was the CCP.[27]

After Chiang Kai-shek's March 20 coup, when he struck out against the Communists and his Russian advisers, the situation of the Association and its Army changed drastically. A Russian observer noted that in the villages, "the lawlessness and arbitrary behavior of landlords increased. *Min-t'uan* and bandits killed peasants and dispersed their organizations. Landlords received rifles from Hong Kong and Macao and the local organs of power were on their side."[28] From May 1925 to May 1926, the Association in Kwangtung was under fire, as shown by the 2,526 complaints sent to the Canton headquarters, and its strength in resolving cases with the govern-

ment was weakening.[29] The *North China Herald* described the arming of the Peasant Militia as "an unfortunate situation created by the communists," whereas the People's Militia (*min-t'uan*) was "a wholesome citizens' participation in the protection of the rights of the farmers." The fact that the two organizations fought each other "wherever both existed together" posed "a serious problem for the government."[30]

Tsou Lu, on the KMT right, claimed that the *min-t'uan* were the real protectors against bandits, but were being hampered by the CCP working through the Association, "which made trouble for them everywhere." He "secretly helped the *min-t'uan* everywhere to struggle against CCP power," but could not do very much because, he claimed, the government was riddled with CCP influence, especially that of Borodin.[31] With the March 20 coup, the tug-of-war between peasants and the old guard came to symbolize the KMT right–CCP confrontation. The Peasant Army increased to some 20,000 members by October 1926, and though poorly trained and equipped was seen by the Canton CCP as a sizable force in the event of a showdown with the KMT. It was evident, however, that in many places the Peasant Army was simply not up to scratch. In Shunte, for example, some internal killing occurred and irresponsible use of weapons was noted. It was to stem this kind of incompetence that Whampoa cadets were asked in October to go to each county to train the Peasant Army. They were supposed to set up a model unit, whose hand-picked members would be specially instructed and then sent back to their home areas to train the Peasant Corps there.[32]

The Canton CCP was determined to prepare for "its own March 20," but Borodin realized that any attempt to wrest political power "would have gone down in a sea of blood." He therefore tried to buy time with Chiang, and the CCP was persuaded that any forces it might muster would be no match for the general's.[33] Voitinsky rejected a CCP request for 5,000 rifles. And even some CCP elements had reservations about making the Peasant Army too strong: at the Plenum of July 1926, it was suggested that the "Army" be called "Self-Defense Corps" and should not be a standing force.[34] Chiang's coup encouraged the KMT right and all those with a grudge against the movement to take action; the whole province experienced clashes between Peasant Corps and militia throughout 1926; but Lo Ch'i-yüan advised the CCP regional committee in July to urge the Corps to maintain a low profile until such time as it could be put in order by special cadres with military expertise. In August the Provincial Association in-

structed its branches to tone down requests for arms and ammunition and to refrain from overly ambitious actions.[35]

The rural conflict created great concern in the KMT: the peasants were blaming the party for not supporting them enough, and the landlord-gentry for supporting them too much. On July 1, the Kwangtung military affairs committee declared that landlords and bandits were on the rampage, while pretending to be the Peasant Corps. Reports came in from Chungshan, Huahsien, Wuhua, and elsewhere of slayings of Association officials and destruction of premises, and the government was besieged with requests for arms, notably from the Ch'ao-Mei-Hai-Lu-feng, Huiyang, and West River area offices. The Northern Expedition set off in July, and it was important to maintain peasant support, but in the worsening rural situation there was a great deal of confusion. The Association was in trouble.[36]

The peasant committee of the Kwangtung CCP called a meeting of special envoys on August 15 to review the whole situation and arrange for a thorough survey of Association membership and the Peasant Corps. This Special Enlarged Meeting of the executive at the provincial and county level took place in Canton from August 17 to 25.[37] Everyone realized that, "in this time of tempest, wind, and rain," new guidelines had to be formulated. The meeting was attended by representatives from the seven area offices and from 40 counties, with many specially invited guests and government department heads. P'eng P'ai was there. Mao Tse-tung spoke at the opening ceremony (he was then Principal of the PMTI). Chief among the aims of the meeting was to strengthen internal organization and to prevent gentry infiltration of the movement.[38] A Russian observer remarked: "It was obvious that an agrarian revolution was brewing in Kwangtung."[39] On the 25th, the last day, a petition went to KMT headquarters. This "recognized that the KMT government was the peasants' government" and showed that "the Association is ready to obey, whereas the landlords are not."[40] For the Communist leaders of the peasant movement, however, the KMT was a dead letter. Nothing was to be hoped for from its left wing, either: "The KMT left used peasant power to aggrandize itself; having attained that, it no longer cares about the Association."[41]

Immediately prior to the executive meeting, the chairman had received 220 letters full of complaints and protests against local authorities, especially from Huahsien. During the sessions themselves a stream of refugees from that county poured into the city.[42] Huahsien was some 50 kilometers outside

Canton and lay in a fertile plain that provided the capital with rice and vegetables. Its Association had got off the ground in 1923 with SYC help. P'eng P'ai had visited Huahsien "a few times," one such occasion being in the previous summer during his absence from the East River.[43] The major oppressors there were the Chiang lineage. In 1924 they tried to crush the fledgling Association, killing the deputy chairman of the executive committee and failing in their aim only as a result of government intervention. In 1925 reactionary groups were in touch with Ch'en in the East River and were laying plans for his return. In the spring of 1926 an all-out attempt to destroy the Association was launched. Peasants were attacked on their way to a meeting and a great war ensued. Matters came to a head in August. At this time, despite the Association's presence in three Huahsien districts and 31 villages, the low membership figure of 3,878 showed the control still exercised by local leaders.[44] P'eng was a member of the investigation and pacification commission appointed by the government to settle matters there.[45]

The commission's chairman was Teng Liang-sheng (from the peasant department); the other members were Wang (from the Provincial KMT), Kuan (from the *min-t'uan* executive committee), and Wu Kuan-ch'i (from army headquarters). Wu had formerly been head of the P'anyü *min-t'uan*, and P'eng immediately put him down as a reactionary: "His uniform appeared to date from the Ch'ing, except that the red epaulettes had been removed as not in keeping with the national republican government. His military cap might have fallen from the head of a soldier defeated in the Yang-Liu rebellion." He was accompanied by one Wei Yao-li, instructor at the *min-t'uan* training center.[46] The commission was joined en route to Huahsien by a complement of government troops.

Then a problem arose. Should the Commission proceed with the troops to P'ingshan, where the militia was entrenched, or should it hasten to Ch'iuhu village, where the Peasant Army was holding out? Wu suddenly decided on P'ingshan. P'eng P'ai had misgivings but did not make a fuss. He spent the night persuading the troop commander, Lei Te, of the worth of the Association, although the commander was already of the opinion that "collaboration of the farmers on a large scale is a prerequisite for the success of our revolution." He had already rooted out bandits and *min-t'uan* followers in Hsiangshan county. As for the militia: "They are counterrevolutionaries, in rare cases neutral, but never truly revolutionary. Most Peasant Association members are revolutionary. I have met scarcely one who does not support the revolution. Counterrevolution is alien to their spirit."[47]

The next morning, instructions for a cease-fire were issued. While the troops made their way to the trouble-spot, the Commission took sedan chairs to meet with a representative of Magistrate Li. P'eng P'ai learned that county officials were fully behind the *min-t'uan* and already in touch with Wu Kuan-ch'i, with whom they were familiar. The militia had attacked the Association on the grounds that it was forcing people to belong. The attack had been launched at the inauguration of a new village Association, and had been led by three Chiang clan toughs whose names were on a list in Wu's possession. Even Wu admitted: "Those three have really gone too far and are ruining everything."

On their way to P'ingshan, they stopped in the area of Hsiaopu village. The peasants here had formed an Association to protect themselves against oppression from Hsiaopu, then controlled by Chiang Hsia-yen, head of the county militia and leader of the P'ingshan squad. P'eng had a personal interest in Chiang Hsia-yen. He had served as magistrate in Haifeng and later in Huahsien during Ch'en Chiung-ming's time. He was reported to have encouraged Ch'en to turn against Sun Yat-sen and was still in contact with the Old Commander. In mid-1924, he had set up the local Landlord Society to curb the peasant movement. It was this man who had been behind the April assault and the killing of the Association deputy chairman. He had established the Huahsien militia on instructions from Ch'en with a brief to disrupt the rear of the Northern Expedition. With his 1,000-strong army, half of them local bandits, he had attacked the Association on August 27, killing, raping, vandalizing, and burning. On August 31, Magistrate Li had ordered Chiang, as county commander, to restrain the Hsienko village militia, who, "hand in glove with bandits," had gone on the rampage against the Association in two places. These places were mainly Hakka: the Hakka were now on the warpath and the situation "might escalate beyond control, resulting in untold suffering." Such circumstances saw P'eng P'ai in his element.[48]

Troops and the Commission did not deter Chiang. He issued orders to "finish the job" by attacking for a second time the village nucleus of the Peasant Association. The P'ingshan militia set off on September 2 with orders to kill, but not to burn the place down for fear of worsening their image before outsiders. They arrived at the market of T'ienho, where the gates were opened by traitors; but as soon as they saw the array of goods they forgot their mission and set about pillaging, then made off to P'ingshan loaded down with loot. Meanwhile, Commander Lei of the Commission troops

had reached the area and sent a platoon to the rescue; but while these were pursuing they suddenly found themselves attacked by hundreds more of the P'ingshan militia, all shouting "Down with the Revolutionary Army!"

The troops took up a defensive position, and an urgent message was sent to Commander Lei for reinforcements. Wu Kuan-ch'i had given a guarantee of militia observance of the cease-fire and he was not pleased to hear of the latest outrage. Fortunately, the militia-bandit attack had more of show than substance: there were trumpets blaring, cannon blasting, and taunts of "Come on, and we'll destroy your Revolutionary Army," but the platoon was able to make good its escape to T'ienho. There, the locals welcomed them with firecrackers and the tradesmen recounted the looting. It was discovered that the militia had a fortified position at Wushihkang, with a blockhouse and gun-turret; there was a second line of defense at Loch'ang village, on the way to P'ingshan. Both positions were well guarded.[49]

Wu tried to excuse the raid as "a misunderstanding," but P'eng P'ai tore this defense to shreds. On September 3, the Commission met and decided to take action. Wu would have his colleagues believe that haste was unnecessary, for he had already sent a note ordering the militia to withdraw from their P'ingshan positions, which he was sure they would do. He had also ordered the front line at Wushihkang to lay down their arms, thereby hoping, as P'eng was shrewd enough to spot, that the bulk in Loch'ang and P'ingshan would be spared by the Army. At last, both Army and Commission moved toward Wushihkang, only to be met with a hail of bullets. Wu jumped into a ditch and lay prone, whereupon P'eng, taking cover alongside, remonstrated with him on the "misunderstanding" and on the strange manner in which his cease-fire message had been acknowledged. The Army returned the fire and surrounded the blockhouse. After useless injunctions to surrender, it was stormed, the soldiers attempting to set it on fire to the accompaniment of women banging gongs for help. Finally, the doors were opened, five bandits armed to the teeth were seized, and the women were released unharmed. "Our military discipline was very good on that occasion," P'eng notes.[50]

During the fighting, Magistrate Li arrived with a dozen guards brandishing weapons and blaring trumpets. He too began complaining to Wu about the "pitiful misunderstanding." P'eng took the opportunity to clarify this misunderstanding, and Li was forced to admit to the presence of bandits only in the militia, his original report having stated that "there are bandits in the militia and in the Peasant Association."

Battle raged until sunset, when there was a lull. Many troops had been wounded. The commander's report to his superior stated: "In my opinion, the incident should not be interpreted as a militia-peasant feud; it was a planned disturbance in the rear of the Army, carried out by militiamen and bandits." The peasants had been made the scapegoats of counterrevolutionary moves against the KMT, with the connivance of the authorities and senior Army personnel: that was how P'eng saw it. Even after all this, Wu was making attempts to help the militia, advising "If you confine your attacks to the peasants, it will not be so serious and both sides could get away with being punished only for troublemaking," but noting that attacks on the Army served merely to strengthen the peasants' case. When the Commission arrived in P'ingshan following its occupation by the troops, Commander Lei took the chair at a meeting attended also by militia leaders. It was the majority view that the militia should be treated as a counterrevolutionary group and dealt with accordingly, the first requirement being that they lay down their arms—a view soon proved correct by news that the Hsiangshan Association's office had been destroyed by militia and bandits.[51]

After some haggling, Wu turned up on September 5 at T'ienho market, where the Commission and troops had quartered for the night. The militia were ready to hand in 60 percent of their weapons, fifty guns out of ninety, the only problem being their collection, since the men had dispersed. P'eng replied that there would be no problem if the militia authorities did their job properly, but Lei and KMT representative Wang favored harsher terms. Wu, after more evasiveness, promised to arrange for forty guns to be handed in that evening, and another fifty by the following noon. He invited P'eng P'ai to return to P'ingshan with him, but P'eng preferred to go with the KMT man and Wei Yao-li, the militia instructor, to inspect militia looting in Yüant'ien. Along the road he tried to convince Wei of the rightness of the revolutionary cause and of fighting "in the interest of the majority." P'eng argued that "even if our inclination is to speak in terms of natural justice and conscience rather than revolution, the conclusion is the same." Wei admitted that his sympathies were with the militia, but he had come to realize that "the peasants are in fact loyal to the government, whereas the militia evidently were not." He told P'eng that Wu had come to Huahsien deliberately to protect the militia and how he had advised them at P'ingshan the night before. Not only that, Wei said, but Wu had earlier managed to have quashed a KMT CEC decision to dissolve the Huahsien Militia.[52]

The looting in Yüant'ien shocked and exhausted P'eng. He returned to

T'ienho, leaving Wei to proceed to P'ingshan with his bodyguard. When Wei reached the militia lines at Loch'ang, he was surrounded and ordered to surrender his weapons. He and his bodyguard complied. While he was explaining himself, a militiaman shot him point-blank in the stomach. He managed to run back toward the Army sentry post, but before he could reach it was again shot, this time in the leg, and fell to the ground groaning for help. "Wu is to blame if he dies," P'eng heard the townspeople say.

Wei was brought back, but seemed to be at death's door. Taking P'eng P'ai's hand, he asked him to write down his last will and testament. Wei stated that he had dedicated himself to honest public service and he thanked Mr. Wu for all his help and patronage. Wei had no children but requested assistance for his relatives. There were some words for P'eng, too: "Mr. P'eng, I have long had great respect for your devotion to the common good. . . . Your efforts have borne valuable fruit for society, and I ask you to continue your endeavors all the more. . . ."[53]

In the meantime, Wu found it impossible to come to any conclusion with the militia in P'ingshan. Fearing the worst, he decided to return to the county capital with his aide, while Kuan (of the militia executive) made his way to T'ienho. Kuan was also shot at by militia. He shouted that he had been in Mr. Wu's party, at which the reply was: "In that case, shoot him!" The villains were clearly bandits; they robbed him and ordered him to face south for execution. Suddenly he remembered the militia leader Chiang Hsia-yen, produced the latter's card, and explained the purpose of his being there. They let him go. He arrived at T'ienho in a state of shock, but grateful for the impulse that led him to take a visiting-card when at P'ingshan. The report that Commander Lei sent to Canton stated: "The head of the Hua-hsien militia is Ch'en's lackey and is gathering forces in P'ingshan, where 1,000 militiamen and bandits are assembling to engage my company." He reported that they had already attacked the Canton-Hankow railway to disrupt the rear of the Northern Expedition. As for Wu, he "was protecting the militia and had become a tool of the counterrevolution." A letter on Wei's condition from P'eng P'ai made Wu understand that the Army would move in force against P'ingshan. He then took a blank sheet of paper bearing the seal and signature of the commander-in-chief and forged an order for Lei to remain in T'ienho pending further instructions. Despite the blatant forgery, Commander Lei did as ordered, much to the resentment of the troops, whose furious comments at the continuing assaults on the peasants went into P'eng's notebook.[54]

The next day Lei convened a meeting of peasants, workers, merchants, and troops. He blamed local bullies and bad gentry for the situation, accusing them of using the militia and bandits to oppress the peasants. He scotched the countercharge that there were bandits in the Peasant Army. He accused the militia under Chiang Hsia-yen of serving Ch'en's political ends.

Meanwhile, alarmed by the commander's report, the Army had dispatched more troops and two envoys, one of them a divisional officer. On September 10, P'eng P'ai went to see them at their headquarters. Together they scrutinized the ultimatum conditions laid down by the chief of the General Staff, Li Chi-shen, P'eng suggesting that three more be added. A local man was charged with obtaining a reply to the ultimatum by the next day. Commander Lei sent another letter to his superior summarizing the views he had expressed at the general meeting and accusing Wu of being a crony of Chiang and of shielding his old pupils in the militia. "In our revolutionary organization, there must be no place for such persons. How dare we call ourselves a Revolutionary Army when we see bandits and do not fight them, and when we cannot stamp out counterrevolutionaries? What confidence can the public place in our army or governmental Party if we are unable to apply revolutionary techniques to solve this problem?" P'eng P'ai must have been delighted, although the situation gave no cause for joy: when he went to T'ienho market, Lei presented him with reports of further attacks and bloodshed.[55]

Local mediation having failed, there was a meeting in P'ingshan on September 12 of all the parties, chaired by the divisional officer. He began by accusing the militia of defiance of the Army and the government, and of the murder of Wei, a special envoy in uniform and acting on instructions. "The militia is notified that the government does not fear it. Can the militia presume to compare itself with the forces of Liu and Yang or Wu P'ei-fu? The government crushed all these, and it will be an easy task for it to squash a small force like the militia." Magistrate Li felt compelled also to reproach them for their evil conduct in the midst of the Northern Expedition emergency. He volunteered that the Peasant Association was ready to make peace and urged the militia to accept the surrender terms.

These were by no means lenient: ¥5,000 to Wei's family and a large sum to endow a memorial school in his name, compensation for each house burned down, and an injunction to hand over all bandit leaders and murderers, with a scale of fines for noncompliance. But P'eng deemed the terms inadequate. The families of all the dead must be compensated, as should the

merchants who had been looted, and the P'ingshan militia must be disbanded. This was passed "unanimously." Teng Liang-shan added that all weapons, not merely the 60 percent in the terms, should be handed in, and that the militia should provide relief to the starving refugees their acts had created.[56]

Eventually the militia accepted terms and signed, but the official document only recorded the conditions stipulated by the Army envoys; nothing from the peasant side was acceptable, said the militia. Only after more hard bargaining was a codicil added that provided for the merchants and families and for observance of the terms to be monitored. The Huahsien Association also got the militia's agreement to restrain its further activities, and a list of the ten worst troublemakers (Chiang Hsia-yen among them) was accepted.[57]

The troops then returned to their Canton barracks, where, as after Kwangning, they were welcomed in splendid fashion by the peasant department and the Association in gratitude for their performance "as true soldiers of the revolution." On September 14 five thousand people attended a celebration meeting at KMT headquarters.[58]

Following their liberation, the peasants of Hai-Lu-feng had great hopes of betterment, and though these were dimmed by the events of 1926, revolutionary ideals were not extinguished. The Haifeng Association had almost 200,000 members, a third of the total provincewide membership, and Lufeng had some 65,000.[59] The Haifeng and Lufeng Associations were, technically speaking, separate, but since their organizations and programs were run more or less by the same people, the counties could be seen as one entity. Indeed, since P'eng P'ai worked through the local area office and was spreading the Association throughout the Ch'ao-Mei region, there was also a great deal of common ground between Hai-Lu-feng and elsewhere. The office had been given the task of developing the Association in East China (which included Fukien and Kiangsi) in preparation for the Northern Expedition, so that Hai-Lu-feng influence would spread even further afield. Whereas in other East River counties counterrevolutionaries remained active, in Hai-Lu-feng the powerful Peasant Association managed to keep them in check. The place remained a haven for those unwelcome elsewhere: when Lo Ch'i-yüan was dismissed from the peasant department after Chiang Kai-shek's March coup, it was to Haifeng and his old friend P'eng P'ai that he went.[60]

Mao Tse-tung described the Hai-Lu-feng area in idyllic terms: "The

county magistrate dares not do harm, tax-collectors dare not seek more than their quota, there are no bandits anywhere in the county, and the practice of local bullies and evil gentry treating the people as 'fish and meat' has almost disappeared."[61] The general rent reduction of 25 percent was an accepted reality. No wonder then that peasants flocked to the Association, especially when rent reduction applied to members only. So confident were the members that a 40-percent reduction was soon sought and obtained, and when the 1926 harvest proved poor they went for 60 percent or more.[62] As for political control, the county magistrate had to bow to Association policy, and even the Kwangtung CCP could report that in Hai-Lu-feng "it is the norm for peasants to interfere in the administration, even more so than elsewhere."[63] They would bypass the authorities and deal directly through their Association. There is a story of an old woman in Ch'ents'un village asking the magistrate to investigate the killing of her only son. The magistrate was not disposed to open an inquiry, so the grieving mother stood at the yamen holding a white flag inscribed "I invite Comrade P'eng P'ai to right a wrong!"—P'eng being regarded as unofficial magistrate.[64]

New magistrates soon had to bend before the wind, and when P'eng Han-yüan was appointed to Haifeng and Liu Ch'in-hsi to Lufeng, Association control was not only total but institutionalized too. The Association made sure that all district officials were "progressive." P'eng Han-yüan, in keeping with Haifeng custom, gave posts to his relatives. A cousin became head of the people's department, another was appointed county treasurer. Trials and executions of landlords were common, an eyewitness states, and it was no good protesting to Canton because when the provincial authorities requested reports these all passed through the magistrate's offices of both counties and were tampered with. Magistrate P'eng had old residences of great families in the county city pulled down to make way for Chung-shan Street, a modern road. He paid no heed to the storm of protest the move aroused, terming it a "revolutionary measure" fully backed by his brother. P'eng Tse carried out a similar scheme in Swabue city, whose Council he headed.[65] Mission property did not escape either. Residencies and chapels were commandeered, and church schools were closed. In early 1926, Father Bianchi was advising Bishop Valtorta to seek legal redress over expropriated property and to appeal to Canton (a usually effective measure) for fair treatment; but the bishop was not optimistic, believing that the Chinese authorities wished to "tire out" the priests and force them to leave, as the Protestants had already done.[66]

Behind Association policy was the local CCP. Its two leaders had been

sent by the CCP Kwangtung Committee: Chang Shan-ming, a former political instructor at Whampoa, was secretary, and Kan Shih-chieh was propagandist. Both had trained in Germany and Russia, and one of their first tasks was to expand the local training school for cadres. They were assisted by Lin Wei-nung, P'eng Yüan-yüeh, and Wu Chih-chi, who were directed to strengthen the CYC. Their brief was to carry out the decision of the CCP Enlarged Plenum of October 1925 to make the CCP the party of the masses, and in this they had considerable success.[67] In late 1925, the local Party had 25 members; in 1926, 700; and by March 1927, 4,000—an incredible leap. Of the 850 villages in Haifeng, some 340 had a CCP branch; cells were to be found in every hamlet.[68] "Even boys of thirteen or fourteen were active in Party work."[69] In the villages, the CCP "had great power and the peasants all wished to enroll. They knew that the CCP was behind the Peasant Association, or thought that the Peasant Association was in fact the CCP."

The Party was not always in control, however. Peasants "did not invariably act on CCP branch orders, nor was all work related to Party structure and policy. Everyone saw only Peasant Association interest or personal interest; the utility of the Party structure went by the board," said an official account. Although this account went on to say that this was "an error quickly corrected," there is no evidence that the peasants shed their independence; rather, the reverse seems to be true.[70] Though by 1927 the Haifeng CCP had nearly half of the total membership in Kwangtung, the rapid expansion had made it impossible for Party leaders to cope.[71]

The KMT was there, too, having been established since March 1925, expanded by P'eng Yüan-chang and Lü Shun-chieh, and staffed by labor union leaders and special envoys of the CCP. Its members were peasants, workers, teachers, and small merchants, the popular masses of the United Front.[72] Many peasants would not join the KMT, however, seeing in it a Party "of those wearing felt hats and leather shoes."[73] Covert CCP propaganda had turned the poorer peasants away from the KMT, whose peasant members were generally better off. The fact that the KMT claimed the Peasant Association as its own was also resented, for, as has been stated, peasants knew that such was not actually the case. In the end, there was in Haifeng a complete rupture between the Association and the KMT, a break that the Communist peasant leaders envisaged happening throughout the province. When we add the fact that a number of other organizations were launched in 1925, the presence of the Association, the KMT, and the CCP meant that a large part of the population had become politicized, which "gave Hai-Lu-

feng a new look and won for it the sobriquet 'Little Moscow.' "[74] Labor unions were reorganized and thousands joined: shop assistants, transport workers, metalworkers, salt-panners, boat crews, and fishermen. Ch'en Shun-i and Lin Tao-wen were in charge of this area. The small merchants, once organized, came to see the benefit for themselves. Like the peasants, they too were freed from random levies and taxes, and because the peasants could now spend more, the merchants were doing better business.[75]

Lin T'ieh-shih headed the Education Bureau in Haifeng, Li Kuo-chen that in Lufeng. Both were former students in Japan. Haifeng had some five hundred schools by this time. The Student Union headquarters were in the house of the Huang family in the old district, the family having fled to Hong Kong. The Union secretary was Lan Chiu-chia, who in 1926 was its representative at the Congress in Canton. Unfortunately, Magistrate P'eng's roadworks had led to half of Lan's house being knocked down, and the poor fellow was so chagrined that he lost his head. Returning from the congress, he took all the Union's registers into the courtyard and burned them. "I foresee the death of all of you," he proclaimed.[76]

The children were not forgotten. They had their own Brigade along "Young Pioneer" lines and an Association, with a range of activities for after-school hours. Some children took things very seriously and reported their mothers as antirevolutionary if they were old-fashioned.[77] "Haifeng organized children before any other county did," and a contemporary asserts that all these organizations were entirely original and not Russian imports.[78] The highly popular Worker and Peasant Recreation Club exerted considerable influence on youth in general, not least ideologically. The club premises were in Kaot'ien in a three-storied villa that had belonged to Ch'en K'ai-t'ing.[79] Women flocked to join their Association, which in the villages meant a separate section of the Peasant Association itself. At its inaugural meeting, P'eng P'ai had given an address on the need for the women of Haifeng to be emancipated.[80] A rightist observer noted that Communists were introducing women into all the professions and giving them responsibility in political and social activities. One certain benefit was that "some, imbued with the new spirit of freedom, left the 'dirty' peasants for more money and enjoyment because of the easy divorce." This observer states that many of the deserted husbands hated the Communists on this account, and that even among the cadres, "the freedom enjoyed by the women and their playing around provided cause for dissension and conflicts."[81] We have already

noted how the Women's Liberation Association was nicknamed "Bureau of Divorce and Remarriage" by its detractors, who claimed that it had made "a big mess" in the villages.[82] This Association did much work protecting the rights of women, and some of the leaders, such as Ch'en Hsin, Chiang Hang, and Ho Lien-fang, spread the movement into Lufeng. They went about in round bamboo hats, red scarves, and rubber shoes, with bird-guns strapped to their shoulders, doing propaganda and organizing work.[83]

A kind of cultural revolution developed, with as much as possible of the old being thrown off. "The Internationale" and Youth Corps songs were heard frequently, but the most popular were the vernacular ballads of P'eng P'ai and Li Kuo-chen. The old diehard gentry and landlords dared not say a word. Gambling and opium disappeared.[84] In what a leftist source called "the best of years," Hai-Lu-feng seemed a place of tranquillity and progress; although there was a long way to go, people were elated at the freedom they had gained after their five-year struggle.[85] Previously, few teachers had wanted to work in Hai-Lu-feng, so remote and backward a place, but now its fame was attracting leading educationalists from Canton and Shanghai. From Shanghai came two well-known writers, Chao Ching-shen and Li Chin-ming, who initiated the trend of leftist writers to flock to "liberated areas."[86] Groups of students from far and near came to see the model county. From Canton and Swatow, peasants, journalists, and students arrived on fact-finding tours. At the end of August, members of the PMTI sixth class visited Haifeng. All this resulted in the county being known throughout the province and the rest of China as a signpost pointing the way toward the real revolution.[87]

The main obstacle to expansion of the peasant movement in East China lay in the Ch'en remnants, allied with the great Lufeng lineages who paid no heed to Association rules on rent reduction and tenancy. The government was asked to intervene and allow local Associations to increase their military power, but the reply had been that "freedom of action" should be delayed until the whole of China was liberated. The Association was urged to intensify surveillance of the counterrevolutionary forces.[88]

The only "freedom of action" lay in the direction of "reformism," which meant improving military preparedness, laying the groundwork for revolt, and actively training the peasants. The land question was left on one side; but the peasant movement had its own momentum and something had to be done. So peasant cooperatives were set up, new land was opened, affor-

estation was undertaken, irrigation was improved, and public roads were built. A people's bank was planned. As to the forces of counterrevolution, their opportunities were soon at hand. The Sun Yat-sen Society began to pose a threat to Peasant Association control. P'eng Han-yüan had to resign the post of magistrate, being replaced by a KMT appointee.[89] An eyewitness commented that even this man "was merely a puppet of the mass organizations, in all his dealings having to refer to the Peasant Association."[90] Magistrate Liu of Lufeng was also replaced, but by a CCP sympathizer. In Swabue, P'eng Tse had to hand over the leadership of the Council. With the Northern Expedition under way, the situation in the East River became more critical and government control tighter.[91]

In August, the East River saw the establishment of the *Chih-kung-tang* (Justice and Equality Party), a cover for Ch'en supporters. Local bandits were being used to extort money; they had already collected ¥14,000 to buy arms, forced peasants to quit the Association, and destroyed its offices. Many similar cases were recorded, P'eng P'ai having to deal with the one arising in Huahsien. Ch'en and his forces were making a final effort to recover what they had lost and to help Wu P'ei-fu, the northern warlord.[92] The new party was an offshoot of its Chinese counterpart in America, which was a Triad cover. In Hong Kong, the new version had as its chairman and vice-chairman Yang Ta-po and Chung Hsiu-nan. The executive committee was also padded with Ch'en's cronies from Haifeng. By August, membership stood at 100,000, and there were branches on the mainland. At a special meeting of Ch'en's most trusted lieutenants, the pledge was made to wage war against the KMT and the Peasant Association.[93]

In Haifeng, such reactionary elements could not act openly. Local gentry were instead encouraged to infiltrate the Association and there cause trouble by spreading rumors of government plans to dissolve it. Peasants were also warned that it would be unwise to be too enthusiastic, for "when old Ch'en returns, he will cut off your heads." These subversive elements also exploited clan and family sentiments to deter peasants from joining, and even scared them off by much talk of law.[94]

The political department of the KMT was concerned about the Red counties in the east, and Li Chi-shen sent his men to Hai-Lu-feng to try to restore the balance, so that the local CCP now had two rivals—local counterrevolutionaries and KMT authorities—to contend with. CCP policy, however, was to pursue a common front with the KMT while infiltrating the Party from below; the problem of collaboration on the one hand and

confrontation on the other, which was to rend the lines of the United Front, thus already loomed large in Hai-Lu-feng.[95]

Lufeng, where the Association's membership was decreasing, fell a victim to severe clan warfare. In Hot'ien district, the P'eng clan, who were the backbone of the Peasant Association and the Peasant Army, and who were kin to P'eng P'ai, had roundly defeated the Chuang and the Lo during 1925. In the summer of 1926, the two fallen clans were back on their feet and all through the autumn harried the Association and the Peasant Army, eventually seeking to take the county seat. The P'eng villages withstood the assaults until the Haifeng Peasant Army under Wu Chen-min and the Lufeng Army under P'eng Chung could arrive. The enemy scattered. This was not the end of the matter, however.[96] In December, bandit units were again active in Hsiangshan. The local CCP leaders decided to let the peasants secretly kill the key counterrevolutionaries, while handing over to the government the lesser ones. The gentry and landlords raised a hue and cry. In Huiyang, the magistrate made an alliance with the militia and Ts'ai T'eng-hui's bandits, and attacked the local Peasant Army in December. The army "was destroyed," with 40 dead.[97] The high ideals of the socialist revolution were thus lost sight of. The Peasant Association, so painstakingly built up into a modern organization, risked being ruined by its entanglement in lineage interest and clan revenge, matters altogether divorced from the national interest. The spiral of skirmishes was to develop into a whirlwind of violence in which both parties to the combat would be destroyed. Before long, what had happened in Lufeng would happen also in Haifeng and in the counties nearby.[98]

By October 1926, the armies of the Expedition had taken the northern center of Wuhan. P'eng, however, was much exercised with securing the "revolutionary base" in Kwangtung and his articles reveal that he was trying to set out the necessary lines for the inevitable confrontation with the KMT.[99] He is reported as having received a secret account from the Provincial Association naming KMT rightists who were supporting counterrevolutionaries. The enlisted soldiers were apparently loyal to the KMT, so any endeavor involving the masses would mean relying on the Peasant Army and the workers' pickets. All his maneuvers centered around this idea; he no longer held out any hope for a change of heart in the KMT, which he saw as having already betrayed the revolution. The CCP Kwangtung Committee shared his view, but not the Central Committee.[100]

In late 1926 and early 1927, P'eng turned to building up Swatow as a

strong base for the revolution that he and his collaborators believed was not far away. Besides his commitment to the Peasant Association, he was on the CCP Swatow Committee and undertook activities aimed at consolidating and expanding the armed preparation of the Peasant Army and workers' pickets.[101] A *North China Herald* reporter sent in an article on the celebration there of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution headlined "Communist Elements in KMT Stepping Up Presence in Swatow." He commented on the growing power of the Peasant Union, which "goes along in many places merrily, taking things in its hands."[102] One example of this power came the following month, when P'eng arranged a worker-peasant demonstration in Chiehyang to secure the release of Yang Shih-hun, a CCP labor leader arrested there.[103] But with many of the KMT left leaders heading for Hunan, local government soon fell more and more under the influence of General Li Chi-shen, commander of military forces in Kwangtung. In December came new laws curtailing the freedom of labor unions, which were now required to have government permission to organize and were not allowed any weapons. At the peasants' and workers' department, Ch'en Kung-po was replaced by a moderate.[104]

In his capacity as head of the Ch'ao-Mei-Hai-Lu-feng area office, P'eng organized a meeting of local Association representatives from February 23 to 26, 1927. This was a critical congress for the region's Peasant Association, which reportedly numbered 1,400,000 members in 271,000 households—an estimate to be taken with a pinch of salt. A Children's Brigade Congress was held simultaneously. But despite the sixteen resolutions and impressive "Letter-Declaration," it proved to be largely window dressing for purposes of political show: not long afterward, local membership was said to be "weak."[105]

In Hai-Lu-feng, the Peasant Army stepped up its attacks on counterrevolutionaries, especially in Lufeng, and General Li ordered the commander of the Huichou garrison, Hu Ch'ien, to curb both the Association and the Peasant Army. Li may have been disturbed by the general lawlessness, large parts of Huiyang being controlled by robbers. In February, these had swooped down from the mountains and had attacked T'anshui in hundreds. The garrison had fled, the town was in the hands of these robbers, and tolls were now being exacted from people using the main road. Some of the soldiers captured were shot. Local leaders requested Hu Ch'ien to take action against the bandits and to punish the "Red Army" (that is, the Peasant Army), with whom the bandits were now generally lumped together. In the

event, no troops were dispatched, but the counterrevolutionaries obtained a respite.[106]

In a speech in Nanch'ang on February 21, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek made it clear that he intended "to suppress the Communist movement because it had gone too far."[107] The anti-Communists in Canton saw this as an opportunity to put pressure, albeit cautiously, on the Reds. By March the peasant movement found itself under heavy attack. The Provincial CCP knew that Chiang was about to purge the KMT of members who were also Communists, a process already started in Kiangsi. Wu Chen-min was sent to Canton to discuss defense measures.[108] At the same time, the CCP "East River special committee" (the "East Special" for short) was formed to direct Party and military affairs there, for the region had become the most important revolutionary area in Kwangtung.[109]

By the end of March, P'eng P'ai had already arrived in Wuhan and his activities there were reported in the local press.[110] Some sources state that he departed just when the party purge was beginning and that he went with Ch'en Yen-nien, Su Chao-cheng, and other leaders from Canton to Wuhan for the Fifth CCP Congress, which opened in Hankow on April 27. In April, too, P'eng was reported to be in Tientsin, in charge of the Hupeh workers' and peasants' department. From there he instructed P'eng Han-yüan, then in Wuhan, to return immediately to Haifeng to organize the revolt.[111] It is also likely that P'eng P'ai reached the north by sea via Hong Kong sometime in late March for a meeting of Provincial Peasant Association representatives that established the temporary executive committee of the All-China Peasant Association.[112]

The party purge began on April 12, 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek struck at the Communists in Shanghai; this was followed on the 15th by General Li's surprise attack on the Canton comrades. On the 17th, the new government in Kwangtung elected Chan Szu-chu and others to constitute a committee for the revision of the Peasant Association.* The committee's brief included the expulsion of all Association CCP members and fellow travelers and the amalgamation of the Peasant Self-Defense Corps with the People's Protection Corps, under government control. The committee was to vet all Peasant Association publications; from May 15 *The Plowshare* came out as a KMT-oriented magazine.[113]

*The Kwangtung Peasant Association held its Second Enlarged Meeting in Canton (March 10–17, 1927). P'eng P'ai was present, and on the agenda was the arming of the peasants for struggle. May 1st was the date fixed for the Peasant Association's Third Congress. (Yü Yen-kuang 1958:44; *HP* [May 16, 1927].)

The expected rebellion on the part of the Peasant Association in reaction to the oppression never materialized, although an observer states that, spurred on by the CCP, the entire Kwangtung Association in March and April gave its support to the Wuhan Government against Chiang Kai-shek. The Peasant Army was actually preparing a parade for April 16 to protest the Nanking attack and stood ready to march to government headquarters in Canton, but then Li Chi-shen made his move and clashes broke out between the Peasant Army and troops of the Fifth Army. At the same time, General Li Fu-lin was using his own soldiers to disband some of the Associations. As a Communist-led organization, the Peasant Association disappeared almost overnight.[114]

# 7

# Southern Radicalism, 1925-1926

The Fourth CCP Congress (January 1925) recognized the role peasants could play in the national-democratic revolution and called for the establishment of Peasant Associations, but only in the name of the KMT, lest the delicate balance in the United Front be upset. "It is inappropriate, recklessly to allow the Peasant Associations to decide to launch rent-reduction campaigns"—a remark aimed at the Kwangtung comrades.[1] However, the Congress did begin to see the CCP as a mass party and approved more lenient admission policies, including those governing peasant membership.[2]

The Kwangtung CCP, convinced of the priority of worker leadership, also had to be won over to taking the peasants into greater account. But with the KMT taking up the peasant cause in earnest, the local CCP could hardly remain indifferent. Even so, in 1925 at least, peasant membership in the CCP did not increase remarkably, and peasants were envisaged not as having a common bond with workers in the party, only as pursuing a common course under CCP control.[3] The Comintern that April indicated a policy that "made it inadvisable for Communists to form peasant political parties; instead, peasants should be organized under broad Unions, to fall under Communist influence via Party cells."[4]

After the revolutionary potential of the peasant masses had become clear as a result of the first Eastern Expedition and the May Thirtieth Movement, however, the Kwangtung CCP Secretariat began considering expansion through the peasantry. Hitherto the Party had been content to leave the Peasant Associations to KMT sponsorship, but the Secretariat now called attention to a resolution of June 30 stating that "previously all our comrades

have used the name of the KMT in the peasant movement, a circumstance that has prevented peasants from distinguishing between our Party and the KMT." There should now be propaganda "about the differences between the KMT and the CCP, so that peasants can see which party is wholeheartedly for their liberation as a class."[5]

The KMT did not escape dissension on the peasant issue within its own ranks. Gratified by their newly acquired political importance, many peasants joined it. Events in Kwangtung had shown how much the KMT stood to gain from enlisting peasant support, but the right was not convinced.[6] The KMT was proud to call itself the "Peasant Party," and Hu Han-min was elated when he became a member of the presidium of the Krestintern in Moscow and represented the Chinese peasants there. The KMT enjoyed Stalin's support.[7] But already in 1924 there was a clash between old and new, seen in the fact that "some KMT officials are oppressing Associations set up by other KMT members." So great did the friction become that early in 1925 the Revolutionary Government had to issue a statement informing the culprits that "any officials who do not obey our Party's program and who fail to protect peasant interests will be dismissed forthwith."[8]

The attitude to the peasant question came to determine the line between right and left in the KMT, Borodin defining the left as "those in favor of solving the land problem."[9] At the Second KMT Congress in January 1926 it was affirmed that the national revolution had become a peasants' revolution because of the numbers of peasants involved, and that "our Party will everywhere and always regard the peasant movement as its base and all political and economic policies will accordingly stem from it."[10] The Congress was dominated by the KMT left, and its peasant program had much in common with that proposed by the Kwangtung CCP peasant committee. Ch'en Kung-po and Wang Ching-wei were vocal on the peasants' behalf, Wang proposing that considerable funds be allotted for the expansion of peasant-movement work. Mao Tse-tung was nominated to be in charge of activities in Hunan.[11]

The CCP Central Committee bowed to the pressure from Canton when, on October 10, 1925, it issued the first major Communist statement on the Chinese peasant movement—a "Letter-Declaration to the Peasantry"[12] setting out minimum demands for the peasants and asserting that the CCP was the party of the workers and peasants and that the KMT right was a false friend. Important directives simplified the formalities for enrolling peasants into Party cells, a move designed to make the CCP a mass party. (Iron-

ically, the Kwangtung comrades were criticized for falling short on this score, despite the fact that they had been the most active.) Another directive stated that all peasant-movement undertakings were to be done in the name of the whole Party and not on an individual basis. Work in the villages should start forthwith and the CCP foundation among the peasantry should be built up.[13]

Thus for the first time the CCP proclaimed its intention to become a mass party that would also embrace peasants. The hope was that the right and left flanks of the KMT could be driven even further apart.[14] In December the Central Committee issued a second statement on the peasant movement, this time centered largely on strategy. The CCP maintained that the workers were still the backbone of the revolution but that the peasants were their main allies: village activity should be stepped up. Rural teachers in particular should be encouraged to enroll, for they would "easily accept our policies" and could represent the CCP in the movement to help with peasant enlistment. A lingering distrust of the peasants on the part of the Central Committee is visible here.[15]

That P'eng and his associates were largely responsible for pushing the entire CCP toward a more definite peasant policy in 1925 cannot be denied; had they not done so, the course of events might have been vastly different, for as Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai admitted, the development of the peasant movement from 1925 to 1927 "was contrary to Party ideas."[16] In the eyes of a rightist, the Kwangtung activists were "the extremists of the South, supported by the omnipotent Borodin."[17]

The Comintern policy of collaboration with the KMT was pursued, with ever more constraints on rank-and-file CCP members, until it became evident that the development of the mass movement in the countryside was being choked by the KMT right. When Chiang Kai-shek struck in March 1926, the façade collapsed and the Kwangtung CCP proposed arming the peasants for a countercoup. It demanded an independent Communist offensive against Chiang, the aim being to eliminate the KMT right and radicalize the whole party.[18] Ch'en Tu-hsiu, with no alternative but to support Chiang in public, nevertheless privately recommended CCP withdrawal from the KMT. He sounded out Voitinsky on the prospect of obtaining rifles for the Kwangtung peasants, but in vain, Comintern instructions being to continue with the United Front in view of the planned Northern Expedition.[19] Borodin also was approached by Chang Kuo-t'ao with the same re-

quest, but with no better results. In Borodin's view, the CCP had "to play the role of coolie in the Chinese revolution."[20]

The KMT left was evidently interested in the peasants only because of the success of the East River military campaign.[21] When Chiang's coup "put the peasant revolt beyond the pale of KMT legality,"[22] the Kwangtung CCP peasant committee began to lose faith in the sincerity of the KMT left. In May, Li Tsung-jen advocated to the CEC the policy of "limiting" the peasant movement, which enemies of the Peasant Association took as a green light for intensifying their attacks. The Association entered its most difficult time. Communists were no longer permitted to head any KMT department and Lin Tsu-han was replaced at the peasant department. Before he left, Lin set up a new peasant-movement committee which, surprisingly, did not include P'eng P'ai, though he remained head of the KMT provincial peasant office.[23]

To the Russian observers, the turnabout was attributable to the Communists' error in monopolizing the labor and peasant movements, thereby provoking the KMT right wing. As already noted, the KMT was also to blame for the Communist monopoly: recommendations at the Second KMT Congress about making the peasant movement a unified branch of its organization had not been implemented.[24]

After Chiang's March 20 episode, the peasant committee of the Kwangtung CCP prepared a "Draft Resolution" on the peasant movement. P'eng was involved in compiling it, and the document is an attempt to force the Party (that is, the Central Committee) on the eve of the Northern Expedition to take a clear and firm stand on peasant policy.[25] The Draft's "minimum requests" on such matters as rent and taxes read very reasonably; more inflammatory, though, were the series of self-criticisms introduced as a device for showing what the Kwangtung Party saw as the true road to national revolution. The success of the province's Peasant Association (800,000 members in 60 counties) had left the local Party (with barely 600 members in 20 counties) unable to cope. The peasants would be deaf to the call to political revolt. It was necessary to work more at the village level, taking the Association as the basic unit. Class struggle, in a broader context than revenge, must be taught by people who were the product of a greatly enlarged cadre-training program. Use of two categories of membership would protect the Association against gentry infiltration. The Association itself was in poor shape: too large, dispersed, badly led, and bedeviled by localism,

clanism, individualism, and superstition. Revolution by peaceful means within the KMT, for so long seen as deliberate policy, was merely a counsel of despair: in other words, said Kwangtung, the Communist Party would be unable to mount a revolution in 1927.[26]

In response, the CCP Plenum of July 1926 issued its "Resolution on the Peasant Movement." After a survey of peasant uprisings in China, the document affirms that "the peasants have become aware of their own sufferings and have, on their own initiative, risen in revolt." It reasserts their importance in the Chinese national liberation movement and the Party's intention to harness peasant power. Nonetheless, the Central Committee held that the Kwangtung CCP's proposed platform was "still premature" and required further deliberation at the Fifth Party Congress. The economic demands were approved. The Plenum rejected the move to make the Peasant Association exclusive to one class: "virtuous gentry" should be included. The Peasant Corps, it was recommended, should be encouraged but should not have a permanent organization in the style of the "Peasant Army." A simple structure like that of the Peasant Self-Defense Corps would suffice. The Resolution gave priority to political rather than to military training, "since, once armed, the altogether disorganized and ill-prepared peasants could easily exceed the objective limits of action." The Association must become independent, "not an appendage of the KMT," and to this end the CCP "must spare no effort to secure leadership in all peasant movements," through Party cells at the lowest levels.[27]

This Resolution showed a far different attitude on the part of the CCP CC, who formerly "never took the peasant movement seriously." But in the eyes of the Kwangtung Committee it still fell short of the need for the Party to lead the agrarian revolution and abandon the Comintern's bourgeois-democratic revolution of the United Front.[28] In a letter dated August 17, 1926, to the "tempest, wind, and rain" meeting of the Peasant Association, the Kwangtung Committee reiterated its belief that "the only way out for peasants is revolution." The national revolution had to eliminate the enemies of the people, including landlords in KMT-controlled areas who were still exploiting peasants. What little freedom these peasants had secured came only through their own fighting. The Kwangtung Party was pursuing its own course regardless of central directives and had clearly thrown in its lot with the peasants.[29]

The CCP Plenum was not unsympathetic to this viewpoint, but doubted that a lone stand by the CCP, divorced from the KMT, would meet with

much success. It was not only the peasant camp that revealed shortcomings: the Central Committee was at pains to pinpoint serious weaknesses within the Party itself. The quality of members had deteriorated, theoretical and practical experience was deficient, members lacked "a definite revolutionary philosophy of life," cadres sometimes displayed a bureaucratic spirit and even venality, and the potential quality and the training of leaders fell short. There was too little theoretical propaganda, and agitation work had failed to penetrate the masses. Whereas the labor movement had become riddled with bureaucracy, the peasant movement "had developed the disease of leftist-deviation everywhere, with slogans too extreme here, or action excessively left-inclined there." As a result, great damage was being done to the peasants.[30] The whole of the July 1926 Plenum left the impression of an impasse for the CCP in regard to the peasant problem. Its Resolution is conservative and cautious, despite the evidence that peasant power was there for the taking. Agrarian revolution was a prime CCP goal, but the time was not seen to be ripe; Communist ideals and planning clashed with reality, and the optimism of the Kwangtung comrades appeared farfetched. Even in July 1926, "the CCP sensed the uneasiness of riding two horses" where the peasants and the United Front were concerned.[31]

Chang Kuo-t'ao states that as a result of Central's clinging to United Front policy and Kwangtung's view of this as "obstructing the peasants' struggle," the gap between the two committees widened. The Kwangtung comrades believed that the problem of the KMT left—if such in any case existed—could be obviated if the land problem were solved, for "the focus of the revolution has shifted from the issue of national revolution to one of land revolution." The Kwangtung Committee was out on a limb, however, and even Borodin (who after all had to implement Comintern policy) did not always share its views. Its members would not bow to the general line, convinced that they were in the right and determined that the whole Party should admit as much.[32]

In November came a change. Ch'en Tu-hsiu seemed more inclined to view the Kwangtung line favorably, and with encouragement from certain Comintern members visiting Shanghai, he drew up a radical land program for the peasant movement that even covered insurrection. But this draft was killed by Stalin's insistence on unity with Chiang and the KMT as a prerequisite for the success of the revolution. The arguments of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and others were to no avail. T'an P'ing-shan, the Chinese delegate to the Comintern executive's 7th Plenum in Moscow that November, did not even

present Ch'en's draft. At this gathering, the Four Theses on China policy were formulated. These advocated the confiscation of land—a proposal warmly approved by T'an, but meant by Stalin to apply only to land belonging to reactionary militarists operating against the KMT. Stalin also rejected the idea of peasant soviets at this time. Thus Comintern directives did not change, although the CCP was still expected to secure full control over the peasants and influence KMT policy.[33]

On November 23 the Kwangtung Committee again declared that confrontation between the masses and the national government was imminent and that Communists should make preparations accordingly. But at the CCP Plenum in Hankow (December 1926), which took its antiradical directives from the Comintern Plenum just concluded, the Kwangtung position was attacked as inviting a struggle "between the CCP and the entire KMT." We may take it, therefore, that any further concern of the CCP for peasant affairs was to lie mainly at the door of the Kwangtung CCP's peasant committee.[34] It was at this time that Mao Tse-tung "began to disagree with Ch'en Tu-hsiu's rightist-opportunist policy," for he had come around to the beliefs of his Canton friends.[35]

The areas through which the Northern Expedition advanced experienced acute peasant unrest, just as had happened in eastern Kwangtung during the 1925 expeditions. The peasants were already partially organized thanks to PMTI-trained cadres and CYC members, and they flocked to the KMT revolution.[36] A contemporary account of events in Hunan describes how peasants were elated by KMT promises and how they welcomed the Expeditionary forces through whom the promises would be realized.[37]

Just as earlier in the East River, it is difficult to assess the real contribution of the peasant masses to the progress of the Expedition, although the KMT, the Chinese Communists, and Russian sources assert that it was great, if indeed not critical.[38] What is beyond doubt, though, is that the liberated peasants were arousing fears in the KMT leadership. Their activities were vividly described later by Mao in his famous "Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement." He too wrote of *kuo-fen* (excesses), but defended them as necessary.[39] The Revolutionary Army and the KMT members, however, did not approve of such measures, and the CCP December Plenum branded the excesses as a disease of leftist infantilism—a stance reflecting the influence of Stalin and the spirit of Comintern directives. CCP officers put a brake on their propaganda in the army, the peasants in the villages were denied arms, and the land problem was shelved.[40]

Many KMT members, their trust more in the urban workers, remained skeptical also of peasant potential. As a contemporary observed, this was because "peasant education and organization are not equal to that of the urban proletariat, and it is not certain that [the peasants] have great strength for revolution." The commentator declared, "This is a wrong idea," for he had seen what peasants could do in the Eastern and Northern Expeditions.[41] After P'eng reorganized the Peasant Association in Ch'üchiang county early in 1926, he used it to show the kind of help Kwangtung peasants could give the Northern Expedition by dispatching what was officially reported as 3,000 to assist with transport in Hunan. It can safely be claimed that at this time P'eng P'ai was the only peasant leader who upheld the priority of the peasant movement with a view to a peasant revolution against the KMT. He had to wait until the Fifth CCP Congress in 1927 before his perseverance was rewarded.[42]

Though P'eng paid lip service to CCP policy with regard to the priority of workers over peasants in the revolution, as far as he was concerned neither workers nor soldiers could match the peasants in potential. Both could disappear and the peasant masses would still bring about revolution. In this respect the Kwangtung CCP leadership was of like mind, having seen both worker and peasant reaction against Hong Kong in 1925 and believing that ultimately the peasants could be made into a proletarian class.[43] The Kwangtung peasant movement could be described as an example of that "heresy in act"[44] which became Mao's new revolutionary doctrine, as the following chapter will show.*

At the end of the Northern Expedition, it was time for the military and the peasants to part company. On December 7, 1926, the main body of the KMT party and government apparatus left Canton for Wuhan, which was shortly to be named the new capital of the revolution. When P'eng P'ai arrived in the spring of 1927, the March KMT Plenum was already over and the KMT left was installed in power. Chiang Kai-shek had failed in his attempts to keep the government under his control in Nanch'ang, and KMT-CCP relations were almost cordial.[45]

*For all the lip service to Marxism, the CCP strategy was geared to peasant demands and conditioned by the availability of peasants for revolution on certain terms. There was a mutual adjustment between Communist tenets and the peasant mind. "It is no surprise, therefore, that the CCP movement achieved victory where, by all Marxist tenets, it might have been least expected that it could." (Mitrany 1951:205.)

# 8

# The Preparation for Revolution

For P'eng P'ai, revolution was first and foremost a job of work needing comrades trained in the skills required to perform it. His nightmare was of having too few cadres. There was also an ideological side to this in the question of revolutionary leadership. The Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI) marks the division between the old rebellion-directed organization and the modern revolution-directed peasant movement. It was also to be the instrument for Communist infiltration and influence in the countryside. Here indeed might come that rapprochement between CCP and peasants, that Leninist formula of professional revolutionaries allied to the motive power of mass discontent, and the means to act on it.[1]

The *Nung-min yün-tung chiang-hsi so* came into being as the result of a KMT decision of June 1924. The intention was to facilitate political and military training for peasant-movement workers already in action near Canton.[2] Where Western scholars have in the past perhaps underestimated the importance of the PMTI, Chinese Communist writers and politicians tend currently to overstate it. They have sanctified the PMTI's Canton premises as the cradle of the revolution, and an imposing Museum of the Peasant Movement stands nearby.[3] The truth is not so extreme. Although the PMTI certainly did contribute to the development and success of the Communist victory in China, it was not the first training institute with political aims in China, even if we discount the various military academies. Mao's "Self-Education University," established in Ch'angsha in August 1921, was one of the best examples of more formal training, and it had a preparatory class too. There was also the propaganda training institute set up in Canton by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the same year.[4] But no one previously had

considered rural reality worth such attention. For all that the PMTI developed independently in Canton, encouraged by the Comintern and Borodin, the claims of P'eng P'ai as its founder cannot be denied. It might well never have got off the ground without the example of the Haifeng peasant movement, and in June 1924, when the decision to establish it was being taken, P'eng was already in the peasant department and surely pressed the motion. He was also, as the PMTI's first Director, the guiding force behind the unique institution once it had opened, and he left his stamp on it.[5]

The First Class was to last until August 21. In all, 38 people enrolled, including two girls. They were mostly students with experience of May Fourth, along with a few peasants who had been in the peasant movement already and some workers familiar with labor-union organization. Qualifications were high for ordinary peasants, which reveals the new political and elitist trend.[6] Local KMT cells submitted candidates, but Chou Fo-hai alleged that the selection favored CCP members or sympathizers and that others stood small chance of admission, regardless of performance in the entrance test. The allegation, repeated by others, may well have been valid: over 90 percent of those sent out on special assignment by the peasant department were SYC or CCP members. All the first students were from Kwangtung, many from counties adjacent to Canton.[7] From Haifeng came P'eng Kuei, who later distinguished himself as the leader of the Peasant Army.[8] The Institute "Rules," probably devised by P'eng P'ai, required students to be from 18 to 28 years of age, in good health, and of sound character. They had normally to possess a good educational standard (preferably Middle School), and to be members of the Peasant Association or children of peasant-tenants. No one from a landlord or gentry family was eligible. Graduation required passing oral and written examinations and a physical checkup. The Institute aimed "to prepare gifted persons for the direction of the peasant movement, and to establish as Party policy the principle that some members do peasant activity."[9]

The First Class was taught by P'eng P'ai and a small staff. It was originally intended to have 300 students, but accommodation problems limited its size. An impressive list of outside lecturers was likewise dropped, P'eng P'ai himself having to do most of the lecturing.[10] The subjects were strictly practical. Students received instruction in speechmaking and in setting up Peasant Associations. Ways to win peasant confidence were pointed out, such as speaking the local language, solving peasant problems through consultation and cooperation with the peasants, and living, dressing, and eating as

they did. Students were counseled to avoid offending peasant superstitions and traditions. They should also refrain from speaking openly about revolution and bloodshed: the peasants would not give actual political support until they could see the relevance of the revolution to their own situation.* P'eng P'ai obviously shaped these guidelines out of his own experience.[11]

There was much practical training and activity outside the Institute. Every Sunday P'eng led the class to the villages for peasant-movement work. Training included marches, tours on horseback, and organizing large meetings. Toward the end of July, P'eng and his students began setting up a Peasant Association in Canton; on the 28th a large meeting organized by P'eng P'ai was attended by over 2,000 people. The meeting, held in the Hall of Kwangtung University, was addressed by Sun, who stated that this was the first time the KMT had been able to meet face to face with peasants, with a view to promoting the principle of the "People's Livelihood."[12] The KMT was much concerned about its enemies in China and its dubious friends in Canton, as the speech by Sun clearly implied; moreover, Sun was bent on realizing his dream of the military unification of China. For these reasons, military training was an important part of the PMTI curriculum in order to establish in the countryside the Peasant Self-Defense Corps. The Peasant Corps, as it came to be called, was given some inexpensive weapons by the KMT. Thus as early as September 1924, the KMT was quite willing to admit, Association "Regulations" to the contrary, that the peasants were armed to support the national revolution.[13]

The First Class ended with 33 graduates. A ceremony took place on August 21, 1924, and was presided over by Sun, who gave an important speech. He suggested how propaganda, organization, and government could proceed so that a peaceful solution to the land problem could be reached. The moderation he advocated in dealing with the land question was an indirect

*The duties of a peasant-movement activist were later summarized by P'eng P'ai in 12 points. "1. He should be ready to suffer, to be honestly daring, and to accept the directives of the Party. 2. His work must start from the roots and be done with humility and without a superiority complex. 3. He must understand fully the peasants' living conditions and their psychology. (Those who are in sympathy will also join in revolution.) 4. His relationship with the peasants must be very close and without any money dealings. 5. He must not covet the peasants' women. (There should be no scope for publicizing the new thought . . . freedom, equality.) 6. He must not discuss their superstitions. 7. He must not be a loafer. (All peasants have to be instructed in order to make them stand up united.) 8. There is no reason for him to show off or to brag about his ability: when success is recorded, all merit must be given to the peasants to put things right. 9. His talking must be clear and plain, and done with great patience. 10. If at times gentry are made use of, he should never speak about it again. 11. When first speaking to the peasants, local dialect could be used to explain the whole story. 12. He should never do something which has not been previously agreed on with the peasants" (*PW*:196).

answer to his Russian advisers or possibly to P'eng P'ai and the ideology he was spreading in the Institute.[14] The KMT was aware of this: as early as June 1924, five members of that party's central supervisory committee had demanded the impeachment of CCP followers, on the grounds that most of the organizers sent out by the peasant department were favoring the Communist cause.[15]

Of the 33 First Class graduates, 24 were designated as "special assignees" and dispatched around the Canton region or back to their own counties. Following graduation, there was another round of military training with the Kwangtung police. P'eng P'ai was in charge of all military training of the Peasant Self-Defense Corps, of which he was the commander.[16]

The Second, Third, and Fourth Classes saw the military element steadily gaining ground, in part because of outside events. The Second Class (August 21 to October 30, 1924) coincided with the Merchant Corps episode; the 300-strong Peasant Self-Defense Corps, augmented by P'eng with rickshawmen, consisted mainly of PMTI students.[17] Patterned on the organization of an army company, the Third Class (January 1 to April 3, 1925) paid much attention to survey and propaganda work—training that we saw take practical shape with the Eastern Expedition, when students set up units to go in behind the liberating army and establish Peasant Associations.[18] Lin Tao-wen from Haifeng was among this class's 114 graduates, some of whom stayed on for the extra study needed to form the Peasant Army at the village level.[19] The Fourth Class opened on April 30, with some students from outside Kwangtung. When Generals Liu and Yang rebelled, the class scattered to rural areas and undertook Association duties until the PMTI reopened in July; but only 50 students returned, so the course was filled out with another twenty who were probably Vietnamese studying under Ho Chi-min, who was himself working at the Soviet Consulate at that time. In all, 51 graduated that September.[20]

The Fifth Class started in October 1925 under P'eng P'ai and subsequently Lo Ch'i-yüan. Mao was one of the lecturers, and among the 43 students from Hunan, ten of them from Mao's own county, was his brother Mao Tse-min. Many new subjects were on the curriculum, including statistics, the history of Chinese secret societies, and singing.[21] It is probable that Mao lectured on class analysis and that these lectures formed the basis of his two articles published in the first issues of *Chung-kuo nung-min* (*Chinese Peasant*) in January and February of 1926. They were titled "Analysis of the Various Classes of the Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitude Toward

Revolution" and "Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society." By way of illustration, Mao refers only to events in Haifeng and Kwangning. The same issues of the magazines contained the "Report" by P'eng P'ai, so it is likely that, acquainted with P'eng at the PMTI and within the CCP, Mao came to a better appreciation of the potential revolutionary power of the peasant class, albeit one based on its sheer numbers. In his first article Mao concludes that poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and the lumpen proletariat were all in favor of revolution. The second again describes the peasants and agricultural laborers as "brave fighters" for the revolution, although he still sees the workers as "its main force." One hundred and fourteen graduates completed the Fifth Class in December.[22]

The Sixth Class opened on May 3, 1926, in the "P'an-yü hsüeh-kung" (P'an-yü academy) in Ta-tung-men. In February 1926 the new peasant-movement committee (of which Mao was a member) undertook the organization, curriculum development, staffing, financing, and accommodation of the Institute. Mao was appointed *So-chang* (Principal). This term was now used instead of *Chu-jen* (Director), and the change may signify that the PMTI had been reshaped into a formal school with a new status, as the changes in its premises and organization seemed to indicate. Certainly it was expensive: the Sixth Class cost the KMT nearly ¥65,000. And the thrust of its teaching was more academically political than directed to the practical ends P'eng P'ai had stressed with the first four classes.[23] The committee nominated the teaching staff; P'eng does not appear on the list, nor among the nine members of the new committee, although he was definitely on the staff of the Institute.[24]

In the spring of 1926 Mao claimed to have a method for augmenting the ranks of the CCP against Chiang, namely by preparing PMTI cadres for a future guerrilla war. To this end, the whole student body was divided into two units of six patrols each and everything was arranged along tough military lines. Students were instructed how to form and run a peasant military organization, as they were expected to do with the Self-Defense Corps in the villages.[25]

The article by Mao of September 1, 1926 (a first hint in Mao of what in the previous chapter was called the "heresy in act"*), came significantly at the end of his term as Principal, and after close contact with the rural reality as expressed by his students. It was prepared to accompany an assemblage

*The definition is in B. Schwartz 1952:191.

of local materials, region by region, which the students worked over in class and which it was intended to publish in a large collection. By September 1926, however, only seventeen such items (P'eng's Haifeng "Report" among them) had been assembled, the preface being Mao's article "The National Revolution and the Peasant Movement."[26] This article has been described by Stuart Schram as the crucial link in the chain of Mao's thought, illuminating the genesis and significance of his vision of a peasant revolution.[27] Only the rise of the peasants, stated the article, would secure victory for the revolution. Mao asserted that "the Chinese revolution has this form only and no other, [so that] the national movement is in great part a peasant movement." Modifying somewhat his previously held views, he wrote that "although we know that the progressive working class especially constitutes the leadership of all the revolutionary classes, if the peasants do not arise and fight in the villages, overthrowing the privileges of the feudal patriarchal landlord class, the power of the warlords and the imperialists can never be uprooted and felled."[28] He reiterated these views on December 20 in his speech at the Peasant Association Congress in Ch'angsha. Mao had gained a new confidence in peasant revolutionary potential—as indeed it seemed everybody from Sun Yat-sen on down had done.[29]

Mao wanted the local materials to initiate "a nationwide survey of agricultural production."[30] One such survey was conducted by P'eng P'ai and some of the PMTI students, who went with him to Ch'üchiang to put in order the Association there and do propaganda work.[31] But the best experience of the student body came with the visit to the place that ranked at the top in terms of peasant-movement success. Just before the final examination in September 1926, the whole Sixth Class went to Haifeng for two weeks. Mao in his September article proved to be well informed on Haifeng, even before his students went there. He is reported to have used and glossed in his lectures expressions from the East River area that only P'eng could have made him familiar with. It was Mao who took the initiative and organized the Haifeng stay; nonetheless, all claims to the contrary, the evidence suggests that he never visited Haifeng personally.[32]

It was in fact his assistant Hsiao-Ch'u-nü who led the students there. He knew Haifeng from the First Eastern Expedition, and had been an early SYC rural activist. When the students arrived in Swabue, they were greeted by members of the KMT, the Peasant Associations, labor unions, the Self-Defense Corps, the county government, and the Youth Federation, as well as by ordinary people of all ages, some thousands in all. A band played and

speeches were made. They were originally planning to stay one week, but in the event remained for two fruitful weeks in Haifeng under P'eng P'ai's guidance.[33] In his report on the field trip Hsiao wrote: "This class went among the revolutionary masses of the peasants. . . . The students were profoundly influenced, and more than ever convinced of the value of peasant-movement work."[34]

But the person most persuaded of the importance of the Haifeng peasant movement seemed to be Mao. His September article urged that a large number of comrades move into the countryside and organize the peasants as quickly as possible. Mao is again carried away by the sheer force of numbers, calculating that if only ten percent of China's 300 million peasants joined the Association, that would mean some 30 million organized peasants. He visualized the movement spreading first to some of the more strategically important provinces, and then to the rest of China for a final onslaught and victory. To this end, he goes on to suggest how the Association should be organized, emphasizing that the peasant movement and the political class struggle are identical, and that the peasants in the countryside are even more involved in this struggle than the workers in the cities.

Mao acknowledged that he derived these impressions from his reading of the Resolutions of the Kwangtung Peasant Congress, the "Report" of the Haifeng peasant movement, and the records of peasant struggles against landlords in Kwangning and P'uning. Here, if further proof of it be needed, is the influence of P'eng P'ai on Mao's thinking, for P'eng had organized the first, had written the second, and had led the anti-landlord activities in both the counties mentioned. Mao understood that the collapse of Ch'en Chiung-ming and his power base had been brought about largely through a corresponding increase in peasant power, especially in Haifeng, where the Association boasted 50,000 families and 250,000 people on its rolls. (The figures are clearly inflated, but neither Mao nor P'eng bothered with statistical accuracy.)[35] Mao's admiration for the Haifeng Peasant Association was such that he declared: "Each and every place in China must emulate Haifeng and then we can say that we have obtained victory. . . . Any other form is useless."[36]

This Sixth Class, which had been acknowledged as the best, closed on October 5, 1926, with 318 graduates. A Seventh Class was called for and organized by the peasant department of the CEC beginning on February 12, 1927, and opened in Wuhan in March. Designed for 500 students, it had stiffer enrollment requirements than previous classes. Again, Mao was Prin-

cipal and (according to some sources) P'eng P'ai assisted. However, because of the deteriorating political situation it closed early.[37]

The influence of the PMTI on the Chinese revolution is not easy to assess. It may well be that the reason why so few of its graduates reached high CCP ranks was that most of them were slaughtered by counterrevolutionaries in the rural areas. There were also some defections. Amid the rural masses, the number of PMTI graduates was of course infinitesimal—in all 1,272, not all of whom operated in the countryside. Of the 454 graduates of the first five classes, one-third were designated "special assignees" in Kwangtung and two-thirds were sent back to their places of origin; it was mainly the latter who organized peasants in the countryside.[38]

In later years, a number of PMTI training procedures became standard in CCP leadership-schooling, such as survey- and report-writing, practical work and military training, and training in how to deal on an equal footing with the peasants. Character molding, self-sacrifice for the common good, and the special role of leadership were among the values shared by the Chinese traditional outlook and the modern need for revolutionary training. All this the PMTI encouraged.[39]

As we have seen in some detail, the transformation of Mao's thinking was mainly the result of his coming under the spell of the CCP Kwangtung Regional Committee and P'eng P'ai's PMTI after mid-1925. Communist reverence for the Institute also stems from the fact that, during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's, it was made out to be the sole creation of Chairman Mao.[40] In his 1930's autobiography, Mao claimed much of the credit for "training organizers of the peasant movement," and the official collection of Mao's writings does not include that very revealing preface of September 1926 in which he acknowledged his debt to Haifeng.[41] There is ample documentation to show that the 1960's witnessed a rewriting of history aimed at ascribing all the achievements of the PMTI to Mao. P'eng P'ai was overlooked completely—"to the shame of Mao Tse-tung," as a Haifeng resident put it.[42]

It is normally taken for granted that the PMTI provided its graduates with a new, mainly Communist political outlook. But the Institute was a KMT structure, not all the students were Communists, and it is unlikely that a few months' training would have converted them all anyway. Apart from the fact that Marxist doctrine was far from clear even to the PMTI staff, the KMT moderate element was not without some say in the curriculum and in decision making. This should be borne in mind when considering

assertions that the PMTI was the fulcrum on which peasant mentality and Communist ideology were balanced, and that the Institute was a CCP stronghold.[43]

The Canton PMTI prompted the establishment of similar schools elsewhere. We have P'eng P'ai's Haifeng PMTI and Peasant Army Training Class of 1925, and his P'uning PMTI of 1926, opened while he was directing local peasant operations there. P'eng later founded a comparable institute for both workers and peasants in Swatow. PMTI's were begun in six other provinces.[44] The "tempest, wind, and rain" Kwangtung Provincial Association meeting of August 1926 decided to have its own institute, with courses much like those of P'eng's first PMTI class.[45]

All this was an object lesson for the Kwangtung CCP. Not only was the Party lagging far behind the Association both in presence and in total numbers, but it also had few senior cadres even inside the Association itself (the seven Association area offices averaged five CCP members each). It was essential to train comrades quickly and get them out to those counties with an Association—there were 60 such—as a force for Party influence. A center accordingly was planned; but because this process coincided with the opening of the Provincial Association's institute in October, it seems likely that the one scheme went into the other and that the Association acted as a cover. Each intake was expected to produce one-third of its number as Party converts.[46]

Another CCP project involved scouting for candidates to be brought in to Canton for training as local Party secretaries. Youth clubs, discussion groups, and picnic outings were useful areas of search. This exactly matched what P'eng P'ai had done in Haifeng.[47] In late 1925 or early 1926, he had opened a CCP training school for cadres in Haifeng. There was also the Worker and Peasant Youth Recreation Club, a front for CYC training. P'eng was also responsible for founding the CCP cadre school for the whole East River area, which he did while he was in charge of that area's Peasant Association office. This was the "East River Party School" and in 1927 was under the direction of the East Special.[48]

In addition to skilled cadres and rural workers, the peasant movement needed formal channels both open and secret to inform, persuade, consult, and command. P'eng in his early years as leader took personal care of such matters and had a talent for the big occasion; but he missed the First Peasant Congress in 1925.[49] The following year, back from Ch'üchiang and Swatow, P'eng made sure of attending such an important event. The Second Peasant

Congress (May 1–15, 1926), also called the "First All-China Peasant Congress," provides one of the best examples of the peasants' involvement in politics, besides witnessing the most successful manipulation of their organization for political ends. It was planned to coincide with the Third National Labor Congress, thereby illustrating worker-peasant solidarity as well as reflecting a certain degree of dependency on the part of the peasants. There were 214 delegates representing some 600,000 peasants.[50]

An eyewitness at the event recalls P'eng P'ai as the Congress chairman, perhaps 28 years of age, ordinary looking but with a discernible inner strength evidenced in his warm handshakes. His voice was resonant, strong, somewhat strident—rather like his outward behavior, which was a show of all-out affection and an endeavor not to give a bad impression. He was embarrassed when people praised the success of the peasant movement to his face. He seemed a practical man, passionate, realistic, gifted at organization and at rousing people with his speeches.[51]

The Peasant Congress began with three days of general meetings with the workers, during which T'an Yen-k'ai spoke on developments within the KMT government, Chiang Kai-shek spoke on "The Great Alliance of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers" (as did Ch'en Kung-po), T'an P'ing-shan spoke on national political and social conditions, Hu Han-min addressed himself to the situation in Russia, Li Li-san reported on his attendance at a meeting of the Workers' Red International and Borodin spoke on the world revolution.[52] The work of the Congress proper began only on May 3 in the P'an-yü Academy, home of the PMTI. Chiang, speaking in favor of a proposal on peasant-worker-soldier unity, announced that "the revolution will be victorious if all the peasants and workers join in." His reason for that belief was the same as Mao's: sheer numbers.[53]

Beneath the 30 Resolutions, the reports that lasted for hours, and the solid committee work on the Provincial Peasant Association's regulations, however, was a sense of confusion and uncertainty about underlying support. The KMT was reminded of the peasants' contribution to the movement it had successfully led and was told clearly: "Deal with the bad gentry." The Krestintern in Moscow was addressed on Leninist liberation and invited: "Help us recover the land." The CCP Central Committee was reassured, after a Congress resolution of quite contrary sense, that the worker masses had priority in the revolution: "We know you cannot admit to being responsible for us peasants."[54] To say that the peasants were bulldozed into compliance with the directives of the Congress organizers may be going too

far, but certainly their delegates were swamped by the compilers of the draft Resolutions and by the full program. They may have had no time to raise considered reservations. Again, the various area office reports had been prepared and delivered by local CCP leaders, so that they were not necessarily objective. There must have been a certain amount of manipulation of representatives, awed as they were by the grand revolutionary and political ferment in Canton. The Second Peasant Congress served as a pattern for later ones at the provincial level in Hunan (December 1926), Kiangsi (February 1927), and Hupeh (March 1927). It showed best the problems of peasants in their political setting and, despite all the leftist clichés and Party hullabaloo, revealed the down-to-earth, economic interests of the peasants—as is evidenced by the topics discussed.[55] But the peasants wanted the government to take action on their continuing exploitation and in particular to move against a new threat, bandit attacks on the Association. Instead of security measures they got booklets.

By October 1926, the KMT was subsidizing the peasant movement with ¥18,000 per month (one-third of it to Kwangtung).[56] The lion's share of this money went for propaganda purposes, largely to support the peasant department's *Chung-kuo nung-min* (*Chinese Peasant*), a monthly magazine about peasant affairs. Toward the end of the year, the original 5,000 printing was increased to 10,000 copies. There were two other peasant journals, as well as news bulletins, monthly murals, and a collection of booklets on political doctrine. The department spent ¥2,000 a month on printing, an indication of KMT concern that compared favorably with CCP efforts in this direction.[57] In November 1926, Bukharin was right to reproach the CCP for not commanding an outlet for its position on the peasant question—a failure that led peasants to believe that the KMT was behind everything.[58]

Were the peasant department publications of real use? The illiteracy rate in the countryside was high, so that the material was in effect for the educated leadership of the peasant movement; peasants had little grasp of modern political doctrines and were content with slogans, cartoons, and speeches.[59]

Peasant Association literature was widely used and had a double purpose. The writers and editors could put across their own interpretation of the movement and at the same time try to direct the peasants toward a political line useful for the revolution. The Kwangtung Peasant Association took over *The Plowshare* from the KMT in January 1926, intending it as a propaganda vehicle aimed at peasants, the general public, and the government.

Some copies were distributed free; the rest were for Association cadres to sell. P'eng P'ai contributed articles, and the general slant of the magazine was toward the CCP. The contents included reports of committee meetings, resolutions, slogans, cartoons, analysis, and comment. The Association also printed posters and propaganda guidelines, but as already noted, such publications were not likely to have much impact on the peasants.[60] Sun Yat-sen was right in saying, "Peasant awareness is stimulated by self-interest; it is useless to speak to them of national interest."[61]

One of the obstacles to effective rural activity was the dearth of information on conditions in the countryside. Comintern agents in Canton were especially insistent on the need for comprehensive and scientifically conducted surveys. The Kwangtung Peasant Association committee—of which P'eng P'ai, Lo Ch'i-yüan, and Juan Hsiao-hsien were the core—pressed for the establishment of a survey unit in the peasant department, and in July 1926 details of a training class, survey locations, forms, and schedules were announced. The surveyors had to be cadres familiar with the county and the local language. Training began in Canton in August, with the three Russian land advisers lecturing on specific techniques. Eleven counties were to be covered.[62] Surveys were due in by November, the idea being to have everything ready for the issuing of directives for new peasant activity by January 1927; but a source says the work was "badly done."[63] Volin, Yolk, and Tarkhanov worked under Borodin as special advisers to the peasant department in Canton. The first two did indeed achieve a survey volume (*Agrarian Relations in Kwangtung Province*), but it was destroyed during Li Chi-shen's coup in April 1927. Tarkhanov also collected similar material on Kwangsi that could not be published at the time.[64]

There were also many problems of internal information-gathering and reporting. The Kwangtung Peasant Association organization, with the greater control it exercised through its area offices, should have been able to remedy these; but a shortcoming of this very Association was its poor membership statistics. If its returns were inaccurate, then how much more so must the figures for other provinces have been. The document criticizing the Associations also complains of report and survey work being badly done or not done at all, despite instructions. One glaring example was the survey on the *min-t'uan*: 10,000 survey forms were printed, upwards of 7,000 were sent out, and only 50 or so were returned. CCP cadres were also blamed for sending in only a third of the required reports, and even those badly done. The special assignees fell short, too: seemingly bent only on enlarging the

Association, "provided 30 peasants agreed, they would start one [Association] without considering the real situation."[65]

The Association therefore mushroomed. But it must be remembered that peasants joined primarily for the protection and economic benefits they believed they could obtain. They did not care about attending meetings concerned with politics and plans; even the fees were collected at second hand, contrary to the Regulations.[66] The politically involved "proletarian class" did not exist in China and would have to be created, said a CCP man in Nanch'ang.[67] For this, the cadres were to blame: they sat like officials in the Association office and did not go out among the peasants; moreover, they did all the talking at meetings. Their reports merely chronicled events; they contained no analysis, grasp of reality, or worthwhile suggestions.[68]

The cadres in the field, the peasant department's special assignees, interpreted both KMT and CCP ideology with a degree of flexibility to suit local peasant aspirations. This explains why the numbers of peasants entering the Association rose so sharply and rapidly. It was in a sense a three-way marriage, with KMT, CCP, and peasant aims forming for the time being a workable partnership, with the peasants having the edge. The special assignees played a delicate role among the peasants: recalled to Canton, they might well have found it difficult to take the right line with their superiors if there had been clashes between the *min-t'uan* and the peasants, for in some circles such skirmishes were favored as indicating class consciousness, whereas in others they were frowned upon as upsetting United Front amity.[69] As to the use of peasant military power, the KMT could at times appear purely opportunistic. In June 1926, a local KMT commander and party leader ordered his First Army troops in the countryside "to protect the people" from the overbearing Peasant Association.[70] He criticized organizations which "spread propaganda pamphlets, drove off county officials, and overstepped their authority merely on the basis of party membership."[71] This was obviously siding with the landlords. In November, however, when he had to move his troops to the front, he could find no better protector for the area than the Peasant Army.[72]

Contingents of the Peasant Army were called on to carry out police duties in various counties, arms being provided by the local constabulary and pay by the county magistrates. Eight counties were allotted a total of a thousand units; Haifeng was to use its own well-organized Peasant Army, which continued to be busy fighting bandits and militia. Indeed, the Canton press was

full of news of clashes all over the East River area. But generally "too little was done."[73]

In a lengthy article dated December 8, 1926, Lo Ch'i-yüan again drew up a thorough case for the Peasant Army and against the militia, in a vain attempt to settle the problem of militia outrages once and for all. The militia continued to kill Association members and the KMT's own envoys. "That shows they are beyond government control," Lo concluded. He called the militia "robbers and bandits"; but before long the government, never willing to define who were the real outlaws, would attach Lo's label to the other side.[74]

With so much achieved by the movement in the two and a half years from its legitimization as the KMT's peasant department, the crisis of late 1926 can seem hard to fathom. True, the March 20 coup had removed Communists from top positions and strengthened the KMT rightists at the provincial and local levels. This was so even in Hai-Lu-feng.[75] But Chiang, still needing peasant support, nonetheless had to go carefully: we have just heard his call to peasants and workers at the Peasant Congress. The Association itself was moving forward, active now in two-thirds of Kwangtung's counties.[76] It commanded several hundred PMTI graduates by the end of the Fifth Class; and the Peasant Army, for all its lack of arms, could field 20,000 men by October of 1926.[77] Why, then, did Lo Ch'i-yüan speak of "tempest, wind, and rain" when the Association met that summer?[78]

Perhaps the beleaguered state of the movement can be judged most easily by looking at what happened in the aftermath of the two success stories recounted in Chapters 5 and 6. There was no doubt that Kwangning was a success, that a nest of reactionaries had been cleaned out with all possible help from the provincial capital, and that the right to organize had been forced home. The episode showed the peasants how the KMT right differed from the KMT left, and how unity with soldiers was to be sought. But the Peasant Army lacked the spirit for more than a local conflict. When in the summer of 1926 it once again required help from KMT regulars, none came.[79] The real achievement of Kwangning was economic rather than political. By the autumn of 1926, the Association operated in fewer than half of Kwangning's county districts, and the following spring saw it offering little resistance to General Li's oppression.[80]

Much the same was true of Huahsien—and more quickly true. On the very day in September 1926 that Canton was celebrating a peasant victory,

with terms and compensation payments settled, the Association office most involved was attacked, once more at the principal villain's instigation, as though nothing had happened.[81] Local counterrevolutionary elements were much stronger than had been thought. Bandits and militia worked together. As for the peasants themselves, they had been taken too far and too fast by their mentors: KMT policies assumed from all sides too great a degree of sophistication.

So it was that the peasants became pawns in a power struggle. Broader lines of strategy, and above all a decision to use total force in the attack, were needed for any success that would endure.[82]

# 9

# The Effort for Change

One of the major problems for the new government in Wuhan was how to deal with the peasant movement, to which the Northern Expedition had given unexpectedly great impetus. In Hunan, peasant activity had run to extremes after liberation by the revolutionary armies once the peasants realized that Association leaders lacked a clear-cut policy and were hesitant to act boldly. The peasants simply wanted to own their own land.[1] A perplexed Wang Ching-wei, for the KMT left, asked Borodin how this situation had arisen; though everyone wanted to solve the land problem, no one could agree on the manner or extent of land distribution to the peasantry.[2] P'eng was thus able to witness the results of the CCP's inconsistent peasant policy and the uncertain involvement of the KMT left with the peasants, a Russian observer noting that both right and left factions of the KMT feared the peasant movement.[3] To a different extent and for other reasons, the same was true of the CCP. T'an P'ing-shan, the Communist agriculture minister in the KMT government in Wuhan, asked for a leave of absence, publicly apologizing for having failed to put the peasants "on the right track."[4] In a letter to Wang, "he cursed the violent ways of the peasant movement."[5]

Both the KMT and the CCP felt the backlash. Their relationship was being jeopardized by "a mass movement growing toward the left, while the political and military authorities begin to incline to the right."[6] One document describes the CCP at the time as "led by a peasant mentality."[7] Later in 1927, the same Russian observer foresaw the risk of the peasant organizations "becoming a weapon in the hand of the gentry, if not strongly organized and led."[8] All the accounts of events in Hunan indicate an escalation of traditional peasant activities: though the ignition was provided by

the revolutionary slogans of the Northern Expedition, after that the peasants went along under their own steam. Many observers drew parallels with the Taiping Rebellion.[9]

Though the "excesses" were by some evidence not necessarily bloody events, the Congress of the Hunan Peasant Association (December 1926) leaves no doubt about what the peasants were after: total expropriation of the wealth of ousted local political and military leaders and their supporters.[10] Communists everywhere were divided on the confiscation issue. The directives of the December 1926 CCP Plenum had flatly denied the existence of the land question, but neither the CCP nor the Comintern wished to dismiss the possibility of land distribution, provided that collaboration with the KMT could be maintained.[11]

On April 2 the KMT set up the Central Land Committee, whose brief was to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of the peasants, the "extreme" Communist leaders, and the KMT-CCP joint leadership.[12] Mao Tse-tung speaks of "an interprovincial meeting of peasants" at which "the proposals of my thesis" were discussed and which was attended by "P'eng P'ai, Fang Chih-min, and two Russian Communists, Yolk and Volin, among others."[13] Mao probably refers to a session of the new Central Land Committee, which held a series of meetings from April 19 to May 6. This body produced the "Draft Resolution on the Land Question," used by the Fifth CCP Congress, which repudiated Mao's proposal for the "economic confiscation" of all land not cultivated by the owners. The Draft Resolution called for the "political confiscation" of land owned by counterrevolutionaries; the holdings of "revolutionary military men" and of small landlords were exempted. Confiscations were to be implemented by local self-government organs, which were empowered to confiscate property in excess of 50 *mou* of good land and 100 *mou* of bad land. There was some concern about whether the peasants would abide by these rules.[14] The Russian advisers, as the Committee worked on, insisted that Kwangtung had already shown the way to the solution.[15] With a view to restraining the peasants, the long-planned All-China Peasant Association was again debated in April, and a standing committee of the provisional executive was formed under T'an Yen-k'ai, including P'eng, Mao, T'an P'ing-shan, and Teng Yen-ta.[16] There are some doubts about whether the Association ever got started, but it did produce a set of guidelines: the *Summary for Propaganda*.[17]

This document, reported in the press in April, stated that the organization existed at the provincial level in Kwangtung, Hunan, Kiangsi, and else-

where. In some other provinces it was still in preparation. Where it was established, "feudal remnants" had been eliminated; in Hunan, peasant self-government was already being practiced in most villages and changes were pending at the provincial level with elections to the provincial assembly. So much for the political aspects. On the economic side, rent and interest on loans were reduced and many taxes and customary duties abolished. As for self-defense, in many places each Peasant Association member had a weapon. (In Kwangtung, the peasants had 40,000 guns.) The document also gave a lengthy account of Association social achievements. It called for the distribution of land to landless peasants, the holding of democratic elections, the arming of peasants against landlords, and the founding of peasant banks and similar institutions. Reference was made to the continuing slanders and oppressions perpetrated by landlords, "who feel their end is near, but still resist and vilify the Association."[18] The propaganda directives were clearly in favor of peasant revolt: the All-China Peasant Association was seen by Mao as a means of "leading the peasant movement of the whole country to follow the example of Hunan," as Chang Kuo-t'ao put it.[19] Infiltration of the Association by landlords was condemned, since their intention was "to come out with peaceful doctrines against revolution, a design we are aware of, and which we fight against."[20] Such challenges show the minds of Mao and P'eng in April 1927.

In March, however, Chiang began weeding out the Communists, and the two opposing camps of Wuhan and Nanch'ang took on more definite shapes. Chiang was veering to the right; the KMT left and the CCP did not know exactly how far they themselves would or could pursue their own course. On April 12, 1927, the campaign to "purge the party" started with a massacre of Communist members, and the CCP at last knew where it stood.[21]

The Fifth CCP Congress opened in Hankow on April 27, and was attended by some eighty delegates, including Roy and Wang Ching-wei. The peasant question and the land issue were much debated, but the outcome was that, in line with the directives of the Comintern 7th Plenum, only large landholdings were to be confiscated. "What the CCP actually did was to correct the excesses of the labor and peasant movements."[22] P'eng was elected to the Central Committee, and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai went to the peasant department to replace Mao.[23] Mao "was very dissatisfied with the Party policy . . . , especially in respect of the peasant movement." Looking back later, he felt that if the peasants had been organized and armed, the soviets would have

stood a better chance at that time. "But Ch'en Tu-hsiu disagreed violently. He did not understand the role of the peasantry in the revolution and greatly underestimated its possibilities."[24]

Li Li-san reported opposition to the Central Committee's "capitulationism" also from P'eng P'ai and two of his Kwangtung fellow members, Lo Ch'i-yüan and Ch'en Yen-nien. Bitterly against Ch'en, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai nonetheless argued that peasant excesses had to be excused; though strongly in favor of land confiscation, he advised taking no measures until the CCP was more powerful.[25] A resolution on the peasant question was passed at the Congress, but Ch'en Tu-hsiu spoke for most in declaring that "the task of the moment was to extend but not deepen the revolution, and consequently land confiscation must be postponed until some future date."[26] Even Roy finally conceded as much. The Congress theses affirmed that "at the present stage, the national revolution coincides with the agrarian revolution." It all seemed quite advanced and bold: "The demands of the Kwangtung peasant movement, led by our Party, went no further than the organization of Peasant Unions and the reduction of rents." One was to understand that because of a half-hearted struggle against the "feudal-bourgeois bloc" and because the Party did not "strike at the very foundation of its power in the villages," the social base of the revolution was not consolidated; "it was due to this very mistake that Kwangtung was so easily lost."[27]

Such admissions might just be Ch'en buying off the Trotskyists, but P'eng P'ai had long shared these sentiments and it was at this time that he initiated the drive for direct power in Hai-Lu-feng, aiming at total land revolution. In flagrant violation of Party policy, the Kwangtung CCP Committee had already issued directives for a revolt to start there on May 1.[28] P'eng, Mao, and other leaders from Kwangtung, Hunan, and Hupeh, together with some of the Russian advisers, had called for the unrestricted confiscation of all land. They were overruled. The directives of the Comintern in May made the priority of the United Front crystal clear: all radical agrarian policy was to be sacrificed. Any form of land revolution was vetoed.[29]

With such divergent views on the land question and on Party policy in general, the internal situation of the CCP deteriorated. The Congress reelected Ch'en Tu-hsiu as General Secretary, but he admitted in open assembly that he was rapidly losing control of the Party's components, because regional committees were supplanting the Central Committee. There was fear that "provincial parties" would go their own way; their own local branches were often "completely autonomous."[30] The pulling apart from

below paralleled what was also happening in the peasant movement. Kwangtung and more recently Hunan were glaring examples of this, and in Hunan, as Chang Kuo-t'ao noted, the members of the CCP local committee "consistently turned toward the left with the leftist turn of the peasant movement."[31]

This was attributable to the CYC groups, whose hold on the peasants and on the Party in the countryside was everywhere very firm. CYC people were generally radicals. Their leader, Jen Pi-shih, was according to Ch'en Tu-hsiu the only one to argue at Party meetings for the withdrawal of the CCP from the United Front that spring.[32] The executive of the CYC went against the Party executive over its opportunism, its capitulation on land policy, and its refusal to arm the peasants. P'eng, himself a former Youth Corps man, was in full agreement with what the "youngsters," so greatly engaged in rural activities, were doing. He attended their Congress in Wuhan on May 10.[33] The CYC proved themselves to be politically stronger than the CCP Central Committee at this time: they were left to face rural problems on their own, taking the side of the peasants and sympathizing with their aims. For them, as for many CCP leaders involved in the peasant movement, the official Comintern or Central Committee line was not of great consequence; hence, whether the CCP was actually leading the rural revolution is open to question.[34]

What of the Peasant Associations meanwhile? Though some did go underground, most were transformed without much ado into KMT-protected bodies; in theory, at least, the authorities would uphold any "reasonable" demands.[35] As for "Land to the Tenants," even in free Hai-Lu-feng that slogan had been only for show. The CCP Kwangtung Committee had advanced such a proposal, but the peasant masses and their "rural operatives" were concerned less with sharpening the struggle than with self-protection.[36] The peasants had never in fact taken sides against the KMT government as such, and it was an ingrained habit among them to follow the stronger, especially where there was nothing to lose and everything to gain by so doing.

One could see the enthusiasm displayed after liberation by the KMT armies as an indication of peasant approval of government policy.[37] The KMT was, after all, "the father," against whom the peasants were reluctant to fight and whose concessions more or less met their own aspirations.[38] However, the All-China Peasant Association did essay a telegram declaring that Chiang was a counterrevolutionary, and that all forces should unite to de-

stroy both him and his government. Mao and P'eng were among the hopeful signatories of this message.[39]

According to rightist sources, the order to start the Haifeng spring revolt was passed down from P'eng P'ai.[40] It is more probable, however, that P'eng and the Kwangtung Committee prior to his departure for Wuhan had decided on it as a contingency measure, when Chiang and General Li showed signs of turning against the Communists. An order as such to begin the revolt never went out because of the general breakdown of communications. The Communist leaders were all in Wuhan for the Fifth Congress, and it is highly unlikely that such an order could have been issued in their absence. The fact was that the East River CCP took the initiative to carry out the peasant revolt it had so long desired.[41]

In the event, to achieve its soviet, Hai-Lu-feng needed two such preliminary uprisings. Both held out for the same period of about ten days, the first from April 30 to May 9, the second from September 17 to 25, and ideology bids us tell of them together.[42] Peasant localism was largely behind the spring revolt: all the indoctrination by Association leaders went for nothing, as the peasants acted solely "pro aris et focis" against the KMT army. There was little class-consciousness, still less political motivation. Despite careful planning by both the East Special and the local cadres, not even all CCP members were behind the revolt, and the mixed bag of slogans (against Chiang and for the KMT) that appeared the morning after a cleanly handled takeover reflected this division over aims and purposes.[43] Officials of every kind were arrested and there was much killing, but it happened out of fear or for revenge rather than to advance the class struggle. No thought was given to the possibility of a withdrawal; supplies and money were missing for that eventuality when it came, and a simple military error—failure to spring a trap on the reoccupying forces—left a taste of defeat.[44]

To one man, Commander Lin Tao-wen, fell the task of bridging the first and second uprisings across the summer months of 1927. From the Lin family of the North Gate, he had joined P'eng P'ai very early after his return from Japan and was a graduate of the third PMTI class. Nicknamed "Pock-marked Tao-wen" from the smallpox scars on his face, he was renowned for his skill at ambush.[45] Warfare continued under Lin from the end of May to mid-August. A series of abortive counterstrikes by the Peasant Army under Wu Chen-min, which ended in that army's marching out of the county on

a disastrous "northern expedition" of its own, left Lin's bands as the one peasant force active at what we shall see was a time of great potential for the movement.[46]

The regular Haifeng garrison was undermanned and cholera had broken out in the city. There was a summer no-rent campaign, and by now the Autumn Harvest directives were known to local leaders. Moving south toward the East River, P'eng P'ai with them, were the KMT left forces of Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung, which had risen in Nanch'ang.[47] On the ground locally the KMT troops were growing demoralized and an important defection took place in early September. With these auspicious omens came a change of tactics for the next round. The new attack called for a coordinated uprising in the countryside, with market towns being taken one by one so as to encircle the county capital. Lufeng was to be recovered first, with Swabue and Haifeng last on the recovery list; but action was to be taken independently of the Yeh-Ho forces.

All went well with this plan, Lin justifying his fame at ambush when a large force of militia was intercepted on its way to Haifeng.[48] The ensuing attempt to occupy the city by a four-pronged drive ended at dawn on September 16 in apparent failure. But the enfeebled garrison troops could stand no more, and by evening they had withdrawn. Immediately, thought was given to the danger of counterattack. But once again intentions outstripped performance: peasants conscripted from village self-defense units did not arrive, and much money was expended on bribing bandits to serve in their place. Land distribution was proclaimed; yet no one knew how to carry it out.[49] If the first uprising had killed too few enemies, then the second would spare none—a promise kept. But where amid the slaughter was a positive social program? Some cadres showed a reluctance to become involved in so much bloodshed; there was little propaganda, and Party visibility was generally low. Even a modest amount of requisitioning took on the appearance of an attack on the people's livelihood.[50] After all this, the eventual planned withdrawal before a strong KMT regiment saw the Communists much discredited. A move out to the central mountain base at Chungt'ung, well-advised though it was, just meant defeat in peasant parlance.[51]

Only the Yeh-Ho troops, then at Swatow, could have saved the second Hai-Lu-feng uprising. But their own troubles will soon be revealed as even greater. Though some units did indeed set off for Hai-Lu-feng, they did not do so as its saviors. We must find out what had happened.[52]

In a speech in Hankow on April 20, Borodin had declared: "Reaction is on the rise in China." But instead of challenging it, he called for a temporary retreat and pointed out "the naïveté with which some of our comrades in Hupeh and Hunan have been unduly occupied." It was false to think that Chiang Kai-shek and imperialism could be done away with so speedily.[53] This contradiction in Borodin, a result of the battle by proxy between rival factions in the Comintern, helps to explain why directives from Moscow and from the CCP Central Committee were so incredibly erratic and incongruous at this time. The effect on China was that all revolutionary zeal ran into the sand.[54]

As for the principle of land revolution, the Fifth CCP Congress upheld it in words but buried it as a practical possibility. Following the Ch'angsha debacle of May 21 (when Communists had to forbid peasants from defending the national revolution), Ch'en Tu-hsiu again proposed a break with the KMT, a move with which Borodin agreed but which he said Moscow would never permit.[55] T'an P'ing-shan complained: "We have to safeguard peasant interests, yet at the same time maintain and consolidate the United Front."[56]

The peasants definitely benefited from the organization of the Association and from military training, but as armed forces they had only a semblance of modernity. Again, it was they who were using their leaders and not vice versa—a fact no Communist document would acknowledge for fear of destroying the Party's political leverage in the KMT as well as the CCP's own illusions.[57] Control by the cadres was hindered anyway by the Association's snowballing membership in the wake of the Northern Expedition. And not surprisingly, after the April 12 party purge, the militarists and many Wuhan leaders felt they would have been better off without the impediment of the peasant and worker organizations.[58] These had transformed Wuhan into a delirious city full of "expectancy and excitement," "an island in the raging sea"; but this was an illusion, for it was a center of economic instability and political tensions, soon to be surrounded by conservative militarists.[59] Wang Ching-wei complained: "The Communists propose our going along with the masses, but where are the masses? Where are the highly praised forces of Shanghai workers, or the Kwangtung or Hunan peasants? There are no such forces!"[60] In the opinion of many, the whole peasant movement was a tragic bluff, and the Peasant Association a "vain error."[61]

Others who were misled included Stalin, the Comintern, and Trotsky himself. Trotsky's faction presumed that the peasants' mentality and aims

corresponded to those of the Communists.[62] When Stalin came around to this thinking it was too late. On June 1, he approved a Comintern telegram directing the CCP to mobilize some 20,000 Communists and 50,000 workers and peasants from Hunan and Hupeh into new army corps under cadet command.[63] Chang Kuo-t'ao remarks: "When this telegram was read at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, none of those present knew whether to laugh or cry."[64] For the peasants, it was not a question of any lateness or indeed earliness: they were hankering after the security and justice of the past, not the Communist utopia to come, and their mentality could not be changed by a few months or even years of training or propaganda.[65] When Stalin's telegram finally acknowledged the inevitability of the peasant struggle, as the "inner core" of the revolution, the CCP Central Committee and Borodin politely answered: "We shall obey as soon as we can."[66]

The first item in this telegram whose contents Roy so ineptly passed on to the KMT left declared that the agrarian revolution should be carried out by the masses themselves: the confiscation act did not need to be promulgated by the national government. This was the main reason why the KMT decided to expel the Communists, who thus circumvented KMT authority on the land question. The break was inevitable.[67]

A terse statement issued by the CCP Central Committee on June 4 (still somehow following the Comintern Resolution of May) encouraged peasants to make revolution for their betterment, despite the setbacks in Hunan and Kwangtung. The peasants, it was declared, should start by establishing a government of their own villages and go on from there, uniting with the smaller landlords to attack the larger, and then challenging warlords and government officials. Soldiers were also welcome to join in. The document urged the Hunan peasants to reestablish the KMT Revolutionary Government, but the KMT leaders in Wuhan saw the writing on the wall all too clearly. On July 15 came the KMT-CCP split.[68]

If the peasants had largely induced the collapse of the United Front, they also had a disruptive effect on the CCP itself. In response to Stalin's telegram, Ch'en Tu-hsiu had declared it necessary to correct peasant "excesses" forthwith, to moderate land confiscation, and to regard the motive force in the peasant movement as poor peasants rather than landless ones. This was all sooner said than done, however. The delay between the statement of policy and its implementation gave Bukharin cause to notify the Comintern that the CCP had rejected its instructions as "impractical." In consequence,

the Comintern called upon CCP members to oppose the opportunism of their leaders, who were hampering the peasant revolution instead of facilitating it. Borodin recommended to Ch'en that he step down as Party leader and Ch'en duly complied on July 15.[69] Days later, Borodin too was gone. Isaacs puts the dilemma thus: "Moscow had imposed a formula which canceled itself out: victory was impossible without the agrarian revolution; victory was also impossible without the cooperation of the Left KMT. But under the leadership of the Left KMT, it was impossible to have the agrarian revolution."[70] The new Comintern envoy, Lominadze, thought that more "steadfast worker-comrades" were needed at the center. A CCP conference was scheduled for August 7 to see what could be done. The Nanch'ang Uprising was to start on the first of the month.[71]

This Emergency Conference marked the official beginning of the "land revolution" for the Party. The faithful were urged to "march forward along the road to Socialism." In the official conference document it was admitted that the land issue had been neglected until the Fifth Congress and that the fault was the Central Committee's. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was blasted for "opportunism," and T'an P'ing-shan's conduct as agriculture minister in Wuhan was described as shameful, because he would not support the land revolution.[72] Mao, himself present, lists P'eng as attending the conference, and he was elected to the new Politburo of the CCP CC.[73] It was decided that Nanch'ang should be but part of a broader insurrection in four provinces, and that the main strength of the peasantry should be expanded into an agrarian struggle through military action.[74]

"Political Tasks and Tactics of the CCP," the conference document, proclaimed the total reliance of the Party on the masses: "The task of achieving China's national liberation and the democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie now falls entirely on the shoulders of the workers' and peasants' movement. Only through the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants can this task be accomplished." It was admitted, however, that at this stage the Chinese revolution was still "a democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie." The Communists had not yet lost all hope of working with the KMT, but that organization would first have to be thoroughly "revolutionized" from within.

The "crux of the bourgeois democratic revolution in China" was radical land confiscation—and this represented a great departure from the Comintern-inspired CCP policies of earlier times. It would allow "countless millions of peasants . . . to rise from below." The autumn harvest season would

be a good time for insurrection: political power in the villages would be easier to transfer to the Peasant Associations. Large and medium landlords were to lose all, small landlords to lower their rents, and the no-rent slogan was to be proclaimed. If this was carried out "within a fixed period, we may proceed to the universal slogan of 'Land to the Tiller,' effect the nationalization of land, and then go on to redistribution."[75] The decision (essentially Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's line) had actually been made in principle before the Emergency Conference. It was a vote for peasant power. On August 23 the new Central Committee, together with the Hunan executive committee, insisted that overemphasis on military forces and apparent lack of confidence in the masses would lead to mere adventurism. On September 5 it again asserted that insurrections must be based not on troops but on the peasant masses.[76]

In all this, the CCP was well aware of the tension generated in the countryside by peasant "excesses" prior to the April clampdown and of the simmering resentment against the KMT. The Autumn Harvest Uprising scheduled for September 10 had been recommended by the CCP in Hunan and Hupeh and had met with Comintern approval, but it is quite likely that the summer harvest no-rent campaign in Hai-Lu-feng also provided inspiration for the whole project.[77] P'eng P'ai must have been aware of these developments at the highest Party level. He was also involved in the preparatory work of the Nanch'ang insurrection that occupied the weeks before the August 7 conference.[78]

This military revolt (still in the name of the KMT) depended initially on the intentions of General Chang Fa-k'uei; but despite that uncertainty, and the eleventh-hour nervousness of the Comintern, the planners had already set their machine in motion before the issue became clear. The two Communist generals in Chang's Army, Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung, were known to be sure; they were joined by Chu Te, the head of Nanch'ang's public security.[79] It was Chou En-lai who was loudest in support of the uprising and of its implementation southward to Kwangtung rather than inland to Hunan. His arguments were twofold. First, the offer of arms and supplies from Moscow could best be taken up via the port of Swatow. Second, the East River peasant movement was known to be very effective; what Chou had seen of it in 1925 told him that here was the ideal base for "strong expansion."[80]

Over the next two months matters turned out disastrously. That Chang at once went against the insurgents troubled them little: 21,000 men in three armies could still be promptly on the move south. What was worse were the

deficiencies revealed in CCP preparation of the ground the armies would cross. In Kiangsi the Party was particularly weak; not even its leader knew of the campaign plan. Peasants along the route fled at the approach of the Nanch'ang armies, having been warned to expect "wives in common" and communized property (a charge by now so old as to suggest that no counterpropaganda whatever had been mounted).[81] Even in "model" Kwangtung the peasant movement was at best patchy: arms were offered and no one took them up; calls for peasant units to step in when the Nanch'ang forces moved on from an area met with little response; and there was widespread reluctance to settle scores with counterrevolutionaries.[82] In vain did P'eng P'ai—his cheerfulness and bravery on the march the subject of many anecdotes—try to rally Ho Lung in October with talk of "300,000 in Hai-Lu-feng having risen to the advance."[83] What had in fact occurred was that general peasant insurrections, which the provincial CCP back in August had planned to time with the arrival of the troops at successive points from Swatow via Huichou to Canton, had been overtaken by the new ideology of September: "peasant primacy" meant no waiting for military support, though Lin Tao-wen had attempted a linkup.[84] Dejected and angry, Chou declared where he would enact the new policy: "I am going to Hai-Lu-feng to raise the banner of the Soviet!"[85] That was not to be, for him at least; but the policy was set. And in pursuit of it, P'eng P'ai and other leaders were before long en route to Hong Kong, there to review with the CCP Kwangtung Committee the newly emerging situation in which it would apply.[86]

By the end of September, the CCP Central Committee and the Comintern had accepted the idea of an independent peasant revolution and the setting up of soviets. *Pravda* reported this on the 30th. These soviets nevertheless were to be established in "industrial centers," to which it was hoped the revolution would spread—since "the soviet slogan, from being a propaganda slogan, must develop into an action slogan." The Peasant Unions, which "have shown their worth as revolutionary organizations," were to take up all the power in the Chinese countryside "under the control of revolutionary committees," and all were to be "converted into soviets of peasant deputies."[87]

Persisting in the illusion that peasants were of the same mind as CCP leaders, the Party Central ascribed the failure of the Nanch'ang uprising to lack of trust in the peasant masses and the absence of land revolution. All the blame was put on the CCP leaders, it being unthinkable that the peas-

antry could let the Party down so miserably. There had been insufficient political work because of the dearth of cadres. As for Yeh and Ho, they had failed "to go to the peasants"; their troops had been taken for "Chiang Kai-shek's Third Army."[88]

The CCP had at least learned a lesson and set itself to preparing clear guidelines, which became the blueprint for the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet. From now on, clarity of aims was essential if the dictatorship of workers and peasants, soviet power, and land revolution were to be realized. The people must confiscate land when and to what extent they wished; the Party must lead them into the land revolution, then on to land nationalization and beyond to the takeover of industry and banking. This could be effected if landlords, gentry, and capitalists were dealt with harshly. In turn, this required a force made up of the masses—the lower classes, including bandits—against the upper classes, in a real Workers and Peasants Army. In all this endeavor, propaganda would ensure that the CCP maintained its hold on the political and military leadership.[89] From Haifeng's Central Base mountain retreat, *The Bolshevik* concluded: "This shows that all revolutions must assemble within the ranks of the CCP and under its flag. The KMT is already dead!"[90] It was a sharp turn in CCP policy, but one that the Kwangtung comrades and P'eng P'ai had long advocated. Now there could be implementation.[91]

A full plan for the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet (the "Plan of Work at County and City Level") had already been drafted by the Kwangtung Committee and submitted to the CCP CC for approval; that approval was given, with minor modifications, on September 23, 1927. The "Plan" laid out all the steps to be taken for consolidating the soviet and made reference to political organization, requisition of land and wealth, arming of workers and peasants, collection of taxes and dues, foreign relations, the nature of the revolutionary committee, work within the KMT, propaganda activities, the workers' economic struggle, and Party organization. This became the blueprint for later action in Hai-Lu-feng.[92] For its part, the East Special issued on October 1 a document listing "Thirty Rules" for revolution, and though this document is reported by a rightist source it follows the CCP line. It demanded total obedience and dedication among the cadres, called for the placing of peasants in the Party echelons, and forbade any resignations during the revolutionary emergency.[93]

The "Thirty Rules" point to a new trend in the CCP after August 7th and the adaptation of policy to local conditions. The document's date proves that

the Party had decided on the establishment of a soviet government through revolution before the Nanch'ang uprising collapsed. In Hai-Lu-feng, under Communist leadership, preparations were going ahead for the establishment of the soviet. The CCP was in a precarious position, however, and no one was naïve enough to believe otherwise. After August 7th, an enlarged session of the Politburo was convened on November 9–10 to make a reassessment of basic policy. This Plenum took disciplinary measures against those presumed responsible for the failure of the uprisings, but stood by the line of August 7th.[94]

Chang Kuo-t'ao states that the Plenum "formally decided to establish a 'soviet regime of the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship' and to carry out the agrarian revolution by organized uprisings."[95] It urged the use of the masses, pursuit of the land revolution, and the exercise of terror. The tide was on an upsurge rather than at ebb, and the establishment of soviets was to happen everywhere as soon as possible.[96] There should be a "permanent revolution," with no clear mark to distinguish the democratic from the socialist variety, although it was understood, especially by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, that the present phase was still worker-peasant, not yet socialist. It was also realized that only in capitalist countries could the soviet be a proletarian dictatorship; in China, it was a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants, the objective of land reform pointing to a democratic rather than to a socialist revolution.[97] The Plenum also adopted the slogan of expropriating the land of all landlords, regardless of the size of holding.[98]

As for the strategy of insurrection, the countryside was to attack the cities along guerrilla lines from rural bases that were expected to be constantly multiplying. The guerrilla warfare would be a natural outgrowth of the peasant struggle, and would result in the creation and expansion of rural bases. While this struggle was going on in the villages, an economic struggle would be waged in the cities, until armed insurrection resulted leading to total revolution by the combined forces of peasants and workers. To secure political power, the urban centers had to be seized first by the workers, the peasants giving support in the countryside. The workers' insurrection was important in itself—in fact, it was to be the center and guideline of the peasant uprising. Economic struggle had to precede urban uprising. Rules on how to lead and carry out a rural or urban insurrection were laid down clearly. The Plenum realized that the time for a general insurrection had not yet come, but the present action was seen as a means of stirring up revolutionary fervor as a prerequisite.[99]

Left out in the cold, Chang Kuo-t'ao termed the Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai uprising plan ridiculous and "obvious adventurism."[100] The CCP leaders, however, were in deadly earnest, still smarting at the charge of "opportunism." Their directives advised that the soviet could not be organized until "a firm victory of the insurrection" was assured, which meant that the uprising had to be maintained in an area for a relatively long time. In the countryside, the vehicle for insurrection was to be the Peasant Association, in form and deed the soviet's precursor.[101]

As events showed, the Communists misunderstood the peasants. They were not so leftist, not so ready to risk all for soviet power, not the best armed forces to take on the KMT's military might. Where success was in fact achieved, it was by dint of contingent circumstances and good preparation under quality Communist leadership of the Peasant Association,* or by relatively greater military strength. Hai-Lu-feng, as we shall see, was an example of the first two factors carrying the day.[102]

It may be useful to end this survey of ideology by distinguishing what may be termed a "military soviet," set up chiefly through conquest, from a "people's soviet," wrought through the masses and protected by them. In fact all the soviets came about through military activity, just as the CCP had envisaged; but there was a qualitative difference between spontaneous mass participation and corralling the masses into the soviet stockade. In Hai-Lu-feng, the long preparation of the masses through the Peasant Association, their opposition to outside forces, and the widespread organization of peasant armed power made for a "people's soviet." Elsewhere, especially in Hunan, the process was more that of a "military soviet"; in Ch'aling, for example, Mao established organs of political power with little preparation for a people's government, and he was criticized for using toughs and mercenaries. There was no vast peasant insurrection at his Chingkangshan.[103]

In China, then, the soviet was a "rural soviet," which for theory at least posed another problem. The whole of Marxist ideology centered upon proletarian revolution; though the peasant soviet was not ruled out, there had always been the idea of the workers leading.[104] Yet here came the Chinese soviet, conceived and enacted largely as the "Peasant Representative Council,"[105] the "political authority of the Peasant Associations."[106] So there was a vexed point of doctrine. Orthodox Comintern writers insisted that soviets were constituted of the urban proletariat under the CCP and that the same

*The peasants considered the soviet as less valid than their Association and in some places they did not want it. They thought of the soviet as "a Peasant Association which had deteriorated" (*PL*:74).

held for the Red Army.[107] Consequently, at the November 1927 Plenum, the need for urban soviets was stressed, as was the warning against reducing urban workers to mere appendages of the peasant movement. Nonetheless, the Plenum accepted that peasant soviets should be established whenever the rising guerrilla forces in the countryside could "obtain victory and hold out in certain areas."[108]

In that respect, Hai-Lu-feng was already far ahead.

# Part Three

## The Peasants as Vindication



# 10

# The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet

P'eng P'ai, reported by one eyewitness as still in Lufeng county on October 7, left for Hong Kong in time for the CCP Kwangtung Committee's meeting there on the 15th. "Reception houses" had been ordered for the comrades from the Yeh-Ho army, but if P'eng stayed in one it was not for long, because although the Committee covered much ground (principally to do with the transfer of peasant-movement leadership from Association to Party and with the new policy of uprisings), its minutes show that P'eng was not expected at further such occasions—they were to happen at least weekly—in the Colony. He was the East Special's head; the Central Committee excused him from its Shanghai meeting planned for early in November; his own East River committee had already issued its plans for revolution.[1]

A source has P'eng back at the central base in Haifeng county on October 19, which is surely too early;[2] but he was openly in Lufeng on November 11 and spoke at the city's Congress of Representatives two days later. By that time, the third uprising was established fact.[3]

Had P'eng indeed been at the Chungt'ung base on October 19, he would have seen the last stragglers of Nanch'ang arrive, some 1,400 troops in all, mainly remnants from Ho Lung's 20th Army, Yeh T'ing's 24th Division, and new peasant recruits mustered a fortnight earlier by the CCP to join the soldiers for an attack on Lufeng. All ranks were dispirited. Few of the soldiers knew what they had been fighting for, caught between loyal KMT forces and hostile peasants and with their own leaders surrendering. It was necessary to tend to the wounded, feed and clothe the soldiers, reinstate the new arrivals with the Workers' and Peasants' Army as the 2d Division, and allow a space for rest and indoctrination.[4]

The East Special and the Hai-Lu-feng Party leaders made preparations for seizing power. To the Central Committee's approval of the Kwangtung "Plan of Work" they now could add a letter of October 12 once more urging use of the peasantry rather than the army. The order was "No surrender"; they were to take "this last chance for survival" and help the peasants to revolt with uprisings first at the village level, then at the level of districts, and finally at the county seat. On October 25, P'eng P'ai issued instructions to begin.[5]

It must be understood, if the KMT's surrender of power is not to seem totally spineless, that the political situation in the province at this moment was in flux. Chang Fa-k'uei was challenging General Li for Canton and was still thought to be loyal to the KMT left, for whom he might create a new capital there. Swatow was important to both Canton and Nanking, but its two most recent commanding generals were of different allegiance. Other militarists were returning to the area, which appeared to be gaining importance again now that the vacuum of the summer months was over and rent payments were due.[6] The Haifeng garrison commander, feeling his position to be precarious in view of Chang's threat to Huichou, decided to withdraw. By October 30 the Lufeng and Swabue garrisons were in Haifeng to make ready the evacuation, and on November 1, despite telegrams to General Li from merchants and gentry seeking to prevent the garrison's leaving, the worried KMT commander led his men off westward to Meilung and beyond.[7]

"Comrades," wrote the Kwangtung Committee to the CCP Hai-Lu-feng soon after, "we are obliged to make a number of stern statements about your report on the taking of Hai-Lu-feng. It was the outcome not of any peasant revolution, but of the timely flight of the enemy terrified by the rumors it heard. Do not overestimate the importance of the occupation."[8] The facts only partly justified this rebuke. Although just one major town, the port of Chiehshih, held out into December and required a prolonged campaign under P'eng P'ai's personal direction before it yielded, there was a struggle for Chiehsheng, across the bay from it, that lasted for three weeks. The implication of peasant revolutionary weakness sounds tendentious.[9] P'eng's "Political Report" concedes that the Yeh-Ho troops alone brought the peasants victory (some militia units would only surrender to the regulars); but in Lufeng the Northwest Peasant Army was outstanding, and in the southeast of the county local peasant units were trusted to act on their own. This reflected Party policy: the army's 2d Division was to step in only when required.[10]

Nevertheless, peasant power was the declared basis for sovietization, and the November Plenum had stressed that the masses must participate if it were to come about.

The Plenum had also insisted on a "democratic" revolutionary takeover through a Congress of Representatives, with decisions reached through people's meetings even during the guerrilla phase that would precede the takeover.[11] Accordingly, provisional revolutionary governments, fully Communist and strongly military, were set up at once both in Haifeng and in Lufeng, with local committees at the district level. These went straight for the land revolution, which they clearly saw as a matter to be well advanced before the Congress met. If there had been any shortage of mass involvement earlier, the sources right and left agree that in one respect at least it was now amply made good. Whether to accept that the killings were in dozens or in hundreds is simply a statistical matter.[12] The CCP Kwangtung's letter just quoted had advised that "the killing of landlords should continue until not one is left. . . . Where this does not occur, the taking of Hai-Lufeng is as unsound as a house built on sand."[13] An East Special "Declaration" spelled this out to mean that petty landowners were included too.[14]

The destruction of landlords' title deeds was imperative. Landlords who had not been killed had to hand in these deeds and all debt records within three days of the order. Then the documents were burned, as were records belonging to pawnbrokers and moneylenders. All articles in pawn were restored to their owners without surcharge. The Soviet chronicler* calls the end of the long and shameful pawn and loan system "a happy event." All gold and silver had to be handed over to the government, and the East Special reported the value of property confiscated from rich merchants and landlords at some ¥40,000. Another ¥20,000 would accrue from valuables and precious metals, and within a few days an additional ¥10,000 would be received from Haifeng. A second provincial CCP letter ordered the requisition of all large shops, but recommended that small ones be left alone.[15]

It was the might of the Peasant Army that made possible the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and the confiscation of land and property. The East Special campaigned for volunteers, the target for new recruits being 600 in Haifeng and 400 in Lufeng. New soldiers would serve a one-year term, could retain their own guns during this period, and could keep them on demobilization. No sooner had the campaign got under way than thou-

*Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai* (*The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet*) appeared anonymously without publisher or place in March 1928. It is claimed that P'eng P'ai wrote the 95-page chronicle, but there is no proof of this.

sands of peasants sought to enlist. The authorities had to deal with the surplus of recruits by ordering each village to organize the *ch'ih-wei chün* (Red Guards' Army), which could be used at the village or county level. The "Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army," as the Central Committee had instructed it be called, was made up of 1,000 men from the Peasant Army Corps and was assigned to protect the government and maintain stability.[16]

The East Special undertook reponsibility for payment of the troops and other military expenses; soldiers who brought their own rifles were reimbursed. In Hai-Lu-feng, the problem was not to get recruits, but to secure arms and military instructors. Indeed, such was the shortage in these two respects that many new men had to be sent away with 20 cents and an assurance that they would be recalled. There was no difficulty about provisions: Haifeng and Lufeng each contributed 1,000 piculs, Tzuchin 500, and Huiyang 300. The normal collection was some 3,000 piculs, and there was a fair stockpile in the mountain bases and at the central base. The rule was that those with 10 *mou* of land or more should give one picul; poor villages were let off with one to two piculs in all.[17]

It was essential to maintain popular support. The CCP Kwangtung had warned that "the taking of Hai-Lu-feng will be consolidated only when all the directives of the Provincial Committee are enacted. These will not be restricted to mere pronouncements about land, statements about confiscation, and the killing of a few reactionaries." One important aspect of the directives concerned politics and the organization of the government there.[18] The Soviet chronicler says: "No words can describe the strong and warm support the peasants are giving to the East River Revolutionary Committee," so happy were they that at last their dreams had materialized, and so willing were they to carry out their duties. This "East Special" was in effect mainly the central organization of the former Peasant Association structure, with generally the same people running things, and the peasants were quite satisfied with their leaders. What had been a social organization was now the Soviet government. At the village and district level, the provisional revolutionary government cadres were all former Association staff. CCP members and Association leaders had blended into a new structure by dint of sharing, for the time being, common goals.[19]

Although an ostensibly Communist program, policy was nevertheless in line with what the peasants of Haifeng had long wished for. The slogans also were ones that would appeal for the most part to peasant aspirations:

"Kill to the last all local bullies, bad gentry, and landlords"; "All land to the peasants"; "All land deeds to the fire"; "Support the Soviet government."[20] Bishop Rayssac of Swatow asserted that P'eng P'ai drew his partisans not primarily on ideological grounds, but because of "the attractiveness of sacking, or nonpayment of debts and rents. Clan rivalry was also cleverly exploited in the pursuit of power," the ground having been prepared during the United Front.[21]

One major Kwangtung directive on prior Central Committee orders was the calling of a Congress of peasants, workers, and soldiers for the organization of the soviet. The East Special also gave clear instructions that such a Congress should take place in Haifeng and Lufeng, and should last for five days. There were to be 300 representatives (60 percent peasants, 30 percent workers, and 10 percent soldiers) chosen by the people from among the peasant and labor unions, the number to be spread evenly throughout the districts and towns on a population-density basis.[22] In Haifeng, the Party set up short courses for organizational groups, whose duty it was to clarify to the peasants their position in the new government.[23]

The provincial CCP's second Letter recommended that the Hai-Lu-feng Party call public meetings and endeavor to induce the most active members of the population to join the CCP. This Letter also urged greater propaganda for the agrarian revolution and against the KMT, which should be branded as a betrayer of the workers and peasants.[24] To boost revolutionary spirit and to publicize the part played by the Communists in the world movement, the East Special held a commemoration of the Russian Revolution on November 7. Haifeng was the site, celebrations taking place in the "Red Palace," the former Confucian temple, now hung with the flag of the International. Over 200 delegates came from Haifeng, Lufeng, Tzuchin, Huiyang, Huilai, P'uning, Wuhua, and elsewhere, the band of the 2d Division entertained, and 6,000 people took part. It echoed what P'eng P'ai had organized in Swatow the previous year, but in a quite different atmosphere and context. Before the opening, "eight or nine counterrevolutionaries were shot dead and many title deeds were burned on the meeting-ground, to roars of approval from those attending." A similar occasion was mounted in Lufeng, although only 100 peasants were present, the bulk of those attending being soldiers. Both meetings give the impression of being stage-managed: a telegram was sent to the CCP Central Committee, to the Chinese Revolutionary Committee, and to the International, designed to be quoted in the press. It attacked the KMT and lauded the efforts of workers and peasants,

especially in Hai-Lu-feng, where, under CCP leadership, they had eradicated all that was bad, implemented the land revolution, and established a soviet government.[25] On November 13 P'eng P'ai attended another occasion: the Congress of Representatives in Lufeng, held at the Lungshan Academy in that city. But the greatest festivity was yet to come.[26]

The realization of P'eng P'ai's long-cherished dream was at hand. On November 18, 1927, there opened in Haifeng city the "Congress of Representatives of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers of Haifeng County." In all, 311 delegates attended: 187 peasants (60 percent), 93 workers (30 percent), and 31 soldiers (10 percent). In compliance with provincial CCP directives, the number of representatives from each district was proportionate to the membership of the Peasant Association there, and delegates were chosen at general meetings of peasants in each district. The same system applied to the number and selection of worker representatives. The soldier delegates were selected through balloting from the Peasant Army and from the 2d Division, which had a fixed allocation. The peasant delegates were very representative of the various districts, but the worker delegates came mainly from the city's 1st district; soldiers from the Peasant Army and the 4th Regiment, both in Kungp'ing, took the lion's share of soldier representation.[27]

Election procedures followed guidelines set by the CCP August 7th Emergency Conference in fulfillment of the slogan "Establish the political authority of the Peasant Associations." Identical procedures were followed at Lufeng. This concept fell just short of creating rural soviets, even though such was not the intention in August. At the Lufeng Congress, P'eng P'ai and Tung Lang delivered speeches from a platform at the top of which two heads were hanging. P'eng described the dais as "a place to harvest landlords"; the press was later to speak of a "Heads' Meeting."[28]

One hundred guests of honor came, many on orders of the East Special from nearby counties. The first day of the Congress proceeded with the most elaborate ceremonial, in keeping with former congresses both local and in Canton. P'eng had a flair for such things, and he chaired all the sessions. Red was the dominant color: the "Red Palace" overlooked "Red Square," bedecked with red lamps and red flags. Red signs and flags bordered the main roads and covered houses and government buildings, cleaned for the occasion. Portraits of Marx and Lenin hung above the square; to the sides were stands for the guests and the band; in the center were mats and pine branches; all around were bunches of red flowers and the ubiquitous revolutionary slogans. It was an impressive spectacle.

The chronicler says that the Congress aimed at making clear to the masses exactly what the land revolution and soviet government meant. Land revolution was on the agenda, and representatives would have the chance to air their views on it. Further, it would be emphasized that the revolution did not end with land distribution and a new government in Hai-Lu-feng alone: these had to come throughout the province and then all over China, if the success in Hai-Lu-feng were to be permanent. The final objective was to convince people that their aspirations had been fulfilled only under CCP leadership and that the Party was the real friend of the masses.[29]

Besides soldiers from the 2d Division, there were peasants also from Hui-yang, Tzuchin, Huilai, and Lufeng, as well as from all over Haifeng county itself. It is plausible to assume that for these peasants the whole event was reminiscent of the old transcounty Flag gatherings. For the Soviet chronicler, however, things were on a much higher plane: "A Congress of workers', peasants', and soldiers' representatives without precedent in China. Never before has there been such warm mass support! It is this that is worthy of remembrance, the most glorious instance in the revolutionary history of China, in particular in that of the proletariat!" Of course the chronicler's aim, as he himself admitted, was to encourage "the workers, peasants, and soldiers not in touch with Hai-Lu-feng"—hence his long and detailed description of the proceedings. P'eng P'ai, too, saw the Congress as "unique, the first of its kind in Chinese history," for the delegates were representing some 400,000 workers, peasants, and soldiers of the county.[30]

After breakfast on the 18th, a procession of representatives entered the Congress area. At 10:00 A.M. a gong was struck and the meeting opened. Following the Soviet chronicler, Chung I-mou lists twenty items on the agenda. "The Internationale" was sung, the band of the 2d Division played, three bows were made to the flag and to the portraits of Marx and Lenin. Then the members of the presiding committee, and its general secretary, Liang Ping-kang, took their seats—all to musical accompaniment.[31]

P'eng P'ai gave the opening address:

> Dear worker comrades, peasant comrades, and soldier comrades! Sixteen years have passed since the 1911 Revolution in China . . . and now, at last, the KMT mask is pulled away! Workers, peasants, soldiers have stood up in full awareness! Our task is to eliminate all oppression, assume all the power of government, and enact the land revolution. The means can be none other than our unity in revolt.
>
> To avoid all suffering, we must stand up, we must support the CCP in its land revolution, the key issue for the Party at present. . . . Nature bestowed land upon us but the landlords grabbed it, leaving us with not a single piece. To secure their hold

on it, they organized a government, a counterrevolutionary government. Then fearing that this government could not in the end guarantee them protection, they established an army, a warlord army. Not satisfied with all this, they invented title deeds to prove their ownership. Thus, they seized all the land, set boundaries to it, and put up markers in their fields.

The Communists knew this full well. They aimed at the liberation of the worker and peasant masses, but realized that without the destruction of the system of private property nothing was possible. For this reason, they led all the people in revolt against the counterrevolutionary government, the army, local thugs, evil gentry, and landlords, to do away with them all and to destroy their land deeds! The Communist Party has, now, instructed all its members to unite with all workers, peasants, and soldiers and crush the counterrevolutionary government, thugs, and evil gentry, to burn all title deeds and root out all markers. Our aim is not for success in Haifeng alone, but throughout Kwangtung, all over China, in the whole world! In China, the counterrevolutionaries have stepped up their attacks on us. Let us arise and resist! The workers, peasants, and soldiers are in possession of the greatest power in the world today. Final victory will be ours![32]

When the audience's enthusiastic reception died down, Tung Lang, commander of the 4th Regiment of the 2d Division, rose to speak. He was followed by Liu Ch'in-hsi, representative of the East River Revolutionary Committee, then Yang Wang, CCP Haifeng Committee delegate, and Chüeh Wu, on behalf of the local CYC committee. All received thunderous applause; the people were deeply moved and spontaneously shouted slogans. The speeches over, the Congress turned to the situation at Chiehsheng, where the militia were still holding out against the Workers' and Peasants' Army stationed in the 5th and 7th districts. Delegates, seething with rage, demanded that a large force be sent to deal with the problem, and a resolution was passed dispatching a company of the 4th Regiment, which set off that very afternoon.

Before the troops left, P'eng P'ai was invited to address them. He spoke about the pioneering nature of the Congress, and about the counterrevolutionaries in Chiehsheng and how they should be dealt with. He asked the troops to be in Chiehsheng by the next day, do their work, and then return to the Congress by the 20th. The company was given a rousing send-off all the way through town, and the Congress then resumed.

Also on the opening day, a telegram was approved and addressed to "The Third International, the Central Committee of the CCP, the Chinese Revolutionary Committee, and all revolutionary organizations in China." It read:

The worker and peasant masses of this county and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, under the leadership of the Communist Party, have already conquered all Haifeng. . . . A Congress of representatives of workers, peasants, and soldiers is now in session to establish a formal Soviet Government, whose intention is to give the land of the county to the peasants, the factories to the workers, and government power to all worker, peasant, and soldier masses through destruction of feudal power, elimination of all counterrevolutionaries, and implementation of the agrarian revolution. This Congress has also issued a Notice calling for the organization of Red Guards at county, district, and village level as a means of consolidating the Soviet Government. These actions of ours are unique in the history of China, even of the entire world, save for Soviet Russia. Our achievement puts us firmly in the vanguard of the Communist Revolution in China. We believe that the Communist leadership is right. We shall in future redouble our efforts to fight under this leadership. We shall strive to assist all districts, all counties, all provinces, all nations, the whole world, so that in the end the proletarian world revolution will succeed.[33]

When the meeting resumed, P'eng P'ai delivered the "Political Report," covering the situation abroad, inside China, and in the East River area, on the general pattern of previous congresses and partly based on Russian models. He received another ovation at the end. The chronicler describes the Report as intended to clarify for the masses developments in Haifeng and the political reality of the county.

Then came an interlude of music, the singing of "The Internationale," and more shouting of slogans. This was followed by a group photograph, tea-drinking, and the lighting of firecrackers. The meeting closed at 5:00 P.M. In the evening, the county CCP Committee hosted a banquet for all the representatives; a great torchlight procession ended the day.[34]

On the 19th the Congress resumed, once again with gongs beaten, "The Internationale," band music, and three bows, all in compliance with protocol. After this, Ch'en Shun-i, member of the Draft Selection and Preparation Committee and the local CCP Secretary, put forward various draft proposals for debate. There was lively discussion on each proposal. The first, on "Land Confiscation," took up much time, and when conclusions were approved unanimously they were circulated through a provisional report.

Just after 10 o'clock a telephone call brought the message that Chieh-sheng had fallen, yielding twenty important prisoners and over forty guns. The Congress cheered this news, shouted slogans, and clapped loudly, the band struck up martial music, and everyone went wild: it was "something quite beyond words." The Congress immediately organized a welcoming

committee to go next day to Tsetaoshan "to receive the glorious Revolutionary Army on its triumphant return from Chiehsheng." Instructions were telephoned back to kill all counterrevolutionaries and to escort the prisoners to Haifeng. In the afternoon, the Congress discussed the second draft proposal, on "The Elimination of the Counterrevolutionaries," the third, on "The Betterment of the Life of the Workers," and the fourth, on "The Betterment of the Life of the Soldiers." This took till dusk, when conclusions were reached and the day's business adjourned. There was a second evening banquet, this one hosted by the Peasant Association and the Labor Union Council and held at Lung-she-p'u.[35]

On November 20, after the Congress had spent half an hour considering the draft on "Aid for the Dependants of Martyrs in Need, and for Workers and Peasants Suffering from Hardship," there was another telephone call: the Revolutionary Army had left Swabue at 6:00 A.M. and would arrive in Haifeng city at about 11. The President suggested that all delegates make the short journey to Tsetaoshan without delay, a proposal met with thunderous applause. The band marched off first, followed by the representatives of various bodies (the Peasant Union, the Labor Union, the Student Union, the Teachers' Federation, the Women's Association, and others), followed in turn by the Workers' and Peasants' Army stationed in Haifeng city, the government of the Soviet, and the "Red Guards." In all, some 10,000 people marched. When the procession reached Tsetaoshan, the first groups of the Revolutionary Army were already in sight, together with their prisoners and captured guns. More rousing scenes ensued, the atmosphere full of revolutionary spirit and exuberance. For the peasants, it evoked happy memories of past triumphant returns of their victorious army. Then everyone went back to Lung-she-p'u for the reception, where Lin Tao-wen and a soldier comrade from the 4th Regiment gave an account of events. The Congress officers raised the matter of punishment for the prisoners, asking each representative to state his wish, but before this individual polling could be done there was a general clamor for their execution. Everyone was in agreement, and another bout of cheering and clapping followed. The meeting closed with songs and slogans.[36]

The execution took place with the prisoners surrounded by an ocean of spectators out to enjoy themselves. Fr. L. Bianchi recollects how, after an oration on Bolshevism, P'eng P'ai started the massacre of the prisoners. Another eyewitness, whose lineage house overlooked the site of the gathering, reports that since nobody else had the nerve to cut off the first head, P'eng grabbed one of the long knives and gave a demonstration of how to do it. It

was pouring rain, there was no shelter, but the army maintained its order. The gory affair over, soldiers and representatives repaired to the "Wan-shou-ssu" (the Temple of Longevity) for another feast.[37]

The Congress was intended to last for three days but had to be extended. Apart from the Chiehsheng developments, there was a public commemoration of earlier peasant martyrs as well as a mass military parade. Before the fourth day's business, P'eng gave a report on the attack on Chiehshih that he had led earlier in the month. He spoke movingly about how the peasants in the area should learn to rely on themselves rather than on the army to conquer the place.

During the meeting proper, two further drafts were brought up for debate (on "The Elimination of Customary Dues and Random Taxes" and "The Question of Women"), along with a proposal forbidding the transport of grain to places outside the jurisdiction of the Soviet, an item raised spontaneously. But as time was running short, the chairman suggested not discussing any further draft proposals unless urgent; matters should now be entrusted to the government. His recommendation was accepted.[38]

On the same day, the people of Haifeng marched in an armed parade to show their support for the Soviet. At noon, some 30,000 people rallied in Lung-she-p'u, spilling over into adjacent areas. The chairman, Ch'en Shun-i, explained the reason for the rally, and representatives of various organizations also spoke briefly. Then came the march-past. There was enormous excitement as over ten piculs' weight of land deeds went up in flames and a dozen counterrevolutionaries were shot. P'eng P'ai delivered another tirade against internal enemies. Once again slogans were shouted, firecrackers were lit, and the air was a mass of red flags. The afternoon session saw the approval of the resolution on P'eng P'ai's Political Report, plus the approval of the document and proposals prepared by the local CYC committee. Next came elections, the candidates first being introduced. There were twenty, of whom twelve were peasants, five workers, and three soldiers; election was by a show of hands. When this was finished, there was some music and singing, and the day's business was done.[39]

In the evening, a ceremony was held to mark the closing of the Congress. On behalf of the presiding committee, Ch'en Shun-i presented the new Soviet cabinet and the members of the judicial committee. These then swore the following oath:

> We resolve to fight for the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers; we do not fear death; we do not seek money; we will not be selfish or partial; we must kill local bullies, evil gentry, and landlords; we must burn all "red land deeds" and vigorously

and decisively implement the land revolution; we shall fight to eliminate all new and old warlords and imperialism, and to bring about the world revolution; if ever we steal or become lazy or retreat in fear, we will be ready to be judged by the Congress and shot.

Then one of the representatives took the seal of the "Soviet Government of Haifeng" and presented it to the cabinet. The crowd thereupon cheered, firecrackers went off, the band played at full volume, and the Congress was over. The CCP November Plenum had laid down directives for the government: the soviet was defined as the organ of political power and took the form of a council of deputies of the masses—workers and peasants—whose duty was to pursue the revolution by organizing insurrections. Once these insurrections were successful, it would become the organ of government. So it was in Hai-Lu-feng.[40]

The Soviet chronicler lists the cabinet, with the number of votes each received: Yang Wang, peasant movement (unanimous); Wu Li-shih, peasant (191); Huang Yeh-ch'eng, peasant (246); Tseng T'ien, peasant (191); Yang Ch'i-shan, peasant (234); Huang Lin-han, peasant (185); Ku Hung-chiang, peasant (239); Chung Ma-ning, peasant (176); Ch'en Shun-i, workers' movement (unanimous); Ho Lien-fang, worker (unanimous; a woman); Chiang Chung-chih, worker (251); Wu Ch'un, worker (214); Wang Huai-tung, soldier (239).

This arrangement roughly matched the policy of having a cabinet comprising 60 percent peasants, 30 percent workers, and 10 percent soldiers in the legislative body of the Congress as well as in the executive. Six of those named were already members of the Congress' presiding committee. The Soviet government in Lufeng was installed on November 13 and prominent in it were Lin T'ieh-shih, P'eng Yüan-chang, Wu Chien-liang, and Chang Wei.[41]

Under the county soviet government came also the district and village soviets with their committees, elected according to the Peasant Association charter. Haifeng, Lufeng, and Swabue had in addition their "city soviet committees," elected by 150 representatives, 50 percent of whom were workers, 30 percent peasants, 10 percent soldiers, and the rest probably merchants and students. The peasant members had to be living within a three-kilometer radius of the city. All subcounty soviets had their own political, financial, and military administration.[42]

The judicial committee of the Haifeng Soviet had fourteen members also elected by the Congress. There were eight peasants plus a full-time peasant-

movement leader, three workers, and two soldiers. Again, the percentages here are roughly the same, with peasants predominating. In both executive and judiciary women were included, particularly among the worker members.[43] The Korean Communist eyewitness, Kim San, reported that the Red leaders established a seven-member revolutionary court with the power of life and death throughout the Soviet region. "During my months in Hai-Lu-feng, I saw several death lists. The names were checked or dismissed so lightly with a flick of the pen that it frightened me." The court was not particularly active, however, and when the foreigner Kim was invited to attend as an impartial observer only four people were sentenced to death. Every village soviet had its authority to pass capital punishment.[44]

On December 1, a huge mass gathering took place in Red Square in Hai-feng city. There is a photograph showing a sea of heads and thousands of flags, as people massed to celebrate the establishment of the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government of Haifeng county.[45] The intonation of official statements, P'eng P'ai's Political Report, and the Congress proceedings all indicate manipulation behind the scenes by the local Communist leaders, whose very language seems addressed not so much to peasants as to convinced Party members. Many representatives came from local CCP ranks: much recruitment had been done among peasants and workers. But in any case the formalities of the Congress, the decorations, the prominent position afforded to the Red Flag and that of the International, the portraits of Marx and Lenin—all these point to a practical, if not formal, assumption of power by the CCP. The Political Report laid out the framework in which the Congress was to interpret and make conclusions on local and world realities, as well as offering terms of reference for the Resolutions. The special committee in charge of preparing the drafts we know to have been chaired by Ch'en Shun-i, who had succeeded Cheng Chih-yün as local CCP Secretary. More than in any other peasant congress, the content was unabashedly Communist; a leftist source notes that P'eng P'ai was personally leading all activities at the Congress. It is obvious that the intention was to create a firm base for the CCP to operate from in response to Central Committee directives. For the peasants in Haifeng, it was the only choice possible.[46]

But in the opinion of a Russian observer: "Peasants had little idea of what a 'Su-wei-ai' or Soviet really was. Some thought that 'Mr. Su' was arriving to deliver them from their hardships, whereas others understood it to mean 'This is mine,' which sounded somewhat similar."[47] Nonetheless, they were at least aware that they were now in command along with their friends of

the Peasant Association and the CCP, that their exploiters and enemies had been destroyed or put to flight, that no taxes were to be paid, and that all would have a share of the land. They knew that they had done something stupendous and unique.[48]

Once the Soviet was formally installed, the leaders went ahead in earnest with organizing its structure and promoting its activities, in accordance with the Congress resolutions. The members of the cabinet were assigned to ten committees: the General Secretariat, and the Judicial, Political, Financial, Education, Health, Communications, Land Development, Military, and Trade and Industry committees. Each had a chairman, five members, a secretary, and two clerks. A contemporary rightist source complains that although the government was formed mainly of elected workers and peasants, it was in fact manipulated by the Communist Party and became a vehicle for implementing Communist policies. The President of the Soviet was P'eng P'ai, simply called Chairman P'eng; he was concurrently Secretary of the East River Special Revolutionary Committee of the CCP and a CCP Central Committee member.[49]

One pertinent question is where the local leaders came up with the whole soviet political structure. Some of it may have been elaborations of former Peasant Association organization, but it is more likely that it all derived from the CCP Kwangtung's "Plan of Work." The first item in this "Plan" was political organization. It called for the elimination of all feudal power and for the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Only people over the age of twenty, as in the Peasant Association, had the right to vote. District and village Associations were to become the district and village government. At the county level, a fully empowered People's Government was to be elected by a Congress with a representation of 60 percent peasants, 30 percent workers, and 10 percent small merchants and poor intellectuals. The Congress of People's Representatives could number 100 or 300 delegates, depending on the population of the county, such delegates to be elected by their Association. The county government should contain nine or thirteen members and have departments for the various sectors and services. The Congress should also elect a judicial committee. The county was to implement the land revolution in compliance with "Revolutionary Committee" directives. Other directives were set out for city government, which was to be elected by a Congress of Representatives numbering between 200 and 500, with 60 percent workers, 20 percent peasants from adjacent villages, and 20 percent students, teachers, and merchants. Such city govern-

ment was to have the same departments as the county, plus one for External Affairs.[50] Hai-Lu-feng reported back to the CCP Kwangtung that the "Plan of Work" requirements had been met, though the Congress was eleven members over the total and the percentages for the city soviet differed from those that had been sought.[51]

This "Revolutionary Committee" just referred to was in charge of the overall direction of the revolution as its highest command. It issued directives on military matters, finance, communications, and foreign relations. In Hai-Lu-feng it was constituted by the East Special, which was the Party's long arm in the area and had "the spirit of the August 7th Emergency Conference." The East Special had been set up in 1927 and operated from Hai-Lu-feng; it was responsible for all aspects of the revolution in the East River area, and became for many people synonymous with the government itself, as sources both right and left confirm. The Secretary answered in particular for the political and financial affairs of all counties, organization and propaganda being left to the other committee members.[52]

The East Special had moved from the central base first to a small monastery on Lungshan—quite near to Haifeng city—and then to Ch'iao-tung-she, where it was housed in the Lin ancestral hall. P'eng P'ai was Secretary, and Wang Pei was in charge of the committee office. Yen Ch'ang-i, the Party representative with the 2d Division, ran its military affairs, Ch'en Ch'ih-hua its propaganda. Wang Pei was a dignified man of somber mien, famous for his habitual reference to "the iron laws and the greatness of the proletariat" when addressing troops of the Red Army. Among the committee members were Cheng Chih-yün, Lin Tao-wen, Yang Wang, Lin T'ieh-shih, Wang Huai-tung, and Chang Wei. This was the body that had issued the "Thirty Rules" in October, covering the takeover's first and most practical tasks (notably propaganda and terror), but also setting out procedures should the revolution fail and retreat become necessary. For the latter eventuality, the orders were very detailed: they included suborning the enemy's soldiers and enlisting bandits to the cause.[53]

Kim San describes P'eng P'ai's considerable control over the government through the East Special. Kim states that "this soviet government was actually a democratic dictatorship," a form P'eng well knew how to manage. P'eng was a revolutionary dictator holding plenary powers, though these derived from the consent of the people. He persuaded rather than coerced. There was no Party dictatorship; instead, there was an executive close to the people and carrying out their will. P'eng had the people in his hand and they

followed him. Like a true democrat, he never commanded, only swayed; never thought of himself as in sole control, but believed in and jealously guarded the right of majority decision. "I remember that one day P'eng P'ai explained his principles of government to me, saying 'We must centralize all power at one given point, but if this is not based upon a foundation of mass democracy, it will be no firmer than beancurd.' " It was the old story of the charismatic leader, with the additional mirage that by following him the peasants could achieve their own aims.[54]

Another observer, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien (later chief of staff of the 4th Division in Hai-Lu-feng), worked closely with P'eng P'ai and declared: "This amazing man had great influence over the peasantry—they worshiped him as a god!"[55] In the peasants' mind he was, as we have seen, a bodhisattva with the right to total obedience, the one chosen by Heaven to establish the new order.[56] Prior to the establishment of the Soviet, a KMT officer asked an old man: "When will there be peace again?" The old man replied: "Let our P'eng P'ai become Emperor and there will be peace everywhere!" P'eng was aware of this mentality. His retort was: "Your P'eng P'ai cannot be Emperor, for among us no one person is. . . . All the people of the Soviet will be, since we are all responsible!"[57] For P'eng and his "new comrades," finally in power, the democratic centralism of their Communist schemes had been realized; but for the peasants, it was a case of trusting and obeying a man of destiny. The outcome was much the same for as long as the motivations of both groups ran parallel.

Chang Kuo-t'ao remarked of the Nanch'ang affair: "Politically our comrades made active propaganda for land revolution, but few had any idea of how to make such a revolution."[58] When the workers' and peasants' dictatorship was proclaimed with the second Hai-Lu-feng uprising in September 1927, land distribution was the major plank in its platform and was seen as the best inducement for peasants to join in the revolution. But a number of factors then militated against carrying it out; moreover, the "Thirty Rules" of October made no mention of land distribution.[59]

Nevertheless, the intent was there, as were peasant aspirations. The CCP Kwangtung's "Plan of Work" for the Soviet went some way toward meeting the need for practical guidelines. Besides land belonging to local bullies and evil gentry, that of counterrevolutionaries should be confiscated. Large and middle landlords, as well as the collective landlords of clan, temple, and similar holdings, were also to lose their land. No noncultivator of any kind was

to retain more than 30 or 50 *mou*—which of these two amounts to be decided on by the local peasants. Rent was to be a maximum of 30 percent, the figure to be fixed also by the peasants. The county government would be responsible for redistributing confiscated land to tenants, landless laborers, and soldiers, with a standard 30 *mou* per household in the gift of local peasants.[60]

These were helpful guidelines, but they left much to be desired, especially when they were applied. The Congress of Representatives struck out boldly with a first resolution on "Land Confiscation," which set the tone for all subsequent ones. The Soviet authorities, now in full political command, decided to go all the way this time, obliging even small landlords and owner-cultivators to surrender their property, despite CCP Kwangtung recommendations to the contrary. Land would then be redistributed to tenants and owner-cultivators in equal measure. The resolution justified confiscation on the grounds that in the past the landlords had had complete freedom (through land deeds, markers, and assistance from the authorities) to set terms in such a way that the peasants had been victimized. In consequence the rural economy was bankrupt, and the way was open for imperialists to collude with local capitalists in promoting industry and their own interests. Moreover, because the peasants did not own the land there was no incentive for them to improve it. If peasants had some land of their own, they would treat it with greater care, use more fertilizer, and have a better harvest. The village economy would therefore also improve. Nature had bestowed the land on all.[61] But the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet chronicler reported that it was difficult to root out from the peasant mind the notion that land belonged to the landlords. Messages of a different kind had to be implanted: "Land was made not by landlords, but by heaven; landlords have grabbed it illegally. Peasants have the duty to take back the land so that all may use it, harvest and enjoy it. As a general rule, those who cultivate land should be the ones to enjoy it."[62]

Yet even the chronicler's version of the kind of message needed was too tame for the Congress of Representatives; "heaven" did not make the land, said their resolution. "Heaven" means nothing. "We peasants alone opened up the land and prepared it for cultivation. Therefore, the confiscation and redistribution of land to the peasants is perfectly right."[63] The problem was how to go about it. The Congress was asked for its views and six points were raised to focus the discussion.

Debate was long and earnest, with peasant representatives particularly

keen on being heard. Some points stayed unresolved. One was about the timing and conditions for removal of markers, discussion on which became bogged down owing to lack of clarity in the draft. The draft in fact said, very simply, ". . . distribution . . .," without further explanation. The basic question remained: "In the end, what method of land distribution is to be used?" Difficult problems were foreseen, such as that of someone given too much land and having to hire labor, or of someone not given enough for actual cultivation. What about when a family increased or diminished in size, or moved elsewhere? Was distribution to be once-for-all, or carried out every year, or every three years? The distribution made, what percentage was to go to the village, district, and county governments as public taxation? Could some land be reserved for soldiers' families and cultivated for them? Should those landless comrades who had done yeoman service for the Association be specially treated?

Various criteria were laid down for land distribution. P'eng P'ai is reported to have suggested the following ones: the number of persons in the family; the strength of its individual members (young/old, hardy/weak); the family's financial circumstances (income from other sources); and the fertility of the land allocated. Moreover, P'eng proposed that the period for land distribution be set by the village soviet and not necessarily on the Russian system; that the annual contribution to village, district, and county governments be a provisional 10 percent, as from June 1928; that soldiers' families be allowed to hire labor; that landless soldiers on discharge from the army be provided with a livelihood by the soviet government; and that slogans connected with land distribution be "No work, no land" and "No revolution, no land."[64] It is not coincidental that the guidelines offered by P'eng P'ai proved so similar to those already proposed by Mao Tse-tung in August 1927.[65] Both most probably drew from the same Russian source in Canton—the Russian agricultural advisers. P'eng's reference to "the Russian system" seems to confirm this link.[66]

As proof of the new ownership, the Soviet was to issue a land certificate stating that "Mr. . . . of . . . village/district was allotted for cultivation the land described as follows, formerly owned or tenant-worked and confiscated by the Government"; only the certificate holder was entitled to use the land; the certificate was not transferable either by sale or mortgage, and in the event of its loss, the holder was to notify the government immediately and would be issued with a new one. The land certificate did not allow of commercial transactions, but did represent a real right of possession far be-

yond simple usufruct. The ultimate landowner remained the Soviet, but the new tax imposed was in no way held to be rent. Communist documents generally spoke of the land as belonging to the Soviet. However, this meant only for purposes of confiscation and redistribution: land once distributed belonged to the peasants' beneficiaries also. The ban on sale or mortgage arose out of this concern for equality, and to preclude the enrichment of ex-tenants.[67] This also applied in the later Kiangsi Soviet, where land-ownership certificates constituted legal evidence that the peasants actually owned the land—a factor of much psychological importance for those who had never before owned any.[68] The old land deeds and titles had to be handed in on pain of death. There was a rush to surrender such documents, which were then destroyed, along with others concerning debts. By the end of January 1928 an estimated 471,000 land deeds and 58,000 ledgers had gone up in smoke.[69]

The guidelines for the land revolution in Hai-Lu-feng can also be ascribed in part to the Kwangtung CCP Committee, which, as documents show, bore the Russian experience in mind. It is likely that the hypothetical problems raised had already been considered by Borodin and his Russian colleagues both in Canton and, later, in Wuhan, when the land controversy was raging and total confiscation and redistribution were countenanced. When the Central Land Committee was preparing its report in Wuhan, the members had to hand "The Solution of the Land Question in Russia" by the visiting expert Tarkhanov. Chang T'ai-lei, then Secretary of the new CCP Kwangtung Committee, had earlier visited Russia and had made himself familiar with land problems and their solutions in that country. This "land law" of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet may nonetheless be seen as the first of many aimed at turning the Chinese countryside into a socialist reality.[70]

According to L. P. Deliusin, who has access to contemporary Russian sources, there is absolutely no reliable or precise information on how Hai-Lu-feng land was actually distributed to each family according to the standards set out by the village soviets. Where possible, some pieces of land were apportioned to the weak, the old, and children, in accordance with directives on helping the poor and the widowed, vague though these directives were. Matters did not proceed as smoothly as expected. The peasants objected, for instance, to redistribution being carried out during the spring sowing.[71] In February 1928, the Communist Huang P'ing spoke of "peasant owners unwilling to burn land deeds and to destroy the demarcations of

their holdings." When redistribution did take place, the original enthusiasm of the peasants and others involved "was seen to wane." Huang states: "In Hai-Lu-feng, it was implemented only in a few villages." Huang's account was much concerned about the conditions of farm laborers and the unemployment of artisans. It recommended the formation of a Union of such laborers or rural workers: "Serious attention must be paid to this question. It is necessary to advance the slogans of full redivision of land and egalitarianism [prohibition of the sale and purchase of land and hired labor in the village], basic slogans in the program." Depending on local conditions, traditional slogans were also to be promoted to attract smallholders and to organize farm laborers.[72]

There is ample evidence to show that peasants were far from accepting of land nationalization, the cornerstone and ultimate aim of Communist land policy. Even equal distribution met with objections, especially when the markers were removed and indiscriminate division took place. Former tenants and landless peasants were later very reluctant to surrender their newly acquired land rights to permit collective farms to be set up. In fact, only one such farm was established, in the northern village of Machu, a bastion of the peasant movement and the home region of Yang Ch'i-shan.[73] The same thing was later found in Hunan. Wang Shou-tao reports that in the spring and summer of 1928, when experiments were made with the collective system of cultivation in Liuyang and P'ingkiang (Hunan), "nobody knew how to begin land revolution, no one having any experience of it. Later on, after the 6th Congress, we received instructions from the Party. The collectivization experiment was not successful. We endeavored to collectivize all farms, share the work among the peasants, and divide the crops at harvest. The peasants did not respond well to this. They wanted land of their own, each family cultivating its own plot. The Party recognized this and changed its policy."[74] Such changes of tack were to become normal in the countryside when peasant line clashed with Communist line. We see again how, even in the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, peasant goals were not always those of the Party. Lo Ch'i-yüan summed matters up with the statement, "The work of land revolution was satisfactory"[75]—not exactly the way to describe the huge success that had been expected.

As Communist accounts confirm, "the destruction of documents was of enormous importance to the peasantry, for it involved the basic destruction of the old system of land ownership; in the event of the landlords returning to power it would be impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to restore the

system of exploitation." This was particularly true of the removal of markers, an action symbolizing the abolition of what P'eng called "the former private-property ideology." Here, too, in the event of reaction, the precise boundaries of landowners' estates would be virtually impossible to restore. Communist observers state that "the practice of making agrarian reforms in this region was a valuable contribution to the further elaboration of the agrarian problem."[76] It was no easy task. Lo Ch'i-yüan puts it thus: "It was not just a question of ousting the local bullies and landlords; the old economic relationships underwent a total change."[77]

One commentator has pointed up the "traditional" nature of the Hai-Lu-feng enterprise: "In fact, rural Haifeng had come to resemble more a medieval European village commune with its annual redivision of common property, notions of equity, and absence of private property in land, than a society in the process of socialist transformation. Rather than pointing to a socialist future of large-scale mechanized and collective agriculture, the [Congress] Resolution on the confiscation of land looked backward to the well-nigh universal peasant longing for a world without lords."[78] In a recent Communist appraisal, the confiscation of the land of owner-cultivators is termed "a shortcoming" at this stage, because it was "too early to raise the slogan of collective farms." The commentator opines that "this attack against the idea of private property was at that time beyond the understanding of the masses and against the nature of the revolution. In addition, the fact that landlords were excluded from getting land increased the obstinacy of the enemy."[79]

But that was CCP policy: Hai-Lu-feng was merely following recent Party guidelines for confiscation of all privately owned land, while trying to adapt to local circumstances. A CCP Politburo Declaration of January 3, 1928, stated: "This peasant revolution has a full revolutionary nature and has totally destroyed the poison of the former opportunism."[80] Referring to the various efforts to establish soviets in many areas, contemporary Russian documents also spoke of "not simply a peasant movement but [a] communist [one] first: the soviet movement."[81]

A document entitled "Confiscate All Land and Set Up Soviets" was issued by the CCP Central Committee sometime between February and June 1928. The soviet was to retain ownership of all land, the peasants enjoying usufruct rights only. The same document changed the criteria for land distribution: instead of an equal share for all, labor power became the yardstick.[82] In Chingkangshan, Mao Tse-tung complied, "so that a person with

labor power is allotted twice as much land as one without."[83] The Sixth CCP Congress changed tack on that principle too, in July, and so (with baffling ease) did Mao; but that is another story.[84]

Soviet society was to be classless, as had been demanded by CCP directives. The CCP November Plenum pronounced: "The Party must strive to make the peasants deal severely with, and kill without compunction, all local bullies, evil gentry, and counterrevolutionaries in the shortest possible period of guerrilla warfare."[85] The wealthy, landlords and merchants, the intelligentsia—indeed, all who were not of worker or peasant stock—were to be downgraded to that level or eliminated if guilty of counterrevolutionary or criminal activities. The class struggle was to be waged to the full, the Congress having embodied this doctrine in a resolution on "The Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries."* Those to be arrested and executed included corrupt officials, local bullies, evil gentry and landlords, spies and propagandists, former KMT police and guards, tax collectors, messengers, and all in any way officially serving the old authorities. Labor unions and the Peasant Association were empowered to order their arrest, investigation, and execution. Villages had the right to ferret out any in hiding, to kill them, burn their houses, and confiscate any wealth; but the wives of such people were to be free to return to their paternal homes, or to remarry if innocent of all crime. Workers and peasants were urged to be on the alert for enemies, especially in the coastal areas. Anyone possessing gold, silver, cloth, equipment, or livestock belonging to members of the traitor [KMT] party should surrender all, otherwise he would be considered an accomplice and be punished accordingly. Anyone found giving comfort to, or communicating with, the enemy would face death. Persons suspected of crimes were to be handed over to the village government, which would discuss and deal with the matter. The village government was not empowered to release people, however; this prerogative rested with the district government. The "secret organization" (perhaps a special police force) and the "Red Guards" in each village and district were to carry out surveillance of suspected enemies and investigate contracts and rent ledgers. The Congress had decided that these

*In his final speech to the Congress on November 21, 1927, P'eng P'ai declared: "On returning home each representative must kill at least 10 counterrevolutionaries and he must also lead peasants and workers to kill 10 more to a total of 20 per representative: with 300 representatives, the final count will be 6,000. But that is not enough since more will still be left behind. . . . We must kill! kill! kill!, until the water in the harbor of Swabue and in the bay of Ma-kung turns red, and all the clothes of each brother are tainted red with the blood of the counterrevolutionaries!" (*PW*:293).

Red Guards should be formed in all villages and districts and had instructed the soviet government to serve notice to that effect.[86]

The emergency situation seemed to justify such draconian rules, although the CCP's "Red Terror" directives endowed harshness with the status of policy. Against this it is clear that many peasants and the majority of the young intelligentsia were undoubtedly influenced by Communist ideology and devotedly set themselves to purging Hai-Lu-feng of its enemies. In a report to Governor Clementi of Hong Kong, Bishop Valtorta asserted: "The Communists have so influenced the masses, their doctrines [have] so taken hold [among] many of the younger generation, and their terrible reprisals [have] so frightened others, that only a strong military force could end the trouble there." For the same reason, Chung Hsiu-nan was urging his fellow exiles to hasten the counterattack. Red spies were everywhere—beginning with the children—and did their job well. Bishop Valtorta spoke of "a well-organized system of spies,"[87] and Fr. Bianchi referred to a soviet "secret police," dubious, evil, and handsomely paid, thirsty for vengeance and blood, and made up of "terrible" characters.

Revolutionary justice was in full swing. At the village level, the accusation of being a counterrevolutionary was enough to justify execution. When the local soviet government met, the slightest majority of votes in favor of the death penalty sealed the fate of the accused.[88] Chung I-mou claims that judgment was dispensed by the judicial committee, but the Soviet chronicler and others imply that the peasants were given a free hand to capture and kill, but not to release—the village soviet being invested with the power of life and death.[89]

The execution ground provided a spectacle in keeping with old feud practice. Involvement of the masses in such killings was part of the CCP design, as Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai indicates in one of his writings of mid-December 1927: "It is not possible to do without a policy of 'Kill! Kill!' The CCP approves and directs such a policy," to be carried out by the masses not only for the sake of killing and burning, but in order to establish the people's government.[90]

The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet as a whole was firmly under control, stage-managed as it was by "a small central body, whose orders were carried out by the members of the Peasant Association" and other bodies. The group of people thus referred to in a Presbyterian missionary report were the local CCP, which was ubiquitous and strongly represented in the whole structure, and which in underground parlance was called the *tsu-chih* (The Organiza-

tion).[91] In Hai-Lu-feng, "all social movements were controlled by the Party members," notes the chronicler.[92] A rightist source describes the soviet government as "the tool of the CCP and a façade. Many of the members are workers and peasants, but the real master is the CCP."[93] Even a Communist report deplores the confusion of roles among the three centers of power—the government, the CCP, and the Peasant Association—and states that "the government and the CCP were often one and the same thing."[94]

During the Soviet, the Haifeng local CCP Committee was headquartered in the famous Ma lineage house. Among its prominent members, Ch'en Shun-i was Secretary, Lin Pin was in charge of organization, and Liang Ping-kang handled propaganda. In Lufeng, the CCP Committee had Lin T'ieh-shih as Secretary, Wu Chien-liang for organization, and P'eng Yüan-chang for propaganda; the Committee also included Chang Wei. The County Committee consisted of eleven members, with a standing committee of three (Secretary, Organization, and Propaganda) and other members seeing to administration, the military, and so on. District Committees had nine members, with a standing committee of three. There were five members to a unit, with one of them in charge; a specified number of units constituted a cell, with a three-member standing committee at the village level.[95] The Party could now come out into the open, though directives of the CCP Kwangtung Committee recommended that the organization should remain covert—particularly where documents, the time and place of meetings, and lines of communication were concerned—against a possible reversal and the need to go underground.[96]

The local CCP deemed it most important to reopen the Party Training School first founded by P'eng P'ai; accordingly, following East Special directives, classes started in the Liao-chien-hu building in Chiatzu (Lufeng). The East River Party School specialized in turning out cadres, as Haifeng had requested. The teaching staff included Ch'en Ch'ih-hua and some Korean Comintern associates. Lo Ch'i-yüan reports many other training classes elsewhere.[97]

The Party expanded greatly under the Soviet, with cells being established in all districts and many villages. The peasants were very much aware of its presence and took to calling it the *ta-hsüeh* (University), whereas the CYC was the *chung-hsüeh* (Middle School). The initial letters of "Communist Party," "C" and "P," were interpreted as "sickle" and "ax" respectively, the sickle standing for the peasants and the ax for the workers, so that the Party represented them both.[98]

A Communist report affirms that the CCP leadership was popular in the

countryside and that membership increased spectacularly. From the few hundreds of November 1927, membership grew to 2,700 by the end of the year and to 7,570 in early 1928.[99] Another report puts membership at 15,000, with whole villages occasionally enrolling.[100] The period from November 1927 to February 1928 saw 83 expulsions. At the end of February, there were 165 village cells, 67 mixed cells, and 7 workers-only cells, making 239 in all. They consisted of 85 percent peasants, 10 percent workers, 2.5 percent intelligentsia, and 2.5 percent others. There was an unspecified but significant number of women. In Lufeng the CCP was much less organized.[101] The CCP membership in Hai-Lu-feng was substantial, but several reports emphasize that Party control lay in the hands of a small minority, very probably the 2.5 percent intelligentsia who had been there from the start. "Full membership of the Communist Party was carefully restricted to a small number, probably no more than one hundred."[102] One Communist document praised the growth of membership in Hai-Lu-feng, but nevertheless criticized the local Party for the number of intellectuals in key posts everywhere.[103]

That so many new members were admitted was the result of complaints aired at the November Plenum to the effect that "cadres are not peasants and workers, but intellectuals and small capitalists," a fact that was responsible for Party shortcomings and that had to be rectified. The Nanch'ang collapse, the short-lived Canton Commune, and various peasant revolts convinced the Central Committee that "they must change into a Bolshevik Party," for which reason more cells had to be opened among the peasants, workers, and soldiers: "We cannot direct them unless we expand among them." Village cells were essential and Party members had to be on Peasant Association committees, where they could fight for the establishment of soviets. On the one hand, the CCP CC revealed that after the April 1927 Party purge, membership dropped from 50,000 to around 10,000, evidence of faulty admission and training policy; on the other hand, it pleaded: "Admit new and more workers, peasants, and soldiers!"[104] The CCP CC had issued similar directives to the CCP Kwangtung on September 23: "Invite and urge workers and peasants to assume responsible positions in the Party, and use them to expand and lead the worker and peasant movement."[105] The Politburo would come to the same view after its assessment of the Canton Uprising. An increase in membership would not, however, mean a reduction in errors; and though military power might be enhanced, there might be decreased awareness and diminished theoretical understanding.[106]

A CCP Haifeng report of November 9, most likely compiled by P'eng

P'ai, bluntly stated that "in all the East River counties except for Hai-Lu-feng, the CCP is weak and there is a lack of cadres." Haifeng was flooded with requests for manpower, but up to November 1927 there were no spare cadres available. Despite notable achievements in Hsingning, and the readiness of peasants in Tzuchin to revolt against high rents, crash training courses were needed to make East River cadres appreciate the position of the peasants in the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet and in the general political situation. The Haifeng report complained that in Wuhua there was too much stress on militarization and that the Peasant Army was out of touch with the Association, having developed into an independent, quasi-military body. Party members in Huichou displayed opportunism when they delayed peasant uprisings pending the outcome of the confrontation between KMT generals. In Huilai, the Party base was weak, no Party work was done, and organizers had to be sent there to improve the situation.[107]

The CCP made good use of propaganda for control of the Soviet and enjoyed a clear field, since the counterrevolutionary intelligentsia had either left or been silenced. A contemporary states that Haifeng people were in the dark about political changes in China: "All information came from a newsletter and articles by 'The Organization.' All these articles spoke of a favorable situation for the revolution." Only later did they come to know that the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet was "an early crop" and that "the revolution was short-lived."[108] The Party ran its newspapers, *Red Flag* and *The Bolshevik*. Those most responsible for propaganda were Liang Ping-kang, Ch'en Shao-t'ung, Ch'en Shun-i, and a cousin of P'eng P'ai. In charge of printing at the "East Special propaganda office" were Ch'en Ch'ih-hua and Pai Yen-i. *Red Flag* aimed at a popular readership, initially appearing every three days but later, owing to a shortage of paper and ink, once a week. *The Bolshevik* dealt more with Marxist and Leninist doctrine and was intended for cadres and intellectuals. The printing press operated from October 1927 to February 1928.[109]

A mixed brigade of 80 CCP members and 80 nonmembers made the rounds of the villages doing propaganda work. A Communist report praised this work, even though it was superficial, but found the propaganda deficient. Measures were not explained well enough. It was the character of the local people that underlay this inadequacy, for though they willingly roused themselves to "revolutionary" action, they were not so ready to deliberate upon the whys and wherefores: the doctrinaire intricacies of Marxist philosophy passed completely over their heads.[110]

Slogans, leaflets, posters, cartoons, and songs were the staple of popular propaganda. There were also well-known "Red Song and Dance Ensembles," lion-dance and choral teams, and theatrical troupes, all of whom helped carry the message. The provincial CCP's 2d Letter recommended such methods, which in any case were areas where Haifeng excelled.[111] As the Central Committee instructed the Kwangtung Party on September 9, the masses should be made aware of CCP revolutionary policy, the reasons for land revolution, and the need to strengthen solidarity between the people and the soviet government. To popularize policy, every policy-making speech should end with a relevant slogan to be carried into rural areas, discussed at the numerous meetings, and shouted at public assemblies. How far such slogans—we have heard examples earlier—were really grasped and accepted by the peasants remains open to question, but as aids to memory and expressions of the leaders' wishes they served their purpose.[112] A rightist report puts it thus: "Communist strength can be destroyed, but Communist propaganda cannot."[113]

Another means of teaching by example was the propaganda tour. These had been ordered after receipt of the CCP Haifeng's Report early in November. In January 1928, a delegation of 79 peasants from seven counties, 48 of them Communists, arrived for a three-day inspection. They held an "East River Area Conference" and discussed the political situation, mass organization, and relations between the urban proletariat, peasants in the countryside, and the Red Army, to name a few topics. Such groups, consisting in the main of CCP members, were intended to promote the Soviet's achievements on their return home, and many made the pilgrimage to "Little Moscow" to learn from the "cradle of the Revolution" its techniques.[114] Rightist sources claim that visitors from Canton, Swatow, Wuhua, P'uning, Huilai, and Chiehyang were entertained with the executions of some two hundred counterrevolutionaries and with a "Heads' Meeting."[115] Against this, a contemporary remarked that the visiting groups "inspired the people for revolution, gave them faith in standing up for their independence, and boosted the rising tide of revolution in the East River area."[116] Kim San noted: "Neighboring farmers came to look at the new society, nodded their heads in approval, and went back to their villages to organize armed struggle there." Hai-Lu-feng was showing the way yet again.[117]

Apart from organization and propaganda, the Soviet paid attention to public welfare, especially for those who had suffered on its behalf in the struggle. A "People's Hospital" was established, though actually it was the

old County Hospital, operating from April 1927 under a new name. The Soviet also commandeered the Presbyterian Hospital in Swabue. When rumors went around that this hospital was to be removed to Haifeng city, its two Chinese doctors hid the two microscopes in jars for safekeeping.[118]

The Congress of Representatives had proposed "Aid for the Dependents of Martyrs in Need, and for Workers and Peasants Suffering from Hardship." The Soviet government was instructed to serve notice to the district and village soviets to conduct inquiries and submit findings within five months. It was decided to appropriate all the possessions of the traitor [KMT] party and bestow them upon these dependents. A great commemoration for the "martyrs" of the revolution was also to be arranged. The Soviet government would award pensions, but districts and villages also had to contribute their share. Wounded soldiers were to be given financial assistance at once. A Pavilion of Remembrance was to be erected to the fallen.[119]

The picture thus far, then, is of an egalitarian and highly structured society where people were inspired by propaganda, organized into various groups, and conditioned by central directives from an authority purportedly representing the people themselves. In line with the local traditional concept of leadership, understood and accepted by all, the CCP dominated the situation, and the expected charismatic leader, P'eng P'ai, led "The Organization" of the new "Red Flag."

Soviet military power involved three combatant bodies: the Peasant Self-Defense Corps (or Red Guards), the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, and the Red Army. This last was formed by the 2d Division from Nanch'ang and the 4th Division from Canton.

The Peasant Corps had been well organized since 1925 and had steadily taken over many of the functions of the local police. They became "Red Guards" when the Soviet was set up, and worked alongside the other bodies rooting out traditions and eliminating counterrevolutionaries. Their training and arms left much to be desired: the 37,800 Guards reportedly had only 12,500 rifles in all, and these fairly old. True, there were 34,650 other rifles of little military use made by the peasants themselves, plus 37,690 pikes; but in terms of armament the Guards were way behind, nor was there any great military discipline or organization. They were good enough, though, to undertake village security and implement the "Red Terror," especially in their home regions. As village and district police, they had their own seal of authority.

Three hundred Pioneers were also recruited for military service. Some 10,000 women were available for fighting, and some of them transferred to areas other than their own. According to Kim San, the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet had between 70,000 and 100,000 people under arms, with 10,000 rifles. There were 3,000 survivors from Nanch'ang and Canton; the rest were Red Guards and members of the Workers' and Peasants' Army. The *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, however, put the total military strength at only 10,000 and rifles at 5,000, many of them obsolete shotguns. P'eng P'ai was commander-in-chief of the military forces, and Liu Ch'in-hsi was his deputy.[120]

The Red Guards saw action against all the strongholds of reaction, especially Chiehsheng and Chiehshih, where they fought just as their Flag predecessors had long ago. The Red Army remained on the sidelines, only moving in when required.[121] It was Red Guard methods of fighting that came to constitute guerrilla tactics later: they were old hands at this form of warfare and knew when to retreat and when to regroup. They maneuvered with great confidence and looked on the enemy very much from a local perspective, cut down to the size of their old feud antagonists. The Red Guards' way had more of drama in it than of real battle, with hundreds of flags all over the field and a cacophony of noises designed to create atmosphere. Friends could thus be reassured and foes filled with terror. "They would raise up the spirits and make it appear as if they were clashing in the mountains with armies of thousands and thousands of horses."[122] They were adept at laying ambushes in rugged terrain, kidnapping, setting traps and mines, dotting the ground with bamboo spikes, and building fences, walls, trenches, and ditches. All was just as it had been in the past, only now it was carried out with greater zest, for the peasants were now engaged under a Red Flag. Carried away by the din of war, they always felt that victory would be theirs.

The Soviet chronicler commented on the fact that Party leaders and rank-and-file alike treated KMT army strength very lightly. One contemporary of P'eng P'ai described him as "superstitious" about the strength of the people: "He thought that with more people one could defeat any lesser number of enemies, armament being a secondary matter."[123] The people relied heavily on the Workers' and Peasants' Army under Lin Tao-wen; this was the elite. Like the Red Guards, the Workers' and Peasants' Army was open to people from sixteen to 40 years of age. There were six groups of women, each group numbering some 300, but their age went only up to 26. At first, recruits were expected to provide their own food and weapons, but later the

Soviet government assumed this responsibility. When members left the Army, the East Special usually bought back their weapons.

The commanders of the three units of the Workers' and Peasants' Army were P'eng Kuei, Huang Ch'iang, and Ch'en Ts'ang. Overall, the peasant forces in Hai-Lu-feng were far from strong: as a Communist report admitted, they in no way gave the impression of being a modern army.[124]

The CCP had called for "the army to be made up of the masses," stating that this was a prerequisite if a genuine revolution was to be developed. The errors made by the Red Army from Nanch'ang—ironically termed "Chiang Kai-shek's 3d Army"—must never recur, and discipline was to be adapted to new principles of democracy and equality. Soldiers could be elected to command rank or policy-making posts within the Soviet, and they enjoyed election rights in both army and Soviet.[125] A reorganization was thus in line with Central Committee directives, which had arisen out of CCP Kwangtung proposals calling for the arming of all workers and peasants. After the success of the revolution, the Workers' and Peasants' Army was to constitute the Soviet's constabulary and strong right arm. Its core had to be peasants—poor ones especially—since these had nothing to lose and would therefore be the most stubborn fighters, as Mao Tse-tung asserted.[126]

"The Betterment of the Life of the Soldiers" resolution had justified preferential treatment: "The soldiers are on the front line of attack on our behalf, and sacrifice themselves body and soul for us." Improvements in their conditions were urgent. It was decided to allot them new uniforms, padded clothes, and blankets immediately, and to distribute their pay on time. Educational standards were to be improved through a soldiers' school and a recreation club. Officers were prohibited from maltreating other ranks at will. All army accounts were to be published and a watchdog committee was to be elected by the men themselves. Better equipment was to be installed in the Military Hospital, and soldiers' families were to be provided with land and to have the right to employ hired labor. On discharge, soldiers would receive a plot of land from the government.[127]

The conditions also applied to the "guest troops in Hai-Lu-feng," the Red Army, which was the real military backbone of the Soviet. One serious difficulty was in tending to its 300 wounded: medicines were in short supply and the doctor at the central base hospital had fled. Nonetheless, the 2d and 4th Divisions fought in many battles, under orders from P'eng P'ai and the East Special. The Red Army also contained some women soldiers, mainly in charge of auxiliary medical and propaganda services, although they could

fight as bravely as the men. One of them, a Honanese, edited *Hung-chün sheng-huo* (*Life in the Red Army*), the army's newspaper.[128]

Friction sometimes arose between the Red Army and the Workers' and Peasants' Army. There were dialect differences, and local people kept to their own military units. Training differed considerably between the two, as did methods of fighting—the Red Army paying the greater respect to military conventions and to the principles of honorable combat. Sacking and slaughter were generally left to the peasants: they did it with relish.[129] "The Red Army in Hai-Lu-feng was humane and killed as mercifully as possible with a gun," Kim San reported.[130]

There was always a shortage of weapons, especially in the Workers' and Peasants' Army. The Peasant Association had a department whose sole job was to purchase arms wherever it could, and under the Soviet its head, Lin Pin, went out personally to buy them. All the weapons left behind by the defeated Yeh-Ho troops in the area were searched out, and a substantial collection resulted. The Red Army had some hand grenades, machine guns, and cannons, many of them taken from the enemy. Unfortunately, it often happened that men in the same unit held different weapons, which meant that the supply and compatibility of ammunition, and the upkeep and repair of guns, proved difficult. Lin Pin established at Kanchuyüan, a mountain base north of Kungp'ing, a small factory for repairing guns and manufacturing bullets. Guerrillas recovered spent cartridges for refilling, emptied unexploded enemy mortar shells of their powder, and, to save bullets, executed people by other means than shooting.[131] One Communist source reports that "by February 1928, the lack of ammunition was so serious that soldiers had to march with unloaded weapons."[132]

When P'eng P'ai discovered a blacksmith in the 4th Division, he sent him to one of the two small arsenals that had been set up to help produce shotguns. The guns produced at the arsenal in the Chungt'ung base area, which was equipped with machinery taken from Ch'en Chiung-ming's arsenal and, according to a later commentator, with machinery from Hong Kong, were effective only at a range of 200 meters.[133] This commentator charged that the machinery lay idle for many months because no one cared to use it and the authorities neglected defense preparations. "Those who dared to stress the need for military power were derided as 'military machines.'" However, this account contradicts the widespread awareness of the importance of arming the people.[134]

Bullets were made out of every possible material, including tin and iron

implements and household utensils taken from landlords. Chung I-mou tells how each shot would be fired with careful aim. KMT troops were deliberately frightened into shooting off their guns in woods and along mountain tracks, so that the spent cartridges could be gathered for reuse.[135]

Where armaments fell short, training had to be better: the East Special established a Training School for the Workers' and Peasants' Army in Haifeng, immediately enrolling 300. Each county in the area could send 100 trainees to boost local military organization, the school being able to accommodate a maximum of 500. Graduates at the end of their course became junior officers in different units. Another comparable school was set up "for the training of the Model Unit of the Red Guards."[136]

New conscripts were always needed, because defections were not infrequent. A Communist document admits that political work in the army was lacking and irregular. The army was detached from the Party and from the government; military officers did not always see eye to eye with CCP policy and aims. There was a lack of coordination and good communications between units. For all the reorganization, soldiers were still exploited and deprived of rest and recreation.[137]

It was difficult to get local people to enlist in the Red Army. Apart from differences of dialect and custom, "peasants wanted only to organize their own villages and, with the exception of some of the youth, refused to go to neighboring villages to strengthen the Soviet. The well-known localism of the peasants made our work considerably more difficult."[138] The political convictions of regular army troops were also dubious, especially in the 2d Division, and desertions became quite serious. When rumors of impending KMT attacks spread, morale fell drastically.[139]

Economic equality lay at the core of Soviet policy. One remarkable thing was that the CCP Kwangtung's 2d Letter to the Haifeng Committee, though advocating large-scale destruction or requisition, recommended that small shops be left alone for the time being.[140] Rightist sources put the number of shops taken over at more than 10,000;[141] the Soviet was able to realize some ¥40,000 from the earliest confiscations of property. Ultimately all shops, great and small, were commandeered and their former owners became Soviet employees, regardless of their political views and despite the Kwangtung recommendation.[142]

Mention has already been made of the ¥20,000, later increased to ¥30,000, that the seizure of gold and silver produced. The Kwangtung

Committee had restricted such seizure to the wealth of bullies, bad gentry, and corrupt officials; the Soviet had a free hand, however, in how it used this revenue.[143] According to an eyewitness, Yang Wang was entrusted with supervising confiscations. Through a network of informers and agents, he investigated the activities in the goldsmith shops and pawnshops and then suddenly swooped down upon them. He knew full well that at the least suspicion of danger his fellow-countrymen would stow their valuables away. The eyewitness reports that thousands of items were seized, he himself having seen one sackful worth several thousand taels. The loot was then handed over to higher-ups, probably P'eng P'ai and Ch'en Tzu-ch'i, chairman of the finance committee, and subsequently made its way through underground routes to the markets of Huichou and Hong Kong. The proceeds went toward Party activities.[144]

Nonetheless, Politburo declarations could assert: "It was possible to secure the economic and political collaboration of the small [Hai-Lu-feng] capitalist class, and trade between Haifeng city and the rural area increased substantially, so that even the middle capitalist class remained neutral."[145] Another leftist source confirms that prices under the Soviet fell and that the people's livelihood improved because of worker-run cooperatives. As peasant buying power increased, the small and middle merchants profited.[146]

But with all the big merchants taking refuge in Swatow and Hong Kong, business soon slumped and the situation became difficult. Ready cash was needed to bring in supplies for a market relying on the exchange of local products for manufactured goods, as well as to bring in raw materials for the small factories and cottage industries. Weapons had also to be purchased.[147] A contemporary report praised "our comrades who proved equal to the task, [when] the Soviet government faced a serious problem." They organized the direct purchase of manufactured goods and foodstuffs from Hong Kong, with a small ship plying between the Colony and Swabue. The foodstuffs were distributed to peddlers for retailing to the peasants, and "the price differential which had developed between the low price of rice and the high price of manufactured goods was once again balanced."[148] The Congress, however, had resolved (as a temporary measure at least) to forbid the export of rice or grain.[149]

Other Congress resolutions dealt with such matters as changing the names of many towns: Ch'ingk'eng became Ch'ihk'eng or Hungk'eng, Chiehsheng became Ch'ihsheng (*ch'ih* and *hung* meaning "red"); in Lu-

feng, Ta'an became Ch'ihan. In Haifeng city, there were the Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg, and Liebknecht roads, and the Red Palace (the former Confucian temple), the Red Bridge, and the Red Pavilion. All roads and squares carried slogans painted in red.

All this was a direct attack on traditional or "feudal" ideology and practice, and on the social and political power of both. Leading the attack were the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers; in support were the members of various organizations. Statues were smashed in the temples, fortune-tellers and geomancers were assaulted, and there was much burning and destruction. Opium smokers, gamblers, and robbers vanished.[150] The new cultural revolution did not have the unqualified approval of the peasants, however. Some had daubed red over their statues and protested against CYC delegates who wished to destroy them: "No! We do not want our Buddhas destroyed. Our gods are revolutionary and look with favor on the Soviet. Only the Buddhas of the *t'u-hao* (local bullies) must be smashed."[151] In general, Confucian temples and the temples and gods of powerful landlords were more subject to being vandalized than Buddhist and Taoist temples, the centers of folk religion.

Throughout 1927 and the period of conflict between local insurgents and the KMT, the 7,000 or so Hai-Lu-feng Christians were not considered to be entirely on the side of the rebels; nonetheless, P'eng P'ai did not make an issue of them. But by Christmas, religious war was official policy, the choice being allegiance to the Soviet or death.[152] In many places, the local leaders took no great note of this: when the chairman of the Aomen Soviet was presented with two Catholics who had been baptized thirty years before and who had refused to join the Peasant Association, he attempted to dissuade their accusers from killing them on the grounds that they were "poor peasants." A show of hands for their acquittal was called for three times, but the villagers wanted them shot, and so they were on January 26, 1928.[153]

The Soviet appropriated all churches, residences, schools, and hospitals. In Swabue, several Presbyterian churches were destroyed by fire, and three preachers were shot, one of them despite the pleas of the local villagers that he was a good man.[154] The U.S. consul at Swatow reported that at least one large Catholic village in Huilai had been razed and many inhabitants murdered.[155] An appraisal of the collected reports on some of the Catholics slain during the "Red Terror" shows that real believers who died for their faith, or just for having worked for the foreign missionaries, were lumped together with people killed to settle old scores, or because of misdeeds. Ac-

cording to Bishop Valtorta, 200 Catholics perished and six churches were destroyed.[156]

Not all Christians proved loyal to their faith, however. Some in Swabue proved "worse than the Bolsheviks," according to Fr. Bianchi.[157] Many Christians, as in the past, moved over to the Reds, either out of conviction or from self-interest; the Red Flag was the victorious emblem. A Christian girl, Wang Pao-chen, joined the CCP after the Soviet was established and later on engaged in espionage activities. Her stepmother warned her, to no avail, and then reported her to the KMT authorities. She was imprisoned and was encouraged by a pastor to recant, but she refused to betray her fellows. She was tortured and died.[158] One Catholic who changed sides was the "Executioner of Cheke [Chiehshih]." This man was an opium smoker who had been helped by Bishop Valtorta to find work as a gardener for a foreign family on the Peak in Hong Kong. He later returned to Haifeng, sold his wife and daughter to get money for opium, and became the most notorious executioner there. Attired in red coat and breeches and paid ¥2 per session, he could decapitate in one stroke with his left hand. He was eventually caught by the KMT, recanted, and confessed to some 200 beheadings.[159]

The KMT also executed Christians who had thrown in their lot with the Reds and who had perpetrated crimes. Sometimes, however, "Christian Reds" were sincere: one is recorded as having performed a baptism in prison at the request of a prisoner.[160] Outstanding among the Catholics who joined the new regime was Chang Kuo-hsien from Tungp'u near Swabue. Of an old Catholic family, and a fervent believer himself, Chang joined out of sympathy for the poor.[161] One famous Red leader, Lin Nao of Chiehshih, was a former catechumen who during the Soviet displayed mercy toward the Christians.[162]

That there should be resentment against Christianity was the result of its obvious links with foreign imperialism and its influence in welfare and education, two powerful areas the new cultural revolution sought to change. The CYC demanded the destruction of all Christian churches along with native religious buildings of every faith.[163]

To show solidarity with the peasants, many of whom were busy with military service or other revolutionary activity, the members of various organizations set aside Saturday for work in the fields. There were meetings and parades, red flags fluttered everywhere, hammer-and-sickle badges were made to commemorate the establishment of the Soviet, and a red pyramid

was erected next to the Lung-chin bridge just outside the city. Children were trained to sing revolutionary songs.[164]

The Children's Brigade was greatly expanded through compulsory enrollment in primary schools. The Brigade took children between the ages of eight and fifteen and aimed to instill in them the Communist spirit through study, games, and sports. The Brigade motto was "Be Prepared Every Minute," and its open-hand salute used the five fingers to symbolize the fraternity of the proletariat in the five continents. Red neckties were worn. The CYC was in charge of the Brigade and was entrusted with the task of directing the children to devote themselves to the Soviet government to the end.[165] Rightist sources have these children informing against members of their own families and, in some cases, killing their fathers or brothers in revolutionary zeal. The Young Pioneers were estimated to number 2,000 and were the elite of the worker and peasant children's groups in every village and town. They had their own central organization in the county capital, complete with president, secretary, treasurer, and propagandist. Three "do's" and three "don'ts" were observed: obey the rules, practice hygiene, be polite; don't touch alcohol, don't smoke, don't drink unboiled water.[166]

Then there were the Young Vanguards, from sixteen to 23 years old, who were selected for military training, espionage work, and local surveillance. There were 10,700 such young people in Haifeng, but only 200 in Lufeng. From their ranks, 300 were chosen to join four groups of about 75 members each—the Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg, and Liebknecht groups—which would be incorporated into the Workers' and Peasants' Army as special units for intelligence and related activities. Should the KMT Army ever dare to invade Haifeng, the Young Pioneers and Young Vanguards were to infiltrate and sabotage it.[167] So well had the CYC leaders indoctrinated these young people that, according to a *North China Herald* report of June 1928, many were killed because they would never surrender.[168]

Overseeing all these youth groups was the CYC, with its own "East Special" and 158 cells. In Haifeng alone there were 3,700 members led by the secretary Wang Ni-tan. Membership was open to those aged sixteen and above.[169] CYC members had made their voice heard at the Congress of Representatives and had prepared their own drafts on "Policy" and "Youth Culture," which the Congress thought the government should consider as a matter of urgency. For the welfare of young people and children, their drafts sought the abolition of the apprenticeship grade, a minimum working age and a maximum number of hours a day children could work, the expansion

of revolutionary education, the abolition of school fees, and the care of those made orphans by counterrevolutionaries. For rural youth work, they requested assistance in the organization of children's groups and the Pioneers, and in the construction of playgrounds and amusement parks. As for cultural matters, the Soviet government should establish a propaganda center to promote Communism, publish propaganda material, open a Communist library in each village and district, and reform the drama.[170]

CYC members were also expected to act as public watchdogs. A Communist source states that at times they overplayed this role, especially in criticizing the local CCP. They took up the workers' cause when the Party seemed to be neglecting it. Even the more radical CCP members could find themselves overtaken by the youngsters, and a generation gap and even more extreme activities ensued, despite periodic reprimands.[171] Like their predecessors, these youngsters were enthusiastic if not fanatical about the revolution, some of them having gone through the "great slaughter" in 1925, when Ch'en Chiung-ming's army returned to Haifeng after the First Eastern Expedition.[172] Lo Ch'i-yüan reports the fears counterrevolutionaries had of the youngsters in Hai-Lu-feng: "The primary-school children have been greatly influenced by the Communists, because the vast majority of their teachers are the Middle School graduates of a few years ago. The future of education is particularly critical." The U.S. consul at Canton expressed similar views.[173]

Seeking greater control over the young, "The Organization" opened in January a Recreation Club for Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Youth. The club was very well patronized, with young people coming in from all districts for meetings and training. The first director was P'eng Yüan-yüeh, the son of a Chiehsheng landlord and a PMTI graduate, and he was assisted by students and the student organization.[174] Propaganda was their special skill: students were active as leaders and initiators in every aspect of youth work, especially in the CYC. Indeed, a later resolution on "The CYC Problem" found it had to stress the "proletarian" nature of the body and complained that the Kwangtung CYC had formerly been based not on worker and peasant youth but on students, who made up the bulk of its membership.[175] After the Party Purge in Canton, the majority gave up their work, but in Haifeng they were still active. The "error" of using the CYC only in the cultural struggle and disregarding it for the political struggle had not been committed there.[176]

Not all students conducted themselves as proper revolutionaries. Ch'en

Chen-ch'ao took his mother's advice and left for Hong Kong, much to the disgust of his brother, a zealous supporter of the soviet.[177] A leftist source claims that during the emergency the schools were "in the main open," but in fact schooling came to a halt and the students had to join in propaganda.[178] All books, libraries, and private collections had to be burned, "since they breed counterrevolutionaries," and this task was assigned to the students.[179]

Primary-school teachers, classified with the students, were equally revolutionary throughout the county, chiefly because they were out of work and had no means of livelihood. Some village schoolteachers were used as local CCP leaders, but because of family background, lineage connections, or simple economic reasons some were unable to cut their ties with local reactionaries, proving half-hearted in action against them and in some cases even sabotaging the soviet. The majority of teachers, however, were devoted revolutionaries.[180] According to the Soviet chronicler, the bulk of the Hai-Lu-feng intelligentsia joined the workers and peasants in their struggle, many applied for Party membership, and still more wished to work in the Peasant Association or labor unions. As for the killings, they came to see them as the inevitable consequences of the class struggle, avowing that "this had to be done."[181]

Women stood to gain much from the Soviet. Their Liberation Association conducted a survey of the *mui-tsai* in landlords' households and restored their freedom to them. Some of these former slave girls took up work for the Soviet, and others were married off. But refugees claimed that the Reds forced widows and girls to marry by putting them up for auction.[182] The Congress resolution on "The Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries" allowed the wives of counterrevolutionaries to return to their paternal homes, where they were free to remain or to marry again. If they engaged in counterrevolutionary work themselves, though, they were liable to be killed too. A resolution on "The Question of Women" called for the public education of all children, male and female, and sought to eliminate brothels, the traffic in human beings, and concubinage. Education for women was to be promoted and cruelty to them banned.[183]

Some women proved as robust as men in endeavors on behalf of the revolution. Outstanding were the women of Ch'ingk'eng, the "Powder-Gun Brigade," armed with old guns or perhaps bird guns (hence their name). Lo Ch'i-yüan claimed that at one of the meetings in the 6th district 10,000

armed peasant women were in attendance, and that armed women could be found throughout the county. The Brigade was very well drilled, the local Red leaders having taken seriously the recommendation to prepare military forces. Women aged from sixteen to 26 were induced or compelled to embark on training, so that eventually they were able to establish six Units in a Brigade of 300. The members wore uniforms similar to those of the men: straw sandals, bamboo hats, and shining gun-belts. They were exceptionally well-trained. The strong and fearless Hakka girls of the northwest took part later in the struggle.[184]

One member of the Women's Liberation Association, Cheng Chen-fang, was from 1928 in the Soviet cabinet. Rightist sources state that the Association was bent on ruining homes, and that its members went around lopping off people's hair and even killing. The more attractive members were employed in propaganda. "Free love" did not mean simply being able to wed the man you loved: "sexual intercourse became as normal as eating, and everything passed." Party cadres were said to have made free with the girls and women engaged in revolutionary activities. There was laxity between male and female soldiers too.[185]

This is not to say that women could not be formidable revolutionaries. Once, the Powder-Gun Brigade was taking part in a parade in the county capital during a reception for the Red Army, and the government ordered the execution of a group of criminals. The women soldiers were invited to display their bravery, and three were selected to carry out the punishment. When the first head was lopped off the crowd cheered, the Red Army men were greatly impressed, and the Brigade won more glory. The executioner was Wu Ta-mei, an 18-year-old stonecutter from Ch'ingk'eng, skilled in handling the large knife with her left hand and a source of delight to the crowd with her smart strokes.[186] Another source has a different version: the girl was Yang Ch'i-sao, a member of the local Peasant Association. P'eng P'ai had to chop off the first head to show people how to do it, and when no one else volunteered, Yang ran up, decapitated two of the unfortunates, and was then taken up to the stage where P'eng declared her "a heroine." The writer remarks that the girl was neither uneducated nor coarse and that she was a member of the Ch'ingk'eng CCP cell.[187] A Hakka woman found herself in a similar situation at a Haifeng meeting where 20 counterrevolutionaries were to be decapitated. After dealing with ten of the victims, she said she felt tired, so P'eng came down from the speakers' platform and finished off

the remainder himself. Bishop Valtorta reported that when Chiehsheng fell in November, Communist women began killing non-Communist women.[188]

Given this behavior, it was therefore natural that equally brutal treatment would be meted out to women during the subsequent reaction. Women of all ages involved in Soviet activities were gagged or pushed into sacks and taken away for execution; others were dumped into the sea. "Every group numbered women and girls among its martyrs."

Many women served as the main line of support for the Workers' and Peasants' Army, bringing up supplies, carrying messages, and doing reconnaissance work on their rounds of the market towns. If caught, they would endure beating and suffer death rather than betray the cause. There were "countless acts of valor."[189] Despite the allegations of license and the evidence of female ferocity, a Presbyterian minister concluded that under the Soviet, for all the strength of the feminist movement, there had been no consistent attack on family life, and that monogamy was favored and, protected.[190]

It does seem to be the case, however, that the older generation met with harsh treatment and that filial piety was despised. During the Northern Expedition, rumors were already circulating that the Communists were doing away with people over 40. Ho Chien, the rightist commander of the 35th Army, is said to have had his father-in-law roughed up, and it appears that Li Li-san's father was got rid of.[191] The attack on evil gentry and landlords was generally an attack on elderly people, since they were the ones with economic and political power. There was no reason why the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet should have acted any differently, and one much-cited instance was the killing of an outstanding old gentryman from Chiehsheng named Ho.[192] It was rumored that P'eng P'ai was going to ship all the elderly off to Russia to work, or was going to kill the useless ones. The wildest stories circulated, one being that everyone under three and over 70 would have to die, another that all over 50 (some said 60) would be eliminated. Such rumors were so persistent and damaging that Lo Ch'i-yüan, in an article in defense of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, went to great lengths to disprove them. He deals in particular with the one about doing away with all those over 40 because they were too old for productive work: during their attack in Hunan, Lo says, T'ang Sheng-chih and Hsü K'e-hsiang claimed that Communist policy was to kill everyone over 25; later, the press raised that age to 40.[193]

However, the rumors would not die. They were undermining the allegiance of many and strengthening the counterrevolutionary hold, especially in Lufeng, where lineage and family elders felt greatly perturbed. P'eng P'ai took steps to silence these tales by showing, in practice, that the elderly were given their due. He arranged a great banquet in the Red Palace for the old folk, and similar feasts were organized in every district. Many old men praised the filial piety of the Communists and were joyful, Chung I-mou reports. All those aged over 80 were given two catties of pork per month. P'eng also planned a Home for the Aged, and he later built one in Tananshan.[194]

In line with orthodox Communist doctrine, the workers received a great deal of attention on the part of Soviet leaders. Rightist sources have claimed that the workers had few grievances against their old employers and that the Reds deliberately fostered worker resentment because to the Communists anybody of any means, or running a going concern, was an enemy. Hence their implementation of the "useless policy" of "factories to the workers," declared futile in an underdeveloped China and particularly in Haifeng. All factories and shops were taken over in the county.[195] Even a contemporary Communist document criticizes the Party's labor organization for being "not rooted in the people, but merely an imposed structure riddled with defeatists and opportunists." If anything was actually done, it was "in the name of the Peasant Association and not as a labor union."[196]

The Labor Union in Haifeng had a solid core of leadership that included in particular Ch'en Shun-i, one of the most prominent figures in the Soviet. Another leader was Wu Hung-chiang, whose work experience in Hong Kong had given him a name for being advanced. The representative of the Meilung Labor Union, he was of peasant origin and had had only elementary education. The workers had formed cooperatives, one of which was the "Kuang-shou yao-kuan" on Haifeng city's main street. They were the special concern of the CYC, especially when they felt themselves to be unfairly treated by the Soviet authorities, or when the peasants seemed to be getting far greater attention. Among all the workers, those in the most favored situation were the farm laborers.[197]

The truth is that after the business entrepreneurs had fled or been purged, the factories came to a standstill, there was no market for the craftsmen's products, raw materials were in short supply, and even the coolies could not earn a livelihood. A Communist report frankly admits of the workers that

"the CCP did not show enough interest in their plight."[198] But when the CYC lodged a strong protest, the Soviet authorities held investigations; the factories were reopened and, together with all workshops, were converted into government-run cooperatives. Some of the revenue from salt was used to subsidize the unemployed, and many, particularly coolies, were absorbed into the Workers' and Peasants' Army or served as Workers' Red Guards. The county had a Central Labor Union, with branches in all districts, and a five-member standing executive elected from a committee of fifteen.[199]

Employment conditions were covered in the Congress resolution "On the Betterment of the Life of the Workers," itself a response to directives issued by the CCP Kwangtung. It urged adoption of the "Three Eights" system: eight hours' work, eight hours' relaxation, eight hours' sleep. Factory workers and shop assistants were not to work over ten hours a day, women and children eight hours. There was to be equal pay for equal work, regardless of age or sex. All outstanding debts or dues were canceled. There was to be an insurance scheme against injury at work, with the employer to provide compensation and be responsible for all medical fees. Where workers lived on the premises, health provisions were to be specified. Plants would be run by the workers; shopkeepers would not be allowed to hire and fire at will. The government was to build factories, especially to provide unemployed workers with a job. No work was to be contracted out. Any shopkeepers or foremen found insulting the workers were to be shot. When children were born, women were to be granted two months' paid maternity leave. Wages would be proportionate to the market price of the goods; there were to be no employment contracts.[200]

But the peasants were the real citizens of the Soviet. They had their village government and their Association, "the best organization for Communist propaganda."[201] The Association's general secretary was Lin Pin, concurrently in charge of organization in the local Party Committee. There was a countywide Peasant Association committee with district and village branches.[202]

Prior to the Soviet, the Peasant Association had been in large measure independent, but now it was in effect a Soviet organ. A Communist report states that in the process of absorption by the Soviet, mistakes had been made, and the poorer peasants and farmhands were short of influence. In the urgency of action to establish power, the links that had in the past bound the leaders and the local people so closely together were now somewhat

looser.[203] At its November Plenum, the Central Committee had suggested that the existing Peasant Association in the Soviet be disbanded and replaced by a union encompassing ruined landowners, tenants, farm laborers, and jobless peasants. Clearly, the intention behind this was to prosecute the class struggle within society. Hai-Lu-feng raised objections: disbandment of the Association would not help the formation of a stronger union for fighting; indeed, it would destroy any hope of such a union, since the peasants would never accept it. The leaders would therefore reorganize their Association so as to give the poor people a greater say in public affairs.[204]

That the CCP leaders and the better-off peasants in command of the Association kept their distance from the poorer peasants as soon as they gained control indicates the true mentality and aspirations of the Soviet elite. Documents refer to the aloofness of the leadership and of the stronger peasants vis-à-vis the poorer ones, and indicate that it was marked enough to justify terming the situation a "polarization within the Peasant Association." Despite Soviet policy's heavy bias in favor of the peasantry in upholding justice and equality, it is evident that the "peasant world" was subject to political realities and other besetting problems which forced different attitudes upon the peasants.[205] In contrast to this, the Soviet chronicler describes both peasants and workers as being as happy as larks, singing, dancing, and putting on entertainments while they rejoiced in their new-found freedom from rents and debts.[206]

Just such scenes of happiness marked the East River Peasant Association's Congress, held in Haifeng for 150 delegates and the same number of other officials and guests during three days in January.[207] *Red Flag* has an account of the festivities by Hsü Yü-ch'ing, the second wife of P'eng P'ai: "All the workers had a week off. There were paper flags and lanterns everywhere, evening parades, lion-dances, and entertainment in many places. Much deafening banging of gongs and drums. People wore standard uniform, not their best clothes. Food was distributed to everybody."[208] They all gathered in Red Square, which was decorated and contained tiered stands, the soldiers and workers in the middle, women to the right, and peasants to the left, some 100,000 people in all, including the entire government and representatives from nearby counties.

According to other reports, the slogans to be heard and seen at the New Year celebrations were of the following kind: "Those who owe rent or debts should repay them with the knife!"; "Those with guts and daring are invited to enjoy the New Year!"; and "With guns and cannon, the New Year

is a grand and marvelous time!"[209] Red cakes were made, red armbands, scarves, and ties were worn, the shops were festooned with red lamps, and pictures of Lenin and Trotsky were displayed. Following the usual ritual bows, P'eng P'ai delivered his "Political Report," taking up a whole day and half of the night with it.[210]

P'eng is reported as dwelling on the national and international situation and calling for an all-out effort to expand the Soviet, attack the enemy in the East River, and ensure the elimination of all counterrevolutionaries. It is very likely that the problem of expansion was debated at length, as directed by the East Special.[211] The resolution on "Present Tasks and Principles of Work" drawn up by the CCP Kwangtung after the fall of the Canton Commune insisted that "the power base must be extended from Hai-Lu-feng to the whole of the East River area." A review of the situation concluded that "the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet has increased its security and stability, the revolution has succeeded everywhere and is expanding to Tzuchin and P'uning, where the people are rising and organizing soviets." The peasants were commanded to take part and not leave it to the military. "At present, though, all the villages near Hai-Lu-feng are still merely attacking the rent policy and are acting only for rent reduction! In Huahsien, the comrades do not even dare to speak of land revolution." The CCP Kwangtung Committee would have to rectify all such local errors.[212]

P'eng P'ai's speech would have taken the same line: later Soviet policy was an attempt to implement these directives. A reporter listed the Congress topics as being the political situation, the organization of the masses, and relations between the urban proletariat, the rural peasantry, and the Red Army—all important issues frequently dealt with as soon as people's governments and soviets came into existence.[213]

The "Plan of Work" had laid down guidelines for the external relations of local revolutionary governments, advising against interference with or assaults upon imperialists, customs officers, and churches, and warning against creating incidents at the borders with alien powers. This was all designed to avoid repercussions. If reaction occurred, however, strikes and boycotts should be pursued. In Haifeng, the foreign policy of the Soviet transgressed these guidelines, for there was harassment of the few resident foreigners, chiefly Catholic priests (although this had been going on since the days of the United Front). Now, though, with the punitive CCP policy against counterrevolutionaries in full swing, restraints proved ineffective.[214]

Up to December 13, the Italian priests in Swabue went unmolested—they had even been invited to stay on and collaborate. Fr. Bianchi, however, in a letter smuggled to his bishop in Hong Kong, wrote: "It is the calm before the storm: rumor has it that they wish to kill all the Europeans." He notified the bishop of premises just searched and Chinese staffs removed, of Christians forbidden to communicate with their priests, and of the latter being cut off from the outside world.[215] On December 15, an order from Haifeng called for the arrest of all missionaries, but it was not until Christmas Eve that soldiers and a gang of youths carried out the instruction and ransacked the mission premises and the convent. The missionaries were paraded through the streets of Swabue and Frs. Robba and Bianchi were escorted to the town's one hotel, together with two Italian, a Portuguese, and four Chinese sisters. Fr. Francis Huang Tzu-ch'ien was also imprisoned. On Christmas Day, there was a huge anti-Christian demonstration from 10 A.M. to 3 P.M., and thirteen Christians were beheaded. Fr. Huang, despite having been sentenced to receive the "Thousand Cuts" on Christmas Day, had been spared and was able to baptize, console, and give absolution to some of his fellow prisoners.[216]

Later reports imply that all the anti-Christian actions were engineered by young officials, mostly students, acting on their own initiative. They had fallen out with the Swabue Soviet chairman, who declared that the missionaries "could afford to have some power."[217] Meanwhile, Bishop Valtorta sought the help of the Hong Kong governor, especially in securing the release of Fr. Huang, a British subject condemned to death. He mentioned that the presence of two small cruisers of the Chinese Maritime Customs off Swabue had been deterrent enough for a stay of executions there. "This fact makes me venture to suggest that a British gunboat could certainly effect the release of Fr. Huang, as well as all the rest. Do something, in the name of humanity!" Governor Clementi was faced with a difficult decision. The officer commanding a tide-survey launch had informed his head office that, on his vessel's berthing in Swabue harbor in front of Red Army headquarters, all contact was forbidden and guards had taken up stations along the shore. At noon on December 21, there had been a noisy demonstration against the intruders, with cannon and rifles fired off, and many flags flying, either "red flag with white star on top corner (hoist), with ax and scythe (center), or plain red."[218]

Bishop Valtorta was at once put in touch with Vice Admiral Tyrwhitt, Commander-in-Chief, China Station, who ordered H.M.S. *Seraph* to sail

for Swabue on December 26. On board were Bishop Valtorta as interpreter (he had served in Haifeng himself) and Fr. Ch'en, a native of Swabue. In a notification to the Apostolic Delegate, the Italian consul general in Hong Kong regretted that his advice to the missionaries to leave Haifeng had not been heeded, and that it was a British and not an Italian vessel that was speeding to the rescue. However, since Fr. Huang was a British subject, the bishop was justified in seeking intervention from that quarter.[219]

The Soviet chronicler takes up the story. He tells how at 4 A.M. on December 27 the British destroyer appeared off Swabue harbor and launched a cutter carrying some 50 marines and soldiers and "En Li-chüeh chu-chiao" (Bishop Valtorta). A unit of the Haifeng Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army responded by forming a 200-man cordon along the shoreline to prevent a landing. Bearing a white flag, the landing party hove to and the Bishop was able to have a letter presented to the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet government. The letter expressed the hope that the ten foreign and Chinese missionaries named as being in custody would be allowed to depart on the destroyer, which was there to evacuate them. On receipt of the letter, the soviet government of Swabue district instructed the cutter to wait for a reply, which was soon forthcoming.

Meanwhile, the *Seraph* prepared for action and people in Swabue began fleeing. When the reply came, it was addressed to the captain of the *Seraph* and was on official paper. On the right was printed "Enact land revolution," on the left "Eliminate feudal power." It was embossed with a huge, rectangular seal bearing the words *Hai-feng Shan-wei shih-li Su-wei-ai cheng-fu* ("Soviet Government of the City of Swabue, Haifeng"), and was dated Dec. 27, 1927, in Chinese and Arabic numerals. The reply acknowledged that the said priests and sisters were lodged at the Chung-hsing Hotel and that Huang Tzu-ch'ien had been imprisoned for treason. Since his crimes had yet to be fully investigated, he would remain in custody, but all the others were free to leave.

This answer did not please the bishop and the captain. Another letter was dispatched: the destroyer was there only to carry the missionaries back to Hong Kong, but if any were harmed or if their churches or premises were damaged, the destroyer would return. Fr. Huang as a British subject must be released. This time the reply stated that Fr. Huang was a Chinese subject, that the local authorities had every right to put him on trial, and that outside interference was not justified; however, since he had taken out British nationality, and for the sake of amity, he would be released. There was this to

say, though: "We people of Hai-Lu-feng are familiar with the nature of every religion and we repudiate them all. Therefore you are requested never to return with your propaganda." Issue was also taken with the captain's threat to return, it being pointed out that such intimidation was unacceptable and in any case useless, since the proletarian class throughout China, and indeed the whole world, would not stand idly by, nor were the people afraid of any great and evil power, so angry were they at their enemies. Finally, the destroyer was warned not to encroach upon the harbor again on pain of dire consequences. Fr. Huang and all the others were handed over, and the ship departed.

The original of the letter gives a slightly different nuance to the assertions of the Swabue authorities, but the Soviet chronicler could claim that the case provided a lesson in how to deal with gunboat diplomacy, and also "opened a new chapter in the history of damaged Chinese-foreign relations."[220]

Engaged on the official Constitution of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet during November, P'eng P'ai found his work and ideas vindicated by the resolutions of the Enlarged Session of the CCP Politburo that month, even though such formal recognition seemed belated. The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet lent credibility to the Chinese Party's new policy, in line with Comintern directives.[221] In the overall picture, however, something was still missing: the urban insurrection by the workers, which was of special significance to the theory of proletarian class struggle. And if criticism from its rank-and-file were to be silenced, the CCP required a brilliant stroke that would enhance its prestige. So did Stalin, who in July had announced the correctness of the "soviet" slogan and of its subsequent implementation. Stalin sought justification for his assertions that the revolutionary tide was rising in China, and he needed a great revolutionary event to show Trotsky and others of the opposition that his China policy was correct. The 15th CPSU Congress was scheduled for December 1927; to coincide with it, Stalin ordered a worker's uprising in Canton and the establishment there of a city soviet.[222]

The military situation seemed extremely favorable, because Chang Fa-k'uei was away fighting in the West River and Canton was largely stripped of forces. So, despite its earlier conviction that no uprising stood a chance, the Kwangtung Committee on November 26 decided that the time was right for a revolt in the city, and a revolutionary military council was created with Chang T'ai-lei as chairman and Yeh T'ing as commander in chief.[223]

Insurrection was set for December 13. A soviet committee of deputies

was chosen, with nine workers, three peasants, and three soldiers listed, though in fact all were intellectuals and appointees. The military forces consisted of 2,000 Red Guards and the 1,200-strong cadet regiment of the Central Military Academy. This regiment, under Yeh Chien-ying, had come down from Wuhan; heavily infiltrated by Communist elements, it was the largest unified force left in Canton. Along with the Red Guards and the cadet regiment, there were two units made up of strike pickets, sailors, and rickshawmen, the last mainly Hai-Lu-feng peasants who had been organized by P'eng P'ai.[224]

When it became evident that Chang Fa-k'uei was moving to disarm the cadet regiment, the date of the uprising was brought forward to December 11, a shift that took the Comintern and the CCP CC in Shanghai by surprise, and that upset the plans for peasant support from the countryside. The cadet regiment and the Red Guards attacked at 3:30 A.M. on December 11 and had the entire city under control within fifteen hours. *Red Flag* listed the members of the Soviet government of Canton, among whom two absentees required stand-ins: the chairman, Su Chao-cheng, and the member responsible for land, P'eng P'ai, "now president of the Soviet in Hai-Lu-feng."[225]

Accounts of what occurred during the two and a half days of the Canton Soviet vary, but most accounts agree about its end. The greatest disappointment was that the expected peasant reinforcements from the countryside did not materialize. One source says that Lo Ch'i-yüan managed to collect a mere 500 peasants from Fengch'uan and Huahsien.[226] The Central Committee resolution of January 3 on the Canton uprising speaks of efforts by the CCP Kwangtung and Canton committees to prepare the peasants in the countryside around Canton; peasants were stationed along the Canton-Hankow railway and at the arsenal, and the Workers' and Peasants' Army constituted at least half of the Red Army troops. But the numbers involved were small—far from the "hundreds of thousands of peasants around Canton" expected to take part.[227] Lominadze, the Comintern agent, ascribed the lack of peasant support to the failure to incite peasant uprisings. Others claim that substantial peasant forces in the East River area, which Soviet chairman Su had gone to muster, were unable to reach Canton because of poor transport facilities.[228] Even the workers themselves were missing. The last strike of any importance had been in October, and Yeh T'ing in his report laconically states: "The masses took no part in the insurrection."[229] The military operation was also confused and poorly led, with Yeh arriving in Canton barely six hours before the revolt began. The workers had no mili-

tary training and few knew how to use rifles; 25 cannon were available, but there were only enough workers familiar with artillery to man four or five of them. There is strong evidence that workers and sailors gave their support to the KMT.[230]

The uprising was crushed by December 13. Troops hunted down the "bob-haired" radical women and the Hoklo rickshawmen from Hai-Lu-feng, "caught with the Red Army remnants fleeing to Hong Kong because they are Communists to a man." The rickshawmen had been among the most stubborn fighters for the Soviet. Governor Clementi of Hong Kong reported that all Hoklo "were shot on sight."[231] An eyewitness report in *The Times* asserted that the rickshawmen had especially picked on the police, whom they regarded as their enemy. Any policemen encountered were shot on the spot. Chung I-mou describes the rickshawmen as attacking the police under the flag of the Haifeng Countrymen's Association, thus drawing down upon all the Hoklo a terrible vengeance.[232] Rightist sources claim that they were led by the Hai-Lu-feng local office in Canton—that is, by the brothers P'eng Han-yüan, P'eng Tse, and P'eng Ta-wu—and that they were particularly active in the Nankuan district of the city. Chung I-mou states that over a thousand rickshawmen perished, mostly young landless peasants from the villages.[233]

Haifeng students in Canton also played their part. They were ready "to suffer a thousand deaths, but never defeat." The Haifeng Students' Association in Canton had been influenced by P'eng P'ai and was considered by the police to be a nest of Reds. Many students from Lu'an Normal School studying at Chungshan University were rounded up by KMT troops and then "disappeared."[234]

The importance to the Canton Commune of Hai-Lu-feng lay in more than the sacrifice of hundreds of its people. Official Party documents and Comintern directives show that it was intended that the revolt in Kwangtung be spearheaded by the Hai-Lu-feng Peasant Army, and that the Canton Soviet was an essential component. Paradoxically, the Canton urban Soviet was projected on a strategy of rural insurrection (most of its participants were to be soldiers and peasants), and it was to be the first instance of an urban Communist regime set up from the countryside, in this case from Hai-Lu-feng. Hai-Lu-feng was a relatively safe base, it could supply manpower and matériel, and it was close enough to Canton to make the coordination of joint uprising possible.[235]

The hasty preparation at all levels to get the revolt going as soon as pos-

sible in December 1927 suggests an insurrection determined upon and awaited; in line with this is the fact that Lominadze reported on the revolt at the 15th CPSU Congress (December 2–29, 1927), prior to the actual events. He said that the CCP was striving to found soviets wherever there was a guarantee of their permanence, and pointed out that they already existed in five Kwangtung districts, where great revolutionary action would take place before long.[236] He was evidently referring mainly to the East River, just as was the CCP Central Committee when, in a January 3 resolution, it stated: "With its 400,000-strong peasant revolution, Hai-Lu-feng is the first base of the Canton revolt"; and again, "the primary task of the Canton Soviet government is to emulate Hai-Lu-feng and establish a real Revolutionary Army."[237] In Communist opinion and expectation generally, though, a patronizing attitude on the part of the city soviet toward the rural one was natural: a soviet was a conquest of a large city through an uprising of workers. That was also the directive of the CCP Politburo on September 19, 1927: "The organization of soviets should be effected first in such key places as Canton and Ch'angsha when we are sure of a decisive and firm victory."[238] Canton, however, was unable to carry through this fiction. On realizing that peasant forces were clearly not going to reach the city in time, the Canton Soviet announced that it would make its own linkup, outward, with Hai-Lu-feng; but the hour for that had passed. On the very day of the city uprising, P'eng P'ai, probably as ill-informed as everyone else about the exact schedule, was leading the Hai-Lu-feng Workers' and Peasants' Army in an attack on Chiehshih, which was still holding out in Lufeng county.[239]

Once the revolution had begun, the sole aim of a guerrilla war was to establish a revolutionary base, failing which defeat was inevitable. This advice had been given by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai in an article in *The Bolshevik* on December 10, 1927—the eve of the Canton uprising. He ascribed the defeat of the guerrillas in Honan, Hupeh, and Kiangsu to the failure to set up such a base, and pointed out that the only successful guerrilla operation had taken place in Hai-Lu-feng. He gave an outline of the stages: "Before the Yeh-Ho army entered Kwangtung, the Hai-Lu-feng peasants were already in revolt; though defeated, they transformed their guerrilla units into a mass uprising (particularly in Haifeng). Fighting alongside the masses gave them even greater military power. . . . The Hai-Lu-feng peasant revolution progressed, went well beyond the limits of a guerrilla war, and finally built up the reality of a Revolutionary Base." Ch'ü called upon all other fighting groups to conduct themselves in similar fashion and to understand the

meaning of guerrilla warfare and the importance of revolutionary bases.[240]

In the January resolution on the Canton uprising, the Central Committee noted that in the history of the Chinese Revolution, Hai-Lu-feng was first in having a land revolution implemented by the masses and in setting up a dictatorship of peasants and soldiers, so that the soviet there now contained half a million people. With less exactitude, however, it also stated, "The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet government (whose chairman, P'eng P'ai, is a CCP CC Politburo member) sent representatives to seek the help and support of the Canton workers." Moreover, it claimed that it produced a "Declaration to the Worker Masses," besides donating from the confiscated wealth of landlords the sum of ¥20,000 for the purchase of arms by Canton workers. The resolution also reveals that the CCP Kwangtung Committee and the Canton Party branch had close links with the peasants, organized a secret Peasant Training Class, and maintained regular contact with the Hai-Lu-feng Party branch and the Soviet government, to both of which the Canton bodies were issuing directives. Those bodies had also strived to develop peasant units around Canton, but the few thousand peasants they secured were a far cry from the hundreds of thousands anticipated. This was "proof that the Party and village links are not yet firm; in fact, there are no CCP cells in the villages and there are no leaders in the peasant movement to develop political ideology." It was also candidly admitted that the peasants, despite having been organized for several years and specially prepared by the CCP leaders, were far from complying with Party aims and programs. There was "a need to prepare armed peasants as an objective condition for the victory of the revolution and the confiscation of the land." This was "an urgent concrete question," the solution to which lay in following the example set by Hai-Lu-feng. "The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet persists, and its rich resources, its triumph, and its experience must be fully utilized to make other peasant revolts become revolution."[241] Thus, at the nadir of CCP fortunes, Hai-Lu-feng again provided a ray of hope—in the words of a contemporary Russian source, an inspiration for uprisings elsewhere.[242]

When the Canton Commune collapsed, the cadet regiment, some of the remaining Red Guards, and some cadets at Whampoa linked up, pulled out of the city, and made for Huahsien, where the peasants—still armed and active—could provide partial cover for them against the KMT troops. The plan was to join Chu Te in the North River; but in the face of local militia attacks and demands from peasants for their arms, the leaders of the various units decided to reorganize into the Workers' and Peasants' Army 4th Reg-

iment and to march to Hai-Lu-feng, where the 2d Regiment was already stationed. The new 4th Regiment's elected leader was Yeh Yung, an energetic and progressive young Szechwanese graduate of the fourth class at Whampoa.[243]

The Regiment crossed the East River, took the county seats of Wuhua and Tzuchin, and, after suffering some casualties at Lungwo at the hands of troops of Chang Fa-k'uei's 2d Route Army, arrived in Haifeng early in January to receive a rousing welcome. The men felt as if they were coming home. "The Internationale" was sung, and all the troubles and fatigue of the eighteen-day march were behind them. They were hailed as "Comrades of the Canton uprising" and, probably on January 2 or 3, given a grand "Red Army Reception" by Haifeng city at which they became the 4th Division of the Red Army. The Canton uprising had already been celebrated, but joy was short-lived; when news came of the wanton slaughter of Hai-Lu-feng folk there was general lamentation.[244]

P'eng P'ai attended the "Red Army Reception" in his habitual rough peasant dress and short trousers. Accompanied by Lin T'ieh-shih, he shook hands with the men of the regiment, offered words of consolation, and chatted about urgent local military needs. Then he delivered an address that included the following exhortation:

> Canton has failed, but we went down in glory. We Communists do not fear defeat. Defeated, we return to the attack. Fallen, we rise again. In the end the day of victory will come. Until then, our martyrs will sacrifice themselves and we will tread in their footsteps. Chiang Kai-shek's men are in Swatow and the Kwangsi troops are in Huilai, ever intent on dominating us, ever unwilling to allow us to govern ourselves democratically. Comrades, we must strengthen our military forces and destroy them! Final victory is assured![245]

Then came a dialogue with his people. "With the Soviet established, if the enemy send a thousand or ten thousand troops, can we destroy them?" The people beneath the platform roared back: "Yes, we can!" P'eng went on: "Of course! We destroyed Ch'en Chiung-ming and all the East River landlords, Yang Tso-mei, the militia, and the Security Guards, and we took Haifeng city. Even if ten thousand troops come, Hai-Lu-feng has 100,000 brave people, ten to one against them. At the cost of 20,000 men, we can wipe out the enemy."[246]

Hai-Lu-feng received the defeated urban revolutionaries from Canton, just as it had earlier provided a haven for those from Nanch'ang. Chung I-

mou remarks that the reality of the unity of workers, peasants, and soldiers had never been so clear as at this meeting. It constituted "a glorious page in the history of the revolution," a page written in "Little Moscow."[247] On his arrival from Canton, a soldier from the 4th Division found "great political awareness" everywhere, conveyed in red slogans painted on white walls. One that impressed him in particular was very long and was the product of the intellectual efforts of people working together. It struck at the political aims and internal relationships of the KMT; but that the soldier was able to repeat the whole sequence after many years, and that its content was more in line with later CCP attempts to discredit the enemy, strongly suggests doctoring.

There is no Party but the KMT:
What imperialistic thinking!
There are no factions within the KMT:
What a great surprise!
The Doctrine of "The Three Principles of the People":
As clear as mud!
The Policy of National Reconstruction:
A pile of bureaucratic paper!
The Period of Military Rule:
A heyday for warlords!
The Period of Guided Democracy:
An opening for officialdom!
The Period of Constitutional Government:
The sowing of general disorder!
Down with the KMT! Hail the victorious CCP!
Away with imperialists, corrupt officials,
Bad gentry, local bullies!
Peasant and worker brothers, let us rejoice together.
The country will be great from this day forth,
There will be peace, with clothes and food abundant.
Let all in every place rejoice and dance
And raise aloft the Red Flag.[248]

Whether or not to stand and fight when invaded was a much debated issue for the Party and military leadership during 1927–28. The matter went beyond mere strategy, since it had to take into account the "localist" psychology of the peasants of Hai-Lu-feng. An episode in December illustrates the problem. In that month, news from various quarters arrived to the effect that some 2,000 troops were on their way from Swatow to the Hai-Lu-feng

area to deal with the Reds. In fact, General Li was preparing an expedition against Canton, where Chang Fa-k'uei was becoming too self-important, and many of his troops were stationed in Meihsien and were getting ready to pass through Hai-Lu-feng. Contemporary Communist sources and British intelligence reports indicate that Ch'en Chi-t'ang did send 3,000 troops of his 11th Division into the Hot'ien area of Lufeng, but they were blocked by tens of thousands of local people, old and young, male and female, bent on preserving the Soviet.[249] Hence *The Bolshevik* could report:

> This proves that the Hai-Lu-feng revolt extended to the masses and does not rely solely on the Peasant Army and soldiers of the Yeh-Ho army. They did not get discouraged after the defeat in Canton. After that, they knew, Li Chi-shen and Chang Fa-k'uei intended to destroy the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet. What policy did they use? They did not retreat or go up to the mountains—they increased their power of attack. They knew that only by holding out and by expanding could they win. They wanted to extend [the Soviet] area to nearby counties and pursue the revolution everywhere throughout Kwangtung.[250]

The troops did not reenter the Hai-Lu-feng area, but this was at least in part because their services were required elsewhere, for by the end of December Chang Fa-k'uei was on the move from Canton toward northeastern Kwangtung, and rival generals were tracking him closely. Chang had taken pains to repudiate in the press the accusation that his army was Communist. The *North China Herald* claimed that in November Li Chi-shen was still "Tsar of Canton," Chang Fa-k'uei being aware that "if he remains in the Canton orchestra, he must play second fiddle." Following the Commune and the defection of one of his brigades, he was so put out by the insinuation of collusion that he let it be known that he might be ready to attack the Communists in Hai-Lu-feng. His real aim was to carve out a niche for himself in the prosperous East River area and Ch'aoshan by taking over Swatow, toward which his troops were now moving. For the time being that city would do; and, "since he is likely to meet with resistance," said the *Herald*, "he may then enlist the support of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, which still continues its cancer of devastation without interference." In Hai-Lu-feng, however, no one trusted Chang, and at the approach of his troops the alarm was sounded.[251]

On December 28, the East Special military committee instructed the Workers' and Peasants' Army, the Red Army, and the Red Guards to evacuate the towns and cities forthwith and disperse to the mountains, where resistance could be mounted. The emergency lasted for two days, causing

all the preparations for the Association congress to be abandoned. Quantities of red decorations were burned in case of a takeover. In the event, though, Chang's army passed straight through Hsingning and Meihsien toward Kiangsi and Fukien and did not stop, pressed as it was by troops loyal to Li Chi-shen.[252] *The Bolshevik* reported that in January one of Chang's regiments in Shihlung defected and raised the Red Flag, the incident being described as a good development and a sign of resistance "with greater awareness" on the part of soldiers against the warlords.[253] Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai announced that more than one battalion of Chang's troops entered the service of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, a fact confirmed by British intelligence.[254]

By the last day of December the Red Army was back. The loss of face was such that the East Special eventually called a meeting to analyze the incident and branded the December 28th affair as "rightist military opportunism." The directives for the revolution and its development were to take over the Ch'ao-Mei area and expand the Soviet's base. "When the enemy comes, it is quite wrong to withdraw and avoid battle." The decision was taken to "invite the enemy in and give him a sound thrashing," and this was then enshrined in a slogan reminiscent of the old Flag policy of taunting the enemy into fighting. This line was to prove fatal, however, when the weak Soviet forces found themselves pitted against superior military skill and equipment. Chung I-mou states that this meeting resulted in Hai-Lu-feng troops being posted to the East River and Han River to assist local peasants to revolt. Men were sent out everywhere to collect army taxes, and it was planned to organize and dispatch a unit of division strength. In all this the leaders were falling into "leftist adventurism," believing now, as one writer reports, that retreat was to be "the last opportunity for the Army."[255]

In one case, however, this extreme policy appeared to justify itself. This was at Ch'ihshih. A former militia commander, Ts'ai T'eng-hui, had been fighting the Reds for some time, backed up by Haifeng refugees in Hong Kong. On January 28 more than 2,000 well-equipped mercenaries, bandits, militiamen, and old Security Corps members drove out the Ch'ihshih peasant-army garrison of some 400 troops, who retreated to Meilung.

The East Special ordered Yeh Yung to attack Ch'ihshih with his Red Army regulars. His 600 men were reinforced by 1,000 Red Guards and P'eng Kuei's Workers' and Peasants' Army. They surrounded the town silently during the night. Chung I-mou describes how the local peasants, on their own, frightened the occupying troops by lighting torches and firing volleys as the troops were gambling and drinking in celebration of their vic-

tory. The Peasant Army by this means succeeded in drawing the enemy out in pursuit. But once out of Ch'ihshih, Ts'ai's men found that the peasants had vanished into the night among the surrounding hills and rocks.[256] Li Lien-p'ing, a local peasant leader involved in this action, tells of how Ts'ai's men had to go around shouting "Come out, you peasants! We have spotted you!" The peasants continued these maneuvers, learned from former feud-fighting, until the enemy tired of the game and concluded that the Reds were not strong enough for a pitched battle.[257]

But when the Red Army arrived before dawn on the 29th, the Red Guards were sent up to Kungtzushan to draw the enemy troops guarding the pass into an ambush. When the peasants started firing, Ts'ai, presuming it was the same old game, led 400 men to chase them off. Red Army units were waiting for them, however, and Ts'ai lost twenty soldiers. As soon as the Peasant Army heard the Red Army's firing, its men moved forward in their customary manner, with great shouting, drumming, blasting of horns and conch shells, banging of gongs, and firing of fusillades and local cannons. The occupiers of the town were taken by surprise, hastily assembled for a counterattack, and sortied, but the terrain favored the attackers, who could fire from higher ground. The enemy tried to break through the Kungtzushan pass three times in vain, while the Workers' and Peasants' Army was closing on the town. Ts'ai's troops broke ranks and fled, and the exiled Chung Hsiu-nan, who had been following them, barely managed to escape capture. The final engagement took place some kilometers outside Ch'ihshih, when a Workers' and Peasants' platoon clashed with a small number of enemy soldiers. Ts'ai was struck by a bullet, and the rest quickly disappeared. Meanwhile, Ts'ai's artillerymen still in town found themselves set upon by peasants armed with spears and knives. They too fled. Kim San reported that most of the attacking had been done by Peasant Army troops, with the 4th Division regulars waiting in the wings for the moment when the enemy dispersed.[258]

Chung I-mou termed the incident the most important battle since the establishment of the Soviet and its greatest victory: more than a thousand of the enemy were eliminated, many guns were recovered, and an artillery piece was captured. But a rightist source, though admitting that it was a serious setback for the Hai-Lu-feng landlords and gentry, puts the losses much lower. This source claims that when Ts'ai and his men regrouped, the final count was no more than twenty dead, a handful of officers and a few dozen troops wounded, and just 30 guns missing. A score or two of refugees

who had been following the troops had perished in the melee, most of these being of the Lin clan whose trademark was "Kuei-feng."[259] The peasant leader Li in his description of the battles implies that Ts'ai's mercenaries fought fiercely and killed a number of Reds, including the battalion commander and the Party representative. It would appear that it was only the suicidal onslaught of a mass of Red Guards and Workers' and Peasants' Army members that carried the day. Li describes the defeated troops later, however, as "no longer an army," and Kim San claims 300 enemy killed as against three Red Army men.

The Red troops, elated at their victory, held a celebration, during which they shouted "Let's attack Swatow! Let's attack Canton!" Their strength appeared to have grown with these victories, and they began planning to attack P'uning and Huilai. Once again, peasant confidence and Communist policy coincided.[260]

By early February 1928, the food situation was critical. Hong Kong, Macao, and other trading centers imposed a strict embargo on Hai-Lu-feng, and British gunboats patrolled the waters at Makung, near Swabue. A large army had to be fed, the area had been ravaged by warfare for years, stocks of food were low, and the black market flourished, the authorities being helpless to do anything about it. A meeting was called to discuss this state of things, and it was decided to requisition rice and grain stocks for general distribution. A large part of these hoarded foodstuffs lay in the granaries at Chiehsheng, Shakang, and Nant'u. The grain, once confiscated, was put under the control of a district grain committee for sharing out evenly among the populace and the army.[261] A rightist report claims that the Reds and their followers were given enough, but that others fared poorly. Rice was rationed and obtainable only on production of a card. The Liu ancestral hall in the Ch'iao-tung-she was one distribution center in Haifeng, the Peasant Association headquarters one in Lufeng. There was a general stampede during distribution, and the old and very young stood no chance. To get one's ration, one had to shout "Long live the Soviet government!" Much of the confiscated grain found its way into the bases of Yenshih and Chungt'ung.[262]

The threat of famine was real, and the cost of everything was high. A CCP document described 1927 as a rich year, but assessed this as no better than an "empty year," with greater exploitation of the peasantry everywhere and one calamity after another because of "the structures of Chinese society." The only solution lay in "the violent change of land relationships"

through worker and peasant struggle. In Hai-Lu-feng, this had already taken place; the problem was the clash between continual fighting and the agricultural cycle, for land cultivation was precluded by feuding, constant attacks, and the engagement of so many people in such conflicts. Starvation loomed.[263]

Currency was in short supply, and salt was the only reliable source of revenue. But salt was no good without a market and the means of transporting it, and Canton was closed as an outlet and the salt ships had vanished with their owners. Smugglers and robbers were resorted to as salt buyers, but it took months of persuasion to get even them to act as go-betweens. Income from the sale of salt was vital for the purchase of much-needed arms and ammunition. P'eng P'ai therefore decided to send an agent to Canton to coax thirteen former transport merchants into letting their salt ships engage in the trade again. Some ¥200,000 greased the palms of the provincial salt-monopoly officials, and the operation was soon under way. Some of the profits accruing from this trade were set aside as security for the opening of a Labor Bank, which was to take over all cash in circulation in the territory of the Soviet.[264]

There was also a need to establish an independent monetary system to meet government expenses. The total monthly expenditure for supporting the unemployed, for propaganda work, and for running various government offices was ¥19,000. A rightist source claims that "the Communists did not request taxes, contributions, rents, or public bonds, so as to attract the peasants." In January 1928, revenue was a mere ¥7,300. A monopoly on salt and fish was therefore imposed, which would also ensure reasonable distribution of these two basic commodities; peddlers, smugglers, and merchants had disappeared from the rural areas, and their absence was creating difficulties, especially in the mountainous terrain of the northwest. Distribution points were accordingly established for the peasants in the hinterland, which had the additional merit of making the collection of revenue easier. Of the revenue from salt, one third (that is, some ¥10,000 per month) went for government expenses, one third went toward relieving the unemployed and paying wages in the cooperatives, and one third was reserved for the Central Soviet Bank. The irrigation system, roads, and other public works were also paid for out of the salt income.[265]

On the pretext of establishing a general relief fund, the Central Soviet Bank, called the Hai-Lu-feng Labor Bank, was set up with branches in various places. People were urged to deposit all their cash with the Bank in re-

turn for its paper money, a scheme devised by Ch'en Tzu-ch'i, the finance committee chairman. Ch'en came from a rich landlord family in Pait'ien village, some eight kilometers outside Haifeng city, and was of the same clan as Ch'en Chiung-ming. He became friendly with P'eng P'ai as early as 1917 and believed in what P'eng was doing and gave him his full support.[266] Ch'en saw the issuance of paper money as a good means of securing hard cash. Since the Soviet could not print its own money, Ch'en used share certificates of his own Nan-feng Company, each with a reported par value of ¥10, to a total of ¥200,000. These went into circulation on February 20, 1928, overstamped in red "Hai-Lu-feng Soviet Government Currency." Naturally, people who had never known paper money were reluctant to exchange their cash for it, so the Soviet government had to make the exchange compulsory, explaining in a decree how the bank notes would help commercial transactions. This issue of Nan-feng certificates, it was explained, was a temporary measure pending the arrival of normal bank notes. The shares bore the seal of the People's Committee of both counties and would be redeemed as soon as the real notes were received. A source of the period claims that there were to be one-, five-, and ten-yüan denominations and that for the time being there would be ¥100,000 of such notes in circulation. The value of the share certificates would remain constant, and they could be exchanged for the proper currency in due course. No other form of currency would be accepted in either county as of the date of the notice, and anyone refusing to recognize the certificates would be deemed to be undermining the Soviet's fiscal system and would be dealt with as a counterrevolutionary. Left with no choice, people had to hand over their cash, though much against their will; where they could get away with it, they cut down on their transactions or took to dealing by barter.[267]

Revenue was also raised through the traditional means: taxation. A draft approved at the Congress of Representatives had strongly demanded the "Elimination of Customary Dues and Random Taxes," and except for a levy on spirits, opium, and gambling, and a surcharge on luxury items, all taxes were indeed abolished. The draft also called for a uniform system of taxation, in line with recommendations made by the CCP Kwangtung and approved by the Central Committee. The old system was to vanish, opium and gambling were proscribed, and standardization was definitely to be adopted. There was a need for the army tax to be made standard; it was not to be greater than 50 percent of the land tax or 10 percent of the tax on goods.[268]

Under the Soviet, the army provisioning tax was fixed from the start: we saw earlier how the total of 3,000 piculs of grain was reached, with an additional levy from owners who cultivated more than 10 *mou* of land. Rightist sources claimed that the Reds had collected in excess of ¥1 million from Hai-Lu-feng, obviously a grossly exaggerated figure.[269]

One common point in CCP policy and peasant sentiment was the swift and drastic treatment meted out to counterrevolutionaries. In Communist jargon, this was the "Red Terror"; in peasant practice, it was very often simple revenge. The virulence of the peasants' attacks on their enemies outstripped that of their mentors. In his "Hunan Report," Mao wrote: "A revolution is not a dinner party. It cannot be so refined, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, or magnanimous."[270] This was accepted by the Comintern 8th Plenum, which, concluding that "insurrection is an art," declared also that in respect to strategy "there is absolutely no halfway house; insurrections must pursue their course to the very end." The August 7th Emergency Conference endorsed these axioms. Indeed, the CCP had envisaged the Autumn Uprisings as a massacre of local bullies, evil gentry, landlords, and corrupt officials, all of whom were lumped together as "counterrevolutionaries."[271]

The "Red Terror" policy had been enforced in Haifeng ever since the first uprising of April 1927; with the second occupation of the county city in September, the slaughter intensified. The Soviet adopted it as policy in November, with its resolution on "The Elimination of the Counterrevolutionaries," whereby all collaborators with the "enemy" were to be shot. When the Peasant Association and the labor unions instructed their members to investigate and seize counterrevolutionaries, this was interpreted as license to kill them on the spot. Those who offered them refuge would meet the same fate, their houses would be burned down, and their wealth forfeited. The same applied to anyone found in possession of valuables belonging to the rebels and traitors or offering them assistance.[272] "Rules for Killing" had been issued before the soviet by the provisional government, and P'eng P'ai declared mercy and pardon to be out of the question, since such sentiments meant "indifference, even cruelty" toward the revolutionaries.* The CCP

*P'eng P'ai defended such policy also on other grounds: "If we do not kill them they will kill us. . . . One's survival means his enemy's death. . . . If I do not kill them today, they will kill me tomorrow!" (CHP:27).

Kwangtung, too, directed that every landlord should perish, and for the peasants the watchword became "Behead all reactionaries!"[273]

As Chung I-mou explains, the targets were those entrenched and powerful rural lineages that had practiced exploitation for generations. One such was the Chung of Nanling, sworn enemies of the Association and of the Soviet, guardians of counterrevolutionaries, and manipulators of their own clan peasants, whom they persuaded into fighting against the "Red Terror." The clan's Nanling fortifications were so strong that Lin Tao-wen had to take an army unit backed up by a large force of armed peasants and men of the Peasant Corps to assault the place. Surprisingly, those who surrendered were spared, "because our revolution is aimed at the extermination of classes, and not at the killing of a number of persons." Such magnanimity was exceptional, however, for wanton slaughter was encouraged and there were awards to those who slew most. The purge spread everywhere, and peasants were zealous in rounding up their foes.[274]

Peasants had to be aroused by fighting before they could set themselves to killing their enemies. It was not enough for the Communist leaders simply to instruct them to eliminate their class enemies: the peasants preferred to have first met them face to face in action. At the beginning, the Soviet government was obliged to pay the executioner, one of the Red Guards, a fee of two yüan. Two weeks later such monetary inducement had become unnecessary, so enraged were the Red Guards by that time. As William Hinton was to note in *Fanshen*: "Only the most severe provocation could overcome the peasants' great reluctance to act and set them in motion. But once in motion, they tended to extremes of cruelty and violence."[275]

This was especially the case when the landlords and gentry raised their own forces in opposition to the peasants, so that the battle lines were clearly drawn. We have seen what happened after the taking of Chiehsheng in November. A prolonged battle for the town was the trigger for butchery on a colossal scale: according to one source, over twenty piculs of heads were collected in baskets.[276] The *North China Herald* wrote of "Heads' Meetings" in December: gatherings took place at a number of centers where platforms were decorated with heads, executions were carried out on the spot, and P'eng P'ai himself joined in. The districts were divided into areas, each one having an executioner and a monthly quota of heads for lopping off. Ears and noses were cut off first and eyes gouged out. No sign of compassion was tolerated at the meetings, which served also as occasions for harangues.[277]

Rightist accounts of the "Red Terror" dwell on its effect on traditional moral and family values. The *Hong Kong Daily Press* noted on December 29: "Sections of the Communist Party reproach each other for not having killed enough. Family ties no longer have any influence in Haifeng. One young lad was his own father's accuser. Another looked and laughed while his father was led to prison." On February 18, 1928, the *North China Herald*, basing its statements on eyewitness accounts, reported a boy ordered to behead his uncle. The boy pleaded that he could not do so, but the uncle's talking of "the will of heaven" persuaded him at last. "The limits of fiendishness have been reached." Harmless folk were compelled "to kill as a policy, to involve as many as possible in any future retribution and to dissuade them effectively from taking any action which might bring that about."[278] It is clear that the traditional customs of local peasants (cannibalism not excluded) found their wildest eruptions in the hatred that the Communists fostered. The magazine *Kuo-wen chou-pao* also concluded from refugees' reports that "the reason why they want all to join in the killing is to reduce the possibility of revenge."[279]

It is difficult to give exact figures for the "Red Terror," but a conservative estimate of 5,000 would seem near the mark, not counting those killed during the guerrilla fighting or during the KMT "pacification" campaign. Bishop Valtorta gives 8,000 killed in Haifeng alone, and other sources give yet more.[280] Though not admitting even to as many as 5,000, Lo Ch'i-yüan justified the slaughter on the grounds that thousands of the Reds had also been killed. He declared that it was not for killing's sake, as it had been all along with the landlords, nor was it a policy of extermination, as was the case with the KMT vis-à-vis the Communists. Hai-Lu-feng had no choice. Lo goes on to compare the atrocities reported in Hai-Lu-feng by the rightist press with those perpetrated in Canton, where after the uprising Li Fu-lin slaughtered 5,700. He also cites recent battles in Kwangtung province and elsewhere: thousands of soldiers killed at a stroke of the pen signing the order for attack. This also was massacre, men dying to make warlords fat. Furthermore, thousands of poor peasants and workers were dying too, not in battle but of sickness and starvation. Lo had a point, and he made no apology for what the counterrevolutionaries, referring to the slaughter in Hai-Lu-feng, called "a day of darkness without a ray of sunlight."[281]

Also part of the "Red Terror" was the destruction of buildings belonging to the counterrevolutionaries, who were thus deprived of the tangible bases of their former control. Hai-Lu-feng had many fortified hamlets, block-

houses, citadels, and villas belonging to families of note and former officials. During the Soviet, the destruction of such buildings became a policy implemented systematically. It was motivated by the fight against private property, by hatred for the symbols of inequality and oppression, and by the countryside's resentment against the town. The practice went back to feuding habits, but recently it had been initiated by the KMT in its *wei-pao* ("surround and attack") drive against the Workers' and Peasants' Army. Whole villages, even towns, were razed to the ground or reduced to rubble, and there is photographic evidence of this. In all, some 14,180 houses in Hai-Lu-feng were destroyed; at five persons per household, this would constitute about one tenth of the houses in the two counties.[282] Up to the end of January, 451 walled villages had been destroyed. Two separate reports put the economic losses in Hai-Lu-feng at about ¥62,000,000. All the accounts and reports indicate that in terms of human, economic, and property losses, the worst-hit places were Chiehshih, Meilung, Chiehsheng, Ch'ihshih, Haifeng city, and Hsint'ien, in that order.[283]

The "Red Terror" had its rationale: by crushing the landlords and gentry, the peasants could gain confidence in themselves and sever the traditional relationships of submission by which they were enslaved. P'eng P'ai had preached on this theme and Mao Tse-tung gave it his approval in his "Hunan Report." The very possibility of a landlord-gentry restoration had to be destroyed before the peasants would have enough confidence to throw themselves completely into the revolution. To this end, they had to be compromised by sharing in the killing and burning, or by at least condoning it in their attendance at executions.[284]

P'eng himself must be allowed a word here, reported by Kim San as a member of the Revolutionary Court in Haifeng city. One of the four people condemned when he sat on the court one day was an intelligent-looking young man whom the peasants had brought in.

> There was no proof against him. "Look at his white hands and face," the peasants said. "There is no mistake. He is a counterrevolutionary landlord's son and a class enemy." I liked his face, which was open and innocent, and said I thought there was no crime on it and that perhaps he would be glad to join with the revolution against his father. P'eng P'ai smiled and took me by the hand. "You are just as young and innocent as he. Class justice is not personal but a necessary measure of civil war. We must kill more, not less, in case of question. You do not know the cruelty in Hai-Lu-feng under the landlords. If you had seen what I have, you would ask no questions. The peasants are a hundred times less cruel than the landlords and they have

killed very, very few in comparison. The peasants know what is necessary for self-defense, and if they do not destroy their class enemies they will lose morale and have doubts about the success of the revolution. This is their duty and yours."

This telling description fits the reality of the "Red Terror." The lesson Kim San had learned in the Canton Commune was "If we do not destroy the enemy, the enemy will annihilate us," and the rule of class struggle was "To fail is death." CCP doctrine on the class struggle thus dovetailed with the traditional "excesses of the peasants" in their sanguinary revenge. The Korean recalls how "peasants did not want a trial or to wait"; they would condemn "by looking at a man," confident that he was dangerous or guilty. "The Red Army in Hai-Lu-feng was humane. . . . But the local peasants, who had suffered torture under the landlords, were not kind to their class prisoners." Their refined tortures and sadistic methods of killing manifested "the cruel revenge-ethic of the old tribal clan society among the peasants."

Reminiscing on Hai-Lu-feng society, Kim San realized that "feudal remnants were very strong. . . . The clan and blood system was still strong. The Soviet did not break it entirely but gradually weakened it." Buttressed though the family was, "the class struggle was very intense in Haifeng. . . . P'eng P'ai's line was to let the people dispense justice as they saw it, provided it was the democratic will of the majority." Class struggle and peasant justice "as they saw it" came to be one and the same in Hai-Lu-feng under the soviet.[285]

But if the aim was to widen the base of popular support, what then? Communist and rightist observers agree that "a percentage of the population was against the Soviet," even though "everyone was forced to join in, to avoid being branded a counterrevolutionary." Many obviously tried to get away: by December there were 30,000 Hai-Lu-feng refugees in Hong Kong. The number of escapees increased to the point that a government notice warned that the families of those leaving were to be held responsible for their return within a certain period. Permission to depart temporarily would be granted by the authorities. However, since too many never came back, this policy was discontinued except in the case of rice merchants and other traders in agricultural products. They were allowed out for 15 days at a time, leaving their shops as their bond.[286]

It was the East Special that had ordered the first Congress of Representatives and the establishment of the Soviet government. It was this com-

mittee, too, that on February 10, 1928, instructed the governments of the Haifeng and Lufeng soviets to call a second Congress. Behind this call was a sense of a need to strengthen the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet area against growing threats. For one thing, after the fall of the Canton Commune the counties found themselves being encircled by KMT armies, and could not count on much help from outside. For another, counterrevolutionary attacks were still a problem. There was a sense on the part of the CCP leadership that a make-or-break effort was needed to establish a larger area within which they could hold out.[287] The East Special directive responded to a CCP Kwangtung call in the January meeting of East River Peasant Association representatives for renewed effort for a second revolt throughout Kwangtung and in particular for the expansion of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet area to include Tzuchin, Wuhua, P'uning, Ch'aoyang, and Chiehyang.[288]

The Second Congress was therefore convened as a "special congress" at which the "Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet Government" was changed into the "Soviet People's Committee," with 32 members and a Secretary. A Notice of February 15 informed the populace of the election of the new cabinet and stressed the need for enlarging the organization and enhancing soviet government power. The notice also gave a full list of the new government members, who were mostly holdovers from the November Congress. There was a reorganization of district soviets whereby the executive and judicial committees elected a five-member presidency to oversee the various departments, and the village soviet now had an executive also.[289]

This Congress seems to have been intended to form an emergency government that would represent not just the workers, peasants, and soldiers, but all the people. The restructuring was probably aimed at mustering help from all social quarters, including the petty bourgeoisie. But if that indeed was its aim, it seems to have been unsuccessful. Electoral representation (which already at the first Congress had found little room for the "small merchant" class on the grounds that it had dangerous connections) was no wider now, despite a CCP Kwangtung call for a new executive committee of the Soviet to be elected by February 1928 and to include Communist and non-Communist peasants, workers, and soldiers.[290]

Adverse reaction to the Soviet was especially strong in Lufeng, where society was more backward than in Haifeng. The counterrevolutionaries by January 1928 were putting out their own very effective propaganda against the Reds, and landlords restricted their demands to a general mobilization to oust the Communists. In Lufeng, political work had been less extensive,

the CCP was not so well organized, the Peasant Association and the Young Pioneers were weaker, and a great deal of sympathy was lost through blunders committed during the "Red Terror" campaign.[291] Moreover, many of those who had thrown in their lot with the Soviet resented certain decisions that had been made and refused to implement the agrarian reforms. As P'eng admitted in his "Political Report," the counterrevolutionaries in Lufeng presented a problem: "When our peasant brothers heard people saying that the land revolution would destroy land deeds, there was much misunderstanding, and they were apprehensive and fearful."[292] It may come as no surprise, then, to learn that in January 1928 a "White Flag" force was able to reoccupy Lufeng city and, albeit for a few days only, install a temporary magistrate.[293]

In their pursuit of the class struggle in Hai-Lu-feng, the Reds, though fully aware that there were no great capitalists among the rich, nonetheless stirred up hatred and used the Black and Red Flags to make people kill one another. That is the rightists talking.[294] But it is certainly true that the CCP leaders and the peasants saw the class struggle in different terms. Among the peasants it evoked old sentiments of rallying to their Red Flag to war against the Black Flag of the rich oppressors. The peasants clearly could not comprehend the subtle distinctions of class; indeed, in many instances CCP members could not do so either. This reversion to old ways was also found among the reactionaries. Chung I-mou recalls how remnant Ch'en Chiung-ming loyalists at the borders of the Soviet area attempted to rouse local bandits and members of the Taoist secret societies, hoping to stir them to revolt against the government. The *Shen-chiao* (Divine Association) and the Long Hairs were already very active inside Lufeng, especially in the Pomei area. In Huilai county and in Ts'ait'an, local bandits and the Long Hairs were particularly successful in spreading the slogan "White Flag Against Red Flag." They started attacking under the new banner, which only confirmed among the peasants in the Soviet the notion that traditional Flag warfare had been revived. They responded accordingly.[295]

Speaking of Lufeng at this time, a Communist document states that "when the Red Army arrived there waving red banners, the troops were greeted by landowners and peasants alike from Red [Flag] villages, thinking them to be allies in the struggle against the common enemy, the Black [Flag] villages."[296] Another observer writes that "when the Reds got control of the county [Haifeng], all the *hung-ch'i* (Red Flags) became *ch'ih-hua* (Soviet Reds)."[297] The ideas behind the new Red Flag were expounded and peasants

were urged to pursue the class struggle against the landlords, but "this propaganda was not always conducted skillfully, and in some cases did not achieve the desired results."*[298]

The militia, clans, and Flags offered the first forceful resistance to Communist designs. Early in January 1928, the new White Flag was organized in Lufeng. The Red Army had still not taken Chiatzu, whose police chief proposed the revival of the Black and Red Flags to oppose the Communists. He contacted the two Flag leaders in K'ueit'an: Ch'en Tzu-ho, who headed the Black Flag and had under his control 10,000 clansmen from the Peihu area; and Ma Ssu-ta, who led the Red Flag, which generally had sided with the Communists. Ch'en proposed amalgamating both Flags into the White Flag, for obvious reasons. A date for an uprising was fixed. All the villages had to take out the old guns used for defense in the past and send all their males to Chiatzu for a gathering. Ma Ssu-ta was elected their chief.

On January 8 they took Nant'ang and Pomei; on the 11th, Lufeng city was occupied and several dozen Communists were slain. But on January 13 several hundred Red troops drove the White Flag forces back to Pomei. The deputy commander of the Red forces, Liu Ch'in-hsi, held a meeting for workers and peasants, and in best Flag tradition the villagers from Shangp'u, opposed to the Reds, turned up with guns at the ready. They had expected to meet up with the White Flag forces reappearing from Pomei, but their impatience led them to arrive early, and a melee ensued at the meeting place, with peasants at each other's throats. Liu Ch'in-hsi led his Communist troops against the few dozen Shangp'u peasants, who retreated toward their village with Liu in pursuit. By this time, however, Shangp'u and its neighboring villages had mustered their inhabitants, and a battle took place in the paddy fields. Liu was defeated, and had to surrender his troops and guns. Among the hundred men killed were two Red leaders. White Flag morale was boosted and preparations were made to retake and defend Lufeng city. Hsiao Chüeh was elected temporary magistrate; he immediately sent to Swatow for ammunition.[299]

Other major towns in the county remained under Communist control, but local Red forces were unable to mount a counterattack, so the 4th Division, recently arrived from Canton, was ordered to advance on the county city. The White Flag irregulars were no match for the professional troops

*The CCP Provincial Committee observed: "What was called the struggle of the masses was but the fighting of small bullies and gentry against big bullies and gentry; the class distinction was less important than the village divisions" (*PL*:66).

and were driven back to Pomei; a 300-strong reinforcement unit dispatched by General Ch'en Chi-t'ang was also routed. The anti-Red forces regrouped for a final stand, and fighting raged for hours until there suddenly appeared from nowhere several dozen devotees of the *Pai-lien-chiao-hui* ("White Lotus Sect"). With their long hair, white gowns, and incense burners, they advanced toward the Reds completely unarmed, yet appear to have startled them into turning on their heels and fleeing. The White Flag victory was ephemeral, however, and the 4th Division soon regained the lost city and villages. When they did, the people there suffered terrible reprisals. At Shangp'u, there was a ghastly massacre and the village was reduced to a smoldering ruin. The Lin lineage was virtually wiped out as 700 people were butchered.[300]

Thus the old features of the peasant world of Hai-Lu-feng—Flag allegiance and localism—proved, especially in Lufeng, the most effective rallying cry for the old leaders. In one of his letters to exiled Haifeng folk, the former leader Chung Hsiu-nan urged them "to rouse the spirit that overthrew the Mongolian Ch'ing," when "many of our countrymen . . . were prominent in the Revolutionary Party." He exhorted them: "Strive to eliminate the Reds."[301]

The local form of "class struggle" was, in effect, the continuation of the attack on notable lineages and clans embarked upon with the arrival of the Eastern Expedition armies in 1925. Chung I-mou admits that much of the slaughter of counterrevolutionaries was—the revolution apart—a simple act of revenge. The "powerful lineages and great families" near the capital city came in for especially severe treatment.[302] The *Shih-pao* reported that two particular clans were "most cruelly attacked: the Ho and the Lin." Both were notorious for their maltreatment of peasants. One resident avows that the killing was indiscriminate: "Many were powerful landlords and gentry, but many had no social status, being merely members of some great lineage or comparatively better-off."[303]

Chung I-mou remarks that, although some of the young and poor among such lineages did harbor revolutionary aspirations, it had proved impossible to achieve anything with them, so entrenched were the majority in their conservative views and so strong was the financial power they wielded. The very geography of the place was an advantage to them; they were self-sufficient in food, could obtain the latest firearms, and felt strong enough to take on the revolutionary forces and crush them. P'eng P'ai had himself feared that

this would happen, and that much of the class war under the Soviet would turn into feuding among Flags and clans.[304]

It has already been noted that P'eng P'ai himself was looked upon by the peasants as a veritable savior, both socially and spiritually. This, again, was in the tradition of the secret societies, and the revolutionary peasants had no qualms about involving their gods in their struggle: as we have seen, they painted their statues red. Kim San, in reporting this, adds that "they painted some other Buddhas white, as landlords' Buddhas which deserved punishment."[305] One resident asserts that despite the sovietization of Hai-Lu-feng, clan and lineage sentiment was strong: thus, when passing through villages, people would always get better treatment if they had the local name, so that a Red leader named Ch'en from Haifeng would find himself welcome in a Lufeng village where Ch'en was also the surname. Lineage and clan links beyond county boundaries persisted, as the P'eng lineage of Hot'ien in Lufeng showed in their contribution to Soviet military strength.[306]

In February 1928, the new Soviet People's Committee ordered an inquiry into complaints that desertions from the 2d Division were causing concern. One regiment alone was down by 57 men. The 2d Regiment of the Workers' and Peasants' Army also lost 25 men from one company. Deserters had taken with them good rifles and clothing, to make the loss even more serious. With the pressure growing from outside, Hai-Lu-feng needed to study its defense as much as its expansion.[307]

A decree of the Soviet People's Committee gave priority to recruitment, with the families of recruits being particularly well treated and assured of a livelihood. The Second Congress of Representatives had laid down rules to ensure a decent life in the army and to obviate class distinctions. These rules were made public and reveal the values and aims of the local people, as well as the spirit it was hoped to foster in the Red Army.[308] The new conditions of service might have been quite attractive to poor farmhands, but there was no time for them to prove their worth.* A rightist source speaks of people being pressed into service, of many desertions, and of the authorities having to station sentinels on the borders and to patrol the key passes into Huiyang. In Canton, the rightist press claimed that by December the

*A foretaste of the new attitudes came in early January 1928, when the Central Committee hailed "this new Workers' and Peasants' Army formed of volunteers from each village," recruited without pay but enlisted freely from worker and peasant organizations. ("Kuang-chou pao-tung" [1928]).

Soviet's military strength was 2,000 men and 1,000 guns, but that it was intended to recruit 10,000 peasants, a large proportion being forced into service.[309]

The rule was that each family of ten members should provide one soldier. To promote enlistment, a "Support the Red Army Week" was arranged by the East Special, opening on February 15. P'eng P'ai is said to have composed a song especially for the occasion. That there should be a "Red Army Week" at all was evidence that the leaders were having recruitment difficulties, especially after an earlier bid in January to expand the soviet had failed. Themes and slogans for this "Week" centered on the Red Army's help to the peasantry: "The Red Army saw to the enactment of the land revolution and aided the armed units of the workers and peasants in their revolt. The Red Army is the military strength of the workers and peasants and of all poor people." Their valor merited reward, and not only of the monetary kind: "The worker and peasant brothers of Hai-Lu-feng must increase their courage and do their duty by joining the Red Army, embarking on training and lending a hand in the East River work of revolt."[310]

Local CCP leaders in the East Special took careful note of the injunctions of the CCP Kwangtung: the "Present Tasks" demanded an increase in the number of Worker and Peasant Army units and the establishment of a Central Army. The Party, as we have seen, was aiming to form a revolutionary base in the East River to compensate for the loss of Canton, and it was expected that the East Special's firm control over the area could render such a policy practicable.[311]

The CCP believed that if the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet did not expand, it would perish; but the economic situation and the effects of the "Red Terror" worked against expansion. A stalemate appeared to have set in. The Second Congress had advocated the involvement in government of all the popular forces and interests, and the People's Committee made an effort to implement this. However, the counterrevolutionaries remained a problem. During the first weeks of 1928 there was a flurry of activity in all fields with a view to preparing for expansion, but without exception the endeavors ran into trouble. It was not really a matter of insufficient funds or manpower: there were untapped resources in the counties nearby, which had an organization network that also came under the East Special. The problem was within Hai-Lu-feng itself.[312]

Chung Hsiu-nan remained determined to liberate Haifeng, and was training auxiliaries and raising funds. In a letter to the Haifeng refugees in

Hong Kong, he blamed commander Ts'ai T'eng-hui for underestimating Red military strength and for refusing to use the local militia. Chung claimed that there were many militiamen in Tsengkuangfan, Jenshan, and Chilung, all bordering Haifeng, and in Huangpu: a force of 1,000 guns could easily be assembled. Another reason for the Ch'ihshih defeat was that little effort had been made to consolidate the conquest and thereby to encourage the first advancing line. This suggestion had come up only to be rejected on the grounds that, instead of bringing relief to the villages, it would have resulted in disaster, with killing and burning all around.

The invading forces, however, were mistaken in thinking that the peasants would welcome them. When they arrived at a village or town, they were received in silence; when they were defeated, the peasants set upon them. At Hsinweilin village, just outside Ch'ihshih, they conducted a prolonged parley with peasants entrenched in four blockhouses. In the end, they had to blast them out and some dozens were killed. The villagers got their revenge later when the troops were in retreat. Chung Hsiu-nan was at a loss to find some way of dealing with such villages: consideration did not work. All he could do was to observe that "the fighting prowess of the Communists in Hai-Lu-feng should not be taken lightly, especially with regard to the ignorant peasants and the mass of youngsters, in great measure poisoned [in their minds], induced, and suborned into fighting."[313]

A purported East Special document, found on two Communists by the Merchant Corps in P'ingshan after an unsuccessful attack, contained details of the plans for revolt in the East River area. The main objective was to stabilize the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet through expansion. The peasants of Huiyang were to be urged to rise all along the borders up to Santochu and P'ingshan, with local Party leaders stressing the land revolution as the prime incentive. All CCP members there had to report for action or be expelled from the Party. Huilai and other neighboring counties were also called upon.[314] Lo Ch'i-yüan declared: "To protect the victory obtained, it is necessary to develop the land revolution in other places and by every means: in the west toward Huiyang and Polo, in the east toward P'uning and Ch'aoyang, in the north toward Tzuchin and Wuhua—a three-pronged attack, mounted simultaneously to build up a Red East River."[315]

In the North, Liu Ch'in-hsi attacked Tzuchin, then entered Wuhua, and tried to rally the peasants on the upper reaches of the Han River. The central drive struck at Hot'ien in Lufeng, then P'uning, threatening Hop'o and Ch'aochou city. P'eng P'ai led the 4th Division on the east route into Huilai,

where he attacked K'ueit'an in order later to aim at Ch'aoyang, Chiehyang, and then Swatow. K'ueit'an fell on February 13. The magistrate wired Swatow for help, but the 6th KMT Company there was encircled and another company's commander was killed. P'eng P'ai's forces destroyed over a thousand houses and sent 10,000 refugees fleeing to Swatow. The central drive took Huangt'ang and Shangsha and threatened Hop'o. In P'uning county, Ch'ihshih and Kuolung fell, and within ten days the whole county was in terror, with villages being razed and hundreds being killed. In Tzuchin, the magistrate was killed, over 300 local gentry were massacred, and 100 women were taken prisoner. Ku Ta-ts'un, the local leader in Wuhua county, had plans to form his own soviet there. He led a roving band of guerrillas that eventually constituted the 11th Red Army.[316] A Communist report described how peasants and workers in the Ch'aoshan area were wrecking railway lines and water pipes, and how in Swatow the workers were rising: "The East River may become a center for revolution."[317]

But all this endeavor was to prove the swan song of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet. The political situation in the province had changed, Canton was besieged with appeals for help from prominent people, and General Li could no longer afford to ignore events in the East River if he meant to maintain his authority and his sources of revenue in eastern Kwangtung. Decisive action was required. Early in February, however, Lo Ch'i-yüan was still expressing doubts about the KMT army's will to fight. That army had units only in Swatow and in the county capitals, whereas the rural areas were firmly under peasant control. "Every day, Li Chi-shen promises to crush the East River Communists. Does he really mean it? If he fails, he'll be on the run again." At the Chinese New Year, Lo was still sounding a positive note: "Our aims and means are before us; we have only to pursue them. We march forward over thorns and broken glass to a bright future. The thorns lie ahead but also behind; therefore we have no alternative but to advance. Ahead there is glory, revolt, and the Red Flag bearing the hammer and sickle of the Red International."[318]

As Russian observers concluded, the Red Army proper and the peasant military forces of Hai-Lu-feng were the prototype of the Chinese Red Army, despite the claims of many later units to this honor.[319] P'eng P'ai was the first to train a Red Army of peasants politically and to get them to enlist on other than a mercenary basis. His troops had long been called "Reds" by the press, later the "Red Army," so as to distinguish Hai-Lu-feng peasants

from Chiang Kai-shek's "Red Cadets."[320] In the spring of 1927, the Peasant Army and Peasant Self-Defense Corps were combined into the Workers' and Peasants' Army under the East Special, which marked the intermediate step toward full transformation into a Red Army.[321]

The birth of the Red Army in Nanch'ang on August 1, 1927, an event still celebrated, is significant only in that it gave the Communists the first fighting troops under their de facto control—they were still under the KMT flag.[322] When the Central Committee ordered the change to the Red Flag on September 19, neither the composition nor the warlord-army character of this force altered much; when it disintegrated, all hopes of a Communist military buildup in the south were dashed. Conveying the Committee's order to the Yeh-Ho troops in Swatow, Chang T'ai-lei instructed them to leave the area and "to transfer . . . to Haifeng and Lufeng, to combine with local peasants into the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."[323]

In late 1927, the only real "Red Army" was the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet Army. Chu Te was still operating in northern Kwangtung under the KMT flag in December, and his Nanch'ang remnants were not organized into the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army until January 23, 1928.[324] As for Mao, after the failure of the Autumn Harvest uprising and his flight to Chingkangshan, he reassembled his dilapidated units and boosted their numbers with local bandits, calling the new force the "1st Division of the First Peasants' and Workers' Army." But this fancy name could scarcely conceal the fact that his army consisted of ambiguous forces trying to make the most of a desperate situation.[325]

On the other hand, it must be admitted that the model of the Red Army shaped at Hai-Lu-feng did not have a future: the Red forces there were mostly wiped out, though (as we shall see) units of the Workers' and Peasants' Army under P'eng Kuei were later incorporated into the 11th Red Army led by Ku Ta-ts'un in the Tananshan Base. Chu Te is partially correct when he describes "the original nucleus of what later became the Red Army" as deriving from four main sources: Nanch'ang, Hunan in 1927 and early 1928, the Canton Commune, and deserters from the KMT armies.[326] In October 1928, Mao went so far as to state that "the present Red Army is a split-off from the National Revolutionary Army, which underwent democratic political training and came under the influence of the masses of workers and peasants."[327] He thus set the stage for his own creation of a new Red Army pattern, and Pavel Mif could affirm that "the main core of the Chinese Red Army was the 4th Army Corps" under Mao and Chu Te. Mif,

however, also stated: "Particularly great service in the creation of the Chinese Red Army was rendered by Comrades Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, P'eng P'ai, Fang Chih-min, Huang Kung-lüeh, and Ho Lung."[328] A contemporary Communist historian notes that "the forces surviving the [peasant] uprisings became the initial group of the Red Army of the Workers and Peasants."[329]

In August 1927, Mao proposed the use of the Red Flag instead of the KMT flag, "which has become the warlords' flag . . . a Black Flag," but nothing came of the proposal then. He was reprimanded by the Central Committee for not relying on the strength of the Workers' and Peasants' Army to be built out of the Workers' and Peasants' Self-Defense Corps. The peasants were to do the brunt of the fighting, and other military units were only support forces. "Military adventurism" would be the case if the reverse were practiced.[330] The "judicious coordination of military organization with local peasant uprisings would provide the formula for a countrywide agrarian insurrection."[331] In his letter of August 30, Mao affirmed that the worker and peasant insurgents were to constitute the "main force," the military units only "an auxiliary"; but in fact he was depending on the latter so much that the CCP Hunan Committee called his group "the rifle movement."[332]

By contrast, in Hai-Lu-feng the concept of the Red Army as a "people's army" was already established in fact, and there were many instances when the Red Army proper stood on the sidelines so that the peasants would have priority in attacks and conquests. In Mao's view, both in 1927 and later, the Red Army was "an army of the people," acting on the people's behalf rather than actually being the people or operating with them. In November 1928 Mao declared: "A special characteristic of the revolution in China . . . is the use of military action to develop insurrection."[333] That indeed was what he had done in Hunan and was doing in Chingkangshan. Mao's concept was Leninism applied in its "military extreme," perhaps out of necessity rather than conscious choice: an indispensable corps of professional revolutionaries, the revolution's "professional army." This was not what the CCP had in mind.[334]

It was P'eng P'ai who was working along CCP lines, especially with his Workers' and Peasants' Army. Though the dream of having the peasant masses overcome any military force proved impossible, he never abandoned the idea. In this respect, peasant mentality and behavior happened to coincide with Party policy of the time. In 1927, Mao was probably thinking in similar terms, but the circumstances in Hunan and his desire for success at

any price led him to the establishment of a Workers' and Peasants' Army in name only; that was in accord with his own convictions and with Party principles. Mao had promised Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 100,000 Hunanese peasants; Ch'ü inflated the figure to 200,000 in his telegram to Moscow; but in the end only 5,000 turned out. "Mao's experience in the peasant movement had demonstrated to him that the Central Committee's naïve belief in the organized peasantry would not bear fruit unless something more could be added. That something more Mao found in the already existing paramilitary units based on underworld life, which had been part of the Hunanese rural scene for generations."[335] For Mao at this time, it was "the discovery of the importance of military organization." Later he was to say: "The existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary condition for the existence of Red political power. If we have local Red Guards only, but not a regular Red Army, then we cannot cope with the regular White Forces, but only with the landlords' levies."[336]

P'eng P'ai had had his own Peasant Army in Hai-Lu-feng since 1925, organized and trained for a political mission and acting for sociopolitical aims on its own home ground, which eventually became its own Soviet.[337] It is true that without the Red Army proper, many of the conquests could not have been made; but that does not detract from the fact that the first "Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army" was born and raised in Hai-Lu-feng, and was in action by April 1927 with the first uprising and the establishment of the ten-day government. The arrival of the Nanch'ang troops in October and of the units from Canton at the year's end certainly brought military skill and better equipment, but there was hardly any alteration in ideals or aims. The Red Army of Workers and Peasants was a reality of long standing, and by the time the Soviet was installed it was a real mass army of armed peasants. The Red military forces in the Soviet came to be conscripted, had formal training, and played a full part in Soviet government policy. They had all the characteristics (and defects) of an army of peasants, yet they still remained the best expression of peasant and Communist ideals for a people's revolution.[338] Lo Ch'i-yuan summed it up well: "The armed masses are the only bastion . . . a few tens of thousands of people in arms ready to die any time for the Soviet government."[339] The Central Committee requested in May 1928 that "the Red Guards of the workers and peasants should be expanded to the utmost," the Red Army itself to be made up largely of these Guards, who were never to break their link with the masses engaged in production. The Committee hoped to stem any trend toward a

"professionalized army system" through a periodic discharge of troops, and favored a volunteer or conscript system.[340]

That the CCP and Mao had later to repudiate such a formula reveals the extent to which peasant and Communist aims and methods came to differ. Rightly, Stuart Schram has pointed out that Mao and others elaborated a strategy for the Chinese revolution in which an "organized military was to play a primary role," Mao being "one of the primary initiators of this tendency."[341] Without detracting from Mao's contribution, it must be said that P'eng P'ai's Workers' and Peasants' Army formed the first nucleus of the Red Army in the real sense of the word and in accordance with the purest Communist and peasant line. Reality showed that peasant ways were too naïve and Communist principles with regard to a People's Army too impractical: Mao was correct when he began to purge his army in Chingkangshan of peasant ideology, on the grounds that this was incompatible with the new style of the Red Army and the life of the Party.[342] "The idea of establishing independent regimes of workers and peasants by armed force is an important one, and must be fully grasped by the Communist Party and by the masses of workers and peasants in areas under the independent regime."[343] Mao declared that recent events had certainly taught him this lesson, but it was hardly the peasant way or in keeping with CCP dreams. The result was that "wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly move into action." The Red Army was no longer one of peasants.[344]

In Hai-Lu-feng at this time the Red Army was still the Peasant Army; or rather, peasants under arms were the Red Army and constituted Soviet military power.

The success of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet sprang from the peculiar political and military situation in eastern Kwangtung. As long as events in Nanking were preoccupying the KMT, there was little time for or interest in the East River, with its remote and troublesome counties. The forces of Li Chi-shen and Chiang Kai-shek were jockeying for power and were busy dealing with Chang Fa-k'uei; the Merchants' Associations of Hai-Lu-feng rightly complained that the military could not be bothered with the plight of their county. Landlords pleading on their knees before the Canton authorities encountered similar apathy, according to newspaper reports, and had impressed upon them the fact that eliminating Chang's forces had top priority, whatever excesses the Reds were perpetrating in the East River.[345]

One place where General Li did take up the problem of Hai-Lu-feng was in Hong Kong, which he visited in January 1928. The Colony had its own reasons to be alarmed at the developments of recent weeks and was disposed to take a harder line on extradition. After Canton, 216 detainees had been held, and a revision of the 1889 ordinances in process would empower the governor to extradite not only a "criminal fugitive" but also any "criminal person" declared as such by the Chinese authorities. Political grounds, now as earlier, were insufficient for removal under arrest, and Clementi told Li that evidence of criminality must be provided. But the general saw that his endeavors to wipe out Communists and pirates in eastern Kwangtung might earn him the gratitude of the Hong Kong government, which would then feel obliged to rid itself of the many Communists there.[346]

The Haifeng Countrymen's Association did much to keep the plight of the refugees in the limelight: telegrams were sent to the authorities and articles appeared frequently in the press. In Canton, the refugees organized a "petition group" that marched noisily to the government offices demanding the dispatch of the army to Hai-Lu-feng, but the marchers were dispersed and their printed material was confiscated. In Hong Kong, public petitions maintained the pressure and the General Chamber of Commerce was active in the cause. Chung Hsiu-nan had assumed the mantle of local leadership and was sending circulars to friends and well-wishers, calling for contributions and generally enlisting support. The KMT was also being bombarded with demands from militia commanders, educational bodies, merchant associations, and East River emigrants both local and in the USA.[347] Even the U.S. consul at Canton joined in, advocating the "occupation of the district by a strong Nationalist force," seeing that it had become "a center of communistic trouble in South China."[348] Bishop Fourquet of Canton had persuaded the French consulate to exert pressure, and the Italian consulate, eager not to appear apathetic after the British had rescued the Italian missionaries, followed suit.[349] It was not long before Clementi could inform his minister in Peking that "the Canton authorities are in hopes of being able to commence operations against brigands and pirates very soon, and to complete the work in three months' time."[350]

Clementi was also able to notify Peking that after the defeat at Ch'ihshih, Li Chi-shen had informed the governor "that the work of suppression will now be undertaken by General Hsü Ching-t'ang. It is generally believed that at least 6,000 well-armed regulars will be required to suppress the movement in the Hai-Lu-feng district alone."[351] The Canton British consulate,

though conveying much the same information, nevertheless pointed out that an expedition to Hai-Lu-feng was "bound to [encounter] strong resistance, as the forces there, when defeated, return to the neighboring hills, whence it is extremely difficult to dislodge them, and return to the villages after the departure of the government troops." Any attacking army would have to take account of the real strength of the Reds, the long-standing reputation of the area for belligerence, and the tenacity and prowess of the people there.[352]

The disposition of regular troops in the East River was charted by British intelligence. Under Li Chi-shen were the 11th Division, commanded by Ch'en Chi-t'ang (5,000), and two regiments of Pai Ch'ung-hsi's army (2,000); loyal to Chiang Kai-shek were Ch'en Ming-shu's 11th Army (5,000) and Chien Ta-chun's 32d Army (2,000). The 11th Army was en route to Canton; Hsü Ching-t'ang's 13th Division, together with Kwangsi troops of the 7th Army under Wang Shao-hung, were heading for Swatow. The report concluded: "The only enemies now left in Kwangtung are Red peasant armies, with their main base at Hai-Lu-feng."[353] In February, Swatow was described as tense, with peasants active in Ch'aochoufu and local police ready to discard their uniforms as soon as peasant forces attacked. Only Ch'en Chi-t'ang's forces of the 11th Division maintained any semblance of control. The British consul at Swatow reported a general insurrection in the air on February 10, with Communists from Hong Kong on the scene.[354]

But in mid-February the KMT at last made a move. General Ch'en mobilized his division for a three-pronged attack on Hai-Lu-feng. Lufeng would be taken via Swatow and Chiehyang; Haifeng would be taken via Huichou and Santochu; and Swabue, Chiehsheng, and the coastal areas would fall under bombardment from the 4th Naval Squadron. At the same time, auxiliaries under Ts'ai T'eng-hui and Chung Hsiu-nan in Huangpu, together with the *pao-an-tui* in Lufeng, would play their part. The troops of the 11th Division were under the command of Yü Han-mou, the deputy commander.[355]

There were reports of heavy fighting in Chiehshih: quantities of troops with air cover had moved in and occupied the town, but were driven out again by the Red Army. Correspondents reported: "Hai-Lu-feng is very mountainous and the KMT are encountering extreme difficulties."[356] The *Chung-yang jih-pao* (*Central Daily*) admitted that "Red sons and grandsons are daily becoming more terrible and feared."[357] The 11th Division had to fight several fierce battles with the 300-strong Red Army and the Workers'

and Peasants' Army. On February 28 the town of Ta'an fell, and the Lufeng Soviet leaders gathered with several thousand peasants to swear to protect the Soviet government. Its offices, the hospital, and all the female cadres were transferred to the central base at Chungt'ung. Orders were given to resist to the end and to pursue a scorched-earth policy. Large quantities of foodstuffs were taken off to the bases, mills were sabotaged, and boats, bridges, and telegraph and telephone lines were destroyed.[358]

When the troops of the 11th Division regrouped in Ta'an the next day, they were divided into two columns. The 30th Regiment under Yü Han-mou marched directly to Lufeng, whereas the 31st under Li Chen-ch'iu, reinforced by the *pao-an-tui*, made for Haifeng. A short way out of Ta'an, however, the 30th Regiment encountered the 4th Division of the Red Army under Yeh Yung. A savage battle lasted for several hours, and hundreds were killed on both sides. But by afternoon the Red Army troops were retreating and the 30th Regiment had a clear road to Lufeng. Detachments were sent to oust the Reds from Chinhsiang, Chiehshih, Nant'ang, Chiatzu, and other towns in the county.

The 2d Division of the Red Army under Tung Lang lay in wait for the other KMT column about ten kilometers from Kungp'ing market. There was a fierce clash, but the Reds eventually had to scatter. The KMT troops had not been expected to arrive so early, and in Kungp'ing a rally was in progress, some 30,000 people attending.[359] Kim San, who was there with Cheng Chih-yün, reported that the enemy troops arrived during the rally, surrounded the town and took it at 4 P.M. on February 29. There was great slaughter. Kim was lucky to escape to Haifeng city. There, P'eng P'ai called a huge rally in the manner of bygone feud days, with everyone, boys, students, and women, "armed to punish the enemy." P'eng shouted the slogan "Drown the enemy in our blood," words taken up enthusiastically by the crowd. "The Internationale" was sung, and then everyone made for Kungp'ing, women and children included, in a gigantic wave directed by the Workers' and Peasants' Army under Lin Tao-wen. Such was their sheer impetus that they were able to enter the city and release many trapped inside. But they soon were forced to move back: the enemy had superior weapons, the fighting was confused, and only the 2,000 peasant troops of P'eng Kuei—mainly youngsters—were able to give any effective support to the various units falling back. "We had no real tactics, only spontaneous mass action. Many times the people rushed forward to the attack in human waves, carrying only their spears and pistols," but the machine guns made them

withdraw again. It was coming very close to that people's war envisaged by the CCP and P'eng P'ai, although it was evident that the masses could not overcome every enemy and difficulty.[360]

Another eyewitness tells of a heroic battle at Hunghuati (Red Flower Ground), a small plain between Huichou and Haifeng, where the Workers' and Peasants' Army fought gallantly, charging the KMT soldiers with spears, though "in fact there was no real organization." "It was impossible not to lose." "Madness" sums up the nature of the fighting that day, with local guns and spears matched against machine guns and cannons.[361] As Kim San reports, the military slogan that P'eng P'ai adopted was *Chien-pi ch'ing-yeh*—"A strong wall and no food left for the enemy." Like P'eng, the CCP leaders had come around to the view that nothing could stop a people's victory.[362] But there were some who saw such convictions as "blind adventurism," with P'eng "apparently unconcerned about the outcome—his behavior was different from what it had been at the start of the peasant movement." Voluntarism loomed large over realism, but all the odds were against its success.[363]

The battle raged all night, with the KMT forces encircling Kungp'ing, but refraining from pursuit of the attackers. Next morning, together with the *pao-an-tui*, they reentered Kungp'ing town unhindered. Kim San asserts that the 3,000 KMT soldiers had been confronted by a force of 70,000 partisans, representing most of the strength of Haifeng. Despite this, it had not proved possible "to drown the enemy in our blood, even though blood enough to do so was shed," the Korean concluded. At least a thousand partisans were killed and 300 wounded, but the KMT troops suffered only about one-third this number of casualties.

Commander Li left one battalion behind in Kungp'ing and led his other two toward Haifeng city. The city had already been evacuated, so that Li's troops made a quiet entry, except for a bomb thrown from the workers' cooperative. Two soldiers died and the building was burned down in reprisal. The Soviet fell. It was February 29, 1928, 3 months and 9 days since its inauguration.[364]

Commander Li sent a battalion to take Swabue and restore communications by sea there. On the way it was ambushed and spent three hours battling through the enemy, who in the end were scattered by machine-gun fire. Swabue was reached on the afternoon of March 2. Meanwhile, in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th districts the peasants were regrouping. Naval units from Fukien headquarters had by this time sealed off the coast, and the navy had

resumed operations in full strength. To the west, Ts'ai T'eng-hui and his men had marched down from the Huiyang border to take Ch'ihshih and Meilung, the local soviet forces having fled to the mountains.[365]

The drive to subdue the Soviet had lasted less than ten days. There was now a deathly calm, with villages deserted, towns half-burned, inland communications disrupted, and many people killed. The invasion witnessed many acts of valor. A girlfriend of Kim San was killed instantly when she reached out for him, ignoring her own safety during the battle at Kung-p'ing.[366] At Lung-chin bridge, KMT troops encountered soldiers of the Workers' and Peasants' Army escorting the last refugees out of Haifeng city. The peasant fighters gave battle, but in the end had to flee to the hills. In Ch'ihshan, the peasants were stubborn in their resistance; one woman killed two KMT intruders with her kitchen knife. The real heroism came from ordinary peasants and youngsters who had hurled themselves into battle, in thousands, as they had done in the days of the Flag wars.[367]

Perhaps no one, the attacking troops included, expected the Soviet to crumble so quickly. Its leaders had certainly not foreseen such an easy victory for their enemies: they knew full well that the KMT forces had superior arms, but believed that the masses had greater power by dint of numbers and convictions. Events proved them wrong, for the masses provided mere cannon fodder in their crude expression of a people's war.[368]

But was it superior military power alone that carried the day? Communist analysts, of that time and later, very much doubted it. A contemporary ascribed the Soviet's defeat to the unity of the counterrevolutionaries and the political and military common front. Canton and Nanking buried their differences in the face of the Communist threat, there were local anti-Communists biding their time, and the Soviet was completely isolated, as well as endangered internally, by White Flag forces.[369] As Mao Tse-tung learned: "Whenever the White Regime in one or more provinces enjoys temporary stability, the ruling classes there inevitably combine and do their utmost to destroy Red political power. . . . This is the reason why many Red Regimes, [such as] Haifeng and Lufeng . . . were crushed."[370] Again, the earlier commentator asserts that the revolutionary endeavor in Hai-Lu-feng had gone to extremes and had understood little of the situation of the Chinese revolution at that time, thereby indulging in "leftist adventurism" along the lines of prevailing Party policy under Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. This was evidenced by the exclusion from power of any representative of the small capitalists, by the

"premature" establishment of land cooperatives, by the handing over of factories to the workers, and by the confiscation of all business firms and shops to the detriment of the middle capitalists. In short, the Soviet's leaders had failed to see that to win over the middle class was vital. Mao fortunately learned this lesson.[371]

Another important consideration was the agricultural cycle. During the winter months, the peasants had time to involve themselves in revolution; but when spring came, farming had to be done. The Soviet economy was in dire straits: Chung Hsiu-nan informed friends in Huiyang that famine was imminent in Hai-Lu-feng. Some farming was done, but less than confidently, since peasants did not see much point in working their newly acquired land when troops might be running all over it. Nonetheless, they had to provide for family and village needs. The "tyranny of work and seasons," as Eric Wolf calls it, thus tempered their political activity.[372]

"Leftist adventurism" was especially blamed for the military debacle, for it encouraged the belief that "to retreat is to lose an opportunity for the army." Mao was not to make the same blunder, and he put Hai-Lu-feng's failure down to underestimation of the enemy.[373] But had he been more familiar with the place and its people, he would have discovered that the error lay within the mentality of the inhabitants themselves: their long history of Flag fighting had encouraged them to regard themselves as invincible, a notion that the local Communist leaders also inherited. Communist historians have made a distinction between the "revolutionary peasant government," which had gone under, and the true "peasant class government."[374] If this is valid, as it appears to be, then it allows a claim that the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, the first Red government in China, collapsed for the very reason it came into being, namely the coincidence of aims and organization of the CCP line at the time and the traditional social and political peasant mentality.

# II

# Between History and Legend

In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet, émigrés began to return to Haifeng city in substantial numbers. Many were old officers of Ch'en Chiung-ming, bent on securing their share and taking revenge. Chung Hsiu-nan's auxiliaries, together with those of Ts'ai T'eng-hui, seemed to be the real masters of Haifeng now. Chung did all he could to mediate between the troops and the inhabitants, and he won general respect. His moderation encouraged many to return to their villages from the mountains, and his obvious sincerity led great numbers to join the White Flag.[1] An army report states that many people had been coerced into joining the Communists, and that they only now dared to make demonstrations against the Reds and to come together in bringing security to the area. From April 5, the 16th Division replaced the 11th in Hai-Lu-feng.[2]

Here we see once again the familiar story of the peasants attaching themselves to the organization or leaders that offered the greatest protection. For many, a change of Flag color meant very little. Those who had been forced by circumstances to join the "Red Flag" of the Communists now began to react against them. In Shaokang village in Meilung, the residents dug up ammunition and 80 guns buried by the Reds. Fr. Robba reported that "they are not afraid." They captured and shot three Communist soldiers, and killed and dismembered two men who had murdered a "Christian martyr."[3] According to the 16th Division report, many people felt only "aversion to the Reds." The report continued: "ordinary folk opposed the Reds, but had been unable to speak out." Now many people acted as guides for the division and as informers. Firecrackers were let off when a Communist met his end, and scores of villagers would turn up at executions to slash the bod-

ies. Again, the report noted: "We did not see what they called the support of the people."[4] Kim San himself reported large-scale defections of peasants from the CCP: whereas there had been an estimated 70,000–100,000 in the Soviet forces prior to the debacle, there were now "less than 10,000," inclusive of "the whole Red Army and the Red Guards." History repeated itself once more, as the peasants sought the security they had all along dreamed of.[5]

Revenge was in the air. The *North China Herald* reported that money often determined a person's guilt or innocence, and that for the "White Self-Defense Corps" revenge took priority over strict justice.[6] "Leagues of villages" had been formed by April for protection against the Reds. In Lufeng, many peasants turned upon their erstwhile leaders, and P'eng Yüan-chang, Ch'en Kuo-sun, and other local CCP personnel were caught and executed.[7] In Swabue, the *min-t'uan* captured Lo Kuo-liang and tortured him: some even paid to be allowed their turn with this illiterate salt-worker, who had led the group that took the missionaries in December. When Yeh Yung, commander of the Red Army's 4th Division, was taken prisoner along with a dozen soldiers, many peasants went to the KMT headquarters to ask for their speedy execution. Some volunteered to carry it out themselves.[8]

The excesses of the "Red Terror" were now rebounding upon its perpetrators; the indiscriminate violence it had let loose was now being redirected against them. The political issues were clearly beyond the understanding of the ordinary peasant. He did not object to killing a selfish landlord or one of the evil gentry, but the case was different if the victim was a kind landlord, or an honest and helpful local leader. Obviously, the Soviet had failed to win over the hearts and minds of the people. "Destroy the CCP" and "Corpses Do Not Revolt" were now the slogans.[9] It is significant that the peasants themselves restored the field boundaries they had torn down, and not merely because they wished to avoid "giving any trouble to the authorities."[10]

The Soviet was thus eliminated, officially at least. Yet it was still operating in the greater part of the region. As admitted in a KMT document, the intervention of the 11th Division had merely scattered the Reds, not rooted them out.[11] A Soviet participant recalls how on a rainy evening in March 1928 "we received an order to abandon everything and to withdraw to the eight villages in Hut'ient'ung, our preestablished base," where as so often before the peasants were to be organized to carry on the fighting. The place became the temporary headquarters of the administration and of the CCP

Secretariat, as well as of the Red Army command. The Soviet was down but not out, as subsequent events were to show.[12]

Heavy fighting continued throughout March in the outer districts, with a particularly hard struggle at Meilung, where peasant power had been at its strongest. There, the units were simply outnumbered and outgunned.[13] After such complete defeat the main Red forces withdrew to the northwest, concentrating at the central base, which had been set up in the spring of 1927 and supplied with provisions and equipment in the autumn for just such an emergency. Surrounded by high peaks and steep valleys, and situated where the four counties of Haifeng, Lufeng, Huiyang, and Tzuchin met, it was a naturally fortified area of some 25 by 15 kilometers. There were hundreds of villages in the area, which had become the revolutionary base of the East River Red forces under the East Special, with headquarters in Chungt'ung town. There was even a hospital and a printing press available. The only means of communication was through tortuous mountain paths and thick forests. The men of the Workers' and Peasants' Army were settled in the various villages around Chungt'ung, and at the first alarm would join the regular army. When the KMT forces stationed at Kungp'ing advanced on Machu and other hamlets, they were repulsed by men guarding the strategic passes.[14] With the arrival of the 2d Division of the Red Army, even better security and military organization was provided. P'utzut'ung, to the west of Chungt'ung, was the main base on the Haifeng border with Huiyang. It was virtually inaccessible to the enemy, and here the second unit of the Workers' and Peasants' Army was headquartered. Its leader, P'eng Kuei, had organized the local peasants into Red Guard units.[15]

The first attack by KMT forces against the central base took place in late March. The 7th Army and the 11th Division had joined forces on March 18, and were led along the mountain paths by local *min-t'uan* guides. They surrounded the base completely, broke through the first line, and then came face to face with the Red Army. The battle lasted a full day and night, but on March 21 the main Red force was defeated.[16]

P'eng P'ai had gone to Lufeng when the Soviet fell, with the Workers' and Peasants' Army, which he planned to lead in an attack on Huilai. When the plan to secure a sea outlet failed, he returned with the Red Army to the central base; when this in turn fell, he moved further west to the high mountain bases.[17] In early May there was a desperate bid by both Red Army divisions to retake Haifeng city, more to gain supplies than to achieve anything permanent.[18] Still, the main hope was to get a foothold along the coast, and

P'eng immediately set about building up a center from which to direct the revolution in that area. This was at Tananshan, on the borders of Ch'aoyang, P'uning, and Huilai.[19] There had for some time been persistent reports of Russians seen or expected (the Comintern's promise of aid to the Nanch'ang uprising was still remembered), and a series of attacks on coastal towns in Lufeng and Huilai to facilitate this anticipated support was clearly part of P'eng's plan.[20]

An article published that May in the *North China Herald* describes the guerrilla tactics: "P'eng P'ai likened the Cantonese soldiers to incense, which when lit drives the mosquitoes away, but which, in the course of time, burns out, allowing the mosquitoes to come back in swarms as thick as ever. [The mosquitoes were] the Red soldiers who, he believes, need only keep clear of districts where, for the time being, the military units happen to be . . . superior in number."[21] In Hai-Lu-feng, the Red and the White forces played hide-and-seek with each other, here and there burning down villages that had supported the other side, the Reds gaining the upper hand on this occasion, the Whites on that. Chung Ching-t'ang moaned: "It is impossible to say when the Red calamity in Hai-Lu-feng will at last come to an end."[22]

At Tananshan, P'eng established a military hospital, a weapons repair shop, a home for the aged, and a school. Many short training courses were given. His second wife, Hsü Yü-ch'ing, was with him and proved very active in general organization and in visits to peasants.[23] While there, P'eng is said to have adapted an extremely popular Ch'aochou "Song of the Thirteen Months" into a form for the peasants to use as a revolutionary song. He also had a troupe of Ch'aochou musicians tour the villages, making very effective propaganda. His theme was the same: the oppressed and exploited peasants would find their salvation only in revolution and the elimination of the landlords. His own integrity won the peasants over: "P'eng P'ai has made his revolution; we must learn from him, join him, and make our own revolution."[24]

P'eng had planned a concerted assault on Ch'aoyang, P'uning, and Huilai. He had a "do-or-die" unit, which he was to lead himself, ready to attack the county city. The peasants responded poorly, however, and the attack had to be called off. On May 20 there was a "Meeting of Representatives of the Huilai Soviet," but shortly after it had begun, KMT troops arrived and the members had to scatter. In late June, all that P'eng could do was to apply himself to the reorganization of the Party in the three counties.[25] That summer, Kim San met P'eng and Cheng Chih-yün living in a cave beneath a large waterfall in Mut'ienling (Huilai), at which time P'eng was seriously ill.

Kim records P'eng as still being in charge and issuing orders as usual.[26] Fr. Robba refers to it as quite comfortable, but soon taken by KMT troops.[27]

In the summer of 1928, the Communist Party was caught up in a great debate. The policy followed by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and others in the Central Committee was being reexamined, and the Party was suffering one of its gravest crises in membership, organization, and ideology. At the Comintern 9th Plenum in February 1928, the resolution on "The China Question" proposed a moderate line and cautioned against running ahead of the masses or going it alone without the help of the "proletarian centers" in the cities. It also advocated the formation of an All-China Red Army and disapproved of isolated guerrilla action. It was this resolution that set out terms of reference for the Sixth CCP Congress, held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11.[28]

P'eng P'ai, an elected member of the CCP CC since the Fifth Congress, was unable to attend. Yet despite his absence, he was not only reelected to the 23-man Central Committee but also chosen to serve in the Politburo and to head the peasant department. This was remarkable: Mao and others did not escape reprimand when they had ignored Party orders or neglected policy, but P'eng P'ai emerged unscathed after policy changes and never lost his position in the hierarchy.[29] The policy approved at the Sixth Congress was hardly in line with what he had been doing: the balance between revolution in the cities and in the countryside was to be restored; urban revolution was to be emphasized; and although the agrarian revolution and the setting-up of soviets were to go ahead, it was stated that "the consolidation of working-class leadership among the peasantry is a prerequisite to the success of the agrarian revolution."[30]

The resolution of "The Peasant Question" acknowledged the revolutionary spirit of the masses of peasants in many places and the need for equal distribution of land; but it cautioned about hurting small- and middle-peasant interests. It insisted on building up the peasant proletariat as an independent organization empowered to act on its own. The use of women and youth in the soviet organization and in guerrilla warfare was advocated, together with the establishment of a Congress of Representatives as the core of any soviets. Propaganda for land distribution was to continue, so as to attract peasants to the cause. The Red Spears and the Long Knives could also be infiltrated and used, guerrilla tactics could be improved, and the Red Army could so be organized that the peasants joined it instead of the *min-t'uan*. The Party, however, was to retain control at all levels.[31]

More importantly, the Congress condemned the weakness of "peasant ideology." It was this that had spurred the rural revolt, especially in Hai-Lu-feng, and it was this, too, that Mao had to deal with later in Kiangsi among his own army and local Party members. His article of December 1929, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," speaks of "putschism," a word borrowed from the Comintern resolution and taken up also by the Congress.[32] It was this term, *mang-tung chu-i*, which he later used to describe the policy of P'eng P'ai in the Soviet.[33]

P'eng, still engaged in his propaganda war, and aided by what sources agree in describing as an unnecessarily high level of KMT reprisals, never wavered in his belief that the winning of minds was essential.[34] As usual, his methods were practical. When the county city of Huilai was under siege, he took the opportunity to send in leaflets by balloon.[35] But though convinced of the necessity of armed revolution, P'eng did not relish military life, particularly of the guerrilla kind. He had great compassion for the peasants and was ever mindful of their health and well-being. He saw to it that his men had a good meal before going into battle, and was solicitous about the sick and wounded. He also set a personal example, regardless of his own state of health: during an attack on Kuolung, he developed a high fever and cough in Ch'ihshih village in P'uning, but carried on directing the fighting and had a bottle of water poured over his head to lower his temperature. For a few months, he was on the run from village to village. By day he worked in the cave, and each evening he made his propaganda rounds with unflagging enthusiasm. "The situation will surely change before long, and our Party will continually increase its experience," he would say. As for the enemy, "it is certain that they will be destroyed."[36]

The guerrilla war in Hai-Lu-feng had never been carried out in isolation: it was linked with the whole resistance movement in the East River area. A multitude of revolutionary bases existed, many of which owed their inspiration to P'eng. Ku Ta-ts'un described the founding of his own base between Fengshun and Wuhua as a "fruit of the labors of P'eng P'ai," who made "the seeds of the Revolution spread throughout eastern Kwangtung." In Tananshan, a soviet government was organized with representatives of nineteen counties in the East River, and the Red Army there expanded into five regiments, subsequently constituting the 11th Army. These troops also gave direct and indirect support to the Central Soviet in Kiangsi during the en-

circlement campaigns of 1930–34. They were left behind when the Long March started.[37]

In Hai-Lu-feng itself, however, the revolutionary momentum was slackening. Not many Red Army troops stayed on, and what few did were sick and dispirited and got on badly with the local peasants. There were important defections after a dispute over tactics between P'eng Kuei and another guerrilla leader in January escalated into a pitched battle, with loss of life.[38] Little wonder, then, that in the spring of 1929 the East Special issued a directive allowing the troops to leave at will. This directive had been urged on the East Special by the Central Committee, which did not look with any great favor on a guerrilla war being waged in the countryside alone.[39]

Yet, as the now discredited Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai had earlier remarked, "without peasant guerrilla warfare, there is no means of fighting back." Ch'ü held that the war had to be fought among the masses and that their tactics were "witness to thousands of years of fighting and plotting in secret societies and the like." The Communist Party needed to help the masses to advance a step further: "They must come to understand the need for the revolution and then, naturally, there will be a guerrilla war, with the masses under a centralized leadership, becoming a military organization." This was a simplification, but in essence was the only viable strategy.[40] It saw Hai-Lu-feng through to Liberation—under P'eng Kuei until 1933, and then for another sixteen years to the coming of the People's Liberation Army in July 1949. In 1948, a soviet government was operating at Ch'ihshih with P'eng P'ai's youngest son, Hsi-hung, in charge of a department.[41]

For all Mao's alarm about "mistaken ideas in the Party," which in December 1929 he attributed to "the fact that its basic units are composed largely of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin," the CCP had no alternative but to allow itself to be conditioned by peasant interests; otherwise, the peasants would not have rallied to it.[42]

The reality in Hai-Lu-feng points to a traditional peasant revolt in a modern setting, and the same may also be said of other places. The "mistakes" that Hsüeh Nung-shan referred to in 1935 concerning the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet and peasant revolts in Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsu were, in fact, mostly manifestations of genuine peasant behavior in such circumstances.[43] That the leaders were Communist and the sociopolitical system unusual did not stop the peasants from thinking and hoping along familiar

lines. As in the past, they attacked cities to punish corrupt officials, wicked gentry, and greedy landlords—their enemies, and the enemies of their Peasant Association. But the "class" notion—essentially sociopolitical—was alien to them, and few peasants actually sought the total elimination of their old oppressors. The ruthlessness with which they carried out their attacks smacked more of "classic" peasant revenge than of premeditated "class" tactics governing a "Red Terror"; indeed, in this respect, the peasants often went beyond or against Party directives. They followed their leaders not because those leaders were Communists but because they were in charge of the Peasant Association, the new Flag. The Red Flag, under which the peasants marched now, symbolized for only a few the Communist Party; fewer still understood its ideology. Most took it as the old "Red Flag" of feud times, pitched against the "White Flag" of other clans and areas.[44]

With the meaning and relevance of Communist revolution and Marxist doctrine not clear even to trained veteran CCP leaders, it would be naïve to expect the large numbers of peasants in the Association and even in the CCP in 1927 to have had more insight than they showed. Furthermore, P'eng P'ai and his aides were making a peculiar kind of revolution, using peasants and moving out from the villages against Marxist canons. Most importantly of all, they were peasant leaders who had come to champion peasant interests as Communist goals, in consequence of which the lines between the two became blurred. A hybrid of Communist policy and peasant practice—of Marxist ideals and traditional rural aspirations—was the result, with cadres and peasants working to attain their own ends. The Communist leaders mouthed Party jargon and pursued Party aims, but were inevitably forced to act along peasant lines. The peasants bellowed Communist slogans, but interpreted them in their own way.[45] Matters reached such a state that complaints arose within the CCP that it had been taken over by a peasant mentality. Mao imparted his firsthand experience of the problem in his "Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains" and made frequent reference to it in his November 1928 report.[46] In that same month, Li Li-san stated in a letter to all Party members: "As a result of the particular development of the struggle in the countryside during the past year, and the fact that the peasants now constitute 70 to 80 percent of our Party membership, the peasant mentality is now reflected in our Party. . . . Unless we proceed to correct the dangers involved in this peasant mentality, it may lead to the complete destruction of the Revolution and of the Party."[47] In December 1929, these sentiments were echoed by Mao with reference to the Red Army, the instrument of the

Revolution and of the Party itself. Mao denounced "ultrademocracy,. . . . disregard for organizational discipline, . . . absolute egalitarianism, . . . and other nonproletarian ideas," which he blamed on the high proportion of peasants in the Party.[48]

In April 1929, Chou En-lai had complained that "the Party branch organizations are indulging in all sorts of deviations, sectarianism, and extreme democratic tendencies."[49] This exactly describes what was happening in the Peasant Associations, for it was P'eng P'ai's object to enable the peasants to stand on their own feet. Similar criticisms had in fact already been made in July 1926 at the 2d CCP Enlarged Plenum, as a result of the 1st Plenum's liberal policy of admitting peasants into the Party.[50] The peasant attitude, denounced as petty-bourgeois in Communist documents, was to persist into the People's Republic and be a source of constant trouble and concern to the leaders. On June 29, 1951, for example, the *People's Daily* reported the following statement by Po I-po, a veteran leader and former finance minister: "It is a difficult thing to conduct systematic Marxist-Leninist education among Party members and cadres of peasant origin, to convince them of socialist and Communist principles. . . . Peasant economy is individual and scattered. . . . Party members and cadres of peasant origin essentially show this characteristic of the peasant masses."[51]

With the Party in disarray by early 1928 and the masses cool to its call for revolt, the Chinese Communists and Comintern representatives strove to assess the situation. At the Comintern in February 1928, Bukharin declared that "the first wave of the broad revolutionary movement of workers and peasants, which developed mainly under the 'mot d'ordre' and, to a considerable degree, under the direction of the CCP, has already passed."[52] The Sixth CCP Congress concluded that China was in the trough between two revolutionary waves, that "a new revolutionary wave is inevitable," and that preparation was essential. The only problem was when the wave would arrive.[53]

All this political analysis, however, could not conceal the fact that the masses had withdrawn from the CCP and that a new policy was required to recover them. The Sixth Congress' resolution on "The Peasant Question" urged a strengthening of the Peasant Association in the south, where it "does not appear much." Cadres were encouraged to enroll the peasants into the guerrilla forces and not let them enter the militia; the cadres were also to infiltrate the secret societies and make use of them.[54] In November 1928,

Mao was speaking of an ebb in the revolutionary tide, with the masses "cold and aloof" toward the Red Army, and with "hardly any cases of mutiny or desertion to our side" from the KMT troops. He remarked sadly: "We have an acute sense of our isolation."[55] Both workers and peasants became a problem for the Communist revolution. Harold Isaacs charges that the CCP had become a "peasant party" in respect of organizational mentality.[56] But Benjamin Schwartz holds that it was the party neither of the proletariat nor of the peasantry: "It has rather been an elite corps of politically articulate leaders organized along Leninist lines."[57] Nym Wales, too, reaches that conclusion: "The CCP under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung has been, I would suggest, not the 'vanguard of the proletariat' in the Marxist-Leninist sense, but an elite of professional revolutionaries which has risen to power by basing itself on the dynamic of peasant discontent."[58] The idea of "manipulation" once again comes in here. There is also a clear indication that the revolution in the countryside, though bearing a definite urban mark, in turn conditioned revolutionary activity in the urban areas.

Mao described the conditions for his "separate armed Soviet Base" as strong mass support won through land reform, the existence of a strong Party and of a strong Red Army, and the control of a strategically located area large enough to maintain a population.[59] These were the ingredients for an "urban leadership" as desired by the Party, whose leadership was some 70 percent intellectuals. Thus the "urban origins"* of the rural Communist revolution cannot be disputed.[60] As Gramsci put it: "Every organic development of the peasant masses, up to a certain point, is linked to or depends upon movements among the intellectuals."[61] But summing up his "Report on Huahsien," P'eng P'ai also declared: "The revolutionary war has moved from cities and towns to villages. It is now a question of fighting to the death in the most truculent phase between the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary forces in the villages."[62] Of that, P'eng was convinced. He did not think of himself or of his fellow Communist leaders as city people. The movement in the countryside might draw inspiration from the cities, but it was inevitably conditioned by the rural environment in which it arose.[63]

The "urban" leadership did not, in fact, always initiate the peasant movement, which (as Mao himself admitted) was spontaneous and autonomous.[64] What it did contribute was modern organization, social power, and political structure, thus making the movement viable. It was a case of the

*The qualification is by A. W. McDonald.

village simply assaulting the city, once the urban intelligentsia had adopted the rural cause and identified with it. Peasant aspirations and Communist ideology were running along parallel lines toward the same aims, but starting from very different premises; moreover, there was such a strong ideological and material bias toward the peasant side that at times the Communist influence seemed submerged in a total rural takeover.[65]

Thus the emphasis on the urban nature of the revolution on the part of many Communist leaders becomes understandable. In a polemic with Mao in 1930, Li Li-san wrote: "All talk of 'encircling the city with the country' or of relying on the Red Army to take the city is sheer nonsense."[66] That very year, nonetheless, saw Li ordering assaults on the cities. Judged in Marxist terms, this was nonsense; yet in the Chinese Communist revolution it was the new reality. In Haifeng it had begun in the early 1920's and reached its fulfillment in the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet in 1927. The strategy later became officially respectable, so much so that it was proffered to Third World countries as the best plan for national and global revolution.[67]

In his interview with Edgar Snow, Mao claimed that "in November 1927 the *first* soviet was set up in Tsalin [Ch'aling] on the Hunan border and the *first* soviet government was elected."[68] Without casting doubt upon Mao's intentions, it must be countered that the Ch'aling Soviet was as strange and precarious as the Red Army he claimed to have organized in the area (it was composed chiefly of bandits). Despite the Council of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers, Mao's soviet was clearly imposed on people who had not the least idea of what it meant for them.[69] And when the leaders reached there halfway through November, they too were at a loss: "This was the first time we had done government work and we did not know how to do it and organize it." They worked "according to the ordinary pattern of government." They took over government offices, issued rules and decrees, and abolished taxation. They put a few people in charge of the worker-peasant movement, but "there was no other work to raise the masses and organize them."[70]

The "chairman" of this soviet was Tu Chung-pin. It would appear that Mao was seen by the locals as the latest bandit to come up the mountain with his thousand men and that he was otherwise unknown to them. Nor, it seems, did he feel welcome as leader: he had to enlist the support of two secret-society members and of a few bandits before being acceptable to the community. He claimed that "in this soviet, and subsequently, we promoted a democratic program, with a moderate policy based on slow but regular

development."[71] This would seem to be making a virtue of necessity, since the small group of displaced troops had their work cut out simply to survive in their new base. Mao himself was not working on the spot, but sent orders to eliminate the county People's Committee and to set up the Government of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers. The pioneers were attacked by KMT troops and in early 1928 had to retreat to Chingkangshan. Mao regretted that so little work was done among the masses and so little money collected during the short-lived Ch'aling Soviet.[72] Together with Chu Te, Mao was able to reestablish a foothold in Ningkang in April. The CCP Ch'aling Committee vanished; "the work there did not take root" and most of the organizations were crushed by the KMT. Furthermore, Mao did not use the term *Su-wei-ai* (soviet) to describe the "Council of Deputies of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers" and the "People's Council"—the representative and executive bodies of his government. The CCP Hunan later reproved him for this oversight. These councils were more like "village councils," as approved by the Fifth CCP Congress, than real organs of democratic political power—which last did indeed come only "subsequently."[73]

The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet was beyond all arguing the first Communist government on Chinese soil.[74] It was common knowledge among the Communist leaders in China in the 1930's that "the first soviet was organized by P'eng P'ai at Hai-Lu-feng in 1927," as Edgar Snow learned from Po Ku, CCP General Secretary in 1934. (A favorite date for it was August.[75]) Russian sources in the 1930's are unanimous in describing Hai-Lu-feng in similar terms. Pavel Mif wrote: "Already at the end of 1927 in Haifeng and Lufeng the first soviet district was established and lasted several months."[76] Yakhontoff also stated: "The first Chinese soviet was organized. It was known as the Hailofong [Hai-Lu-feng] Republic and though it endured for only about five months, between November 1927 and April 1928, it naturally prompted imitations."[77]

A soviet was also organized by Chu Te in Ichang on January 1, 1928, following a mid-December peasant uprising there.[78] Indeed, throughout this period there are reports of soviets from many regions, not only Kwangtung. Within Kwangtung itself, in the East River area, very shortlived soviets were set up in Wuhua, P'uning, Huilai, and other counties. In north Kwangtung, peasants attempted to assume control of Ch'ingyüan and places in the North River area.[79] Ch'ungyai (Hainan Island) seemed to have great success, "almost similar to Hai-Lu-feng," and the peasants took over several counties, establishing soviets wherever they could. The CCP was reported to have a

membership of over 10,000 there, and the prospects of consolidating the gains made looked good. P'eng P'ai made reference to Ch'ungyai in his speech to the Congress of Representatives in Hai-Lu-feng.[80] It is doubtful, however, whether the Ch'ungyai development can be correctly termed a soviet: in his speech, P'eng compared it to other peasant outbreaks in the North and West River areas, which were of no great significance, and there is scant mention of the Ch'ungyai Soviet elsewhere. The Hai-Lu-feng Soviet chronicler must certainly have known of events on Hainan; whatever the case there, he readily and emphatically asserts the priority of Hai-Lu-feng: "In the Chinese Revolution . . . this is the first time that the unfettered political power of the workers and peasants has been organized successfully."[81]

P'eng P'ai left for Shanghai, possibly in the winter of 1928, to take in hand the reorganization of the Central Committee's peasant department.[82] He all but disappears from view now—a report written in February, rumor of a journey back to the East River in July, a CCP Kiangsu Committee attended in August constitute the few biographical details we have of him. But his career and achievements were far from over.[83]

Those achievements were matters of great sensitivity to Mao in the early 1930's. During the Yenan years there was a certain bitterness that encouraged the Communists to forget the triumphs and blunders of the 1920's in South China. For Edgar Snow's interview in 1936, Mao included just one sentence about Hai-Lu-feng—and half of that an error of fact.[84]

The KMT special branch police and White troops, however, found good reason to be attentive to the fate of the large P'eng family. Their retaliation began at once with Ts'ai Su-p'ing, executed in 1928.[85] P'eng's brothers Han-yüan and Ta-wu were tracked down in Macao by the Haifeng Countrymen's Association, extradited to Canton, and executed; [86] another brother, P'eng Shu, was caught at Tananshan and executed in 1933, the same year that P'eng's second wife, Hsü Yü-ch'ing, was executed.[87] Other relatives were able to escape: another brother, P'eng Tse, and his family, along with P'eng Shu's children, enjoyed the support of the Catholic Mission in Hong Kong, as did Pao-lu, P'eng P'ai's second son, for a time. Hsi-hung, the youngest of P'eng's children by Ts'ai Su-p'ing, was spared his mother's fate.[88]

But it was Chou Feng, P'eng's own mother, who stood closest to the events of later years and at times indeed became a symbol of her son's achievement. During the "Red Terror" of the Soviet, the field outside the clan house at

Ch'iao-tung-she was used for executions, and Chou Feng had grown sick with "fear and horror," so much so that with others in the family she left for Macao and Hong Kong (a Communist source claims Shanghai).[89] During the war years she too partook of Bishop Valtorta's care and protection, and also benefited from a monthly remittance of HK$200 sent by Chou En-lai. She went back to Haifeng at Liberation, when the family home plus some land from which she could draw rent were returned to her. A devout Catholic, she proved a good friend to the missionaries, particularly to Fr. Bianchi, visiting them in prison during the 1951–52 period that preceded their expulsion from China.[90]

In 1956, Chou Feng was invited to attend a "Meeting of Relatives of the Martyrs" of Kwangtung province, and then a similar meeting for the whole country in Peking. At the latter gathering, everyone respectfully addressed her as "Old Lady P'eng" and she was given the place of honor, being welcomed by Mao personally. Provincial authorities and local county leaders showered her with honors and treated her regally, Haifeng folk calling her "Mother of the Country." She was visited by such personages as Chou En-lai, Nieh Jung-chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Kuo Mo-jo, and Ku Ta-ts'un. In 1956, too, P'eng P'ai's youngest son, P'eng Hung (P'eng Hsi-hung), was installed as deputy magistrate of Haifeng.[91] There was a huge celebration in November 1957 to mark the Soviet's 30th anniversary.[92]

Some of P'eng P'ai's works and books about him had been published before, but in the mid-1950's there even appeared *Tales of P'eng P'ai*, suggesting that the Communist leader was becoming almost a legendary figure.[93] But political developments in Kwangtung were soon to throw a shadow over him. The Party Central Committee grew concerned about the increase in the forces of localism in the province, which had taken heart in 1957 from accusations made by Ku Ta-ts'un that interference from outside was undemocratic.[94] Friction between local officeholders and cadres from elsewhere quickly built up, and not only in Haifeng. The struggle against localism was directed by T'ao Chu, the CCP Kwangtung Secretary, and extended throughout the province. In Haifeng, the outsiders gained control of all the key positions and even sent P'eng Hung away on a rehabilitation course.[95]

In 1965 T'ao Chu ordered the "four purges," with the assistance of selected military commanders. These purges were designed to root out the localism and feelings of superiority of the Haifeng people, who, because of P'eng P'ai, thought themselves the best and greatest revolutionaries. Local

Party members were said to be proclaiming their four "firsts" and three "greats," glorifying the role of P'eng P'ai in CCP history and belittling that of Mao. They were praising P'eng as the greatest and most heroic member of the early CCP; their much-publicized boast was that "Haifeng was the place where the first Peasant Association, the first Soviet, and the first Red revolutionary base came into being."[96]

When the Cultural Revolution began, those local people in power in Haifeng had to pay for such revisionism. Even Chou Feng was denounced: the local Communists were branded as her underlings and as members of the "Black Gang." Regardless of her 96 years, she was accused of misuse of public funds and of being a counterrevolutionary (among her "six sins"). These charges justified attacks upon her as an unredeemed member of the landlord class, and all her possessions were confiscated. For nine months, from April 1966 to January 1967, she was forced to attend meetings where she was denounced and occasionally manhandled. After this, she was taken away under "protective custody."

As for P'eng P'ai, his life and work were reassessed and he was branded a leftist adventurist. The Haifeng revolution was consigned to the backwaters of CCP history. A rally was planned to denounce P'eng P'ai in Haifeng city, but as soon as it was discovered that Mao had once praised P'eng, the organizers dropped their scheme. There was already some resentment among the populace against the various privileges accorded to Chou Feng and the P'eng clan, and this resentment was exploited to erode the authority of P'eng Hung. In 1966, large posters were put up and leaflets circulated against him, with counterpropaganda from his supporters. Matters came to a head between the local and "foreign" factions, with some street fighting. The foreign group won the day.[97]

The foreigners were hated because they had carried out Party orders for the establishment of communes and for great irrigation projects, and because they had forced people to work upwards of twelve hours a day without sufficient food. In local eyes they were also held responsible for the terrible famine from 1959 to 1961, when thousands starved to death. Making matters worse was the fact that all the leading cadres in Haifeng came from the Ch'aoshan area, and the Hoklo majority had a history of feuding with Ch'aochou people. The Party secretaries were all from Ch'aoshan, and on the committee the locals were outnumbered two to one. They were not of a mind to see their prestige and past achievements set aside so easily.[98]

On May 14, 1966, the authorities removed the name of P'eng P'ai from

public buildings commemorating him, together with all vestiges of the old Soviet. There was an immediate local reaction: a "big-character poster" appeared in Haifeng, denouncing plans to "destroy Haifeng's revolutionary past and distort events."[99] What followed (a very early instance of the war of words that soon would rage throughout China) saw the hardening of two opposed factions: the local camp, known as the "People's Headquarters," and the camp of the foreign "Left Committee." The locals represented those elements—students, workers, the unemployed, and peasants—who traditionally began rebellions in Haifeng. Few cadres were in the local camp. The Left Committee had the support of the garrison troops and were quick to accuse their opponents of counterrevolution, including acts against the Party and Mao Tse-tung.[100] The schism was well expressed by a local observer describing the general feelings of the peasants after the cooperatives movement of 1955 and the communes of 1958. The peasants became "agricultural laborers of the State, suffering even greater oppression and exploitation than under the landlords." This "intensified the resentment and dissatisfaction aroused in the peasants by CCP government policy." They also looked upon the Cultural Revolution with distaste. In other words, the mentality of the peasants was not in line with Party ideology, nor had it ever been. Their "burning hope and desire for the possession of land" could be felt even in the 1960's, notes the observer.[101]

There were many verbal confrontations with the military, so many indeed that the Red Army considered it necessary to increase its show of strength, as if it were a foreign force on foreign soil. Inevitably, the clash of words turned into a clash of arms. In May 1967, for the first time in Kwangtung, peasants dared to attack the Red Army. The People's Headquarters immediately became an object of hatred to the entire Red Army and was considered dangerous by the authorities.[102]

Both Canton and Peking became concerned about Haifeng. The two opposing factions sent delegations to Peking, where each argued its case from June to August 1967. The local faction found great sympathy among people everywhere, largely as a result of the presence in universities and colleges throughout the country of students from Haifeng. In Peking, the "Capital Fights for Haifeng," a military group made up of Haifeng students, was active in lobbying for the local cause. When the delegations returned home, both claimed to have won the backing of the Central Committee in Peking and organized celebrations and propaganda meetings.[103]

Throughout the conflict, the P'eng clan took a leading role. Two P'eng

wives heading the delegation to Peking had pleaded that Chou Feng, old and ill, should be allowed to leave Haifeng to receive proper care. The Cultural Revolution Office of the CCP Central Committee approved the request and gave the P'eng wives a letter for the Canton garrison commander requesting that Chou Feng be brought either to Peking or to Canton for treatment of her illness. On receipt of the letter, the Canton "Flag Faction" of the Red Guards, which had been instrumental in getting the two women to Peking, sent a car to Haifeng to take the old lady away. But the military and the Left Committee prevented her departure. Then the provincial military commission ordered that an official should escort Chou Feng back to Canton, but this time it was the People's Headquarters that objected: first they wanted Chou Feng declared a "Revolutionary Mother." Until her dignity was thus restored and the slur of "old landlady" cleared from her, she would not be moved. In Peking, a group of Red Guards in league with the Haifeng local faction issued a declaration denouncing T'ao Chu as the chief instigator of her suffering. Support for her cause was gathered from every quarter of Canton and Swatow, the local faction taking this chance to attack the foreigners. Later an attempt was also made to overturn the accusations against P'eng Hung.[104]

The climax began in August 1967, after rallies against the Haifeng garrison commander had been triggered by a decision to arm the Red Guards. Since all authority rested with the foreigners, this meant that local people had no access to arms other than their old spears and knives. The rallies became too much for the Left Committee, which publicized an alleged plot by the People's Headquarters to stage a counterrevolutionary coup.[105] War preparations began on both sides. The People's Headquarters formed a guerrilla unit under Li Lien-p'ing. On the night of August 26, a huge assault with machine guns and rifles was launched against those People's Headquarters partisans who remained in the city, and the Lung-chin became "a river of blood." Thereafter, search-and-destroy operations switched to the mountains, where over the following nine days many of the new guerrillas were ambushed, or tricked into surrendering and then killed.[106]

Those guerrillas who escaped managed on September 16—with help from the "Red Flag" group in Canton—to inform Chou En-lai of all that had happened and to enlist his aid. Premier Chou issued orders for the protection of the People's Headquarters' guerrillas, but by then a terrible toll had already been taken. Between August 26 and September 10, 1967, Haifeng had witnessed a revival of its traditional savagery: entire families were

wiped out, many people were tortured and beaten to death, corpses were hung in the streets, old personal grudges were worked out, and the head of P'eng K'o, a nephew of P'eng P'ai, was strung up on a wall, having been cut off by someone in revenge for the killing of his father in 1927. An old man of 80, seeing all these horrors, cried out "Leftist robbers!" and "Worse than the Japanese!," only to be cut down himself in reprisal. The massacres lasted for over two weeks, while the Canton military headquarters and the provincial military commission were helpless to do anything. According to the "Declaration to All the People of China" issued later by the People's Headquarters, on August 27 alone 400 people were killed, over 500 wounded, and 3,000 imprisoned and beaten up.[107]

Peking eventually ordered the transfer of the garrison in Haifeng, a reshuffle of the leadership there, and the protection of People's Headquarters' members in adjacent counties; a commission of inquiry was set up as well. All these measures proved fruitless, however. The Left Committee's power was undiminished, no one was punished, and when relatives of the victims brought the bloodstained clothing of their loved ones to the new authorities, as was the custom in past Flag feuds, no one redressed the wrongs. Chou En-lai is reported to have admitted: "The situation in Haifeng is the gravest in the whole country. This is not an armed fight but a sheer massacre."[108] In this respect the verdict of Mao on the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet was correct: "a policy of putschism."[109] The term had been explained in 1928 by the Central Committee as "blind actionism" which made "beating to death the center of all action." That would allow anybody "to be completely swayed by the 'peasant mentality.' "[110] For the peasants in Hai-Lu-feng such "Red Terror" was nothing new. What was new was the aim behind this manipulation of them now.

The stark fact was that in Canton few recognized the authority of Chou En-lai, and therefore those in power did not feel obliged to involve themselves in a local issue. In the tangle of the Cultural Revolution, events in Haifeng had assumed national importance and interest. Chou Feng and the P'eng clan became stalking-horses for an indirect attack on Chou En-lai by the group later known as the Gang of Four. Anybody for P'eng P'ai was considered to be against Mao. Premier Chou's links with P'eng dated back to the 1920's, and he had consistently helped the P'eng family. An article published in the *People's Daily* on August 31, 1978, asserts that Chiang Ch'ing and Lin Piao faked revolutionary history to discredit P'eng P'ai, and raged against Chou Feng and her family as a cover for damaging Chou and the

entire revolution. The article also confirms that P'eng Hung, the son of P'eng P'ai, perished during the Cultural Revolution. Notice of his death was conveyed to his relatives eight years after it occurred, and his corpse has never been found. P'eng K'o was killed and his body left exposed for three days. In all, five relatives of P'eng P'ai were slain during the Cultural Revolution and many others mistreated. The memory of P'eng P'ai, however, had been kept alive.[111]

As we have seen, the Premier's efforts to help Chou Feng during the Cultural Revolution were thwarted. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying also intervened to no avail, because even the Party Secretary in Canton could do little. Chou En-lai sent five telegrams to the Canton garrison, but it was not until October 31, 1967, that anything happened. On that day Chou Feng was released from her Haifeng courthouse cell by a military unit assigned to the task. She was taken by car under escort to Canton and put into a hospital there. She died in isolation in March 1973 at the age of 102 years.[112]

On August 31, 1978, the 49th anniversary of P'eng P'ai's death, Radio Peking and a New China News Agency press release announced that P'eng P'ai had been rehabilitated and that the honor of his name, blotted out by the Cultural Revolution, was restored in full. On November 15, five of P'eng's relatives and 104 cadres slain through the efforts of the Gang of Four were also cleared, and the 1,680 people who had lost their posts because of loyalty to P'eng P'ai were fully reinstated.[113]

Haifeng today is replete with references to its former Soviet leader: his name is once again on the middle school and the hospital; the monuments of the revolution have been restored as valued historical landmarks; and a museum preserves the memory of his time. P'eng P'ai had in fact interpreted the rural reality there when he declared in December 1923: "The class struggle of the Chinese peasants will explode in the future along the coastline of South China."

What was lacking was the catalyst, the person who would polarize different elements around a single issue—the peasant social issue—and add to it the force of example and the strength of organized action. This P'eng P'ai provided. He was a man "who lived and died for lofty ideals."[114] The half century since P'eng P'ai's death has seen his name alternate between a reputation's furthest extremes, until it hovers today between history and legend.

# Reference Matter

# Notes

The following abbreviations are used in the Notes. For complete publication data, see the Bibliography, pp. 427–66.

*CCTH* *Chung-yang cheng-chih t'ung-hsün.*
*CEJ* *Chinese Economic Journal.*
CHP Ch'en Hsiao-pai (comp.), *Hai-Lu-feng ch'ih-huo chi.*
CKC Hai-feng Ch'iu Kuo-chen, *Feng-ti yü-sheng lu.*
*CKKMTCK* *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chou-k'an.*
*CKNM* *Chung-kuo nung-min.*
*CNP* *Ch'en Ching-ts'un hsin-sheng nien-p'u.*
CO Colonial Office, London.
*CQ* *The China Quarterly.*
*CTH* *Chung-yang t'ung-hsin.*
FO Foreign Office, London.
HA Hong Kong Archives of the Catholic Mission.
*HC* *Hsiang-tao chou-pao.*
*HCN* *Hsin ching-nien.*
*HFHC* *Hai-feng hsien-chih.*
HFNY "Hai-feng hsien nung-yeh kai-k'uang tiao-ch'a pao-kao."
*HKT* *Hong Kong Telegraph.*
*HP* *Hua-tzu jih-pao.*
*HS* *Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai.*
*HT* *Hsing-tao jih-pao.*
*JAS* *The Journal of Asian Studies.*
KA Kuo-min-tang (KMT) Archives, Taiwan.
*KCMKJP* *Kuang-chou min-kuo jih-pao.*
*KK* *Kantoskaia Kommuna.*
*KNPK* *Kuang-tung nung-min yün-tung pao-kao* (Kuang-tung [9])
*KTCCNC* *Kuang-tung ching-chi nien-chien.*
*LFHC* *Lu-feng hsien-chih.*
LFNY "Lu-feng hsien nung-yeh kai-k'uang tiao-ch'a pao-kao."
*LTCP* *Li-t'ou chou-pao.*
*MC* *Le Missioni Cattoliche.*
MEP Missions Étrangères de Paris.
*MT* *Mao Tse-tung chi.*
*NCH* *North China Herald.*
*NKHK* *Nung-kung hsün-k'an.*
*NMTK* *Nung-min ts'ung-k'an.*
*NMYT* *Ti-i-tz'u kuo-nei ke-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i nung-min yün-tung.*
*NT* *Nung-min yün-tung.*
PA Pontificio Istituto Missioni Estere Archives, Rome.
*PC* *P'eng-P'ai chuan-lüeh.*
PEM Presbyterian English Mission, London.
*PKC* *Hai-Lu-feng p'ing-kung chi.*
*PL* *P'eng-P'ai yen-chiu shih-liao.*
PP P'eng-P'ai, *Seeds of Peasant Revolution* (P'eng P'ai [29]).
*PPKS* *P'eng P'ai ti ku-shih.*
*PS* *Pu-erh-se-wei-k'e.*

*PW* *P'eng-P'ai wen-chi.*
*SCMP* *South China Morning Post.*
*SK* Huang P'ing, "Four months of soviet power in Hai-Lu-feng," in *Soviety v Kitae* (1934).
*SW* Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works.*
TC T'ien Chih, "Jen wu p'ien."
WK Wales & Kim San 1941.

## *Introduction*

1. Harrison 1972:154–58; Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank 1952:140–48.
2. Schwartz 1952:137,192; Rue 1966:138.
3. Schwartz 1952:129.
4. *Ibid.*:128–32. The "Political Report of the Hupei Provincial Committee" of 10 Sept. 1927 admits that the CCP was losing its grip on the labor movement (*CTH* 5 [20 Sept. 1927]). The glowing picture painted by Chesneaux (1968:346–47) of the leftist labor movement in 1927 soon changed with the bloody challenge of the KMT party purge. In fact, leadership of the labor movement was not the preserve of the CCP but was also open to the KMT, which had the advantage of being the leading government party (Wilbur 1968:43–46).
5. *Annual Report of the Shanghai Municipal Council* 1930.
6. *NCH*, 3 Aug. 1929.
7. Hou Feng 1978:98–99; Chou En-lai 1930.
8. *PC*:71–73; *PL*:265–66, 329–34.
9. CHP:165–66. The author was a contemporary, fairly objective in his reporting. He was a participant in the events in Haifeng.
10. Chou En-lai 1930; *PL*:330.
11. Chung I-mou 1957:126–27. The author was a friend of P'eng P'ai. He contributed to *Hsin Hai-feng* in 1921, survived the Soviet, and later wrote extensively about it. See also Hou Feng 1957:45; Hou Feng 1978:99–100.
12. *PC*:72–73.
13. Hou Feng 1978:101; Chung I-mou 1957:128.
14. *PL*:83,86,270,277,335.
15. *PL*:275; Hou Feng 1978:101; *PC*:72–73.
16. TC (5 Aug. 1978). The author was a contemporary of P'eng P'ai from an important lineage in Haifeng. He joined the Soviet, escaped abroad, and finally became a journalist in Hong Kong, where he writes under a pseudonym. He is in general an accurate source.
17. *PL*:83–85; *PC*:74–75. For a more detailed account of these events, see Galbiati 1981:959–74.
18. By early 1928, official documents of the CCP hailed the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet as the hope and the model for a Communist revolution in China. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* . . . (1928):18–19; "Kuang-chou pao-tung . . ." (1928); "Kuan-yü . . ." (1928). Huang P'ing stated: "Without exaggerating its significance, we can say that this [Hai-Lu-feng] experience has given us a series of valuable indications [toward the solution] of problems to be tackled in the establishment of the revolutionary power of the masses in the Chinese countryside. . . . The lesson of Hai-Lu-feng will help us to overcome these difficulties in the future." Huang P'ing 1934:123.

19. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:27–28. The author was an intimate friend of P'eng P'ai who, through the letters he sent him, provides an inside view of the peasant movement in Hai-Lu-feng. On the ideological problems raised by the first "rural Soviet," see Galbiati 1981:871–86; and Harrison 1969:43–44,48. *The Bolshevik* editorialized in early 1928: "Kwangtung is not indeed the example of industrial areas in China, and the greatest reason that Kwangtung could raise the Soviet banner first is the expansion there of the uprisings of the peasant masses." "Liang-ke . . ." (1928).

20. Schwartz 1952:66,88,89,125–29; J. Ch'en 1967:155–59; Thornton 1966:165–67.

21. Galbiati 1981:804–25; Johnson 1962:2,3,9–11, 15–19. For the special relationship of the Red Army to the peasants, see Thaxton 1975b:233–34,281–82.

22. Yü Yen-kuang 1958:24.

23. C. Brandt 1958:59.

24. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:637.

## *Chapter 1*

1. *HFHC*:vol. 1, 1–6; "Agricultural Conditions in Kwangtung" (1933):372. *KTCCNC*:1A, 22–24; "Kwangtung Vital Statistics" (1932):55, 59; PA, Maglioni 1927.

2. *LFHC*:1–5; *KTCCNC*:1B,18–25,27–34; CHP:33,131; *PKC*:106,111; Maglioni 1975:25; Shan Feng 1976:50–51.

3. Chung I-mou 1957:15n; Shih Fan 1957:12.

4. *HFHC*:vol. 1,4; *PKC*:108.

5. HFNY:2–3; LFNY:7–8.

6. Sun Ching-chih 1962:30–35; Band 1948:4,8–9.

7. Sun Ching-chih 1962:29–31; *HFHC*:vol. 1,5.

8. Wales 1972:207.

9. PA, Maglioni 1927; Elvin 1973:123; Hsü Keng-pi 1972:395–97; *HFHC*:vol. 3,7–8; HFNY:4; LFNY:9; *KTCCNC*:1K,42–49.

10. HFNY:1–2,5,11; LFNY:7,10–11; PP:38; PEM 1923:3.

11. *HFHC*:vol. 1,2–3,8; PA, Maglioni 1927; *PKC*:106,112.

12. *Shina shōbetsu zenshi* (1917):246.

13. CHP:43; Chung I-mou 1957:7; CKC:76,85,87; Shih Fan 1957:24,33; TC (29 Sept. 1977; 21 Mar. 1978; 11–14 Aug. 1978; 10 Sept. 1978).

14. *Shina shōbetsu zenshi* (1917):246–47; PA, Maglioni 1927; CHP:8; TC (23 Dec. 1977, 12 Sept. 1978); Band 1948:252.

15. PA, Robba 1931:20; PEM 1911:5–9; TC (25 Oct. 1978).

16. *HFHC*: vol. 1,6; CHP:29; *PKC*:81; TC (2 Feb. 1979).

17. *Shina shōbetsu zenshi* (1917):248–49; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:40,43–44,58; *LFHC*:33–37.

18. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:51; CHP:33,39; "Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai chih chi" (1928):7.

19. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:53,57,59,66; *PKC*:106,108,111; CHP:39–40.

20. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:40,57; CKC:6–7; PEM 1911:10; HFNY:3; LFNY:8.

21. PEM 1910:45.

22. PA, Robba 1931:5,23,27; CKC:6,43,64–65; De Maria 1943:215; Tragella 1963:322.

23. Maglioni 1975:23,28,36,118,120; Sun Chung-chih 1962:38–39,53.

24. Balfour 1970:136.

25. Dawson 1962:4–5; Hsieh T'ing-yu 1929:204,221; Campbell 1912:480.

26. *PKC*:110–13; Lo Hsiang-lin 1965:138; Kulp 1925:79; CKC:344–45. Though Hakka, the Ch'iu clan within a generation in Haifeng adopted the dialect and customs of the Hoklo people. Only on special occasions—such as Ch'ing Ming, when offerings were made to the ancestors—did the elder leading the ceremonies speak Hakka.

27. Ho Ke-en in Drake ed. 1961:120–23; CHP:39; Wakeman 1966:25.

28. Chung Ching-wen 1928:97–99.

29. Lo Hsiang-lin 1965:134–39; CKC:344–45; *PC*:2; CHP:39. According to inscriptions on tombs in Haifeng, the P'eng arrived there in Ming times, originally from Shansi.

30. Freedman 1966:1–3,20–21,27–28; *PL*:357–58; *PC*:5; TC (17 Mar. 1978, 27 June 1979).

31. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:323,327–28; PP:125; CKC:28; CHP:43.

32. *HFHC*:vol. 1,6; *HFHC*:vol. 2,33; CKC:351–52; PA, Robba 1931b:13.

33. Marks 1978:262–63.

34. CHP:39–41; Chung I-mou 1955:191,210.

35. Freedman 1958:105.

36. Ashmore 1897:214; Brambilla 1943:183–84. For a description of these feuds, see also Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:354–56,432,452–54; Band 1948:31.

37. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:11,263–71,330–31; Kulp 1925:110–14; O. Lang 1946:180.

38. Kulp 1925:306. See also Freedman 1966:1–3.

39. Kulp 1925:328. See also C. K. Yang 1965:109–11.

40. Kulp 1925:306,328.

41. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:359.

42. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:47,52–53.

43. Freedman 1966:69; Kulp 1925:108–9,323–29; PP:8–9.

44. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:47,52–53.

45. Ashmore 1897:214.

46. PP:88.

47. Hou Feng 1957:32; *PC*:2; Chung I-mou 1957:7–8; PP:24; *PL*:368–70.

48. PP:19. There are discrepancies in the figures recorded in different editions of P'eng P'ai [13].

49. Interview with members of the P'eng family. The land was mainly in the Ch'ihshan area, located about 3 to 8 km. northeast of the city of Haifeng on the road to Lufeng and comprising a dozen villages with the surname P'eng. Other land was in Lungshan, P'ingkang, and Loshan. See *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981): 173–82.

50. PP:22,24.

51. *PC*:3.

52. Kuang-tung [8]:156,159; Chang Chung-li 1955:19; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:354,383–88; Muramatsu Yuji 1966:578; *KNPK*:28. The "right of subsistence" is especially considered by Scott 1976:6. Thaxton 1975b:1,2,6–10, also expounds on this "fundamental social morality."

53. Marks 1978:85–86,100,191,332; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:46,55.

54. PA, Robba 1931b:10,19–23; CKC:345.

55. PEM 1923:19.

56. PP:14; CKC:345–46,377.

57. Ch'u T'ung-tsu 1969:164–66; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:40.

58. S. Feuchtwang in Skinner ed. 1977:588.

59. PA, Maglioni 1927.

60. *HFHC*:vol. 1,9,19–20,49; "Kwangtung vital statistics" 1932:60–62. The latter source notes that only 55 percent of the Cantonese population profess adherence to any religious faith. "In many cases people worship deities with little or no idea of the faith represented by such gods."

61. Garabelli 1907:116. P'eng P'ai wrote a poem against peasant superstition (*PW*:331).

62. HA (22 Sept. 1922), Robba–Valtorta.

63. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:70–71; *HFHC*:vol. 3,16–17; *PKC*:70–71.

64. PP:25.

65. PP:18,39,119,138; CKC:27,346,350; *PKC*:113. The belief in *feng-shui* was still strong in the 1950's in Haifeng: Shan Feng 1976:21.

66. Kuhn 1967:248; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:47.

67. Davis 1977:80–82; Freedman 1958:124–25.

68. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:52,59–61,68; Marks 1977:97,n.5; Hsieh Wen-lung 1969:188; Hsü Keng-pi 1972:440–41; PEM 1923:19–20; Brambilla 1943:216.

69. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:59,61. On the Flags, see Galbiati 1981:56–66.

70. PA, Robba 1931b:10,39; PEM, *Report* (1923):19–29; Brambilla 1943:216.

71. PA, Maglioni 1927.

72. PA, Robba 1931b:16,35.

73. Kulp 1925:208.

74. Garabelli 1907:102; HA (22 Sept. 1922), Robba–Valtorta; Hsieh Wen-lung 1969:111,178–82,306; PEM, *Report* (1913):26; CKC:31–32.

75. Schiffrin 1968:60,235–45; W. Hsieh in Chesneaux ed. 1972:142–44,146–47,151,158.

76. PP:18,79,122.

77. F. Wakeman in Chesneaux ed. 1972:33–35.

78. Hai Feng 1969:111; K'uang Hsiao-an 1926:20.

79. MEP, *Lettres* (1921):63; Dardess 1970:543–45; Shih 1967:355–58,361; Wakeman 1977:205–6; *HFHC*:vol. 2,38–39; Wakeman 1966:29–47; W. Hsieh in Chesneaux ed. 1972:149,152–54.

80. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926h:4; HA (21 July 1928); HA (13 June 1935), Bianchi–Valtorta.

81. Chesneaux ed. 1972:11–12; Teng Szu-yu 1958:112; PP:27–28, 30, 35, 46, 107.

82. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:190,225,234; G. Puyraimond in Chesneaux ed.

1972:123; Latourette 1932:324–25; MEP, *Lettres* (1924):68–70; MEP, *Lettres* (1929):111; Tragella 1963:vol. 3, 70.

83. PEM, *Report* (1909):38–42; Band 1948:202,254–56.

84. PA, Robba 1931b:9–35,39–40; PEM, *Report* (1910):43; PEM, *Report* (1913):29; PEM, *Report* (1921):9; Band 1948:266,362–64.

85. FO 228/3012 (19 June 1925); PP:58.

86. PP:131.

87. Yuan Ying 1960:91; *PC*:2–3,7; TC (22 Feb. 1978; 17,18 Mar. 1978); Chung I-mou 1957:7–8.

88. TC (14 Feb. 1978, 5 July 1978); PP:131.

89. Kuang-tung [8]:141; Kulp 1925:151,164–65; Chen Han-seng 1936:95,105–7,112.

90. Chung I-mou 1957:46.

91. PP:131. Chou Feng was later accused of having resisted her son's revolution. See Hai Feng 1969:119,124.

92. PP:19,64–65,76,79; *PC*:3.

93. Chung I-mou 1957:7–8; Hai Feng 1969:153; Shih Fan 1957:4,7; *PC*:3. The birthdate of P'eng P'ai is given in his file at Waseda University, except for the year, which should be 1896. For other Japanese sources on this matter, see Eto Shinkichi 1961:166,n.17.

94. Hou Feng 1959:3; *PC*:3.

95. CKC:19–20.

96. Tu Sung-shou 1951:26.

97. CKC:19; *HFHC*:vol. 3,6–7; Wales 1972:206; Chung I-mou 1957:34–35n.

98. PA, Maglioni 1927.

99. MEP, *Lettres* (1923):86.

100. CKC:20,24–29,80,377; P'eng Chen-ch'iu 1976:119–29.

101. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:650,n.51.

102. PA, Robba 1931b:9,25; *PPKS*:27–28.

103. CKC:21–23.

104. PP:130.

105. *HFHC*:vol. 1,3,9; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:235–37.

106. *HFHC*:vol. 2,12,20; Ch'u Tung-tsu 1969:14–15; Brenan 1899:1–5,10,13; J. R. Watt in Skinner ed. 1977:353,360,362; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1953.

107. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:40,42,45.

108. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:44,46,55–58,63.

109. *CNP*:12.

110. Wang Yu-ch'uan in Levenson ed. 1971:134.

111. Muramatsu Yuji 1966:590. See also Freedman 1966:63,66.

112. PP:18.

113. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:25–39,63–65; PP:28,123. P'eng P'ai chased off an "area chief," wrote a short poem against him (*PW*:332), and abolished this office in 1925 (*PL*:126).

114. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:44.

115. Hsü Keng-pi 1883:561.
116. T. Grimm in Skinner ed. 1977:479–80,488–91; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:43–44,48,54,62–63.
117. PP:14.
118. *PKC*:106.
119. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:54–55.
120. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:44; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:185–87,194–96.
121. PP:18–19.
122. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:202–4; Freedman 1966:87–88.
123. Wakeman 1966:22–28,109–25; Kuhn 1967:219–25,233–39,248–49; Ch'en Fu-tsung 1957:14.
124. Li Chung-chüeh 1923:51–53,55–58; PEM 1923:4; Freedman 1966:105–9.
125. Freedman 1966:8.
126. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:362.
127. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:452–53; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:44–46.
128. Chiang Monlin 1957:62; *CNP*:6–8.
129. *KNPK*:25,28.
130. Ch'u Tung-tsu 1969:180–85; *CNP*:10; Rhoads 1975:75; Wang Tsung-sheng 1922:11.
131. Rhoads 1975:51–55,71–74,82; *CNP*:10; PEM, *Report* (1909):36.
132. CKC:5,18.
133. Garabelli 1907:103.
134. CKC:23–30,42–43.
135. Schiffrin 1968:235,242–46; Feng Tzu-yü 1954:vol. 1,95; Tsou Lu 1941:vol. 2,665–68; Chung I-mou 1957:4–5.
136. *CNP*:6–8,10–12. W. Hsieh 1962:201–2.
137. Rhoads 1975:68–69,78–83,101–3,111–16; Feng Tzu-yü 1954:vol. 2,181–90; "Shan-wei ch'i-i" (The uprising in Swabue), in *Chung-hua min-kuo* (1966):343–54.
138. *CNP*:10–13; *HKT* (14 Sept. 1907); J. Lust in Chesneaux ed. 1972:175; Rhoads 1975:98–99,119,148,154,158–60,175,185–87.
139. PEM, *Report* (1910):45; *PKC*:111,113; PP:10.
140. PA, Maglioni 1927; *CNP*:11–13,18,40; PEM, *Report* (1915):29.
141. CHP:122.
142. Schiffrin 1970:15. See also Rankin 1971:232; Keenan 1974:225–37.
143. CKC:18,23–30,33–35. P'eng P'ai learned revolutionary ideas from the propaganda of Lin P'u-t'ing, a teacher at the school (*PC*:4).
144. *CNP*:12–17; Rhoads 1975:198,202,213–14.
145. Tsou Lu 1926:104; Hsieh Wen-lung 1969:44,161–66,286; PP:8–9; Chesneaux 1973:62.
146. CKC:33–34; Hsieh Wen-lung 1969:179,181; Marks 1978:252.
147. Ch'en Chin-lu 1958:vol. 2,51–52; Li Lang-ju & Lu Man 1962:410–11; W. Hsieh 1962:202–4.
148. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:264.
149. PP:9; Friedman 1974:120–21.

150. Freedman 1966:20–21,103; Kuhn 1970:79–81; Wakeman 1966:15–16; Franz 1955:419–33.

151. PA, Robba 1931:39–40.

152. Friedman 1970:296.

153. CKC:33–35.

154. PP:9.

155. Rhoads 1975:232; Ch'en Chin-lu 1958:50–53; TC (9 Jan. 1978).

156. PP:9.

157. PEM, *Report* (1912):31; PA, Robba 1931b:39–40.

158. Rhoads 1975:259; M. Bergère in M. Wright ed. 1968:276–77; Friedman 1970:293,297,300.

159. PP:9–10.

160. Marks 1978:258; Bianco 1971:18–19.

161. Ch'en Tu-hsiu is quoted in Schwartz 1952:13. See also Chesneaux 1973:63.

162. Hai Feng 1969:114. For the peasants and the 1911 Revolution, see Galbiati 1981:22,n.82.

163. *KNPK*:34. For changes after 1911, see also Thaxton 1975:42,44.

164. Friedman 1970:306; Perkins 1922:8–9,103.

165. CKC:37–39; *PC*:3; Rhoads 1975:254. For a detailed history of elite education in Haifeng, see Galbiati 1981:161–63.

166. Shih Fan 1957:1–11; *PPKS*:3–4; Hou Feng 1957:33–35; *PC*:4–5.

167. Hou Feng 1959:4n. See also Chung I-mou 1957:8; CKC:38–39,45; TC (20 May 1978).

168. Hou Feng 1959:3,8,20; Hai Feng 1969:116–17; TC (17 Feb. 1977, 17 May 1977, 1 Apr. 1978); Malukhin 1975:8; *PL*:360.

169. PEM, *Report* (1915):29. See also PA, Robba 1931b:39; *SCMP* (10 May 1913).

170. *Shen-shih. . .* (1926):32–37; *KNPK*:34–35; Tanaka Tadao 1931:61–62.

171. PP:124.

172. PP:9; PA, Robba 1931b:41; Hsüeh Nung-shan 1935:517.

173. *CNP*:20–21; Friedman 1974:89,133–35; Hsieh Wen-lung 1969:244.

174. T'ang Leang-li 1930:134–35; PEM, *Report* (1918):5–6; CKC:73,78–80,120.

175. *CNP*:21–22,24–26; FO 228/2983 (27 May 1918); FO 228/2990 (8 Mar. 1921); FO 228/3276 (18 July 1918, 20 Jan. 1919); W. Hsieh 1962:211,252,n.105.

176. PP:10; *KNPK*:34–35.

177. PP:10; *PPKS*:3–4.

178. PP:92; *PL*:324.

179. PP:100–101.

180. PP:63; Chung I-mou 1957:22–23; Shih Fan 1957:6,33.

181. PP:55,72; TC (16,23 May 1977).

182. Wakeman 1966:45. "To a substantial extent" gentry and merchants belonged to the same class (M. Elvin in Skinner ed. 1977:468).

183. Elvin 1973:292–93; M. Bergère in M. Wright ed. 1968:241; CHP:29.

184. *PKC*:106; CKC:344–47.

185. Hsü Keng-pi 1972:395–97.

186. PA, Maglioni 1927; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:58; CKC:377.

187. Esherick 1976:67. See also Chen Han-seng 1936a:20,49,54,93.

188. Rhoads 1975:148,222,248; CHP:12–13; PP:10; TC (21 June 1979).

189. M. Bergère in M. Wright ed. 1968:267,271–72; Friedman 1974:120. Mura-

matsu Yuji 1966:595–96. "The P'eng family had wealth but no power. Every time taxes were collected, they suffered extortion at the hands of government officials" (*PC*:5).

190. Muramatsu Yuji 1966:599; Thaxton 1975:30.
191. CKC:25; *KNPK*:36; *PL*:316.
192. CHP:31; CKC:377; PP:14; *CNP*:10; *PKC*:26.
193. PEM, *Report* (1910):43.
194. Moore 1967:459–60. See also Thaxton 1975:1–7, 649.
195. J. Esherick in Lewis ed. 1974:52–53.
196. P'eng P'ai [21]:562.
197. PP:9; *KNPK*:34.
198. The main source is PP:10,12,16–17,45,54,62,110,119,125. See also *KNPK*: 33–35; WK:186,324–25.
199. The main source is *KNPK*:28–29,32,34,36. For the bad habits of the landlords, see PP:64–65.
200. PP:53,62.
201. Thaxton 1975:95. See also Brandt 1963:196.
202. "Kuang-ning nung-min yün-tung" (1927):96.
203. PP:64,125.
204. Elvin 1973:258–59; Chang Yu-i 1957:vol. 2,325,336.
205. *KNPK*:34.

## *Chapter 2*

1. CKC:37–38; Hou Feng 1959:4–5; Pang Yong-pil 1975:303.
2. Sanetō Keishū 1960:544–45.
3. Wang Feng-gang 1931:136–37.
4. Sanetō Keishū 1960:283; Wang Tsung-sheng 1922:11; P.C. Huang 1972:42–44; Gţay ed. 1969:24; Hackett 1949:134–69.
5. W. Hsieh 1962:210–11; *PC*:11; TC (17,26 Feb. 1978). See also Galbiati 1981:171,n.53.
6. Sanetō Keishū 1960:65,495; Fu Chi-hsüe 1972:vol. 1,311; Wang Kung-pi 1955:108–23; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3; *PC*:6.
7. Wang Kung-pi 1955:111–13; Li Chien-nung 1956:517; Chow Tse-tsung 1960:79–80.
8. *PC*:6–8; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3.
9. *Hanseiki no Waseda* (1932):305–6,507–17; H. D. Smith 1972:14,30.
10. Akamatsu Katsumaro 1952:177–79; Asanuma Tsuitō shuppan henshū iinkai ed. 1962:147–49; Totten 1966:32–33.
11. Aoki Keiichiro 1948:6–12; Wu Chüeh-nung 1927:96–100,102–6; Yamamoto Hideo 1968:100; Dore 1959:69–73.
12. Kitazawa Shinjirō 1969:75–117,123–24; Kikukawa Tadao 1947:28,38–52, 66,73,81; Ch'i Shen-huan 1922:105–10.
13. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:29.
14. Yung Ying-yue 1971:38–40; Kitazawa Shinjirō 1969:111–12; WK:93. "It

cannot be overemphasized, however, that this was a period of great flux and confusion for the Japanese radicals. To attempt any rigorous demarcation of ideological positions would be very misleading" (Scalapino 1967:11).

15. Beckmann & Okubo Genji 1969:18–26; H. D. Smith 1972:27–28.

16. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3–4; *PC*:11. On Kawakami Hajime, see Bernstein 1976:131–32.

17. Eto Shinkichi 1961:167,n.23; Pang Yong-pil 1975:320,n.5; H. D. Smith 1972:56–57,97.

18. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3–4,29. P'eng P'ai entered the "Yuaikai" (Friendship Society) alone.

19. *PC* 10; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3–4.

20. *Hanseiki no Waseda* (1932):49; *PC*:11; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3–4.

21. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:3.

22. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4; *PC*:8–9; Wang Kung-pi 1955:118–23; Fang Hui 1954:84; "P'eng P'ai t'ung-chih 'wu-ssu'. . ." (1964); Chung I-mou 1957:8–10.

23. Cheng Po-ch'i in *Wu-ssu hsiao shuo*. . . ed. 1961: 218–28; Akamatsu Katsumaro 1952:52–53; Eto Shinkichi 1961:167.

24. Pang Yong-pil 1975:320,n.9; "P'eng P'ai liu-hsüeh. . ." (1980):83.

25. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4; *PC*:12; Malukhin 1975:13–21; *Wu-ssu shih-ch'i*. . . (1959):vol. 2, 426–27. For the presentation of *Shuang-chou p'ing-lun*, see Chow Tse-tsung 1963:95.

26. *CNP*:24–25.

27. *NCH* (8 Jan. 1921).

28. *NCH* (26 Feb. 1921).

29. Chan & Etzold 1976:20–22.

30. *NCH* (29 Apr. 1922). See also Li Yün-han 1966:vol. 1,64; "Brief History" in Wilbur & How eds. 1956:50.

31. FO 228/2990 (11,12 Feb. 1921; 8 Mar. 1921); FO 228/2999 (28 Dec. 1921); FO 228/3276 (11 Feb. 1921; 24 Jan. 1922).

32. W. Hsieh 1962:227–32; *CNP*:26–28; *NCH* (10 Sept. 1921).

33. Fisher 1960:470.

34. PEM 1911:10; PEM, *Report* (1913):29.

35. PP:44. Also TC (27 Sept. 1977); Chung I-mou 1957:20.

36. Rhoads 1975:20; PL 106.

37. PEM 1911:10; *PKC*:101–2; HA (6 Mar. 1928), Robba–Valtorta. The *Lu'an jih-k'an* was started on 5 Aug. 1921 (*PL*:102).

38. CHP:13; PP:17,59.

39. T.S.O. 1923:60.

40. Wu Chüeh-nung 1927:111. A list of CCP leaders who studied in Japan is in J. Price 1974:55–56,139–140. For a list of Republican leaders who studied in Japan, see Rhoads 1975:102.

41. "Kao nung-min shu" (1924):24–28.

42. R. Scalapino in Feuerwerker et al. eds. 1967:212–13,215.

43. Chung I-mou 1957:15–17; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4; P'eng P'ai in letters to his friends remembers Japan.

44. *CNP*:6–8; PEM, *Report* (1910):43; W. Hsieh 1962:2,10.

45. Gasster 1969:158–62; Kropotkin 1955:5–6,223–25.

46. *CNP*:3,14–15,18,40; W. Hsieh 1962:202–6.
47. *NCH* (11 Feb. 1922).
48. Scalapino & Yu 1961:1,36.
49. W. Hsieh 1962:211–13,238. For the presentation of *Min-hsing pao*, see Chow Tse-tsung 1963:66.
50. Snow 1972:117; Mao Tse-tung 1919 (*MT*:vol. 1,57–69).
51. Tretiakov 1934:294–95.
52. Chan Ming-kou 1975:42,50,291–95; Chesneaux 1968:203.
53. *NCH* (8 Jan. 1921). See also *NCH* (4 Feb. 1922, 25 Mar. 1922).
54. W. Hsieh 1962:214,252,n.105; Whiting 1968:116,n.21; Bing 1971:683; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:232.
55. Meisner 1967:13. See also Chow Tse-tsung 1960:245, note; Gasster 1969:187–88.
56. Chung I-mou 1957:9,14.
57. Yip Ka-che, in Chan & Etzold 1976:96. See also Bianco 1971:52.
58. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,442–44; Chung I-mou 1957:9,20.
59. Chow Tse-tsung 1960:182.
60. *Ibid.*:46–48,298–99; Li Yün-han 1966:81–86; Bianco 1971:49; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1966:66–67; Meisner 1967:82–88.
61. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:121–22.
62. Carr 1950:vol. 1,16–21; Harrison 1969:26–27,30–31; Schwartz 1952:29.
63. P'eng P'ai [3],[4], in *PW*:41.
64. Chung I-mou 1957:14,45; FO 228/3276 (11 Feb. 1921); FO 228/3273 (24 July 1920, 7 Oct. 1922); MEP, *Lettres* (1923):90.
65. *CNP*:27–28; C. Brandt 1958:23,note.
66. Harrison 1972:29; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:133–34; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):188.
67. Chou Fo-hai 1964:318.
68. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4.
69. Chung I-mou 1957:9,11; Hou Feng 1959:5; CHP:1.
70. Chung I-mou 1957:20. See also C. Brandt 1958:21,200,n.59. For the problem of when P'eng P'ai joined the CCP, see below and Galbiati 1981:203–4. By October 1924 P'eng P'ai had already joined the CCP, as documented in an official report to the SYC (*PL*:14).
71. Tanaka Tadao 1931:vol. 2,72–74,81; Pringsheim 1962:77; "Ch'ing-nien-t'uan. . ." (1957); Meisner 1967:88. The SYC were in Haifeng already in 1922 (*PL*:1).
72. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:133–34.
73. Tanaka Tadao 1931:73–74.
74. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,442–44. For the presentation of the magazine, see Chow Tse-tsung 1963:100; CKC:89.
75. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,442.
76. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4.
77. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,442. See also TC (24 June 1978).
78. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,443.
79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.*:443–44.
81. Chow Tse-tsung 1960:178,note; Chung I-mou 1957:10,125.
82. "*Hsin Hai-feng* . . . mu-lu" (1959):vol. 3,538; TC (30,31 Dec. 1977; 7 Jan. 1978).
83. "*Hsin Hai-feng* . . . mu-lu" (1959):vol. 3,538–39. The "Declaration" is in Chung I-mou 1957:15–20, and *PW*:3–7.
84. Chung I-mou 1957:18,20.
85. "*Hsin Hai-feng* . . . mu-lu" (1959):vol. 3,538–39.
86. TC (6 Mar. 1978).
87. Chow Tse-tsung 1960:366; Wright ed. 1968:60.
88. Chung I-mou 1957:20.
89. *Ibid.*:125. See also Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4; *PL*:102; *PC*:14.
90. Chung I-mou 1957:10; TC (14 Aug. 1978). Ch'en Chiung-ming and P'eng P'ai arrived at much the same conclusions from their social analysis, though they differed greatly in social practice. W. Hsieh 1962:220,234; PP:101–2.
91. Chung I-mou 1957:125; *PL*:107,280–81; PP:31; TC (26 Dec. 1977; 13,14 Aug. 1978; 11,12 Sept. 1978).
92. TC (2 Oct. 1977); CHP:124; *PC*:9,41; Chung I-mou 1957:10.
93. D. Buck, in Elvin & Skinner eds. 1974:183.
94. PP:18,71,73; D. Buck, in Elvin & Skinner eds. 1974:194–95. See also Ch'en Tsung-yüeh 1922:933–42.
95. PP:130.
96. PP:17; Chung I-mou 1957:9,44–45; W. Hsieh 1962:14.
97. TC (14,15 Aug. 1978); PEM, *Report* (1909):36–37; PEM, *Report* (1911):24–28; PA, Robba 1931:41; PA (25 Sept. 1932), Robba–Tragella.
98. PP:18. See also Kuang-tung [2].
99. CKC:35; *PKC*:103. For the literacy in the area, see Galbiati 1981:164,n.36.
100. PP:130. Also PEM, *Report* (1911):31; TC (18,19 Mar. 1978).
101. Perkins 1922:9.
102. W. Hsieh 1962:213–15; Keenan 1974:228,230.
103. PP:36–37,130.
104. "Kao nung-min shu" (1924):5.
105. PP:17–18. Also *KNPK*:36.
106. CKC:28–30,33–35,41–46; Chung I-mou 1957:45–46.
107. Shih Fan 1957:11; TC (22–24 Nov. 1977). P'eng P'ai ([12]:26) speaks of his clothes being seen by the peasants as those worn by rich people and officials, "their oppressors and swindlers."
108. TC (7–10 Nov. 1977; 1 Dec. 1977). P'eng P'ai also had a hand in forming the drama group of the Kwangtung SYC in March 1922 (*PL*:110–11).
109. TC (6 Nov. 1977); *PL*:105.
110. TC (15 Nov. 1977); PEM, *Report* (1923):457.
111. Shih Fan 1957:11–19; *PC*:15; *PL*:107–8.
112. TC (9 Oct. 1977, 13 Aug. 1978).
113. McDonald 1978:120. See also Chung Lu-ts'ai 1934:96–100; Garrett 1970:116,162.
114. WK:206.

115. *PC*:15. See also Chung I-mou 1957:10; Hou Feng 1959:5–6; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):270.

116. Shih Fan 1957:14–16,19–25; TC (2 Oct. 1978).

117. PP:130; *CNP*:28–29.

118. *NCH* (19,26 Feb. 1921, 11 Feb. 1922).

119. FO 228/2990 (12 Feb. 1921); FO 228/2991 (5 July 1921); FO 228/2994 (26,29 Mar. 1922); FO 228/2997 (27 May 1922); FO 228/2998 (21 June 1922); FO 228/3000 (7 Jan. 1922, 11 Jan. 1923); Li Chien-nung 1956:418; *NCH* (22 Apr. 1922, 6 May 1922).

120. Li Shui-hsien 1922:146–50.

121. PP:9; Chung I-mou 1957:10.

122. PP:9; CKC:67,71–87,380.

123. PP:9; *CNP*:29–31; FO 228/3272 (7 July 1922; 7, 27 Oct. 1922); *NCH* (22 July 1922, 7 Oct. 1922).

124. FO 228/2992 (25 Aug. 1922).

125. Li Yün-han 1966:vol. 1,126,135; *CNP*:29–30; Li Chien-nung 1956:442.

126. CKC:102.

127. Ch'i Feng 1923:28. Also see *NCH* (12 Aug. 1922, 7 Oct. 1922).

128. T'ang Leang-li 1930:47; CKC:75,84–87; *CNP*:31.

129. FO 228/3272 (7 July 1922; 7,27 Oct. 1922). Also *MC* 52/16 (17 Aug. 1923):245.

130. PP:19,130. The celebration was on 4 May 1922 (Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:5, puts it wrongly in 1923; *Lu'an jih-k'an* puts it in 1922 [*PL*:109]).

131. PP:131; Chung I-mou 1957:10,125.

132. Hou Feng 1959:7.

133. Chung I-mou 1957:10; PP:131.

134. PP:19,131; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:6; Chung I-mou 1957:125; *PL*:109.

135. Chung I-mou 1957:125. Magistrate Weng had previously refused to accept the resignation of P'eng P'ai on 19 Mar. 1922 (*PL*:108). See also Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:6; PP:54.

136. CHP:1–2; HA (31 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Governor H.K.

137. PP:131; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:6; *PC*:15; Chung I-mou 1957:10.

138. PP:131. For the presentation of *Red Heart Weekly* (translated *Sincerity Weekly*), see Chow Tse-tsung 1963:101.

139. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:6–8; *PW*:8–9.

140. Chung I-mou 1955:181; Chung I-mou 1957:11; *PPKS*:5–6.

141. *PPKS*:6; *PW*:330.

142. PP:131; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8.

143. PP:19,131. P'eng P'ai decided "to go to the people" (Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8).

144. Chung I-mou 1957:11–12. See also *PPKS*:5–6; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8.

145. Landsberger 1974:6–10,18–19.

146. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,444.

147. Schiffrin 1968:35.

148. Schwartz 1952:19.

149. PP:101; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:7–8.

150. P'eng P'ai [16]:4,8; *PW*:1–2.

151. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:7; PP:19–20.

152. PP:19,78,88,108,121.

153. *PL*:323,358,360; PP:19; Harrison 1969:117,130.

154. *KNPK*:53,123. For the series of sources in favor of the starting of the Peasant Movement either in 1921 or in 1922, see Galbiati 1981:246,n.22.

155. CHP:1. *Hsin Hai-feng* (1959):vol. 3,538, had already reported on this kind of activity in 1921: "The Socialist Movement and the Haifeng Villages."

156. TC (3 Dec. 1977).

157. PP:131; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9–10.

158. PP:19; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8; Chung I-mou 1957:12.

159. PP:19,131; P'eng P'ai [12]:22; Hou Feng 1959: 8; *PPKS*:7.

160. Freedman 1966:22; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):182.

161. Hou Feng 1959:19; PP:20.

162. PP:20–22.

163. PP:18,22–23. Also "Kao nung-min-shu" (1924):1,7; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8—"Rumors were spread that he was mad."

164. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:2.

165. PP:22; P'eng P'ai [12]:26. See also *PL*:316,359.

166. Kan Nai-kuang 1927:19–20; "Kao nung-min-shu" (1924):6.

167. [Yün] Tai-ying 1924b, 1924c.

168. Li Jui 1977:183.

169. PP:22–24.

170. Chung I-mou 1957:13; Hou Feng 1959:11.

171. Chung I-mou 1955:182.

172. Chung I-mou 1957:13–14; PP:24; Shih Fan 1957:31.

173. PP:24; *PPKS*:20–21.

174. Shih Fan 1957:37; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:6; *PC*:13; *PL*:358. A comment on these events is in *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):173,182–83.

175. PP:78; TC (3 Dec. 1977).

176. PP:44.

177. PP:24.

178. PP:24–25; *PC*:13; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8–9, speaks of 7 peasants.

179. PP:86; Chan Ming-kou 1975:49. For the difference between the "Agricultural Society" and the "Peasant Union," see Galbiati 1981:255,n.30.

180. PP:25–26; Chung I-mou 1957:20; Hou Feng 1959:14–16.

181. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8.

182. PP:26–28; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8–9. P'eng P'ai declared that the peasants had been swindled too much in the past to be ready to trust him now.

183. PP:28–29.

184. PP:24,29–30; *PL*:317–18.

185. PP:12; *KNPK*:34; CHP:29–30.

186. PP:30–31.

187. PP:10,12.

188. Davis 1977:152.

189. PP:31.

190. PP:31; TC (10 Feb. 1980). P'eng P'ai is rather inaccurate with his figures: in October 1922 there were around 50 members (Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9). The need to inflate figures in his later "Report" stemmed from political and didactic concerns. The different editions of the "Report" are summarized in an introductory note to the Bibliography on p. 427.

191. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9; TC (10 Feb. 1980).

## *Chapter 3*

1. P'eng P'ai [12]:26; also Skinner ed. 1977:265–66.
2. Shih Fan 1957:12; *PPKS*:16–18.
3. CHP:31; Fei Hsiao-t'ung 1953:91–107.
4. *NMYT*:158,160–62.
5. Chung I-mou 1957:5; Shih Fan 1957:47; Chesneaux 1973:75–76.
6. PP:20–21,32; Li Ch'un-t'ao (1924):28, has a chart, possibly provided by P'eng P'ai in his letter, showing the city of Haifeng surrounded by the 13 Peasant Unions already established in Feb. 1923 (*PW*:23–24).
7. *PKC*:78,106; PP:13–14.
8. PP:15,42; *PKC*:116; Kuang-tung [9]:1–3.
9. Chen Han-seng 1936a:viii-xiii,4,24–27,31–39; Chen Han-seng 1934:443–44; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:65–66; Kulp 1925:86–87.
10. P'eng P'ai [21]:562; Kuang-tung [9]:36; Freedman 1966:11–14; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 3,5.
11. Chen Han-seng 1936a:39.
12. Muramatsu Yuji 1966:571; interview with Mr. T'o Chao-tung, 72, a semi-freeholder and primary school teacher from Ao-men (Haifeng).
13. Elvin 1973:254–55; Freedman 1966:15–16; Wilbur 1964:16; CKC:349.
14. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:27; "Kwangtung agricultural statistics" (1928):329; PP:13, gives owners about 20 percent, part owners 25 percent, and tenants 55 percent. In 1924 P'eng P'ai stated: owners and part owners 30 percent, tenants 55 percent (*PL*:316).
15. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:65; PP:14. For the "Land Question," see Galbiati 1981:105–9.
16. PP:10,73; CKC:337.
17. Chang Yu-i 1957:55,57, quoting the Russians; TC (9 May 1978).
18. Kuang-tung [9]:29; PP:127; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:27–28.
19. Muramatsu Yuji 1966:599.
20. PP:21; Chen Han-seng 1936a:62.
21. HFNY:3; LFNY:8; PP:14.
22. Chung I-mou 1957:17.
23. PP:13.
24. "Kwangtung agricultural statistics" (1928):328–30; PP:13.
25. *KNPK*:25; Marks 1978:332.
26. *KNPK*:23–30, for different kinds of contracts; *NMYT*:67; PP:38.
27. *KNPK*:25; PP:11,42; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:55–56.
28. "Kwangtung agricultural statistics" (1928):330–31; *KNPK*:5; PP:73.
29. PP:12,22.
30. Chen Han-seng 1936a:55; *KNPK*:23–27; TC (10 Dec. 1977); PP:48. Many abuses by the landlords are enumerated in PP:23–24.
31. *KNPK*:29; PP:65.
32. PP:64,89; *KNPK*:28; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:25,30; *PW*:43.
33. P'eng P'ai [21]:562; PP:14,125.
34. Chen Han-seng 1936a:46; Tanaka Tadao 1931:165; *NMYT*:182; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:20; Hai Feng 1969:132.

35. Muramatsu Yuji 1966:596.

36. *HFHC*:vol. 2,47–48; Li Chung-chüeh 1923:55–56; Dudgeon 1886:10–11, explains the "red and white deeds."

37. Tawney 1932:181.

38. Hsü Keng-pi 1883:446,470,491–92.

39. Wang Yu-ch'uan, in Levenson 1971:135–37.

40. *NMYT*:161; P'eng P'ai [23]:17; *PL*:317.

41. *Nung-min yün-tung hsü-chi* (1926):14, reporting Sun Yat-sen; PP:18.

42. CHP:124; Chen Han-seng 1936a:xiv.

43. "Financing the Nationalists" (1927):131; P'eng P'ai [23]:17; PP:13–14.

44. CKC:378; FO 228/3272 (7 Apr. 1923).

45. Hsüeh Nung-shan 1935:517; Han Sheng 1928:22–23; *NMYT*:183–84.

46. PP:18; Wang Chung-niao ed. 1929:169; *HS*:8.

47. PP:14.

48. PP:10; *KNPK*:30–32; *NMYT*:225–27.

49. Chen Han-seng 1936a:95–96.

50. CHP:130.

51. PP:21,39; Chen Han-seng 1936a:89; Buck 1937:vol. 1,405.

52. Elvin 1970:107.

53. PP:16–17.

54. PP:44; *PKC*:78.

55. PP:69.

56. PP:14–15.

57. CKC:67,377; PEM 1923:8.

58. C. K. Yang 1965:40,46. For different assessments of the rural economy, see Galbiati 1981:table 15.

59. PP:13; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:69; Chang Yu-i 1957:327.

60. PP:34–35; Buck 1937:vol. 1,318; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:683–84; *KNPK*: 27.

61. *PKC*:109; CHP:131.

62. PP:16; PEM 1923:8.

63. CKC:7,28,379.

64. Chayanov's theory would seem a valid explanation here; see Chayanov 1966:1–7; Shanin 1971:150–60,386–88.

65. PP:15–16.

66. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:69,71; *PKC*:5–10; Kulp 1925:105; Chao Kuo-chun 1960:5.

67. PP:13–15; HFNY:3; LFNY:8.

68. C. K. Yang 1965:51.

69. Chen Han-seng 1936a:xi; *PL*:316–17. P'eng P'ai in his "Declaration" laments that "in our normally peaceful and carefree villages, not even the chickens and dogs are left to themselves!" (Chung I-mou 1957:16).

70. Hsiao San 1962:59.

71. PP:31; Chung I-mou 1957:21; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9. Li puts the informal start of the Peasant Union on 29 July 1922 (p.8), as does Li Lao-kung (*PL*:317).

72. Chung I-mou 1957:182; Hou Feng 1959:18; Chow Tse-tsung 1960:94–95. For the involvement of students in the Peasant Union and a firsthand account by one of them, Li Lao-kung, see *PL*:315–17.

73. *KNPK*:52; C. Brandt et al. 1952:48; *PL*:3.
74. Yang K'ai-tao 1923:17–18; Li Ch'un-t'ai 1924:8.
75. Tanaka Tadao 1931:vol. 2,73–76. 76. *KNPK*:51,54.
77. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:29. 78. Harrison 1969:141–42.
79. [Teng] Chung-hsia 1924; PP:86. 80. PP:31; Landsberger 1974:47.
81. TC (6,8,10,11 Oct. 1977); PP:87–88; *KNPK*:108; *PL*:323.
82. Chapman 1928:11–12. 83. PP:31–32.
84. PP:32. 85. TC (3,4,5 Dec. 1977).
86. CHP:29–30; P'eng P'ai [21]:562. 87. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:10,28.
88. PP:31; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:10.
89. Chung I-mou 1955:183; Chung I-mou 1957:21.
90. PP:41; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9.
91. CHP:30; PP:33,57. The figures do not square either with the "membership chart," which by the end of 1922 showed a total of 5,000 cards distributed, or with the "chart of union membership in each county."
92. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:10–11. The letter by P'eng P'ai to Li of 9 Feb. 1923 is much earlier than the "Report" published in 1926.
93. PP:33–34; *PL*:323. Li Lao-kung, an eyewitness, states that the chairman of the Peasant Union was Ma Huan-hsin, who later left for trade union work, whereupon P'eng P'ai took over.
94. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:11–14. They approved the provisional regulations for the General Union and for the District Unions. See also *PW*:16–17,18,21.
95. PP:32–34,92,126; Davis 1977:137. Li Ch'un-t'ao (1924:17–18) reports a "Manifesto for the Establishment of the General Peasant Union" and a "Declaration of the Haifeng General Peasant Union on the Present Situation." See also *PW*:25–27.
96. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:10; PP:33.
97. PP:34; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:8–9; *PL*:323.
98. PP:34–35; TC (20,26 Feb. 1978); *PL*:3.
99. PP:35, 61.
100. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:11.
101. PP:50,112; Marks 1977:74–75,95.
102. Wales 1972:205; PP:40; Hai Feng 1969:78,120ff,158.
103. *PPKS*:12–13; PP:29,121. 104. Chesneaux 1973:70–71.
105. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:18. 106. Freedman 1966:121.
107. PP:32; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:15–17 ("The Utility of the Peasant Union").
108. PP:32.
109. March 1968:253–59; *PKC*:111,113; PA, Maglioni 1927.
110. Hsiao San 1962:58. Also Hsih Fan 1957:46; *PW*:333–34.
111. Shih Fan 1957:43–50; Kulp 1925:196–200; Davis 1977:75,77.
112. PP:32–33; *PPKS*:24–25.
113. PP:33; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:18.
114. PEM, *Report* (1911):32; HA (22 Sept. 1927), Robba–Valtorta; Bianchi 1978:304; *MC* 32 (1903):110–11.
115. PEM, *Report* (1909):36,38; PEM, *Report* (1911):32; PEM, *Report* (1912):31; PEM 1923:10; CHP:129,134; PA, Robba 1931:19,38.

116. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9,18; PP:33,35.

117. PP:36,40; Chung I-mou 1957:21; *PL*:319.

118. Freedman 1966: 121.

119. Rhoads 1975:183. The Catholics and the KMT in Haifeng also used the theater against their adversaries; HA (26 May 1928, 18 Sept. 1928), Robba–Valtorta. P'eng P'ai had a special interest in theater, music, and songs. See TC (21 Nov. 1978); Hou Feng 1959:15; Chung I-mou 1957:13. For a collection of songs by P'eng P'ai, see Hsiao San 1959 and 1962; *PW*:330–37.

120. *PPKS*:27–28.

121. "P'eng P'ai t'ung-chih huo ke-ming ko-yao" (1962).

122. PP:36; *PL*:319. For the PMTI, see Chapter 8.

123. PP:37. For the work of P'eng P'ai in education see also *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):265–71.

124. Li Jui 1977:59–65; *SW*:vol. 1,54.

125. PP:18–19,130; Chung I-mou 1957:16.

126. PP:37. See also Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960: 644,n.370. For a critical appraisal of the educational system, see P'eng P'ai [16]:4–5; and "Declaration on the Present Education," in Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:18. See also Kulp 1925:242–44. For previous experiments in popular and village education in China, see Galbiati 1981:280–82.

127. PP:37–38; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:18.

128. Mao Tse-tung, "Report," *SW*:vol. 1, 53–54; *NMYT*:236–38.

129. PP:38; P'eng P'ai [12]:48; *PL*:317–18.

130. PP:38; TC (14,15,22,23 Aug. 1978).

131. PP:38,40.

132. Hofheinz 1977:154.

133. PP:38–39.

134. PP:39–40.

135. PP:36. For samples of seals, see Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 2, 184–85, and Chung I-mou 1958:22.

136. Hofheinz 1977:155. The rent reduction time was soon reduced from 5 years to 3 years (PP:40,62). But the SYC group led by P'eng P'ai never gave up the idea of economic and social struggle, which they saw as a class struggle (Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:18; *PL*:3).

137. PP:40; *PW*:47; Hou Feng 1957:22,61.

138. [Teng] Chung-hsia 1924:5.

139. PP:41; CKC:104; *NCH* (20 Jan. 1923).

140. PP:41; CKC:107.

141. PP:42–43; Chung I-mou 1957:22; *PL*:322.

142. PP:43–44.

143. PP:44–45.

144. PP:48,54.

145. TC (15 Dec. 1977).

146. PP:45–46; P'eng P'ai [21]:562.

147. PP:46–47; Chung I-mou 1957:23.

148. PP:102; *PL*:322.

149. PP:48–50; MEP, *Lettres* (1923):89.

150. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:19–20; *PW*:47. For the "May Day Declaration" and "Report," see also *PW*:28–31.

151. PP:50.
152. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:20,30.
153. PP:50–51; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:20.
154. PP:80; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:19–20.
155. CKC:104–7,378,380; *HP* (17,18 Jan. 1923; 10 Feb. 1923); FO 228/3000 (11 Jan. 1923, 15 Feb. 1923).
156. PP:85; *KNPK*:36.
157. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:30, and *PL*:322, state that peasants in Haifeng were rallying to P'eng P'ai against Ch'en Chiung-ming and the gentry-landlords, as 20 years before they had rallied to the Catholic priest against the Ch'ing Mandarin. In 1903, Fr. Zamponi, after winning a big court case in Haifeng, had on his rolls "10,000 names of poor peasants who looked at the missionary as their protector against the abuses of the rich." (PA, Robba 1931:31–34.)
158. PP:51–53,102.
159. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:24; P'eng P'ai [2], in *PW*:54.
160. P'eng P'ai [21]:560; Yü Yen-kuang 1980:6,n.1; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:29.
161. PP:54,87–88; P'eng P'ai [3], [4], in *PW*:41–42. P'eng P'ai admits to the presence of "bad elements" in the Peasant Union.
162. PP:88.
163. C. Johnson 1964:38; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:1; *PW*:47.
164. PP:54–55,72.
165. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:20–24. For a comment on the "Constitution," see [Teng] Chung-hsia 1924; Ch'i Feng 1923:41–45.
166. PP:55; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:24–25; *PW*:46–47.
167. PP:56; *PW*:33–38.
168. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:25. Ch'en Tu-hsiu is referred to as Shih An (*PL*:1; *PW*:42,52).
169. PP:61,66; Maglio 1923.
170. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:25; *HS*:3; *PW*:42–44,47; Chung I-mou 1957:24–26.
171. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:25,30; PP:62–66; CHP:132. Help by the landlords in a calamity was traditional in Hai-Lu-feng.
172. PP:61–63.
173. PP:66–68.
174. CHP:127; MEP, *Lettres* (1922):74; MEP, *Lettres* (1923):86.
175. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:30, quoting Ch'ao Yü-o, who wrote about it.
176. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:25,30–31; Yü Yen-kuang 1958:26–27.
177. PP:69–70. For the "Declaration" and illustrative diagrams, see P'eng P'ai [12]:89–91.
178. PP:71.
179. PP:71–73; *PL*:324.
180. PP:73–75; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:26; *PW*:48–49. The events were reported in *HP* (5 Sept. 1923); *PL*:325–27.
181. PP:75; Shih Fan 1957:71–79.
182. PP:76.
183. PP:77; Chung I-mou 1957:25–27.
184. PP:91,93; CHP:3.

185. Hou Feng 1959:28; *PL*:205–6.

186. PP:79,110.

187. PP:76–77. On 9 Jan. 1922, Huang Ch'in-hsüan had been elected chairman of the county assembly, with P'eng Han-yüan as his deputy (*PL*:106).

188. PP:78,92. Money and equipment were taken from the Peasant Union headquarters and clinic (Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:27).

189. PP:79–80. P'eng Han-yüan argued for political means, being less concerned with class struggle—a fact previously lamented by P'eng P'ai (Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:29).

190. PP:80–81; Chung I-mou 1957:27–28.

191. PP:81–88. There is a full description of the trip to Laolung.

192. PP:86.

193. PP:89–93; *HP* (28 Aug. 1923).

194. PP:93–94,135. For the "Declaration," see Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:25–27; *PW*:43–45; PL:325–26.

195. PP:94–95; FO 228/3272 (26 Sept. 1923); *PL*:325–26; *HP* (15,17,20 Sept. 1923).

196. PP:95–98.

197. PP:97–99.

198. PP:96,99; *PW*:43,50,52.

199. PP:100–101.

200. PP:101.

201. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:232,309; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:4.

202. P'eng P'ai [3], [4], in *PW*:42. P'eng P'ai wants the SYC to become, besides a propaganda unit, also a revolutionary secret organization. He declares that he was an anarchist who came to believe in Marxism in 1921, and that his recent experience strengthened such belief. (P'eng P'ai [2], in *PW*:54.)

203. I Yüan [Chou En-lai] 1930; *PL*:343. See also *PL*:14,373.

204. Chang Lung 1923. See also *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):185,n.21.

205. PP:102.

206. PP:103–4.

207. PP:104–6,113.

208. PP:104,112; Ch'en Yu-p'eng 1927:68; P'eng P'ai [13], 1 May 1926:506.

209. Wilbur 1964:19.

210. PP:104–5; *PW*:50,53. The SYC were active there also in the labor movement.

211. PP:105–6,108; P'eng P'ai [21]:560.

212. PP:108–11.

213. PP:111; *PW*:54.

214. Landsberger 1974:52.

215. PP:79. For the priority in setting up a Peasant Army and in insisting on arming the peasants for revolution, see *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):254–56.

216. PP:113.

217. PP:113–14; CKC:108–9; FO 228/3272 (25 Dec. 1923).

218. PP:114–15.

219. PP:115–16; *NCH* (2 May 1924; 4 June 1924); MEP, *Lettres* (1923):86; MEP, *Lettres* (1924):69.

220. PP:60; P'eng P'ai [21]:561; P'eng P'ai [3], [4], in *PW*:41–42.
221. PP:116–17.
222. PP:117–19,127.
223. PP:120–21.
224. PP:121; *PW*:56.
225. PP:120–21; P'eng P'ai [21]:561.
226. P'eng P'ai [21]:561; Chang Lung 1923:328–29; PP:121.
227. PP:121,138; P'eng P'ai [21]:561–62; Chung I-mou 1957:29–30.
228. FO 228/3729 (10 Feb. 1928); PP:121.
229. PP:121; *PL*:373; *PW*:56.

## *Chapter 4*

1. Bianco 1971:74–76.
2. Thaxton 1975b:661; Friedman 1974:222.
3. Wong Young-tsu 1977:333–39.
4. *The Times* (2 Jan. 1913); *NCH* (7 Dec. 1912).
5. "Kao Chung-kuo. . ." (1920).
6. Tanaka 1931:vol. 2,26–29; "Ya-chien. . ." (1921):1–4.
7. Chung-kuo [17]:29–30; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:10; *PL*:11–12,339,342,365; *PC*:23.
8. Schiffrin 1957; Gasster 1969:87.
9. Friedman 1974:14,25–26,204.
10. Chan & Etzold 1976:32.
11. D. C. Price 1974:215.
12. *SCMP* (12 July 1923); *SCMP* (3 Oct. 1923).
13. Leng & Palmer 1961:81; T'ang Leang-li 1930:152–53.
14. Chung-kuo [13]:10–11,30.
15. C. Brandt 1958:47.
16. Pringsheim 1962:78; Tanaka 1931:vol. 2,74.
17. Li Ang 1942:65.
18. Yün Tai-ying 1924c; Yün Tai-ying 1924b.
19. C. Brandt 1958:46–48.
20. Meisner 1967:242; "Kao Chung-kuo. . ." (1920).
21. Ch'en Kung-po 1966:103–5.
22. *Ibid.*:116–22,126.
23. Li Ta-chao 1962a:146.
24. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1922.
25. Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1923b; Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1923c.
26. *HC* (1 Aug. 1923), in Harrison 1969:46.
27. Kuang-tung [9]:123; Muntjewerf 1973.
28. Degras 1960:vol. 2,25–26.
29. Chao Kuo-chun 1960:2, reports the quotation.
30. Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1923c:5,6.
31. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:308–9.
32. *Ibid.*:309.
33. Snow 1972:185.
34. Ch'en Kung-po 1966:300–301; Harrison 1972:52–54; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:67,86,87.
35. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:85.
36. Bing 1971; Harrison 1972:51; Isaacs 1971:107–8; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:253.
37. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:308–9; Meisner in Lewis 1974:230.
38. Mif 1937:22,23.

39. Carrère d'Encausse & Schram 1969:13,14,123; Mitrany 1951:14; Harrison 1969:38–39.

40. Harrison 1969:40; Cohen 1964:35,43–45; Schwartz 1952:117–18; Willettes in Shapiro & Reddaway eds. 1967:218–19.

41. Carrère d'Encausse & Schram 1969:18; Schwartz 1952:121; C. Brandt 1958:1; Eudin & North 1957:69.

42. Degras 1960:vol. 1,138,143; North 1966:43–50.

43. Haithcox 1963.

44. Trotsky 1946:223; Carrère d'Encausse & Schram 1969:27–29,149–54.

45. Whiting 1968:96,97,115,125. 46. Eudin & North 1957:151.

47. Degras 1960:vol. 2,5–6. 48. Whiting 1968:109.

49. Degras 1960:vol. 2,25–26; Eudin & North 1957:343–44.

50. Dombal 1923:563. 51. Snow 1972:184.

52. Harrison 1969:47. 53. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:599.

54. Hsüeh Nung-shan 1935:562–63.

55. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:309; Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1923b.

56. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:1,27–30. 57. Chung I-mou 1957:12.

58. Kuang-tung [9]:53. 59. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:300,307ff.

60. Fisher 1960:462–65,473; Isaacs 1966:376; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:326.

61. P'eng P'ai [29]:115; I Yüan (Chou En-lai) 1930 (in *PL*:343). P'eng P'ai in 1924 derided Sun Yat-sen for his uncertain peasant policy.

62. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:601; Hsüeh Nung-shan 1935:567,569,570.

63. Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1923a; Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1923d.

64. *CKKMTCK* 21 (25 May 1924); 27 (29 June 1924); 28 (6 July 1924).

65. Borodin 1927a.

66. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926e:6–7; Fisher 1960:463–67.

67. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:329,341,342,405,600; Woo 1928:83,101. Li Yün-han 1966:268–70.

68. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang*. . . 1927:70–73 (1st Declaration), 75–79 (2d Declaration), 79–83 (3d Declaration).

69. Kuang-tung [9]:53; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:1–6,50–53.

70. Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 1,33–58.

71. *CKKMTCK* 21 (25 May 1924); *Nung-min hsieh-hui chang-cheng* (1924).

72. Bianco 1971:74; "The peasant road to Revolution . . . constitutes the first major reworking of Marxist doctrine" (Schram 1964).

73. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926e:5.

## *Chapter 5*

1. *The Times* (11 Feb. 1924; 11 Aug. 1924; 14 Aug. 1924).

2. Frank 1926:266.

3. *CKKMTCK* 10 (9 Mar. 1924); 16 (13 Apr. 1924).

4. Tsou Lu 1941:vol. 1,339. 5. Li Yün-han 1966:270.

6. CHP:4. 7. K'uang Hsiao-an 1928:1.

8. Chiang Kai-shek 1957:31.

9. "Pen-tang. . ." (1926):1,5; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926b.
10. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:4–6.
11. Li Yün-han 1966: 275; Tsou Lu 1951:vol. 1,161.
12. "Pen-tang. . ." (1926):3–4.
13. *CKKMTCK* 27 (29 June 1924):5,7.
14. *Nung-min hsieh-hui chang-cheng* (1924). For the revised 1926 Constitution, see *NMYT*:244–56.
15. P'eng P'ai [15]:7; *NMTK*:vol. 1,7,27.
16. *CKKMTCK* 28 (6 July 1924); Chung-kuo [13]:71–72; "Kao nung-min shu" (1924):11; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:2,6,13.
17. [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i.
18. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:601–2.
19. Malukhin 1975:99.
20. Kuang-tung [9]:124; P'eng P'ai [29]:104; *Nung-min hsieh-hui tsu-chih-fa*.
21. *CKKMTCK* 28 (6 July 1924), 29 (13 July 1924); *Nung-min yün-tung hsü-chih* (1926):183, with details of the flag.
22. "Pen-tang. . ." (1926):7; Schwartz 1952:85.
23. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:1; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:5; *CKKMTCK* 29 (13 July 1924); "Ti-i-chieh. . ." (1926):8; *PC*:21,34.
24. *NMYT*:8; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:4; Hofheinz 1977:215.
25. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:49; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 3,47–48; *CKKMTCK* 42 (15 Aug. 1924):4.
26. Hou Feng 1959:40; Chung I-mou 1955:189; *PW*:65.
27. *NMTK*:vol. 1,1–8.
28. *NKHK* 2 (1 Aug. 1924):15–16; *NKHK* 5 (1 Sept. 1924):10.
29. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:224,236,249,323; Hofheinz 1977:8,314; *PL*:4–5.
30. A. Chan 1973:38–39.
31. "Kao nung-min shu" (1924).
32. Chan Ming-kou 1975:246–47.
33. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:6; Li Ang 1942:55.
34. Kuang-tung [9]:124; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:449.
35. *NKHK* 4 (21 Aug. 1924):10; *NKHK* 5 (1 Sept. 1924):9.
36. The Peasant Army was established on 27 Aug. 1924 with P'eng P'ai as its commander—*SCMP* (28 Aug. 1924); *PL*:114,116.
37. M. Wright ed. 1968:264–65; Chesneaux 1968:248–49; Li Chien-nung 1956:460; Chan Ming-kou 1975:59–62.
38. T'ang Leang-li 1930:185–89; Kuang-tung [8]:169; FO 228/3272 (17 Sept. 1924); Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:18–19; *NKHK* 6 (11 Sept. 1924).
39. Chesneaux 1968:249.
40. Vishnyakova 1971:162; Kuang-tung [9]:55–56; FO 228/3158 (10 Oct. 1924).
41. P'eng P'ai [15]:9.
42. Voitinsky 1924:692,698,715.
43. Chung-kuo [12].
44. Tsou Lu 1951:vol. 1,166.
45. Chou Ch'i-chien wrote a lengthy "Kuang-ning nung-min yün-tung" (The peasant movement in Kwangning) in *NMTK*:vol. 3,83–191. On that see also

*NMYT*: 139–47; Kuang-tung [9]:64–83; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 3,55–72. *PL*:206–20 gives a CCP account of these events. Hofheinz 1977:179–213 also covers the story.

46. *NMTK*:vol. 2,155; Chang Yu-i 1957:478; *NMYT*:182; [Ts'ai] Ho-sen 1925c:1034.

47. Kuang-tung [9]:52–53,99–100,123; "Ch'en Po-chung" (1926a); "Ch'en Po-chung" (1926b):426; *NMTK*:vol. 3,83–88; *PL*:11.

48. *NMTK*:vol. 3,87–89.

49. *NMTK*:vol. 3,89–91; *PL*:12. Report by P'eng P'ai in *PW*:63–64.

50. *NMTK*:vol. 3,92–93; Juan Hsiao-hsien 1926b.

51. *NMTK*:vol. 3,94–95.

52. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:6; Liao Chung-k'ai 1926:3.

53. *NMTK*:vol. 3,95–98.

54. *NMTK*:vol. 3,98–105.

55. *NMTK*:vol. 3,105–10; Ch'en K'o-wen 1926a:371; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:7.

56. *NMTK*:vol. 3,110–11.

57. *NMTK*:vol. 3,111–16. Five declarations signed by P'eng P'ai are in *PW*:67–81.

58. *NMTK*:vol. 3,116–21; Kuang-tung [9]:81.

59. *NMYT*:140–41.

60. *NMTK*:vol. 3,122–24; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:7.

61. *NMTK*:vol. 3,124–35; Li Yün-han 1966:282–83.

62. *NMTK*:vol. 3,135–41. The speech by P'eng P'ai is in *PW*:66.

63. *NMTK*:vol. 3,127,142; Kuang-tung [9]:124; *PL*:211,216.

64. *NMTK*:vol. 3,142–47; *NCH* (27 Dec. 1924).

65. *NMTK*:vol. 3,147–50.

66. *NKHK* 6 (11 Sept. 1924):10; *NMTK*:vol. 3,150–54.

67. *NMTK*:vol. 3,154–58; Kuang-tung [9]:125; Ch'en K'o-wen 1926a.

68. *NMTK*:vol. 3,158–65.

69. *NMTK*:vol. 3,165–75.

70. *NMTK*:vol. 3,175–76.

71. Kuang-tung [9]:83.

72. *NMTK*:vol. 3,176–78; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:396–97.

73. *NMTK*:vol. 3,178–81.

74. *NMTK*:vol. 3,181–86.

75. *NMTK*:vol. 3,186–89; *PL*:219.

76. *NMTK*:vol. 3,189–90; *NMYT*:149; Kuang-tung [9]:92–100.

77. *NMTK*:vol. 3,190–91; *KCMKJP* (12 May 1925; 13 May 1925; 14 May 1925).

78. Kuang-tung [9]:81–82,124; *PL*:212.

79. FO 228/3272 (26 June 1924); CKC:110–11.

80. FO 228/3272 (17 Sept. 1924; 29 Sept. 1924); PEM, *Report 1925*:119–20; *NCH* (10 Jan. 1925).

81. Liu Ping-ts'ui 1928:303,336.

82. *MC* 54/10 (15 May 1925).

83. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:452–53; *PL*:117ff.

84. Hou Feng 1959:41; Chung I-mou 1955:189; *MC* 54/20 (15 Oct. 1925).

85. Cherepanov 1964:11–18,28–31.

86. *MC* 54/16 (15 Aug. 1925).
87. Kuang-tung [9]:125–26; Juan Hsiao-hsien 1926b:1.
88. *HP* (4 Mar. 1925).
89. Kuang-tung [9]:126; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:13,49.
90. Liu Ping-ts'ui 1928:196–97.
91. Su Wei 1951a:175; Chung I-mou 1957:31; *PPKS*:12–13.
92. Chung I-mou 1955:189–90; Hou Feng 1959:42.
93. *HP* (4 Mar. 1925); *SCMP* (9 Mar. 1925).
94. Chung I-mou 1955:190; Liu Ping-ts'ui 1928:203–4; Hou Feng 1959:42.
95. Liu Ping-ts'ui 1928:208–9; *HS*:5; *PL*:118.
96. [Ts'ai] Ho-sen 1925a:882–83.
97. *Hui-ch'ang jih-k'an* 5 (6 May 1926).
98. P'eng P'ai [18]; *PW*:89.
99. P'eng P'ai [22]; *PW*:84–86; [Ts'ai] Ho-sen 1925c:1031; *PL*:118–19; *HS*:5; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):259; Kuang-tung [9]:131.
100. *CNP*:34; FO 228/3011 (17 Mar. 1925); Chung I-mou 1955:190.
101. *HP* (4 Mar. 1925); *PL*:125,131.
102. FO 228/3011 (6 Apr. 1925), 228/3272 (26 Apr. 1925); *PC*:41; Hai Feng 1969:4,118.
103. T'ieh-jen:1,19; Chung I-mou 1955:190; Chung I-mou 1957:34–35; Hou Feng 1959:42–43; *PL*:118; *PC*:42–43.
104. *CNP*:34; Chung I-mou 1957:32–33.
105. P'eng P'ai [22]; *PW*:85.
106. Chung I-mou 1957:34–35; Hou Feng 1959:43–45; *PL*:134,137.
107. Hou Feng 1957:45.
108. CHP:30; Chung I-mou 1955:191.
109. Bianchi 1925a, 1925b.
110. MEP, *Lettres* (1925):76–77; MEP, *Bulletin* 46 (Oct. 1925):640.
111. HA (9,25 Aug. 1925), Robba–Spada.
112. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:47; *PC*:44; *PL*:136,137–40.
113. MEP, *Lettres* (1925):75; Chung I-mou 1955:191; Hou Feng 1959:43,46.
114. *NCH* (7 Nov. 1925).
115. CHP:39–40,110; *PKC*:28; Chung I-mou 1955:196; Hou Feng 1959:51; *PC*:43; *PL*:125–27.
116. Chung I-mou 1957:36–37; Su Wei 1951a:174; MEP, *Lettres* (1925):77; FO 228/3012 (21 Aug. 1925).
117. Bianchi 1925b.
118. Hui-ch'ang jih-k'an (1925); "Pen-tang. . ." (1926):9; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:9; *KCMKJP* (12 May 1925, 13 May 1925, 14 May 1925); *NMYT*:171–97; *NMTK*: vol. 1, 45–62.
119. KA 447.0/130 has a picture of P'eng P'ai addressing the May Day rally. *PL*:131,135.
120. Chung I-mou 1957:35; Ch'en Yu-p'eng 1927:68–69; *NMYT*:163.
121. *NCH* (18 Apr. 1925); MEP, *Lettres* (1925):75.
122. Chung I-mou 1957:45; P'eng P'ai [29]:51; *PL*:315–28. The article is by Li

Lao-kung, writing under the pen name of Li K'e-chia in 1924, on the early peasant movement in Haifeng and the reasons why he joined it.

123. TC (4 Oct. 1977; 28,29 Nov. 1978; 1–4,10–15 Dec. 1978).

124. CHP:152–53.

125. Chung I-mou 1957:36,43–48; CHP:57,126–27; *PL*:130; Su Wei 1951b; Wales 1972:201–2; Brambilla 1943:292.

126. Ku Feng 1926:17; *PL* 124–26; TC (24 Oct. 1978, 9 Aug. 1979).

127. *NCH* (29 Aug. 1925).

128. P'eng P'ai [22]; *PW*:85. [Ts'ai] Ho-sen 1925c:1031; FO 228/3012 (19 Aug. 1925); MEP, *Bulletin* 43 (July 1925):434; 45 (Sept. 1925):545.

129. HA (25 Aug. 1925), Robba–Spada; HA (22 Aug. 1925), Bianchi–All Fathers; FO 228/3012 (19 Aug. 1925):Enclo.

130. Hou Feng 1959:45; Chung I-mou 1955:197; Shih Fan 1957:79,83–84.

131. Chung I-mou 1957:37; FO 228/3011 (15, 25 May 1925).

132. Kuang-tung [9]:114; Li Chien-nung 1956:495; *NCH* (1 Aug. 1925); Chung I-mou 1957:37–38; MEP, *Lettres* (1925):769; *HS*:5.

133. Bianchi 1925b.

134. FO 228/3012 (21, 27 Sept. 1925); *SCMP* (1,24 Oct. 1925).

135. Chung I-mou 1955:192; Hou Feng 1959:46; *CKNM* 6/7 (1 July 1926).

136. *NMYT*:200–201; Chung I-mou 1955:190-91; Hou Feng 1959:46–47; TC (24, 26 Oct. 1978).

137. Fan Pai-ch'uan 1952:113–14; *HS*:6; Chung I-mou 1955:192.

138. FO 228/3212 (4 Oct. 1925); *PL*:141–46; *PW*:87–100; P'eng P'ai [18]; *PW*:89–93.

139. FO 228/3012 (27 Sept. 1925, 4 Oct. 1925); FO 228/3013 (19 Oct. 1925, 7 Nov. 1925); *NCH* (10 Oct. 1925, 14 Nov. 1925); Chung I-mou 1957:37–38; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:50.

140. P'eng P'ai [32]:14; *PW*:263–70.

141. Hou Feng 1959:47; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926h:4.

142. *PC*:45; *SCMP* (28 Oct. 1925).

143. Hou Feng 1959:47–48; *HS*:6–7; Chung I-mou 1957:39–40,42.

144. *NCH* (13 Feb. 1926).

## *Chapter 6*

1. *NMYT*:171–77.

2. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926f; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:19,40.

3. Lin Wei 1925:1252; Wu Ming 1937:52; *PL*:163,191,231.

4. Malone 1926:18.

5. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:11; Kuang-tung [9]:135–36; *PL*:173,189–91.

6. *NCH* (13 Feb. 1926); Wu Ming 1937:53.

7. TC (18 May 1977, 18 Feb. 1978); *PL*:335.

8. *NMYT*:158–70; *CKNM* 4 (1 Apr. 1926):1–13; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:47,71; *HP* (30 Jan. 1926); *PL*:221–29, has a CCP report of the events. See also Kuang-tung [9]:103–8; Marks 1977:65–100; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 3,73–79.

9. *NMYT*:164–66; *HP* (22 Jan. 1926); Kuang-tung [9]:105–7.

10. *NMYT*:166–68; Kuang-tung [9]:103–8.
11. *NMYT*:168–70.
12. Kuang-tung [9]:109–10. The speech by P'eng P'ai is in *PW*:189.
13. Kuang-tung [9]:111–12,135; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 3,81–82.
14. T'ang Leang-li 1930:249; Ku Feng 1926:19,29.
15. P'eng P'ai [23]:12–19. The article has an introduction by Lo Ch'i-yüan, but the main body was written by P'eng P'ai. *PW*:198–201.
16. P'eng P'ai [23]:12–14; Kuang-tung [9]:158.
17. P'eng P'ai [23]:15–16; Kuang-tung [9]:158.
18. P'eng P'ai [23]:16–19.
19. *KCMKJP* (16 Sept. 1926).
20. Ch'en Yu-p'eng 1927:66–70.
21. *Shen-pao* (21,26 July 1926); Kuang-tung [9]:118. Ku Ta-ts'un became a member of the CCP Central Committee and helped the P'eng family in the 1950's. See Hai Feng 1969:118–19; Vogel 1969.
22. P'eng P'ai [5]:11; *PW*:258–62.
23. P'eng P'ai [5]:12–14.
24. Ku Feng 1926:17–18,30.
25. P'eng P'ai [32]:13–16.
26. P'eng P'ai [32]:16–19; *Shen-pao* (15, 25 Sept. 1926).
27. *KCMKJP* (24 Nov. 1926, 12 Dec. 1926); FO 228/3020 (5 Nov. 1926); *LTCP* 22 (15 Dec. 1926), "Kuo-min hsin-wen" of 5 Nov. 1926.
28. Harrison 1972:78–80; Vishnyakova 1971:234.
29. Kuang-tung [9]:143–48; *KCMKJP* (5–7 July 1926); *Shen-pao* (21 July 1926 to 27 Sept. 1926); KA 447/53.
30. *NCH* (24 Apr. 1926).
31. Tsou Lu 1951:vol. 1,166.
32. Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 3,71–74; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:83–88; *KCMKJP* (14 Aug. 1926); Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926k:26–28.
33. C. Brandt 1958:72,76.
34. Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1929:3–4,11; Fisher 1960:473; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:296–302.
35. Kuang-tung [9]:158; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926k:29–30.
36. *NT* 9 (28 Sept. 1926):196–200; *LTCP* 11 (21 July 1926); *HC* 171 (17 Sept. 1926):1743; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 2, part 7,93–115, part 8,14–15; P'eng P'ai [5]:12.
37. Kuang-tung [9]:159ff; [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i and 1926k.
38. [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i:34; *PC*:24; *KCMKJP* (17,19,20 Aug. 1926). For a description of the activity of P'eng P'ai at the meeting, see *PL*:195–205.
39. Cherepanov 1964:12.
40. [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i:33–34; *PC*:48,50; *PL*:195–98.
41. Kuang-tung [9]:113.
42. "Pen-hui. . ." (1926):23; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:43–45; *KCMKJP* (27 Aug. 1926).
43. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:2,28; Chiang Lo 1935:61–70; "Ch'en Po-chung" 1926b:426; *PL*:11–12,63–64,144–45; *CKKMTCK* 42 (15 Aug. 1924); *NKHK* 5 (1 Sept. 1924); Kuang-tung [9]:134.
44. Teng Liang-sheng 1926:15–16; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:46–47.

45. For a full report of the events, see P'eng P'ai |15|:5–45; *PW*:207–57; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 2, part 8,14ff; Hofheinz 1977:214–33; P'eng P'ai |33|:part 2. See also *KCMKJP* (27 Aug. 1926; 1,2,9,12,14,25 Sept. 1926); *LTCP* 15 (23 Sept. 1926).

46. P'eng P'ai |15|:5–6,13–14,18; Kuang-tung |9|:114.

47. P'eng P'ai |15|:6–9.

48. P'eng P'ai |15|:10–14; Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1924a:629–30.

49. P'eng P'ai |15|:14–18.

50. P'eng P'ai |15|:19–21.

51. P'eng P'ai |15|:21–25.

52. P'eng P'ai |15|:25–28.

53. P'eng P'ai |15|:12,28–31.

54. P'eng P'ai |15|:31–33. P'eng P'ai, who was present with a camera, provides a photo of the forged document.

55. P'eng P'ai |15|:33–36.

56. P'eng P'ai |15|:36–38.

57. P'eng P'ai |15|:39–41.

58. P'eng P'ai |15|:41–44.

59. Kuang-tung |14|.

60. "Ch'ao-Mei. . ." (1926); Rue 1966:51.

61. Mao Tse-tung 1926d; *MT*:vol. 1,176.

62. Chung I-mou 1955:195–97; Chung I-mou 1957:42; *HS*:7–8,19–20.

63. Kuang-tung |9|:118.

64. Wu Ming 1937:51; *PL*:353.

65. Hou Feng 1959:51; CHP:5; *PKC*:28; *KCMKJP* (10 Aug. 1926); TC (27, 29, 30 Sept. 1977).

66. HA (12 Jan. 1926), Bianchi–Valtorta; Costantini 1946:327; PEM, *Report* (1926):31–32.

67. Chung I-mou 1957:42–44; Wales 1972:203; *Kao nung-min shu* (1925); Wilbur & How eds. 1956:94–95; TC (6, 7 Apr. 1978).

68. *HS*:10–11. For a different calculation of CCP members, see p. 297 below.

69. Wales 1972:203.

70. *HS*:9.

71. Harrison 1972:99.

72. *HS*:9–10; Chung I-mou 1957:43; TC (22 Oct. 1977); *PKC*:28; *PL*:120–23.

73. *HS*:9.

74. Chung I-mou 1957:43,52.

75. *HS*:9; TC (25, 26 Sept. 1978); Chung I-mou 1957:44; *PC*:52–53.

76. Chung I-mou 1957:45; *HS*:8; TC (21–26 Mar. 1978); Wales 1972:209.

77. *KCMKJP* (15, 23 Feb. 1927); Chung I-mou 1957:30,52.

78. Wales 1972:202.

79. Chung I-mou 1957:43; TC (2,5–7,24–27 Apr. 1978).

80. Chung I-mou 1957:46–48; Wales 1972:201.

81. CHP:5,57–59.

82. Wales 1972:202.

83. Chung I-mou 1957:48.

84. Chung I-mou 1955:195–96; Chung I-mou 1957:48–49,52.

85. Chung I-mou 1957:49.

86. Chung I-mou 1957:46,56; TC (17 Apr. 1977); Marks 1978:585,n.33.

87. *KCMKJP* (20 Aug. 1926); *NMYT*:23.

88. "Ch'ao-Mei. . ." (1926).
89. *HS*:9–12; Wales 1972:206; Chung I-mou 1955:197.
90. Wales 1972:202.
91. CHP:8; Hou Feng 1959:52; Chung I-mou 1955:197.
92. *CNP*:35; *Shen-pao* (14, 16 Aug. 1926; 17 Nov. 1926); P'eng P'ai [6]:8–10; *PW*:202–5. On the third anniversary of the "Fifth Day of the Seventh Month," P'eng P'ai made a speech stressing unity as power. (*PL*:205–6; *PW*:206.)
93. *CNP*:36; *NCH* (25 Sept. 1926).
94. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926k:15,18,20.
95. Chung I-mou 1957:53; *HS*:10; *SCMP* (22 Mar. 1927).
96. CHP:39–40; *Shen-pao* (4, 17 Nov. 1926); *HS*:10.
97. *KCMKJP* (31 Dec. 1926); *HS*:10; *MC* 56/22 (15 Nov. 1926).
98. FO 228/3276 (29 Mar. 1927); MEP, *Lettres* (1927):76.
99. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:531,538; P'eng P'ai [6].
100. Chung I-mou 1955:196; Chung-kuo [16]:49–50.
101. Hou Feng 1959:50; *PC*:53–53; *PL*:189–90,236.
102. *NCH* (20 Nov. 1926, 31 Dec. 1926).
103. Hou Feng 1978:66; *PC*:53.
104. Chan Ming-kou 1975:256.
105. *KCMKJP* (24 Jan. 1927; 15,21,22 Feb. 1927; 2 Mar. 1927); *HP* (16 May 1927); *PL*:232–37; *PW*:271–76.
106. *HS*:10; Chung I-mou 1957:52–53; Wales 1972:200; Hou Feng 1978:70–71; *MC* 56/5 (1 Mar. 1927).
107. *NCH* (19 Mar. 1927).
108. Chung I-mou 1957:53,56–57; *SCMP* (22 Mar. 1927).
109. Wales 1972:203; *HS*:13; Chung I-mou 1955:206.
110. *PL*:237–43; *Wu-han min-kuo jih-pao* (1 Apr. 1927).
111. *HS*:14; Chung I-mou 1955:198; CHP:8,110.
112. Hou Feng 1978:71–72; Snow 1972:187–88.
113. Harrison 1972:96; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:251, 259,274–79; Yü Yen-kuang 1958:44.
114. Dalin 1975:330–31; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:57–60.

## *Chapter 7*

1. Ho Kan-chih 1959:86; Harrison 1972:61.
2. Mif 1937:23; C. Brandt 1958:62–63; J. Ch'en 1967:99–100.
3. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:409; C. Brandt 1958:201,n.62.
4. Degras 1960:vol. 2,204.
5. Chung-kuo [11]; Tsou Lu 1941:416–17.
6. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:601–2; Kuang-tung [9]:124; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927: 50–53; Ch'en Yu-p'eng 1927:48–49.
7. C. Brandt 1958:61–64,67–69.
8. *NMHK* 9 (1 Dec. 1924); Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:51.
9. Li Shih 1933:86.
10. "Pen-tang ti-erh-tz'u" (1926).

11. Kuang-tung [9]:90–114; Ch'en Kung-po 1926b:1–4.
12. "Kao nung-min shu" (1925).
13. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:96,102, 103,122.
14. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:461–63.
15. *Tso nung-min. . .* (1926).
16. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1928b.
17. T'ang Leang-li ed. 1934:22. See also Rue 1966:23–24; Yakhontoff 1934:125; Malukhin 1975:55,77.
18. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:226–27; Harrison 1972:78–80.
19. Ch'en Tu-hsiu 1929:3–4; Chesneaux 1968:313–14.
20. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:512.
21. Kuang-tung [9]:114.
22. Isaacs 1966:106.
23. Vishnyakova 1971:217; *SCMP* (26 May 1926); *NCH* (24 Apr. 1926); Wilbur & How eds. 1956:228–29,377–79.
24. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:232,233,258; "Pen-tang ti-erh-tz'u" (1926):5,8,9.
25. Kuang-tung [9]:165–89.
26. *Ibid.*:166–70. The basic peasant mentality was stressed by exposing the shortcomings of the Peasant Association, which were reported as "many" and present "everywhere," a real "obstacle to revolution" (*ibid.*:116–21). The same shortcomings were present also in other provinces. See *NMYT*:311–12,368–70,413–14; and *PL*:66–67,196–97.
27. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:282–87,296ff.
28. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:600; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:461.
29. [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i:34,38,39.
30. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:276ff.
31. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:600; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:301.
32. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:600; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1966:86.
33. Hofheinz 1977:24ff; Trotsky 1932:Appendix, 397–432; C. Brandt 1958:80–81; Ch'en Ch'eng 1960:83–86; Eudin & North 1957:350–56.
34. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:377.
35. Snow 1972:187. The Peasant Department of the CCP Central Committee, already decided upon in 1925, was started only in Nov. 1926 with Mao Tse-tung as its secretary and with P'eng P'ai and Juan Hsiao-hsien among its members (*PL*: 15).
36. Yang Hsin-fu 1926 (in KA 465/37).
37. *NMYT*:310.
38. McDonald 1978:264ff; KA 465/36; *NMYT*:270–73,293–301; Mif 1937:38.
39. Mao Tse-tung 1927b, in *MT*:vol. 1,212,214,219; *NMYT*:263ff.
40. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:375–81,428; Fisher 1960:485; Trotsky 1932:417.
41. Chung-kuo [16]: 49,50.
42. *KCMKJP* (13 July 1926); *PC*:53.
43. Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:27–28; *PC*:48; *Hui-ch'ang jih-k'an* (1926):3,5; Kuang-tung [9]:126.
44. Schwartz 1952:191.

45. Woo 1928:226; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:370–71; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971: 545,575.

## *Chapter 8*

1. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926b:4; Schwartz 1958:68. See also Berkley 1975:161–79; and Hofheinz 1977:78-92.

2. "Pen-tang ti-erh-tz'u" (1926):7; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:5; *CKKMTCK* 29 (13 July 1924).

3. Chang Li-chuan 1971.

4. Li Jui 1957:154–57; *CNP*:27–28. See also J. Price 1974:111ff.

5. Chung I-mou 1955:191; Chung I-mou 1957:52; Wilbur 1968:61; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926d:168; *PL*:13; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):188–89; *NMYT*:7.

6. "Ti-i-chieh. . ." (1926):8; *PC*:21,34; *CKKMTCK* 28 (6 July 1924):6; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926d:168,176–77.

7. Chou Fo-hai 1964:324; *PL*:13; Kuang-tung [9]:53. The SYC made it a point to enter the PMTI to control it (*PL*:6). The same allegations appear in Tsou Lu 1941:356–57 and Chiang Kai-shek 1957:31.

8. Liao Yüan ed. 1951:20; "Ti-i-chieh. . ." (1926).

9. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:3; *CKKMTCK* 29 (13 July 1924); *PL*:182–84.

10. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:2; *CKKMTCK* 28 (6 July 1924).

11. *CKKMTCK* 29 (13 July 1924).

12. "Ti-i-chieh. . ." (1926):8; *NKHK* 2 (1 Aug. 1924):15–16; *NMTK*:vol. 1,1–8.

13. Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 2, part 7,102; *CKKMTCK* 40 (28 Sept. 1924).

14. "Ti-i-chieh. . ." (1926):8; *NMTK*:vol. 1,8–13; *CKKMTCK* 36 (31 Aug. 1924).

15. North 1966:60.

16. "Ti-i-chieh. . ." (1926); *NKHK* 6 (10 Sept. 1924):13–14; *PL*:116; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):191–93.

17. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:16–19; Kuang-tung [9]:55,56; *NKHK* 6 (10 Sept. 1924).

18. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:24–30; Juan Hsiao-hsien 1926a:1.

19. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926d:181,187.

20. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:30ff; *PL*:132; Duiker 1972:481–82.

21. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926c:36ff; Li Jui 1977:212; *KCMKJP* (25 Nov. 1925); *PL*:181,184–87.

22. Mao Tse-tung 1926a and 1926b; Snow 1972:186–87; Schram 1967:82–85; Schram 1969:45–49; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):194–95.

23. "Nung-min-pu ti-i-tz'u" (1926):1–5; "Nung-min-pu ti-ehr-tz'u" (1926):1–4; Li Jui 1957:157; J. Price 1974:185,n.13.

24. "Nung-min-pu ti-i-tz'u" (1926):5–6; Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 2, part 8, 18–21; *NMYT*:21-22; Li Yün-han 1966:vol. 1,275,n.38; P'eng P'ai gave a speech at the PMTI on 2 June 1926 (*PL*:194–97).

25. Li Jui 1977:283; *NMYT*:23–32; Schram 1967:90.

26. Mao Tse-tung 1926d, in *MT*:vol. 1,175–79; Berkley 1975:174.

27. Schram, "Introduction," in Li Jui 1977:xxxvii.

28. Mao Tse-tung 1926d, in *MT*:vol. 1,176,178.

29. Li Jui 1977:297. The same ideas had already been expressed by P'eng P'ai in a speech on 4 Aug. 1925 (*PL*:141–42; *PW*:87–88).

30. Mao Tse-tung 1926d, in *MT*:vol. 1,178.

31. *KCMKJP* (20 Aug. 1926); Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:17.

32. *NMYT*:20,23; Li Jui 1977:250,284; Tu Sung-shou 1951:26; Liao Yüan ed. 1951:16,17.

33. Chung I-mou 1955:196; Chung I-mou 1957:51,52; *KCMKJP* (20 Aug. 1926). P'eng P'ai was present in Haifeng and gave a speech (*PW*:206; *PL*:205–6). See also Wang Shou-tao 1963:25–26.

34. *NMYT*:23. See also Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926j.

35. Mao Tse-tung 1926d, in *MT*:vol. 1,175–79.

36. Mao Tse-tung 1926d, in *MT*:vol. 1,176. Also *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981): 211,231.

37. *NMYT*:20,394–95; Hou Feng 1978:72; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:545,613,630–31.

38. J. Price 1974:213–16; Wilbur 1968:61; *NMYT*:7; Hofheinz 1977:52.

39. Tai Wen-i 1969:17–18; Nivison 1956:58–61; Carrère d'Encausse & Schram 1969:55,106; Harrison 1969:47–49,52.

40. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:376; Schram, "Introduction," in Li Jui 1977: xliii; Tai Wen-i 1969:17.

41. Snow 1972:186.

42. Hai Feng 1969:112–13. *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):186,198.

43. Schram 1969:47ff; Kuang-tung [9]:170,189; Hofheinz 1977:82,Table 5.

44. CHP:6,152; Chung I-mou 1957:36,41; Hou Feng 1978:66; *PC*:36–37; *PL*:130,178; *NMYT*:436.

45. Kuang-tung [15]:91–94; "Nung-min hsün-lien-so" (1926):23.

46. Kuang-tung [9]:170,187–89; *KCMKJP* (23 Feb. 1927; 14 Mar. 1927).

47. Kuang-tung [9]:172–73.

48. Hou Feng 1959:48,50,58; Chung I-mou 1957:42–43,86.

49. *Hui-ch'ang jih-k'an* (Jan. 3,4 1926); *NMYT*:178–97.

50. *KCMKJP* (15 Apr. 1926); Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:13; *PL*:190–91; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926g; Kuang-tung [9]:132–39.

51. Wu Ming 1937:52–53; *PL*:355. See also Fang Chih-min in *PL*:347–51.

52. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926g:6; *Hui-ch'ang jih-k'an* (5 Mar. 1926).

53. Chiang Kai-shek 1926.

54. *NMYT*:204–23,244–56; Kuang-tung [3]:14–15. For more details see Galbiati 1981:503–8.

55. Kuang-tung [9]:148–51; *PL*:193–95. The celebration of Marx's birthday was impressive: P'eng P'ai chaired the meeting and gave a speech. (*PL*:192–93; *PW*:192.)

56. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:8,9,13,17; Chung-kuo [17]:4.

57. Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 2, part 8,4; Chung-kuo [17]:5.

58. Pu-ha-lin (Bukharin) 1926.

59. Chan Ming-kou 1975:130–31,238.

60. Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:30–31; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926k:26; "Pen-hui. . ." (1926):24.

61. Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 4,17.

62. "Pen-tang. . ." (1926):7; Kuang-tung [9]:160–64; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927: 8,40; *PL*:199–200; *CKNM* 10 (1 Dec. 1926).

63. Kuang-tung [9]:117.

64. Vishnyakova 1971:219,222; FO 228/3728 (15 Dec. 1927), 228/3777 (28 Dec. 1927).

65. Kuang-tung [9]:116–20,124,129; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:40.

66. Chung-kuo [17]:34,37; *NMYT*:208; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926k:24.

67. Ho Yang-lin 1928:vol. 1, part 1,73.

68. Kuang-tung [9]:120–21.

69. *Ibid.*:124–25; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:11.

70. *SCMP* (14 June 1926); Jordan 1976:61–62.

71. Jordan 1976:62, quoting *Kuo-wen chou-pao* (25 July 1926):13.

72. *NT* 17 (23 Nov. 1926):390 ("Nung-min hsiao-hsi").

73. *Shen-pao* (4 Nov. 1926, 17 Nov. 1926, 24 Nov. 1926), in KA 447/53; *KCMKJP* (6 Nov. 1926); FO 228/3020 (5 Nov. 1926); HS:11.

74. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1926l:8,16.

75. Chung I-mou 1955:197; Chung I-mou 1957:53; Shu Chien 1927.

76. Kuang-tung [9]:143–48; Chiang Kai-shek 1926.

77. *NMYT*:7; "Pen-tang" (1926); *KCMKJP* (14 Aug. 1926; 10 Oct. 1926).

78. [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i:34.

79. Kuang-tung [9]:99–100; "U-ku Kuang-ning. . ." (1926); *KCMKJP* (8 July 1926, plus issues of 13–15,23,27 July); *PL*:198.

80. Hofheinz 1977:209; Yü Yen-kuang 1958:43; Dalin 1975:330–31.

81. P'eng P'ai [15]:41–45; *PL*:197.

82. *LTCP* 23 (22 Dec. 1926):12–13; Chung-kuo [13]; Yü Yen-kuang 1958:44–45.

## *Chapter 9*

1. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:379–80; *NMYT*:315; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:602–4,609.

2. T'ang Leang-li ed. 1934:24–25.

3. Val'den 1927:33–34.

4. C. Brandt 1958:129, quoting the *People's Tribune* (30 June 1927).

5. "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (1928):7.

6. Trotsky 1932:417.

7. Ch'en Ch'eng 1960:vol. 2,148–49.

8. Val'den 1927:36.

9. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:603; McDonald 1978:270,n.70.

10. Hofheinz 1977:50; *NMYT*:373–74; P'eng P'ai was said to have been an eye-witness in North China in November 1927 not only to landlords being paraded around in tall hats, but also to their being killed—"more than 10,000" (*HS*:76).

11. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:428,432.

12. Chiang Yung-ching 1963:278ff; Schram 1967:99–102.

13. Snow 1972:187.

14. Hofheinz 1977:36-45; *Kung-fei huo-kuo* (1961):vol. 1,149–52, 162–64.
15. Vishnyakova 1971:222,314; Li Ang 1942:93.
16. Schram 1967:102; Eto Shinkichi 1962:162,n.33; *PL*:244.
17. Hou Feng 1978:71–72; Li Ang 1942:87; Wang Chien-min 1965:431–33; *PL*:344; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):228-30.
18. Wang Chien-min 1965:433-35.
19. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:613.
20. Wang Chien-min 1965:435.
21. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:545,557,574–77.
22. *Ibid.*:621ff.
23. Harrison 1972:100,n.36.
24. Snow 1972:188.
25. Harrison 1972:104; Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927a:2122–24.
26. Chao Kuo-chun 1960:3; North & Eudin 1963:82,245.
27. Harrison 1972:106; Wang Chien-min 1965:373–79.
28. Hofheinz 1977:45; *HS*:13.
29. Harrison 1972:107; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:33–34; Vishnyakova 1971:228, 315–16.
30. C. Brandt 1958:128.
31. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:613.
32. Harrison 1972:104; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:617.
33. Tanaka Tadao 1931:78–79; Pringsheim 1962:79; TC (6 Apr. 1978); Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:616,624.
34. Harrison 1972:98,124; Tanaka Tadao 1931:2,75–76; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:461.
35. Harrison 1972:96; Wilbur & How eds. 1956:251,259,274–79; Chang Tzu-ch'iang 1927:57–60.
36. Hofheinz 1977:21–22; *HS*:14.
37. *NMYT*:310; Stoler 1927:22; McDonald 1978:269.
38. [Lo] Ch'i-yüan 1926i:30–31.
39. Hou Feng 1978:73.
40. CHP:8,110; *PKC*:29,92–93.
41. *HS*:13,15,18,19; Hou Feng 1959:53; Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1967:140.
42. *HS*:14–20,32–36; Chung I-mou 1957:54–62,66–71. For a detailed description of these events, see Galbiati 1981:625–76.
43. Wales 1975:205; Chung I-mou 1955:191,198; Chung I-mou 1957:54–55; *HS*:14–17,20,21,26–28.
44. *HS*:15,20; Chung I-mou 1955:200–201; Chung I-mou 1957:57–58; Wales 1975:204,208.
45. Chung I-mou 1957:57,61; TC (22 Jan. 1978; 23 Jan. 1978); CHP:8,40; Hou Feng 1959:66.
46. *HS*:22–25; Chung I-mou 1957:53,59,62–66; Kuang-tung [6]:694–98.
47. HA (15 Aug. 1927), Robba–Valtorta; *HS*:31–32; *CTH* 5 (20 Sept. 1927).
48. *HS*:32–33; Chung I-mou 1957:66–68; CHP:10–13,34–35.
49. *HS*:34–37; Chung I-mou 1957:67–69; *PKC*:30–31; CHP:10–14.

50. *HS*:36–37; Chung I-mou 1955:203–4; Chung I-mou 1957:69–70.

51. *HS*:38,43–44; "Hai-Lu-feng ti hung-ch'i" (1958):237–38; CHP:5,17; Chung I-mou 1955:204; Chung I-mou 1957:70,100; *PKC*:32.

52. Chung I-mou 1955:205; Chung I-mou 1957:72; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:94–95,98; Wilbur 1964:14,24,31,53–54; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:31–35.

53. Borodin 1927b.

54. Schwartz 1952:80–81; C. Brandt 1958:125,129,133–35; Vishnyakova 1971: 325.

55. Isaacs 1966:234–36; Roy 1946:482,550–53.

56. Trotsky 1932:29.

57. *HS*:14,20; *NMYT*:290–91,381–84; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:610,614; Van Slyke 1967:417; D. J. Li 1969:93, quoting Hsü K'o-hsiang: "Frankly I did not have much respect for this hodgepodge Communist army." See also Deliusin 1974:79–80.

58. *NMYT*:393,396; Val'den 1927:31; Chan & Etzold 1976:52–53; Fisher 1960: 486,491.

59. Chapman 1928:30; Vishnyakova 1971:320.

60. Harrison 1972:111–12.

61. Li Yün-han 1966:728.

62. Trotsky 1932:354,412,416; C. Brandt 1958:133,138–39, 144; Schwartz 1952: 53. Mao was also caught by the vision of peasants in revolution; see *MT*:vol. 1,211–12; and Schram 1969:250.

63. Harrison 1972:11; Wang Chien-min 1965:529; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:606–13,632.

64. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:637.

65. Deliusin 1974:54; Stoler 1927:13.

66. Harrison 1972:111.

67. "Wu-han cheng-chih. . ." (1927); Wang Chien-min 1965:468–69; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:637–40; Wang Ching-wei 1927.

68. Chung-kuo [6].

69. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:30–35; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:655; Harrison 1972: 114,127.

70. Isaacs 1966:220.

71. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:35–37.

72. Mif 1937:53; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:39–40; Deliusin 1974:46; Ch'en Ch'eng 1960:vol. 3,1–5; Wang Chien-min 1965:503–4.

73. Snow 1972:192.

74. "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (5 Mar. 1928):5.

75. Harrison 1972:127,129.

76. Deliusin 1974:47; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:44–53.

77. *NMYT*:303–4; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:44; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:660; *HS*:28–29.

78. Wang Chien-min 1965:536; Harrison 1972:121,123.

79. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:660–62,672ff; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:4ff,31–32; Wilbur 1964:9–10; Wei Hung-yüan 1957:10ff; Guillermaz 1962:165.

80. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:13,15; Wilbur 1964:11–12.

81. Wang Chien-min 1965:539; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:89ff; Wilbur 1964:12–13.
82. Wang Chien-min 1965:540ff; Wilbur 1964:19–21.
83. Wu Ming 1937:54–56; *PL*:246,352–57; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:27.
84. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:100; Wang Chien-min 1965:543–44; Chung I-mou 1955:205; Chung I-mou 1957:72; *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).
85. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:32.
86. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:35; Wilbur 1964:31; *PL*:16–19,247; Mao Ta 1927:10.
87. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:195–96.
88. *CTH* 7 (30 Oct. 1927); Hua Kang 1932:213–14; Wang Chien-min 1965:547–49.
89. Deliusin 1974:40; Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927b:126–27.
90. Mao Ta 1927:10.
91. P'eng P'ai published an article on the urgency of the land revolution: P'eng P'ai [31]; *PW*:277–79.
92. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).
93. CHP:168–72.
94. *HS*:57; "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (8,15 Jan. 1928); Deliusin 1974:55.
95. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:43.
96. Harrison 1972:135–36.
97. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927b:127–31.
98. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:105–9.
99. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927c:294–97; Deliusin 1974:56–59.
100. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:47.
101. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:108–9. Hai-Lu-feng was already enacting such a policy (*PL*:22–23).
102. "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (15 Jan. 1928):6–7; *HS*:91.
103. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927c:297; Snow 1972:194–95; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:50–51; Lai Ku 1958:253–54.
104. C. Brandt 1958:105; Dallin 1949:108; Wales 1939:236; Rue 1966:77.
105. Chung-kuo [10]:164.
106. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1928b:128.
107. Yakhontoff 1934:182–83; Dallin 1949:108; Deliusin 1974:61–62.
108. *CTH* 13 (30 Nov. 1927); "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (5 Feb. 1928):7. The Comintern and the CCP were forced by events to settle for nominal "proletarian leadership of the Chinese revolution" (Harrison 1969:43). By this time P'eng P'ai had also come around to accepting the equality of workers and peasants in the revolution (*PW*:87–88, 190–91).

## *Chapter 10*

1. Wilbur 1964:31,53–54; *PL*:16,20,247; *CTH* 7 (30 Oct. 1927); *PC*:58.
2. Hou Feng 1959:58.
3. *PC*:59–60; *HS*:57; TC (30 Dec. 1978, 3 Jan. 1979).
4. Chung I-mou 1955:206,210; Chung I-mou 1957:72–76; *HS*:39–43; "Hai-Lu-feng ti hung-ch'i" (1958):238–40; Kung Ch'u 1971:103–4.
5. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927), 7 (30 Oct. 1927); *HS*:45–46; Chung I-mou 1957:76.
6. FO 228/3581 (7,13,25,28 Oct. 1927); FO 228/3582 (22 Nov. 1927); *The Times* (18 Nov. 1927); *PL*:22.

7. *HS*:45–46; Chung I-mou 1957:76–77; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:3–4.
8. *KK* 1967:214ff,219–20.
9. CHP:31–39; *Kung-fei t'u-sha*. . . , in KA 467/10; FO 228/3728 (17 Dec. 1927); FO 228/3729 (10 Feb. 1928); *HS*:60–61.
10. *HS*:46–48,78; *KK* 1967:214ff; Chung I-mou 1957:77–78; CHP:29–30.
11. "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (8 Jan. 1928):4–7.
12. Chung I-mou 1957:78; CHP:21–23; *PKC*:33; Wang Chien-min 1965:574.
13. *KK* 1967:219. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent *KK* references are to the 1967 edition.
14. *KK*:229–30.
15. *HS*:49–51; *KK*:215,219–20; *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); Lo Fu 1927.
16. *HS*:50–51; *KK*:216–17; *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).
17. *HS*:51; *KK*:216–17.
18. *KK*:219.
19. *HS*:51–52.
20. *HS*:52.
21. MEP, *Lettres* (1928):83.
22. *CTH* 5 (20 Sept. 1927); *KK*:219.
23. *KK*:215–18.
24. *KK*:220.
25. *KK*:218,228.
26. *HS*:57; TC (22 Nov. 1978).
27. *HS*:57ff; *KK*:215; Chung I-mou 1957:78; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:4; *PC*:59–60. For a detailed list of members, see *HS*:66–67.
28. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1928b:128; TC (30,31 Dec. 1978); TC (3–6 Jan. 1979); "Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai chih chi" (1928):7.
29. *HS*:57–58; Chung I-mou 1957:78–79; *Hui-ch'ang t'e-k'an* (1927), also in *PL*:248–55.
30. *HS*:58–59.
31. *HS*:58–59; Chung I-mou 1957:79,81.
32. Hou Feng 1959:60; Hou Feng 1978:83; full text in *PW*:280–82.
33. *HS*:59,64 (telegram); Chung I-mou 1957:82. There was also a "Declaration" (*HS*:64–65).
34. *HS*:59–60. The "Political Report" is in *HS*:70–80, and *PW*:283–91. See also Chung I-mou 1957:80–81.
35. *HS*:60; Chung I-mou 1957:81; *PL*:22. The text of the nine draft resolutions is in *HS*:80–88, and in *KK*:222–27.
36. *HS*:61–62; *PL*:22.
37. Bianchi 1978:311; TC (3 Jan. 1979).
38. *HS*:62.
39. *HS*:62–63; Hou Feng 1978:85–86; Chung I-mou 1957:81–82.
40. *HS*:63–64; P'eng P'ai also gave a speech (*PW*:292–93); Hou Feng 1959:62; Hou Feng 1978:85.
41. *HS*:68; *PKC*:33; CHP:76.
42. Chung I-mou 1957:84–85.
43. *HS*:69–70.
44. WK:185,187.
45. Hai Feng 1969 (photo section); HA (Jan. 1928), "Report," Robba–Valtorta.
46. *PL*:22 states that one in four of the representatives was a CCP member. Ninety percent of the representatives entered the CCP at the end of the Congress, so that "only the old ones were left out."
47. Yakhontoff 1934:86.

48. *HS*:64–65; Chung I-mou 1957:83–84; Hou Feng 1978:85–86.
49. CHP:76. See also *PL*:21–22, and Chung I-mou 1957:87.
50. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).
51. *KK*:215.
52. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); *PL*:21 ("Report" by Chang T'ai-lei); CHP:75–76; *SK*:139; *PL*:23ff.
53. TC (24 Feb. 1979, 4 Aug. 1979); Chung I-mou 1957:75,86; CHP:168–72. See also Eto Shinkichi 1962:171–72.
54. WK:207, and *PL*:34, both describe the "blind faith" in P'eng P'ai.
55. Wales 1972:151.
56. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958a:215; Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:178,180.
57. Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:225–26.
58. *CTH* 7 (30 Oct. 1927), Chang Kuo-t'ao's "Report."
59. *HS*:36; Chung I-mou 1957:42.
60. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).
61. *HS*:49–50. For the "Resolution," see *HS*:80–82, and *PL*:252–55.
62. *HS*:80–81.
63. *HS*:80.
64. *HS*:81–82.
65. *CTH* 3 (30 Aug. 1927); Schram 1964:58; *MT*:vol. 2,50.
66. *HS*:82; Deliusin 1974:70; *SK*:135.
67. *HS*:49–50; *SK*:134; Chung-kuo [10]:164–65.
68. Kim 1973:126.
69. *HS*:90; Hou Feng 1978:85–86.
70. *SK*:135; *Kung-fei huo-kuo* (1961):vol. 1,164 ("Report"); Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:138.
71. Deliusin 1974:72; *Räte China* (1973):37–38.
72. *SK*:134–35,137.
73. Hofheinz 1977:254; Chung I-mou 1957:86; *PL*:18.
74. Wales 1952:78–79 (Wang Shou-t'ao).
75. *HS*:90; for similar instances in the Kiangsi Soviet, see Kim 1973:143–45.
76. Deliusin 1974:71,73; *HS*:90.
77. *HS*:91.
78. Marks 1978:505.
79. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:5.
80. "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928); *CTH* 5 (20 Sept. 1927); *CTH* 13 (30 Nov. 1927).
81. Johanson & Tabue 1934:9.
82. Rue 1966:112–14; Chao Kuo-chun 1960:11.
83. *SW*:vol. 1,89–90.
84. Ch'en Ch'eng 1960:vol. 3,25–26; Snow 1972:196; Schram 1967:130,137.
85. "Wu-han t'ao-kung" (8 Jan. 1928):8. See also *CTH* 13 (30 Nov. 1927).
86. *HS*:57,82–83.
87. HA (31 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Governor H.K.; CHP:58.
88. Bianchi 1928; *SK*:140; *NCH* (12 May 1928).
89. Chung I-mou 1957:101; *HS*:35,83; WK:185–88; *KK*:214.
90. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927c:296.

91. Band 1948:14; PEM 1925:22; TC (3 May 1978).
92. *HS*:9.
93. CHP:76.
94. *SK*:139.
95. Chung I-mou 1957:86–87; *Hai-Lu-feng chih. . .* in KA 478/6; CHP 75–76.
96. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); *PL*:23.
97. *KK*:218; *HS*:91.
98. Chung I-mou 1957:87.
99. *SK*:138. See also *PL*:32, which gives 11,000 members.
100. Johanson & Tabue 1934:7. See also *HS*:9–10.
101. *SK*:138–39; *Räte China* (1973):40–43.
102. *NCH* (12 May 1928); Yang Ping-k'un 1958:7.
103. *KK*:21–24. For a criticism of the local CCP Congress in Jan. 1928, see *PL*:32–36.
104. "Wu-han t'ao-kung" (15 Jan. 1928):1–4; *SK*:137–39.
105. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); *PL*:77. The CCP Kwangtung Committee gave similar directives to the "East Special."
106. "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928); *PL*:49ff. The CCP in the East River area was to be restructured.
107. *KK*:217–18; "The Party's foundation was not good" (*PL*:66). The CCP Central Committee was in constant contact with the Hai-Lu-feng soviet through the CCP Kwangtung Committee (*PL*:21–22,32,37).
108. TC (19 May 1978, 8 Aug. 1979).
109. CHP:146,156; Chung I-mou 1958:23.
110. *SK*:138; *HS*:15.
111. *KK*:220; Chung I-mou 1957:105.
112. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); Yang Ping-k'un 1958:9; *PL*:47.
113. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:9.
114. Chung I-mou 1957:86; *SK*:143; WK:184-85.
115. CHP:26–27; *PKC*:36.
116. Ku Ta-ts'un 1957.
117. WK:184–85. For the full "Report," see *PL*:28–31.
118. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:5; Band 1948:14.
119. *HS*:85–86.
120. *Räte China* (1973):40; *HS*:15; K'uang Hsiao-an (18 Mar. 1928):2–3; *SK*:137; WK:190; *PL*:29.
121. CHP:37; Chung I-mou 1955:204; Pao T'ung 1928.
122. Li Lien-p'ing 1959:5.
123. *HS*:16; TC (14 Apr. 1978).
124. CHP:54,60; *SK*:136–38,142; *KK*:216–17; TC (13 Jan. 1979).
125. Wang Chien-min 1965:547,549.
126. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); *SW*:vol. 1,32.
127. *HS*:84–85.
128. *SK*:136,142; *KK*:217; Chung I-mou 1957:97; *Räte China* (1973):39; *PL*:40–41,47.

129. Li Lien-p'ing 1959:3; Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958b:2; Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958a:216; *PL*:80.

130. WK:187.

131. TC (19,21,22 Sept. 1978); *KK*:214; *SK*:136.

132. *Räte China* (1973):39.

133. Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:226; Chung I-mou 1957:97–98; Chung I-mou 1958:21,23; WK:190.

134. Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:229; the "East Special" was too concerned with the Red Army and weapons (*PL*:67,75).

135. Chung I-mou 1957:97–98.

136. CHP:68ff.

137. *SK*:136–38; CHP:68ff,72–73.

138. *Räte China* (1973):41; Wales 1972:151; *SK*:138.

139. CHP:73.

140. *KK*:220.

141. K'uang Hsiao-an (1 Apr. 1928):7.

142. *KK*:215; CHP:18; K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928); HA (10 Nov. 1927), Robba–Valtorta.

143. *KK*:215; *CTH*:6 (30 Sept. 1927). 144. TC (5,6,9 Feb. 1980).

145. "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928). 146. *HS*:53; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:6.

147. CHP:54,67–68; *SK*:143; "Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai chih chi" (1928).

148. *Räte China* (1973):48–50.

149. *HS*:87.

150. Chung I-mou 1957:85–86; T'ieh-jen:vol. 1,43; *PKC*:34; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:5–6.

151. WK:325.

152. HA (19 July 1927; 15 Aug. 1927), Robba–Valtorta.

153. HA (Jan. 1928), "Report," Robba–Valtorta.

154. Lo Fu 1928; *The Times* (7 Jan. 1928); PEM, *Report* (1928):137; *NCH* (18 Feb. 1928); *The H.K. Daily Press* (29 Dec. 1927).

155. Hofheinz 1977:267.

156. HA, "Martyrs' Collection" (29 Nov. 1941), Bianchi–Valtorta (two Catholics in Ao-men were killed for personal hatred, not faith), (Spring 1929), "Pastoral Letter" by Bishop Valtorta; PA, Valtorta E. (Mons.) 1935.

157. HA (21 Apr. 1928), Bianchi–Valtorta.

158. Su Wei 1951b:34; *MC*, 61, no. 19 (8 May 1932).

159. HA (14 May 1928), Robba–Valtorta.

160. HA (21 Apr. 1928, 19 Sept. 1928), Robba–Valtorta.

161. TC (9,10 Mar. 1978); HA (15 Jan. 1930), Robba–Valtorta; *MC*, 57, no. 18 (22 June 1928).

162. HA (15 Jan. 1930), Robba–Valtorta.

163. *MC*, 54, no. 4 (15 Feb. 1927); Bianchi 1978:313.

164. K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928):4; Chung I-mou 1957:86; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:6; CHP:55.

165. Wales 1939:100–102; *SK*:137–38; *Räte China* (1973):40–43.

166. *PKC*:35; CHP:77–78.
167. *SK*:138; CHP:174.
168. *NCH* (23 June 1928).
169. *SK*:138; Chung I-mou 1957:87.
170. *HS*:87–88.
171. *Räte China* (1973):49–50.
172. Liao Yüan ed. 1951:32.
173. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:9, reporting Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928c; Hofheinz 1977:266.
174. *SK*:143; TC (2 Apr. 1978).
175. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* (1928):27.
176. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* (1928):27; *SK*:143.
177. TC (5 June 1978, 18 Sept. 1978).
178. *SK*:143; K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928):4.
179. CHP:170.
180. *SK*:139; *PKC*:8; CHP:127.
181. *HS*:53–54.
182. Chung I-mou 1955:209; Chung I-mou 1957:86; HA (12 Jan. 1928), Valtorta–Italian Consul.
183. *HS*:82,86.
184. Chung I-mou 1957:48; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928c; *SK*:138; CHP:60.
185. CHP:57,63; FO 228/3729 (10 Feb. 1928), Enclo.2.
186. Chung I-mou 1957:102; CHP:61.
187. TC (7,8 Jan. 1979).
188. *Hai-Lu-feng chih*. . ., in KA 478/6; HA (31 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Governor H.K.
189. Su Wei 1951b:33–34.
190. Hofheinz 1977:266.
191. Li Jui 1977:314; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1971:605–6; McDonald 1978:301–2. He doubts such attacks in Hunan.
192. WK:187–88; FO 228/3729 (10 Feb. 1928), Enclo.2.
193. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928c. See also *HS*:93; Shih Fan 1957:84–89; *NCH* (12 May 1928); *Kung-fei t'u-sha*. . . , in KA 467/10; K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928).
194. Chung I-mou 1957:107,113; Hou Feng 1959:66; *PL*:53. The "East Special" admitted the devastating effect of such rumors.
195. CHP:5,79.
196. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* (1928):23.
197. *SK*:138–39; TC (10,11 Dec. 1980).
198. *SK*:143.
199. *Räte China* (1973):48–50; CHP:77.
200. *HS*:83–84. Also *KK*:225–26. 201. CHP:77.
202. TC (18 Sept. 1978). 203. *SK*:137.
204. "Wu-han t'ao-kung" (1928):8; *SK*:137.
205. *SK*:137.
206. *HS*:53,89.
207. Chung I-mou 1957:106; *SK*:143–44; *PL*:28–31, has a full report on the Congress.
208. E. Hsiao 1932:141.
209. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928a:549; CHP:45.

210. K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928):4; Chung I-mou 1957:106.
211. Hou Feng 1959:64; Hou Feng 1978:89.
212. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* (1928):14–19.
213. *SK*:144.
214. *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927); *SK*:141.
215. HA (14 Dec. 1927), Bianchi–Valtorta.
216. Bianchi 1928:66–70; Bianchi 1978:312–13; *The H.K. Daily Press* (29 Dec. 1927).
217. HA (27 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Officer i/c HMS *Seraph*.
218. HA (26 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Governor H.K.:23 Dec. 1927 Memorandum.
219. *The H.K. Daily Press* (29 Dec. 1927); Costantini 1964:441.
220. *HS*:54–56,90. See also Lo Fu 1928; Chung I-mou 1957:87–89; FO 228/3728 (31 Dec. 1927).
221. "Wu-han t'ao-kung. . ." (1928).
222. Trotsky 1932:291–92; Isaacs 1966:282; C. Brandt 1958:158–62; Roy 1946: 557,559.
223. Harrison 1972:135–38; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:135–37; Lo-tso-fu-ssu-chi 1930:37–65; Li Ang 1942:38–40.
224. Chung-kuo [9]:179–81; "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928); Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:137; Huang P'ing 1928:123; Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:128,149, give a full story of the Cadet Regiment.
225. FO 228/3728 (17 Dec. 1927), Enclo.1 & 2 (*The Red Flag* and the list of the members of the government). See also *PL*:255–56; "Kuang-chou kung-tang" (1928):3.
226. "Kuang-chou kung-tang" (1928):3; *PL*:23–24.
227. "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928); *PL*:22–23.
228. Lo-tso-fu-ssu-chi 1930:96,150,152; WK:165ff,169. See also Tang Shin-she 1928:1656; *The Times* (13 Dec. 1927).
229. Roy 1946:558; Huang P'ing 1928:118–23.
230. Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:141–42; Chung-kuo [9]:181; "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928); Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:51.
231. KA 478/6; *HS*:92–93; Hua Kang 1932:238; FO 228/3728 (31 Dec. 1927).
232. *The Times* (18 Jan. 1928); Chung I-mou 1957:103.
233. CHP:110–12; Chung I-mou 1955:210.
234. CHP:112; TC (12 July 1977).
235. Lo-tso-fu-ssu-chi 1930; Schwartz 1952:106; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:7–8; Hua Kang 1932:277,243.
236. Lominadze 1928:142. See also Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:138,143,145–46.
237. "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928).
238. Pak ed. 1971:131; "Liang-ke. . ." (1928); Mif 1937:57, indulged in such wishful thinking for Canton.
239. Hua Kang 1932:239,247–48; CHP:37.
240. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927c:297.
241. "Kuang-chou pao-tung" (1928).

242. Johanson & Taube 1934:7.

243. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958a:214–15; Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977: 168,171,175,188,189; Kung Ch'u 1954:89ff; Wales 1972:150.

244. Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:209,212,214; WK:162,175,178; *SK*:136; CHP:144–45; *PL*:24–28.

245. Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:178,225–27.

246. Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:223–25.

247. Chung I-mou 1957:103–4.

248. Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:218–19.

249. Chung I-mou 1957:105–6; HA (13 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Robba, (21 Dec. 1927), Rayssac–Valtorta; *The Times* (18,30 Nov. 1927; 5 Dec. 1927); FO 228/3689 (South China Command, Nov. 1927).

250. Pao T'ung 1928:476.

251. FO 228/3728 (31 Dec. 1927), Enclo.2; *KCMKJP* (1 Dec. 1927; 7,14 Jan. 1928); *NCH* (12 Nov. 1927).

252. Chung I-mou 1955:211; Yang Ping-k'un 1958:8–9; *SK*:131–32; CHP:43–45.

253. Pao T'ung 1928:478.

254. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1928a; FO228/3826, Intelligence Report (31 Mar. 1928).

255. Chung I-mou 1955:211; Chung I-mou 1957:106ff. For an assessment of these events and of the meeting of cadres, see *PL*:32–36.

256. CHP:49ff,99; Chung I-mou 1955:211–12; Chung I-mou 1957:109ff; Hou Feng 1959:64.

257. Li Lien-p'ing 1959:1–5.

258. WK:191; FO 228/3729 (8 Mar. 1928); K'uang Hsiao-an (1 Apr. 1928):4.

259. Chung I-mou 1957:111; CHP:50–52.

260. Li Lien-p'ing 1959:5; WK:191; Chung I-mou 1957:111.

261. *HS*:87,90; CHP:67–68; "Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai" (1928).

262. K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928):4.

263. "Wu-han t'ao-kung" (8 Jan. 1928):2.

264. CHP:67; *SK*:143.

265. *Räte China* (1973):48–50; CHP:122–23.

266. CHP:65; TC (28–31 Jan. 1980; 4,5 Feb. 1980).

267. Chung I-mou 1957:112–13; CHP:65ff.

268. *HS*:86; *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).

269. *KK*:216; CHP:86.

270. Mao Tse-tung, "Report," *SW*:vol. 1,28.

271. Harrison 1972:129; Hsiao Tso-liang 1970:45–46,54,60. "They were convinced that to burn a field of a landlord is to make revolution" (Hsüeh Nung-shan 1935:622).

272. Chung I-mou 1957:55,70; *HS*:25,35,82–83.

273. Chung I-mou 1957:78–79; *KK*:219. See also *PL*:18. "Toward an evil enemy it is impossible to speak of mercy and love. . . . The Red Terror made the worker and peasant masses of Hai-Lu-feng understand that they had to do away with any

'mercy' or any kind of 'pardon' with the counterrevolutionaries. . . . Because 'mercy' and 'pardon' toward counterrevolutionaries means to be merciless and cruel toward the revolutionaries." (Chung I-mou 1957:41,99.)

274. Chung I-mou 1957:100–101.

275. Chung I-mou 1957:102; *HS*:35; Hinton 1966:54. For the early reaction of the peasants to the Red Terror, especially in Lufeng, see *HS*:35–37. "If you go to extremes, the Peasant Association will fail. . . ." They were still thinking in terms of the Peasant Association!

276. CHP:31–33. See also *HS*:60; FO 228/3728 (17 Dec. 1927), Enclo.5.

277. *NCH* (12 May 1928). See also K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928):2; CHP:26–27.

278. *The H.K. Daily Press* (29 Dec. 1927); *NCH* (18 Feb. 1928). See also *NCH* (7, 14 Jan. 1928).

279. CHP:53,111; WK:188; *Kung-fei t'u-sha. . .* , in KA 467/10; K'uang Hsiao-an (25 Mar. 1928):2.

280. HA (31 Dec. 1927), Valtorta–Governor H.K.; CHP:56. The figure of 5,000 was admitted by the "East Special" in a "Notice" to Party members of Feb. 1923. P'eng P'ai had asked for 6,000 to be killed (*PW*:293).

281. *HS*:92–94.

282. Chung I-mou 1957:190; CHP:13,29–31; Wales 1972:207.

283. *SK*:134; CHP:96,178; *PKC*:39.

284. P'eng P'ai [29]:47–49; Mao Tse-tung, "Report" (*SW*:vol. 1,35).

285. WK:171,185–88,324–25.

286. *SK*:132,135,148; *PKC*:20–21; "Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai chih chi" (1928):6–7; *NCH* (10 Mar. 1928); *Kung-fei t'u-sha. . .* , in KA 467/10; *Shen-pao* (16 Dec. 1927). *PL*:49 admits a large exodus of people and comrades.

287. CHP:63–65,76; Chung I-mou 1957:111; Hou Feng 1959:64; *PL*:21–22,28.

288. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* (1928):17.

289. CHP:63–65,110,112; Chung I-mou 1957:111–13.

290. Eto Shinkichi 1962:178; *SK*:139; *PL*:39. The merchants were now included in the "masses."

291. *SK*:140; *KK*:218; *PL*:22–23,66–67.

292. *HS*:78. See also *SK*:135.

293. CHP:47. See also *PL*:53.

294. *PKC*:20.

295. Chung I-mou 1955:211; Chung I-mou 1957:107. See also CHP:43,46–48; Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:227–28; HA (17 Dec. 1927), Robba–Valtorta.

296. *Räte China* (1973):44–45.

297. CHP:47.

298. *Räte China* (1973):45. "The class war became a struggle between villages" (*SK*:140). The P'eng villages in Hot'ien were fighting all the others in the area (CHP:39–41).

299. CHP:46–48; K'uang Hsiao-an (18 Mar. 1928):2; *NCH* (12 May 1928).

300. CHP:44,48; Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:228; MEP, *Lettres* (1928):83.

301. CHP:52.
302. Chung I-mou 1957:99–101.
303. *Kung-fei t'u-sha. . .* , in KA 467/10; *Shih pao* (10 Oct. 1927); TC (4 Dec. 1979).
304. Chung I-mou 1957:100.
305. WK:325.
306. TC (30 Apr. 1978); CHP:39–41.
307. CHP:72–73.
308. CHP:68–71; Chung I-mou 1957:113–16.
309. CHP:71–72; *Kung-fei t'u-sha. . .* , in KA 467/10; *Min-pao jih-pao* (16 Dec. 1927).
310. *SK*:142; Chung I-mou 1957:114; CHP:61–62,72; Hou Feng 1959:64; Hou Feng 1978:90.
311. *Kung-fei tsui-chin* (1928):19,25.
312. *KK*:214–15; Chung I-mou 1957:111.
313. CHP:50–52; WK:191.
314. CHP:54.
315. *HS*:91.
316. CHP:54; K'uang Hsiao-an (18 Mar. 1928):3, (1 Apr. 1928):5; Wales 1939: 179; *SK*:133.
317. Pao T'ung 1928:477.
318. Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928a:548–49.
319. Johanson & Tabue 1934:7.
320. Malukhin 1975:125.
321. Chung I-mou 1957:55; Rue 1966:58.
322. Wilbur 1964:24; Schwartz 1952:90.
323. Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:28; *CTH* 6 (30 Sept. 1927).
324. Smedley 1956:212–15,218; Kung Ch'u 1954:70.
325. Snow 1972:192–96. See also Schram 1967:124–26; Schwartz 1952:108; Rue 1966:59,66; Li Ang 1942:84–85.
326. Wales 1939:245.
327. Mao Tse-tung 1928b (*SW*:vol. 1,66).
328. Mif 1937:66,68.
329. Wang Shih 1958:105. "The prototype of this kind of Communist power [the Red Army] had developed in Haifeng and Lufeng counties" (Harrison 1972:140).
330. Mao Tse-tung 1927d (*MT*:vol. 2,11–13), 1927e (*MT*:vol. 2,13).
331. Schwartz 1952:100.
332. Mao Tse-tung 1927e (*MT*:vol. 2,13); Snow 1972:194: In 1928 the CCP Kwangtung Committee urged the "East Special" to take care of the "Red Army and Red Guards in Hai-Lu-feng" (*PL*:79). *The Red Flag* 16 (30 Aug. 1930) declares P'eng P'ai to be "the founder of the Red Army" (*PL*:346). Mao Tse-tung in 1936 called the local military forces "in the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Kwangtung" the "Red Army" (Mao Tse-tung 1936b [*SW*:vol. 1,206]).
333. Schwartz 1952:189–90; Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,99).
334. Bianco 1971:207.
335. Hofheinz 1967:83,85–86; Chung I-mou 1957:30.
336. Mao Tse-tung 1928b (*SW*:vol. 1,66).

337. Chung I-mou 1957:31–32,35–36; *PL*:8,10,206.
338. Chung I-mou 1957:41,55,74,82,113; Hai Feng 1969:138–39.
339. *HS*:91.
340. *CCTH* 30 (3 July 1928):433–34.
341. Schram 1964:63.
342. Mao Tse-tung 1967a (*SW*:vol. 1,105).
343. Mao Tse-tung 1928b (*SW*:vol. 1,66).
344. Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,97).
345. K'uang Hsiao-an (1 Apr. 1928):3; Chung I-mou 1957:89,107; *The Times* (9,13 Feb. 1928); *SCMP* (21 Feb. 1928).
346. FO 228/3728 (7 Jan. 1928); FO 228/3908 (28 Mar. 1928); CO 129/508 (25 May 1928).
347. CHP:50–52,83,87,112.
348. Hofheinz 1977:116.
349. HA (26 Nov. 1927), Valtorta–Fourquet; HA (26 Nov. 1927), Carrara–Canton Government.
350. FO 228/3729 (10 Feb. 1928).
351. FO 228/3729 (8 Mar. 1928).
352. FO 228/3826, Canton Political Report (Mar. 1928).
353. FO 228/3901, South China Command Intelligence Diary (Jan.-Feb. 1928).
354. FO 228/3826, Intelligence Report, Swatow (31 Mar. 1928); FO 228/3706 (15 Feb. 1928); *NCH* (25 Feb. 1928); *PL*:37–42.
355. CHP:90–92,99; Chung I-mou 1957:116–17.
356. *NCH* (10 Mar. 1928).
357. Chu Tao-nan & Yü Ping-k'un 1977:228.
358. CHP:92; Chung I-mou 1957:117.
359. CHP:92–94; Chung I-mou 1957:117.
360. WK:190–93.
361. TC (12–14 Apr. 1978).
362. WK:190; Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:225.
363. TC (21 Feb. 1978).
364. CHP:94; WK:193; Ch'en T'ung-sheng 1958:229.
365. CHP:94–96,99; Chung I-mou 1957:118.
366. CHP:96; WK:192.
367. TC (15 Apr. 1978); CHP:95.
368. *PL*:38–40,206. For an account of an earlier people's war in Hai-Lu-feng, see *HP* (21 Nov. 1923).
369. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:9; *PL*:66–67; *PC*:65.
370. Mao Tse-tung 1928b (*SW*:vol. 1,67).
371. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:9–10. See also Yü Yen-kuang 1980:11; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):110–12.
372. CHP:54,135; Eric Wolf, in Shanin 1971:264–65.
373. Yang Ping-k'un 1958:9; Mao Tse-tung 1936b (*SW*:vol. 1,206).
374. Harrison 1969:138.

## *Chapter 11*

1. HA (21 Apr. 1928), Robba–Valtorta; FO 228/3730 (14 Apr. 1928); CHP:99–100.

2. *PKC*:19–21; CHP:104; FO 228/3826, Canton Political Report (Sept. 1928); *NCH* (10 Mar. 1928).

3. HA (29 June 1934), Bianchi–Valtorta; HA (21 Apr. 1928), Robba–Valtorta.

4. *PKC*: 21–23.

5. WK:190,193.

6. *NCH* (10 May 1928).

7. HA (27 Apr. 1928), Robba–Valtorta; CHP:96.

8. HA (5 May 1928), Robba–Valtorta; *PKC*:51–52.

9. CHP:149; *PKC*:22–23,63,91; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928b.

10. CHP:135.

11. *PKC*:68.

12. Su Wei 1951b:33.

13. CHP:95–100; Chung I-mou 1957:118; WK:194.

14. CHP:101; Chung I-mou 1957:95–96; *PL*:39–41.

15. Chung I-mou 1957:96,98–99; CHP:101–2,147.

16. Chung I-mou 1957:118; CHP:102–3; *NCH* (28 Apr. 1928); *MC*, 57, no. 16 (8 June 1928):250; FO 228/3901, South China Command Intelligence Diary (Apr. 1928).

17. CHP:103–5; Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958a:216,230; Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958b:3; WK:195–96; *NCH* (14 Apr. 1928); *PC*:66; *PL*:42–49.

18. Chung I-mou 1957:119; CHP:139–42,179; WK:197–99; HA (5 May 1928), Robba–Valtorta.

19. Hai Feng 1969:136; Hou Feng 1959:66; Hou Feng 1978:95; *PC*:67; Ku Ta-ts'un 1958.

20. CHP:54,147; Chung I-mou 1955:212; K'uang Hsiao-an (18 Mar. 1928); *PKC*:91; FO 228/3730 (20 Apr. 1928); FO 228/3901, South China Command Intelligence Diary (May 1928).

21. *NCH* (25 May 1928).

22. CHP:143.

23. Hou Feng 1959:66; Hou Feng 1978:87,95–96.

24. Hou Feng 1978:92–96 (the song is given on 96).

25. CHP:142–43,147; *PKC*:91; *PC*:66–67; *PL*:49–52,53–61,78–79.

26. WK:201–6.

27. HA (29 June 1928), Robba–Valtorta.

28. Harrison 1972:148–50; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:82.

29. Hou Feng 1959:66; Hou Feng 1978:98; C. Brandt et al. 1952:140–48. P'eng P'ai was reprimanded by the CCP Kwangtung Committee (*PL*:61–68).

30. Harrison 1972:157–58.

31. Ch'en Ch'eng 1960:vol. 3,25–32.

32. Schram 1967:135; Mao Tse-tung 1967a (*SW*:vol. 1,107).

33. Snow 1972:197. Also see *PL*:70.
34. HA (22 May 1928), Robba–Valtorta; *NCH* (26 May 1928); WK:194,325.
35. Hou Feng 1978:96–97.
36. *PC*:76,81.
37. Ku Ta-ts'un 1957.
38. CHP:162; HA (29 Jan. 1928), Robba–Valtorta.
39. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 1958a:230; Rue 1966:163.
40. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1927c:295.
41. Chung I-mou 1957:120–22. The story of Hai-Lu-feng up to 1949 can be found in Galbiati 1981:974–95.
42. Mao Tse-tung 1967a (*SW*:vol. 1,105).
43. Hsüeh Nung-shan 1935:622; *PL*:76–77.
44. Wales 1972:207; *PL*:66–68.
45. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 1928b:121–24; Harrison 1969:59; Liu Shao-ch'i 1969:21–22; Chang Kuo-t'ao 1972:81; *PL*:263; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:512; Mitrany 1951:205.
46. Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,88,91,93); Schram 1967:139.
47. Schwartz 1952:137.
48. Mao Tse-tung 1967a (*SW*:vol. 1,105–15).
49. Schwartz 1952:132.
50. Wilbur & How eds. 1956:276–77.
51. *The People's Diary* (29 June 1951), reported in Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960: 724,n.26.
52. Schwartz 1952:110.
53. Harrison 1972:158–59; Rue 1966:100.
54. Ch'en Ch'eng 1960:vol. 3,29–30,32. P'eng P'ai spoke of the dangerous situation in 1929 in two articles (*PW*:304–12,313–15).
55. Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,97–98).
56. Isaacs 1966:404.
57. Schwartz 1952:199.
58. Wales 1939:335.
59. Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,99).
60. Schwartz 1952:199; McDonald 1978.
61. Gramsci 1971:14–15.
62. P'eng P'ai [15]:66.
63. Harrison 1969:13.
64. Jun Chih [Mao Tse-tung] 1926; Harrison 1969:48.
65. Schram 1967:140–41; J. Ch'en 1967:155–59; Li Ch'un-t'ao 1924:9–10,29. P'eng P'ai saw class awareness in peasants as early as 1923.
66. Schwartz 1952:139.
67. Carrère d'Encausse & Schram 1969:237; Lin Piao 1965:9–30.
68. Snow 1972:194.
69. Mao Tse-tung 1927d (*MT*:vol. 2,11–12); Schram 1964:65; Hofheinz 1967:85.
70. Lai Ku 1958:254.
71. Snow 1972:194–95; Schram 1967:128; Schwartz 1952:108.
72. Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,74–75); Lai Ku 1958:254–55.

73. Mao Tse-tung 1928c (*SW*:vol. 1,90,95); Rue 1966:83–84.
74. Hua Kang 1932:217; Harrison 1972:234; *PC*:63.
75. Snow 1957:18; Wales 1972:179,345.
76. Mif 1937:65.
77. Yakhontoff 1934:84.
78. Smedley 1956:218. For a chronology of the soviets, see Johanson & Tabue 1934:485.
79. Pao T'ung 1928:477–78; Lo Ch'i-yüan 1928a:550.
80. Chung I-mou 1957:81; *HS*:77.
81. *HS*:1.
82. Hou Feng 1978:98; CHP:165; *PC*:69; Harrison 1972:150–51; *PW*:294–96; *PL*:82–83.
83. P'eng P'ai [7], in *PW*:304–12; Eto Shinkichi 1962:179; Hou Feng 1959:67.
84. Snow 1972:197.
85. TC (17–19 May 1977); Hou Feng 1978:76–77, gives her death in May 1927.
86. CHP:109–12.
87. HA ("Special Note," Aletta, L.); *PL*:335,note.
88. HA ("Special Note," Aletta, L.); TC (22 Feb. 1978; 14,15 Mar. 1978).
89. CHP:111–12; TC (19–21 Feb. 1978); Hai Feng 1969:119,124; *PC*:75.
90. HA ("Special Note," Aletta, L.); TC (31 May 1978; 1 June 1978; 5,13 July 1978; 2 Aug. 1978); Hai Feng 1969:119; Bianchi 1978:303,308,316,318.
91. Hai Feng 1969:4,118–20; TC (3,7 Aug. 1978).
92. Hai Feng 1969:5–6,120–22; *Nan-fang jih-pao* (21 Nov. 1957); *Ta-kung pao* (H.K.) (16,18,21 Nov. 1957); *Jen-min jih-pao* (21,22 Nov. 1957).
93. Shih Fan 1957; PPKS. For books in Russian or English on P'eng P'ai, see Galbiati 1981:996.
94. Vogel 1969:211–13.
95. Hai Feng 1969:121–22. This is the main source for these events. The author was a young Communist cadre working in Kwangtung who was sent back to his country of origin, Haifeng, at the start of the Cultural Revolution. When he escaped to Hong Kong on 27 Jan. 1968 he wrote of his experiences, a reliable report which nobody in Hong Kong ever disproved and which was confirmed through interviews with Haifeng people both in Hong Kong and in Haifeng. He serialized his writings in *Chung-pao chou-k'an* from 30 (12 Apr. 1968) to 45 (26 July 1968). In 1969 the articles were collected into a book.
96. Hai Feng 1969:5–6,122–24; *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):24,106–10.
97. Hai Feng 1969:3,10–13,123–25,128–29; TC (9 Aug. 1978).
98. Hai Feng 1969:3–4,129–30.
99. Hai Feng 1969:14–18; *HT* (18 Feb. 1979).
100. Hai Feng 1969:44–61.
101. Hai Feng 1969:66–67,70. The opening lines of the "Internationale" were used to express people's feelings (41–42), and they vented all their hatred of 18 years of rule on the part of the CCP on the present power-holders in Haifeng (48–49).
102. Hai Feng 1969:71–74.
103. Hai Feng 1969:75–77.

104. Hai Feng 1969:76,78–80. *The East Is Red*, the organ of the Peking Red Guards, published the "Declaration" (154–58).

105. Hai Feng 1969:80–88.

106. Hai Feng 1969:89–92.

107. Hai Feng 1969:92–94; *HT* (18 Feb. 1979).

108. Hai Feng 1969:94,95–97.

109. Snow 1972:197.

110. *CCTH* 30 (3 July 1928).

111. *HT* (18 Feb. 1979); *Jen-min jih-pao* (31 Aug. 1978, 12 Feb. 1979); Hai Feng 1969:125. See also *Chi-nien P'eng P'ai* (1981):6,10,28, for confirmation of the events described.

112. *Ming-pao* (8,12 Sept. 1978); TC (10 Dec. 1979).

113. *Shih-pao* (1 Sept. 1978); *Ming-pao* (2 Sept. 1978); *HT* (16 Nov. 1978).

114. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying in 1980 wrote the title for the "P'eng P'ai Middle School" in Haifeng city. Marshal Nieh Jun-cheng in April 1980 wrote a dedication to P'eng P'ai: "Comrade P'eng P'ai was one of the early members of our Party, / A true proletarian revolutionary and the first leader of the revolutionary Chinese peasant movement. / His glorious life has left posterity an example to be emulated and never forgotten."

# Bibliography

This book is based largely on a study of original documents tracked down throughout the world. Contemporary press reports are in collections in Hong Kong and the KMT Archives (Taiwan), as well as in the Toyo Bunko (Tokyo) and in the libraries and archival collections of Stanford, Harvard, and Columbia universities. Missionary archives in Hong Kong, Rome, Paris, and London yielded useful background and on-the-spot accounts. The Public Record Office in London also supplied important diplomatic insights through the records of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office.

Of great value to understanding P'eng P'ai are, naturally, his own writings. I have supplemented them with the contemporary accounts and memoirs of his friends, such as Li Ch'un-t'ao. Interviews with eyewitnesses to the events of the 1920's in Hai-Lu-feng, and firsthand information kindly provided by the family, made for a deeper appreciation of the realities.

A word about the structure of the alphabetical listing that follows. Where an author is represented by more than one work, the works are listed chronologically by year, or, within the same year, by month and day. An exception to this is the treatment of the many works by P'eng P'ai himself, where a decision was made to list entries in alphabetical order and to use bracketed numbers to simplify citations in the notes. Abbreviations are the same as those listed at the start of the Notes on p. 377.


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# Index


Administration, 144, 223, 263; in Hai-Lu-feng, 11–17 *passim*, 24, 32, 35; under Ch'en, 47–48, 81–82, 100, 190. *See also* Hai-Lu-feng Soviet
*Agrarian Relations in Kwangtung Province* (Volin and Yolk), 251
Agrarian revolution, 166, 277; United Front and, 236–37, 263–64; land and, 258, 293; sovietization and, 268, 281; peasant leadership in, 346, 359
Agricultural Societies, 96, 153, 177, 201
All-China Labor Congress (May 1921), 84
All-China Peasant Association, 256–57, 259–60
All-China Peasant Congress, First (May 1926), 194, 195–96, 246–53 *passim*
All-China Red Army, 359
Alliance Party, 38–42 *passim*, 125, 163
"Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society" (Mao), 244
"Analysis of the Various Classes of the Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitude Toward Revolution" (Mao), 243–44
Anarchism, 63–65, 73, 211–12, 396
Anarcho-communism, 59, 65ff, 72, 120, 127, 142
Anarcho-socialism, v, 65, 68, 73
Anarcho-syndicalism, 56f, 64
Annual Report of the Shanghai Municipal Court, 1
Aomen, 42
Association for the Protection of the Walled City, 79
Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), 260f, 265–66, 332, 345

Bakunin, Mikhail A., 63–64
Baptists, American, 26
Basel Mission Society, 26
Bianchi, Fr. Lawrence, 200–201, 282, 295, 368; and religious harassment, 199, 223, 307, 317
Black Flag, *see* Flags
*Bolshevik, The*, 267, 298, 322–27 *passim*, 379
Bolshevik Revolution, 56
Bolsheviks, 47, 56, 61, 65, 196
Bolshevism, 197, 297; under Ch'en, 60–61, 65, 164; under P'eng, 85, 118, 191, 282
*Book of Odes, The*, 31, 75
Borodin, Aleksandr P., 61, 214, 241, 251; on land revolution, 169–70, 233, 237, 255; Peasant Association and, 171–77 *passim*, 184; on revolution, 182, 194, 234–35, 249, 262ff, 291
Bourgeoisie, 24, 43, 167, 258, 264, 337
Boxers, 26
British influence, 38; under Ch'en, 60–61, 65, 82f, 179, 201; under CCP, 317–19, 326–29 *passim*, 349–50
Builders' League, 56–62 *passim*
Bukharin, Nikolai I., 168, 250, 263, 363

Burial Associations, 123
Bussac, Fr., 26

Cannibalism, 23, 334
Canton, 49, 64–70 *passim*, 84, 197, 330; education in, 36, 77; government in, 40–47 *passim*, 60–62, 81–83, 141, 145, 150; P'eng in, 54, 151, 209; Peasant Union in, 96, 125, 140; United Front in, 158–59, 169–75 *passim*, 191–92, 233, 239, 291; Peasant Association in, 176, 177–78, 204, 213–14; militarization in, 179–88 *passim*, 301, 341–42, 347; unrest in, 189–90, 200, 201–2, 250, 274, 299; anti-communism in, 230, 344–53 *passim*, 370–73
Canton CCP, 152, 182, 191–92, 214, 323
Canton City Peasant Association, 127, 174, 177, 242
Canton Commune, 1, 297, 316, 321–26 *passim*, 336f, 345
Canton Tea-house Labor Union, 64
Canton Uprising (Dec. 1927), 297, 319–26, 334
Cantonese people, 14f, 82
Capitalism, 67, 142, 164, 267f
Catholicism, 25–26
Catholics, 26, 367–68, 394f; assaults on, 42, 199, 223, 306–307, 316–18; social welfare and, 76, 123–24. *See also* Bianchi, Fr. Lawrence; Valtorta, Bishop H.
CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 1–2, 65, 164–72, 241–52 *passim*, 325, 413; KMT and, v–vi, 190, 200, 202, 243, 378; in peasant movement, 4–5, 93, 116, 148, 158, 255–69, 292; P'eng and, 68f, 140, 151–52, 159, 173–77 *passim*, 387; Peasant Association and, 178–79, 195, 197–98, 203–14 *passim*, 227–31; revolution and, 180, 293, 332–33, 343–54 *passim*, 361–65 *passim*, 412; Soviet and, 186, 285–86, 295–307 *passim*, 315–19 *passim*, 329, 337–42 *passim*, 366–67; reaction to, 355–57, 363–64, 368–71. *See also* Central Executive Committee (CEC); Socialist Youth Corps (SYC)
CCP Central Committee (CCP CC), 257–63 *passim*, 371, 403, 406; P'eng and, 3–4, 273, 286, 359, 367; revolution and, 228, 249, 274, 320, 322; on peasant movement, 233–37, 315; on land question, 264–65, 293–94, 299; and Soviet, 266f, 277, 285, 297, 331, 368–72 *passim*, 415; militarization and, 276, 341n, 345–48 *passim*, 361
CCP Congress, First (July 1921), 68, 165
CCP Congress, Second (July 1922), 165
CCP Congress, Third (June 1923), 151, 165–66, 168
CCP Congress, Fourth (Jan. 1925), 232
CCP Congress, Fifth (Apr. 1927), 230, 236, 239, 256–64 *passim*, 366
CCP Congress, Sixth (June 1928), 1, 292, 294, 359–60, 363
CCP Plenum (Oct. 1925), 224, 363
CCP Plenum (July 1926), 236–37, 363
CCP Plenum (Dec. 1926), 238, 256
CCP Plenum (Nov. 1927), 268, 270, 276, 284, 294–95, 297, 315
*Central Daily*, 350
Central Executive Committee (CEC), of CCP, 174–77 *passim*, 183, 204, 219, 235, 246
Central Land Committee, of KMT, 256, 291
Central Soviet, Kiangsi, 360–61
Central Soviet Bank, 330–31
Ch'aling, 269, 365–66
Ch'aling CCP Committee, 366
Chan Szu-chu, 230
Chang Fa-k'uei, 265–66, 274, 319–27 *passim*, 348
Chang Kuo-hsien, 307
Chang Kuo-t'ao, 66–67, 69; peasant movement and, 165–66, 168–69, 176; United Front and, 234–35, 237; revolution and, 257, 259, 263, 268f, 288
Chang Ma-an, 94–98 *passim*, 120, 146
Chang Shan-ming, 224
Chang T'ai-lei, 69, 291, 319, 345
Chang Tse-p'u, 131, 133–34
Chang Wei, 195, 284, 287, 296
Changchou, 47, 64, 73
Ch'ang-tsu, 35
Ch'angsha, 126, 240, 245, 262
Chao Ching-shen, 226
Ch'ao-Mei, 136, 210, 222, 327
Ch'ao-Mei-Hai-Lu-feng, 215, 229
Ch'aoan, 149, 153

Ch'aochou, 15, 42, 47–52 *passim*; peasant movement in, 67, 136, 197, 343, 358, 369
Ch'aochou Students' Association, 67
Ch'aochoufu, 149, 205, 350
Ch'aoshan, 326, 344, 369
Ch'aoyang, 153, 337, 344, 358
Chekiang, 163
Ch'en Chen-Ch'ao, 309–10
Ch'en Chi-t'ang, 326, 340, 350
Ch'en Ch'i-ying, 82
Ch'en Ch'ih-hua, 287, 296, 298
Ch'en Chiung-kuang, 82, 155–56
Ch'en Chiung-ming, 12, 67, 70, 124f, 208–13 *passim*; as early leader, 16, 37–43, 60–65; elite and, 46–48, 53, 100, 103, 108–9; P'eng and, 54, 72–88 *passim*, 119, 152–59, 388, 395; Sun Yat-sen and, 81–82, 164, 169; Peasant Union and, 128–51 *passim*; KMT opposition to, 179, 186–202 *passim*; reactionary supporters of, 212–21 *passim*, 226, 246, 338
Ch'en Chuang, 198
Ch'en Ch'ung-yüeh, 74, 81
Ch'en clan, 12, 16, 48, 50, 103, 119, 341
Ch'en Fu, 45
Ch'en Hsiao-lun, 53, 137, 143
Ch'en Hsin, 226
Ch'en Hsiu, 72
Ch'en K'ai-t'ing, 28, 39; in government, 47, 51, 79, 148; P'eng and, 85, 132–33, 156–57
Ch'en K'uei-ya, 45, 68–69, 74, 115, 117, 192, 206
Ch'en Kung-po, 67–68, 229, 233, 249
Ch'en Kuo-sun, 356
Ch'en Lien-po, 179–80
Ch'en Ming-shu, 350
Ch'en Ping-ting, 201
Ch'en Po-chung, 180–87 *passim*
Ch'en Po-hua, 81, 150
Ch'en Shao-t'ung, 298
Ch'en Shun-i, 68–69, 115, 225, 281–85 *passim*, 296, 298, 313
Ch'en Ta-sheng, 38, 81
Ch'en Ts'ang, 302
Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 43, 66–71 *passim*, 81, 88, 395; on Board of Education, 60, 67–68, 73–76 *passim*; peasant movement and, 140, 165–69 *passim*, 240, 258–59; KMT-CCP and, 173–74, 234, 237–38, 262, 263–64
Ch'en Tzu-ch'i, 305, 331
Ch'en Tzu-ho, 339
Ch'en Yen-nien, 230, 258
Ch'en Yen-sheng, 81
Ch'en Yü-k'o, 48
Ch'en Yüeh-po, 130–37 *passim*, 150
Cheng Chen-fang, 311
Cheng Chih-yün, 192; as student leader, 68–69, 71, 115, 197–98; in CCP, 195, 285, 287, 351, 358
Cheng Jun-ch'i, 185
Cheng Shih-liang, 37
Ch'eng Shu-shun, 75, 127
Ch'enghai, 153
Cheshih, 183
Chesneaux, J., 378
Chiang Ch'ing, 372–73
Chiang Chung-chih, 284
Chiang clan, 184–89 *passim*, 216f
Chiang Hang, 226
Chiang Hsia-yen, 217–22 *passim*
Chiang Kai-shek, 3, 187–88; KMT-CCP and, 174, 179, 191, 194, 200, 239; March 20th coup (1926), 213f, 222, 234–35, 253; break with CCP, 230–31, 237, 244, 249, 257–62 *passim*, 324, 345–50 *passim*
Chiang Kai-shek's Third Army, 267, 302
Chiang-t'un Peasant Association, 181
Chiao-yü-ch'u, 71–84 *passim*, 106, 127, 225
Ch'iao-tung, 9, 15–16
Ch'iao-tung P'eng, 9, 11
Ch'iao-tung-p'u, 146
Ch'iao-tung-she, 11, 18–19, 121, 129, 287, 329, 368
Chiatzu, 13, 296, 339, 351
Chiehsheng, 12, 13, 156f, 305, 329; oppression in, 20, 100; revolution in, 274, 301, 335, 350; fall of, 280–83 *passim*, 312, 333
Chiehshih, 13, 100, 193; revolution in, 274, 283, 301, 322, 335, 350f
Chiehyang, 229, 299, 337, 344, 350
Chien Ta-chun, 350
*Chih-kung-tang*, 227
*Ch'ih-hsin chou-k'an*, 85–88, 94
*Ch'ih-hsin-she*, 57
*Ch'ih-wei chün*, *see* Red Guards' Army
Ch'ihan, 306, 351
Ch'ihk'eng, 109, 305, 310f

Ch'ihshan, 353, 380; P'eng in, 19, 89–96 *passim*; Peasant Union in, 99, 115, 118, 133
Ch'ihsheng, *see* Chiehsheng
Ch'ihshih, 12f, 21, 360f; revolution in, 327–28, 335, 343f, 349, 353
Chik'ang, 15–16
Children, 28f, 97–98, 225, 308, 359
Children's Brigade, 225, 308
Children's Brigade Congress (Feb. 1927), 229
Chilung, 343
China Association, 59
Chinese Anti-Red Army, 201
*Chinese Daily*, 129
Chinese New Year, 30, 52, 129–30, 156, 188, 315–16, 344
*Chinese Peasant*, 243–44, 250
Chinese Republic, 43, 95, 108, 163
Chinese Socialist Party, 164
Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, 345–46
*Chinese Youth*, 93, 164
Ching-ts'un, 64
Chingkangshan, 366
Ch'ing clan, 22–24, 32
Ch'ing dynasty, 16, 34, 38, 211
Ch'ing Ming, 380
Ch'inghu, 118
Chingkangshan, 269, 293–94, 345–48 *passim*
Ch'ingk'eng, 109, 305, 310f
Ch'ingyüan, 366–67
Chinhsiang, 351
*Chiu-kuo jih-pao*, 55
Ch'iu Ching-yün, 28, 137–39, 143
Ch'iu clan, 16, 187, 380
Ch'iu Feng-chia, 39
Ch'iu Kuo-chen, 31, 40, 70, 136, 190
Chiuhsi, 118
Chou Ch'i-chien, 178–84, 188, 204
Chou En-lai, 1–4 *passim*, 151, 194–95, 265f, 363, 368–73 *passim*
Chou Feng, 27ff, 85, 87, 195f, 367–73 *passim*, 382
Chou Fo-hai, 68, 241
Chou Pu-hsi, 44
Christianity, 25–27, 58
Christians, 12, 23–24, 58, 196, 306–7, 317, 355. *See also* Catholics; Protestants
Chu Chih-hsin, 64
Chu Mo, 131f
Chu Te, 265, 323, 345–46, 366
Chu Wen-kuang, 25
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, 265, 295, 359; on peasant policy, 165, 234, 257–58; revolution and, 268f, 322–23, 327, 347, 353, 361
Chuang clan, 228
Chung Ching-t'ang, 48, 84, 130f, 144f, 154f, 201, 358
Chung clan, 16, 48, 333
Chung Hsiu-nan: Ch'en and, 38, 48, 50, 81, 84, 136; as counterrevolutionary, 227, 295, 328, 340, 342–43, 349–55 *passim*
Chung I-mou, 279, 313, 378; on P'eng, 69, 72, 73–74, 86, 88; on Peasant Union, 118–19, 145; on counterrevolutionaries, 295, 340; on revolution, 304, 321, 325–28 *passim*, 333, 338
Chung Ma-ning, 284
Chung Sheng, 81
*Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien*, 93, 164
*Chung-kuo nung-min*, 243–44, 250
*Chung-yang jih-pao*, 350
Chungshan, 177, 215
Chungt'ung, 261, 273, 303, 329, 351, 357
Ch'ungyai, 366–67
Chüeh Wu, 280
*Ch'üan-hsüeh-so*, 36, 67, 73–75
Ch'üchiang, 16, 239, 245
City God temple, 11, 13, 20, 79, 137
Clan, *see* Lineage
Class-consciousness, 4, 53, 163f, 180, 384, 396; in Japan, 57, 63; peasant view of, 116, 135, 362, 388, 420, 424; rent reduction and, 141f, 211–12, 394; Peasant Association and, 171, 203, 207, 235, 252; CCP and, 182, 315, 319, 338–41, 354; revolution and, 260, 294, 310, 333, 335–36
Clementi, Governor, 295, 317, 321, 349
Climate, in Hai-Lu-feng, 10, 114, 140–42, 209, 212
Cock-Crow Society, 64
Collectivization, 63, 163, 292f
Comintern, 165–71 *passim*, 232–41 *passim*, 251–70 *passim*; 319ff, 353–63 *passim*, 412
Comintern Congress, Second (1920), 167
Comintern Congress, Fourth (Nov. 1922), 167–68

Comintern 7th Plenum (Nov. 1926), 237–38, 257
Comintern 8th Plenum, 332
Comintern 9th Plenum (Feb. 1928), 359
Communism, 64, 72f, 85, 201; Ch'en and, 60, 151, 165; in peasant movement, 142f, 202, 211f, 237, 239n, 247–48, 288
Communist Party, in Japan, 57
Communist Youth Corps (CYC), 69, 164, 198, 248, 280, 283; influence of, 224, 238, 259, 296, 306–14 *passim*. *See also* Socialist Youth Corps (SYC)
Compradores, 49–50, 115, 179. *See also* Merchants
Concubines, 27–28
"Confiscate All Land and Set Up Soviets" (CCP), 293–94
Confucian ideology, 19f, 31–34 *passim*, 44–51, 71
Congress of People's Representatives, First, 286–314 *passim*, 331, 336–37, 359
Congress of People's Representatives, Second, 337, 341–42
Congress of Representatives of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers of Haifeng County (Nov. 1927), 275–86 *passim*, 367
Congress of the Hunan Peasant Association (Dec. 1926), 245, 256
Conscience Society, 64
Constitution for the Peasant Association (1924), 175–76, 183
Constitution of the Provincial Peasant Union (1923), 176
Cooperatives, 313–14
Cosmos Club, 57, 59
Council of Deputies of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers, 365f
Counterrevolutionaries, 2, 247, 310, 331, 353, 369ff; Peasant Armies and, 180, 229–30, 275; KMT and, 182, 209, 212–13, 219, 220–21, 259–60, 294; Peasant Association and, 208, 213, 216, 222, 226, 254; CCP and, 227f, 266, 281, 298, 309, 342; land of, 256, 280, 288; elimination of, 277, 283, 299, 316, 332–38, 340; revolution and, 282, 294f, 364
CPSU Congress, 15th (Dec. 1927), 319, 322
*Creation*, 68
Crops, 10–11, 106, 140f, 148. *See also* Rice
Cultural Revolution, 247, 369–73 *passim*
Culture, 15, 78, 125, 226, 306, 388, 394

*Daily News*, 150
Davis, Fei-ling, 22
Dawn of the People Society, 57, 59
"Declaration of the Peasants of Haifeng to Their Countrymen" (Li), 149
"Declaration of the Returned Students Weeping with Their Compatriots" (P'eng), 55
"Declaration on the Peasant Movement" (KMT), 170–71
"Declaration to All the People of China" (People's Headquarters), 372
"Declaration to My Countrymen" (P'eng), 68, 72–73, 92, 211, 392
"Declaration to the Chinese Peasants" (SYC), 164–65
"Declaration to the Peasants on Rent Reduction" (Peasant Union), 142
Deliusin, L. P., 291
Democracy, 56–57, 120, 288
"Democracy" (Sakuyō), 56
Democratic dictatorship, 166, 264, 268, 287–88
Dewey, John, 88
Divine Association, 338
Divine Strike Society, 182–89 *passim*
"Draft Resolution on the Land Question" (KMT), 256

East River area, 192, 200–202, 322, 326; Ch'en in, 42, 216, 227; peasant movement in, 140, 196, 208–9, 213, 253, 265; revolution in, 342–50 *passim*, 357, 360
East River Area Conference (Jan. 1928), 299, 315–16
East River Party School, 296
East River Peasant Association, 337
East River Special Revolutionary Committee (East Special), of CCP, 260, 273–87 *passim*, 308, 316; militarization and, 230, 296, 304, 416, 421; revolution and, 267, 302, 326–27, 342–45 *passim*, 357, 361
Eastern Expeditions, 190–95 *passim*, 202–10 *passim*, 232, 238f, 243, 340
Economic blockade, policy of, 4, 118
Economic issues, 56, 164, 257; in villages, 17–20, 35, 109–15, 159; and political power, 48–51, 100, 312, 340; CCP and,

268, 289, 293; under Soviet, 304–5, 330–31, 335, 354. *See also* Exploitation; Rent; Taxation
Education, 12, 31–43 *passim*, 109, 225f; P'eng and, 44–46, 62–63, 74–80, 84–85; in Japan, 54–60; political activism and, 69, 144, 296, 309f; of peasants, 89, 125–27, 163. *See also* Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI)
Education Bureau, 71, 75–80, 84, 106, 127, 225
Elders, 17, 312–13
"Elimination of the Counterrevolutionaries, The" (CCP), 282, 294, 310, 332
Emancipation, of women, 72, 225, 310
Emergency Conference (Aug. 1927), 264–65, 278, 287, 332
Engels, Friedrich, 66
Executioner of Cheke (Chiehshih), 307
Exploitation, 62, 123, 286, 329, 333; by landlords, 52–53, 106f, 116, 164, 293; Peasant Union and, 118, 128, 142; Peasant Association and, 175, 208, 250

Famine (1959 to 1961), 369
Fang Chih-min, 256, 346
Fang clan, 100, 108, 197, 205–7
*Fanshen* (Hinton), 333
Feast fee, 107–8, 207, 257, 267
February 7 Incident (1923), 168
*Fen-chih*, 105–6, 131
*Feng-shui*, 21, 79, 128, 381
Fengch'uan, 320
Festival of the Red Heart, 145
Festivals, 29, 30–31, 40, 114, 129–30, 145
Feuchtwang, S., 20
Feuds, clan, 17–21 *passim*, 26, 82, 114; peasant movement and, 97, 145, 196, 228, 277, 341. *See also* Flags
"5th day of the 7th month" (1923), 146f, 152, 154, 196
First Peasants' and Workers' Army, 1st Division, 345
Flags, 182n; clan feuds and, 22–26 *passim*, 46, 354, 372; Black Flag, 36–42 *passim*, 121, 346; Red Flag, 40ff, 121, 197, 338–39, 358, 371; Peasant Union and, 97ff, 121–22, 129–37 *passim*, 145, 156, 159; White Flag, 121n, 338–40, 347, 353–62 *passim*, 367; CCP power and, 279, 285, 300–301, 327, 338–41, 344–46, 355, 362
*Fortnightly Critique, The*, 60
Foshan, 176
Fourquet, Bishop (Canton), 349
Franke, of Krestintern, 174
Freedman, Maurice, 17, 22
Freeholders, of land, 20, 102f, 114, 175, 210
French consulate, 349
Friendship Society, 57, 386
Fukien, 14, 22, 222; Ch'en in, 47, 64, 81; revolution and, 327, 352–53
*Fukien Star*, 64
Fukienese people, *see* Hoklo people
Funeral Aid Society, 122–23

Galen, General, 191, 194
Gambling, 39, 64, 83, 175, 208, 226, 331
Gang of Four, 372f
Gentry, 142, 241, 384; in early government, 17, 31–36 *passim*, 46; exploitation by, 18, 25, 103–4, 149, 186, 208; change and, 38, 66, 71, 226; under Ch'en, 43, 47–50, 100, 102, 137; P'eng and, 78–85 *passim*, 90, 154, 395; Peasant Union and, 117–22 *passim*, 128–32 *passim*, 139, 146, 156–57, 159; CCP attitude toward, 181, 195–96, 267, 277, 288, 294; as reactionaries, 183, 203, 210, 227f, 235–36, 255; KMT and, 215, 249, 274; Red Terror and, 312, 328–40 *passim*, 356, 362
Gentry-merchants, 49–50. *See also* Merchants
Germany, 167, 224
Gifts, customary, 107–8, 114, 207, 257, 267
Government, *see* Administration
Government of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers, 366
Gramsci, Antonio, 364
Granaries, charity, 18, 33
Great Knives, 182f, 189
Guards Artillery Regiment, 187–89
Guards Corps, 46, 205
Guerrilla warfare, 196, 244; peasants in, 192–93, 200f; in Soviet, 268, 270, 275, 294, 371; in revolution, 301, 322–23, 344, 359–63 *passim*
*Guide Weekly*, 152, 158, 170, 193
Gyōminkai, 57, 59

*Hai-feng tzu-chih pao*, 39, 40, 70
Hai-Lu-feng, v, 9–53, 105–14 *passim*, 395, 421; CCP in, 5, 168, 258; change in, 60–69 *passim*; peasant movement in, 101, 163, 192–202 *passim*, 208–9, 222–29, 253. *See also* Haifeng; Lufeng
Hai-Lu-feng CCP, 163, 195, 274–80 *passim*, 323
Hai-Lu-feng Labor Bank, 330–31
Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, v–vi, 4, 266–372, 378, 415
*Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, The*, 275–84 *passim*, 289, 295–96, 301, 310, 315–19 *passim*, 369
Hai-Lu-feng Soviet Army, 345
Hai-Lu-feng Student Union, 65, 67
*Hai-Lu-feng Su-wei-ai, see Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, The*
*Hai-t'ien chou-k'an*, 86–88
Haifeng, 63–77 *passim*, 368–69, 395; description of, 9–36 *passim*, 48, 62, 101–15, 211; P'eng clan in, 15–16, 19, 368–69; uprisings in, 38, 44, 192–95, 201–2, 260–61; Ch'en in, 47, 81–84; P'eng in, 55, 78f, 89, 100, 177; radicals in, 63–77 *passim*, 309; peasant movement in, 90–91, 99, 163, 168, 241–48 *passim*, 309; Peasant Union in, 116–19 *passim*, 128–40 *passim*, 149–53 *passim*; Peasant Association in, 174, 177, 197–198, 224; revolution in, 274, 322, 324, 332–36, 350, 351–53; militarization in, 304, 308, 345, 421; after Soviet, 355, 365, 370–72
Haifeng CCP, 71, 280, 296–99 *passim*
Haifeng Countrymen's Association, 50, 150, 199, 321, 349, 367
Haifeng County General Peasant Union, 118–25 *passim*, 135–36
Haifeng County Peasant Union, 94, 111, 169ff, 195
Haifeng Peasant Army, 228, 252
Haifeng Peasant Association, 206, 210, 222–23, 246, 369
*Haifeng Self-Government Newspaper*, 39, 40, 70
Haifeng Soviet, 275–85 *passim*, 306, 313, 316–18, 329, 337–43 *passim*, 366
Haifeng Student Union, 59, 74, 225, 321
Hainan Island, 366–67
Hajime, Kawakami, 57
Hakka people, 82, 91; description of, 14–15, 26, 30, 380; militarization of, 42, 138, 217, 311–12
Han people, 14
Hankow, 173f, 230, 238, 257, 262
"Head's Meetings," 278, 299, 333
Hinton, William, 333
Ho Chi-min, 243
Ho Chien, 312
Ho clan, 20, 312, 340
Ho Lien-fang, 226, 284
Ho Lung, 261, 265–67, 273, 346
Hoklo people, 37, 39, 83, 321; clan relations of, 14f, 20–24 *passim*, 30, 369, 380
Hok'ou, 118
Hong Kong, 150, 179f, 201, 239, 266, 305; P'eng clan in, 3, 367; Hai-Lu-feng and, 13, 25, 49–50, 51; Ch'en in, 40, 70, 83, 136ff, 149, 193; influence of, 61–62, 96, 99, 124, 213, 317–19, 329; reactionaries in, 197, 227, 336, 349
*Hong Kong Daily Press*, 334
Hop'o, 343–44
Hot'ien, 13–17 *passim*, 197, 228, 326, 343, 420
Hoyüan, 148, 155
Hsiakang, 36–37
*Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, 152, 158, 170, 193
*Hsiang-yüeh*, 34
Hsiangshan, 176f, 216, 219, 228
Hsiao Chüeh, 339
Hsiao-Ch'u-nü, 245–46
*Hsieh-tou, see* Feuds
Hsienko, 217
Hsiho, 118
Hsikang, 183
*Hsin chiao-yü*, 76
*Hsin ch'ing-nien*, 60, 67f, 76
*Hsin Hai-feng*, 69–71, 76, 85, 87
*Hsin-sheng hui*, 85
*Hsin-wen pao*, 150
Hsing Chung Hui, 24, 37–38
Hsingning, 15, 298, 327
Hsint'ien, 335
Hsü Ching-t'ang, 349–50
Hsü Ch'ung-chih, 83, 179, 192, 194, 200
Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, 288
Hsü Hsüeh-ch'iu, 38

Hsü K'e-hsiang, 312
Hsü Keng-pi, 33–34, 49
Hsü Yü-ch'ing, 205, 315, 358, 367
Hsüeh Nung-shan, 361
Hu Ch'ien, 229
Hu Chun, 210–13
Hu Han-min, 136, 163, 188, 233, 249
*Hua-tzu jih-pao*, 129
Huahsien, 177, 201, 215–22 *passim*, 227, 253–54, 316–23 *passim*
Huahsien Peasant Association, 177, 201, 216, 222, 253–54
Huang Ch'iang, 198, 302
Huang Ch'in-hsüan, 196, 396
Huang Chu-su, 174
Huang clan, 184–89 *passim*, 225
Huang Feng-lin, 117, 129, 134
Huang Hsing, 163
Huang Hsüeh-tseng, 204
Huang Kung-lüeh, 346
Huang Lin-han, 284
Huang P'ing, 291–92, 378
Huang Tzu-ch'ien, Fr. Francis, 317–19
Huang Yeh-ch'eng, 284
Huangnit'ang, 131
Huangpu, 343, 350
Huangt'ang, 344
Huangtung, 186
Hui-Ch'ao-Mei Peasant Union, 153, 176
Huichou, 49, 124, 305; Ch'en in, 38–39, 47, 81, 153–54; revolution in, 155, 191, 274, 298, 350
Huichou Associated Peasant Union, 136
Huichou Uprising (1900), 24, 37
Huilai, 209, 277, 279, 298f, 366; uprisings in, 22, 199; Peasant Union in, 136, 153, 194f; revolution in, 306, 324, 329, 338, 343–44, 358, 360
Huiyang, 15, 40, 153, 276–79 *passim*; uprisings in, 26, 136, 191f, 215, 228–29; peasant movement in, 155, 194ff; revolution in, 343, 357
Hunan, 61, 126, 345; peasant movement in, 166, 233, 238–50 *passim*, 255–57; revolution in, 258–65 *passim*, 361, 417; soviet in, 269, 292, 312, 346–47
Hunan CCP, 346, 366
Hunan Peasant Association, 256–57, 259
"Hunan Report" (Mao), 238, 332, 335
Hung Chao-lin, 81, 155
Hung T'ui, 56
*Hung-chün sheng-huo*, 303
Hungary, 167
Hunghuati, 352
Hungk'eng, 109, 305, 310f
Hupeh, 164, 250, 258–65 *passim*, 322, 361
Hut'ient'ung, 356

*I-chun*, *see* People's Armies
*I-hsüeh*, 33
*I-ts'ang*, 18, 33
Ichang, 366
Imperialism, 66–67, 262
Incense Army, 25
Industry, 12, 33, 49, 62, 313–14
Inflation, 56, 113–14
Intellectuals, 34, 44, 46, 56, 74; as elite, 16f, 36, 50; as political activists, 37–38, 63–65, 67, 178, 234; in peasant movement, 115–19 *passim*, 135, 139, 144, 364–65; in sovietization, 294, 310
Internationalism, 56, 58–59
Isaacs, Harold, 264, 364
Italian consulate, 318, 349
Iwao, Wada, 56–57, 58

Japan, 36, 38, 54–68 *passim*, 76, 178, 386
Japanese Socialist Federation, 56
Jen Pi-shih, 259
Jenshan, 343
Joffe, A. A., 166
Juan Hsiao-hsien, 68, 178–79, 183, 204, 251, 406
Justice and Equality Party, 227

Kan Shih-chieh, 224
Kanchuyüan, 303
"Kao nung-min-shu" (KMT), 63, 178
"Kao t'ung" (P'eng), 68, 72–73, 92, 211, 392
Kaosha, 52–53
Karakhan, Lev, 66–67
Kaying, 15
*Ke-ming*, *see* Revolution
Kensetsushadōmei, 56–62 *passim*
Kiangsi, 14, 222, 230, 327; CCP and, 250, 256–57, 266
Kiangsi Soviet, 291, 360–61
Kiangsu, 2, 163, 322, 361

Kim San, 285, 287–88, 299–303 *passim*, 328f, 335–36, 341, 351–59 *passim*
KMT (Kuomintang), 194, 224–25, 298, 325, 394; CCP conflict and, v–vi, 202–7 *passim*, 212–15 *passim*, 230, 262–67 *passim*, 277, 378; P'eng and, 1–4, 152, 159, 279, 360, 369; CCP alliance with, 166–72 *passim*; peasant organization in, 173–85 *passim*, 240–59 *passim*; violence and, 307, 334f, 345f
KMT Congress, First (Jan. 1924), 170, 173
KMT Congress, Second (Jan. 1926), 233, 235
KMT Plenum (Mar. 1927), 239
KMT Revolutionary Army, 165, 198, 208, 238; Ch'en forces and, 190–94, 196–97; peasants and, 200–203 *passim*, 218–22, 260–61, 273, 304; CCP opposition to, 274, 301, 308, 343–45; threat to CCP, 321, 323, 337, 348–59 *passim*, 364, 366
*Kona Maru*, 38
Krestintern, 174, 197, 233, 249
Kropotkin, P. A., 57, 63–64, 65
Ku Hung-chiang, 284
Ku Ta-ts'un, 210, 344f, 360, 368, 403
Kuang-shou yao-kuan, 313
K'ueit'an, 339, 344
*Kung-ch'an*, *see* Communism
*Kung-t'uan-chün*, 179–80
Kungp'ing, 12f, 62, 91, 200, 278; Peasant Union, in, 118f, 131, 154–55; revolution in, 200, 351–52, 357
Kungtzushan, 328
Kuo Mo-jo, 368
*Kuo-min hsin-wen*, 213
*Kuo-min jeh-pao*, 55
*Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 301, 334
Kuolung, 344, 360
Kwangning, 24–25, 180–90 *passim*, 195–96, 244, 246, 253
Kwangning Peasant Association, 182–83, 253
Kwangsi, 61, 81, 180, 200, 251
Kwangsi Army, 83, 200, 324, 350
Kwangsi clique, 47, 60
Kwangtung, v, 5, 54, 309, 368, 370; background, 9, 14–15, 17, 22, 26, 36; militarization in, 35, 41, 195–96, 208, 230, 262, 350; land in, 38–39, 101–10 *passim*, 115, 163, 256–57, 391; Ch'en in, 42–47 *passim*, 60–67 *passim*, 76–77, 81–83, 153, 159, 190–91; KMT in, 166, 200, 228f, 344, 349; PMTI in, 241, 243, 247; revolution in, 263–66 *passim*, 280, 321–22, 326, 334, 360; sovietization in, 345, 348, 366
Kwangtung Army, 47f, 60, 81, 83, 190–93 *passim*; peasant movement and, 95, 102, 155, 185; oppression and, 109, 136–37
Kwangtung Association for the Study of Self-Government, 39
Kwangtung CCP, 232–39, 247f, 421; peasant movement and, 204, 215, 223–24, 259; revolution and, 228, 258, 266, 273–77, 319f, 342; KMT and, 230, 259f, 267; soviet and, 286–89, 291, 296–305 *passim*, 314–23 *passim*, 331–37 *passim*, 368
Kwangtung Peasant Congress, First (May 1925), 197, 203, 248
Kwangtung Provincial Assembly, 190
Kwangtung Provincial Peasant Association, 176, 178, 197–98, 203–15 *passim*, 230n, 231, 246–59 *passim*
Kwangtung Provincial Peasant Association Congress (May 1926), 194, 195–96, 246–53 *passim*
Kwangtung Provincial Peasant Union, 136–40 *passim*

Labor Day parade (1920), 83–84
*Labor Herald*, 68
Labor movement, 64, 235, 237, 257, 378, 396
Labor unions, 245, 282, 313–24; peasants and, 152, 165, 198; KMT and, 177–78, 194, 224–25, 229; revolution and, 294, 310, 332
Laborers, 113–15, 175, 210, 292
"Lament for the Peasant Friends of Wuhua, A" (P'eng), 212
Lan Ch'en-jun, 147–49
Lan Ching-Ch'ing, 120, 146–47
Lan Chiu-chia, 225
Land, 10, 16ff, 35, 38, 75; value of, 49–51, 101–5, 158; peasant movement and, 94–95, 120, 175, 211–12; peasant condition and, 109–14 *passim*, 127, 174, 184. *See also* Property; Tenure, of land
Land certificate, 290–91

Land League, 163
Land question, 73, 163–70 *passim*, 226–27, 233–49 *passim*, 255–59, 261, 359, 364
Land revolution, 167f, 263–68 *passim*; violence and, 199, 329–30, 343, 419; in Soviet, 275–93 *passim*, 316, 323, 338, 364
Landlord Society, 132, 137, 143, 147–48, 158, 189, 217
Landlord-tenant relations, 19–20, 58, 104–8, 180, 395; exploitation in, 49–53, 102–3, 111–16 *passim*, 164; peasant movement and, 56, 98, 140–43, 148–49
Landlords, 16, 25f, 36, 369; under Ch'en, 43, 48, 100, 109; P'eng's attitude toward, 46, 80–85 *passim*, 94–97 *passim*, 192, 409; as reactionaries, 84, 200, 206–7, 212f, 337, 348; peasant movement and, 117, 128, 169, 181, 203, 241; Peasant Union and, 118–22 *passim*, 130–34, 137, 146, 154, 156–57; CCP and, 167, 236, 256, 263–67 *passim*; KMT and, 170, 215, 252; Peasant Association and, 175, 183–90, 208, 210, 257; attacks on, 195–201 *passim*, 223–28 *passim*, 275–80 *passim*, 312, 328–40 *passim*, 356, 362, 419; and Soviet, 288–94 *passim*
Language, 13–14, 15, 33, 64, 92–93, 100, 206
*Lao-tung-sheng*, 68
Laolung, 88, 142–50 *passim*, 192
Leadership, 99, 117; in Peasant Union, 118–19, 140, 145; CCP and, 167, 178, 236, 359, 364
Left Committee, 370ff
Lei Te, 216–21 *passim*
Lenin, V. I., 47, 188, 205, 316; influence of, 57, 66, 80, 278f, 285; peasant movement and, 166–67, 168
Leninism, 240, 298, 346, 363f
"Letter-Declaration to the Peasantry" (CCP), 233
"Letter-Declaration to the Peasants" (KMT), 63, 178
Li Chen-ch'iu, 351
Li Chi-shen, 221, 251, 253; rival to CCP, 227–31 *passim*, 260; sovietization and, 274, 326f, 344, 348–50, 352
Li Chi-yüan, 181–87 *passim*
Li Chin-ming, 226
Li Ch'un-t'ao, 55–59 *passim*, 68, 74, 119, 379; on peasant movement, 70, 85–91 *passim*, 96f, 127, 149, 169; on class consciousness, 116, 135, 142; on Peasant Union, 120, 122, 136–39 *passim*, 391f
Li Chung-chüeh, 15, 32ff, 217–21 *passim*
Li Fu-lin, 83, 231, 334
Li Hung-chang, 88
Li Kuo-chen, 55, 68–74 *passim*, 190, 225f
Li Lao-kung, 68, 115, 146–54 *passim*, 159, 192–202 *passim*, 392f, 401–2
Li Lao-szu, 95–96
Li Li-San, 1, 5, 258, 312, 362, 365
Li Lieh-chun, 109
Li Lien-p'ing, 328, 371
Li Szu-hsien, 95
Li Ta-chao, 66, 71, 165
Li Tsung-jin, 235
Li Yüeh-t'ing, 45, 74, 85, 115
Li-chia, 34
Liang, Fr., 26
Liang Ping-kang, 279, 296, 298
Liao Ch'ien-wu, 185, 188
Liao Chung-k'ai, 60f, 174–77 *passim*, 182–88 *passim*, 200f
Liebknecht, Karl, 57
*Life in the Red Army*, 303
Lin clan, 13, 16; as landlords, 20, 49, 102, 118, 143–44; persecution of, 196, 329, 340
Lin Hu, 155
Lin Huan, 95
Lin Kan-ts'ai, 44–45, 109, 193
Lin Nao, 307
Lin P'ei, 95–96, 97, 120
Lin Piao, 372–73
Lin Pin, 296, 303, 314
Lin Po-ch'ü, 173f, 235
Lin P'u-t'ing, 383
Lin Su, 55, 68–69, 115, 117, 138, 146–49, 195
Lin Tao-wen, 68–69, 243, 282; in Peasant Union, 115, 195; in Peasant Association, 197–98, 200, 225; in revolution, 260–61, 266, 287, 301, 333, 351
Lin T'ieh-shih, 55, 190, 225, 284, 287, 296, 324
Lin Tou-wen, 38, 143
Lin Tsu-han, 173f, 235
Lin Wei-nung, 224
Lin Wu-nung, 192, 195
Lineage, 16–20, 30, 41–42, 138
Literacy, 76, 125, 250

Litigation, 98–99, 114, 120, 128–33 *passim*, 205
Liu Chen-huan, 83, 200, 221, 243
Liu Chih-wen, 212f
Liu Ch'in-hsi, 196, 223, 280, 301, 339, 343
Liu En-ch'üan, 124
Liu Jen-ching, 151, 168
Liuyang, 292
Lo Ch'i-yüan: in CCP, 68, 258, 292–96 *passim*; in Peasant Association, 178–79, 202–10 *passim*, 222, 251; militarization and, 214, 243, 253; revolution and, 309–12 *passim*, 320, 334, 343–47 *passim*
Lo clan, 17, 228
Lo Jui-ch'ing, 368
Lo Kuo-chieh, 180, 186
Lo Kuo-liang, 356
Loshan, 380
Loan Societies, 18
Loans, 18, 109–10, 123, 257, 315
Localism, among peasants, 43, 136, 260, 304, 325, 368–69
Loch'ang, 218, 220
Lominadze, V., 264, 320, 322
Long Hair Society, 25, 201, 338
Long Knives, 359
Lu Chen-liu, 187-88
Lu'an, 9
*Lu'an Daily* (*Lu'an jih-k'an*), 62, 70, 84, 85–87, 137, 139
Lü (Taoist monk), 146
Lü Ch'u-hsiung, 124
Lü clan, 16
Lü Shun-chieh, 190, 224
Lü T'ieh-ts'o, 85, 132, 138, 149
Lüching, 16, 45
Lufeng, 67, 90, 202, 273; description of, 9–26 *passim*, 32–36 *passim*, 49, 62, 75f, 101, 104; Peasant Union in, 118, 135–41 *passim*, 149, 153, 194, 196; peasant movement in, 195–99 *passim*, 222–28 *passim*; revolution and, 229, 261, 274, 322, 326, 343–58 *passim*, 421; Soviet in, 275–79 *passim*, 284, 296f, 305–8 *passim*, 329, 337–41, 366
Lung-chin River, 9, 353, 371
Lung-she-p'u, 21, 133f, 282f
Lungchin Drama Company, 78
Lunghua, 2, 3
Lungshan, 30, 287, 380
Luxemburg, Rosa, 57

Ma Chao-p'ing, 124
Ma clan, 16, 48
Ma Huan-hsin, 139, 143, 393
Ma Ssu-ta, 339
Ma Yü-hang, 38, 48, 81, 84, 139–50 *passim*
Macao, 62, 197, 213, 329, 367
McDonald, A. W., 364n
Machu, 201, 292, 357
Magistrates, 16–20 *passim*, 32–49 *passim*, 208, 223
Maglioni, Fr. R., 23
Makung, 329
*Mang-tung chu-i*, 360, 372
"Manifesto on China" (Karakhan), 66–67
Mao Tse-min, 243
Mao Tse-tung, vi, 64, 249, 367f; peasant movement and, 93, 222–23, 233, 239; education and, 126f, 240, 243–47; P'eng and, 151, 290, 369; in KMT-CCP, 165–66, 168, 215, 238, 256–58, 260; in CCP, 264, 359–65 *passim*, 406; and soviets, 269, 293–94, 302, 353–54, 360, 366, 372; revolution and, 332, 335, 345–48, 370, 411, 421
Martial arts, 23–24, 26
Marx, Karl, 57, 64, 66, 80, 278f, 285, 408
Marxism, 4, 65, 66–67, 85, 163, 247; in Japan, 57, 63; P'eng and, 59, 396; clan struggle and, 135, 164; revolution and, 171, 239n, 269, 298, 362–65 *passim*, 398
Mass Education Movement, 79–80, 126
May Day, 83–84, 135f, 197
"May Day Declaration," 135
May Fourth Movement, 47, 59–68 *passim*, 241
May Thirtieth Movement, 201, 232
Medical care, 12, 39, 120, 123–24, 299–300, 314
Meihsien, 15, 67, 210, 326f
Meilung, 12–20 *passim*, 49, 102, 193f, 313; Peasant Union in, 118f, 130, 154; revolution and, 274, 327, 335, 353–57 *passim*
Meisner, Maurice, 65
Merchant Corps, 175, 179–80, 187, 243, 343
Merchant Corps Incident, 179–80, 243
Merchants, 48–51, 113; Ch'en and, 43, 81, 109, 190; peasant movement and, 143f, 189, 211; KMT and, 179, 225, 274; in So-

viet, 275, 305, 348; class awareness and, 294, 337, 384, 420
Merchants' Association, 348
Messianism, 24f, 163
Mif, Pavel, 345–46, 366
Militarization, 46; for clan protection, 34–35, 41–42; in peasant movement, 155, 207, 226, 262, 298. *See also* Guerrilla warfare; Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI); Peasant Self-Defense Corps
Military power, 59, 109, 211; peasants and, 226, 252; CCP and, 267, 297; and Soviet, 300–301, 303, 322, 348, 350–54
*Min-chün*, 40–41, 43, 82, 155, 348
*Min-hsing pao*, 64
*Min-pao*, 37–38
*Min-sheng*, 64
*Min-t'uan*, 46, 179ff, 186, 208–22 *passim*, 230, 251ff, 356–59 *passim*
Ming dynasty, 15, 164, 380
Minjindōmeikai, 56
Missions Etrangères de Paris, 26
Modernization, 12f, 36, 42–54 *passim*, 60, 75
Monetary system, 48–51, 330–31
Moneylenders, 109–15 *passim*, 275
Moore, Barrington, 51
Moscow, 1, 69, 233, 237–38, 249
*Mui-tsai*, 27–28, 310
*Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (Kropotkin), 63–64
Mutual Aid Society, 64
"Myself" (P'eng), 87

Nan-feng certificates, 331
Nanch'ang, 261, 325; Chiang Kai-shek in, 230, 239, 257; Red Army in, 300f, 345, 347
Nanch'ang Uprising, 1, 102, 264–68 *passim*, 273, 288, 297, 358
Nanhai, 30, 177
Nanking, 231, 274, 348, 353
Nanling, 333
Nant'ang, 339, 351
Nant'u, 23, 329
National Association for the Advancement of Education, 75ff
"National Revolution and the Peasant Movement, The" (Mao), 245
*National Salvation Daily*, 55
Nationalist Party, 42, 158
Nationalization, of land, 62, 67, 163, 265, 267, 292
Nepotism, 42, 136
*New Haifeng*, 69–71, 76, 85, 87
New Life Society, 85
New Men Society, 56
*New Tide*, 68
*New Youth*, 60, 67f, 76
Nieh Jung-chen, 368, 426
Ningkang, 366
*North China Herald*, 60, 64f, 229; on CCP, 2, 308, 326; on militarization, 196–97, 214, 358; on Red Terror, 333f, 356
Northern Expedition, 190, 208–22 *passim*, 227f, 234–39 *passim*, 255f, 262, 312
Northern Expedition Army Tax, 209
Northwest Peasant Army, 274
*Nung-min hsieh-hui*, *see* Peasant Association
*Nung-min tzu-wei-chün*, *see* Peasant Self-Defense Armies
*Nung-min yün-tung chiang-hsi*, *see* Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI)
*Nung-t'uan-chün*, *see* Peasant Self-Defense Corps

Office for the Promotion of Education, 36, 67, 73–75
Officials, 17; under Ch'en, 47f, 81–82, 100, 115; peasant movement and, 84, 117, 154, 208, 217, 263; revolution and, 332, 362
"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" (Mao), 360
Opium: Ch'en and, 39, 64, 83; in peasant movement, 175, 199–200, 208, 226, 331
Organization, The, 295–300 *passim*, 309
Ou Sheng-pai, 68
Ownership, *see* Property

Pai Ch'ung-hsi, 350
Pai Yen-i, 298
*Pai-lien-chiao-hui*, 25, 340
P'anyü, 177, 216
*Pao-an-tui*, 46, 350ff
*Pao-chia* system, 32ff
*Pao-t'ien*, 106, 143
*Pao-wei-t'uan*, 46, 205
Paoan, 177

Parents' Associations, 18, 123
Pawnbrokers, 35, 49, 109–10, 113, 275
Peasant Association, v, 56, 406, 420; KMT and, 170–239 *passim*; PMTI and, 241–46 *passim*; CCP and, 259–65 *passim*, 273, 276, 363; revolution and, 269, 298, 303, 306, 332f, 362; sovietization and, 278, 282–86 *passim*, 294–97 *passim*, 310–15 *passim*, 338. *See also specific associations by place*
Peasant Congress, First (May 1925), 197, 203, 248
Peasant Congress, Second (May 1926), 194, 195–96, 246–53 *passim*
Peasant movement, in Japan, 56–62 *passim*
Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI), 204, 215, 240–48, 407; KMT and, 125, 176–82 *passim*; students from, 183, 191, 198, 226, 238, 260, 309
Peasant Self-Defense Armies, 155, 175, 399; KMT and, 179–80, 200–201, 243, 252–53; Peasant Association and, 183–92 *passim*, 206, 213–22 *passim*, 228–31; CCP and, 195, 198–99, 236, 241, 278; in revolution, 260–61, 267, 273–76; in Soviet, 298, 321, 326, 345–50 *passim*
Peasant Self-Defense Corps: KMT-CCP, 170, 175–80 *passim*, 195–201 *passim*, 210, 230, 236; training for, 214–25, 242–45 *passim*; in Soviet, 300, 333, 345f
Peasant Union, 1, 58, 170, 198–99, 203; history of, v, 90–99 *passim*, 100–159, 192–95 *passim*, 203–6 *passim*, 391–96 *passim*; CCP and, 202, 229, 258, 266, 282. *See also specific unions by place*
Peking, 47, 59, 81, 188, 349, 368–72 *passim*
P'eng Chung, 228
P'eng clan, 13–17 *passim*, 50, 380, 385, 403, 420; Ch'en and, 85, 200; P'eng P'ai and, 89–94 *passim*; peasant movement and, 118, 138, 154, 197, 228; in Soviet, 341, 367–73 *passim*
P'eng Fan, 18, 27ff, 49
P'eng Fang, 27
P'eng Han-yü, *see* P'eng P'ai
P'eng Han-yüan, 27f, 78, 367; P'eng and, 89–90, 91; in Peasant Union, 115, 145–50 *passim*; in revolution, 192, 230, 321; in government, 197, 223, 227, 396
P'eng Hsi-hung, 361, 367–73 *passim*
P'eng Hui-jin, 16
P'eng K'o, 372f
P'eng Kuei, 198, 241, 361; in revolution, 302, 327, 345, 351, 357, 361
P'eng K'uei-ch'i, 18
P'eng Ming-ho, 18–19, 78, 92, 94
P'eng Nan-chin, 18, 27ff, 49
P'eng P'ai, 2–4, 27–37 *passim*, 44–46, 54–66
P'eng Pao-lu, 367
P'eng Shou-yin, 27ff
P'eng Shu, 27f, 367
P'eng Ta-wu, 27f, 321, 367
P'eng Te-huai, 346
P'eng T'ien-ch'üan, 28
P'eng Tse, 3, 27, 72, 227, 321, 367; P'eng and, 28, 55, 58, 90f, 223
P'eng Ying-p'ei, 27f
P'eng Yüan-chang, 195, 224, 284, 296, 356
P'eng Yüan-yüeh, 309
People's Armies, 40–41, 43, 82, 155, 348
People's Committee, 366
People's Corps, *see Min-t'uan*
People's Council, 366
*People's Daily*, 363, 372–73
People's Government, 286–87
People's Headquarters, 370–72
People's League, 56
People's Liberation Army, 361
*People's News*, 213
People's Republic of China, 24, 152, 363
*People's Review*, 37–38
Piazzoli, Fr., 26
P'inghsiang, 163
P'ingkang, 118, 380
P'ingshan, 149, 191, 216–22 *passim*, 343
"Plan of Work at County and City Level" (CCP), 267, 274, 286–89, 316
*Plowshare*, 208, 230, 250–51
Po I-po, 363
Po Ku, 366
Political power, 63, 89, 178, 385; in Hai-Lu-feng, 24, 32–36 *passim*, 42, 48–52; in Peasant Union, 99, 115, 118, 139, 141, 159; in CCP, 195–96, 214, 267; and Peasant Association, 223, 265; and revolution, 268f, 306, 312, 347; in Soviet, 284, 353, 367
"Political Report of the Hupeh Provincial Committee" (P'eng), 274, 281–85 *passim*, 338, 378

"Political Tasks and Tactics of the CCP" (CCP), 264
Pomei, 338, 339–40
Poor Devils' Alliance, 189
Population, 11–16 *passim*, 49, 101, 103, 164
Powder-Gun Brigade, 310–11
Pozzoli, Bishop, 83
Pozzoni, Fr., 26
*Pravda*, 266
"Precious Piece of Paper, A" (P'eng), 211
Presbyterian missionaries, 26, 36, 123f, 295, 306
Proletariat, 165, 179, 252, 269; peasants as, 4, 109,166f, 239, 259; CCP and, 309, 364, 412
Propaganda, 189, 261, 359; for Peasant Union, 124–25, 129, 142–43, 155–56, 250–51; P'eng and, 151, 154, 358, 360; youth and, 181, 309f, 396; CCP and, 191–92, 224, 237, 267, 277, 298–99, 348
Propaganda Training Institute, 67–68, 240
Property, 19–20, 72, 82, 95, 165f; peasants and, 127–28, 132, 255, 370; expropriation of, 193f, 223, 268, 275, 292–94, 334–35
Protestants, 26, 42, 223, 295, 306; and social welfare, 36, 76, 123f
Provincial Peasant Union, 136–40 *passim*
P'uning, 246, 248, 277; Fang clan in, 100, 108, 205–7; peasant movement in, 117, 136, 153, 197; revolution in, 299, 329, 343–44, 358, 360; soviet in, 316, 337, 366
P'uning Peasant Association, 206–8
Putschism, 360, 372
P'utzut'ung, 357

Raimondi, Bishop, 26
Rayssac, Bishop, 277
Recreation club, for youth, 225, 248, 309
Red Army, v, 5, 273, 278ff; in Soviet, 270, 300–304, 320–29 *passim*, 336–70 *passim*, 416, 421
Red Flag, *see* Flags
*Red Flag*, 298, 315, 320, 421
Red Guards' Army, 282, 371; purpose of, 276, 281, 294–95, 300–306 *passim*, 314, 421; in revolution, 320, 326–33 *passim*, 347–48, 356f
Red Heart Society, 57
*Red Heart Weekly*, 85–88, 94
Red Peasant International, 174, 197, 249
Red Spears, 359
Red Terror, 278, 295–300 *passim*, 306–7, 332–42 *passim*, 356, 362–72 *passim*, 419–20
Red Turbans, 25
Reformism, v, 1, 63; under Ch'en, 39, 47, 64, 76–77; in peasant movement, 121, 167, 226–27
Religion, 20–27 *passim*, 35, 175, 306–7, 319, 381. *See also* Christianity; Worship
Rent, 58; in landlord-tenant relations, 16, 19, 50–56 *passim*, 102–14 *passim*; P'eng on, 94, 136, 207; Peasant Union on, 98, 118ff, 127–49 *passim*, 157, 394; CCP on, 165–68 *passim*, 195, 235, 258–65 *passim*; KMT-CCP and, 170, 180, 193–203 *passim*; Peasant Association on, 175, 183–89 *passim*, 211ff, 223, 226, 232, 257; in Soviet, 274, 289, 291, 315f. *See also* Tenancy
"Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement" (Mao), 238, 332, 335
"Report on Huahsien" (P'eng), 364
"Report on the Haifeng Peasant Movement" (P'eng), 99, 101, 111, 244ff, 390
"Report on the Labor and Peasant Day" (P'eng), 135
*Republican Daily*, 55
"Resolution on the Peasant Movement" (CCP), 236
Revenge, 23, 202, 235, 332, 340, 356, 362, 372
Revive China Society, 24
Revolution, v–vi, 1, 66–67, 101, 154, 226; P'eng and, 4–5, 72f, 85–89 *passim*, 94–95, 120–25 *passim*, 152–58 *passim*, 358; Peasant Union and, 140–45; KMT-CCP and, 163–72 *passim*, 180–86 *passim*, 228–29, 234–54, 258–70; Peasant Association and, 195–204 *passim*, 213, 216, 362; and Soviet, 273, 298–310 *passim*, 319–27, 343–48 *passim*, 359, 363–65, 378, 419. *See also* Agrarian revolution; Land revolution; Red Terror
Revolution of 1911, 24, 38, 39–43, 279
Rey, Fr., 196
Rice, 10, 49, 106–13 *passim*, 127, 210ff, 329
Righteous Army, *see* People's Armies
Robba, Fr. M., 42, 196, 199, 317, 355, 359

Roy, M. N., 167, 257f, 263
"Rules for Killing" (CCP), 332
Rural Covenant, 34
Russia, 56, 65, 205, 249, 266; influence of, 47, 66–67, 125, 281, 291; training in, 148, 190–91, 224; Sun Yat-sen and, 164, 169–70; KMT and, 166, 179, 256, 262, 264; advisors from, 171, 174, 197, 213; militarization and, 200–201, 265, 347, 358. *See also* Moscow
Russian Revolution, 47, 56f, 229, 277–78

Sacred Edict, 25, 32
Sakoe, Osugi, 57
Sakuzō, Yoshino, 56
Salt, 12, 32, 49, 108f, 138, 314, 330
*San-ho-hui*, *see* Triad
Sandeman, Dr., 124
Santochu, 350
Sasso, Fr., 26
Scholars, *see* Intellectuals
Schram, Stuart, 245, 348
Schwartz, Benjamin, 364
*Sea-Sky Weekly*, 86–88
Secret societies, 21–25, 41, 46, 363; Peasant Union and, 120, 121–22, 148; Soviet and, 338, 341. *See also specific societies by name*
Security Corps, 46, 350ff
Seido, Takatsu, 59
Self-Education University, 240
Self-Government Army, *see* People's Armies
*Seraph*, H.M.S., 317–19
Shakang, 16–23 *passim*, 329
Shanghai, 61–62, 69, 81, 230, 262; CCP in, 1–2, 93, 320; P'eng in, 55, 59, 68
Shangp'u, 339f
Shangsha, 344
Shansi, 14, 380
Shaokang, 355
*She-hsüeh*, 33–35
*She-hui Ch'ing-nien t'uan*, *see* Socialist Youth Corps (SYC)
Shekang, 184–89 *passim*
Shekang Peasant Association, 184
*Shen-chiao*, 338
*Shen-shang*, 49–50. *See also* Merchants
*Shen-ta-t'uan*, 182
Shih Ts'ung-t'ung, 68
*Shih-pao*, 340
Shihlung, 190, 327
Shina Kyokai, 59
Shinjinkai, 56f
Shinjirō, Kitazawa, 56–58
Shoi, Kiyake, 58
*Shuang-chou p'ing-lun*, 60
Shunte, 176ff, 214
Sneevliet, H., 65
Snow, Edgar, 365ff
Social power, 63, 178, 306
Social welfare movement, 116, 122–28, 139–40, 153, 203–4, 210, 299–300
Socialism, 66, 293, 363; P'eng and, 58, 68–73 *passim*, 86, 94, 120; Ch'en and, 60–67 *passim*; revolution and, 142, 154, 264, 268
Socialist Youth Corps (SYC), 68, 69–70, 241, 245, 387, 407; in peasant movement, 90, 93, 115–16, 139–41 *passim*, 164–68 *passim*, 177–80 *passim*, 216; P'eng and, 151–52, 388, 394, 396. *See also* Communist Youth Corps (CYC)
Society for Righteousness, 38
Society for the Protection of Landlords, 183, 185
Society for the Study of Socialism, 65, 68–69, 89
Society of Heaven and Earth, 123
Society of the Progressive Masses, 45
Society to Guarantee Taxation and Production, 132
Society to Protect Production, 119
Society to Recover the Nation's Rights, 38
Southern Sung dynasty, 14f, 21, 25
Soviet chronicler, *see Hai-Lu-feng Soviet, The*
Soviet People's Committee, 337, 341–42
Sovietization, 120, 268–70, 341, 365–67, 379; CCP and, 266, 275, 278, 285–88, 297, 322, 359
Stalin, Joseph, 233, 237f, 262–63, 319
Starvation, 29–30, 143, 166, 354, 369
*Statistical Monograph* (Ch'en), 109
Status, 18–19, 27–28, 41, 48–51 *passim*, 74, 77, 88f, 117
"Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains" (Mao), 362
Student activists, 44–45, 54–59 *passim*, 66–73 *passim*, 240–48 *passim*, 370

Student Union, 45, 65–71 *passim*, 120, 194, 198, 225, 282. *See also* Haifeng Student Union
Su Chao-cheng, 230, 320
Suicide, 52, 205
*Summary for Propaganda* (KMT), 256–57
Sun Yat-sen, v, 24, 37ff, 108, 205; Ch'en and, 48, 60, 65, 81–83, 136, 151–59 *passim*, 169–70, 217; P'eng and, 73, 88, 212; in KMT, 163–64, 166, 173–77 *passim*; peasants and, 168, 245, 251, 398; militarization and, 175, 179–80, 242; Peasant Association and, 176, 183–88 *passim*
Sun Yat-sen Society, 206f, 227
Sung dynasty, 32
Superstition, 21, 79, 110, 123–30 *passim*, 196
Swabue, 12, 14, 39, 59, 62, 82; uprisings in, 24, 42, 46, 149f; Christians in, 26, 76, 123f, 196, 199, 300, 306f, 317–19; peasant movement in, 135, 223, 227, 245; revolution in, 261, 274, 282, 350–56 *passim*; Soviet in, 284, 305
Swatow, 13, 26, 42, 49, 305, 371; militarization and, 38, 136, 155, 228–29, 265; Ch'en in, 47, 61–65 *passim*, 190–96 *passim*; peasant movement in, 67, 142, 150–54 *passim*, 197, 204–5, 226, 248; revolution and, 261, 274, 299, 324, 326, 344f, 350
Swatow Apostolic Vicariate, 26
Syndicalism, 56f, 64

Ta'an, 306, 351
*Ta-tao-hui*, 182
Taiping, 39, 90
Taiping Rebellion, 22, 35, 39, 256
*Tales of P'eng P'ai* (Shih), 368
T'an Chih-t'ang, 67–68
T'an P'ing-shan, 67–68, 173–78 *passim*, 194f, 237–38, 249, 255f, 262, 264
T'an Yen-k'ai, 249, 256
Tananshan, 313, 358, 360, 367
Tang Sheng-chih, 312
T'ang dynasty, 14
Tanka people, 15
T'anpu, 181–89 *passim*
T'anpu Peasant Association, 181, 184
T'anshui, 191, 229
Tao Feng-shun, 197
T'ao Chu, 368–69, 371
Tarkhanov, O. S., 251f, 291
Taxation, 75, 77, 83; in Hai-Lu-feng, 17–20 *passim*, 32–38, 46–52 *passim*, 106, 108–9, 114f; peasant movement and, 94, 132, 153, 203, 208–11 *passim*; KMT-CCP and, 164–74 *passim*, 235, 257; in Soviet, 267, 286–91 *passim*, 327, 331–32, 365
"Te-ch'u" villa, 74, 80, 94, 95–96, 129, 155, 194–95
Tenancy, 103, 105–6, 111, 113, 174, 180, 210
"Tenants Curse the Landlords, The" (P'eng), 97
Teng Chung-hsia, 116
Teng K'eng, 60, 81
Teng Liang-shan, 222
Teng Liang-sheng, 216
Teng Yen-ta, 256
Tenure, of land, 20, 51, 105
Theater, 78, 125, 388, 394
Third National Labor Congress (May 1926), 249
"30 percent maximum," 141–44, 148–49, 289
"Thirty Rules" (CCP), 267–68, 287f
Thousand Men Society, 163
Three Dots Society, 211
Three Harmonies Society, *see* Triad
T'ien Chih, 378
T'ienho, 217–21 *passim*
*Times, The*, 173, 321
Tokyo, 59, 63, 68
Tokyo Imperial University, 56f
Triad, 18–25 *passim*, 37–46 *passim*, 97ff, 121–27 *passim*, 227
Trotsky, Leon, 167, 237, 262–63, 316, 319
Ts'ai Chia-pang, 72, 76
Ts'ai clan, 16
Ts'ai Huo-p'eng, 184–85, 186
Ts'ai Su-p'ing, 45, 91, 205, 367, 425
Ts'ai T'eng-hui, 196, 228, 327–29, 343, 350–55 *passim*
Ts'ai Yu-p'ing, 204
Tseng lineage, 16
Tseng T'ien, 284
Tsengkuangfan, 343
Tsou Lu, 173, 180, 214
*Tsu-chih*, 295–300 *passim*, 309

Tu Chung-pin, 365
Tuan Ch'i-jui, Prime Minister, 55
Tung Lang, 278, 280, 351
T'ung Meng Hui, 38–42 *passim*, 125, 163
Tung-fang tsa-chih, 62–63
Tung-hu-she, 12, 48, 74
Tungkuan, 176–79 *passim*, 190
T'ungyüan, 185
*Two Pecks of Rent* (Peasant Union), 129
Tyrwhitt, Vice Admiral, 317
*Tzu-chih-chun*, *see* People's Armies
Tzuchin, 136f, 153, 276–79 *passim*, 298, 316, 324, 337, 343–44

United Front, 158, 203, 316; KMT-CCP and, v, 166, 224–37 *passim*, 252, 258–63 *passim*; peasant movement and, 169–70, 171, 177, 179
United States, 306, 309, 349
"Use the Masses' Revolutionary Struggle to Respond to the Massacre by the Counterrevolutionaries" (Chou), 3–4
Utopianism, vi, 25, 30, 64

Valtorta, Bishop H., 223, 295, 307, 312, 317–18, 334, 368
Versailles Peace Conference (1919), 59
*Voice of the People*, 64
Voitinsky, Grigory, 69, 214, 234
Volin, M., 103, 251, 256
Voting rights, 17, 177, 257, 287

Wages, 114, 126, 314
Wales, Nym, 364
Wang, of KMT, 216, 219
Wang Ching-wei, 60, 81, 233, 255, 257, 262
Wang clan, 16, 27
Wang Huai-tung, 284, 287
Wang Hung-wen, 117
Wang Ni-tan, 308
Wang Pao-chen, 307
Wang Pei, 287
Wang Shao-hung, 350
Wang Shou-tao, 292
Wang Ta-wei, 83
Wang Tso-hsin, 16, 27, 90, 94, 132, 137–59 *passim*
Wang Tzu-an, 2
Warlords, 41–42, 178, 181, 346; Ch'en and, 47, 151, 152–53, 227; P'eng and, 59, 82, 186, 202, 213; revolution against, 263, 327, 334
Waseda University, 28, 55–58 *passim*, 382
Water rights, 16f
Wealth, 109, 208, 395; in Hai-Lu-feng, 16f, 39, 49–53 *passim*; P'eng clan and, 18–19, 89, 385; communism and, 72f, 117, 164, 256, 267, 294, 305
Weapons, 24, 145, 192, 303–4, 305, 416
Wei Kung-chieh, 210
Wei Yao-li, 216–22 *passim*
Wen Liang, 67, 151
Wen T'ien-hsiang, 21, 36, 45
Weng Kuei-ch'ing, 73, 78f, 84f, 128, 389
Whampoa cadets, 179, 188–93 *passim*, 214, 324
White Flag, *see* Flags
White Lotus Sect, 25, 340
"Who Has the Duty to Come Out and Uphold Socialism?" (P'eng), 86
Wilson, Woodrow, 56
Wolf, Eric, 354
Women, 191, 198, 225f; in Soviet, 282–85 *passim*, 297–303 *passim*, 310–12, 314, 321, 359
Women's Liberation Association, 198, 226, 282, 310f
Worker and Peasant Recreation Club, 225, 248, 309
Workers, 89, 143, 198, 278; CCP and, 165–68 *passim*, 412; KMT and, 170, 239, 249; Soviet and, 268f, 313–21 *passim*, 370
Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government of Haifeng County, 285
Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, 267, 273, 335; recruits, 276, 308–14 *passim*; in Soviet, 280ff, 300–304 *passim*, 318–29 *passim*, 341–57 *passim*
Workers' Army Corps, 179–80
Workers' Friendship Society, 69, 89
Workers' movement, 169, 178, 264, 268
Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet Government, 337
World War I, 56
Worship, 11–21 *passim*, 30–35 *passim*, 79, 96, 137, 196

Wu Chen-min, 195, 198, 228, 230, 260–61
Wu Chien-liang, 284, 296
Wu Chih-chi, 224
Wu Chih-hui, 81
Wu Ch'un, 284
Wu Huan-t'ang, 74, 117
Wu Hung-chiang, 313
Wu Kuan-ch'i, 216–21 *passim*
Wu Li-shih, 284
Wu P'ei-fu, 168, 221, 227
Wu Ta-mei, 311
*Wu-cheng-fu chu-i*, 63
Wuhan, 228, 230, 239, 246, 255–64 *passim*, 291
Wuhua, 202, 209; in peasant movement, 153, 197, 210–15 *passim*, 231; and soviet, 277, 298f, 324, 337, 343–44, 366
Wup'oling, 21, 36
Wushihkang, 218

Yachien, 163
Yakhontoff, V. A., 366
Yamen, 74, 100, 144–45; in Hai-Lu-feng, 11, 20, 32, 36; under Ch'en, 48, 61
Yang Ch'i-sao, 311
Yang Ch'i-shan, 150; in Peasant Union, 90–91, 94, 118–22 *passim*, 129, 145, 156; revolution and, 146, 192; CCP and, 195, 284, 292
Yang Hsi-min, 83, 200, 221, 243
Yang Shih-hun, 229
Yang Szu-chen, 55, 57, 74, 85, 115
Yang Ta-po, 227
Yang Wang, 68–69, 195–99 *passim*, 280–87 *passim*, 305
Yang Yin, 2
Yanma, 52f, 98
Yao people, 15
Yeh Chien-ying, 194, 320, 373, 426
Yeh Chü, 81, 155
Yeh clan, 16
Yeh T'ing, 261–67 *passim*, 273, 319f
Yeh Yung, 324, 327, 351, 356
Yeh-Ho army, 261, 273f, 303, 322, 326, 345
Yen, James, 79–80
Yen Ch'ang-i, 287
Yenshih, 329
Yinchen, 118
Yolk, E. S., 103, 251, 256
Young Pioneers, 225, 301, 306–9 *passim*, 338
Young Vanguards, 308
Yü Fu, 212f
Yü Han-mou, 350f
Yü K'un, 131–41 *passim*
Yuaikai, 57, 386
Yüan Shih-k'ai, 43–47 *passim*
Yüant'ien, 219–20
Yüeh people, 14
Yuji, Muramatsu, 50
Yün Tai-ying, 93, 164
Yünlu, 97
Yunnanese Army, 83, 149, 200

Zamponi, Fr., 395
Zinoviev, G. E., 237

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