Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right

The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe

Simon Bornschier

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Preface

This book grew out of my fascination with the long-term stability of West European party systems and the partial disruption of these historical patterns caused by the forceful manifestation of identity politics in the 1990s. While some scholars took the latter to mark the end of cleavage-based politics, the common changes a number of party systems were experiencing can also be read as a sign that the societal changes of previous decades were quite predictably transforming older antagonisms. In fact, the very commonality of right-wing populist appeals made interpretations of a fundamental detachment between party systems and societies seem implausible. This is both good and bad news. Parties solidly anchored in society instill mechanisms of accountability, and despite citizens' growing skepticism toward politicians and parties, party systems have remained fairly responsive to voters' preferences throughout the countries studied. But the bad news is that we may find no comfort in the seemingly durable presence of parties that mobilize anti-universalistic preferences and values.

A first key to understanding the extreme-right-wing populist phenomenon is the novel ideology that has allowed the successful exponents of this new party family to mobilize tensions rooted in social structure. The first two chapters of this book study the ideological foundations of right-wing populist parties' appeal and its relationship to the political changes brought about by the New Left. In the third chapter, I introduce a cleavage perspective into the study of the extreme populist right. In doing so, I relate political change and entrepreneurship to the forces of inertia and path dependence that continue to characterize Western European party systems. I argue that

a cleavage perspective continues to make sense if we relate cleavages—old and new—to politics or to the concrete political conflicts between parties. This approach offers reasons why the extreme populist right flourishes in some countries but not in others. The German case demonstrates that the established parties can succeed in averting the establishment of a right-wing populist party and that, consequently, the right-wing potential present in all advanced industrial societies may remain latent.

This book could not have been written without the extensive collaborative efforts of and data collected by the researchers of the National Political Change in a Globalizing World project. Beyond the publications we wrote collectively (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), three of us studied the transformation of Western European party systems through the prism of a specific party family. This book is the study of one of these families. My participation in this project was extremely valuable to my work on this book, and I thank my five colleagues—Hanspeter Kriesi, Romain Lachat, and Timotheos Frey at the University of Zurich and Martin Dolezal and Edgar Grande at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich—for providing such a stimulating environment. Although we did not always agree in our interpretation of the changes we were studying, we share important views about the transformation of West European party systems in recent decades. In addition, I owe a debt to Timotheos Frey for showing me how to visualize otherwise unintelligible empirical results. He and Romain Lachat provided vital assistance in the data analysis.

As my doctoral supervisor, Hanspeter Kriesi followed the writing of this book from the very start. His enthusiasm and his criticism proved invaluable for its completion. I cannot overstate how much I have learned from him over the years. When Hans-Dieter Klingemann joined the project as an external member of the jury, he also contributed greatly to the improvement of the manuscript. Even more important is the debt I owe him for my initial interest in comparative politics. My fascination developed in a seminar on the future of democracy that he taught in Paris in the 1990s, and it was enhanced when he supervised my senior thesis at the Free University of Berlin. Without the influence of these two noted scholars, my interests almost certainly would have taken a different course.

I cannot possibly do justice to the numerous people who have provided valuable comments on portions of the manuscript. I can only begin by offering special thanks to Hans-Georg Betz, Dieter Fuchs, Herbert Kitschelt, Daniel Oesch, Hubert Roth, and Andrea Schlenker. Later in the project, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Zsolt Enyedi, and Oddbjørn Knutsen provided valuable input. In the final stages, I had the pleasure of exchanging ideas with Peter Mair while I was a visiting fellow at the European University Institute. In fact, this book could not have evolved without the influence of Stefano Bartolini and his *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability.* Last, but by no means least, I owe Silja Häusermann my deep gratitude for her numerous enlightening observations

about the project and for her continuing interest in the topic despite the many dinners we spent talking about it.

Finally, I express—posthumously, I regret—my thankfulness to Alan Zuckerman for his enthusiastic endorsement of the manuscript. I am also grateful to Alex Holzman and the editorial team at Temple University Press, and to Joan S. Vidal in the Production Department, who have done a great job and have generously offered help at every turn. Susan Deeks deserves a special acknowledgment for her excellent work in bringing the manuscript into shape in the copyediting process.

Florence, May 2009

INTRODUCTION

A Dynamic Perspective on Cleavages and the Populist Right

Value Divides and the Transformation of Western European Party Systems

The continuing presence of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe's political landscape since the 1990s is a phenomenon that escapes explanations centered on the level of individual countries. In spite of the split in 1998, Jean-Marie Le Pen came in second in the French 2002 presidential elections. He received a respectable share of the vote even in 2007, faced with a Gaullist candidate who heavily emphasized law-and-order stances and whose credibility in implementing important policy changes was obviously higher than that of a challenger no other party accepts as a coalition partner. In Austria, Jörg Haider and a handful of faithful followers left the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party; FPÖ), the party they had led to unprecedented electoral successes in the 1990s, after internal disputes. Nonetheless, together the FPÖ and the new Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria; BZÖ) received no less than 28 percent of the vote in the 2008 election. In Switzerland, the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party; SVP) has become the country's strongest party and gained a second seat in the country's executive Federal Council in 2003. Strong right-wing populist parties also exist in Flemish Belgium and in Denmark. The populist right has become firmly entrenched in countries that differ markedly in terms of their institutions, party systems, and political cultures.

Right-wing populist parties should be seen, I suggest in this book, in the larger context of changing societal structures that have affected party systems

since the late 1960s. While European party systems continue to carry the stamp of historical class and religious cleavages, the dimensions underlying party interactions have been transformed. A first restructuring of political space occurred as a consequence of the mobilization of the New Social Movements of the left in the 1970s and 1980s (Kitschelt 1994). This process has led to a transformation of Social Democratic parties as well as to the emergence of Green or ecologist parties, as I will refer to them, which have come to constitute the left-libertarian pole of a new cultural dimension of conflict that has succeeded the value divisions characteristic of the religious cleavage. Spurred by the educational revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the diffusion of universalistic values has thus led actors to call for the political enforcement of the principle of individual autonomy and the free choice of lifestyles. In a longer perspective, these developments can be seen as part of a long-term trend of secularization, as Scott Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee (2003) have argued.

Already in the 1980s, however, the contours of an opposing conception of community and of a different justification of moral principles had emerged in the form of the neo-conservative movement. Intellectuals and conservative political parties placed a renewed emphasis on tradition as a necessary binding force for society and propagated solidarity in established communities, such as the family, as an antidote to the perils of individualization. While neo-conservatism remained an elitist ideology, the conservative counter-movement to the libertarian left gained momentum when the populist right, a new party type, succeeded in framing the question of identity and community in terms of "us" and "the other." By putting the issues of immigration and the alleged inability to integrate people with different cultural backgrounds onto the political agenda, the populist right drove a second transformation of the dimensions of political conflict in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2006). Contrary to classical extreme-right parties, the populist right does not adhere to racism and does not reject other cultures as such; it advocates an "ethno-pluralist" ideal of preserving the distinctive traditions of national cultures.

As a consequence, a new cultural conflict gained center stage in Western European party systems in the 1990s. One side holds universalistic conceptions of community and advocates individual autonomy; the other emphasizes the right to preserve traditional communities in which common moral understandings have developed and are seen as threatened by multicultural society. These opposing positions mirror contemporary debates between liberals and communitarians in political philosophy, and in their extreme form they constitute the poles of a political dimension of conflict that runs from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian values. While liberal philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) emphasize universally binding norms, even moderate communitarians such as Michael Walzer (1983) are reluctant to grant abstract principles primacy over shared moral understandings within an "organic" community. New Right intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist have popularized and radicalized the latter view and have provided a blueprint for the populist right's "differentialist

nativist" discourse, as Hans-Georg Betz (2004) and Betz and Carol Johnson (2004) have termed it.

The factors determining the success of extreme-right parties in the 1980s have been quite diverse, leading Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995) to distinguish several types of such parties, which differ in their programmatic orientation. While some of them, such as the French Front National or the SVP in Switzerland, allegedly have an authoritarian free-market appeal, others, such as the Austrian FPÖ, are assumed to thrive more on populist anti-state pleas. These differences are conceived as the product of country-specific opportunity structures (Kitschelt with McGann 1995; McGann and Kitschelt 2005). In this first mobilization phase, anti-immigrant stances have played a minor role. And until today, extreme-right parties clearly capitalize on more than just opposition to immigration, even if that issue catalyzed their success (Mudde 1999).

If the differences were ever that stark, the "identitarian turn" of the 1990s in the discourse of right-wing populist parties, to use Betz's (2004) expression, has resulted in a programmatic convergence across countries. Rather than mobilizing country-specific potentials, these parties thrive on an ideologically homogeneous group of voters that are located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural dimension of conflict. As a consequence, extreme-right-wing populist parties—or right-wing populist, for short—can be considered a common party family within the broader category of extreme-right parties. Apart from their location at the extreme of the ideological dimension running from the libertarian-universalistic to the traditionalist-communitarian position, two further attributes distinguish them from other parties. The first is their populist anti-establishment discourse, in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established parties both of the left and right. Second, they show a hierarchical internal structure, which sets them apart from pluralist mainstream parties and allows a charismatic leader to quickly revise the party's positions in reaction to the changing moods of the populace. This organizational feature has enabled right-wing populist parties to rapidly seize the immigration theme, as well as to exploit new issues such as European integration. Within the wider extreme-right party family, the extreme populist right represents an ideologically more moderate subgroup by virtue of its "differentialist nativist" discourse, as well as by virtue of its explicit adherence to democratic rule. This allows right-wing populist parties to portray themselves as the ignored mainstream of society.

In the next two chapters of this book, I claim theoretically and then underscore empirically that the populist right's ideological core consists of opposition to the process of societal modernization that has accelerated since the 1960s. Spurred by the educational revolution as a critical juncture, the more widespread endorsement of universalistic values in society has resulted in a counterpotential constituted by citizens who oppose libertarian cultural norms. Why, then, did it take the traditionalist-communitarian potential so long to manifest itself in partisan politics? After all, the libertarian-universalistic movement led

to the formation of ecologist parties and the transformation of Social Democratic and Socialist parties much earlier.

The first answer to this question refers back to the definition of the populist right outlined above: Within the broader extreme-right family, only those belonging to the right-wing populist subgroup have been successful. As Jens Rydgren (2005) has pointed out, the success of the populist right has depended on the emergence and subsequent cross-national diffusion of the "differentalist nativist" political frame. To some degree, this echoes the older distinction between "old" extreme-right parties of a fascist imprint and the "new," post-industrial extreme-right party type (Ignazi 1992, 2003). But while the adoption of the new discourse is a necessary condition for success, it is not sufficient to account for variation in the fortunes right-wing populist parties have faced across Western Europe. Beyond ideology, two crucial factors are suggested in this book. On the one hand, the success of any new party hinges on the extent to which the traditional cleavages retain their hold on voters. On the other hand, the response of the established parties to their challenger determines whether a right-wing populist party will be able to break into the party system.

Historical Cleavages and the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties

Notwithstanding the increasing similarities of right-wing populist parties in terms of their discourse, their far from uniform success across Western Europe is striking. Despite experiencing similar processes of societal modernization, party systems in Germany, Britain, Sweden, and Spain have proved resilient to the rise of a party of the populist right. Rather than looking only at the profiles of their voters or at the populist right itself, the emergence of this party family must be analyzed in terms of the wider context of the party systems in which they are situated. The historical account of cleavage mobilization around class and religion suggests a straightforward answer concerning the timing and the differential entrenchment of right-wing populist parties: Established cleavages limit the space for the mobilization and political manifestation of political potentials based on new societal divisions (Bartolini 2000; Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995; Rokkan 1999). New divides will materialize only if the established cleavage structure no longer "organizes" issues cutting across existing lines of division "out of politics," in E. E. Schattschneider's (1975 [1960]: chap. 4) famous words.

Since party systems have became more volatile since the 1970s, contradictions in the understanding of the cleavage concept have limited its analytical usefulness. Different interpretations lead to diverging implications with respect to the space left by the established cleavages for the mobilization of new conflicts. Quite clearly, the socio-structural determinants of alignments along the *traditional* class and religious cleavages have lost strength. We could therefore conclude that the potential for new conflicts to emerge is large. However, new linkages between social groups and political parties have crystallized, and voting behavior continues

to have a structural basis (Evans 1999; Kriesi 1998; Müller 1999; Oesch 2008b). Rather than having vanished, the traditional cleavages seem to have been transformed, and continue to bind large parts of the electorate. The major obstacle to understanding the degree to which today's politics continues to be structured by the traditional cleavages is the gap that exists between research on the social basis of party systems and accounts that focus on political conflict.

To take into account the evolving nature of cleavages, I propose to link the structural-cleavage account with a focus on politics and parties' conflicting policy proposals. A focus on political conflict allows us to make sense of the famous "freezing into place" of European party systems that Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) observed, a process that has remained poorly understood to this day. Cleavages remain stable and "organize out" new issues to the degree that the basic oppositions they represent continue to shape voters' understandings and interpretations of politics. Consequently, a durable pattern of political behavior of structurally defined groups—a cleavage—has its origin in the conflicts resulting from a macro-historical critical juncture, but its continued salience depends on its being kept alive by contemporary political conflict. While conflict has group-binding functions (Coser 1956), collective political identities will gradually become weaker in the absence of political disputes. As a result, cleavages will no longer be transmitted over generations if the conflict they stand for has lost its relevance, and a window of opportunity for new divisions will emerge on the political stage.

Given the role of conflict in stabilizing and perpetuating cleavages, an empirically quantifiable model has been developed that incorporates the patterns of programmatic conflict in party competition into the cleavage model. By focusing on the lines of conflict that structure party interactions in election campaigns, it is possible to analyze the interplay of established cleavages and new divisions that may or may not alter the dominant patterns of oppositions. The empirical evidence presented in this book suggests that party oppositions evolve around two conflicts in the six countries studied—France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. The first is the political manifestation of the traditional class cleavage, whose socio-structural underpinnings suggest that it has evolved into a broader state-market cleavage. The second dimension is a cultural divide that is reminiscent of the religious cleavage but has been enriched with new issues. Today, as a result of the mobilization efforts of the New Left and of the counter-mobilization of the New Right, it reflects an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values.

Programmatic Lines of Conflict and Opportunities for Right-Wing Populist Mobilization

A central argument developed in this book is that the rise of the populist right is a consequence of the growing salience of the new cultural dimension of conflict at the expense of the economic state-market cleavage. Differing from

Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) idea that the "winning formula" for the extreme right combines authoritarian ethnocentrism and free-market economics, I show that these parties almost exclusively mobilize on the cultural dimension. In fact, they rally an electoral coalition that is united by relatively homogeneous cultural preferences but diverges much more in terms of orientations regarding state intervention in the economy. As the example of the French Front National most clearly demonstrates, the continued success of right-wing populist parties crucially depends on the prevalence of culturally, as opposed to economically, defined group identifications among their voters. Given the role of conflict in shaping collective identification, right-wing populist parties can thrive only if cultural conflicts are more salient to their voters than economic divisions. To assess the dynamics of success of the populist right, it is therefore essential to move beyond one-dimensional left-right conceptions of political space and to distinguish clearly between the party positions on both dimensions that are found to underlie party oppositions in Western Europe.

Obviously, right-wing populist parties cannot shape the dimensions of conflict underlying the party system alone. This study therefore considers the dynamics of competition of the party system as a whole, focusing on the programmatic positions and strategies employed by the established parties in dealing with the themes on which the populist right thrives. Previous studies have tested the hypothesis that support for the populist right depends on the convergence of the mainstream parties and the resulting political space for challengers. However, their predictions are weakened either by assumptions that party positions can be represented on a single left-right dimension, which meshes positions on the cultural and economic divides (e.g., Abedi 2002; Carter 2005) or by the implicit conviction that voters will support only parties that adequately represent them on both relevant dimensions (Kitschelt with McGann 1995). Both assumptions are problematic and do not hold up against empirical evidence.

For scholars working within the cleavage approach, the idea that voters may experience conflicts of interest as a result of cross-cutting cleavages is in fact far from new. As a result of the recent transformation of the cultural dimension of conflict in European party systems, this problem is posed anew and has resulted in the dealignment and realignment of various groups of voters. Two important predictors emerge that structure the opportunities for the populist right. One is the *relative importance of the economic and cultural dimensions* of conflict to its potential voters; the other is the *relative salience of the various group identifications* that these voters hold. It is only the waning of collective identities based on social class that has made possible mobilization efforts based on national identity and tradition, because class identifications have typically cut across such broad ascriptive categories.

The model developed in this book analyzes the contribution of each dimension of conflict in structuring political alignments separately. It combines a focus on parties' programmatic offerings with an analysis of the preferences or the political demand of voters. Beyond addressing the question of the relative impor-

tance of the two dimensions of conflict for the mobilization of the various party families, the model centers on two factors that impinge on the chances for challenging parties to gain success. The first factor, in the tradition of Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990), as well as Hanspeter Kriesi and Jan Willem Duyvendak (1995), is the *closure* of the social groups divided by a cleavage. The degree of closure of these groups is essential, because when existing group identifications are strong, mobilization efforts along new lines of social division are difficult.

The second factor that impinges right-wing populist parties' chances is the *opportunity structure* resulting from the programmatic positions and the strategies of the established parties. Where the established parties absorb the traditionalist-communitarian potentials that gain room as a result of the weakening of the traditional cleavages, the populist right will have trouble entrenching itself. In other words, the responsiveness of the party system to the preferences of the electorate is of crucial importance. Likewise, if the established parties keep polarization around the new cultural conflicts low, they may be able to contain the manifestation of the new potential while remaining responsive to their constituencies. The approach outlined in this book thus integrates a cleavage-theoretical and a strategic, actor-centered perspective. This combination requires including the programmatic content of party competition in the analysis, for which I draw on a new data sources. In what follows, I explain how party positions are measured and then outline how the model links the positions of parties with the orientations of voters.

Measuring the Programmatic Content of Party Oppositions

An analysis of political conflict between parties and the strategies they employ should focus on election campaigns, where parties fight over which issues are most salient and communicate their positions to voters. I therefore take advantage of data based on a coding of the media coverage of election campaigns that has been collected within a larger project (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008); these data cover one election in the 1970s and three elections in the 1990s and 2000s. The choice of these data has advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantages over expert survey data are clear: Because small political formations such as right-wing populist parties may not have marked profiles on all dimensions of political conflict salient in a party system, expert surveys risk producing data that are biased by theoretical expectations regarding parties' positions. An obvious disadvantage of the campaign data over that collected by the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) is that the campaign data cover only a relatively limited time span. Given the focus on the long-term transformation of cleavages, it would be promising to extend the analysis to the 1950s and 1960s, when, it is generally assumed, cleavages were still "frozen."

However, an important advantage of the campaign data over party manifestos and especially over expert surveys is that the positions derived from the newspaper

coverage of election campaigns more closely reflects what voters actually learn about the parties' positions. This, in turn, is heavily determined by the dominant themes of the campaign. The data therefore are more situational, which is advantageous for the present problem for a number of reasons. Because the populist right has succeeded in setting the media agenda in recent years, it has forced even those parties to take positions regarding immigration and traditionalist-communitarian values that, for example, were more occupied with economic than with cultural issues in their election programs. Furthermore, because I assume that voters' preferences and political identities are reinforced by conflict between parties, it is useful to focus on the issues that were actually disputed during the campaign. In addition, the media data offer information both on the *position* of parties regarding the issues of the campaign and on their relative *salience.* Using Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling, both position and salience are taken into account to create graphical representations of political space.

Integrating Political Supply and Political Demand in the Study of Cleavages

The focus on political conflict and on the responsiveness of parties to their constituencies requires a combination of data on the positions of parties and voters. On the political demand side, national post-election surveys are used to measure voters' positions along the dimensions of party opposition and their loyalties to ideologically defined party blocks. The model developed in this book thus bridges "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches to party-system change by combining information on parties' mobilization efforts with information on the issue orientations and partisan loyalties of voters. Reconstructing the lines of conflict found to structure party competition at the voter level, it is possible to gauge to which degree the party system is responsive to the preferences of voters. If the party system adequately reflects the preferences of voters, more polarized positions will reinforce the underlying group identifications and political identities. If polarization is weak, however, then alignments may be stabilized in the short run by the prevalence of strong social and political identities. But in the longer run, they are likely to give way to new alignments if sufficiently polarizing new conflicts emerge. By taking into account the evolving nature of political issues as well as the policy responsiveness of parties, this perspective allows an integration of the sources of stability (emphasized by cleavage theory) and the forces of change (emphasized in realignment theory) in explaining the evolution of party systems.

Combining the general polarization and responsiveness of the party system and voters' loyalties to ideological party blocks results in a typology that distinguishes several types of divide that leaves varying room for the manifestation of new conflicts and parties. In simplified form, this typology contrasts three basic situations. *Segmented cleavages* most strongly inhibit new divisions, since both parties and their electorates are characterized by high levels of polariza-

tion. Party positions closely match voters' preferences, and the two are durably aligned along the cleavage. If a divide constitutes what I call an *identitarian cleavage,* party preferences are stable due to strong collective identities of social groups. These identities, however, are not strongly reinforced by political conflict, and consequently allegiances are likely to remain stable only as long as new oppositions do not gain in importance relative to old ones. If, however, there is a mismatch between the positions of parties and voters, and the *party system is unresponsive,* voters' loyalties are likely to decline. In this case, new political actors mobilizing on old or highly salient new dimensions of conflict are likely to enter the political arena.

Applying the Model: The Countries Studied

While the theoretical approach outlined above is not geared toward a specific party family, it is applied to explain differences between countries in the entrenchment of a specific party family—the populist right. Because this book develops a general theory and then tests it on a limited number of countries, parties, and elections, the choice of the cases to be studied is crucial. My first analysis of the right-wing populist party family covers six countries: France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. According to the argument, political space has come to be structured similarly across Western Europe, and verifying this claim with a sample of countries that differ with respect to institutional, societal, and political characteristics amounts to a tougher test of the hypothesis. The six countries vary in size, in the degree to which they experienced an economic crisis in the 1990s, and in their political institutions, which range from clearly majoritarian in the case of Britain to highly consensual in Switzerland. Furthermore, their party systems differ, ranging from a two-party system in Britain to multiparty formats with six to seven effective parties in certain Swiss and Dutch legislatures in the 1990s.

Although the lack of information on election campaigns preceding the transformation of the traditional cleavages is regrettable, the later elections covered by the media data are ideal for the research question at hand. In each of the six countries, one election in the mid-1970s is analyzed, where we expect a first transformation of political space to have occurred under the impact of the mobilization of the New Left and the issues it has brought to the political agenda. Three campaigns in the 1990s and early 2000s cover the years in which the right-wing populist counter-mobilization gained momentum, resulting in a second transformation of the political space and of Western European party systems. Three time points in each country allow a study of the strategies employed by the established parties, as well as of their consequences for right-wing populist parties.

The results reveal that for all the differences between countries, the same dimensions of opposition have come to characterize party interactions from the 1990s on: the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian and

FIGURE I.1 Advertisement from the Front National's 2007 presidential election campaign.

Source: Courtesy of the Front National. Available at http://lepen2007.fr/blog/index.php?Photos (retrieved February 27, 2007).

a state-market line of conflict. While the transformation of political space has thus been remarkably similar in spite of important contextual variation, right-wing populist parties have not profited to the same degree from this dynamic. Whereas they have experienced considerable electoral breakthroughs in the French, Swiss, and Austrian party systems, they have failed to establish themselves at the national level in Germany and Britain. (The Netherlands is a dubious case to which I shall return.) In a second step, I therefore apply the analytical model described above to three exemplary cases. Two of these stand for different routes to the establishment of a strong right-wing populist party, while one shows how the established parties under certain circumstances can inhibit the emergence of the populist right.

France is the first country studied and represents a case where a new right-wing populist party was able to establish itself early on. The Front National was the first party to adopt a modern culturalist discourse, some twenty-five years ago, and still represents something like the "avant-garde" of this party type. This is illustrated by a poster from the 2007 presidential campaign (see Figure I.1), which shows a young woman of African descent despising the established left and right for having ruined the country while supporting Le Pen's plea for

assimilation, social mobility, and laicism—indeed, some of France's fundamental and widely shared republican values.

The second case is that of Switzerland, where an existing party of the right, the SVP, underwent a transformation from a conservative agrarian party to an exponent of the populist right. This route is similar to that of the FPÖ in Austria. While the FPÖ is generally considered a party of new extreme right (e.g., Ignazi 2002, 2003), the SVP's status as a member of this family is more disputed, in particular because of the role that opposition against European integration has played in its success. While the country's troubled relationship to the European Union has certainly played a role in catalyzing the SVP's rise, my analysis establishes that Switzerland faces a transformation of its party system that is closely comparable to what is occurring elsewhere in Europe.

Finally, I analyze Germany as a country where the populist right did not experience an electoral breakthrough. This case represents a crucial test for my theoretical framework. Both in Germany and in Britain, it could be—and, in fact, has been—argued that political institutions (or in the German case, the National Socialist past) explain the absence of a successful right-wing populist party (e.g., Ignazi 2003). As I argue, there is little evidence to support the claim put forward by Terri Givens (2005) that the electoral system has played a decisive role in containing the extreme right's success in that country. Rather, the strength of established political identities and the patterns of opposition in the party system emerge as highly distinct from those found in the countries where the populist right proved successful. Thus, Germany is not a unique case as such, and patterns of opposition in the party system are likely to play a decisive role in Britain, as well. More specifically, the contrast between the French case and the German case highlights the central importance of not only the reaction of the established right but also the major party of the left with the rise of the cultural issues. These strategies determine the polarization of the party system along the new cultural divide and shape the political potentials that right-wing populist parties can mobilize.

The Dutch trajectory cannot easily be accommodated in any of the routes sketched out. It may be argued that the liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; VVD) has pre-empted the populist right's success by virtue of its pronounced traditionalist-communitarian position. At the same time, this did not prevent the spectacular eruption of the List Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 elections. As we will see, Pim Fortuyn's discourse was not traditionalist-communitarian, making him fit uneasily into the right-wing populist party family. It is not yet clear whether Geert Wilders's newly founded Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) is capable of making electoral inroads similar to those of other right-wing populist parties and establishing itself durably in the Dutch party system. Because of the ideological distinctiveness of new right-wing actors and their more recent appearance with respect to other countries, the Netherlands will have to await a separate analysis at a later point in time.

Plan of the Book

Part I of this book addresses the defining characteristics of right-wing populist parties and the potential underlying their rise. In Chapter 1, I discuss the emergence of the new cultural divide that opposes libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values and justify the claim that these are polar normative ideals. Chapter 2 argues that right-wing populist parties can be considered a common party family by virtue of their specific position regarding the new cultural dimension of oppositions, as well as by virtue of two further criteria. Drawing on the campaign data already discussed, this hypothesis is verified in an empirical analysis of party positions in three election campaigns between the late 1980s and early 2000s in France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain.

Part II puts the mobilization of the populist right into the context of the transformation of historical cleavages that has occurred since the 1960s. Chapter 3 presents a conceptual reassessment and a development of the cleavage approach. I first discuss the various understandings of what accounts for the "freezing" of Western European party systems after the full mobilization of electorates in the 1920s. Addressing the paradox of a remarkable overall stability of party systems in the midst of massive societal changes, I highlight the central role of collective identities in the perpetuation of cleavages. As time goes by, however, cleavages appear less structured by social identities—such as class or religious denomination—and more and more become politically defined collective identities. The chapter ends with the core analytical model used in the second part of the book. I distinguish various types of cleavages and political divides, each of which has different implications for the mobilization space of political actors seeking to politicize new conflicts.

Chapter 4 discusses how this model is implemented empirically. Since the methods and analytical procedures I use are innovative, they are explained step by step and illustrated using concrete examples from the country chapters to come. The aim of Chapter 4 is to make the country studies easily accessible by avoiding technical considerations and to serve as a reference for those interested in the details of the procedure. The chapter begins by explaining, in more detail than is necessary for the preliminary analysis in Chapter 2, the collection and characteristics of the media data used throughout the book. I then explain how the dimensionality of political conflicts is determined and develop measures for the positions of parties and electorates along lines of conflict and the cohesiveness of these positions, and for the responsiveness of the party system to voters' preferences. Furthermore, the key concepts to capture social structural position—class and education—are presented.

In Part III, the model is tested in three countries. Each case is embedded in a discussion of the specialized literature on the context of the national party system and the fate of the populist right in the respective country. I discuss the traditional cleavages that underlie the party system, as well as how firmly the

party system remains anchored in social structure. The country chapters also assess how the established parties have dealt with the issues evolving around a traditionalist-communitarian defense of community and what the resulting potentials for a right-wing populist mobilization are. Alternative explanations are reviewed, and the results generated by my analytical model are validated with prior qualitative and quantitative evidence.

Beyond the common approach, each of the country chapters fleshes out country-specific ways in which the traditionalist-communitarian potential is mobilized and identifies additional determinants of the success of the populist right. The French case, which is presented in Chapter 5, sets the stage for the country studies. Beyond the programmatic innovations of the Front National itself, it highlights how the fortunes of the populist right are conditioned by the strategies pursued by the established parties in dealing with the cultural issues that have been debated since the late 1960s. Furthermore, it shows how the Front National has proved versatile in domains that do not belong to its ideological core, such as changing its position with respect to the state-market divide and taking up concerns about European integration.

The analysis of the rise of the Swiss People's Party in Chapter 6 underlines the similarities in the political potentials on which right-wing populist parties thrive, despite the central role commonly attributed to European integration in explaining the success of the Swiss People's Party. What is frequently referred to as an "openness to the world versus demarcation" divide in Switzerland is in fact only a variant of the more general antagonism between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. Similarly to France, alignments in Switzerland were still structured by religious and class cleavages in the 1970s, and the manifestation of the left-libertarian agenda in party competition first led to a loss of responsiveness of these countries' party systems, and then to reconfigurations of partisan alignments and parties' programmatic offerings. By the 1990s, under the impact of the mobilization of the populist right, party systems in both countries were characterized by a three-block structure. The poles were constituted by the left-libertarian and right-wing populist blocks, with the center-right uneasily squeezed in the middle. At the end of this process of party-system transformation, right-wing populist parties became an integral part of a segmented pattern of opposition in Switzerland and France and clearly had an electorate of their own in ideological terms.

The German case, presented in Chapter 7, underlines the importance of the strategic responses of the established parties to new political potentials and illustrates the usefulness of the general model in explaining the absence of a strong right-wing populist challenger. Because the Christian Democrats have retained ownership of the issues related to traditionalism and immigration, they have continued to rally voters who hold traditionalist-communitarian preferences. Thus, the structural potentials related to the new cultural conflict manifest themselves in tempered form in Germany. In particular, the German case underlines the strength of an approach that focuses on the party system as a whole: The way

the left is transformed by the left-libertarian movements turns out to impinge heavily on the mobilization of the traditionalist-communitarian potential. Thus, the centripetal pattern of competition between the two major parties of the left and right has played the dominant role in averting the entry of a right-wing populist challenger at the national level.

The Conclusion summarizes the results and their implications for party-system and cleavage theory. The analysis presented in this book underlines that the new cultural conflict can now be regarded as institutionalized. In those countries where the populist right has made a breakthrough, it has evolved into a segmented cleavage that has displaced the religious opposition and has settled as the second major structuring dimension in these party systems. The evidence also suggests that the configuration of the party system impinges heavily on the strategies chosen by the established parties, leading to the emergence of right-wing populist parties in some cases and to their failure in others.

I

Putting Right-Wing Populist Parties in Context

1

The New Cultural Conflict and the Populist Right in Western Europe

In the course of the past two decades, right-wing populist parties have gained sizable shares of the vote in France, Switzerland, and Austria. In the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn has succeeded in breaking into a party system whose segmentation and "pillarization" once made it an example of stability. Throughout much of the postwar period, Switzerland and Austria had also been marked by high stability in party alternatives. In these countries, as well as in Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Belgium, the success of new parties of the right has largely surpassed that of older parties of the extreme right, which seemed to represent a "normal pathology" resulting from tensions created by rapid change in industrial societies (Scheuch and Klingemann 1967). Certainly, the optimism of the "golden age" of growth after World War II has given way to gloomier feelings of malaise in the era of unemployment and austerity politics. The enduring success of right-wing populist parties, however, and the increasing similarity of their discourse suggest that they are more than a populist outbreak of disenchantment with electoral politics. Rather, it has become apparent that a common potential must underlie their rise.

To understand the right-wing-populist phenomenon, these parties should be analyzed in the larger context of changing societal structures that have affected party systems since the late 1960s. More specifically, I suggest that the populist right rides the tide of a broader societal movement that represents a counter-offensive to the universalistic values advocated by the New Social Movements that came up in the 1960s. A new cultural line of conflict has thereby taken shape across Europe that puts libertarian-universalistic and

traditionalist-communitarian values in opposition. As a result, the various types of extreme-right parties that Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995) have distinguished have largely vanished since their common turn to identity politics.

The discourse of right-wing populist parties now centers on three convictions. The parties claim, first, that traditional norms based on common understanding stand over abstract universalistic principles. Second, they claim that multicultural society destroys the "organically grown" national community and thus dilutes those traditional norms. And third, they insist on the primacy of politics, in that majority decisions taken within a political community stand above universalistic normative principles and decisions taken by supranational political authorities such as the European Union (EU). This chapter demonstrates that the populist right's traditionalist-communitarian discourse represents a polar normative ideal to the libertarian-universalistic conviction of the New Left. Chapter 2 then verifies this claim empirically and discusses the criteria necessary to define the right-wing populist party family.

The New Cultural Conflict

The Advent of Value-Based Conflicts in the Late 1960s

Around 1968, new political issues came up that had more to do with values and lifestyles than with traditional distributional conflicts. As Ronald Inglehart (1977) put it, a "Silent Revolution" took place that led segments of society to question traditional societal values and forms of politics. Differing somewhat from this initial emphasis on political styles (e.g., Offe 1985), the resulting disputes are now more often described as cultural and value-based in character. A "postmodern political conflict" has developed that Inglehart characterized as an opposition between materialist and post-materialist values. As Scott Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee (2003) show, an opposition between "libertarian" and "authoritarian" values continues to polarize the inhabitants of advanced industrial countries.[1] The two authors conceive the shift from authoritarian to libertarian values as part of a long-term process of secularization, which leads from theism through modernism to postmodernism. In theism, the location of authority is external and transcendental, and truth and morality are based on absolute principles. In modernism, the localization of authority is still external, and universal but is based in and constructed by society. Finally, in postmodernism, the location of authority "has become internal and individual" (Flanagan and Lee 2003: 237). The mobilization and counter-mobilization around the antagonisms between authority

[1]It should be noted that the term "libertarian" is used here to refer exclusively to liberal cultural or societal values, not to an all-embracing call for a minimal state, as is the case in Robert Nozick's (1974) conception. Following Kitschelt's (1994) and Flanagan and Lee's (2003) usage, I will use the term "libertarian" to denote a culturally liberal position that is fully compatible with an interventionist social-welfare state.

and autonomy, and between conformism and non-conformism, according to Flanagan and Lee, are expressions of this shift.

Consequently, after distributive issues had structured the left-right divide for a long time, the movements of the New Left brought value and identity issues to the political agenda. Russell Dalton and his colleagues (1984), together with Inglehart (1984), claimed early on that identity politics and lifestyle politics were leading to the political realignment of social groups that blurred the conventional socio-structural bases of voting choice. In a similar vein, Kitschelt (1994) has demonstrated that in the 1980s, the value divide created a two-dimensional political space in European party systems. Cutting across the "old" distributional axis, a line of conflict putting libertarian and authoritarian values into opposition had come to structure the attitudes of voters.

This conception is quite similar to the somewhat broader pattern that Flanagan and Lee (2003) have detected. As a variety of sources on the policy positions of political parties show, political space in advanced Western democracies is at least two-dimensional, if not three-dimensional (Warwick 2002). However, it is not clear whether these dimensions are really new or simply have been rendered more salient in the past decades. Probably, this is due to the fact that, so far, the new value opposition has been discussed only in relation to the traditional class cleavage. But even if most European party systems do not carry the stamp of all four cleavages that resulted from the national and industrial revolutions (Rokkan 1999), many are characterized by more than just one cleavage. With the religious cleavage representing the second common structuring element of European party systems, political space in multiparty systems is likely to have been two-dimensional before the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s transformed the meaning of "left" and "right." Indeed, Flanagan and Lee (2003) explicitly relate today's libertarian-authoritarian value divide to an opposition between religious and secular worldviews.

On the political left, the prominence of libertarian political issues gave rise to the establishment of ecologist parties and a transformation of Social Democratic parties early in the 1980s (Kitschelt 1994). As a result of this change, these parties have attracted an increasing number of votes from the middle class, especially among constituencies such as the so-called social-cultural professionals (Kriesi 1993a, 1998; Müller 1999). On the political right, however, the impact of this new dimension of conflict has had a less uniform impact, although Kitschelt and McGann (1995) have argued that radical-right parties constituted the opposite pole on the new libertarian-authoritarian axis of conflict. Similarly, in Piero Ignazi's (1992, 1996, 2003) interpretation, extreme-right parties are a "by-product of a Silent Counter-revolution," an equivalent on the right to Inglehart's "Silent Revolution." However, the process these authors sketch out for the rise of the radical right is much more country-specific than the process on the left, where countries primarily diverge in the extent to which older parties of the left or newly founded ecologist parties absorbed the New Left's issue agenda (see Hug

2001). Furthermore, the political orientations of right-wing extremists' supporters seem to have varied between countries, as well (Gabriel 1996).

Kitschelt and McGann's (1995: chap. 1) explicit differentiation of European radical right-wing parties exemplifies the heterogeneity of this category. According to them, the combination of authoritarian and free-market appeals constitutes the "winning formula" characteristic of the "New Radical Right." This programmatic profile may seem somewhat contradictory, but allegedly it allows parties such as the Front National to appeal to losers of modernization, as well as to disenchanted segments of the middle class. In other cases, the model is specified in that party systems and political economies characterized by patronage make a populist anti-statist strategy most successful, as in the case of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Italian Lega Nord. In still other cases, a "welfare chauvinist" strategy is most promising. If these differences in the programmatic profile of the radical right were to exist, then it would seem debatable whether these parties are the product of a transformation of the political right that is the mirror image of the left's move toward libertarian positions.

I argue that in the 1980s, the "winning formula" of right-wing populist parties consisted not so much in a specific programmatic profile as in *strategic flexibility* that allowed them to capture issues other parties had neglected. Right-wing populist parties' main commonality in their first mobilization phase in the 1980s, therefore, was primarily their anti-establishment discourse (Betz 1998; see also the country chapters in Betz and Immerfall 1998; Schedler 1996). This could be combined with advocating for issues that the established parties did not take up—for example, neo-liberal demands (in the domestic realm) in the 1980s—and allowed populist right-wing parties to present themselves as "anti-cartel-parties," in Richard Katz and Peter Mair's (1995) terminology. Their prime advantage in seizing such changing programmatic opportunity structures was their hierarchical internal structure. This set them apart from the established parties, which had a pluralist character, and permitted them to repeatedly revise their policy positions in response to sentiments in the populace. Immigration policies, on the other hand, did not play a prominent role until the early 1990s.[2]

Hence, to the degree that oppositions along the cultural axis of political competition are likely to result in a reconfiguration of existing cleavages, this process probably started only in the late 1980s or early 1990s. While empirical studies show that an authoritarian potential arose at approximately the same time as the libertarian potential (Sacchi 1998), this did not immediately result in strong support for traditionalist stances. For the traditionalist or authoritarian potential to be politicized in a way that mobilizes broad segments of society, it needs to be connected with more concrete political conflicts that are conductive to collective identity formation. Social movement theory and cleavage theory

[2]See Betz 2004: chap. 2 for a review and Swyngedouw 2000 on the late adoption of the immigration issue by the Vlaams Blok.

teaches us that a durable organization of collective interests requires the prior construction of a collective identity, as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3.

Right-wing populist parties can be seen as part of a broader movement of the right, which has its origin in broad societal transformations that oppose social groups for structural and cultural reasons, similarly to the New Left (Kriesi 1999). Accordingly, and as is not often noted, the movements of the right—such as religious, fundamentalist, and nationalist movements—are equally manifestations of identity politics and are just as concerned with *recognition,* as Craig Calhoun (1994: 22f.) points out (see also Honneth 2003 [1992]). Nineteenth-century European nationalism, for example, represents a rather "old" form of identity politics. The fact that movements of the right are also manifestations of identity politics is perhaps not so evident because of their conservative character, whereas the libertarian movements demanded the recognition of specific differences—for example, in terms of gender and sexual orientation. As a conservative movement, which deplores that society has changed for the worse, the values and goals underlying the populist right seem more diffuse. The formation of a right-wing populist collective identity and the political manifestation of the underlying tensions therefore depend more heavily on political leadership. While grassroots mobilization played an important role in the movements of the libertarian left, elites have played a significant role in the case of the populist right in attributing meaning to the myth of an endangered traditional community.

In the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries found a political message that is conductive to forming such a collective identity. I postulate that the programmatic profile of right-wing populist parties converged regarding two groups of issues that make this party family represent the counter-pole to the libertarian left. The first centers on the new discourses embodied in the anti-immigration stance, which involves not ethnic racism but, rather, what Hans-Georg Betz and others (Betz 2004; Betz and Johnson 2004) have called "differentialist nativism" or "cultural racism." The second group of issues represents a reaction against the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left and includes the rejection of the multicultural model of society and of universalistic values in general. Both groups of issues are theoretically and empirically situated at one pole of a new line of conflict that can be labeled libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian. In the next section, I substantiate the claim that the issues advocated by the libertarian left and the populist right are indeed polar-normative ideas.

The Conflict between Libertarian-Universalistic and Traditionalist-Communitarian Values

Early on, Milton Rokeach (1973) suggested that the space of possible ideological positions is two-dimensional. He found that a large number of values structure people's belief systems; at the same time, however, the range of possible values

in the political domain is limited because, first, not all combinations of values are logically feasible; and second, most combinations are devoid of "human activity," as Aaron Wildavsky (1987: 6) put it. That is, they are not viable because they have no cultural or historical material—that is, no relevant paradigms or blueprints—on which to draw. In Serge Moscovici's (1988) terms, one could say that they lack corresponding social representations.

As a consequence, Rokeach proposed a model in which politically relevant ideologies are ultimately combinations of two values: freedom and equality. The hypothesis is validated by a quantitative content analysis of Socialist, Communist, Fascist, and Capitalist texts, which each represent a different combination of emphases on freedom and equality. Similar dimensions are found in the accounts of Wildavsky and his colleagues (Wildavsky 1987, 1994; Thompson et al. 1990), and while there is disagreement concerning the labeling of the two dimensions, they essentially correspond to those propagated by Kitschelt (1994): Conflicts over the value of equality structure the state-market axis, while differing emphases on freedom structure the universalistic versus communitarian, or libertarian versus authoritarian, axis of conflict. In other words, the antagonism that underlies the new cultural conflict is not new as such. Only its rising salience and the concrete issues to which it is tied are intrinsic to post-industrial societies.

A synthesis of normative models of democracy provided by Dieter Fuchs (2002: 40–43) suggests that our conception of viable value combinations indeed draws on existing blueprints or normative substantiations. In Fuchs's mapping, a first observable dimension within political thought represents responsibility for the lives of citizens—that is, self-responsibility versus strong responsibility of the state—which corresponds to the established state-market line of conflict. The second dimension concerns the nature of the relationship between individuals. It is exemplified by libertarian or liberal conceptions of democracy, on the one hand, and republican conceptions, on the other. The second dimension is at the center of the ongoing philosophical debate that puts individualist and communitarian conceptions of the person in opposition (see Honneth 1993). Implicit in this discussion is an antagonism between universalistic and traditionalistic values. Although communitarian thinkers such as Michael Walzer (1983) and Charles Taylor (1992 [1989]) propose only a more or less modest corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical grounds for a farther-reaching critique of the universalistic principles established by John Rawls (1971). As a proponent of the liberal account, Robert Dahl (1989) denies any substantive values as constituting the common good. In his conception, the common good consists in the conditions of equal participation—in other words, in the universalistic democratic process itself.

Even moderate communitarians such as Walzer (1983, 1990) and Taylor (1992 [1989]) have argued that universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions within an established community and therefore engender the danger of being oppressive. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of

universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and widely shared cultural practices. And since the liberal-universalistic theory, no less than other accounts, ultimately depends on the plausibility of this conception of the individual, this view cannot be considered more objective than a communitarian approach, as Taylor (1992 [1989]) convincingly argues. Communitarians urge us to acknowledge that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions and that an individualistic conception of the self is misconceived.

Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the concept of "cultural differentialism," not claiming the superiority of any nationality or race but, instead, stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions. In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for the discourse of right-wing populist parties (Antonio 2000; Minkenberg 2000). As Robert Antonio (2000: 57–58) summarizes:

> New Right opposition to African, Middle Eastern, or Asian immigration stresses the evils of capitalist globalization, resistance to cultural homogenization, and defence of cultural identity and difference. Their pleas for "ethnopluralism" transmute plans to repatriate immigrants into a left-sounding anti-imperialist strategy championing the autonomy of all cultural groups and their right to exert sovereignty in their living space. . . . They contended that modern democracy's melding of diverse ethnic groups into a mass "society" destroys their distinctive cultural identities. In their view, it dissolves cultural community into atomized, selfish, impersonal economic relations.

Although Pierre Birnbaum (1996) has claimed that a substantial affinity exists between communitarian philosophers and the New Right, it should be stressed that the sympathies of leading New Right thinkers such as Alain de Benoist toward North American communitarians are rather one-sided, as Antonio (2000: 63) has underlined. However, communitarian arguments have provided a "blueprint" (in the abovementioned sense) or a broader justification for the right-wing populist parties' differentialist discourse that is much harder to attack intellectually than biological racism.

From a theoretical point of view, then, the defense of cultural tradition and a rejection of the multicultural model of society represent a counter-pole to individualistic and universalistic conceptions of community. Immigration is directly linked to this conflict since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right and exponents of right-wing populist parties deem necessary to preserve. Equally present in communitarian thinking is an emphasis of the primacy of politics over abstract normative principles. In Walzer's (1983: chap. 2) account, the right to

self-determination within a political community includes the right to limit immigration in order to preserve established ways of life.[3]

In this context, the populist right's conception of democracy deserves mention. At first glance, the strong commitment to popular rule and calls to introduce direct democracy launched, for example, by the Front National appear in strange accord with similar demands of the New Left. However, building on the distinction between protective and transformative conceptions of democracy put forward by Mark Warren (1992) and David Held (1996), the difference is that right-wing populist parties see direct democracy primarily as a means to preserve popular sovereignty. Thus, direct democracy is intended to protect citizens against the state and its rulers, which allegedly are out of touch with the majority of the population. Coupled with the populist right's disdain for the liberal component of liberal democracy (see Swyngedouw and Ivaldi 2001), direct democracy thus risks establishing the tyranny of the majority.

Democratic involvement therefore serves quite a different function from that in the New Left's conception. Here, following participatory democratic theory (e.g., Barber 1984; Pateman 1970), citizens' participation in decision making is thought to foster not only individual autonomy but also compromise by modifying participants' pre-political preferences. While this transformative vision is absent from the thinking of the extreme populist right, the principle of justice to which New Left libertarians arguably adhere is not an unconditional application of universalistic norms. It is, rather, Jürgen Habermas's (1996) discourse model, which attempts to bridge liberal and communitarian ideas. An open discourse, in this conception, establishes universalistic principles that are nonetheless bound by the cultural traditions of those who participate in the deliberation.

The Rise of the Populist Right

Mobilizing the Traditionalist-Communitarian Potential

While the challenge to tradition may appear as an inevitable consequence of modernization and cultural globalization, right-wing populist parties have framed it in terms of opposition to those segments of society that hold decidedly libertarian-universalistic values and conceptions of community. This strategy has been promising because universalistic values are strongly fostered by higher education (Kriesi et al. 2008; Stubager 2008) and thus have become much more diffused as tertiary education has expanded in the past few decades. The impact of the New Social Movements of the left, which promoted cultural liberalism and

[3]It has to be emphasized that Walzer merely conceives universalistic principles (everyone is allowed to move where he or she wants to) and the preservation of established traditions as conflicting goals. Hence, he does not deny the legitimacy of refugees—political or economic—migrating to more secure or more prosperous countries in principle.

universalistic values, have been considerable because of what David Snow and Doug McAdam (2000) call the "general diffusion" of movement identities in the broader population. As a consequence, the potential for a counter-mobilization has also increased. In adopting the traditionalist-communitarian ideology, amalgamated with the demarcation from foreigners, right-wing populist parties have been able to develop a novel collective identity, and their successful mobilization has completed the establishment of the cultural divide.

Right-wing populist parties' framing of an anti-universalistic program in terms of "cultural differentialism" has been important because social-psychology studies show that "blatent" prejudice is relatively rare among European citizens (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). By avoiding overtly racist statements, the populist right has been able to thrive on more subtle forms of prejudice that have been shown to be much more common in the public. Similarly, democracy represents an almost uncontested value in advanced industrial nations (Fuchs et al. 1995), and in advocating more, instead of less, democracy, the new populist right can mobilize beyond the narrow radical-right constituency.

For these reasons, the cross-national diffusion and adoption of this successful new mobilization frame since its "invention" by the French Front National has constituted a necessary condition for the success of the populist right, as Jens Rydgren (2005) has correctly pointed out. It is not a sufficient condition, however, as the persisting differences in the success of parties with similar ideological profiles testify. If the existing cleavage structure is firmly anchored, then the established parties will have the capacity to "organize" issues that cut across established lines of division "out of politics," in E. E. Schattschneider's (1975 [1960]: chap. 4) famous words. Existing collective identities can inhibit the political manifestation of grievances based on new group divisions. In a similar vein, students of ethnic conflicts have stressed that "ethnicity competes with other large-scale bases of organization, notably class mobilization, for the loyalty, time, and resources of potential members" (Olzac 1992: 18). Much therefore depends on the nature and intensity of the other conflicts that are prevalent in party systems—most prominently, the nature and intensity of the distributional conflict.

The Economic Profile of the Populist Right

Right-wing populist parties mobilize a group of citizens located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural line of conflict, and diffuse feelings of resentment vis-à-vis the established parties and economic preferences are clearly secondary to their success. Contrary to Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) assertion that the most successful right-wing populist parties mobilize by means of a combination of authoritarian and free-market issues, I claim that economic preferences play no role in the mobilization of the populist right. To the contrary, free-market appeals pose a problem because their support base includes more and more citizens who, because of their lack of education and low or obsolete

skills, can be considered the losers in modernization. Betz (2004) has referred to this shift as a "proletarianization" of the populist right's support base. The working class has become the core clientele of parties such as the French Front National, the Austrian FPÖ, the Progress Party in Norway, the Danish People's Party, and the Belgian Vlaams Blok, which has been renamed Vlaams Belang (Betz 2001; Bjørklund and Andersen 2002; Mayer 2002; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007; Oesch 2008a; Perrineau 1997; Plasser and Ulram 2000; Swyngedouw 1998).

Studies of the ideological profile of the Front National's electorate by Pascal Perrineau (1997) and Nonna Mayer (2002) and the analysis presented in Chapter 5 suggest that the populist right's lower-class component has strongly "leftist," or state-interventionist, preferences concerning economic policy, which contradicts Kitschelt's proposition. Similarly, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2005) presents evidence that those who vote for the populist right in France and Denmark are fundamentally divided on the economic axis. To the degree that right-wing populist parties still take a market-liberal stance, as they did in the 1980s, lower-class citizens vote for them *despite* their economic profile rather than because of it. What is even more plausible is that the changes in their electorates engendered a shift away from neoliberal demands on the part of right-wing populist parties in the 1990s, as Betz (2001, 2004) has suggested. In Chapter 2, this hypothesis will be tested empirically.

As a consequence, cultural, as opposed to economic, conflicts must constitute the primary concern for a right-wing populist electorate characterized by diverse economic preferences. By implication, the enduring success of right-wing populist parties crucially depends on the prevalence of culturally, as opposed to economically, defined group identifications among its supporters. Collective identities defined by economic-class position must be replaced with broader group attachments based on common interpretations of "what it means" to share a national culture whose traditional norms and values seem threatened.

The degree to which conflicts that are different from the new cultural divide continue to bind large parts of the electorate to specific parties depends on the country-specific strategies of the established parties regarding both the traditional state-market cleavage and the issues of the New Left. A model that focuses on these differing strategies is presented later in this volume, but there are common factors that affect all Western European countries. For one thing, economic globalization impinges on the balance between economic and cultural issues, and for another, European integration creates new opportunities for political mobilization.

Denationalization as a Catalyst for the Manifestation of the New Cultural Potential

Globalization can be understood as a spatial widening and an intensification of regional or global economic and cultural interactions (Goldblatt et al. 1997: 271; Held et al. 1999). In the economic domain, the lowering of boundaries between

nation-states nourishes and accelerates the process of economic modernization. By exposing certain sectors to increasing competition, globalization is likely to engender new social divisions (Esping-Andersen 1999; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). The "losers" of modernization are lower-skilled individuals who, depending on a country's political-economic system, either have increasing difficulty competing in the labor market or face a relative decline in real income (Scharpf 2000a: 68–124). Income-distribution trends show that the share of households at the lowest end of the post-redistribution scale has risen in Great Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands and slightly in Switzerland since the 1970s and 1980s. Germany and France do not display such a clear trend (Alderson et al. 2005).

At the same time, the policy repertoire available to national governments is constrained as a consequence of agreements to liberalize international capital flows and trade, some of which are formally enforced by institutions such as the EU and the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a consequence, a real problem of legitimacy arises, since "governments must increasingly avoid policy choices that would be both domestically popular and economically feasible out of respect for [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] rules and European law or as a result of decisions made by the WTO, the European Commission, or the European Court of Justice" (Scharpf 2000b: 116).[4] As Evelyne Huber and John Stephens (2001: 221) show, partisan effects on a whole array of welfare-state indicators vanished in the 1980s when "governments found themselves with dramatically fewer options."

Many governments have explicitly justified unpopular measures in the making of economic and social policy with the structural imperatives of globalization and European Union integration, an example being the obligation to fulfill the Maastricht requirements to participate in the European Monetary Union. As a consequence, a potential arises for political actors that insist on the *primacy of autonomous national politics* as against these obligations. Right-wing populist parties, in this sense, can be understood as "anti-cartel parties," which mobilize resentment because the established parties are no longer responsive to the preferences of voters (Blyth and Katz 2005; Katz and Mair 1995). Kitschelt (2000) has vividly criticized this view, arguing that parties always have an interest in exiting the cartel in order to attract votes.[5] This may be impossible for the reasons outlined above, however, and at the very least, the possibilities of appealing to specific social groups are much more limited in the context of austerity politics and budgetary restraint than in the high times of Keynesianism in the postwar decades.

[4]See, similarly, Mény and Surel 2000; Offe 1996.

[5]Kitschelt's argument seems somewhat inconsistent, since a few pages later he traces dissatisfaction with parties to the very non-responsiveness that Katz and Mair (1995) can be assumed to have in mind: "Dissatisfaction with parties does not originate in their new capacity to form cartels and dissociate themselves from their voters, but . . . in the political-economic agenda of policy-making, confronting parties with inevitable trade-offs among objectives voters would like to maximize jointly" (Kitschelt 2000: 160). As I argue in Chapter 3, it is useful to distinguish between *policy-specific* and *organizational* cartelization.

In the contemporary context, as Mark Blyth and Richard Katz (2005) argue, in which parties are unable to constantly expand the provision of public goods to secure their support, cartelization represents a rational response. The solution parties have chosen is a collective discourse of "downsizing expectations"; "externalizing policy commitments" to independent central banks, the EU, or other supranational organizations; and distancing themselves even further than the catch-all party type from any defined social constituency that could hold them accountable (Blyth and Katz 2005: 42).

This is not to say that parties have converged in their rhetoric. In fact, evidence from the programmatic statements that parties put forward in election campaigns suggests that the major parties of the left and right have converged regarding economic policy only in Germany and Britain and have not done so in France, Switzerland, Austria, or the Netherlands since the 1970s (Kriesi et al. 2006). We also cannot expect the left and right to pursue exactly the same policies once in office. Even if the general thrust of the economic-policy making in France, for example, has been a liberalizing one in the past two decades, the reforms of left-wing and right-wing governments continue to differ in the way they affect specific social groups (Levy 2000, 2005). However, in conjunction with Social Democrats' increasingly middle-class support base and an emphasis on the constraints of globalization, the left no longer issues very class-specific appeals (for a similar argument, see Goldthorpe 2002: 15–20). Furthermore, the Social Democrats' new core constituency of socio-cultural professionals has political preferences that differ from those of their old core constituency, the manual working class (Kitschelt and Rehm 2005). In appealing to socio-cultural specialists, the New Left has increasingly framed its social policy in terms of values—for instance, by uncoupling entitlements from labor-market participation and making them universal (Häusermann 2010). The left thus has further eroded its support in the working classes by advocating policies that are diametrically opposed to the preferences of its old core constituency, which holds rather traditionalist values, as Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues (2008) show.

Even if programmatic stances continue to diverge, the left has thereby adopted a cross-class rhetoric that traditionally has been a characteristic of the political right. Voters are therefore increasingly unlikely to interpret the differences in parties' programmatic offerings in class terms. This weakens the collective identities that underlie the traditional (worker versus non-worker) state-market opposition. Along the "new" state-market cleavage that puts citizens with different views concerning economic policy into opposition, the middle class is at least as divided internally as the working class is distant from the middle and upper classes.[6] Furthermore, concerning those segments most affected by economic modernization, persistently high levels of unemployment or declining standards of living have led to a loss of credibility of parties' promises to solve such problems. No matter how pressing economic grievances are, these social

[6]The country studies in Kriesi et al. 2008 provide empirical evidence concerning this point.

groups' class-based collective identities may have been weakened to the extent that they have become receptive to culturally framed mobilization efforts. Voting for right-wing populist parties then becomes a viable option, even if these parties do not generally advocate state-interventionist economic policies.

Right-wing populist parties have seized the opportunities associated with an insistence on the primacy of national politics in two ways. In what may be called the *political logic* of their mobilization, they have denounced the "cartelization" of the established parties of the left and right, which allegedly no longer differ in their policies. In this sense, the populist right has profited indirectly from the processes of globalization and European integration. It has also more directly exploited these processes by attacking the gradual process of denationalization. While Betz (2004) presents evidence that right-wing populist parties increasingly take anti-globalist stances in their programs, an explicit pro- versus anti-globalization conflict so far has not been very prominent in election campaigns (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). But a similar conflict is embodied in disputes over European integration. Because the delegation of competences to the EU to a certain extent undermines autonomous economic and social policy at the national level, there are cultural and political, as well as economic, rationales for opposing European integration.

Previous studies of party positions at the aggregate level have found an (initially unexpected) association between parties' positions on European integration and a value divide ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian to Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (GAL-TAN) positions (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006). Beyond the apparent affinity between the defense of national sovereignty and Euro-skepticism, the conception of the new cultural conflict as an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values sheds more light on the nature of this link. Beyond the introduction of a European citizenship in legal terms, the rising importance of the EU polity establishes a new political community that is very real by virtue of the collectively binding decisions that affect its members. For those who adhere to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, European integration further threatens the autonomy of the national demos that these citizens already consider endangered—for example, by the application of universalistic principles by autonomous state agencies such as constitutional courts. The higher the level of policymaking, the more universalistic the rules of decision and the principles guiding decision making must be, and the more likely it is that only relatively abstract or procedural principles can be agreed on. These, in turn, clash with traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of justice.

Consequently, the populist right has been quick to seize the political potential in politicizing the process of European integration and in waking what Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin (2004) have called "the sleeping giant." Opposition to the integration project comes both from the extreme left and from the extreme populist right, as Sylvain Brouard and Nicholas Sauger's (2005) study of the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in France reveals. I argue that the

resistance of these two party families to a unified Europe is closely related to their respective core ideologies. While most electoral surveys do not allow a clear distinction to be made between economic and cultural motives for the rejection of European integration, the French data used in Chapter 5 make it possible to verify the claim that the populist right's mobilization against the EU is driven by culture, not by economics.

Right-Wing Populist Parties within Their Party Systems

If a sizable proportion of the electorate holds preferences that are located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural axis that structures the belief systems in advanced industrial countries, it is, of course, not evident why it should be (exclusively) right-wing populist parties that mobilize this potential. In principle, the reaction to the societal transformations since the 1960s could take various forms. And, in fact, there have been earlier attempts to mobilize opposition against the growing diffusion of universalistic values, such as the neo-conservative ideology (see Habermas 1985), which has been endorsed by many parties of the mainstream right. Conservative parties frequently even launched the debate about immigration in the early 1980s when they found themselves in the opposition, as Ignazi (1992, 2003) correctly points out. However, in many cases they then lost ownership of the issue to the extreme right. Much therefore depends on whether the established parties of the right continue to take a clear position along the cultural divide. This has proved difficult, since the electoral coalition that traditionally has supported these parties is often divided over the new cultural issues. Whether the left pursues a polarizing strategy in the cultural domain is also crucial.

In cases such as Britain and Germany, the populist right has not achieved a breakthrough. Chapter 2 investigates whether political space is indeed similarly structured in countries where the populist right has been successful and where it has not. The analysis of the German case in Chapter 7 will flesh out how the established parties have jointly prevented a right-wing populist party from asserting itself.

In those cases in which a right-wing populist party has been able to establish itself at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide, however, it enjoys undeniable advantages. For one thing, imitation by an established party may no longer work because voters prefer the original (right-wing populist party) to the copy, as Jean-Marie Le Pen has frequently stated. Most important, a traditionalist-communitarian discourse and opposition to immigration represent the most promising way to mobilize the anti-universalistic potential because they are highly conductive to the formation of a collective identity. This ideology is thus able to gain a much broader following and have stronger appeal among the disadvantaged sectors of society than was the case for the rather elitist

neo-conservative movement. Once the populist right has gained momentum, it is able to keep its core issues on the political agenda and create lasting loyalty among voters.

If established right-wing parties and the new populist right may at times advocate similar issues, then a question arises: How can these two groups of parties be properly distinguished? In Chapter 2, I suggest criteria to demarcate the right-wing populist party family from its mainstream competitors. I then verify empirically the degree to which right-wing populist parties have actually converged on a profile corresponding to the discourse of the New Right and the degree to which they are located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural divide.

2

The Extreme-Right-Wing Populist Party Family

Two propositions are tested in this chapter by way of an empirical analysis of the dimensions structuring political space around the 1990s in six Western European countries. The first is that right-wing populist parties are located in a distinct position in political space. Together with two further criteria—their anti-establishment discourse and their hierarchical internal structure—they can thus be considered a common party family. Among the six countries studied in this chapter, the "candidates" for inclusion in the extreme-right-wing populist party family are the French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Swiss People's Party (SVP), and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The empirical analysis also provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that right-wing populist parties have de-emphasized neo-liberal demands.

The second proposition is that political space is structured by the same two dimensions in the countries where right-wing populist parties have not found great resonance at the national level: Britain and Germany. Consequently, the populist right's lack of success in these two countries may be due partly to the fact that established right-wing parties have adopted similar positions in debates centering on national tradition and are equally reluctant to endorse universalistic values. These hypotheses are tested by means of an analysis of parties' issue positions deriving from a coding of the media coverage of election campaigns. These data have been collected in a larger research project (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008) and are based on a sentence-by-sentence coding of the newspaper coverage of parties' programmatic statements in election campaigns. The technical aspects of the

analysis are presented only briefly in this chapter; the reader is referred to Chapter 4 for a more detailed description of the data and the procedures used to analyze them.

An Extreme-Right-Wing Populist Party Family?

The term (extreme) right-wing populist is used in this book to denote political parties that, despite having distinct historical origins, can be distinguished from others on the basis of a number of commonalities. It may seem straightforward to identify the presumable members of such a party family; however, naming clear analytical criteria is a difficult task. Consequently, consensus regarding a definition of the extreme right is slim, posing a problem for comparative research (Mudde 1996). A first useful definition is offered by Piero Ignazi (2003), who defines extreme-right-wing parties as situated at the extreme of the left-right spectrum. This is a relative criterion and should not be confused with usages in Germany, for example, according to which extreme-right parties, in contrast to the radical right, oppose the democratic constitution and therefore represent anti-system parties in a narrow sense. Ignazi (2002, 2003) further distinguishes between "old" and "new" extreme-right parties. While the old type has its roots in historical fascism and is a product of materialist conflicts, "new" extreme-right parties are the product of post-materialist conflicts characteristic of the post-industrial period.

Building on Ignazi's (2003) criterion of extremeness, I specify the extreme-right-wing populist party family as a subgroup of the broader category of extreme-right parties. The distinctiveness of the populist right has a programmatic component and a contextual component. In *programmatic* terms, it represents a more moderate subgroup of the broader extreme-right category by virtue of its "differentialist nativist," or culturalist, discourse and its renunciation of biological racism. The criterion of relative extremeness has the advantage of making the definition inclusive toward parties that declare supporting democracy or even call for the introduction of direct democratic means of citizen participation. While their pro-democratic discourse makes it difficult to call them anti-system parties, extreme-right-wing populist parties are certainly polarizing parties, drawing on Giovanni Capoccia's (2002) framework. It is therefore only for the sake of brevity that at times I drop the term "extreme" from their label. While Ignazi (2003) pays little attention to the specific discourses that extreme-right parties may employ, the work of Hans-Georg Betz (2004, 2008; Betz and Johnson 2004) has drawn scholarly attention to the discursive innovations in the populist right's discourse. As Wouter van der Brug and colleagues (2005) show, the framing of the issue agenda of the populist right parties seems to matter, since their success depends on their being perceived and evaluated as normal parties by voters.

In *contextual* terms, it matters whether or not extreme-right parties are conceived as a product of a new cultural conflict in advanced industrial societies. If

this is the case, then they must represent a phenomenon different from extreme-right parties outside advanced industrial countries in terms of their raison d'être and in terms of the mechanisms underlying their rise. Thus, while Australia's One Nation Party is a potential candidate for inclusion in the right-wing populist party family (see Mughan et al. 2003), the parties of the extreme right in Eastern Europe are almost certainly not. Consequently, the potential benefit of analyzing the determinants of the success of all these parties jointly is small, as Pippa Norris's (2005) analysis shows. Even an elementary distinction between "old" and "new" extreme-right parties shows that their electoral fortunes depend on different factors, as Matt Golder (2003) demonstrates empirically.

The term "populist" in the label "extreme-right-wing populist party" refers to a specific style of discourse and to characteristics of the internal structure of these parties. These elements have been important in the mobilization of this party family but are not necessarily specific to it. For a new party to break into an existing party system with a fully mobilized electorate, it must succeed in displacing the existing structure of conflict with a new one, as E. E. Schattschneider (1975 [1960]: chap. 4) has pointed out. A promising way to do this is to denounce the established parties for being unresponsive to what really cleaves the electorate and to accuse them of deliberately forming a "cartel" to protect their privileges. Thus, the populist right's anti-establishment discourse has been part and parcel of its role in establishing a new line of conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. In addition, these parties are characterized by a hierarchical internal structure that differs from the pluralist organization of mass parties. This allows them to adapt quickly to new circumstances and to seize programmatic opportunity structures more quickly than the established parties, which interpret new issues in terms of the existing structure of conflicts and thereby seek to reinforce existing cleavages (see Chapter 3).

Strategic flexibility was a key to right-wing populist parties' success in the 1980s, when they still propagated diverse issues, such as neo-liberal demands in the case of the Front National and the FPÖ (e.g., Ignazi 2003). Their internal party structure has remained a prime advantage, allowing them to thrive on new potentials, such as those stemming from diffuse resentments against Muslims after September 11, 2001 (Betz 2008) or from widespread feelings of insecurity that have fueled the law-and-order issue. The populist right has taken up the associated issues by pointing out that these resentments and feelings of insecurity belong to a more salient line of conflict than those represented by the established parties. A case in point is the reversal of the populist right's originally favorable stance regarding European unification, framing opposition to the project in terms of its traditionalist-communitarian convictions, as we shall see. While the established parties are divided regarding European integration and therefore avoid taking clear positions (Bartolini 2005; Franklin et al. 1996; Kriesi et al. 2006), the populist right can successfully combine a critique of the integration project with the political anti-establishment logic of its mobilization.

To distinguish the extreme-right-wing populist party family, I use three empirically applicable criteria that sum up this discussion. One is related to these parties' extreme position in political space, and two are related to their populist style of mobilization:

- A *location at the extreme on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions.* The criterion of extremeness is similar to one used by Ignazi (2003). However, my focus is exclusively on parties' position regarding the cultural axis of conflict. Contrary to Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995), I argue that a specific stance on distributive issues is not a defining feature of this party family. On the contrary, right-wing populist parties' attitude regarding distributive conflicts is likely to vary as a function of the socio-structural characteristics and preferences of their electorate. Ignazi (2003), by contrast, uses a single left-right dimension and therefore cannot distinguish between positions on the economic and the cultural axes. This is a problem because left-right positions are correlated with both economic and cultural issues, as Wouter van der Brug and Joost van Spanje (2009) have shown.
- A *populist anti-establishment discourse,* in which right-wing populist parties draw a political line of conflict between themselves and the established parties. This is the "political logic" of their mobilization, which they use to portray themselves as anti-cartel parties and defenders of real democracy. Drawing up a politically defined antagonism, in addition to the divide based on interests or values, also helps them to bridge the internal divisions within their heterogeneous electorate and to mold a new collective identity.
- A *hierarchical internal structure,* which sets them apart from the pluralist organization of the established parties. This allows them repeatedly to revise their policy positions in response to sentiments in the populace, as the vast country-specific literature on their programmatic stances testifies.

Parties have to conform to all three criteria to be included in the group of extreme-right-wing populist parties. For example, Cas Mudde (1996: 231–232, 2000) criticizes the concept of populism, employed on its own, as primarily describing a political style and not a specific ideology. While I agree with this point, I consider the combination of a traditionalist-communitarian stance with a populist anti-establishment discourse as a central element in distinguishing right-wing populist parties from the established right, which may at times advocate similar policy positions for tactical reasons. Since the empirical analysis in the next section focuses primarily on parties' positions in political space, I provide some support concerning the other two criteria here.

Strong evidence for the importance of the internal party structure is provided by the two cases in which a pre-existing, established party underwent a transformation to become an exponent of the populist right. The rise of the Austrian FPÖ and the Swiss SVP was accompanied by an abandonment of their former pluralist party organizations in favor of a hierarchical machinery allowing a charismatic leader to dominate the apparatus. This is supported by Ignazi's (2003: 111–116) description of Jörg Haider's ascension to the leadership of the FPÖ, as well as by the Swiss experience, which is presented in Chapter 6. The remaining two candidates for inclusion in the extreme-right-wing populist family—the Front National and the List Pim Fortuyn—also fulfill the second and third criterion. The Front National's anti-establishment discourse is well known, as Jean-Marie Le Pen regularly refers to the established parties as the "gang of four" and denounces the "candidates of the system" for lying.[1] At the same time, the party's structure is extremely centralized and hierarchical (Venner 2002). The Pim Fortuyn movement is also an obvious case: The LPF essentially consisted of Fortuyn and parliamentary candidates that he selected personally (Pennings and Keman 2003).

Of course, an anti-establishment strategy is more feasible as long as right-wing populist parties are not in government. If they cannot adopt their propositions while participating in government, it becomes more difficult to convince voters that they are actually different from the other parties. The fate of the FPÖ in Austria, at least, suggests such an interpretation (Heinisch 2003), but the negative effect has not lasted. In Switzerland, participation in government has been even less detrimental to the continuing success of the SVP. Christoph Blocher, an exponent of the right-wing populist wing of the party, entered the federal government in 2003 and, in fact, contributed to adopting policies consistent with the party's line, such as a restrictive new asylum law. The degree to which participation in government poses a problem for right-wing populist parties' ongoing success thus remains an unsettled question. To a certain degree, both the SVP and the FPÖ have managed to hold on to a double strategy of participation in government and anti-establishment rhetoric.

Right-Wing Populist Parties and Their Competitors in the Political Space of the 1990s and Early 2000s

Research Design

The following analysis tracks the positions of the List Pim Fortuyn, the Front National, the FPÖ, and the SVP in the political space constituted by the programmatic positions advocated within their respective party systems. The structure of political space in these countries can then be compared with the cases of Germany and Britain, where no strong extreme-right-wing populist parties are present at the national level. To identify the lines of conflict structuring political

[1] *Le Monde,* April 25, 1995, 5.

competition, a media analysis of parties' "political offerings" in the elections for the each country's first parliamentary chamber was conducted (except for France, where the analysis focuses on presidential contests). In each country, all articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general were selected from a high-quality newspaper and a tabloid covering the two months before election day for three elections in the 1990s and early 2000s. The articles were then coded sentence by sentence, as is spelled out in detail in Chapter 4.[2] For the present purposes, only relationships between political actors and political issues are taken into account. Political actors were coded according to their party membership. Small parties were grouped. For example, in France, the "Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy; UDF)" category comprises several small centrist parties. To insure reliability, small parties for which insufficient information could be obtained on their issue positions were excluded from the analysis.

A detailed schema that distinguished among two hundred or more subcategories was used to code political issues. For the statistical analysis, these subcategories were regrouped into twelve broader categories. In the following, the content of these categories is specified. All categories have a clear direction (i.e., an actor's stance toward them can be positive or negative). The abbreviations in parentheses refer to categories used in the figures.

Economic Issues

Welfare. Content includes expansion of the welfare state and defense against welfare-state retrenchment; tax reforms that have redistributive effects; employment and health-care programs. Valence issues such as the statements "fight unemployment" or "against recession" were dropped if the actor did not specify whether the goal was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation.

Budget. Content includes budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cutting of expenditures, and reduction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution.

Economic liberalism (*ecolib*). Content includes support for deregulation, more competition, and privatization; opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed measures do not have an impact on state expenditure (this is the distinguishing criterion from the welfare category); opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors.

Cultural Issues

Cultural liberalism (*cultlib*). Content includes support for the goals of the New Social Movements, such as peace, solidarity with the Third World, gender equality, and human rights; support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and the

[2]Because of their importance in the campaign, party ads were also coded in Switzerland.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), and the United Nations; opposition to racism; support for the right to abortion and euthanasia and for a liberal drug policy. Content for cultural protectionism (coded negative) includes patriotism and calls for national solidarity, defense of tradition, national sovereignty, and traditional moral values.

Europe. Content includes support for European integration, including enlargement, or for European Union (EU) membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria.

Culture. Content includes support for education, culture, and scientific research.

Immigration. Content includes support for a tough immigration and integration policy and for restricting the number of foreigners.

Army. Content includes support for the army (including NATO), for a strong national defense, and for nuclear weapons.

Security. Content includes support for more law and order; fighting against criminality and political corruption.

Residual Categories

Environment (*eco*). Content includes calls for environmental protection and opposition to nuclear energy.

Institutional reform (*iref*). Content includes support for various institutional reforms, such as the extension of direct democratic rights, and calls for efficiency of the public administration.

Infrastructure (*infra*). Content includes support for the improvement of the infrastructure.

The data are analyzed using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), which results in a graphical representation of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space in every country. The grouping of the issues into economic, cultural, and residual categories is provided as illustration and does not determine the analysis. To give salient relationships between political actors and issues more weight than less salient ones, Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling is used. There are always distortions between the "real" distances and their graphical representation in the low-dimensional space resulting from the MDS, but the weighting procedure ensures that the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues is more accurate than those corresponding to less salient ones. The results thus take into account both position and saliency.

In all six countries, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since the move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the clearest improvement in the goodness of fit of the solution.[3] The results

[3]The values for the Stress-I statistic, which is an estimation of goodness of fit of the final configuration, is .32 for Austria, .29 for France, .25 for the Netherlands, .32 for Switzerland, .34 for Germany, and .25 for Britain.

of the analysis are presented in Figures 2.1 to 2.6. The dimensions resulting from the MDS analysis are not substantially meaningful. The solution can therefore be freely rotated, and it is possible to lay theoretically meaningful axes into the distribution. It is also important to keep in mind that the distances in the solutions can be interpreted only in relation to each other and not in absolute terms. For example, right-wing populist parties may not be just next to the subject of immigration in absolute terms, because their proximity to other issues also "pulls" them in another direction. A more complete description of methodological procedures and a guide to the interpretation of the MDS analyses is in Chapter 4.

In the solutions, a first line has been drawn between "welfare" and "economic liberalism" as a representation of the distributional political conflict. All of the configurations have been rotated to make this antagonism lie horizontally in political space. Arguably, these two categories represent the political content of the traditional state-market cleavage. The cultural line of conflict has been drawn by connecting "immigration" and "cultural liberalism," the two categories that embody the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. Cultural liberalism conveys support for universalistic values, as well as the repudiation of the opposing normative ideals—the defense of tradition, national sovereignty, and traditional moral values. Opposition to immigration and calls for a tough integration policy (denoted in the figures as "immigration"), by contrast, captures stances regarding the theme the populist right has used in constructing a collective identity based on demarcations from people with cultural backgrounds different from that of the majority population.

Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Political Space of Western European Party Systems

The first thing we notice when looking at the general patterns is that the configuration of political alternatives presented in the six party systems is strikingly similar. Political competition everywhere is structured by an economic and by a cultural line of conflict, although to varying degrees. France and Switzerland show signs of integration of the two dimensions, with cultural liberalism associated with a pro-welfare position and anti-immigration stances lying closer to the economic-liberalism pole of the state-market divide. Britain is an exception in that immigration played a minor role in the elections under investigation, and the category therefore does not appear in the figure. However, as in the other countries, in Britain cultural liberalism, along with support for the EU, is a polarizing issue. I start by discussing the countries that display a strong presence of parties that are presumed to belong to the right-wing populist party group, testing the hypothesis that this can be considered a party family. I then analyze the proposition that established right-wing parties are situated in a similar position in Britain's and Germany's political space, thereby weakening the chances of an electoral breakthrough by more extreme parties.

The French Front National, Austrian FPÖ, and Swiss SVP are clearly situated at the extreme of the political spectrum in their respective countries, as Figures 2.1–2.3 show. All of them are farthest away from cultural liberalism and are the most fervent opponents of immigration, causing them to form the lower pole of the cultural line of conflict. By contrast, the Dutch LPF, while also located at the limits of the political spectrum (see Figure 2.4), stands out for not being particularly opposed to immigration, raising doubts concerning its inclusion in the category of right-wing populist parties. In France, Austria, and Switzerland, however, right-wing populist parties are clearly located at the opposite pole from the Social Democratic and ecologist parties with regard to all of the issues associated with the cultural dimension. In Switzerland, support for European integration is also located in the libertarian-universalistic domain and appears to be even more polarizing than cultural liberalism. This supports the hypothesis that attitudes toward the EU are becoming "embedded" in the cultural axis of conflict (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Finally, right-wing populist parties are also close to law-and-order stances ("security") and institutional reforms, where calls for direct democracy are included. However, this is not necessarily what distinguishes them from other parties.

Having presented the general picture, I now discuss the most important differences between the cases. A brief interpretation that focuses on the individual countries addresses, among other points, right-wing populist parties' varying positions regarding the economic axis of conflict.

In Austria (Figure 2.1), the cultural line of conflict cuts across the distributional dimension very clearly. The FPÖ is located on the cultural line of conflict and rather remote from the distributional axis, near anti-immigration and farthest away from cultural liberalism. At the same time, the FPÖ has moved away from neo-liberalism, which was an issue it propagated in the 1980s (e.g., Ignazi 2003), and is now located closer to "welfare" than to economic liberalism. This is less visible in the figure, where other issues also condition its position, but the similarity measures show that between 1999 and 2002, the FPÖ completely reversed its position and switched to a pro-welfare and anti-economic liberalism position (see Appendix A). This move is in line with a strategy that aims to mobilize the losers in economic modernization and globalization. Indeed, the FPÖ represents something like the "master case" of a modernization-loser party, combining exclusionary community construction with leftist economic stances.

The Austrian case also shows that established parties may seek to attract the same potential a right-wing populist party has been mobilizing, even if their pluralist internal structure, as I have argued, makes this more difficult for them to do. It is quite striking how close the conservative Austrian People's Party has moved to the FPÖ's position, especially in the 1999 election campaign.

The situation in France is similar in some respects to that in Austria. The cultural line of conflict also clearly cuts across the distributional dimension, and here, too, cultural liberalism and anti-immigration stances are located at the



FIGURE 2.1 Political space in Austria, 1994–2002.

KEY *Political groups:* FPÖ, Austrian Freedom Party; LIF, Liberal Forum; ÖVP, Austrian People's Party, conservatives; SPÖ, Austrian Social Democratic Party.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform.

extreme points of the axis (Figure 2.2). The Front National takes a distinct position and consistently has been located in the traditionalist-communitarian political space over the years, far away from cultural liberalism. While the parties of the left are always located in the left-libertarian domain, the parties of the established right have shifted their strategy: In 1995, they were located between the left and the Front National, although at a safe distance from the latter. In 2002, they moved closer to cultural liberalism, back to a position similar to that in 1988. Overall, there is a triangular configuration of party alternatives, with the parties of the left situated on the upper left; the moderate right-wing parties situated to their right; and the Front National situated at the lower end of the cultural divide. At the same time, the Front National's position regarding distributional issues is not clear-cut. In 2002, it moved nearer to economic liberalism and away from the more pro-welfare stance it had taken in 1988 and 1995.

In Switzerland, the cultural dimension appears highly polarizing, and the SVP is clearly situated at the one pole of this opposition, advocating cultural



FIGURE 2.2 Political space in France, 1988–2002.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National and Mouvement National Républicain (National Republican Movement); GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; MRG, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist; later, Union for a Presidential Majority; currently, Union for a Popular Movement); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *iref,* institutional reform.

protectionism, as opposed to cultural liberalism, and a strict immigration policy (Figure 2.3). Also, the SVP's fervent opposition to joining the European Union is evident in the location of this issue: "Europe" is far more removed from the center of the configuration than in most of the other countries, which indicates that this issue polarizes the party system. At the same time, we can see that the cultural divide does not cut across the distributional one very clearly. Anti-immigrant positions are located much closer to economic liberalism than to welfare-state support. In other words, there are signs of integration of the economic and cultural divides in a single left-right dimension. Thus, the SVP is located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide but also close to economic liberalism. Its position in the economic domain does not seem suitable to mobilize the losers in economic modernization.

The SVP's opposition to joining the EU, of which Switzerland is not a member, can be considered an expression of economic protectionism as well as part of a defense of national community and its distinct traditions. The importance of the European integration issue also explains the unexpected position of the Greens, which is due to their rejection of a rapprochement. As the analysis in Chapter 6 shows, the Green Party does represent the counter-pole to the SVP along the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. What is most striking about the SVP is that it has moved into a political



FIGURE 2.3 Political space in Switzerland, 1991–1999.

KEY *Political groups:* CVP, Christian Democratic People's Party; EXR, older extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party. *Issue categories: cultlib,* cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform.

space originally occupied by extreme-right parties such as the Freedom Party, the Swiss Democrats, and the Swiss Democratic Union. As Figure 2.3 shows, the SVP's position is identical to that of the older parties of the extreme right. As the SVP's program has shifted, the older extreme-right parties have almost vanished. Because of the attention they have been paid by the media has diminished, we can no longer estimate their position for 1999.

In the Netherlands, the data cover the span from 1994 to 2003, but it makes little sense to analyze the four elections jointly that took place in this period, because the Dutch political space has been profoundly restructured. We find the largest shifts in party positions in this country. I therefore restrict the analysis to three contests: the 1998 election, before Pim Fortuyn appeared on the political stage, and the 2002 and 2003 elections. In 2002, the List Pim Fortuyn reaped a sweeping success, receiving 17 percent of the vote. In the 2003 elections, however, the LPF—without Fortuyn—gained only 5.7 percent of the vote. For the political space of the late 1990s to early 2000s, the line connecting cultural liberalism and immigration cuts across the distributional dimension very clearly (Figure 2.4). The LPF is manifestly located quite far away from cultural liberalism. This reflects



FIGURE 2.4 Political space in the Netherlands, 1998–2003.

KEY *Political groups:* CD, Christian Democratic Appeal; D66, Democrats 66; GL, GreenLeft; LPF, List Pim Fortuyn and Leefbaar Nederland (Livable Netherlands); PVDA, Labor Party; VVD, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, liberals.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform.

its opposition to the multicultural model of social integration, demanding instead that foreigners adapt to the Dutch culture. At the same time, the conservative Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; VVD) shows a clearer anti-immigration stance than the Pim Fortuyn movement.[4]

The LPF's position reflects the fact that Pim Fortuyn very much advocated an innovative ideological cluster of his own that does not fully conform to the libertarian-universalistic versus communitarian-traditionalist dimension of

[4]Unfortunately, the Centrumsdemokraten and other extreme-right parties, which we would expect to be positioned similarly, could not be included in the analysis because there are too few observations regarding their positioning.

conflict. While he was opposed to multicultural society (which forms part of the cultural liberalism category), he held libertarian values concerning homosexuality and related societal values. He did not take a tough stance on immigration or a strong law-and-order position, as our data show (see the tables in Appendix A). While he did criticize the individualization and fragmentation of society (Pennings and Keman 2003: 62), thus aiming at the communitarian potential I have sketched out, his vision was nonetheless different from that of right-wing populist parties. Consequently, the LPF should not be classified as an extreme-right-wing populist party similar to the Front National, the FPÖ, or the SVP. Mudde (2007: 47) and Paul Pennings and Hans Keman (2003) have come to a similar conclusion. Pennings and Keman, using an analysis based on party-manifesto data coded by the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), note that the LPF shows more resemblance to established right-wing parties in other European countries than to parties of the extreme right. As far as the its programmatic profile regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism is concerned, the LPF is clearly nearer to a liberal position.

What is also striking is how all of the established parties in the Netherlands have moved away from cultural liberalism, though not necessarily toward anti-immigration stances. Indeed, of all countries studied here, the differences in the Dutch parties' positions in the different elections are the largest. The success of Pim Fortuyn's programmatic stance thus has to be seen in the light of (1) an established party (the liberal VVD) taking a clear position at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide *before* the appearance of the LPF; and (2) strong competition from other parties imitating the ideological mix developed by Pim Fortuyn and collectively challenging what had appeared to be a multicultural consensus.

No Space for the Populist Right in Britain and Germany?

The basic structure of political space in Germany (Figure 2.5) is quite similar to that found in the four countries already discussed. The cultural line of opposition runs from cultural liberalism to anti-immigration stances, cutting across the economic axis very clearly. In 1994, the Greens and the Social Democrats took a left-libertarian position and were located close to the universalistic pole of the cultural divide, according to general expectations. The liberal FDP in that election was very liberal in both economic and societal matters. The Union, by contrast, which represents the sister Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union parties, is located in a centrist position with regard to both dimensions. Thus, while the resulting configuration is triangular, the space at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide is not yet occupied.

Between 1994 and 2002, the major parties made a quite astonishing general move toward the traditionalist-communitarian pole, with the (partial) exception of the Greens, which primarily moved closer to economic liberalism. While the SPD took a centrist position on both dimensions in 1998 (similar to the Union's



FIGURE 2.5 Political space in Germany, 1994–2002.

KEY *Political groups:* FDP, Free Democratic Party, liberals; PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism; SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany; UNION, Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform.

location in the first election), the Union moved farther toward the anti-immigration pole of the cultural divide. Thus, while the configuration remains triangular, the two main parties have both moved away from a libertarian-universalistic position. With no strong challenging party of the populist right, German political space is thus characterized by a configuration resembling that found in the countries previously analyzed. The Union's location is similar to the location occupied by the populist right in other countries and, in fact, appears to leave little room for populist right parties, except for small parties of the extreme right, which represent a marginal phenomenon and are hardly covered by the media.

Although political space is also two-dimensional in Britain (Figure 2.6), the situation is somewhat different from that in the countries discussed so far. While a cultural dimension structures the positions of the major parties, it is characterized only by a libertarian-universalistic pole and lacks the ideological counterpart of the quest for a culturally homogeneous community. Budgetary rigor is located at the opposite extreme in political space. This is not entirely surprising, because cutting back the state is associated with a neo-conservative political position, which is liberal in economic terms but traditionalist in cultural matters (Eatwell 1989; Habermas 1985). Right-wing populist parties such as the



FIGURE 2.6 Political space in Britain, 1992–2001.

KEY *Political groups:* CONS, Conservative Party; LABOUR, Labour Party; LIBDEM, Liberal Democrats.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform.

Front National and the FPÖ advocated similar positions in the 1980s (Ignazi 2003). Even in the 1990s, budgetary rigor was generally associated with a traditionalist-communitarian posture in Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, although not in Germany (see Figures 2.1–2.5).

However, support for and opposition to universalistic values clearly plays a role in parties' appeals in Britain. This dimension coincides with contrasting stances toward the European Union, similarly to Switzerland. While the Labor Party and the Liberal Democrats switched their positions regarding the cultural conflict between 1997 and 2001, the Conservatives are farthest away from cultural liberalism and European integration. Although the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats came closer to the Conservatives' position in 1997 and 2001, respectively, the Conservatives have been most consistently located in a position remote from cultural liberalism and universalistic vales. In the elections under study here, the Conservatives display a neo-conservative profile characterized by an acceptance of economic modernization but a rejection of cultural modernity, which Jürgen Habermas (1985) identifies as core traits of neo-conservatism. Under Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives explicitly emphasized the need to

defend national tradition (Eatwell 2004: 64). In more recent elections, which are not covered in this analysis, they have also placed the immigration issue on the political agenda, as established conservative parties in other countries had done earlier on.

The absence of a right-wing populist competitor thus seems driven by the ability of the mainstream parties to avoid leaving traditionalist-communitarian positions to more extremist parties, on the one hand, and by the characteristics of their challengers, on the other. The success of the United Kingdom Independence Party in the 2004 and 2009 European elections suggests that a potential for communitarian-traditionalist mobilization beyond the Conservatives exists. The historical weakness of the British extreme right, however, according to Roger Eatwell (2004), is not due to structural factors, political culture, or even institutions, a frequently quoted explanation (e.g., Ignazi 2003). Rather, it a result of the nature of these parties themselves, which are internally divided and far too radical. In this sense, the British National Party's "modernization" strategy of the past years, which has consisted of adopting a differentialist cultural discourse and targeting disadvantaged social groups (Eatwell 2004), may prove successful in the long run.

Conclusion

The evidence from the analysis of political space shows that political conflicts in the six countries examined are structured by an economic state-market and a cultural line of conflict. Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, I have suggested that the issues associated with this axis—the libertarian goals brought up by the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the conservative counter-reaction represented by movements of the right—can be interpreted in terms of an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values or conceptions of justice. The more recently established pole of this line of conflict is characterized by opposition to the universalistic conceptions of the New Left, including the right to difference, social permissiveness, and, in some countries, support for supranational integration into the European Union, as well as by an anti-immigration stance. With the exception of Britain, where the immigration issue until recently has been almost absent from the political debate, cultural liberalism and anti-immigration stances indeed lie at opposing poles of a new cultural line of opposition.

The French Front National, Austrian FPÖ, and Swiss SVP are positioned at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of this opposition. Clearly, they are not single-issue parties; they express a coherent ideological vision. This, taken together with their populist anti-establishment discourse and hierarchical internal party organization, makes them constitute a common party family. Because the Dutch Pim Fortuyn movement's position regarding the cultural line of conflict differs from that of the other populist parties, the LPF does not fit the criteria for inclusion in the right-wing populist party family.

Right-wing populist parties stand out for their extreme positions on the cultural axis of conflict, not for specific stances regarding the state-market conflict. While the Austrian FPÖ has a rather state-interventionist profile, the French Front National changes its position on distributional conflict frequently. This reflects unease in satisfying the diverging economic preferences of their voters, as Chapter 5 demonstrates. Of the three parties included in the extreme-populist-right group, only the Swiss SVP is consistently pro-market.

A final note regarding the proper definition of the extreme-right-wing populist party family is in order here. The empirical application of my criteria to delineate this party family has primarily sought to distinguish this group from the pluralist parties of the established right. However, an analysis that focuses on parties' position in political space is rather insensitive toward internal differentiations *within* the extreme right. Because all of these parties share an ideological core, drawing borders inside the extreme-right group is no easy task (Mudde 2000). As I have argued, what distinguishes right-wing populist parties from the wider extreme-right party family is their culturalist discourse, which the Front National, FPÖ, and SVP all practice. The distinction between the older parties of the extreme right and the new right-wing populist sub-type plays an important role in the discussion of the extreme right in Germany in Chapter 7.

In this chapter, it has been more important to draw a clear distinction between extreme-right-wing populist parties and parties of the established right. Although this may seem a trivial problem at first sight, it is in fact essential, as this analysis shows. For example, the Dutch VVD's ideological position in political space corresponds closely to the profile shown by the three members of the extreme-right-wing populist group. Given these similarities, a distinction based on origin, which would classify the Swiss SVP as an established conservative party and the Austrian FPÖ as a national conservative party, makes little sense. A major difference lies in the anti-political-establishment rhetoric and hierarchical internal structure of right-wing populist parties.

Finally, the analysis shows that right-wing populist parties' lack of success in Germany and Britain can be explained at least partly by the fact that established parties in those countries have a programmatic profile that is similar to the profile that is characteristic of the populist right. In Germany, the Union parties appear to occupy the political space in which right-wing populist parties thrive elsewhere. Political conflicts in Germany closely resemble those found in the other countries, and unlike in Britain, the immigration issue played a role in German election campaigns of the 1990s. For this reason, the German case merits a more in-depth analysis, which I undertake in Chapter 7.

II

New Political Divides and Historical Cleavages

3

From Structure to Culture and Back

The Perpetuation and Transformation of Historical Cleavages

> Despite more or less thirty years of close reading by countless scholars in a variety of different fields, and despite what is now a genuinely voluminous literature seeking to explore and often test the ramifications of the so-called "freezing hypothesis", there still remains a marked degree of confusion about what precisely was believed by Lipset and Rokkan to have settled into place by the 1920s. (Mair 2001: 27)

The mobilization of the historical cleavages identified by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), in processes lasting to the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, have given birth to the modern party systems in Europe. Subsequently, the full mobilization of European electorates led to a "freezing" of the major party alternatives. A crucial characteristic of Western European competitive politics, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1990 [1967]: 134), is that "the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of national electorates."

Assuming a zero-sum relationship between established cleavages and new divides, as suggested by Hanspeter Kriesi and Jan Willem Duyvendak (1995), the aim of this chapter is to develop a model to assess how established conflicts limit the room for parties that are mobilizing on new issue dimensions. Applying a cleavage perspective to contemporary developments, however, requires a conceptual reassessment of the approach. While the narrow

focus on the socio-structural underpinnings of voting choices in much of the literature on cleavages was criticized early on (Sartori 1968; Zuckerman 1975), a new strand of research focusing on the role of agency in cleavage formation has emerged only recently (e.g., Deegan-Krause 2006; Enyedi 2005). I suggest paying attention to the role of agency not only in the *initial formation* of a cleavage but also in its *perpetuation.*

In developing a dynamic account of the cleavage concept, I argue that a more adequate understanding of the importance of collective identities in perpetuating long-term political alignments is necessary. If cleavages are formed by the interplay between structural or cultural similarities and the formation of a collective consciousness of social groups, then their continued salience must result from the stability of these collective identifications. A central factor that keeps these identities alive, I claim, is political conflict. Furthermore, the stability of party systems depends on whether parties adequately represent voters along old and new issue dimensions. The model proposed in this chapter thus incorporates the force of collective political identifications and the responsiveness of the party system to voters' preferences. I develop a typology of cleavages and other divisions from which hypotheses are derived concerning the mobilization potential of new conflicts. While the approach developed in this chapter is not specific to explaining the rise of the right-wing populist party family, it is tested in later chapters to explain why the populist right has succeeded in breaking into some party systems but not others.

The Cleavage Concept and the Historical Experience of Europe

The Formation of Cleavages and Party Systems

Across Europe, the twin processes of the national and industrial revolutions constituted "critical junctures" that determined subsequent political development and led to long-term alignments between social groups and political parties. In Rokkan's model (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1999), the process of nation building resulted in conflicts that are territorial, on the one hand, and cultural, on the other. The *center-periphery cleavage* was triggered by "the conflict between the *central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries," while the *religious cleavage* developed from "the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing *Nation-State* and the historically established corporate privileges of the *Church*" (Lipset and Rokkan 1990 [1967]: 101).

As opposed to these cultural conflicts, *functional oppositions* have arisen only after a certain degree of internal and external consolidation of the national territory and a certain level of cultural standardization (Bartolini 2005: chap. 2;

Caramani 2004). Going back to Rokkan (1999), cross-local oppositions first resulted from the industrial revolution, which in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century produced two cleavages: a *sectoral cleavage* between the primary and secondary sectors of the economy, placing agricultural and industrial interests into opposition, and, as the historically youngest divide, the *class cleavage.* While the class cleavage has not necessarily been the strongest one, it has probably received the most attention in comparative politics because it has come to structure politics in every European country.

The mobilization of the four historical cleavages identified in the classic approach gave birth to the modern party systems in Europe. Subsequently, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have famously noted, the full mobilization of European electorates led to a "freezing" of the major party alternatives. Daniele Caramani (2004) has shown that the ending of territorially fragmented politics was an early process that was completed before World War I. The basic structure of European party systems has proved remarkably stable throughout much of the twentieth century, as Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990) demonstrated in their seminal study, which relies on aggregate measures of volatility between ideological party blocks.

In their further elaboration of the concept, Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213–220) have offered a definition of a cleavage that has become widely accepted. According to them, to constitute a cleavage a political divide must comprise three elements: (1) a *socio-structural* element, such as class, religious denomination, status, or education; (2) an element of *collective identity* of this social group; and (3) an *organizational manifestation* in the form of collective action or a durable organization of the social groups concerned. Going beyond these three elements, the term "cleavage" is usually reserved for relationships that show a certain amount of stability. A cleavage constitutes a *durable pattern of political behavior* linking social groups and political organizations. It represents a *political structure,* in David Easton's (1990: 43) terms, since "structure is a property of behavior."

The relationship of the four historical cleavages illustrates nicely that the space for new conflicts is conditioned by the existing cleavages. The class divide was the last of the four cleavages to materialize, and although it represents the main commonality of European party systems, its impact has been far from uniform in the different countries. This is due to in part to the country-specific opportunities for alliances with other political movements. More important, working-class parties found their mobilization space constrained by prior mobilization efforts of the religious, nationalist and agrarian political movements and the loyalties they engendered (Bartolini 2000: chap. 8; Rokkan 1999). As a consequence, the share of the working class voting for parties of the left varies heavily across countries, and so does the socio-structural homogeneity of the electorate mobilized by left-wing parties, as shown by Bartolini (2000: 497).

Sources of Stability: Differing Interpretations of the "Freezing Hypothesis"

Although the genesis of European party systems has been cogently explained, the mechanisms accounting for these systems' remarkable long-term stability were not analyzed in detail in the original article by Lipset and Rokkan or in Rokkan's later work (Rokkan 1999). Empirical tests of the continuing validity of the freezing hypothesis have proceeded along two main lines, as Mair (2001: 28–33) points out. As we will see, they are based on differing interpretations of what exactly "froze" into place in the 1920s.

One possible strategy to assess the stability of cleavages is to study the socio-structural determinants of voting behavior. In one of the major studies in the field, Mark Franklin and his colleagues (1992) conclude that, if the traditional class cleavage is understood as a division between manual and non-manual employment, its force is weakened dramatically. Franklin and colleagues, however, leave unexplored the continuing existence of a modified state-market cleavage that now puts into opposition different social groups from those that originally brought the cleavage into being. This conclusion is suggested by findings based on more refined class schemata, such as the work assembled in the volume edited by Geoffrey Evans (1999). Most of the contributors to that book fail to find uniform trends of cleavage decline across countries (Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999; Weakliem and Heath 1999). If the socio-structural referents of cleavages have changed, however, then the conflicts around which politics evolve are most likely to differ, as well. Proceeding from the "bottom up" from socio-structural characteristics to voting choices, we do not know whether these new socio-structural divisions are really the underpinning of a conflict similar to the old class cleavage or if they reflect some new or other dimension of conflict. More than offering a test of the strength of the *historical* cleavages, then, this is an analysis of the continuing relevance of the cleavage concept as such, which claims that political oppositions are in some way rooted in social structure.

The contradiction between the two approaches is only apparent, in other words. Since social structure has evidently changed a great deal since the 1920s, the long-term stability of party systems, revealed by Bartolini and Mair's (1990) analysis, is necessarily due to something other than stable patterns of linkage between social strata and political parties. If party systems retain their basic shape in the midst of an evolving society, this can be accounted for only by the forming of new links between social groups and parties. After all, declining numbers of religious and working-class voters imply a natural process of structural dealignment that somehow needs to be compensated for. This is in fact the reasoning put forward by Evans (1999), as well as by scholars who have pointed out that conflicts over cultural values render new socio-structural divisions relevant (Kriesi 1993a, 1998; Müller 1999; Oesch 2008a). But if the cleavages have been profoundly transformed, then it hardly makes sense to speak of the freezing of the cleavages themselves.

An alternative strategy is to focus on the stability of party systems formed by the historical cleavages. This perspective seeks to explain the persistence of parties beyond the conflicts that originally brought them into being. On closer reading, Lipset and Rokkan's original formulation of the freezing hypothesis conforms more to this interpretation than to the first. Lipset und Rokkan (1990 [1967]: 134) refer to the "narrowing of the support market" as a consequence of the formation of mass parties and to the subsequent "freezing of the major party alternatives," not the cleavages themselves. They explicitly state, "The *party systems* of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the *cleavage structures* of the 1920s" (Lipset und Rokkan 1990 [1967]: 134; emphasis added). A frozen party system is thus equivalent to a structurally consolidated or institutionalized party system, in Giovanni Sartori's (1976) terms. The stronger a party system structures the expectations of actors over time—at the elite level as well as at the mass level—the more it contributes to channeling old and new conflicts into established structures of competition.

A partial explanation for the confusion about the exact meaning of the freezing metaphor may actually lie in the influential definition of a cleavage put forward by Bartolini and Mair, which can be read only as putting great emphasis on the socio-structural homogeneity of parties' electorates. However, in other instances, the authors themselves are far less strict in their understanding of cleavages. This applies to Mair's (1997) later work, as well as to Bartolini (2000), who accepts a long-term decline in the socio-structural homogeneity of the left's electorate as quite natural. As Mair (1997, 2001) argues, the transformation of cleavages is actually the only possible explanation for the stability of European party systems demonstrated in Bartolini and Mair (1990). Their constant adaptation helped parties survive in a profoundly changing environment.

Hence, Bartolini and Mair's definition, which emphasizes the linkage among social structure, collective identity, and organization, seems much more suitable for analyzing the conditions for the initial mobilization of cleavages than for answering the question about the degree to which historical cleavages structure politics today. Thus, it will not suffice to focus on social structure and on the stability of partisan alignments. We also have to identify the concrete political conflicts that parties fight about and study how they are interpreted and processed along the lines of historical antagonisms reflected in cleavages.

The Role of Collective Identities and Conflict in Perpetuating Cleavages

With respect to the initial mobilization of socio-structural divisions or grievances, social structure, collective identity, and political organization—the three elements Bartolini and Mair (1990) emphasize—represent a mobilization sequence. A shared understanding of group membership is a necessary condition for the emergence of a cleavage because individuals will join together and act on behalf of their membership in a group only if they share a collective identity that

allows them to overcome the collective-action problem (Klandermans 1997; Melucci 1996; Pizzorno 1986, 1991). To put it differently, individuals will only act collectively to support a political movement—even one that represents their "objective" interests—if they interpret the underlying conflict not in individual terms but as inter-group conflict (Tajfel 1981). As Sidney Tarrow points out, "If the social movement research of the last two decades has shown anything, it is that grievances are not sufficient to trigger collective action, that this requires someone who can take advantage of political opportunities, develop organizations of some kind, *and interpret grievances and mobilize consensus around them*" (Tarrow 1992: 177; emphasis added). Collective identities are "produced by the social construction of boundaries" (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 74). Clearly, then, political agency plays an important role in creating cleavages.

But actors, and more specifically parties, also matter in perpetuating cleavages. To the degree that political conflicts evolve around issues directly linked to the original cleavages, politics is likely to reinforce and sustain the underlying collective identities. Lewis Coser (1956) has emphasized the group-binding functions of conflict, which serves to highlight the boundaries of the group and to keep group identification salient at the level of the individual member. If individuals perceive themselves as belonging to a group, they downplay within-group differences and start to emphasize differences between themselves and other groups (Tajfel 1981). In other words, they symbolically construct boundaries between themselves and their political competitors. Donald Green and his colleagues (2002) show that partisan identification represents a social identity that involves the rejection of the opposing groups.

Some time ago, Sartori (1968) argued that it takes a working-class party to turn objective class *membership* into subjective class *consciousness* and thus render class a relevant basis for politics. I take this line of reasoning one step further: It is not the party that keeps subjective class consciousness alive but the conflicts it carries out with parties defending diverging interests. Without an antagonist, this identification would lose much of its political relevance and, if not refreshed, would open the way to identifications on the basis of some other group membership. It is thus not parties as such that reproduce collective identities, but the party *system,* defined as a "*system of interactions* resulting from inter-party competition" (Sartori 1976: 44), that reproduces collective identities.

Contrary to the argument put forward by Angus Campbell and colleagues (1960: chap. 7) and Philip Converse (1969), then, it is not necessarily the long-term identification of social groups with a specific party that accounts for the stability of a party system over time. It is, rather, the stability of the patterns of interaction between parties that perpetuates political alignments. Accordingly, party identification is the product of a genuinely *political* socialization process.

Party systems then reproduce themselves over time as new generations of voters are socialized into the existing structure of interaction and come to interpret politics in terms of the prevailing pattern of oppositions. Thus, the configura-

tion of the lines of conflict in a party system represents something like a cognitive schema that helps individuals to make sense of politics. A schema is a "cognitive structure of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances that guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information" (Conover and Feldman 1984: 96). One of the roles of schemas is to generate expectations against which reality is compared (Conover and Feldman 1984: 97), much like the notion of a frozen or an institutionalized party system developed in the preceding section. In the absence of patterned interactions, the party system provides no cognitive schema or guideline for the interpretation of politics. Accordingly, no stable links between social constituencies and parties will exist, and levels of volatility from one election to the next can be very high, indicating the absence of any form of structuring. Examples for such constellations are absent in Western Europe, but the experience outside Europe—looking at the contrasts between highly structured and fluid party systems in Latin America, for example (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995)—demonstrates that veritable party *systems* are the product of historical cleavage formation. That is, they do not develop easily in historical contexts where the formation of the party system did not reflect socio-structural antagonisms.

The notion that the socialization in a party system entails the development of a cognitive schema helps to explain why cleavages, once formed, are so resistant to change and how they can persist beyond the immediate conflicts that have brought the system into being in the first place. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 218) put it, they offer individuals existing alternatives for their social identities and political integration. At the same time, parties continuously adapt to structural and cultural changes. Thus, while new political issues are for the most part *interpreted and processed* in terms of the established structure of conflict, there is by no means stability in the *political content of conflict.* Structures of opposition may resemble those produced by the historical cleavages, but it is not the cleavages or the original conflicts as such that are perpetuated but the shape of the party system.

At this point, it is obviously necessary to move from *identities anchored in social structure* and tightly bound to social groups—whose mobilization initially produced cleavage structures—to more genuinely *political identities,* which are partly a product of politics itself. This interpretation is in line with Sartori's (1968) dictum that we have to conceive of the party system as an independent variable between the domains of social structure and politics. At a fine level of analysis, then, the partisan camps divided by a cleavage consist of social groups that have been mobilized into this opposition by virtue of the homogeneity of their life chances, their religious worldview or their sectoral interests. Represented in the party system, however, are broader patterns of opposition, which are the result of multiple alliances between social groups in opposition to those with opposing interests or ideologies.

At this higher level of abstraction, where we move from the political organization of social groups to political articulation and interaction within a party

system, the more particularistic identities based on attachments to social groups are meshed into broader political orientations. These can be conceived as "political cultures" in the sense of generalized orientations toward politics (Almond and Verba 1963: 13; Eckstein 1996). It has repeatedly been pointed out that such very basic clusters of values and ensuing value identities are antagonistically related to one another. According to Aaron Wildavsky (1987: 7), "Conflict among cultures is a precondition of cultural identity."

Building on Chapter 1, there are essentially two politically relevant value dimensions: freedom and equality. The value of equality underlies the mobilization of the class and sectoral cleavages. However, the traditional antagonisms centering on culture, such as the religious cleavage, as well as the rising libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide, are associated with differing emphases of the value of freedom. The two dimensions structuring political space are unlikely to be of equal importance for the individual voter. For some, the most salient identity may be class; for others, religion; and yet for others, national identity.

How Cleavages Evolve

Dealignment, Realignment, and Transformation of Cleavages

If individuals develop ideological schemas in the process of their socialization within a party system, this also allows them to take decisions on new issues relatively easily. As Wildavsky's (1987) culturalist theory of preference formation suggests, ideological schemas help voters take decisions on new issues consistent with their basic political beliefs. New conflicts thus are usually somehow absorbed into the established structure of conflict without altering it. If new issues divide the same social groups as the conflicts that prevailed, they will simply be taken up by parties and will result in a somewhat altered meaning or political content of the dominant lines of conflict within a party system. Just like voters, parties rely on ideologies to position themselves with respect to new issues (Budge 1994).

If parties' established electorates are divided concerning an issue that is new or was of minor salience hitherto, then parties will try to avoid positioning themselves regarding this issue. The obvious temptation to attract new voters by positioning themselves regarding controversial issues is tempered by the risks inherent in such a strategy. Parties are historical beings and "stand for something," in the words of Hans-Dieter Klingemann and his colleagues (1994: 24), and this keeps them from abandoning political positions that are closely associated with them. Consequently, the party system is not particularly responsive to new issues in times of "normal politics," as E. E. Schattschneider (1975 [1960]) suggests, because the established cleavage structure tends to "organize" issues cutting across established lines of division "out of politics."

If new issues cannot be integrated into the existing structure of conflict, however, and if one of the parties within the system—or a new party—takes them up, the other parties will have to take sides, as well. In this case, a *realignment* is likely to occur that reconfigures the linkages between social groups and political parties (e.g., Dalton et al. 1984; Martin 2000; Mayhew 2000). Small realignments may occur continuously, but according to Pierre Martin's (2000) account of the theory, when party systems adapt to new structures of conflict, this is usually a rather eruptive process and can be traced to a number of "critical elections" that are characterized by higher levels of volatility accompanying the shifts between parties' constituencies. This eruptiveness is precisely due to the inherent inertia of party systems as a consequence of their freezing along historical antagonisms.

The precondition for realignment is a weakening of the established structure of conflict and the corresponding identifications. Building on the distinction between structural and behavioral dealignment (e.g., Lachat 2007; Martin 2000), the weakening of the established structure of conflict may be related to two causes. For one thing, the links between parties and social groups may become weaker as a result of structural change, because modernization leads to a long-term change in the strength of those social groups in which the old structure of conflict is anchored. For example, the advent of a post-industrial economy has led to a shrinking of the traditional working class, while secularization has led to a decline in the share of regular churchgoers in Western European countries. A party system reflecting primarily these conflicts will therefore be less rooted in social structure than it was a few decades ago, opening a window of opportunity for the mobilization of new conflicts.

The links between social groups and parties may also undergo change in the absence of socio-structural transformations, however. Dealignment is then called *behavioral* because a given social group changes its political allegiance as a consequence of the rising importance of new political issues or the advent of a new dimension of political conflict. For individuals to be mobilized in terms of their membership in a different social group from hitherto, however, identification with this group must be stronger than their older identifications. New identifications stand in direct competition with established group attachments, and much therefore depends on the latter's salience. Adopting Sheldon Stryker's (1980, 2000) terms, individuals' *salience hierarchy of identities* must be transformed for behavioral realignments to take place. A process of realignment thus requires a redrawing of the hierarchy of individuals' personal group attachments and cognitive schema. Because an individual's social networks are embedded in social structure (Stryker 1980), redrawing one's group attachments is not an entirely voluntary process, and collective identities thus also remain anchored in social structure.

Behavioral dealignment thus occurs if the new group identifications prove to be stronger than older ones. Following the reasoning put forward in this chapter,



FIGURE 3.1 Social structure, collective identities, and their reinforcement by parties' differing policy propositions.

this is likely to be the case where the old conflicts have lost some of their significance or have even been pacified. If political identities depend on conflict with opposing social groups, the decline of conflict between parties along a cleavage will lead to a gradual weakening of the group identities underlying it. As a consequence, other identities can ascend. These can be older group attachments, such as national identification, that were suppressed by class or religious identities and that now re-emerge. The fading of the identities linked to the traditional cleavages also opens space for the emergence of new collective identities crafted by political entrepreneurs. The possibilities to deliberately forge new identities are subject, however, to the limits of objective social or political similarities characteristic of the new constituency.

Summing up the discussion so far, the programmatic content of party oppositions is relevant in two respects. First, conflict along the broad dimensions of opposition reflected in the party system activates voters' ideological schema (or cognitive representation of political space) and reinforces the established interpretation of what politics is about in the specific country. To the degree that parties adequately voice the preferences of their constituencies, the conflict over policy also keeps alive the antagonistically related collective (political) identities that underlie divisions. Inversely, if a conflict is pacified, this leads to the dilution of the group identifications underlying it. These mechanisms are displayed graphically in Figure 3.1, where the three levels correspond to the constituting elements of a cleavage as defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990). The third level now includes the policy propositions issued by parties.

By implication, alignments can be expected to remain stable in the long run only to the degree that parties adequately represent the preferences of voters. A mismatch in the positions of parties and voters can therefore lead to a reconfiguration of partisan preferences. In the short term or even in the medium term, the absence of conflict between antagonistic ideological party blocks or a mismatch

in the positions of parties and voters should not lead to dramatic transformations of the party system, because collective identities fade only eventually, and ideological schemas also are not reconfigured in a day. Understandings of politics therefore tend to reproduce themselves in a path-dependent manner (see also Pierson 2000: 259–262). To the degree that the adoption of ideological schemas takes place in a political socialization process, as I have suggested, there is an element of inertia to them. In line with other accounts that emphasize socialization (e.g., Eckstein 1988; Franklin 2004; van der Brug 2010), change is likely to be at least partially driven by generational replacement. We should thus expect significant differences in the make-up of ideological schemas between cohorts patterned by the structure of conflict that individuals were socialized into when they entered the electorate. Furthermore, voters have developed long-term loyalties to political parties, and continuity in voting behavior may also occur as a habit.

The Rise of New Divisions since the Late 1960s

A study of the rise of new conflicts from a cleavage perspective should be anchored in an account of the long-term evolution of social structure, but it should also borrow from the realignment approach a focus on the concrete conflicts that redraw partisan alignments in critical elections. Following Erik Allardt (1968) and Hanspeter Kriesi (1999), I argue that the educational revolution of the 1960s and 1970s constituted a further critical juncture after the national and industrial revolutions, because higher education socializes individuals with universalistic values (Stubager 2008), and the dynamic resulting from the stronger diffusion of such values has led to a counter-mobilization led by right-wing populist parties and to the emergence of a libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict in Western European party systems. Oddbjørn Knutsen (2002) presents evidence that education indeed plays a role in determining voting choices in Western democracies. What is more, Rune Stubager (2009) shows that social groups defined by high and low levels of education, respectively, to some degree demonstrate a collective identity and perceive an antagonism with the other educational group in terms of interests.

A somewhat different reading points to the processes of globalization and Europeanization that have intensified since the 1980s and 1990s and that create new groups of "winners" and "losers" in socio-structural terms (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Bartolini (2005), however, has argued that the lowering of national boundaries in Europe leads to a destructuring of the functional cleavages at the national level. In line with Bartolini's account, I argued in Chapter 1 that the process of globalization feeds into the new cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values *indirectly* by weakening the state-market cleavage. European integration, by contrast, directly reinforces the new cultural divide because it provides right-wing populist actors with a highly symbolic issue that fits their traditionalist-communitarian ideology.

A Typology of Alignments and Their Implications for the Mobilization Potential of New Conflicts

Cleavages and Lines of Conflict

Different types of alignment between parties and voters are likely to have variable consequences for the mobilization capacity of new conflicts. While some cleavages may be at the center of political disputes, others presumably have a more identitarian role and stabilize alignments because the social groups divided by them continue to share a collective identity. Drawing on the work of Bartolini and Mair (1990: 19–52, 68–95), as well as of Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995), we can differentiate cleavages along two dimensions: salience and closure. Salience denotes the importance of a cleavage relative to other divides in a party system, while closure refers to the stability of the social relationship represented by the cleavage. Together, these elements condition the stability of political alignments. A cleavage, according to these authors, is important if it structures partisan preferences to a high degree and if voters do not change allegiances from a party on one side of the cleavage to one belonging to the opposite camp.

From Bartolini and Mair (1990) I retain the notion that the closure of social groups opposing one another along a line of cleavage can be analytically grasped by means of the stability of partisan alignments. Note that this implies a focus on politically defined collective identities, which are situated at a higher level of generality than the various group attachments and role identities underlying them. The limitations inherent in cross-nationally comparable data preclude a focus on more specific social identities that are intimately tied to social structure and are central in the initial mobilization of cleavages.

In determining the salience of a divide, I focus on the *polarization* regarding the issues around which it evolves using the differences between parties' programmatic statements. If parties' positions are far apart along a line of opposition, it represents a salient dimension within the party system. This follows from the central role I have attributed to political conflict in perpetuating cleavage structures. Bartolini and Mair (1990), by contrast, focus on cross-cleavage volatility. This is unsatisfactory because low levels of volatility can be a consequence either of virulent conflict, or of social closure that is no longer reinforced by conflict. These two situations have strongly differing implications for the emergence of new conflicts.

To analyze political conflicts, I use the term "line of opposition" to denote an over-arching issue dimension that structures party competition in a given election. Through its tight conjunction with the policy level of party competition, it denotes something distinct from a cleavage. Such a dividing line can, but does not necessarily, reflect a cleavage. First, the number of lines of opposition present in a party system does not have to coincide with that of the underlying cleavages. Rather, the dominant lines of opposition are likely to reflect the most salient cleavages. As we shall see in later chapters, the economic and cultural dimensions

characterizing party oppositions in Western European countries correspond rather closely to the divisions originally engendered by the sectoral/class and religious/cultural cleavages. At the same time, a cleavage as a (durable) pattern of political behavior of social groups that links them to specific political organizations is something we do not necessarily encounter (directly) in everyday politics. Hence, the center-periphery cleavage, where it exists, may not find expression in a separate dimension of conflict but most probably is integrated into the main dividing lines that structure party interaction.

As I have argued, the contemporary impact of the historical cleavages lies primarily in having shaped party systems in the crucial phase of mass enfranchisement and mobilization, which led to their subsequent "freezing" and not so much to the immutability of a cleavage's socio-structural basis. I therefore propose to lay primary emphasis on the stability of the links between social groups and parties and pay less attention to the socio-structural homogeneity of the groups divided by a cleavage. A cleavage structure, then, denotes a *durable pattern of political behavior of socially or politically defined groups.* In the model presented here, I regard the stability of alignments over time as the crucial factor distinguishing short-term alignments from cleavages. To the degree that we find the same lines of opposition to be relevant in a number of consecutive elections, and if these divisions engender durable alignments, it is highly probable that they represent a cleavage with some underlying homogeneity in socio-structural terms. Unstable alignments, by contrast, whether they are founded in social-structural divisions or not, are either short-term deviations from the established patterns of cleavage politics or a herald of an unfreezing party system. If the proposition is correct that collective identities are reproduced by conflict, however, then cleavages that do not manifest themselves in politics even occasionally are bound to fade.

The next step in the analysis, then, is to relate oppositions in the party system to the attitudes of voters. In determining the chances for a realignment to occur as a consequence of a new dimension of conflict, the match between the positions of parties and that of their respective electorates is crucial: It allows an estimation of the degree to which the party system is responsive to voters. Because the term "cleavage" has usually been reserved for relationships where political parties represent durable oppositions in the preferences of social groups, I consider a rough match in the positions of parties and their voters as a defining feature of a cleavage. Over the long run, a mismatch between the two will presumably lead to an erosion of the link between parties and their social constituencies. This leads to a waning of the cleavage and opens space for new alignments based on other group attachments.

Different Types of Divide and Resulting Mobilization Potentials for New Conflicts

The discussion above calls for an analytical schema combining three elements: (1) the polarization of parties' positions along a line of opposition, indicating

the *salience* of a divide; (2) the match between the positions of parties and their voters along this line of opposition, allowing an estimation of the responsiveness of the party system to the preferences of the electorate; and (3) the degree of closure a division entails in terms of the organizational loyalties of social groups. Like Bartolini and Mair (1990), I am interested not in partisan loyalties to individual parties but in the stability of preferences for ideological blocks of parties along a divide, which represent the broad divisions reflected in voters' ideological schemas. Stable preferences indicate closure and strongly rooted political identities, while unstable preferences are an indication of a fluid line of opposition or cleavage. Closure gives an indication of the collective-identity component of an alignment. If this component is strong, it will delay the manifestation of a new opposition even if parties have converged in their positions and if the conflict is pacified.

Figure 3.2 shows the possible combinations of these three elements. The starting point for analysis is a single dimension structuring political competition in a particular election in a country. The analysis of a number of elections can then reveal either dominant patterns or evolutions in the types of divide. I now explain the content of the cells in the schema and briefly state what the implications of the various types of alignment are for the mobilization capacity of new political oppositions.

Starting at the top left of Figure 3.2, we find a situation combining high party polarization and a match in positions of parties and voters, indicating that voters' preferences are also polarized. With parties and voters being durably aligned along a line of opposition, this corresponds to a highly *segmented cleavage.* The term "segmentation" comes from depictions of consociational democracy and there denotes deeply rooted identities such as language and religion. However, following Mair (1997: 162–171), it can fruitfully be used for any deep political opposition that entails strong loyalties and party preferences of certain social groups. As a consequence, the electoral market is tightly restrained and leaves little room for the emergence of new lines of opposition or new political parties. At the extreme, such a structure of opposition rules out any real competition between parties. Political systems characterized by pillarization, where the Netherlands at least used to be a prominent example, each party has its own constituency, and they do not really compete at all. Presumably, therefore, this is the structure of conflict that most strongly inhibits the emergence of a new conflict at the center of the party system. In this category we find, on the one hand, established cleavages that have either preserved their salience or have been reinvigorated by new issues, or, on the other hand, highly salient new divides that have come to structure politics.

A corresponding case where preferences are volatile, exemplified by the field to the right, points to an *emerging line of opposition.* Competing with other, cross-cutting divides, it has not attained durability and lacks strong partisan loyalties. Voting choices are dependent on the relative salience of this line of opposition as opposed to other divides in a given election. Should the division prove to be temporary, patterns of party competition will not change much. If, however, the

	Match		Mismatch	
Polarization of Parties	Stable Alignments	Unstable Alignments	Stable Alignments	Unstable Alignments
High	Segmented cleavage	Emerging line of opposition	Unresponsive party system (organizational cartelization)	
	Both parties and voters highly polarized and durably aligned along dimension	Segmented opposition crosscutting other dimension and lacking closure	Outdated cleavage, but established loyalties check new conflicts, or alignments stabilized by more salient dimension	Unanchored party system: high potential for realignments or anti-cartel parties
Low	Identitarian cleavage	Competitive political dimension/ Schumpeterian competition	Unresponsive party system, possibly: New dimension of political conflict (issue cartelization)	
	Alignments stabilized by strong political identities, historically formed	Performance of government decisive for voting choices	Party identification checks realignments	High potential for anti-cartel parties or realignments

FIGURE 3.2 Types of divide as a function of polarization, responsiveness, and social closure.

conflict remains salient on the side of the voters, it is likely to lead to realignments and the subsequent stabilization of alignments. The driving force of such realignments is either an outsider party or an established party reorienting itself to attract new voters beyond its traditional constituency.

Moving to the right, we find two situations with a mismatch between the positions of parties and voters. In both cases, parties' positions are far apart on the dimension, but the party system is unresponsive to the positions of voters. Supposedly, these constellations are related to Richard Katz and Peter Mair's (1995) thesis of party-system cartelization. Cartelization can refer either to the established parties' keeping specific issues off the agenda, a situation that is addressed below, or to their ability to inhibit the entry of new competitors, partly because of their privileged access to state resources. The latter case may be termed "organizational cartelization" and is relevant for cases of polarized

but unresponsive party systems. The established parties manage to restrict competition while their grassroots members' or their own clinging to traditional core constituencies make an ideological convergence impossible.

If alignments are stable, this indicates that parties (1) represent an *outdated cleavage,* which is pacified on the voters' side but still engenders loyalties; or (2) are of *secondary relevance* for voters, who are more concerned with the stances parties take regarding a different dimension. As a consequence, the mismatch between voters' preferences and the positions of parties does not lead to realignments. In a similar situation where party preferences are not stable, the party system simply does not reflect voters' preferences and is unanchored in the electorate. Hence, the *emergence of a new line of opposition is possible,* due either to the reorientation of an established party or to the entry of a new competitor that de-emphasizes the established line of opposition for the benefit of a new one.

I now turn to the two cases in the bottom-right corner, where the party system is feebly polarized and at the same time fails to represent voters, implying that party electorates are characterized by more divergent policy preferences. This can be the case in two contrasting situations. Either the established parties have converged along a line of opposition and are thus *unresponsive* to their voters, for whom the dimension remains salient. Some would argue that this is the case with respect to the class or state-market dimension. Or the established parties have not (yet) taken clear positions along a new dimension of political conflict. Parties can try to avoid doing so for various reasons—for example, because they are internally divided concerning new issues, as appears to be the case regarding parties' stances toward European integration (Bartolini 2005).

In cases in which parties converge while their electorates remain polarized, we have evidence for what I propose to call *issue-specific cartelization.* This is probably the most advantageous situation for anti-establishment parties to emerge, since they can advocate programmatic positions that are not represented within the party system, on the one hand, and denounce the other parties for not being responsive to the preferences of voters, on the other hand. In fact, this corresponds to a prominent explanation for the rise of right-wing populist parties in the 1980s (Abedi 2002; Ignazi 1992, 2003; Katz and Mair 1995; Kitschelt with McGann 1995). If party alignments are stable, and social closure is high, existing political identities will retard processes of realignment. But because the positions of the established parties are similar, and because no visible policy oppositions or conflicts reinforce group attachments, existing party preferences can be expected to decline, opening the way for new conflicts to gain room.

Finally, in those situations represented by the two bottom-left cells, the distances between parties are low. If congruence between parties and electorates is a given, this means that voters do not differ strongly in their preferences, either. The first case is that of an *identitarian cleavage,* in which party preferences are stable because of strong collective identities of social groups, constituting political subcultures. In either case, closure remains high because of enduring group attachments that carry the imprint of historical conflicts. But since the underlying

collective identities are not reinforced by contrasting programmatic stances of parties, preferences are likely to remain stable only as long as new oppositions do not gain in importance relative to the old ones. Even if this happens, and if the new oppositions cross-cut existing constituencies, the rise of a new line of opposition will at least be tempered or delayed by the force of existing loyalties.

A *competitive political dimension,* by contrast, denotes a kind of competition that is close to Joseph Schumpeter's (1993 [1942]) characterization of party competition: Elections serve to elect competing teams of politicians that try to convince voters in the electoral market. In theory, as Anthony Downs (1957) has argued, this results in their targeting the median voter (but see Barry 1978 [1970]; Powell 2000). In a situation conforming to these criteria, voters can choose among parties by virtue of their performance in office. If new potentials were to arise, newcomers in principle could find fertile ground, because there is little in political identity to check the emergence of new conflicts. However, since the established parties do not have any strong links to specific constituencies that keep them accountable, they are relatively free to reorient themselves and to absorb new issues, limiting the chances for challengers to gain success. An exception to this scenario would be if the established parties agreed not to address issues evolving around new oppositions, which would open space for anti-cartel parties.

While the primary aim of this typology is to study patterns of opposition in the party system as a whole in a given election, it is applicable at various levels of specificity. One can move up to a more general level and identify dominant patterns over a number of elections within a country. It is also possible to move down and to characterize the more specific nature of oppositions for certain parties or groups of voters. For example, in cases of pillarization, a cleavage may continue to exist, but it is not necessarily relevant to the same degree for all voters. In cases of segmented political oppositions a certain danger therefore exists that the party system will not be responsive to those who are not integrated into the prevalent networks of societal and political opposition. As a consequence, the structure of oppositions will inhibit the emergence of new conflicts only if the party system also integrates citizens who lack strong political identities. The schema developed can thus be applied to analyze the political behavior of subgroups of a party's electorate, whose links to a specific party may be of different kinds.

One of the problems involved in an analysis centering on parties and their electorates is that a non-responsive party system can generate both support for outsider parties and abstention from voting. For example, right-wing populist parties quite often seem to recruit their voters from previous non-voters, as the example of the French Front National shows (Mayer 2002). More generally, John Goldthorpe (2002) has argued that, while class voting may be in decline, the relationship between class and non-voting may be fortified by the processes of modernization and globalization. An analysis that seeks to gauge the chances that new lines of opposition will emerge should therefore pay attention to abstention from voting as a possible forerunner to the transformation of cleavages.

Conclusion

Beyond shedding light on the way political conflict perpetuates cleavages in transformed form, the central task of this chapter has been to develop a typology of divides with varying consequences for the emergence of new lines of opposition. To the degree that established cleavages entail collective identities and provide cognitive schemata for the interpretation of politics, they condition the room available for the articulation of new conflicts that cut across the old divisions. Because collective identities and ideological schemas are shaped and reinforced by political conflict, it is essential to link cleavages to the policy level of oppositions in party systems over and above the three constituting elements of a cleavage suggested by Bartolini and Mair (1990).

In the country studies, the resulting model is applied to study the patterns of opposition in three countries, focusing on one election in the 1970s, before the new cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values emerged, as well as on three recent elections. In two of these countries—France and Switzerland—the rise of the new cultural divide has resulted in the emergence of a right-wing populist party in the party system. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate how the prevailing patterns of opposition allowed the populist right to establish itself. Using the typology developed in this chapter, Chapters 5 and 6 also assess which type of divide the new cultural conflict has turned into and whether it is likely to remain durable. Despite the similarities of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the French Front National with respect to their position in political space, the two cases represent different starting points for the populist right. In France, the Front National broke into the existing party system, while the Swiss SVP was an established party that transformed into a right-wing populist party. In both cases, this resulted in a reconfiguration of the party system.

If the premises underlying the model are correct, the differentiation of various types of divide should also be able to account for the fact that no right-wing populist party has emerged in Germany. As we saw in Chapter 2, the basic structure of the German political space is remarkably similar to that of those countries where new parties of the right have been successful; it must be either the strategies of the established parties or the force of political identities tied to the older cleavages that have precluded a development similar to that in the other countries. Both hypotheses are verified using the analytical schema developed in this chapter. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, however, various methodological choices require discussion. Chapter 4 lays out how the model is implemented in the country chapters to come and how the positions of parties and voters and the stability of alignments are measured.

4
Research Design and Methods

This chapter lays out and illustrates the procedure and the methods used in the subsequent country analyses. Adopting the structure of the chapters to come, the discussion has three main parts. The first step is to investigate the dimensionality of political space and to determine the positions parties take within it. I therefore start by describing in more detail than in Chapter 2 the campaign data used in this study and discuss at some length the interpretation of the configurations resulting from the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis.

The second section illustrates, step by step, the measurement of the elements needed to deploy the model set out in Chapter 3 and summarized in Figure 3.2. This analysis relies on the campaign data and on four post-election surveys in each country. Since the methods I use differ from those employed in prior research, the theoretical rationale for these procedures is discussed in detail. Drawing on examples from the French case study, I explain the measurement of (1) the positions of parties and voters along the dimensions found to structure oppositions within the party system; (2) the internal heterogeneity of the stances of parties and their voters; and (3) the match between the positions of parties and voters.

The third section discusses the additional analyses performed in each chapter, which refer to hypotheses developed in Chapters 1 and 3. First, I use individuals' positions along the relevant dimensions of conflict as voting determinants to assess which of these dimensions parties mobilize on and who right-wing populist parties' main antagonists are. Probing further into the structure of oppositions from the perspective of voters refines and

corroborates the analysis by linking political supply and political demand according to a more strictly causal logic. I also introduce the class schema used in later chapters and develop hypotheses concerning the propensity of various classes to support the populist right.

As a final step in the analyses to come, I verify the degree to which the heterogeneity of the right-wing populist voters' economic preferences is related to social class. My hypothesis from Chapter 3 is that social class continues to matter in the formation of economic preferences, but that these preferences are irrelevant for electoral choices as long as cultural orientations appear more central to the voters of the populist right.

Determining the Dimensionality of Parties' Programmatic Offer

The Campaign Data

To identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition in democratic elections, I rely on data based on the media coverage of election campaigns in six European countries. These data have been collected within the research project National Political Change in a Denationalizing World (Kriesi et al. 2006). It covers one election in the 1970s and three more recent elections that took place between the late 1980s and the early 2000s in France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain. Parties' programmatic offerings are coded in the two months preceding each election. The election in the 1970s serves as a point of reference before the most recent restructuring of conflicts in Western European party systems took place. More specifically, in the 1970s we expect a situation in which the first transformation of the traditional political space took place under the mobilization of the New Left. The second transformation, driven by the rise of the New Right, is traced in the three more recent contests.

In all countries except France, the focus of the analysis is on parliamentary elections. France is the exception because presidential elections are more important than legislative elections as a consequence of the country's semi-presidential regime, which makes the study of presidential contests more promising. Because no suitable surveys are available for presidential elections in the 1970s, however, the first campaign studied is the 1978 parliamentary contest. For each election, we selected all articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general during the two months preceding election day in a high-quality newspaper and a tabloid. These were *Die Presse* and *Kronenzeitung* in Austria, *Le Monde* and *Le Parisien* in France, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Algemeen Dagblad* in the Netherlands, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Blick* in Switzerland, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Bild* in Germany, and *The Times* and *The Sun* in Britain. Because the number of relevant articles varies a great deal between countries, we did not code every daily issue in all cases. Switzerland and France are two strongly contrasting examples, with the number of articles ranging from an average of six per day in the *Neue Zürcher*

Zeitung to about eighteen in *Le Monde*. To arrive at a roughly similar number of sentences, between two and six days were coded per week, depending on the number of daily articles (for details, see Lachat 2008b: 347–348). However, special reports on parties' programs and interviews with party leaders or presidential candidates were included, regardless of the weekday. In Switzerland, party advertisements in the same two newspapers were also selected because of their importance in Swiss campaigns.

The articles (and advertisements in Switzerland) were then coded sentence by sentence using the method developed by Jan Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder 1998; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001), which allows a coding of the relationship between political actors and issues. The direction of the relationship indicates whether the actor favored or opposed the issue, coded −1 or +1. There are three intermediary positions, but they were used only if a statement was explicitly contradictory. Political actors were coded according to party membership. Small parties were later grouped to form larger categories, such as the parties of the extreme left competing in various countries. Another example is a number of small centrist parties in France that are grouped in the Union for French Democracy (UDF) category.

Political actors' programmatic statements were coded into two hundred to four hundred detailed categories, with the number depending on the country. The statements concerning these detailed issues were then re-coded in the twelve broader categories presented in Chapter 2. There are two reasons for this. First, issues were grouped to correspond to the central concepts used in this research. For example, the categories "welfare" and "economic liberalism" together allow an operationalization of the state-market conflict, while "cultural liberalism" and "anti-immigration stances" correspond to the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian line of opposition. Second, the importance of the more specific issue categories varies from one election to the next depending on the political agenda, making it difficult to compare them over time.

Each of the twelve broad categories used to cover the political agenda has a clear direction, and actors' stances toward it can be either positive or negative. The assignment of the detailed, country-specific issues to the broader categories used for the comparative analysis is, of course, a crucial step in the analysis. A great deal of effort was devoted to defining clear rules concerning the assignment, which were laid out in Chapter 2, and to implementing them coherently across countries. Lists with the detailed issues and their assignment to the larger categories for each country are available from the author on request.

Dimensionality

The first step in Chapter 2, as well as in the research strategy for the chapters to come, is to determine the dimensionality of political space and identify the issue categories that structure oppositions in the party system in a given election. The campaign data were analyzed using MDS. Without making any prior assumptions

regarding the number of and relationship between the dimensions to be determined, this allows a representation of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space according to measures of proximity between them (Coxon 1982; Rabinowitz 1975).[1] In the preliminary analysis presented in Chapter 2, three elections since the late 1980s were analyzed together in each country, assessing their dimensionality jointly. More detailed analyses follow in the country chapters that focus on one election at a time; this is likely to reveal possible differences between single elections in the 1990s. Furthermore, one electoral contest in the 1970s is included. In all of these analyses, the mean distance between the individual parties and each of the twelve issue categories is used as a measure of proximity between parties and issues.

To give those relationships that were prominent in a given election more weight, Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling is used, employing the number of observations in each category as a weight.[2] While some degree of distortion between the "real" distances in the data and their graphical representation in the low-dimensional space always results from MDS, the weighting procedure ensures that the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than less salient ones. The representation of political space thus takes into account both *position* and *saliency*. Note that weighting by the overall salience of categories implies a focus on the general structures of opposition in the party system, not on the salience of issues for individual parties. Categories with fewer than 3 percent of the sentences per election were excluded from the analysis, as were parties for which fewer than twenty sentences were available, except where indicated otherwise.

In all six countries, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since the move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the clearest reduction in the Raw Stress statistic, a measure for badness-of-fit.[3] The values for Stress-I, which are more appropriate to estimate the fit of the final configuration (see Coxon 1982), are indicated together with the figures in the country chapters. The closer this value is to zero, the better the low-dimensional representation fits the original data. There are no generally applicable rules for what constitutes an acceptable fit. We have to keep in mind that the graphical representation of political space is always a simplification of a more complex reality. While the goodness-of-fit may therefore vary from one election to another, the procedure does tell us reliably how many dimensions are necessary to represent political space.

The dimensions resulting from the MDS analysis are not substantially meaningful. The only relevant information provided is the *relative distance* between the parties and the various issue categories. This means that the solution can be

[1] This variant is therefore also referred to as multidimensional "unfolding."

[2] Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling can be carried out using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS.

[3] This is visible in an "elbow" in the Scree Plot.



FIGURE 4.1 MDS solution for the 1988 French elections. Stress-I statistic: .30.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *iref,* institutional reform (see Chapter 2).

freely rotated. Nonetheless, it is possible to lay theoretically meaningful axes into the distribution to facilitate the interpretation. In determining these axes, I apply two criteria. First, the opposition constituted by the poles must make sense theoretically. Hence, for the 1990s I expect an opposition between "welfare" and "economic liberalism," on the one hand, and between "cultural liberalism" and "immigration," on the other. Second, the categories constituting the poles should lie at the extremes of the distribution, since this is an indication of polarization. In all cases, the opposition between "welfare" and "economic liberalism," representing the distributional political conflict, constitutes one of the emerging dimensions, and all configurations have been rotated to make this axis lie horizontally in political space. The second dimension is then formed by connecting a second pair of polar issues. In the example in Figure 4.1, which shows the result for the 1988 campaign in France, we see that the second dimension indeed opposes support for cultural liberalism and anti-immigration stances.

Because of its theoretical relevance, the conflict surrounding European integration is also taken into account if it proves polarizing. In Figure 4.1, Europe

appears as a rather consensual issue because of its central location. However, this conclusion is misleading because of certain specificities of MDS analyses that I wish to point out. For illustration, in Figure 4.1 I have indicated the standard deviation of parties' positions next to the issue categories. The European issue is in a central position because positions regarding the European Union (EU) cut across both of the two main dimensions structuring the space: All of the main parties endorsed European integration rather strongly in the 1988 election, with the exception of the Parti Communiste Français (Communist Party of France; PCF), which fervently opposed it. Note that this situation does not necessarily result in a three-dimensional solution for two reasons. First, the EU issue was not very prominent in that election; thus, European integration does not result in a separate dimension because distances are weighted by salience. Second, the distances are in fact more or less adequate in the two-dimensional solution. The major parties are indeed situated much nearer to Europe than is the PCF, and, as pointed out, the distances in the solution can be interpreted only relative to one another.

Because parties may seek not to address issues that cut across established lines of conflict, a strategy discussed as *issue-specific cartelization* in Chapter 3, highly polarizing issues that do not fit the general pattern of oppositions are quite interesting for the present purposes, regardless of their salience. Consequently, if Europe constitutes a polarizing issue in one campaign, it is analyzed as an additional dimension regardless of its salience, provided that there is sufficient information to do so.

Having identified the relevant dimensions and additional issues of interest, the next step is to measure parties' positions along these dimensions. This information cannot be inferred from the MDS solution, because the axes laid into the configurations are meant only to facilitate interpretation and do not correspond, for example, to dimensions as they result from factor analysis. In the MDS graphs, party positions are a function of their joint proximity to all twelve issues, not only those that I identify as the poles of a dimension. For the further analysis, therefore, positions must be measured differently.

Positioning Parties and Voters along the Dimensions of Conflict and Determining the Resulting Structures of Opposition

The Demand-Side Data

To position voters on the lines of conflict dividing parties and to determine the responsiveness of the party system to voters' demands, the data on parties' political supply is complemented with survey data. For all elections studied, it is possible to rely on national election surveys. (See Appendix B for a list of the surveys used.) These surveys have several advantages over the cross-national datasets commonly used in comparative analyses. First, they are administered after the

TABLE 4.1 Sample Size and Number of Right-Wing Populist and Conventional Extreme-Right Voters in the Election Surveys Used

	Number of Individuals with Valid Party-Choice Variable	Number of Right-Wing Populist Voters	Number of Voters of the Conventional Extreme Right
		France	
1978	3,867	—	25[a]
1988	3,280	357	—
1995	3,307	446	—
2002	3,179	362	—
		Switzerland	
1975	611	(62)[b]	14
1991	476	62	34
1995 (basic sample)	1,016	154	56
1995 (supplementary)	3,454	398	141
1999	1,175	274	31
		Germany	
1976	1,082	—	—
1994	1,461	—	9
1998	1,334	—	29
2002	1,201	—	8

[a]It is not possible to differentiate between the French Front National and other extreme-right groups in this survey.
[b]The number refers to the Swiss People's Party, which cannot be considered a party of the populist right at this point.

election campaigns in which parties have presented their programmatic offerings and directly after the voting choice. It is thus unproblematic to relate voters' preferences at the time of the survey to their voting choices and to parties' campaign pledges. Second, in designing these surveys, the salient issues around which political debate in a specific country evolves are usually taken into account. This makes it possible to operationalize the central issue dimensions around which party conflict evolves. One exception is the 1991 election survey in Switzerland, which allows a more limited analysis than would be desirable. Third, the size of the survey samples used in this volume are vastly superior to those commonly used in cross-national analyses and allow a reliable portrait of right-wing populist voters. In particular, the size of the French samples overcomes the common problem of under-representation of this electorate, as can be seen in Table 4.1. This problem is less acute in Switzerland, because voting for the Swiss People's Party, an established party that underwent a transformation into a right-wing populist party, is far less stigmatized. In the Swiss case, the samples for the more recent elections even include a sufficient number of voters of the conventional extreme right to compare them with those who support the new populist right. In Germany, by contrast, extreme-right voters are marginal. Because Germany is the case in which the populist right has not achieved a breakthrough, however, the analysis must focus on the voters for the established parties rather than on those of the extreme right.

While the French data are nationally representative, I use the weights contained in the German surveys to correct for slight distortions in sampling. In the Swiss case, the basic samples are representative. For 1995, however, I include the supplementary samples from a number of cantons in the regression analyses but apply weights to correct for the oversampling of these cantons.

Position

To determine *party positions,* I calculate the mean of their statements regarding the two categories forming the dimension (or a single category, as in the case of European integration). To take into account the relative salience of the two issue categories that make up the dimension, I compute a weighted mean using the respective share of sentences as a weight. In the example of the 1988 French election, cultural liberalism was more important than immigration policies in the campaign. Consequently, the weighting procedure gives more weight to cultural liberalism in determining parties' positions along the cultural dimension. To make the results reliable, I exclude party positions that are based on fewer than ten sentences.

The same dimensions are then reconstructed and the electorates' positions are determined on the voter side. Another strategy is to use factor analysis to assess the dimensionality of voter orientations and then to position electorates on these dimensions (see Kriesi et al. 2008). For my analysis, this alternative procedure has a number of drawbacks. First, if the dimensions revealed at the voter and party levels are not strictly identical, it does not make sense to compare positions across the two levels. Furthermore, and different from the dimensions determined in the MDS analysis of the parties' political offerings, standard factor analysis forces the resulting factors to be uncorrelated (orthogonal). Consequently, if attitudes toward economic and cultural issues are correlated in the aggregate, this yields a first factor that represents a mixture of economic and cultural preferences. This is the case in Herbert Kitschelt's (1994; Kitschelt with McGann 1995) first, left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian factor. This makes the interpretation of his second factor—which essentially represents what cannot be explained by the first dimension—not very straightforward. The problem, then, is that the two dimensions may be correlated to varying degrees for different voters. Specifically, I expect right-wing populist voters to combine economic and cultural preferences in rather distinct ways. To illustrate, one may have legitimate doubts concerning Kitschelt and McGann's (1995: 106–108) positioning of the French Front National's voters at the far right on the economic dimension, since this dimension is also related to a number of cultural issues in the factor analysis. Possibly, this finding is due to the fact that, while the economic and cultural dimensions are correlated for large parts of the electorate, this is not the case for Front National voters. (Consequently, their alleged economic liberalism in reality reflects their authoritarian cultural values.) If we find the two dimensions to be distinct in the political offerings, it is therefore advantageous to posi-

tion electorates on the economic and cultural dimensions independently from one another, as well, and to assess whether parties adequately reflect voters' positions along these dimensions. The analysis presented in Chapter 5, which focuses on economic preferences, reveals that Kitschelt's results cannot be confirmed if we dissociate economic and cultural preferences.

The first step in measuring voters' positions is to assign the issue-specific questions in the surveys to the broader categories used in the media analysis. With a few exceptions, there are enough items in the surveys to allow an operationalization of the relevant categories. In fact, quite often we find several items that are related to the same category. In these cases, an index was formed using the factor scores of a principal component factor analysis. With very few exceptions, this theoretically grounded classification results in a single factor, indicating that the variables measure the same underlying dimension. In cases in which there is a large number of items, it is difficult to obtain one-dimensional solutions, and it makes sense to form subcategories (e.g., cultural liberalism may be decomposed into traditional and libertarian values). A listing of the indicators used and the assignment to the relevant issue categories is in Appendix C.

The next step in the example of the 1988 election in France is to combine the cultural liberalism and immigration categories to form the cultural dimension. This is done by performing a second principal component factor analysis using the welfare and economic liberalism categories.[4] The mean position of each party's electorate is determined using respondents' factor scores. Note that all the factor analyses are carried out using the attitudes of all respondents, not only those who voted in the particular election. Because citizens with more clearly structured belief systems or ideological schemas are more likely to turn out to vote than others (Klingemann 1979), including non-voters in the construction of the indexes amounts to a tougher test of the hypotheses.

The respective location of parties and voters on each dimension is presented as in Figure 4.2. Parties are situated on the upper line and their voters below. A strong methodological word of caution is in order here: Because the positions of parties and voters are measured on different scales, the positions cannot be directly compared, and the correspondence between the two can be judged only in relative terms. The positions of the parties, being derived from the mean position of their statements in the media, have a possible range of −1 to +1. These positions therefore can be interpreted in absolute terms. Hence, if the Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy; UDF) is situated in the middle of the spectrum in the example shown in Figure 4.2, then its position is really in the middle of the road between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. However, the positions of voters have been standardized as a result of the factor analysis and can be interpreted only

[4]If the factor analysis performed to form these categories yielded sub-categories, as discussed above, they are all included in this second aggregation step. In no case did the latter result in a solution with more than one dimension.



FIGURE 4.2 Positions of parties and voters on the cultural dimension in France, 1988.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

in relative terms. While UDF voters are also centrally located in the graph, this tells us only that they are situated in the middle of the voter distribution, which is not necessarily halfway between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. Because respondents' answers may vary according to the wording of the question in the survey, it is not possible to derive absolute positions on the voter side. Consequently, there is no way to make the two scales strictly comparable.

Heterogeneity of Parties' and Electorates' Positions

As informative as they are, the mean positions of parties and voters tell us little about the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the statements issued by parties and of the preferences within a party's electorate. Different political actors who belong to the same party may issue diverging policy stances, while the preferences of voters who make up a party's electorate may be spread out along the ideological spectrum to quite varying degrees. On the voter side, considerable heterogeneity is in fact the rule, because it is not ideology alone that matters in voting decisions—although the following chapters reveal that ideology, if it is properly measured, matters a great deal. To compare and visualize the ideological heterogeneity in parties' positions and within electorates, we can calculate the standard deviations of positions. In Figure 4.2, bars indicate the spread around average positions. For the 1988 election in France, we can see that the Front National's statements concerning the cultural line of conflict are much more homogeneous than those of the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic; RPR), for example. The Front National also has a more homogeneous electorate than the other parties. By giving an idea of the overlap of the positions of two neighboring electorates or parties, the standard deviations of the positions allow us to assess how strongly parties compete with one another for ideologically

similar electorates. This, in turn, is crucial in determining how segmented political competition is, which is relevant when classifying elections according to the model set out in Chapter 3. Note that if political actors issued very few statements concerning an issue, the direction may be the same in all statements, and consequently the standard deviation is zero.

Match

Even if the mean positions of parties and voters cannot be compared directly, it is possible to measure the congruence of representation—or the responsiveness of the party system—by calculating correlations. The differing scales are not a problem in correlations because the latter tap only the covariance between positions. The results from the correlations are displayed below the figures for each election. In the example shown in Figure 4.2, match is very high, indicating an almost perfect correspondence between parties' and electorates' positions, which is plausible when looking at their respective locations. Because the match can be calculated only for party-voter pairs, I indicate in brackets the number of pairs on which the measure is based. In the example shown, the Greens are not taken into account because they were not sufficiently present in the campaign to be positioned on the economic dimension.

As a rule of thumb to classify elections according to the schema in Figure 3.2, I take correlations below .8 as an indication of mismatch and correlations above this value to characterize a responsive party system. A correlation of .8 means that-two thirds of the variance in the parties' positions can be explained by voters' preferences, or vice versa. Obviously, the choice of the cut-off point is debatable, and I do not rely exclusively on this criterion in the country chapters. However, while values over .8 or even .9 are in fact quite common, unresponsive party systems are usually characterized by a match between parties and voters way below .8. Consequently, while any classification rule is debatable, the cases of responsiveness and unresponsiveness are rather clear in reality.

Overall Polarization

While the graphical representation of the positions of parties and voters allows a substantial interpretation of the prevalent pattern of opposition, we need an overall measure of polarization along a dimension to classify elections according to the theoretical model. The standard deviation of party positions along a dimension is a straightforward solution. I am interested here in the ideological spread of a party system's political offering to voters to determine the degree to which the offering satisfies voters' preferences. For this reason, and following Hans-Dieter Klingemann's (2005: 43) argument, it is preferable not to weight party positions with party strength in assessing the polarization of the party system, since this would conceptually confound the supply and demand sides of the analysis. By performing the calculations with and without the populist-right

challenger (if there is one), we can also determine how strongly that challenger contributes to the polarization of the party system.

Again, a rule of thumb is required to classify electoral contests as either strongly or weakly polarized. I consider standard deviations below .5 evidence for rather weak polarization, while values beyond .5 indicate relatively high levels of polarization. If we want to estimate how much space there is for a right-wing populist challenger, the polarization measure excluding the challenger is obviously most instructive. If, however, such a party is already established and forms part of a pattern of segmented oppositions, as in the French example used above, the characterization of the party system should rely on the values that include all parties.

Determining Ideological Party Blocks and Measuring the Stability of Alignments

So far, we have a measure for two of the three elements necessary to classify party systems according to the different types of divide outlined in the previous chapter. In analyzing the stability of alignments between voters and parties—the third element—I am interested in the degree to which a line of opposition engenders loyalties that indicate social closure of the groups divided by an opposition. Loyal voters are those who vote for a party that belongs to the same ideological block in a number of consecutive elections. As urged in Chapter 3, it is crucial also to take into account non-voting, since abstention may be an antecedent to the reconfiguration of preferences. Loyalty in my conception thus implies that a voter regularly turns out to vote for his or her ideological party block. The alternative measure, volatility, would take into account only those voters who actually shift support from one block to the other in two consecutive elections, while those who did not vote in one of them would be excluded from the analysis. As Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck and his colleagues (2006) have shown, however, a shift in partisan loyalties normally involves a prior move into independence. By focusing on only wholesale shifts in party preferences, volatility therefore disregards possible erosions of loyalty that may be gradual but nonetheless make voters open to the mobilizing attempts of new political actors.

To determine the stability of alignments, I use recall questions from the surveys. Asking people which party they voted for in a prior election is not unproblematic, since declared choices are known to be inaccurate at times (Himmelweit et al. 1978), and I am conscious of the limitations of this approach. However, the alternative—using aggregate measures of volatility as, for example, employed by Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990)—is equally problematic. The problem there is that shifts between the blocks that run in opposing directions can cancel each other out. Consequently, apparent stability in aggregate volatility may conceal varying degrees of fluctuation between the blocks. A limitation of the use of recall questions, however, is that we obtain only information regarding stability in two consecutive elections. Comparing the level of short-time stability over

time and across parties nonetheless provides adequate information regarding (1) the relative loyalties demonstrated by the voters of the various ideological blocks; and (2) the evolution of these loyalties over time.

Two additional points can be made for the use of recall questions for my purposes. First, errors in recall are not random, but tend to produce consistency in behavior at the time of recall (Himmelweit et al. 1978: 369). Thus, this measure is conservative and, if anything, will tend to underestimate change. Second, the fact that I am interested in only loyalties to ideological blocks, and not in loyalties to individual parties, also makes the use of recall questions less problematic. Even if respondents err in naming the party they voted for in the preceding election, it is less likely that they will also misname the ideological block they voted for—at least, if the division between the blocks is substantially meaningful.

Contrary to conventional usage, I focus on each line of opposition separately in assessing the loyalties to ideological party blocks.[5] This means that the ideological blocks have to be defined separately for the economic and cultural divides. While such a classification is straightforward in the case of the economic divide, it is somewhat trickier concerning the cultural divide.

For the economic divide, two blocks can be defined based on the sides they take with regard to the traditional class cleavage. Classifying most parties is relatively easy using what Bartolini (2000: 10–11) calls a "genetic approach"—identifying those parties as belonging to the left that have their roots in the process of lower-class enfranchisement and the rise of the class cleavage, which are characteristic of the structure of industrial conflicts. Bartolini's classification thus provides a good starting point. The more difficult question concerns newer parties and, in particular, the so-called New Left parties and the populist right, which have emerged since the late 1960s and are not the product of the conflicts of the industrial age, as argued in Chapter 1. In most countries, however, ecologist and New Left parties clearly have their origins in movements that are considered "movements of the left" (Kriesi 1999). Apart from this genetic criterion—and, in particular, with respect to the controversial posture of the populist right with regard to the state-market cleavage—I also use parties' empirically determined positions in political space for the classification.

Identifying the relevant blocks along the cultural dimension is more difficult, because we do not have established criteria such as those that relate to the class cleavage and the economic dimension as a starting point. From the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, however, we can expect up to four blocks along the cultural divide: (1) New Left parties, whose raison d'être is their pronounced universalistic position; (2) the classical parties of the old left, which primarily mobilize on the economic dimension and do not stand out for their universalism; (3) parties of the established right, which mesh economically more liberal positions

[5]Contrary to Bartolini and Mair (1990: 45), I thus avoid drawing possibly misleading conclusions pertaining to the entire cleavage structure just from the volatility between the left and the right blocks relative to total volatility.



FIGURE 4.3 Ideological blocks along the cultural dimension in France, 1988.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

with conservatism; and (4) New Right parties, which differentiate themselves from the established right in terms of their innovative culturalist discourse and mode of mobilization (in Western Europe, this block is represented by the populist right). Not all of these blocks are necessarily discernible in every country. Furthermore, the distinction between Old Left and New Left is not always an easy one, since New Left parties either can be newly founded parties such as the Greens or can result from the transformation of an older Socialist party. I therefore complement the theoretically grounded classification with the empirical measures of the distances between parties' and voters' positions along the cultural dimension. Large gaps between mean positions and low levels of overlap in the stretch of these positions indicate a segmentation of competition. If such a pattern is manifest over various elections, it seems reasonable to consider the parties separated in this way as belonging to different ideological blocks.

Figure 4.3 shows the example of positions along the cultural divide in the 1988 election in France. Assuming that the pattern is reproduced in later elections, three blocks can be identified. First, because neither the positions of parties nor those of their electorates reveal a divide between the old left and the New Left, and because the overlap is especially large on this side of the spectrum, the left as a whole constitutes the New Left block (Parti Communiste Français, PCF; Parti Socialiste Français, PSF; extreme left; and Greens in the example). The second block is made up of the established right: the RPR and the UDF. Finally, because both the Front National as a party and its voters lie far apart from the established right, the populist right forms a New Right block of its own. Based on this classification, the share of voters who remained loyal to their ideological party block can be calculated.

We now have the three elements necessary to classify election according to the model developed in Chapter 3: position, match, and stability. This analysis rests on a comparison of the aggregate positions of parties and voters. In the

ensuing steps, the country chapters probe further into the causal logic of voting choices. First, individuals' ideological positions are used to predict their vote, and second, the social class base of right-wing populist party support is explored.

Positions on the Dominant Dimensions of Conflict as Voting Determinants

Having located voters on the policy dimensions that structure conflict in the party system, we can explore the role these positions play in individual voting decisions. The first aim of this analysis is to verify the claim that right-wing populist parties mobilize more or less exclusively on the cultural dimension of conflict. The second is to probe further into the structures of opposition in the party system by determining the dimensions on which the other parties mainly mobilize. If my broad assumptions reflected in the definition of four ideological blocks outlined above are correct, there should be parties that gain votes by virtue of their followers' economic preferences, while others attract votes because of their cultural orientations. More specifically, I expect the voters of New Left parties to be mobilized by the same dimension of conflict as those of the populist right. The old left, by contrast, should turn out to be the antagonist of the established right on the economic dimension. While the prior analyses show us the degree to which the positions of parties and voters match, the analysis of voting determinants reveals which dimension is relevant for each party.

In this analysis, voters' positions on the economic, the cultural, and, where present, the EU dimension—are used to explain voting behavior. I run separate binary logistic regressions for each party using dummies as dependent variables. Multinomial logistic regression would have the advantage of discriminating better between the choices of ideologically similar parties, but there are also drawbacks in such a procedure. The most important is the need to arbitrarily define a reference category that by definition influences the results of the analysis. Because I am interested not exclusively in what distinguishes right-wing populist voters, say, from the established right, but in the relative importance of the most salient dimensions of conflict for all of the different party electorates, binary logistic regression yields more interesting results. All tables containing results of these analyses report odds ratios, z-values, and the corresponding significance levels for tests of significance, as well as the variance explained (using Pseudo R-Square) for each party. The coefficients of logistic regression are not particularly informative as such, and I therefore report odds ratios instead. The odds ratio, to give an example, indicates the ratio between the probability of an individual holding more markedly traditionalist-communitarian values to vote for one party as opposed to voting for another party or not voting at all.

The explained variance allows us to assess the mobilizing logic of parties. Some will mobilize a distinct electorate in ideological terms, while others may gain votes for a wide range of other motives, such as the personal traits of leaders and protest voting. Contrary to assertions that at least some right-wing populist

parties rally large numbers of protest voters (e.g., Luebbers et al. 2002; van der Brug and Fennema 2003), my hypothesis is that, if anything, certain issue positions may be associated with political dissatisfaction. Put differently, I postulate that right-wing populist parties do not mobilize a moody bunch of voters who are driven by little more than the rejection of the established political class. Rather, these are "rational protest voters" (Bornschier and Helbling 2005) who reject mainstream politics because they feel that the established parties fail to represent their views.

The Socio-structural Basis of Right-Wing Populist Party Support

Education and Class as Voting Determinants

To the degree that the rise of right-wing populist parties is indeed the product of a cultural conflict that has its origin in the expansion of higher education, as I have suggested, then these parties' socio-structural mobilization pattern should be related to education. I distinguish among low levels of education (elementary school and lower vocational training), medium levels of education (secondary education, vocational training), and higher education (undergraduate and graduate levels) to discern the impact of education on the propensity to support the populist right.

The next step in the analysis focuses on the losers of economic and cultural modernization in terms of social-class membership. I draw on a modified version of the Erickson-Goldthorpe class schema proposed by Romain Lachat (2007). Departing from Erickson and Goldthorpe, and following Kriesi (1993a, 1998) and Walter Müller (1999), the schema features three segments within the new middle class. Beyond vertical accounts of stratification, a horizontal differentiation helps to capture the origins of diverging political orientations that are due to work logics and degrees of autonomy exerted in the workplace (see Kriesi 1998). While the resulting occupational categories are not classes in a narrow sense (Oesch 2006), they do identify groups that can be expected to share certain economic interests and cultural worldviews.

According to Daniel Oesch (2006), who has recently refined and extended the approach, three work logics can be distinguished: organizational, technical, and interpersonal. Three segments are thereby distinguished in the middle class. *Managers* are situated in an environment dominated by an organizational work logic, characterized by the exercise of delegated authority. Examples would be financial managers, bookkeepers, and public-service administrative professionals, here and in the following using examples provided by Oesch (2006). They are employed in administrative hierarchies with a bureaucratic division of labor, which can be expected to engender strong loyalties to their organization. *Technical specialists* are less oriented toward their organization than toward their professional community, which represents an additional or competing point of

reference for them (examples being architects and computing professionals). Their work logic is technical because the processes they work in are determined by technical parameters. Finally, an interpersonal work logic is characteristic of the so-called *social and cultural (socio-cultural) specialists,* who are less bound into lines of command. This group includes teachers, journalists, and social workers, all of whom have a strong orientation toward their clients, patients, and so on. Even more so than the technical specialists, social and cultural specialists put a heavy emphasis on individual autonomy.

Together with the more conventional categories that correspond to the Erickson-Goldthorpe schema, this class schema is composed of eight classes, to which the category of non-labor-force participant is added. The terms in italics indicate the abbreviations used later in the country chapters:

1. Self-employed *farmers*
2. Other *self-employed* in non-professional occupations
3. Semiskilled and *unskilled workers,* including agricultural workers
4. *Skilled workers* and foremen
5. *Routine non-manual workers* in white-collar occupations
6. *Managers* and other professionals in administrative occupations
7. Professionals with *technical* expertise
8. *Socio-cultural* specialists
9. *Non-labor-force* participants

My operationalization of these categories for the six countries under study relies on Lachat (2007) and Kriesi and colleagues (2008). Not all surveys used permit a full operationalization of the schema, and the country chapters draw attention to differing implementations. In a first analysis, logistic regressions are run to assess the impact of the class categories on the vote for the populist right using dummy variables for the social classes. Managers are chosen as the reference category because they constitute a relatively large group and at the same time are not expected to represent the core support base of right-wing populist parties.

Some more specific predictions can now be made concerning the propensity of the various social groups to support the populist right. Starting with existing hypotheses concerning the new middle class, we can then go on to develop expectations regarding the other categories. According to Kriesi (1998) and Müller (1999), the new middle class is characterized by diverging value orientations that derive from, or are reinforced by, individuals' position in the production process. The interpersonal work logic characteristic of socio-cultural specialists, together with their shielded position from the market, can be expected to generate support for universalistic values, on the one hand, and economic preferences favoring material equality, on the other hand. Socio-cultural specialists represent the core support base of the New Left (Kriesi 1998; Müller 1999). For these reasons, I expect this group to strongly oppose the ideology of the populist right and hence to be under-represented in its support base. Managers, by contrast, are

conceived as the most right-authoritarian segment within the new middle class (Kriesi 1998; Müller 1999). In other words, they are probably less supportive of universalistic values and, on average, are situated nearer to the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural dimension, combining this cultural ideology with more market-liberal stances. Technical experts can be expected to lie in between these two groups. Within the middle class, then, managers are most susceptible to being mobilized by the populist right in terms of a traditionalist-exclusionist conception of community. However, the middle classes as a whole do not necessarily belong to the groups most strongly affected by the process of economic and cultural modernization. Consequently, we cannot expect right-wing populist parties to draw over-proportional support here.

As far as the other classes are concerned, the petite bourgeois segment within the self-employed has long been considered a potential for right-wing extremist parties (Kitschelt with McGann 1995; Lipset 1960: chap. 5). Low levels of education make the members of this category receptive to the particularistic and traditionalist stances of the populist right. Furthermore, applying Stefan Sacchi's (1998) argument, which draws on Jürgen Habermas's (1995 [1981]) theory of modernization, this segment's early integration into market processes makes it more likely that its members will develop anti-state attitudes rather than hostility toward the market. At the same time, the petite bourgeoisie belongs to the segments that are particularly touched by economic modernization. However, while Kitschelt and McGann (1995) suggested that this segment is also attracted by the neoliberal profile of the "new radical right," I hypothesize that the self-employed, as the other voters of the populist right, are overwhelmingly mobilized by cultural issues. The petite bourgeoisie appears as a constituting part of the anti-modernist cultural potential that Sacchi (1998) has empirically identified in Western societies.

In principle, similar factors such as low levels of education would also make farmers appear predisposed to support the populist right. While the origin of the Swiss People's Party as an agricultural party and its continuing support in this segment would underscore such a hypothesis (Kriesi et al. 2005), parties rooted in the urban milieu, such as the French Front National, have not been successful among farmers until quite recently (Mayer 2002). If the origin of right-wing populist parties matters for their success among farmers, then we would expect Switzerland to represent an exception. Looking at Austria, the Freedom Party's spiritual home in Pan-German nationalist circles does not make the party appear predisposed to mobilize peasants, either. Finally, according to Müller (1999: 147), the position of routine non-manual workers in the class structure is too undetermined to allow the formulation of clear hypotheses regarding their party political preferences. However, in terms of pay, they are often worse off than the manual working class, as Oesch (2006) is able to show. Furthermore, certain segments of this group are under pressure because of economic modernization and automation. In other words, routine non-manual workers do appear to constitute a potential for the populist right.

Finally, segments of the working class can in fact be expected to represent a core support base of the populist right. For one thing, relatively low levels of formal education characterize the *unskilled* as well as large parts of the *skilled workers*. This makes the working class relatively receptive to the traditionalist-communitarian ideology of the populist right. Furthermore, they belong to the social groups most strongly affected by economic modernization and structural change (see Kriesi et al. 2006). At least *relative to the golden age of industrial welfare capitalism, they clearly stand to lose*. In principle, workers would appear to constitute an economically leftist, rather than a culturally traditionalist, potential. If, however, the collective identities related to the traditional state-market cleavage have weakened, then the working classes' links to the parties of the left will also have declined and they will become a more promising target for identity-based appeals. Similarly to the petite bourgeoisie, their early insertion into the production process makes it probable—following the Habermasian logic explained above—that they will come to see themselves as the losers in modernization in cultural, rather than in economic, terms.

To the extent that the traditional institutions of left-wing working-class socialization, such as unions, lose their influence because of the decline of the employment structures characteristic of the Fordist production regime, and a shift in emphasis takes place from economic to cultural issues in the political arena, parts of the working class may defect from the left and vote for parties that advocate traditionalist-communitarian stances. Note that this does not necessitate that individual members of the working class shift from the left to the populist right; nor does it imply a radicalization of workers' cultural preferences. Regarding party preferences, the cleavage account developed in Chapter 3 suggests that rising support for the populist right of formerly left-leaning occupational groups is likely to take place primarily through a process of generational replacement. Furthermore, the average preferences of the members of social classes need not change over time for such a long-term shift to take place. The growing propensity of workers to support the populist right may be due to nothing more than a transformation of the salience hierarchy of individual-level group identifications, making the traditionalist-communitarian identity triumph over class identification.

A Declining Impact of Class on Economic Preference Formation?

If right-wing populist parties rally behind themselves different social classes that historically had diverging interests regarding the state-market divide, then two explanations can serve to explain this fact. The first is that social class quite generally is no longer relevant in the formation of political preferences, as boldly put forward by Paul Kingston (2000). The second, in line with the explanation just advanced as to why segments of the working class may support the populist right, attributes this shift to the relative decline of other conflicts and the corresponding

group attachments. Consequently, class may well continue to matter for the formation of economic preferences, and voters belonging to social classes characterized by left-wing economic preferences will then vote for the populist right *despite* the fact that these parties do not represent their economic preferences. This means that economic preferences are simply irrelevant because cultural orientations prevail.

To test this hypothesis, and to refute the first explanation, the country chapters present the location of the different classes within the populist right's electorate in political space, constituted by the economic and the cultural dimension used in the previous analyses. Classes are located using their average factor scores on these dimensions. If my reasoning is correct, then the social classes within the populist right's electorate should differ in their economic preferences and be united by a common cultural outlook.

III

The New Cultural Cleavage and the Populist Right in France, Switzerland, and Germany

5

France

The Reshaping of Cultural Conflicts and the Rise of the Front National

In much of the twentieth century, France hardly qualified as an example of a stable party system, and it has not been uncommon to see new parties rise and old parties fall. The institutions of the Fifth Republic, however—the two-round majoritarian formula used in national parliamentary elections and in presidential contests—did progressively bring about a more stable pattern of "bipolar multipartism" after 1958 (Knapp 2002; Parodi 1989). The era of stability proved to be short-lived, however, as new cultural conflicts appeared in the early 1980s. Since then, different conceptions of norms that should be binding in society, of the way community is conceived, and of the balance of power between the nation-state and the European Union (EU) have undermined existing alignments.

As a driving force of the transformation of the party system and as one of the most successful right-wing populist parties, the French Front National in many ways is something like the "prototype" or "avant-garde" of right-wing populist parties. Taking up concepts of the French "Nouvelle Droite (New Right)," it was among the first to adopt a "differentialist nativist discourse," in Hans-Georg Betz's (2004) words, staunchly defending national culture and the established traditions it embodies. Earlier than in other countries, the extreme populist right in France achieved its electoral breakthrough in the 1980s.

France thus appears as a promising case for the application of the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3. As I shall argue, the rise of the Front National is related to the decline of the religious cleavage and to important structural changes in the French economy. Contrary to Herbert Kitschelt and

Anthony McGann's (1995) contention, however, economic issues have hardly played a role in the party's success story. Instead, the evolution of the French party system brought about by the Front National is the result of the rising prominence of cultural, as opposed to class, divisions for certain social groups. As I show, social class does continue to matter in the formation of economic preferences, but these preferences are manifestly irrelevant for those who support the populist right. The Front National's ability to unite this diverse coalition thus depends centrally on the predominance of culturally, as opposed to economically, defined group identifications within its electorate.

The following section gives a brief overview of the French party system and its evolution in the past decades. In particular, it is important to note that there is a strong tradition of discourse centering on national sovereignty introduced by the Gaullist movement, which paved the way for the Front National's specific and highly innovative variant of this discourse. The proceeding sections then follow the research strategy outlined in Chapter 4. I focus on presidential elections whenever possible because of their superior importance in France's semi-presidential system; no appropriate post-election survey, however, was available for a presidential election in the 1970s. The analysis therefore begins with the parliamentary election in 1978 and proceeds to the presidential contests of 1988, 1995, and 2002. The long time span covered by the data is appropriate for an analysis of the French case, where the populist right firmly entrenched itself early on. In the third section, the impact of the economic and the cultural dimensions of conflict on voting decisions is assessed. Finally, I analyze the educational and class basis of the Front National's support and empirically demonstrate the continuing influence of social class in the formation of economic preferences even among Front National voters.

The Transformation of the French Party System

Traditional Cleavages, New Issues, and the Rise of the Front National

Despite the organizational instability of parties, the basic political divisions in French political society have remained rather stable until fairly recently. As in many other European countries, political divisions in France carried the imprint of class and religious cleavages. In the absence of strong clerical parties, the parties of the right implicitly defended the prerogatives of the church (Rokkan 1999). Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that the dominating left-right divide was by no means solely the expression of class cleavage; it was also marked by a strong cultural or value component. In fact, religious voting has always been much stronger than class voting in France (Bartolini 2000: 494; Knutsen 2004: 228). In this sense, the early manifestation of the new libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide is perhaps less surprising, because it does not depend only on the pacification of the economic

cleavage. The state-market division, according to Oddbjørn Knutsen (2004), remains relatively strong in socio-structural terms. At the same time, the two traditional cleavages overlap to a large degree, and as a result of the new electoral rules introduced in the Fifth Republic, a bipolar communist-secular versus anticommunist-Catholic opposition emerged (Grunberg 2006; Martin 2000; Parodi 1989). Within each of the two blocks, the two major parties joined together to support a candidate of the left or the right, respectively, in the second round of the presidential elections.

On the right and on the left, however, there have been early signs of a breakup of the bipolar pattern and of a transformation of cultural conflicts that manifested itself suddenly in the 1980s. Within the right, Charles de Gaulle's presidency introduced a tradition of heavy emphasis on national sovereignty and the defense of a prominent place for France in world politics. As a consequence, the right was divided between Gaullists and non-Gaullists. In the 1970s, Jacques Chirac's newly founded Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic; RPR) progressively gained weight at the expense of the centrist Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy; UDF) federation. Although the UDF had its traditional strongholds among religious voters, it was more culturally liberal than the RPR. This is to some degree counter-intuitive but in line with the politics of mediation and cautious modernization that Christian Democratic parties typically pursue (Frey 2009). Hence, UDF Minister of Health Simone Veil liberalized contraception and in 1975 introduced the right to abortion. The Gaullists, by contrast, introduced a new emphasis on national sovereignty and patriotism that in some ways made them the forerunner of the contemporary populist right.

On the political left, and during a similar time period, François Mitterrand's re-launched Parti Socialiste Français (Socialist Party; PSF) gained support at the expense of the communists. This evolution can, on the one hand, be attributed to the Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party; PCF) following an orthodox Stalinist ideology despite growing disillusionment with the communist regimes in the East (Courtois and Peschanski 1988). In contrast, the Socialists proved receptive to the universalistic values of the New Social Movements of the left. The Communist Party had drawn over-proportional support from the secular segment of the population, and the demise of the religious cleavage thus weakened not only the Catholic but also the Communist subculture (see Knutsen 2004: 108–109).

The decline of the religious cleavage thus paved the way for a culturalist counter-reaction to the Socialist New Left. In 1977, the right-wing government announced plans to repatriate immigrants, countering the left's initial successes in the wake of its ascension to power and confronted with rising levels of unemployment. This provoked a counter-mobilization of the unions and the non-communist left, as well as of segments of the right itself, leading the government to abandon the plan (Martin 2000: 258–259). The established right played with ideological polarization again after it found itself in opposition after 1981. When

the Socialist government under Mitterrand decided to regularize illicit immigrants and abandon the death penalty, the established right reacted promptly and radicalized its discourse to oppose these measures. France is thus one of the prime examples that corroborates Piero Ignazi's (1992, 2003) claim that the established parties of the right pushed a radicalization of political discourse on which right-wing populist parties later thrived.

But it was also the Socialist left that contributed to the prominence of New Right issues. Confronted with the early successes of the Front National, it promoted anti-racism as a central issue to fill its ideological void, as Pascal Perrineau (1997: 49–50) states, defending a multiculturalist "recognition of difference." This strategy reinforced the Front National's ownership of the immigration issue (Meguid 2005) and more generally contributed to the rising salience of the cultural, as opposed to the economic, dimension of conflict. After the RPR performed a turnaround of its ideological profile and rallied behind cultural liberalism, a new structure of opposition emerged, with the Socialists representing the counterpart to the established right in economic terms and the antagonists of the populist right in cultural terms. In an analysis of voters' attitudes, Gérard Grunberg and Etienne Schweisguth (2003) have termed this the "tripartition" of political space.

At the same time, this claim must be qualified by drawing attention to the crosscutting nature of the European-integration dimension. While the Gaullists traditionally had been skeptical of the integration project, they changed their stance quite radically in the European elections of 1984 and rallied behind a list led by Simone Veil, a member of the UDF and former president of the European Parliament. With the Euro-skeptical Communist Party's decline and the increasingly pro-European line of the Socialists, almost the entire political spectrum turned pro-European. Voters have not followed suit, however. The narrow margin of approval of the Maastricht Treaty and the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty to gain majority support brought to the fore that voters are strongly divided in their attitudes toward the integration project.

European integration has played a non-negligible role in the mobilization of the French populist right. The Front National's stance toward the EU is one of the prime examples of its strategic flexibility, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Originally strongly favorable toward the integration process (see Mayer 1998), it grasped the opportunity provided by Euro-skeptical sentiments among voters. Quickly revising its position, it devoted considerable attention to the issue in its new election program, which was launched shortly after the Maastricht referendum in 1992. The staunch anti-European stance was also a reaction to the emergence of new Euro-skeptical competitors that resulted from secessions from the established right (Perrineau 1997: 74–75, 78–79).

European integration also poses a different challenge, however, by introducing a fissure within the left that may gradually lead to a pattern of opposition involving four blocks. While the Socialists favor European integration, the lack of support on the part of the communist and extreme left, as shown in analyses

of the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (Boy and Chiche 2005), is presumably related to a different logic of rejection from that on the right. Given that EU policies have paved the way for deregulation and more liberal economic policies, while there has been little re-regulation in the realms of economic- and social-policy making at the European level, the Euro-skepticism of the non-Socialist left is a result of strongly state interventionist convictions. More generally, conceptions of social justice and of the relative emphasis put on the state or the market in allocating resources can be expected to be decisive in forming attitudes toward the EU, whose policies are heavily oriented toward the economic domain. Contrary to the electorate of the populist right, I do not expect voters situated on this side of the political spectrum to be particularly concerned with the loss of identity, a hypothesis supported by Jocelyn Evans (2000).

Quite exceptionally, the 2002 post-election survey permits a separate operationalization of cultural and the economic preferences concerning European integration, and the empirical analysis substantiates the hypothesis of a dual logic of rejection of the EU. It is possible to investigate the degree to which attitudes toward the EU are related to positions on the domestic dimensions of conflict and whether the conflicts resulting from the integration question cut across established alignments. Even if the European-integration issue has not been very prominent in the presidential contests studied in this chapter, there is evidence that Europe has been "invisible, but omnipresent" in structuring alignments in the 1990s, as Céline Belot and Bruno Cautrès (2004) put it.

A Strong Challenger

The Front National's centralized internal organization and its ensuing capacity to quickly take stances on new issues have been crucial in both its initial rise and its ability to stabilize support (see Table 5.1). Because of Le Pen's leadership qualities, in 1972 the Front National succeeded in integrating the rather diverse streams of the French extreme right and established a powerful organization. The

TABLE 5.1 Front National's Share of Votes in Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in France, 1970s–2000s (%)

	1973	1974	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1995	1997	2002
A. Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 1973–2002										
Parliament	—		.3	1.8	10	9.7	12.7		14.9	11.3
Presidency		.7		—		14.4		15.0		16.9

B. Presidential Election 2002, Second Round

Rally for the Republic/Union for a Popular Movement, Chirac: 82.2%
Front National, Le Pen: 17.8%

Source: Part A: Caramani 2000; www.assemblee-nationale.fr and other Internet databases. Part B: Mayer 2002: 363.

Note: In Part A, blank spaces indicate that elections were not held at that level, and dashes indicate that the Front National did not present candidates.

Front National's structure is extremely centralized and hierarchical, giving Le Pen a lot of leeway to define the programmatic line over the party's militants (Venner 2002). A further example of the Front National's flexibility has been the reversal of its stances in economic policy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the party was resolutely market-liberal, which prompted Kitschelt and McGann (1995) to highlight this as its defining feature, setting it apart from the old radical right. However, when the Front National first saw a "proletarianization" of its electoral basis in the 1986 elections, it progressively abandoned its neoliberal thrust. While the party program launched in 1985 had been very neoliberal, the 1992 manifesto was protectionist and included pro-welfare state stances (Perrineau 1997). In a 1996 demonstration, the Front National even called for defending the public sector and for a higher minimum wage, culminating in the slogan "Le social, c'est le Front National" (Perrineau 1997: 88).

The downside of Le Pen's control over the Front National's apparatus and the consequent lack of pluralism has been a series of splits. When Le Pen set up a list of candidates that included many defectors from the established right in 1986, which probably helped the party's appeal a great deal, militants in turn left the party. Personal rivalries between Le Pen and Bruno Mégret, himself a renegade from the Gaullist RPR, have persisted and even provoked the split in the party that resulted in the Mouvement National Républicain (National Republican Movement; MNR) in 1998. Until then the Front National had progressively gained vote shares in national parliamentary elections similar to those achieved by Le Pen in presidential contests (Table 5.1). This prompted the plausible claim that the party was increasingly attracting an electorate that was convinced by its programmatic stances and less driven by Le Pen's personal charisma (Mayer 1997). The 2002 presidential elections, in turn, underscored the role played by Le Pen's personality, as well as the importance of a strong party organization. In that election, both Le Pen and Mégret ran. Although Mégret, as a representative of the moderate party wing, appeared much better suited to mobilize the bourgeois elements of the Front National's electorate, his disappointing performance in direct competition with Le Pen underlined the Front National's dependence on its icon (Mayer 2002). Although it would be interesting to analyze the two formations jointly, the MNR's limited presence in the media, as well as the insufficient number of survey respondents who voted for Mégret, precludes this.

It is important not to mistake the influence of a charismatic leader and a strategy of mobilizing resentment against the established parties for a lack of strong ideological convictions on the part of voters. While sympathy for Le Pen in statistical terms played the most decisive role in explaining the Front National vote in the 1995 presidential elections, 80 percent of those who voted for the party also declare that they did so because of their candidate's ideas; his personality came in second (Mayer 2002: 209–210). The central role played by resentment vis-à-vis the political class in the mobilization of the populist right should not be understated, either, and has been strongly confirmed by all studies of the French case. Le Pen regularly refers to the established parties as the "gang of four"

and denounces the "candidates of the system" for "lying."[1] While this discourse is typical of right-wing populist parties, the detachment of the French political system from society and the frequent corruption scandals make it especially powerful in this case. Nonetheless, in the empirical analysis I seek to demonstrate that the Front National does not capitalize on changing coalitions of protest voters but, in fact, mobilizes an ideologically extreme minority of the electorate that is unlikely to return to the established parties.

All this said about strategic flexibility and personal charisma, the role of the Front National's strong and far-reaching organization should not be downplayed. Although Le Pen centralized the party's internal structure in the early 1980s, the Front National also has a rich array of affiliated organizations. Youth and women's organizations, a number of sector-specific unions in the public and private sector, affiliated traditionalist Catholic movements, and newspapers aim at creating and nourishing a tightly knitted nationalist counterculture, in Perrineau's (1997: 46–47) words, reminiscent of the Communist Party in its early years.

New Structural Potentials and Their Political Manifestation: Xenophobia and the Politics of Economic Adjustment

To make sense of the rise of the immigration issue in the 1980s, it is important to acknowledge that it is linked neither to an increase in immigration, which has been severely limited since the mid-1970s, nor to a surge in xenophobia. According to survey data presented by Pierre Martin (2000: 256), the share of citizens who believe that there are too many immigrant workers in France has not risen significantly between 1966 and 1993—they were already a majority back then. In other words, the political potential inherent in the politicization of immigration issues has not grown. We must therefore focus on *political* factors to explain the timing of the rise of the Front National and the subsequent transformation of political space. At the individual level, adopting the framework developed in Chapter 3, the political mobilization of ethnic-nationalist categories must be related to a waning of other, previously relevant group attachments. In the French case, this concerns social class, as well as religious identities, whose political relevance has declined, as we have seen. While the declining role of religion derives from a long-term process of secularization characteristic of all Western European societies, the diminished significance of group identities linked to the class cleavage seems to be more intimately related to politics itself and, more specifically, to the politics of economic reform since the early 1980s.

Indeed, France's path to economic modernization since the 1970s has had far-reaching consequences. As Jonah Levy (2000, 2005) shows, the economic-policy changes of the 1980s and 1990s imply a shift from a state-directed to a market-directed economy, resulting in a radical break with the past. According to Peter Hall (2006: 7), the efforts made to liberalize the economy have been "the

[1]Interview in *Le Monde,* April 25, 1995, 5.

most substantial of any nation in continental Europe." While these reforms greatly enhanced competitiveness, making France one of the most attractive destinations for foreign direct investment in Western Europe throughout the 1990s, the process has not been without losers. The relatively large segments of the workforce with low levels of skills and education were hit especially hard by the deindustrialization triggered by the increased international economic competition. As Levy (2005: 119–122) has forcefully argued, French governments reacted to this challenge by redeploying state activism from industrial- to social-policy making. He calls social-policy making a "social anesthesia" program, designed to "pacify and demobilize the victims and opponents of market-led adjustment" (Levy 2005: 119). When social exclusion increasingly became a problem in the 1980s, targeted minimum benefits, such as a state-financed minimum income, were introduced (Palier 2005).

As a consequence of these measures, the level of inequality, though always exceptionally high within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) world, has not risen since the 1970s (Alderson et al. 2005: 422). However, as in all regimes of coordinated capitalism and continental welfare states, individuals with few or obsolete skills find it increasingly difficult to compete in the labor market (Hall and Soskice 2001; Scharpf 2000a). One of the major problems in France, in other words, is ensuring employment, especially for the young and, even more, for young people with low levels of education. According to Eurostat, the unemployment rate for people younger than twenty-five in France in 2005 was more than twice as high as the overall French unemployment rate of 9.9 percent. Two related dualisms therefore emerge within the French population. First, there is a divide between those covered by the generous Bismarckian social-insurance schemes and the 10–15 percent of the population who rely on only targeted minimum benefits (Palier 2005: 141). While the benefits may prevent poverty, they do not override the emergence of an insider-versus-outsider divide within the labor market. Second, this antagonism has a strong generational component, as Louis Chauvel (2006) shows, producing an "insiderization" of previous generations and an "outsiderization" of new ones.

From the perspective of my argument, the political potentials resulting from these new social divisions must be seen in conjunction with the fact that the basic thrust of economic reforms has been similar under the left-wing governments under Mitterrand's presidency and under the right-wing governments thereafter (Hall 2006; Levy 2005). When the left's Keynesian strategy failed in the early 1980s, the Communist ministers left the government, and President Mitterrand switched to a course of austerity. Anchoring the franc in the European Monetary System and the single-market project made it difficult for later governments to change this course. At the same time, the right is traditionally also state-interventionist in France. Consequently, little difference was visible between the positions of the established parties. The Front National has profited from this lack of conflict in the economic domain, since the social groups most affected by the new social divisions are over-represented in its electorate. It is also quite telling that the Front National

voters are young, on average, and that the party is weakest among those older than sixty-five. On the one hand, the latter are presumably more firmly rooted in the traditional structure of conflict, and on the other, the young are more likely to be labor-market outsiders. In fact, a combination of attributes such as being younger than forty and not having a "*bac*" degree (equivalent to a high-school diploma) made the probability of voting for the Front National climb to about 27 percent in the 1997 parliamentary election (Mayer 2002: 81; Perrineau 1997: 103).

Structural potentials due to the process of economic modernization and liberalization therefore exist, and the segments of the workforce most touched by these structural changes are also over-represented in the Front National's electorate. But we are left with a paradox: The potentials resulting from structural economic change are mobilized not in economic, but in cultural or ethnic, terms. As a result, the electoral coalition mobilized by the Front National could hardly be more heterogeneous as far as economic preferences are concerned. While some segments favor strong government intervention in the economy, others have more liberal preferences, as Perrineau (1997) and Nonna Mayer (2002) have shown. The party itself is well aware of this. Le Pen actively sought to weaken the impact of economic issues by declaring that the socioeconomic cleavage has lost relevance and has been replaced by opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan identity and those of a national identity (Perrineau 1997: 64). Rather than reinforcing the state-market cleavage, economic modernization has therefore contributed to the rising salience of cultural conflicts.

The Changing Dimensionality of the French Political Space

Having provided the wider context of the transformation of the French party system, the analysis now focuses on the patterns of opposition that result from parties' policy stances, on the one hand, and voters' orientations and long-term alignments, on the other. The first step in the analysis is to identify the dimensions that structure oppositions in the four elections under study. In contrast with Chapter 2, the time frame here begins in the late 1970s, proceeding with a separate analysis of each election.[2]

The political space resulting from the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis and constituted by parties' positions concerning the twelve issue categories in each election is presented in Figure 5.1. In all four cases, the solution is clearly two-dimensional. As expected, the opposition between "welfare" and "economic liberalism" emerges as one dimension and can be interpreted as the political content of the traditional state-market cleavage. The second axis to emerge throughout the four elections is stamped by cultural issues. In the late 1970s, the libertarian-universalistic pole of the new cultural divide is already

[2]The discussion here focuses on the results of the analysis, because the procedures and methods employed were explained in detail in Chapter 4, to which the reader is referred for all technical matters.



FIGURE 5.1 Political space in France, 1978–2002: Positions of parties and issue categories. Stress-I statistics: .13 (1978); .3 (1988); .19 (1995); .26 (2002).

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; MRG, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist; later, Union for a Presidential Majority; currently, Union for a Popular Movement); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *iref,* institutional reform (see Chapter 2).

present. This is visible in the extreme position of cultural liberalism, which regroups the issues related to the goals of the New Social Movements. It can also be seen that, of all parties, the Socialist PSF is located closest to this category. The counter-pole of the cultural dimension is formed by budgetary rigor. The rejection of cultural liberalism and the endorsement of budgetary rigor can be interpreted as a neo-conservative position, which is liberal in economic terms but traditionalist in cultural matters (see Eatwell 1989; Habermas 1985). The Gaullist RPR displays such a profile. However, it is interesting to note that the two dimensions are partially integrated, as all parties but the Socialists are situated on a single dimension running from support for the welfare state to budgetary rigor. This conforms to the established wisdom that economic and cultural conflicts overlapped to a large degree in France. At the same time, we can see that the PSF's more strongly libertarian-universalistic stance as compared with the French Communist Party is largely responsible for the two-dimensionality of the solution.

While the economic divide remains stable over time, the cultural divide was transformed between 1978 and 1988. In the late 1980s, a traditionalist-communitarian counter-pole to the universalistic principles embodied in cultural liberalism, represented by exclusionist anti-immigration stances, emerged. This accords with the hypothesis of a second transformation of the cultural divide that resulted in a conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian worldviews. While the positions of parties evolved somewhat, the basic structure of conflict was reproduced in 1995 and 2002.[3] As in 1978, there was a tendency for the two dimensions to be integrated in 1995 and 2002, as cultural liberalism is associated with a left-wing position on the state-market dimension and anti-immigration stances are closer to economic liberalism.

Nonetheless, with the partial exception of the 1995 election, the "tripartition" of political space is clearly visible in the solutions, and it is now the Front National's position that escapes the one-dimensionality of the established parties' positions. All of the parties of the left combine support for the welfare state with an endorsement of universalistic values, annihilating the differentiation between the traditional left and New Left that was visible in 1978. The UDF and RPR have largely converged in their position, as well, and are generally situated closer to the market pole of the state-market divide. However, looking at the cultural divide, we observe a change in strategy of the established right vis-à-vis the populist challenge: Whereas the UDF and RPR had been situated halfway between the left and the Front National on the cultural divide in 1988 and 1995, they converged with the parties of the left on a relatively universalistic position in the most recent contest. As a consequence, the structure of opposition turns more clearly two-dimensional. The established left and right diverge primarily in their

[3]In 1995, support for the army was very strongly associated with anti-immigration stances, and both categories could be interpreted to represent the traditionalist cultural pole. However, because positions regarding the army are relevant only in this election, cultural liberalism and immigration are taken to represent the cultural divide in the three more recent contests.

TABLE 5.2 Operationalization of the Relevant Issue Categories on the Demand Side in the Four Elections in France

	Economic Dimension		Cultural Dimension		European-Integration Dimension
	Welfare	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	Budgetary Rigor	Europe
1978	X	X	X	—	Not yet a relevant dimension

	Economic Dimension		Cultural Dimension		European-Integration Dimension
	Welfare	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	Immigration	Europe
1988	X	X	2 dimensions	X	—
1995	—	2 dimensions	X	X	X
2002	—	X	X	X	X

Note: X indicates that one dimension emerges from the factor analysis. In two cases, the solution is two-dimensional, and both underlying variables are used for the construction of the axis. See Chapter 4 for an explanation of this procedure and Appendix C for a list of the items used for each category.

economic positions, leaving the entire traditionalist-communitarian political space to the Front National. Later we will see the degree to which the shifting positions of the established right correspond to the orientations of their voters.

European integration does not take an extreme position in the French political space, but this is partially because the division over Europe cuts across both other dimensions. European integration was sufficiently present in the media to have constituted a polarizing issue in 1988 and 1995 but no longer played a role in the 2002 contest. Because of its theoretical and empirical relevance, it is studied in the subsequent analysis alongside the state-market cleavage and the evolving cultural divide.

The next step is to calculate the position of the parties along the three dimensions identified and then locate voters in the parties' political space. Table 5.2 shows which of the relevant categories can be operationalized on the voter side with survey data. The issue categories constituting the axis are then integrated into a single measure of the party and voter position on each dimension (see Chapter 4). Concerning the economic dimension, we lack items for voters' orientations regarding support for the welfare state in 1995 and 2002. Consequently, this dimension is calculated using only voters' positions regarding economic liberalism. This lack of information is not a major problem: From a theoretical point of view, these categories can be expected to form one dimension, and empirically attitudes regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism are highly correlated at the individual level in 1978 and 1988.[4] Regarding the cultural dimension, only cultural liberalism is available in 1978, and attitudes regarding the European Union can be measured only in 1995 and 2002 on the demand side.

[4]For 1978 and 1988, welfare and economic liberalism display factor loadings of at least .8 on the state-market dimension.

Patterns of Opposition along the New Cultural Divide

Position, Match, and Polarization

Figure 5.2 shows the positions of parties and their electorates along the cultural dimension. A location on the left indicates a libertarian-universalistic position, while a location on the right denotes a defense of tradition as against these universalistic principles. The latter ideological syndrome from 1988 on is coupled with exclusionist stances regarding foreigners, as we have seen. In the 1978 election, the positions of the parties of the left and of the centrist UDF did not differ very much, while the RPR pursued a polarizing strategy by issuing more traditionalist stances. In fact, the Gaullists were the only party that was nearer to the traditionalist pole of the divide. It is also quite evident that a number of parties failed to represent their voters adequately. While the UDF took the most libertarian-universalistic position after the PSF, its voters were situated at the opposing end of the distribution, virtually at no distance from those who voted for the Gaullist RPR. In this sense, the RPR's rise at the expense of the UDF is not surprising. The Communists and the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; MRG) were similarly out of touch with their voters, resulting in a very low overall match in positions on the supply side and on the demand side, as indicated beneath each of the graphs. In other words, the party system was clearly unresponsive to the electorate. The Front National's position cannot be determined in 1978 because of an insufficient number of statements. The orientations of its voters, however, are very dispersed along the cultural dimension. This results in a centrist average position and suggests that the party did mobilize primarily along this conflict.

Between 1978 and 1988, polarization surged, and the parties became much more spread out along the spectrum. This is attributable both to the more clearly libertarian-universalistic discourse of the left and to the emergence of the Front National at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide, set far apart from the moderate right. While the RPR had not changed its position very much, the UDF lay at quite a distance from the parties of the left, resulting in a programmatic convergence of the established right. In 1995, the UDF did not appear because the party did not present a candidate of its own but called to support Édouard Balladur, a second RPR candidate who ran against Chirac. In 1988 and 1995, the location of the parties closely resembled the relative positions of their electorates.

The most important finding is that the Front National mobilized an electorate whose location is as extreme as that of the party itself. From 1988 on, the populist right has had an electorate of its own in ideological terms. Although there is some overlap between relatively traditionalist supporters of the RPR and the less traditionalist followers of the Front National, a large number of the Front National's voters are located at the extreme of the dimension. The relatively large



FIGURE 5.2 Parties and voters on the cultural divide in France, 1978–2002: Position, match, and polarization.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; MRG, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist; later, Union for a Presidential Majority; then, Union for a Popular Movement); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

spread of the RPR's issue statements underlines the party's difficulty in defining its position on the cultural dimension, and its voters are more dispersed along the spectrum than those of the Front National. While the electorates have also become more polarized than they were in the 1970s, it is the strong increase in the polarization of the party system that has restored the responsiveness of the party system, resulting in a close match of the positions of parties and voters. Overall, we face a situation of *deep segmentation* of which the Front National is an integral part: The party system is responsive with or without the Front National and its voters. Both the party and its voters lie at the extremes on the cultural divide and strongly contribute to the segmented nature of opposition on this axis.

On the party side, however, the 2002 election marks a change in strategy of the established right regarding the right-wing populist challenger: While the polarization of the party system was more or less maintained because of the presence of the Front National, the parties of the established right converged on a relatively libertarian-universalistic position, close to the left. Without the Front National, the polarization of the party system is minimal. This quite extraordinary result at first sight could be attributed to the last two weeks of the campaign, when it was clear that Le Pen would be one of the candidates in the second round. However, there is no change in this picture if we omit all articles that appeared in the two weeks between the first and the second round of the elections. If the parties of the established right moved toward the libertarian-universalistic pole in the 2002 election, their voters did not follow suit. Party electorates were much more evenly spread out along the dimension than the parties themselves, and the correlation of .8 marks a comparatively low match, indicating that the party system was not very responsive. The Gaullist RPR is especially detached from its electorate and risks losing to the Front National those voters who attach great importance to the issues associated with the cultural divide. The degree to which this danger is real depends, in conjunction with the RPR's future strategy, on the strength of the loyalties of the voters of the established right, to which I now turn.

The Stability of Alignments along the Cultural Divide

In analyzing the stability of alignments, I am interested in the degree to which ideological divisions along the cultural dimension entail durable collective political identities. The first step involves identifying the ideological party blocks theorized in Chapter 4. Against this backdrop, the 1978 election is rather difficult to interpret, the largest distance being the one between the RPR and the other parties. From 1988 on, however, the picture changes, and several common features can be identified. First, a division between the established right and the populist right is observable, and the Front National's electorate clearly represented an ideological block of its own. Except for the extraordinary pattern in 2002, a division between the moderate right and the parties of the left is also visible. Within

the left, however, no clear differentiation between traditional left and New Left emerged, and the overlap both in parties' programmatic stances and in their voters' preferences indicates that they compete for voters with similar ideological outlooks in cultural terms. Les Verts (the Greens, ecologists) represent a partial exception, since their voters in 2002 could be taken to represent a distinctively libertarian-universalistic block (along with the MRG's electorate). But this is less clear for the earlier years, and the position of the party itself, which can be determined only for 2002, does not differ from that of the others.

Consequently, I form three ideological blocks: a leftist-universalistic family, a center-right group, and the Front National's voters. The division between the left and the center-right broke down in 2002, but only on the party side, and I therefore use the same blocks over the entire time span. For the 1978 election, only two blocks can be formed because too few respondents declared having voted for the still marginal extreme right. The division between left-libertarian and center-right parties corresponds to the classification that is used for the class cleavage, but note that I exclude those who voted for the various independent candidates of the left and right here. We cannot locate these candidates in political space because of an insufficient number of statements in the media, and they may offer combinations of economic and cultural stances that differ from those of the parties in the three blocks. An example would be Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a dropout from the Socialist Party who combined a leftist economic program with a somewhat nationalist and Euro-skeptical discourse in the 2002 election. A second example is Philippe de Villiers, a former member of the UDF who founded a new party called Mouvement pour la France (Movement for France) and, as a presidential candidate in 1995, led a campaign in defense of tradition and national sovereignty.

The first striking feature in Figure 5.3 is the high level of partisan loyalty demonstrated by the Front National's voters. About 80 percent of those who declared having voted for it in the preceding election did so again in the election under survey.[5] However, cross-tabulations of actual and previous votes (results not shown here) also demonstrate that in all elections, considerable parts of the Front National's electorate come from voters who previously did not vote, who were not yet eligible to vote in the previous election, or who voted for other parties, mostly for independent candidates and the established right. Voters coming from the left are the smallest category in all years. These results show that, at least concerning the hard core of the Front National's voters, the structure of opposition is indeed highly segmented. Looking at the left-libertarian block, we see a decline in loyalty between 1978 and 1995 but a stabilization at about 72 percent thereafter. In the first election, loyalties on the left were still stronger than those

[5]This result has to be taken with a grain of salt, since the number of respondents who declare having voted for the Front National in the preceding election is always lower than the number of those who declare having done so in the more recent election, the one actually under examination. However, the analysis in Swyngedouw et al. 2000, which uses sophisticated methods such as iterative proportional fitting to correct for the effective vote shares of parties, supports the results presented here.



FIGURE 5.3 Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian block, the center-right, and the Front National in France, 1978–2002 (% loyal voters).

demonstrated by Front National voters later on, but they are now somewhat weaker. Loyalty to the center-right, by contrast, has always been the most fragile. From 1988 on, loyalty to the center-right has declined further from its comparatively low levels, reaching a low of 59 percent in 2002.

Summary: Emerging Types of Cultural Opposition

The French party system was in the wake of the emergence of a new dimension of political conflict in 1978. Polarization was low, indicating that the parties' positions were feebly structured by conflicts over libertarian-universalistic values and neo-conservative calls to roll back the state. The left-wing libertarian movements of the late 1960s and 1970s do not seem to have led to a strong opposition around questions of libertarianism versus traditional moral values at the level of the party system in the 1978 election, even if the RPR emerged as the most traditionalist party and even though this was one of the two dimensions that structured the opposition in the campaign. However, strong alignments related to the traditional secular-communist versus Catholic-traditionalist divide still checked realignments along the *new dimension of political conflict,* a situation found in the second cell from the right at the bottom of Figure 3.2.

By 1988, a new and more extreme pole had emerged in the shape of the Front National. A traditionalist-communitarian potential was not only present; it already formed a loyal constituency of the Front National. At the same time, the parties of the left had adopted a more decisively libertarian-universalistic stance in the 1980s. Although the center-right had not moved much, polarization had thus grown both at the party level and at the voter level, and the party system became responsive to the citizenry. Since 1988, oppositions have become highly segmented. This is especially true for the Front National's traditionalist block,

which maintains the highest levels of loyalty. And while the left-libertarian block, too, seems to have stabilized its alignments, the center-right block displays declining levels of loyalty, pointing to ongoing processes of dealignment.

Overall, the new cultural conflict represents something between an *emerging line of opposition* and a *segmented cleavage,* according to my theoretical model (Figure 3.2). The polarization of the party system reflects a similar polarization of electorates. At the same time, the decline of partisan loyalty to the center-right block indicates that the opposition still lacks closure and, consequently, the divide is not yet entirely settled. The 2002 election again changed this situation of congruent segmented representation. With all parties converging on a rather universalistic stance, and polarization declining starkly, the party system has become rather non-responsive, *and* party support has become volatile as far as the center-right block is concerned, opening a wide potential for the Front National's anti-cartel rhetoric. This is crucial not only because the cultural preferences of the established right's voters are not adequately represented, but also because part of the RPR's electorate has cultural preferences that overlap with those of the Front National's clientele anyway. Consequently, much depends on the salience of the economic, as opposed to the cultural, divide for the voters of the center-right, as well as on the nature of oppositions along the economic dimension. These are the questions to which I now turn.

Patterns of Opposition along the State-Market Cleavage

Position, Match, and Polarization

Figure 5.4 shows the respective positions of parties and voters on the economic dimension. A position on the left corresponds to a programmatic stance or preferences in favor of the welfare state and against economic liberalism, while a position on the right represents the opposite set of preferences. Starting with the election of 1978, we find that the space of political competition is skewed to the left, with the RPR positioned right in the middle of the spectrum and the UDF to the left of it. Without the Front National, polarization is below .5, and thus rather modest. Including the populist right, however, causes polarization to rise considerably. Unlike on the cultural dimension, there are enough statements to position the Front National on the economic dimension in the 1978 election, which is an interesting finding as such. And at the end of the 1970s, the party did in fact have the most clear-cut market-liberal profile of all. In other words, we do find some evidence for Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) claim that, at the beginning of its ascendance, the Front National mobilized voters who did not see their free-market preferences represented by any of the established parties. The Front National's electorate does not differ much from the voters of the established right, although we have to keep in mind that extremely few people voted for the populist right and that the results are therefore not very reliable.



1978: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (seven parties): .79
Polarization parties: .50; without FRONT: .38



1988: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (six parties): .98
Polarization parties: .45; without FRONT: .49



1995: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (four parties): .88
Polarization parties: .35; without FRONT: .32



2002: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (eight parties): .76
Polarization parties: .50; without FRONT: .45

FIGURE 5.4 Parties and voters on the economic divide in France, 1978–2002: Position, match, and polarization.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; MRG, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist; later, Union for a Presidential Majority; currently, Union for a Popular Movement); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

However, by 1988 both the Front National and its voters were situated quite differently. In that election, the party lay halfway between the Socialists and the established right, and its voters lay to the left of those who supported the established right. The average position masks divergent individual preferences, as the large spread of positions indicates. In the 1988 election, as well as in later elections, the heterogeneity of economic preferences of Front National voters contrasts starkly with their relatively homogeneous outlooks concerning the cultural dimension. The dispersion of the Front National's voters is especially large in 2002, reaching far into the grounds of the left. This is already strong evidence for the hypothesis that the voters of the populist right are drawn together by their cultural orientations, while their divergent economic preferences make it difficult for the party to define its position on this dimension. After the centrist location in 1988, the Front National returned to a more market-liberal position in 1995 and, especially, in 2002. However, this position clearly does not correspond to the preferences of the majority of its voters.

As far as the party system as a whole is concerned, polarization generally lies around .5, except in 1995, when it was considerably lower. At the same time, the relatively close match of positions between parties and voters indicates that the party system is by and large responsive to the electorate. There was a decline in match in the 2002 election, however, caused in part (and not by accident) by the two political formations that resulted from the new cultural conflicts since the late 1960s—the Greens and the Front National, which both failed adequately to represent their voters. Both electorates are quite centrist on average, while the two parties lie at the respective extremes. Furthermore, in 2002, supporters of the UDF turned out to have more decisively market-liberal preferences than those of the RPR, while the parties did not mirror this difference. The following analysis of voters' loyalties allows us to estimate how large the potential for realignments is that result from such incongruent representation in the 2002 election.

The Stability of Alignments and Resulting Types of Opposition

The distinction between the ideological party blocks divided by the class cleavage is quite straightforward in France. The only question left to settle, as discussed in Chapter 4, is how to classify the parties of the New Left and of the New Right, which are the product of post-industrial conflicts. Even here, however, the case is simple for the French Greens, who are clearly situated at the interventionist pole of the state-market divide. The Front National, by contrast, leans more toward the market pole of the cleavage, even if this is not an adequate reflection of its voters.

Loyalties to the left and right blocks are presented in Figure 5.5. The results show that loyalties on the left have been in decline since 1978 and have been weaker than those commanded by the right since 1988. Between 1995 and 2002, however, alignments on the right started to decline, as well. Overall, though, lev-



FIGURE 5.5 Stability of alignments to the left and right blocks in France, 1978–2002 (% loyal voters).

els of loyalty seem quite high, and the economic divide appears to exert a strong influence on partisan alignments. Putting together the three elements of the schema presented in Chapter 3, we can now draw some conclusions regarding the character of economic divisions within the French party system. In line with the introductory discussion of the politics of economic reform, party polarization is generally rather low. Much therefore depends on whether this is an adequate representation of parties' voters. In 1978, this was not the case if one excludes the Front National, which hardly gained any votes in that election. With loyalties very high in the late 1970s, we thus had an unresponsive party system in which party identification checked realignments (see Figure 3.2). Here, realignments could in fact have favored a party advocating more clearly market-liberal policies, as the Front National did in that election.

In 1988 and 1995, however, match was restored, and the party system regained responsiveness. In conjunction with low levels of polarization and high stability of alignments, this indicates that the class cleavage represents an *identitarian political dimension,* where alignments are more strongly structured by political identities than by real-world policy differences between the left and right blocks. This is mainly due to the fact that even the right in France is far from endorsing market liberalism. There is a difference between the voters of the left and the right, however: The former demonstrate declining loyalties, indicating that at least for some segments of the electorate, the class cleavage is moving in the direction of a *competitive political dimension,* where the performance of governments is in part decisive in voters' choices. This is plausible in light of the similarity of the basic liberalizing thrust of the economic reforms pursued by governments of the right and the left in the 1980s and 1990s.

The erosion in loyalties on the right is less marked. There was no decline until 2002, when the party system no longer mirrored voters' positions very well.

Since the loyalties of the Front National's voters constantly have been high, this appears to be a problem of the established parties of the right. As it was in 1978, the party system to a certain degree has become unresponsive to voters. At the same time, we should remember which parties were most clearly out of touch with their voters in that election: the Greens and the Front National. To the degree that economic stances come to matter more for these electorates, there is a potential for realignments to take place. Much depends, however, on the relative weight these citizens attribute to being congruently represented on the economic and cultural dimensions, respectively. Constantly high levels of loyalty despite misrepresentation in the economic domain indicate that, for Front National voters, the economic divide represents a *secondary political dimension,* again employing the analytical schema from Chapter 3. This hypothesis is substantiated in the analysis of voting determinants. First, however, we should investigate the degree to which the European-integration issue acts as a dimension crosscutting alignments based on the economic and cultural divides.

Support for the European Union: A Crosscutting Dimension?

Party positions with respect to European integration can be analyzed in the 1988, 1995, and 2002 elections, and we have information on voters' attitudes for 1995 and 2002. In the 2002 election, the data permit a separate analysis of voters' orientations regarding the economic and cultural implications of the integration process. Right from the start, it should be kept in mind that European integration, while constituting a polarizing issue, played a prominent role in the election campaign only in 1988 (see Appendix A). Often we do not have ten sentences regarding the EU for a party, and positions based on fewer than ten observations are set in brackets in Figure 5.6. Especially in the 2002 campaign, European integration hardly played a role, and it is therefore possible to represent the positions of only three parties in that election: the Front National, the Socialist Party, and the RPR.[6] The degree to which the EU represents a salient issue for the electorate and parties deliberately avoid politicizing European integration indicates issue-specific cartelization, where parties suppress conflicts that cut across the dominant dimensions of opposition.

We have information regarding only parties for the 1988 election, but it is quite revealing to compare the changes in position that occured between 1988 and 1995. In the late 1980s, only the Communists opposed European integration, while all of the other parties, including the Front National, were quite strongly in favor of the EU. Between 1988 and 1995, the Front National dramatically reversed its position, going from reticent but clear support for the EU to a staunch opposition of the project. In line with the new 1992 party program, which devoted

[6]For this reason, it makes little sense to calculate measures for match and party system polarization for 2002.



FIGURE 5.6 Parties and voters on the European-integration dimension in France, 1988–2002: Position, match, and polarization.

Note: Parties whose position is based on fewer than ten sentences are set in parentheses.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; MRG, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic (Gaullist; later, Union for a Presidential Majority; currently, Union for a Popular Movement); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

considerable attention to European integration (Perrineau 1997: 75), the Front National put the most emphasis of all parties on the issue in the 1995 election campaign, where almost 9 percent of its statements concerned the EU (see Appendix A). The voters of the Front National are also the electorate most skeptical of the integration project, although we can see that these voters' preferences were far from homogeneous in 1995, as demonstrated by the large standard deviation around their average position. However, a few years later, in 2002, the supporters of the Front National showed a more distinct profile: They were by far the most Euro-skeptical and were situated at quite a distance from the RPR's voters. The latter emerged as the group that was second most opposed to European integration, which contrasts with the party's position of favoring the project.

This evolution is concomitant with a stronger structuring of attitudes toward the EU along partisan lines. Between 1995 and 2002, electorates' positions became more polarized, due either to realignments that had taken place or to the mobilization efforts of parties. Although European integration was not a hotly debated issue, the analysis presented here concurs with Belot and Cautrès's (2004) claim that under the surface Europe played an important role in the 2002 presidential election (see also Meunier 2004).

Most important, the general pattern of opposition revealed in Figure 5.6 differs from that found on the economic and the cultural divides. While the Socialists and the center-right favored European integration, the Communists and the Front National were rather skeptical, indicating a split within the left and the right. (Note that the voters of the various radical left candidates were not pro-Europe, either.) The overall correspondence of the positions of parties and voters along the European divide can be reliably estimated only for 1995, but there we see that the party system was highly responsive to the preferences of voters, as indicated by the match of .99. The Socialists and the Front National represent the poles of the distribution on both the party and voter side, but the supporters of the Greens also consistently stand out for their pro-European attitudes.

The fact that representation is by and large congruent along the EU dimension underscores that the issue indeed has played, and continues to play, a role in structuring alignments. Given the Communist-Socialist split regarding the EU, realignments may have taken place between these two parties. With the RPR's voters having become more Euro-skeptical between 1995 and 2002, a further potential for the Front National, with its decisively anti-EU stance, may exist. However, the populist right's capacity to mobilize this potential is restrained by competition in the nationalist political space. While the Front National faces decreasing competition in the realm of the ideological core of its positions, as the previous analyses have shown, this is not necessarily the case regarding the EU issue, where various dropouts from the established right, such as Charles Pasqua, Philippe Séguin, and Philippe de Villiers compete for Euro-skeptics' votes.

To substantiate the hypothesis that the Front National's opposition to European integration is related to its traditionalist-communitarian ideology, and not to economic protectionism, we must be able to show that left-wing and right-wing populist Euro-skepticism are not only conceptually but also empirically distinct. Given the libertarian-universalistic outlook of the electorate of the left, left-wing opponents of the EU can be expected to reject the project for economic reasons. Market integration in the EU implies a liberalizing thrust that voters with markedly interventionist preferences along the state-market dimension are likely to oppose. The fear of losing political sovereignty and a perceived danger for the traditional community, by contrast, leads right-wing populist voters to reject the integration process.

In election campaigns, the question of European integration unfortunately has not been sufficiently salient to allow in-depth analysis of party stances toward the economic and cultural aspects of integration. On the demand side, however,



FIGURE 5.7 Voters' positions in the national political space and on the economic and cultural dimensions of European integration in France, 2002.

KEY *Political groups:* EXL, extreme-left parties; FRONT, Front National; GREENS, Greens, other ecologist parties; MRG, Movement of Left-Wing Radicals; PCF, French Communist Party; PSF, French Socialist Party; RPR, Rally for the Republic/Union for a Presidential Majority (Gaullist); UDF, Union for French Democracy, small centrist parties.

items in the 2002 post-electoral survey allow a differentiation of the economic and the cultural dimension of EU integration. The economic dimension is operationalized using an item that taps respondents' fear that EU integration endangers the achievements of the welfare state. For the cultural dimension, I use items pertaining to respondents' fear of losing their identity and seeing France's role in the world put into question by the EU. Both dimensions are standardized, and the positions of the electorates are shown in a two-dimensional space in Figure 5.7. To compare the European dimensions with the national dimensions of opposition, the figure also shows the electorates on the state-market and libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian dimensions of conflict. This is a two-dimensional representation of the positions found in Figures 5.2 and 5.4.

The positions of party electorates in Figure 5.7 strongly support the hypothesis regarding the different logics of rejection on the left and the populist right. The voters of the Front National are extreme only as far as their culturally based orientations regarding the EU are concerned. The Communists and the extreme left, by contrast, most clearly see an economic threat as a consequence of EU integration. It is interesting to note that the voters for the major parties of the established left and right, the PSF and the RPR/UMP (Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle, later renamed Union pour un Mouvement Populaire [Union for a Popular Movement]), diverge more along the cultural dimension than along the economic dimension. Most striking, however, is the similarity of the electorates' positions along the two European political dimensions and those constituting the national political space. Although positions along the national dimensions appear more polarized and therefore more segmented, there is a strong

resemblance of the basic pattern conveyed in the two images. In both instances, the Greens and the Front National lie at the extremes of the cultural dimension, while parties of the established left and right, exemplified by the PCF and the UDF, are situated at the extremes of the economic dimension. Given the minor role the European integration issue has played in presidential campaigns, oppositions regarding the EU are surprisingly segmented, especially along the cultural dimension. Looking at the difference in the degree of polarization of electorates in Figure 5.7 with respect to the national dimensions, on the one hand, and the EU dimensions, on the other hand, a further potential for the politicization of European integration seems to exist. In the analysis of the factors that structure voting behavior presented in the next section, it is interesting to investigate the impact of the EU issue on partisan alignments.

Political Divides as Determinants of Voting Choices

While the analysis so far was concerned with the congruence between the positions of parties and voters, I now determine how the three political dimensions identified determine voting choices. More specifically, I am interested in assessing which parties mobilize on which dimensions. Naturally, most attention is given to the Front National, but I am also concerned with the populist right's main antagonists and closest competitors. The results of the analysis, following the procedures outlined in Chapter 4, are presented in Table 5.3. The direction of the variables is coded in such a way that the odds ratios indicate the probability of voting for a party when attitudes are more right-wing in economic terms or more traditionalist-communitarian in cultural terms.

Looking at 1978, and with minor exceptions, a relatively simple pattern of oppositions is visible, following a left-libertarian versus right-wing-traditionalist antagonism: Those voting for the parties of the left are in favor of the welfare state and state intervention in the economy and defend libertarian-universalistic values. The reverse is true for the UDF and RPR, which mobilize strongly on both dimensions. The voters for the Greens are those most decisively moved by cultural liberalism, but economically they actually lean more to the right and thus represent a first exception to the overall pattern. The other exceptions are the MRG, which I do not address in detail, and the Front National. In the latter case, no clear result emerges, as the results are insignificant because of the limited number of cases.

This basic pattern remains stable in the later elections, but at the same time the results lend support to our prior interpretation of a segmentation of the cultural dimension caused by the mobilization of the Front National. Both the RPR and the Front National mobilize voters with traditionalist-communitarian attitudes along the cultural dimension. However, this effect is much stronger for the populist right than for the established right. The reverse is true for voters with market-liberal preferences. In 1988 and 1995, there was something of a tendency for market-liberal attitudes to favor the Front National. But the effects

TABLE 5.3 Political Dimensions as Determinants of Voting Choices in France, 1978–2002 (logistic regressions run separately for each party)

		Parties							
Dimensions		Ecologists	Movement of Left-Wing Radicals	Extreme Left	Communist Party	Socialist Party	Union for French Democracy	Rally for the Republic/ Union for a Popular Movement	Front National
				1978					
Economic	odds	1.4**	1.3*	.5***	.3***	.6***	1.8***	1.9***	1.3
	z	2.5	2.3	−3.3	−14.3	−8.6	10.4	11.5	1.3
Cultural	odds	.5***	1.2	.8	.8***	.9**	1.4***	1.5***	1.06
	z	−5.5	1.7	−1.2	−5.0	−2.8	5.0	6.4	.26
Pseudo R^2		5.6%	1.7%	4.6%	15.8%	4.5%	8.6%	10.6%	.9%
				1988					
Economic	odds	1.0	—	.6**	.3***	.5***	2.4***	2.2***	1.2*
	z	.2	—	−3.1	−10.5	−11.7	11.6	11.0	2.4
Cultural	odds	.6***	—	.8	.6***	.7***	1.0	1.6***	2.9***
	z	−4.8	—	−1.7	−5.7	−6.3	−.1	6.4	10.8
Pseudo R^2		3.5%	—	4.4%	18.6%	9.5%	10.7%	12.2%	12.7%
				1995					
Economic	odds	.7*	—	.7**	.4***	.5***	—	2.5***	1.2*
	z	−2.4	—	−2.9	−8.9	−11.5	—	15.8	2.5
Cultural	odds	.7**	—	.5***	.8*	.8***	—	1.3***	2.0***
	z	−3.0	—	−5.1	−2.2	−4.9	—	4.8	8.1
Europe	odds	.9	—	1.3**	1.4***	.6***	—	.9*	1.7***
	z	−.6	—	2.6	3.8	−7.4	—	−2.1	7.6
Pseudo R^2		3.8%	—	6.5%	11.9%	12.5%	—	14.0%	12.1%
				2002					
Economic	odds	.9	1.1	.6***	.4***	.7***	2.1***	1.5***	1.1
	z	−1.5	.8	−8.4	−7.3	−6.1	9.7	8.2	1.4
Cultural	odds	.3***	.5***	.7***	.5***	.7***	1.0	1.4***	2.6***
	z	−9.9	−4.7	−5.0	−5.4	−5.4	−.1	6.6	12.5
EU (economic)	odds	.9	1.0	.9*	.9	.9**	1.1*	1.1**	1.0
	z	−.7	−.2	−2.2	−1.4	−2.7	2.1	2.7	.6
EU (cultural)	odds	.8*	.8	1.0	1.3*	.8***	.9*	1.1	1.3***
	z	−2.1	−1.6	−.6	2.0	−4.0	−1.9	1.9	3.3
Pseudo R^2		11.8%	6.5%	5.3%	11.0%	3.9%	7.4%	4.8%	12.5%

Number of observations: 2,199 (1978); 1,712 (1988); 2,047 (1995); 3,312 (2002).
Significance levels: *$p \leq .05$ **$p \leq .01$ ***$p \leq .001$.

are much weaker than for the established right, and in 2002 market liberalism ceased to have a significant influence on the Front National vote. Overall, the results confirm the hypothesis that the populist right mobilizes almost exclusively on the cultural dimension.

The analysis of voting determinants also clearly reveals who the Front National's main competitors and antagonists are. Starting with the competitors, we can see that from 1988 on, the UDF has not mobilized citizens by virtue of their cultural preferences but, instead, has gained support from those with market-liberal preferences. This is a direct effect of the declining role of religion in politics and the transformation of the cultural divide, initiated by the Gaullist RPR and then radicalized by the Front National. Most of the parties of the left appear to gain votes by a dual logic of mobilization, receiving support from those with leftist economic preferences and from citizens with libertarian-universalistic attitudes. So far, then, the analysis supports the hypothesis that the rise of the Front National has established a tripartite structure of opposition, where the parties of the left represent the counterpart of the established right in economic terms and the antagonists of the populist right in cultural terms. Even if the parties of the left do not diverge very much in their logic of mobilization, Green voters most clearly constitute the ideological counter-pole to the populist right on the cultural dimension. However, the Greens compete in mobilizing voters with a distinctly libertarian-universalistic profile with the Communists, with the extreme left in 1995, and with the MRG in 2002.

In an important respect, however, the tripartition argument is imprecise. The European-integration dimension has introduced a rift within both the left and the right, as the analysis of voting determinants confirms. In 1995, the first year for which we have information on voters' attitudes, the European issue reveals differing mobilization logics within the left and right blocks. On the political right, favorable attitudes toward the EU are a predictor for voting for the RPR, while a skeptical view makes the probability of voting for the Front National rise sharply. A similar contrast is visible on the left, where the Socialists gain support from voters with a distinctly pro-European profile, while PCF and extreme-left voters are critical of the EU.

The separate measurement of the economic and cultural aspect of European integration in 2002 allows a more precise appraisal of these effects. Here, the analysis shows that the Front National mobilizes those citizens who reject the integration process in fear of losing their identity and rejecting the loss of national sovereignty implied by it. The culturally open or universalistic conceptions of community prevalent among the voters of the left make them insensitive to this threat. The exception, however, are the voters for the Communists. Contrary to expectations and to the prior analysis of the location of electorates in the European political space, these voters also appear to be moved by a fear of losing their identity. In general, however, the parties of the left gain votes from those who believe that European integration may undermine the achievements of the welfare state, while those who do not show such a fear are more likely to vote for the

established right. Economic considerations regarding the EU play no role for the Front National's electorate, confirming my prior findings. The issue of European integration has thus led to a pattern of opposition characterized by four blocks, with a division between the established right and the populist right, as well as between the Socialists and Greens, on the one hand, and the Communists and extreme left, on the other hand.

Comparing the overall predictive power of voters' positions on the three political dimensions in explaining party choices, it is interesting to note that from 1988 on, it has been the Front National whose support can best be predicted by means of ideology, followed by the Communists and, at some distance, by the RPR. More so than the other parties, in other words, the populist right gains its votes from citizens with a distinct ideological profile. Consequently, there is actually less, not more, room for explanations based on charisma and protest votes in accounting for the success of the populist right as opposed to other parties. Such explanations appear more powerful for the followers of the extreme left, whose support is poorly explained by ideological variables. The vote for the Front National, however, is an ideological vote.

The Impact of Social Class and Education on Support for the Front National

The Socio-structural Support Base of the Populist Right in France

As the preceding section shows, the Front National mobilizes an electorate that is clearly distinct in ideological terms. Is this also true in socio-structural terms, or does the Front National mobilize a heterogeneous alliance in terms of occupation and educational achievement? The high level of stability of alignments demonstrated by the voters for the Front National makes this a particularly interesting question. I am concerned with two questions here: first, whether support for the populist right is still related to the socio-structural divisions typical of the industrial era; and second, the degree to which the conflict the Front National mobilizes is anchored in new antagonisms related to education. Table 5.4 presents logistic regression results, explaining the vote for the Front National using dummy variables for social classes and for educational groups, as set out in Chapter 4. Because there are few Front National voters in the 1978 sample, and because none of the variables are significant, I do not report the results for this first election.

While there is some evolution in the support base of the Front National in terms of class over time, the results for Model 1 display certain similarities between 1988 and 1995 and between 1995 and 2002. In the first two elections, the self-employed are over-represented among Front National voters, and in 1995, we actually find support for Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) thesis of an alliance between the self-employed and members of the working class in supporting the

TABLE 5.4 Socio-structural Basis of Support for the Front National in France (logistic regression results)

		Model 1			Model 2		
Occupational Classes		1988	1995	2002	1988	1995	2002
Farmers	odds	.8	.8	1.4	.7	.7	1.1
	z	−.6	−.9	1.2	−1.2	−1.4	.3
Self-employed	odds	1.7*	1.8**	1.0	1.5#	1.6*	.8
	z	2.4	3.0	.0	1.75	2.3	−.7
Unskilled workers	odds	1.1	1.6*	1.3	.9	1.4	1.0
	z	.2	2.1	1.1	−.5	1.3	−.1
Skilled workers	odds	1.3	1.9***	1.5**	1.2	1.6**	1.2
	z	1.5	4.1	2.5	.8	3.0	1.0
Routine non-manual workers	odds	1.3	1.3	.9	1.1	1.1	.8
	z	1.1	1.3	−.3	.4	.7	−1.4
Technical specialists	odds	—	1.1	.7	—	1.1	.6
	z	—	.4	−1.1	—	.2	−1.4
Socio-cultural specialists	odds	—	.5**	.4***	—	.5*	.5**
	z	—	−2.7	−3.7	—	−2.3	−2.9
Non-labor-force participants	odds	1.0	1.2	.9	1.1	1.2	.8
	z	.1	.7	−.3	.1	.6	−.7
Intermediate professionals[a]	odds	1.1	—	—	1.0	—	—
	z	.5	—	—	0	—	—
Higher education	odds				.3**	.3***	.3***
	z				−2.8	−3.4	−3.4
Low education	odds				2.0**	2.0**	1.8**
	z				2.6	3.0	2.4
Pseudo R^2		.5%	2.1%	1.8%	1%	2.7%	2.9%

Note: For *social class,* managers are used as the reference category, except for 1988, where managers/professionals together form the reference category. Because different class categories were used in the 1988 survey, the normal typology could not be constructed. For that year, an additional category, *intermediate professionals,* cuts across the three categories in the middle class constructed in the other years, and two categories had to be dropped because the information provided in the survey was not sufficiently detailed. I have included the categories *liberal professions* and *professional and intellectual cadres* from the survey in the manager category. For *education,* citizens with medium levels of education (secondary education or vocational training) form the reference category.

Number of observations: 3,289 (1988, Model 1); 4,078 (1995, Model 1); 4,017 (2002, Model 1); 3,252 (1988, Model 2); 4,055 (1995, Model 2); 4,014 (2002, Model 2).

[a]This is an additional category used only in the 1988 survey.

Significance levels: $^{\#}p \le .10$ $^{*}p \le .05$ $^{**}p \le .01$ $^{***}p \le .001$.

populist right. The similarities between 1995 and 2002, however, pertain to the over-representation of skilled workers—by far the largest group among Front National voters, as we shall see—and an under-representation of socio-cultural specialists. The latter finding conforms to expectations, because this group represents the core support base of the New Left in advanced post-industrial countries. The self-employed are no longer over-represented in 2002.

Model 2 introduces education into the equation, and the results quite impressively underscore the importance of this variable in right-wing populist mobilization. Citizens with tertiary education are very unlikely to vote for the Front

National compared with those with secondary education or vocational training, who form the reference category. By contrast, those who have low levels of formal education (i.e., little more than elementary school) are much more likely to support the populist right. Both effects are strong and highly significant. By and large, the introduction of education does not affect the impact of the class variables. The exception was the propensity of skilled workers to vote for the Front National in 2002, which ceases to be significant and thus at least in part appears to be an effect of low education. Overall, the party's support base is most strongly distinguished by education in socio-structural terms, but a class pattern persists beyond this. What stands out in the results is the strong reluctance of the socio-cultural specialists to support the populist right, even when education is taken into account.

To further test Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) contention, according to which the Front National, as the "master case" of the New Radical Right, attracts some social groups through its pro-market appeals and others through its authoritarian-exclusionist stances, I tested interaction effects between the social classes shown in Table 5.4 and positions on the economic divide (results not shown here). The findings do not support the thesis that some social classes vote for the populist right for economic reasons. For 1988 and 1995, none of the interaction terms are anywhere near significant. In 2002, however, the interaction terms for economic preferences and skilled workers, routine non-manual workers, and non-labor-force participants are significant, but contrary to expectations and to Kitschelt and McGann's hypothesis, these groups stand out for their left-wing economic preferences. In other words, many of those who support the Front National do so not because of its pro-market stance, displayed, for example, in the 2002 campaign, but *in spite of* it. A last series of analyses further fleshes out this point.

Social Class and the Formation of Economic and Cultural Preferences

The analysis so far has suggested that the Front National manages to rally an electorate with heterogeneous economic preferences. This does not necessarily imply, however, that class plays no role in the formation of political preferences. Quite to the contrary, my hypothesis is that the heterogeneity of economic preferences shown by the Front National's electorate suggests that class continues to play a role in the formation of *economic* preferences. This hypothesis can be verified by breaking down the voters of the populist right by social class and assessing their mean preferences with regard to the economic and the cultural dimension of conflict. Figure 5.8 locates these subgroups in the two-dimensional political space. The figures in brackets refer to the share of respondents who belong to the respective social class within the Front National's electorate.

The results prove to be remarkably similar over the years and provide strong support for the hypothesis. The positions of the social classes within the Front



FIGURE 5.8 Positions of social classes within the Front National's electorate in political space in France, 1988–2002.

Note: Figures in parentheses report the respective share of members of these social classes in the Front National's electorate.

KEY *Social classes: farmer,* self-employed farmers; *intermed,* intermediate professions; *manager,* managers and professionals in administrative occupations; *non-lab,* non-labor-force participants; *routine,* routine non-manual workers; *self,* self-employed; *skilled,* skilled workers; *soc-cult,* socio-cultural professionals; *tech,* technical specialists; *unskilled,* unskilled workers.

National's electorate differ considerably with respect to the economic dimension. This is especially true for the largest groups within the Front National's electorate—the skilled workers, who are rather leftist in economic terms, and managers and self-employed, who have quite market-liberal preferences. What unites Front National voters from all of these classes is their homogeneous position regarding the cultural dimension. Especially those groups that form the core basis of the party's support—skilled workers, managers, routine non-manual workers, and, until 1995, the self-employed—have fairly similar preferences located in the traditionalist-communitarian domain.

We can conclude, then, that class does matter in the formation of economic preferences. However, whether voters are actually mobilized on behalf of these preferences or based on a shared desire to preserve a culturally homogeneous national community is quite a different question. The results presented here show that Le Pen's Front National has succeeded in constructing and nourishing a new collective identity that has displaced identities linked to the traditional class cleavage in salience for important segments of the electorate.

Conclusion

As a result of the waning of the religious divide in French politics, which pitted against each other a secular-communist subculture and a Catholic-traditionalist subculture, French politics have been profoundly altered in the past two or three decades. Together with a (limited) convergence of left and right along the economic dimension of conflict, this has opened the way for a transformation of the cultural divide. In the late 1970s, cultural liberalism and the issues related to it, such as the free choice of lifestyles, sexual liberation, and international solidarity, could still be represented in a simple polarity between voters of the left and voters of the right. The RPR's role as the counter-pole to the libertarian left contributed to its rise in the 1970s at the expense of the UDF federation. And because the RPR also played an active part in redefining the nature of cultural oppositions, the Gaullist right today is haunted to some degree by a radicalized variant of the identity politics it nourished earlier on. Up to this point, the French case thus conforms to Ignazi's (1992, 2003) model.

The dynamic of changes in the party system escapes a one-dimensional, left-right interpretation of conflicts, however. In particular, it has been the relatively low polarization of the party system in terms of the economic divide that have moved the class cleavage from a segmented opposition to an identitarian political dimension, where loyalties are more strongly structured by political identities than by real-world policy differences between left and right. Declining attachments on the political left even indicate that, for some segments of the electorate, the class cleavage is moving in the direction of a competitive political dimension, where the performance of governments is at least partly decisive in voting choices. The lack of closure of the state-market cleavage has thus permitted cultural conflicts to ascend to unprecedented prominence.

Oppositions are much more marked along the cultural divide. In the late 1980s, the structure of opposition was highly segmented along the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian dimension. The Front National mobilizes an electorate whose preferences closely resemble the stances of the party itself and lies at the traditionalist pole of the cultural dimension. One of the most striking features of the Front National's mobilization is the fact that its voters display the highest levels of loyalty of the three ideological blocks identified along the cultural dimension. The Front National has managed to unite the hard core of the traditionalist-communitarian segment of the electorate and established itself durably in the French party system. While alignments to the left-libertarian block have stabilized, those to the center-right show a continuous decline, pointing to ongoing processes of dealignment from the center-right parties, which may profit the Front National.

The analysis presented in this chapter expands Grunberg and Schweisguth's (2003) contention that the mobilization of the Front National has driven the evolution from a bipolar to a tripartite structure of opposition in the French party system and disconfirms Robert Andersen and Jocelyn Evans's (2003) claim to the contrary. Recent conflicts over European integration are altering this pattern yet again, however. The populist right gains votes from those who oppose the integration project because of their traditionalist-communitarian preferences. The favorable position of the Gaullists and the UDF with respect to the EU thus reinforces the division between the established right and the Front National. A similar contrast is visible on the left, where the Socialists gain support from voters with a distinctly pro-European profile, while the PCF and extreme-left voters are skeptical of the EU. The EU has introduced a rift within both the left and the right, which follows an economic logic in the former case and a cultural logic in the latter case. Despite the minor role played by European integration in the presidential campaigns studied in this chapter, oppositions concerning the issue are structured by partisanship to a surprising degree. This warrants the conclusion that it would be legitimate to speak not of three, but of four, ideological blocks in French politics.

Once more, the analysis of orientations regarding the EU has underscored the irrelevance of economic preferences in explaining the vote for the Front National. These voters are neither particularly concerned with the impact the EU may have on the French welfare state, nor do they wholeheartedly approve economic liberalization. Much has been made of Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) claim that the populist right mobilizes certain social groups on the basis of their allegedly economically liberal preferences. A market-liberal political potential indeed existed in France at the end of the 1970s, but the Front National failed to gain even a modest share of the vote with its market-liberal stance in 1978. The considerably larger share of voters it rallied in later elections is characterized by the most strongly diverging economic orientations of all electorates. As a result of the uneasy task of accommodating such diverging preferences, Le Pen moved uneasily toward more statist stances in 1988 and back to neoliberalism in 2002.

The social groups most strongly touched by the processes of economic modernization and structural change are over-represented in the Front National's electorate. The paradox remains that these segments of the population are mobilized on behalf of their cultural, not their economic, preferences. Economic preferences continue to diverge as a function of social class, but they are largely irrelevant for an electorate primarily concerned with the preservation or re-establishment of a homogeneous cultural community. This paradox is partly explained by the educational basis of the populist right's mobilization. Confirming the hypothesis that the new cultural conflict is an offspring of the educational revolution, the Front National draws over-proportional support from citizens with low levels of education, while those with higher education by and large refuse to vote for it.

As long as cultural conflicts remain vibrant, the Front National is unlikely to vanish. Much, of course, depends on the strategies pursued by the other parties. In the 1980s, the Socialists contributed to the Front National's success by pursuing a strongly adversarial strategy against it. And once the populist right was established, the RPR/UMP's relatively libertarian-universalistic profile in the 2002 presidential contest was clearly inappropriate to contain its success. In the 2007 election, not covered by this analysis, the fortunes of the populist right changed once more. While the strong leadership image of Nicolas Sarkozy, the RPR/UMP presidential candidate, induced many Front National voters to abandon Le Pen, the hard core has remained loyal to him (Mayer 2007). But it is improbable that the Front National will vanish soon, given the two-dimensional structure of oppositions in the French party system. What is more, European integration starkly divides the mainstream right and the extreme populist right and is likely to remain a contested issue. However, whoever Le Pen's successor will be, it will be difficult for the populist right to grow beyond the hard core of traditionalist-communitarian voters. As Le Pen's result in the second round of the 2002 presidential election showed, there are clear limits to the Front National's reach.

6
Switzerland

The Transformation of the Swiss People's Party

Of the countries studied in this book, Switzerland stands for a case in which an established party has mobilized and absorbed the political potentials related to the new cultural conflicts that have emerged since the 1960s. In the course of this process, the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party; SVP) has evolved from a conservative agrarian party into an extreme-right-wing populist party. Many studies of the SVP converge in their assessment that the party has undergone a profound transformation, which centers on the preservation of Swiss traditions against the challenges of immigration and supranational integration in the European Union.

Popular discord over Switzerland's rapprochement with the European Union has played a central role in catalyzing the crystallization of the new cultural line of opposition. In fact, this conflict is frequently characterized as an opposition between "openness" to the world and a traditionalist or nationalist "closure" (Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Hardmeier and Vatter 2003; Kriesi et al. 2005). The centrality of Europe in the SVP's mobilization raises the question of whether its voters really hold the anti-universalistic and exclusionist conceptions of community that are characteristic of right-wing populist supporters. While I show that SVP voters' attitudinal pattern closely corresponds to that demonstrated by other supporters of the populist right across Western Europe, it is also true that tying the rather diffuse anti-universalistic potential to Switzerland's relationship with Europe has been central to the SVP's ascendance.

While the political potentials related to the new cultural divide were present in Switzerland early on, the major established parties were slow to respond

in the 1970s. New parties emerged on the left and on the right, leading to a fragmentation of the traditionally stable Swiss party system. The SVP's rise in the 1990s thus marks an adjustment process in the party system that has strongly affected the balance of power between parties and the party system's mechanics. Switzerland represents a case in which, despite a profound transformation of the patterns of opposition in the party system, the traditional parties to a large degree have absorbed the new cultural conflict.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the forces that have traditionally shaped the Swiss party system and elaboration of the recent changes. The empirical analysis starts by determining the lines of opposition that structured party competition in the national elections of 1975, 1991, 1995, and 1999. I then investigate the patterns of opposition and the interaction between parties' programmatic stances and their voters' preferences along the economic, cultural, and European-integration dimensions. Because the technical procedures and their theoretical justification are laid out in Chapter 4, I refer to the peculiarities of the Swiss analysis only when presenting the results. Because of a lack of appropriate survey data, only a partial analysis of the 1991 election is possible. In the fourth section, I turn to the role the three dimensions play in structuring voting decisions. Finally, I analyze the educational and class basis of support for the SVP. This has important consequences for the vulnerability of the populist right if economic conflicts regain center stage.

From Stability to Instability and Back: The Evolution of the Party System and the Rise of the SVP

Traditional Cleavages and the Rise of New Parties in the 1970s and 1980s

Unlike in France, the populist right rose in Switzerland within a party system that has been renowned for its stability. Historically, the liberal-religious, agrarian-industrial, and state-market cleavages had all led to the formation of political parties and subsequently shaped the party system over decades. In the 1970s, the religious cleavage was still stronger than the class cleavage, as Arend Lijphart's (1979) analysis showed. At the same time, it is important to note that the conflict mirrored by this cleavage is not the same in all cantons, which in turn is a prime factor in accounting for the existence of different cantonal party systems. The Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (Christian Democratic People's Party; CVP) and its forerunners have traditionally represented two different antagonisms, depending on the context: The CVP has gathered the support of the Roman Catholic minority in the predominantly Protestant cantons, while it reflects a conflict between religious and secular citizens in the Catholic cantons, where the left was unsuccessful until recently. The Liberals (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei [Free Democratic Party], or FDP, and Liberale Partei der Schweiz [Liberal Party], or LPS) and the Christian Democrats (CVP) have been the predominant

parties, with the Christian Democrats also representing voters with welfare-statist views. The patterns of party competition therefore vary markedly from canton to canton, and it is customary to speak of different cantonal party systems (Klöti 1998; Kriesi 1998; Ladner 2004). This will be relevant later on for the assignments of the parties to the ideological blocks formed by the class cleavage.

Historically, Switzerland was a country in which liberalism was hegemonic (Luebbert 1991). This resulted in a late and weak mobilization of the left and secured the Liberals (FDP and LPS) a much stronger role than in most continental European countries. However, in the 1990s, the Liberals were overtaken first by the Sozialdemokratische Partei (Social Democratic Party; SP) and then by the SVP as a consequence of the growing prominence of the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict.

Apart from the class and religious cleavages that characterize all Western European countries, the existence of an agrarian party—the predecessor of the SVP—is a characteristic Switzerland shares with the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (Rokkan 1999). Founded in 1936 as the Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei (Party of Farmers, Artisans, and Citizens), it was rooted in the German-speaking Protestant cantons and changed its name to Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party) in 1971. Represented in the national Executive Council, it has been a junior partner in the grand-coalition government whose composition remained unchanged between 1959 and 2003 (called the "magic formula"). The permanent representation of the four major parties in government—the Social Democrats, the FDP, the Christian Democrats, and the SVP—guaranteed the consensual style of politics of which Switzerland represents the model (Lijphart 1999).

Since the late 1960s, however, new political parties have emerged both to the left of the Social Democrats and on the extreme right. Those of the extreme left gradually have been absorbed by the Social Democrats and by the Greens, which have integrated a diverse number of ecologist parties that emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s (Ladner 2007). The oldest party on the extreme right is the Nationale Aktion (National Action Party), which rose to prominence in the 1970s by launching three popular initiatives against foreign "overpopulation." Although they were all defeated, the popular support for the first initiative, which gained of 46 percent of the vote in 1970, brought to the fore a xenophobic political potential. Anti-immigrant mobilization in the 1970s was intimately tied to the name of James Schwarzenbach, a charismatic and disputatious politician who vindicated a traditional Christian and rural Swiss identity. After leaving the Nationale Aktion, Schwarzenbach founded the short-lived Republikaner (Republican Party). Support for the Nationale Aktion, which changed its name to the Schweizer Demokraten (Swiss Democrats) later on, peaked at 3.3 percent of the vote. Combining anti-immigrant, ecological, and social concerns, it can be taken to represent a classical extreme-right tendency (Gentile and Kriesi 1998: 126). In 1985, the Swiss Automobilist Party was founded as a reaction against ecologist and socialist successes. Taking on a broader extreme-right agenda, it combined



FIGURE 6.1 Shares of voters of the major parties and party blocks in Switzerland, 1975–2003 (%).

Source: Available at http://www.parlament.ch/d/dokumentation/statistiken/Documents/in-statistiken-tabellen-nr-waehleranteile-2007.xls (accessed November 2, 2009).

KEY *Political groups:* CVP/LDU, Christian Democratic People's Party, various small Christian Democratic parties, Landesring der Unabhängigen (Alliance of Independents); EXL, extreme-left parties; EXR, extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party.

anti-immigrant with-free market and anti-statist appeals and thus followed Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) model of a New Radical Right party (see Skenderovic 2009: chap. 5). However, similar to the Swiss Democrats, the Automobilist Party reached the height of its support in the 1991 election, where it received about 5 percent of the vote, and has steadily declined since then. Support for other extreme-right parties has generally been negligible, but it is noteworthy that the Lega dei Ticinesi (Ticino League) gained almost a quarter of the vote in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland immediately after its founding in 1991. Although a right-wing populist party in profile and style, the Ticino League is a special case because it is at the same time a regionalist party. Overall support for the extreme right peaked in 1991 in Switzerland, when five parties together gained 10.9 percent of the vote (see Figure 6.1).

The Transformation of the SVP and the Rise of the New Cultural Divide

In the 1970s, after the social groups constituting the SVP's core support base—farmers and rural inhabitants—had diminished in strength, the party sought to attract new voters, pursuing a centrist political strategy (Skenderovic 2009). However, the SVP's moderate programmatic profile did not bring about electoral gains. Furthermore, ideological moderation clashed with the more conservative ethos of the party's Zurich section. As a reaction to this course, the Zurich section of the party, under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, started pushing for a

more polarizing strategy in the late 1970s, staunchly defending traditionalist values. Blocher's anti-intellectualism, as well as his earlier, active opposition to the 1968 student movement, underline the anti-libertarian or anti-universalistic thrust that nourishes the right-wing populist mobilization in Switzerland. Anti-immigration stances, however, do not seem to have played a role in the SVP at this point.

In the years that followed, Blocher's Zurich section of the party underwent a process of transformation, taking on the characteristics that distinguish right-wing populist parties from mainstream parties in organizational and rhetorical terms: a hierarchical internal organization, as well as an aggressive anti-establishment discourse (see Chapter 2). The party became not only more professionalized but also more centralized and hierarchical, or even authoritarian, according to Damir Skenderovic (2009). Programmatic decisions were made by a small circle of high-ranking party officials. The Zurich section also "invented" the aggressive anti-establishment campaigning style that was later adopted by the national party organization and the other cantonal sections (see Kriesi et al. 2005 for illustrative examples).

The Bern section of the SVP, by virtue of its electoral strength, had traditionally dominated the national party organization. Blocher gained influence over the national party organization when the Zurich section progressively displaced the Bern section in terms of the votes it could deliver, and because of the success of two campaigns that touched on the virulent question of Switzerland's relationship to Europe and the world. In 1986, Blocher led the successful campaign against Switzerland's adherence to the United Nations. In 1992, he was the leading proponent of the campaign against participation in the European Economic Area, which was defeated in a popular vote and set the course for Switzerland's standing aloof from the European Union. Because the Bern section, whose proponents traditionally represented the party in the federal government, had supported the rapprochement with Europe, the defeat of the proposal further strengthened Blocher's position in the party and allowed him gradually to dominate the national party organization. Since the late 1980s, it has also been the Zurich section that has succeeded in putting the asylum question on the national agenda, promoting tough stances against "fake" and criminal asylum seekers.

There are numerous examples of politicians who did not agree with the new programmatic line and consequently left the party voluntarily or were forced to leave. Although some dissent remains concerning the proper labeling of the SVP, most recent studies of the party agree that its ideological profile corresponds to that of a right-wing populist party (Kriesi et al. 2005; Mazzoleni 2003; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Skenderovic 2009; but see Mudde 2007: 57–58). However, it is important to note that establishing a hierarchical party structure is not conterminous with a weak organization. Similarly to the Front National in France, the SVP has a rich array of affiliated organizations, such as youth sections of the

party and civil-society organizations. Prominent among these is the Aktion für eine Unabhängige und Neutrale Schweiz (Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland), co-founded by Blocher after the United Nations vote in 1986. As a consequence of the SVP's transformation, and of its superior organizational strength, the smaller parties of the extreme right have found their mobilization space tightly constrained. Divided into rival parties and competing with a better-funded party with a charismatic leader, the extreme-right parties suffered a dull fate. After their high in 1991, they virtually collapsed under the mobilization efforts of the SVP, as Figure 6.1 shows. The empirical analysis therefore substantiate the double claim that (1) the SVP's transformation resulted in a programmatic convergence with the parties of the extreme right; and (2) the voters for these parties and the followers of the SVP have similar orientations regarding the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide.

With the Social Democrats and the Grüne Partei (Green Party, ecologists) absorbing the various splinter parties of the left, and the SVP supplanting the parties of the extreme right, the established parties have reversed the trend toward party-system fragmentation. But organizational continuity should not mask the profound transformation in the patterns of interaction and in the balance of power in the party system that the empirical analysis shows. In the 1990s, the parties lying at the poles of the new cultural divide have grown steadily. While the SVP was the strongest party in 1999, the Social Democrats had recovered from their losses in the 1980s, despite the competition they faced from the Greens within their own camp. The losers of the transformation of the cultural divide have been the parties of the centrist block: the Christian Democrats and the Liberals (see Figure 6.1). While the erosion of the Christian Democrats' support base must also be seen in the context of the waning of the traditional religious cleavage (Lachat 2007: chap. 3), not all Christian Democratic parties in Europe have suffered to the same degree from this general trend (Frey 2009).

As a consequence of these shifts in party strength, Blocher gained a seat in the seven-seat Federal Council at the expense of the Christian Democrats after the 2003 parliamentary elections. The SVP, the FDP, and the SP now each hold two seats, while the CVP must content itself with one. But the Liberal Democrats are also under pressure, and their decline—albeit less pronounced—more intimately reflects their difficulties in finding a coherent strategy vis-à-vis their challenger. However, the Swiss Parliament attacked the transformed SVP in 2007 by refusing to re-elect Blocher and appointing an exponent from the moderate wing instead. This led to fierce fights within the party and ultimately to the breaking away of parts of the moderate faction that formed the Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (Democratic Citizens' Party; BDP).[1] Similarly to the French case, this

[1]The BDP initially inherited the SVP's seats in the Federal Council when the SVP's two federal councillors joined the BDP. The BDP has already lost one of these seats, however, due to the resignation of the officeholder, and the SVP is likely to win back its second seat, as well.

underscores the susceptibility to splits of hierarchically organized parties of the extreme populist right.

The mobilization around the new cultural conflicts has also led to a homogenization of the conflicts that structure party competition in the cantonal party systems, which until recently remained less nationalized than in other countries (Armingeon 1998; Caramani 2004). By means of its modern style of campaigning, the SVP has drawn attention to its political agenda throughout the country and has expanded its reach to the Catholic and French-speaking cantons, in which it had no historical roots (Kriesi et al. 2005). Consequently, it has been the driving force of a "nationalization" of the national party system and a more confrontational style in Swiss politics. An analysis of the SVP's development between 1995 and 2003 shows that the party's potential—the share of people who are considering voting for it—has remained constant, and that its growth from a share of 14.9 percent of the vote in 1995 to 26.7 percent in 2003 is largely due to its ability to mobilize this potential (Kriesi et al. 2005). The strategy of permanent campaigning, the party's professional style, and the charisma of Blocher, in other words, have played a decisive role in the success of the populist right in Switzerland.

Political Potentials Underlying the Rise of the SVP

As pointed out earlier, the immigration question has been on the political agenda for a long time in Switzerland. In other words, just as we have seen in France, the rise of an anti-immigrant party cannot be attributed to rising levels of xenophobia. In fact, attitudes toward foreigners in general became more favorable in Switzerland between the 1960s and the 1990s (Stolz 2001). The crucial question, therefore, is whether exclusionist attitudes are mobilized and politically articulated by political parties. Because of the openness of the Swiss political system, with its direct democratic institutions, the immigration question surfaced earlier than in other countries. But this did not immediately lead to the articulation of the issue at the party level. In fact, when the populace voted on three popular initiatives seeking to limit the number of foreigners and expelling some of those already living in Switzerland in the 1970s, the established parties unanimously rejected the proposals. As the empirical analysis shows, party oppositions at this time were still structured by an older cultural antagonism. But there is also evidence that the political potentials underlying the new cultural line of conflict were already present.

Apart from actors' need to articulate political potentials, established loyalties crosscutting the latent identity categories have conditioned the emergence of new group divisions. In particular, the class and religious cleavages are likely to have limited the room for the mobilization of broad ethnicity-based identities in the postwar years. However, the comparatively strong mobilization of the left-wing New Social Movements of the 1970s and 1980s (Koopmans and Kriesi

1995) and the subsequent shift from economic to cultural issues on the part of the parties of the left are likely to have weakened the group attachments underlying the traditional class cleavage. As Simon Hug and Alexandre Trechsel (2002) show, the influence of the religious cleavage—and, to a lesser degree, the traditional class cleavage—in structuring electoral alignments has diminished, especially since the 1990s.

The rise of the transformed SVP owes a lot to the salience of the conflict over Switzerland's relationship to the European Union. At a theoretical level, the question of European integration is related to the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide, as argued in Chapter 1. By tying up to the forceful Swiss myths of national independence and regional autonomy and the instruments of direct citizen participation, resistance to the EU provides a particularly powerful frame for right-wing populist parties' mobilization in Switzerland. At the empirical level, the centrality of the European integration issue is demonstrated in models that explain the support for the SVP (Holzer and Linder 2003; Kriesi et al. 2005; McGann and Kitschelt 2005). At the same time, orientations toward the EU and the emphasis laid on national autonomy have been shown to be strong components of a broader and highly salient cultural divide structuring belief systems in Switzerland (Brunner and Sciarini 2002). Indeed, this has led these and a number of other authors to characterize the cultural conflict as one between "integration" and "demarcation" (Bornschier and Helbling 2005; Hardmeier and Vatter 2003; Hug and Sciarini 2002; Hug and Trechsel 2002; Kriesi 1993b; Kriesi and Sciarini 2004).

While I do not question the plausibility of this label, I show in this chapter that this divide does not represent a Swiss idiosyncrasy but is, in fact, only a variant of the more general cultural divide that one can detect throughout Western Europe. The issue of European integration has catalyzed the formation of a New Right collective identity, but the underlying potentials and the political orientations of Swiss citizens closely mirror those found elsewhere. At the political and rhetorical level, all of the major parties approved Switzerland's participation in the European Economic Area in the 1992 referendum. This made the European issue a highly promising vehicle for the populist right. The SVP could denounce the established parties not only for "selling out" Swiss identity but also for forming a cartel based on an elitist consensus that was not backed by a majority of the population. At a more general level, the collusive arrangements typical of consensus democracies make an anti-establishment discourse appear particularly promising for outsiders. If anything comes close to a party cartel, then it is an informally institutionalized grand coalition encompassing all of the major parties. Although the SVP traditionally has been represented in the Executive Council, the federal party structure made it possible for the Zurich section to play the oppositional card while the more moderate Bern wing was in government. In this sense, territorially fragmented party systems seem to leave "room for experimentation with the mobilization of new

issues," as Hanspeter Kriesi (2008: 45) argues, testified also by the case of the Freedom Party in Austria.

Because of the cultural polarization brought about by the mobilization of libertarian-universalistic issues and by the prominent role played by European integration throughout the 1990s, we can expect the SVP's rise to be primarily associated with cultural potentials as well as with the political potentials that are amenable to an anti-establishment discourse. Economic grievances have presumably played a more moderate role than elsewhere, among other reasons because of low levels of unemployment. Because of its tradition of openness to the world market, Switzerland has been less pressed to adapt its economic model to the more competitive international environment than other countries in Europe, as Giuliano Bonoli and André Mach (2000) point out. However, meager growth levels and rising levels of unemployment in the 1990s—albeit low compared with those in neighboring countries—have contributed to a general perception that reform was necessary (Bonoli and Mach 2000; Lachat 2008a). Because perceptions of job insecurity can be more important than real threats (Mughan et al. 2003), the gloomy mood of the 1990s, supported by important measures to liberalize the economy, may well have created a potential that the populist right might thrive on.

At the same time, a dualism exists in the Swiss economy between an internationally competitive sector and a sheltered sector, which is also characteristic of other small open economies (Katzenstein 1985). Certain sectors of the economy thus risk being exposed to competitive pressure if Switzerland joins the EU and have already come under pressure as a result of the World Trade Organization agreements and the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU (Mach et al. 2003). Because certain segments of the workforce risk losing from closer integration with the EU, opposition against integration in part may reflect not only cultural perceptions of threat but also economic fears. Contrary to the case in the French analysis, however, the survey data available in Switzerland do not permit a separate measurement of the cultural and economic components of citizens' orientations toward the EU.

While the SVP clearly mobilizes those opposed to European integration for whatever reasons, its programmatic stance concerning the state-market divide does not appear very suitable to attract the losers in economic modernization: workers with low skill levels and, more specifically in the Swiss case, those employed in hitherto sheltered sectors. The party's harsh anti-state discourse and its appeal to self-responsibility generally make its position appear neoliberal in the media, as the analysis shows, and it is implausible that modernization's losers should endorse such policies. But the SVP's strategy in the economic domain is much more ambiguous than it may seem. Once in Parliament, the party's elected representatives do not follow a market-liberal ideology. Quite to the contrary, they often vote against market-liberalizing reforms (Häusermann 2003). Specifically, while they support a feebly regulated labor market, they are protectionist

as far as general market liberalization is concerned, especially regarding agriculture policies (Bernhard 2004). Given that farmers are one of the party's traditional core constituencies, this is not surprising. But even at a more general level, this evidence suggests that the SVP does in fact protect those branches of economic activity that have been sheltered both from international competition, as well as from inter-cantonal competition within the country. Rhetorically, this policy is framed not in terms of the state-market cleavage but as opposition to EU membership and concessions in the negotiations over the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. The ensuing analyses probe further into these hypotheses and verify how well the SVP represents its voters along central dimensions of conflict in the Swiss party system.

The Configuration of Parties' Political Space and Resulting Dimensions of Opposition

The first step in the analysis is to determine what the relevant dimensions of opposition were in the election campaigns under study. Figure 6.2 presents the results of the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analyses of the parties' programmatic offerings using the procedures explained in Chapter 4. In the mid-1970s, as well as in the 1990s, Swiss political space is two-dimensional, although the two dimensions crosscut each another to varying degrees. One of these dimensions is characterized by an opposition between support for the welfare state and economic liberalism, corresponding to the traditional state-market cleavage. In 1975, polarization around the economic divide was not particularly high, and the parties diverged more along the vertical than the horizontal dimension. In later campaigns, however, the two issues constituting the state-market cleavage showed a very high degree of polarization. In other words, the economic cleavage remains salient in Swiss politics.

The cultural dimension in 1975 reflects a libertarian-authoritarian divide. It revolves around the New Left's challenge to traditional values but also encompasses law and order statements. The Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats lie fairly near each other at the libertarian-universalistic pole of this divide, while the Liberals and the "old" SVP are situated far away from cultural liberalism and close to law-and-order stances. The small parties of the extreme right combine a leftist economic stance with an anti-universalistic position.

A decade and a half later, in the 1991 election, two new polarizing issues had appeared: European integration and immigration (the latter situated close to support for the army). In line with a New Left position, the Social Democrats showed a leftist economic profile and strongly advocated cultural liberalism. They also showed the strongest support for European integration. At the other extreme, the SVP's position is close to that of the smaller parties of the extreme right because of the party's transformation. As in 1975, it strongly opposed cultural liberalism, but this profile was now coupled with fervent opposition to



FIGURE 6.2 Political space in Switzerland, 1975–1999: Positions of parties and issue categories. Stress-I statistics: .25 (1975); .24 (1991); .24 (1995); .38 (1999).

KEY *Political groups:* CVP, Christian Democratic People's Party, various small Christian Democratic parties, Alliance of Independents; EXL, extreme-left parties; EXR, extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform (see Chapter 2).

European integration and immigration. Between the poles lie the parties of the established right. Their position with regard to the cultural dimension was somewhat variable, testifying to their difficulty in defining their stances regarding the new antagonism. Finally, in 1991 the Green party's position differed from the one that these parties typically occupy in other countries. Although it was not far remote from cultural liberalism and did not take tough stances against foreigners, it opposed European integration and was located far away from the other parties. The Greens' position is largely responsible for the fact that the dimension crosscutting the economic divide for 1991 runs from Europe to immigration and thus does not correspond to the expected new cultural divide.

In the early 1990s, the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide had indeed materialized, but it ran parallel to the state-market cleavage, while the crosscutting dimension revolved around European integration and traditionalist-communitarian stances. In 1995, then, support for supranational integration became clearly associated with cultural liberalism, while anti-immigrant and pro-army positions formed the opposing pole. Finally, in 1999, Europe was closely related to a welfare-statist position. The new cultural divide did form a second dimension, but it was strongly correlated with the state-market divide. For the 1999 election, in other words, the configuration tends to become one-dimensional. This is an interesting finding in a multiparty system that should encourage programmatic differentiation. It is partially due, however, to the fact that the parties situated at the poles of the cultural antagonism also occupy the poles of the economic divide.

For the subsequent analyses, it is necessary to define the dimensions along which the positions of the parties and their voters are to be compared. Having found the familiar opposition between welfare and economic liberalism in all four elections, the case is straightforward regarding the economic divide. In terms of the cultural divide, the matter is again clear for the election of 1975, where an antagonism between cultural liberalism and security emerges quite clearly and makes sense theoretically. Choosing the relevant categories in the 1990s is not an unambiguous task in the light of the shifting patterns of cultural opposition. Immigration and army both consistently form one pole of the cultural line of opposition, while the varying degrees of association between cultural liberalism and European integration suggest that the EU dimension should be kept apart from the more general cultural divide. Furthermore, since one of the central aims of this analysis is to establish the degree to which cultural oppositions in Switzerland differ from those found in the other countries, I measure the cultural dimension of the 1990s using the same categories as in the other countries: cultural liberalism and immigration. From a theoretical point of view, this antagonism is closest to the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide. Because support for the army in 1991 and 1995 emerges empirically as intimately related to anti-immigration stances, and in 1991 could even be considered to constitute the pole of the cultural divide,

TABLE 6.1 Relevant Issue Categories per Election and Issue Categories Operationalized on the Demand Side in Switzerland

	Economic Dimension		Cultural Dimension		European-Integration Dimension
	Welfare	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	Security	Europe
1975	X	X	2 dimensions	X	X

	Economic Dimension		Cultural Dimension			European-Integration Dimension
	Welfare	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	Immigration	Army	Europe
1991	—	—	—	—	—	—
1995	X	—	X	X	X	X
1999	X	X	X	X		X

Note: X indicates that one dimension emerges from the factor analysis. In one case, the solution is two-dimensional, and both underlying variables are used for the construction of the axis. See Chapter 4 for an explanation of this procedure and Appendix C for a list of the items used for each category.

I use the army and immigration categories to establish positions in those years.[2] A separate analysis of the European-integration dimension allows us to assess the congruence between positions along the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian and the EU divide.

Table 6.1 shows which of these categories can be operationalized on the voter side using post-election surveys. Most surveys make possible the operationalization of the relevant categories. The 1991 survey is an exception: It contains so few issue-related questions that none of the dimensions can be measured. The following analyses therefore focus on the elections of 1975, 1995, and 1999. With respect to European integration, the information provided by the surveys is actually better than what we can infer from the media analysis. Due to limitations in the information available for the supply side, a direct comparison of the positions of the parties and their electorates is possible only for the 1995 election. However, it is illuminating to position voters along the EU dimension in 1975, way before integration became a political issue. Having operationalized the issue categories, voters' positions along the three dimensions are again determined using factor analysis.[3]

[2]The category also proved polarizing in 1999, but this was mainly due to the SVP's strong approval of the army while most parties did not address the issue at all. For this reason and because army is no longer intimately related to immigration, I do not use positions regarding the army for the construction of the cultural divide in 1999.

[3]For theoretical reasons, I expect a single factor to result from these analyses, because the corresponding issue categories should be part of the same underlying dimension. In general, this expectation is confirmed. There is one exception, which concerns the integration of the three categories relevant for the cultural dimension in 1975. In constructing the underlying cultural-liberalism category, two factors emerged; one is closer to cultural liberalism, while the other measures traditional values (see Appendix C). In the subsequent aggregation to a single cultural dimension, traditional values prove to be related to security concerns, while cultural liberalism forms a second factor. However, because the Eigenvalue of the second factor is only 1.00003, it seems reasonable to enforce a one-dimensional solution.

Parties and Voters on the Cultural Divide

Position, Match, and Polarization

Beginning with the cultural divide, I track the positions of the parties and their electorates and verify how well political supply and demand match along this evolving antagonism. The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 6.3. Looking at the situation in 1975, it is quite striking to find that, while the parties took rather divergent positions regarding the libertarian-traditionalism divide, the positions of their voters hardly differed. On the party side, we can see that the Social Democrats were located at the libertarian-universalistic pole of the divide, but the CVP was not very far off. The opposing pole is constituted by the parties of the extreme left and the extreme right. The SVP, by contrast, had a centrist position close to that of the Liberals, and the same held true for its voters. Traditionally, the SVP had been a conservative party, but the results shown here mirror the assessment found in the literature that the party pursued a centrist strategy in the 1970s. Overall, the cultural conflict articulated by the party system does not correspond to equally strong differences in orientations in the electorate. The strong mismatch between parties and their voters—reflected in a low value for match—also derives from differences in the ordering of parties and their voters, of which the extreme left is the most obvious case.

The reconfiguration of party oppositions along the cultural dimension came in two steps. In 1991, after the immigration issue had become salient, this dimension no longer reflected a libertarian-authoritarian divide but was more intimately related to differing conceptions of community. The overall polarization of the party system had risen, and the SVP had taken a step into more traditionalist-communitarian terrain. However, the SVP was not the party farthest to the right; it lay between the Liberals and the extreme right. In a second major change, which took place between 1991 and 1995, the SVP moved to the extreme of the dimension, outdistancing even the small extreme-right parties. The small extreme-right parties' position is in brackets, indicating (as in the following figures) that we captured fewer than ten statements from them concerning this dimension. This reflects the scarce attention they have received in the media since the SVP sets the agenda. The 1999 election confirms the pattern established four years earlier and shows a further rise in polarization. This is also due to the Social Democrats' moving closer to the libertarian-universalistic pole, which resulted in an expanding gulf between the parties of the left and the center-right.

The relative positions of electorates closely correspond to the stances taken by their parties, resulting in extraordinarily high measures for match. Voters' positions are much more polarized along the cultural dimension than they used to be in 1975, and we find similar ideological blocks on the supply and on the demand side. The first is a left-libertarian block, constituted by the SP, the Greens and the extreme left, all of which take a decidedly libertarian-universalistic position. At the other extreme lie the voters of the SVP, which are located close to



1975: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (six parties): .19
Polarization parties: .41; without SVP: .46



1991: only parties
Polarization parties: .58; without SVP: .59



1995: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (six parties): .96
Polarization parties: .50; without SVP: .40



1999: parties (above) and voters (below)
Match (four parties): .98
Polarization parties: .60; without SVP: .58

FIGURE 6.3 Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Switzerland, 1975–1999: Position, match, and polarization.

Note: Parties whose position is based on fewer than ten sentences are set in parentheses.

KEY *Political groups:* CVP, Christian Democratic People's Party, various small Christian Democratic parties, Alliance of Independents; EXL, extreme-left parties; EXR, extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party.

those of the smaller extreme-right parties in 1995 and actually outflank them by far four years later. In between lies a center-block formed by the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. These two parties have moved together between 1991 and 1995, and the same holds true for their voters. In 1995, there is still some overlap between the programmatic statements of the center-right and the left-libertarian block, indicated by the bars showing the heterogeneity of positional statements. However, on the voter side, the divide between the left-libertarian and the center-right block clearly runs deepest, and in 1999, the parties have moved apart as well. On the other hand, an opposing development is discernible regarding the division between the center-right and the extreme-right block. In 1995, the center block's statements hardly overlap with those of the SVP. In 1999, as the distance between the left and the center-parties widens, the latter and the SVP have moved together.

On the voter side, there was already more affinity in 1995 between those who voted for the SVP and those who chose the Liberals than their respective parties' positions would lead us to expect. The fact that the center-right, unlike the Social Democrats, did not demarcate itself from the populist right reflects its fear of losing parts of its electorate to its more extreme competitor. This danger seems real: Concomitantly with its growth between 1995 and 1999, the cultural orientations of the SVP's electorate became more heterogeneous, which probably reflects the inflow of less extreme voters into its electoral pool.

In all, these results show that both the SVP and its voters clearly lie at the extreme of the cultural dimension running from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community. In this sense, the results closely parallel those concerning the Front National in France. The potentials underlying the SVP's successful mobilization, in other words, are by no means solely related to opposition to the European Union. The average position of the SVP electorate along the cultural line of opposition and the relative homogeneity of these voters' orientations—though they were more pronounced in 1995 than in 1999—show that the party rallies citizens who stand out for their exclusionist conception of community and their opposition to universalistic values.

Before turning to the loyalties that the three ideological blocks along the cultural divide engender, an intriguing question remains: Is the increasing polarization along this divide solely a product of the mobilization efforts of political parties—first the smaller extreme-right parties and then the SVP—or did the corresponding potential in some way already exist on the voters' side? Fortunately, the items contained in the 1975 post-election survey allow an operationalization not only of the libertarian-authoritarian divide that we have found to structure party oppositions in the 1970s but also of the new cultural division of the 1990s. I start by probing into the relationship between these old and new antagonisms. Table 6.2 presents the results of a factor analysis using the issues related to the old and new cultural divides. Appendix C lists the items used. The results are striking in that they show orientations regarding the two dimensions to be clearly separated: The first factor almost exclusively captures

TABLE 6.2 Results of a Rotated Factor Analysis of Old and New Cultural Issues in the Swiss 1975 Survey

	New Cultural Dimension	Old Cultural Dimension
Cultural liberalism	**.80**	−.01
Immigration	**−.79**	.15
Army	−.23	**.79**
Traditional values	−.05	**.81**
Security (law and order)	.32	**.59**
Eigenvalue	1.73	1.34
Variance explained	34%	26%

Note: Factor loadings > .5 are set in bold.
Number of observations: 1,062.

the new antagonism, centering on gender roles and solidarity with the Third World (cultural liberalism) and the rights of immigrants (immigration). The second factor encompasses traditional moral values and patriotism (attitudes toward taking drugs and respect for the national flag), law-and-order stances, and support for the army. These results impressively underline the theoretically postulated connection between cultural liberalism and anti-immigration preferences. Although none of the established parties mobilized anti-immigrant sentiments, these orientations are correlated with cultural liberalism at the individual level (Pearson's r = .37).

To determine how strongly the old and new cultural divides are related to party loyalties, the location of party electorates can be plotted in a two-dimensional political space constituted by the two divides. Figure 6.4 reveals that the electorates of the left and center-right parties diverge mainly along the horizontal dimension, which corresponds to the old cultural antagonism. Contrary to the prior analysis, this dimension also includes voters' orientations regarding the army; as a result, their positions are somewhat more polarized. While the voters of the extreme right and the SVP lie at the extreme of this dimension, they hardly differ from the supporters of the Liberals. Instead, the electorates of the SVP and the extreme right stand out for their position along the new cultural dimension, where their position is remarkably similar.

These results illustrate two interesting points. First, as we have already seen, a traditionalist-communitarian political potential that was not really mobilized by the established parties already existed in the 1970s. Second, the SVP faced no tradeoff in attempting to gain voters with such attitudes, since its traditional electorate already endorsed them to a large degree. The extraordinary success of the SVP after its transformation then seems to have resulted from its ability to hold on to its old clientele while gaining additional votes as a result of the rising prominence of the new cultural divide. In the process, it absorbed the electorates of the smaller extreme-right parties, which were internally divided and lacked the organizational capacity and resources, as well as the charismatic leadership, of the SVP.



FIGURE 6.4 Party electorates along the old and new cultural divides in Switzerland, 1975.

KEY *Political groups:* CVP, Christian Democratic People's Party, various small Christian Democratic parties, Alliance of Independents; EXL, extreme-left parties; EXR, extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party.

The Stability of Alignments along the Cultural Divide and Resulting Patterns of Oppositions

Having determined the content of oppositions and the positions of parties and voters along the cultural divide, the next task is to investigate how far the new cultural antagonism has led to durable alignments. From a theoretical point of view, two ideological blocks may be expected on the left and on the right of the political spectrum, as discussed in Chapter 4. Three of these can actually be discerned in Switzerland: the New Left, the traditional right, and a New Right block. No division emerges between more traditional leftist parties and the New Left. The Social Democrats, the Greens, and the voters for the smaller extreme-left parties form part of the same left-libertarian block, given their unambiguous position at the pole of the divide.[4] The Christian Democratic parties and the Liberals form the center-right block, corresponding to the positions of the parties and of their voters. Finally, the SVP and the smaller parties of the extreme right, of which the Swiss Democrats, the Automobilist/Freedom Party, and the

[4]In the 1975 campaign—the only one in which it received sufficient coverage in the media to measure its position—the extreme left appeared at the authoritarian pole of the libertarian-authoritarian antagonism, close to the extreme right. However, extreme-left voters in that election, and in later elections, are consistently located at the libertarian-universalistic pole of this divide.



FIGURE 6.5 Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, center-right, and extreme-right ideological blocks in Switzerland, 1991–1999 (% loyal voters).

Ticino League have been the most important in electoral terms, form an extreme-right block.

Figure 6.5 presents voters' loyalties to the three ideological blocks along the cultural divide. Because the three blocks had not yet materialized in 1975, and because the corresponding survey does not feature a recall question, the first election to appear is that of 1991. The figure reveals that the extreme-right populist block in general demonstrates the highest levels of loyalties. Between 75 and 79 percent of those who declared having voted for one of the parties in this block four years before remained loyal. As far as the other blocks are concerned, loyalties to the center-right block were still somewhat higher than those to the left-libertarian party block at the beginning of the period under study. They show opposing trends, however: While allegiances to the Liberals and Christian Democrats have declined, the voters of the left-libertarian parties have become more true to their parties, reaching levels similar to those of the extreme right. Overall, loyalties are strong, and the differences between the blocks are rather modest. Compared with the results in the French case, the fidelity of the center-right voters has suffered less.

We are now in a position to characterize the cultural divide more accurately employing the schema presented in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.2). The more extensive analysis of the situation in 1975 allows a comprehensive assessment of this first election. Concerning the *old cultural divide,* which is the one structuring party positions in the campaign, the party system can be characterized as unresponsive, corresponding to the second cell from the right at the bottom of the schema. However, we have seen that a *new cultural division* was present on the voters' side, but this antagonism did not correspond to the one reflected by the party system. Hence, this was a new dimension of conflict along which the party system was unresponsive. Given the renowned stability of the Swiss party system

until the 1970s, alignments probably still were rather stable, and party loyalties checked the emergence of the new conflict. Consequently, the success of the new parties of the extreme right was still very limited.

In the course of the 1990s, after the new cultural antagonism had gained center stage because of the mobilization efforts of the SVP, the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide has evolved into a segmented cleavage. While the libertarian-universalistic pole is occupied by the Social Democrats and the Greens throughout, the party system as a whole has gained responsiveness because of the SVP's extreme position. There is an almost perfect match in the positions of parties and voters. Loyalties are high, especially those to the extreme right and the left-universalistic blocks, indicating a high degree of closure of the groups separated by the divide. Accordingly, and as discussed theoretically in Chapter 3, this conflict can labeled a cleavage because it corresponds to a durable pattern of alignments of social groups.

My conception of the stability of alignments, as discussed in Chapter 4, is sensible to differences in turnout among the adherents of different ideological blocks. In the case of Switzerland, where turnout is notoriously low, this affects my measure of loyalties more than in other contexts. A more in-depth analysis shows that the rising stability of alignments to the left is partly due to these parties' enhanced capacity to bring their people to the ballot box. Because of political conflict, the social closure of left-universalistic political identities has thus become stronger in the 1990s. On the political right, the recovery in the stability of alignments to the center block in the 1999 election was also a product of high turnout. At the same time, more voters defected from the center-block and voted for the populist right in 1999 than in 1995. Relying on respondents' recall of their 1995 vote, it appears that a good tenth of those who voted for the center-right block in 1995 switched to the populist right in the following election (results not shown here).

However, despite the considerable overlap in the ideological orientations of center-right and right-wing populist voters, the borderline between these two ideological blocks is not as permeable as it may appear. The stability of alignments that the ideologically more extreme SVP engenders is perhaps less surprising, also in the light of the French findings presented in Chapter 5. But with respect to the center-right block in Switzerland, we may ask what exactly accounts for the relatively high degree of loyalty. Is it a consequence of long-standing sympathies for these parties that are slow to erode or of a dislike of the populist right's anti-consensual style? It is also possible that alignments are reinforced by another dimension of conflict, a hypothesis that lies at the heart of the following analysis of the European-integration dimension.

European Integration: A Reinforcing Issue Dimension?

Notwithstanding the central importance often attributed to the issue of European integration in Swiss politics, the analysis so far has provided little evidence that the SVP's political stances and its voters' orientation diverge strongly from



FIGURE 6.6 Parties and voters on the European integration dimension in Switzerland, 1975–1999: Position, match, and polarization.

Note: Parties whose position is based on fewer than ten sentences are set in parentheses.

KEY *Political groups:* CVP, Christian Democratic People's Party, various small Christian Democratic parties, Alliance of Independents; EXL, extreme-left parties; EXR, extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party.

those of other right-wing populist parties. Orientations regarding the EU may nonetheless play a role in structuring alignments between the center-right and right-wing populist party blocks, reinforcing the three-block division found along the cultural divide. Figure 6.6 presents the positions of parties and voters along the EU dimension for those years in which there are sufficient data. A direct comparison of parties and voters along the lines of analysis pursued for the cultural dimension is possible only in 1995. In 1975 and 1999, the issue was not sufficiently present in the election campaign to position parties.

Nonetheless, we can measure voters' positions in 1975 using a survey question asking respondents whether Switzerland should join the European Community (EC), which is similar to the items employed in the later surveys. Already one finds the SVP to be the party whose voters most strongly oppose joining the EC, together with the supporters of the extreme left and right. This parallels the findings concerning the new cultural divide and once more underlines, first, that the SVP faced no tradeoff in holding on to its core supporters and expanding its electoral reach, and second, that the attitudinal profile of the SVP's traditional electorate was remarkably similar to that of extreme-right voters.

By 1991, when Europe had become a salient issue, the SVP again lay close to the parties of the extreme right and vividly opposed Switzerland's taking part in the process of unification. The three other parties—the SP, the CVP, and the Liberals—differed somewhat in their position, but they were all closer to the integration pole. We also find some evidence that the Green Party's opposition to the EU was responsible for the unusual configuration of political space in the MDS analysis presented earlier. Looking at the favorable position of Green voters in 1995 and 1999 suggests that this party was probably out of touch with its electorate concerning this question. The EU issue played a less important role in 1995, but the positions of those parties that we can place are fairly similar to their positions four years earlier (the SP and the extreme right appear in brackets because fewer than ten statements were captured in the media analysis). There is a divide between the Europe-friendly Social Democrats and Liberals, on the one hand, and the deeply skeptical SVP and extreme right, on the other. This divide closely mirrors the position of these parties' electorates, resulting in an almost perfect figure for match. Not only is the party system highly polarized, but voters also diverge much more in their orientations regarding the EU in 1995 than was the case in 1975. Looking at the spread in positions reveals that the electorates of the SVP and extreme right and those of the other parties do not overlap.

The 1999 election confirms this basic pattern. Liberal and Christian Democratic voters were somewhat less enthusiastic concerning closer ties to the EU than the left; the major rift, however, was between the populist right and the other parties. Because the differences between the moderate right and the populist right are much larger here than they were concerning the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide, Europe does appear to be an important factor structuring alignments between these two blocks. In particular, the EU divide probably contributes to the high degree of fidelity that the voters of the populist right demonstrate.

It is therefore possible to label the cultural divide in Switzerland as one running between "integration" and "demarcation," but at the same time, this divide is nothing more than a variant of a more general cultural divide we find in Western European countries. First, a similar fissure concerning European integration between the established right and the populist right can be found in France, although in weaker form (Chapter 5). Second, the integration dimension alone

cannot account for the deep divide—engendering strong partisan loyalties and political subcultures—between the left-libertarian and center-right blocks in Switzerland. These parties, as well as their voters, differ much more with respect to the opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community than they do regarding the question of the country's relationship to Europe.

Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide

In determining the relevant dimensions of opposition between parties, we have seen that the traditional state-market cleavage remains highly salient for parties in Switzerland. The central question addressed in this section is the degree to which this is also the case for voters and whether alignments along the state-market divide crosscut or reinforce those structured by the new cultural dimension of conflict. Figure 6.7 shows the positions of parties and voters on the economic dimension. In the earliest election, the party political spectrum is clearly skewed to the left and weakly polarized. The position of the major parties more or less conforms to expectations, except that we would have expected the Liberals to be the most market-liberal party. In fact, it is the (old) SVP that took the position farthest to the right, even if the large standard deviation indicates that the thrust of its programmatic statements was far from homogeneous. The parties of the extreme right, by contrast, had a rather welfarist profile typical of the "old" extreme right. Because the positions of voters are standardized, we know only what their relative positions were and thus cannot judge whether their orientations were as skewed as the positions of the parties. However, we can see that the SVP's voters actually lie to the left of those who voted for the Liberals. Together with the misrepresentation of extreme-left and extreme-right voters, this accounts for the low match between political offerings and demand.

In the 1990s, market liberalism gained support, and the party spectrum became more balanced, although the basic positions remained unchanged. At the same time, the SVP's shift to a somewhat more leftist position between 1991 and 1995, then back to free-market convictions in 1999, testifies to its somewhat ambiguous stance toward economic liberalism. Before entrenching itself firmly on the right of the spectrum in 1999, the SVP also continued to display high levels of heterogeneity in its programmatic statements. Contrary to the situation in the 1975 election, the match between the positions of parties and voters was high in the 1990s. In fact, the relative position of the SVP's electorate turns out to have been rather market-liberal in the aggregate, even if it lay to the left of the Liberals' voters. Furthermore, while the SVP's electorate was internally heterogeneous, it was no more divided than the other parties' voters. In the Swiss case, in other words, we find some support for Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann's (1995) proposition that a mixture of authoritarian and market-liberal orientations characterizes voters of the extreme right. However, it remains to be seen in the further analysis whether the SVP mobilizes some segments of its



FIGURE 6.7 Parties and voters on the economic divide in Switzerland, 1975–1999: Position, match, and polarization.

KEY *Political groups:* CVP, Christian Democratic People's Party, various small Christian Democratic parties, Alliance of Independents; EXL, extreme-left parties; EXR, extreme-right parties; LIB, Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party; SP, Social Democratic Party; SVP, Swiss People's Party.



FIGURE 6.8 Stability of preferences for the left, right, and Christian Democratic party blocks in Switzerland, 1991–1999 (% loyal voters).

electorate according to a cultural, and others according to an economic, logic or whether there is an overriding rationale common to its entire electorate.

To test the stability of alignments engendered by the economic divide, it is again necessary to form ideological party groups and measure how loyally voters turn out to support them. For most parties, the classification into a left and right block based on their positions along the traditional class cleavage is unambiguous. Although the voters of the smaller extreme-right parties are generally economically right-wing, as we have seen, some extreme-right parties, such as the Swiss Democrats, have a welfare-statist program, and I therefore exclude extreme-right voters from the calculations. The SVP, however, clearly belongs to the right-wing block. The Christian Democrats pose a problem. Applying the "genetic" criterion is not so straightforward in the Swiss case as it may seem. As already discussed, in those cantonal party systems that historically have lacked a party of the left, the Christian Democrats compete with the Liberals and take on parts of the left's economic program. In fact, in our media data, the CVP appears quite left-wing, with the exception of the 1995 campaign. Throughout the world, Christian Democratic parties have supported the establishment of generous welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2001), and in ideological terms, Christian Democracy's politics of mediation is distinct both from left-wing and right-wing ideologies regarding the economic order (Frey 2009). I therefore treat the Christian Democrats as a separate ideological block. While their voters usually lean more to the right than to the left, they took a genuinely middle-of-the-road position in 2002, which underscores the usefulness of this classification.

Figure 6.8 shows the stability of alignments structured by the three ideological blocks. Starting at similar levels, the loyalties of the voters of the left and right blocks show an upward trend and reach about 80 percent in 1999. The fidelity of Christian Democratic voters is weakest. Considering party-system polarization,

match, and loyalties jointly, we can now draw some conclusions regarding the state-market cleavage. Overall, there has been a steady increase in the polarization of the party system, but up to 1995 polarization was still at low or intermediate levels. As far as the stability of alignments is concerned, we can again assume high loyalties to the ideological blocks in 1975 and throughout the 1990s, given the figures for 1995 and 1999. Because there is a mismatch between parties and voters in 1975, the party system was unresponsive in that election, with party loyalties at the same time checking realignments. By 1995, the party system had regained responsiveness, as indicated by a high match in the positions of parties and voters, meaning that the class divide represented an *identitarian cleavage.* However, polarization was already on the rise in 1995, and four years later, in 1999, it had risen well above .5, resulting in a *segmented cleavage* along the state-market divide.

As the analysis reveals, alignments structured by the state-market divide and the cultural divide are not crosscutting but, rather, reinforcing. Both cleavages engender high levels of loyalty; the weakest element in this system of alignments is the Christian Democrats and their voters. As we saw in the analysis of the dimensions of opposition based on the campaign data, the economic and cultural lines of opposition have tended to be integrated in Switzerland, especially in 1991 and 1999. Indeed, the correlation between the positions of party electorates along the two dimensions shows that the two dimensions are even more strongly related on the voter side. The simple correlation coefficients are .76 for 1975, .95 for 1995, and .91 for 1999.[5] Political space on the voters' side therefore appears one-dimensional and encompasses all of the state-market, libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian, and European-integration dimensions.

The combination of the findings concerning the economic and the cultural divides clearly shows that the comparatively low levels of loyalty displayed by the center-right block result from recompositions within the right, and not between left and right. In other words, these weak loyalties are the consequence of flows of voters from the center-right to the SVP and indicate that the center-right block is potentially vulnerable. At the same time, the division between the center-right and the right-wing populist blocks reflects fundamentally differing orientations regarding European integration. The European-integration dimension thus reinforces and stabilizes the separation of the center-right and populist right blocks along the cultural dimension, counteracting further realignments.

Political Divides as Determinants of Voting Choices

Having determined the patterns of oppositions in the Swiss party system, I now explore how well voters' positions along the three dimensions explain partisan

[5]The corresponding figures for the parties' positions are .33 in 1975; .99 in 1991; .46 in 1995; and .68 in 1999.

TABLE 6.3 Political Dimensions as Determinants of Voting Choices in Switzerland, 1975–1999 (logistic regressions run separately for each party)

		Parties						
Dimensions		Ecologists	Extreme Left	Social Democratic Party	Christian Democratic People's Party	Free Democratic Party, Liberal Party	Swiss People's Party	Extreme Right
				1975				
Economic	odds	—	.6	.6***	1.1	1.7***	1.3	1.2
	z	—	−1.1	−4.7	1.4	4.5	1.6	.7
Cultural	odds	—	.8	.8*	1.1	1.3*	1.0	1.5
	z	—	−.8	−2.5	.7	2.1	−.1	1.1
New cultural	odds	—	.8	.8#	.9	1.1	1.3#	1.5
	z	—	−.6	−1.9	−1.2	.8	1.7	1.4
Europe	odds	—	1.2	1.0	1.0	.8*	1.5*	1.2
	z	—	.5	−.1	.3	−2.2	2.4	.6
Pseudo R^2		—	3.1%	4.7%	.4%	4.7%	4.4%	3.9%
				1995				
Economic	odds	.9	.5***	.6***	1.1#	1.6***	1.2**	1.2
	z	−1.0	−3.5	−9.6	1.7	10.1	3.1	1.4
Cultural	odds	.4***	.4**	.6***	1.4***	1.7***	2.0***	1.4**
	z	−7.8	−2.9	−9.7	5.1	9.1	8.5	2.6
Europe	odds	1.2	.9	.7***	.9	.6***	2.3***	2.9***
	z	1.4	−.3	−5.7	−1.0	−9.0	11.6	7.3
Pseudo R^2		9.4%	13.1%	12.5%	1.3%	8.4%	17.2%	12.8%
				1999				
Economic	odds	.5***	.5**	.6***	.9	2.0***	1.5***	1.3
	z	−3.4	−2.7	−6.5	−.8	.2	5.2	1.4
Cultural	odds	.6**	.6	.5***	1.3**	1.1	1.7**	.5**
	z	−2.7	−1.9	−7.6	2.8	1.5	5.4	−2.6
Europe	odds	.9	.7	.5***	.8*	.6***	2.4***	5.2***
	z	−.6	−1.2	−6.6	−2.3	−5.4	9.7	5.0
Pseudo R^2		10%	10.8%	20%	.9%	8.1%	21.8%	16.4%

Number of observations: 1,008 (1975); 6,913 (1995); 1,690 (1999).
Significance levels: $^{\#}p \le .10$ $^{*}p \le .05$ $^{**}p \le .01$ $^{***}p \le .001$.

choices, which sheds additional light on parties' distinct mobilization logics. Table 6.3 shows the results of the logistic regression analyses for 1975, 1995, and 1999.[6] I start the discussion by looking at the 1990s and then go back to the 1975 election to see whether similar patterns can be found in the earliest election.

[6] In all further analyses, I take advantage of the additional cantonal samples included in the 1995 post-election surveys, which raise the number of observations considerably. (Weights are applied to correct for the resulting over-sampling of these cantons.) I did not use the additional samples in the preceding analyses because the weighting procedure cannot be properly employed in factor analysis.

Because the driving forces of party mobilization are similar in 1995 and 1999, they can be discussed jointly. In general terms, the vote for the Social Democrats and the SVP can clearly be predicted best using voters' location on the three lines of opposition. Libertarian-universalistic values and positive attitudes toward Europe are a good predictor of the vote for the Social Democrats, while the opposing set of preferences—traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community and refusal to join the EU—best explain the vote for the SVP. The determinants of the vote for the smaller parties of the extreme right clear any doubt that the SVP rightfully belongs to the extreme-right-wing populist party family. The supporters of the small parties of the extreme right are fervently opposed to European integration, but they are actually not more, but less, traditionalist-communitarian than the voters of the SVP.[7]

The economic dimension also plays an important role in structuring voting decisions, but here the patterns of opposition differ. The Social Democrats and the extreme left, on the one hand, and the Liberals, on the other hand, occupy polar positions. Taken together, the cultural, economic, and European-integration dimensions result in a triangular pattern of conflict in which the left opposes the Liberals along the economic dimension and the populist right along the cultural dimension, while the populist right challenges all of the mainstream parties in the domain of European integration.

There are two qualifications to this general picture that touch on crucial points of my argument. The first concerns the role of cultural antagonism in the mobilization of the Liberals. Even more so than the Christian Democrats, Liberal voters in 1995 held traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community and in this respect differed only in degree from those who supported the SVP. In 1995, the more fundamental difference between the Liberals and the populist right lay in their voters' starkly opposing attitudes toward European integration. The situation in 1999 was entirely different, however, because the cultural dimension no longer played any role in the Liberals' mobilization. This evolution may reflect realignments that took place between the Liberals and their right-wing populist challenger between the two elections.

The second qualification regards the role of economic liberalism in the SVP's mobilization. Contrary to my hypothesis that right-wing populist parties mobilize exclusively on the cultural dimension, the SVP's voters also appear to be driven by market-liberal convictions. At the same time, as economic attitudes become more favorable to the free market, the probability of supporting the Liberals rises more steeply than is the case for the SVP. My hunch is that market-liberal orientations among the adherents to the populist right are part of a broader anti-leftist and anti-statist syndrome that takes different forms in different countries, depending on their tradition of state involvement in the economy.

[7] For 1999, the results suggest that a combination of relatively universalistic and Euro-skeptical attitudes makes a vote for the extreme right more probable. Note, however, that the position of extreme-right voters along the cultural dimension is less universalistic than it may appear (see Figure 6.3).

An analysis of the different orientations within the SVP's electorate, presented in the next section, pursues this hypothesis further.

Only brief commentaries are required concerning the other parties. Within the left, no fundamental differences emerge between Green and Social Democratic voters on the cultural axis of conflict. These electorates share strongly universalistic outlooks. The findings in Switzerland therefore support the claim that the Greens represent the counter-pole of the populist New Right along the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide. The differences between Social Democratic and Green voters, however, are related to the fact that the economic and European-integration dimensions of conflict do not consistently play a role in the mobilization of the ecologists. This stands in contrast to the general contention, and to the findings in France, according to which Green voters are among the most supportive of European integration. However, a "normalization" is observable in Switzerland between 1995 and 1999 in that Green voters had a tendency to be more supportive of European integration, even if the effects were insignificant in both elections. Concerning the Christian Democrats, it must be said that they are not really part of the general structure of oppositions: The Christian Democratic electorate does not stand out for its economic profile, and while its members share traditionalist-communitarian outlooks, the contribution of the core ideological conflicts characterizing the party system is almost nil in explaining their vote. This supports Timotheos Frey's (2009) claim that this party family employs a non-ideological mobilization logic.

To what degree do the patterns of opposition found in the 1990s correspond to those in the 1970s? For 1975, we can estimate the role played by the "old" cultural dimension, centering on libertarian and authoritarian values, and by the emerging oppositions revolving around cultural liberalism, immigration, and European integration.[8] In very broad terms, the main antagonists in 1975 were the Social Democrats and the Liberals. In economic terms, this division is unsurprising. In cultural terms, we can see that progressive positions on the old divide and on the new divide foster support for the Social Democrats, while only the old antagonism, shaped by traditional values and law-and-order stances, is relevant for the Liberals. Here, the supporters of the SVP and of the extreme-right parties already constitute the counter-pole to the New Left. But it must be kept in mind that it took the parties at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new divide more than two decades to reach levels of support roughly similar to the combined strength of the Social Democrats and the ecologists.

[8] Although cultural liberalism forms part of the new and the old cultural conflict, positions on the two dimensions are only weakly correlated at the individual level ($r = .14$). The old cultural dimension is much more strongly related to traditional values and law and order, while the new dimension is heavily stamped by cultural liberalism.

The anti-European potential was also already there to grab in 1975: Although the issue was not yet prominent because joining the EC was not on the political agenda, supporters of the SVP were already strongly Euro-skeptical. Only the Liberals' electorate was characterized by "Europhile" sentiments, and internationalism did not yet play a role for the left. Overall, we can see that party competition in the 1970s was not strongly driven by ideology: What the lines of conflict explain in terms of voting behavior is modest compared with the later elections. As a tentative conclusion, then, because we do not have precise information concerning voters' loyalties, the evidence suggests that alignments were more strongly structured by established political identities than by ideology in the 1970s.

Social Structure and Support for the SVP

The Impact of Class and Education

Are the distinct ideological preferences of the SVP's electorate a product of similar positions in the employment structure? And do the social classes that make up the party's support base differ in outlook? Together with the role of education in the SVP's mobilization, these are the questions addressed in this and the following section. Previous analyses have shown that individual-level orientations regarding the cultural dimension in Switzerland are related to different socio-structural attributes, most prominently education and social class (Lachat 2008a). My main concern here is to establish whether support for the SVP, which takes a clear-cut position in this domain, is stronger among those affected by the processes of *economic* modernization, or whether the SVP's potential is confined to those who oppose *cultural* modernization. As pointed out earlier, the Swiss economic model does not lead us to expect that certain occupational categories as a whole have lost out in the modernization thrust of the past decades. Rather, losers are most likely to be found *within* certain categories, such as those working in sectors that traditionally have not been exposed to international competition. Unfortunately, most class schemas are not particularly well suited to detect these more subtle within-class differences, and the analysis presented here is therefore cursory. Nonetheless, it is possible to test the thesis put forward by Kitschelt and McGann (1995) that the New Radical Right gains votes from workers because of its cultural stances, while other segments, such as the self-employed, support these parties because of their free-market appeal.

Table 6.4 presents the results of a logistic regression model that explains voting for the SVP using dummy variables for education and social class as independent variables (see Chapter 4). I include class and education in the same step because the results pertaining to class are not affected by the inclusion of education. Because the 1991 survey allows only the operationalization of a more simple class schema, I do not report the results for that election, since they are not directly comparable with those for the other years.

TABLE 6.4 Socio-structural Basis of Support for the SVP in Switzerland (logistic regression results)

Occupational Classes		1975	1995	1999
Farmers	odds	6.6***	4.0***	3.8***
	z	4.1	5.0	4.3
Self-employed	odds	1.5	1.3	1.2
	z	.7	1.0	.7
Unskilled workers	odds	.7	1.1	1.4
	z	−.6	.3	1.5
Skilled workers	odds	.4	.9	.8
	z	−1.5	−.6	−.9
Routine non-manual workers	odds	.7	.7	.7
	z	−.6	−1.6	−1.1
Technical specialists	odds	.3	.9	.6*
	z	−1.4	−.7	−2.3
Socio-cultural specialists	odds	.7	.3***	.3***
	z	−.5	−4.2	−4.1
Non-labor-force participants	odds	1.0	1.6*	1.0
	z	0	2.1	−.2
Higher education	odds	.8	.6**	1.2
	z	−.7	−2.5	.8
Low education	odds	1.3	.8	.7#
	z	.4	−1.2	−1.7
Pseudo R^2		10.5%	3.7%	3.6%

Reference category: Managers/medium-level education.
Number of observations: 1,219 (1975); 7,167 (1995); 2,033 (1999).
Significance levels: #$p \leq .10$ *$p \leq .05$ **$p \leq .01$ ***$p \leq .001$.

From the 1975 election on, farmers have constituted the only class whose over-representation in the SVP's electorate is statistically significant. Given the party's origins, its strong roots in the rural milieu constitute no surprise. As we may have expected, the self-employed also tend to vote for the SVP, but this effect is insignificant in all elections and becomes weaker over time. In the 1999 election, there was a similar tendency for unskilled workers to support the populist right, which is consistent with the economic-modernization hypothesis. Again, however, the result is not significant. A recurring finding is a strong and statistically significant under-representation of socio-cultural specialists in the SVP's electorate—indeed, the group most likely to vote for the New Left. With some notable exceptions, then, the results testify to the cross-class appeal of the SVP. Other studies, using sophisticated class schemas, have demonstrated that parts of the working class have a special propensity to vote for the populist right (Mazzoleni et al. 2005; Oesch 2008a). Furthermore, the SVP's recent gains have been concentrated in the working class (Selb and Lachat 2004). In part, the fuzziness and heterogeneity of the SVP's support base is due to the party's ability to merge

its old support base with new voters. Despite its transformation and a significant broadening of its electoral reach, the SVP has been able to hold on to its rural constituency. Interestingly, the party has a more clear-cut socio-structural profile in those cantons where it has not traditionally been present, such as Lucerne and Ticino, where not only farmers and the petite bourgeoisie but also unskilled workers are over-represented in its support base (de Ambrogi et al. 2005; Diener et al. 2005). In my analysis, however, a consistent over-representation of losers in economic modernization cannot be asserted.

There is more evidence to suggest that the SVP rallies the losers in the cultural-modernization processes of the past decades. In 1995, where the sample is sufficiently large, we see that voters with higher education are conspicuously under-represented in its electorate. No differences are observable between voters with medium levels and those with low levels of education. However, the finding concerning higher education does suggest that the divide between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values has a structural basis, as does the under-representation of socio-cultural specialists, which persists even when education is controlled for. For 1975 and 1999, no educational pattern emerges. The effects observable in these years (but that do not reach statistical significance) wash out when the class variables are omitted from the model (results not shown). In 1995, the negative effect of higher education actually becomes even stronger and significant ($p = 0.000$).

All of this suggests that the populist right's appeal is predominantly cultural in Switzerland. To rule out the possibility, suggested by Kitschelt and McGann (1995), that some social groups vote for the SVP because of its neoliberal appeal, I have tested interactions between social-class position and locations on the economic and cultural dimensions of conflict. In general, few effects are significant. I report only the results from the 1995 survey in Table 6.5, because the extraordinarily large number of respondents makes the results very robust. The findings disconfirm the hypothesis that the SVP uses different economic- and cultural-mobilization logics depending on social class. Although almost four hundred SVP voters responded to the survey, none of the interaction effects between social class and economic preferences were significant. There are also few classes whose members stand out for supporting the SVP for cultural reasons, the exception being socio-cultural specialists. However, this result has to be seen in conjunction with socio-cultural specialists' generally low propensity to vote for the SVP. In other words, only socio-cultural specialists with markedly traditionalist-communitarian ideological worldviews support the SVP. The direct effects of social class remain unchanged when compared with the previous model in Table 6.4, even when we control for ideological positions. However, right-wing economic preferences are no longer a significant predictor of voting for the SVP.

In all, then, the results of the analyses suggest that, except for its stronghold among farmers, the SVP has a cross-class profile. The under-representation of

TABLE 6.5 Interaction Effects between Social Classes and Ideological Positions as Predictors of the SVP Vote, 1995 (logistic regression results)

Predictor	Odds Ratio	Z-value
Ideological Positions		
Economic dimension	1.2	1.1
Cultural dimension	2.3***	2.2
Social Class		
Farmers	3.4***	3.7
Self-employed	1.2	.6
Unskilled workers	.9	−.6
Skilled workers	.8	−.8
Routine non-manual workers	.5#	−1.9
Technical specialists	.8	−.8
Socio-cultural specialists	.3***	−3.7
Non-labor-force participants	1.3	.8
Interaction Effects		
Farmers * economic	1.0	.0
Self-employed workers * economic	1.0	−.1
Unskilled workers * economic	.9	−.4
Skilled workers * economic	1.1	.5
Routine non-manual workers * economic	.9	−.3
Technical specialists * economic	1.2	.9
Socio-cultural specialists * economic	1.2	.5
Non-labor-force participants * economic	1.1	.3
Farmers * cultural	.8	−.7
Self-employed workers * cultural	1.0	0
Unskilled workers * cultural	1.2	.6
Skilled workers * cultural	1.1	.4
Routine non-manual workers * cultural	1.6	1.4
Technical specialists * cultural	1.3	1.1
Socio-cultural specialists * cultural	2.1**	2.7
Non-labor-force participants * cultural	1.1	.5
Pseudo R^2	13%	

Reference category: Managers.
Number of observations: 6,961.
Significance levels: $^{\#}p \leq .10$ $^{**}p \leq .01$ $^{***}p \leq .001$.

the socio-cultural specialists is the notable exception to this pattern and parallels the findings in the French case. The logic of the SVP's mobilization does not differ between social classes, suggesting that individuals from different class locations support the SVP predominantly because of its traditionalist-communitarian worldview. However, we have also seen that market-liberal attitudes also foster support for the SVP, although the effect is weaker. What is more, this effect does not seem to vary between social classes. In a final analysis, I therefore verify whether class matters at all in the formation of preferences among the voters of the populist right in Switzerland.

Social Class and the Formation of Economic and Cultural Preferences for the Populist Right

The divergence in economic preferences within right-wing populist parties' support coalition may have important consequences for their future electoral prospects. The following analysis is confined to the 1995 and 1999 elections because the 1975 survey features too few SVP voters to permit a reliable location of its electorate broken down by social-class location. Figure 6.9 shows the preferences of these subgroups in the SVP's electorate in the two-dimensional space constituted by the economic and cultural dimensions. As expected, populist right voters from all occupations share a deeply traditionalist-communitarian worldview. What is more surprising, however, is that their economic preferences are relatively similar, as well. All segments within the SVP's electorate are situated in the market-liberal spectrum. The remaining differences—for example, concerning the distance between unskilled workers and the self-employed—conform to expectations. But disagreement over economic policy is rather modest if compared with that of the different groups within the Front National's electorate in France (Chapter 5).

There are two explanations for this somewhat unexpected phenomenon. At a general level, different patterns of orientations (or political cultures) exist regarding individuals' relationship to the state in different countries. Historically, Switzerland is marked by an early hegemony of liberalism and by a weak labor movement (Bartolini 2000; Luebbert 1991). Historical specificities, as well as differences in world-market integration, then result in differences in the class patterning of preferences for state involvement in the economy. The working class as a whole does not display markedly left-wing economic preferences in Switzerland (see Lachat 2008a). The same holds true in the Netherlands and in Austria, two other small, open economies. The working classes in France, Germany, and Britain are more state-interventionist (evidence for this is in the country chapters in Kriesi et al. 2008). Interestingly, the Front National's discourse is quite different as a result. Also, in the case of SVP voters, mistrust against public spending is presumably part of a broader anti-state orientation. At least the SVP itself deplores state interference both in the economy and in societal matters. In the party's discourse, state structures are depicted as dominated by the New Left, and opposing state intervention therefore has not only a free-market but also an anti-universalistic component. As argued earlier, this does not necessarily make the SVP or its supporters genuinely market-liberal.

The homogeneity of both economic and cultural orientations within the SVP's electorate suggests that culturally defined group identifications do *not* have to compete with and ultimately triumph over class identifications to ensure the populist right's continuing success. Consequently, the party's vulnerability to a rising salience of economic, as opposed to cultural, conflicts is minimal. This appears to have been a key to the SVP's success in the 1990s, when the cultural divide and the state-market cleavage became more polarized.



FIGURE 6.9 Economic and cultural positions within the SVP's electorate, broken down by class, 1995 and 1999.

Note: Figures in parentheses report the respective share of members of social classes in the SVP's electorate.

KEY *Social classes: farmer,* self-employed farmers; *manager,* managers and professionals in administrative occupations; *non-lab,* non-labor-force participants; *routine,* routine non-manual workers; *self,* self-employed; *skilled,* skilled workers; *soc-cult,* socio-cultural professionals; *tech,* technical specialists; *unskilled,* unskilled workers.

Conclusion

Although the corresponding political potential was present early in Switzerland, it has taken the parties mobilizing against the libertarian-universalistic values of the New Left more than two decades to match the New Left's electoral strength. Unlike in France, it has not been a new party of the extreme right that has mobilized this potential but an established party that has undergone a transformation into a party of the populist right. It is the prolonged struggle for hegemony in the national party organization of the SVP's Zurich section, under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, that explains the late manifestation of a strong and united right-wing populist party in Switzerland. The analysis presented in this chapter does not leave much doubt that the SVP qualifies for membership in the right-wing populist party family. Despite the similarity of the SVP to other extreme-right populist parties in Switzerland and elsewhere, however, resistance to European integration has played a much more important role in the party's rise than elsewhere. As the only major Swiss party to oppose closer ties to the EU, the SVP could capitalize on an anti-establishment discourse that has been important in molding a sovereignist-exclusionist collective identity and has allowed the party to clearly demarcate itself from the established right.

Nonetheless, the SVP's voters hold a traditionalist-communitarian worldview to a similar degree as the voters of the French Front National. However, because the diffuseness of the traditionalist-communitarian potential requires political entrepreneurs to tie it to specific political conflicts, not only the immigration issue but also Switzerland's relationship to Europe helped the populist right to dominate the Swiss political agenda in the 1990s. The SVP's extraordinary success compared with other right-wing populist parties can be explained, as suggested by Anthony McGann and Herbert Kitschelt (2005), by its ability to gain new voters while holding on to its traditional clientele. The SVP faced no tradeoff between holding on to its traditional electorate and winning over those segments of society that hold a traditionalist-communitarian conception of community that is incompatible with European integration. Partly as a consequence of this meshing of traditional and new support bases, the class and educational basis of SVP voters is less clear-cut than elsewhere. The SVP's success is further aided by the fact that, differently from France, its constituency shares a disdain for state intervention in the economy. Because the SVP has always been represented in Parliament, however, its voters know all to well that anti-statism and economic protectionism are not mutually exclusive.

Looking at the Swiss party system as a whole, a triangular pattern of conflict has emerged in which the Social Democrats oppose the Liberals along the state-market cleavage and the SVP along the cultural divide. While the left-libertarian and the extreme-right-wing populist blocks are supported by strong collective identities that engender stable alignments, voters' loyalties to the center-block are the weakest, partly because of defections that have benefited the SVP in recent

elections. At the same time, the European-integration dimension reinforces the division between the center parties and the populist right. The deepest dividing line along the European dimension runs between these two blocks and contributes to the segmentation of loyalties. The overall stability of alignments structured by the three-block pattern of oppositions suggests that the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian divide is consolidating into a cleavage.

The SVP has displayed a surprising ability to consolidate and even expand its support since its right-wing populist component came not only to dominate the party organization but also to participate in the national government. Rather than revealing the hollowness of anti-establishment populism, government participation has allowed the populist right in Switzerland actually to fulfill some of its promises. For example, it succeeded in making asylum policy more restrictive. In this respect, the situation for the SVP has been more advantageous than for the Freedom Party in Austria. But even there, it seems that where the populist right has succeeded in establishing itself, it is unlikely to vanish too soon.

7

Germany

A Constricted Ideological Space and the Failure of the Extreme Right

Despite the attention regularly devoted to the extreme right in Germany both in the media and in scholarly research, its electoral support has remained rather limited in the postwar era, and its successes have been confined to singular events. In the 1980s, this situation changed somewhat, when support for the Republikaner (Republican Party) appeared to mirror the rise of right-wing populist parties in other countries (Kitschelt with McGann 1995). However, the Republicans proved incapable of consolidating their success in the 1990s. This failure is often attributed to the competition within the extreme right in Germany. However, even the combined support for the three most important extreme-right parties—the Republicans, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany; NPD) and the Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union; DVU)—reached no more than 3.3 percent in 1998, which marked the height of these parties' success in national parliamentary election in the 1990s. Despite sporadic gains at the level of the *Länder* (states) and in European elections, the extreme right has not been able to entrench itself even at those levels.

The absence of a right-wing populist party is striking in light of the resemblance of the German political space to that of other countries where these parties have been successful, as we saw in Chapter 2. As elsewhere, the state-market divide and a cultural dimension manifest themselves in election campaigns. While the rise of the issues brought up by the libertarian New Social Movements provoked a first redefinition of cultural conflicts and the emergence of a powerful ecologist party, Die Grünen (Green Party),

a corresponding development on the political right has not occurred. Germany thus represents one of the rather rare cases where the established right has remained largely unchallenged. Among the six countries studied in Chapter 2, only Britain shares this characteristic. In both cases, it could be argued that singular explanations account for the failure of the extreme right, such as the majoritarian electoral formula in Britain and the memory of National Socialism in Germany. Both accounts are plausible but also problematic, since they deflect attention from more general features of party competition in these countries that limit the appeal of the extreme right.

In what follows, I first review the four most important explanations put forward for the failure of the extreme right in Germany or for a party to emerge at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural divide. The first points to the electoral system but is not very pertinent: Institutional factors cannot explain the extreme right's failure to institutionalize itself in those German states where it has succeeded in passing the threshold. The second explanation stresses the discourse and characteristics of the existing extreme-right parties and their ensuing incapacity to mobilize along the lines of modern right-wing populist parties, in line with the theoretical arguments presented in Chapters 1 and 2. Third, the legacy of National Socialism clearly has implications at the elite and mass levels. The campaign data used throughout this book reveal that extreme-right actors in Germany are unable to gain access to the media to present their views. Finally, I discuss the strategies of the established parties and, in particular, how they have dealt with the immigration issue. A number of studies have argued that there is no space to the right of the Christian Democratic sister parties in cultural matters and concerning immigration policies. My own analysis qualifies this view by showing how the joint strategies of the established right and left have been crucial in inhibiting the articulation of the traditionalist-communitarian potential. It underlines that we must focus not only on the strategies of right-wing populist parties' closest competitors but also on the dynamic of competition in the party system as a whole. Using the analytical model employed in the other chapters, I argue that insights can be drawn from the German case that can be generalized to other contexts.

Not much attention is devoted in this chapter to the recent and sometimes spectacular successes of extreme-right parties in elections at the level of the eastern states. If the "old" extreme right has been successful in Eastern Germany, then this cannot plausibly be attributed to the dynamic of party-system transformations since the late 1960s that have resulted in the emergence of right-wing populist parties in France, Switzerland, and Austria. The potentials underlying the success of the extreme right in Eastern Germany will therefore be more similar to those in Central Europe and Eastern Europe than in the advanced industrial democracies. Nonetheless, the empirical part of this chapter focuses on the party system of unified Germany as a whole because, obviously, the different distribution of preferences in the eastern part of the country impinges on the German-wide strategies of parties. Consequently, they are relevant for the patterns of

opposition that define the space available for the extreme right. These methodological choices follow from the specific focus of my model, and I avoid entering the ongoing debate about the extent to which distinct party systems exist in Western Germany and Eastern Germany (see Dolezal 2008; Pappi 1994; Weßels 2004). With the exception of the 1976 election, the empirical analyses in this chapter focus on the national contests of 1994, 1998, and 2002 in unified Germany.

In this chapter, I start with a broad sketch of the historical cleavages underlying the German party system as well as its development in the past decades. In the second section, I discuss explanations for the weakness of the extreme right. The empirical sections are then devoted to the hypothesis that the weakness of the extreme right can be attributed to the ability of the large parties of the left and right to absorb and crowd out the political potentials stemming from the emergence of the new cultural line of conflict.

The Postwar Party System and Historical Cleavages

Like most of its European counterparts, the German party system carries the imprint of class and religious cleavages. But contrary to its fractionalized and polarized predecessor of the Weimar period, the party system of Western Germany witnessed a process of consolidation and concentration after World War II. The Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union; CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union; CSU), succeeded in integrating large parts of the bourgeois electoral potential by absorbing various smaller conservative parties (Niedermayer 2006). Whereas the religious cleavage historically had embodied an antagonism between Protestants and Catholics, the Union parties were founded as inter-confessional Christian parties after the war, marking the emergence of a religious-secular cleavage. Concerning the state-market cleavage, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany; SPD) remained the only legal party on the left after the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany; KPD) was outlawed. In 1959, the SPD moderated its program, resulting in a widening of its appeal. Up to the 1980s, only one relevant additional party existed: the Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party; FDP). Traditionally, the FDP took sides with the Union parties along the economic cleavage and with the SPD regarding the socio-cultural dimension of conflict (Niedermayer 2006: 115).

Contrary to France, for example, the two main cleavages in Germany did not coincide but crosscut each other rather strongly after World War II, a constellation generally thought to foster ideological moderation. Until recent elections, for instance, Catholic workers predominantly supported the Christian Democrats (Dolezal 2008). Together with the two main parties' integrative capacity and nearly hegemonic status, this has resulted in centripetal political competition (Grande 2003; Smith 1976). At the same time, the reformist strategy of the social-liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt put new issues on the political

agenda. This made it increasingly difficult for the SPD to accommodate the diverging tendencies within its electorate that resulted from its appeal among intellectuals and the 1968 generation (Niedermayer 2006: 115–116). The rise of the libertarian-authoritarian value divide in the 1970s and 1980s led to internal tensions, and the SPD found it difficult to define its programmatic line (Kitschelt 1994: 39). Ultimately, it could not prevent the emergence of the Green Party. The Greens' appearance in the early 1980s marked the rise of a new phase of pluralization of the party system (Klingemann 1999; Niedermayer 2006).

Apart from the 1949 election, and up to the founding of the NPD as a merger of various extreme-right splinter groups in 1964, extreme-right parties had remained without major successes in Germany. The NPD did receive 2.2 and 4.1 percent of the vote in the federal elections of 1965 and 1969, respectively, but these elections proved to be singular events. Despite the emergence of the neofascist DVU as a second extreme-right party in 1971, the extreme right consistently received less than 1 percent of the vote thereafter and remained a marginal phenomenon until the late 1980s (Stöss 2005: 76). In 1983, the Republican Party was founded as a breakaway from the Bavarian CSU and became the most successful postwar extreme-right party at the national level. It reached the height of its success in the European elections of 1989, capturing 8.8 percent of the vote. At the same time, the party was unable to win more than marginal shares of the vote in federal elections. The European elections were therefore an exceptional event, and the extreme right has hardly affected the German party system.

German reunification, however, resulted in the entry of a new party: the post-communist Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism; PDS). Beyond this, however, unification has had a rather limited impact on the German party system because of the established parties' ability to penetrate the new electoral landscape. Moreover, differences in voting behavior between the eastern and the western part of the country are in decline, and party competition has become even more similar with the formation of the Die Linke (Left Party; see Dolezal 2008). This new party resulted from a merger between extreme-left parties in Eastern Germany and Western Germany. Having experimented with an alliance in the years before, the PDS and the West German Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit-Die Wahlalternative (Electoral Alternative for Social Justice; WASG), a party founded by dissatisfied (former) SPD members and union officials, formed Die Linke in 2007. Thus, two new parties, the Greens and the Left Party, gained representation in Parliament in the "period of differentiation" in the party system that began in 1983. At the same time, the number of relevant parties has remained lower than in other countries with proportional representation (Klingemann 2005). At least on the surface, then, the pattern of moderate pluralism has been preserved. But the process of pluralization has had farther-reaching consequences for the logics of coalition formation and the mechanics of the party system, especially at the state level (Grande 2003).

As far as the socio-structural determinants of voting choices are concerned, the evidence suggests that the party system has remained firmly rooted in the

religious and class cleavages. The propensity of unionized workers to prefer the SPD and of Catholics to support the Union parties has remained relatively strong (Klingemann 1999; Weßels 2000). In light of the alleged centripetal pattern of competition between the major parties, as well as of the transformation of political space as a result of the new cultural conflicts, this is surprising. Indeed, the apparent stability hides a transformation of both historical cleavages. The persisting differences in party preference are not mirrored in strongly diverging ideological orientations of the core groups divided by the traditional cleavages—at least, not in terms of the conventional left-right scale (Weßels 2000). Furthermore, the loyalty of blue-collar workers to the SPD is in decline in the medium term because of generational replacement (Pappi 2002; Pappi and Mnich 1992). And overall, the traditional cleavages are waning as a result of the shrinking of the core groups underlying them—the industrial working class and Catholic churchgoers (Klingemann 1999: 121).

Consequently, the impact of the manual versus non-manual divide on overall voting behavior has weakened (Nieuwbeerta 1995). More differentiated class schemas similar to the one employed in this book, however, point to a transformation rather than a weakening of the state-market cleavage. Romain Lachat (2007) shows that the decrease in class voting is modest, while it is non-existent in Oddbjørn Knutsen's (2004: 229) analysis. In other words, a renewed state-market cleavage remains fairly vibrant in Germany, mainly as a result of the SPD's adaptation to the changing class structure (Müller 1999: 140–141). Social classes in Germany differ more strongly in their economic than in their cultural preferences, while the opposite is the case in other countries (see Lachat and Dolezal 2008: 247). The persistence of stronger class differences in economic preferences than in other countries may be partly accounted for by the greater importance of the economic divide, which is also a result of the difficulties associated with the process of unification, a point to which I return.

The evidence regarding the religious cleavage is more contradictory. Using religiosity as a measure, the religious cleavage appears to have weakened somewhat between the 1970s and the early 1980s and remained stable thereafter (Lachat 2007) or declined further (Knutsen 2004: 229). At the same time, the predicative strength of religious denomination has not receded since the 1970s (Knutsen 2004: 229).

Summing up, there is a high degree of persistence in the ties between the two major parties and their core constituencies. However, these groups have shrunk quite dramatically, and it is only the parties' capacity to adapt to socio-structural changes that explains the stability of the German party system (Klingemann 1999). As a result, and because of the emergence of the Green Party, new links between social groups and parties have formed, as studies using more refined class schemas can show (Lachat 2007; Müller 1999). Levels of volatility have remained comparatively low and do not show the sporadic eruptions characteristic of other Western European countries, even since the 1980s (Klingemann 2005: 49).

Overall, the rootedness of the German party system in the electorate does not appear to offer propitious circumstances for the emergence of a party situated at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the new cultural divide. Furthermore, cross-national differences in the voting behavior of this party family's core support groups are instructive. Quite contrary to the situation in Switzerland and France, in Germany the industrial workforce remains the stronghold of the Social Democrats (Oesch 2008b: 339–344). Despite the decline of the traditional class cleavage, the SPD remains more firmly anchored in the working class than other left-wing parties, and Catholic workers continue to support the Christian Democrats (Dolezal 2008). Persisting alignments within this group thus limit the potential for realignments that could benefit the extreme right.

Explaining the Weakness of the Extreme Right in Germany

Restraining but Not Insurmountable: The Electoral Threshold

Although the German electoral system is basically proportional, the 5 percent national threshold for gaining representation in Parliament combined with the vote for a specific candidate discourages the formation of new parties. According to Terri Givens (2005), the electoral threshold accounts for the lack of success of the extreme right in Germany. Rather than voting sincerely for the extreme right, citizens would strategically vote for a viable right-wing coalition. Even if we were to accept her evidence that strategic voting exists, it would still be somewhat doubtful that this would entirely explain the extreme right's meager success in Germany, as Givens (2005) claims.

Several further points put doubt on a purely institutional explanation. First, it is debatable whether voting for the extreme right is really like voting for any other party, and it is not altogether plausible that the potential extreme-right voter engages in the same kind of strategic reasoning as someone who is choosing between two mainstream parties (see Norris 2005: 112–113 for a similar argument in spatial terms). Voters of the extreme right are generally disenchanted with the established parties and therefore cultivate what can be called a "rational protest vote." To the degree that voters with traditionalist-communitarian outlooks support an established party, this is more likely to have to do with the mainstream's programmatic offerings than with strategic considerations. It is also worth remembering that the transformation of cultural conflicts in Germany discussed in Chapter 2 resulted in the emergence of a strong Green party. It thus does not seem impossible for new parties to overcome the threshold. Further, there is no clear evidence for a negative effect of a high *effective threshold* on support for the extreme right in comparative research. Earlier analyses found such an effect (Jackman and Volpert 1996), but Elisabeth Carter (2005) demon-

strates that characteristics of the electoral system no longer have a significant effect if the ideological and organizational features of right-wing extremist parties themselves are taken into account.

Finally, and perhaps most important, attributing a decisive role to the electoral threshold neglects the experience of the extreme right at the state (*Länder*) level. On various occasions, an extreme-right party has succeeded in passing the 5 percent threshold that also applies to representation in regional legislatures. In most cases, however, the extreme right has been unable to consolidate its success. If the votes for these parties are really guided by strategic considerations, the parties' potential voters should not strategically desert them once they are represented in Parliament, because they have received a signal that their votes are not likely to be lost ones. However, in Baden-Württemberg the Republicans gained 10.9 percent of the vote in 1992 and 9.1 percent in 1996; although they were represented in the legislature with fifteen and fourteen seats, respectively, they failed to pass the threshold in the 2001 election. Similarly, the Republicans entered Berlin's legislature in 1989 with 7.5 percent of the vote yet lost parliamentary representation in the elections held a year later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in which they gained only 3.7 percent in the western part of the city. The only, albeit partial, exception to this pattern is Bremen, where parliamentary representation is easier to obtain because of a lower threshold; the DVU has repeatedly entered the legislature there. Even in Bremen, however, the DVU has not been able to stabilize its vote share and dropped out of the legislature after it won an all-time high of 6.2 percent of the vote in 1991 (Stöss 2005: 124–133). Whether the same applies to the eastern states, where the NPD and the DVU have passed the threshold in Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Brandenburg in the most recent contests, is not yet clear. In any event, the parties that have benefited from the recent dynamic of success in the eastern states, the NPD and the DVU, belong to the neo-fascist type of extreme-right party, whose success cannot be accounted for by the gradual transformation of Western European party systems since the 1970s.

Overall, then, the failure of the extreme right to institutionalize and consolidate its successes even at the state level suggests that the electoral system, while representing a hurdle for new parties, can be attributed only an explanatory role in conjunction with other factors. Other institutional features do not seem promising candidates for such an explanation, either. The rules for the state funding of parties in Germany, for example, guarantee reimbursement of campaign costs even for parties that fail to pass the threshold of 5 percent of the vote. According to Pippa Norris's (2005: 95–102) compilation of information on various institutional provisions, such as financial regulations for parties and entitlement to free media access, the chances for the extreme right in Germany do not seem less propitious than elsewhere. We should therefore look at features of the extreme-right parties themselves and of the party system in which they compete to account for their limited appeal in Germany.

Discourse and Organizational Capacity of the German Extreme Right

One of the keys to the success of the extreme populist right throughout Europe has been to distance itself from overtly racist stances and to advocate its traditionalist-communitarian credentials in more acceptable terms. Piero Ignazi (1992, 2002, 2003) distinguishes between the "old" extreme right, which strongly resembles early-twentieth-century fascism, and the post-industrial parties of the "new" extreme right. As Elisabeth Carter's (2005) comprehensive analysis shows, neo-fascist parties receive only marginal voter shares across Europe, and Matt Golder (2003) demonstrates that different factors account for the success of "old" and "new" extreme-right parties.

Given the historical experience of National Socialism, extreme-right parties will have to moderate their discourse and distance themselves from fascism even more explicitly than elsewhere to attract more than a handful of extremists and protest voters in Germany. Against this background, it is immediately clear that neither the NPD nor the DVU is likely to make large electoral inroads. There is a consensus that these two parties belong to the "old" extreme-right group (Golder 2003; Ignazi 2002: 28) and adhere to classical racism (Carter 2005: 36). Furthermore, the DVU is linked directly to neo-fascist organizations (Kitschelt with McGann 1995: 218). Concerning ethno-pluralist discourses, Cas Mudde (2000: 171–172) finds some vague indications of the concept in the DVU's party literature but states in conclusion that the party's ideology is "too nebulous to include such elaborated world views as ethnopluralism." While the NPD did denounce the decline of traditional moral values, the Americanization of lifestyles, and the 1968 generation's libertarian values in the 1960s (Mudde 2000: 67), both the NPD and the DVU retain traces of anti-Semitism in their discourse, express nostalgia for Germany's military glories, and claim the rehabilitation of the Nazi past. Furthermore, prior to 1989, they put heavy emphasis on demanding the reunification of the country (Ignazi 2003: 66–74).

In terms of their organizational characteristics, both parties are weakly organized and poorly led, and the NPD is ridden with internal divisions (Backes and Mudde 2000; Carter 2005: chap. 3; Ignazi 2003). They have at times overcome their rivalries and formed alliances in state elections, most recently when they gained some success in the eastern states. However, since the NPD takes a strong neo-fascist stance, the alliance makes it more difficult for the extreme right to mobilize beyond its core clientele (Stöss 2005: 146).

The Republican Party, which is generally regarded as representing the "new" extreme-right party type (Cole 2005; Golder 2003; Ignazi 2002: 28), clearly had a better chance of success. Founded by Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voigt, members of Parliament from the Bavarian CSU, the Republicans initially took over large parts of the CSU's program and attempted to differentiate themselves from the extreme-right milieu (Backes and Mudde 2000: 458–459). But the Republicans' national-conservative ideology became more extreme when Franz Schön-

huber ascended to the party's leadership in 1985, supported by a flow of militants from neo-Nazi organizations into the party after its first electoral gains (Kitschelt with McGann 1995: 217). During World War II, Schönhuber was a member of the Waffen-SS and was later dismissed as a television journalist for his compliance with Nazism.

Although Schönhuber explicitly wanted to turn the Republican Party into a right-wing populist party inspired by the French Front National, he failed to cushion the immigration theme in acceptable terms, and the party lacked broad appeal (Backes and Mudde 2000: 459; Ignazi 2003: 71–72). According to Mudde (2000: 171–172), the party does not have an elaborate ideology, and the concept of ethno-pluralism is not in its programs. Although accused regularly of anti-Semitism and racism, the Republicans have always been explicitly pro-democratic and repeatedly have attempted to moderate their overall profile (Mudde 2000). Since 1992, however, the party has been under surveillance by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The party's new chairman, Rolf Schlierer, initially tried to move the Republicans away from extremism but made a U-turn in 1998 when he agreed with the NPD and DVU that the three parties should not engage in competition in future elections. Again, the boundaries between the old and the new extreme right in Germany were blurred.

The erratic movement from extreme positions to more moderate stances and back results from continuous power struggles inside the party. The Republicans benefited from generous public funding after their early successes and were able to count on growing numbers of party activists, which should have allowed them to reinforce the party apparatus. However, confrontations between the extreme faction and more moderate protagonists such as Schlierer could not be accommodated within the party's structures (Decker 2000: 162–163). Carter (2005: 66–72) classifies the Republicans as a weakly organized, poorly led, and divided right-wing-extremist party. Schönhuber, although generally considered the most charismatic right-wing extremist leader in Germany (Decker 2003: 58; Stöss 2005: 85), has proved too weak to withstand the dissent within the party leadership. In sum, the parties of the extreme right in Germany differ from the successful exponents of this party family. None of the parties has developed an elaborate traditionalist-communitarian discourse, and all are plagued by internal rifts and lack undisputed leaders.

Historical Legacies and the Stigmatization of the Extreme Right in Germany

While adherence to ethnic nationalism inhibits the success of the extreme right even more in Germany than elsewhere, the historical experience of National Socialism in part accounts for the continuity in extreme-right thought. Political activists draw on historical blueprints, discussions in intellectual circles, and ongoing debates in political philosophy in adopting political ideologies. According to Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995: 203–204), fascism in

Germany has left a dual legacy of intellectual thought and "old fighters" from the Nazi period who are still around. Thus, the traditional extreme right has been able to transmit its interpretation of politics to successor generations of activists. By contrast, the French Front National has drawn on contemporary philosophical currents of the New Right.

The discursive opportunity structures resulting from different models of citizenship suggest a further reason for this difference between Germany and France (Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). Amending Ruud Koopmans and Hanspeter Kriesi's model slightly, the republican model of citizenship in France provides opportunities to demand the cultural assimilation of foreigners or—if integration is seen as impossible—the limiting of their numbers. This is a culturalist or ethno-pluralist discourse. The ethnic concept of citizenship, by contrast, in conjunction with the long-standing denial of the political class that Germany is a country of immigration, provides less fertile ground for the politicization of integration and cultural identity. Arguments hinging on biological racism have therefore survived, while the legacy of National Socialism at the same time makes racism taboo. The stigmatization of extreme-right activism is especially strong in Germany, as comparative studies have shown (Klandermans et al. 2005), and it extends to "new" exponents of the extreme right, as well.

One of the consequences of this stigmatization is that none of the established parties would ever enter an alliance with the extreme right in Germany (see Art 2007). Equally relevant, however, is the extreme right's limited access to the news media. If right-wing populist parties want to convince the public of the difference between overt racism and their ethno-pluralist vision, the media must give them the opportunity to present their political ideas. In Germany, even the initially moderate Republicans were by and large denied access to television, in part because politicians from the established parties refused to enter into discussion with them (Bergdorf 1998).

The media data used in this volume allows a comparison of the extent to which newspapers function as a platform for the diffusion of extreme-right parties' programmatic stances in different countries. Table 7.1 shows the number of actor-issue sentences—that is, statements of political actors on their policy propositions reported in newspapers—making public the programmatic visions of extreme-right politicians in the election campaigns studied in this book. The figures show that the coverage of extreme-right parties' program differs strongly by country. What is more, it reveals that successful right-wing populist parties such as the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) could count on extensive media coverage. In German and British newspapers, not a single sentence gives readers a hint of these parties' policy stances; they are referred to only negatively by other political actors or in terms of the danger they represent for democracy. Obviously, established parties that transformed into right-wing populist parties have easier access to the media, as the cases of the FPÖ and the SVP show. However, we can see in the Swiss case that the small extreme-right parties also received fairly extensive coverage prior to their decline

TABLE 7.1 Newspaper Coverage of Extreme-Right (Populist) Parties' Programmatic Stances in Six Countries, Late 1980s–Early 2000s (*N* and % of actor-issue sentences in election campaigns)

		Switzerland					
Election	Austria: Freedom Party of Austria	Swiss People's Party	Extreme Right	France: Front National	Netherlands: Extreme Right	Germany: Extreme Right	Britain: Extreme Right
First	71 (8.8%)	162 (14.8%)	87 (8%)	190 (9.3%)	21 (2.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Second	177 (16.1%)	81 (15.6%)	34 (6.5%)	114 (6.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Third	168 (17%)	87 (26.9%)	2 (.6%)	138 (12.3%)	12 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)

Source: Media content analysis.

Note: The election years analyzed are 1994, 1999, and 2002 in Austria; 1991, 1995, and 1999 in Switzerland; 1988, 1995, and 2002 in France; 1994, 1998, and 2002 in the Netherlands; 1994, 1998, and 2002 in Germany; and 1992, 1997, and 2001 in Britain. *Extreme right* comprises various parties of this type in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain.

in the mid-1990s. French newspapers also have given considerable attention to the Front National's programmatic statements, including full-page interviews with Jean-Marie Le Pen. Dutch newspapers, by contrast, hardly write about the programs of parties such as the Centrumsdemokraten (Center Democrats), corresponding to the strong stigmatization of extreme-right activism (Klandermans et al. 2005). Because I do not consider the List Pim Fortuyn a right-wing populist party (Chapter 2), I have not included Pim Fortuyn's statements for the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn was in fact able to play an important role in the 2002 media campaign and to present his ideas in great detail. More than 25 percent of all actor-issue sentences referred to his political program.

Of course, cause and effect are to some degree unclear in this comparison. It may also be right-wing populist parties' ideological moderation and more nuanced ideology that gives them more media coverage, which in turn furthers their success. Nonetheless, the comparison does suggest that even modern right-wing populist parties are likely to face considerable difficulties in diffusing their message in Germany and Britain. We can conclude, then, that countries differ not only in the degree to which the established parties employ a "*cordon sanitaire*" strategy with respect to right-wing populist parties, meaning that they refuse to cooperate with it, but also in terms of the barriers these parties face in gaining access to the media.

As a consequence of its neo-fascist discourse and the stigmatization of its positions, the extreme right's electoral potential is more limited in Germany than in other countries. Table 7.2 shows the share of respondents in the 1998 post-election survey who believed that the Republicans and the DVU represented their interests. The overall results suggest that the Republicans had a somewhat broader appeal, with 6.1 percent of the respondents agreeing that the party had the right objectives. The corresponding figure for the DVU was lower. As we know from the country analyses so far, parts of the electorate of the established right hold cultural preferences that put them within the reach of right-wing populist parties' mobilization efforts. To test whether this also holds true for Germany, the

TABLE 7.2 Perception of German Voters about Whether Extreme-Right Parties Represent Their Interests, by Electorate, 1998 (%)

	Party Electorate									
	Green Party	Party of Democratic Socialism	Social Democratic Party	Free Democratic Party	Christian Democratic Union	Christian Social Union	Extreme Right	Non-voters	Refused to Answer	Total
Do the Republicans . . .										
Represent your interests?	3	4.7	4.5	.4	4.7	4.8	81.6	5	9	6.1
Oppose your interests?	92.2	83.7	86.4	84.2	84.8	75.4	11.4	68.8	74.6	82.1
Neither represent nor oppose your interests?	4.9	11.6	9.1	15.4	10.6	19.9	7	26.2	16.5	11.8
Does the German People's Union . . .										
Represent your interests?	2.6	4.8	3.4	.5	2.7	2.3	39	3.9	10.4	4.3
Oppose your interests?	93.1	84	88.3	78.7	88.9	85.2	27.8	74.8	73.8	85
Neither represent nor oppose your interests?	4.4	11.2	8.3	20.9	8.4	12.5	33.2	21.3	15.9	10.8

Source: 1998 Post-election survey (see Appendix B).

Notes: Percentages for the first eight columns represent those who answered yes to the question. The Christian Social Union competes only in Bavaria. The extreme right includes the National Democratic Party, the German People's Union, and the Republican Party. Results were calculated using regional sampling weights.

responses in Table 7.2 are broken down by party choice in the 1998 election. But support for the Republican Party's political program does not differ among the supporters of the major parties, and the same holds true for the DVU. The perception that these parties represent their interests is slightly stronger among nonvoters and strongest among respondents who refused to declare their party choice. Here, the potential seems larger, in part because this group is likely to comprise a number of respondents who did not admit actually having voted for the extreme right.

To sum up, the results presented in Table 7.2 show that even for the more moderate Republican Party, the overall electoral potential is limited and does not vary between the electorates of the mainstream parties. The outright rejection of the extreme right's program differs somewhat more. The comparison with France is instructive: In 2002, 22.3 percent of respondents declared they strongly agreed or more or less agreed with the ideas defended by Le Pen, and this share was much higher among the voters of the established right than among those of the established left.[1] The results for Germany, by contrast, are compatible with the finding of Jürgen Falter (1994) and Kai Arzheimer and colleagues (2001) that even the majority of voters with strongly right-wing-extremist worldviews are integrated by the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties. This begs the question whether the extreme right's limited potential is due to the strategies of the established parties, to which I now turn.

The Strategies of the Established Parties: Still a Restricted Ideological Space?

Since World War II, the two Christian Democratic sister parties, the CDU and the CSU, have shown a remarkable capacity to integrate the entire right-wing spectrum. In discussing Germany's "restricted ideological space," Gordon Smith (1976: 402) points out that "the early ability of the CDU to spread itself across the previously rigid lines of German society led to the assimilation of a large proportion of the electorate within a single umbrella-party." In the 1950s, the Union first formed alliances with, and then integrated with, the Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (League of Expellees and Disenfranchised), a party that represented expellees from the east. The party employed a strong rhetoric of German national unity and prevented the emergence of an independent extreme-right voter block (Kitschelt with McGann 1995: 208). The Union's strategy of refusing to accept a competitor to its right has been a deliberate one. Dominance in the right-wing spectrum gives the Christian Democrats considerable leeway to shift their positions without the risk of losing votes to a more center-right competitor. It is widely held that the extreme right's marginality is due to the ability of the established right to take up the extreme right's issues, to occupy its positions in a more moderate and acceptable way, and thereby to

[1]Calculated from the 2002 post-election survey used in Chapter 5.

integrate its potential supporters (Dolezal 2008; Jaschke 1999: 141–142; Minkenberg 1997: 155; Niedermayer 2006: 119).

Comparative research shows that the political space other parties leave to the extreme right has a strong impact on the extreme right's success. In an analysis covering forty-one extreme-right parties, Carter (2005: 114–125, 205–212) shows that these parties perform worse when their mainstream right-wing competitors take more right-wing positions. In Germany, it seems, the established right was able to absorb the right-wing extremist potential until the early 1980s and then again from the 1990s to present. The following brief sketch seeks to substantiate this claim. The established right first failed to respond adequately to the challenge resulting from the rise of the New Left, resulting in the emergence of the Republican Party in 1983. However, German unification and the immigration issue provided the Christian Democrats with an opportunity to regain credibility among traditionalist-communitarian voters, again restricting the political space available to the extreme right.

Germany witnessed a "renaissance of conservatism" in the 1970s as a reaction to the 1968 student movement and to the formation of a social-liberal government after the 1972 election, which shifted the nation's policy regarding the communist countries in Eastern Europe. Confronted with the decline of religiosity and a programmatic vacuum, the Union parties endorsed the Zeitgeist by stressing the importance of the family for moral guidance and by propagating a new historical and national consciousness (Grande 1988). The new conservative-liberal coalition that took office in 1982 had announced a moral and intellectual renewal (the so-called *geistig-moralische Wende*), which can be interpreted as a neo-conservative counterpart to the New Left political agenda. When the Union parties returned to power, however, they failed to perform the promised "turn" in terms of concrete policies (Ignazi 2003: 74–75). Symbolically, patriotism made a comeback under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl (Grande 1988: 69). It was a large loan by the West German federal government to East Germany, arranged by the CSU leader Franz Josef Strauß, that provoked the Republicans to break away from their mother party, the Bavarian CSU. The founding of the Republican Party is commonly held to have resulted from the Union parties' failure to fulfill their promises, which in turn was due to tensions between competing factions within the party (Grande 1988: 70–71; Ignazi 2003: 75; Minkenberg 1992: 70–72).

In other words, the Union parties, with their pluralist and democratic internal structure, showed difficulties in absorbing the traditionalist political potential that resulted from the mobilization of the New Left. The odds for such a strategy improved, however, with the appearance of two new issues on the political agenda. First, the Union orchestrated the reunification of Germany under Kohl's leadership and thereby deprived the extreme right of one of its central themes (Stöss 2005: 38–40, 86). Even the new Republican Party, which reached the apex of its success in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, had made this one of its central claims (Betz 1991: 121). However, the Union had always been

sensitive to the national question and never explicitly recognized the postwar eastern border with Poland. Second, the CSU and parts of the CDU took up the immigration issue in the early 1980s. A few weeks before the social-liberal coalition fell, Kohl, as the leader of the CDU, demanded that the number of foreigners in Germany be reduced, and the CSU continued to campaign against refugees (Schmidtke 2004; Thränhardt 1995).

The German Social Democrats responded to the explosive immigration issue differently from the Socialists in France. As we have seen, the Socialists pursued an "adversarial strategy," in Bonnie Meguid's (2005) terms. The SPD, by contrast, employed a "dismissive strategy" by systematically downplaying the immigration question. In retrospect, Helmut Schmidt, who headed the social-liberal government coalition from 1974 to 1982, explained that in 1980, the SPD had decided not to ask for local voting rights for foreigners because this went "against the instincts of our core electorate"—the SPD's blue-collar constituency (Schmidtke 2004: 166–167; Thränhardt 1995: 327). In the early 1990s, when Germany was confronted with large numbers of migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia, the SPD again avoided a stretching of the ideological space. The Union parties were in government at that time and reacted promptly to the wave of extreme-right activism and violence that had emerged. Arguing that the "threshold of tolerance" and of the capacity to assimilate foreigners had been reached, they modified the constitution to allow for a far more restrictive immigration policy. They succeeded in forcing the SPD into the so-called asylum compromise, thereby ousting the issue from the political agenda (Schmidtke 2004: 169). According to Ignazi (2003: 77–78), extreme-right violence after the consecutive drop in the number of refugees was confronted with a strong counter-mobilization by anti-racist organizations and trade unions, and resulted in a re-stigmatization of extreme-right positions.

The integration of foreigners became a more polarizing issue in 1999 when the "red-green" coalition of the SPD and the Green Party announced that it would reform Germany's nationality law and allow dual nationality for long-standing foreign residents and their children. In response, the Union parties launched a large debate on national identity, demanding that immigrants conform to Germany's "guiding culture (*Leitkultur*)." As a consequence, the new nationality law was drafted in close collaboration with the opposition, because the left-wing government wanted to keep the issue out of partisan politics. Even if it ultimately failed to get the backing of the Union parties, the proposition was watered down considerably (Schmidtke 2004: 171).

Again, comparative research underlines the accommodative strategy of the parties of the established right concerning the extreme-right-wing agenda. Marcel Luebbers and colleagues (2002) show that the space for an extreme-right-wing party is limited in Germany as a result of position concerning immigration of the CSU, which has the most restrictive stance of all established right-wing parties included in their analysis. Ruud Koopmans and his colleagues (2005) come to the same conclusion, and interestingly, it is in Germany and Britain that

the established right leaves little room for the extreme right and is able to preempt the extreme right's success. As Jürgen Falter (1994: 159–163) and Frank Decker (2000: 164–165) observe, the success of the extreme right in Germany has generally followed political-attention cycles regarding the immigration and integration issues. However, the Union parties' ensuing capacity to absorb the issue, in conjunction with the consensus-oriented approach of the SPD, seems to have prevented the issue from staying on the political agenda for protracted periods of time. As a consequence, the extreme-right potential has declined in Germany. According to calculations by Wouter van der Brug and colleagues (2005: 547) using European Election Studies, the share of respondents who found the Republican Party attractive dropped from 16.1 percent in 1989 to 11.3 percent in 1994, and further to 5 percent in 1999.

One of the central aims of the empirical analysis in the remaining sections of this chapter is to evaluate the claim that the extreme populist right has found its mobilization space restricted because of the dynamics of competition in the party system. A dynamic approach that analyzes each election separately extends the preliminary analysis presented in Chapter 2. If the structure of competition in Germany is similar to that found elsewhere in Western Europe, the (extreme) traditionalist-communitarian potential may be prevented from manifesting itself in broadly two ways. First, as suggested above, the Union parties may crowd out the extreme right by virtue of their own pronounced position. Second, the political potential constituted by voters holding extreme positions along the cultural dimension may remain latent because of the established parties' joint efforts to play down cultural issues that polarize political competition elsewhere. These hypotheses are now tested empirically.

The Configuration of the Party-Political Space: The Traditionalist-Communitarian Transformation of the 1990s

The analysis starts by determining the dimensions of opposition in the election campaigns studied and follows the methodological procedures laid out in Chapter 4. Because of the frequent claim that the Union parties are able to cover the entire right-of-the-middle political spectrum by virtue of the Bavarian CSU's taking a more rightist and anti-immigrant position than the CDU, the Bavarian Christian Democratic party is positioned separately. All sentences in the newspapers referring to common positions of the two Union parties are coded as CDU statements. Figure 7.1 shows the representation of political space resulting from the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis. In all but one case, the solutions are clearly two-dimensional. In 2002, it is debatable whether a two- or a three-dimensional solution is more appropriate. However, the goodness-of-fit of the solution improves far more when moving from one to two dimensions than when moving from two to three dimensions. For ease of representation and interpretation, I show the two-dimensional solution.



FIGURE 7.1 Political space in Germany, 1976–2002: Positions of parties and issue categories. Stress-I statistics: .16 (1976); .34 (1994); .32 (1998); .25 (2002).

KEY *Political groups:* CDU, Christian Democratic Union; CSU, Christian Social Union (only in Bavaria); EXR, extreme-right parties (including the National Democratic Party, German People's Union, and Republican Party); FDP, Free Democratic Party, liberals; PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism; SPD, Social Democratic Party.

Issue categories: cultlib, cultural liberalism; *eco,* environment; *ecolib,* economic liberalism; *europe,* European integration; *infra,* infrastructure; *iref,* institutional reform (see Chapter 2).

In all four elections, an economic and a cultural line of opposition emerge. Both in the 1970s and in the 1990s–2000s, the economic conflict is characterized by the antagonism between support for the welfare state and economic liberalism, representing the traditional state-market divide. From the distances between the two poles of the economic divide, we can see that divisions regarding economic policy ran deeper in the 1998 and 2002 elections than in the two earlier contests. Regarding the cultural divide, a transformation occured between the 1970s and the 1990s. In 1976, this dimension was structured by diverging positions regarding cultural liberalism, while both budgetary rigor and support for the army were at the opposing end of the dimension in the traditionalist political space. From a theoretical point of view, both issues can plausibly be interpreted as the counter-pole to cultural liberalism, and I have drawn the axis halfway between them. In 1994, however, when the immigration issue appeared on the political agenda, a traditionalist-communitarian counter-concept to cultural liberalism had emerged.[2] The universalistic values embodied in cultural liberalism were less polarizing in this election, as the centrist location of the category shows. This is an exception, however, because the cultural divide clearly cut across the economic divide in the 1998 and 2002 campaigns, and both poles structure party oppositions.

In other words, a cultural divide placing a libertarian-universalistic position and a traditionalist-communitarian position in opposition had clearly taken shape in Germany in the 1990s, as it had in France and Switzerland. In principle, this should have provided a favorable opportunity structure for right-wing populist parties. The transformed cultural divide resembles the "parochialism versus cosmopolitism" dimension on which Kitschelt and McGann (1995: 226) found the Republicans' electorate taking an extreme position in an analysis based on data from 1990. This dimension did not structure the attitudes of the other electorates, however. Combined with Martin Dolezal's (2008: table 9.2) finding that both cultural liberalism and immigration were part of a cultural dimension underlying voters' attitudes in the 1998 and 2002 elections, we can conclude that a line of conflict that was initially relevant only for extreme-right voters became the focal point of party competition in Germany.

The positions of the parties in the political space are analyzed in more detail in the next section, but some broad evolutions deserve notice here. The configurations in Figure 7.1 show that the Union parties took a clear position along the cultural dimension in the 1970s, and the CDU has also been located nearest to the traditionalist-communitarian pole since 1994. The position of the CSU does not appear more extreme than that of the CDU, but this may also be due to the more limited information we have concerning its stances. The SPD's location is

[2]For the 1994 campaign, 2.7 percent of the sentences fall into the immigration category, slightly below the share of 3 percent usually employed as a minimum for inclusion in the MDS solution (see Chapter 4). I have lowered the minimum share of sentences for this election to allow the representation of immigration. In 1998 and 2002, 6.3 percent and 4.1 percent of the sentences, respectively, concerned immigration (see Appendix A).

less clear-cut than that of the CDU. In 1976, when it formed a coalition with the liberals, it constituted a left-libertarian pole, while the FDP took an economically rightist and culturally libertarian position. In the later campaigns, however, the SPD adopted more centrist stances and abandoned its distinctive position, which is now occupied by the Greens. Similarly to the SPD, the FDP also distanced itself from cultural liberalism, especially in the 2002 election. Finally, the post-communist PDS appeared to be left-libertarian in 1994 and 1998 but cannot be represented in the 2002 solution because of insufficient media coverage of its policy stances.

Unlike in Switzerland and France, in Germany European integration has not constituted a salient issue. Europe played a role in only the 1994 election, and favorable stances regarding the European Union (EU) lie close to the traditionalist-communitarian area of political space. This reflects the CDU's traditionally strong support for integration. In Germany, European integration therefore is not associated with libertarian-universalistic positions, as theoretically expected. This reflects a pro-European consensus in Germany, where no relevant political actor has mobilized against European integration. Furthermore, mass attitudes regarding the EU traditionally have also been quite favorable in Germany. Despite less enthusiasm for the EU since the 1980s, the fear of losing sovereignty is not widespread (Díez Medrano 2003; Dolezal 2008). As the surveys employed in this chapter show, partisanship is not structured by attitudes regarding the EU to a significant degree. The average attitudes of the supporters of the CDU and SPD hardly differ, and the voters for the Greens and the FDP stand out for their pronounced pro-European attitudes (results not shown here). For this reason, and because we lack reliable information on the positions of parties, the EU dimension is not examined in this chapter.

For the subsequent analyses of the positions of the parties and of their voters, the dimensions of opposition are defined as follows: For the economic divide, welfare and economic liberalism emerge as polarizing issues in all four contests, and the case is therefore straightforward. As Table 7.3 shows, attitudes regarding economic liberalism, at least, can be measured on the demand side in all four elections using survey data. As far as the cultural divide is concerned, I use orientations regarding cultural liberalism, budgetary rigor, and the army in the 1976 election. Both neo-conservative calls to cut back the state and insistence on a strong army theoretically make sense as traditionalist counter-poles to libertarian positions. Survey data allow only an operationalization of cultural liberalism on the demand side, however. In the three more recent contests, I uniformly use cultural liberalism and immigration to locate parties and voters, and items pertaining to these categories are available in the three surveys. For all subsequent analyses, the party vote (*Zweitstimme*) is used to identify respondents' partisanship. The first vote is cast in single-member districts, and in most of them the SPD and Union parties alone have realistic chances of winning a seat, resulting in widespread strategic voting. By contrast, the second vote, which is cast in fairly large multi-member districts, allows respondents to cast a sincere vote.

TABLE 7.3 Relevant Issue Categories and Available Data on the Demand Side in Germany

	Economic Dimension		Cultural Dimension		
	Welfare	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	Budget	Army
1976	X	X	X	—	—

	Economic Dimension		Cultural Dimension	
	Welfare	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	Immigration
1994	X	X	X	X
1998	—	X	X	X
2002	—	X	X	X

Note: X indicates that the category can be operationalized and that a single dimension results from the factor analysis. See Chapter 4 for an explanation of this procedure and Appendix C for a list of the items used for each category.

Parties and Voters on the Cultural Divide

Position, Match, and Polarization

To identify the types of opposition prevalent along the cultural divide, the positions of parties and voters are presented in Figure 7.2, together with the values for the polarization of the party system and the match between parties and voters. In the 1976 election, parties represented an opposition between the social-liberal government and the Christian Democrats along the libertarian-traditionalist divide, with positions being highly polarized. As indicated by the match between political supply and demand, the party system reflected voters' preferences almost perfectly. A two-block structure is clearly discernible at both levels.[3]

There is a clear difference between the situation in the mid-1970s and the three more recent contests, in which the old contrast was no longer present. The most striking feature of the new pattern is that the two major parties were no longer taking strongly opposing positions, and the same holds true for their electorates. In the 1994 contest, a year after the new immigration law took effect, the SPD and CDU lay very close to each other, a finding that recurs in the later elections. The two major parties were located in the libertarian-universalistic spectrum in 1994, moved to the center in 1998, and moved back to the left in 2002. For the 1994 election, newspapers focused on the three traditional German parties, and we cannot place the smaller actors, which tended to take much more extreme positions in the later contests. This is particularly true of the Greens, while the FDP hovered between the mainstream positions of the two major parties and a more decidedly libertarian-universalistic stance. Finally, as discussed earlier, at no point do the media give any cues about the political program of the parties of the extreme right.

[3]Non-voters are included in this graph because they stand out for their traditionalist positions, possibly indicating an electoral potential to the right of the Union parties. This contrasts with the centrist average location of non-voters in later years. For this reason, they are generally not shown in the figures.



FIGURE 7.2 Parties and voters on the cultural divide in Germany, 1976–2002: Position, match, and polarization.

KEY *Political groups:* CDU, Christian Democratic Union; CSU, Christian Social Union (only in Bavaria); EXR, extreme-right parties (including the National Democratic Party, German People's Union, and Republican Party); FDP, Free Democratic Party, liberals; PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism; REP, Republican Party; SPD, Social Democratic Party.

A new pattern of opposition has thus emerged that is characterized by similar stances of the SPD and the Union, while the smaller parties occupy the universalistic space to the left of the SPD that the SPD abandoned after the mid-1970s. This pattern mirrors the distribution of preferences on the voter side. Except for 1998, when the figure for match barely reaches the level indicating congruent representation, the correlation between the positions of parties and those of their voters is very high, indicating that the party system is responsive to voters' preferences. While large parts of the electorate are bound into an alliance with two major centrist parties, the Greens mobilize the forefront of the New Left. Their voters consistently lie at the universalistic pole of the divide. This creates an imbalance in the party system, as there is no counter-pole to the Greens. A potential for differentiation on the right would exist, however: Since the center of the axis halves the distribution of respondents' preferences, there are obviously many voters with more traditionalist-communitarian outlooks than the average Union voter.

However, apart from the small group of extreme-right followers, these voters do not seem inclined to support new or anti-establishment political parties. In fact, it is interesting to note that in 1994, Republican voters did not appear more extreme than Christian Democratic voters. This could indicate that a considerable share of Republican voters were protest voters, as Bettina Westle and Oskar Niedermayer (1992) have suspected, while Falter (1994) has found evidence that these voters in fact hold extremist worldviews. However, reliable conclusions are precluded by the extremely limited number of Republican voters in the survey employed here (9 respondents). In the 1998 and 2002 elections, where there were more respondents, the situation was different. I have subsumed voters for the Republican Party, the NPD, and the DVU under the extreme-right label, and this electorate was clearly situated at the extreme of the cultural dimension. As we would expect, they expressed fierce opposition to both immigration and cultural liberalism. At the same time, the extreme right appeared unable to mobilize beyond its core constituency of hard-line authoritarians. By and large, the established parties have kept the immigration issue off the political agenda since the immigration law was reformed, containing the salience of this issue in voting decisions. While the Union parties do at times take restrictive stances that differ considerably from those of the SPD (see Appendix A), these statements are relatively marginal. At the highest, in the 1998 election campaign, 6.3 percent of all sentences concerned immigration. Cultural liberalism has been far more salient, and therefore more important, in determining positions on the cultural dimension.[4]

To a large degree, then, voters with traditionalist-communitarian worldviews appear to vote for the Union parties. However, the hypothesis that the mainstream right's integrative strategy is aided by the CSU's being more extreme than

[4]As explained in Chapter 4, the two issue categories are weighted by salience to make party locations reflects their position with respect to the overall public debate.

the CDU is not confirmed in this analysis. The CSU is located only slightly to the right of the CDU, and the same holds true for its electorate. Thus, the Union parties do not permanently mobilize the traditionalist-communitarian potential. Rather, this potential remains latent most of the time and does not manifest itself politically. This, in turn, is possible only because of the collusive strategy that the major parties of the left and right generally and in times of "normal politics" pursue, combined with the Union's moving to the right whenever the immigration issue actually surfaces in the public debate. As the bars indicating the standard deviation of voters' preferences show, the electorates of the SPD and Union parties are characterized by similar degrees of heterogeneity and by some degree of overlap. Only the Greens escape the centripetal dynamic. To a more limited degree, this holds true for the post-communist PDS, but in the elections under study here, the party remains an Eastern German phenomenon. As we will see, supporters of the PDS stand out even more for their strong welfare-statist preferences. Finally, the FDP differs markedly from the two major parties only at times, and its voters are also located in the center of the distribution.

The centripetal nature of competition between the major parties of the left and right along the cultural divide helps to explain the limited success of parties that attempt to mobilize a similar clientele, as right-wing populist parties do in other countries. By leaving the libertarian-universalistic spectrum to the Greens, the SPD has abandoned the New Left conviction it displayed in the 1970s and has moved to a more orthodox leftist position. As mentioned earlier, blue-collar workers, who, together with those who have low levels of formal education, represent the core clientele of right-wing populist parties in other countries, have remained faithful to the Social Democratic left in Germany. And this is the case despite the fact that skilled and unskilled workers, as well as citizens with little formal education, have developed relatively anti-universalistic and anti-immigrant orientations since the 1970s to a similar degree in Germany as in other Western European countries (see Kriesi et al. 2008; see esp. Dolezal 2008 on Germany). It is quite plausible that the SPD has kept this electorate from becoming alienated by taking a centrist posture regarding the conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community.

Ideological Blocks, Voters' Loyalties, and Resulting Patterns of Oppositions

In all but the 1976 election, the very nature of the patterns of cultural opposition in Germany has impeded a clear-cut identification of ideological blocks, which is necessary to implement the analytical model set out in Figure 3.2. Because of the break in the patterns of opposition between the 1970s and the 1990s, the 1976 election is treated separately. In that early contest, which is marked by antagonism between the libertarian and the authoritarian blocks (the SPD and FDP as opposed to the Union parties), loyalties were very strong,



FIGURE 7.3 Stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, center-left, and center-right ideological blocks in Germany, 1994–2002 (% loyal voters).

with 85.3 percent and 90.2 percent of the electorate, respectively, having voted for the same block in the preceding election. Because the party system was quite polarized and reflected voters' preferences closely, the cultural divide represented a *segmented cleavage* in 1976.

In the 1990s, the SPD and the FDP abandoned their decidedly libertarian position. Of the four ideological blocks that can theoretically be distinguished along the new cultural divide, the New Right block is insignificant in Germany. Within the remaining three blocks, only the division between old left (the SPD) and New Left (the Greens) is reflected in segmented ideological positions. Compared with this divide, the distance between the SPD and the Union parties is smaller at the voter level and at the party level. Nonetheless, it is sensible to distinguish these two blocks in analyzing the stability of alignments because of the "genetic" criterion discussed in Chapter 4. The opposition between the SPD and the Union parties traditionally has been, and to some degree remains, the political expression not solely of the class divide but also of the religious cleavage. The associated moral questions live on in conflicts over new cultural issues. Figure 7.3 shows the stability of alignments to the left-libertarian, the center-left, and the center-right blocks since 1994, when the new pattern of opposition emerged. I have subsumed only Green Party voters under the left-libertarian label, because the supporters of the PDS less consistently demonstrate a libertarian-universalistic outlook and lie between Green Party and SPD voters. The SPD and the PDS thus form the center-left block, while supporters of the Union parties and of the FDP form the center-right block. Extreme-right voters are few in number and do not fit into any of these blocks because of their combination of cultural and economic preferences, a point I return to later.

Figure 7.3 reveals that loyalties to the two center blocks started at comparably high levels in 1994 but developed differently thereafter. While the stability

of alignments to the center-left declined between 1998 and 2002, the center-right gained ground and demonstrated the highest level of loyalty of all of the ideological blocks in 2002. The loyalty of libertarian-universalistic voters to the Green Party shows a slow but steady increase, which points to a growing institutionalization of the divide within the left. Applying the model from Figure 3.2, the four elections can be classified as follows. In 1994, the party system was feebly polarized but nonetheless responsive to the electorate. In conjunction with the relatively strong loyalties of both center-left and center-right voters, the cultural divide therefore represented an *identitarian cleavage,* in which alignments were stabilized by strong political identities and historical cleavages—in this case, by the remains of the religious-secular divide. However, this does not hold for voters with strongly libertarian-universalistic convictions, who lost their spiritual home in the SPD and were only in the process of developing strong loyalties to the Greens.

By 1998, party positions had become much more polarized, and the system by and large retained responsiveness. Loyalties remained stable or deepened, as in the case of the left-libertarian block, and the cultural divide therefore constituted a *segmented cleavage,* as in 1976. The pattern changed again in 2002, when polarization dropped considerably and the match between parties and voters rose. With loyalties to the two major blocks moving in opposite directions, this case is somewhat ambiguous to classify. Because of the eroding allegiance of SPD voters, in part reflecting defections to the Union parties but also to the Greens, the situation became more competitive. Overall, however, 78.6 percent of those who had cast a valid vote in 1998 chose a party that belonged to the same ideological block four years later (data not shown here). With more than three-quarters of the electorate remaining loyal, we can safely classify the cultural divide in 2002 as an *identitarian cleavage,* acknowledging that this is less clear within the left than between left and right.

Summary: Patterns of Cultural Conflict and the Extreme-Right Potential

Since the 1970s, oppositions along the cultural divide have oscillated between a segmented cleaveage and an identitarian cleavage. In conjunction with the qualitative analysis presented earlier, we can conclude that this has facilitated the containment of the extreme-right potential. In two of the four elections studied, in 1994 and in 2002, the major parties and their voters were not deeply divided, and only the Green Party and its electorate escaped the centripetal dynamic. At the same time, loyalties remained high, limiting the potential for new political actors to mobilize those sections of the electorate that support right-wing populist parties in France and Switzerland. Contrary to the situations in France and Switzerland, in Germany there is a divide within the left, and the left-libertarian block is not hegemonic, containing the potential for a traditionalist-communitarian counter-mobilization.

That said, over the long term, identitarian cleavages are less likely to inhibit the emergence of new political parties than segmented cleavages, because political conflicts are not constantly reinforced and the underlying collective identities are not reactivated. In the German case, though, loyalties are not only historically formed along the segmented cleavage that one could still observe in 1976 but are also sporadically reinforced by more polarized electoral campaigns, as the example of 1998 shows. However, the dividing line between the left-libertarian and the center-left block is more in flux, since the Greens had only begun to build a loyal following in the 1990s. The decline of fidelity to the center-left is largely due to a process of reconfiguration within the left rather than to a more general opening of the cultural cleavage. The next section provides evidence that supports this hypothesis by showing how conflicts along the state-market cleavage reinforce the divide between the left and right.

Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide

Position, Match, and Polarization

Because the opposition between the major actors in the German party system reflects both a cultural cleavage and the state-market cleavage, the patterns of opposition in the economic domain have important consequences for the stability of the party system as a whole. Compared with other countries, in Germany the economic divide was relatively salient throughout the 1990s because of the economic challenges resulting from the reunification of the country. According to Gerd Mielke (2001: 90), the problems of unemployment and the question of the viability of the system of social protection have resulted in a "renaissance of the social question" in structuring the party system. And, in fact, party positions were more polarized along the economic dimension in the 1990s and early 2000s than in the 1976 election, as Figure 7.4 shows. In 1976, parties differed less regarding economic policy than they did concerning the cultural divide, and we can also see that the social-liberal coalition was far less united in economic-policy making than it was in regard to cultural issues. The largest gap in ideological profile is between the Social Democrats and the CDU. On the whole, the party system is responsive.

In the later elections, the left and right blocks first diverged in the 1994 election, while the 1998 and 2002 campaigns brought a convergence of the major parties as a consequence of the SPD's move toward the center. Since 1998, party positions have not demonstrated a clear division into two ideological blocks. This centripetal pattern of competition between the SPD and the Union parties mirrors a similar proximity of their electorates, which could already be observed in 1994. Looking at the match between the positions of parties and voters reveals an adaptation of the parties to their respective electorates. In the 1994 election, the party system as a whole did not represent voters well. Most obviously, the SPD's voters were much more centrist than their party, and the same holds for



FIGURE 7.4 Parties and voters on the economic divide in Germany, 1976–2002: Position, match, and polarization.

KEY *Political groups:* CDU, Christian Democratic Union; CSU, Christian Social Union (only in Bavaria); EXR, extreme-right parties (including the National Democratic Party, German People's Union, and Republican Party); FDP, Free Democratic Party, liberals; PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism; REP, Republican Party; SPD, Social Democratic Party.

the Greens. Four years later, the SPD had moved toward the center, and in 2002, the Greens followed suit. With these reorientations, the party system regained responsiveness, as demonstrated by the high match in positions of parties and voters. As a consequence, only the PDS and the FDP escaped the centripetal dynamic of competition.

Two further points deserve mention. The first concerns the extreme right. We can see that the supporters of the NPD, the DVU, and the Republican Party were actually extreme on the cultural and economic dimensions in the two latest contests, combining xenophobic authoritarianism with strong welfare-statist stances. This profile is extraordinary and contrasts with that of supporters of modern right-wing populist parties, who do not share homogeneous preferences regarding economic policy. However, those who voted for the Republicans in 1994 once again stand out for having preferences similar to those of Christian Democrats and obviously did not constitute a distinct electorate in ideological terms. Also, a significant group of non-voters with more leftist preferences than those of the average SPD supporter develops in 1998 and 2002, indicating a left-wing potential that was not being absorbed by the established parties and that is likely to have fueled the emergence of the Left Party.

The Stability of Alignments along the State-Market Cleavage and Implications for the German Party System

Looking at the stability of alignments along the economic divide sheds light on the role of that divide in the overall structure of alignments. For the definition of ideological blocks, the "genetic" historical criterion is sufficient in most cases. The SPD emerged from the labor movement of the late nineteenth century, while the Union parties and the FDP form the opposing, market-friendly camp regarding the class cleavage. The case is also simple for the post-communist PDS, and the Greens—at least until 1998—clearly had a leftist profile. Extreme-right voters are assigned to neither of the two blocks. Figure 7.5 reveals highly stable alignments over the entire period from 1976 to 2002. The findings confirm that the weakness of the center-left block observed in the earlier analysis is to a large degree due to reconfigurations between the left-libertarian and center-left blocks, while loyalties to the left as a whole remain high. Even in 2002, they reach levels comparable to those sixteen years earlier. Loyalties to the right have declined since the earliest election but regained stability in the latest contest. In light of the relatively similar positions of the major parties and their voters, this result is remarkable.

Confrontations in the 1976 election evolved around an *identitarian cleavage,* in which alignments were stabilized not by virulent conflicts but by strong political identities that resulted from earlier conflicts. In 1994, the party system was unresponsive. While the overall polarization was just below .5, the SPD, which took more radical stances than its voters, showed *organizational cartelization.* At the same time, long-standing voter loyalties checked realignments in



FIGURE 7.5 Stability of alignments to the left and right ideological blocks in Germany, 1976–2002 (% loyal voters).

favor of the established right. In the remaining two elections, when the party system regained responsiveness, the state-market divide represented a *segmented cleavage* (in 1998) and an *identitarian cleavage* (in 2002) because polarization was relatively modest.

Overall, we find that the economic cleavage is similar in nature to the cultural divide: characterized by rather low levels of polarization but with occasional instances of segmentation. To a large degree, then, ideological alignments are based on acquired political identities rather than on contemporary conflicts. Because parties never leapfrog one another's positions, voters know what they stand for. At the same time, the performance of governments will be decisive in stabilizing alignments in the longer run. After all, both dimensions that structure competition in the German party system would be classified as competitive political dimensions, according to my model, if it were not for the remarkably strong political identities that have developed out of long-established patterns of conflict. In a last step, by looking at individual-level voting determinants, the following question is addressed: How firmly rooted are the collective identities that underlie the stability of the German party system in differing ideological orientations?

Political Divides as Determinants of Voting Choices

Given the centripetal pattern of oppositions of the major parties and their electorates along both dimensions of party interaction in Germany, we cannot yet be sure about the degree to which these conflicts really structure partisan alignments for the entire electorate. The rival interpretation would read that the conflicts found in the election campaigns are relevant only for the supporters of the smaller and ideologically more extreme parties. Party identifications with

TABLE 7.4 Political Dimensions as Determinants of Voting Choices in Germany, 1976–2002 (logistic regressions run separately for each party)

		Parties						
Dimensions		Green Party	Party of Democratic Socialism	Social Democratic Party	Free Democratic Party	Christian Democratic Union	Christian Social Union	Extreme Right (1976, 1998, 2002) or Republican Party (1994)
				1976				
Economic	odds	—	—	.6***	1.1	1.6***	1.4**	—
	z	—	—	−6.5	.8	5.4	3.1	—
Cultural	odds	—	—	.4***	.8*	1.8***	1.6***	—
	z	—	—	−9.4	−2.3	6.8	4.1	—
Pseudo R^2		—	—	14.7%	1%	10.1%	5.3%	—
				1994				
Economic	odds	.8	.5***	1.0	1.8***	1.2***	1.0	1.2
	z	−1.5	−5.6	−.1	3.8	3.5	−.1	.6
Cultural	odds	.3***	.6***	.9#	1.2	1.6***	1.4#	1.7
	z	−7.7	−6.1	−1.7	1.5	7.7	1.8	1.0
Pseudo R^2		16.3%	9.4%	.2%	4%	4%	1%	2.2%
				1998				
Economic	odds	1.0	.4***	.9	2.4***	1.5***	1.2	.6
	z	.2	−4.1	−1.6	3.9	5.1	.8	−1.6
Cultural	odds	.2***	.6***	.8***	.9	1.7***	1.2	10.1***
	z	−7.4	−3.9	−3.2	−.7	6.4	1.1	6.6
Pseudo R^2		20.5%	8.8%	.9%	8.3%	5.9%	.5%	30.9%
				2002				
Economic	odds	1.0	.3***	.8*	1.2	1.5***	1.4*	.4***
	z	.3	−7.8	−2.1	.7	4.1	2.4	−3.8
Cultural	odds	.4***	.6*	.8**	1.1	1.5***	1.7***	7.9***
	z	−6.4	−2.3	−2.5	.9	4.9	4.2	4.7
Pseudo R^2		8.7%	20.1%	1.2%	.4%	4.4%	4.4%	34.2%

Note: Extreme right as employed in 1998 and 2002 includes the German People's Union, the National Democratic Party of Germany, and the Republican Party.

Number of observations: 1,054 (1976); 1,921 (1994); 1,421 (1998); 1,307 (2002).

Significance levels: $^{\#}p \le .10$ $^{*}p \le .05$ $^{**}p \le .01$ $^{***}p \le .001$.

the major parties could exclusively be the product of past conflicts, which are no longer of much relevance today. The large overlap between the orientations of SPD and Union voters lends some plausibility to this interpretation.

Table 7.4 shows the effects of voters' positions on the two dimensions on party choice, based on separate binary logistic regressions for each party. Overall, the vote for the SPD and the CDU can be better explained with voters' ideological positions for 1976 than for the later elections. This is particularly true for the SPD, which lost its ideological profile completely in 1994. This is the case for

both the cultural dimension and the economic divide. In the 1998 and 2002 elections, the SPD gained a somewhat sharper profile, but what we can explain with ideological variables in terms of voting choices for the SPD alone is quite limited. Two competitors within the left have had more clear-cut profiles. The Eastern German PDS is the only party that has continued to mobilize economically leftist voters, which helps to explain the success of its alliance with the Western German WASG in the 2005 elections. Somewhat unexpectedly, the PDS also rallies voters who adhere to libertarian-universalistic values. One has to keep in mind, though, that in the elections studied here, this is a finding based on the Eastern states. In Germany as a whole, it is the Greens that most strongly mobilize a highly ideological electorate that strongly endorses libertarian-universalistic values. As in France and Switzerland, Green Party voters in Germany do not stand out for their economic preferences, and it is therefore misleading to depict them simply as standing to the left of the SPD. Instead, they are the mirror image of the populist right, which is absent in Germany. To sum up the results for the left of the political spectrum, we find that the new cultural dimension plays a role in structuring alignments. Contrary to the findings in France and Switzerland, in Germany this potential is mobilized more or less exclusively by the Greens and, in the Eastern part of the country, by the PDS. These results thus confirm Richard Stöss's (2002: 419) finding that the SPD is the real "people's party" that mobilizes voters near to the overall mean of citizens' preferences on both dimensions.

Turning to the right of the political spectrum, it is interesting to note—and highly relevant for the mobilization space of the extreme right—that the Christian Democratic CDU is *not* the mirror image of the SPD. Corresponding to its traditional cleavage position, the CDU mobilizes an electorate that is distinct in both economic preferences and cultural orientations. Although the amount of variance explained by voters' positions on the two dimensions has been lower in recent years than it was in 1976, the CDU continues to attract voters who are more traditionalist-communitarian as well as more market-liberal in economic terms. It is actually the Bavarian CSU that—similarly to the SPD—often mobilizes a diverse following, which is due to its nearly hegemonic position in Bavaria. However, it did attract voters with traditionalist-communitarian worldviews in 2002. Overall, the Christian Democrats are solidly rooted in the traditionalist-communitarian milieu, a pattern that holds regardless of the degree of polarization in the particular campaign. While polarization along the cultural divide reached high levels only in the 1998 election (see Figure 7.2), the CDU consistently has rallied the counter-pole to the Greens. Finally, the FDP oscillates between a centrist pattern of mobilization and a more ideological appeal based on market-liberal convictions, but it has not mobilized a culturally distinct electorate since the 1970s.

The results presented in Table 7.4 also provide some relevant information about the electorate of the right-wing extremist parties. First, the results confirm that the Republicans did not mobilize a particularly extreme electorate in 1994.

This changes in the later elections, however, when the extreme-right group consists of voters for the NPD and the DVU, as well as for the Republicans. Here we see that having an extreme traditionalist-communitarian outlook makes the odds of voting for a party of the extreme right rise considerably: For no other party are voting choices so dependent on ideological variables, as the amount of variance explained indicates. At the same time, this also reflects the limits of the mobilization capacity of the extreme right, which has been unable to reach beyond a hard core of voters that are extreme in their anti-universalistic and exclusionist stances. As Falter (1994) and Arzheimer and colleagues (2001) have shown, it is the interaction of a number of factors that raises the probability of a vote for the extreme right: Only the conjunction of an extreme-right worldview and feelings of political discontent or economic deprivation push citizens into voting for the those parties. The Union parties continue to integrate voters with far-right orientations who lack these supplementary features. The analysis presented here, which locates voters separately on the two dimensions of conflict, shows that those who support the extreme right also demonstrate an unusual combination of extreme attitudes regarding economic policy and cultural issues.

To summarize, the results confirm the reinvigorated cleavage hypothesis. The highly stable alignments in Germany are firmly rooted in ideological differences that pertain to state involvement in the economy, as well as in diverging normative conceptions of community and justice. The CDU—and to some degree the CSU, as well—attracts an electorate that is distinct because of its traditionalist-communitarian and economically more liberal outlook. The Union is therefore more firmly anchored in the two cleavages than the SPD, whose voters are less distinct in ideological terms. As a consequence, the SPD is obviously more vulnerable to the changing moods of public opinion and more dependent on its candidates' performance in office. The relative homogeneity of the Union's electorate suggests that the established right should be more successful in preventing the emergence of a party of the New Right than the SPD proved to be regarding its New Left competitor.

Conclusion

In gauging the impact of the strategies of the established parties on the success of right-wing populist challengers, the analysis presented in this chapter underlines the usefulness of an approach that focuses not only on the populist right's closest competitors but also on the parties situated at the libertarian-universalistic counter-pole of the cultural divide. While the Union parties pursued a polarizing strategy in the early 1980s, similarly to other established right parties, the German trajectory differs from that of other countries in two respects. First and foremost, the SPD abandoned the decidedly left-libertarian position it had occupied in the 1970s and has not attempted to exploit the issue of community. It has refrained from endorsing strong counter-conceptions to the ethnic-communitarian model

of citizenship defended by the Union and moved to the center of the cultural divide. This has entailed the loss of its libertarian-universalistic electorate to what has become one of the most successful ecologist parties, but it has also prevented a more fundamental reconfiguration of the party system.

Partly as a consequence, the Union has retained ownership of the immigration issue and of the more general defense of traditionalism. Its hegemonic position in the traditionalist-communitarian political space has given it sufficient leeway to pursue an accommodative strategy whenever it has faced a challenger from the extreme right. Except for such occasional strategic jumps into traditionalist-communitarian terrain, however, the Union parties have cultivated a moderate center-right political discourse. The analysis also disconfirms the hypothesis that the Union parties' integrative capacity is aided by the Bavarian CSU's being more extreme than the CDU.

Several authors have argued that a mainstream right party that leaves little room for an extreme-right competitor limits the extreme right's success, and that the convergence of the mainstream parties fosters it (e.g., Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Kitschelt with McGann 1995; Luebbers et al. 2002). Building on the role of conflict in structuring political identities, the analysis presented in this chapter suggests a different account that is more in line with Meguid's (2005) approach. On the one hand, the major parties play down those issues that could prove most disruptive for existing alignments, and cultural conflicts therefore revolve more around cultural liberalism, where the SPD's and the Union's positions differ less. On the other hand, the Union reveals a more pronounced position regarding immigration whenever the issue makes its way onto the political agenda and thereby inhibits the entry of an extreme-right competitor. It is thus the *conjunction* of the strategies of the established parties of the left and right in Germany that allows them to integrate vast parts of the electorate and, in particular, those groups that have turned to right-wing populist parties in other countries. The role of the National Socialist legacy in shaping these strategies should not be neglected. By the same token, Germany's mass political culture results in new parties of the far right immediately being associated with the fascist past. Consequently, the established parties refuse to enter alliances with them; the media provide no coverage of their program; and even the segment of the electorate that has markedly more traditionalist and anti-immigrant sentiments than the average Union voter refuses to vote for them.

The integrative capacity of the established parties is greatly aided by the persistence of political identities that carry the imprint of the historical class and religious cleavages. Most of the time, the patterns of conflict along the economic and cultural dimensions have the character of identitarian cleavages. In the long run, this may make competition depend more and more on the performance of governments, and alignments could become more volatile. However, the party system does occasionally become more polarized. Rather than being a permanent feature, centripetal competition therefore alternates with segmented oppositions, thereby reinforcing the underlying political identities. Further, the SPD and the

Union never "leapfrog" their competitors' position and therefore remain true to what they "stand for" in voters' cognitive representations of political space.

There is more change regarding the smaller parties and the situation is less clear on the political left. As a consequence of the SPD's centrist strategy, new parties have emerged that mobilize voters who lie closer to the poles of the economic and cultural dimensions. While the Left Party may alter the patterns of economic conflict in the party system, the emergence of the Green Party, more than anything else, has contributed to maintaining older political identities despite the emergence of the new cultural conflicts. The strength of the Green Party is the flipside of the overall weakness of the libertarian-universalistic pole in electoral terms. The ecologist New Left has absorbed the libertarian-universalistic electorate in Germany and has allowed the mainstream parties to keep polarization along cultural conflicts low.

CONCLUSION

The Redefinition of Cultural Conflicts and the Transformation of Western European Party Systems

The New Cultural Conflict and Its Political Manifestation

Because of the presence of the historical class and religious cleavages, the space of political alternatives represented in Western European party systems has always been characterized by an economic and a cultural, or value-based, divide. Due to the mobilization of the New Left and the extreme populist right, the cultural divide has been redefined since the 1970s. The educational revolution of the 1960s has resulted in wide embracing of the universalistic norms advocated by the culturally libertarian New Social Movements. In many countries, Social Democratic parties have reacted to the resulting electoral potential by adopting these issues and undergoing a New Left transformation. Ecologist parties have been formed to represent citizens with universalistic outlooks. As a consequence, a libertarian-universalistic value dimension structured party positions on cultural issues in the 1970s, while the political right found it difficult to define an opposing normative ideal that could mobilize broad segments of the populace.

After some delay, right-wing populist parties have adopted a new mobilization frame that is conducive to the bonding of the diffuse traditionalist potential. By insisting on the primacy of established cultural practices over the universalistic norms of the New Left and relating this claim to an opposition to immigration, the populist right has contributed to molding a collective consciousness on the part of those who feel alienated by the societal developments of the past decades. The discursive innovation of right-wing

populist parties has resulted in the mobilization of an electorate that is characterized by homogeneous traditionalist-communitarian value orientations.

Orientations of this kind are not new as such, and their political relevance therefore depends on whether they triumph over attitudes that are related to other conflicts. The mobilization of the new cultural divide is thus the result of the waning of political identities related to class and religion and the corresponding political attachments. On the one hand, modernization and the secularization characteristic of Western European societies have reduced the impact of religion on politics. On the other hand, economic modernization, in conjunction with the processes of globalization and European integration, has weakened economically defined contrasts and collective identities. Right-wing populist parties have therefore benefited not only from the potential of cultural modernization's losers—which place universalistic values in opposition—but also from economic potentials. Paradoxically, however, they articulate these grievances predominantly in cultural, not economic, terms.

With the partial exception of Britain, where the immigration issue has not played an important role until recently, the basic structure of the party political space is remarkably similar in the countries studied in this book. An economic state-market divide and an opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values came to structure party interactions in France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany in the 1990s. Britain's political space, however, still showed similarities with that of the other countries in the 1970s, before the issue of community came to dominate cultural politics. In Germany, the established right launched the issues of immigration and traditionalism in the early 1980s, and even in the absence of a right-wing populist party, those issues played a role in the election campaigns of the 1990s. The prevalence of orientations in the German electorate similar to those on which right-wing populist parties thrive underlines the need for a theory to explain both the magnitude and the timing of the success of right-wing populist parties.

Political Conflict, Party Strategies, and the Transformation of Party Systems in France, Switzerland, and Germany

Political conflict plays a central role in perpetuating the political identities that underlie cleavages. Strong identities shaped by historical conflicts may stabilize alignments for some time, but if interactions in the party system do not reinforce the underlying divisions, voters will no longer be firmly anchored in the old structure of conflict. Consequently, the obstacles for mobilizing new divisions decrease. The lack of conflict along one dimension can also lead to the growing salience of another existing or suppressed division and to the ascendance of the corresponding group attachments. The model developed in this volume focuses on the lines of opposition prevalent in election campaigns and on the attitudes

and political loyalties they entail at the voter level. It assesses how rooted voters are in the traditional conflicts but can also be used to study how established political actors have reacted to new issues and how this shapes the fortunes of challenging parties.

The three cases that have been studied represent alternative paths for the manifestation of the traditionalist-communitarian potential. In France, the weakly institutionalized nature of the parties of the established right opened the way to the early emergence and subsequent entrenchment of a new right-wing populist party, the Front National, in the 1980s. In Switzerland, an established conservative party transformed into a party of the populist right, the Swiss People's Party (SVP). In the process, the SVP adopted the new right-wing populist discourse, forged a hierarchical internal party structure, and meshed the revolt against universalistic values in a broad anti-establishment strategy of collective-identity formation. According to these shared characteristics, both the French Front National and the SVP are exponents of an extreme-right-wing populist party family that took shape in the 1990s. Germany, by contrast, has not seen the breakthrough of a party of this type.

Because strong class identifications shaped by the state-market cleavage are likely to crosscut the broader traditionalist-communitarian identity mobilized by the populist right, Figure C.1 shows the nature of economic conflicts in the three countries studied in one election in the mid-1970s and in the three more recent campaigns. For ease of representation, only the first two elements of the model are shown: the polarization of the party system and the match between the positions of parties and their electorates, indicating the responsiveness of the party system to voters' preferences. The resulting four quadrants correspond to four basic types of divide, each of which is further differentiated in the full model according to the stability of alignments that the line of conflict entails (see Figure 3.2). For the most part, the state-market divide represents an *identitarian cleavage* because of medium to low levels of polarization and responsive party systems. In some contests, the match in the positions of parties and their voters is somewhat lower, but we do not see a generalized failure of party systems to reflect voters' preferences. However, while voters' loyalties to the left and right ideological blocks continue to be strong, economic conflicts are not been strongly reinforced by political conflict. This was already the case in the 1970s, and the situation was similar one or two decades later. Switzerland represents an exception to this general picture in that the party system was unresponsive in the 1970s but became more strongly polarized along the state-market cleavage toward the end of the 1990s than was the case in the other countries. In part, this reflects the impact of the specific programmatic mix of the SVP, which combines an extreme position on the cultural divide with a decidedly anti-state stance.

The state-market cleavage is thus kept alive by the relatively strong political identities associated with it rather than by segmented oppositions. For those parts of the electorate who do not have strong allegiances to the left and right economic blocks, the economic divide is likely to have evolved into a competitive



FIGURE C.1 Patterns of opposition along the state-market cleavage in France (F), Switzerland (CH), and Germany (D).

political dimension, where the performance of governments is decisive in voting decisions. In the long run, as established political identities fade, this is what we expect for the entire electorate. In France, an overall decline in the stability of alignments to these blocks has been evident since the 1970s, while such alignments have remained rather stable in the other countries. Loyalties related to the state-market cleavage have thus delayed, but not completely organized out, the rising prominence of political identities related to the new cultural divide.

Patterns of opposition in Switzerland and France have become more segmented along the new cultural line of conflict than along the economic divide, as Figure C.2 shows. In both countries, alignments were still structured by the religious and class cleavages in the 1970s, and the manifestation of the left-libertarian agenda in party competition first led to a loss of responsiveness of their party systems, and then to reconfigurations of partisan alignments and parties' political offerings. By the 1990s, under the impact of the mobilization of the populist right, a three-block structure had emerged in which the poles were constituted by the left-wing universalistic and the traditionalist-communitarian blocks, with the center-right squeezed in the middle. At the end of this process of party-system transformation, parties closely mirrored the positions of the electorate. Right-wing populist parties have been an integral part of a segmented



FIGURE C.2 Patterns of opposition along the cultural divide and the European-integration dimension in France (F), Switzerland (CH), and Germany (D).

Note: Except where noted otherwise ("F95 Europe," "CH95 Europe"), patterns of opposition refer to the cultural divide.

pattern of oppositions in Switzerland and France and clearly have an electorate of their own in ideological terms.

Rather than features of the electoral system or other country-specific factors that have been invoked to account for the absence of a serious right-wing populist competitor in Germany, patterns of competition in the party system have been crucial in containing the populist right's success. In contrast to France and Switzerland, party oppositions in Germany were quite segmented along a libertarian-traditionalist line of conflict in the 1970s. While maintaining responsiveness in the later elections, the party system was less polarized in two of the three recent elections. With the exception of the 1998 campaign, the pattern of oppositions has been rather centripetal. In the absence of a strong right-wing populist challenger, the two major parties of the left and right succeeded in keeping polarization low along the cultural divide in the 1990s, while strong political identities related to the left and right ideological blocks stabilize alignments. The Union parties have retained ownership of the issues related to traditionalism and immigration and continue to rally voters who hold traditionalist-communitarian preferences. Consequently, the structural potentials related to the new cultural conflict

manifest themselves in tempered form. However, even in Germany it is not the segmentation of the state-market cleavage that undercuts the salience of the new cultural divide but, rather, the way parties have dealt with cultural issues.

The clear separation between the traditional left and the New Left in Germany—which contrasts with the situation in France and Switzerland—has been one of two decisive factors in keeping overall polarization along the cultural line of conflict low. While the Social Democratic Party (SPD) held a strongly libertarian-universalistic position in the 1970s, it had moved to the center in the later elections, resulting in the emergence of a strong ecologist party, the Greens, that mobilizes voters with decidedly universalistic outlooks. Overall, the libertarian-universalistic pole is therefore politically weaker, and cultural issues have generally been less prominent than in those countries where the entire left has undergone a New Left transformation. In conjunction with the Union parties' generally centrist stance, large parts of the electorate are bound into a cultural antagonism that is far less polarized and more pragmatically handled than in France and Switzerland.

The second characteristic of the German party system is that the Union parties alone dominate the entire right-wing spectrum. This has given the Union considerable flexibility in adapting its position whenever the extreme right has managed to push immigration and the national question onto the political stage. This is visible in Figure C.2 in the contrast between the segmented structure of oppositions in the 1998 election and the more identitarian pattern before and after. The crucial feature that distinguishes Germany from France and Switzerland in this respect is that there has always been competition *within* the right in the latter two countries. In France, the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) succeeded in displacing the Union for a Popular Movement (UDF) as the dominant force in the right-wing spectrum by launching a first attempt at right-wing identity politics. When the RPR moderated its position, it was overhauled by a political force that defended a much more coherent traditionalist-communitarian worldview. To some degree, then, Jacques Chirac's new Gaullist party was an early forerunner of the populist right. The same logic applies to the SVP, which also increased its share of voters at the expense of the other established parties of the right. By putting right-wing identity politics on the political agenda, it advanced from the smallest of the four parties traditionally represented in the grand-coalition government to the strongest party in Switzerland.

Unlike the SPD in Germany, the left in Switzerland and France took a clearly adversarial position to that of the populist right and thereby pushed the polarization along the new cultural divide. The analysis confirms the argument put forward by Bonnie Meguid (2005), according to which the strategies of both the mainstream left and right determine polarizing parties' chances to emerge. This qualifies earlier hypotheses that a convergence of the major parties contributes to the success of right-wing populist parties (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Kitschelt with McGann 1995; Luebbers et al. 2002). These claims are based on expert estimates of party positions and take into account neither

the shifting positions of parties nor the varying salience of issues across campaigns. The campaign data and an analysis covering several elections draw a more nuanced picture: Most of the time, the collusion of the major parties in Germany contains the salience of divisive cultural issues. Whenever the debate over immigration emerged in the 1990s—for example, as a consequence of rising numbers of asylum seekers—the Christian Democrats crowded out their extreme-right competitors by moving to the traditionalist-communitarian pole.

To some degree, these strategies have been shaped by the explicit desire of the Social Democratic left in Germany to avoid a polarization of cultural conflicts that could actually have fostered its success. Both the New Left and the populist right stand to gain from this polarization, while the established right can only lose. While the established right's flirtation with tough stances on immigration alienates voters who are liberal in both the economic and the cultural sense, their endorsement of universalistic values will play into the hands of their extreme-right-wing competitors. An electoral coalition united by shared economic preferences risks breaking apart when cultural conflicts gain center stage. On the left, a similar logic applies to the electorate of the traditional Social Democratic parties. The difference is that the New Left has been able to compensate for the loss of its core constituencies by rallying increasing middle-class support.

The Role of European Integration

The European-integration issue introduces a fissure between the established and the populist right that reinforces the new cultural conflict in Switzerland and France. Figure C.2 shows that the European-integration project engendered the most segmented of all oppositions in the 1995 electoral contests in these two countries. There is a theoretical affinity between traditionalist-communitarian and anti-European sentiments, and where the European-integration dimension is present, the populist right has been the driving force in pushing its salience and polarization.

In Switzerland, opposition to the country's rapprochement with Europe has constituted a second, highly important mobilization frame for the populist right. While coinciding to a considerable degree with the new cultural divide, the European-integration dimension has catalyzed the forging of a traditionalist-communitarian collective identity by the SVP. What is more, it plays an important role in reinforcing the distinctiveness of the two ideological blocks constituted by the established and the populist right. In contrast to right-wing populist voters, those who vote for the established right generally favor the European project, a situation similar to that in France. The French Front National, however, can count on those voters for whom European integration represents a threat to their culture and political sovereignty, while those who feel economically threatened support the Communists. In the absence of a Euro-skeptical left-wing party, the SVP is capable of mobilizing the entire range of opponents

of the European Union. This goes part of the way toward explaining the broader appeal and larger electoral success of the populist right in Switzerland than in other countries. Germany, by contrast, lacks the necessary conditions for the mobilization of identity-based Euro-skepticism: the presence of a right-wing populist party or, more generally, a split within the right. With all actors, and especially the Union parties, traditionally supportive of European integration, the issue is not politicized.

The Institutionalization of a New Cultural Cleavage and Prospects for the Populist Right

Where the populist right has made electoral breakthroughs, it has rallied an electorate that is ideologically distinct by virtue of its extreme position on the cultural dimension of conflict. What is more, the new cultural conflict these voters voice is not merely a temporary populist backlash against the New Left and the political establishment in general. Instead, it is firmly anchored in social structure. Higher education depresses the propensity to vote for right-wing populist parties in both France and Switzerland, although the effect is clearer in France, where those with low levels of education are especially likely to vote for the Front National. The Front National and the Swiss SVP share an underrepresentation of socio-cultural specialists, the core constituency of the New Left. Due to its ability to hold on to its traditional electorate, however, the SVP mobilizes a broader electoral coalition in class terms. The working class is not overrepresented in its electorate, which is unusual for a right-wing populist party (see Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007).

The two parties vary in a further important respect: the heterogeneity of economic preferences demonstrated by their respective electorates. In France, the posture of supporters of the populist right regarding the state-market cleavage continues to differ as a function of social class. The populist right's core constituency consists of skilled workers, who have left-of-the-center economic preferences. In Switzerland, by contrast, the SVP's voters share not only homogeneous cultural preferences but also strong anti-state orientations. The differing orientations of right-wing populist voters regarding the state-market cleavage in France and Switzerland could have important consequences for the stability of their party allegiances. Similar to what Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2005) has suggested, right-wing populist parties' continuing success depends on the superior salience of cultural, as opposed to economic, collective identities, because it is with respect to the former that its voters are united through their extreme position. In both cases, however, the segmented pattern of oppositions suggests that the phase of realignment has come to an end. The traditionalist-communitarian block in France and Switzerland commands the highest loyalties along the cultural dimension, and it is unlikely that these voters will abandon their parties soon. It would thus be premature to take Jean-Marie Le Pen's losses in the 2007 presidential elections to imply an early end of the extreme populist right in France. For those

who have been socialized into the new structure of conflicts, cognitive representations of politics center on cultural, not economic, antagonisms. Considerable parts of the Front National's electorate applaud Le Pen's statement that the terms "left" and "right" have become meaningless and that the real antagonism has to do with identity. What is more, given the strength the populist right has reached, it is rather unlikely that disputes over the proper definition of binding norms, over what constitutes the basis of the national community, and over the challenge posed to national sovereignty by European unification will recede soon. Where a right-wing populist party has established itself, it also nourishes the conflicts on which it thrives, and the party system will therefore perpetuate the collective political identities underlying the antagonism between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values.

Because rival factions are more easily reconciled in a pluralist than in a hierarchical party structure, right-wing populist parties are prone to scissions. Breakaways have occurred in France and in Austria, and most recently also in Switzerland. In all of these cases, however, the populist right has recovered. Since the disadvantageous consequences of government participation and Jörg Haider's departure, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) had recruited a charismatic new leader and has not fared badly in recent elections. Its spin-off, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), has survived, as well, at least in its stronghold in Carinthia. In France, abandonment of the Front National by Bruno Mégret's faction did not harm Le Pen's success in the 2002 presidential election. The same is likely to prove true for the recent breakaway from the SVP in Switzerland. As far as the question of leadership is concerned, charismatic personalities have proved important in the mobilization of the new populist right. But its supporters do not vote for a figurehead more than the sympathizers of other parties; nor do they simply express their distrust vis-à-vis the established parties. What is more, personalities are more central in phases of realignment than in times of "normal politics," when voters rely on their ideological schemas to make political decisions.

As a result of the mobilization of the conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of justice and community, Western European party systems have thus been altered. In two of the party systems studied in this book, the new cultural conflict has evolved into a full-fledged cleavage and has displaced the religious cleavage as the second major cleavage dimension. Where right-wing populist parties have failed to break into the party system so far, it is rather unlikely that right-wing populist parties will be able to establish themselves in the future. In Germany, economic conflicts seem to be gaining room again, and a new party has emerged to the left of the Social Democrats on the state-market divide. The ensuing polarization of this dimension reinforces economically defined group divisions and puts limits on the mobilization of new conflicts. In the Netherlands, the success of the Socialist Party suggests a dynamic similar to that in Germany. But at the same time, debates over the dangers of a multicultural society and the challenge it poses to Dutch values

are still alive in the Netherlands. It remains to be seen whether Geert Wilders's Freedom Party will adopt a profile characteristic of extreme-right-wing populist parties elsewhere in Europe and defend *traditional* values, or whether he will follow Pim Fortuyn's highly original ideological stance. As I argued in Chapter 2, Pim Fortuyn claimed to defend the Dutch heritage of *universalistic* values against the allegedly intolerant immigrants; consequently, his party did not form part of the extreme-right-wing populist party family. In any event, the intensity of conflict the libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian cleavage engenders across Europe is likely to vary among countries even in the future.

The lesson to learn, therefore, is that the evolution of social structure does not determine the shape that political antagonisms will take. The configuration of party systems and the strategies of political actors impinge on and process the political manifestation of changing socio-structural antagonisms. The historical method employed by the founding fathers of the cleavage approach made them sensitive to the contingency of political development and to the pitfalls of a crude structuralism. In this book, I have sought to underline the theoretical importance and empirical applicability of an approach that focuses on the interaction of structural potentials, collective beliefs, and political agency.

APPENDIX A

Issue Positions and Issue Salience in the Campaign Data

TABLE AA.1 Issue Positions of French Parties in the Four Campaigns: Average Direction of the Coded Sentences for the Twelve Categories of Issues

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberal-ism	Cultural Liberal-ism	European Inte-gration	Culture	Anti-immi-gration	Army	Security	Environ-ment	Institu-tional Reform	Infra-structure
						Extreme Left						
1988	1.00	−1.00	−.85	1.00		1.00	1.00		1.00		1.00	
2002	1.00	.25	−1.00				−1.00		−.33		.33	
						Communist Party						
1978	.94	−.44	−.94	.46		.82			1.00	−1.00	.82	
1988	.91	−.75	−1.00	1.00	−1.00	1.00	−.80		.20		.92	
1995	.75	−1.00	−.94	.83	−.50	1.00	−.50	−1.00	1.00		.57	
2002	1.00	.33	−.87	.60		.60	−1.00		1.00		−1.00	
						Socialist Party						
1978	.71	−.35	−.86	.76		.46			.80	1.00	.58	
1988	.72	.21	−.48	.98	1.00	1.00	−.46		.29		.49	
1995	.78	−.10	−.86	.75	.95	.94	−.44	−.58	.71		.46	
2002	.63	.34	−.67	.46		1.00	−1.00		.92		.65	
						Greens						
2002	.88	−.25	−1.00	.43		1.00	−1.00		−.14		−.27	
						Movement of Left-Wing Radicals						
1978	.77	.17	−.58	.20		.50			1.00	.67	.94	
1995	.56	.00	−1.00	1.00	1.00		−1.00	1.00			1.00	
						Union for French Democracy						
1978	.23	.84	−.37	.07		1.00			.92	.61	.64	
1988	.16	.87	.30	.82	1.00	.94	.78		.76		.84	
1995	−.33	1.00	−.71	1.00	.56		1.00		1.00		.75	
2002	−.22	.64	−.28	.40		1.00	−1.00		1.00		.71	
						Rally for the Republic (Gaullists)						
1978	−.05	.85	−.04	−.72		1.00			1.00	.33	.04	
1988	.20	1.00	.32	.12	.91	.85	.56		.72		.09	
1995	.24	.60	−.47	.26	.59	.90	.76	.55	1.00		.45	
2002	.05	.94	.21	.43		1.00	−.85		.96		.00	
						Front National						
1988	−.05	.88	−.71	−.79	1.00	−.14	1.00		1.00		.73	
1995	.29	.75	.00	−.69	−1.00	−1.00	.68	.79	1.00		.64	
2002	−.13	1.00	.41	−.71		.71	.83		.77		.80	

TABLE AA.2 Issue Salience for French Parties in the Four Campaigns: Frequency (%) with which a Party Addressed Issues of a Given Category during Each Campaign and Number of Observations for Each Party (*N* and % of the corresponding election)

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	European Integration	Culture	Anti-immigration	Army	Security	Environment	Institutional Reform	Infrastructure	*N*	% of Election
						Extreme Left								
1988	52.1	2.1	27.1	6.3	.0	4.2	2.1		2.1		4.2		48	2.4
2002	36.1	13.1	34.4	.0		.0	1.6		4.9		9.8		61	5.9
						Communist Party								
1978	27.7	11.1	28.5	17.4		4.7			.9	.4	9.4		235	16.6
1988	38.2	4.8	17.0	9.1	4.2	7.9	12.1		3.0		3.6		165	8.3
1995	22.2	1.9	28.7	11.1	3.7	7.4	3.7	5.6	2.8		13.0		108	6.0
2002	43.2	8.1	20.3	6.8		6.8	8.1		4.1		2.7		74	7.2
						Socialist Party								
1978	34.5	10.2	24.8	10.6		4.3			3.1	.9	11.5		322	22.7
1988	23.4	4.2	19.2	12.5	8.7	15.4	6.3		3.8		6.6		745	37.7
1995	27.7	3.3	22.3	6.6	6.1	5.2	5.0	3.0	5.3		15.5		638	35.5
2002	31.1	13.2	12.6	10.8		7.8	4.5		15.0		5.1		334	32.3
						Greens								
2002	20.2	7.1	16.7	8.3		9.5	3.6		21.4		13.1		84	8.1
						Movement of Left-Wing Radicals								
1978	26.3	4.7	34.2	7.9		6.3			1.1	3.2	16.3		190	13.4
1995	23.1	10.3	20.5	15.4	7.7	.0	15.4	2.6	.0		5.1		39	2.2
						Union for French Democracy								
1978	20.0	5.5	23.0	17.3		5.5			5.7	10.1	12.9		456	32.
1988	19.1	9.4	18.8	6.1	8.0	18.5	2.5		9.9		7.7		362	18.3
1995	8.6	8.6	20.0	11.4	22.9	.0	2.9	.0	2.9		22.9		35	1.9
2002	20.7	12.6	18.4	11.5		4.6	8.0		16.1		8.0		87	8.4
						Rally for the Republic (Gaullists)								
1978	29.3	9.3	21.4	17.2		4.7			6.0	1.4	10.7		215	15.2
1988	21.1	3.4	19.4	11.2	4.6	8.2	13.3		11.8		7.2		475	24.0
1995	20.8	10.9	20.1	7.0	9.8	6.3	2.1	3.9	4.4		14.7		816	45.4
2002	20.1	11.7	18.2	7.7		4.0	4.7		17.9		15.7		274	26.5
						Front National								
1988	10.4	7.1	3.8	11.5	2.7	3.8	33.9		14.8		12.0		183	9.3
1995	12.3	7.0	11.4	15.8	8.8	1.8	21.9	6.1	5.3		9.6		114	6.3
2002	13.4	4.2	14.3	11.8		5.9	20.2		21.8		8.4		119	11.5

TABLE AA.3 Issue Positions of Austrian Parties in the Four Campaigns: Average Direction of the Coded Sentences for the Twelve Categories of Issues

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberal-ism	Cultural Liberal-ism	European Inte-gration	Culture	Anti-immi-gration	Army	Security	Environ-ment	Institu-tional Reform	Infra-structure
						Greens						
1994	.00	.60	−1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	−.11		1.00		−.14	
1998	.23	1.00	−.25	.47		1.00	−.60	.00	−.60	.92	1.00	
2002	.53	.00	−.13	.53	.56	.42	−1.00	−.81		1.00	.00	−.20
						Social Democratic Party						
1975	.59	−.40	−.30	.91		.69			.81	.00	.29	.90
1994	.86	.46	−.15	.65	.80	.75	.66	−.32	.87		.29	1.00
1998	.57	.89	.26	.44	1.00	.71	−.25	−.74	.50	.76	.74	
2002	.69	.67	−.58	.48	.29	.64	−1.00	−.93		.89	.74	.82
						Liberal Forum						
1994	1.00		.86	.83	1.00	1.00	.00	−1.00	1.00		−.45	
1998	.09	1.00	.83	.60	1.00	.83		.57	−1.00	1.00	.40	
						Austrian People's Party						
1975	.89	.50	−.37	.50		.14			1.00	1.00	.37	.80
1994	−.34	.88	.43	.21	.94	.26	−.14	−.14	.65		.34	1.00
1998	.15	1.00	−.04	−.51	.61	.73		−.28	1.00	.47	.70	
2002	.14	.83	.14	.34	.50	.68	.38	.30		.73	.18	.00
						Austrian Freedom Party						
1975	−.71	.73	−.17	−1.00		−1.00			1.00	1.00	.82	1.00
1994	−.20	.50	−.13	.25	.00	.50	.67	.00	1.00		.54	
1998	−.23	.56	−.05	−.55	−.13	1.00	.60	.38	1.00	1.00	.70	
2002	.38	1.00	−.50	−.83	.20	−1.00	1.00	.29		1.00	.35	.54

TABLE AA.4 Issue Salience for Austrian Parties in the Four Campaigns: Frequency (%) with which a Party Addressed Issues of a Given Category during Each Campaign and Number of Observations for Each Party (*N* and % of the corresponding election)

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	European Integration	Culture	Anti-immigration	Army	Security	Environment	Institutional Reform	Infrastructure	*N*	% of Election
							Greens							
1994	4.9	12.2	2.4	4.9	2.4	17.1	22.0	.0	17.1		17.1	.0	41	5.2
1998	15.9	2.4	14.6	23.2	.0	7.3	6.1	7.3	6.1	14.6	2.4		82	7.6
2002	11.0	1.3	2.6	11.0	5.8	8.4	4.5	11.6		27.1	10.3	6.5	155	15.8
							Social Democratic Party							
1975	12.8	8.7	12.5	6.4		15.2			6.1	4.1	9.9	24.2	343	53.6
1994	10.5	7.8	12.3	17.7	6.0	7.2	5.7	4.2	15.9		5.7	6.9	333	42.0
1998	14.7	5.0	17.2	11.4	1.1	6.6	1.1	10.0	8.9	9.4	14.7		361	33.6
2002	25.9	8.9	7.0	8.5	2.6	10.4	1.5	10.0		14.1	7.0	4.1	270	27.6
							Liberal Forum							
1994	2.2	.0	31.1	26.7	4.4	2.2	4.4	2.2	2.2		24.4	.0	45	5.7
1998	24.0	9.4	24.0	5.2	3.1	12.5	.0	7.3	1.0	3.1	10.4		96	8.9
							Austrian People's Party							
1975	17.5	11.4	22.4	4.4		20.2			1.8	.4	15.4	6.6	228	35.6
1994	17.4	5.6	17.7	12.5	5.6	6.2	2.3	6.9	12.1		11.5	2.3	305	38.5
1998	21.8	5.8	6.9	19.6	5.0	11.0	.0	16.0	2.8	4.1	6.9		362	33.7
2002	20.7	10.6	8.5	7.5	10.9	7.2	10.9	7.2		11.6	4.4	.5	387	39.5
							Austrian Freedom Party							
1975	10.1	21.7	17.4	1.4		7.2			7.2	13.0	15.9	5.8	69	10.8
1994	14.5	5.8	11.6	2.9	1.4	2.9	8.7	2.9	10.1		39.1	.0	69	8.7
1998	17.4	5.2	12.2	11.6	2.3	5.8	12.2	9.3	6.4	1.7	15.7		172	16.0
2002	23.4	3.6	8.4	7.2	13.8	.6	4.2	12.6		12.6	6.0	7.8	167	17.1

TABLE AA.5 Issue Positions of Swiss Parties in the Four Campaigns: Average Direction of the Coded Sentences for the Twelve Categories of Issues

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberal-ism	Cultural Liberal-ism	European Inte-gration	Culture	Anti-immi-gration	Army	Security	Environ-ment	Institu-tional Reform	Infra-structure
						Green Party						
1991	.83	−1.00	−.33	.63	−.81		−1.00	−.73	−.50	.85	.50	−.84
1995			−.33	.00	−.50		−1.00	−1.00		.65	−.75	−1.00
						Social Democratic Party						
1975	.77	1.00	−.71	.71		1.00		.50	−1.00	.83	.32	
1991	.74	−.09	−.20	.69	.76		−.41	−.75	−1.00	.81	.11	−.20
1995	.89	.20	.14	.52	.56		.00	−.15		.95	−.55	.08
1999	.83		−.25	1.00	1.00	.73	−.78			.58	−.33	.83
						Christian Democratic People's Party						
1975	.88	1.00	−.22	.78		1.00		.25	.25	1.00	.41	
1991	.67	.14	.20	.11	.55		−.14	−.40	1.00	.62	.58	.67
1995	.33	1.00	.53	−.25	.33		−.33	.50		.70	.46	.24
1999	1.00	.56	−.22	.84	1.00	.94	.64	−1.00	.60	.57	−1.00	1.00
						Liberals						
1975	.26	.78	.00	.47		.64		.50	.88	−.11	.22	
1991	.47	.55	.87	.37	.43		.67	.76	.92	.74	.59	.60
1995	−.56	.93	.93	.09	.44		.14	.75		.50	.21	1.00
1999	.25	.96	.85	.80	1.00	.39	.56	.00	1.00	.00	.60	.91
						Swiss People's Party						
1975	−.25	1.00	−.40	.41		1.00		1.00	1.00	.63	.09	
1991	−.32	.71	.23	−.18	−.82		.71	.75	1.00	−.10	.20	−.10
1995	.19	.94	.71	−.87	−.86		.83	.88		.92	.46	−.60
1999	−.80	1.00	.79	−.26	−.91	−.60	.69	1.00	1.00	.00	.83	1.00
						Extreme Right						
1975	.27	1.00	−1.00	−.03		1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
1991	−.50	.75	1.00	−.58	−1.00		.93	.56	1.00	−.18	1.00	.33
1995	−1.00	1.00	1.00	−.25	−1.00		.91	1.00		−1.00	.60	−.67

TABLE AA.6 Issue Salience for Swiss Parties in the Four Campaigns: Frequency (%) with which a Party Addressed Issues of a Given Category during Each Campaign and Number of Observations for Each Party (*N* and % of the corresponding election)

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	European Integration	Culture	Anti-immigration	Army	Security	Environment	Institutional Reform	Infrastructure	*N*	% of Election
							Green Party							
1991	3.4	1.1	1.7	9.1	30.7		2.8	6.3	1.1	18.8	3.4	21.6	176	12.9
1995	.0	.0	7.7	20.5	10.3		2.6	2.6		43.6	5.1	7.7	39	4.0
							Social Democratic Party							
1975	19.1	7.8	12.2	25.2		3.5		9.6	2.6	5.2	14.8		115	18.9
1991	13.5	13.1	8.2	18.4	9.4		7.0	9.0	.4	13.1	3.7	4.1	244	17.8
1995	20.2	2.7	15.3	18.0	4.9		1.1	7.1		12.0	12.0	6.6	183	18.8
1999	13.6	.0	9.1	10.6	3.0	22.7	13.6	.0	.0	9.1	9.1	9.1	66	8.7
							Christian Democratic People's Party							
1975	14.4	9.0	8.1	28.8		5.4		3.6	7.2	3.6	19.8		111	18.3
1991	10.6	2.7	3.9	19.6	15.3		8.2	3.9	2.7	23.1	5.1	4.7	255	18.7
1995	9.7	18.2	12.3	10.4	1.9		3.9	1.3		21.4	8.4	12.3	154	15.8
1999	7.6	11.0	12.4	17.2	2.8	17.9	4.8	2.8	3.4	10.3	2.1	7.6	145	19.0
							Liberals							
1975	18.6	8.0	25.2	8.4		4.9		7.1	7.5	4.0	16.4		226	37.2
1991	10.4	8.8	12.0	13.1	10.9		6.1	4.5	6.7	14.1	10.7	2.7	375	27.4
1995	7.8	9.1	26.0	13.9	11.7		6.1	3.5		1.7	12.6	7.8	231	23.7
1999	6.5	18.6	20.6	4.0	2.4	16.6	12.6	.8	3.6	3.2	2.0	8.9	247	32.4
							Swiss People's Party							
1975	8.9	8.9	11.1	24.4		4.4		8.9	12.2	8.9	12.2		90	14.8
1991	12.6	3.5	11.1	17.1	11.1		20.6	5.0	1.5	12.6	2.5	2.5	199	14.6
1995	6.2	12.5	2.4	10.7	46.0		4.2	5.9		2.1	8.3	1.7	289	29.6
1999	3.3	22.0	6.3	6.3	7.2	7.9	28.0	7.2	3.6	2.0	3.0	3.3	304	39.9
							Extreme Right							
1975	16.7	1.5	4.5	48.5		6.1		7.6	3.0	3.0	9.1		66	10.9
1991	1.7	6.8	4.2	16.1	9.3		22.9	6.8	3.4	18.6	5.1	5.1	118	8.6
1995	6.3	10.1	5.1	10.1	10.1		27.8	6.3		3.8	12.7	7.6	79	8.1

TABLE AA.7 Issue Positions of Dutch Parties in the Four Campaigns: Average Direction of the Coded Sentences for the Twelve Categories of Issues

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberal-ism	Cultural Liberal-ism	European Inte-gration	Culture	Anti-immi-gration	Army	Security	Environ-ment	Institu-tional Reform	Infra-structure
						GreenLeft						
1972	.61	.00	−1.00	1.00		1.00		−1.00	−1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1994	.56		−.50	.25		.00	−1.00		1.00	1.00		−1.00
2002	1.00			−.50		1.00	1.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	.56
2003	.43	−.14	.50	1.00			−1.00		.50	1.00	−.33	−.26
						Labor Party						
1972	.79	−.15	−1.00	.81		1.00		−.59	−.45	1.00	1.00	−.33
1994	.33	.10	.14	.33	.78	.39	−.16		.04	.75		−.33
1998	.74	−.38	−.50	.43	−.23	.89	−.50	−.50	.53	1.00		.80
2002	.23		−.41	−.31		.14	−.19	−.36	.60	.24	.00	.74
2003	.30	−.33	−.60	−.33			.10		.19	−.42	.05	
						Democrats 66						
1972	.69	−1.00	−1.00	.63		1.00		−1.00	−1.00	.20	1.00	.00
1994	.32	−1.00	1.00	.00		1.00	.00		.25	1.00		−.25
1998	.63	1.00	1.00	.68	1.00	.66	−.96	−1.00	−.04	.75		1.00
2002	.23			−.32		.11	.00	−.93	1.00	1.00	.50	
						Christian Democratic Appeal						
1972	.59	−.07	−.52	.50		.59		.00	.80	.98	.57	.65
1994	−.10	.75	.55	.58	−.17	.67	.62		.36	.81		.25
1998	−.67		.33	.19	−.20	1.00	−1.00	1.00	.78	1.00		1.00
2002	.00		−1.00	.00		.63	−1.00	.21	1.00	1.00	1.00	−1.00
2003	.24	.04	−.40	−.17			.04		.41	−.10	.10	.40
						People's Party for Freedom and Democracy						
1972	−.39	.64	.43	.40		.17		.06	.90	1.00	.58	1.00
1994	−.43	.43	1.00	−.56	−.50	−.38	.50		.64	−.08		−1.00
1998	−.33	.66	.12	−.30	−.06	1.00	.57	.90	−.05	−.72		.07
2002	−.33		.35	.24		1.00	1.00	.14	.40	.00	.00	.60
2003	−.17	.13	.27	−.31			.17		.17	.50	.38	.33
						List Pim Fortuyn						
2002	−.33		.33	−.40		.17	−.28	.08	−.13	−1.00	.47	
2003	.00	.57		−.22			−.17		.06	−.60	.38	−.65

TABLE AA.8 Issue Salience for Dutch Parties in the Four Campaigns: Frequency (%) with which a Party Addressed Issues of a Given Category during Each Campaign and Number of Observations for Each Party (*N* and % of the corresponding election)

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	European Integration	Culture	Anti-immigration	Army	Security	Environment	Institutional Reform	Infrastructure	*N*	% of Election
						GreenLeft								
1972	31.8	4.5	2.3	2.3		18.2		18.2	4.5	6.8	6.8	4.5	44	5.6
1994	20.5	.0	10.3	10.3	.0	5.1	10.3		5.1	28.2		10.3	39	5.9
2002	26.7		.0	13.3		10.0	3.3	3.3	.0	3.3	13.3	26.7	30	4.0
2003	14.6	14.6	2.1	2.1			10.4		8.3	2.1	6.3	39.6	48	6.1
						Labor Party								
1972	25.5	12.7	2.9	7.8		12.7		15.7	10.8	2.9	5.9	2.9	102	13.1
1994	20.0	4.7	3.3	7.0	4.2	20.9	11.6		16.7	10.2		1.4	215	32.3
1998	13.6	11.4	8.6	10.0	7.9	10.0	5.7	5.7	14.3	5.7		7.1	140	29.3
2002	7.3		5.8	8.8		2.6	7.7	44.2	5.5	7.7	2.2	8.4	274	36.5
2003	27.8	10.0	5.6	3.3			5.6		8.9	6.7	32.2	.0	90	11.4
						Democrats 66								
1972	36.7	4.1	2.0	8.2		12.2		10.2	2.0	10.2	10.2	4.1	49	6.3
1994	26.8	2.4	2.4	9.8	.0	4.9	9.8		19.5	9.8		14.6	41	6.2
1998	17.0	.7	5.0	25.5	2.8	11.3	9.2	2.1	19.9	5.7		.7	141	29.5
2002	18.3		.0	23.2		11.0	2.4	26.8	2.4	1.2	14.6	.0	82	10.9
						Christian Democratic Appeal								
1972	26.9	7.2	8.8	12.0		10.4		4.5	6.6	6.6	11.7	5.3	376	48.1
1994	29.3	7.8	7.8	10.6	7.4	2.1	6.0		18.7	7.4		2.8	283	42.5
1998	16.2	.0	8.1	21.6	13.5	2.7	2.7	5.4	24.3	2.7		2.7	37	7.7
2002	16.2		2.7	24.3		10.8	2.7	18.9	10.8	2.7	8.1	2.7	37	4.9
2003	22.9	9.9	4.0	16.2			4.7		22.9	11.5	4.0	4.0	253	32.1
						People's Party for Freedom and Democracy								
1972	25.2	11.9	6.7	11.4		5.7		15.2	9.5	2.9	9.0	2.4	210	26.9
1994	8.0	8.0	5.7	10.2	9.1	4.5	34.1		12.5	6.8		1.1	88	13.2
1998	13.1	10.0	10.6	6.3	21.3	1.3	8.8	3.1	6.3	5.6		13.8	160	33.5
2002	10.6		9.2	13.4		2.8	4.2	14.8	33.1	5.6	2.8	3.5	142	18.9
2003	21.2	8.8	6.9	12.4			5.5		18.9	5.5	18.0	2.8	217	27.5
						List Pim Fortuyn								
2002	22.7		4.9	22.7		3.2	10.8	7.0	17.3	1.1	10.3	.0	185	24.7
2003	2.2	7.8	.0	10.0			6.7		18.3	5.6	9.4	40.0	180	22.8

TABLE AA.9 Issue Positions of British Parties in the Four Campaigns: Average Direction of the Coded Sentences for the Twelve Categories of Issues

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberal-ism	Cultural Liberal-ism	European Inte-gration	Culture	Anti-immi-gration	Army	Security	Environ-ment	Institu-tional Reform	Infra-structure
						Labour						
1974	.92	.23	−.28	1.00	−1.00	1.00			−.67	−1.00	1.00	.82
1992	.48	−.53	−.88	−.35		.56			−.33	1.00	−.07	
1997	.41	.29	−.10	.10	−.50	.68			.86	.81	.21	.70
2001	.60	−.03	−.01	.67	.37	.55	.09		.86	.48	.70	
						Liberal Democrats						
1974	1.00	−1.00	−.27		−1.00					−1.00	1.00	1.00
1992	1.00	−.80	.60	1.00		.80				1.00	.79	
1997	.03	−1.00	−.73	.80	.89	1.00			.33	1.00	.54	.78
2001	1.00		.60	−1.00		1.00			1.00	.00	1.00	
						Conservatives						
1974	.90	.33	.09	−.16	−.50	−.05			.38	−.77	.60	.86
1992	.60	.48	.35	−.22		.61			1.00	.47	−.75	
1997	.11	.25	.48	−.21	−.79	.43			.93	1.00	.24	.42
2001	.30	.46	.23	.23	−.79	.00	.64		1.00	−.71	−.20	

TABLE AA.10 Issue Salience for British Parties in the Four Campaigns: Frequency (%) with which a Party Addressed Issues of a Given Category during Each Campaign and Number of Observations for Each Party (*N* and % of the corresponding election)

	Welfare	Budget	Eco-nomic Liberal-ism	Cultural Liberal-ism	Euro-pean Inte-gration	Culture	Anti-immi-gration	Army	Security	Environ-ment	Institu-tional Reform	Infra-structure	*N*	% of Election
							Labour							
1974	15.0	7.5	38.7	2.9	11.6	3.5			3.5	2.3	8.7	6.4	173	32.3
1992	29.4	7.2	22.2	7.7		18.6			1.4	1.4	12.2		221	38.2
1997	10.5	5.7	18.8	11.1	12.0	10.3			15.7	4.8	7.4	3.7	542	44.4
2001	13.3	3.5	20.8	4.9	13.8	7.2	2.6		13.6	7.2	13.1		428	66.7
							Liberal Democrats							
1974	24.3	13.5	29.7	.0	2.7	.0			.0	2.7	24.3	2.7	37	6.9
1992	8.2	20.4	10.2	12.2		10.2			.0	4.1	34.7		49	8.5
1997	12.2	3.0	9.1	16.5	5.5	6.1			9.1	20.7	7.9	9.8	164	13.4
2001	30.0	.0	25.0	5.0	.0	25.0	.0		5.0	5.0	5.0		20	3.1
							Conservatives							
1974	8.0	2.8	33.4	11.7	3.7	5.8			8.9	9.2	3.1	13.5	326	60.8
1992	14.9	15.6	16.9	12.0		14.9			10.4	4.9	10.4		308	53.3
1997	15.5	2.3	11.2	11.0	18.4	7.8			15.9	5.2	5.6	7.0	516	42.2
2001	11.9	7.2	6.7	6.7	25.8	10.3	11.3		8.8	3.6	7.7		194	30.2

TABLE AA.11 Issue Positions of German Parties in the Four Campaigns: Average Direction of the Coded Sentences for the Twelve Categories of Issues

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	European Integration	Culture	Anti-immigration	Army	Security	Environment	Institutional Reform	Infrastructure
Party of Democratic Socialism												
1994								−1.00	−.79	1.00	1.00	
1998	.85		.06	.80		1.00		−.67	−.33	.83	.00	.50
2002	1.00	.00	−.96	1.00						1.00	1.00	
Greens												
1994	.86	−1.00	−.70	.71		1.00	−1.00	−1.00		1.00	.75	.50
1998	.58	1.00	−.56	.67		.29	−1.00	.04	−.63	.82		−.13
2002	.33	.60	.11	.72			−1.00		.00	.98	1.00	.00
Social Democratic Party												
1976	.27	−.63	−.29	.66		.80		−.90	.21	1.00		.63
1994	.34	.87	−.93	.45	.21	.50	−1.00	−.33	.64	.50	1.00	.76
1998	.32	.40	.00	.42		.83	1.00	.17	.83	.86	.27	.79
2002	.59	−.29	.22	.40			−.44		.63	.65	.43	.78
Free Democratic Party												
1976	.07	−.78	.46	.79		.56		−.63	.00	.16		−.71
1994	.06	.33	.68	.36	−.09	.00	−.75	.60	.00	.60	.43	
1998	−.52	.92	.96	.87		.60	−.56	.07	.69	.00	.71	.71
2002	−.13	1.00	.57	.54			.33		−.50	−1.00	.88	.67
Union[a]												
1976	.30	.40	.56	−.24		.33		.45	.87			−.56
1994	.20	.73	.54	.17	.63	.60	.85	.88	.64	.76	.72	.58
1998	.09	.59	.61	−.08		1.00	.94	1.00	.97	−.05	.40	.29
2002	.43	.58	.22	.15			.64		.91	−.03	.85	.25
Christian Democratic Union[b]												
1976	.48	.59	.55	−.16		.00		.33	.89		.20	−.56
1994	−.02	.57	.32	.49	.86	.43	.85	.86	.57	.77	.60	.58
1998	.13	.28	.43	.07	1.00	1.00	.91	1.00	.97	.02	1.00	.29
2002	.30	.56	.20	.44	1.00	1.00	.56	1.00	.75	−.18	1.00	−.20
Christian Social Union[b]												
1976	−.10	.00	.67	−.38		.50		1.00	.83			
1994	.64	.81	.80	.14	.13	1.00		1.00	1.00	.70	1.00	
1998	−.07	.96	1.00	−.06		1.00	1.00		1.00	−1.00	.36	
2002	.63	.63	.38	.23	1.00	.33	.67	1.00	.97	.23	.83	1.00

[a] Used for the MDS analysis in Chapter 2.

[b] Used in Chapter 7.

TABLE AA.12 Issue Salience for German Parties in the Four Campaigns: Frequency (%) with which a Party Addressed Issues of a Given Category during Each Campaign and Number of Observations for Each Party (*N* and % of the corresponding election)

	Welfare	Budget	Economic Liberalism	Cultural Liberalism	European Integration	Culture	Anti-immigration	Army	Security	Environment	Institutional Reform	Infrastructure	*N*	% of Election
Party of Democratic Socialism														
1994	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	4.8	66.7	4.8	23.8	.0	21	2.2
1998	19.7	.0	27.3	15.2		3.0	.0	9.1	4.5	9.1	6.1	6.1	66	5.8
2002	5.3	10.5	63.2	5.3			.0		.0	5.3	10.5	.0	19	1.7
Greens														
1994	13.5	3.8	9.6	13.5	.0	1.9	3.8	7.7	.0	23.1	15.4	7.7	52	5.4
1998	18.9	1.8	4.9	18.3		4.3	7.9	7.3	9.8	17.1	.0	9.8	164	14.5
2002	11.2	4.7	8.4	16.8			.9		6.5	43.0	6.5	1.9	107	9.7
Social Democratic Party														
1976	17.5	3.4	13.2	30.3		4.3		4.3	10.3	.4		16.2	234	38.4
1994	18.3	6.7	10.3	17.9	6.3	5.4	1.3	6.7	6.3	9.4	4.0	7.6	224	23.1
1998	30.6	3.5	9.7	13.5		4.2	1.4	2.1	16.0	11.1	3.8	4.2	288	25.5
2002	18.0	8.9	18.8	29.3			1.8		9.1	6.7	2.8	4.6	505	45.9
Free Democratic Party														
1976	15.7	5.1	27.0	15.7		9.6		2.2	6.2	10.7		7.9	178	29.2
1994	13.1	8.8	18.2	20.4	8.0	7.3	5.8	3.6	5.8	3.6	5.1	.0	137	14.1
1998	18.2	6.8	14.2	25.6		2.8	10.2	4.0	7.4	2.8	4.0	4.0	176	15.6
2002	15.2	34.3	20.0	12.4			2.9		3.8	1.0	7.6	2.9	105	9.5
Union[a]														
1976	16.7	12.6	19.7	31.8		1.5		5.6	7.6	.0		4.5	198	32.5
1994	16.1	7.5	12.5	14.2	9.5	1.9	2.4	4.5	10.7	10.5	5.4	4.9	535	55.2
1998	17.9	11.5	5.1	21.6		3.9	8.3	1.8	15.4	6.7	3.4	4.4	435	38.5
2002	22.3	11.5	13.5	15.1			9.9		12.4	9.6	3.6	2.2	364	33.1
Christian Democratic Union[b]														
1976	14.7	10.9	21.2	32.1		.6		5.8	5.8		3.2	5.8	156	24.3
1994	14.7	3.5	9.4	17.5	8.9	1.8	3.3	5.6	12.2	11.7	5.1	6.6	395	40.8
1998	18.6	8.0	4.4	22.8	.9	4.7	6.8	2.4	17.4	8.0	.3	5.6	338	29.8
2002	24.2	12.6	19.8	12.1	5.3	1.0	4.4	1.5	5.8	10.6	.5	2.4	207	17.4
Christian Social Union[b]														
1976	21.3	17.0	12.8	27.7		4.3		4.3	12.8				47	7.3
1994	20.0	18.6	21.4	5.0	11.4	2.1		1.4	6.4	7.1	6.4		140	14.5
1998	15.0	23.0	7.0	17.0		1.0	13.0		8.0	2.0	14.0		100	8.8
2002	17.2	8.9	4.4	16.7	1.1	1.7	15.0	1.1	18.3	7.2	6.7	1.7	180	15.2

[a] Used for the MDS analysis in Chapter 2.

[b] Used in Chapter 7.

APPENDIX B

Datasets Used for the Demand-Side Analyses

TABLE AB.1 Post-election Surveys Used for the Analysis of Voters

France

Surveys available at the Socio-Political Data Archive (http://cdsp.sciences-po.fr):

1978: Enquête post-électorale française, 1978 (reference no. BDSP-CIDSP q0062)
1988: Enquête post-électorale française, 1988 (reference no. BDSP-CIDSP q0601)
1995: Enquête post-électorale française, 1995 (reference no. BDSP-CIDSP q0891)
2002: Panel électoral français 2002 (reference no. PEF 2002)

Switzerland

Surveys available at the Swiss Foundation for Research in Social Sciences (http://www2.unil.ch/fors):

1975: Attitudes politiques 1975 (reference no. 20) (part of "Political Action—An Eight Nation Study")
1991: VOX-Analyse der Nationalratswahlen 1991(Longchamp/Hardmeier survey)
1995: Swiss electoral study 1995 (reference no. 1815)
1999: Swiss electoral study 1999 (reference no. 6646)

Germany

Surveys available at the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA; http://www.gesis.org):

1976: Wahlstudie 1976 (ZA study no. 0823)
1994: Nachwahlstudie 1994 (ZA study no. 2601)
1998: Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998 (ZA study no. 3066)
2002: Bundestagswahlstudie 2002 (ZA study no. 3861)

APPENDIX C

Operationalization of Issue Categories on the Demand Side

TABLE AC.1 Indicators Used for the Operationalization of Issue Categories on the Demand Side

Var	Description	Category
	France: 1978	
t26	Should inequality be reduced?	welfare
t27	Should the nationalized sector be enlarged?	economic liberalism
t29	Should gains in the standard of living be controlled to fight inflation?	economic liberalism
t30	Should layoffs be banned by the state?	economic liberalism
t71	Should the right to strike be abandoned?	economic liberalism
t64	Are you proud to be French?	cultural liberalism
t73	Should people be allowed to take birth-control pills before reaching the legal age?	cultural liberalism
t77	Should schools teach discipline or critical awareness?	cultural liberalism
t87	Should children be sent to catechetical instruction?	cultural liberalism
	France: 1988	
q1a6	Does too much income equality discourage people from working?	economic liberalism
q4	Should the state control private enterprises in times of economic difficulty?	economic liberalism
q31a2	Should the state guarantee a minimum income?	welfare
q31a9	Should taxes on high assets be reintroduced?	welfare
q2a1	Do you disapprove of unmarried couples?	traditional values
q2a2	Do you disapprove of abortion?	traditional values
q2a3	Do you disapprove of infidelity?	traditional values
q2a4	Do you disapprove of homosexuality?	traditional values
q31a6	Is it women's role to raise children?	traditional values
q31a7	Does society need hierarchy?	cultural liberalism

Var	Description	Category
	France: 1988 (*continued*)	
q10	Should schools teach discipline or critical awareness?	cultural liberalism
q1a4	Are you proud to be French?	cultural liberalism
q31a5	Do Jews hold too much power in France?	cultural liberalism
q31a8	Should it be considered normal that Muslims in France have mosques?	cultural liberalism
q1a9	Are there too many immigrants in France?	immigration
q31a3	Do you agree or disagree with the statement that one no longer feels at home in France?	immigration
	France: 1995	
q36	Which should have priority: the competitiveness of the economy or the situation of employees?	economic liberalism
q20a2	Is there too much or not enough state interference in the economy?	economic liberalism
q21a4	What is your attitude regarding competition?	economic liberalism
q21a5	What is your attitude regarding profits?	economic liberalism
q21a6	What is your attitude regarding unions?	economic liberalism
q21a7	What is your attitude regarding nationalization?	economic liberalism
q21a12	What is your attitude regarding privatization?	economic liberalism
q7a1	Are there too many immigrants in France?	immigration
q7a6	Do you agree or disagree with the statement that one no longer feels at home in France?	immigration
q21a13	What is your attitude regarding Islam?	immigration
q7a3	Is homosexuality acceptable?	cultural liberalism
q7a5	Should Muslims in France have mosques?	cultural liberalism
q7a7	Should women be allowed to have abortions?	cultural liberalism
q22a1	Should schools teach discipline or critical awareness?	cultural liberalism
q20a1	Should women stay at home, or should they have the same role as men?	cultural liberalism
q21a2	What is your attitude regarding feminism?	cultural liberalism
q21a8	What is your attitude regarding authority?	cultural liberalism
	France: 2002, Wave 2	
xq237	Should layoffs be banned by the state?	economic liberalism
xq239	Should the state control private enterprises in times of economic difficulty?	economic liberalism
xq255	What is your attitude toward research on the human genome?	cultural liberalism
xq58	Should schools teach discipline or critical awareness?	cultural liberalism
xq39p2_4	Do Jews hold too much power in France?	cultural liberalism
xq39p2_1	Are there too many immigrants in France?	immigration
xq39p2_3	Do immigrants enrich our culture?	immigration
	Switzerland: 1975	
v38	Scale: state interference or free markets	economic liberalism
v53	Issue importance: the state should look after old people	welfare
v65	Issue importance: the state should provide good medical care	welfare
v68	Issue importance: the state should provide adequate housing	welfare
v80	Issue importance: the state should try to reduce the economic gap among people	welfare
v56	Issue importance: guaranteeing equal rights for men and women	cultural liberalism
v83	Issue importance: giving more aid to the Third World	cultural liberalism
v156	Do you approve of people taking drugs?	traditional values

Var	Description	Category
	Switzerland: 1975 (*continued*)	
v157	Do you approve of people showing disrespect for the national flag?	traditional values
v158	Do you approve of people living in hippie communities?	traditional values
v74	Issue importance: guaranteeing neighborhood safety from crime	law and order
v155	Do you approve of people refusing to go into the army?	army
v201	Should Switzerland join the European Community?	European integration
v77	Issue importance: providing equal rights for foreign workers	Immigration
	Switzerland: 1995	
val2	Should social expenditures be increased or reduced?	welfare
val8	Should taxes on high incomes be increased or reduced?	welfare
val1	Do you favor having a strong army or abandoning the army?	army
val3	Should Switzerland join the European Union or go it alone?	European integration
val4	Do you favor equal opportunities for foreigners or better opportunities for the Swiss?	immigration
val5	Should tradition be defended or questioned?	cultural liberalism
	Switzerland: 1999	
rp15495a	Should the state interfere in the economy or rely on the market?	economic liberalism
rp15420a	Should social expenditures be increased or reduced?	welfare
rp15480a	Should taxes on high incomes be increased or reduced?	welfare
rp15410a	Do you favor having a strong army or abandoning the army?	army
rp15430a	Should Switzerland join the European Union or go it alone?	European integration
rp15440a	Do you favor equal opportunities for foreigners or better opportunities for the Swiss?	immigration
rp15450a	Should tradition be defended or questioned?	cultural liberalism
rp15600	Is criticism regarding Switzerland's role in World War II justified or not?	cultural liberalism
	Germany: 1976	
v503	Do you prefer state control or allowing the markets to decide?	economic liberalism
v505	Do you favor state responsibility for welfare or individual responsibility?	welfare
v504	Do you favor public order, or is personal freedom more important?	cultural liberalism
v518	What is your attitude on the right to divorce?	cultural liberalism
v519	What is your attitude on abortion rights?	cultural liberalism
v506	Should churches have a say in politics?	cultural liberalism
	Germany: 1994	
v39	Scale: attitude on state stimulation of the economy	economic liberalism
v42	Scale: attitude on public housing	economic liberalism
v104	Do you agree that obedience and discipline are important?	cultural liberalism
v100	Do you favor more or less spending on retirement benefits?	welfare
v27	How important is it that the state provide public housing?	welfare
v30	How important is regulating the immigration of foreigners?	immigration
v41	Scale: make immigration easier or more difficult	immigration
v44	Should foreigners have to adapt?	immigration
v45	Should foreigners be sent back to their home countries?	immigration
v46	Should immigrants be given political rights?	immigration
v47	Do you approve of marriages between Germans and foreigners?	immigration

Var	Description	Category
	Germany: 1998	
v177a	Does the state have a responsibility to provide work for all?	economic liberalism
v350b	Scale: attitude on nationalization of important firms	economic liberalism
v176c	How important are equal rights for men and women?	cultural liberalism
v350a	Are you proud to be German?	cultural liberalism
v350c	Should Germans have the courage to feel national pride?	cultural liberalism
v174b	Scale: attitude on immigration	immigration
v350l	Do you fear being swamped by foreigners?	immigration
v350n	Do you agree that foreigners should marry among themselves?	immigration
v350r	Can you in some way understand the assaults that have occurred against homes for asylum seekers?	immigration
	Germany: 2002	
v350b	Scale: attitude on nationalization of important firms	economic liberalism
v350a	Are you proud to be German?	cultural liberalism
v350c	Should Germans have the courage to feel national pride?	cultural liberalism
v174b	Scale: attitude on immigration	immigration
v350l	Do you fear being swamped by foreigners?	immigration
v350n	Do you agree that foreigners should marry among themselves?	immigration
v350r	Can you in some way understand the assaults that have occurred against homes for asylum seekers?	immigration

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