

# The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction<sup>1</sup>

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## 1. Introduction

The “Xinjiang Papers” are a cache of government documents from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), most of them classified, that were originally leaked to the *New York Times* by a “member of the Chinese political establishment” and published on November 16, 2019.<sup>2</sup> (The Xinjiang Papers are not to be mistaken with the China Cables, a set of classified documents published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and by the author of this introduction on November 24, 2019).<sup>3</sup> The *New York Times* only published a small number of transcribed pages from the Xinjiang Papers and quoted from several but not all documents. It never released the originals into the public domain.

In September 2021, a set of digital files was leaked to the Uyghur Tribunal based in London during their second set of hearings (September 10<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup>), by a person who wishes to remain anonymous. Nothing further is known about the origin of these files. A careful comparison of the files to the evidence published by the *New York Times* in 2019 performed by this author and the peer reviewers shows that they are identical to the Xinjiang Papers. Consequently, it was decided to refer to them as the “Xinjiang Papers.”

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<sup>1</sup> This introduction to the Xinjiang Papers, along with the transcripts of and introductions to the related documents, were peer reviewed by Dr. James Millward, professor at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and Dr. David Tobin, lecturer in East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield. The author expresses his gratitude for their detailed feedback, and also would like to thank Mishel Kondi from the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation for her very extensive and dedicated assistance with transcription, research and translation.

<sup>2</sup> Ramzy, Austin and Buckley, Chris. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.” *The New York Times*. November 16, 2019. <http://web.archive.org/web/20191116135003/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.

<sup>3</sup> See ICIJ. “Read the China cables documents.” ICIJ. November 24, 2019. <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/read-the-china-cables-documents/>. AND Zenz, Adrian. “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign.” *Journal of Political Risk*. *Journal of Political Risk*, November 24, 2019. <https://www.jpolorisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>.

The files contain highly sensitive and pertinent material in relation to Beijing's policies in Xinjiang. Nearly all the material is classified as confidential. One document containing three speeches by Chinese President (more accurately: General Secretary) Xi Jinping is classified as "top secret" (绝密), China's highest State Secret Classification Level (国家秘密的密级) for government documents, denoting material that if leaked "will cause particularly serious damage to the security and interests of the country."<sup>4</sup> For comparison, the classification level specified on the main cable (or telegram) of the China Cables was "secret" (the second-highest classification level).<sup>5</sup> Overall, this appears to be the first-ever instance that material with "top secret" statements made by a Chinese head of state have leaked into the public domain – a fact that was not mentioned in the original *New York Times* report.<sup>6</sup>

The original *New York Times* report noted how the words of Xi Jinping "laid the groundwork for the crackdown," but only identified a small number of conceptual linkages between Xi's words and the subsequent policies – in line with our still evolving understanding of the atrocities back in 2019.

The present analysis, however, shows that the linkages between statements and mandates made by Xi and other central government figures and policies that were implemented after 2016 are far more extensive, detailed and significant than previously understood. In addition, the original *Times* report did not mention several documents issued by the central government that are part of the leak, and which contain crucial additional evidence for such linkages.

The material provides substantial evidence linking numerous aspects of Beijing's crackdown in Xinjiang to explicit statements and demands made by central government figures in 2014, including:

- Mass internments in re-education camps
- Poverty alleviation through coercive labor transfers
- "Optimizing" the ethnic population distribution by increasing Han population shares
- Criminalizing customary religious practices
- Forcing hundreds of thousands Han officials to "become family" with ethnic populations
- Implementing Chinese language-focused education in centralized boarding schools.

Appendix A provides a detailed comparison of related statements with policies implemented after 2016/2017.

First, the documents state that in 2014, Xi Jinping himself authorized the Xinjiang government to draft a local legal regulation to address the issues of religious extremism and violent resistance. The resulting "De-Extremification Regulation" came into effect in April 2017 and is intimately linked with the re-education campaign.<sup>7</sup> Its October 2018 revision constituted the first official acknowledgement

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<sup>4</sup> "中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of State Secrets." 中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法中国人大网 (China's National People's Congress ). Accessed November 27, 2021. [http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content\\_4509.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4509.htm).

<sup>5</sup> See Zenz. "'Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts': Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang's Extrajudicial Internment Campaign." <https://www.jpolicy.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>. Or Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany et al. "Exposed: China's Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm." ICIJ. November 25, 2019. <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/>.

<sup>6</sup> The so-called "Tiananmen Papers" purported to contain top secret government documents related to the 1989 massacre. However, there has been no verification of the originals or of the original Chinese classification designation, and the papers' authenticity has been challenged (See Ching, Frank. "The Other Tiananmen Controversy." *South China Morning Post*. June 3, 2004. <https://www.scmp.com/article/458154/other-tiananmen-controversy>).

<sup>7</sup> Zenz, Adrian. "Evidence of the Chinese Central Government's Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang's Re-Education Internment Campaign." The Jamestown Foundation. September 24, 2021. <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-of-the-chinese-central-governments-knowledge-of-and-involvement-in-xinjiangs-re-education-internment-campaign/>.

that so-called Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs, 职业技能教育培训中心) perform “re-education” (literally “transformation through education”, 教育转化).<sup>8</sup> VSETCs are a state euphemism for what are in effect high-security re-education internment camps. In its original report, the *New York Times* famously cited Chen Quanguo’s mandate to “round up everyone who should be rounded up.” However, its report did not mention that Xi Jinping himself issued an arguably very similar demand when he mandated in 2014 that “those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced.”<sup>9</sup> Xi’s statements that religious extremism is like a “powerful psychedelic drug” and that acts of terror will “multiply like cancer cells” if extremist thought is not eradicated are quoted verbatim (and attributed to Xi) in a widely-cited March 2017 government document that likens re-education to free medical treatment for “sick thinking.”<sup>10</sup> At the very time when Xi demanded that people’s “immunity” against extremist ideology must be increased, Uyghur regions were actively carrying out early forms of re-education and reported that these re-education efforts were “increasing the immunity...of ‘susceptible’ groups of people.”<sup>11</sup> In two separate speeches, Xi called religious extremism a “poison.” He argued that Xinjiang was stricken with a “heart sickness” that could only be cured by “heart medicine” in order to “support the correct, remove the evil.” A 2017 work report on re-education in a Uyghur region quoted the latter expression verbatim when stating that re-education must “support the correct, remove the evil.”<sup>12</sup>

Second, the material shows that the transfer of nearly 3 million rural surplus laborers into full-time employment through a “vigorous” development of labor-intensive industries was designed to prevent Uyghurs from “having nothing to do” and therefore being “easily exploited by evildoers.” Xi Jinping similarly suggested that unemployed persons are liable to “provoke trouble”, and that employment in companies promotes ethnic mixing and helps workers to “resist religious extremism.” He argues that such employment will lead ethnic workers to “imperceptibly study Chinese culture” (i.e. without them realizing it).<sup>13</sup> The stated reasons for Xinjiang’s labor transfers are therefore more political than economic: while the promotion of employment through labor transfers into labor-intensive industries was not expected to make a greater contribution to the economy or government revenue than other industries, it was considered a “matter of vital importance” to “Xinjiang’s long-term peace and stability.” In a classified May 2014 speech, a leading central government figure announced a plan to “drive at least one million people into employment”<sup>14</sup> through developing the

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<sup>8</sup> “新疆维吾尔自治区第十三届人民代表大会常务委员公告（第7号）Announcement of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (No.7).” 新疆维吾尔自治区人大常委会. October 9, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20181010124647/http://www.xjpcsc.gov.cn/1009/t4028e49c665347630166588b8cf40001001.html>.

<sup>9</sup> The relevant sections from the original documents with transcript page numbers for this and subsequent quotes can be found in the Introduction, Authentication and Transcription for documents no.1 and 2 (some of them are also found further below in this Introduction to the Xinjiang Papers).

<sup>10</sup> “宣讲稿：到教育转化班学习是对思想上患病群众的一次免费住院治疗 Presentation: Studying in the Educational Transformation Facilities Is Free Hospitalization for the Ideologically Ill Individuals.” 壹读. March 31, 2017. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119192652/https://read01.com/zh-sg/n3L6Do.html>.

<sup>11</sup> 潘从武 and 刘琰. “新疆司法厅实施‘土壤改良计划’，主攻‘去宗教极端化.’” *The Paper* (法制日报, May 20, 2016). [http://web.archive.org/web/20211014204208/http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin\\_prom.jsp?contid=1471896&from=renmin](http://web.archive.org/web/20211014204208/http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin_prom.jsp?contid=1471896&from=renmin).

<sup>12</sup> “新源县司法局2017年工作计划.” 新疆新源. 新源县人民政府网, May 26, 2017. [http://web.archive.org/web/20190630195027/http://www.xinyuan.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/common/inf\\_content/xy022-02\\_A/2017-0526003.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20190630195027/http://www.xinyuan.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/common/inf_content/xy022-02_A/2017-0526003.htm).

<sup>13</sup> Chinese: 潜移默化学习中华文化 (Document no.2, p.20).

<sup>14</sup> Full sentence: 比如，对发展纺织服装产业提出了一系列的扶持政策和要求，是要带动至少一百万人就业，这件事对新疆社会稳定和长治久安至关重要。 (Document no.2, p.76).

textile and garment industries – a plan that was formalized in February 2018.<sup>15</sup> Xi himself called for a systematic expansion of ethnic citizens from Xinjiang going to eastern China for “education, employment and residence.” China’s premier Li Keqiang notes that Chinese companies have struggled to recruit ethnic workers in Xinjiang due to the latter’s maladaptation to modern society. He argues that Xinjiang must therefore “transform [people’s] way of thinking about employment,” language that was soon after mirrored in official directives on the forceful promotion of labor transfers.<sup>16</sup> In sum, the mandates contained in the Xinjiang Papers quite directly undergird the implementation of significantly more coercive labor transfer mechanisms between 2015 and 2017. Third, the documents show that plans to optimize the ethnic population composition, which are connected to Xinjiang’s campaign of suppressing births, can be linked to statements and demands made by the central government. In a top-secret speech, Xi argued that “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability.”<sup>17</sup> This statement was later quoted verbatim by a senior Xinjiang official in July 2020, who then argued that southern Xinjiang’s Han population share was “too low.”<sup>18</sup> Other classified documents lament “severe imbalances in the distribution of the ethnic population” and a “severely monoethnic” population structure (an overconcentration of Uyghurs) in southern Xinjiang. They mandate that by 2022, 300,000 settlers (mostly Han from eastern China) are to be moved to regions in southern Xinjiang administered by the Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps (XPCC), also known as ‘*bingtuan*’, a paramilitary colonial settler entity, with the explicitly stated aim of increasing Han population shares in the region. Xi himself ordered the abolishment of preferential birth control policies for ethnic groups in southern Xinjiang that had previously allowed them to have more children than the Han. His demand that birth control policies in this Uyghur heartland were to be made “equal for all ethnic groups” – a euphemism that since 2017 undergirded policies that drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic groups. To name just one pertinent example, Xinjiang’s Health Commission established a set of performance targets in 2019 that employed the exact same expression – “implement a birth control policy that is equal for all ethnic groups” – as the stated overall goal behind a new mandate to reduce birth rates in southern Xinjiang by “at least 4 per mile,” to provide free birth control surgeries that included female sterilization procedures, and to achieve an adoption rate of “long-term effective birth prevention” measures of at least 90 percent in rural regions.<sup>19</sup> A central government directive from December 2017 (document no.7) that is part of the leak makes a similar demand, to “enact birth control policies that are equal for each ethnic group”, yet bluntly adds that this measure is specifically designed to “promote equal population growth for each ethnic group.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> “《新疆纺织服装产业发展规划(2018-2023年)》印发实施。”新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府。March 2, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20180825053820/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/02/148047.html>.

<sup>16</sup> Chinese: 转变就业观念 (document no.2, p.40). Subsequent Xinjiang directives from 2016 are found for example at “关于开展自治区脱贫攻坚转移就业专项行动的通知 (新人社发〔2016〕74号)。”中国就业。人社部农民工司, July 4, 2016. <https://archive.is/iQUUt>.

<sup>17</sup> Chinese:人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础 (document no.1, p.40).

<sup>18</sup> “刘以雷老师参加‘中国区域经济50人论坛’专题研讨会并作为代表发言。”新疆大学经济与管理学院。July 14, 2020. <http://web.archive.org/web/20210220221018/http://ems.xju.edu.cn/info/1055/1661.htm> AND Zenz, Adrian. “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang.” *Central Asian Survey* 40, no. 3 (August 24, 2021): 291–312. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>. (Open access version at Zenz, Adrian. “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang.” (June 8, 2021). *Central Asian Survey*. Available at SSRN: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3862512](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3862512).)

<sup>19</sup> 在南疆实行各民族平等的计划生育政策 (Document no.2, p.22).2019 Xinjiang Health Commission planning document: [wjw.xinjiang.gov.cn/hfpc/yjskg/201901/e99e758857c0417dbf8e76377efc4f11/files/35885e0814254402bd1b71c7062d31f0.xls](http://wjw.xinjiang.gov.cn/hfpc/yjskg/201901/e99e758857c0417dbf8e76377efc4f11/files/35885e0814254402bd1b71c7062d31f0.xls) (since deleted), archived download: “2019年自治区卫生健康委员会机关及直属（管）单位绩效目标。” Accessed November 26, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3kYC94i>.

<sup>20</sup> Chinese: 落实各民族平等的计划生育政策 and 促进各民族人口均衡发展 (Document no.7, p.20). Note that 均衡 can be translated as either “equal” OR “balanced,” and likely here refers to both (with “equal” constituting an important aspect in official perceptions of “balanced”).

Xi further mandates that the XPCC is to “bring into play [it’s] role in optimizing population resources and become a staging area for optimizing the population” in the Uyghur heartlands.<sup>21</sup> Another leaked classified central government document indicates that this goal is to be achieved by 2030.<sup>22</sup> All of these mandates is precisely in line with recommendations made by numerous Xinjiang academics and experts on population growth and “population optimization,” who have unilaterally called for such measures.<sup>23</sup>

Fourth, the classified material shows that numerous other policies designed to assimilate and control the region’s ethnic groups including a Chinese (Mandarin) language focused education in centralized boarding schools, more intensive forms of predictive policing through the analysis of big data, or sending Han officials to live with Uyghur families, can be directly linked to statements or explicit demands made by Xi Jinping. For example, Xi demanded that rural children should be put into boarding schools so that they would “study in school, live in school, grow up in school.”<sup>24</sup> His observation that “some religious people interfere with matters of the secular life” was soon after formalized as the mandate that “religion is strictly forbidden to interfere with secular lifestyles.”<sup>25</sup> By 2017, this policy then undergirded the internment of persons in re-education camps who had offered customary prayers at funerals or participated in customary religious wedding ceremonies.<sup>26</sup> In short, Xi’s remarks and requirements provided the basis for criminalizing most of the customary religious practices that are part of ethnic populations’ daily lives.

The files also show the motivation behind these unprecedented measures. In a top-secret speech, Xi argues that the Belt and Road Initiative, his signature foreign policy project, requires a stable domestic security environment. He asserts that the entire country’s national security and the achievement of China’s major goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are in jeopardy if the situation in southern Xinjiang cannot be brought under control. Xi demands that the region engages in an all-out battle to “prevent Xinjiang’s violent terrorist activities from spreading to the rest of China.” He notes that since violent acts have already spread to other regions of China, “[t]herefore we propose that Xinjiang is currently in ... a painful period of interventionary treatment...”<sup>27</sup>

The material divulges a wide range of other important information. Xinjiang’s Party Secretary Chen Quanguo personally commanded officials to “round up all who should be rounded up” and that the region’s vocational re-education facilities (VSETCs) are to be “unswervingly operated for a long time.”<sup>28</sup> The documents state that the state should show “absolutely no mercy” towards its “enemies,” plans by Beijing to sinicize Islam, and the construction of new high-security prisons, detention centers and military bases in the regions administered by the XPCC. They detail how

<sup>21</sup> Chinese:成为优化人口的中转站 (Document no.1, p.40)

<sup>22</sup> Document no.7.

<sup>23</sup> See Zenz. “End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group!” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483#metrics-content>. (Open access alternative: Zenz. “End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group.” SSRN: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3862512](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3862512)).

<sup>24</sup> Chinese:让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校 Document no.2, p.21.

<sup>25</sup> Chinese:有一些信教的人干预世俗化生活的事情，如干预婚丧嫁娶、生活方式等，这个也是不能让它蔓延开来的 (Document no.1, p.33), and 张玉和常雪梅。“中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会关于全面推进依法治疆建设法治新疆的意见。” 人民网. 新疆日报, November 28, 2014. <http://web.archive.org/web/20210201050726/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1128/c64387-26115134-2.html>.

<sup>26</sup> Zenz, Adrian. “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang.” *The Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 2, (February 17, 2020). <https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/>.

<sup>27</sup> Chinese: 所以，我们提出，新疆正处于...干预治疗阵痛期... (Document no.2, p.6)

<sup>28</sup> Chinese: 要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去 (Document no.8, p.7).

officials in Xinjiang who did not fully obey their orders and failed to detain large numbers of the local Uyghur population in re-education facilities were severely punished.

## **2. Overview and Comparison to the Files Obtained by the New York Times**

### *2.1 Overview of the Leaked Files*

The files given to the Tribunal contain high-resolution digital images of original Chinese paper documents. Prior to being leaked, some sections in the files were digitally redacted using black boxes (then original paper documents appear to have been unredacted). Most of the redactions cover the top and bottom sections of title pages or of final pages and appear to be designed to redact original reception stamps and perhaps handwritten notes – features that could identify and endanger the person who leaked them. Two files contain duplicate contents that are also part of other files in the set. In total, the leak contains 11 unique documents and 300 unique pages (317 pages in total when including duplicates).

This author wrote to with *New York Times* with several questions, including whether the files received by the Tribunal were the Xinjiang Papers that had previously been reported on by the *Times*, and whether the *Times* had potentially passed them to the Tribunal. Their spokesperson Danielle Rhoades Ha replied with the following official statement, confirming that:

The documents received by the Tribunal were previously reported on by The New York Times in 2019. The documents were not supplied to the Tribunal by The Times.

Since the paper confirmed that it did not provide the files to the Tribunal, the author surmises that the documents given to the Tribunal were possibly leaked by one of the same entities which had previously leaked them to the *New York Times* by. It is unclear why the files leaked to the Tribunal feature different redactions. The redactions in the copies given to the Tribunal mostly pertain to title pages and appear to be designed to redact original reception stamps and perhaps handwritten notes – features that could identify and endanger the person who leaked them.

A careful review of the material by the author of this introduction (and confirmed by the two peer reviewers), indicates that the material given to the Tribunal appears to be an identical subset of the “Xinjiang Papers” first published by the *New York Times*. This is discussed in detail in section 2.2. below. Notably, the thumbnails published by the *New York Times* of the documents they obtained indicate the same missing pages and the same duplicate documents as in the files obtained by the Tribunal. The author was subsequently able to independently authenticate the contents of most of the individual documents through detailed and extensive comparisons with publicly available Chinese government and state media sources.

In order to protect the person who – according to the New York Times – originally leaked these files from the Chinese mainland, the documents’ contents can only be made public as transcripts. The Uyghur Tribunal approached and commissioned the author of this introduction to produce full transcripts as well as an authentication and analysis of the material. This was done by the author on a *pro bono* basis as part of his work for the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC). The Tribunal separately asked the two peer reviewers to independently review the work produced by this author, which they did on a *pro bono* basis. This author and both peer reviewers were given full access to the entire original file set.



This author and Mishel Kondi, a research assistant employed by VOC, produced 11 transcripts from the original files with assistance from a VOC graphics designer.<sup>29</sup> The peer reviewers verified the authenticity of these 11 transcriptions by comparing them to the originals. The transcripts themselves were also separately proofread by a native Chinese speaker with experience in researching Chinese government documents, who checked them for potential transcription errors.

**The 11 PDF files containing the introduction, authentication and transcription of each document can be accessed by clicking on the document titles in Table 1. Due to the complexity of the material and the limited available time, by November 27<sup>th</sup> only three transcripts are ready to be published: documents nos. 1, 2 and 4.**

An overview of each document sorted by date is provided below:

| No. | Title   | Date              | Page count | Page numbering  | Missing pages |
|-----|---|-------------------|------------|---|---------------|
| 1   | <p>General Secretary Xi Jinping's Speeches While Inspecting Xinjiang<br/>《习近平同志在新疆考察工作期间的讲话》 <a href="#">click to view transcript</a></p> <p>This document set contains the following documents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cover page: Notification (通知) issued by the General Office of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Committee of the CCP (中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会办公厅) (October 17, 2016)</li> <li>Speech given at the end of the inspection work in Xinjiang (April 30, 2014)<br/>在新疆考察工作结束时的讲话 (2014年4月30日)</li> <li>Speech given during an informal discussion with the comrades in charge from the five prefectures of southern Xinjiang (April 28, 2014)<br/>在同南疆五地州负责同志座谈时的讲话 (2014年4月28日)</li> <li>Speech given during the symposium of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (April 29, 2014)<br/>在新疆生产建设兵团同座会上的讲话 (2014年4月29日)</li> </ul> | April 28-30, 2014 | 45         | <p>1 to 44 (cover w/o page number)</p> <p>Note: the 45<sup>th</sup> page (with page number 44) is inferred from the print visible through the observe page.</p> | None          |

<sup>29</sup> Their work time was paid for by the VOC, while the Uyghur Tribunal paid related travel expenses.

|   |  |                    |    |          |                        |
|---|--|--------------------|----|----------|------------------------|
| 2 | Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum<br>《习近平、李克强、俞正声同志在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上的讲话》 <a href="#">[click to view transcript]</a><br>This document set contains the following documents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comrade Xi Jinping's speech (May 28, 2014)<br/>习近平同志的讲话 (2014年5月28日)</li> <li>Comrade Li Keqiang's speech (May 28, 2014)<br/>李克强同志的讲话 (2014年5月28日)</li> <li>Comrade Yu Zhengsheng's concluding speech (May 29, 2014)<br/>俞正声同志的总结讲话 (2014年5月29日)</li> </ul> | May 28-30, 2014    | 77 | 1 to 78  | P.3                    |
| 3 | Notice on Responding to the Stimulus and Impact of a Series of Terrorist Attacks in the UK and Further Strengthening the Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work in the Region<br>关于应对英国系列恐怖袭击事件刺激影响 进一步强化全区反恐维稳工作的通知  | June 29, 2017      | 10 | Redacted | None                   |
| 4 | Secretary Chen Quanguo's speech at the Video Conference on August 30, 2017 – Required Knowledge and Skills<br>陈全国书记2017年8·30视频会议讲话 应知应会<br><a href="#">[click to view transcript]</a>  | August 30, 2017    | 6  | 1 to 6   | None                   |
| 5 | Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on forwarding the "Minutes of the Informal Seminar on Several Historical Issues in Xinjiang by the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group"<br>中共中央办公厅转发《中央新疆工作协调小组关于新疆若干历史问题研究座谈纪要》的通知   | September 10, 2017 | 28 | 1 to 28  | None                   |
| 6 | Speech by Comrade Chen Quanguo at the First and Second Plenary Sessions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Ninth Committee of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the Communist Party of China<br>陈全国同志在中共新疆维吾尔自治区第九届委员会 第四次全体会议第一次、第二次全体会议上的讲话  | October 30, 2017   | 31 | 1 to 31  | None                   |
| 7 | Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the "Outline of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps' Southward Development Plan"<br>中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅 关于印发《新疆生产建设兵团向南发展规划纲要》的通知  | December 18, 2017  | 43 | 1 to 43  | None                   |
| 8 | Chen Quanguo Autonomous Region Party Committee Standing Committee (Expanded) Meeting Key Points of the Speech on Stability Maintenance<br>陈全国自治区党委常委(扩大)会上讲话要点中关于维稳工作  | February 22, 2018  | 2  | 6 to 7   | At least p. 1-5 and 8. |



|    |   |                |    |  |          |
|----|---|----------------|----|--|----------|
| 9  | Autonomous Region Party Committee Bulletin on Wang Yongzhi's Serious Violation of Discipline, and related Lessons and Warnings (March 8, 2018)<br>自治区党委关于王勇智严重违纪案及其教训警示的通报(2018年3月8日)<br><br>Attachments:<br>1. Wang Yongzhi's Confession (December 2017)<br>王勇智忏悔录 (2017年12月)<br>2. Suggestion signed by Wang Yongzhi on the "Decision on Expelling Wang Yongzhi from the Party and from Public Office" (February 12, 2018)<br>王勇智在《关于给予王勇智开除党籍、开除公职处分的决定》上签署的意见 (2018年2月12日)<br>3. Handwritten page (February 12, 2018) (same contents as | March 8, 2018  | 30 | Main document: 1 to 11<br><br>Attachment 1: 1 to 15<br><br>Attachment 2: 1 to 2<br><br>Two additional pages: one page w/ number 12, one handwritten page w/o page number | None     |
| 10 | Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing "Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation." (April 19, 2018)<br>中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅印发《关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见》的通知(2018年4月19日)   | April 19, 2018 | 14 | 1 to 16  | P.12, 15 |
| 11 | Autonomous Region Party Committee Office Bulletin on Gu Wensheng's Serious Violation of Discipline, and related Lessons and Warnings (May 16, 2018)<br>自治区党委办公厅关于谷文胜严重违纪案及其教训警示的通报 (2018年5月16日)   | May 16, 2018   | 14 | 1 to 14  | None     |

Table 1.

The original *New York Times* report stated that the person who leaked the files “expressed hope that their disclosure would prevent party leaders, including Mr. Xi, from escaping culpability for the mass detentions.”<sup>30</sup> This appears to explain the selection of files that were leaked.

First, the files contain six speeches by Xi Jinping and other central government figures from 2014. As discussed above, they provide an important link between a wide range of recently-implemented rights-violating policies in Xinjiang and the central government (see Appendix A for a detailed overview). This link is further reinforced by the fact that one of the files contains a cover letter from the Xinjiang government from October 2016 that mandates the study of Xi’s top secret April 2014 speeches. Publicly available evidence, most of which has since been deleted, indicates that in late 2016, these documents as well as the three speeches delivered by Xi, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng in May 2014 at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, were studied as containing the “strategic deployment of the Party Central Committee for Xinjiang work.”<sup>31</sup> Local government study sessions of this particular set of speeches aimed to “convey and learn the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s

<sup>30</sup> Ramzy and Buckley. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.” <http://web.archive.org/web/20191116135003/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xinjiang/bmdt/201610/67ce208a120c481b987ef061e6d11c18.shtml> (since deleted), Archived URL: “自治区林业厅召开干部大会传达学习习近平总书记重要讲话。”新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府网. (自治区林业厅, October 26, 2016. <https://archive.md/wip/6uSlv>).

series of important speeches, arrange and deploy current and future key tasks.”<sup>32</sup> In late 2016, these “future key tasks” would have referred to the internment campaign, which began in spring 2017. Government reports indicate that in February 2017, just weeks prior to the internment campaign, leading cadres in prefectures and counties were subjected to an intensified study schedule of Xi’s two speeches for at least two hours every week, alongside Chen Quanguo’s own speeches.<sup>33</sup> A February 8, 2017, work report from the Yili Prefecture government, a region with a population dominated by ethnic groups, reported a “serious and systematic study” of the speeches held by Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Xinjiang Work Conference in May 2014 (document no.2).<sup>34</sup> To quote from this likewise now removed web page:

The implementation of the series of important speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping is the first priority. Reaching a common understanding and unity of thought, such that the ideology is integrated into the comprehensive objective and target; all of this work must be planned and centered on advancing the general objective in order to truly achieve a unified pace and unified action.<sup>35</sup>

This report emphasizes that the spirit of Xi’s speeches must reach every single member of the village work teams. The author had previously argued that the deployment of these teams after Chinese New Year each year determined the timing of the start of the internment campaign, given that these teams constitute a crucial element in identifying those who were sent to the camps.<sup>36</sup>

Second, the files contain four important documents from 2017 and 2018 that directly implicate Xinjiang’s Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and his second in command, Zhu Hailun, in the internment campaign. Compared to the material from 2014, these documents reflect an overall much more draconian approach to bring the region’s ethnic groups under control, without any of conciliatory overtones found in the 2014 speeches. This more recent material contains direct evidence about the importance of the re-education camps and the need to intern substantial shares of the population by “rounding up all who should be rounded up In these speeches, Chen Quanguo repeatedly invokes the need to fulfil the will of the central government. In one instance, he directly states that the “vocational skills education training centers” are an example of the “good methods [adopted by] Xinjiang to fully implement the central goal of the General Secretary [Xi Jinping] for Xinjiang work”

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.zgtps.gov.cn/info/1009/23968.htm> (since deleted), archived download:

穆志伟. “特克斯县组织召开县委中心组2016年第16次集中学习会议-特克斯县公共信息网 (23968-HTML).PDF.” October 27, 2016. <https://bit.ly/3cEU0sk>.

<sup>33</sup> [http://www.xinyuan.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/common/inf\\_content/xy045-02\\_A/2017-0223001.htm](http://www.xinyuan.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/common/inf_content/xy045-02_A/2017-0223001.htm) (since deleted), archived download: “关于印发《喀拉布拉镇在‘两学一做’学习教育中开展‘学讲话、转作风、促落实’专项活动实施方案(2017-0223001-HTML). PDF.” 新疆新源县人民政府. February 23, 2017. <https://bit.ly/3nIPway>.

<sup>34</sup> <http://www.xjyl.gov.cn/info/1644/112467.htm>. (since deleted), archived download: “州科技局学习自治区‘学讲话 转作风 促落实’活动并做动员部署-塞外江南-新疆 伊犁(112467-HTML).PDF.” 伊犁哈萨克自治州人民政府网. 伊犁哈萨克自治州人民政府. February 8, 2017. <https://bit.ly/3HNUnPq>.

<sup>35</sup> Chinese: 贯彻落实习近平总书记系列重要讲话放在首位，认识要再统一，始终把思想统一到总目标上，一切工作都要围绕总目标来谋划推进，真正做到步调统一、行动统一

<sup>36</sup> See Zenz. “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang.” <https://www.jpolarisk.com/karakax/>. Section 3.


(document no.4, p.1).<sup>37</sup> Chen also states that “the vocational education training centers must be unswervingly operated for a long time” (document no.8, p.7).<sup>38</sup>

The two documents on the punishment of Xinjiang county-level party secretaries who failed to obey government orders show that cadres were expected to ruthlessly carry out whatever order they were given. Among other things, those who failed to “round up all who should be rounded up” faced severe consequences. This evidence further confirms that the responsibility for this atrocity squarely rests with the top-level leadership in both Xinjiang and Beijing.

Finally, the three documents issued by the central government on the “correct” history of Xinjiang, on improving the governance and control of Islam, and on the development of the XPCC in southern Xinjiang confirm the central government’s plans to fundamentally alter the religious and demographic composition in the region (and, in the case of Islam, likely in the entire nation). Again, this demonstrates how the central government itself is behind the intention to reengineer Xinjiang’s ethnic cultures and communities.

## 2.2 Comparison to the Material Published by the New York Times

The New York Times report from November 16, 2019, contains 13 fully transcribed pages from the original Chinese documents. Most of them relate to a question-and-answer script drafted by officials in Turpan Prefecture to use with returning (Uyghur) students from eastern China whose family members had been detained. This document is not part of the leak to the Uyghur Tribunal. Four of the transcribed pages published by the paper are contained in the set obtained by the Tribunal (see Appendix B for a set of screenshots). In each case, the correspondence between the two is perfect, including text indents, headers and sections in bold font, the exact location of page numbers, and whether page numbers are surrounded by dashes or not.



<sup>37</sup> Chinese (full sentence): 五是充分肯定了新疆贯彻落实总书记新疆工作总目标创造的好做法、好经验。如，职业技能教育培训转化中心...

<sup>38</sup> Chinese: 要把职业技能教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去

Figure 1: This transcribed page in the *New York Times* report corresponds to document no. 4, page 1. Additionally, all literal quotes from the documents published in the Chinese version of the *New York Times* report were found in identical form in the documents leaked to the Tribunal: a total of 27 quotes from five of the leaked documents (see Appendix C for a full list). Finally, other descriptions of the contents and context of the documents contained in the *New York Times* report matches the material contained in the files given to the Tribunal (except those pertaining to the Turpan question-and-answer script). For example, the report states that the documents pertaining to Wang Yongzhi's case consist of "an 11-page report summarizing the party's internal investigation into his actions, and the text of a 15-page confession that he may have given under duress"<sup>39</sup> This precisely matches the documents obtained by the Uyghur Tribunal.

All of this indicates that the transcriptions produced by the *New York Times* are most likely from the exact same original documents as those obtained by the Tribunal.

The *New York Times* stated that it obtained 24 documents with 403 pages:

- 96 pages of internal speeches by Xi Jinping
- 102 pages of internal speeches by other officials
- 161 pages of directives and reports on the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang
- 44 pages of material from internal investigations into local officials

The author employed image magnification tools to closely review the textual and other features visible in the 403 document page thumbnails published in the *New York Times* report (when magnified, the text in the thumbnails is not legible, but general shapes are apparent). He then compared these thumbnails to the pages given to the Tribunal. The results show that 23 of the thumbnails are duplicates, meaning that within a given document, multiple pages, often those shown in consecutive order, are the exact same (this count excludes duplicates that result from the fact the leaked file cache included two documents with 17 pages that are also contained in another of the documents). Consequently, the thumbnail set published by the *Times* only shows 380 distinct pages (and more specifically,  $380 - 17 = 363$  distinct pages when excluding the 17 pages that result from duplicate leaked documents).

The author reached out to the *New York Times* for comment on this discrepancy. The paper received this request but chose not to respond to it.

The document sets obtained by the Tribunal directly correspond to the visual features of all related thumbnails in the *New York Times* report in the same page order, except that the latter at times show more pages because they contain duplicates. In one case, duplication is only evident after flipping a thumbnail horizontally using image editing software (Figure 2). Only the left-hand page shown in Figure 2 is a valid representation of a government document page in the thumbnail set, because these documents have prescribed indent sizes for the beginnings of new paragraphs. In the original (non-flipped) version, the indent of the second paragraph of the right-hand image would be far too large.

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<sup>39</sup> Ramzy and Buckley. "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims." <http://web.archive.org/web/20191116135003/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.




Figure 2: Comparison of the last two thumbnails of the “102 pages of internal speeches by other officials.” The image on the left shows the second-last thumbnail of the set in original form. The image on the right shows the last thumbnail horizontally flipped (no further editing was performed). Both pages appear to be identical.

The reason for these duplicates is unclear. Due to the fact that they are distributed very unevenly among the documents, with some containing many and others none, the author is inclined to believe that they are more likely the result of human error than of deliberate obfuscation. If the Times intended to deliberately create duplicates for the purpose of obfuscation, they could also have chosen not to publish any thumbnails, or to engage in a much more sophisticated obfuscation attempt.

A careful comparison shows that the material given to the Tribunal comprises about 314 of the 380 distinct pages that were published in the Times’ report in thumbnail form, meaning that 66 pages visible in thumbnails were not given to the Tribunal (Table 2). The Tribunal also obtained three pages that are not shown in the *New York Times* thumbnails. If the thumbnail duplications are due to human error, and the Times did in fact obtain 403 pages of documents (not all of which are shown in the thumbnails), and if the three pages obtained by the Tribunal but not shown among the *Times* thumbnails were part of the *Times*’ 403-page count, then the difference between the two leaks would potentially be  $403 - 317 = 86$  pages.

| Type of data                         | New York Times leak<br><i>(including duplicate pages from documents that were contained more than once in the file cache, excluding duplicated thumbnails contained within each particular document)</i> | Uyghur Tribunal leak<br><i>(including duplicate pages from document sections found more than once in the file cache)</i> | No. of pages missing from the Uyghur Tribunal leak             |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Internal speeches by Xi Jinping      | 95 (1 duplicate thumbnail)   | 96 (includes one mostly blank final page of document no.1 that the Times perhaps did not include in their thumbnails)    | 0  |
| Internal speeches by other officials | 89 (13 duplicate thumbnails)   | 82 (the Tribunal leak includes two pages of such speeches that are not shown in the NYT thumbnail sets)                  | 9 (89 minus the 80 corresponding pages from the Tribunal leak) |

|   |                                      |            |  |
|---|--------------------------------------|------------|--|
| Directives and reports on the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang | 152 (9 duplicate thumbnails)         | 95         | 57   |
| Internal investigations into local officials  | 44 (0 duplicate thumbnails)          | 44         | 0  |
| <b>Entire set</b>   | <b>380 (23 duplicate thumbnails)</b> | <b>317</b> | <b>66 (380 minus the 314 corresponding pages from the Tribunal leak)</b> |

Table 2.

Of the 11 distinct documents given to the Tribunal, 10 can be fully identified in the New York Times reports' thumbnail sets. One of the files leaked to the Tribunal contains a two-page fragment of a speech given by Chen in February 2018 (document no.8). The author was not able to identify these two pages in the thumbnail sets published by the Times. It unclear whether this is because the Times decided not to include this fragment, because they did not feel confident about authenticating it, because they did not receive it, or due to human error.




Figure 3: Comparison of the New York Times thumbnail of the final page of the confession of former Yarkand county party secretary Wang Yongzhi (left-hand) with the same page given to the Uyghur Tribunal (right-hand). The Times modified their page edges to fade into black, reducing the white space and making the page appear to be slightly smaller than its actual size. Both images clearly show Wang's thumbprints in the same positions. The right-hand image was altered by the author by removing the outlines of the original paper page, increasing the contrast, and blurring and pixelating the result, in order to protect the person who originally leaked it. The New York Times evidently used similar but slightly different methods, resulting in a more box-shaped pixelation of the thumbprints and different contrast levels in certain sections (notably the lighter top-most thumbnail).

Both leaks also feature the exact same missing pages (page 3 in document no.2 and pages 12 and 15 in document no.10). This indicates that the files obtained by the Times and the Tribunal came from the same source. It is unclear whether the missing pages resulted from human error or deliberate



omission. However, it is in this author’s opinion not particularly likely that the missing three pages contain especially sensitive material that was deliberately withheld due to its sensitive contents.

The vast majority of pages (57 of 66) that are visible among the New York Times thumbnails but missing from the set given to the Tribunal were labelled “Directives and reports on the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang” by the Times. A comparison shows that several documents that the Times subsumed under this title are in fact of an entirely different nature. That particular thumbnail section includes for example all three central government documents (nos. 5, 7, 10), none of which have anything to do with “local surveillance. None of them are mentioned in the Times report. Only one document given to the Tribunal, the document no.3 titled “Notice on Responding to the Stimulus of a Series of Terrorist Attacks in the UK and Further Strengthening the Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work in the Region,” fits the “surveillance” description. The other 9 missing pages pertain to “internal speeches by other officials,” which in the set leaked to the Tribunal include speeches by central government figures such as premier Li Keqiang, or Xinjiang officials such as Chen Quanguo.




Figure 4: Comparison of the New York Times thumbnail of the second page of the final speech of Xi Jinping while inspecting Xinjiang (April 30, 2014) with the same page given to the Uyghur Tribunal (right-hand). The author modified both images by increasing contrast levels in order to make the shapes of the textual features more evident. The Times’ had modified their page edges to fade into black, reducing the white space and making the page appear to be slightly smaller than its actually size. Both images show the same textual features such as indents or the very short sentence stub at the top left. The right-hand image was altered by the author by removing the outlines of the original paper page, increasing the contrast, and blurring and pixelating the result, in order to protect the person who originally leaked it. The New York Times evidently used similar but slightly different methods, resulting in a more box-

*shaped pixilation and slightly different contrast levels in certain sections, with an overall stronger obfuscation of the original page.*

It is unclear why a total of either 66 or 86 pages were withheld from the Tribunal. It may be that these pertain to more localized contexts, and that those who leaked the Xinjiang Papers felt that the Tribunal would only require higher-level evidence. Such thoughts are of course purely speculative. It is however important to note that besides the Turpan question-and-answer-script, none of the other missing documents are explicitly mentioned or quoted from in the Times report. Likely, the Times report focused on information judged to be of immediate interest to a general global audience. One would expect that if these documents contained blockbuster material, the *Times* would have incorporated them in its report. An altogether alternative explanation is that the documents leaked to the Tribunal may have been leaked by a person from China who only had access to these documents, although this seems less likely.

The Times' thumbnails contain additional redactions, such as the redaction of document titles that are in large, bold font, and therefore more easily recognizable even in thumbnail form. They also redact a large stamp in the center of one of the pages that are part of the attachments of the document set outlining the confession and punishment of former Yarkand county party secretary Wang Yongzhi (王勇智), while not redacting his thumb prints (Figure 3). This stamp is not redacted in the set that was given to the Tribunal. The Times thumbnails also redact the reprint dates and names of the reprinting local authority of two central government documents (documents nos. 7 and 10) issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (abbreviated as 中共中央办公厅), which are shown at the very bottom of each documents' last page. These are fully visible in the set leaked to the Tribunal. The Times article shows the fully transcribed cover page of only one document: Chen's August 30, 2017, speech (document no. 4). This transcription accurately preserves the urgency designation "most urgent" (特提) in the top left corner found on the original page.<sup>40</sup>

Since the New York Times thumbnails redact document titles and many other aspects of documents' first pages, it is impossible to know which types of documents may be missing from the set leaked to the Uyghur Tribunal.

### **3. Methodology for Authenticating the Documents**

Besides a detailed comparison of the leaked material to that revealed by the New York Times, the material's authentication was based on the following approach.

The header, layout, textual and graphical features of each document was reviewed, determining the type of document, and comparing the leaked files to the common formatting found in corresponding material from Chinese government files that are publicly available on the Chinese internet (see section 4). Additionally, the three cables (or: telegrams) contained in the documents were compared to the details and features of the original cable contained within the China Cables, which is in the author's possession.

#### **3.1 The Five Documents Containing Speeches or Summaries of Speeches**

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<sup>40</sup> The English translations of these urgency levels are taken from

“国务院关于发布《国家行政机关公文处理办法》的通知 Procedures for Handling Official Documents in the Administrative Departments of the Government.” 北大法律英文网 (Law Info China). State Council, April 16, 2012. <http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=174218>.

Each document was reviewed in light of its context and setting. For example, four of the five speeches are publicly known events whose context and contents are described and summarized by related state media articles and government reports, often with considerable detail. In several instances, state media summaries of speeches featured literal quotes of entire sections from the original documents. Table 3 exemplifies this for document no.1 with a small subset of such matching passages (identical passages are in bold font). This type of comparison shows for example that the expression “absolutely no mercy” (毫不留情), which featured in the title of the New York Times report, had in fact been published as part of a literal quote of that section of Xi’s speech by the Chinese state media outlet Xinhua (Table 3).

A careful analysis of the contents also shows that several noteworthy statements made by Xi are not his original words, but are quotations, at times word by word, from other officials. At least this is what can be ascertained based on publicly available material (in theory, these officials could have quoted earlier, non-public statements by Xi). An example of this is the statement highlighted by the New York Times that Xinjiang will require a “painful period of interventionary treatment.” On March 7, 2014, days after the Kunming train station stabbing, Xinjiang’s party secretary Zhang Chunxian first used this expression to argue that stability maintenance was Xinjiang’s primary task.<sup>41</sup>

| Media source and date   | Media quotes  | Quotes from document no.1   |
|---|---|---|
| Xinhua, May 3, 2014<br>Archived URL:<br><a href="https://archive.is/yOXR4">https://archive.is/yOXR4</a> | <p>在对新疆改革发展稳定工作提出全面要求后，总书记指出，实现新疆社会稳定和长治久安，关键在党，根本靠坚强的干部队伍、严密的基层组织体系、管用的群众工作机制。抓好这3件事，切入点很多，当前一个重要载体就是党的群众路线教育实践活动。要从解决作风上的突出问题入手，落实到提高干部队伍素质、提高基层组织战斗力、提高新形势下群众工作能力上，落脚到做好改革发展稳定各项工作上。</p> <p>总书记强调，做好新疆工作事关全国大局，决不仅仅是新疆一个地区的事情，而是全党全国的事。全党都要站在战略和全局高度来认识新疆工作的重要性，多算大账，少算小账，特别要多算政治账、战略账，少算经济账、眼前账，加大对口援疆工作力度，完善对口援疆工作机制，共同努力，实现新疆社会稳定和长治久安。</p> | <p>四、切实抓好党的建设，促进干部队伍建设实现新疆社会稳定和长治久安，关键在党，根本靠坚强的干部队伍、严密的基层组织体系、管用的群众工作机制。抓好这3件事，切入点很多，当前一个重要载体就是党的群众路线教育实践活动。要从解决作风上的突出问题入手，落实到提高干部队伍素质、提高基层组织战斗力、提高新形势下群众工作能力上，落脚到做好改革发展稳定各项工作上。(p.21)</p> <p>我要特别强调一点，做好新疆工作事关全国大局，决不仅仅是新疆一个地区的事情，而是全党全国的事。全党都要站在战略和全局高度来认识新疆工作的重要性，多算大账，少算小账，特别要多算政治账、战略账，少算经济账、眼前账，加大对口援疆工作力度，完善对口援疆工作机制，共同努力，实现新疆社会稳定和长治久安。(p.26)</p> |

<sup>41</sup> “张春贤谈昆明暴恐案哽咽:曾自己在房里静静思考。” 中国新闻网, March 7, 2014. [http://web.archive.org/web/20200131130155/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2014qglianghui/2014-03/07/content\\_17331846.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20200131130155/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2014qglianghui/2014-03/07/content_17331846.htm).

|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Xinhua, May 3, 2014.<br/>Archived URL:<br/><a href="https://archive.md/yOXR4">https://<br/>archive.md/yOXR4</a></p> | <p>总书记对各族干部群众说，<b>新疆各族群众是我们的兄弟姐妹，宗教极端思想和恐怖主义是我们共同的敌人。团结兄弟姐妹，我们要付出真情、献上真心；打击共同敌人，我们要针锋相对、毫不留情。要深入开展各种形式的群防群治活动，着力打好反恐怖人民战争，筑起铜墙铁壁，使暴力恐怖分子成为“过街老鼠、人人喊打”，通过打击极少数教育团结大多数。</b></p> | <p><b>新疆各族群众是我们的兄弟姐妹。团结兄弟姐妹，我们要付出真情、献上真心；打击共同敌人，我们要针锋相对、毫不留情。要深入开展各种形式的群防群治活动，着力打好反恐怖人民战争，筑起铜墙铁壁，使暴力恐怖分子成为“过街老鼠、人人喊打”。</b> (p.8-9)</p> <p>在严厉打击犯罪分子的同时，要加强政策法律宣讲，<b>通过打击极少数教育团结大多数。</b> (p.29)</p> |
|--|---|--|

Table 3: Examples of substantial literal quotes from the leaked documents that can be found in state media reports of Xi Jinping's speech while inspecting Xinjiang from April 30, 2014. Passages highlighted in bold are identical.

In addition, the exact title and at times issue number of these speeches can be verified from other public government and media sources.

For example, document no. 1 contains not only a title with an issue number of Xi's speeches, but also a cover page dated October 17, 2016, indicating the purpose and timing of the document's dissemination. A report published by the Tekes County government on October 27, 2016, only ten days after the issuance of the set of speeches, notes that on the 25<sup>th</sup> of that month, the County Party Committee conveyed a study session that was only attended by a select number of key leaders.<sup>42</sup> The report quotes the title of document no.1's speech set (《习近平同志在新疆考察工作期间的讲话》). Together with the title of document no.2 (the set of speeches by Xi, Li and Yu in May 2014), the title of document no.1 is also mentioned in the context of an October 24, 2016 study session of the XUAR Forestry Department.<sup>43</sup> This now-deleted report explains the significance and influence of Xi's two speeches at a time when the region was at the cusp of embarking on a multipronged set of draconian measures:

[T]he speech made by General Secretary Xi Jinping during his inspection in Xinjiang and his speech at the second Central Xinjiang Work Symposium are the strategic deployment of the Party Central Committee for Xinjiang work. At present and for a period of time in the future, we must study them repeatedly and thoroughly to truly understand the core principles and grasp their spiritual essence, so as to make [them] enter the mind and heart, always remembering, creating a unity of knowledge and action, and let [it] take root. It is necessary to integrate the study of the spirit and essence of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech with the study and implementation of the spirit and essence of the series of speeches by the Secretary of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region Chen Quanguo...<sup>44</sup>

Especially significant is the mandate to “study of the spirit and essence of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech [together] with the study ... of the series of speeches by ... Chen

<sup>42</sup><http://www.zgts.gov.cn/info/1009/23968.htm> (since deleted), archived download: 穆志伟. “特克斯县组织召开县委中心组2016年第16次集中学习会议-特克斯县公共信息网 (23968-HTML).PDF.” October 27, 2016. <https://bit.ly/3cEU0sk>

<sup>43</sup> <https://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xinjiang/bmdt/201610/67ce208a120c481b987ef061e6d11c18.shtml> (since deleted), archived URL: “自治区林业厅召开干部大会传达学习习近平总书记重要讲话.” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府网. 自治区林业厅, October 26, 2016. <https://archive.md/6uSlv>.

<sup>44</sup> ... 习近平总书记在考察期间的讲话和在第二次中央新疆工作座谈会上的讲话，是党中央对新疆工作作出的战略部署。当前和今后一个时期，我们要反复学、深入学，真正领会核心要义、把握精神实质，做到入脑入心、时刻铭记、知行合一、落地生根。要把学习习近平总书记重要讲话精神与学习贯彻自治区党委陈全国书记系列讲话精神结合起来...

Quanguo.” This provides a direct conceptual link between mandates issued by Xi and their later implementation under Chen.

Documents no.1 and no.2 both represent long speeches by Xi Jinping that were held within 30 days of each other. Naturally, several passages and expressions overlap. One of these overlapping passages is of particular interest, because it contains important evidence that links Xi to the legal framework underpinning the internment campaign.

| Document no.1, p.8 (April 30, 2014)  | Document no.2, p.9 (May 28, 2014)   |
|--|---|
| <p>We must hold high the banner of the rule of law and be good at using law-based ways of thinking and methods to solve problems. At the national level, the enacting of counterterrorism legislation must be sped up. In Xinjiang, local laws and regulations can also be formulated in response to prominent issues such as religious extremism, to promote the gradual normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work.</p> <p>要高举法治旗帜，善于运用法治思维和法治方式解决问题。国家层面要加快反恐怖立法，新疆也可以针对宗教极端等突出问题搞一些地方性法规和规章，推动反恐维稳工作逐步实现常态化。</p> | <p>Regarding those who violate the law, those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced, there must be no one above the law. The national level must expedite the process of [enacting] counterterrorism legislation, and Xinjiang should also draft relevant local regulations to promote the normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work.</p> <p>对违法犯罪的，该抓的抓，该判的判，决不能有法外之人。国家层面要加快反恐立法进程，新疆也要制定相关地方性法规，推动反恐维稳工作实现常态化。</p> |

Table 4.

The “relevant local regulations” highlighted by Xi refers to the “XUAR De-Extremification Regulation” (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例) which was issued in March 2017. It laid the foundation for the “normalization, standardization, and legalization” (常态化、规范化、法治化) of Xinjiang’s re-education (lit. “transformation through education”; 教育转化) through “centralized education” involving “behavioral correction” (XUAR Government, March 30, 2017; [Legal Daily](#), April 11, 2017). Re-education camp construction bids and anecdotal accounts from the ground indicated that Xinjiang’s campaign of mass internment began right around when the Regulation came into effect.<sup>45</sup> The PRC has also stated that the Regulation constitutes the legal basis for the VSETCs ([PRC Consulate-General in Brisbane](#), November 30, 2018).<sup>46</sup> The Regulation was revised in October 2018 to fully legitimize the VSETCs, referring to them as “re-education institutions” (教育转化机构) ([Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress](#), October 9, 2018).

Of particular interest here is also Xi’s statement that “regarding those who violate the law, those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced, there must be no one above the law” (对违法犯罪的，该抓的抓，该判的判，决不能有法外之人) in his May 28, 2014 speech, which immediately preceded his remark that Xinjiang could enact that local legislation (Table 4). This is because it closely mirrors a statement found in several of Chen Quanguo’s speeches and highlighted in the New York Times article: “rounding up all who should be rounded up”

<sup>45</sup> Zenz, Adrian. “‘Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude’: China’s political re-education campaign in Xinjiang.” *Central Asian Survey*, 38:1. 2019. First published September 5, 2018, 102-128. Doi: [10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997](https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997).

<sup>46</sup> “新疆维吾尔自治区第十三届人民代表大会常务委员会公告。”新疆维吾尔自治区人大常委会. October 9, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20181010124647/http://www.xjpcsc.gov.cn/1009/t4028e49c665347630166588b8cf40001001.html>. Note that Western experts on Chinese domestic law dispute that Xinjiang’s Regulation can in fact achieve this function – see for example Clarke, Donald. “No, New Xinjiang Legislation Does Not Legalize Detention Centers.” *Lawfare*, October 11, 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/no-new-xinjiang-legislation-does-not-legalize-detention-centers>.



(应收尽收Xi's expression is mirrored word-for-word in a January 2015 government work report by Xinjiang's Qiemo County (compare also Table 5).<sup>47</sup>

One might argue that Xi specifically refers to persons who actually violated a law. However, later developments show that Xinjiang's de-extremification strategy was already turning from a focus on those who had perpetrated acts of violence to preemptively and extrajudicially detain "susceptible" problem populations for re-education purposes. Given the immediate context of Xi's words – the statement that Xinjiang could enact its own related legislation, which later became the legal basis for the re-education camps – it is not difficult to see how his call to seize and sentence those who should be seized and sentenced logically evolved into Chen Quanguo's demand to "rounding up all who should be rounded up" into extrajudicial internment facilities.

| Statement author, date and source document reference                              | Statement (English)                                      | Statement (Chinese) |
|---|--|---------------------|
| Xi Jinping, May 2014, document no.2, p.9  | "those who should be seized should be seized"            | 该抓的抓                |
| Xi Jinping, May 2014, document no.2, p.9  | "those who should be sentenced should be sentenced"      | 该判的判                |
| XUAR government, June 2017, document no.3, p. and p.7                             | "round up all who should be rounded up"                  | 应收尽收                |
| XUAR government, June 2017, document no.3, p.7                                    | "detain all who should be detained"                      | 应押尽押                |
| Chen Quanguo, February 2018, document no.8, p.7                                   | "do the round-up-all-who-should-be-rounded-up work well" | 做好应收尽收工作            |
| XUAR government, March 2018, document no.9, p.8 and 17 (three instances in total) | "round up all who should be rounded up"                  | 应收尽收                |

Table 5.

The context surrounding document no.4 – Chen Quanguo's speech from August 30, 2017 – is well-documented in government and state media reports.<sup>48</sup> In the leaked files, it came not as a full speech transcript but as a set of "Required Knowledge and Skills" (应知应会), a four-character expression that denotes a set of basic knowledge or skills that those working in a related profession "must know" (应知) and be able to implement or perform (应会).<sup>49</sup> Not uncommonly, related documents contain a list of official terms and slogans with related explanations in a format conducive to learning the entire list by heart. These then frequently serve as a basis to formally examine official's related knowledge.<sup>50</sup> Document no.4 speaks of the need to "perfectionate the management of prisons, detention and training centers" (监所培训中心管理更加完善; p.5), with the latter referring to the

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.xjqm.gov.cn/publicity/zdjc/zfgzbg/2487.html> (since deleted)

<sup>48</sup> See "陈全国出席自治区稳定工作电视电话会议并作重要讲话." 新疆维吾尔自治区纪委监委, November 1, 2016. <https://archive.md/Kp1na> OR 姚彤 and 董少华. "陈全国: 坚定信心常抓不懈紧紧围绕总目标打好组合拳 以和谐稳定的好局面迎接党的十九大胜利召开." 新疆日报. September 1, 2017. <https://archive.md/FWlf2>.

<sup>49</sup> See e.g., "应知应会, 党员必学基本知识." 中国共产党新闻网. 人民网-中国共产党新闻网, May 20, 2020. <http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0520/c117092-31716511.html> OR <https://archive.md/INlxU>.

<sup>50</sup> <http://kdj.kq.xinjiang.gov.cn/ktdsz/ndgzbg/202005/231f1638eaaa40cd8d8cebdf1b67738a.html> (since deleted), archived download: "奎屯—独山子经济技术开发区2019年工作总结." 政府信息公开, May 19, 2020. <https://bit.ly/3D1A10r>.



VSTECs.<sup>51</sup> It mandates a thorough implementation of the so-called “Five Prevents” (五防), five preventative measures that include the prevention of escapes. These measures are also referenced as part of the extensive security measures mandated for VSTECs in the main cable of the China Cables.<sup>52</sup> Publicly available government reports confirm that the “Five Prevents” are a measure “demanded by Chen Quanguo” for VSTECs.<sup>53</sup>

In comparison, the fragment of the February 22, 2018, speech by Chen Quanguo (document no. 8) is more difficult to corroborate through public sources. No direct public reference to this speech or its contents could be found. However, the fact that Chen presided over that exact event – the “Autonomous Region Party Committee Standing Committee (Expanded) Meeting” (自治区党委常委(扩大)会) – on the morning of that exact day, is documented by several government sources.<sup>54</sup> While the reasons for leaking only a fragment of two pages are unclear, those two pages contain highly sensitive material. Their content shows significant overlap with Chen’s other two speeches contained in the set, as well as the June 2017 cable on responding to the potential knock-on effects from the terror attacks in England (document no.3). For example, document no.8 mandates to “do the round-up-all-who-should-be-rounded-up work well” (做好应收尽收工作; p.7). Similarly, document no.3 mandates that “all persons with motives of committing crimes” or those who show “abnormal behavior” should be subjected to the command “round up all who should be rounded up” (应收尽收) and “detain all who should be detained” (应押尽押), in order to prevent the occurrence of “lone wolf” attacks (p.7). Document no. 9, which details the punishment of the former Yarkand County party secretary Wang Yongzhi notes that he refused to “round up all who should be rounded up” (应收尽收; p.2). One notable statement contained in document no.8 that cannot be found anywhere else is the command that “the vocational education training centers must be unswervingly operated for a long time” (要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去; p.7).

The mandate to “round up all who should be rounded up” is not limited to leaked documents but can be corroborated from independent and publicly available sources. For example, the 2018 budget report for Urumqi’s Gaoxin District contains performance evaluation standards for the so-called convenience police stations (警务站) set up by Chen Quanguo. The main deliverable (output and effect) of these stations is to “strike” (打) according to the “round up all who should be rounded up” work demand” (“应收尽收”的工作要求).<sup>55</sup> Another such reference can be found in a 2018

<sup>51</sup> 监 = 监狱, 所 = 看守所, 培训中心 = 职业技能教育培训中心.

<sup>52</sup> Zenz. “Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts.” <https://www.ipolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>.

<sup>53</sup> See “关于印发《喀什地区困难群体就业培训工作实施方案》的通知20.” 政府信息公开内容页-喀什政府信息网. 喀什政府信息公开平台, August 7, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20181204024839/http://kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2963>. AND “新疆司法厅第九督导组赴北疆部分监狱、教育矫治局(强制戒毒所)督导检查.” 新疆监狱纪检监察, June 4, 2018. <https://archive.fo/Qq5V5>.

<sup>54</sup> See “坚决贯彻以习近平同志为核心的党中央的决策部署紧紧围绕新疆工作总目标奋力开创各项工作新局面.” 新疆日报. February 23, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211012181913/http://wap.xjdaily.com/xjrb/20180223/99913.html>. OR “民建新疆区委会2018年1--2月大事记.” 新疆维吾尔自治区委员会. 区民建宣调部, August 16, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20180816003545/http://www.mjxjqwh.cn/shownew.asp?NewsID=8108>.

<sup>55</sup> “按照“应收尽收”的工作要求, 持续做好“挖、减、铲”“防回流、打派遣”“四断”“两收”专项行动 “2018年度高新区(新市区)六十户乡人民政府部门决算公开说明.” 乌鲁木齐高新技术产业开发区, October 8, 2019. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211105215434/http://www.uhdz.gov.cn/info/4768/29846.htm>.

grassroots party building work report by the Yuli County government, which is cited below and in Table 6.<sup>56</sup>

Document no.8 is dominated by jargon specific to Chen Quanguo during the crucial years of 2017 and 2018 that can be found in both publicly available material and his other speeches contained in the set. It contains several important statements and technical terms that are reflected in similar or near-identical statements in the other two Chen speeches. A previously little-noticed but very significant term in his lexicon is the “Four Things” (四件事; see Table 6). It is often found in Xinjiang government accounts from late 2017 as one of Chen Quanguo’s core demands (陈全国书记...要求), but the term is never explained.<sup>57</sup> Now, based on the leaked material, we can for the first time understand that the first of these “Four Things” is the safety, quality and long-term continuation of the VSETC re-education facilities. An October 13, 2017, report by Radio Free Asia’s (RFA) Cantonese service reported that several Xinjiang officials were being penalized over being unable to recite from memory the “Four Things” put forward by Chen Quanguo, which are “regarded as Chen Quanguo’s political priority<sup>58</sup>

In document no.8, the “Four Things” are expressed as “Four Plus Two Things” (“4+2”件事), adding two tasks: 1) to use the Integrated Joint Operations Platform to “round up all who should be rounded up”; 2) to do a good job with border control. The almost exact same definition of the “Four Plus Two Things” can be found in an internal government document obtained by the author through local government networks in Xinjiang in late 2019.

A constellation very similar to the “Four Plus Two Things,” albeit one that does not spell out what the “Four Things” exactly are, can be identified in publicly available government records. On February 27, 2018, five days after Chen’s February 22 speech recorded in document no.8, the Yuli county government detailed a government meeting on the 26<sup>th</sup> in which over 80 leading county cadres studied instructions on grassroots party work. The demand made in this report could be expressed as a “Four Plus One Thing[s].” To quote:<sup>59</sup>

Party organizations at all levels must tighten the grip of the fight against terrorism at all times, implement the "Four Sentences" with an iron and skillful hand, make great efforts and do a good job regarding the "Four Things" ["四件事"] and "the one [thing of] round[ing] up all who should be

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.yuli.gov.cn/Item/87771.aspx.html> (since deleted), archived download: 张金晨 and 郭洋洋. “尉犁县召开基层党（工）委书记抓基层党建工作述职评议考核会议-尉犁县政府网(87771-Aspx-HTML).PDF.” 尉犁县政府网, February 27, 2018. <https://bit.ly/318TW1o>.

<sup>57</sup> See for example “旅发委迅速传达自治区主要领导重要批示精神 坚定坚决落实‘四句话’做好‘四件事’ 全力以赴确保十九大旅游行业安全稳定.” 国家旅游地理. October 14, 2017. <http://m.cntgol.com/pcarticle/161880> OR <https://archive.md/biaEk>, OR “安征宇任新疆克孜勒苏柯尔克孜自治州党委书记.” The Paper. Accessed November 26, 2021. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211027152001/http://m.thepaper.cn/kuaibao\\_detail.jsp?contid=1849087&from=kuaibao](http://web.archive.org/web/20211027152001/http://m.thepaper.cn/kuaibao_detail.jsp?contid=1849087&from=kuaibao). OR “做好宣讲落实任务 为十九大营造良好的社会氛围.” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府网. October 28, 2017. <https://archive.md/7QeNp>. OR “新疆方志信息（2018）年第01期.” 新疆地情网. 新疆地方志编纂委员会, February 22, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211027152306/http://www.xjtonglan.com/fzcc/fzcx/1444.shtm>.

<sup>58</sup> “文革復辟：背不出陳全國語錄 七幹部受罰.” Radio Free Asia. October 13, 2017. <https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/xinjiang-official-10132017083743.html>.

<sup>59</sup> Source: <http://www.yuli.gov.cn/Item/87771.aspx.html> (since deleted), archived download: 张金晨. “尉犁县召开基层党（工）委书记抓基层党建工作述职评议考核会议-尉犁县政府网(87771-Aspx-HTML).PDF.” November 19, 2021. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZfiVNHAR4jcgDBBXkzk8qxp2HwftHbX/view>. Compare “兵团交通运输局全面动员干部职工积极参与‘访惠聚’驻连工作(5217158-SHTML).PDF.” 新疆生产建设兵团交通运输局, April 18, 2017. <http://jti.xjbt.gov.cn/c/2018-04-17/5217158.shtml>. (Archived URL: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YmxziicbUKmetwsNGSUGtdrrrps1HpkT/view>).

rounded up" ["一个应收尽收"], establish a long-term mechanism for counterterrorism and stability maintenance.<sup>60</sup>

The combination of the “Four Things” with the command to “round up all who should be rounded up” is only logical, given that the VSETC re-education work is intimately linked to the task of comprehensively rounding up all who the state wants to be interned.

| Document no.  | Chen speech August 30, 2017 (no.4)                              | Chen speech October 30, 2017 (no.6)   | Chen speech Feb. 22, 2018 (no.8)   | Knowledge of Very Important Theories (Xinjiang internal document, 19 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress) | Yuli county report, Feb 27, 2018 |
|---|---|---|--|--|----------------------------------|
| Statements pertaining to the significance of the internment facilities  | 五是充分肯定了新疆贯彻落实总书记新疆工作总目标创造的好做法、好经验。如，职业技能教育培训转化中心，网络管理创新，建立一体化平台 | n/a   | 要把职业技能教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去  | n/a  | n/a                              |
| Mandates regarding Internment facility security                         | 监所培训中心管理更加完善。“五防”工作必须到位，绝对安全必须保证。一把手要负总责，分管同志专抓，决不能出任何问题        | 持续抓好“四件事”（职业技能教育培训中心和监管场所绝对安全...  | 确保两所、一中心绝对安全，特别要把职业技能教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去   | 确保职业技能教育培训中心绝对安全   | n/a                              |
| The “Four Things” (四件事)   | n/a   | 持续抓好“四件事”（职业技能教育培训中心和监管场所绝对安全、群众工作、社会面防控常态化、军警武装拉动常态化）                            | 二是抓好“4+2”件事。确保两所、一中心绝对安全，特别要把职业技能教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去，办好、办出质量；精心做好群众工作；全面加强社会面防控；常态化开展武装拉动。做好应收尽收工作，边境地区要防范境外人员非法入境 | “4+2”：确保职业技能教育培训中心绝对安全，做好群众工作、社会面防控常态化、军警武装拉动常态化，“对一体化平台”推出和严打深挖的涉暴恐危安人员应收尽收；抓好边境                  | 抓好“四件事”和“一个应收尽收”，形成反恐维稳的常态机制     |
| The “Four Breaks” (四断) (break roots / lineages / connections / origins) | 断根、断代、断联、断源“四断”明显，实现了标本兼治、源头治理、综合治理、系统治理 (p.3)                  | 抓好“四断”（断代、断根、断联、断源），对利用宗教活动传播极端思想的，发现一起、坚决依法查处一起，彻底铲除宗教极端思想滋生蔓延和传播渗透的土壤。(p.19-20) | n/a  | n/a  | n/a                              |

Table 6.

Documents no.4 and no.6 also mandate that the state must achieve the “Four Breaks” (四断), which refers to breaking the roots, lineages, connections and origins of religious extremists (断根、断代、断联、断源).<sup>61</sup> While there are multiple sources for the full statement, the abbreviation as “Four Breaks” is much less common. The author was able to find two other references of 四断. One is contained in a May 2017 report of a meeting of the XUAR People’s Political Consultative Conference (新疆维吾尔自治区政协) on stability maintenance and counterterrorism that speaks of applying the

<sup>60</sup> Chinese: 各级党组织要时刻紧绷反恐怖斗争这根弦，以铁的手腕落实“四句话”，抓好“四件事”和“一个应收尽收”，形成反恐维稳的常态机制。

<sup>61</sup> Compare “关于印发《喀什地区2018年督查工作要点责任分解方案》的通知。”喀什政府信息公开平台. June 3, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20180813115300/http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=285...>

“Four Breaks” to religious extremist thought (宗教极端思想).<sup>62</sup> Another reference is the 2018 budget report of Urumqi’s Gaoxin District’s convenience police stations mentioned above, which mandates that the stations are to continue to implement the special action (专项行动) of the “Four Breaks” (四断) and the “Two Collects” (两收).<sup>63</sup>

### 3.2 The Three Documents Issued by the Central Government

Like most of the speeches, the three documents issued by central government authorities (nos. 5, 7 and 10) have titles, publication dates and wider contexts that can be verified to a substantial degree. In contrast to the speeches, their contents are less designed for public consumption. There are no state media reports that summarize their contents or provide substantial literal quotes. Instead, references to these documents are often briefer and less detailed.

Document no. 5 seeks to present a “correct,” state-sanctioned view of Xinjiang’s history in order to change “wrong” views. Its title (although not its issue number) can be independently confirmed through publicly available sources, including a statement published by the National Ethnic Affairs Commission (NEAC) on September 28, 2017.<sup>64</sup> The document is the result of the “Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group’s Research Forum on Several Historical Issues in Xinjiang” (中央新疆工作协调小组关于新疆若干历史问题研究座谈) and is dated September 10, 2017. A Xinhua report summarizes the results of a “Research Symposium on Several Historical Issues in Xinjiang” (新疆若干历史问题研究座谈会) held only days later in Beijing and led by Yu Zhengsheng, the head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group at the time.<sup>65</sup> Both the Xinhua report and document no.5 use nearly identical language to describe the need to “correctly handle Xinjiang’s ideological realm, especially issues pertaining to the realm of history” (正确处理新疆意识形态领域特别是历史领域现实问题; p.2).

Publicly available reports also confirm that following the document’s stated intent, Xinjiang government entities began to study this document in late 2017, soon after it was issued, and that its contents was communicated to the relevant propaganda entities in order to be taught down to the village level.<sup>66</sup> A report from the Xinjiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences asserts that the study of this document was designed to “resolutely eliminate the influence of erroneous thoughts in Xinjiang’s history, culture, ethnicity, religion” in order to “lay a solid ideological and political

<sup>62</sup> “政协新疆维吾尔自治区第十一届委员会常务委员会关于坚决维护民族团结坚决反对民族分裂的决议.” Sina 新闻中心. May 18, 2017. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119193944/http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2017-05-19/docifyfkmc9740823.shtml>.

<sup>63</sup> Chinese: 按照“应收尽收”的工作要求, 持续做好“挖、减、铲”“防回流、打派遣”“四断”“两收”专项行动. “2018年度高新区(新市区)六十户乡人民政府部门决算公开说明.” 乌鲁木齐高新技术产业开发区(新市区). October 8, 2019. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211105215434/http://www.uhdz.gov.cn/info/4768/29846.htm>.

<sup>64</sup> “国际交流司召开全司会议.” 中华人民共和国国家民族事务委员会. September 28, 2017. <http://www.neac.gov.cn/seac/xwzx/201709/1070173.shtml> OR <https://archive.md/I5Dcm>.

<sup>65</sup> 刘阳, and 李海韵, eds. “新疆若干历史问题研究座谈会在京召开 俞正声出席会议并讲话.” 新华网. 新华社, September 13, 2017. [http://web.archive.org/web/20190802235039/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/13/c\\_1121658236.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20190802235039/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/13/c_1121658236.htm).

<sup>66</sup> “自治区普通高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地情况介绍.” 喀什大学人文学院. August 9, 2020. <https://rwy.ksu.edu.cn/info/1056/5285.htm> OR <https://archive.md/ik9n0>;

“墨玉县召开第十七次中心组理论学习会议 张冠军主持会议.” 新浪新闻. November 20, 2017. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119194231/https://news.sina.cn/gn/2017-11-20/detail-ifynwxum7726518.d.html>.

foundation for governing Xinjiang according to law<sup>67</sup> A report from Xinjiang University states that one of its faculty members, Professor Meng Nan, participated in the writing of the document.<sup>68</sup>

A computer-aided textual comparison of document no.5 with Xinjiang's white book titled "Several Historical Issues in Xinjiang" (《新疆的若干历史问题》白皮书)<sup>69</sup>, which was published in July 2019, using the website Copyleaks.com which specializes in the detection of plagiarism, yielded a high matching score. The comparison found that 35.2 percent of passages featured identical text, while 10.5 percent of passages were identical with only minor changes. These figures should be treated with some caution, given that the author found that Copyleaks does not always successfully identify all matching passages in Chinese texts, meaning that the combined matching percentage of 45.7 percent could be an underestimation. Even so, these metrics give a strong indication of a high degree of overlap (of possibly close to 50 percent) between the classified document and the subsequently published white paper. Notably, the classified document at times contains stronger language and more direct admissions. For example, it bluntly notes that the work of creating a "correct" notion of Xinjiang's history must "dig deep into the roots of wrong thinking" (深挖错误思潮的根子上着力; p.2). It also notes that while the Three Districts Revolution (三区革命; or Ili Rebellion), a Soviet-backed uprising by Turkic ethnic groups against the Kuomintang government in three prefectures in Xinjiang between 1944-1949, was "part of the people's democratic revolution in our country," nevertheless "grave mistakes were made in the early stage" (p.4). In contrast, the public white paper makes no mention of "wrong thinking," of the Ili Rebellion, or of any type of historical mistakes (especially not "grave" ones).

The title, issue number and aspects of the contents of document no.7 on the southward development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) can be corroborated from public government and academic sources.<sup>70</sup> This document states that by 2022, southern Xinjiang's XPCC population is to be increased by 300,000. This exact same goal is also found in two Chinese academic publications that were previously analyzed by the author.<sup>71</sup>

The document contains statements regarding the ethnic population distribution that can be verified through related accounts by scholars. It points out that southern Xinjiang's "population structure is extremely monolithic" (人口结构极为单一) and suffers from "severe imbalances in the distribution of the ethnic population" (人口民族结构严重失衡; meaning there are too many ethnic groups and too few Han). Document no.2 (Yu Zhengsheng's speech) likewise states that in southern Xinjiang,

<sup>67</sup>“院机关第三党支部和吐鲁番农业科学研究所党支部联合开展主题党日暨民族团结联谊活动。”新疆农业科学院科研管理处。May 23, 2018. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211020194313/http://www.xaas.ac.cn/nkykkgc/kgc\\_nry.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=1080&wbnewsid=8067&archive=0](http://web.archive.org/web/20211020194313/http://www.xaas.ac.cn/nkykkgc/kgc_nry.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=1080&wbnewsid=8067&archive=0).

<sup>68</sup>“总体建设目标。”新疆大学丝绸之路历史文化研究基地。October 13, 2020. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211109234423/http://www.history.xju.edu.cn/info/1152/1212.htm>.

<sup>69</sup>刘杨。“新疆的若干历史问题。”中华人民共和国中央人民政府。新华社，July 21, 2019. [http://web.archive.org/web/20190727212318/http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/21/content\\_5412300.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20190727212318/http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/21/content_5412300.htm).

<sup>70</sup> See “且末县第十七届人民政府第32次常务会。”政府信息公开。政府办，February 17, 2021. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211014133244/http://www.xjqmx.gov.cn/zwgk/2qmxrmzfbgs/jcxcgk2qmxrmzfbgs/zfhy2qmxrmzfbgs/content\\_23004](http://web.archive.org/web/20211014133244/http://www.xjqmx.gov.cn/zwgk/2qmxrmzfbgs/jcxcgk2qmxrmzfbgs/zfhy2qmxrmzfbgs/content_23004). OR 吉秋霞, 林均瑜, and 庞培浩。“力促兵地民族交流交往交融 广东东莞谢岗镇代表团赴托云牧场开展结对交流活动。”新华网。广东援疆指挥部驻三师图市工作队, September 23, 2020. <https://archive.is/wip/u7Ppp>. and 2020新疆南疆地区城镇化、产业升级与人口集聚——基于县域统计资料与 SDEM 模型\_欧阳金琼.

<sup>71</sup> See 2020新疆南疆地区城镇化、产业升级与人口集聚——基于县域统计资料与 SDEM 模型\_欧阳金琼 OR Zenz. “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang.” <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>. (Open access alternative: Zenz, Adrian. “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang.’ Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862512>).



“the population structure is monolithic” (人口结构单一), adding that there is a concentration of poor people and a “distorted religious atmosphere” (宗教氛围扭曲; p.67). In these statements, “monolithic” effectively refers to a monoethnic (predominantly Uyghur), monoreligious (predominantly Islamic) and mono-economic (predominantly agrarian and low-income) social structure.

Virtually the exact same statements on ethnic population ratios and an overconcentration of Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang have been made by Liu Yilei, deputy secretary-general of the XPCC Party Committee and dean of Xinjiang University’s Western China Economic Development and Reform Research Institute, as well as other important Xinjiang academics.<sup>72</sup> Importantly, the document’s statement that “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability” (人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础) was not only echoed word for word by Liu Yilei in July 2020, but is also found in identical form in Xi’s speech at the XPCC on April 29, 2014 (document no. 1, p.40). That speech contains a dedicated section on the sensitive topic of population structure and optimization, where Xi argues that Xinjiang must “give play to the XPCC’s role in optimizing population resources [to] become a transit point for optimizing the population” (要发挥兵团优化人口资源的作用，成为优化人口的中转站; p.40).

| Source   | Document no.7   | Xi’s speeches                                   | Liu Yilei’s July 2020 speech         | Xinjiang academics  |
|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| The population structure of Southern Xinjiang is monolithic (monoethnic) | 南疆地区人口结构极为单一 (p.6)  | n/a   | n/a                                  | 主要基于维吾尔族人口增长快、数量大,使南疆的民族单一性、宗教单一性特征更为突出 (Li Xiaoxia, 2017)                  |
| The population and ethnic structure are seriously unbalanced             | 人口民族结构严重失衡(p.6)   | n/a   | 人口结构失衡问题是南疆问题的核心                     | 在南疆民汉人口结构失衡严重到不可思议的程度 (Liao Zhaoyu, 2016)                                   |
| Statements on population structure / security                            | 人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础 (p.6 and again on p.8)  | 人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础 (document no.1, p.40)       | 人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础,南疆汉族人口比重太低,不足15% | 新疆边境地区民族结构变化势必会影响民族之间的交流和团结,成为造成族群隔离、影响民族关系、阻碍新疆发展的巨大隐患,威胁人口安全。(Liang 2019) |
| The population structure must be optimized                               | 到2030年,兵团在南疆的整体实力显著增强,优化人口结构的作用突出体现 (p.1)<br><br>重点留住当地人口、吸引内地人口,发挥优化人口资源作用 (p.8) | 要发挥兵团优化人口资源的作用,成为优化人口的中转站 (document no.1, p.40) | n/a                                  | 针对目前南疆汉族人口仅占该地区总人口15%的状况来看,优化其人口资源可以说就是确保新疆人口安全的重要基础 (Wang Qiaolong, 2018)  |

Table 7.

<sup>72</sup> “刘以雷老师参加‘中国区域经济50人论坛’专题研讨会并作为代表发言。”新疆大学. 新疆大学经济与管理学院, July 14, 2020. <http://web.archive.org/web/20210220221018/http://ems.xju.edu.cn/info/1055/1661.htm>. AND Zenz. “End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang.” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>.



The authentication of document no.10 is comparatively straightforward. A Radio Free Asia (RFA) report from June 2018 shows photos of the full cover page and of page 10.<sup>73</sup> For both of these pages, text and layout are identical to those contained in the Tribunal leak. In addition, both title and issue number can be corroborated from other government sources.<sup>74</sup> In October 2019, the Central Institute for Ethnic Administrators (中央民族干部学院) named document no.10 as the key training document for religious figures in Ningxia to study religious policy and the “Sinicization of religion”<sup>75</sup> This document is unique in the set in that “Xinjiang” is not even mentioned in the text. It is a general directive issued by the central government without a specific regional focus.

### 3.3 The Three Cables

Cables (or: telegrams) are typically more difficult to authenticate, given that their titles, contexts, and contents are usually not discussed in publicly available reports. All three cables contained in the data leaked to the Tribunal (documents nos. 3, 9, 11) are mentioned in the NYT article, two of them with a fully transcribed page. Additional verification through independent sources was possible to varying degrees. The cable contained in document no.3, titled “Notice on Responding to the Stimulus of a Series of Terrorist Attacks in the UK and Further Strengthening the Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work in the Region,” was issued on June 29, 2017, ten days after a series of consecutive terror attacks in England.<sup>76</sup> It discusses many of the known securitization aspects of Xinjiang’s police state, including convenience police stations and re-education or “transformation through education facilities” (教育转化场所). The document’s mandate to “round up all who should be rounded up” is reiterated in two of the other documents from 2017 and early 2018 (nos. 8 and 9, compare tables 5 and 6).

Importantly, document no.3 contains a surprisingly negative evaluation of the performance of several well-known security mechanisms, noting an insufficient density of parts of the convenience police station network, that some stations do not have enough well-equipped security staff, that some security agencies focus more on the technical capabilities of their equipment than on the training of their personnel, that there can be substantial investments in preventative measures but without effective results, or that the monitoring of overseas instant messaging tools is insufficient (p.3, 5).

While such statements are not usually publicly communicated and therefore difficult to authenticate, such forthright criticism is consistent with language found in confidential internal documents that mandate improved standards and practices. For example, the main cable of the China Cables noted that the quality, efficiency, hygienic conditions and “absolute safety” (绝对安全) of the VSETC re-education facilities was to be made a priority, indicating that these were issues that required

<sup>73</sup> 林坪. “中国机密文件曝光 强推伊斯兰教‘中国化.’” Radio Free Asia. October 11, 2020. <https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shehui/yi-06222018105345.html>.

<sup>74</sup> E.g., “2018年党中央 国务院下发文件贯彻落实情况汇总表.” 四平市人民政府. Accessed November 27, 2021. <https://archive.md/KXWwh>. Compare “山阳区深化‘转变作风抓落实、优化环境促发展’活动开展情况公示（三）.” 焦作山阳区人民政府. December 24, 2019. <https://archive.md/WJZjw>. AND 涂琼. “以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指引 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应.” 中国西藏网. 拉萨日报, May 30, 2018. <https://archive.md/t69Fl>.

<sup>75</sup> “宁夏彭阳县在中央民族干部学院举办宗教界代表人士培训班.” October 24, 2019. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119135852/http://www2.mzgbxy.org.cn/html1/report/1910/890-1.htm>.

<sup>76</sup> 李萌. “2天3城遭袭 欧洲‘独狼’难题何解?” 新华网. June 22, 2017. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211108205231/http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-06/22/content\\_29839887.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20211108205231/http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-06/22/content_29839887.htm).

improvement.<sup>77</sup> The particular preoccupation with the “absolute security” of these centers is reflected in a number of documents contained in this leak (see Table 6). In a similar vein, document no.3 laments that:

Some transformation through education work is not sufficiently systematic and targeted, security measures and medical and health conditions are not kept up, and there is a high risk of cross-infection and incitement to wrongdoing in the ‘transformation through education’ facilities. (p.4)<sup>78</sup>

It goes on to mandate the following:

Strictly implement the internal management system of supervision [detention] facilities and education and training sites [VSETCs], improve the living conditions of detainees and education and training personnel, strengthen prison investigation methods and security and preventative measures, and strictly prevent cross-infection and damage from surprise attacks. (p.6-7)<sup>79</sup>

The term “cross-infection” (交叉感染) was interpreted by the New York Times in a medical sense. While this could in theory be a valid interpretation for the first citation (p.4), 交叉感染 is in the author’s view more likely linked to the following term “incitement to wrongdoing” than to the preceding reference to health conditions. Importantly, 交叉感染 has a second interpretation that is certainly the only valid way to view its meaning in the second citation (p.6). This interpretation was provided by Xi Jinping in his April 30, 2014, speech:

It is important to do a good job with reform through education [教育改造] and transformation [through education; [教育]转化] of offenders, so as to prevent a practice of arrest and release in large numbers, as well as cross-infection. The problem of cross-infection should be effectively addressed, so that criminals cannot establish ties and engage in communication with each other whilst in educational transformation facilities, lest they become poisoned more deeply and do greater harm when they are released. ... Even after release, these people are to [be subjected to] continued transformation through education.<sup>80</sup> (document no.1, p.30)

This meaning of “cross-infection” as the horizontal transmission of religious extremism or other “incorrect” thinking in re-education facilities is echoed by a well-known paper on re-education

<sup>77</sup> ICIJ. “Read the China Cables Documents.” <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/read-the-china-cables-documents/>.

<sup>78</sup> Chinese: 有的教育转化工作系统性和针对性不强, 安防措施和医疗卫生条件跟不上, 在教育转化场所交叉感染、受蛊惑煽动的风险大

<sup>79</sup> 严格落实监管场所及教育培训点内部管理制度, 改善在押人员和教育培训人员生活条件, 加强狱侦手段和安防措施, 严防交叉感染和袭击破坏。

<sup>80</sup> Chinese: 要做好犯罪人员教育改造和转化工作, 防止大抓大放、交叉感染。要切实解决好交叉感染问题, 不能让犯罪人员在教育改造的地方搞串联交流, 反而中毒更深, 出来后做更大的坏事。

published by Qiu Yuanyuan from the Xinjiang Party School in 2017.<sup>81</sup> Qiu critiques that transformation through education centers tend to use a “one-pot cooking” approach that places persons of different backgrounds into the same facility. The fact that they study and live together on a daily basis greatly increases the “hidden dangers of ‘cross-infection’[交叉感染]” (p.75).<sup>82</sup>

The cables contained in documents nos. 9 and 11 represent “bulletins [or: circulars] for educating [or: teaching a lesson] and warning” (教训/教育警示的通报), a type of bulletin that is commonly found in China and Xinjiang. Numerous such documents were issued in 2017 and later.<sup>83</sup> The exact title of the document related to case of the former Yarkand county party secretary Wang Yongzhi (《自治区党委关于王勇智严重违纪案及其教训警示的通报》) was published on the XUAR government website on March 21, 2018, about two weeks after the case document’s date, in a statement exhorting cadres to “not touch ‘red lines’<sup>84</sup> A report by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (中共中央纪律检查委员会) from April 20, 2018, notes that Wang’s case was used for video-based “warning education” in Kashgar Prefecture (of which Yarkand county is a part).<sup>85</sup> In contrast to previous warning education sessions, this event achieved an unprecedented scope by targeting “nearly 200,000 public officials in Kashgar.”

Wang’s case is discussed in further detail in a July 2018 report of the Chongqing Morning Post.<sup>86</sup> To quote:

Among them, Wang Yongzhi was criticized for a combination of political degeneration, economic greed, unauthorized rash action, and moral corruption. He is a typical “two-faced man” with very bad (or poor) character and an extremely serious story.

The exact same list of things he is accused of can be found in document no.9 (page 2). In his confession, Wang admits that “in violation of rules and regulations,” he acted “without authorization” (擅自) when releasing more than 7,000 of the 20,000 camp detainees in his county,

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<sup>81</sup> 邱媛媛. “紧紧围绕总目标做好‘去极端化’教育转化工作.” 中文期刊服务平台, 2017. <http://www.nmglib.com:8901/article/detail.aspx?id=672372336>. OR <http://yuxiqbs.cqvip.com/Qikan/Article/Detail?id=672372336>. 紧紧围绕总目标做好“去极端化”教育转化工作. Closely focusing on the general/comprehensive goal of doing a good job on “De-radicalization” transformation through education work.

<sup>82</sup> See also “动态资讯. 去极端化视域下的‘柔性’反恐怖策略研究——以沙特、也门和埃及为例.” 国家安全-反恐怖主义信息网. 公安学刊. 浙江警察学院学报, 2019,(02). Accessed November 22, 2021. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119194734/https://cati.nwupl.edu.cn/dtzx/hswx/1348.htm>.

<sup>83</sup> See for example “明确责任分工 强化执纪问责.” 新疆统一战线. 自治区党委统战部, July 4, 2017. <http://web.archive.org/web/20200930142057/http://www.xjztb.gov.cn/system/2019/04/19/035654048.shtml>., “观察 | 上好正风肃纪反腐必修课.” 中央纪委国家监委网站. August 20, 2020. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211119195432/https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/202008/t20200820\\_224067.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20211119195432/https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/202008/t20200820_224067.html).

<sup>84</sup> “警示教育 警钟长鸣.” 发布时间, March 21, 2018. <https://archive.md/l8a4m#selection-253.114-253.118>. OR <https://archive.md/l8a4m> OR <http://fjb.xinjiang.gov.cn/xjfp/fpjgdj/201803/2b0aae3f3ad8491ea2e661fa5d479fb1.shtml>.

<sup>85</sup> “新疆以‘身边人’案例抓实公职人员警示教育 监察对象在哪 教育就跟到哪.” 中国纪检监察报. April 20, 2018. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211116182243/https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/201804/t20180420\\_170315.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20211116182243/https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/201804/t20180420_170315.html).

<sup>86</sup> “女局长擅权妄为‘被查 恶劣截取扶贫资金自认‘手下留情.’” 央视网. Accessed November 27, 2021. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211020221034/https://www.cqcb.com/headline/2018-07-03/936088\\_pc.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20211020221034/https://www.cqcb.com/headline/2018-07-03/936088_pc.html).

thereby “personally planting these ‘time bombs,’ which seriously threatened social stability.”<sup>87</sup> This is most likely what the “unauthorized rash action” refers to. According to government-issued figures, the 2017 “reform” of Xinjiang’s Disciplinary Inspection System (纪律检查体制) led to 104,544 cases that resulted in some form of disciplinary action for 119,686 officials that year.<sup>88</sup>

Similarly, the case and confession of Akto’s former county committee party secretary Gu Wensheng (谷文胜) can be found in publicly available government reports. The exact title of his case (《自治区党委办公厅关于谷文胜严重违纪案及其教训警示的通报》) is found in a report published on June 18, 2018 by China Tobacco, indicating its wide circulation to serve as a warning.<sup>89</sup> Gu was accused of corruption, a dictatorial leadership style, and a lax and inefficient implementation of poverty alleviation policies. Document no.11 is dated May 16, 2018. A May 31, 2018 notice on the Xinjiang People’s Procuratorate website states that:

A few days ago, the former secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region’s Akto County Party Committee, Gu Wensheng, was suspected of taking bribes, dereliction of duty, and illegal possession of guns and ammunition.<sup>90</sup>

Notably, document no.9 only discusses corruption and failing to obey the party without a single mention of the weapons-related charges.

A March 2020 report by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision Commission (中央纪委国家监委) in Beijing noted that Xinjiang continued to uphold a high level of severity and “zero tolerance” in dealing with disciplinary issues among cadres.<sup>91</sup> In 2019 alone, the region sanctioned 28,410 officials. Xinjiang’s Commission for Discipline Inspection broadcasts the “warning education film” titled “The Price of Willfulness” (“任性”的代价) to warn cadres. It features the “heartbroken confession” of Gu Wensheng, and reportedly caused “shock and distress” among Akto county poverty alleviation cadres who were made to watch it.

Overall, every single document contained in the leaked set has titles, contexts, passages, concepts or terms that can be independently verified through multiple sources of publicly available material, most of which can be sourced from government or state media websites.

## 4. Types of Documents

<sup>87</sup> Entire Chinese sentence: 因此，为了一己私利，我在各类会议上反复强调“应收尽收”不是全部收押，擅自做主将全县已收押收教2万余人中的7000余人违规解押解教，亲手埋下这些“定时炸弹”，给社会稳定带来严重威胁，一旦出事，将给喀什地区乃至新疆带来无可挽回的政治影响。

<sup>88</sup> “2017年新疆深化纪律检查体制改革综述。” 凤凰网资讯. 亚心网, December 22, 2017. [http://web.archive.org/web/20211026172012/https://news.ifeng.com/a/20171222/54397205\\_0.shtml](http://web.archive.org/web/20211026172012/https://news.ifeng.com/a/20171222/54397205_0.shtml).

<sup>89</sup> “新疆区局（公司）开展2018年度党组理论学习中心组第五次集中学习。” 新疆维吾尔自治区烟草专卖局（公司），June 8, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211020215529/http://www.tobacco.gov.cn/gjyc/xjycgzdt/20180608/d9cf42d283b84a9f88c2f5eef5c1f.shtml>.

<sup>90</sup> “新疆检察机关依法对谷文胜涉嫌受贿、玩忽职守等提起公诉。” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民检察院. May 21, 2018. [http://web.archive.org/web/20190113110921/http://www.xj.jcy.gov.cn/jwjk/qwfb/201807/t20180711\\_2282690.shtml](http://web.archive.org/web/20190113110921/http://www.xj.jcy.gov.cn/jwjk/qwfb/201807/t20180711_2282690.shtml).

<sup>91</sup> “新疆：处置问题线索69817件 谈话函询14441次。” 中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法. 中国人大网. March 4, 2020. [http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content\\_4509.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4509.htm).

The eleven documents leaked to the Uyghur Tribunal consist of five speeches (讲话), three documents issued by the central government (the Central Office – 中共中央办公厅文件), and three cables or telegrams (电报, document headers ending with发电). One of them is classified as “top secret” (绝密), China’s highest classification level (涉密程度) for government documents<sup>92</sup>; seven are classified under the second-highest confidentiality level of “confidential” (机密); one carries no classification, and the February 2018 speech fragment permits no analysis of such features. The three central government issued documents specify time periods after which their classification expires (保密期限).<sup>93</sup>

All documents except for document no.4 are official government documents and fall within one of the 15 specified types of such documents.<sup>94</sup> As such, they follow the formatting outlined for government documents. For example, contain 22 lines per page, employ standardized paragraph indents, and use the government-required font no.3 (3号仿宋体字; sections 5.2.3 and 7.3.3). Issue years are surrounded by the prescribed hexagonal brackets (六角括) – for example “〔2017〕” (section 7.2.5).<sup>95</sup>

Note that the reproductions of documents from the Xinjiang Papers shown below (and found in the transcript PDFs) are designed to be as close to the originals as possible. However, they are not fully identical to the originals: page margins, fonts, font colors, text spacing and text placement represent good approximations but not exact matches.

## 4.1 Speeches

Two of the five speeches were distributed as bulletins or circulars (通报) of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党中央委员会办公厅 or 中共中央办公厅), or short Central Office (中办), with issue (期) year and number. One speech was issued as a Bulletin of the XUAR Party Committee Office (新党办通报, which stands for 新疆党委办公厅通报). They refer to themselves as “issues” (期). A summary of Chen’s speech from August 30, 2017, was distributed by the XUAR government as a set of “Required Knowledge and Skills” 应知应会, a four-character expression that denotes a set of basic knowledge or skills that those working in a related profession must know (see section 3.1). This type of document is not one of the 15 types of Official

<sup>92</sup>“中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法” 中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法中国人大网 (China’s National People’s Congress). [http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content\\_4509.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4509.htm).

<sup>93</sup> See section 7.2.2. “党政机关公文格式国家标准 (2012年最新版).” 西藏自治区住房和城乡建设厅. November 23, 2015. [http://web.archive.org/web/20200811213604/http://zjt.xizang.gov.cn/jggk/zcfg\\_2386/xzfg/201511/t20151123\\_98487.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20200811213604/http://zjt.xizang.gov.cn/jggk/zcfg_2386/xzfg/201511/t20151123_98487.html).

<sup>94</sup>“关于进一步规范公文起草报送工作的通知.” YiYuan Vocational and Technical College, March 26, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119195753/https://www.jyvtc.edu.cn/dzb/500166/790368/index.html>.

<sup>95</sup>“党政机关公文格式国家标准 (2012年最新版).” 西藏自治区住房和城乡建设厅. [http://web.archive.org/web/20200811213604/http://zjt.xizang.gov.cn/jggk/zcfg\\_2386/xzfg/201511/t20151123\\_98487.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20200811213604/http://zjt.xizang.gov.cn/jggk/zcfg_2386/xzfg/201511/t20151123_98487.html).



documents of Party and Government Organs (党政机关公文), and therefore – unlike all the other documents contained in the leaked files – technically not subject to related formatting rules.<sup>96</sup>

The bulletins all reflect the prescribed formatting: the title “中办通报” with spaces between characters and in red bold font, with issue year and number. This is separated by a solid red line from the main text body, with page numbering starting on the first page. The top sections of the original documents are all redacted. The publicly available originals shown below indicate that this is in order to cover up reception stamps.



Figure 5. Right-hand bulletin: document no.1. Source for left-hand bulletin: <http://web.archive.org/web/20211109235144/http://www.vacmic.com/HdAtt/att/2016/05/20160516111327541.pdf>

Chen Quanguo’s two October 30, 2017 speeches were published as a “Xinjiang Party Committee Office Bulletin” (新党办通报, an abbreviation of 新疆党委办公室通报). The first character of the abbreviation indicates the administrative unit of the issuing authority, in this case the Xinjiang autonomous regional level (新thus does not mean "new" here). In the example below (left side), we see a bulletin issued by the Party Committee Office of the city of Hohhot in Inner Mongolia (呼党办通报), which starts with “呼,” the first letter of the city (呼和浩特). While Chen’s August 30, 2017 speech summary (document no.4) does not specify a classification level, it contains the following statement at the end: “This piece is internal information, and must not be disseminated or published through the Internet or WeChat.”<sup>97</sup> This unique designation appears to be exclusively used within internal government circles; a search shows that it does not confirm to official guidelines or similar publicly available statements on Chinese government or other websites.

<sup>96</sup> “关于进一步规范公文起草报送工作的通知.” YiYuan Vocational and Technical College. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119195753/https://www.jyvtc.edu.cn/dzb/500166/790368/index.html>.

<sup>97</sup> Chinese: (此件系内部资料，不得通过网络、微信传播、发布)






Figure 6. Right-hand bulletin: document no.6. Source for left-hand bulletin: <http://web.archive.org/web/20211109235255/http://sthjt.nmg.gov.cn/sthjdt/ztl/zyjhbdczg/zgrwqd/202103/P020210324368978988542.pdf>

The cover page for document no.1 is a notification (通知) issued by the General Office of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Committee of the CCP (中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会办公厅). The cover page is dated October 17, 2016 and is addressed to “the party committees of all counties (cities, districts),” each of which received only one copy. The design of the cover page conforms to that of other similar notifications issued by regional or central government authorities: a red header with both Chinese and Uyghur, underlined by two red lines: first thicker, then thinner – the same lines are found in inverse order at the bottom of the page. Being a single-page notification, the signature and date of the issuing authority are on the first page. There is no issuing year or number in the top-right corner, but, like for example a similar notification from Inner Mongolia, the ethnic script above the Chinese header, and the urgency designation in the top-left corner.<sup>98</sup>



Figure 7. Right-hand notification: document no.1. Center: <http://web.archive.org/web/20200519030115/https://www.aboluowang.com/2020/0430/1444475.html>. Left-hand:<http://web.archive.org/web/20211122011530/https://sinosc.chinasdc.cn/NewsInfo/News/NewsDetailWeb?Tid=2186&cCode=00140001>.

<sup>98</sup> See “内部文件曝光！大纪元：中共瞒疫情 特急通知曝四大真相。”阿波罗新闻网 Apollo News. 阿波罗新闻网, April 30, 2020. <http://web.archive.org/web/20200519030115/https://www.aboluowang.com/2020/0430/1444475.html>.

## 4.2 Central Government Documents

The three central government documents were likewise issued by the Central Office (中共中央办公厅文件), with issuing year and number (中办发〔year〕number号). They refer to themselves as “documents” (文件). Their formatting and layout again exactly corresponds to that of publicly available documents: the title 中共中央办公厅文件 in tightly spaced bold red font, issue year and number below in black font, and then a red line interrupted by a five-pronged red star. Below this the title of the document in bold black font, with page numbering starting on the first page. These documents all end with a solid black line, followed by the original date of issue (中共中央办公厅秘书局[year]年[month]月[day]日印发). For two of the documents this was followed by a line showing the reprint date and local authority conducting the reprint, in these cases the General Office of the XUAR CCP Committee (中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会办公厅[year]年[month]月[day]日翻印). The reason for a lack of reprint information for document no.5 is not directly clear but does not constitute a concern regarding authenticity, given that one can find other examples that only contain the central government issue date.<sup>99</sup>




Figure 7. Right-hand document: document no.7. Source for left-hand document: [http://web.archive.org/web/20180731021439/https://xibu.youth.cn/zhcwj/qtbwfw/201805/t20180503\\_11611962.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20180731021439/https://xibu.youth.cn/zhcwj/qtbwfw/201805/t20180503_11611962.htm)

The three central government documents are designated as “summary” (纪要; document no.5), “outline” (纲要; document no.7), and “suggestion” (意见; document no.10). All these three designations refer to writings sent by higher-level to lower-level entities (“suggestions” denote a

<sup>99</sup> 中共中央办公厅.“中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅转发《国务院深化医药卫生体制改革领导小组关于进一步推广深化医药卫生体制改革经济的若干意见》的通知。”中共中央办公厅. October 24, 2016. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211101162610/http://wsjkw.il.gov.cn/zdzt/shylwstzgg/201705/P020201231315965875322.pdf>.

standardized mode of command from the center to lower levels of government that should not be confused with statements of opinion).<sup>100</sup>

### 4.3 Cables

The cable that is numbered as document no.3 in this set states at the end that it is “CC’ed to comrades Zhu Hailun and Zhu Changjie” (抄送：朱海仑、朱昌杰同志). Zhu Hailun, who is also shown to be the signatory of this cable, was the signatory of the main cable contained in the China Cables. In mid-2017, he was Deputy Secretary of the XUAR Party Committee and Secretary of the XUAR Political and Legal Committee (自治区党委副书记、政法委书记).<sup>101</sup> In mid-2017, Zhu Changjie was the vice chairman of the XUAR government (自治区副主席).<sup>102</sup> The other two cables are Bulletins/Notifications for Educating and Warning (教训/教育警示的通报) that discuss the punishment of officials.

Documents nos. 3 and 9 are marked with an “urgency level” (紧急程度) of “extra urgent” (特急), which represents the second-highest level, and document no. 11 is marked as “urgent” (加急), which represents the third-highest level.<sup>103</sup> Chen Quanguo’s August 30, 2017 speech, which is neither a cable nor one of the 15 types of government documents, has a simple designation on the top left marking it as “most urgent” (特提), the highest urgency level in the Chinese system (without prefacing this level with the term “level”; 等级). This is the same urgency level as that of the main cable of the China Cables.<sup>104</sup>

All three cables use the exact same fonts for different sections of their headers, and these are identical to the main cable of the China Cables, as well as those of other cables sent by Xinjiang authorities.<sup>105</sup> Just like the Central Government Documents, cables come with a number (号) as opposed to an issue iteration (第[number]期). The header layout and contents of the State Organ Cable (自治区机关发电) (document no.3) is identical with that of the main cable of the China Cables, which is also a State organ Cable. The two Party Committee cables (自治区党委发电) show a

<sup>100</sup> “关于进一步规范公文起草报送工作的通知.” Jiyuan Vocational and Technical College. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119195753/https://www.jyvtc.edu.cn/dzb/500166/790368/index.html>.

<sup>101</sup> Chavkin, Sasha. “Xinjiang’s Architect of Mass Detention: Zhu Hailun.” ICIJ. December 3, 2019. <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/xinjiangs-architect-of-mass-detention-zhu-hailun/>.

<sup>102</sup> “新疆今年已破获毒品案1695起-新华网.” 新华网. December 14, 2017. [http://web.archive.org/web/20210524164729/http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2017-12/14/c\\_1122111902.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20210524164729/http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2017-12/14/c_1122111902.htm).

<sup>103</sup> See 刘丽娟. “国务院关于发布《国家行政机关公文处理办法》的通知.” 中华人民共和国中央人民政府. August 24, 2000. [http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000/content\\_60454.htm](http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000/content_60454.htm).  
The English translations of these urgency levels are taken from  
State Council. “国务院关于发布《国家行政机关公文处理办法》的通知 [失效].” August 24, 2000. <http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=174218>.

<sup>104</sup> Zenz. “Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts.” <https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>.

<sup>105</sup> For example, “关于举办2021年全疆广播电视系统播音员主持人继续教育培训班的通知.” 新疆维吾尔自治区专业技术人员人才培养工作. June 30, 2021. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211022010743/https://edu.xjzcsq.com/train?uuid=51>.

different layout. The original files provided to the Tribunal for each of them had the signatories redacted, as well as some of the top sections of the first pages.




Figure 8. Right-hand cable: document no.3. Source for left-hand cable: <https://www.jpolarisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>

Being a “state organ” (机关) cable with a secrecy designation, the document no.3 features the same term “新机密发” on the right-hand side as the China Cables cable in front of the issue number, which stands for Xinjiang State Organ Secretly-Transmitted<sup>106</sup> Cable, regardless of the issuing unit (which is separately listed in the center of the second line). As with the bulletins, the “新” is the abbreviation for the issuing administrative regional unit, in this case the XUAR.<sup>107</sup> In contrast, unclassified cables (明电) from state organs that do not require secret (secure) transmission protocols either do not feature a transmission designation and number, or are labelled 明发 instead of 密发 - see the example in figure 9 that shows the transmission designation for a Bayingol State Organ Unclassified Transmission (巴机明发; Bayingol is a prefecture in southern Xinjiang). Similarly, the two Party Committee cables have the designation 新党发电 followed by the issue year and number, with “新” standing for Xinjiang.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>106</sup> “密发” is short for “密传发电”, see e.g.

<sup>107</sup> Compare for example the same designation by another cable issued the same year by the Cele (Qira) County CCP Party Committee Central Office: 新机密发 (2017) 213 号《关于进一步做好基层政务网络建设管理工作的通知》, “中共策勒县委办公室 2019 年部门预算公开.” Accessed November 27, 2021. <https://archive.md/wip/8Shfs>.

<sup>108</sup> Compare for example designations such as 新党发电[2021]2号, Xinjiang Shaanxi Chamber of Commerce. “关于开展学习贯彻习近平总书记‘七一’重要讲话精神的通知.” Chamber of Commerce. September 6, 2021. [http://www.xjsxsh.net/vip\\_doc/21518246.html](http://www.xjsxsh.net/vip_doc/21518246.html) OR <https://archive.md/zkBBK>.



Similarly, the cables' years and numbers are prefaced by a particular abbreviation for the issuing authority. With the main cable of the China Cables, this is the "Xinjiang Party Politics and Law [Committee] Cable" (新党政法电). For document no.3, the designation is "Xinjiang Stability Maintenance [Work Command] Cable" (新稳指发电).




Figure 9. Source: <https://www.jpolorisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>, Figure 7.

None of the three cables given to the Tribunal appears to have been stamped. China's regulations permit that the documents and cables of designated dispatching state organs that are commonly issued do not have to bear a stamp.<sup>109</sup> In addition, cables that are electronically transmitted and printed on the receiving end can simply contain the printed signature without stamp.<sup>110</sup>

#### 4.4 Overview of All Document Types

| No. | Title | Type of document and issuing authority | Issue year/no. | Secrecy / urgency | Distribution scope / limits |
|-----|-------|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
|-----|-------|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|

<sup>109</sup> See section 3, item 13 ("印章") "党政机关公文处理工作条例." 党政机关公文处理工作条例中共中央办公厅. 国务院办公厅. Accessed November 27, 2021. [http://web.archive.org/web/20130314084451/http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2013/content\\_2344541.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20130314084451/http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2013/content_2344541.htm).

<sup>110</sup> See 最新公文写作实用大全.

|   |  |   |  |  |  |
|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| 1 | General Secretary Xi Jinping's Speeches While Inspecting Xinjiang (April 28-30, 2014)<br><br>Cover page (October 17, 2016)   | Speech, sent as Central Office Bulletin (中办通报) by the Central Office (中办)<br><br>Cover page: notice (通知), issued by the General Office of the XUAR CCP Committee (中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会办公厅) | [2014]第21期<br><br>Cover page: n/a                    | Top secret (绝密)<br><br>Cover page: Confidential (机密)         | In Xinjiang: county / corps level (县团级)<br><br>"This document is a top-secret document at the provincial military level and can (only) be communicated to officials at or above the county level." |
| 2 | Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28-30, 2014)  | Speech, sent as Central Office Bulletin (中办通报) by the Central Office (中办)   | [2014]第25期   | Confidential (机密)  | n/a  |
| 3 | Notice on Responding to the Stimulus and Impact of a Series of Terrorist Attacks in the UK and Further Strengthening the Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work in the Region (June 29, 2017)   | Autonomous Region State Organ Cable (自治区机关发电), sent by the XUAR Stability Maintenance Work Command (新疆维吾尔自治区维护稳定工作指挥部)  | [2017]24号<br><br>Transmission number (新机密发) redacted | Confidential (机密)<br><br>Urgency: very urgent (特急)           | n/a  |
| 4 | Secretary Chen Quanguo's speech in the video conference on August 30, 2017 (Required Knowledge and Skills)   | Speech, issued as a set of "Required Knowledge and Skills" (应知应会), no issuing authority named   | n/a  | Secrecy: n/a<br><br>Urgency: most urgent (特提)                | "This document is internal information, and must not be disseminated or published via the Internet or WeChat."   |
| 5 | Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on forwarding the "Minutes of the Informal Seminar on Several Historical Issues in Xinjiang by the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group" (September 10, 2017)    | Central Government document (文件), issued by the Central Office (中共中央办公厅)  | [2017]53号  | Confidential for 3 months (机密3个月)                            | In Xinjiang: county / corps level (县团级)  |
| 6 | Speech by Comrade Chen Quanguo at the First and Second Plenary Sessions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Ninth Committee of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the Communist Party of China (October 30, 2017)  | Speech, issued as a Bulletin of the XUAR Party Committee Office (新党办通报)   | [2017]第53期   | Confidential (机密)  | County / corps level (县团级)   |
| 7 | Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the "Outline of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps' Southward Development Plan" (December 18, 2017) | Central Government document (文件), issued by the Central Office (中共中央办公厅)  | [2017]74号  | Confidential for 10 years (机密10年)                            | In Xinjiang: county / corps level (县团级)  |
| 8 | Chen Quanguo Autonomous Region Party Committee Standing Committee (Expanded) Meeting Key Points of the Speech on Stability Maintenance (February 22, 2018)   | Speech (inferred from filename, cover / first page missing)   | n/a  | n/a  | n/a  |
| 9 | Autonomous Region Party Committee Bulletin on Wang Yongzhi's Serious Violation of Discipline, and related Lessons and Warnings (February 1, 2018)  | Autonomous Region Party Committee Cable (自治区党委发电), sent by the General Office of the XUAR CCP Committee (中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会办公厅)  | [2018]3号   | Secrecy: Confidential (机密)<br><br>Urgency: extra urgent (特急) | County / corps level (县团级), "to be returned after the conclusion of the warning education"   |



|    |   |  |           |  |                            |
|----|---|--|-----------|--|----------------------------|
| 10 | Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing "Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation." (April 19, 2018) | Central Government document (文件), issued by the Central Office (中共中央办公厅)   | [2018]24号 | Confidential for 20 years (机密20年)                      | County / corps level (县团级) |
| 11 | Autonomous Region Party Committee Office Bulletin on Gu Wensheng's Serious Violation of Discipline, and related Lessons and Warnings (May 16, 2018)   | Autonomous Region Party Committee Cable (自治区党委发电), sent by the General Office of the XUAR CCP Committee (中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会办公厅) | [2018]19号 | Secrecy: Confidential (机密)<br><br>Urgency: urgent (加急) | County / corps level (县团级) |

Table 8.

## 5. Implications

With few exceptions, the Xinjiang Papers consist of documents classified at the highest and second-highest classification levels. They provide important new insights into the role of the central government in injecting a long-term change the direction of Xinjiang Work in 2014. In particular, the documents indicate how the central government mandated policy directions that would more-or-less naturally result in subsequent practices of mass internment for re-education, poverty alleviation through coercive labor transfers, and the optimization of ethnic population structures through Han in-migration and birth prevention.

## Appendix A: Statements from Speeches by Xi Jinping and other central government figures that relate to (or mandate) policies implemented in Xinjiang after 2016/2017.

| Policy                           | Statements   |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Bilingual education              | It is necessary to strengthen the capacity-building of bilingual teachers and expand the coverage of bilingual education.<br>要加强双语教师队伍建设, 扩大双语教育普及面。(document no.1, p.20-21)<br><br>It is necessary to strengthen ethnic exchanges and promote ethnic unity, promote bilingual education...<br>要从加强民族交流、促进民族团结的高度, 推进双语教育(document no.2, p.15) |
| Boarding schooling               | We must push forward the construction of standardized boarding schools in rural and remote areas, and improve the overall enrollment rate, so that school-age children can learn in school, live in school, and develop in school.<br>要抓紧推进农牧区和偏远地区标准化寄宿制学校建设, 全面提高入学率, 让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校。(document no.2, p.21)                         |
| Expand inland boarding education | ... systematically expand the scale Xinjiang's ethnic minorities going to the eastern parts of China to receive education, employment, and residence...<br>...有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模... (document no.2, p.15)  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>Adjustment of birth control policies in southern Xinjiang</p>   | <p>Implement a family planning policy that is equal for all ethnic groups in Southern Xinjiang...<br/>在南疆实行各民族平等的计划生育政策 (document no.2, p.22)</p> <p>There is a red line that must be clearly drawn, that is, religion must not interfere with politics or government affairs. No one is allowed to use religion to interfere with administration, justice, education, marriage, and family planning, or to obstruct normal social order, work order, and order of life, or to oppose the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system, or to undermine ethnic unity and national unity.<br/>有一条红线必须划清, 那就是宗教不得干预政治、干预政府事务, 决不允许任何人利用宗教干预行政、司法、教育、婚姻、计划生育, 决不允许利用宗教妨碍正常社会秩序、工作秩序、生活秩序, 决不允许利用宗教反对中国共产党的领导和社会主义制度、破坏民族团结和国家统一。(document no.2, p.25)</p>   |
| <p>Issues of concentrated ethnic populations in one region / need to adjust population structure or proportions as a matter of long-term peace and stability</p> | <p>It is necessary to accelerate the development of minority groups in Southern Xinjiang, and give priority to the urbanization construction of cities and towns in the southern divisions, and bring into play the unique role of XPCC's towns in maintaining stability and safeguarding national border security, agglomerating the population, and disseminating civilization. The fourth is to bring into play the XPCC's role in optimizing population resources and become a staging area for optimizing the population. Based on the developments of ethnic groups around the world and the experience of governing Xinjiang in the past, population proportion and population security are the important basis for long-term peace and stability.<br/>要加快南疆少数民族聚居团场发展, 优先在南疆师团设市建镇, 发挥兵团城镇在维稳戍边、集聚人口、传播文明方面的独特作用。四是要发挥兵团优化人口资源的作用, 成为优化人口的中转站。从世界民族发展和历代治疆经验看, 人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础。(document no.1, p.40)</p> <p>Southern Xinjiang is a vast territory with long borders, many deserts and Gobi, and home to a large population of ethnic minorities. It is characterized by fragile natural ecology, relatively lagging development, complex religious issues, and a severe stability situation.<br/>南疆地域辽阔, 边境线长, 沙漠戈壁多, 少数民族人口集中, 具有自然生态脆弱、发展相对滞后、宗教问题复杂、稳定形势严峻等突出特点。(document no.1, p.12-13)</p> <p>At the same time, the XPCC's role as a cohesive agent (literally: smelting furnace that [produces] cohesion) to unite the masses of all ethnic groups should be fully developed to regulate social structure, promote cultural exchanges, optimize population resources, promote unity among ethnic groups, drive the development of one side and affluence the people of one side, forming a solid foothold to oppose division and uphold stability.<br/>同时, 要把兵团凝聚各族群众大熔炉的作用充分发挥出来, 调节社会结构、推动文化交流、优化人口资源、团结各族群众, 带动一方发展, 富裕一方百姓, 形成反对分裂、维护稳定的坚固阵地。(document no.2, p.34)</p> <p>Given that southern Xinjiang has poor natural conditions, a weak economic foundation, poor employment conditions, a monolithic population structure, there are many people who face difficulties, a distorted religious atmosphere, a complicated surrounding environment, and a situation involving severe struggles, how can we solve the problems of Southern Xinjiang, maintain social stability and realize long-term peace and stability without implementing special policies?<br/>南疆自然条件不好, 经济基础薄弱, 就业条件差, 人口结构单一, 群众困难比较多, 宗教氛围扭曲, 周边环境复杂, 斗争形势严峻, 不给特殊政策怎么解决南疆问题, 怎么维护社会稳定和实现长治久安?<br/>(document no.2, p.67, speech by Xu Zhongchun)</p> |
| <p>Promote ethnic mixing and melding, and population embedding</p>   | <p>There has been an increase in the number of incidents in which the Uyghur-Han community is judging right from wrong based on ethnic criteria. There is also an obvious increase in the awareness of ethnicity among young people, even among children. In some places, there is a phenomenon of ethnic groups living separately. This matter must be taken very seriously. Only by strengthening inter-ethnic exchanges among ethnic groups can we bridge the gap and heal the wounds. From the angle of strengthening ethnic exchanges and promoting ethnic unity, we need to promote bilingual education, facilitate the establishment of a social structure and community environment in which all ethnic groups are mutually embedded in each other, and systematically expand the scale of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities going to the eastern parts of China to receive education, employment, and residence...<br/>现在, 维汉群众以民族划线判断是非曲直的情况增多, 青少年族别意识明显增强, 连儿童之间也有族别意识, 有的地方出现了分族而居的现象。这个问题必须引起我们高度重视。消除隔阂、抚平伤口, 只有加强民族交往交流交融这一条道。要从加强民族交流、促进民族团结的高度, 推进双语教育, 推动建立各民族相互嵌入式的社会结构和社区环境, 有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模...</p>   |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>Identifying young persons etc. as problematic or susceptible groups / need to strengthen the political thought education of young persons</p> | <p>The ideological education of Xinjiang students who are attending various schools in the eastern parts of China must be done well.<br/>对在内地各类学校上学的新疆学生，思想工作要抓好。(document no.1, p.21)</p> <p>With regard to special groups of people such as ex-convicts, drug addicts, troubled youths, social parasites, as well as relatives of violent terrorists who had been cracked down and punished, we should strengthen our work to help them overcome practical challenges, so that they feel cared for by the party and the government, and become a person who is useful to society while living in harmony with it.<br/>对刑释解教人员、吸毒人员、问题青少年、社会闲散人员等特殊人群，对受到打击和处罚的暴力恐怖分子的亲属，要强化工作，帮助他们解决实际困难，让他们感受到党和政府关怀，成为对社会有用、与社会和谐相处的人。(document no.1, p.9)</p> <p>The "three evil forces" use religious extremism to incite a "holy war," and claim to have access to "heaven," thereby compelling the misled masses to hurt others as well as themselves. This is very vicious! It is precisely our intention to compete with them for the masses, not only to protect the innocent people at large, but also to salvage and rescue a group of blind and ignorant young people who may be on the path of no return.三股势力“利用宗教极端思想煽动“圣战”，声称可以上“天堂”，让受蛊惑的群众去伤害别人，也伤害自己，相当恶毒！我们就是要同他们争夺群众，既保护广大无辜群众，也挽救和争取一批可能走上不归路的盲目无知的青少年。(document no.1, p.25)</p> <p>It is a major problem that more than 100,000 junior high school students in Southern Xinjiang are unable to continue their education every year and prematurely enter the workforce. High school education and vocational education should be strengthened to build a "firewall" and "separation net" between religious extremists and young people, while creating the necessary knowledge and skills for youth employment.<br/>南疆每年10多万名初中毕业生不能升学，过早流入社会，是一个大问题，要加强高中教育和职业教育，在宗教极端分子与青少年之间架起“防火墙”、“隔离网”，同时为青年就业创造必要的知识和技能条件。(document no.1, p.31)</p> <p>Religious extremists are stepping up their efforts to compete with us for rural youth, inciting those with lower incomes and weak discernment to engage in various illegal and criminal activities. In the past two years, many of the participants in violence- and terrorism-related cases were rural youths born in the 1980s or the 1990s.<br/>宗教极端势力正在加紧同我们争夺农村青年，煽动收入较低、辨别能力较弱的农村青年从事各种违法犯罪活动。近两年涉暴涉恐案件中，不少参与者就是80后、90后的农村青年。(document no.1, p.12)</p> <p>It is necessary to strengthen the ideological and political work in higher education institutions, and enhance the ideological and political education of young people. When Xinjiang students attend schools in Eastern parts of China, it is important to not only focus on learning cultural skills, but also to avoid the darkness under the lamp, letting the ideological and political education "fall through the cracks," otherwise, they might engage in protest and boycott activities in Eastern parts of China.<br/>要加强高等院校思想政治工作，加强青少年思想政治教育。新疆学生到内地读书，不能只注重文化技能学习，要防止思想政治教育“挂空挡”，防止灯下黑，结果反而在内地搞什么抗议、抵制活动。(document</p> |
| <p>Promote cadres living with ethnic families, pairing up families (the "Becoming Family" / 结对认亲 campaign)</p>                                   | <p>Cadres and masses of all ethnic groups must move and interact at multiple levels, in multiple ways, and in multiple forms. This is an important task that must be done under the current situation. ... Party and government agencies, enterprises and institutions, people's organizations, and democratic parties must take the initiative to do something with harmonious feelings. Uyghur cadres and workers have activities together, and once a month find a weekend for an activity together. Cadres of all ethnic groups can take the lead to visit, take their family, children, etc. to go for walk, have a chat, have a meal.<br/>各族干部群众要多层次、多方式、多形式走动互动起来，这是当前形势下必须要做的一项重要工作。... 党政机关、企事业单位、人民团体、民主党派等都要主动做一些融洽感情的事情。维汉干部职工一起活动活动，一个月找一个周末在一起搞个活动。各族干部可以带头串门，带着家人、孩子等一起走走，聊聊天、吃个饭都可以。(document no.2, p.15-16)</p>   |

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| <p>Promote employment in companies, labor transfer</p> | <p>It is necessary to make use of intensive management, urbanization, new forms of industrialization development, and large-scale agricultural production to recruit suitable local employees from all ethnic groups and promote a civilized mode of production and life.<br/>要利用集约化管理、城镇化建设、新型工业化发展和大规模农业生产的条件，适当吸收地方各族职工，倡导文明生产生活方式...(document no.1, p.39)</p> <p>Unemployment is a prominent issue in Xinjiang and a large number of unemployed people floating around in society will provoke trouble. ... In particular, employment in enterprises is conducive to ethnic exchanges and assimilations, promoting national unity, transformation of the mode of mass production and life, as well as resisting religious extremism.<br/>新疆就业问题突出，大量无业人员游荡在社会上就会无事生非。... 尤其是在企业就业，有利于民族交往交流交融，有利于促进民族团结，有利于促进群众生产生活方式转变，有利于抵制宗教极端思想。(document no.2, p.20)</p> <p>Employment can also lead people of all ethnic groups to acquire knowledge, learn skills, learn the Chinese language, and imperceptibly [without them themselves realizing it] study Chinese culture.<br/>就业还可以引导各族群众学知识、学技能、学汉语，潜移默化学习中华文化。(document no.2, p.20)</p> <p>At present, there are close to 3 million in the urban-rural labor market in Xinjiang in need of seeking employment, which is equivalent to about one-sixth of the labor force in the entire region. The problem of surplus labor in Southern Xinjiang is particularly serious. Unemployment is the biggest livelihood issue in Xinjiang, and this issue directly affects people's morale. If people's morale is unstable, it will be difficult to maintain stability in society. Employment is the foundation of people's livelihood and the foundation of stability. The strategy to maintain stability and peace in Xinjiang is to understand and solve the issues of employment and people's livelihood problems, so that developments in Xinjiang are based on employment to benefit people's livelihood. The employment situation and systemic contradictions in Xinjiang are relatively prominent, leading to the coexistence of difficulties in employment and recruitment. Especially in the rural areas, there are insufficient jobs and many unemployed people – people without land, employment or a fixed income have nothing to do and wander around all day; not only will this breed dissatisfaction, but they will also be easily exploited by evildoers. At the same time, many enterprises in Xinjiang, including hotels and other service industries, often fail to recruit workers. With the intention of recruiting workers in Xinjiang, some enterprises from eastern parts of China have partnered with local government organizations, but still failed to recruit enough. To a large extent this is because people's employment concept and skills have not adapted. There is an old saying in Xinjiang, "I would rather eat bread at home than eat mutton soup outside." On the one hand, it shows people's strong feelings for their hometown, while on the other, it shows a weak awareness regarding leaving their hometown to work or start a business. Changing this situation requires patience and time, as well as improving the management [and] training methods for new employees.<br/>现在新疆大约有300万城乡劳动力需要解决就业，相当于全区劳动力的约六分之一，南疆富余劳动力问题尤为突出。就业是新疆最大的民生问题，而民生牵动民心，民心不稳，社会就难以稳定。就业是民生之本、稳定之基，我们要从稳疆安疆的战略高度来认识和解决就业与民生问题，使新疆的发展立足就业惠及民生。新疆就业总量和结构性矛盾都比较突出，就业难和招工难并存。就业岗位不足，无业人员多，特别是农村，无地、无业、无固定收入人员没事做，整天游逛，不仅会滋生不满情绪，还容易被坏人利用。与此同时，新疆不少企业，包括宾馆等服务业，经常招不到工，内地一些企业有意在新疆招工，有的请当地政府组织，也招不够，相当程度上是因为人们的就业观念和技能还不适应。新疆有句老话，“宁肯在家里吃苞谷饅，也不到外地喝羊肉汤”。这一方面表明，群众的恋乡之情很浓，另一方面表明大家外出就业创业的意识不强。改变这种状况需要耐心和时间，也需要改进对新就业人员的管理培训方式。(document no.2, p.39-40 – speech by premier Li Keqiang)</p> <p>We must ... transform [people's] way of thinking about employment...<br/>要...转变就业观念(document no.2, p.40 – speech by premier Li Keqiang)</p> <p>Development must be positioned precisely and accurately, and must absolutely be subservient to [the goals of] social and long-term peace and stability. For example, in Xinjiang, the demand for the development of labor-intensive industries is particularly urgent. Although these industries may not contribute more to economic growth and taxation than other industries, they are particularly important for employment and for promoting cultural exchanges and integration of various ethnic groups.<br/>发展一定要定位准确、精准发力，一定要服从服务于社会稳定和长治久安。比如，在新疆，对发展劳动密集型产业的要求尤为迫切，虽然这些产业对经济增长和税收的贡献不一定比其他产业多，但对就业尤为重要，对促进各民族交往交流交融尤为重要... (document no.2, p.65 – speech by Yu Zhengsheng)</p> <p>For example, a series of supporting policies and requirements have been put forth for the development of the textile and garment industry, which is to create employment for at least one million people. This subject is of vital importance to Xinjiang's social and long-term peace and stability. To develop the textile and garment industry, we must rely on the environment to persuade enterprises to transfer their production [to Xinjiang] ...<br/>比如，对发展纺织服装产业提出了一系列的扶持政策和要求，是要带动至少一百万人就业，这件事对新疆社会稳定和长治久安至关重要。把纺织服装产业搞上去，要营商环境，要让企业愿意把产业转移过来</p> |
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| <p>Labor transfers to eastern China</p>  | <p>...systematically expand the scale of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities going to the eastern parts of China to receive education, employment, and residence ...<br/>                 ...有序扩大新疆少数民族群众到内地接受教育、就业、居住的规模... (document no.2, p.15)</p>   |
| <p>Preventative policing, big data analysis, stronger intelligence work</p>                        | <p>Social security early warning system must be strengthened to improve the efficiency and quality of our intelligence work, in order to predict the moves of the enemy and even preemptively before they make a move. Not only are the problems nipped in the bud and isolated, but none can escape detection. On the societal level, transparency must be balanced with discretion, and strictness with relaxation. Police visibility cannot be reduced, and the security measures cannot be weakened. As you refine your preemptive plans against key terrorist attacks and strengthened combat drills, this is very good to achieve the goal of improving the pertinence of tactical research, increasing the efficiency of emergency response and the effect of contingency planning.<br/>                 要加强社会安全预警机制建设, 提高情报效率和质量, 做到敌动我知、未动先知、先发制敌, 既“挖根子”又“打后台”, 防止出现“神不知鬼不觉”的问题。社会面防控要显隐结合、张弛有度, 见警率不能降低, 安防措施不能减弱。你们针对重点恐怖袭击方式逐一细化预案, 加强实战演练, 这很好, 就是要提高战术研究针对性, 提高应急反应速度和现场处置效果。(document no.1, p.29)</p> <p>It is necessary to carry out various forms of mass defense and governance practices, focus on fighting a people's war on terror, build militaristic defense, and turn violent terrorists into a target of scorn, detested by all.<br/>                 要深入开展各种形式的群防群治活动, 着力-8-打好反恐怖人民战争, 筑起铜墙铁壁, 使暴力恐怖分子成为“过街老鼠、人人喊打”。(document no.1, p.8-9)</p> <p>With regard to violent terrorist activities, our intelligence work is still weak overall. We must make good use of big data technology to carry out Counterterrorism operations, compare and correlate massive data sets, transform seemingly unrelated, unorganized, and disorderly data into straight-forward visual information, and strive to expose trends in violent terrorist activities and eradicate these activities in their infancy.<br/>                 对暴力恐怖活动, 我们的情报工作总体还是薄弱。要善于运用大数据技术开展反恐怖斗争, 对海量数据进行比对和关联, 将看似毫无联系、混乱无序的数据转化成直观的可视化的信息, 努力发现暴力恐怖活动的动向, 力争把恐怖活动消灭在萌芽状态。(document no.2, p.10)</p> <p>It is necessary to widely mobilize people of all ethnic groups to actively cooperate with Counterterrorism operations, improve corresponding mechanisms, encourage reporting and whistleblowing, strengthen prevention and control on the societal level, management of the floating population, and security precautions for essential targets, critical points, and key industries. In addition to strengthening civil, physical, and technological defense, the masses must also be mobilized to work together to form an all-round and three-dimensional societal prevention and control system. Those who shelter, harbor, or fund violent terrorists must be investigated in accordance with the law. Intelligence is the key in the war against terrorism. We must be clairvoyant and well-informed, be ahead through early warnings, be ahead of the enemy.<br/>                 要广泛发动各族群众积极配合反恐行动, 完善相应机制, 鼓励检举揭发, 加强社会面防控, 加强流动人口管理, 加强重要目标、要害部位、重点行业等安全防范, 除了要加强人防物防技防建设外, 也要发动群众一起来做, 形成全方位立体式的社会防控体系。对包庇、窝藏、资助暴力恐怖分子的, 要依法追究。反恐怖斗争情报是关键。要有千里眼、顺风耳, 预警在先, 先发制敌。(document no.2, p.9-10)</p> <p>It is necessary to greatly improve the early warning capabilities of mass prevention and control management, strengthen publicity and education, and guide the people of all ethnic groups to see clearly, distinguish right from wrong, raise their awareness of counterterrorism, recognize that maintaining stability is safeguarding their own interests, and firmly stand with the party and the government. It is necessary to organize and mobilize the people of all ethnic groups to strengthen joint defense and control, mass prevention and control, build militaristic defense, and cast a wide net, so that violent terrorists become a target of scorn, detested by all.要大力提高群防群治预警能力, 加强宣传教育, 引导各族群众擦亮眼睛、明辨是非、提高反恐意识, 认清维护稳定就是维护自身利益, 坚定站在党和政府一边。要组织动员各族群众加强联防联控、群防群治, 筑起铜墙铁壁、构建天罗地网, 使暴力恐怖分子成为“过街老鼠、人人喊打”(document no.2, p.9)</p> |
| <p>Establish local de-extremification legislation (the legal basis for the re-education camps)</p> | <p>We must hold high the banner of the rule of law and be good at using law-based ways of thinking and methods to solve problems. At the national level, the enacting of counterterrorism legislation must be sped up. In Xinjiang, local laws and regulations can also be formulated in response to prominent issues such as religious extremism, to promote the gradual normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work.<br/>                 要高举法治旗帜, 善于运用法治思维和法治方式解决问题。国家层面要加快反恐怖立法, 新疆也可以针对宗教极端等突出问题搞一些地方性法规和规章, 推动反恐维稳工作逐步实现常态化。(document no.1, p.8)</p> <p>...Xinjiang should also draft relevant local regulations to promote the normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance work.<br/>                 ...新疆也要制定相关地方性法规, 推动反恐维稳工作实现常态化。(document no.2, p.9)</p>  |


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| <p>Religious extremism embodies pathological dangers for humans, requiring a related "cure" and an "immunization" of the population against its dangers (aka various forms of re-education)</p> | <p>Although it is said that "people observe etiquette and know honor and shame only after they are well-fed and clothed", the psychological impact of extremist religious thoughts on people must never be underestimated. Issues in the psychological world often cannot be controlled by material factors. In reality, people who have been captured by religious extremism, regardless of age or gender, have their consciences destroyed, lose their humanity, and murder without blinking an eye!</p> <p>虽然说“仓廩实则知礼节，衣食足则知荣辱”，但对宗教极端思想对人们的精神影响绝不能低估，精神世界的问题往往不是物质因素可以左右的。现实生活中，被宗教极端思想俘获的人，无论男女老少，都变得良知泯灭、丧失人性，杀人不眨眼！(document no.1, p.9)</p> <p>The human heart can neither be bought by money, nor can it be bought by charity. Habit cures habit. For Xinjiang, this "cure" is the correct concept of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the core system, and core value of socialism. It is necessary to use this cure to strengthen the body and the mind. Effective measures must be taken to increase within the people of all ethnic groups the identification with the great motherland, with the Chinese nation, with the Chinese culture, and with the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. ... It is necessary to strengthen the ideological education of the public and make it clear to them that good days are derived from the good policies of the party, and that the party's kindness should be praised loudly, honestly, and often with great fanfare, and for a long time. The "Four Comprehensives" should be taught from infancy, to be cast as a seed in the young hearts of children so that it can have time to grow and blossom into a flower. To have an upper hand in the fight against ideological separatism in Xinjiang, we must first start with the problems of infiltration and spread of religious extremism.</p> <p>人心靠钱是买不来的，靠恩惠施舍也是换不来的。心病还需心药医。对新疆来说，这副“心药”就是正确的祖国观、民族观，就是中华文化，就是社会主义核心价值体系和社会主义核心价值观，要用这味药扶正祛邪、健体强心。要采取有效措施，增强各族群众对伟大祖国的认同、对中华民族的认同、对中华文化的认同、对中国特色社会主义道路的认同。...要加强群众性思想教育，向群众讲清楚好日子源于党的好政策，党的恩情要大张旗鼓讲、理直气壮讲，经常讲、反复讲、长期讲。“四个认同”要从娃娃抓起，在幼小的心灵里撒播种子，和风细雨，培土浇根，备足养分，将来才能开花结果。加强新疆意识形态领域反分裂斗争，首先要解决好宗教极端思想渗透蔓延这个问题。(document no.2, p.23-24)</p> <p>Without eradicating the violent and terrorist ideology of religious extremism, violent terrorist activities will continue to replicate and multiply like cancer cells.</p> <p>不根除宗教极端思想这一暴力恐怖的意识形态，暴力恐怖活动就会像癌细胞一样不断复制繁衍。(document no.2, p.25)</p> <p>Religious extremism is a powerful psychedelic drug. Under its toxic influence, some people are obsessed with "martyrdom." When committing violent and terrorist crimes, these people often lose their lives through their stubborn resistance – out of fear that they may not die. Some persons – even whole families – become reckless criminals.</p> <p>宗教极端思想是一种强力迷幻药，在其毒害下，有的人痴迷“殉教”，实施暴力恐怖犯罪时往往顽抗送命，唯恐不死，有的甚至一家子全成了亡命徒。(document no.2, p.24)</p> <p>Some serious problems in Xinjiang emerged from materialism and the emphasis on things rather than people that are apparent in some localities and departments. To launch the fight against separatism, we must not only react with a swift "surgical" type of clean-up, but also pay attention to the continuous enhancement of the "immunity" of the cadres and the masses.</p> <p>新疆出现一些严重问题，同一些地方和部门存在的见物不见人、重物质轻精神问题有很大关系。开展反分裂斗争，既要重视“外科手术”式的随时清理，更要注重干部群众“免疫能力”的持续增强。(document no.2, p.26)</p> |
| <p>Perform re-education</p>   | <p>It is necessary to be effective with the education and transformation of criminals to prevent large-scale arrests and releases and cross-infection. In order to effectively solve the problem of cross-infection, criminals should not be allowed to engage in communication and exchanges in venues of educational reform, where they could be exposed to deeper toxins, and commit worse crimes when they are released. This issue must be dealt with in depth, especially with regards to prison management work which must be performed in an all-round way. Even if these people are released eventually, they will continue to receive education toward transformation. When they are released, they will not return to their old habits, but the discourse of the authority will be manifested in them!</p> <p>要做好犯罪人员教育改造和转化工作，防止大抓大放、交叉感染。要切实解决好交叉感染问题，不能让犯罪人员在教育改造的地方搞串联交流，反而中毒更深，出来后做更大的坏事。这个问题要深入抓，特别是监狱管理工作要全面做好。就是将来这些人放出来也要继续教育转化，放出来以后不是放虎归山，而是天下归心，攻心为上。(document no.1, p.20)</p>  |




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| <p>The role of grassroots work in controlling the region</p> | <p>The key to governing Xinjiang is at the grassroots, and the difficulties are also at the grassroots. In laying the foundation and convincing the grassroots, we must not make any mistake. Day before yesterday, I saw in Ayagmangan Village, Tokzake Town, Shufu County that the village has formed a "three-in-one" work system with village-level organizations, village working groups, and village police offices. Upon reflection, this shows the new improvements on the foundational work at the grassroots level.</p> <p>做好新疆工作，重点在基层，难点也在基层，抓基层打基础任何时候都不能放松。前天我在疏附县托克扎克镇阿亚格曼干村看到，村一级形成了村级组织、驻村工作组、村警务室“三位一体”的工作格局，大家反映基层基础工作有了新的加强。(document no.1, p.23)</p> <p>More than 90% of the people in Southern Xinjiang are Uighurs. It is very dangerous if there is no continuity or bridging. It is necessary to take all measures to mingle, create a comfortable environment, and form a harmonious relationship. Xinjiang is a vast territory that is sparsely populated, so foundational grassroots work must be vigorously carried out at the village level. The key is to firmly establish the unwavering party's core leadership position at the grassroots level, and the most important thing is to form a strong team of grassroots cadres.</p> <p>南疆90%多是维族群众，如果上面下面接不上茬，这是很危险的。要采取一切措施来打成一片，形成一种鱼水之情、水乳交融的关系。新疆地广人稀，基层基础工作特别要在村一级用劲。最关键的是要在基层牢固确立党的领导核心地位不动摇，最重要的是要形成一支强有力的基层干部队伍。(document no.1, p.23-24)</p> <p>Develop grassroots party organizations into a tough fortress that unites and leads the people of all ethnic groups to continuously create stability and initiate new developments, so that the people, money, and rules in each grassroots organization can play an active role. We learned in Ayagmangan Village that in the "Visit, Benefit, Gather" activity organized by the autonomous region's party committee, the comrades in the village working group really got their hands dirty, thoroughly considered the situation, took the lead in doing practical things, and worked hard to seek actual results. It was a good way to strengthen foundational work at the grassroots level. It is necessary to constantly learn from experience and capture the learnings in activities.</p> <p>使基层党组织成为团结带领各族群众不断开创稳定和发展新局面的坚强战斗堡垒，使各个基层组织都有人办事、有钱办事、有章理事，都能发挥积极作用。我们在阿亚格曼干村了解到，自治区党委统一组织的“访民情、惠民生、聚民心”活动，驻村工作组的同志真抓实干，深入察实情，带头做实事，努力求实效，是一种加强基层基础工作的好形式，要不断总结经验，把活动坚持抓好。(document no.1, p.36)</p> <p>The most solid support for the work in Xinjiang is at the grassroots level, and the most prominent contradictions and problems are also at the grassroots level. We must take grasping the grassroots level and laying the foundation as a long-term plan to consolidate the foundation of maintaining stability in Xinjiang. We must strive to build grassroots party organizations into tough fortresses to serve the public, maintain stability, and oppose separatism. Xinjiang is a vast territory that is sparsely populated, so foundational grassroots work must be vigorously carried out at the village level.</p> <p>新疆工作最坚实的力量支撑在基层，最突出的矛盾和问题也在基层，必须把抓基层、打基础作为稳疆安疆的长远之计和固本之举，努力把基层党组织建设成为服务群众、维护稳定、反对分裂的坚强战斗堡垒。新</p> |
| <p>Village-based work teams</p>                              | <p>Day before yesterday, I saw in Ayagmangan Village, Tokzake Town, Shufu County that the village has formed a "three-in-one" work system with village-level organizations, village working groups, and village police offices. Upon reflection, this shows the new improvements on the foundational work at the grassroots level.</p> <p>前天我在疏附县托克扎克镇阿亚格曼干村看到，村一级形成了村级组织、驻村工作组、村警务室“三位一体”的工作格局，大家反映基层基础工作有了新的加强。(Document no.1, p.23)</p>  |

## Appendix B: Transcribed document pages published by the New York Times that correspond to pages contained in the documents obtained by the Uyghur Tribunal


Corresponds to document no. 3, page 5.




Corresponds to document no. 4, page 1.



Corresponds to document no. 6, page 17.



Corresponds to document no. 9, page 8.



**Appendix C: List of Quotes from all 11 Documents Cited in the Original (Chinese language) New York Times Article from November 16, 2019.**

| Document and page number (in document leaked to the Tribunal) | Chinese quote (N.Y. Times quote in bold, with added text from the full sentence contained in the leaked document)   | English translation (taken from N.Y. Times article)  |
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| Document no.1, p.4  | 新疆发生的大量暴力恐怖事件，北京“10·28”暴力恐怖事件，昆明“3·01”暴力恐怖事件，都以血的教训警示我们，当前新疆正处于暴力恐怖活动活跃期、反分裂斗争激烈期、干预治疗阵痛期，“三期”叠加，今后一个时期将是新疆稳定形势比较严峻的时期。   | “a period of painful, interventionary treatment”   |
| Document no.1, p.8  | 要加强公安等专政机关建设，从力量、装备到工作手段和条件、工作机制都要适应反恐维稳斗争的需要。要加强上下配合和区域合作，形成立体式、网格化的工作体系。四是要坚持全国一盘棋，加强反恐合作。  | “organs of dictatorship,”  |
| Document no.1, p.8  | 看到新疆特别是南疆一些基层派出所、乡镇机关受到暴力恐怖袭击，造成很大伤亡，我很痛心。 <b>我们的同志拥有的手段也太简单了，所有的武器还对付不了那些大刀片子、斧头等冷兵器，最起码要大刀片子对大刀片子。</b>  | “The methods that our comrades have at hand are too primitive” ...<br>“None of these weapons is any answer for their big machete blades, ax heads and cold steel weapons.”   |
| Document no.1, p.8  | 新疆各族群众是我们的兄弟姐妹。团结兄弟姐妹，我们要付出真情、献上真心；打击共同敌人， <b>我们要针锋相对、毫不留情。</b> 要深入开展各种形式的群防群治活动，着力打好反恐怖人民战争，筑起铜墙铁壁，使暴力恐怖分子成为“过街老鼠、人人喊打”。   | “We must be as harsh as them” ...<br>“and show absolutely no mercy.”   |
| Document no.1, p.9  | 暴力恐怖活动根子是民族分裂主义，思想基础是宗教极端思想。虽然说“仓廩实则知礼节，衣食足则知荣辱”，但对宗教极端思想对人们的精神影响 <b>绝不能低估</b> ，精神世界的问题往往不是物质因素可以左右的。现实生活中， <b>被宗教极端思想俘获的人，无论男女老少，都变得良知泯灭、丧失人性，杀人不眨眼！</b>   | “The psychological impact of extremist religious thought on people must never be underestimated” ... “People who are captured by religious extremism — male or female, old or young — have their consciences destroyed, lose their humanity and murder without blinking an eye.” |
| Document no.1, p.24   | 在多年来反恐怖、反渗透、反分裂斗争中，我们各族基层干部表现英勇,展现了一种大无畏精神，这就是战斗堡垒作用的生动体现。  | “struggle against terrorism, infiltration and separatism”  |
| Document no.1, p.30   | 在严厉打击犯罪分子的同时，要加强政策法律宣讲，通过打击极少数教育团结大多数。 <b>要做好犯罪人员教育改造和转化工作</b> ，防止大抓大放、交叉感染。要切实解决好交叉感染问题，不能让犯罪人员在教育改造的地方搞串联交流，反而中毒更深，出来后做更大的坏事。这个问题要深入抓，特别是监狱管理工作要全面做好。 <b>就是将来这些人放出来也要继续教育转化</b> ，放出来以后不是放虎归山，而是天下归心，攻心为上！ | “There must be effective educational remolding and transformation of criminals” ... “And even after these people are released, their education and transformation must continue.”  |

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| Document no.2,<br>p.6-7  | 当前，新疆工作的总目标是社会稳定和长治久安，要抓住这个总目标，起一个领头作用，其他工作都围绕这个总目标来展开和推进。我们说，发展是第一要务，是实现长治久安的基础，这是对的，”习近平说。“但不能认为发展起来了一切问题就能迎刃而解了，可以断定在新疆不是这种情况。   | “We say that development is the top priority and the basis for achieving lasting security, and that’s right” ... “But it would be wrong to believe that with development every problem solves itself.”  |
| Document no.2,<br>p.7    | 新疆这些年发展速度很快、人民生活水平不断提高，但民族分裂活动和暴力恐怖活动仍然呈上升趋势。这说明，经济发展并不能自然而然带来长治久安，不能用发展问题代替稳定问题。   | “In recent years, Xinjiang has grown very quickly and the standard of living has consistently risen, but even so ethnic separatism and terrorist violence have still been on the rise” ... “This goes to show that economic development does not automatically bring lasting order and security.” |
| Document no.2,<br>p.7    | 从全国来看，不打败“三股势力”的挑战，社会稳定就会受到冲击，各族人民大团结就会受到破坏，改革发展稳定大局就会受到影响。   | “social stability will suffer shocks, the general unity of people of every ethnicity will be damaged, and the broad outlook for reform, development and stability will be affected.”  |
| Document no.2,<br>p.8    | 面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。   | “The weapons of the people’s democratic dictatorship must be wielded without any hesitation or wavering,”   |
| Document no.2,<br>p.8    | 要着力堵塞漏洞、消除隐患、完善机制、提升能力，下重手、出重拳，立足打早打小打苗头，挖根子、拔钉子、端窝点、打团伙、追逃犯、揪幕后，追着打、压着打、挖着打，不给暴力恐怖分子任何喘息之机。不要怕敌对势力说三道四，也不要怕敌对势力抹黑新疆形象。暴力恐怖活动不打掉，天理不容！谁要说三道四、指手画脚，都要坚决顶回去！  | “Don’t be afraid if hostile forces whine, or if hostile forces malign the image of Xinjiang,”   |
| Document no.2,<br>p.9-10 | 信息员可以在全美任何地方拨打免费电话，向有关部门报告“可疑行为”，该信息将被立即转到有关部门参考查证。“打人民战争，应该是我们共产党人的拿手好戏，我们最善于做组织起来的工作。”要广泛发动各族群众积极配合反恐行动，完善相应机制，鼓励检举揭发，加强社会面防控，加强流动人口管理，加强重要目标、要害部位、重点行业等安全防范，除了要加强人防物防技防建设外，也要发动群众共同来做，形成全方位立体式的社 | “We Communists should be naturals at fighting a people’s war” ... “We’re the best at organizing for a task.”  |

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| Document no.2,<br>p.11  | 新疆边境线长达5600公里，地形地势十分复杂，有不少薄弱点，防不胜防，“三股势力”渗入危险加剧。“美国从阿富汗撤军以后，盘踞在阿巴边境的暴力恐怖组织可能很快向中亚渗透、在叙利亚、阿富汗等地接受实战化训练的‘东突’恐怖组织人员随时可能在新疆发动暴力恐怖活动。所以，我们必须关口前移、力量前置，实施对境外“东突”恐怖组织专项侦查打击行动。 | “After the United States pulls troops out of Afghanistan, terrorist organizations positioned on the frontiers of Afghanistan and Pakistan may quickly infiltrate into Central Asia” ... “East Turkestan’s terrorists who have received real-war training in Syria and Afghanistan could at any time launch terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.”                               |
| Document no.2,<br>p.17  | 一段时间以来，由于分裂势力、暴力恐怖势力都打着伊斯兰教的旗号，于是一些人认为，应该遏制伊斯兰教发展，甚至提出要消除伊斯兰教的存在。这种观点同样是片面的、甚至是错误的。   | “In light of separatist and terrorist forces under the banner of Islam, some people have argued that Islam should be restricted or even eradicated” [He called that view] “biased, even wrong.”  |
| Document no.2,<br>p.24  | 这些人一心想着“圣战”升天堂，最终走上罪恶的邪路！千万不要低估了宗教极端思想的毒害性，一旦信了它就像吸食了毒品一样，丧失理智、精神疯狂，什么事都干得出来。”  | “the toxicity of religious extremism.”<br>... “As soon as you believe in it” ...<br>“it’s like taking a drug, and you lose your sense, go crazy and will do anything.”   |
| Document no.2,<br>p.62  | 会上，习近平总书记发表重要讲话，李克强总理对新疆经济社会发展作出部署，中央将下发《关于进一步维护新疆社会稳定和实现长治久安的意见》，这些充分体现了我们党在新形势下的治疆方略，为进一步做好新疆工作指明了方向。   | “set the direction for making a success of Xinjiang.”  |
| Document no.3,<br>p.2-3 | 四是过分强调“人权高于安全”，对互联网和现实社会宣扬极端主义的管控力度不够，特别对极端势力发表煽动性、蛊惑性言论等行为姑息纵容，放大效应明显。   | “excessive emphasis on ‘human rights above security,’ and inadequate controls on the propagation of extremism on the internet and in society.”   |
| Document no.3,<br>p.5   | 各地各部门要不断增强危机意识和忧患意识，始终坚持底线思维，强化问题导向，以英国恐袭事件为警示，举一反三、引以为戒，认真查找自身工作中的漏洞和薄弱环节，千方百计加以弥补和整改，坚决防止暴力恐怖事件发生。  | For example, a 10-page directive in June 2017 signed by Zhu Hailun, then Xinjiang’s top security official, called recent terrorist attacks in Britain “a warning and a lesson for us.” It blamed the British government’s “excessive emphasis on ‘human rights above security,’ and inadequate controls on the propagation of extremism on the internet and in society.” |
| Document no.3,<br>p.5   | 1、强化严打攻坚。继续挖存量、减增量、铲土壤，集中力量开展严打攻坚会战，采取一切措施和手段，把暴恐团伙和暴恐分子挖干净、抓干净、打干净，坚决消除现实危害。坚持应收尽收、有了就收，对重点人员和不放心人员集中办班培训，实施甄别审查、教育转化，坚决消除潜在危害。  | Keep up the detentions, it ordered. “Stick to rounding up everyone who should be rounded up,” it said. “If they’re there, round them up.”  |



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| Document no.6, p.17  | 我们要坚决贯彻落实总书记的重要指示，着眼党和国家战略全局，牢牢把握以习近平同志为核心的党中央关于社会稳定和长治久安是新疆工作总目标的科学定位，充分认识新疆处于暴力恐怖活动活跃期、反分裂斗争激烈期、干预治疗阵痛期“三期叠加”的形势没有根本改变，充分认识新疆反分裂斗争的长期性、复杂性、尖锐性，充分认识反恐维稳斗争是一场持久战、也是一场攻坚战，坚定不移把维护稳定作为压倒一切的政治任务、重于泰山的政治责任。  | “The struggle against terror and to safeguard stability is a protracted war, and also a war of offense,” Mr. Chen said in a speech to the regional leadership in October 2017 that was among the leaked papers.   |
| Document 9, p. 2     | 一、违纪事实及主要特点莎车县“7·28”严重暴力恐怖案件发生后，王勇智临危受命任莎车县委书记，本应鞠躬尽瘁为党工作，可他却无视党中央治疆方略和自治区党委决策部署，甚至公然对抗。身为党员领导干部，王勇智集政治蜕变、经济贪婪、思想堕落、擅权妄为、生活腐化于一身，“四个意识”个个皆无，“六项纪律”项项违反，其所作所为荒唐至极、十分罕见，令人瞠目结舌、难以置信，是典型的政治上的“两面人”。（一）弄虚作假、欺上瞒下，与党中央治疆方略和自治区党委决策部署背道而驰。王勇智对党中央治疆方略和自治区党委贯彻落实总目标各项措施置若罔闻，拒不执行自治区党委“应收尽收”要求，置全县各族群众生命财产安全于不顾。 | “He should have given his all to serving the party,”<br><br>“Instead, he ignored the party central leadership’s strategy for Xinjiang, and he went as far as brazen defiance.”<br><br>“He refused,” it said, “to round up everyone who should be rounded up.” |
| Document no.9, p. 3  | 自认为自己长期生活工作在喀什，情况清、底数明，办法也比他们多，总觉得地委安排的工作好高骛远、不切实际，于是在执行过程中存在严重抵触情绪，根本不当回事。  | His superiors, he [Mr. Wang] wrote, were “overly ambitious and unrealistic.”  |
| Document no.9, p. 3  | 比如今年斋月期间，自己明知不能喝酒，也接到通知下午地委要召开维稳工作电视电话会议，却依然我行我素，中午与朋友聚众喝酒并严重醉酒，下午会议汇报工作时语无伦次，刚说了两三句，便一头栽到桌子上，成为全地区最大的笑话，也造成了极为恶劣的影响。  | “While reporting on my work in the afternoon meeting, I rambled incoherently,” he said. “I’d just spoken a few sentences and my head collapsed on the table. It became the biggest joke across the whole prefecture.”   |
| Document no.9, p.8   | 作为党员领导干部，我毫无党性原则，不能与党中央保持高度一致，不能自觉维护党中央的绝对权威，自认为比党中央和自治区党委更了解喀什地区实际情况，上级的决策部署与基层实际差距大，不能照搬照套，必须有选择地抓落实。因此，在执行自治区党委“应收尽收”要求中，打折扣、做选择、搞变通，认为收多了会人为制造矛盾，增加抵触情绪，加剧社会不稳定因素；   | “The policies and measures taken by higher levels were at gaping odds with realities on the ground and could not be implemented in full,” he [Mr. Wang] added.  |
| Document no.9, p. 17 | 因此，在执行自治区党委“应收尽收”要求中，打折扣、做选择、搞变通，认为收多了会人为制造矛盾，增加抵触情绪，加剧社会不稳定因素；另一方面青壮年劳动力都收走了，势必影响脱贫攻坚进程，影响自己的政绩，导致无法实现自己尽快离开莎车的目的。  | “I undercut, acted selectively and made my own adjustments, believing that rounding up so many people would knowingly fan conflict and deepen resentment,” Mr. Wang wrote.  |
| Document no.9, p. 17 | 因此，为了一己私利，我在各类会议上反复强调“应收尽收”不是全部收押，擅自做主将全县已收押收教2万余人中的7000余人违规解押解教，亲手埋下这些“定时炸弹”，给社会稳定带来严重威胁，一旦出事，将给喀什地区乃至新疆带来无可挽回的政治影响。  | “Without approval and on my own initiative,” he added, “I broke the rules.”   |