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Migration to and from Taiwan

Edited by
Chiu Kuei-fen, Dafydd Fell and Lin Ping

Migration to and from Taiwan

Migration has transformed Taiwanese society over the past twenty years. The main inflow has been temporary workers from Southeast Asian countries and women from Southeast Asia and China marrying Taiwanese men. The main outflow has been migration to China, as a result of increased economic integration across the Taiwan Strait. These changes have significantly altered Taiwan's ethnic structure and have profound social and political implications for this new democracy. As large numbers of these migrants take Taiwanese citizenship and their offspring gain voting rights, the impact of these 'new Taiwanese' will continue to increase.

This book showcases some of the leading researchers working on migration to and from Taiwan. The chapters approach migration from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including international relations, sociology, social work, film studies, political science, gender studies, geography and political economy, and so the book has great appeal to scholars and students interested in the politics of Taiwan, Taiwanese society and ethnic identity as well as those focusing on migration in East Asia and comparative migration studies.

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The origins of this volume lie in conversations between the three of us in 2010. Since we come from quite different disciplinary backgrounds (literature, sociology and comparative politics), finding a topic on which to work together was not easy. Eventually we settled on migration to and from Taiwan.

We decided to organize two international workshops and to use the best papers as the basis for the volume. These brought together new and well-established scholars working on migration-related topics from a wide range of disciplines. The workshops were co-organized by the Centre of Taiwan Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS); the Research Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences, National Chunghsing University (NCHU, Taiwan); and the Department of Political Science, National Chungcheng University (CCU, Taiwan). The editors gratefully acknowledge their institutional, financial and logistical support.

The first conference was held at the beautiful Ching-hsing University's Huisun Forest Campus in December 2010. In addition to those chapters included in the volume, we would also like to offer thanks for the contributions to this conference from Chen Mei-ying (National Chia-yi University), Chu Jou-jou (Chungcheng), Hsieh Min-chieh (Chungcheng), Leou Chia-feng (SOAS), Lin Yi-chieh (Chunghsing), Lara Momesso (SOAS) and Weng Hui-chen (Formosa Lily Social Worker's Office). In addition to our universities, the first workshop also received travel funding from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

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1 Migration to and from Taiwan

Identities, politics and belonging

Chiu Kuei-fen, Dafydd Fell and Lin Ping

Over the past two decades, Taiwan has contributed significantly to East Asia's growing migrant populations. The main body of immigrants are people coming from Southeast Asia and China (the PRC). Most of them are either contract workers (such as construction workers or domestic helpers) or dependents (female spouses) of Taiwanese people. The main body of emigrants are professionals and their families moving to China and Southeast Asia. They generally move as entrepreneurs and expatriates of the relocated Taiwanese firms. Both the inflows and outflows highlight Taiwan's economic integration into the Asia Pacific region. The scale of migration to and from Taiwan has been transforming Taiwan's society, politics and economics.

During the past few years we have taught several courses concerning international migration in Taiwan at our respective universities. We have found a very high level of interest in this topic among our students and believe courses on international migration will continue to expand with increased levels of migration in Taiwan. The field of international migration in Taiwan presents a way to make the island empirically and theoretically interesting to new and broader academic communities. For example, the intensive cross-Strait migration adds another dimension of research to the field of cross-Strait relations that has long been dominated by economic and security approaches. Cross-Strait migration also brings the issue of Taiwan back into the field of China studies. In addition, the trends of international migration in Taiwan present significant scope for comparative studies with some countries in East Asia (such as Japan and South Korea) and Europe (such as Spain and Italy) that have experienced similar trends. Through exploring the issues of international migration in Taiwan, readers will obtain more knowledge about the development of Taiwan and the changes in East Asia over the past two decades.

Some statistics highlight the scale of migration to and from Taiwan. It is now estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million Taiwanese people reside in China, a group widely referred to as the *Taishang* (台商, meaning Taiwanese business people). Even if we accept the lower estimate, this group represents around 10 percent of the adult population. In 2011, over 420,000 foreign nationals work as factory labourers or caregivers in Taiwan, with the largest group from Indonesia.[1] This group is commonly referred to as *Wailao* (外勞, meaning overseas labour).

The level of female spousal migration into Taiwan has also been significant, at about half a million over the past two decades.[2] More than 290,000 children had been born to these mixed-parent families by the end of 2010.[3] Apart from the figures above, there is some other significant migrants flow in and out of Taiwan. For instance, since the 1960s Taiwan has suffered a brain drain, whereby well-educated Taiwanese people have been emigrating to developed countries in the west, such as the USA, Canada and Australia.

In Taiwan it has been customary to talk in terms of four ethnic groups: the aboriginals, Hokklo (Hokkien speakers), Hakka, and Mainlanders (*waishengren*).[4] However, the migration trends of the past two decades have made this standard typology of ethnic differentiation increasingly untenable. The new immigrant groups are now larger than both the aboriginals and first generation Mainlanders. Over time, as more of the immigrant spouses become citizens and their offspring reach voting age, the social and political influence of these 'new Taiwanese' will continue to rise. However, the full significance of this new Taiwanese group has not been fully realized. Immigrant wives in Taiwan remain primarily seen as 'spouses' and 'foreign' rather than as immigrants and new citizens. These terms suggest an emphasis on assimilation rather than an attempt to grapple with the multiculturalism of a society of transnational migration flows (Belanger *et al*. 2010). Dafydd Fell's analysis of political advertising in this volume testifies to the main political parties' inadequate attention to the new multicultural composition of Taiwanese society.

These migration patterns raise a huge range of questions for scholars of contemporary Taiwan. What kind of national identity will these migrants and their children adopt? Will they pose a challenge or opportunity to the competing nation-building projects fighting for the allegiance of Taiwanese people? What kind of political values and behaviour should we expect from these groups? Will their gaining of citizenship and voting rights affect the political balance of power? To what extent has Taiwan welcomed and accepted its new inhabitants? Does its treatment of migrants support or undermine Taiwan's claim to be promoting multiculturalism and universal human rights? These are just some of the fascinating questions that we try to address in this collection.

Over the past decade there has been growing academic interest in the patterns and consequences of migration to and from Taiwan. This edited volume aims to showcase some of the leading researchers' work on this topic. The chapters approach the issue from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including international relations, sociology, social work, film studies, political science, gender studies, education, geography and political economy. Although there is much attention to new migrant groups in Taiwan's popular media and academic circles, surprisingly little has been published in English on the topic. Moreover there is little dialogue between works conducted on Taiwan's migration in different academic disciplines. This was made clear to us when we held the two conferences where these chapters were first presented. Although the participants were all working in the field of migration to and from Taiwan, most had never met before, let alone knew the academic work of their colleagues from different academic disciplines.

The chapters in this volume focus on three central themes related to migration to and from Taiwan. These are (1) identity, (2) politics and (3) belonging. Many of the chapters address the national identification of the migrants coming to and leaving Taiwan. Questions that cut across the chapters include how and why migrants' identifications have changed over time and the extent to which they have developed mixed or intermediate identities. Compared to disciplines such as education and sociology, political science in Taiwan has given far less attention to the issues involved in migration. This is the reason we have tried to highlight the political dimensions of migration. Therefore some chapters in this volume consider the political values and behaviour of migrants, and how the politics of immigration are contested within Taiwan. Since Taiwan has claimed to be welcoming its new immigrants into a multi-cultural society, and officially China views Taiwanese migrants as returning fellow compatriots, we consider whether the migrants have developed a sense of belonging in their new countries of residence.

The authors in this volume include both new and well-established scholars working on migration-related topics from a wide range of disciplines. The majority of the chapters are based on extensive fieldwork with migrants in China, Taiwan and Canada. These studies offer the reader vivid portraits of the ups and downs in the lives of these migrants. Many of the authors try to bring in the voices of these new migrants through use of interview data. Other research methods are also featured, such as content analysis of political propaganda and documentaries focused on migrants, as well as statistical analysis.

In some of the sub-fields of Taiwan studies, most of the leading scholars publish widely in English. This is particularly the case with those working in comparative politics and international relations. However, as we mentioned earlier, the English-language literature on Taiwan's migration is less extensive. Since many readers will be unfamiliar with existing work, we chose to start this volume with the chapter on the state of the field. This chapter gives the readers a taste of the work done so far on those people migrating to and from Taiwan.

The first chapter is authored by Tseng Yen-fen (曾嬿芬) and Lin Ping (林平). They introduce the key themes and developments in sociological research on migration to and from Taiwan over the last two decades. The arrival and departure of migrants has brought a quick accumulation of rich knowledge on the issue. This chapter also examines the external linkages of this emerging subfield with other fields, such as international relations and the development of Taiwan. By pointing out some of the pitfalls in the findings of current research, they call for new ways to foster diversified research topics and develop more coherent theories.

Migration from Taiwan

The next five chapters focus on four components of Taiwanese emigration. The first four look at migration to China. Although these migrants are typically classified as *Taishang*, these chapters reveal the complexity and diverse nature of the growing Taiwanese communities in China.

The chapter authored by Keng Shu (耿曙), Gunter Schubert and Lin Rui-hua (林瑞華) reviews the key findings and themes in the field of *Taishang* studies from political science, economics and sociology scholars. They argue that the current research on the *Taishang* reflects anxieties and concerns regarding how Taiwan adapts to globalization. Thus the study has been haunted by debates between those who have enormous faith in and those who remain sceptical of the impact of globalization in China. The authors claim that three common themes in *Taishang* studies reflect the widespread fears within Taiwanese society. First of all, many political scientists are anxious about whether Taiwan's opening-up may force the island's population to give up its autonomy to China, and whether *Taishang* may be the agents helping China gain political leverage. On the other hand, economists are divided between those who view China as an opportunity to revitalize Taiwan's flagging economy and those who fear migration is leading to a hollowing-out of Taiwan's workforce. Finally, sociologists are curious to know to what extent these Taiwanese businesspeople or enterprises are still Taiwanese. In other words, after relocating to locations such as Shanghai, do the *Taishang* maintain their identification with Taiwan and Taiwan-centred cultural and political values?

The second chapter in this section considers a new type of *Taishang* in China. They are not expatriates being pushed away from Taiwan but independent, skilled migrants seeking to develop their careers. Tseng Yen-fen's chapter draws on in-depth interviews with these skilled workers in Shanghai in 2008–10 to illustrate the 'freedom' of these movers. The migration, settlement and consequent identity politics of these 'independent movers' is less understood than that of the conventional business owners, investors and expatriates. Tseng shows how identity politics shape the sentiments behind the decision-making of these migrants in terms of their migration prospects. By going beyond methodological nationalism, the author claims that their identifications with China or Taiwan are only part of the identity politics story, but not the whole reality. She illustrates other parts of identity politics, the sense of belonging with their specific destination – in this case, Shanghai – and their places of origin, mainly Taipei. She also highlights the sense of belonging based on the profession and careers these skilled migrants experience in China. The sense of 'place' and 'profession' is little discussed in previous studies, but it helps readers understand why some skilled Taiwanese move to China even though they are neither entrepreneurs nor expatriates.

The chapter by Lee Chun-yi (李駿怡), 'From being privileged to being localized? Taiwanese businessmen in China', examines respondents who are the closest fit to the stereotypical *Taishang*. Political issues have always been the most sensitive issue for Taiwanese businesses in China. The most popular saying among them is 'Businessmen only talk about businesses'. Lee makes use of extensive fieldwork among *Taishang* in multiple locations in China to analyse their political attitudes and views on cross-Strait relations. She finds that though most *Taishang* do not have a strong political identity, they do not just talk about business. *Taishang* are keen to support those political parties which could be beneficial to their investment in China. As long as this party could lead to their

prosperity, *Taishang* welcome blue, green or red to govern cross-Strait issues.[5] Second, after living in China for more than two decades, most *Taishang* have already come to identify themselves as 'Chinese born in Taiwan'. They also increasingly identify with Chinese rather than Taiwanese society. Thus Lee's findings suggest identity trends among Taiwanese in China are moving in the opposite direction to those seen in the past two decades in Taiwan, where self-identification as Chinese has plummeted.[6]

Prior to the late 1980s, the last major migration wave to or from Taiwan was the massive relocation of up to two million people from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1948–50 following the defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in the Chinese Civil War. This group are known as the Mainlanders (*waishengren*). They are the focus of the chapter 'Happy reunion or brothers only in name', written by Lin Ping (林平).

While the previous chapter presents a picture of the relatively successful integration of Taiwanese businesspeople into Chinese society, this one reveals the other side of the story. Lin discusses the interaction between Taiwanese and Chinese by conducting fieldwork on two 'proxy' groups, the Hometown Association (外省同鄉會) and the Tailian (台胞聯誼會). The former are usually regarded as a pro-China Taiwanese society, and the latter are usually treated as a pro-Taiwan Chinese organisation. However, after examining interaction between the Hometown Association and Tailian 2008–10, he argues that both the Taiwanese Mainlanders and the local Chinese are reluctant to integrate with each other. They view the other side as both strangers and distant cousins at the same time. Both dream of integration as a happy reunion but in reality see each other as brothers only in name. Assumptions of ethnic affinity held by both sides make their interaction more difficult than they expected.

In addition to the large numbers of Taiwanese moving to China, there have been other significant migrant outflows from Taiwan to developed western countries. These migration patterns began in the 1950s and have gradually expanded over time. Much of the research on Taiwanese immigration to western countries has focused on those who arrived after the late 1980s. A feature of these more recent migrants is that they are often commuters between Taiwan and their new host countries, as they often maintain their economic livelihood in Taiwan but obtain resident status abroad to help their children's education prospects.

In contrast Nora Chiang's (姜蘭虹) chapter examines early immigrants that moved to Canada and Guam in the 1960s and 1970s. Using autobiographical interviews, the author reconstructs the lives of early Taiwanese-Chinese immigrants. She finds that they were more successful at developing careers and social skills and a strong sense of belonging their new home countries, compared with later migrants. Although they retain a degree of identification with Taiwan, they also have become 'permanent settlers' and some have even retired and remained in their host regions, enjoying their multi-cultural environments.

Migration to Taiwan

Until recently migrants were largely invisible in Taiwan's media. This has begun to change as Taiwanese migrants have come to be increasingly featured in films, TV drama and documentaries. In the Public Television Service (PTS) TV drama *Don't Call Me Overseas Bride Anymore* (别再叫我外籍新娘), we see how four Vietnamese wives cope with the trials and tribulations of life with Taiwanese husbands following their agent-brokered weddings. Particularly through the efforts of the social worker character Shen Zijun (沈姿君), we see how Taiwan still struggles to match its claims to be a model for gender equality, human rights and multiculturalism. In the even more popular comedy *It's Fate, I Love You* (命中注定, 我愛你), two of the protagonists become *Taishang* and the central love triangle develops as the characters move back and forth between Taipei, Shanghai and the mythical Ginger Island (姜母島). *Homesick Eyes* (望鄉) and *No Money, No Honey* (麵包情人), on the other hand, give us portraits of Southeast Asian migrant workers and their respective predicaments. Building on the self-narratives of the migrant workers, both award-winning documentaries address the challenges of migration from the perspective of migrant workers.

The next two chapters share a concern for the visual representation of migrants in Taiwan. First, Chiu and Tsai examine two Taiwanese documentaries to probe the complexity of migration issues in Taiwan. *My Imported Wife* (我的強娜威) is a documentary about the tough challenges of transnational marriage between a Taiwanese man with cerebral palsy and his young wife from Cambodia. Another film *Libangbang* (飛魚), is about immigration of indigenous people from Orchid Island (蘭嶼), a tiny island near south eastern Taiwan. Chiu and Tsai argue that *My Imported Wife* is not just about the victimhood of the impoverished immigrant wife and the socially disadvantaged Taiwanese husband; it also invites an understanding of transnational marriage as the pursuit of cosmopolitan rights. *Libangbang,* likewise, addresses the complexity of the indigenous people in Taiwan. The authors refuse to interpret it in simple terms of involuntary victimhood. The indigenous migrants are not only 'natives' but also cosmopolitans negotiating for different life scripts for themselves. Taking us into the intimate family space of the migrants, these two documentaries reveal how the cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged operates.

Also on the theme of visual representation is Fell's review of how Taiwan's political parties have dealt with the migration issue since the lifting of martial law through an examination of election advertisements. Thus here the subject of the research is political parties and how they locate themselves in the Taiwanese migration debates. Are they attempting to take a more exclusive position that discourages migration and demonizes these new potential citizens, or have they tried to emphasize the positive implications of immigration and adopted a welcoming or multiculturalist approach? This research offers us a chance to compare Taiwan's parties with their counterparts in Europe. Fell shows that what is particularly surprising is what is missing. In other words, the main migrant groups that feature in this volume are largely invisible and ignored in party propaganda.

In contrast, the parties give much greater attention to the ageing first-generation Mainlanders and the non-existent problem of Chinese labour migration. It was not until the 2012 elections that the main parties adopted more welcoming messages to new Taiwanese.

The next set of chapters examines migration into Taiwan from a number of different perspectives. First, Isabelle Cheng (程念慈) examines the case of identification change among Indonesian–Chinese marriage migrants to Taiwan. Although these migrants come to Taiwan on Indonesian passports and are often put into the same category as other South East Asian marriage migrants, Cheng finds that a large proportion are actually ethnic Chinese. Thus for many of Cheng's respondents, migrating to Taiwan is returning to their imagined Chinese homeland. Cheng attempts to explain how and why their identification changes over time after moving to Taiwan. She argues that they develop an intermediate identity, but one that is slightly different from those experienced by Chinese or other South East Asian migrants.

A large proportion of marriage–migrant spouses coming to Taiwan had their marriages arranged by marriage brokers. This commoditized process involved the male spouse paying significant commission to the brokers. We can get a taste of this from the TV series *Don't Call Me Overseas Bride Anymore*. Here the prospective Taiwanese husbands are first attracted by a wall poster advertisement offering an all-inclusive deal and guaranteeing to supply virgin brides in the package. In other words, the practice is reinforcing the kind of patriarchal values that Taiwan's women's movement has spent the past few decades trying to dismantle.

One such feature related to patriarchal values is the prevalence of domestic violence in many mixed-marriage households, perpetrated by both husbands and in-laws against migrant female spouses. The chapter by Wang Hong-zen (王宏仁), Chen Po-wei (陳伯偉) and Tang Wen-hui Anna (唐文慧) explores the life experiences of such victims of marriage migration to Taiwan. Their fieldwork with abused Vietnamese immigrant wives highlights how they resist patriarchal Taiwanese social normalization. The authors analyse their engagement with their husbands' families and official social work institutions to try to understand how they negotiate with the patriarchal society to legitimize their stay in Taiwan and escape the gender norms imposed on them. This chapter highlights how efforts to achieve the goals of multiculturalism and human rights often falls short in the case of marriage migrants in Taiwan.

As more mixed marriages take place, a growing number of children are being born into such families and entering the Taiwanese education system. There has been widespread concern that children from mixed-heritage families will be at a severe disadvantage and that this may even result in a decline in Taiwan's international competitiveness. Chen Yu-wen's (陳毓文) chapter attempts to test these stereotypes of mixed-heritage adolescents by comparing their life adjustment with those from single-heritage families. She investigates their academic and social lives in particular. She finds that mixed-heritage children are at a higher risk of suffering from depression, poor social interactions with peers and worse self-evaluated academic performance. However, Chen did not find that

these children exhibit more problematic behaviour. Chen proposes a number of measures to improve their social esteem and academic performance, as well as to reduce discrimination.

The next chapter on migration to Taiwan, by Chen Kuang-hui (陳光輝) and Luo Ya-hui (羅雅惠), compares mothers and children from families with Chinese spouses and their counterparts from domestic families in Taiwan to fill the gap in the study of political socialization. Chinese spouses are often suspected of supporting unification with China and Taiwan's current ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and thus are viewed with deep suspicion by Taiwanese nationalists. There are also concerns that these spouses will socialize their offspring with similar Chinese-centred values. Chen and Luo examine whether the husbands' families affect their Chinese spouses' political attitudes. They consider the potential impact of growing up in families with Chinese spouses upon children's development of political attitudes and their political behaviours in the future. When these children reach adulthood, will they take part in politics and have a large impact on the political system in Taiwan? Whether and how growing up in families with Chinese spouses makes them distinct from children of domestic families is a question of importance for political scientists. Therefore, this chapter also investigates whether these unusual experiences make children of Chinese spouses different from their counterparts from domestic families.

The last chapter on migration to Taiwan, by Tseng Yu-chin, Isabelle Cheng and Dafydd Fell, considers the topic from an associational perspective. It examines how Chinese spouses and their Taiwanese families have mobilized against proposed discriminatory regulations affecting their work, citizenship and political rights. This chapter reveals how the mainland spouses were affected by and engaged with competing political parties and nation-building projects. Thus we see immigrants contributing to Taiwan's vibrant civil society, and their growing importance in political competition.

The final chapter tries to place Taiwan's migration in a comparative light, particularly with reference to other East Asian cases. Like Korea and Japan, Taiwan has been a magnet for work and marriage migration since the late 1980s. Tony Fielding highlights some of the similarities and unique features of the way migration has operated in Taiwan compared to its East Asian neighbours. In addition, he assesses some of the lessons that comparative migration studies can take from the Taiwanese case.

Identity, politics and belonging

Several interesting dimensions emerge when the chapters are read together. The first is the impact of non-economic factors on migration. Lin Ping and Tseng Yen-fen's studies reveal that many Mainlander Taiwanese moved to China because they were unhappy with what they perceived as an anti-China political climate under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule (2000–8). The fear of being marginalized because of their ethnic association with China was a driving force for migraton out of Taiwan. In Cheng's analysis, the anti-Chinese riots of May 1998 in

Indonesia were an important factor driving ethnic Chinese Indonesians to move to Taiwan. In both cases (ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Mainlander Taiwanese in Taiwan), migration was triggered by a strong sense of ethnic otherness in the home country. In addition, migration for both groups is imagined to be a 'homecoming'. Interestingly, the former group often finds China falls short of their expectation of 'home'; the latter group is split between those who feel quite at home after they arrive in Taiwan and those who struggle to make it home.

This non-economic factor also triggered migration from Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s. Dissatisfaction with the authoritarian political climate of Taiwan under martial law (1948–87) also contributed to the large flow of Taiwanese migrants to North America. Nora Chiang's study shows that many of these immigrants became permanent settlers and integrated successfully with their host countries. The cosmopolitan and welcoming atmospheres of Canada and Guam are identified as an important factor of successful integration. In addition, the length of residence, social skills and local knowledge all contributed to the development of a sense of belonging. Thus, these 'reluctant immigrants' eventually came to identify with their host countries.

Apart from subjective reasons, objective structural factors, such as the policies governing investment and professional activities in the host countries, apparently have a great impact on identity formation. Lee Chun-yi argues that since 2008 many *Taishang* have adopted an attitude of assimilation to secure their investment in China. While Taiwanese immigrants in China in previous research tended to be aloof from the local communities, she suggests they are now eager to blend in. Paradoxically, the decreasing privileges enjoyed by *Taishang* in mainland China boost their integration with the Chinese society as they find it imperative to acquire more local resources in competing with domestic enterprises. Thus, the findings of Lin, Cheng, Chiang and Lee suggest that the length of residence, policies of the host countries and immigrants' local knowledge are significant factors in developing a sense of home or belonging.

Second, class and gender politics feature in many of the contributions to the volume. Many unexpected problems for migrants arise from the intricate interplay of class and gender. The conflict generated by Southeast Asian immigrant wives' attempts to participate in the local job market is a case in point. Many Southeast Asian women are from poor families. They marry Taiwanese men in the hope of improving the financial situation of their families of origin. If for some reasons such expectations cannot be met through their husbands, these immigrant wives often try to find a job to secure an income of their own. Wang *et al.'s* study shows that Vietnamese wives' attempts to participate in the labour market, seen as a virtue in Vietnam, are often frustrated by their families in Taiwan. The documentary representation of transnational marriage conflict in *My Imported Wife* analysed in Chiu's chapter gives us a glimpse of the complexity of the issue. In addition to the Taiwanese husbands' endorsement of traditional gendered division (i.e. men work whereas women take care of the families) and the stigmatization of working, media representations of immigrant women also fuel the opposition of Taiwanese husbands and their families. One of the most prevalent media stereotypes of such

marriages in the news media is that they are a cover for human trafficking for the sex industry. In fact, one of the four Vietnamese wives in *Don't Call Me Overseas Bride Anymore* gets pressed into prostitution after coming to Taiwan. Caught between the role of a filial daughter responsible for the financial improvement of her family of origin and the role of filial daughter-in-law and dutiful wife expected by her new family in Taiwan, the immigrant wife often finds herself negotiating with intertwined class and gender politics.

Third, we see the significance of narrative in the migrants' trajectories and researchers' agendas. Tseng Yen-fen rightly remarks that 'migration is… very much driven by "narratives" supplied by the media and actors involved.' As the reader reads through the chapters, they will surely be struck by the power of narratives in shaping the migrant subjects' journeys and the researchers' arguments. Almost all the chapters in this book engage in dialogue with certain constructed narratives. As mentioned above, many Mainlander Taiwanese's moves to China and Indonesian women's migration to Taiwan are powered by the 'homecoming' narrative. In the case of Southeast Asian immigrant wives who marry for economic reasons, two powerful narratives are often woven into their trajectories. One is the narrative of the Taiwanese dream. Migration to Taiwan is often taken to be a journey of liberation from poverty. The other is the story of immigrant women as prone to illicit activities if permitted to go out to work. As for immigrant wives from Mainland China, the narrative of national security with the threat of China as the scenario is one that they have to fight against in their struggle for Taiwanese citizenship. Such a perception is what has driven the discriminatory legislation that the social movement analysed in the Tseng, Cheng and Fell chapter struggled against. Tseng Yen-fen also shows that the Shanghai story propagated in mainstream popular cultural representations in Taiwan generates the so-called 'Shanghai fantasy'. The Shanghai story attracts many skilled workers from Taiwan. Dafydd Fell's analysis of political advertising demonstrates how political parties skilfully exploit the power of stories to serve their own interests. The impact of narrative(s) on migration is certainly an interesting subject for further research.

It is noteworthy that, just like the migrant subjects in their analyses, the researchers in this volume develop their arguments through engagement with certain kinds of narratives. The chapter by Keng, Schubert and Lin points out that the script of globalization is key to the problems of *Taishang* studies. The divergence of research findings in this specific area actually reflects the difference of the globalization scripts adopted by the researchers. In other words, the researchers' agendas are defined by different narratives of globalization that exert an implicit impact on their research findings.

A fourth dimension that emerges from the chapters is how they serve to reveal that Taiwan is still far from being a multi-cultural society. The perception of ethnic chauvinism contributing to the migration of Mainlander Taiwanese to China is seen in Lin Ping's chapter and the disappointment of many of the overseas Chinese that moved to Taiwan is discussed in Cheng's chapter. Similarly, much of the media discourse and electoral propaganda discussed in Fell's chapter served

to demonize existing and imaginary future migrants to Taiwan. Other chapters have shown that migrant spouses have often been treated as worse than second-class citizens, having limited personal freedom to leave the family home and often being physically and mentally abused. Although the social movement analysed by Tseng, Cheng and Fell succeeded in preventing the proposed discriminatory legislation being passed, the exclusionary views expressed by politicians cited in the chapter reflect widespread hostility to immigrants in Taiwanese society. Moreover, the chapter shows that even after the KMT came to power migrant spouses still faced legal discrimination.

Although we address a wide range of migration issues in this book, we should point out that it was impossible to address all aspects of the topic. One area that we did not manage to include this time was, of course that of contract workers in Taiwan's industry and domestic care sectors. The scale of this community is visible from the range of bars and snack stores catering to South East Asian workers in major cities in Taiwan. This marginalized community has now begun to be covered in documentaries and film, such as the 2009 comedy *Pinoy Sunday* (台北星期天). Other important topics omitted include the commercial brokers that arrange transnational marriages and emigration abroad, both of which have become significant in Taiwan's service sector. We also did not include pieces on the largest overseas Taiwanese community abroad–that in the United States–or the growing numbers of Taiwanese students in China. Perhaps these could be included in a second such volume in the future.

Notes

1 Central News Agency, 'Taiwan has 420,000 migrant workers: CLA', Focus Taiwan News. Available online at http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aSOC&ID=201111200016 (accessed 30 November 2011).
2 National Immigration Agency, 2012. Available online at www.immigration.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=29698&mp=1 (accessed 10 January 2013).
3 Ibid.
4 The term 'Mainlander' is a controversial one. Generally it is used to refer to those who moved to Taiwan from Mainland China in the late 1940s and early 1950s and their descendants. However, is it fair to call someone a Mainlander if they are a second or third generation descendant of those earlier migrants and have never lived or even been to China? Some authors in this volume prefer to limit the term to only the first generation, while others prefer broader coverage.
5 The terms blue, green and red refer to the Kuomintang, Democratic Progressive Party and Chinese Communist Party respectively.
6 See National Chengchi University, 'Election study center surveys data archives: trends in core political attitudes among Taiwanese'. Available online at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=6 (accessed 6 August 2012).

2 Through the looking glass

Migration into and out of Taiwan

Tseng Yen-fen and Lin Ping

Migration is a central focus of public debates and intellectual discussions in contemporary societies everywhere. Researchers on migration have to investigate beyond the micro/macro divide and engage in multiple levels of analysis at the same time. Such micro-level studies have tended to focus on the motivations behind migrants' actions, their ability to adapt to their host countries and the development and maintenance of migrant organizations, while macro-level studies are carried out on the realities within host societies. The most challenging task is to address the experiences of migrants in the context of responses from the state. The rewarding part of such a challenge is that we come to understand a country's characteristics by analysing its immigration and emigration practices and patterns.

After the end of World War II, Taiwan's population structure was mainly changed by the ratio of births to deaths and the government's tight control over both immigration and emigration until the 1980s (Hsieh 1989; Yang, Chiang and Liao 2005).[1] The lifting of the travel ban to China, together with the import of contract labour in the late 1980s, contributed to the beginning of a major population shift that is still active today (Hsia 2005; Keng and Schubert 2010; Ku 2006; Yang, Chiang and Liao 2005). By reviewing research on Taiwan's migration patterns, this chapter aims not only to understand major features related to migration, but also to look at Taiwan's society as a whole. Both are critical missions in guiding readers through the chapters of this volume.

Migration into Taiwan: facts and issues

In their general survey of citizenship laws in East Asian countries, Castles and Davidson (2000) found that northeast Asian states (e.g. Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) promote ethnic homogeneity through their policies more than any other countries in the world. The exclusionary migration regimes of these countries reflect their ideologies of ethnic homogeneity. For example, until the recent changes in the nationality laws, Taiwan did not issue immigration visas except in the case of spouses. In other words, foreigners were not supposed to immigrate into Taiwan except when marrying a Taiwanese citizen.

That static picture has changed drastically since the early 1990s as a result of two major streams of migrants that have diversified Taiwan's population. The first major wave of immigrants arrived in the form of guest workers who come and go according to the terms of their contracts, with only very few overstaying their visa and making Taiwan their home. Then came the second wave of migrant women who married local Taiwanese men. This type of migration is more permanent in nature. These new population developments have many implications regarding how to reinterpret Taiwan's ethnicity, class divisions and gender relations.

Backgrounds and typology

Foreign workers

In 1991, Taiwan responded to the demand for foreign labour from the island's labour-intensive industries and for domestic maids and care workers from the general population by formally establishing a foreign labour policy. The number of foreign workers has grown every year since, and by 2012 over 430,000 foreign workers were legally living and working in Taiwan. The increase in this number can be attributed to the increasing demand for care workers controlled by need-based assessment, in which the government conducts assessments of care needs and places no cap on how many visas can be issued, while manufacturing workers are capped by quota controls. The four countries from which most of these workers originate are Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia (see Table 2.1).

In recruiting foreign workers, Taiwan adopted a guest worker programme over other forms of immigration policy, with policy-makers arguing for the island's continued ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The idea of ethnic homogeneity seems rather innocuous compared with the class assumption behind the criteria for inclusion and exclusion, since white-collar workers are exempt from the above regulations. While most countries adopt policies welcoming foreign workers with special skills and talents, such skills and talents are not found exclusively in white-collar jobs: chefs, nurses and nannies can qualify in such skill categories. But this is not the case in Taiwan. It is their working-class background that rendered this group of foreign workers subject to denial of extended residency

Table 2.1 Number of foreign workers by type of work and nationality

	Nationality				
	Indonesia	*Philippines*	*Thailand*	*Vietnam*	*Total*
Industry	30,541	62,509	70,530	74,686	238,269
Care work	155,088	22,676	952	22,994	201,711
Total	185,629	85,185	71,482	97,680	439,980

Source: Bureau of Employment and Vocational Training, June 2012.
http://www.evta.gov.tw/home/index.asp (accessed 3 July 2012)

and immediate repatriation when their work permit expired. Also, controls are maintained to which working-class foreigners are subject not only at the points of their arrival and departure, but also during their stay. These migrant workers are thus confined by restrictive immigration regulations and stringent conditions of employment. For example, they are not allowed to change their place of residence or employer at will.

Marriage migrants

In addition to migrant workers, many foreigners have moved to Taiwan since the 1990s as the result of marriage with a Taiwanese. Most of these intermarriages were first sought out by socioeconomically disadvantaged Taiwanese men (Hsia 2005). According to the latest figures, from 2011, there are more than 400,000 migrant spouses currently living in Taiwan. Two thirds are from China, with many of the rest coming from Southeast Asia (National Immigration Agency [NIA] 2012). In 2003, during the peak of this trend, such marriages represented 31 per cent of the nation's total registered marriages. Mainland China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand were the top four countries from which these spouses originated. While the number of marriage migrants from Mainland China remains stable, the number of such migrants from other countries continues to decline (see Table 2).

Table 2.2 Number of foreign spouses by nationality and gender (2001–11)

	Foreign and Chinese spouses		*Nationality (region)*				*Gender*	
Year	*Total*	*%**	*MC*	*HKM***	*SEA*	*Others*	*M*	*F*
2001	46,202	27.10	26,516	281	17,512	1,893	3,400	42,802
2002	49,013	28.39	28,603	303	18,037	2,070	4,366	44,647
2003	54,634	31.86	34,685	306	17,351	2,292	6,001	48,633
2004	31,310	23.82	10,642	330	18,103	2,235	3,176	28,134
2005	28,427	20.14	14,258	361	11,454	2,354	3,139	25,288
2006	23,930	16.77	13,964	442	6,950	2,574	3,214	20,716
2007	24,700	18.29	14,721	425	6,952	2,602	3,141	21,599
2008	21,729	14.03	12,274	498	6,009	2,948	3,516	18,213
2009	21,914	18.71	12,796	498	5,696	2,924	3,673	18,241
2010	21,501	15.49	12,807	525	5,212	2,957	3,792	17,709
2011	21,516	13.01	12,800	663	4,887	3,166	4,090	17,426

Source: National Immigration Agency, Foreign Spouses Statistics, various years. (www.moi.gov.tw/files/news_file/week10101.doc), accessed 8/3/2012

Notes:
*% for percentage of the total marriage
**MC for Mainland China; HKM for Hong Kong and Macau; SEA for Southeast Asia

The number of spousal migrants is due to closer regional connections between Taiwan and nearby countries. These regional connections are effects of foreign direct investments from Taiwan. Studies show that the internationalization of Taiwan capital in several Southeast Asian countries has induced the inflow of spousal migration from this region (Hsia 2000). For example, a large proportion of bridal agencies are capital-linked migrants to Southeast Asia, such as expatriates working in Taiwanese factories and small business owners relocating to Southeast Asia who later become commercial matchmakers (Hsia 2000; Wang and Chang 2002).

Most inter-marriages in Taiwan have occurred between Taiwanese men and women from Asian countries with weaker economies. Researchers attribute this pattern to the skewed marriage 'market'. While more Taiwanese women are getting better educations and becoming more independent economically, Taiwanese men remain traditional about the gender division of labour at home. Therefore, less privileged Taiwanese men look to marry women from less developed countries, who are expected to be obedient and traditional wives (Hsia 2000; Wang and Chang 2003; Tien and Wang 2006). Southeast Asian spouses, in particular, are expected to perform the role of dutiful and docile daughters-in-law or housewives pertinent to Taiwanese family ideology. However, such expectations are often unrealistic, leading to conflicts of various sorts (see Chapter 11 of this volume). The social integration policy of Taiwan puts the responsibility for integrating spousal migrants, especially women, in the hands of the family into which they marry. Unfortunately in reality, more often than not, their new families are the problem, not the solution.

Immigrants as new ethnic groups?

Since the 1990s, many scholars have paid attention to issues of ethnicity from a newly constructed perspective of understanding ethnic cleavages among the island's four major ethnic groups: Hokklo, Mainlanders, Hakka and Aborigine. Except for Aborigines, these groups are all ethnic Han, having moved and migrated from China in different periods of time. The focus of the study of ethnicity has been on political splits and social cleavage within the Han population (Wang 2005; Rigger 2010). Therefore, one of the major impacts of the large amount of migration into Taiwan in the post-1990s era has been a resulting expansion of ethnic diversity, with the number of new immigrants and children from mixed-parent families now larger than both the aborigine and first-generation Mainlander populations. Over the course of time, these immigrants and their children, by obtaining Taiwanese citizenship, will come to constitute a large proportion of the population.

Research on the social integration and political participation of these 'new Taiwanese' groups (both from Southeast China and China) and their evolving national identity will definitely enrich the field of ethnic studies in the coming years. In discussing integration among migrant populations, naturalization – namely citizenship acquisition – is an important indicator of these migrants' positions. In Taiwan, naturalization is most significantly affected by gender.

Female spouses are much more likely to naturalize than their male counterparts. In the case of foreign spouses, by 2012, 64 per cent of all female and 0.5 per cent of all males had become naturalized. The current law requires all foreigners to give up their original nationalities before application for naturalization. The question remains as to what is involved in making the decision in favour of naturalization, and what it means to these women newcomers to give up their original citizenship status.

Upstairs, downstairs and outcast

Much research on migration concentrates on how people move up the social ladder through moving abroad, since most migration is from less to more developed countries. This has also proven to be the case in Taiwan, with most foreign spouses and migrant workers coming from the less developed Southeast Asia. Some researchers argue that this 'moving up through moving out' reflects the hierarchical structure of global capitalism and the relative status between countries in this structure (Hsia 2000, 2005). However, a study on domestic workers from the Philippines displays a unique pattern. Many Philippine domestic workers are preferred for their English-speaking skills and, as a result, an overwhelming proportion come from well-educated or middle class backgrounds. Therefore, they are literally moving 'downward' by becoming domestic workers in Taiwan (Lan 2002). Their upward mobility is accomplished via the money sent home to support status consumption, such as brand-name products and private schooling, by their family members back in the Philippines. The class positions are better understood in a transnational social landscape. Immigration policy in Taiwan, like that of many other countries, is strongly biased in favour of higher-class migrants when it comes to permanent residency and citizenship. Taiwan is unique in its tight exclusion of working-class migrants from becoming long-term residents and applying for citizenship.

In such an exclusive regime, workers recruited from developing countries fill the lower-rung job sectors as guest workers. Their path to long-term residency is thus cut off by design. However, white-collar workers from developed countries, such as Japan and the USA, enjoy an easier path to permanent residency and citizenship. Such a stratified immigration system inevitably creates a new underclass in Taiwan society, with foreigners as guest workers without protections (Lan 2005). Such an underclass is close to what Eric Wolf (1983: 383) describes as the 'new labourers' in his discussion of how capitalists of the nineteenth century created a new kind of working class by relocating workers to many sites for further exploitation in order to gain a larger scale of capital accumulation. The development of a new working class consists of processes of both integrating diversified national backgrounds while at the same time segregating them from the local population. In Taiwan, working-class migrants have become pseudo-pariahs; outcasts among the lowest social strata. Taiwan's immigration policy has thus become a means of marking, or even establishing, social class. Under such circumstances, the children born to these cross-border marriages are at risk of suffering the same stigmas, as

the majority of them are born to migrant mothers living in lower socioeconomic conditions. In conclusion, these 'incompatible others' do not include all foreigners, but just those with socially contemptible backgrounds.

Migration out from Taiwan: Taiwan in the global context

Although migration from Taiwan is not unusual, research on Taiwanese emigration was rare until the 1990s. All the current research is based on estimations from incomplete quantitative data or qualitative studies on selected Taiwanese communities overseas. There are estimated to be 529,000 Taiwanese emigrants in the US (OCAC 2003), 85,000 in Canada, 28,000 in Australia (OCAC 2005), 1,000,000 in China (Lin 2011) and 55,000 in Southeast Asia (Ku 2006).

These studies also show that Taiwanese cluster in certain districts of the following cities: New York, Los Angeles, Vancouver, Sydney, Shanghai, Dongguan, Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh City. Some studies further explore the strategy of migration and adaptation of Taiwan migrants to their host countries (Chee 2005; Chiang and Hsu 2006; Lin 2011, Ku 2006; Hsiao, Wang and Kung 2008; Tseng 1995; Wong 2004). These studies provide a good chance to explore both the experiences of these emigrants and the relationship between Taiwan and the host countries in the global context.

Taiwanese in the US: political alliances in the Cold War, 1950s–70s

The Taiwanese in the US might constitute the first wave of emigration from Taiwan after the end of World War II. Because of the island's tight border controls, they were not officially labelled emigrants. Most of them just went to the US as college students with their dependents and did not return (Hsieh 1989). It is not clear how many Taiwanese left in this period and they are often described as part of the ethnic Chinese population in the US (Chen 1992). After living in the US for several decades, some of them failed to adapt to their host country and segregated themselves from the rest of the population. Others have adapted successfully (Tseng 1995; Chee 2005). Some even eventually returned to influence Taiwan's political and economic development (Tsay 2003; Philips 2005).

Highly educated Taiwanese moved to the US due to two factors: US immigration policy and the influence of international affairs on Taiwanese society. The first factor was the immigration policy implemented in 1965. In that year US Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, which facilitated the entry of both the families of current immigrants and skilled labour to fill the needs of certain sectors in the economy. Although the act was not specifically aimed at Taiwanese people, it helped Taiwanese people studying in the US find work after graduating and facilitated their families later joining them (Chee 2005). A study based on sporadic records estimated that 20 per cent of Taiwanese college graduates studied abroad (mainly in the US) in the 1970s, but only 8 per cent of them returned home after graduating (O'Neil 2003).

The second factor is the influence of international affairs on Taiwan. During this period, Taiwan was ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT). With support from the US, the Taiwanese government (also called the Republic of China, or ROC for short) held China's seat in the United Nations and claimed itself to be the only legal government of China. From the 1960s this status was seriously challenged by the Chinese government (the People's Republic of China, or PRC). In 1971, China's seat was awarded to the PRC. In 1979 the US formalized its diplomatic relationship with the PRC and ended its official ties with the Taiwanese government. These events caused serious political uncertainty in Taiwan. Emigration, or at least possession of another country's passport, was seen on Taiwan as a way to quickly leave the island if it was ever annexed by China (Hsieh 1989; Chee 2005; Chen 2008).[2]

In short, the US was the most favourable country for emigrants from Taiwan from the 1950s to the 1970s. This pattern was influenced not only by the motivations of the migrants themselves, but also by the need for educated labour in the US. Shifts in the cross-Strait strategic balance further encouraged these patterns.

Taiwanese outside Asia: from agricultural to industrial, 1980s–90s

Since the 1980s, a growing number of Taiwanese have moved to western countries in search of business opportunities. Countries such as the US (Kwong and Miscevic 2005), Canada (Chiang 2008), Australia (Ip, Wu and Inglis 1998; Chiang and Hsu 2006) and New Zealand (Chiang 2011) have implemented immigration policies attracting affluent business migrants from newly industrial countries.

Compared with the previous generation of Taiwanese immigrants in the US, who moved there as dependents or poor students, later generations of Taiwanese immigrants were more likely to be professionals and the wealthy. They migrated either for business opportunities in the host countries or because of deteriorating quality of life at home (Chee 2005; Chiang 2004, 2008; Hsu 2008). In order to maximize their benefits, some moved as a 'split family', where the wife and children remained in the host country while the husband shuttled between Taiwan and the host country (Chee 2005; Chiang 2008). Some even created 'golden parachutes', whereby children moved abroad as students without adult supervision (Pih and Mao 2005).

Although the emigrants in this period were more educated and resourceful than their predecessors, they still faced difficulties integrating due to language and social barriers (Ip, Wu and Inglis 1998; Chiang 2004). Therefore, most of them either created their own businesses or frequently travelled back and forth to do business in Taiwan in order to make a living (Schak 1999; Chiang 2004). This back-and-forth movement encouraged more discussion on issues of identity, especially for those who left Taiwan during their childhood (Tsai 2010; Chiang and Liao 2008).

Taiwanese emigration during this period was not just an issue of population movement. It reflected the development of the Taiwanese economy and the context

of global competition for talent. Although Taiwan's economic reform was praised as a miracle for its success, the island also faced deteriorating living conditions (Gold 1986), with pollution, congestion and over-urbanization making living there unpleasant and undesirable. At the same time, countries such as the US, Australia and Canada loosened their immigration policies to lure affluent investors and migrants with professional knowledge. With worsening living conditions at home and these incentives from overseas, it is no surprise that Taiwanese with the necessary resources emigrated to these countries.

Taiwanese economic power in the Asia Pacific, 1990s–present

While Taiwanese emigrants in the previous periods were more or less independent migrants, Taiwanese people moving to CSA (China and Southeast Asia) during this period were initially motivated by outsourcing and relocation of Taiwanese firms. With rising labour costs and ever more stringent environmental protections in Taiwan, and China and Southeast Asia opening their markets to foreign direct investments (FDI), Taiwanese firms and investors found it harder and harder to justify remaining on the island. Therefore, a certain number of Taiwanese people moved to CSA as entrepreneurs, along with their family members (Lin 2009; Hsiao, Wang and Kung 2008). Most of them live in Shanghai, Dongguan, Jakarta, Ho Chi Min City and Kuala Lumpur.[3]

Because Taiwanese people arrived in these countries due to specific macroeconomic circumstances, most research has emphasized political–economic themes (Hsing 1996, Wu 1995; Hsiao, Wang and Kung 2008; Keng and Schubert 2010), with little attention paid to these migrants' personal experiences. These studies suggest that this population movement will further affect the relationship between Taiwan and the host countries in which these immigrants live (Hsiao, Wang and Kung 2008; Keng and Schubert 2010). Apart from the political–economic effects of migration, some studies explore the integration between migrants and local people. A few studies concentrating on issues of identity state that most Taiwanese people in these countries are reluctant to associate with locals (Kung 2005; Lin 2009). Even marriage between Taiwanese and locals is sometimes regarded as a strategy for business security and not the result of sincere care and intimacy (Kung 2005; Shen 2005).

Taiwanese migration to both China and Southeast Asia was initially triggered by the same factor – the relocation and outsourcing of traditional industry – and caused serious debates in the late 1990s. These debates highlighted different opinions surrounding Taiwan's economic competitiveness versus its national security and revolved around two competing policies: *Go-west* (西進) and *Go-south* (南向). Supporters of the former argued that Taiwanese industry should aim for China, because ethnic affinity across the Strait is a good base for development (Hsu 1995). However, supporters of the latter argued that it should aim for Southeast Asia because of China's hostile policies regarding the island's political development (Chen 1996).

This debate illustrates the worry over political influence from China. Although *Go-south* was supported by the Taiwanese government from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, the number of Taiwanese firms in Southeast Asia is much lower than the number in China. While more than a million Taiwanese people have moved to China without any detriment to Taiwan's sovereignty, the worry over political influence from China still exists. Whether these Taiwanese in China will identify themselves as Chinese and be manipulated by the Chinese government to influence Taiwan's politics is often discussed, but not fully explored (Keng and Schubert 2010; also see Chapters 3 and 9 in this volume).

Conclusions and propositions for future research[4]

Our intention has been to argue that to understand the state and society of Taiwan, it is necessary and effective to review migration issues pertinent to some of its most important characteristics. Migration not only concerns demographic changes but also reflects the core identities of Taiwan as a state and as a society. However, there are some drawbacks in current studies and we offer some suggestions to deepen as well as broaden understanding of the subject. The following are some propositions for research.

The need for comparative studies

Although many scholars have paid attention to issues of ethnicity, class and gender, we need more varieties of studies with careful research designed to examine the current arguments. For example, while most foreign brides in Taiwan come from the less developed areas of China and Southeast Asia, there is a need to research spousal migrants from other countries, many of them male, to compare experiences across gender and nationality. While most contract labour comes from Southeast Asia, there is little research to compare the experiences of ethnic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese from the same country. Are the ethnic Thai workers less happy than the Chinese–Thai workers when all other conditions are equal?

This comparative framework also applies to studies on emigration. While Taiwanese businesses in both Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (a country mainly composed of Muslim Malays) and Dongguan, China (a country mainly composed of Confucius Chinese) are usually labour-intensive, research comparing the migration process and business management of Taiwanese people in these two cities could possibly better illustrate how ethnicity affects working environments.

Broaden the topics of migration studies

Most migration research on Taiwan is driven by analysis of empirical data. However, without a broader knowledge of migration literature, current topics are still narrowly defined and confined. We need more research guided by theory and findings from a wider range of migration literature. For example, while some research explores the migration experience of Taiwanese people in China, little

discusses the perceptions that Chinese people have about these migrants and the response of their family members who are still in Taiwan. Are Taiwanese businessmen regarded as unwelcome invaders or friendly neighbours by Chinese people? Are Taiwanese people likely to support more cooperation across the Strait because some of their family members work in China?

While most research concentrates on the experiences of foreign spouses or contract labour, few pay attention to their links with their home countries, with even fewer trying to understand the attitudes of Taiwanese who are in constant contact with new immigrants, either by working with them as co-workers or by living with them as family members. More research is needed to discover the reality of how new immigrants are perceived by the locals in their networks, not just attitudes among the population in general.

More research on the diversity of migrants

As mentioned above, stereotypes exist both to differentiate and to homogenize Taiwan's immigrants and emigrants. Therefore, it is important to produce research that reflects the diversity of migrants, including generational, class and gender diversity. For example, how do children from mixed Taiwanese–Chinese families identify themselves with regard to being Chinese or Taiwanese? How do the few Taiwanese women who have married rich Chinese men identify themselves compared to the Chinese women who have married Taiwanese men? Research on these aspects could produce fruitful findings regarding national identity in East Asia.

To sum up, studies on migration into and out of Taiwan describe and analyse not only issues of population but also those relevant to a wide variety of issues affecting the island. By treating migration studies as a strategic field of research, we are very likely to gain a greater understanding of some core aspects that define what Taiwan is.

Notes

1 Strictly speaking, a certain number of people moved into and out of Taiwan before the 1980s, such as refugees and troops from the Chinese Mainland and people studying in the US that did not return. However, the former are usually termed 'Mainlanders' and are one of four major ethnic groups in Taiwan and thus not regarded as immigrants; the latter are rarely discussed due to the lack of reliable data. Both groups are partially mentioned later in the chapter.
2 Apart from the US, a few Taiwanese people moved to South Africa, Central and South America and Oceania during the same period. However, the number of Taiwanese people who went to these areas was so limited that they are often overlooked in discussions. Interested readers may read the works of Pickles and Woods (1989), Hart (2002), Tang (2010), Siu (2005), Park (2009) and Chapter 10 in this volume.
3 Strictly speaking, it is difficult to know where these Taiwanese actually live. However, five out of six Taiwanese Schools Overseas supported by the Taiwanese government (Ministry of Education) are located in these cities. Therefore, these cities are usually regarded as where the main Taiwanese communities are.

4 The major part of this section is written by Yen-fen Tseng. It was published in Chinese "研究移居/住台灣：社會學研究現況 (Migrating into Taiwan: Appraisals and Critiques to Sociology of Migration in Taiwan) in the journal *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* in June 2007.

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3 Taiwan and globalization

Reflections on the trajectory of *Taishang* studies

Keng Shu, Gunter Schubert and Emmy Rui-hua Lin

Introduction

The study of Taiwanese entrepreneurs doing business in mainland China, or *Taishang* 台商,[1] has become a booming research area in Taiwan. In the past decade or so, more than a hundred journal articles have been published each year and several dozen Master's and PhD theses submitted[2] – a very different situation from that ten years previously, when hardly any studies on the subject were available. It is therefore timely to look back and assess the achievements and trends in this new research field of '*Taishang* studies' (for brief reviews see also Keng and Lin 2007b; Tsai and Chang, 2010; Keng *et al.* 2012). In this chapter, we argue that the research agendas within this field reflect the anxieties in Taiwan concerning the undergoing process of globalization. This is because Taiwanese businesspeople were among the first group of Taiwanese to surf the waves of globalization, dragging their home country along. Consequently, Taiwanese society and academia have split over the *Taishang* issue. Those who take a positive view of globalization normally regard *Taishang* as pioneers of globalization who bring more opportunities to Taiwan. Those who are concerned about the risks and uncertainties that come with globalization, on the other hand, tend to treat *Taishang* as potentially dangerous for Taiwan's economy and political future.

Centred on this argument, the rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, we will trace the origins and development of *Taishang* studies by following the footprints of Taiwanese businesspeople in China historically. We distinguish between four stages of *Taishang* studies and highlight how the *Taishang* have been perceived, interpreted and debated during different time periods. On the basis of this review, in section two we develop further our argument that the study of *Taishang* is closely tied to Taiwan's anxiety on her path to full-fledged globalization, and that scholars take different stances informed by their perspectives on the opportunities and pitfalls of this process. In section three we address how *Taishang* operate their companies in China, thus stressing their organizational responses to geographical relocation as a manifestation of globalization. Section four deals with past research on the *Taishang* as sojourners in China and focuses on their (cultural) identity in terms of change and resistance (to change). In the final section, we summarize our findings and restate our major

argument that *Taishang* studies are closely related to the way Taiwanese scholars reflect on globalization and Taiwan's position within it.

The emerging field of *Taishang* studies: development and characteristics

The rise of the *Taishang* as an issue of academic interest can be dated back to the late 1980s, when labour-intensive industries in Taiwan were forced to cut costs due to structural changes in the Taiwanese economy and began to shift their operations to the Chinese mainland (Keng and Lin 2007a). This process concurred with Taiwan's partial opening-up towards China after the island republic's transition to democracy. Taiwanese businesspeople started to make investments in China, first in southern Fujian and then increasingly in the Pearl River Delta in southern Guangdong, which offered better local conditions, export channels and basic infrastructure (Wang 1997; Hsing 1998). In the first half of the 1990s, after a rather cautious movement initially, the island witnessed the first peak of *Taishang* migration to the Chinese mainland, with mostly labour-intensive and small and medium-sized enterprises moving across the Taiwan Strait in massive scale, among them major manufacturers of textiles, shoes, furniture and electronic appliances (Tung 2000; Keng and Lin 2005). Making use of cheap Chinese labour provided by the millions of migrant workers flowing to China's booming coastal provinces and the managerial capacity of Taiwanese personnel sent to China by their companies, the Pearl River Delta around Dongguan City soon became the symbol of China's export miracle, spurred by *Taishang* entrepreneurialism (Wang 1997; Chen (ed.) 2005; Zhu 2006; Kao 2009).

The rise of Taishang studies

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, following the Asian financial crisis and China's accession to the WTO, another wave of *Taishang* arrived. Most of them now settled in the Yangtze River Delta. Kunshan, a county–level city close to Shanghai, soon became the world's largest production base of Taiwanese notebook computers and the major destination for *Taishang* investment in new high-tech industries, most notably semiconductors and integrated circuit devices, biochemistry, solar technology and precision machinery (Chen and Keng, 2005; Chien 2007, Chien 2008, 2009; Lee 2009; Keng 2010). Today, the lower Yangtze River Delta – including cities such as Shanghai, Suzhou and Wuxi (southern Jiangsu), as well as Xiaoshan and Ningbo (northern Zhejiang) – has the biggest *Taishang* community in mainland China. The number of mainland *Taishang* has continued to grow over the years and is expected to keep growing, especially as the ban on cross-Strait direct exchange was lifted in late 2008, resulting in a steady rise in economic interaction across the Taiwan Strait.[3]

The 'second wave' of *Taishang* migration reaching China in the late 1990s finally kicked off scholars' keen interest in Taiwan, China and the West (Keng *et al.* 2012). *Taishang* studies started by tracing the migration history of Taiwanese

businesspeople and the many obstacles they had faced since putting their feet on the Chinese mainland for the first time. The massive flow of investment capital across the Taiwan Strait became one of the major concerns of scholars specializing in economics and political economy. They assessed, for instance, the impact of this flow on Taiwan's manufacturing basis, and debated the spectre of an economic 'hollowing-out' (Tung 2000; Chen *et al.* 2002; Lee Teng-hui Foundation 2006). At the same time, scholars studying Taiwanese firms also became interested in the study of Taiwanese business people (Chen 2005; Chang and Chiang 2007; Keng and Lin 2008).[4] These two strands of research saw mutual enrichment and reinforcement and quickly pushed the agenda of *Taishang* studies ahead.

Other scholars were more concerned with the evolution of local government–business relations. For example, Wang Jenn-hwan (Wang and Lee 1997) was among the first interested in how *Taishang* adapted to the local environment outside Taiwan. He identified a new mode of economic governance across the Taiwan Strait as a result of joint efforts by Taiwanese entrepreneurs and local Chinese governments, which shaped Taiwan's economy significantly. Hsing You-tien (1996, 1998) and Wu Jie-min (1997, 2001) came to very different conclusions in their observation of the relationship between *Taishang* and local governments in the Pearl River Delta. For Hsing, both formed a close and solid alliance (1996), while for Wu, their relations could at best be described as 'same bed, different dream' (1997). Hsing stressed the *Taishang*'s 'Chineseness' by highlighting the cultural and kinship basis of local government–business coalitions (1996). In contrast, Wu emphasized the 'Taiwaneseness' of *Taishang* by arguing that such cooperation was at best instrumental and temporary (2001). The debate between them became the first academic polemics in the study of *Taishang*.

Siding more with Wu, Cheng Lu-lin, in his often-cited article on the Taiwanese shoe industry in China (1999), claimed that the *Taishang* play a unique and most beneficial role of mediators between foreign capital and the local Chinese economy. Taking a different perspective, Hsu Jinn-yuh's studies of the Taiwanese IT industry (2005, 2006) showed that Taiwanese enterprises in China have secured their competitiveness by bringing China into the global market and, in this process, displayed 'hybridization' of Chinese and foreign capitalist practices. In sum, most of these early studies of *Taishang* were concerned with the nature of the newly emerging forms of (local) governance on the Chinese mainland under the influence of *Taishang* investment and migration, and most of their authors agreed that the status of Taiwanese enterprises in China is a typical case of 'in-betweenness', mediating between the global (Taiwanese capital) and the local (Chinese governments).

Some other scholars, mostly political scientists, looked more closely at the socio-political implications of intensifying cross-Strait interaction or collaboration caused by the *Taishang*. For example, Wu Jieh-min (1997) used the *Taishang* as a micro-level case to draw a general picture of cross-Strait relations, i.e. political deadlock with economic exchanges. Tung Chen-yuan, for his part, claimed that *Taishang* were a potential threat to Taiwan's national security and a liability for its fragile economy and young democracy (2000, 2003). Keng Shu followed this line but offered a much more elaborated analysis of the imagined dangers of the

Taishang factor for Taiwan (Keng and Lin 2005; Keng 2011). According to him, the Chinese communist regime's leverage on Taiwan via the *Taishang* was limited at best. Gunter Schubert, based on his earlier insights on Taiwanese nationalism, suggested that the self-perceived identity of *Taishang* on the Chinese mainland is situational, and is mainly a response to their sensitive exposure to Chinese politics (2010). Hence, they would not easily be drawn into the 'Chinese camp'. After several years of intensive field research in the Dongguan area of the Pearl River Delta and the Shanghai-Kunshan metropolitan region, Keng and Schubert strengthened this point and argued that earlier studies claiming the *Taishang* would be made agents of China's unification policy *vis-à-vis* Taiwan were simplistic and had to be thoroughly qualified (2010, 2012).

Another strand of research put *Taishang* investment in the context of China's regional development. A typical example is Chang Chia-ming's study (2006) of *Taishang* in Suzhou, one of the few monograph-length investigations on Taiwanese businesspeople in mainland China. However, Chang devoted more space to an assessment of the development of Suzhou than to the specific conditions of the *Taishang* in this environment. Other studies shared similar research interests and compared, for instance, the development trajectories of Kunshan and Dongguan or the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas (see Li and Xu 2001; Zhu 2006; Chen (ed.) 2009).

Increasingly since the early 2000s, *Taishang* studies have become more 'contextualized', in the sense that the daily lives of Taiwanese businesspeople in China became the focus of scholarly attention. For instance, Deng Jian-bang (2007, 2009) and Lin Ping (2009a, 2009b, 2010) investigated the daily lives of different *Taishang* constituencies. Deng, for his part, argued that *Taishang* are always on the move and never able to permanently settle (2007). As a 'global cohort' they transcend the limits of traditional nationalism and thus do not understand their identity as an either–or choice. Lin instead highlighted the significance of culture in post-war Taiwan and claimed that when Taiwanese meet Chinese, they feel different from them. This held true even for Taiwanese mainlanders (*waisheng ren*; 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Studies of this kind tended to highlight the differences between Taiwanese entrepreneurs (as business owners, or *Taishang* in a strict sense) and Taiwanese factory managers (*Taigan*, or *Taishang* in a broader sense) on the one hand, and between *Taishang* of Taiwanese (*bensheng ren*) and mainlander (*waisheng ren*) descent on the other. Keng (2002) also differentiated between two generations of *Taishang* in the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas respectively. The *Taishang* thus cannot be considered a homogeneous social group, though all their different constituencies have to adapt and 'localize' in the sense that they must learn to cope with difficulties and find ways to solve problems of everyday life, such as access to good health care and adequate education for their offspring. In other words, as immigrants the *Taishang* could be much more conceptualized as a coherent group whose members needed to deal with many things just like all other immigrants, namely the management of intergroup relationships, personal and collective identity, citizenship, social welfare and other issues.

This 'immigration perspective' soon became prominent in the field of *Taishang* studies. For instance, Lin Ping (2009a) studied residential segregation of Taiwanese in China, specifically looking at the mainlander *Taishang* as return migrants, and persuasively showed that the Taiwanese exhibited a lifestyle very much different from that of the local Chinese. Deng Jian-bang was the first to explore the dynamics of intergroup relations between Taiwanese managers and their Chinese colleagues, pinpointing 'double-marginality' on the part of the Taiwanese, for they have left Taiwan but are unable or have no intention to be incorporated into Chinese society (Deng 2002, 2007). He put his findings in the context of transnationalism, thus adding a new theoretical perspective to the study of *Taishang*. Lin (Lin *et al*. 2011; Lin 2012) pointed to the class factor as the major fault line between Taiwanese and local Chinese, arguing that 'ethnic boundaries' are actually founded on the basis of economic disparities between both groups. Finally, Tseng Yen-fen and Wu Jie-min (2011) concentrated on the issue of Taiwanese citizenship in China and created a new term denoting the status of Taiwanese as residents without citizenship: 'denizenship.' It means that *Taishang* choose to stay in China but have no incentive to be *Chinese*. Compared to the earlier strand of studies, the 'immigration perspective' has generated sound sociological insights and made the field compatible with research on global migration.

Reflections on the field of Taishang studies

In sum, as this brief overview shows, the study of Taiwanese businesspeople in China has followed the evolution of cross-Strait relations over time and took different directions resulting from the diverging academic interests and disciplinary backgrounds of the scholars involved. In the earlier stage, *Taishang* were identified as a new empirical phenomenon and mostly discussed with respect to their specific modes of production, company organization, investment strategies and social networks to safeguard and expand their economic interests. In the second stage, their specific significance for and impact on cross-Strait relations determined the research field. Finally, in the latest period, *Taishang* were integrated into the study of global migration, though they have remained visible as a specific group to be studied in its own right.

After a decade of development of *Taishang* studies, the field has become a popular research area stretching across different disciplines, ranging from business administration, economics and sociology to political science. At the same time, however, *Taishang* studies lack a commonly accepted approach and do not share a widely acknowledged research focus. The fragmentation of the field, it is argued here, reflects anxieties and concerns, but also varying interpretations, on the part of Taiwan scholars with respect to Taiwan's journey towards globalization. As mentioned above, Taiwanese businesspeople were among the first driving forces of globalization when their country was yet not ready for it. The study of *Taishang* is thus strongly enmeshed in the contentions between those who have enormous faith in and those who are sceptical, if not outright pessimistic, about the impact of globalization on Taiwan. This split, as we call it, has shaped and is continuously shaping

the focus and context of the emerging field of *Taishang* studies. This argument shall be more specifically addressed below by looking at two bodies of literature which discuss first, the consequences of organizational adjustment in Taiwanese companies, and second, identity shifts of Taiwanese businesspeople. Both phenomena may be considered responses to globalization forced upon the *Taishang*.

We argue that at the outset of the *Taishang*'s going global, Taiwan was rather reluctant to open up to the world, including the Chinese mainland, as this implied the danger of undermining the island republic's autonomy from its 'big other,' China. Taiwanese businesspeople who shifted their capital across the Taiwan Strait and then began to settle on the mainland were discredited as selfish and soon suspected to be China's willing tools to manipulate Taiwan's political elites. This led to the above-mentioned split in public opinion in Taiwan. While many Taiwanese became seriously worried about the activities of the *Taishang*, others remained more positive, regarding them as pioneers of Taiwan's new go-global strategy. This entailed very different assumptions on the political significance and the role of *Taishang* in the evolution of cross-strait relations. Certainly, the drive of Taiwanese businesspeople to go to China was politically dangerous and implied many economic pitfalls for Taiwan. What would be the consequences of such large-scale transfers of investment capital and productive capacity for Taiwan's economy (Tung 2003a; Lee Teng-hui Foundation, 2004)? Would it bring about improved competitiveness at the firm level, thus strengthening Taiwan's global trade position (Tung 2000; Lee Teng-hui Foundation 2006)? Would it translate into gains of influence and power for the Taiwanese state (Tung 2003b; Keng and Lin 2005)? Or, just the opposite, would the 'emigration' of *Taishang* lead to a hollowing-out of Taiwan's manufacturing base and debilitate its position in the international trading system (Tung 2000; Lee Teng-hui Foundation 2006)? And would it weaken Taiwan's position facing China at the negotiating table, jeopardizing its political leeway (Keng 2003; Keng and Lin 2005)?

From a socio-cultural perspective, people in Taiwan became divided on the *Taishang* because of their impact on the complicated issue of Taiwan's national identity (Keng 2003; Keng *et al*. 2006, 2012). Following political democratization and gradual 'ethnic' reconciliation between Mainlanders and Taiwanese since the late 1980s, "'being Taiwanese,' 'Taiwanese consciousness' or the 'the love for Taiwan' became almost sacred formulas in the island's identity discourse, not to be questioned or deconstructed (Chen 2004; Schubert 2010). But the 'exodus' of Taiwanese entrepreneurs challenged the very premises of such nationalist sentiments. Ever since they moved to China, *Taishang* have been, implicitly or explicitly, asked: 'Do you still love Taiwan?' or 'Are you still Taiwanese?' (Tung 2003a; Lee Teng-hui Foundation 2004; Keng and Lin 2005; Keng 2011). Some people even consider the *Taishang* as 'close to traitors', betraying their country for profit and taking on 'Chinese colour.' Again, people with different outlooks on *Taishang* migration in the context of globalization took different positions on the issues of identity and expressed different levels of tolerance *vis-à-vis* the *Taishang* (Keng 2003).

Although the economic and political implications of *Taishang* investment and migration to the Chinese mainland have been vigorously debated over the past

decade, the Taiwanese have gradually reached a consensus on the inevitability of globalization. Consequently, the aforementioned debate has lost much of its earlier momentum. Those who used to worry about the political dangers of the '*Taishang* factor' now admit the *Taishang*'s positive contributions to the stable and peaceful development of cross-Strait relations (e.g. Tung & Hong, 2010). And those who used to suspect that the *Taishang* would change their identity to become 'Chinese' have relativized their predictions (as reported in Keng, 2011). However, the split is still there, though on different analytical levels. Scholars focusing on the firm dimension of the *Taishang* issue tend to appreciate globalization and thus normally highlight the positive outcomes of organizational adaptation of *Taishang* companies. In contrast, scholars interested in the personal dimension often have reservations about globalization and stress *Taishang*'s reluctance to give up their Taiwanese identity. The stance on globalization on the part of scholars still figures as the independent variable that informs the outcomes of *Taishang* agency and identity formation. If globalization, read Taiwan's integration with the Chinese mainland, is considered as generally positive, the *Taishang* become a force of development, dialogue and transnationalism. If globalization is considered dangerous for Taiwan, and hence to be controlled, the *Taishang* become a factor of insecurity, an instrument in the hands of a hostile Chinese government and a constituency that undermines Taiwan's identity and claim to political sovereignty.

Adapting to globalization: studying Taiwanese enterprises in China

Many studies on Taiwanese businesspeople have concentrated on the organizational restructuring of their firms in China over time (Wang 1997; Hsing 1998, 2003; Wang 2004; Hsu 2005, 2006; Chang and Chiang 2007; Keng and Lin 2008; Lee and Saxenian 2008). As mentioned earlier, Taiwan started its economic transformation in the late 1980s by shifting from exporting to one single market, the US, to a more diversified pattern of export production and to the expansion of its global production networks and commodity markets, now targeting South East Asia and mainland China. *Taishang* companies thus became a lens through which structural change in Taiwan's economy could be well observed. This produced three different areas of research: (1) inter-firm relations between *Taishang* companies, (2) intra-firm relations in Taiwanese enterprises and (3) the socio-political organization of Taiwanese businesses in China.

Inter-firm relations

Many scholars have been interested in the networks among *Taishang* businesses (Chen and Chen 1998; Hsing 1998; Hsu 2006; Keng and Lin 2008), linking up with the broader literature on network-like business organizations (Redding 1995; Orrù *et al*. 1997). Although they often shared the same concerns, these authors held different views on the results of organizational changes after Taiwanese firms had been relocated from Taiwan to China. Among those views stressing the

unifying force of global capitalism, Hsu (2005, 2006) has illustrated two types of globalized production networks and finds evidence of 'hybridization' between global and local networks. Based on extensive field research in the Pearl River Delta, Keng and Lin (2008) also claimed that the Taiwanese networks blend elements of ethnic identity and strategic calculation and thus make instrumental use of the Taiwanese identity in an alien environment. In other words, Taiwanese trust each other, so they can easily do business with each other. Hence, the specific status of *Taishang* facilitates business transactions in mainland China.

Another group of scholars highlighted the hierarchy of the capitalist world system, such as in Cheng Lu-lin's above-cited analysis (1999) of the shoe-production business of *Taishang* in mainland China. According to him, the *Taishang* can at best occupy a semi-peripheral position in the capitalist world system which is dominated by the multinational companies in the US or Europe, and are hardly able to climb upward in global production networks.

Intra-firm relations within Taiwanese enterprises

Second, scholars have been concerned with the impact of globalization on the organization at the intra-firm level and focused on labour relations in *Taishang* enterprises (Peng 2007; Liu *et al.* 2009; Huang 2011; Huang *et al.* (eds) 2011; Lin *et al.* 2012). Again, these authors held contrasting views on the phenomena they found. For example, some studies suggested that the necessities of global trade forced the *Taishang* to reshape their previous particularistic, family-based approach into a new type of labour relations (see Peng 2007; Huang 2011; Lin *et al.* 2012). Others argued, to the contrary, that this parochial approach would be sustained and that either an 'ethnic glass-ceiling' (Deng 2002; Liu *et al.*2009) or class-like hierarchical relations (Peng 2007; Huang 2011) would prevail everywhere in *Taishang* enterprises. Some scholars, for their part, found that labour relations had been strictly reorganized according to capitalist principles, pushing the antagonism between capital and labour even further. For example, they argued that the peasant workers hired in *Taishang* enterprises had become a new underclass in Chinese society (see Wu 2010; Huang 2011; Huang *et al.* (eds.) 2011). Also, reorganized production, as reflected by the 'piece wage system' (*jijian gongzi*) analysed by Thomas Peng (2007) in his case study of a sweatshop-like *Taishang* enterprise in Guangdong, was interpreted to have facilitated a refurbishment of capitalist exploitation. Still other scholars rejected this 'capitalism-smashes-everything' kind of thinking and found that there is strong path-dependency under the world system, stabilizing family-business arrangements in labour relations even under changing market conditions and the military-like management of many Taiwanese companies that is widely accepted by both *Taishang* and workers (Huang 2011).

Once again, the quoted authors hold different views on globalization. Some equate it with the domination of the world capitalist system and insist that globalization will completely reshape the pre-existing mode of production, playing the role of Friedman's 'flatteners of globalization' (Friedman 2007). No matter if they

see globalization positively (Lin *et al.* 2012) or negatively (Deng 2007; Huang 2011), both sides consider it a powerful and inevitable force. Others, however, stress the significance of local culture, social resistance and earlier institutional arrangements that rather bring about 'glocalization' – that is, diverging patterns of global capitalism (e.g. Deng 2002; Liu *et al.* 2009). Clearly enough, these different background assumptions concerning the key nature of globalization affect the research agendas and findings in the *Taishang*-based studies.

Socio-political organization of Taiwanese businesses

Third, many scholars concentrated on the socio-political reorganization of *Taishang* companies under the influence of globalization (Wu 1997; Po and Pun 2003; Tung 2004; Keng and Lin 2007b; Wang and Lee 2007, 2011). To begin with, Taiwanese businesspeople seemed to be on a stronger footing to deal with an authoritarian regime in China. For example, Tung Chen-yuan, and Li and Xu (2003b and 2001 respectively) implied that Taiwanese business organizations (TBAs) in China have just been functioning like interest groups, and thus are able to defend *Taishang* interests effectively. But this claim has been questioned by the empirical work of Keng and Lin (2007b) on the organizational effectiveness of TBAs. From their viewpoint, Taiwanese businesspeople still have to live under various constraints, just like any other social organization in China. Even if they were seemingly empowered by China's quest for foreign capital and the need to keep Taiwan from seeking independence, the *Taishang*'s political agency in the mainland is clearly restricted, and the TBAs are not powerful enough platforms to make the *Taishang*'s influence felt by the Chinese authorities.

Given their weaknesses *vis-à-vis* local governments in China, some scholars have identified three coping strategies of Taiwanese businesspeople: adaptation, partnership and disengagement. For example, Hsing (2003), Chen and Keng (2005), Chang and Chiang (2007), and Keng and Lin (2008) all found that *Taishang* socialized with and bribed local officials to get more assistance with running their businesses and expanding commercial opportunities. By maintaining these practices, these authors contended, they adapt and survive, just like any other entrepreneurs doing business in China. Hsing You-tien, for her part (2003), made the point that the position of the *Taishang* has benefited from maintaining symbiotic alliances with local governments, hence lifting them to equal footing with local officials. However, as the case of Kunshan showed (Keng 2010), the status of *Taishang vis-à-vis* local cadres has gradually weakened over the years, as Kunshan has gone increasingly global and the *Taishang* have lost their privileged economic position *vis-à-vis* entrepreneurs from elsewhere, including domestic capitalists. Finally, Wu Jie-min's research in the Pearl River Delta (1997) and Chang and Chiang's study in the Yangtze River Delta (2007) both show that *Taishang* do socialize with local officials, but the purpose of socializing is to secure the latter's overall support and to avoid, as much as possible, their interference. Keng's case study of Kunshan (2010) draws a more recent picture of this dynamic relationship and shows how local Chinese governments

have been strengthening their rather weak position *vis-à-vis* the *Taishang* over the past fifteen years (see also the comparative studies in different regions in China by Lee 2011).

Again, these studies on the socio-political status of *Taishang* reflect their authors' different assumptions on globalization, especially with respect to the status and political influence of foreign capital in China. Some believe that the *Taishang* are still rather weak when facing the authoritarian regime on the mainland (e.g. Keng and Lin 2007b). Others believe their status has been significantly improved because they serve the regime well (Po and Pun 2003; Hsing 2003). And even if *Taishang* are considered politically rather weak, some scholars find that they still have enough leverage to enjoy preferential deals with local governments, or just to keep the latter at bay (Chang and Chiang 2007). Finally, some scholars believe that the *Taishang* live under miserable conditions and do not enjoy much leeway in running their businesses as they want, just as globalization forces people into a fixed pattern of rules and behaviour nobody can escape from.

As has been argued repeatedly throughout this chapter, different authors with contrasting assumptions on the nature of globalization usually come up with different conclusions on how Taiwanese businesspeople have responded to globalization, and to what effect. As a result, the field of *Taishang* studies has achieved little consensus so far and remains divided over almost all the issues debated.

Resisting globalization: studying Taishang identity in China

The centrality of the identity factor in Taishang studies

Apart from the firm-related responses of Taiwanese businesspeople to globalization discussed above, a much more urgent and critical issue of scholarly concern has been the identity change among the *Taishang* under the impact of globalization. The rise of a distinct Taiwanese identity, as has been observed in Taiwan for some two decades now, means for many domestic and foreign observers a weakening of Taiwan's ties to China and to its being Chinese (Chen 2004; Keng 2011). No wonder, then, that the identity issue has been sitting at the very centre of *Taishang* studies and the study of cross-Strait relations (Schubert 2010). Some scholars have studied the specific mechanisms that shape and reshape *Taishang* identity on the Chinese mainland, especially by highlighting the antinomy between interest and identity – sometimes also understood as rationality vs. emotion, sense vs. sensitivity, cultural bonds vs. benefit and local vs. universal (Keng *et al.*2006; Wang 2009). For some scholars, identity stands against interest, while for others it is abandoned for the sake of interest. Different positions on the identity–interest nexus can also be found in the study of Taiwanese businesspeople, often understood as protagonists of global capital and, therefore, primarily concerned with the pursuit of individual and collective interest (Keng *et al.* 2006; Lin, 2009a,b).

The dynamics of Taishang identity

For their part, *Taishang* often claim that the identity problem haunts them in China, suggesting they face a dilemma no matter how much they are prone to safeguarding their interests. Many scholars have taken a 'classical stance' and describe the *Taishang* as fundamentally economic animals when it comes to the selection of investment sites (Chen (ed.) 2005; Chang 2006; Chang and Chiang 2007), positioning themselves in global production networks (Chen (ed.) 2005; Zhu 2006; Cheng 1999) or making arrangements for local supply chains (Wang 2004; Keng and Lin 2008; Lee 2009). In contrast, others have stressed emotional factors and their importance for the life of Taiwanese businesspeople, namely group identity (Keng 2002; Lin and Keng 2008), life culture (Keng 2002; Lin 2009b), lifestyle (Deng 2002; Lin *et al.* 2011) or even political identity (Keng 2002). A few scholars have pointed at social status and class as identity-shaping factors (Lin 2010, 2012; Lin *et al.* 2011). Another body of literature has directly touched upon identity shifts within the *Taishang* community that have materialized over time. For example, some scholars have claimed that *Taishang* cannot but gradually merge with Chinese society – think of Fon's bold five-year transition hypothesis (2003).

But even so, other observations suggest that Taiwanese businesspeople are only settled within their 'Taiwanese communities' or 'transnational communities', have not fully integrated into their host society (e.g. Lin and Keng 2008; Lin 2009b), and normally maintain close ties with Taiwan (Deng 2007, 2009a). *Taishang* often gather in some kind of 'ethnic enclave' which they call home in China, for instance Shanghai's Gubei district or the restaurants in Houjie township in Dongguan, where they regularly eat and drink. Most scholars find little evidence supporting the assumption that Taiwanese gradually assimilate to Chinese society. For example, Deng (2002), in his work on the intergroup relations between Taiwanese and local Chinese, describes these relations as 'unfamiliar closeness'. Lin Ping's (2009b) study on the residential segregation of the *Taishang* and their families draws a similar conclusion, suggesting that *Taishang* would rather not mingle with local Chinese unless they thought it advantageous for professional reasons. In their comparative analysis of Korean (Wangjing) and Taiwanese (Shanghai) sojourners settling in China, Linand Keng (2008) found no significant difference between the two groups of residents in their resistance to localization.

Other studies that have explored *Taishang* identity have varied considerably in their findings. Some hold that Taiwanese businesspeople are part of a 'global class', going beyond territory-bound identity (Keng 2002; Deng 2009). These authors point at the possibility of 'double identities' (Keng 2003), 'double marginalities' (Lin 2009a) or 'transnational life-style' patterns (by building a lifestyle of constant travelling; see Deng 2009). A close look at these findings, again, suggests contending assumptions on the effects of globalization. Some assume the pre-global era kind of thinking that the *Taishang* will either assimilate to Chinese society (Fon 2003) or manage to maintain their original identity and successfully resist local identity. More recent studies, however, undertake a

paradigmatic shift in assuming a new transnational perspective and thus accommodate the possibilities of 'space of flows' (Deng 2009), 'a new concept of citizenship' (Tseng and Wu 2011) or an 'extra-territorial identity' (Keng 2002, 2003) for *Taishang*.

Conclusion

The study of *Taishang* has been an emerging research field stretching across different disciplines in the social sciences over the past fifteen years or so. At first glance, the studies published over this period seem to tell us that this field is quite heterogeneous. A closer look, however, shows that it is in fact split by contending conclusions drawn from similar research foci. What causes this split? In this chapter, we argue that *Taishang* studies are shaped by anxieties related to Taiwan's journey towards globalization, and that these anxieties produce studies informed by either enormous faith in or strong scepticism about the impact of globalization on Taiwan. Taiwan scholars split on the *Taishang* issue because some took a positive view of globalization, thus thinking of Taiwanese businesspeople as pioneers in a new and promising territory, while others were concerned because of the risks and uncertainties associated with globalization, hence treating *Taishang* as sources of trouble for Taiwan's relations with China. Those scholars who focus on the management of Taiwanese companies tend to see their positive adaptation to globalization, while those who investigate the 'people-dimension' of *Taishang* – including issues related to identity and social integration – tend to appreciate resistance to the pressures of globalization. To put it differently, if you are a believer in the benefits of globalization, you treat the *Taishang* as an important and positive force for making Taiwan strong. If you think that globalization undermines Taiwan's economic and political sovereignty, you treat the *Taishang* as a potential danger to Taiwan's prosperity and freedom. Too few studies have given the *Taishang* a voice of their own to express what they themselves believe is their role and significance for the evolution of cross-Strait relations in the context of intensifying globalization. There is thus still much to do in the emerging research field of *Taishang* studies.

Notes

1 By *Taishang* we mean Taiwanese businesspeople who work and live, at least periodically, in mainland China (mainland *Taishang*; see Keng, Lin and Schubert, 2012). The concept of (mainland) *Taishang* can have a broader meaning of comprising both entrepreneurs and factory managers (*Taigan*) or a narrower meaning just including entrepreneurs, treating the *Taigan* as a different analytical category. In this chapter, we apply the former definition.

2 This calculation is based on the NCL Databases. For journal articles, see http://readopac.ncl.edu.tw/nclJournal/ (accessed 10 January 2013); for published books, see http://isbn.ncl.edu.tw/NCL_ISBNNet/ (accessed 10 January 2013); for MA and PhD theses, see http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/ (accessed 10 January 2013). In addition, Keng, Lin and Schubert's essay (2012) provides an updated review of current research on the subject.

3 In November 2008, representatives of the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) of China signed a number of bilateral agreements to re-establish direct air and sea

transport as well as postal communication between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait after almost sixty years. See 'Outcome and Explanation of the 2nd "Chiang-Chen Talks"' November 7, 2008 (available online at www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=201; accessed 10 November 2008).

4 These scholars mostly included sociologists focusing, among other topics, on intra-firm labour relations (including relations between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese personnel) and on the adaption of *Taishang* business networks to the new environment after relocation.

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4 Bordering careers on China

Skilled migration from Taiwan to China

Tseng Yen-fen

Introduction

According to 2010 Chinese census data, in greater Shanghai alone, there are about 700,000 Taiwanese migrants. Migration from Taiwan to China has experienced several waves due to a combination of changes to economic conditions, cross-strait relations and government regulations. The disparity between a newly developed but growing economy and a mature yet sluggish one is the structural force behind such migration. Even when Taiwan experienced economic hardship as a result of the financial crisis of 2008–9, with a growth rate of minus 10 per cent in 2009, China still enjoyed 6 per cent growth over the same period of time. During the economic crisis, surveys showed that more Taiwanese were considering moving to China for work. For example, according to 104 Human Bank, a major Taiwanese Internet job search agency, there was a 30 per cent increase in the number of job seekers looking for employment in China in January 2009 compared to the same period the year before, with 19,567 job seekers competing to fill 6,016 jobs in China that specifically targeted Taiwanese (*Central Agency News*, 9 January 2009).

Along with increased Taiwanese economic investment in China, regulations governing Taiwanese migration to China have been relaxed, granting largely unrestricted rights of work and residence in China. Once they enter China, Taiwanese can easily apply for one-year residence permits, which can be renewed an unlimited number of times. Those who own property or maintain a work permit can apply for a five-year residency permit. Taiwanese can work anywhere in any sector as long as they are proven to be healthy, are between 18 and 60 years old and have entered China legally. A large number of Taiwanese have availed themselves of this opportunity. Many make this journey without any clear plans regarding where to begin. While Taiwanese investments in China offer job opportunities mainly in manufacturing sectors, an open-border job market across the strait has broadened the kinds of work Taiwanese might seek. China's employment opportunities thus have served as a magnet, attracting those who either were not satisfied with their current job or were not employed at all. This study will focus on such migrants who emigrated to China prior to securing a job or investment opportunity there.

This paper draws on in-depth interviews conducted between 2008 and 2011 with Taiwanese skilled workers who worked and lived in Shanghai independent of any expatriate community. In order to learn about the migration patterns of both those who have stayed in China and those who have returned to Taiwan, the sample also included a few people currently residing in Taiwan. The migration, settlement and consequent political identities of these independent migrants are less understood than those of business owners, investors and expatriates. This chapter first offers a portrait of new migration patterns among these independent movers, and then looks at their ethnic and cultural identities before and after moving to China. Evidence shows that as a result of their hyper-mobility, Taiwanese migrants, and their children, are forced to balance the advantages of adapting to China's local customs and gaining international exposure with the disadvantages of further alienating themselves from their Taiwanese roots.

Brave new migrants

Compared to expatriates sent to China by corporations, the research subjects of this study represent a new class of migrants who move to China on their own initiative, via diverse channels built across the strait over the past two decades. These channels include personal networks, which play a hugely important role. As Tsai and Chang's (2010) study shows, having friends or close associates such as relatives and colleagues working in China positively affects individuals' willingness to move to China. Another important channel is Internet-based job search engines. These websites have become a key tool for white-collar workers (Fountain 2005). The largest Internet job search site in Taiwan, 104 Human Bank, whose website already contained a large section of job listings from China, recently launched an operation in China (www.104china.com) whose main mission is to match Taiwanese workers with jobs in major Chinese cities. The general manager of 104 Human Bank of China, based in Shanghai, explained to me why they established a separate Taiwanese Talent Website for those looking to live and work in China:

> We observed a significant increase in the number of Taiwanese who had visited our China section searching for a job. It is more efficient to list these job opportunities by establishing a separate business operation here. We also predict more Taiwanese will come to work in China once direct flights are in operation, as it will then take the same amount of time to travel across the strait that it does to go from Taipei to Kaohsiung.
>
> (25 January 2008, Cheng)

Self-help books with advice on and experiences of working in China make such a move look all the easier. These books offer information such as how to find a job, negotiate benefits packages, settle down and deal with issues such as taxation, insurance, and even workplace politics. Taiwanese who initially lack any personal contacts can turn to these alternatives for the information needed.

China rush: the background

The first wave of Taiwanese professionals, managers and technicians initially moved to China to work in Taiwanese companies and transnational corporations. In more recent years, Chinese enterprises have actively recruited Taiwanese employees, offering them competitive salaries in industries such as retail (e.g. department stores), marketing and entertainment industries such as TV production. The following are two examples of Taiwanese employees working for Chinese enterprises:

> There is a great demand for experienced Taiwanese TV producers from local Chinese TV channels. Chinese viewers are craving something beyond what standard Chinese TV producers can offer. They want more entertainment, and Taiwanese are best suited to fill the gap, as Chinese are very fond of popular culture in Taiwan.
>
> (1 August 2010, Hsiao)

> I moved to China as an expatriate working for a Taiwanese architect firm. I was not satisfied with the salary, although it was fair for my skills and experience. Later I found a job in one of the most famous architect firms in Shanghai. I earned almost twice as much as I did in Taiwan. Chinese firms pay according to skill level, not by nationality.
>
> (23 May 2011, Yang)

Most interviewees stress similar pull factors of Chinese job prospects stimulating their careers, along with China's booming economy. When I interviewed the executive manager of 104 Human Bank of China, she offered her observations about such prospects:

> If you have been involved in businesses in China that are ten times the size of those in Taiwan, you will never go back. You have been in a different world, so to speak.
>
> (25 January 2008, Cheng)

This migration is encouraged not only by macroeconomic trends that favour China, but also by changes in individual industrial sectors. For example, in the past decade jobs offered by top advertising agencies, such as in the creative department, account services, media services and production, have been shifted from Taipei to Beijing and Shanghai. According to one interviewee, an executive in one of Beijing's top agencies with twenty years of working experience, the driving forces behind this shift are the following:

> The country branches of top advertising agencies have been regionalized following the regionalization of large clients. These clients, such as P&G, have centralized their marketing to only a few regional centres. Their marketing

> strategies are drawn separately to target markets carved out by each regional centre. Once the marketing budget is allocated to regional centres, instead of country branch offices, most of the upstream jobs in advertising agencies, meaning more creative and important jobs, are now in regional centres such as Shanghai and Beijing, but no longer in Taipei. Before this happened, each country, small or large, had its local advertising budget and therefore businesses available for local advertising agencies.
>
> (23 December 2007, Chen)

Sometimes, Taiwanese migrants have become middlemen, outsourcing tasks to local Chinese on behalf of Taiwanese firms. For example, the following interviewee told me how he had been persuading his friends who run an interior design firm in Taiwan to slash their number of employees by moving job functions to China:

> Once digitalized, many parts of design jobs can be given to workers across the border at much lower costs. I have been persuading my friends to transfer the drawing part of their job functions to me in Shanghai, negating the need to employ any drawing personnel. I can handle these drawings with much cheaper labour costs. For example, it costs 4 to 5 and even NT$10,000 to draw a 3D graph in Taiwan, while it costs no more than NT$1,000 here. Whenever problems arise, MSN can solve most problems, or I can make use of my flying back frequently to discuss them.
>
> (23 January 2008, Lin)

Business does, however, also travel in the other direction across the strait at times. For example, Taiwanese migrants in China help to find business for people back in Taiwan. In one such case, a TV commercial producer from Taiwan stated she had to move to Shanghai in order to win business from local advertising agencies with increased budgets to spend. She considered this the only way to save jobs for her employees in Taiwan. Thus Taiwan lines of production can continue to operate on projects from China:

> If you do not find business from China, you are not going to lose your jobs right away, but you will lose power and become marginalized right away. If you are in China, you may get to produce things for Taiwan's market. While you are in Taiwan, you never get to produce anything that will enter China. Since I still produce most of my commercials in Taiwan, my being here is to supply the projects for Taiwan to take care of my employees.
>
> (4 April 2008, Chen)

Many Taiwanese professionals move to China optimistic about their future there. Just as Akerlof and Shiller (2009) argue that people's economic decisions and actions are often inspired by stories about markets and investments, migration is also very much driven by narratives supplied by the media and other actors. No

matter the length of time Taiwanese have been taught about sharing an 'imagined community' with Chinese across the strait, their migration journey to China still requires new imaginative elements. They need a supply of information about China as material to imagine how their lives there would be. The media is a major pipeline for supplying such information, images and, above all, perceptions about post-reform China. With the majority of mainstream media in Taiwan being pro-China, the pictures about China available in Taiwan tend to be painted, in general, with rosy colours (Huang 2006). My interviewees are often sought out by friends and acquaintances looking for first-hand experiences about working in China. Most of this curiosity is aroused by generally favourable evaluations supplied by the media. For example, one interviewee offers the following account:

> These Taiwanese friends want to hear more from people like me who have been working in China for a period of time. They often ask, 'Is Shanghai really as good as what our media portrays?'
>
> (27 January 2008, Hu)

The contrast of a fast-growing Chinese economy versus a struggling one in Taiwan involves self-deprecating discourses. The following is typical of such talk:

> I am not speaking from a particular political viewpoint. However, in general, I hear many complaints about Taiwan's stalled economic progress. We put so many regulations on ourselves. Since I came to China, I have been witnessing how this country is thirsty for making money. But look at our Taiwan. There it is politicians just fighting for the sake of politics. I am sad to say that Taiwan is wasting its energy. I told my friends I am glad that I made the decision to come to a place that is growing, while Taiwan is struggling for no good reason. We have to find our own way in the booming China.
>
> (23 January 2008, Yao)

Famous writer Lei Xiang (2007: 57), in his book entitled *Destination/Shanghai* (目的地上海), offered an account of how Taiwanese returning from Shanghai have commented that 'compared to the jungles of high rises in Shanghai, Taipei felt like the countryside'. One interviewee even put it this way:

> Now when I return to Taipei, the smooth flow of traffic and fewer people on the street feels strange and lacks the buzz prosperously growing Shanghai enjoys.
>
> (25 January 2008, Teng)

While the Chinese saying that 'good news never leaves home but bad news travels long and far' might be true, the opposite is often observed in discussion with migrants in China. That is, news about good fortune is transmitted, while bad luck never makes headlines. One interviewee had the following complaint:

> Many Taiwanese, once migrating here, only report good news, instead of negative parts of their experiences, back to their friends and relatives in Taiwan. When I first arrived in Shanghai, I was very disappointed to find out it was very difficult to get used to life here. There was simply quite a big gap between what I heard people saying about the life they were leading here and how they really lived.
>
> (24 January 2007, Chen)

Ambivalent migrants

The great majority of interviewees still have ambivalent attitudes about their long-term plans, with most unable to say for sure that they would stay in China for longer than the next five years. Many times when I first told interviewees that I was conducting research about Taiwanese immigrants in China, the notion of 'immigrants' was often deemed not to apply to them, for the word immigrants (*yiming*, 移民) implies a longer-term settlement.

Those interviewees who plan to continue working and living in China for a long time to come tend to be either young workers who started their first jobs in China or those working for bosses with strong ties to the area, usually in small firms. Middle-aged people working in larger and more alienated organizations are more uncertain about their long-term future, like the above interviewee. Not only is their job security under threat; the initial lures of salary and other benefits offered to Taiwanese are shrinking, making it less and less attractive for Taiwanese to work in China. A sales manager in charge of medical insurance packages tailored to Taiwanese migrants in China was required to evaluate the financial situation of her clients and found:

> A decade ago, Taiwanese expatriates normally earned 30,000 or 50,000 RMB, plus four round-trip tickets back to Taiwan for vacations. Now the salary has been reduced to 20,000 RMB, plus one trip back. This reduction in salary packages has taken place over just a few years.
>
> (28 January 2008, Wang)

The flexible regulations governing Taiwanese residency mean many opt to renew their one-year residency permit, an option applicable without any precondition. In some cases, when Taiwanese enterprises hope to evade taxation, they do not hire Taiwanese as formal employees for their China operations. Rather, these employees are still listed as part of Taiwanese business entities, simply coming to China on tourist visas and leaving the country every three months, though such practices are illegal.

Among my interviewees, those who obtained five-year residency rights applied for them using their work permit or property ownership. However, many eligible for five-year residency still consider a one-year term a more convenient option than applying for five years of residency, especially as health checks are required when applying for the latter. One interviewee who moved back to Taiwan, leaving

the rest of his family in Shanghai, illustrated the flexibility available for his family to continue residing in Shanghai:

> Originally, I applied for residency by way of my work permit. After getting laid off, I lost my work permit. The kids can stay because they study in Shanghai, but my wife has to renew her residency permit every year by leaving China for over thirty days. My family comes back to Taiwan twice every year so it is not a problem to fulfil such requirements. I also found that even if we did not leave China for thirty days. The authorities tend to be lenient with Taiwanese in these matters. But they apply such policies strictly with foreigners.
>
> (13 December 2007, Liao)

However loosely the residency regulations are applied to Taiwanese, the resilience of Taiwanese migrant status is ironically linked to their difficulty in becoming citizens. First of all, for Taiwanese, there are only two paths to obtaining citizenship. The first qualification is given to those elderly exiles who migrated to Taiwan with the KMT regime and remained single. They can apply for citizenship to receive needed care, provided their families in China are willing and able to supply such care. Understandably, few people qualify and their numbers continue to decline. The second qualification, which applies to all foreigners, is for those who marry a Chinese citizen. In other words, although Taiwanese are privileged in enjoying residency and employment rights, their citizenship requirements are the same as other foreigners'. To add to the burden, the Taiwanese government has implemented a single choice policy that requires Taiwanese to renounce their Taiwanese citizenship before becoming a Chinese citizen. By becoming Chinese citizens, these migrants would have to apply for a visa if they ever chose to visit Taiwan again.

Before direct flights between China and Taiwan started, I had discussions with interviewees about how the increased convenience in travelling might affect migration patterns. Some freelance workers speculated the change would allow for more transient arrangements in living and working in Taiwan and China. One interviewee, a landscape designer, contemplated such an option:

> I hope to return to Taiwan in the next one or two years, mainly for the sake of my child's education. However, the most ideal situation, assuming that direct flights become available, would be settling back in Taiwan but maintaining my client base in China. After all, I have gained knowledge about this market and the preferences of its clients. Once it is no longer so time-consuming to fly, I could travel there twice a month, staying for three or four days per trip.
>
> (29 January 2008, Chao)

On the other side of the coin, quicker travel routes might encourage more Taiwanese to work in China while maintaining family in Taiwan. Regardless of differences in where these workers choose to live, most of them have chosen to be 'trans-migrants', a term coined by Glick Schiller and her co-authors (1992: 1) which

refers to those migrants who 'develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders'. The following discussions with interviewees describing their short-term plans indicate that they share many similarities with such trans-migrants. Among those who work for transnational corporations, the biggest difficulty for Taiwanese migrants is dealing with the prospects of 'decentralization of responsibility' or localization of key personnel. Salt put it very well when stating the following:

> Managers relocated overseas to 'run' a subsidiary company should identify and develop a cadre of local nationals who can take over and run the operation in the long run. What this means is that as the organization becomes multinational, it increasingly uses relocated skills and expertise to exercise control from the centre; but after a certain point the trend toward the international relocation of staff is halted and may well go into reverse.
>
> (1992: 501)

Many Taiwanese interviewed had indeed been replaced by locals they had helped to train. If they found jobs in other transnational corporations locally, they no longer were treated as expatriates and tended to suffer pay cuts or loss of the attractive packages and fringe benefits formerly offered. In other ways too, although paid higher than local workers, they were treated as part of the local labour force. Working in China no longer served as such a strong career boost, and these migrants instead found themselves moving horizontally to other companies. More recent migrants are more worried about their future than earlier ones and therefore are more hesitant about relocating.

Due to interruptions in employment opportunities or bottlenecks in advancement, several interviewees left China only to return at least once. They returned to Taiwan for various reasons, including family, work and quality of life. However, as most maintained connections in China, they were ready to return there for another chance. One interviewee left China because she was disappointed with her pay and promotion options, but came back to work in Shanghai again. She talked about the importance of keeping connections viable:

> I left Shanghai in a rather hasty manner so I did not pack my personal stuff and kept the rented apartment. Since I had to deal with some remaining matters, I had to keep the cell phone with China Mobile functioning. A few months after I returned to Taiwan, I received a call on the cell phone from a Taiwanese friend in Shanghai. He tried to persuade me that I could easily find suitable jobs in Shanghai and told me he heard about a job vacancy ideal for me. His words encouraged me very much, so I returned and found my current job (working in a Taiwanese-owned bakery chain).
>
> (20 January 2007, Hong)

Another interviewee's story offers a view of a very mobile life. This interviewee is a high-tech engineer; he has worked in China twice and now works in Taiwan.

Still, he foresees a lot of uncertainties about the future. Initially, he was sent to Shanghai as an expatriate to help an American transnational corporation set up manufacturing lines in Shanghai. He got a very good package to cover his family relocation expenses, so his family moved with him. Three years later he lost his job and got an offer to work in Taiwan. The rest of his family stayed behind because they wanted their children to continue their education in the international school system. A year later, he decided to quit the Taiwan job and went back to live with his family, but he later accepted yet another offer to work in Taiwan. (13 December 2007, Liao).

Another interviewee used to work for a Taiwanese-owned biotechnology company in Shanghai but came back to Taipei to start his own business as an importer of biotechnology cosmetic products from France. He talked about his decision:

> To work in a less developed country is very energy-consuming. The business system in China is very unstable and is dependent on political will and policy whistle blowers. You need to spend a lot of energy smoothing things out by dealing with bureaucrats and officials because you must do these things yourself. Although my experiences in China really help me with what I am doing now, for I sell the majority of these products to wholesalers in China, I would still rather base my business operations in Taipei and fly there when I need to. This way, I only need to focus on what I am good at.
>
> (24 April 2007, Yang)

These cases illustrate the advantages of moving in and out of China. Having work experience in China in general helps people find jobs or start businesses in Taiwan. However, when asked where they plan to retire, a great majority opt to return to Taiwan. One interviewee planned to move between cities in and beyond China, such as London or Tokyo, but still keep her house in Taipei as her home:

> Working and living in China or other cities around the world is just an adventure away from home. I would not consider myself a migrant (*yimin*, 移民), for I am not settling down. What I am doing is keeping 'on the move' (*yidong*, 移動).
>
> (23 December 2007, Chen)

Political and cultural identities

> For us, our roots are still in Taiwan; Shanghai is a workplace and Taiwan is our home.
>
> (24 January 2008, Lin)

How these decisions to move or migrate interact with the interviewees' identity at the nation-state level was also discussed. The three main areas covered were political and cultural identities, cosmopolitanism and professional/career identity.

During the formal interview process, I did not include any questions regarding their political views in Taiwan, but such issues often emerged naturally in our discussions about their migration. I often heard my interviewees clarifying that their moving to China did not mean they did not love Taiwan, in attempts to disassociate their move with the possible accusation that they are siding with China politically. Several interviewees also hinted at their political standing by framing the year of their migration in terms such as 'I moved right after Chen Shui-bian got elected as President', thus implying the move was associated somewhat with their potential discontent over regime change from the Kuomintang to the Democratic Progressive Party.

To some Mainlanders, the old links, whether in the form of family networks, cultural affinity or historical memories, motivated them to move. The following experiences of the so-called second-generation Mainlanders help to elaborate:

> My father was from Jiangsu and had some close relatives living in Shanghai. During 2002 he and my mom came to live in Shanghai for one year. After that he had always wanted to come back here (Shanghai) to live. But my mom (not being from China) did not like the idea. During their stay, I visited them and got the chance to see Shanghai for myself. I later received an offer from a friend to work here. My father urged me to take the job. They eventually came to live with me for a few months each year.
>
> (29 January 2008, Chao)

Another interviewee, whose father also originated from China, reflected on the effect of her father's legacy on her moving to China:

> The idea of 'coming back' to Shanghai was instilled in me by my father. He was an Anhui native but grew up in Shanghai, a graduate of Shanghai High School. At that time, he enjoyed a prestigious life, surrounded by classmates from well-to-do families. So he always looked back on that time as the good old days. As a result, when I first travelled to Shanghai, I had a special affinity with the place. Standing on the river bank opposite to Pudong, although most constructions were almost in place, Pudong was still out of light in most parts of the area. But I thought to myself, 'One day, everything will be different, and I hope I can come to work here'.
>
> (25 January 2008, Cheng)

There are some salient differences between blue and green supporters in their evaluations of China's development. Pan-blue supporters tend to look at the bright side, namely China's economic growth and rising status as a world power, while their pan-green counterparts often stress the dimensions of income inequalities and deteriorating environmental quality. However, when it comes to questions regarding whether they make friends with local Chinese, both groups share similar answers. Neither group forms friendships with Chinese and, outside their workplaces, they hardly ever interact with locals. There is a large amount of

distrust among Taiwanese toward Chinese. On two occasions, while in public, second-generation Mainlanders used the Taiwanese (or Hokklo) dialect instead of their mother tongue to refer to the word 'Chinese' while mentioning their dislike of and offering negative comments on Chinese. Some of the sources of this social detachment come from different values as a result of coming from different societal systems. Taiwanese often refer to Chinese as 'those Communists', a term that often refers to people being heartless, militant, amoral, inhumane, and so forth. Thus second-generation Mainlanders are finding it more difficult to integrate into Chinese society than their parents did.

To localize or to internationalize?

As more and more migrants move their whole family to China, compared to earlier waves of migrants who left their families behind (Sheng 2005), they express worries about how their children will integrate. Ironically, for many parents, their worry is that their children might integrate into local society too well and too soon – an outcome perceived as more negative than positive. Some interviewees even said part of the reason why they send their children to international schools is that they do not want their children to mingle with local students. In short, parents prefer their children to internationalize than to localize. Those who can afford to tend to send their children to schools with an English curriculum.

One interviewee lamented the fact that her child had to attend a local school because she could not afford other options:

> My kid is getting along very well with her classmates in school; too well, I am afraid. I don't want her to be heavily influenced by the Chinese, for they maintain some values that I do not like. I pay attention to how to reorient her to the right directions. Bible study groups really help us do that.
>
> (6 April 2007, Lee)

Other interviewees complained about the difficulty their children had adapting to China's rigid and rigorous norms in school. One offered the following:

> Maybe it is just my kid, but she simply could not get used to the harsh way teachers treat school children here. When she enrolled in the first grade, she refused to go to school. Afterwards, she had a series of nightmares about school. It was just too much. I cannot bear to see her suffering. We transferred her to a Taiwanese school (台商小學). Guess what? She has been doing tremendously well with her school work and has behaved well in class.
>
> (23 January 2008, Yao)

One interviewee does not have any children but expresses similar worries about problems associated with integration for the next generation, particularly if they might still wish to retain Taiwanese roots and cultures:

> If my kids are adapting too well to the culture here, they will have a hard time being accepted when they go back to Taiwan. For example, the simplified character system they will be learning would make it difficult for them to understand traditional characters. If they adopt a local accent, there will be a distance between them and their Taiwanese peers. Despite this, China is growing and if the kids learn local ways, it might be advantageous.
>
> (25 January 2008, Wang)

The cultural identities discussed above offer a very mixed picture of how much and how willing these migrants, and especially their children, are to assimilate into the local environment. This is because although many migrants predict their children can do much better if they stay in China and develop a career in its booming market, some are empathetic to their children's yearning to return to Taiwan. The following are two examples:

> Taiwan remains very attractive to our young ones growing up in China. For those who left Taiwan a bit older, like during their elementary school years, Taiwan is a home that they might always want to go back to. After all, they did not choose to move to China and have to put up with a lot to get used to China's environment. Like my son, he will study abroad for his master's degree but plans to work in Taiwan.
>
> (24 January 2008, Lin)

> My children all like Taiwan better and would like to return there to live. However, since this is a family-owned business, they have to inherit it. Otherwise, if they were allowed to choose freely, they would prefer going back.
>
> (5 April 2007, Shin)

In contrast, there are also very savvy parents who know the benefits of integration and intentionally sent their children to local schools. The following is from one such parent:

> We send our boys to a private school catering to both Taiwanese and local children. It is a Chinese/English bilingual school, so they can go on to enter the international division of the public high school. This way they will learn English, with their peers being some familiar Taiwanese faces, along with some other local children. We think their job future is in China, so it will be better if they can make friends with locals.
>
> (22 January 2007, Liu)

Putting concerns over localization aside, internationalizing their children is an appealing option for many parents. Shanghai's attraction to Taiwanese includes the diverse choice of international schools for younger members of the family.

The majority of migrant families I interviewed emphasized the benefits of sending children to schools with curricula transplanted from English-speaking countries. This style of education is considered beneficial not only because the students learn an all-English curriculum, but also because they have the opportunity to make friends with children of expatriate families from other countries. Compared to Taipei, Shanghai has a much larger number of international and English-speaking schools available at various costs. According to official figures on the national origins of cross-border migrants living in Shanghai, there are, besides Taiwanese, sizable migrant populations from Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, the US, Singapore and Australia (Huang 2006: 94). Many of my interviewees stressed the importance of their children's exposure to such international influences in building up their worldviews. One migrant who relocated from Los Angeles remarked:

> After my kid came to Shanghai and went to an international school here, he became more informed of activities and values in other parts of the world besides the US. He has now returned to California to attend university and has found that his American friends in college have very limited, US-centred viewpoints, while he is much more open to other types of worldviews. He is more international than his American counterparts. Without going to school here, this would have been impossible.
>
> (18 January 2007, Liu)

Several interviewees even considered the availability of schools in major Chinese cities with an international (or all-English) curriculum as one of the major attractions of moving to China. An interviewee whose family moved due to her husband's job in a large Chinese state-owned company put it this way:

> One of the reasons that my husband decided to quit a very good job in Taiwan and take the offer here was the children's education. We think it would be wonderful if they could be educated in a more international environment.
>
> (16 January 2007, Ho)

Taiwan has long experienced a brain drain to industrially advanced countries such as the United States and Canada. In the most recent decade, however, migrants from the island have moved in large numbers to major cities in China. Between 1996 and 2000, the number of Taiwanese in countries other than China reached over 1,000,000 in total, but the figure shrank to just half that size between 2001 to 2005 (Lee and Peng 2009). Instead, a growing number of workers have migrated to China. Migrants who moved from Taiwan to the US or Canada before arriving in China are also among this new stream. The other stream is the children of Taiwanese who pursue higher education in English-speaking countries. Their journey is like taking a train that makes several stops at different places to unload family members at different life stages.

Conclusion

Opening the national borders of labour markets has affected the way migrants perceive their relationships with Taiwan and China. Many interviewees find work within the Greater China economic bloc encompassing the two entities, but still feel the existence of two distinctive nation-states. While Taiwanese migrants feel China offers better, if not the best, career options for the timeframe they set, they are less comfortable with China as a nationalized society and polity, even if they consider Taiwan an integral part of China's economy. Mainlanders and Taiwanese alike often perceive China quite negatively. After direct flights began, some of them moved back to live and work in Taiwan as a base, and more are considering the idea. They still do business in China, taking advantage of their expertise gained from working there before. Many are engaged in circular migration, moving back and forth to and from China frequently.

What are the identity issues resulting from such hyper-mobility? One obvious outcome is their lack of social interaction with local Chinese. A great majority of interviewees do not have any Chinese they can call friends, whom they mingle with beyond the workplace. Instead, because of the strong potential involved in moving back and forth, Taiwanese tend to socialize with other Taiwanese and care more about Taiwanese affairs than Chinese ones. In other words, they identify more closely with Taiwanese communities and socialize more in expatriate enclaves.

A study conducted by Huang (2010) found that despite divergent visions on where they plan to settle, Taiwanese tend to maintain a 'mental isolation' from Chinese society. I found that their strong distrust of and distaste for the Chinese news media causes them to depend heavily on the Taiwanese news media for information. Huang specifically points out that Taiwanese tend to use communication tools to forge and maintain Taiwanese-only social networks and interpersonal communications. Even much of their transnational communication is sustained through the use of illegal means, such as satellite TV and pirated videos. That is why Huang (2010, n. p.) concluded that 'everyday experiences—lived or mediated, local or transnational—enable migrants to renegotiate their own similarities with and differences from the Chinese'.

What we observe with Taiwanese working in mainland China is a mixture of both new ideas of economic integration and old ones of socio-political distinctions. A reality defined by national rivalries and memories of conflict has gradually been replaced by somewhat contradictory perceptions of cultural distinctions on the one hand, and economic convergence on the other. In between such world views, these migrants are forced to create and maintain new forms of mobility and networks.

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5 From being privileged to being localized?

Taiwanese businessmen in China

Lee Chun-yi

Introduction

> When I am among my own people, they understand me, as I understand them; and this understanding creates within me a sense of being somebody in the world.
>
> (Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*[1])

Taiwanese businesspeople have invested in China for almost three decades. Most of these businesspeople, called *Taishang*, consider political questions to be quite sensitive. The most popular saying among the *Taishang* is: 'Businesspeople only talk about business'. Nevertheless, due to the changing cross-Strait relationship, it is more or less unavoidable for *Taishang* in China to involve themselves in political issues. More precisely, they have indirect influence on Taiwan's mainland policies and are also involved in China's local politics.

This chapter aims to analyse the *Taishangs*' political attitudes and expectations across the Strait. Interview data from *Taishang* in Tianjin (天津), Kunshan (昆山) and Dongguan (東莞) was collected during field trips to China in 2004–2005 and 2009.[2] The preliminary analysis revealed that most *Taishang* do not have strong political identities. However, they do not talk about business only. Most interestingly, after living in China for almost three decades, the *Taishang* have gradually, if not totally, adapted to Chinese society. This gradual change raises questions about whether the *Taishang*s' reconciliation to Chinese society has any causal relationship with their political identity. In other words, *Taishang* acceptance of Chinese society does not necessarily mean they would fully support the island's governance by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); nevertheless, it is clear that the *Taishang* are keen to support those political parties which could benefit their investment in China. As long as it might contribute to their prosperity, *Taishang* support any party's efforts to govern cross-Strait issues.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first explains the methodology of this chapter and the reasons for choosing Tianjin, Kunshan and Dongguan as the cities for my case studies. The second illustrates Taiwanese businesspeople's evolving political identities and further details different situations of the *Taishang* under Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) and Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) governments.

Three case study cities

Due to the sensitivity of this topic, this chapter's methodology is to interpret *Taishangs*' political attitudes by a combination of interviews and observation of the changing interaction patterns between Taiwanese businesspeople and local Chinese governments. This chapter is based on case studies conducted in three Chinese cities: Tianjin, Kunshan and Dongguan. The interview data draws on eighty-five interviews carried out in these cities during the periods October 2004–January 2005 and June–August 2009. The interviewees are mainly Taiwanese businesspeople in these cities, including the chairmen and directors of the Taiwanese Business Association (TBA, 台商協會) and local Taiwanese Affairs Office (TAO, 台辦) in each city.

Tianjin is one of the four state municipalities in China under the direct jurisdiction of the central government. Tianjin, neighbouring Beijing (北京), has always been known as the gateway to the capital. This unique geographical position has made it the largest port city and a transportation hub and trade centre for northern China.[3] According to Rashid Malik's research into local individual businesspeople in 1991, Tianjin officials act conservatively towards entrepreneurs. Thus businesspeople in Tianjin have enjoyed few extra favours.[4] As the director of Tianjin Investment Promotion Bureau stated,[5] the Tianjin government's policies towards foreign and domestic investors follow the central government's direction closely. The reasons why Tianjin's government is less prone to offer businesspeople benefits than those of other cities are that Tianjin is geographically close to Beijing and, because of Tianjin's provincial-level status directly under central government control, Tianjin officials are highly responsive to national policies.[6] As a result, Tianjin's government can be perceived as a representative of the central government, and its interaction with Taiwanese investors hence has special significance. Taiwanese businesspeople in Tianjin mainly concentrate on manufacturing, such as electronics, engineering, food, furniture, rubber making, paper making and bicycles, most of which serves as exports. Total Taiwanese investment in Tianjin in 2009 was around US$51 billion. Of all foreign investment, Taiwanese investment is ranked fifth highest in Tianjin.[7]

Kunshan lies in the economic corridor between Shanghai (上海) and Nanjing (南京) and is easily accessed by multiple modes of transportation. Kunshan is sixty kilometres away from Shanghai Harbour.[8] Being situated close to Shanghai, the Kunshan government acknowledged that it would be highly possible for Kunshan to be marginalised by its larger neighbour.[9] In order to compete with Shanghai, Kunshan's government realised that they needed to offer investors greater incentives. These incentives came in the form of cheap land, reduced bureaucratic red tape and helpful local government officials.[10] The basic philosophy of the Kunshan government towards businesspeople is to serve, not govern, investors. Because of Kunshan officials' determination and enthusiasm for attracting foreign investment, the small county developed a national economic zone of its own. Without support from national policy, and learning from the experiences of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the southern provinces, the Kunshan

government established the Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone (KETD) in 1985. In August 1992 the State Council upgraded the KETD to a national development zone. It became the fifteenth SEZ in China.[11] For most Taiwanese businesspeople, although Kunshan is a small county, it still has great potential to compete with Shanghai because of local officials' enthusiasm for collaborating with investors. Taiwanese investment in Kunshan focuses comparatively more on high-technology industries. Taiwanese investment accounted for 60.9 per cent of all foreign investment up to June 2009. The registered Taiwanese investment by June 2009 totalled US$170.9 billion.[12]

Dongguan is located in the Shenzhen (深圳)–Guangzhou (廣州) economic corridor in China's Pearl River Delta (珠江三角洲). The Dongguan government benefited from its close distance to two SEZs in Guangdong province, namely Shenzhen and Zhuhai. The central government promulgated special measures for Guangdong (廣東) and Fujian (福建) to attract foreign investment in 1979 and established the SEZs in the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze Delta (長江三角洲) and the Minnan Delta (閔南三角洲) in 1985. With Beijing's special policies, general foreign investment in these areas is tax-free for two years. Following that period and once foreign investors start making profits, they receive a tax reduction of up to 50 per cent for the following three years. Specific investments, for instance in hi-tech and biological industries, and specific agricultural sectors enjoy even greater tax benefits.[13] With these investment advantages granted by the central government, Dongguan benefited from waves of foreign investment from the mid-1980s.

Due to Dongguan's early economic openness, by October 2004 the number of Taiwanese commercial projects there totalled 5,258. The number of Taiwanese companies represented 34.3 per cent of all foreign companies. The joint Taiwanese capital and actual applied Taiwanese capital were Renminbi (RMB) 10 billion and RMB 6.76 billion, respectively. Taiwanese investment amounted to 27.3 per cent of all foreign economic investment in Dongguan.[14] According to official estimates, Taiwanese businesses there accounted for one-tenth of all Taiwanese businesses in China, one-third of Taiwanese businesses in Guangdong province and one-third of all Dongguan foreign investors.[15] Taiwanese businesses there focus more on furniture and toy making, garments, plastics and general manufacturing. The amount of Taiwanese investment in Dongguan is currently about US$114 billion.[16] In a nutshell, the characteristics of Taiwanese investment in these three Chinese cities are small and medium enterprises (SMEs), export-oriented and generally demand large amounts of cheap labour.

The change in Taiwanese businesspeople in China

The first fieldwork trip to China was conducted from the end of 2004 to early 2005. The second was conducted in 2009.[17] I conducted thirty-eight interviews during the first trip, but only twenty-one interviewees were willing to express their opinions about cross-Strait politics. Among these twenty-one interviewees, sixteen are politically neutral, three are pan-blue[18] and two are pan-green. One of

the pan-green Taiwanese investors stated that although local officials did pressure him before the presidential election, 'they could not really control whom we voted for in Taiwan'.[19] This interviewee further complained that although local officials were very friendly to Taiwanese businesses, Taiwanese investors still could not enjoy many of the rights and privileges given to locals. For instance, he has to pay triple the tuition fees for his grandchildren because his family are regarded as foreign or non-domestic. Another pan-green interviewee in Kunshan said that 'Taiwan has fewer and fewer bargaining chips with China in the economic market. China wants to squeeze Taiwan's last space and isolate the island as well'.[20] He went online during the interview and demonstrated that it was impossible to get any online news reports about Taiwan while in China.

The pan-blue Taiwanese investors during my 2004–2005 fieldwork stated clearly that they wanted Taiwan's government to open the 'three direct links'[21] as soon as possible. According to an interviewee in Kunshan: 'We still wish Taipei's government could open the three direct links. If the Taipei government did so, then it could increase the amount of Taiwanese investment in China and enhance Taiwanese economic development'.[22] This interviewee further expressed the view that the Chinese government actually has already proposed some flexible arrangements for Taiwan to open the three direct links in terms of dealing with the sensitive issue of sovereignty. For instance, cargo could change national flags according to 'flexible arrangements'.[23] This Taiwanese investor did not understand why Taipei's government had not opened these links, given the flexible arrangements China offered. Among all the pan-blue interviewees, the demand for Taipei's government to open the three direct links was the most popular opinion acquired on this trip.

During the 2009 research trip, forty-seven interviews were conducted. These interviewees were all *Taishang* living in the three above-mentioned case study cities (Tianjin, Kunshan and Dongguan). I learned of two-thirds of the interviewees during the first fieldwork trip in 2004–2005. All expressed their opinions about cross-Strait relations. Interestingly, none of them are pan-green: twenty-one are pan-blue and twenty-six are politically neutral. This raises questions as to whether all answers offered were truthful. It has been noted that the elite-driven semi-structured interview has drawbacks relating to interpretations of the facts.[24] It has to be taken into consideration that the interviewees from these two research trips are mainly members of Taiwanese Business Associations (TBA) or owners of factories. In short, they are chairmen of factories and enterprises in China, not cadres who work for Taiwanese companies in China. Nor do they come to China because they have family members who run businesses in China. It is conceivable that some interviewees might reserve their opinions on such questions in order to safeguard their commercial or political interests. This point is especially important when we interpret responses from the 2009 fieldwork. For example, during my 2004–5 research trip, I visited a *Taishang* in Tianjin – the interviewee mentioned above who complained about kindergarten fees. He was the owner of a small rubber factory with about fifty employees. He was a supporter of the green camp at that time and the only one to openly support Chen's government during

that year's series of interviews. When I visited him again in Tianjin in 2009 he was more conservative in his support for the green camp and remained largely neutral when discussing political expectations. When I asked the reasons for this change, he said:

> The economic situation in China is getting tough, especially for many Taiwanese factories who closed their doors after the financial crisis in 2008. They (Chinese officials) also stopped offering tax benefits to the *Taishang*. I don't want to create any complications in order to make sure my business can run smoothly.[25]

This is only a single case, but illustrates the order of priorities for the *Taishang*. Their political preferences are deeply entangled with the prosperity of their businesses in China.

Since the three direct links officially began on 15 December 2008,[26] Taiwanese investors have urged the Taipei government to work harder on economic performance instead of fighting about political issues. Most interviewees during the 2009 series of interviews acknowledged the Ma Ying-jeou administration's performance, but only fifteen stated clearly that they support Ma over Chen Shui-bian. The reason why Taiwanese businesspeople supported Ma's government does not have any political motivation, but is simply because Ma's mainland policies facilitated their investment in China. To quote one interviewee in Dongguan:

> I don't feel there is much difference in terms of the cross-Strait relationship under Ma's government. Nevertheless, I do feel that many of his policies facilitated our investment in China. A very simple example is that direct flights have saved us time going home.[27]

One Taiwanese investor stated that even though he supported Ma's government, Taiwanese businesspeople were better off under Chen's government. According to this interviewee, in Tianjin,

> Because of the tension across the Strait, the Chinese government tried very hard to win over our hearts and minds. They developed lots of beneficial policies to facilitate our investment here. Nowadays, we don't enjoy any beneficial policies anymore. Being a Taiwanese investor seems to be not much different from being any other foreign investor.[28]

Furthermore, many interviewees stated that domestic businesspeople are now entitled to the most beneficial policies because the government encourages investors to explore domestic markets. The emergence of domestic entrepreneurs will be further discussed in the following section about the structural change in the *Taishangs*' interaction with local Chinese officials after 2008.

A more sensitive issue is citizenship. Of forty-seven investors, nine said that they do not rule out the possibility of taking People's Republic of

China citizenship. The reason for becoming Chinese is rather practical, as one interviewee in Kunshan explained:

> I think I am a citizen from the Republic of China, but if they (the Chinese government) want to give me citizenship, I will not object to this idea. Having Chinese citizenship is very convenient. For example as a Taiwanese investor, we cannot buy houses or factories. Therefore we have to use one Chinese employee's identity to be the *de jure* owner of our factory even though we are the *de facto* owner. Often some dishonest employee legally takes over their boss' factory and there is no legal way for the owner to get it back. The same limitations are also applied to the property market. Being Taiwanese, we cannot purchase houses. Therefore many *Taishang* use their Chinese wives' or girlfriends' names to buy houses. This is also a reason some *Taishang* have a second wife in China. If their relationships are smooth then that's fine, but many *Taishang* have also lost houses at the hands of Chinese women. Therefore we (*Taishang*) actually are very vulnerable.[29]

Nevertheless in September 2006, the Chinese government promulgated the regulation 'Notice on Regulating the Administration of Foreign Exchange for Real Estate Market'《關於規範房地產市場外匯管理有關問題的通知》.[30] This regulation allowed citizens from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau to purchase houses in China. The above quote from the interviewee, while outdated and probably not completely accurate, can lead one to deduce that financial security in China is extremely significant to *Taishang*, whether in the sense of their factories or of their private housing. Most of them might not pursue Chinese citizenship, for various reasons; nevertheless it is not unthinkable that *Taishang* would consider doing so, after looking at these interviewees' responses and their desire to gain a better livelihood in China than they can in Taiwan.

The same issue of Taiwanese identity is also noted by an interviewee in Tianjin:

> In the past, I felt that showing my Taiwan compatriot travel certification was a matter of pride. I also felt superior telling people that I am Taiwanese. Nevertheless, especially in the last five years, I have felt that my Taiwan compatriot travel certification has not been as advantageous as before. Sometime I even feel discriminated against for being Taiwanese.[31]

This is indeed an interesting change. John W. Berry found that for migrants relocating from lower to higher income economies, where the host community is entrenched in its expectations, these migrants will remain on the periphery.[32] In China during the late 1980s to 1990s, when the first *Taishang* arrived in China, the situation did not align with Berry's observation. At that time, most *Taishangs*' income was higher than locals', and they were considered privileged in many ways. They did not try to mingle with local people. On the contrary, they tried to distinguish their own circles from local society. The establishment

of the Taiwanese Businessmen's School in Dongguan is a good example.[33] Nevertheless, from 2000 onwards, the economic differences between *Taishang* and local Chinese people have changed and, as will be discussed in the following section, the *Taishang* seem to be more willing to integrate into Chinese society. Whether this change is due to their long-term settlement in China or to their declining economic strength, could these Taiwanese immigrants and investors in China gradually be following immigrant patterns observed by Berry? This question deserves closer scrutiny, though most indicators from my research trip in 2009 showed that economic elements are crucial to *Taishang*s' integration into Chinese society.

It can be seen that in 2004–5, although most interviewees did not wish to comment directly on cross-Strait issues, voices supporting the pan-green political camp could still be heard, whereas in 2009 all Taiwanese investors supported the pan-blue camp or were neutral. However, few of them said they would pursue Chinese citizenship for practical reasons. In order to explain the change in the *Taishang*s' political leanings, and also to be more objective in our interpretation of interviewees' responses, we need to compare the changes in Taiwanese businesspeople's interaction with the Chinese government. As MacLachlan *et al*. (2010) suggested, sociocultural labels made public can strongly influence people's internal scripts regarding who they are and what they can do.[34] Therefore the way local Chinese officials treat *Taishang* influences the latter's self-identity. The reason for targeting local Chinese officials as the main point of interaction with *Taishang* in China is because local officials are at the frontline in dealing with Taiwanese investment in China. *Taishang* interact with local Chinese people in daily life, but this kind of interaction does not significantly affect their business. This is the reason why this chapter focuses mainly on the changing patterns of interaction between local Chinese officials and *Taishang*, because this pattern influences *Taishang*s' sense of Taiwanese identity, either by enriching or by diminishing it. Most interviewees mentioned that they felt somehow different under the DPP's government than the KMT's government. Therefore the following section reviews the interaction of *Taishang* with three local governments – Tianjin, Kunshan and Dongguan – during the DPP's governance (from 2000 to 2008) and the KMT's governance (from 2008 onwards).

From 2000 to 2008: Taiwanese businesses embedded into Chinese society

Since 2000, a new development for Taiwanese businesspeople in China is the emergence of multilateral interaction in a wider range of cities. For instance, in Tianjin, the government established the principle of 'enhancing cooperation between Tianjin and Taiwan at all levels' which meant a strengthened focus not only on attracting Taiwanese investment but also on extending contacts with Taiwanese people in aspects of culture, religion, education, etc.[35]

The interaction between Taiwanese businesspeople and the Kunshan government also underwent a transition similar to the interaction with the Tianjin

government. The meetings became more frequent and involved more multilateral contacts. It can be suggested that local officials had begun not only to focus on attracting Taiwanese capital, but also to pay attention to the lives and education of Taiwanese people in China. Through the multilateral interaction of this period, Taiwanese investors came to identify themselves not only as capital contributors, but also as residents interacting deeply with Chinese society. This is the main reason why most local governments adopted multilateral contacts with Taiwanese businesses or, more inclusively, Taiwanese people in their localities during this period. After investing in China for more than a decade, Taiwanese people in China were not only focused on running their businesses but also on living in China, and this point is reflected in local governments' multilateral interactions with Taiwanese people.

The Tianjin annual cultural exchange activity started in 2001 and in 2003, the Tianjin Mazu Cultural and Tourist Festival[36] was jointly organised by the Tianjin government, the Tianjin TBA and the National TAO. This is a three-day festival which is focused on cultural exchanges and promoting tourism, but is also aimed at exploring ways to gain more economic cooperation between Tianjin and Taiwan.[37] Although attracting Taiwanese investment is still the main target, during this period Tianjin officials realised that in order to win over Taiwanese people's hearts and minds, offering preferential conditions of investment was not the only option. The Tianjin government still followed the central government's principle of using Taiwanese investors for further political benefit. Nevertheless, under this grand principle the nature of the interaction broadened from economic cooperation to more civic spheres, so it can be suggested that the Tianjin government adopted a multi-tiered strategy of interaction with Taiwanese people in Tianjin from this period onwards.

In Kunshan the significance of Taiwanese investment extended from the business sphere to the academic field. Due to the significant amount of Taiwanese investment in Kunshan, in 2002 the Taiwanese Studies centre of Tsinghua University established the Kunshan centre.[38] Since then, once a year the Kunshan Taiwanese Studies centre has, in combination with the Suzhou provincial government and the Kunshan TAO, invited not only Taiwanese investors but also Taiwanese scholars to attend a two-day conference in Kunshan.[39] The discussion topics have included the trend of Taiwanese investment in Kunshan, the successful strategy of the Kunshan government in attracting Taiwanese investment, and also the practical methodology for linking Taiwanese industrial progress with economic development in Kunshan. Following this annual conference, there are also academic seminars – for instance, the 'Developmental Forum of China's Processing Zone' held by the Kunshan government and the Chinese Customs Association. This conference also invited the directors of Taiwan's Kaoshiung EPZ to share their experiences.[40] On the basis of these events, it can be suggested that the Kunshan government has increasingly linked Taiwanese investment with more systematic academic interaction.

Starting in 2002, 'cultural year' activities have been organised by the Taiwanese Businessmen's Dongguan School and supported by the Dongguan TAO. The

aim of this 'cultural year' activity is to create an amiable and sophisticated community culture and improve Taiwanese people's living quality in Dongguan.[41] Since 2002 the Taiwanese Businessmen's Dongguan School and the Dongguan TAO have held seminars on different topics, including the 'Future of the Cross-Strait Economy', the 'Education of Being Parents', 'Ways of Improving the Quality of Living' and 'Life Education.' The topics of these seminars show that Taiwanese investors have put down roots in Dongguan. In addition to being investors, they raise their families in Dongguan and therefore pay more attention to the quality of life there.

In 2002, the central Chinese government allowed Taiwanese investors to participate in meetings of the local People's Congresses (PC)[42] and local People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCC).[43] With the encouragement of the central government, several local governments invited Taiwanese investors to attend these two official forums in cities such as Shanghai, Xiamen and Guanzhou.[44] Taiwanese investors' attendance at local PCs and PPCCs in most localities allowed them to participate in local governments' policy discussions. Some local governments invited Taiwanese investors to attend these meetings but prohibited them from giving their opinions during the meetings. Even so, Taiwanese investors still expressed the view that this gesture by local governments demonstrated their respect for Taiwanese businesses.[45]

Have Taiwanese businesses lost their role? Interaction between Taiwanese businesses and the Chinese government since 2008

Following the development of Taiwanese businesses' adaptation to Chinese society, *Taishang* could expect to have more influence on the Chinese government or enjoy more beneficial policies for their investment. However, since 2008, dramatic changes have occurred not only in the cross-Strait relationship but also in the global economic structure. Those changes directly affected Taiwanese businesspeople's interaction with local officials. Most of them state that their position of privilege disappeared during this period. Although Taiwanese investment is still important to local governments, Taiwanese businesspeople seem not to have such easy access to local officials anymore. There are several issues worth noting concerning this period in relation to the changing patterns of interaction between Taiwanese businesspeople and local Chinese governments, of which the most crucial include competition with emerging local enterprises, dealing with labour issues, facing global economic recession and, finally, the KMT's return to power in Taiwan.

From 1987, many Taiwanese businesses enjoyed initial benefits from local governments, such as tax rebates and low-cost land rental. However, most tax privileges have now been suspended, after almost two decades. As for land rental, in the beginning most local officials agreed to offer Taiwanese businesses extremely cheap rent in order to attract as much Taiwanese investment as possible. Nevertheless, their agreements were unreliable: as a Taiwanese businessman in Dongguan complained,

> the one [local official] who offered us this cheap land rental is now retired. We didn't sign any formal contracts for this place because the price was settled through informal *guanxi*. Therefore when the new official comes in, we will have problems signing another contract with him or paying him more "fees".[46]

In other words, Taiwanese businesses are not only losing their tax benefits, but also have to pay more for land rental. This is very different from the situation when they first arrived in China to invest. The current Dongguan people's government vice-director of municipal TAO stated the following:

> We still have very positive interactions with Taiwanese businesses. Taiwanese investment is the most important resource of foreign capital to Dongguan. Nevertheless, we have to be more regulated and follow the central government's policies. The 'Three waive and two in half' tax benefit has an expiration date, and this is applied to not only Taiwanese businesses but also to all other foreign investors. As for the land rental, we would like to have a more systematic agreement with all investors. Therefore all old agreements should be reviewed according to the current value of land.[47]

Under such circumstances, Taiwanese businesses therefore have to compete equally with not only other foreign investors, but domestic investors as well. Most Taiwanese businesspeople remarked that in competition with other foreign investors they might gain some trifling benefits because of their shared language and culture, but in competition with domestic enterprises, Taiwanese businesses did not have any advantages. One Taiwanese businessman in Tianjin said:

> We actually helped domestic enterprises to emerge. Many excellent local cadres in my company, after acquiring knowledge and skills, left us and started their own businesses. Once they accumulated more capital, we could not compete with them because they are local and could have the lowest expenditures and also have great *guanxi* with the locality.[48]

Taiwanese business people's difficulty competing with domestic enterprises increased due to two new challenges in 2008: the new labour contract law and global economic recession.

When the Law of the People's Republic of China on employment contracts (hereafter referred to as the new labour law) came into effect on 1 January 2008, many employers in China started to worry about their human resource expenditure, because it provided detailed protections for labour.[49] For Taiwanese businesses, this was the worst timing possible, as most tax benefits ceased around 2004 or 2005 and Taiwanese businesses started to experience pressure to compete with domestic enterprises. In 2008, the implementation of the new labour law meant that most Taiwanese SMEs which had benefited from cheap labour now faced a rather challenging situation. A Taiwanese businessman in Dongguan explained:

> This new labour law increased our management expenditures. After the economic recession, we have received fewer orders to maintain the original number of employees. We cannot even lay off people because we have to pay employees' pension retrospectively from the time he or she was hired. Most of us are struggling to get over this economic recession.[50]

The new labour law and the ensuing economic recession therefore struck most Taiwanese businesses heavily in 2008. This raises a question: as Taiwanese businesspeople interacted rather smoothly with local officials from 2000 to 2008, why would they not ask for extra help from those officials? The following quote from the section chief of the economic department in the Taiwan Affairs Office of Dongguan sheds some light on this issue:

> We already gave a lot of help to Taiwanese businesses. Nevertheless, under the current situation, we think that the most important task for Taiwanese businesses is to upgrade their skills or transform their industries. We welcome industries which are high-technology and low pollution; if Taiwanese investors are qualified by our standards, surely we would offer more benefits.[51]

This statement shows that Taiwanese investors are facing a difficult time in China today. It can be argued that in an economic recession, businesses everywhere have difficulties. Hence Taiwanese businesses in China are facing similar difficulties to other foreign or domestic investors. The new labour law, it is applied to all investors in China, foreign and domestic. The point under discussion here is the attitude of local officials towards Taiwanese businesses in the face of these two challenges. From 2000 to 2008, local officials made exceptions to facilitate Taiwanese investment in localities. Gradually, from 2008 onwards, Taiwanese businesses have come to receive equal treatment with other investors. The change in local officials' interaction with *Taishang*, as this chapter would argue, influenced *Taishang*s' sense of identity. *Taishang* were treated by local Chinese officials as a privileged class of investors in early 1980s and 1990s, but nowadays are treated as, at best, equal with all other investors. This factual change contributed to *Taishang*s' eagerness to adapt to Chinese society in order to secure their investments in China.

It is quite difficult to prove that the cross-Strait political change has had a causal effect on *Taishang*s' decreasing privileges in China, though the KMT's return to power did inadvertently affect *Taishang*s' role in cross-Strait relations. On 22 March 2008, the KMT won the presidential election in Taiwan. This victory for the KMT dramatically changed the cross-Strait relationship. One very important breakthrough was the resumption of cross-strait negotiations involving the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). After a gap of almost a decade, the leaders of both organisations met again in Beijing on 12 June 2008.[52] The resumption of negotiations was significant for the cross-Strait relationship and to the strategic value of Taiwanese businesspeople for the Chinese government.

From 2008 onwards, there has been no further need for Taiwanese business people to act as envoys across the Strait. One Taiwanese businessman in Kunshan declared:

> In the past, the function of the TBA was similar to a local Taiwanese consulate because there were no governmental representatives in China. However, after the SEF and ARATS started to interact again, the TBA became more like a normal association, and any issues related to politics have been dealt with by the SEF.[53]

Since the strategic value of Taiwanese businesspeople has decreased due to Taiwan's new political landscape, the Chinese government has gradually started to treat Taiwanese businesses in the same way as any other investor.

Conclusion

The political attitudes of *Taishang*s is a challenging research topic, because most *Taishang*s are so cautious about revealing their political views. Thus this represents a black hole in the research of cross-Strait studies. The reason this aspect of research is difficult to conduct is not only because of its sensitivity, but also because the types of questions are often not welcomed by interviewees. There have been many great works tackling this issue which have created fruitful scholarly debate.[54] However, work about *Taishang*s' identities is quite time-sensitive and, as this chapter would argue, *Taishang*s' identities are involved in a dynamic, changing process which has been influenced by cross-Strait relationships and domestic changes in social and economic conditions in China.

This chapter offered a preliminary exploration of the political attitudes of *Taishang* in China. Whether big entrepreneurs, such as the chairman of Ever Green Group, Chang Yung-fa (張榮發), or Taiwanese small and medium entrepreneurs, as is the case for the majority, they all support whichever party which can bring cross-Strait prosperity because it will protect their investment interests. An interesting finding of this paper is the *Taishang*s' contradictory opinions about the KMT government. During 2000 to 2008, when Taiwan was under the DDP government, Taiwanese businesspeople felt that the Chinese government was using all possible methods to woo them. Since 2008, when the KMT moved back into the presidential office in Taiwan, the Chinese government has not relied on *Taishang* to resolve cross-Strait issues as greatly as was the case under the DPP's government. The Beijing and Taipei governments communicate smoothly due to Ma Ying-jeou's China-friendly policies, such as the opening of the three direct links and resuming negotiations through the SEF and ARATS. Certainly these policies facilitated *Taishang* investment in China. However, *Taishang* have lost their role of bridge across the Strait since the KMT won the presidential election. At the same time, many *Taishang* reflect that they seem to have lost the privileged position they held with the Chinese government.

Apart from the power shift caused by Taiwan's presidential election in 2008, this chapter argues that the *Taishang*s' push to be more integrated into Chinese society is due to their pursuit of secured and improved investments in China. If we review the first quote from Berlin at the beginning of this chapter, can we say that *Taishang* now in China are among 'their own people'? This chapter certainly has not answered this question, but by applying quotes from the interviewees in 2004–5 and 2009, and by observing changes in the cross-Strait relationship, we can at least argue that because of *Taishang*s' long-term investment in China, they are motivated to integrate into Chinese society. It might take a long time for the *Taishang* to feel they are among their own people in China – but this does not seem to have been a reason for their moving to China in the first place, anyway.

Notes

1 Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays of Liberty*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 157.
2 The author would like to extend appreciation for the project 'Taiwanese people in Mainland China's Identity Change' co-organised by Hong Kong University and East Asia Studies Centre of Chengchi University in Taiwan, which financed the fieldwork trip of 2009.
3 This description is from the government brochure *Introduction to Tianjin Hi-Tech Industry Park* (天津高新科技園區簡介); data were collected from Investment Promotion Bureau, The Administrative Commission of Tianjin Hi-Tech Industry Park.
4 Rashid Malik, *Chinese Entrepreneurs in the Economic Development of China*, London: Praeger, 1997, pp. 12–13.
5 Interview data, T10, interview date: 11 November 2004, Tianjin.
6 Jane Duckett, *The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce Departments in Reform Era Tianjin*, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 52–53.
7 Statistical data collected from the Tianjin people's government, Bureau of Taiwanese Affairs, 3 July 2009.
8 This information is from the government brochure, *Guide to Investment—China Kunshan Economic & Technological Development Zone* (投資指南—昆山經濟及科技發展園區), data collected from Kunshan Foreign Investment Bureau, interview date: 30 November 2004, Kunshan.
9 Lan-chih Po & Ngai Pun, 'Making Transborder Governance: A Case Study in the Role of Taiwanese Capital in Kunshan's Institutional Change', *City and Design/An Academic Journal for Intercity Networking*, 15/16 (2003): 59–91.
10 For example, it was also very easy for *Taishang* to ring governmental officials' – such as party secretaries' – mobile phones when they had problems in Kunshan.
11 'Introduction of Kunshan', *Kunshan Ribao* (editorial), 26 May 1994, p. 1.
12 Statistical data collected from Kunshan people's government, Bureau of Taiwanese Affairs, 8 July 2009.
13 Godfrey Yeung, *Foreign Investment and Socio-Economic Development in China: The Case of Dongguan*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 44.
14 Statistical data collected from Dongguan People's Government Municipal Bureau of Taiwan Affairs, 20 December 2004; all figures relate to October 2004.
15 Ibid.
16 Data collected from Dongguan People's government, Bureau of Taiwanese Affairs, 22 July 2009.
17 Due to this issue's sensitivity, this paper reserves the names of interviewees. It only reveals the date and location of interviews when quoting interviewees.

18 Pan-blue is a political alliance in Taiwanese politics. It is composed of the Kuomingtang (KMT), the People's First Party (PFP) and the New Party. The name comes from the party colour of the KMT. The pan-blue force is opposed to the pan-green political coalition, which is composed of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and the minor Taiwan Independence Party (TIP). The name comes from the party colour of the DPP.
19 Interview data, T3, interview date: 2 November 2004, Tianjin.
20 Interview data, K8, interview date: 2 December 2004, Kunshan.
21 The three direct links are direct cross-Strait postal, transportation and trade links.
22 Interview data, K2, interview date: 29 November 2004, Kunshan.
23 Available online at www.web66.com.tw/web/NMD?postId=189519, (accessed 10 May 2010). At that point the three direct links were still prohibited, so they suggested that for transportation such as shipping, cargos from Taiwan or China could change flags when the ships reached the other side's marine protected area. This is the so-called 'flexible arrangement'.
24 David Richards, 'Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls', *Politics*, 16(3), p. 201.
25 Interview data, T3, re-interview date: 28 June 2009, Tianjin.
26 Liang-Jen Chen, 'After waiting for sixty years, cross-Strait three direct links opened today', *United Daily*, 15 December 2008, A1.
27 Interview data, D9, interview date: 14 July 2009, Dongguan.
28 Interview data, T21, interview date: 1 July 2009, Tianjin.
29 Interview data, K22, interview date: 9 July 2009, Kunshan.
30 Available online at www.chinabiz.org.tw/chang/monthly/105-200707/105-06.asp (accessed 21 August 2012).
31 Interview data, T23, interview date: 1 July 2009, Tianjin.
32 John W. Berry, *Mobility and Acculturation*, in S.C. Carr ed. *The Psychology of Global Mobility*, New York: Springer, 2010, p. 201.
33 Chun-Yi Lee, *Taiwanese Business or Chinese Security Asset*, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 71.
34 MacLachlan, Malcolm Carr Stuart C. and McAuliffe, Eilish, *Recognising the Human Dynamics of Dominance, Justice and Identity*, London: Zed Books, 2010, p. 92.
35 Xue chan Wu, 'Pushing Tianjin and Taiwan Multilateral Exchange and Cooperation', *Tianjin Ribao*, 23 April 2001, p. 2; 15 March 2002, p. 1.
36 Mazu is the Chinese goddess of the sea. The east coast provinces of China and Taiwan deeply believed that worshipping Mazu brought them good fortune. In Taiwan, there are over a thousand temples to Mazu. In China, Mazu studies started in the 1980s, when five academic seminars were held to discuss the importance of Mazu in Chinese culture. Therefore it can be suggested that Mazu is part of the common culture of China and Taiwan. Data obtained from www.mazu.org (accessed 10 April 2007).
37 Zhi Cheng Wu, 'China, Tianjin Mazu Festival Started Today', *Tianjin Ribao*, 23 September 2003, p. 5.
38 'Taiwanese Studies Center of Tsinghua University Established a Kunshan Centre' (editorial), *Kunshan Ribao*, 22 June 2002, p. 1.
39 An Yan, '2002 Cross-Strait (Kunshan) Special Forum', *Kunshan Ribao*, 21 October 2002, p. 1.
40 Wei zhong Wu, 'The Developmental Forum of China's Processing Zone in Zhou Zhuang', *Kunshan Ribao*, 21 October 2002, p. 1.
41 'Taiwanese Circle: Taiwanese Businessmen in Dongguan Created Community Culture' (editorial), *United Daily*, 4 April 2002, p. 13.
42 Local People's Congresses aim to ensure the implementation of the Constitution and the law and the administrative rules and regulations in each administrative area. However, devising the law is not the remit of members of local People's Congresses; they are mainly in charge of overseeing the implementation of laws. The relation

between local People's Congresses, local People's Political Consultative Conferences and local government is that local PPCCs hold a discussion before the decision is made, local People's Congresses vote policy decisions after discussion is finished, and then government carries out the decision. Nevertheless, both local People's Congresses and local PPCCs are consultative institutions: they do not have concrete power to influence local government policy implementation. Available online at www.china.org.cn/english/chuangye/55414.htm (accessed 5 June 2007).

43 Li juan Wang, 'The Chinese Government Allowed Taiwanese Businessmen to Participate in Local People's Congresses and Local People's Political Consultative Conferences Below Provincial Level', *United Daily*, 12 December 2002, p. 13.

44 Jia rong Liang, 'Taiwanese Businessmen Participate in More Local Chinese Governments' Affairs', *Economic Daily*, 18 March 2002, p. 11.

45 Ibid.

46 Interview data, D30, interview date: 23 July 2009, Dongguan.

47 Interview data, D29, interview date: 22 July 2009, Dongguan.

48 Interview data, T30, interview date: 2 July 2009, Tianjin.

49 Baker and McKenzie, *Law of the People's Republic of China on Employment Contract*. Available online at www.51labour.com/zhuanti/2007ldht/html/Page1-8.asp (accessed 5 January 2010).

50 Interview data, D23, interview date: 20 July 2009, Dongguan.

51 Interview data, D28, interview date: 22 July 2009, Dongguan.

52 *Cross-Strait News*, editorial from the SEF, 10 June 2008. Available online at www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=47611&ctNode=3696&mp=11 (accessed 6 September 2009).

53 Interview data, K15, interview date: 8 July 2009, Kunshan.

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6 Happy reunion or brothers only in name?

Mainlander Taiwanese in China[1]

Lin Ping

Introduction

While most research on migration and China focuses on the Chinese overseas, little attention has been paid to migration into China. News from the press and research findings suggest that most people moving into China are professionals exploring business opportunities. Between 2004 and 2005 it was estimated that more than 175,000 Westerners and 750,000 Taiwanese lived in China, most of them working as entrepreneurs or high-ranking managers in multinational or Taiwanese firms (Lin 2009; see also Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume).[2]

However, there is little literature on either western professionals or ethnic Chinese moving to China.[3] Although Taiwanese people in China are by no means the largest population of noncitizens, their migration experience has not yet been fully explored. One issue deserving attention is whether the migration of Taiwanese people to China will trigger political integration between Taiwan and Mainland China in the future. In other words, will this non-political integration trigger political integration across the Strait? Are these migrants going to vote for pro-China or pro-integration policies during elections in Taiwan (Chen 2005; Keng and Schubert 2010; see also Chapter 3 in this volume)?

While Taiwanese scholars often have different opinions on this issue, Chinese officials are quite consistent. They regard the feature of Taiwanese people in China as a sign of a 'happy family reunion' and a stepping stone to political integration across the Strait. However, there has not been much discussion on how average Chinese citizens perceive the influx of Taiwanese businesses and people. It is difficult to predict whether non-political integration will bring political integration if we are unfamiliar with the responses of such a large population. We thus need more research to explore the mutual perceptions between Taiwanese and Chinese people before making any substantial prediction.

Although many Taiwanese have moved to China over the past decade, one of the most difficult aspects of this research was getting Chinese people to share their perceptions on this pattern, particularly when their thoughts contradicted the mainstream 'we are all Chinese' political discourse of Chinese officials. In order to obtain perspectives from both the immigrants and the local people, the author selected two organizations – the Hometown Association of Dongguanese in Taipei,

台北市東莞同鄉會 (DiT) and Tailian of Dongguan 東莞市台胞台屬聯誼會 (ToD) – as samples representing the Taiwanese and Chinese people, respectively. Both the DiT and the ToD have frequently been involved in cross-Strait activities for more than a decade. By exploring the interaction between the DiT and ToD, we can perhaps gain a better understanding of the mutual perceptions between the Taiwanese and the Chinese people.[4]

Apart from the practical needs discussed above, how members of the DiT and ToD perceive each other forms the focal point of discussion on ethnicity in this study. As constructivist stances have gained ground in studies of ethnicity, objective understandings on the subject have been replaced by subjective approaches to define ethnicity in terms of participants' beliefs, perceptions and understanding. This study thus provides a good chance to discuss how ethnicity is formed through discussing the cooling of interactions between the DiT and ToD. Before exploring their perceptions of one another, the following sections review the literature on the cross-Strait relationship and politics in Taiwan, and migration studies and Taiwanese people in China. All sections provide background information for the later analysis.

China, Taiwan, and Taiwanese People in China

Our understanding of prehistoric Taiwan is limited. Fragmented historical records show that the Chinese began settling in Taiwan in the sixteenth century (Andrade 2008). Nowadays, more than 97 percent of Taiwanese people are of Chinese descent. In general, people whose ancestors originated from China before the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1945) are termed *Benshengren* (Native Taiwanese). The following civil war from 1947 to 1949, between the KMT (Kuomintang) and the Communists, drove more than one million Chinese people to Taiwan with members of the KMT regime. These Chinese and their descendants are often referred to as *Waishengren* (Mainlander Taiwanese).[5] Like the Chinese people in Southeast Asia, or in North America in the early 1900s, they organize various kinds of *Huiguan* (hometown associations) in order to keep contacts among themselves (Chung 1999).

Although Mainlander Taiwanese are not necessarily members of the KMT, both groups share similar histories, including suffering the Sino-Japanese War and the collective move to Taiwan. However, Native Taiwanese to some extent feel that the stable life they enjoyed during the Japanese period was destabilized and exploited by the arrival of the KMT army. Therefore, Native Taiwanese tend to be anti-KMT and pro-Japan, while Mainlander Taiwanese are more likely to be pro-KMT and anti-Japan. Although these differences were suppressed by the KMT's monopoly of power, they caused serious disputes after the late 1980s (Gold 1993; Chu and Lin 2001).

Partially due to intermittent political tensions across the Strait in the 1990s, the split between Mainlander Taiwanese and Native Taiwanese was further integrated into issues of identity politics. Most public polls show that Mainlander Taiwanese are more likely to identify themselves as being both Taiwanese and

Chinese, or Chinese only, than the Native Taiwanese population. These different self-perceptions mean that party preferences are interwoven with national identity which, in turn, has created a divisive atmosphere on the island with regard to people's attitudes toward China since the late 1990s (Ho and Liu 2003; Hsieh 2008).

In the late 1990s, the idea of a Greater China supported by the KMT gradually lost favor and was replaced by the DPP's pro-independence Taiwan First ideology. Although the KMT won the presidential election in 1996, it was defeated by the DPP in the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. Therefore, during this period, many Mainlander Taiwanese felt politically excluded in Taiwan (Chang 2005; Corcuff 2002). Some research also argues that Mainlander Taiwanese are more likely to have worked (or to expect to work) in China than Native Taiwanese (Tsai and Chang 2010).

Conventional economic principles suggest that people move abroad mainly due to economic incentives (Massey *et al* 1993; Massey 1999) and studies on psychology suggest that they may settle down more easily if they move to a country ethnically similar to their own (Berry 1992; Ward and Kennedy 1999). These findings are partially consistent with those of current research on Taiwanese people in China. Most people included in this population are entrepreneurs, expatriates of Taiwanese firms, and their family members. They leave Taiwan due to the risk of unemployment at home and the availability of career opportunities in China, as suggested by conventional research on the economy (Lin 2009; Tseng 2011; see also Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume). In spite of the ethnic affinity across the Strait, they do not mix as successfully with Chinese people as previous research on psychology has suggested. Most of them still maintain a certain distance from Chinese society even after having lived in China for years (Lin 2009, 2010).

Questions, method, and limitations of analysis

Since research on migration suggests that people may settle down more easily if they go to countries ethnically similar to their own, it is surprising that Taiwanese people in China have difficulty settling. Why does easy settlement not occur, as some studies on cross-cultural psychology predict? This suggests that a salient aspect of this experience has yet to be addressed.

Since Mainlander Taiwanese originated from China more recently than their native Taiwanese cousins, and are often considered to be pro-China, this finding suggests that research focusing exclusively upon Mainlander Taiwanese in China should be helpful to illustrate why most Taiwanese people in China have little intention of integrating with the local Chinese people. If the perceptions which Mainlander Taiwanese and Chinese hold of one another are revealed, this may also help to examine whether ethnicity is formed through the daily interaction and subjective understanding proposed by Fredrik Barth and Rogers Brubaker (Barth 1969, 2000; Brubaker 2004).

Because of the difficulties in statistical sampling, most research on Taiwanese people in China is based on limited interviews in certain Taiwanese firms or cities

(for example, see Tseng 2011). Since it is unrealistic to acquire a randomized sample, the aim of this research is to map the life courses of different Mainlander Taiwanese, rather than providing a picture with a definitive and exhaustive categorization. In order to achieve this goal, the author used maximal variation as the sampling strategy to select proper respondents with wide variations in age, class, gender, and education. Like most sampling processes in qualitative research, the sampling in this research started by using snowball technique in the early cases but ended with a large range of different respondents. In total, the author interviewed nine respondents in Dongguan and seven in Shanghai. Although these informants were selected from 2004 to 2005, the author kept contact with most of them until 2011. This long-term relationship helped the author obtain and illustrate information more thoroughly.

As mentioned in the introduction, one of the most difficult aspects in this research was getting Chinese people to describe their perceptions of Taiwanese people, particularly when their thoughts strayed from the party line. Therefore, the author also selected members of the DiT and ToD as proxy groups to explore the experiences of Taiwanese people and perceptions of local Chinese respectively.[6]

The DiT is one of the hometown associations organized by Mainlander Taiwanese in Taiwan. It was set up in 1969 by people originating from Dongguan, Guangdong province. Although this association is located in Taipei, its members actually come from various cities in Taiwan.[7] The ToD is the Tailian branch in Dongguan. Tailian is a semi-official association composed of Chinese people who are closely related to Taiwanese people, as spouses, parents, or siblings.[8] Both the DiT and ToD have been involved in various cross-Strait activities for more than a decade. Some members of the DiT have returned to Dongguan and some members of the ToD frequently visit Taiwan. Members from both sides are familiar with each other. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider both associations as representative of their respective populations and to use their feedback to explore mutual perceptions between the Taiwanese and Chinese people.

Because neither the Taiwanese nor the Chinese respondents were statistically selected, the findings of this study can provide only part of the picture. Therefore, this study claims neither to cover all the crucial factors nor to describe the whole process or stages of such migration. It simply offers an analysis of the overall responses from various respondents. However, the contribution of this article is that there are overlapping features and consistency among the respondents, which suggests that these common features might also be important for people who were not included in this study's sample.

Findings[9]

As indicated in the discussion above, all Taiwanese respondents in this paper are Mainlander Taiwanese. They or their parents originated from China in the late 1940s. Cultural and organizational links have sustained the widespread notion of common origins even for people who are strongly against political integration with China. This ethnic affinity, to a certain extent, blinds both Taiwanese and

Chinese respondents to the cultural and social barriers that come with interaction with one another. Respondents' unfamiliarity with these barriers causes confusion when these two populations encounter such difficulties at later stages. Therefore, constant interaction between these Taiwanese and Chinese populations does not bring deep understanding and mutual acceptance, but instead mutual resistance, to strengthen their sense of separate ethnicity.

Why move? Unusual anxiety toward a usual inquiry

Why people move is often the first question asked in migration studies. The most common explanation is that people move due to various economic incentives. Previous studies on migration in general, as well as those on Taiwanese people in China specifically, indicate that people move overseas mainly in order to increase economic rewards. This type of explanation was also clearly provided by Taiwanese respondents at the beginning of the author's fieldwork. They clearly expressed that they moved either due to the career opportunities available in China or to avoid the risk of unemployment in Taiwan. This is not surprising, since Taiwan has struggled economically while China has experienced dramatic economic growth since the late 1990s. After an unusual phone conversation,[10] the author grew aware of something which had not been explored and paid more attention to what the respondents expressed in public and what they talked about in private. All expressed no interest in politics and described their migration to China as a means of achieving a better material life. However, almost all of them raised another issue in more private discussions.

In these private environments Mainlander Taiwanese respondents changed the topic of conversation to political issues. What they expressed was not the political constraints they encountered in China but the political disputes that they had suffered within Taiwan. They often talked about their unhappiness with Taiwan's anti-China political climate, using terms such as 'the sadness of being Mainlander Taiwanese in Taiwan' and 'the devil island.' They were disappointed with the KMT's loss in the presidential election and angry at being regarded as alien in DPP political discourse, especially during the election campaigns. Their responses in private revealed the change of political discourse as one crucial (but publicly unexpressed) concern among respondents.

This finding is unusual but similar to those of some studies on the former Soviet Union in the 1990s and Indonesia in the 1960s. Russians in the former republics moved to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and ethnic Chinese left Indonesia after the anti-Chinese riots. They all moved out due to similar concerns (Pilkington 1998; Dawis 2009). Although the Russians and Mainlander Taiwanese did not encounter physical threats as the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia did, the political change in their host countries still caused a similar mental trauma, triggering their migration.

Some readers may doubt whether a change of political climate exerts such a considerable influence on migration. The respondents' position in the political disputes in Taiwan is similar to the position of 'marginal man' argued by

Robert Park (1928), but with more complex dimensions. The change of political discourse in Taiwan (from the Great China Ideology in the 1950s–1980s to the Taiwan First Ideology in the 1990s–2000s) reveals a different path of marginalization. During the first period of time, respondents were educated that Taiwan was part of China, but was more legitimate than the regime in Mainland China. In addition to receiving this knowledge in school, they were also acculturated in this ideology through their family history. Their sense of 'Chineseness' was not only something imposed from the outside; it also originated from and was strengthened at home.

The transition of this ideology from Great China to Taiwan First triggered many disputes. One of the main arguments was how to define Taiwan, or how to define Taiwan's elements originating from China. Some anti-China fundamentalists argued that these elements should be overlooked, deleted, or abandoned. This domestic argument was also intertwined with and strengthened by the deteriorating cross-Strait relations in the early 2000s (Corcuff 2005; Lynch 2004; Wu 2005). Mainlander Taiwanese felt they were being relegated to the margins due to their ethnic origins in China. As increasing efforts were made to strengthen Taiwan as a state independent from China, they felt part of their emotional belief was severely compromised. What made them feel more miserable was that they had to follow the new mainstream ideology. If they did not follow it, they would possibly be verbally attacked by people with different opinions. The more Taiwan moved away from Chinese culture, the more Mainlander Taiwanese felt marginalized.

To be clear, the author is not justifying (or helping the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents to justify) their reasons for moving to China, but simply pointing out that the change in the political climate in Taiwan was one of the important (but often overlooked) reasons triggering their migration to China. The political socialization in Taiwan between the 1950s and 1980s encouraged them to regard China as their ethnic homeland, though they had all been born and educated in Taiwan. Therefore, when the pro-China ideology was replaced by an anti-China one during the DPP's period in power, they were frustrated. They felt as though they were being criticized and marginalized because of their ethnic association with China. The author does not overlook the importance of economic concerns (i.e., the availability of jobs in China) in migration, but argues that noneconomic concerns clearly play a salient role. When China transitioned toward a more economically liberal and prosperous country in the late 1990s, leaving Taiwan for China became a reasonable and practical solution to the issue of feeling marginalized in Taiwan.

Life in China: from happy family reunion to brothers only in name

All the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents had strong connections with China and partially regarded their visits to China in the early 1990s as similar to returning home, like their parents. Despite this, only one of them moved to the same city or county where their parents had originated from or lived with their Chinese relatives. This finding is similar to those of studies on return migration of

the diaspora in Eastern Europe. Members of the diaspora may visit the hometowns of their ancestors, but few actually settle down there, because these hometowns are often economically underdeveloped (Markowitz and Stefansson 2004; Long and Oxfeld 2004). However, does this perception of home being too backward fully explain this "only for visits" relationship?

When the author asked some of the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents how they interacted with their Chinese relatives, he received no clear response. They talked about what they did for their Chinese relatives during the early visits, such as helping to refurbish the ancestral hall and helping younger relatives financially, but were reluctant to talk about their interactions in later stages. One of them added an additional remark – "They just want money" – to stop the author's inquiry. It seemed that their relationships with their Chinese relatives were more complicated than they had expected.

After further contact with respondents, the author found that the underlying cause of this unspoken relationship is often money issues between the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents and their Chinese relatives. During their visits in the early 1990s, they were often asked for favors by their Chinese relatives as compensation for the period spent suffering during the separation. However, most immigrant respondents were not wealthy. They considered the assistance they gave to their Chinese relatives as gifts and reasonable help, not as being "a generous Santa Claus at Christmas." They felt that their Chinese relatives wanted easy money to improve their lives, not to learn skills and gain knowledge. This kind of money issue is rarely openly discussed, but was privately shared between the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents and people with similar backgrounds. They did not blame their Chinese relatives for China's low-quality infrastructure (which is of course not their fault), but they grumbled about the practicality of their Chinese relatives. Although they had partially regarded China as their ethnic homeland before migration, they quickly realized that their Chinese knowledge was not only spatially disoriented but also temporally disembedded from the real China.

While the feeling of being out of place disoriented the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents, this temporal disenfranchisement discouraged them from integrating with the Chinese people. Unlike Europeans who might find living in China an adventure (Yeoh and Willis 2004; Holdsworth 2002), their migration experiences actually resulted in a reconstruction of their interpretation of China and led them to identify themselves in new ways. As if to counteract the discrepancy between the imagined Chinese knowledge that they had obtained in Taiwan and the real Chinese experience encountered in China, only one of the respondents lived with Chinese relatives. Most lived with other Taiwanese people and formed an ethnic enclave. With this protection, the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents participated in social activities that they had grown accustomed to while living in Taiwan. No matter how much they had aspired to leave Taiwan, few enjoyed life in China.

This finding does not fit with what psychologist John Berry has suggested but is similar to what anthropologists Fredrik Barth and Rogers Brubaker have proposed (Berry 1992; Brubaker 2004): People who share objective ethnic traits but little interactive experience may not actually be happy socializing with each other.

Their experiences of interaction may reduce participants' sense of ethnic belonging, highlighting for them what had originally been unnoticed (but sometimes significant) differences, leading to the emergence of unexpected boundaries and the arousal of reactive identities. This process illustrates how the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents gradually distanced themselves from the term Chinese and ceased to regard China as their ethnic homeland. To these respondents, their migration to China was not only a residential relocation but also a learning process wherein they came to better understand the differences between themselves and their Chinese heritage.

Perception from the Chinese: from "welcome home" to "think about it seriously"

As the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents gradually changed their attitudes toward Chinese people, how did the Chinese people perceive the arrival of these Mainlander Taiwanese, or Taiwanese people in general? During the author's fieldwork in 2004–05 and 2008–11, he not only interviewed the Mainlander Taiwanese but also conversed with local Chinese officials and core members of ToD. From these discussions, a picture of "cooling down" (or "back to normal"; see the following discussion) was provided by the Chinese respondents to illustrate their perception of the coming of the Mainlander Taiwanese or Taiwanese people in general.

As discussed above, most Mainlander Taiwanese respondents were expected to be generous benefactors in their early visits. The Chinese respondents also expressed warm, welcoming attitudes toward their arrival in the early 1990s. This is because it not only meant family reunions (which are important in Chinese culture), but also signified the beginning of a political reunion with Taiwan (which was important in Chinese politics). Both the family reunions and the seemingly promising political reunion were no less important than the economic aid coming from the Mainlander Taiwanese. Therefore, the Chinese respondents expressed that they were quite cheerful about the contacts and the accompanying business investment from Taiwan.[11]

However, as some Chinese respondents expressed, some Mainlander Taiwanese (especially those investing in the early days) did not behave as 'good brothers' whom they could look up to or look after. They destroyed this supposedly harmonious relationship by having out-of-wedlock affairs with Chinese females, by setting up "paper factories" and violating local regulations, or by deceiving local business partners in order to increase their profits. To the Chinese respondents, some people from Taiwan were not good relatives and did not maintain sincere relationships, but were simply a privileged group who exploited the local population.[12] Similar to the money issues regarded as an "unspoken issue" among the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents, this "Taiwanese-styled morality" was widely discussed among the Chinese respondents. Therefore, a sincere attitude of welcoming these migrants home in the early 1990s gradually changed into hollow gestures in the latter half of the next decade. The following story of the interaction between the DiT and ToD may further illustrate this change.

The Asian financial crisis in 2007 damaged many countries in East Asia, including Taiwan. Organizations relying on bank interest payments or donations from the public as a major source of income had difficulty maintaining their regular activities. The DiT was one such organization. All members of the DiT are Mainlander Taiwanese, originating from Dongguan but living in Taiwan. Because of the regular interaction between the DiT and ToD, the Chinese government of Dongguan obtained information on the difficulties and, in order to express its generosity, donated RMB 300,000 via the ToD to the DiT for a "foundation of studentships." Partially in order to arrange this donation, the DiT organized a six-day "return visit tour" for Taiwanese to visit Dongguan and neighboring cities in early 2010. The ToD also arranged its annual assembly at a time when DiT participants would be in Dongguan to participate in the annual assembly of the ToD.

The first three days of the tour were in cities around Dongguan, similar to any other comparable trip. When DiT participants entered Dongguan on the fourth day, they were, however, seated in a brand-new coach guided by a police car, heading to Songshanhu (the High-Tech Zone in Dongguan) in order to have dinner with local officials and businessmen. After dinner, the DiT participants were hosted in a newly opened five-star hotel in the city center. On the fifth day, all DiT participants were required to be in formal dress in order to participate in the annual assembly of the ToD as VIPs. DiT participants queuing to enter the assembly hall stated they felt a sense of participating in a tributary, like envoys from small countries queuing to show their respect to the Chinese emperor in the old days.[13]

What made the DiT participants more uncomfortable was how the local Chinese officials expressed their concerns at the lunch banquet, using terms such as "we need a stronger bird for this cage … We do need more investment, but the old labor-intensive and high-pollution industries are not welcome. They should be replaced by new high-tech industries. … How is the economy in Taiwan? It is getting more and more competitive here. For those planning to find jobs or set up careers here, they should think about this competition seriously before coming here." While the topics covered by the local Chinese officials during the lunch banquet perhaps reflected reality, they made DiT participants feel uneasy and also slightly humiliated. Although the DiT participants were still regarded as VIPs, they felt a clear change of attitude. The sincere welcome home experienced a decade ago was gone, replaced by an approach that emphasized an attitude of "think about it seriously before coming here."

From the incidents experienced by the DiT and ToD or the perceptions of the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents and Chinese respondents, it is difficult to say that a mutual respect between the immigrants and the locals has developed. To many local Chinese people, most Taiwanese people are arrogant and selfish. The best way to deal with the Taiwanese people – especially those doing business in China, according to the Chinese respondents – is to do the same thing, to get even with them. This may explain why the Chinese respondents and the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents did not trust each other. With the rise of economic growth in coastal China and the downturn of the economy in Taiwan, the local Chinese government grew more confident about dealing with cross-Strait issues in their

own way. While the Mainlander Taiwanese respondents interpreted this change of attitude as a cooling down, the Chinese respondents interpreted it as returning to normal. While both are correct in their own way, the situation does show that both sides are not exactly as close to each other as their ethnic origins might otherwise suggest.

Again, the findings from the Chinese respondents correspond to Barth and Brubaker's suggestions (Barth 1969; Brubaker 2004). They suggest the importance of cognition and learning processes as a part of the development of ethnic identity. Ethnic identity is not limited to shared traits or entities but is also dependent upon how the agents see the social world and interpret their social experiences and relations with others. It is a category of practice; a way of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the world; and a system of cognition developed through this learning process. Although the Chinese respondents of the ToD initially regarded Mainlander Taiwanese respondents of the DiT as people with shared objective traits (i.e., both originating from Dongguan), they have gradually learned and recognized differences through their uneasy interactions over the past two decades. After going through this process, they still regarded the Mainlander Taiwanese as brothers – but brothers only in name.

Discussion and concluding remarks

Since the Mainlander Taiwanese originated from China more recently and are often referred to as pro-China within Taiwan, it was expected that a study focusing exclusively upon the Mainlander Taiwanese in China and Chinese people with Taiwanese relatives would be helpful to illustrate the lack of integration between Taiwanese immigrants and local Chinese. It would also help to examine whether ethnicity is formed through the daily interaction and subjective understanding proposed by Fredrik Barth and Rogers Brubaker if the perceptions of one another held by Mainlander Taiwanese and local Chinese were revealed.

While previous studies on migration stress the importance of economic pressures, this article goes beyond this well-known feature and discusses the political concerns that compel the migration of ethnically close groups. This article does not reject the importance of economic pressures but argues that the change in the political climate in the host country can also be critical. Although the economic explanation of motivation is still obvious, the findings of this study contribute toward a fuller understanding of migration. More stress on the influence of non-economic concerns is suggested to be necessary for future studies.

Ethnicity is a subjective perception formed through the learning process

Although Taiwanese respondents in this article regarded China as an ethnic homeland to which they could escape from political disputes in Taiwan, they had difficulties integrating with Chinese society. They were often treated as foreigners in China because of their unfamiliarity with local society. Just as the Taiwanese

respondents experienced difficulties integrating, the Chinese respondents also expressed difficulties in receiving these compatriots back home. Over the course of time, both the Taiwanese and local Chinese people came to claim that this kinship was functional only on the surface, and regarded each other as brothers only in name.

This finding confirms what Barth and Brubaker suggest: That ethnicity is about not only objective traits and entities, but also subjective ways of seeing developed from a long-term learning process. People on both sides feel a sense of loss and anomie after going through these experiences. While this learning process brings more opportunities for mutual understanding, it also reduces the rosy expectations held by both the immigrants and the host society. Although Mainlander Taiwanese respondents are often regarded as pro-China by people in Taiwan, all of them work to keep a certain distance from the image of being Chinese after interacting with China's population. Therefore, it would be risky to predict that the KMT would gain more votes than the DPP from Mainlander Taiwanese with Chinese experience after having gone through such a complicated experience.

Ethnicity is strengthened when it comes unexpectedly

Why does this learning process not lead to more mutual understanding and acceptance, as psychologist John Berry suggests, but instead to a formal and detached relationship? It seems less likely to be caused by clearly visible differences (such as different political systems) and more by something less clear or tangible (such as treatment of family reunions and approaches to wealth). The presumed ethnic affinity across the Strait magnifies the impact of subtle differences following migration. Interaction with an objectively similar ethnic group can have a more profound effect on ethnic consciousness than contact with a completely foreign group whose characteristics have little personal ethnic relevance. While both immigrants and hosts anticipate that the migration of ethnically similar peoples will be less problematic than other types of migration, the mutual ethnic and social alienation results in a more disorienting situation, forcing both immigrants and hosts to fundamentally reconsider their ethnic identities.

If we compare the findings of this study with the findings of studies on the British in China, we may obtain a clearer picture of how this mutual alienation, and not mutual acceptance, is formed (Yeoh and Willis 2004). Immigrants' perceptions in this article are more complicated than those of immigrants from a conventional foreign country with little ethnic relevance to China. Conventional foreigners may develop an impression of their host country through mass media and personal experiences, but their perceptions may not become clear until they have spent a certain length of time there. The distance in geography and culture between conventional foreigners and the host country helps these foreigners to accept what they encounter with little bewilderment. It is like Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. No matter how strange the events Alice experienced in the kingdom of her dream, there was no hurry for her to deeply analyze them. For most conventional foreign immigrants, there is little pressure for them

to think about all the experiences encountered unless they have mastered a certain level of local knowledge. No matter how much they dislike what they encounter, they can just perceive the host country as a foreign country of little relevance to their daily life.

However, the immigrant respondents' images of the host country in this study are different. With a rich knowledge of Chinese culture and history, they can easily accept much tradition and many customs that conventional foreign immigrants may find strange. What the immigrant respondents in this article actually feel annoyed about are the subtle differences that most conventional foreign immigrants would not perceive, especially when these differences occur unexpectedly, challenging their assumptions about the host country. The knowledge they held before migration and the geographical closeness between Taiwan and China pushed most immigrant respondents in this article to think about their Chinese experiences, both the good and the bad. It is like Washington Irving's *Rip Van Winkle*. All things become familiar, different, and absurd at the same time. It is difficult for people to simply accept what they encounter. Over the course of time, most immigrant respondents in this article came to keep their interaction with the locals at a certain level, without further improvement. They tend to assimilate into the host society in public but retain an "outsider" identity in private. This is why the migration process described in this article does not lead to more mutual understanding and acceptance, as John Berry suggests, but instead to a formal and detached relationship.

While the immigrant respondents changed their perceptions about the Chinese following migration, the Chinese respondents also changed their attitudes toward the Taiwanese – from brothers to look after, or look up to, to brothers only in name. The change in mutual perception between the immigrants and the hosts confirms what anthropologists Barth and Brubaker suggest, which is that ethnic boundaries are not based upon objective differences between groups but the subjective perceptions developed after interactions between groups. Ethnic identity is a product of the process of these interactions. Ethnicity is, after all, about relationships, not facts.

Notes

1 An early version of this paper was published by the journal *The China Review* in December 2011. However, some detailed information has been revised in this article. I am very grateful to China Information for the consent to reprint this article in this book.
2 The number of people from western countries and Taiwan is estimated by the Chinese government (Ministry of Labour and Social Security), see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/04/eng20060404_255781.html (accessed 15 June 2011).
3 Only a few studies have explored the life of non-Chinese in China, such as Europeans in the early twentieth century (Holdsworth 2002), Singaporean and British (Yeoh and Willis 2004; Willis and Yeoh 2008) and Africans in the 2000s (Bodomo 2012).
4 More information about the DiT and ToD will be presented in the following sections.
5 It was easy to tell the difference between the Native Taiwanese and the Mainlander Taiwanese before 1992, because the *Ji-guan* (domicile) was registered on ID cards.

In the survey of 1992, 15 percent of Taiwanese people were registered as Mainlander Taiwanese while 85 percent were Native Taiwanese. Although this registration was abolished after 1992, most polls in the media still consider this "self-identity" as a significant category (Wang 2005; Rigger 2010).

6 The author has been a member of the DiT since 1985 and has been continuously involved in activities held by the ToD since 2001. This long-term relationship provided the author access to both organizations during the fieldwork.

7 More details about the DiT are available online at http://staff.pccu.edu.tw/~yin03/news.htm (accessed June 15, 2012).

8 More details about the Tailian are available online at www.tailian.org.cn/n1080/index.html (accessed June 15, 2012).

9 All names are pseudonyms.

10 When the author was still in Dongguan in November 2004, he was encouraged by a Taiwanese PhD student to telephone a lady named Yang who had been in Shenzhen (a city just near to Dongguan) for eight years. It was suggested that she might be able to provide the author with some advice. The first sentence Yang spoke to the author on the phone was, 'Are you a *waishengren* [Mainlander Taiwanese]?' The author thought it was quite an unusual way to greet someone whom one had never met before, so he paused before replying, 'Yes.' Following this exchange, Yang talked a lot about her current life, especially 'the sadness of being a Mainlander Taiwanese in Taiwan.' Since it was at the time close to Taiwan's parliamentary elections in December, Yang hoped that 'the KMT would gain more seats to give the DPP president a lesson.' The author did not ask Yang any particular questions but just listened to her complaints about politics in Taiwan. It was quite an unusual phone conversation. After that, the author was aware of some things that were unexplored and paid more attention to what immigrant respondents talked about in private.

11 There is little academic research discussing the family reunion and its political implications in the early 1990s. However, some literary works and films might be helpful to illustrate how these issues have been treated in the past, such as the Chinese film *Apart Together* (團圓), which was awarded the Silver Bear for the Best Script at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2010.

12 There is little academic research discussing how the Chinese people perceive the coming of Taiwanese investment in the 1990s–2000s. One chapter of an unpublished thesis, *Marriage Across the Taiwan Strait*, authored by Joseph Leo Cichosz in 2011, and a Chinese TV soap opera, *Dong shen me, Bia dong zhen gan qing* (動什麼, 別動真感情), broadcast in 2004, might be helpful for readers who are interested.

13 The Tributary System existed when the Chinese Empire was strong. During that period, countries around China would send envoys with treasure to the Chinese emperor to demonstrate recognition that China was their symbolic, though not legal, protector. Then the Chinese emperor would repay them with more gifts and treasures to envoys and promise not to interfere in the issues of each country. This tributary system acknowledged the Chinese emperor and China as superior to the other participant countries (Dreyer 2007: 2–4).

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7 Different places, different voices

Early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada and Guam[1]

Lan-hung Nora Chiang

Introduction

The United States and Canada rank first and second, respectively, as the most popular destinations for Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants.[2] Recent literature on new Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants to western countries has focused on those who have arrived since the late 1980s. Yet many of those immigrants studied have not stayed permanently in their host countries, but have adopted a transnational residence pattern which requires them to engage in two or more social fields[3] (Waters 2002; Chee 2005; Chiang 2006, 2008). Research on Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada has focused on new immigrants who were in most cases transnationals, unlike the early immigrants who adopted a linear movement pattern and settled permanently.

As these early immigrants are seldom studied, this research tries to fill in a gap and raise questions which are pertinent to settlers of that time.[4] This article posits that among those who left Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, their migration trajectories have taken different paths, even when emigrating to the same destinations. It tries to address the following issues: 1) What are their reasons for and processes of migration? 2) How do these immigrants make a living, and in what ways do they adapt to their new environments? 3) What are their reasons for staying in the host countries and how they define home? 4) How do they identify themselves and what is their sense of belonging within the host countries? Through a qualitative study of Taiwanese–Chinese who emigrated in the 1960s and 1970s, before the wave of new immigrants, this paper attempts to address the above issues in depth. In the following, I will first present the demographic background of Chinese settlements in Canada and Guam and examine the theoretical aspects of home. I will then present my field methodology and the social economic profile of the Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants. My research findings will follow, while developing linkages with the theoretical debates that were posited earlier.

The background of early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants can be retrieved from statistics and academic literature. Like the Hong Kong and PRC-born migrants, they had nothing to do with the early Chinese settlers who worked as railroad builders, fortune-seekers and sojourners who made up the immigrant population

of the nineteenth century. Statistically speaking, Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants are in fact underestimated if only Taiwan-born immigrants are counted (Chiang and Kuo 2000). The China-born immigrants who fled with their parents to Taiwan to escape the civil war between 1945 and 1949 are included in this study.

Review of pertinent literature

Changing picture of Chinese immigrants to Canada

Chinese constitute the largest visible minority in Canada and have historically arrived from a variety of countries.[5] Chinese who came to Canada in the nineteenth century originated from a small number of counties in the southern province of Guangdong. Since 1967, the universal point system of Canada's immigration policy has favoured applicants who are young and well-educated, who are proficient in English or French, and who have the occupational skills that are in demand in Canada. In the past few decades, with the intensification of economic globalization, Canada has developed new immigration initiatives to select highly skilled and business immigrants. In 1978 Canada amended its immigration policy to allow for the admission of entrepreneurs as immigrants without assessment on the basis of occupational demand or pre-arranged employment. The volume of business immigration to Canada continued to increase. In 1990, business immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong made up about 50 percent of the Chinese immigrant population.

Between the past two censuses (2001, 2006), of the three ethnic Chinese groups from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, immigrants from Mainland China grew most rapidly. From 1996 to 2006, Mainland Chinese immigrants doubled, while the number of Hong Kong-born immigrants declined. The 2001 census recorded 70,790 Taiwan-born immigrants living in Canada. The most popular areas were Vancouver (64 percent), Greater Toronto (22 percent), and Calgary (2.2 percent). In 2006, this number declined to 60,205. In spite of the relatively smaller numbers compared to other self-identified Chinese from different national origins, their significance should not be overlooked.

Background of the Taiwanese–Chinese on Guam

Guam, the second site of my study, is an unincorporated territory of the United States, located in the western Pacific region. Guam is the largest and southernmost island of the Mariana Archipelago, having a land area of some 545 square kilometres, and is located 1,474 miles southeast of Taiwan. Its population is estimated to be approximately 175,000. Guam is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural community that encompasses residents from other Pacific islands, Asia, the US mainland, and elsewhere. It has a complex, cosmopolitan island community, with roots based in its "islander" culture (Stephenson et al 1999).

There appears to be no comprehensive research study to date focusing on the Chinese residents of Guam, and the current total number of Taiwanese–Chinese

residents on Guam is difficult to assess (Stephenson *et al.* 2010). Crocombe (2007) briefly considered Chinese entrepreneurs on Guam, while acknowledging other Chinese residents of Guam who derive from a variety of countries. Taiwan-born immigrants do not show up as a separate category in the census, and estimates of their numbers range from 2,000 to 3,000.

Concepts of home and roots

How to define the concept of home has been an important subject within humanistic geography, and more recently within feminist geography. In the mid-1970s, geographers examined home as an important place of special experiences and meanings (Entrikin 1976). Home is regarded as a haven and a place to relax and anchor one's fatigued mind and body after one's travail in the outside world (Tuan 1971, 1975). Spiritual and psychological attachment to a place like home might be considered an important human need which ensures an authentic sense of place (Peet 1998). Blunt and Dowling (2006) presented a critical geography of home by identifying two key elements: Home as a place to live, and home as an imaginary place imbued with feelings of belonging, desire, and intimacy, or perhaps fear, violence, and alienation. "Home," more significantly, is the sociological setting in which people build and maintain social relationships and affirm their identity and connectedness. A home as a physical location and a psychological concept is often a positive one of warmth, security, and a haven from the pressures of paid employment (or unemployment) and public life (Bowlby *et al.* 1997). Bowlby *et al.* wrote that a crucial element of the everyday understanding of home is the notion of a place within which children are or will be reared, and therefore a place of origin, a place of belonging, a place to which to return (p. 344).

In Chinese, the word *gen* invokes the notion of a permanent "home," as in the expression *luodi shenggen* (planting new roots 落地生根), which I apply to the "old-timers" who are unlikely to go back to live in Taiwan because they have already established themselves abroad, even though they may still consider Taiwan to be their root (*gen*). In contrast to the new immigrants, they may have less choice about where and how they settle. In this study, I focus on the Taiwanese–Chinese who have settled in Canada and Guam permanently. In addition to the Taiwan-born, this population also includes China-born, or those born of parents from Mainland China. In all cases, the concepts of flexible families or "astronaut" households (Chiang 2006, 2008), are less apparent in the case of the early immigrants.[6] Arriving in Canada or Guam when they were adults, they have neither totally abandoned their Taiwanese homeland or roots as a result of their long stay abroad, nor become transnationals who live in two entirely different social fields, like the new Asian immigrants. They are permanent settlers, encompassing a separate identity from nineteenth- century Chinese sojourners on the one hand and new Asian transnational migrants on the other.

Research methodology and socio-economic profile

The early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in this chapter are studied in two different settings: Canada and Guam. For the purpose of comparison, the research questions and methodology were similar, but addressed in different contexts. My previous studies of Taiwanese immigrants in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States, based on in-depth interviews, have given me ample experience of studying Taiwanese people in different contexts. The excitement of looking for "ground truth"[7] lies in the continuous emergence of new research subjects which are meaningful to the Taiwanese community. Reflexivity is exercised when choosing the subject matter as well as applying the methodology. While focusing on subjects such as residential mobility (Chiang and Hsu 2005), employment (Chiang 2004), split households (Chiang 2008), and the 1.5 generation[8] (Chiang and Yang 2008; Chiang 2011) in my research, I later found that I have not studied Taiwanese immigrants who have been settled for more than three decades in destination countries such as the United States and Canada, which have a long history of immigration.[9] Recent literature on Taiwanese–Chinese migrants has tended to focus on new immigrants who have arrived since the 1980s, but have pursued a highly mobile form of circular migration.

My fieldwork constitutes the main source of information on early immigrants. I use sensitive micro-level field research together with census statistics and surveys as background work in my sample cities. The application of ethnographic interpretation with participant observation has allowed me to understand the "emotions, experiences, and significance," as described by Graham (1999), of migration. Qualitative research methods promoted by Hay (2005) and Baxter and Eyles (1997) were utilized, using semi-structured questionnaires to interview the early migrants, which I broadly define as people who migrated before the wave of new Taiwanese immigrants of the late 1980s (Bulbeck *et al.* 1999). Driven by contemporary social, economic, and political reasons, they may have formed a wave of immigration steeped in a diversity of circumstances, but have not captured the interest of scholars and policy makers.

Between 2008 and 2011, I made two trips to Guam and multiple trips to Vancouver, Calgary, and Toronto in Canada, interviewing twenty-four and twenty-two Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants respectively.[10] Each interview usually took 1–3 hours. Samples were acquired through friends and respondents from my earlier studies.[11] I was able to earn these interviewees' trust and thus gain useful insight from them and, in turn, was introduced by them to other potential interviewees. I was received warmly by my respondents and was able to interview some of them multiple times. I was often able to visit the organizations that they belonged to, such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Guam and Evergreen Club in Toronto, in addition to their Chinese schools, places of work, homes, and places of worship, helping me grasp the context of their life experiences. Taiwanese are friendly, hospitable, and flexible in their schedules in general, but an introduction from someone was of great help; sometimes it was essential. Apart from this, one notable factor contributing to the successful recruitment of

respondents was the connectedness between immigrants and Taiwan, which most of them left close to thirty years ago.

Having conducted the fieldwork in four different locations at different time periods, I hope that the samples, though limited, provide the reader with a diversity of respondents' backgrounds and mobility patterns, which cannot be retrieved from the census. As the national censuses of the host countries organize immigrants by their places of birth, thus including only those who are Taiwan-born, they underestimate the number of immigrants from Taiwan, since many early migrants were born in China or elsewhere. It should be noted that without visiting the communities I would not have been able to acquire a nuanced understanding of these immigrants, nor would I be able to identify the issues and circumstances helping to define their life experiences. Migration studies have recently turned to themes of identity and belonging, placing migrant stories at the root of much of this research, with interviews, focus groups, life histories, photographs, and documents to illuminate the experience of migrants and the patterns and processes of migration (Gilmartin 2008).

However, I am aware of the limitations of the chain referral strategy, which may have omitted people who did not want to be interviewed or who were unavailable at the time of my fieldwork. Since these interviews took place during the summer, or in semester breaks, I could only make short trips of uneven duration, usually for less than two weeks. However, conducting fieldwork at different times and places helped me to think through issues clearly regarding their relevance and ways of investigation. I also tried to replicate the research design in each of the trips, but found it necessary at times to modify some of the questions to suit the contexts.

Table 7.1 identifies the socio-economic profile of the twenty-four Taiwanese–Chinese who were interviewed in Canada. The group included eleven males and thirteen females. Fifteen were born in Taiwan, and the nine others were born in China and other countries. The four earliest arrivals in Canada emigrated there in 1966. Fourteen arrived before the new wave of Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants, and six arrived in the 1980s. One third of them first studied in another country before emigrating from there to Canada. These countries include the US, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Most of the respondents are well-educated and had varied work experience before migrating. With three exceptions, all completed their tertiary and vocational education in Taiwan, while six migrated to pursue further studies in the US and Canada. One has a PhD degree, three have Master's degrees, and fifteen have a Bachelor's degree. Their migration categories include "independent," "skilled," "family," and "student." The majority of them changed their professions after arriving in Canada. The details of how they looked for employment in Canada and made a living will be discussed in the following section.

Table 7.2 indicates the socio-economic profile of the twenty-two Taiwanese–Chinese who were interviewed in Guam. They include thirteen males and nine females. The men were between the ages of 45 and 67 at the time of the interviews, while the women were between the ages of 48 and 65. With reference to the place of birth, seventeen were born in Taiwan and five were born in China.

Table 7.1 Profiles of early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada

No.	*Age/Sex*	*Place of birth*	*Education*	*Occupation TW/Canada*	*Year of migration to Canada*	*Identity*	*Return to Taiwan?*
EVAN#1	60/M	Macau	BA (TW)	Import–export business/ financial advisor	1994	Canadian; Taiwanese	No
EVAN#2	63/F	TW	BA (TW); further studies (US)	Student/arithmetic teacher	1971 (re-migrated from US)	Canadian	No
EVAN#3	58/F	TW	BA (TW)	Accountant/accountant	1976	Taiwanese–Canadian; Taiwanese	No
EVAN#4	76/M	China	BA (TW)	Accountant (retired)	1973	Canadian; Chinese–Canadian; Chinese	No
EVAN#5	65/M	China	BSc (TW); MSc (U.S.)	Student/car repair manager	1972 (re-migrated from US)	Chinese–Canadian; Taiwanese; Chinese	No
EVAN#6	62/F	TW	BA (TW)	Student/designer	1973 (re-migrated from Hong Kong)	Canadian; Taiwanese; Chinese	No
ECAL #7	66/M	TW	BSc (TW); PhD (CDN)	Student/manager	1968	Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian; Taiwanese	No
ECAL #8	63/M	TW	BSc (TW); further studies (CDN)	Plant manager/ process systems manager	1975	Taiwanese–Canadian	No
ECAL#9	72/F	TW	Vocational school (TW)	Kindergarten teacher/ day care manager (retired)	1971 (re-migrated from Thailand)	Canadian; Taiwanese	No
ECAL#10	63/F	TW	BA (TW)	Accounting assistant/ food service	1983	Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian	No
ECAL#11	61/F	China	BA & MA (CDN)	Assistant/junior high school teacher	1975 (re-migrated from US)	ALL	No
ECAL#12	59/F	TW	BA (TW)	Trading company/ business analyst; project manager	1975	Chinese–Canadian	Yes
ECAL#13	65/F	China	BA (TW)	Secretary/housewife	1967	Canadian; Chinese–Canadian; Chinese	No

Continued

Table 7.1 (Continued)

No.	*Age/Sex*	*Place of birth*	*Education*	*Occupation TW/Canada*	*Year of migration to Canada*	*Identity*	*Return to Taiwan?*
ECAL#14	62/M	Hong Kong	Technical college (HK)	Air force technician/Air Canada mechanic (retired)	1988	Canadian; Taiwanese	No
ECAL#15	73/M	TW	Vocational school (TW)	Engineer/Engineer (retired)	1966	Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian; Taiwanese	No
EVAN#16	69/M	TW	Teacher's training college (TW) and (CDN)	Teacher/engineer	1976	Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian	No
EVAN#17	60/M	TW	High school & MSc (CDN)	High school student/ Professional engineer	1967	Canadian; Chinese–Canadian	No
EVAN#18	64/F	China	BA (TW)	Student/accounting clerk (retired)	1975 (re-migrated from US)	Chinese–Canadian	No
EVAN#19	58/F	TW	BA (TW)	General office clerk/realtor	1979	Chinese	No
EVAN#20	64/M	TW	BA (TW)	Teaching assistant/ Financial advisor	1982 (re-migrated from US)	Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian	No
ETOR#21	62/F	Vietnam	BA (TW)	Bank clerk/bank clerk	1970	Chinese–Canadian; Chinese	No
ETOR#22	58/F	TW	BA (TW)	Student/restaurant manager	1982	Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian; Taiwanese	Winter in TW; Summer in Canada
ETOR#23	48/F	TW	Elementary school (TW)	Pianist/Chinese natural herbalist	1988 (re-migrated from Singapore)	Canadian; Taiwanese	Yes
ETOR#24	63/M	China	BSc (TW); MSc (US)	Company employee/ Company employee	1974 (re-migrated from US)	Chinese–Canadian	No

Notes:
EVAN: interviewed in Vancouver
ECAL: interviewed in Calgary
ETOR: interviewed in Toronto
TW: educated in Taiwan
US: educated in the United States
CDN: educated in Canada
All: Canadian; Taiwanese–Canadian; Taiwanese; Chinese

Table 7.2 Profiles of early immigrants in Guam

No.	*Age/sex*	*Place of birth*	*Education*	*Occupation TW/Canada*	*Year of migration to Guam*	*Identity*	*Return to Taiwan?*
G#1	48/F	Taiwan	Vocational school (TW)	Secretary	1984	Taiwanese–American	No
G#2	49/M	TW	BA (US)	Real estate	1972	Taiwanese–American; Taiwanese	Yes
G#3	62/F	Taiwan	High school (TW)	Furniture store owner	Early 1970s	—	Undecided
G#4	52/M	Taiwan	BA (US; unfinished)	Car dealer	1980	Global	No
G#5	48/M	Taiwan	BA (US)	Real estate	1970	American; Taiwanese; Chinese	No
G#6	65/M	Taiwan	BA (TW)	Accountant/enrolled agent (retired)	1971	—	Undecided
G#7	65/M	Taipei	Vocational school (TW)	Construction	1978	Taiwanese	Undecided
G#8	64/M	China	PhD (US)	Investment	1972 (re-migrated from US)	American; Taiwanese Chinese	Yes
G#9	65/F	China	MA (US)	Insurance	1971 (re-migrated from US)	Taiwanese–American	No
G#10	50/M	Taiwan	Vocational school (TW)	Auto company owner	1979	Chinese	Yes
G#11	60/F	Taiwan	High school (TW)	Bakery owner	1967	Taiwanese	No
G#12	73/M	China	Military academy	Trading company/business analyst; project manager	1975	Chinese–Canadian	Yes
G#13	47/M	Taiwan	MA (US)	Auto parts manager	1973	Taiwanese–American; Taiwanese; Chinese	Yes

Continued

Table 7.2 (Continued)

No.	*Age/sex*	*Place of birth*	*Education*	*Occupation TW/Canada*	*Year of migration to Guam*	*Identity*	*Return to Taiwan?*
G#14	56/M	Taiwan	High school (TW)	Furniture store owner	1976	Chinese–American; Chinese	No
G#15	58/F	Taiwan	BA (US unfinished)	Real estate	1975	Chinese–American; Chinese; Taiwanese	Yes
G#16	67/M	China	BA (US Unfinished)	Real estate	1974	Taiwanese–American	Yes
G#17	62/F	China	MA (US)	Librarian	1971 (re-migrated from US mainland in 1991)	Chinese–American; Chinese	No
G#18	61/M	China	PhD (US)	University professor	1985	Chinese–American	Yes
G#19	53/F	Taiwan	College (TW)	Tour company president	1985	Taiwanese–American	Yes
G#20	53/M	Taiwan	College (TW)	Shop owner	1982 (re-migrated from US mainland in 1985)	Chinese–American	No
G#21	63/F	Taiwan	High school (TW)	Shop owner	1978	American	No
G#22	45/M	Taiwan	College (US)	Business manager	1972	Taiwanese–American	Yes

The career fields for the male Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants included real estate, auto industry, accountancy, construction, insurance, education, business management, and sales. The career fields for the Taiwanese–Chinese women included sales, secretarial service, insurance, real estate, and library science. The earliest immigrant arrived in Guam in 1967. Others came to Guam in the 1970s and 1980s. Four of them identified themselves as re-migrants from the US. Their migration categories included "family," "employment," "investment," "professional," and "student."

Research findings

This section focuses on these immigrants' reasons for and processes of migration; their life experiences, including adaptation to life in their host country; and their sense of home and belonging. The following is based on narratives derived from my face-to-face interviews.

Reasons for and processes of emigration

Political situation

The withdrawal of Taiwan (the Republic of China) from the UN in 1971 was a critical turning point for the emigration of Taiwanese–Chinese people seeking a politically stable environment. Some even left earlier. **ETOR#21** stated, "We left Hong Kong in 1967, because there were riots by leftist students at the time. It was not safe to stay there because my husband's father was a member of the KMT. My husband emigrated to Canada in 1967 as an 'independent.' I came to Canada as a tourist, got married, and stayed."

EVAN#4 described the following situation: "It was much easier to immigrate to Canada than to the US where everyone wanted to go at that time.' During this time Guam became a popular destination as it was easier to get a visa to emigrate there than to the US mainland, and it was geographically closer to Taiwan. Speaking from his own experience and observations as an "old-timer," **G#2** analyzed the situation as follows:

> For some, Guam was used as a stepping stone. Seventy percent had the intention to move on to the US mainland. Thirty percent who stayed were engaged in real estate and trade. Only ten percent from those times stayed on, as kids left for the US mainland for education, while wives also moved as they did not want to stay back on Guam by themselves.

Following family members or friends

Knowing someone, such as a friend or relative, in Guam or Canada often triggered the move and influenced decisions on where to move, as was the case for **G#8** and **G#13** in Guam and **ECAL#8**, **ECAL#16**, and **ECAL#17** in Canada. While in col-

lege, **ETOR#22** was introduced by a matchmaker to her husband, who moved to Montreal in 1982 to join his brother-in-law and establish his restaurant business.

ECAL#18, a well-educated lady who finished her tertiary education in Taiwan, studied educational psychology in Japan and emigrated with her family to the US, where she completed further studies. She met her husband, who got a Master's degree in the United States, and re-migrated to Canada, where he preferred to stay.

In Guam, **G#1** and **G#17** took similar paths. **G#1** went with her husband, whose father was an American professor there. After she divorced, her parents came to join her in Guam in 2005. **G#17**, whose husband is a retired Commander in the US military in Guam, went to the US as a student as early as 1971. She explained: "I came to Guam as a military spouse in 1991, when my husband was re-located from the US We moved every two years before we came to Guam."

Sometimes, one can observe strong parental influence in one's decision to emigrate, as in the cases of **G#5** and **G#15** in Guam. **G#5** came to Guam with his parents and three brothers at the age of 10, when he was in primary school grade six. In 1979, the US severed ties with Taiwan and recognized China, leading to a slump in the housing market in Taiwan and causing some alarm for investors there. Like other Taiwanese, his family emigrated to pursue the American dream, being influenced by the media at that time. Similarly, **G#15** stated the following:

> We came to Guam in the E-2 Category as Skilled Migrants. It was purely a coincidence that we emigrated. My father was a tailor for the US military in L City. During the Vietnam War, the Governor of Guam visited Taipei and invited my father to visit Guam as a tourist. Thinking that his children should see the world (闖天下), my father suggested that we relocate to Guam, which is close to Taiwan.

Immigration for the sake of children's education was not common for early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada. **EVAN#6,** who left Taiwan in 1969 to marry her husband from Hong Kong and immigrated with him to Canada in 1973, is an exception:

> We came to Canada because we did not want our daughter to be educated in Taiwan or Hong Kong. We could not do what other Chinese parents did in not permitting their children to study the subjects of their interest, but requir[ing] them to fulfill the wishes of their parents.

Among the "old-timers," **ECAL#17** was the only migrant who emigrated when he was a teenager – in 1967, with his family of six – because of his father's fear of the communists, and his desire to provide his children with an education abroad.

According to **ETOR#23,** she was guided to Canada not only her marriage, but also by her "fate":

> In 1988, I came to Canada at the age of 28, working as a pianist. I had never thought of emigrating to Canada, until I met my husband. It must have been

> due to fate that I stayed… I have been guided by Master Lu, a Taoist who lived in the Tang Dynasty, and by Kuanyin Buddha who led my way. I prayed to her for a place to let me settle down. Later, when I was working as a pianist in Singapore, I got a work permit to emigrate to Canada. Later, when I was about to sell my house and leave Canada, I met my husband who came to attend all my performances. We got married and had a son who is now 18 years old.

Change of student status to immigrant status

It used to be quite easy to change one's student visa to immigrant status. **ECAL#7** earned his BSc Degree from a leading university in Taiwan in 1965, served in the military for two years, moved to Canada to study for a PhD in 1968, and worked in Calgary for thirty years until retirement. For him, "to change from student to immigrant status was a normal process." This description is similar to that of **ECAL#13's** husband, who earned his PhD in Vancouver and taught at a university in Calgary.

Work-related reasons

Work was the main reason for some to move to Guam. **G#2** explained to us that two types of Taiwanese–Chinese came to Guam in the 1970s. The first consisted of veterans who found construction work via Taiwanese veteran assistance organizations (RESA 榮工處).[12] The second were Taiwanese–Chinese who came under E-2 Investor Visas. During that era, First Commercial Bank was established, and China Airlines started to link Taiwan with Guam.

In my sample, **G#6, G #7,** and **G#11** were migrants with skills, and thus were able to find gainful employment. At the age of 28, in 1971, **G#6** accepted work as an accountant in the US Air Force, and was later employed as an enrolling agent:[13] "I did not have any difficulties in finding work. In those days, it was easy to get a Green Card." Having arrived in Guam in 1967, **G#11** considers herself the first old-timer among the Taiwanese-Chinese immigrants. Her husband came as a skilled migrant, hired by a New York-based company to set up a branch office for jade carving, because jade products were not then being imported to Guam.

Re-migrating from the US mainland

While one always assumes that Canada or Guam to the US mainland is the only direction in which migration occurs, we also see cases where the direction of the move is reversed. **ECAL#11** recalled how she re-migrated from the US in 1975: "I taught summer courses at the University of Calgary in 1974, and found Calgary to be a friendly city. I applied for immigration in the fall of 1974 and arrived there in May 1975."

G#8, who received his PhD in the United States in 1971, moved to Guam to work in the construction business, because he had many family friends there with

similar backgrounds. Having a degree in library science from the US mainland. **G#9** has worked at the leading university in Guam for over twenty years since her husband was re-stationed on the island from the US mainland for military service. **G#20** enjoys the multi-cultural environment much more than the culture found on the US mainland, where she felt discriminated against in terms of the way people spoke and their body language. She talked about having a tough life there because of her Asian ethnicity.

Other reasons for emigrating from Taiwan can be complex and not grouped in any of the above categories, as **EVAN#1** vividly commented. "Taiwanese immigrants were here because they 'wanted to have the same piece of cake for Chinese New Year as everybody else.' Professor, you are right too in using the Chinese saying in your paper that 'they came like a swarm of bees (*I wo feng*一窩蜂).'"

ECAL#15 seems to support the same point of view, noting the common aspiration of university graduates to go abroad after completing their tertiary education and two years' compulsory military service (in his time).

> I applied for immigration to Canada because I wanted to go abroad. It was simply difficult to leave Taiwan unless one pursues further studies, works abroad, has a lot of money, or emigrates. Half of my classmates went abroad at different times. We have a big alumni association in Canada.

The above narratives illustrate how migration may be shaped as much by politics as by economics, in addition to complex individual motivations. They make us aware of a nearly forgotten generation of Taiwanese–Chinese who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of shifting global politics around the US, China, and Taiwan. Looking at the diversity of reasons and processes of emigration, one cannot assume or explain migration behavior with just one theory.

Life experiences and adaptation

> Don't be afraid of speaking English. Canadians don't speak Chinese. One can learn English from songs and listening to TV. Try to forget about the past and start all over here. Be prepared to accept low level work.
>
> (**ECAL#14**)

ECAL#14, who worked in various Canadian cities as a technician before his retirement, made the above suggestions when we asked him what kind of advice he would give to new immigrants. Even after studying English for many years in high school and university in Taiwan, English was still a challenge for many. For some, limited vocabulary posed a hurdle to living in either Canada or Guam. Originally a high school teacher, **ECAL#16** tried very hard to improve his English after emigrating to Canada in 1976. Due to such challenges, it was hard to find a teaching job. As a result, he did all kinds of low-skilled work, such as painting, cleaning, maintenance, and repair.

Similarly, **ECAL#17** earned money for school by working in various part-time jobs such as sweeping buses, working in mines, and installing telephones. After getting a degree in Electrical Engineering, he was employed as an engineer, first working for a power company and later owning his own company.

A respected philanthropist in the Taiwanese community, **ETOR#22** shared her experiences with me.

> It took me ten years to get used to living in Canada. At the beginning, I walked for one hour each way to buy milk from the store. It took me three years to start learning to drive. Language was a big problem at first, and I was very scared every time the telephone rang. I felt like a dumb person while living in an area with Westerners.

For **G#11**, her difficulty upon arrival in Guam in 1969, two years after her husband, was not being able to speak English. She learned English from the Filipinos employed in her husband's jade-carving workshop. Fortunately, she learned English quickly, even though her children reminded her that she did not have the right accent. When she first arrived, **G#12** could not speak English and could not find sufficient Chinese food, making her feel very homesick.

Only a few lucky respondents found that English was not a problem as they were trained in foreign languages, having worked in foreign firms in Taiwan or having lived in another country, as was the case for **ECAL#13**, **EVAN#15**, and **EVAN#5**.

Other difficulties shared by these respondents are related to differences in the physical and cultural environment between Taiwan and the host society, such as, in the case of Guam, the weather being too hot; the high cost of food; the lack of Chinese restaurants; having to cook and eat frozen food; the lack of vegetables, seafood, and fruit; electricity shortages; malfunctioning telephone networks; stores closing at 6pm, the lack of domestic helpers; difficulty learning English; feeling homesick; recovering from devastating typhoons; the high costs of living; and learning to drive (Stephenson et al 2010).

On the other hand, some of the early migrants who decided to make Guam their home were happy to point out that, in spite of Guam's relatively small population, they were able to conduct their businesses profitably in real estate, sales, insurance, travel, trade, and so forth. The advantages of staying on Guam expressed by some of the Taiwanese–Chinese interviewees included the number of friends there, the friendly local population, the number of charitable activities which one could get involved in, the clean air, a safer and more wholesome environment, and the lack of public transportation, which prevented children from wandering around after school (Stephenson et al 2010).

Two established Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants assured us of their decision to stay in Guam. **G#5** stated, "All four of us [brothers] went to the US mainland for our university education, but my parents always told me to come back to the place where we were raised." **G#6** added: "Some of my friends cannot believe that I [have lived] on Guam for so long (since 1971). Guam is small, but one

does not need to spend so much time traveling like in New York. The air is also cleaner."

In a different context, the cold weather in Calgary and Toronto was considered a disadvantage of living in Canada. **ECAL#10** stated, "It is so cold and dry here in Calgary. I was so scared that my car would stop moving in the middle of the road." **ECAL#15** shared similar feelings, stating, "It is so cold in Calgary that some of my friends left for Vancouver." As a researcher, I visited Canada several times in the winter for fieldwork, and know how cold it can be.

Overcoming difficulties of various kinds to make a living

One way to earn a living is to accept low-paying jobs. As **ECAL#10** shared, "My husband worked as a Calgary duty manager and later in gas piping design. I got a part-time job in food service and was paid C$9 per hour." **EVAN#6** reminisced:

> When I first went to Canada, I only brought with me C$1,200. First, I worked in a garment factory for C$2 per hour for six months. I lost my job and studied English until I reached the advanced level, and found work in design. I am now a designer for books, posters, magazines and clothing. It was not difficult to find work here, as long as you were not picky.

ETOR#20 emigrated by himself and got work in the mills in Vancouver. After obtaining his Certificate in Finance, he worked as a financial advisor. **ECAL#13** and her husband lived frugally as they had only one income at the beginning.

Religion also helped immigrants to overcome their difficulties, as in the case of **ECAL#19:**

> I was guided by God in every step. Whenever I pray, God points out the way for me. With two children, I worked as a typist in a Japanese company and as a clerk in an export company and a bank. The EXPO took place in Vancouver in 1986, and lots of immigrants arrived in 1987. I decided to study for a certificate in real estate, and have been working as a realtor since 1991.

As always, hard work is the norm, as expressed by **G#22**. "We Chinese always work all the time; no Sundays, no holidays. We don't go to the beach on Guam to swim, bar-b-q, relax, or even chat. That doesn't accomplish anything."

G#3, who owned several furniture stores in Guam and Mainland China, told us in vivid detail about her career and how she helped her brothers and sisters to establish their businesses. She started work in Taiwan at the age of 17 and has never stopped working. **G#7** often flew back to Taiwan several times a year, flying in the morning and returning the next day after finishing his business meetings. "I can sleep well on the plane. Sometimes I asked the flight attendant not to wake me up for meals." At the age of 62, **G#9** seems to be tireless in working in her businesses, which includes a travel agency, an insurance company, and trade. Even though **G#15** came from a wealthy family before she emigrated to Guam,

she and her husband worked very hard during their first 10–15 years on Guam, first in their jewellery shop for one year, then in a furniture store for twelve years until 1986, and finally in real estate, renting commercial buildings that they built on acquired land.

Success stories

Some of the early immigrants have been quite successful.

EVAN#2 and her husband felt very lucky about being able to get work in Canada on the second day of their arrival in 1971. Her husband immigrated as a professional architect, after graduating from a vocational college in Taiwan. She is employed as a mathematics teacher offering supplementary classes to school-age immigrants. They both became Christians in Canada and spent a lot of time in the church, as well as doing volunteer work in a migration agency. After graduating from a good vocational school in Taipei, **ECAL#15** worked as a technician in Taiwan. He completed a BSc in Mechanical Engineering in Calgary and worked as an engineer in consulting firms from 1973 to 2002. With a good educational background, **EVAN#18** worked continuously, in a bank and duty-free shop and for an airline.

EVAN#22 felt very proud to tell her husband's success story. Unsuccessful in Montreal at first, they moved to Toronto to start a buffet restaurant with two other Taiwanese. Rated the best Chinese buffet in Toronto, it now has twenty-one branches there. I interviewed her at home, after which she gave me a ride back to my hotel and told me the details of their life and work:

> We would like every customer to be welcomed warmly when they came to our restaurant and to leave with a smile of satisfaction every time. My husband also values family life, comes home for dinner as much as he can, and takes a five week vacation with our family every year. He is very much into philanthropic work, setting up scholarships for the staff's children and donating to the Taiwanese associations in Toronto. As an early immigrant, he often gave talks to new immigrants, encouraging them to get started in their first jobs with confidence and courage, and to learn to speak English in the first three years.

As a result of his hard work, **G#10** was the first Taiwanese immigrant to win an award from the United States Small Business Administration (USSBA) in 2003, representing Guam. His parents first came to Guam in 1967, and started a furniture business. His first job was in warehouse delivery, which he did for four years as part of his family's business. His subsequent jobs were all based on his own ideas. He was self-employed from 1982 to 1986 in wholesale, then worked in retail and wholesale as an owner between 1986 and 2008. At the same time, he sold BMW automobiles between 1991 and 2008. 'I have been here for exactly twenty-nine years, nine months… The ability to adapt and change according to

demand was important. My first sales product was sunglasses, followed by car radios, and now luxury cars."

Even with the small market in Guam, **G#2** seems to be doing quite well.

> I remember helping my father with the garment industry in the mid-1970s, importing garments from Taiwan, where the garments were forty-nine percent finished… My father had to convince Washington that these were imported fabrics to be made into clothes in the USA. Even though the market in Guam was small, Chamorros (Guam's indigenous population) would buy whatever was for sale with whatever money they had, because of their happy go-lucky-lifestyle.

The early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants were socially and economically privileged migrants relative to those who emigrated in the nineteenth century, generally having requisite social and economic capital to undertake formal migration and settle successfully in Guam and Canada. Yet they did not have it easy. They experienced deskilling with migration, as their foreign degrees or work experience were not recognized in the host societies. They experienced downward social mobility as they took up jobs inferior to those they held before migrating. Lastly, they struggled especially to gain a cultural foothold in English-speaking, white North American society.

Home, identity, sense of belonging, and returning

One would assume that old-timers who had spent more years of their lives in the host countries than in Taiwan would have given more thought to the identity issue than new immigrants. The questions asked were, "Where do you perceive as home and why?," "Who do you think you are?," and "Are you returning to Taiwan?"

Home

In Canada, we often got straightforward answers like "Canada is my home," with the following reasons given. They are related to proximity of family members, the environment, and their length of stay.

> My family is here. **(ETOR#24)**
>
> My children are here. **(ETOR#24, ECAL#9)**
>
> Canada is my home. Most of my family members are in North America. **(ECAL#8)**
>
> We are so used to (life) here. When we go back to Taiwan or Hong Kong where my husband grew up, we cannot breathe properly because of the air pollution. **(ECAL#13)**
>
> Canada is my home. I like the living environment and will not go anywhere else. **(EVAN#1)**

> We cannot get used to Taiwan anymore because it is too hot and humid there…We visit Taiwan about once every two to three years. **(ECAL#7)**
>
> I am no longer used to Taiwan and do not want to return. But my home is still Taiwan because I was born there and my brothers and sisters are all there. **(ECAL#16)**
>
> Canada, Taiwan, and Vietnam are all my homes. We don't return to Taiwan because we are no longer based there. Canada is my home. It is inexpensive to live here. **(ETOR#21)**
>
> We are Canadians, as we have been out of touch with Taiwan for too long. **(EVAN#2)**
>
> My home is here in Toronto, the place I have lived most of my life. **(ETOR#24)**

Early Taiwanese–Chinese in Guam regard Guam as their home for similar reasons:

> We have been in Guam for over thirty years, but lived in Taiwan for only twenty years. We have no other home to go to and will stay in Guam. **(G#13)**
>
> Guam is my home, and Taiwan is where my roots are. **(G#20)**

Who am I?

As in most of my previous studies, the identity issue has been somewhat paradoxical. Asking people to choose among different categories is not sufficient to reveal the complexity of their feelings. It is therefore important to prompt repeated and fuller answers with qualitative remarks, as follows:

> Identity is situational. If I go to the US, I say that I am Chinese from Taiwan. If I travel, I say that I am Taiwanese. It depends how and where the question is asked. **(ECAL#14)**
>
> "I am Chinese, but also Taiwanese" is an easier way to describe myself… it is hard to divide people into clear categories. **(G#2)**
>
> I am Chinese, Taiwanese, and Chinese American all at the same time. **(G#15)**
>
> People choose their identity to their advantage. In China, one would say that he is from Guam. But in Guam, one would say that he is Chinese… Regarding self-identity, I am American, Taiwanese, and Chinese. It is sometimes confusing, as to whom I am. **(G#5)**
>
> I think of myself as Chinese, although I have US citizenship. My boys think they are mixed. They are happy to grow up in Guam which does not have racial prejudice. **(G#17)**

> I am Taiwanese, since I have affection towards Taiwan… I consider both Guam and Taiwan my homes. **(G#21)**
>
> I am "Taiwanese American" and "Taiwanese" at the same time. **(G#22)**

Returning to Taiwan

I also asked the respondents if they are planning on returning to Taiwan, as an indication of sense of belonging. A majority (22/24) of Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada wanted to remain in Canada, while a smaller proportion (9/22) wanted to remain in Guam. The following narratives illustrate the decision to remain in Canada:

> I will not return to Taiwan. All my family members are in the United States. My three daughters all graduated from the University of British Columbia. Canada is my home. My husband likes living here. **(EVAN#18)**
>
> Having been in Canada for thirty-nine years, I do not have any roots in Taiwan. **(EVAN#18)**
>
> The only time I went back to Taiwan was in 1981. I do not like the politics there. **(ETOR#20)**
>
> Taiwan is my home, and all my brothers and sisters are there. I went back for the first time five years after I immigrated here. I now return every winter, and less often in the summer, as I cannot stand the hot and humid weather. **(ECAL#19)**

However, some are planning to return in the near future:

> My husband wants to return to live in Taiwan, eventually to *kao lao huan hsiang* (returning home when one is old 告老還鄉). We have already bought a house in Taichung where we can live in the winter. We normally return to visit our relatives in Taiwan twice a year. **(ETOR#22)**
>
> I have not rested for the last fifteen days since the Chinese New Year …I really crave retirement, and look forward to going back to Taiwan where I feel at home with the culture, even though I have lived in Canada for twenty-three years. **(ETOR#23)**

While **G#21** used the term *luo ye giu gen* (leaves returning to the roots 落葉歸根) to describe how she feels about returning to Taiwan in the future, quite a few others were undecided, as to whether they wanted to go back.

> I thought about returning to live in Taiwan before. There are too many people there. Guam is more layback (sic). It is a friendly place, and I am used to living here. **(G#18)**

> I returned to visit my parents in Taiwan five to six times a year when they were alive, but now we only return about two to three times a year. I was born there, and I would like to contribute to Taiwan's Higher Education… If I have a good job offer, I will return to live there. I can spend one semester in one place, or stay in Taiwan, renting out my apartment in Guam. **(G#18)**

All in all, it is hard to decide whether to stay or leave, like the first generation of new immigrants that I studied (Chiang 2011). However, this generation of migrants who became permanent settlers is distinct from the post-1980s new Chinese immigrants (from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong) who are more transnational.

Conclusions

Extant literature concerning the diaspora of Taiwanese–Chinese to overseas locations often highlights their high unemployment rates in western countries such as Canada and Australia which has attracted recent Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants who have gone abroad with financial assets under business migration programs (Chiang and Kuo 2000; Chiang and Hsu 2006). In spite of their good education and entrepreneurial skills acquired in their home countries, Taiwanese-Chinese often have not applied these skills well in the host countries. Because their children's education formulates an important reason for them to immigrate overseas, "astronaut families" (Chiang 2006, 2008) and split households (Waters 2002; Chee 2005;) are common outcomes.

This study attempts to fill in existing gaps on Chinese–Taiwanese migrants in the West through ethnographic research, helping to provide vivid images of the life experiences of early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants. Our interviewees are not descendants of the immigrants who came much earlier, such as the *loh wah kiu* (old overseas Chinese 老華僑), nor those among the new Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants of the late 1980s. Their historical significance is linked to two political incidents that led to the alienation of Taiwan, first from the United Nations in 1971 and then from the United States in 1979. The timing of their immigration was also linked to immigration policy changes such as the introduction of the points system in 1967, and its subsequent amendment in 1978 in Canada. Their migration to Guam was also affected by the change in visa requirements.

Whether the early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants are settling permanently or not depends on the circumstances. They often think of themselves as different from the new Taiwanese–Chinese arrivals, who are leading transnational lives. As noted by Wong (2005), the new Asians arrived as business immigrants, independent skilled workers, or with family members who were immigrating. The first generation of recent Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants was concentrated in middle-class or upper-middle class residential areas which provided safety, good transportation and, most importantly, good quality schools to which many Taiwanese sought admission. Some of the first-generation migrants fit the stereotype of "millionaire migrants" as depicted by Ley (2010). They raised their children with one or both parents living in Canada, while being supported by their

earnings from Taiwan. As transnationals, the parents and different members in the family stayed connected, maintaining links between migrants and their family and friends back home.

The cosmopolitan and welcoming atmosphere of both Canada and Guam suits the Taiwanese–Chinese who have chosen to immigrate. They experience a smooth process of integration as their sense of home grows stronger, and as they become permanent settlers in a multi-cultural environment. Despite the differences in location, more similarities than differences were brought to light between the early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada and in Guam. Most of them came to Canada or Guam for gainful employment when they were young adults. Diligence, ingenuity and perseverance served them well as important achievement factors, in addition to the development opportunities for hard-working immigrants. They came from a good educational background and brought with them entrepreneurship and social capital from Taiwan. Their children received a good education while in Canada and Guam, went on to study at university and moved on to successful careers. In both locations, they have in fact contributed to the host societies in building human capital and increasing the birth rates. More importantly, they are not "settler losses," but are making the host country their home and becoming an integral and vibrant part of the host community through various kinds of social participation. Most of them, by now retired and in good health, are enjoying rich and busy social lives as volunteers in various religious, social, political, and community organizations.

The early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants are contributing significantly to the cultural and ethnic diversity of Canada and Guam in the era of globalization. Having lived abroad for close to forty years, their global views are different from the new immigrants and the people back in Taiwan, maintaining a strong sense of belonging to the countries to which they have immigrated. Having moved with their families at the start, their definition of home depends to a large extent on where their family members are. They therefore fit the description of *luo di sheng gen* (planting new roots, 落地生根). In contrast to the new immigrants, they are less likely to engage in a transnational life.

Identity changes with time. It would be worthwhile to compare different generations with regard to their mobility patterns, identity, and sense of home in the future. Chinese immigrants of different ethnicities should also be studied as a part of the early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Canada and the United States, which have taken the largest numbers of immigrants of all countries. By utilizing ethnographic research, this paper highlights the diverse nature of early immigrant experiences which remain under-represented in recent accounts in print. One cannot speak with assurance that there is a substantial difference between contemporary, early, and historical migration processes and outcomes. All migrants need to struggle to survive or to be successful in their adopted countries. The theoretical and policy implications that impacted the life experiences of the early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants who were interviewed during the course of this study need to be investigated on a broader scale in order to reach general conclusions.

Notes

1 An early version of this paper was published by *Journal of Chinese Overseas* in 2012.
2 Specifically, this refers to Han Chinese who emigrated from Taiwan to other countries.
3 "Social field" is a term used by sociologists to indicate one's living space that include various lived experiences. In this case, two countries in which the migrants live simultaneously after emigration, are "transnational social fields."
4 "Early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants" in this study are defined as those who moved to Canada and Guam roughly between 1960 and 1980, to differentiate them from the new Asian immigrants who came to western countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in large numbers in the late 1980s. They belong neither to the group of Chinese sojourners and fortune-seekers in other countries, nor to the new Chinese immigrants who sustained a transnational/circular migration pattern. This term is used interchangeably with "old-timers" in the text.
5 A person or group visibly not one of the majority race in a given population. The term is used primarily in Canada, as a demographic category by Statistics Canada, in connection with that country's Employment Equity policies. The qualifier "visible" is important in the Canadian context where political divisions have traditionally been determined by language (English vs. French) and religion (Catholics vs. Protestants) – "invisible" traits.
6 The term "astronaut family/household" was first used in Hong Kong, where the husbands, after immigration, return to their homelands to make a living to support their wives and children in the host countries. See Chiang 2006 and 2008).
7 This is a metaphor used in geography, meaning that one does not get all the truth from statistics, remote sensing, but obtains information from face-to-face interviews.
8 The term "1.5 generation" refers to people who immigrate to a new country at a young age. They earn the label of "1.5 generation" because they bring with them characteristics from their home country but continue their assimilation and socialization in the new country.
9 My own experience as a young member of an early migrant family to the United States in the late 1960s also strengthen my curiosity in understanding this cohort who belong neither to the group of Chinese settlers in overseas countries, nor new Chinese immigrants who sustained a circular migration pattern.
10 The interviews in Guam were conducted in two separate trips between 2008 and 2009. Ten were conducted in the period of June 14–22, 2008, twelve took place between August 30 and September 7 2008, and three were completed in January 2009. Out of these, I selected twenty-two samples of those who arrived before 1980 to be considered as early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants. In Canada, I interviewed six persons April 3–11, 2009 in Vancouver, fourteen persons during August 5–20 in the same year in Calgary, and four persons in Toronto during February 15–19, 2011.
11 I would like to thank Professors Emeriti Becky Stephenson and Hiro Kurashina for introducing me to the interviewees in Guam, their participation in most of the interviews, and insights into the Chinese community in Guam, about which they have profound knowledge. Field assistants Yvette Li and Fendi Chen helped with recordings in Chinese. I am also grateful to Cathy Chu, Josephine Smart, Theresa Barber, and Shirley Chung for introducing to me some of the early Taiwanese–Chinese immigrants in Vancouver, Calgary and Toronto.
12 This was a government organization consisting of veterans who were construction professionals.
13 A federally authorized tax practitioner empowered by the US Department of the Treasury to represent taxpayers before the IRS.

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8 Two migration documentaries from Taiwan[1]

Chiu Kuei-fen and Tsai Yu-yueh

Documentaries and migration studies in Taiwan

Like South Korea, Taiwan has become a destination country for immigrants from many Asian countries in the past decades.[2] In the case of Taiwan, immigration flows and the resulting demographic transformation began to gather momentum in the 1980s with Taiwan's increasing economic investment in China and South East Asia.[3] Just as Taiwanese emigrants went to Japan in the 1970s and early 1980s for economic reasons, many immigrants from China and Southeast Asian countries now come to Taiwan with the hope of escaping dire economic situations back home.[4] As some chapters of this book show, the large migration flows have led to a significant demographic transformation in Taiwan and generated new social issues for study.

In this essay, we use two Taiwanese documentaries to address the following relatively under-explored issues in migration studies: 1) perspective and predicament of the Taiwanese husband in brokered transnational marriages, 2) the question of agency in the micro-social relations of inter-cultural partnerships, and 3) indigenous migration within Taiwan, which has also constituted an important field of research but is seldom considered comparatively with studies of transnational migration. *My Imported Wife* (2009, directed by Tsai Tsung-lung) is a documentary about the tough challenges of transnational marriage for a 40-year-old Taiwanese man with cerebral palsy and his young Cambodian wife. The other documentary is *Libangbang* (Chinese title: *Ching Wen's Not Home*, 2000, directed by Kuo Chen-ti), which deals with the migration of indigenous people in Taiwan. The migrant subjects in the two documentaries are socially disadvantaged minorities struggling for survival in adverse conditions. They migrate with the hope of improving the economic situation of their families back home. To facilitate the dialogue with the other chapters of this book, our main focus is *My Imported Wife*. The discussion of *Libangbang* will be relatively short, since it is much shorter and less complex than *My Imported Wife*. *Libangbang* will serve here as a sample to generate a comparative approach to the migration issues discussed in this chapter.

The two documentaries not only challenge the stereotyped representation of their migrant subjects as helpless, oppressed victims, but also draw attention to what I call "the cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged." As defined by Robert Fine, cosmopolitanism is 'a social form of right' in its external manifestation, "realized

in particular institutions, laws, norms, and practices."[5] Subjectively, cosmopolitanism designates a form of consciousness that recognizes rights "as a social form of the subject in the modern world"[6] and the necessity for all human beings to struggle 'for mutual recognition as equals in the context of our multiple differences.'[7] The idea of the cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged points to the agency of the underprivileged. The two documentaries provide a perspective on the micro-social relations in migration, showing us how the underprivileged migrants (and their partners) actively negotiate with inhuman forces in their pursuit of alternative life scripts.

My Imported Wife: "Am I treated like a human?"

The documentary *My Imported Wife* (2003) takes us into the private family space of a Taiwanese husband and his Cambodian wife. Unlike most migration representations that take the immigrant wives as the main focus, this documentary presents an in-depth portrayal of the Taiwanese husband. We learn from the director's voice-over that Huang is a 40-year-old man with cerebral palsy who sells flowers for a living. We also learn that Huang "wanted to have a family, but couldn't find a wife. So he went to Cambodia, and took a foreign bride." He paid the marriage agency US$20,000 to marry 18-year-old Navy. She married with the hope that she could improve the situation of her impoverished family in Cambodia and help them build a house.

Thus, we have a couple quite representative of brokered transnational marriages in several respects. First, the marriage is implicated in an "institutionalized profit-oriented social context."[8] Second, most Taiwanese husbands are socially disadvantaged, but not impoverished[9] – for, in addition to the significant sum paid to the marriage broker, US$20,000 in the case of Huang, they are usually expected to provide continuous financial support for their wives' families.[10] These Taiwanese men turn to Southeast Asian women either because they have difficulty finding a bride domestically[11] or because they subscribe to the traditional concept of gender roles, with which fewer and fewer Taiwanese women comply these days.[12] Third, commodification is key to the problems of transnational marriage. As Lan Pei-chia remarks, "People who emigrate to work are usually not the poorest; they need to have some money and education to initiate the journey. Those who marry to emigrate are relatively impoverished; they have little to invest but themselves."[13] Although this sweeping generalization may not hold true for all immigrant wives, it does fit quite well with the financial picture of Navy.

The documentary begins with a fight between the couple. It captures the marriage in crisis and reveals the issues at stake for the couple:

Navy: She's [the mother-in-law] right.
Huang: Then why do you take my money?
Navy: I know…

Huang: Why do you want my money? Do you take me for a human being? What do you want with my money?
Navy: I know you're human.
Huang: When has she treated me like a human? Just ask her. I'm telling you they're not really poor.
Navy: They're not poor. Really? Then why else would I marry to Taiwan? Because of poverty, that's why I got married [and came] here. I dare you to come out and say it.

The beginning scene marks the commodity status of the immigrant wife. Her choice of the transnational marriage is imbedded in the broader context of uneven international economic development and the marriage industry that feeds on this imbalance. However, Navy appears very articulate and tough rather than a voiceless, helpless victim of transnational marriage. Neither does the Taiwanese husband assume the overwhelming dominating role in their marriage relationship. Another interesting thing to note here is that while many related studies focus on how immigrants' rights and humanity are jeopardized,[14] the opening scene reveals that the human status of the Taiwanese husband is also cast in doubt. The Taiwanese husband's protest indicates that the male party in a transnational marriage may be equally plagued by questions of humanity and commodification in transnational marriages.

Indeed, throughout the documentary, we see a deeply troubled and insecure husband who suspects that his Cambodian wife married him for money and would leave him without regret if he lost his job. As the documentary unfolds, we see Huang trying to resist the role of "rich Taiwanese son-in-law" that, in his view, turns him into a commodity in the marriage. The deep-seated worry about his jeopardized human status propels him to make scenes in front of Navy's relatives. To find a solution to the money problem that is ruining their marriage, Navy tries to find a job, to gain some financial independence. However, the attempt is obstructed by Huang, as is often the case with many transnational marriage couples.[15] Huang suspects that she would run away if she found a job, for the stereotypical image of "money-grabbing, runaway foreign brides" is widely disseminated in Taiwan.[16] Paradoxically, as Navy is deprived of the opportunity to secure a financial income of her own, she is forced to ask for money from him, which further deepens his suspicion that his wife is simply using him as a cash machine. The vicious cycle places the couple in a difficult dilemma. "Am I treated like a human?" The very beginning of the documentary thus dramatizes and complicates the question of humanity that often lies at the heart of migration studies.

The documentary is structured basically by two major journeys. One is the journey Huang and Navy undertake to her home village in Cambodia three years after their marriage. The couple's journey to Cambodia is followed by a trip to Taiwan by Navy's mother, which worsens the couple's already tense relationship. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is in his most seemingly triumphant moment as a powerful husband *vis-à-vis* his wife and the poor in-laws that Huang is shown to be most vulnerable to the threat to his status as a human. In shots

taken in Cambodia, Huang is shown always surrounded by Navy's relatives and friends. We see him distributing gifts and money in the villages. In a scene showing Huang inside the mother-in-law's home, Huang remarks bitterly that everything in it was purchased with his money. Instead of securing for Huang what Wang Hong-zen calls "masculinity"[17] for Taiwanese men, these moments in Cambodia reveal how such masculinity remains a problem for the Taiwanese husband.

A hotel receptionist, an old friend of Huang's, offers an analysis of Huang's psychological complex in an interview:

> He feels insecure. He lacks confidence That's why he's like that… His attitude is really wrong. It makes no difference whether he marries a Taiwanese or a foreign woman. It ends up all the same. He's afraid she likes him for his money, not for what he is… If someone is very nice to him, he would suspect that she is after something.[18]

While the Taiwanese husband is continuously tormented by the fear that he is nothing but a cash machine to his Cambodian wife and her relatives, the Cambodian wife, on the other hand, feels she is being treated as subhuman because of her family's poverty. Both feel that they are treated as a commodity rather than as a human being. The in-depth portrayal of the psychological effects of commoditized transnational marriage makes this documentary particularly valuable for migration studies.

The narrative ends with a whole set of questions posed by the director's voice-over, coupled with shots taken in Cambodia and Taiwan:

> Taiwan and Cambodia. City and countryside. Forty years old and twenty years old. Huang Nai-hui and Navy. Can the distance between them be bridged? Are there still battles of trans-national marriages going on in corners invisible to us? When can the Taiwanese prince and the Cambodian princess live happily ever after?

A very bleak prospect for the couple indeed.

Significance of multi-layered ending

It is noteworthy that, strictly speaking, this narrative ending is not the ending of the documentary. It is followed immediately by inter-titles, telling us that the couple fights less after the mother-in-law goes back to Cambodia and that "Perhaps the battles will continue… But happiness exists in such moments." These inter-titles are accompanied by a picture of a smiling Huang and Navy. In contrast to the gloomy picture we find in the first ending, the second ending opens up the possibility of happiness. It is implied that transnational marriages are just like all other marriages, with ups and downs throughout.

Indeed, a 2010 study shows that "compared to Taiwanese native married women, fewer married immigrants had stressful life events or depression, and they reported (a) higher QOF (quality of life)."[19] The research included interviews of 1602 married women, of which 801 were immigrant wives and 801 were domestic married women. The immigrant participants were between the ages of 16 and 50, "the mean length of residence in Taiwan was 6.58 ± 3.87 years, and most had low education and low employment rate." The research finds that "after controlling for putative confounding factors, the immigrants still had better psychological QOF and a lower prevalence rate of depression."[20] Although more studies are needed to consolidate the conclusion reached in this particular study, it alerts us to the problem of assuming that all transnational marriages are inevitably worse off than those with both spouses from the same country.

Following this "second ending" is another ending constituted mainly by two film clips. As the conventional list of the names of people involved in the making of the documentary runs at the bottom of the screen, we also see two film clips running on the upper part of the screen. One film clip shows a smiling Huang making comments on their roles in the documentary. "We are the directors, best actors, best male and female actor; all at the same time! We laugh when we want to laugh; we cry when we want to cry. It seems we are making a TV soap opera." The other clip shows Navy speaking excitedly. "See how pretty it is! Hey, you'll air the film in Taiwan when it's finished? My Cambodian friends would be very happy to see it on television. I'll call my friends to spread the news when you set a date to put on the air."

The two film clips serve as a comment on the film itself. This meta-ending calls attention to the influence documentary has on self-representation. Huang and Navy were conscious of their participation in the filming process and that what they said or did would contribute to the meaning of the documentary. As the documentary filmmaker and critic Trinh Minh-ha points out, "The truest representation of oneself always involves elements of fiction and of imagination, otherwise there is no representation, or else, only a dead, hence 'false,' representation."[21] This does not mean that the documentary is pure fiction. The point is that the idea of a "pure" documentary is unsustainable.[22] The filmed subjects often consciously choose what to present to the camera and how to present it.[23] The final ending of the documentary implies that the filmed subjects are highly conscious of the power of media and may use it for their own interests. In the documentary, we see both Huang and Navy vigorously voice their opinions in defense of themselves. Both refuse to accept what they see as inhuman treatment that impinges on their human rights.

This opens up the question of agency of the underprivileged in transnational marriage. The underprivileged immigrant wives exert their agency not simply in what Wang Hong-zen calls the "hidden spaces of resistance" (e.g., manipulating intimate relations with their husbands and threatening to leave Taiwan);[24] many Southeast Asian women choose cross-border marriage because they imagine Taiwan to be a place where they can be more or less free from the givenness at home.[25] The exercise of imagination, in Arjun Appardurai's view, is essential to

"the fabrication of social lives" and resistance to "the givenness of things."[26] As Appardurai remarks, "Lives today are as much acts of projection and imagination as they are enactments of known scripts or predictable outcomes."[27] The projection of a new life in Taiwan is not possible without a cosmopolitan outlook that presupposes an openness toward the world. On the other hand, many socially disadvantaged Taiwanese men find in brokered transnational marriage the prospect of marriage denied to them in the local marriage market. Imagination generated by transnational information flows may create an ideological illusion, but it also powers the projections of alternative lives that open up possibilities heretofore unimaginable to the underprivileged.

Huang and Navy are shown developing a cosmopolitan outlook not simply because they travel across borders, but also because they exhibit what Gerard Delanty defines as a "cosmopolitan imagination" that makes it possible to develop new relations between the self, the other, and the world in moments of openness.[28] In Delanty's view, what characterizes cosmopolitanism is not "mobilities–networked relations organized in new kinds of spaces and temporal processes."[29] Rather, it is the creation and articulation of communicative models of world openness.[30] While mobility generates transnational experiences, it does not necessarily bring into presence a cosmopolitan outlook which suggests "a moral and ethical standpoint." The key here is a negative self-perception among actors, for "cosmopolitanism signals a condition of self-confrontation and incompleteness."[31] For immigrant wives such as Navy, openness toward cultural differences is key to survival. For Huang the Taiwanese husband, on the other hand, this negative self-perception becomes apparent as he is forced to confront his long-standing sense of insecurity.

In the documentary, the family space of transnational marriage is shown to be a cosmopolitan space, where a husband and wife from very different backgrounds constantly negotiate with cultural differences in the pursuit of their dreams. Both the husband and wife are compelled to see their own culture from another perspective and subject many of their assumptions to critical scrutiny. To borrow from Jacques Derrida's discussion of the question of the foreigner, the foreigner is not simply a "being-in-question," as noted so often in migration studies, but is "also the one who, putting the first question, puts me in question."[32] Coming from another culture and speaking an unusual language, the foreigner "shakes up the threatening dogmatism of the paternal *logos*."[33] In other words, the question of the foreigner demands new practices and new understanding of what constitutes the self.

Seen in this light, *My Imported Wife* goes beyond representation of the victimhood of the underprivileged in transnational marriage. It explores the pursuit of cosmopolitan rights in an age of transnational capital flows. The documentary shows that what really matters for the couple is the question of their human status. The couple's fights are conducted in terms of the discourse of the human. One crucial defining feature of such discourse is the prohibition of "the instrumentalization or technologization of human beings—the use of another human as a means rather than as an end itself…"[34] As this documentary reveals in profound depth, the human, in Pheng Cheah's words, does not exist outside and independently of instrumentality, but is "materially constituted by instrumentality."[35]

It is arguable that the pursuit of human status drives Huang and Navy into brokered transnational marriage. Huang hopes to overcome his social disadvantage (cerebral palsy) that renders him "less than human" and not on a par with other male competitors in the local marriage market. Navy, on the other hand, seeks to overcome the constraints of impoverishment. Moreover, as we see in the documentary, the continual fights between Navy and Huang actually stage negotiations for the constitution of humanity in a marriage relationship so deeply involved in the inhuman forces of commodification.

As a discourse on transnational marriage, *My Imported Wife* provides much food for thought for migration studies. First, in choosing transnational marriage, the underprivileged may not be simply helpless victims, but agents trying to change their lot in life. They should be understood, as Michel Foucault says, as "investors": "migration is an investment; the migrant is an investor. He is an entrepreneur of himself who incurs expenses by investing to obtain some kind of improvement."[36] Indeed, the director Tsai points out in a telephone interview that not all immigrant wives come to Taiwan because their families are poor. As Isabelle Cheng's chapter in this book shows, many Indonesian immigrant wives choose to come to Taiwan because of ethnic clashes in Indonesia. In other words, they become migrants in pursuit of other life possibilities. Finally, if a cosmopolitan outlook signifies a stance of openness towards the world and a willingness to engage negative self-perceptions through cross-cultural encounters, the parties involved in transnational marriages may be seen as engaging in cosmopolitanism in a sense. The case of Huang and Navy challenges the traditional theoretical links among transnational mobility, class, and cosmopolitanism.[37] Cosmopolitanism is not an exclusive privilege of the elite class, though the risks and stakes involved in the practice among the underprivileged, such as work exploitation and sexual assault, are often much greater than when practiced by the elite class.

Libangbang: "Does he want to come back home?"

To demonstrate how the cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged takes place not only in transnational space but also within domestic space, we now turn to *Libangbang*, a relatively short and less complex documentary of thirty-six minutes directed by Kuo Chen-ti. Our analysis of the documentary will also, accordingly, be brief. In contrast to the strong rhetoric of *My Imported Wife*, *Libangbang* can be characterized as a lyrical film. It was shot on Orchid Island, a small island off the southeastern coast of Taiwan with a population of 4,000 people. Most of the island's inhabitants are *Tao* indigenes. The documentary portrays the daily life of an indigenous couple. Their eldest son, Ching Wen, migrates to Taiwan for work and sends money back to help his family. This is very much like what Navy does in *My Imported Wife*. Structured as a visit to the indigenous island at a time when the traditional fishing season was about to begin, this short documentary moves along with casual chat between the director as a visiting guest and her hosts, Ching Wen's parents. The interview is interwoven with shots of the indigenous

way of life, such as women working in a taro field, indigenous men fishing using traditional methods, meal preparation, and house-building.

Libangbang, the English title of the documentary, is the *Tao* word for flying fish, the totem for the indigenous tribe on Orchid Island. The English title thus identifies the documentary as a film about the indigenous culture on the island.[38] The Chinese title, *Ching Wen Is Not Home*, however suggests another reading of the documentary. *Ching Wen Is Not Home* poses the question: "Why is Ching Wen not home?" Significantly, the protagonist Ching Wen is absent from the documentary. There are traces of him throughout the film, including his oil paintings to be sent to Taiwan for sale, some photos of his family taken by him, sea pebbles he collected for work on the house, gifts he gave to his parents, the house he helped build but did not have time to complete, and old film clips of him making a traditional boat. These traces not only evoke memories of his presence on the island, but also underscore the point that he is no longer there. His parents miss him, but for some reason he has not come back home as he promised. The documentary ends as the fishing season arrives. The mother offers this monologue:

> The day before yesterday he called and said if he does not make it back by April, he will be back in May. I asked him to make it April. "March 15 on the lunar calendar will be the Crab Festival. Aren't you coming back?" He said, "Oh really? Yes, yes, I want to come back." I'm not sure if he really wants to come back or not.

The mother stops talking with a lonely (sad?) smile, as if she doubts that she will see her son again any time soon. Thus ends the film.

The documentary dramatizes the absence of Ching Wen and unfolds a typical story of indigenous migration to Taiwan. We learn from the mother that Ching Wen went to study in Taipei when he was 17 years old. Since then, he has worked for most of the time in Taiwan, as there are very few job opportunities on the island. Fishing is the only way to make a living for most of the indigenous men there. In the documentary, the parents keep waiting for Ching Wen to come back home to finish building his house, but his return is repeatedly postponed for various reasons. Although Orchid Island appears rather idyllic in the film, the documentary implies that the indigenous society is plagued by economic problems. Many young people go to Taiwan for work to help improve the financial situation at home.

As in the case of immigrants from Southeast Asian countries, uneven economic development is the underlying cause of the high rates of indigenous migration from Orchid Island to Taiwan. This scenario of migration thus invites a comparison with immigrants from Southeast Asian countries. Like migration from Southeast Asian countries, indigenous migration from Orchid Island to Taiwan is often understood as a forced movement motivated by economic reasons.[39] Another factor is the impact of modernity. Based on her fieldwork, Tsai Yu-yueh points out that the *Tao* people's world view has changed gradually since the 1960s.[40] For many young *Tao* indigenes, the traditional way of life is no longer satisfying.[41]

Migration to Taiwan is often taken as a move to open up possibilities. Again, we find here a parallel to the immigrants from Southeast Asian countries discussed above.

This hope of creating new possibilities in a new place can certainly be interpreted as an ideological illusion. But the choice may also suggest a cosmopolitan outlook. It means, as in the case of Navy in *My Imported Life*, breaking away from the constraints of one's lot at home. In other words, the indigenes choose not only to be "natives" but also to be cosmopolitans in their own ways, in spite of the risks and challenges involved in migration.[42]

Thus, we need to handle carefully the central question posed in *Libangbang*: "Why is Ching Wen not home?" The answer seems all too obvious: He has gone to work in Taiwan, for he wants to help gain more income for his family back home. Interestingly, the ending of the documentary film spawns another question that complicates the issue: Does he *want* to come back home? The documentary implies that perhaps Ching Wen has not been forced to stay away from home.[43] While Ching Wen's mother continues to hope that her son will come back home for good when more jobs are available on the island, we find through a recent interview with Ching Wen that he now lives most of the time in Taiwan, making a living as a freelance artist. For young *Tao* indigenes like Ching Wen, who have a higher educational background and more "cultural capital," the comparatively cosmopolitan environment in Taiwan seems more attractive. However, it should also be noted here that for indigenous cosmopolitanism to take place, it is not enough to have a cosmopolitan outlook. Many indigenes with lower education work as cheap, unskilled laborers in Taiwan. Mental and emotional stresses are a prevalent problem.[44] The complexity of the social problems generated by indigenous migration reminds us that cosmopolitanism is not simply a matter of subjective choices. The role of structural constraints should not be overlooked. The cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged is a strenuous battle against the inhuman forces that shape their material reality.[45]

Conclusion

The documentary format is often valued for its indexical capacity. Indeed, our study shows that documentaries provide an invaluable space of self-representation for the underprivileged. As Jay Ruby remarks, "Being able to hear people tell their stories and observe their lives instead of being told what they think and the meaning of their behavior clearly offers subjects a greater say in the construction of their image."[46] This is where documentaries can contribute significantly to documentary studies. At their best, documentaries as a mode of representation not only open up a space for the underprivileged to voice their feelings, but also shed light on the underlying psychological factors that should be taken into consideration in understanding this social phenomenon.

The two documentaries analyzed in this study remind us that the underprivileged have conflicting interests and different investments in self-representation. Making room for all these different positions and self-representations, documentaries provide

a space of hospitality that welcomes the foreign.[47] Documentaries, understood in this sense, are a discourse of ethics: "Ethics is hospitality."[48] These two documentaries not only give us a glimpse of the cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged; they also demonstrate how the practice of creating a documentary is a practice of cosmopolitanism with the cultivation of an "ethic of hospitality" as the aim.

Notes

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2 Danielle Belanger, Hye-Kyung Lee and Wang Hong-zen, "Ethnic Diversity and Statistics in East Asia: 'Foreign Brides' Surveys in Taiwan and South Korea," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33.6 (2010): 1108.

3 Wang Hong-zen and Chang Shu-ming, "The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-border Marriage Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam," *International Migration*, 40.6 (2002): 95; Hsiao-chuan Hsia, *Searching for a Haven* (流離尋岸) (Taiwan: Tang-shan, 2002), pp.163–70.

4 Wang and Chang, "The Commodification of International Marriages", p.98; Hsia Hsiao-chuan, "Foreign Brides, Multiple Citizenship and Immigrant Movement in Taiwan," *Asia and Pacific Migration Journal*, 18.1 (2009): 28.

5 Robert Fine, C*osmopolitanism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p.xi.

6 Ibid., p.139.

7 Ibid., p.xiii.

8 Wang and Chang, "The Commodification of International Marriages."

9 Hsia, *Searching for a Haven*, pp.161–75; Hong-zen Wang, "Masculinity and the "Attractive" Transnational Marriage: Why Do Taiwanese Men prefer Viet Nam Women as Wives?" (男性氣魄與可「娶」的跨國婚姻：為何臺灣男子要與越南女子結婚?) *Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (臺灣東南亞學刊), 3.1 (2006): 6–7.

10 Wang, "Masculinity and the Attractive Transnational Marriage", p.7.

11 Hsia, *Searching for a Haven*, pp.87–91.

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14 Hsia Hsiao-Chuan, "Internationalization of Capital and the Trade in Asian Women—the Case of 'Foreign Brides' in Taiwan," in *Women and Globalization*, Delia Aguilar and Anne Lacsamana (eds.) (Amherst, NY: Humanity Press, 2004), pp.181–229; Lan, "Migrant Women's Bodies and Boundary Markers," p.834; Tsai Ying-Hsiu, H. H. Michael Hsiao, "The Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) for Foreign Workers and Foreign Spouses in Taiwan: A Portrayal," *Asia Pacific Forum*, 33 (2006): 1–31; Belanger, Lee and Wang, "Ethnic Diversity and Statistics in East Asia."

15 Wang, "Masculinity and the Attractive Transnational Marriage", pp.28–9.

16 Hsia, *Searching for a Haven*, pp.191–2.

17 Wang, "Masculinity and the Attractive Transnational Marriage."

18 To make the interviewee's meaning more comprehensible to our readers, I am presenting here a slightly modified version of the English subtitles.

19 Frank Huang-Chih Chou, Pei-Chun Chen, Renyi Liu, Chi-Kung Ho, Kuan-Yi Tsai, Wen-Wei Ho, Shin-Shin Chao, Kung-Shih Lin, Shih-Pei Shen, and Cheng-Chung Chen, "A Comparison of Quality of Life and Depression between Female Married Immigrants and Native Married Women in Taiwan," *Social Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology*, 45.9 (2010): 921.
20 Ibid., p.929.
21 Minh-ha Trinh, *Framer Framed* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 168.
22 Stella Bruzzi, *New Documentary: A Critical Introduction* (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), p.211; John Corner, "Documentary Theory," *The Art of Record: A Critical Introduction to Documentary* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp.21–2.
23 Trinh, *Framer Framed*, p. 205.
24 Wang Hong-zen, "Hidden Spaces of Resistance of the Subordinated: Case Studies from Vietnamese Female Migrant Partners in Taiwan," *International Migration Review*, 41.3 (2007): 719.
25 Hsia, *Searching for a Haven*, pp.112–120.
26 Arjun Appardurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp.54–55.
27 Appardurai, *Modernity at Large*, p.61.
28 Gerard Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57.1 (2006): 27.
29 Ibid., p.32.
30 Ibid., p.35.
31 Ibid., p.38.
32 Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, Rachel Bowlby (trans.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p.3.
33 Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, p.5.
34 Pheng Cheah, *Inhuman Condition: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p.4.
35 Ibid., p.263.
36 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Graham Burchell (trans.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.230.
37 James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.33–36. Victor Roudometof, "Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization," *Current Sociology*, 53 (2005): 114.
38 The main fishing season runs from March to June. The *Tao's* traditional rituals and social organization are closely connected to fishing.
39 Tsai Yu-yueh, *Mental Disorder of the Tao Aboriginal Minority in Taiwan: Modernity, Social Change, and the Origin of Social Suffering* (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 2009), pp.205–206.
40 Tsai Yu-yueh, "Migration, Mental Frustration, and Modernity: The Social Origins of the Mental Disorders of the *Tao* Aboriginal People on Taiwan's Orchid Island," *Taiwanese Sociology* 13 (2007): 19–21.
41 Tsai, *Mental Disorder of the Tao Aboriginal Minority in Taiwan*, pp.104–110.
42 Maximilian C. Forte, "Introduction: Indigeneities and Cosmopolitanisms," *Indigenous Cosmopolitanism: Transnational and Transcultural Indigeneity in the Twenty-first Century,* Maximilian C. Forte (ed.) (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), p.14.
43 The reality is more complicated than this simple dichotomy implies. Taiwan is no haven for job-seeking indigenes. In addition to poor working conditions, indigene laborers face tough competition in the Taiwanese job market. The large inflows of foreign laborers for manufacturing and construction industries in Taiwan since the late 1980s have affected job opportunities for the indigenes. With more than 300,000 foreign laborers as job competitors, many indigenes suffer from unemployment. The

unemployment rate of the *Tao* indigenes in 2007 was 18 percent, much higher than the 7.92 percent for other indigenous tribes and the 5.03 percent for other Taiwanese ethnic groups. ('Report on Indigenous Employment,' Taipei: Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan, 2008: p.2).

44 Tsai, *Mental Disorder of the Tao Aboriginal Minority in Taiwan*, pp.104–110.

45 Because of the uneven distribution of educational resources, more than 50 percent of the indigenes who work in Taiwan are junior high school graduates. They tend to take on unsteady labor jobs on short-term contracts with little prospect of social mobility or advancement. Low promotion rates, long working hours, low pay, and high-risk working environments are common features of these jobs.

46 Jay Ruby, "Speaking for, Speaking about, Speaking with, or Speaking Alongside," *Picturing Culture: Explorations of Film and Anthropology* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), p.204.

47 Jacques Derrida. *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (trans.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p.10.

48 Ibid., p.17.

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9 Migration through the lens of political advertising

How Taiwanese parties discuss migration

Dafydd Fell

Over the past two decades, immigration has become one of the most salient issues in western party systems. Parties such as the Front National (France), British National Party (England), Progress Parties (Scandinavia) and Party for Freedom (Netherlands) have relied heavily on an anti-immigrant message to appeal to voters. In some countries these new challenger parties have made major inroads into the support base of older established parties. This was exemplified in how the Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen was able to come second in the first round of the French presidential election in 2002 and contest the one-on-one second round. Anti-immigrant appeals have often caused the mainstream political parties to pander to anti-immigrant sentiment by offering policies designed to restrict legal immigration and even limit the numbers of overseas students. In 2007 the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown responded to concerns that migrant workers were gaining the lion's share of new jobs created by projects such as the London Olympics by calling for 'British Workers for British Jobs'.[1] This was later exploited by the British National Party, which in 2009 ran a nationwide poster campaign (including in my own small town) showing three construction workers in helmets and the slogan 'British Jobs for British Workers'. On British news programmes, non-governmental organizations such as Migration Watch regularly warn audience of how the country is being swamped by uncontrolled immigration. More recently, the British Coalition government has implemented policies designed to restrict the numbers of fee-paying overseas students from outside the European Union. The topic has even permeated the cultural sphere, with countless films and TV dramas, such as *My Beautiful Laundrette* and *This is England*, centred on the migration issue.

When we compare the scale of immigration – both labour and marriage migration – to and from Taiwan with European cases, it is clear that migration has had an equal if not greater social impact in Taiwan. As large numbers of migrant spouses from Southeast Asia and China gain Taiwanese citizenship, they will become major political constituencies. The migration trends of the past two decades pose severe challenges to Taiwan's political elites. For instance, the commercialization of arranging foreign brides has served to reinforce the kind of patriarchal values that Taiwan's women's movements have fought to dismantle since the dying days of martial law. Similarly, the increasing

numbers of Taiwanese living and studying in mainland China and the popularity of mainland spouses in Taiwan itself are both seen as undermining the development of Taiwanese identity and nationalism. Such groups are viewed by some Taiwanese nationalists as potential Trojan horses for the People's Republic of China's (PRC) unification campaigns.

What is thus surprising is that the migration issue has not been more salient, given that it is so entwined with the most controversial issue in Taiwanese politics, that of national identity. Unlike in British or French televised presidential/prime minister debates, Taiwan's presidential candidates do not cross swords on the issue. This limited salience became apparent to me from a cursory review of Taiwanese television election advertisements over the last two decades, which found that only a handful out of the 2,000 or so broadcast advertisements touched upon the migration issue. Nevertheless, in the 2012 national level elections in Taiwan, new immigrants finally received extensive and quite inclusive attention. It is possible that this will prove to have been a watershed year marking the moment at which parties have at last begun to take these constituencies seriously and fight for their votes and welfare.

In this chapter I examine how Taiwan's political parties have dealt with the migration issue since the lifting of martial law through an examination of these election advertisements. Election advertisements represent one of the best means of understanding Taiwanese political parties and their positions on core issues. This is because election advertisements are the form of propaganda that is most accessible to ordinary voters, and these ads are just so ubiquitous across TV channels that it is almost impossible for Taiwan's TV-obsessed public to avoid exposure to them. Election advertising was banned under martial law and in the first post-martial law election only newspaper ads were permitted.[2] TV ads were first permitted in 1991 and 1992, but using a UK-style system of limited free time on the three terrestrial channels according to the number of candidates the main parties nominated. However, in the mid–late 1990s, as the number of cable television channels exploded, Taiwan liberalized towards a US-style free market in election advertising. In other words, parties were free to buy as much advertising space as they could afford and the channels could supply. I can still recall how the commercial breaks on my 5-year-old's favourite cartoon channels were dominated by election advertisements during the 2000 presidential campaign. In contrast to the universal exposure to TV election ads, far fewer voters watch televised debates, look at party websites, read political news in the newspaper, watch political talk shows, join election rallies or read election party manifestos.

The first decade of television election advertisements

The first advertisement in my sample came in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, the first time the whole national parliament had been directly elected.[3] The election saw the almost century-old ruling party, the Kuomintang (國民黨KMT), challenged by the Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨 DPP), which had been

founded just six years earlier. The central slogan of this three-minute DPP ad was 'We have given them (KMT) forty years. What have they given us?' The ad featured a white-collar worker speaking to the camera about his brother's experience of emigrating to the United States. The narrator talks of how common it is to see emigration company advertisements.[4] He tells us how it was the pressure of the Taiwanese education system that persuaded his brother to make the painful decision to leave Taiwan for the sake of his children. We hear how the brother suffered racial discrimination and depression in the US. The speaker in the ad is not sure whether he would be prepared to leave Taiwan but makes it clear that, having been through the Taiwanese education system, he and his wife have chosen not to have children. There is much overlap between the voice-box character and the sufferings of the protagonist Lu Wenting (陸文婷) in Shen Rong's (謎容*) 1986* novella *At Middle Age* (人到中年). In that story Lu's closest friends chose emigration to North America rather than continuing to suffer the hardships of intellectual life in post-Cultural Revolution China.

The above ad was part of the DPP's efforts to expand its support among the white-collar urban middle class by moving away from its traditional nationalist and democratic reform appeals. By 1992 Taiwan was on the road to becoming a liberal democracy, so the DPP needed to find new issues to maintain its growth. Thus this ad was designed to tap into the widespread middle-class concerns over the state education system and their solution – moving abroad.

In December 1995 Taiwan held its second direct legislative elections, and four months later its first-ever direct presidential election. However, these were held under the shadow of Chinese military exercises and missile tests off the Taiwan coast that were designed to intimidate Taiwanese voters.[5] Of all the campaigns of the 1990s, the one that saw the most attention to the migration issue was the 1995 Legislative Yuan election. The two main parties took starkly different approaches to the topic, revealing the limitations to partisan convergence.

First, the KMT released five separate TV ads that focused on ethnic harmony and the contributions that the Mainlander ethnic group had made to Taiwanese society. Thus these ads share similarities with the argument often made by liberal or leftist parties in Europe that the benefits of immigration outweigh their costs to the new host society. The first shows a series of wedding photographs dating from the 1950s to the 1990s featuring Mainlanders and other ethnic groups. It ends with the slogan 'We are all one family' (我們都是一家人). This message of ethnic harmony and the corresponding accusation that the DPP tries to incite ethnic tensions and discrimination against non-Hokklo voters has been one of the most consistent in the KMT's propaganda repertoire. The remaining four ads tell the life stories of four Mainlanders who served in the anti-Japanese and Chinese Civil Wars after moving to Taiwan since 1949. For example, in the Child Soldier Professor ad (小兵教授篇), we hear how Li Nan-hsien (李南賢) from Guangdong joined the army at 11. Unable to speak Mandarin and illiterate, he fought against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Kinmen. The ad describes how during his army service and afterwards he studied hard, and eventually became a popular professor at National Chunghsing University. These ads

included references to anti-Japanese sentiment and Chinese nationalist symbols. They were unashamedly targeted at first-generation Mainlanders, who had long been the KMT's most reliable supporters, but were being courted by the rising Chinese nationalist New Party (NP).

Particularly in the DPP's most radical phase in the early 1990s, it tended to appeal to anti-Mainlander sentiments.[6] Examples of this include the anti-Premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) (he was a first-generation Mainlander) TV ads of 1992, which focused on Hau's verbal gaffes. In one such spot an actor impersonating Hau repeats his comment: 'I love Taiwan, but I love the Mainland more' (我愛台灣, 我更愛大陸). A DPP newspaper ad from 1994 carried a similar anti-Mainlander message. It argued that while Mainlanders enjoyed the best quality of social welfare in the world, Taiwanese had been completely neglected and thus had been their 'slaves for the past fifty years'.[7] The DPP did not make any serious efforts to court the votes of these first-generation Mainlanders, viewing these people as just too incompatible with the party's Taiwanese nationalist values to be worth expending campaign resources on. The KMT also tried to take advantage of the DPP's hostility towards Mainlanders by cultivating a climate of fear among this community in order to strengthen their own electoral interests. For instance, one KMT newspaper ad in 1998 showed the face of an anxious-looking, aged Mainlander veteran and the slogan, 'If this (electoral) battle is lost, the veterans will have no (welfare) guarantee'[8] (輸了這一站，退伍軍人沒有保障).

Unsurprisingly, at the time the DPP handled the migration question in a starkly different manner to the KMT. It tried to play on the widespread anti-Chinese sentiments created by the PLA's military threats. One such theme was to argue that Taiwan must not become another Hong Kong. For instance in one ad we hear the well-known author Shih Shu-ching (施叔青) explain how the Tiananmen Incident (天安門事件) and changes in Hong Kong in the approach to its handover to the PRC persuaded her to leave Hong Kong and return to her home country of Taiwan. Two other DPP ads played on fears of mass migration of Chinese to Taiwan if Taiwan unified with China and became just another province of the PRC. We see clips of hordes of homeless migrant labourers in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou and the narrator asks, 'Are we willing to be flooded by this blind migration? Are we willing to become part of this blind migration?' (我們不願意被盲流淹沒？我們不願意成為盲流的一份?). The DPP appeared to be portraying these potential migrants as sub-human, as they were shown with alien like blank eyes. The style of these ads was quite reminiscent of the KMT's own terror equation employed through the 1990s, which used the formula that a DPP victory would bring Taiwan independence, which would result in Chinese invasion and destruction of Taiwan and loss of prosperity.[9] The DPP tried to intimidate voters with an alternative threat of invasion – an invasion of Chinese migrants, which would create social chaos and take Taiwanese jobs.

In 1998 the KMT's most prominent candidate, Hong Kong-born Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), attempted to offer a broad, inclusive identity appeal known as New Taiwanese (新台灣人). This was best encapsulated in one of President

Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) rally speeches supporting Ma, in which Lee stated: 'No matter whether you came to Taiwan four or five hundred, forty or fifty years ago, (we are) all New Taiwanese.'[10] In the same rally Lee asked Ma where he comes from, to which Ma replied in Hokkien, 'I am a New Taiwanese who grew up drinking Taiwan water, eating Taiwanese rice; a true Taipeinese born in Wanhua'.[11] The KMT also reinforced this message in the Happy Reunion Song TV ad (歡聚歌篇). This song has become the KMT's unofficial national anthem for ethnic harmony among the four main ethnic groups and has been used by the KMT and Ma in election ads since 1998. It mixes Taiwanese and Hakka lyrics with an aboriginal chorus and sends the message that regardless of ethnic background, we are all one happy family.

Migration issues in post-2000 Taiwan

In 2000 the DPP's Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) won the presidential election, defeating the KMT rebel Soong Chu-yu (James Soong 宋楚瑜) and KMT candidate Lien Chan (連戰). This represented the first change in ruling party through elections in Taiwan's history. There was also a radical change in the party system, as significant splinter parties broke off from the mainstream parties. The People First Party (親民黨PFP) was formed of politicians defecting from the KMT and NP, while the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) recruited politicians from both the KMT and DPP. The year 2000 also marked the start of Taiwan's first taste of divided government, as though the DPP held the presidency for the next eight years, the KMT and its allies (PFP and NP) held a clear majority in the parliament. Compared to the consensual inter-party relations of the 1990s, party politics in the era of divided government became polarized and antagonistic.[12]

In the first few years of the post-2000 period, the KMT and its allies continued to stress ethnic harmony in their TV ads. Such ads were meant to indirectly imply that the DPP was stirring up ethnic hostility, particularly against Mainlanders. For instance, in one PFP ad in 2001, locals and non-locals (本土與非本土, meaning Taiwanese and Mainlanders) are represented by a quarrelling couple. The narrator (Soong Chu-yu's wife) explains how tragic it would be for Taiwan to continue to distinguish between locals and non-locals. Then we see the couple looking lovingly into each other's eyes on a bed and turning out the light. The next shot shows a new-born baby. Part of this appeal to multi-ethnic harmony also involved multilingual ads; thus in this ad, the narrator uses both Taiwanese and Mandarin and the background song is in Taiwanese. Nevertheless, it should be noted that for the KMT and its allied parties, this inclusive or multi-culturalist image did not yet reach beyond the four main ethnic groups.

Despite the rapid increase in the number of migrant spouses in the post-2000 period, there was little sign of any resulting rise in attention to the issue in party propaganda. In 2004 elections were held for the presidency (in March) and the Legislative Yuan (in December). However, I found only two ads that touched upon migration into Taiwan. The first in the presidential campaign was a ninety-second DPP ad titled 'Believe in Yourself, Believe in Taiwan' (相信自己相信台灣).

An American speaks in Taiwanese and Mandarin of how he took Taiwanese nationality and of his love for the country. He explains how his American family cannot understand why he wanted to become Taiwanese and was prepared to do Taiwanese military service. Such a decision required him to formally relinquish his US citizenship. The second ad came from the DPP-allied TSU party and was placed during the December 2004 Legislative Yuan elections. Its title was the Football ad (足球篇) and it showed a goalkeeper (representing the TSU) saving penalty after penalty, each penalty kick representing a component of cross-Strait integration. Along with blocking the PRC's 'one country two systems' and the migration of 18-inch wafer production to China,[13] it claimed a key TSU achievement was preventing Chinese immigrants from gaining the right to participate in politics (中國移民參政權). I presume this means the right to stand for election or vote. In 2002 the party even proposed legislation that would require a presidential candidate to have been born in Taiwan to stand.[14] This move was clearly designed to disqualify leading KMT politicians who had been born in China, such as the then KMT chairman Lien Chan and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, from standing in future presidential elections. This bid did not gain cross-party support.[15]

Nevertheless, one migration-related trend that was especially prevalent in the 2004 presidential election was TV advertisements sponsored by overseas Taiwanese groups supporting the DPP's candidate, Chen Shui-bian. My content analysis found sixty separate overseas Taiwanese ads. In one often repeated slot, an elderly American lady standing in front of a stereotypical American house asks her Taiwanese neighbours if they are going on a vacation. The Taiwanese couple explain why they are flying back to help Chen win a second term. She is impressed that they would fly thousands of miles just to vote in an election. Amazingly, this American lady knows Chen's nickname, Abian (阿扁), notes that he has done a lot of good work for Taiwan and expresses her hope that he will win re-election.

In 2008 the DPP returned to the migration terror appeal that it had first employed in 1995. This time a series of DPP ads warned that if the KMT fulfilled its pledge to create a One China Common Market (一中市場), Chinese labourers would swamp Taiwan. In fact, some of the same images of migrant scenes in China were directly recycled from the 1995 ads. We are told that there are 200 million unemployed people in China ready to come to Taiwan, and that salaries in China are just a fifth of those in Taiwan. The message of the ad is clear from its title, 'Taiwanese labour friends, are you ready?' (台灣勞工朋友　你準備好了嗎?) Another ad warns that if Ma Ying-jeou wins, Taiwanese will have to compete for work with 200 million other people. A number of ads made a link to this issue by reminding voters that Ma advocates recognizing Chinese education qualifications. For instance, in one ad we see Ma in a presidential debate stressing he opposes recognizing PRC educational diplomas, and then we are shown him saying, forty minutes later, that he supports their recognition. Another such ad warns that after recognizing PRC diplomas fake diplomas will be everywhere, ending with the question: 'If Ma Ying-jeou wins will you be able to keep your rice bowl?' 如果馬英九當選你能保住飯碗嗎? The message coming out of the DPP was highly reminiscent of the British National Party's appeal for 'British Jobs for British Workers' mentioned at the outset of this chapter.

At this point the DPP had not begun to seriously woo the new Taiwanese, who were rapidly gaining citizenship and thus voting rights. Instead, as we see in Tseng, Cheng and Fell's chapter in this volume, its attempt to impose discriminatory regulations on spouses from China was already alienating not only the Chinese spouses, but also their immediate Taiwanese families. On the eve of the 2008 election the DPP's presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) significantly damaged himself and his party by suggesting that Taiwanese men should stop being 'pigs' and marrying Chinese women because they were 'cheap'.[16] A blogger responded: 'Well I guess that's another 500,000 ROC citizens that won't be voting for Hsieh'.[17]

In the 2008 elections, the KMT had two TV slot ads that touched upon the migration issue. The first one came at the issue indirectly. Its principal subject was the DPP's initiative to hold a referendum on returning KMT party assets to the state on the same day as the January 2008 legislative election. The ad is relevant to this chapter as it featured what was unmistakably a Southeast Asian migrant spouse. In the ad we see a Taiwanese mother-in-law looking at a public notice about the DPP-backed referendum. While the mother-in-law looks confused about the referendum notice, her foreign daughter-in-law (in perfect Mandarin) explains that it is tying the referendum to the general election and that they should boycott this DPP 'dirty trick'. Thus in this ad we see a Southeast Asian bride that has become integrated sufficiently enough not only to express herself well in Chinese, but also to educate her mother-in-law about complex Taiwanese party politics.

The second ad on migration from 2008 was the KMT's attempt to undermine the DPP's message about uncontrolled labour migration. The ad featured comments from ordinary-looking Taiwanese. In this ad we are told that Chinese tourists will be allowed, but not Chinese labour. One person says that even though Chinese diplomas will be recognized, those who have obtained such degrees will not be allowed to work without ROC ID cards. Another asks how they can compete when they can only use simplified characters, and a third person, who looks like a lawyer, tries to reassure his colleagues by saying that the Chinese university graduates will not be allowed to take professional licence examinations and so do not pose any threat. Thus this ad tried to convince voters that economic liberalization with China will not involve the kind of labour migration that the DPP ads had warned of. In contrast, the KMT's message was that closer cross-Strait economic ties would actually bring far more benefits than dangers.

This pattern of debate over the potential dangers and benefits of closer economic relations with China continued after the KMT returned to power in 2008. The process reached a climax in the build-up to the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in the summer of 2010. The DPP issued a series of (three-minute-long) ads only shown online, titled *Is it Really Good to Have ECFA?* (有ECFA 真好?). In one ad we see the male Taiwanese protagonist A Ming (阿明) facing a Mainland Chinese graduate of National Taiwan University in a final-round job interview. Even though A Ming is well qualified, the Chinese candidate gets the job, as he has countless professional qualifications and is willing to work for half the salary demanded by A Ming. The narrator warns that after ECFA is signed, Taiwanese will be undercut by Chinese engineers and doctors requiring half the

salaries Taiwanese demand. Thus the ad was warning of the consequences of both Chinese student and labour migration to Taiwan under the KMT.

Continuity and change in 2012

The final campaign covered in my analysis is that of the combined presidential and legislative elections held in January 2012. Of the TV ads examined, here there were signs of continuity and change. Perhaps because Chinese labour migration has not been liberalized and the scale of Chinese students coming to Taiwan has been limited, the DPP did not stress the danger of Chinese swamping the labour market this time. In contrast, the KMT was on familiar ground, recycling the Happy Reunion Song ad (歡聚歌篇) which it had consistently used since 1998. What was particularly interesting about the 2011 version of the ad was that we also get the image of a cheerful-looking couple (Taiwanese husband and Vietnamese wife) and their baby outside a Vietnamese restaurant. Thus for the KMT at least, the ad implies that the new generation of migrant brides are now part of the national community rather than being a threat. The KMT also produced a twenty-minute, two-part short film for online audiences called *National Flag Girl* (國旗女孩). In the first part a Taiwanese girl who has always lived abroad meets a male Taiwanese traveller who likes to photograph ROC flags wherever he travels. The meeting inspires the lead actress to make her own first visit to Taiwan and to try to understand her mother's home country. Throughout the film the ROC flag seems to be ever-present, in various forms. The short film was made at the time of the celebrations for the 100th anniversary of the ROC and was part of the KMT's bid to make its form of Republic of China-style nationalism relevant to today's younger generation.

The KMT's more inclusive approach was especially visible in a series of ads shown only on its website under the title *Diverse and Tolerant Taiwan* (多元包容台灣情). In one such ad we hear about a half-French, half-Dominican lady called Arelis Yoh Gabot (蕾妮絲) who has adopted Taiwan as her home and immersed herself in Hakka culture. She shows this through her love of Taiwanese food and how she has learnt to cook traditional Hakka cuisine. She even has become a *Linzhang* (neighbourhood head). Despite all the mouth-watering food discussions, the KMT's appeal to multiple identities comes through in the piece, as the final three sentences are 'I am a Hakka daughter in law, I am Taiwanese, I am a citizen of the ROC'. We even see her and her daughter in one of the KMT's final televised ads of the campaign.

It was encouraging to see that the DPP adopted a more multi-culturalist approach for the first time in its 2012 election advertising. In the DPP's New Immigrant ad (新移民篇), we see a Vietnamese spouse talking to her Taiwanese daughter as they make Vietnamese spring rolls. The narration is entirely in Vietnamese – a first for a Taiwanese election ad. The subtitles tell us that the DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) advocates friendly policies towards new immigrants, such as better work training and placement for new immigrants and encouraging mothers to pass on their own languages and cultures to their children. However, it will still be a challenging task for the DPP to overcome the impression of

being unwelcoming to these new Taiwanese citizens that was created by its time in office.

Conclusions

The study has shown that despite growing levels of migration to and from Taiwan, it has yet to become the kind of divisive political issue that it has in many European countries, which actually have lower proportions of migrant populations. Rather than the marriage migrants transforming Taiwan's post-war ethnic structure, it is the prospect of uncontrolled Chinese labour migration that has received the most attention. However, this is actually an issue on which the main parties have almost identical positions, basically ruling out such developments and agreeing to control the number of overseas contract labour. The DPP and its allies have tended to be more concerned about the numbers of spouses from mainland China, fearing this could undermine their nation-building projects and electoral prospects. The KMT appears to have only openly adopted a more inclusive position on migrant spouses in the most recent elections. For most of the period covered in this research the KMT did not appear to be much more welcoming of the new migrants, and any claim for either party being promoters of multi-culturalism is not yet very convincing. However, it will be interesting to observe whether the more inclusive appeals towards new immigrants taken by both leading parties in 2012 are maintained.

If marriage migration and outward work emigration continue at their present rates, migrants will represent a number of major political constituencies with the potential to effect electoral results. Not only are a large number of migrant spouses gaining voting rights after gaining citizenship, but increasing numbers of their children will reach voting age in the next decade. In addition, many dedicated Taiwanese citizens both in China and elsewhere in the world return to Taiwan to vote in major elections. The almost inevitable introduction of postal voting will radically increase the voting rate and influence of these overseas Taiwanese in national-level elections. Thus far the main parties have not devoted significant resources to targeting these growing constituencies, but continued failure to understand the desires of these groups could be extremely costly for Taiwan's mainstream parties. Shelley Rigger has talked about how today's political parties have become divorced from the concerns of Taiwan's younger generation.[18] The same will surely apply for the new migrant citizens. The kind of political issues and slogans that worked for Taiwanese voters in the past are unlikely to appeal to the new Taiwanese groupings. Therefore how the parties handle the integration and concerns of these new Taiwanese represents a central challenge to the island's democracy.

Notes

1 George Jones, Toby Helm and Graeme Wilson, "British Workers for British Jobs," *Daily Telegraph*, 6 June 2007.

2 For a review of the development of election advertising after martial law see Cheng, *Campaign Advertising: Theory, Policy and Strategy* (1995) and Cheng, *Election Campaign Communication in Taiwan* (2004).

3 Prior to 1991–2 the Republic of China's (Taiwan) two parliaments had been controlled by politicians elected on mainland China in 1947 and 1948 and frozen in office for over four decades. Only after 1969 were a small minority of parliamentary seats opened for direct election on Taiwan. For a discussion of Taiwan's democratization and constitutional reforms see Fell (2011), *Government and Politics in Taiwan*, Chapters 3–4.
4 In the early-mid 1990s I worked part-time in the largest emigration company in Kaohsiung. In my own observation, by this stage in the early 1990s, Canada, Australia and New Zealand had become the most popular emigration destinations.
5 For more on the 1995–6 cross-Strait crisis see Zhao (1999), *Across the Taiwan Strait.*
6 For more on the DPP's national identity related appeals see Fell (2005), *Party Politics in Taiwan*, 85–128.
7 *Liberty Times*, 17 November 1994, 17.
8 *China Times*, 30 November 1998, 10.
9 *China Times*, 30 November 1998, 10.
10 *United Daily News*, 2 December 1998, 2.
11 Cited in Stephane Corcuff, "Taiwan's 'Mainlanders,' New Taiwanese?" in Corcuff, ed. *Memories of the Future: National Identity and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2002), 163–195, 187.
12 On party system change see Fell (2008), "Inter-Party Competition in Taiwan: Towards a new Party System?"
13 For more on the politics of IT company migration from Taiwan to China see Chu (2013), *East Asian Computer Chip Wars*.
14 Lin Mei-chun and Tsai Ting-I, "TSU to take 'Taiwanese only' to legislature," *Taipei Times*, 27 February 2002, 3.
15 Ma was born in Hong Kong in 1950 and Lien in Xian, China in 1936.
16 Ko Shu-ling, "Hsieh vows to promote ethnic harmony, justice," *Taipei Times*, 27 February 2008, 3.
17 Forumosa.com, Topic: Hsieh Insults Taiwanese with Mainland Spouse. Available online at http://www.forumosa.com/taiwan/viewtopic.php?f=89&t=68498 (accessed 10 February 2012).
18 Rigger (2006), *Taiwan's Rising Rationalism*, 26.

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10 Home-going or home-making?

The citizenship legislation and Chinese identity of Indonesian–Chinese women in Taiwan

Isabelle Cheng

Female marriage migration from Indonesia to Taiwan

The focus of this chapter is Overseas Chinese *(Huaqiao)* women from Indonesia who marry men in Taiwan. The genesis of this migration can be traced back to as early as the late 1970s. Anecdotal information suggests that in those earlier years, discharged Mainlander servicemen (known as *Mainlander veterans* in later times) were the first to engage in this practice. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, parallel to the expanded economic interaction between Taiwan and Indonesia, Indonesian women began to migrate to Taiwan, via marriage, in their thousands. Their number rose as economic interaction was boosted by the *Go South* policy, a foreign policy that aimed to enhance Taiwan's relationship with Southeast Asian states (Hsia 1997: 39). These couples were mainly introduced to each other through commercial brokers, but a certain percentage met through social matchmaking which was assisted by the contact between the Indonesian Chinese community and their relatives and friends in Taiwan. They were the pillar of female marriage migration to Taiwan from Southeast Asia up to 1996, when they came to be exceeded in numbers by Vietnamese women.

From 1989 to 2010, a total of 26,551 women from Indonesia moved to and resided in Taiwan after marriage with local men. During the same period, 21,617 Indonesian women acquired ROC citizenship. The great majority of them acquired citizenship by marriage. The figure of those who acquired it by other means is marginal (MoI 2011).[1] Although there seem to be no publicly available statistics to ascertain how many of these Indonesian women are of Chinese ancestry, ethnographic information suggests that the majority of them are (Hsia 1997: 16). Those who I met during my fieldwork addressed themselves as *Overseas Chinese in Indonesia* (*yinni huaqiao*).

While the reconfiguration of Taiwanese and Chinese identity is ongoing in Taiwan, their self-identification as Overseas Chinese seems somewhat anachronistic. Although they identify themselves as Chinese, they are most likely to be referred to as 'Indonesian brides' by their neighbours, teachers and the media. To what extent is this self-identification relevant to their daily lives in Taiwan? In what context is this self-identification acted upon and how does it affect their self-understanding in relation to Taiwan? These are the unexpected questions

emerging from my fieldwork, and in this chapter I hope to suggest some answers to these critical questions.

The 'unknown' Indonesian–Chinese immigrant women

Established literature on marriage-immigrant women in Taiwan tends to focus on these women's desire to better their economic condition. Such literature seeks to identify the potential means and contexts within which marriage-immigrant women can realise this goal. As economic betterment is a significant pull for migration, which is also evident in the findings of my fieldwork, literature in this regard is critical to underline the structural factors for migration and to explore whether and how immigrant women may gain and exercise their agency (Hsia 1997: 72–83, 115–122; Hsia 2005, 2006, 2007; Lin 2005). Nevertheless, arguing that all marriage-immigrant women are pushed and pulled by structural forces alone does not address the critical role played by ethnicity in the migration process. The Chinese identity of Indonesian Chinese women is such an illustrative case (see discussion below for how they expressed their Chinese identity).

Studies across a range of disciplines on Indonesian women have touched upon their Chinese ethnicity. A sociological study titled *Becoming Taiwanese* discusses the anti-Chinese riot in Jakarta of May 1998 as a factor in migration. But it falls short of analysing whether their linkages with Chinese culture interact with their experiences of becoming Taiwanese after migration (Chen 2010). One piece of research into child education finds that an Indonesian Chinese mother draws on her Chinese identity as a resource to perform her motherly duties (Chen 2006). In contrast, a nursing study of nineteen Indonesian Chinese women's motherhood methods did not recognise the role of Chinese heritage in childrearing (Shu *et al.* 2008). In spite of the fact that the government of Taiwan is concerned about the quality of immigrant mothers' childrearing because of their foreign ethnicity, these studies do not suggest conclusive answers; one's ethnic background may or may not influence one's cultural transmission.

In contrast to this relative lack of interest in analysing the Chinese identity of Indonesian Chinese women, there are studies specifically concentrated on those of Hakka background. The interest seems to follow Hsia's argument that Hakka in Taiwan and Indonesia are in similarly disadvantaged ethnic relations (Hsia 1997: 56) and Hakka families prefer to seek Hakka women as transnational marriage partners (ibid: 53). In line with these assertions, studies of Indonesian women of Hakka descent seem to be driven by an interest in encouraging Hakka from abroad to assimilate into the Taiwanese Hakka culture (Chang 2007; Hsieh 2007; Hsu 2007). Studies of this kind bear a fallacy: although Indonesian Hakka is a speech group of specific socio-economic characteristics and geographical concentration (see Somers 2003 on gold miners in West Kalimantan), it is are not perceived by Indonesian Chinese as an ethnic community (Hsiao and Lim 2007). The fallacy seems to be rooted in Taiwan's multiculturalism discourse

framed by the division of four ethnic groups (the Indigenous Peoples, Hoklo, Hakka and Mainlanders). The studies as such run the risk of essentialising the Hakka culture in Taiwan as orthodox, sidelining the global distribution of Hakka communities and their adaptation to their localities (e.g. Oxfeld 2005) and revealing the political agenda of the Hakka community in Taiwan: That is, while perceiving themselves as threatened by the growing strength of the Hoklo community, the Hakka community claims the membership of Indonesian Hakka in the Taiwanese Hakka community in order to reinforce the self-identity of the Hakka community and thus reify the boundary between Hakka and Hoklo communities.

Overlooking the subjective identification of Indonesian Chinese women as Chinese runs the risk of undervaluing their experiences of being ethnic others both in Indonesia and Taiwan. As Tseng points out, migration studies facilitate new routes to explore old social issues (Tseng 2007: 79). This chapter aims to meet this critical challenge and examines how the change of citizenship legislation in the wake of the reconfiguration of Taiwanese and Chinese identity interacts with immigrants who were once embraced as members of the Chinese nation.

Research method

By taking a 'way, way down below' perspective (Yuh 2002: 7), my exploration is located in the interaction of Chinese identity with the host society in everyday living. Findings are drawn from in-depth interviews with a total of twenty Indonesian Chinese women in Taiwan in March–June 2009 and January 2010. Through the introduction of a placement agency, primary school teachers, church clergy and a marriage broker, I interviewed them at their homes, schools and workplaces in the urban areas of Taipei, Keelung and Kaohsiung, and in the rural areas of Yilan, Pingtung and Penghu. All of the interviews, except the one with Chong Lian Fa, were audio recorded with the interviewees' consent, and transcripts were sent to interviewees who read Chinese by post or via email. All of the interviewees were given pseudo-names. Those who confirmed that their family had adopted Indonesian names or were introduced to me by their Indonesian names are given Indonesian pseudo-names here. Others are given Chinese names, the spellings of which are determined by the dialect they speak in Indonesia, including Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien and Teochew. The personal profiles of the interviewees, including their hometown, dialect, domicile, age, education, occupation, channels through which they met their husbands, length of residency, number of children, citizenship status and religion are provided in the appendix.

I will now trace how the image of Overseas Chinese evolved throughout the Cold War era to the recent post-democratisation decades. As explained below, this evolution is accompanied by a change in the legal definition of Overseas Chinese in specific laws. This legal change itself is an indication of the state's redrawing of the boundaries of national and political community.

Drawing the boundaries of national and political community: revising the legal definition of Overseas Chinese

Overseas Chinese used to be political and economic assets for Taiwan. During the early decades of the Cold War era, characterising Overseas Chinese as nationalistic and patriotic, both Taiwan and China actively sought their allegiance in each other's attempts to be recognised as the legitimate government of China.[2] Additionally, each side sought the assistance and economic prowess of Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in order to promote national development at home. As such, the Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) government in Taiwan capitalised their allegiance to legitimise KMT claims of representing China, thus framing their settlement in Taiwan as 'returning to the Homeland', in spite of the fact that their ancestral home was China and not Taiwan (Chao 2001: 17–18). As part of the grand strategy of containing the expansion of Chinese communism in Southeast Asia (Kao 1974: 166), between 1954 and 1964,[3] Taiwan received funding from the US government to encourage Overseas Chinese students to seek tertiary education in Taiwan (NIOERAR 1957: 52–5).

The above strategies were built on the foundation that under the Nationality Act of 1929, which awarded nationality by birth (*jus sanguinis*), Overseas Chinese were nationals. The embracing of Overseas Chinese 'returnees' was facilitated by a set of lax regulations governing the certification of Overseas Chinese status and the awarding of citizenship (NIA 2009: 8). Nevertheless, while individual applications for settlement seemed to be welcomed, plans for evacuating Overseas Chinese to Taiwan on a large scale were met with reservation within the government because of the political concern that privileging Overseas Chinese might create a sense of disparity amongst native Taiwanese (*benshengren*; Chao 2001; Hsia Cheng-hua 2006). On the other hand, the political value of Overseas Chinese was compatible with their social image of affluence, an envied status spotlighted by female entertainers' marriages to Overseas Chinese tycoons.[4] The affluent image also applied to male Overseas Chinese students who studied at Taiwan's universities and were seen as desirable candidates for marriage (interview with Le Fen Fen), while they were resented by local male students for their exemption from the otherwise compulsory military service (Simon 1988).

However, as Taiwan's restructured economy took off in the 1970s, and as it later became prominent as one of the Asian Tigers, the imbalance in quality of life between Taiwan and Southeast Asia gradually changed the government's position on Overseas Chinese from welcoming to restricting. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, concerns were raised that Overseas Chinese were among illegal migrant workers (Selya 1992: 792), and those who sought settlement were perceived as free-riders of Taiwan's burgeoning social welfare (NIA 2009: 8). The need to tighten control of the inflow of Overseas Chinese to safeguard the distribution of resources was therefore felt.

On the other hand, in the wake of democratisation[5] beginning in the late 1980s and the concurrent re-configuration of Chinese identity, Taiwan began to assert its aspiration to be recognised as an entity separate from China (Deans 2001).

With the growing Taiwanese consciousness, the lure of Overseas Chinese as a political asset for the KMT's legitimacy claim became diminished. The KMT and the consecutive Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) governments were politically re-drawing (or re-imagining) the boundaries of the national and political community under the 'nationalist principle.' That is, 'the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1990: 1). Clarifying the ambiguous and controversial status of Overseas Chinese as nationals opened a window of opportunity to legally refine who can be included inside the community, who can be entitled to the substantive rights endowed by citizenship, and under what kind of conditions it may be done so.

The legal reform of legislation concerning Overseas Chinese was achieved between 1999 and 2002. The legal status of Overseas Chinese was defined as *Nationals Sojourning Abroad* in a 1991 administrative decree,[6] but was later included in the category of *Nationals without Household Registration* in the Immigration Act promulgated in 1999 (Article 3).[7] Also included in this category are naturalised foreigners. Both are regarded as an external population (NIA 2009: 1) to the Taiwan Area, the *de facto* sovereign territory of the Republic of China.[8] The Nationality Act was amended in 2000 and specifies the documentation required to prove one's nationality. It specifically excludes a certificate of Chinese descent as evidence for nationality.[9] Besides this, requirements for naturalisation were refined in the following years, including evidence to prove proficiency in the Chinese language and renouncing one's previous nationality (Article 3). This is also applied to citizens' foreign spouses. In 2002, the Act Governing the Certification of Overseas Chinese Status was promulgated and the previously lax certification was replaced with a set of clearly defined rules (Articles 4, 5). To sum up, the reformed legislation in effect makes it difficult to claim nationality of the Republic of China (ROC; interview with an OCAC staff member) and particularly reduces the validity of descent as proof of nationality claimed by Overseas Chinese.

While the current legislation reduces the significance of descent for claiming nationality, it stresses *domicile* as the requirement for citizenship. Under the Immigration Act, if an Overseas Chinese person can prove he/she has ROC nationality, he/she will be regarded as a *National without Household Registration* and will have to reside in Taiwan for a certain period of time in order to apply for household registration. If he/she cannot, or does not, claim ROC nationality, he/she is regarded as a foreigner and will have to apply for naturalisation to become a *National without Household Registration*. Only when the registration is completed does the applicant become a *National with Household Registration in the Taiwan Area* (Article 10); that is, he/she becomes a citizen of the Republic of China. Household registration thus is the watershed between a national and a citizen (Chao 2005; Rigger 2002). When the principle of awarding nationality by bloodline (*jus sanguinis*) draws an ethnic boundary of the national community, the legislation stressing domicile draws a civic boundary of the political community.

As political developments gradually brought Taiwan to this stage, Chinese communities in Southeast Asia also gradually underwent a transformative change

(for an overview, see Unger 1944; Skinner 1959; for Indonesia, see Kahin 1946). After the Chinese republican revolution aroused nationalist sentiments in the overseas communities, the ability to read Chinese and speak Mandarin was stressed by the KMT government as instrumental to sinocisation (and led to funding for Overseas Chinese schools). Sinosisation through language was also prevalent among Overseas Chinese communities, who regarded it as a critical aspect of gaining Chinese identity. In other words, speaking any dialect was insufficient to back up one's self-identification as Chinese; instead speaking Mandarin, the national language, and reading Chinese generated more credibility.

In the immediate years after the Southeast Asian countries gained independence, the possibility of Overseas Chinese acquiring dual citizenship by bloodline and place of birth was seen as an indication of their questionable loyalty to the newly established states (for Indonesian Chinese, see Willmont 1961). Those who adopted the local nationality, and their offspring, lived through the consequences of the nation-building project aimed at reducing their Chinese identity and promoting their integration (if not assimilation). Requiring Chinese to adopt names in local languages and restricting or banning the use of the Chinese language in various ways were two common constituents of the state-launched nation-building project (for Indonesia, see Suryadinata 2004: 81–101).

The Indonesian Chinese women whom I met during fieldwork are spouses or children of those who acquired Indonesian nationality by marriage, inheritance or birth. Because of their parents' insistence and the state's tolerance, the women born before the mid-1960s had the chance to receive an education delivered in Chinese (Mandarin) or to learn Chinese as an academic subject. Those women who were born afterwards were deprived of such educational resources by the ban on the use and teaching of Chinese, as well as the outlawing of independent Chinese schools (Murray 1964; Suryadinata 1972). Being educated at a state school with indigenous Indonesians (*pribumis*), with the national curriculum delivered in the Indonesian language, younger generations speak Indonesian as their *lingua franca* and are more integrated with the indigenous Indonesians. The facility in Chinese language (Mandarin) is largely lost and it is not uncommon to see that some have also stopped speaking Chinese dialects to family members. Being a citizen by birth, inheriting an Indonesian-sounding name, attending state schools, speaking Indonesian, and mingling with indigenous Indonesians at school and in the workplace make the younger generations more comfortable with their hybrid Chinese–Indonesian identity (Handoko 2009).[10]

As a result of the political and economic development discussed above, the label 'Overseas Chinese' has become a problematic designation in Taiwan, as well as in the countries of residence of the Chinese community (Wang 1981: 12–4; Wang 2000: 41–2; Wang 2001: 88–9). In Taiwan, in legal terms, it has been narrowed from an ethnic concept defined by bloodline (overseas-born Chinese descendants endowed with nationality) to a civic concept defined by domicile. In other words, the extraterritoriality of nationality is conditioned by the territoriality of citizenship if Overseas Chinese wish to deepen their relationship with the national community and political polity established in Taiwan. As a member of the polity,

he/she will be entitled to substantive rights, including the right to make decisions in public affairs jointly with other members of the polity. Drawing the geographical boundary of the polity along the border of the government of Taiwan's jurisdiction is another step taken to realise the assertion that the Taiwanese consciousness is the foundation to create an imagined community, members of which share a common destiny (Lee 1999: 9; Hughes 1997: 37).

Under these circumstances, the self-identification of Indonesian–Chinese women as Overseas Chinese seems anachronistic. How did they express their Chinese identity and in what context did they enact it? Did their Chinese identity have a role to play in their migration decision? How did their Chinese identity interact with the society of Taiwan while being reconsidered from political and cultural perspectives? These are the questions to be answered by the lived experiences of Indonesian–Chinese immigrant women.

Chinese identity and motivations for migration

In addition to their pursuit of a better life, these migrants' Chinese identity is an identifiable driving force for migration. This self-identification is enacted by the aspiration for belonging, as well as the pursuit of safety and stability.

Aspiration for belonging

> We wanted to go back to China, that's why we came to Taiwan.
>
> (Chong Lian Fa, from Kalimantan, 29 January 2010, Pingtung)

Collectively constructed by interviewees' aggregated narratives, lived experiences of being Chinese in Indonesia across generations can be summarised as follows:[11] being ethnic others, they described themselves as guests, residents and lodgers of the land, or asserted with frustration that these are the terms by which they are excluded and discriminated against by indigenous Indonesians. To be Chinese is to experience linguistic cleansing, to live a life socially and physically segregated from indigenous Indonesians, to be content with institutional exclusion from the public sector, to have restricted representation in the national legislature and to endure violence incited by ethnic hatred.[12] The perceived hierarchy of relationships between the Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians acts to claim that Indonesian Chinese occupy a superior economic position. An often-cited example is that Chinese hire indigenous Indonesian men and women for manual and domestic work. Another vocal expression addresses the indigenous Indonesians with the derogatory term *Huan Ah* (Hokkien words for savage), in opposition to the equally derogatory epithet *Cina* (Indonesian word for Chinese) used by indigenous Indonesians. As their hybrid identity develops due to integration policies, sensitivity to each of these aspects decreases from older generations to younger generations.

However, what remains distinctive among the older generations is the strong home-going aspiration or seeking of a return to the collective: the Chinese nation. After Indonesian independence and the Chinese Civil War, Indonesian Chinese were divided by their inclination towards the Communist People's Republic of China or the Nationalist ROC (Mozingo 1976: 91; Wang 2001: 63). Their nationalistic loyalty is reflected by the destination of their migration in the first decade after Indonesian independence (Suryadinata 1972: 67). There were several waves of migration to China in the 1950s and 1960s (Godley 1989; Godley and Coppel 1990). For those who identified with the ROC, however, the imagined homeland was Taiwan, not Communist-occupied China.[13] This was partly because the Communist ideology was thought to be inferior to the republican politics of the ROC, and the PRC was also blamed for causing anti-Chinese resentment because of its alleged support of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) military coup in 1965.

'Taiwan was the real China; the Chinese communists stole away our country,' was how 44-year-old Le Fen phrased her sense of belonging to Taiwan. A native of Medan, Fen is the fourth generation of a Cantonese family.[14] Fen joked that she acquired nationalistic sentiment towards the ROC through being brainwashed by her parents, who attended Taiwan's university in the early 1960s. However, she saw her decision to seek tertiary education in Taiwan in 1983 as 'returning to my roots, my own country! Finally I did not need to put up with fear and terror of living with Indonesians anymore'.

Her fear of living in Indonesia was caused by violent ethnic clashes and the threat of rape. As first told to her by her mother, and later by her friends who remained in Indonesia, she narrated the violent incidents in 1965 and 1994:

> In 1965, there was a terrible riot in Medan. My mother went out on her own when she was heavily pregnant. She was horrified by what she saw; a group of *Huan Ahs* were marching down the street, some of them were holding chopped heads of Chinese men! No matter how well you treated your Indonesian servants, whenever there was a riot, they opened the door and let their people come in and kill their Chinese masters. Then they hung the chopped head to show to the public. There's no such threat to one's life in Taiwan... In the early 1990s, there was an anti-Chinese riot in Medan. Chinese people were killed and Chinese women were raped by Indonesian men wearing military uniform. I was in Taiwan but my friends in Medan sent photos of the horrible incidents to me.

Her sense of belonging was also a reaction to the institutionalised differentiation by the Indonesian government. '*Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan Asing'* was marked on her identification documentation, specifying that she was an Indonesian national of foreign descent.[15] She protested: 'I was born in Indonesia, I had the nationality, so why would I be any different from other Indonesians who are also born here?'

The subjective Chinese identity which features strongly in Fen Fen's narratives has weakened among younger interviewees. Instead of being possessed as

a personal attachment and belief, it feels more like a family legend and tends to be held in the background. This is how 28-year-old Liew Siu Lian associated herself with her prescribed Chinese identity. She recalled a conversation with her father when she was 15: 'My father told me Indonesia isn't our country. He said he and his family fled from China and we ought to return to China or Taiwan – our own country. I don't know, this is what he said.' Siew Lian's narratives show that to her generation, the distinction between China and Taiwan is no longer clear-cut.

Although Siew Lian was not sure about her father's statement at that time, three years later she did come to Taiwan. While the plane was descending, she looked out of the window and had her first glimpse of the island. At that moment, she was caught by an unfamiliar surge of emotions and thought: 'This is really the country for us Chinese!' At that moment, the oral family legend was awakened as a real sentiment and the physical contact with the imagined homeland transformed a dormant consciousness into an awakened identity.

To sum up, otherness, or the perceived hostility and threat to life, is an integral component of older interviewees' diasporic identity. It is extraterritorial in the sense that their homegoing aspiration is not bounded by their actual ancestral home, but defined by a political affiliation. For older interviewees, the term Overseas Chinese is used to stress their otherness in Indonesia; for younger interviewees, Overseas Chinese is used to inform their ancestry.

Pursuit of safety and stability

> Even if our entire family was killed, at least there would be a daughter surviving in Taiwan.
>
> (Hok Kim Siew, 5 June 2009, Penghu)

If the diasporic aspiration to return is stronger among older interviewees, for younger interviewees the catalyst for taking action to migrate was the anti-Chinese riots that erupted in May 1998. Interviewees in their twenties to forties had previously been spared large-scale social unrest because of their age or place of residence. Thus, the May 1998 riot was cognately internalised as a personal experience, even though some of them did not live in areas where riots actually erupted.[16] The riot in Jakarta was characteristically remembered for the rape of Chinese women. The threat of rape reinforces the perception that Indonesia is not a safe place for Chinese, particularly for Chinese women.

The horror of riots and the terror of rape are encapsulated by the dramatic narration of Pontianak-born Hoh Kim Siew:

> The anti-Chinese riot is also a reason for me to marry off to Taiwan. At that time my dad thought even if our entire family was killed, at least there would be a daughter surviving in Taiwan. The riot was really horrifying. We lived in the city so it was OK, but it was very bad in the countryside. In the countryside they targeted women, taking them to…

Kim Siew, realising her young daughter was also listening to her narration, stopped speaking at that point. Earlier on when she stated 'the riot was horrifying', her daughter casually asked 'How horrifying?', as a 9-year-old child would do. Kim Siew replied, 'They captured you and chopped your head off!' This signifies that, in Kim Siew's mind, decapitation was as terrifying and dehumanising as rape.

The threat to personal safety was so real that Susani Halim's mother was also convinced that migration to Taiwan was the way to ensure her daughter's safety. A 37-year-old university graduate, Susani was brought up in a well-off Christian family in Jakarta. She spoke Indonesian with family members and articulated her subjective identity thus: 'We think we are Indonesian, except we don't look like them. However, they don't accept us as Indonesians.' The threat of rape was a wake-up call. That is, although the younger generations have a stronger subjective Indonesian identity, their Chinese blood still makes them a target for ethnic attacks (Purdey 2006; Siegel 1998: 83–91 on Chinese in the riot and 91–102 on rape). Encouraging daughters to marry and leave for Taiwan is thus seen as a survival strategy for the daughter and for the family. Their migration provides freedom from the fear of attack on their virginity, personhood and ethnicity. In this sense, Taiwan is seen as a safe haven for Indonesian Chinese.[17]

For 34-year-old high school graduate Tan Mee Leh, the threat of rape was strongly felt, to the extent that it invoked aspirations to return 'home.' As she narrated:

> Haven't you heard about the riot of 1998? *Mountain People* (indigenous Indonesians) killed us Chinese! We were frightened we would be killed by them! What a poor university girl. After she was raped by Indonesians, they did all kinds of horrible things to her. Americans have written about it (e.g., US State Department, 1999)… China said if we were bullied by Indonesians again, they would dispatch boats to Indonesia and take us away.[18] Our mothers were all very happy. None of them would want to stay behind, but we didn't know if they meant it. I heard about this from my parents and they heard from others. They waited and waited, but nothing happened. And that's it. We didn't really know whether at the end they came or not. Perhaps they were just bluffing and not sincere. This sort of thing happened twice.[19] We Chinese should be courageous and take all of our brothers and sisters back home – there should not be (a third anti-Chinese riot).

Although not a Christian, Mee Leh's aspiration to 'take… our brothers and sisters back home' is strikingly similar to the mission of Moses leading the Jews out of Egypt to the Promised Land. The hope of a Chinese evacuation reinforces the paternal image of the Chinese state in Mee Leh's imagination. The parent–child metaphor is a key feature to her diasporic homegoing aspiration, which also appears in her critiques of the citizenship legislation (see below).

Among these oral accounts, the fear of rape is given most prominence. The fact that it is an accusation mentioned in different periods of time and in different places indicates that the collective trauma is preserved in the personal

consciousness, and that it is a terrifying threat to their virginity as well as their Chinese personhood. The suggestion that it was orchestrated by the military (that women were raped by men 'wearing military uniform') accentuates the ethnic clash and suggests a quasi-ethnic cleansing.

With an aspiration of belonging and the pursuit of safety and dignity, they migrated to Taiwan. Some of them imagined Taiwan as a place for Chinese, of Chinese and by Chinese. However, as discussed above, the host Taiwanese society had gone through a trade-off between Taiwanese and Chinese identity. The resultant consolidation of Taiwanese consciousness, bounded by territoriality, is codified in the citizenship legislation. How would their Chinese identity, either diasporic or hybrid, interact with the host society? Based on interviewees' perceptions and interpretations, the following section attempts to answer this question.

Chinese identity and acquiring citizenship: returning to the imagined Homeland

In 1983, Le Fen Fen entered Taiwan with Overseas Chinese status. Other interviewees entered Taiwan from 1984 to 2007 as Indonesian nationals; thus, their application for citizenship as local citizens' spouses was processed by different legislation. I will focus only on the cases of Le Fen Fen and Tan Mee Leh, to contrast the differences in the legislation and the resultant different perceptions.

Le Fen Fen entering Taiwan in 1983 as a certified Overseas Chinese

As mentioned in the previous section, Fen Fen was determined to leave Indonesia for her own country – the 'real China in Taiwan' – for a sense of belonging. This was realised when the Overseas Chinese certification proved lax:

> Back then it was really easy to get the Certificate at the OCAC (Overseas Chinese Affairs Council).[20] I showed them my birth certificate and other documents, which had been translated into Chinese, and they believed me. How could they tell I was Chinese, not Indonesian? Perhaps they knew we looked different. We are paler.

The lax attitude was perceived by Fen Fen as a welcoming and inclusive gesture of a government happy to host Overseas Chinese returnees. This perception is further accredited to the fact that her husband, a university friend and Overseas Chinese returnee from South Korea, was awarded citizenship because his Shandong-born parents retained their ROC nationality after moving to South Korea. With the Certificate, Fen Fen was able to enrol at a university in central Taiwan, and after her duration of residency expired, her husband – by that time an ROC citizen – sponsored her residency and citizenship application. After acquiring citizenship, although it was legal for her to retain her Indonesian nationality, Fen Fen did not wish to keep what she felt to be a symbol of discrimination and suppression. Hence, when her Indonesian passport expired, she did not renew it. Nowadays,

she travels on her ROC passport which marks her birthplace as Indonesia, and when she is mistaken for a Mainland Chinese person, she clarifies that she is a Taiwanese born in Indonesia.

At the time of the interview, Fen Fen recalled her twenty-eight years living in Taiwan with satisfaction. Relatively non-restrictive legislation and the relaxed attitude of civil servants enabled her to be free from terror and to fulfil her life goals and career ambition. The legislation conveyed the positive message that her return was embraced and her interests were cared for. She vocally confirmed that she identifies with Taiwan for its free democracy, economic prosperity, social mobility, meritocracy in the job market and personal safety. Taiwan lives up to her expectations as a place for Chinese, of Chinese and by Chinese.

Tan Mee Leh entering Taiwan in 2006 as a foreign national

Teochew-speaking Tan Mee Leh was married in Jakarta in the mid-1990s but did not move to Taiwan until 2006. This is because her Taiwanese husband was discouraged by the May 1998 riot and stopped shuttling between Taiwan and Indonesia. To secure her marriage and carry on with family life, she had no option but to leave behind her well-provided life in Jakarta and move to Taiwan.

When Mee Leh arrived in Taiwan, her residency, employment and citizenship was regulated by the Nationality Act and Immigration Act that had been reformed in the early 2000s. She needed to work because her Hakka in-laws were not keen to share family resources with her. Without citizenship, she encountered difficulties in finding non-manual labour jobs. She wished to apply for citizenship, but was confronted with the requirement to prove her ability to speak Chinese. She enrolled in a government-funded evening Mandarin course, but found it often clashed with her jobs. She was frustrated to the degree that she felt deserted by the Earth God (*tu di gong*) she worshipped.

Her strong Chinese identity was thus invoked to counter the legislation, which appeared exclusionary and unwelcoming and lacked benevolence. At times, her Chinese identity is conflated with a Taiwanese connection through family ties:

> I'm an Indonesian *Huaqiao*, not Indonesian (*yinniren*). Everyone in my family says we're Chinese. There's never been a moment we said we were Indonesian. … In the past, China and Taiwan were having a war (the Chinese Civil War) so some people went to Indonesia from Taiwan. As a matter of fact, my family is Taiwanese! My granddad went to Indonesia after 1949[21] so we ended up there. *Huaqiao* are Chinese nationals (*zhongguoren)*. The government should separate (those from Indonesia) into *Huaqiao* and Mountain People, and give *Huaqiao* special treatment. After all, we're people of the same country! We are Taiwanese originally. Now we have returned to our own country and should be embraced! It's our granddads who made the decision of going to Indonesia, not us. If one leaves one's country in the past but now returns from abroad, this person should be embraced as a family member coming home. This person should not be kicked out. This should

> be the right way to look at this issue. … We're Taiwanese and should get special treatment from the government. We're all Chinese and finally we have come home: the home of our fathers. We're children (of the country) by birth not by adoption! We're coming home like brothers and sisters. We're happy to come home. We should be embraced so we would be confident, feeling secure and really happy. … But we're not recognised. The government didn't welcome us home. We're not given special privilege when applying for citizenship. The government is making it so complicated for us! We're really disappointed. We have such a difficult life over there (in Indonesia), and now we're not recognised by *you Taiwanese*. This is even more painful!

Mee Leh's arguments differ little from the rationale behind the *jus sanguinis* principle. Had Mee Leh come to Taiwan before 1999, she would have received exactly the special treatment she advocates, provided that she could prove her father was a Chinese national. As seen in the parent–child metaphor, she asserted her right by birth to be recognised as a member of the national community. Combining this with the previously quoted desire to 'take all of our brothers and sisters back home' in the context of fleeing from riot-stricken Indonesia, she actually charged the Taiwanese government with a moral obligation to house and comfort the returned children. It is only when she was disappointed by the lack of willingness on the part of the parent state for performing such a moral obligation that she placed Taiwan in opposition to her and her imagined siblings. It would be hard to fail to notice that the deprivation of parental care by the Taiwanese government is described as more painful than suppression by the ethnic others (indigenous Indonesians and the Indonesian government).

Mee Leh's Chinese identity is also shown in her critique of the Chinese-language requirement. Inability to speak Chinese is recognised by Indonesian Chinese as the sign of their (perhaps regrettable) inadequate ties to Chinese culture. The requirement acts to precisely point out this inadequacy. Thus, older interviewees like Jakarta-born Choi Sook Ying treated the government-funded Mandarin courses as an opportunity to learn the language and, more importantly, regain her lost ties to the culture. To acquire the linguistic ability is to put the missing piece back so that her Chinese identity is authenticated and she is able to vocally profess her Chinese identity.

Mee Leh however seemed to feel pressed to defend her eloquent Chinese identity when the adequacy of this identity was challenged:

> I speak Teochew at home in Indonesia. I couldn't speak Mandarin before I came to Taiwan. I went to an Indonesian-language school. The Indonesian government banned Chinese-language schools. Chinese-language schools were only available in the countryside, and the teachers were really old men originally from China. My dad speaks Mandarin really well, but this wasn't passed down to us. We were born and bred there (in Indonesia) and were educated there and thus changed (unable to speak Mandarin)… I'm studying really hard. I must learn our language, but I'm afraid I'm not smart enough.

> My dad speaks Mandarin well, but there are still so many characters he doesn't know. I'll continue to come to the language class even after I get citizenship because this is our language; I must learn it well. I'm now standing on the soil of Taiwan; I must learn.

Mee Leh's linguistic experiences highlight the critical role language plays in her self-identification as Chinese. Her strong willingness to learn Mandarin is a vocal expression of her home-going aspirations.

Tan Mee Leh and Le Fen Fen are two opposite cases who demonstrate how their Chinese identity interacts with the citizenship legislation underlined by different political interests. Imagining Taiwan as the homeland and the real China, Fen Fen returned to Taiwan when winning the allegiance of Overseas Chinese was held by the KMT government to be a signifier of the government's legitimacy and its ideological superiority over the PRC. Democratisation in the later years further strengthened her identification with the 'better China' in Taiwan. Also imagining Taiwan as the homeland, Mee Leh returned when the competition to be the 'real China' was essentially over. Thus, when Fen Fen resorted to having her Chinese identity authenticated by the Certificate, her interest was received by accommodative legislation. When Mee Leh invoked her Chinese identity, without the Certificate, her call for special treatment was invalid. For Fen Fen, Taiwan *proper* is the real China. For Mee Leh, the real China is the one that fulfils the expected parental responsibility to look after returned children.

Fen Fen and Mee Leh are two cases with a strong Chinese identity pronounced by home-going aspirations. Compared to them, most younger interviewees less vocally manifested Chinese identity in their self-understanding in relation to Taiwan. This is actually compatible with their hybrid identity, in that they are Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry. However, their interpretation of citizenship illuminates another path of imaging their relationship with Taiwan.

The other path of imagination: making Taiwan their home

Becoming a citizen marks a significant change in the life of an immigrant. This is more so under Taiwan's citizenship legislation, as renouncing the previous nationality – thus acquiring but one nationality – is a legal requirement. The renunciation is to act out the singular loyalty demanded by the state of Taiwan. On the part of the state, awarding citizenship after receiving singular loyalty means rendering formal inclusion and acceptance. On the part of the immigrant-turned-citizen, being granted citizenship means being recognised as a (nearly) equal member of the national and political community (Castles and Davidson 2000: 84). This nominal equality means that there is no contestation of their membership. This is the sentiment uttered by 55-year-old Ng Siew Day and shared by others: 'With citizenship, one is a real and complete Taiwanese!' The nominal acceptance enables an immigrant-turned-citizen to act like a citizen; exercising citizenship induces the senses of stability, belonging, responsibility for the well-being of the nation and entitlement to fairness and equality.

One channel through which to exercising citizenship is voting. Voting is interpreted by interviewees as performing their civic duty, expressing their opinion about public affairs and ensuring sound governance for the well-being of the nation and the next generations. These interpretations are also marked by associating citizenship with motherhood, as shown in the following quotes:

> I go to vote because I want to elect a capable president. I want to see Taiwan get better because my children are here. This is the hope shared by mothers around the world. We want to give our children a better life.
>
> (Ang Lip Fong)

> With citizenship I can vote. It's not (a matter of) whether I like it or not. It's because we've been here for a long time. We have our family here. We hope to have a better government.
>
> (Chew Siew Wai)

> I go to vote because this is my vote. I'm a local person, I'm a daughter-in-law of Taiwan.
>
> (Chong Lian Fa)

> Voting is what a Taiwanese should do. We live in Taiwan so we should go to vote. I voted in Indonesia, too. It feels the same. Both are what we should do.
>
> (Choi Kim Chai)

It goes without saying that there are interviewees who did not see citizenship beyond its legal and nominal meaning, or view it mainly in the instrumental light of its making job-hunting easier. However, this should not overshadow the fact that some interviewees perceive citizenship as a channel through which to participate in the public sphere and become part of the collective decision-making body for public affairs. This is how citizenship is conducive to identification. What is equally noteworthy is that this participation is understood as an extension of motherhood from the private family domain to the public sphere. I have argued that citizenship, viewed in the process of renouncing the previous nationality and acquiring ROC citizenship, is gendered as a home-bound and duty-based concept (Cheng 2013). The quotes above manifest that citizenship in its civic sense can be enacted as motherhood-orientated participation in the public forum. Thus, the role of mother–citizen is another way to imagine their relationship with Taiwan. As a wife and mother, they adopt Taiwan as their home. As a citizen, they make Taiwan a home where their interests as well as those of their children are shared and shaped by the political polity.

Conclusion

The findings of my fieldwork show that the Chinese identity does have a role to play in the migration processes of Indonesian Chinese women. Although there is a shift from the diasporic identity of older generations to the hybrid identity

of younger ones, Chinese identity is an identifiable driving force for migration to Taiwan. Being ethnic others in Indonesia and seeing Taiwan as a place for Chinese, of Chinese and by Chinese, the interviewees moved to Taiwan seeking a sense of belonging and in pursuit of safety, stability and dignity. Their lives in Taiwan are largely affected by the citizenship legislation, and the perceived degree of rigidity is projected as the intention of the state. Hence, legislation is a field in which Indonesian Chinese women interact with the host state.

However, the legislation is not static. Rather, its evolution in the past two decades is a direct result of the state re-drawing the boundaries of the national and political community. For Overseas Chinese, ROC nationality acquired by bloodline is just a transition to citizenship, the final acquisition of which is achieved by domicile. As such, the citizenship legislation confines extraterritorial nationality to territorial household registration. This strengthens the civic concept of Taiwanese consciousness – that the national and political community is composed of those who commit to dwell there and share a common destiny.

Reform of the legislation means the time of arrival of Indonesian–Chinese women determined the degree of legislative rigidity to which they were subject. This is exemplified by the opposing experiences of Le Fen Fen and Tan Mee Leh. Imagining Taiwan as the homeland and the 'real China', Fen Fen entered as a certified Overseas Chinese and encountered a lax institution which was designed to entice the political allegiance of Overseas Chinese. Also imagining Taiwan as the homeland and claiming her family ties with Taiwan, Mee Leh entered as a foreign national and encountered a restrictive institution which was designed to safeguard resource distribution and which required a singular loyalty. These opposite receptions led Fen Fen to feel included, but induced disappointment, frustration and a sense of exclusion in Mee Leh. For others, citizenship paves a different path with which to imagine their relationship with Taiwan. As a mother–citizen, exercising citizenship is another way to make Taiwan their home.

These findings underline that sensitivity to immigrants' ethnicity and self-understanding can introduce inside-out and outside-in perspectives in the construction of the national community. This paper has shown that the narratives of Indonesian–Chinese women not only express their personal and individual interpretations of their relationship with Indonesia and Taiwan, but also mirror how both countries have re-drawn the boundaries of their national communities.

Notes

1 Figures show that 2 per cent of people acquire citizenship by means other than becoming the spouse of an ROC citizen – see http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/list.htm under 'Acquirement of ROC Nationality by Causes' (accessed 6 June 2011).
2 The political value of Overseas Chinese in China suffered during the Cultural Revolution (Fitzgerald 1969) and the relationship between the PRC and Overseas Chinese communities was not restored until the PRC began its economic reforms in 1978.
3 The US funding was discontinued in 1961 and completely stopped in 1965. The Asian Foundation also provided funding for Overseas Chinese students' maintenance fees, which totalled nearly USD 200,000 between 1953 and 1959 (Kao 1974: 154).

4 A well-known case is the 1977 marriage of Pai Chia-Li (白嘉莉) and Sarawak-born Burhan Uray (Huang Shuang An, 黃雙安) (Chang 2003: 61). Burhan Uray was born to a Chinese father and indigenous Indonesian mother and owns the wood products-based Djayanti Group. In 1994 he expanded his enterprise to fisheries (Kanō 2008: 258; Indonesian Commercial Newsletter 28 Mar 1994).

5 Democratisation is significant for the making of immigration legislation in the sense that the legislative evolution is punctuated by the lifting of martial law (1949–87) and the termination of the Period of Mobilisation for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion (1947–91). During the period under martial law, the constitutional right of free movement was suspended by administrative decrees. Citizens and Overseas Chinese were not allowed to enter or exit Taiwan without prior written permission. Even after the lifting of martial law and the termination of the Mobilisation Period, movement was still restricted by the National Security Act. In 1998, the restriction was announced unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The court's verdicts gave a necessary legal boost for the passing of the Immigration Act.

6 Article 1, the Regulations of Nationals' Entry, Short-Term Visitation, Long-Term Residency and Household Registration (國人入境短期停留長期居留及戶籍登記作業要點).

7 The English version of the Immigration Act, '無戶籍國民', translates as *Nationals without Registered Permanent Residence in the Taiwan Area*. As Permanent Residency is commonly used in English-language literature to refer to permanent domicile without acquiring citizenship, adopting the government translation may cause confusion. Hence this paper modifies the term to *Nationals without Household Registration*.

8 This is also clarified in the Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and People of the Mainland Area. This law is a practical solution to the constitutional ambiguity stating that people in China are ROC nationals and the territory under PRC jurisdiction is ROC territory.

9 Arts 11(2) and (3), the Enforcement Rules of the Nationality Act.

10 There has been a revival of cultural identity amongst the Chinese community but it is blended with commercial and tourism interests (Hoon 2009; Chan 2009).

11 My intention is to use interviewees' own voices to convey their subjective understanding in relation to Indonesia.

12 The fear of violence overwhelmingly characterises the sense of otherness of Indonesian Chinese. Such violence may be as minor as children's bullying, as random as looting, killing and rape in the midst of large-scale social unrest or as institutionalised as the government's suppression of the Chinese language. This is well narrated by Jakarta-born 63-year-old Choi Sook Ying:

> When I was five or six, Indonesians forbade us to speak Chinese. They'd inspect our house and if they found there were Chinese characters (Chinese-language materials), they would drag us away, chop our heads off, dig a hole and bury us in the ground. I had many relatives killed like that by Indonesians… They didn't allow us to go to a Chinese-language school. But when I went to their Indonesian-language school, my Indonesian neighbours beat me. They were boys and girls older than me, seven- or eight-years-old. I was six. As soon as they saw us, they cried out "Cina! Cina!" They beat any Cina on sight. No one came to help me, no one stopped them… Not everyone had such experiences, but if you lived close to Indonesians, you'd encounter it… They raped Chinese girls, really young girls, so we didn't dare go to school on our own unless our parents went with us.

In March 1957, the government announced that Indonesia was in a 'state of siege,' which authorised supreme power on the part of the military. With this mandate, the military ordered communities to close down pro-KMT schools. This policy was later adopted by the Ministry of Education (Willmont 1961: 73; 86–7). It is unclear if

Sook Ying was referring to these incidents. In the aftermath of the 1965 coup, violence was directed towards pro-PRC schools, which were later closed down (Tan 1991: 117).

13 From 1952 to 1961, the total number of Indonesian Chinese students who graduated from Taiwan's colleges and universities was 316. This number had grown to 5,039 at the end of the 1997 academic year (MoE 1999: 87).

14 Fen Fen's grandfather was headmaster of a Chinese school and both her mother and grandfather were leading figures in the Chinese literary circle in North Sumatra. Her aunt went to an independent Chinese school where all of her textbooks were shipped from Taiwan and every morning students bowed to Sun Yat-Sen's portrait, which was hung in a prominent position in the classroom.

15 This practice was abolished in later years.

16 Before March 1998, attacks and violence against the Chinese community occurred in East Java, Flores Island, West Java and South Sulawesi. On 7 May 1998, after Suharto was elected as president, anti-Chinese riots erupted in Medan and North Sumatra and lasted three days. On the 12th of that month, university students in Jakarta staged an anti-Suharto demonstration, resulting in the deaths of six students who were shot by police and sparking anti-Chinese riots. Afterwards anti-Chinese riots were recorded in South Sulawesi, Java, East Java, Central Java, Aceh and Sumatra. Indonesian police recorded at least sixty-nine riots between May and August and stated that one third of these were triggered by ethnic issues (Deutsche Press-Agentur, 26/09/98, cited by Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Chinese in Indonesia, 2004. Available online at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f389bc.html (accessed 8 April 2011).

17 Although the statistics for spousal visas issued by Taiwan to Indonesian women do not state applicants' ethnicities, 1999 did see a sharp rise in approved spouse visas and hence migration of Indonesian wives to Taiwan. Compared to the PRC government's cautious stance (see below), the Taiwanese government was more outspoken. Not only did it demand the investigation and trial of perpetrators, but it also threatened to withdraw from investing in Indonesia and to freeze the recruitment of Indonesian workers in Taiwan. Characterising the issue as protecting Overseas Chinese and human rights, Taiwan pledged to relocate abused Indonesian Chinese women, help them file charges and assist those who wished to travel to Taiwan for medical treatment. The last offer was accepted by some rape victims in Surabaya (Purdey 2006: 166).

18 Mee Leh's narration may be a circulated rumour, as officially the PRC government made no statements about assisting in any evacuation. On the contrary, initially the official tone was cautious and the victims were noted as 'members of the Indonesian family'. However, this careful position was heavily criticised within China and later the PRC government called for the punishment of perpetrators and protection of Indonesian Chinese. The issue of protecting Indonesian Chinese was raised repeatedly, including in the meeting between the visiting President Jiang Zemin and President Habibie in November 1998, in which the issue was held by the PRC as one relating to the 'long term stability of Indonesia' (Purdey 2006: 165–6).

19 The PRC government conducted four operations in 1960, 1961 and 1966 and evacuated 4,251 persons back to China. See FitzGerald 1973: 42; Huang 2005: 51–2; 428–9 (note that on p. 428 the number is given as 4,215).

20 In 2006 the English title of the organisation was changed to Overseas Compatriot Affairs Council, but the Chinese title remains untouched (OCAC 2008: 8–9).

21 It is not clear if Mee Leh's grandfather originates from Taiwan or China. She mentioned that her family are Teochew people and speak Teochew at home. This makes it less likely that her grandfather migrated from Taiwan to Indonesia, unless his migration was a two-leg journey: from China to Taiwan, then Taiwan to Indonesia.

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Appendix: the personal profiles of interviewees

Hometown and dialects

Of the interviewees, nine were from Jakarta and another nine were from Pontianak and Singkawang, West Kalimantan. Le Fen Fen and Sim Se Ham were from Medan. Jakarta is cosmopolitan, whereas Kalimantan is provincial and less developed. In addition to the Indonesian language (*Bahasa Indonesian*), Hokkien is the *lingua franca* for Indonesian Chinese. However, Hakka is the dominant speech in Kalimantan. Interviews from Jakarta and Medan speak Hakka, Cantonese, Teochew (Chaozhou) and Foochow (Fuzhou). Multilingualism – speaking Indonesian as well as one or more Chinese dialects – is common among Indonesian Chinese. However, it is not common to speak Mandarin (see the section on education background).

Domicile

There is a clear urban–rural divide between interviewees' places of residence in Taiwan. Half of the interviewees reside (or work) in urban areas, including metropolitan Taipei, Keelung and Kaohsiung. The other half reside in rural areas, including Yilan, Pingtung and Penghu. Thus their migration across the state

border also means a movement along a development spectrum. Of the twenty interviewees, Of the twenty interviewees, six moved to rural Taiwan and three to urban areas, From urban Jakarta and Medan, four interviewees moved to rural Taiwan and eleven to urban areas.

Age

The mean age of all interviewees was 37.05 and the mean marriage age was 25.5. If excluding Choi Sook Yin and Ng Siew Day, who came to Taiwan for their second marriage, the mean marriage age was 22.8. Four interviewees from Kalimantan got married between the ages of 17 and 19.

Education

Four interviewees are university graduates, including Le Fen Fen, who studied in Taiwan. Lai Siu Moi studied in Sydney at a college of catering and home economics. Seven interviewees (35 per cent) received senior high school-level education. Five interviewees received junior high school-level education, including three who dropped out in the second year. Three interviewees finished education at primary school level. Having been unable to attend any school, Choi Sook Yin was illiterate in both Chinese and Indonesian languages.

The educational attainment of Indonesian Chinese was affected by the national ideology of *Pancasila* and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) and the subordinate education policy which led to banning the teaching of Chinese language and the curriculum written in Chinese (Suryadinata 1972). This deprived Indonesian Chinese of access to education in the Chinese language. For Choi Sook Yin and Ng Siew Day, this also meant the denial of an education in the Indonesian language, as without Indonesian nationality they were not allowed to attend state school.

Occupation

Types of interviewees' employment prior to migration are clearly defined by the urban–rural divide of hometown. For those who resided in Jakarta, there was employment generated by the investment of multinational companies. Others made their living by opening shops or maintaining family-owned shops, a major career for Indonesian Chinese. For those whose hometown was in Kalimantan, they worked in shops, helped out with the family's farming or ran trading between Jakarta and Pontianak at a personal level. In addition, there were those migrating to Taiwan at a young age without having had a substantial period of employment. After Taiwan opened its domestic labour market to foreign labourers, Ng Siew Day and Hoh Foong Lian worked in Taiwan's factories.

After migration and graduation from university in central Taiwan, Le Fen Fen found employment in the IT industry. Nine interviewees, regardless of whether in rural or urban areas, were unemployed housewives mainly because of their

responsibilities of childrearing, housekeeping and caring for their elderly parents-in-law. Others found employment in shops, restaurants and hotels, or helped out in family-owned businesses.

Channels for meeting their husbands

There were four major ways in which the women came to know their would-be husbands. Nine interviewees were introduced by professional brokers. Three met their husbands while studying or working in Taiwan and another three met their husbands while the latter was working in Jakarta. Five interviewees were introduced by social matchmaking via families, relatives or friends who have transnational links between Taiwan and Indonesia.

Length of residency in Taiwan and motherhood

Interviewees migrated to Taiwan between 1983 and 2007. Twelve interviewees (60 per cent) arrived in Taiwan before 2000 and had lived in Taiwan for more than ten years. The other eight came after 2000. Fifteen interviewees became mothers in Taiwan, while three were childless at the time of interview. Ng Siew Day and Choi Sook Yin have adult children in Indonesia.

Acquisition of citizenship

Fifteen interviewees (75 per cent) had acquired citizenship and the other five were on a Residency Permit.

Religion

Six of the interviewees were Christian. Their Christian beliefs may create friction in their interaction with in-laws if they decline to practice ancestor worship and tomb sweeping. Other interviewees did not have a specific religious belief but observed a religious calendar defined by folk beliefs and conducted ceremonial practices as most Taiwanese families do.

11 Tactical resistances in daily politics

How do battered Vietnamese wives negotiate family and state tightropes in Taiwan?

Wang Hong-zen, Chen Po-wei and Anna Tang Wen-hui

Introduction

Existing literature on Vietnamese migrant wives in Taiwan has focused primarily on structural conditions that determine the experiences of immigrant wives in contemporary Taiwanese society (e.g. Hsia 2001). Within this line of reasoning, research has tended to overstate structural constraints and has therefore overlooked the significance of agency of migrant wives, who are often portrayed as docile or victimized rather than as individuals who negotiate and appropriate their limited resources to improve their marginalized positions.

In this chapter we argue that despite unfavourable social conditions, migrant women are able to manoeuvre a way out of family/state constraints. In arguing this, we do not suggest a voluntarism that celebrates 'freed' agency without any social constraints; instead, we recognize the importance of some social spaces for individual manoeuvre, even though they are never entirely open-ended and can sometimes be tightly constraining. It is through 'hidden spaces' of resistance (Wang 2007) that we are able to decipher how battered Vietnamese wives negotiate both familial and state tightropes in Taiwan.

Based on two of the present authors' previous research (Tang and Wang 2011a,b), this article seeks to examine the interactions between abused Vietnamese migrant wives and their husbands' families. Specifically, we explore the structural conditions that enable them to or forbid them from actively negotiating dominant social values in order to further improve their marginalized positions in everyday practices. In so doing, we hope to address a gendered presumption about the 'passivity' of Vietnamese migrant wives through examining their situated resistances towards the patrilineal Taiwanese family system.

We must stress that not all migrant Vietnamese wives in Taiwan experience intense family conflict and/or domestic violence. According to Wang (2001), at least 90 per cent of migrant Vietnamese wives in Taiwan are satisfied with their marriage. Thus, in researching Vietnamese wives, we do not want to perpetuate media stigmatizations of cross-border marriages; rather, we seek to provide a critical sociological examination of the interplay between structure and agency by understanding how migration intersects with class, gender and ethnicity.

Social norms in everyday life and the 'hidden spaces' of the subordinated

A merit of sociological analysis is to uncover structural determinations that cannot be easily altered by individual free will. Such structural influences become evident through the routinization of everyday practice, or what Erving Goffman described as 'a consistent and never-to-be-relaxed-monitoring of behaviour' (cited in Giddens, 1990: 36). Thus we are 'actors' who 'perform' in accordance with our given scripts to maintain societal harmony.

Yet sociological analysis of this sort is not without criticism. What is often unexplored/unexplained is how exceptions (e.g. criminality, alcoholism, or drug abuse) arise if social structures are so pervasive and deterministic (Wrong 1961; Granovetter 1985). Structural analysis thus tends to overlook the potential of agency to allow people to 'perform' differently from their ascribed scripts.

Structure and agency appear to be seemingly irreconcilable paradigms for sociological research. It is particularly important to establish an analytical equilibrium to provide an adequate understanding that neither overlooks the structural constraints nor underplays agency resistances. In past decades, research has increasingly explored the resistance of the subordinated. James Scott (1976), for example, has pointed out that the 'infrapolitics' of the subordinated is usually not confrontational. If we want to provide a more complex picture of power relations, we need to understand the 'hidden transcripts' of the subordinated.

By 'hidden transcripts', Scott refers to discourses and practices occurring 'backstage' (in Goffman's sense) which are not always congruent with performances on the main stage. Specifically, under an authoritarian regime, dictators may want to maintain the impression of being kind and benevolent, whereas the masses may appear to be obedient and submissive in an orchestrated performance that matches social expectations. Both the power play and intentions of the dominator/ subordinated are hidden. For example, land expropriation for economic developments may be used as a euphemism for collusion amongst those in power. By contrast, for the seemingly subordinate, the 'use of the dominant social order that deflects its power' allows them to be 'subverted from within' in the sense of 'escaping it without leaving it', and to tactically 'poach' areas of being where imposed power cannot reach (de Certeau 1984: xi–xiii).

As a form of inclusion as well as exclusion, 'hidden scripts' are only known by those who share similar interests in order to deceive or hide from their opponents. For Scott, hidden scripts can expose power relations between the dominant and the dominated and reveal a well-camouflaged infrapolitics that explains the dynamics of 'public' performances and 'unspoken' intentions.

Scott's notion of infrapolitics has contributed significantly to research on the agency of the subordinated since the 1990s (see Kerkvliet 2005; Lan 2006; Yeoh and Huang 1998). Such conceptualization avoids re-stigmatizing or victimizing marginalized subjects. Yet in research of this sort, agency appears to be understood as synonymous with 'disobedience'. This oppositional logic fails to explain the contradictory social positions that individuals may occupy simultaneously (Wright 1980). It also fails to capture more complex power relations that are

not based on an oppositional logic. The prerequisite structural conditions for the resistance of the subordinated to take place are left unexamined.

Building on Scott's recognition of agency, this paper explores how contradictory social relations create a 'hidden space' for migrant Vietnamese wives to escape from or resist oppressive social structures and cultural norms in Taiwanese society. By 'hidden spaces', we refer to social spaces that 'do not exist in "normal" social relations. This is a space in which the subordinate can hide, escape from norms, or find weapons to resist' (Wang 2007: 712). It is through contradictory structural conditions or power relations that 'hidden spaces' come to exist.

Take Filipina maids as an example. They enjoy more vacation days than other migrant worker groups in both Taiwan and in Singapore. Specifically, their religious norm of going to church on Sundays contradicts the employer's power to prohibit them from having personal time (Yeoh and Huang 1998: 588). In combination with the state's (non-compulsory) rule that workers should have one day off every week, a discursive space to successfully negotiate a day off is created by conflictual social relations.

Similarly, Vietnamese migrant wives in Taiwan do not necessarily encounter consistent social forces that inevitably render them subordinate. In particular, not all Taiwanese family members will share the same hostile view of the 'foreign bride' (although it is not uncommon that conflicts are often triggered by the migrant wife's mother-in-law). Even if migrant wives are treated unfairly by their Taiwanese families, the Taiwan Domestic Violence Prevention Law (DVPL) can become a last refuge, alongside help from sympathetic local Taiwanese. It is through such conflictual power relations that domination *and* emancipation are simultaneously experienced by the subordinated.

Importantly, by agency, we do *not* suggest that migrant wives with 'suspicious intentions' manipulate orders of protection to either negotiate alimony, property and custody or to justify their adultery (Lee *et al.* 2007). Analysis of this sort risks over-simplifying domestic violence and the multiple structural constraints it implies (Tang and Wang 2011b). Consequently, the subordinated are simply 'pathologized' and presumptions based on class inequality, patriotism and gender simply overlooked (Chao 2008; Chen 2003).

In response to such analysis, this chapter aims to posit an alternative sociological understanding of agency through exploring the 'hidden spaces' of the subordinated. We focus on how migrant women are able to develop survival or resistance strategies in order to secure, or even improve, their marginalized positions. We shall elaborate this stance by focusing on contradictory power relations and structural disjunctions. By exploring the hidden spaces of the subordinated, we seek to identify how the resistances of the subordinated occur, and under what circumstances.

Research methods[1]

This research adopts Institutional Ethnography (IE; Smith 2005) to collect data by using fieldwork observation, interviews and text analysis. The purpose of

this method is to understand the logics behind different 'local' narratives and to illustrate 'relations of ruling' that impact individuals' experiences. When domestic violence occurs, IE seeks to discover how different information, events and processes are organized by institutional ideologies. It also enables us to understand how different sub-systems are coordinated and linked, creating a support network for abused women, and (simultaneously) barriers that are hard for them to break.

We have interviewed sixteen Vietnamese immigrant women who sought help from the Center for the Prevention of Domestic Violence of a local city government in Taiwan, three of their husbands, five family members, four social workers and two judges. We have also obtained some textual information from government bodies to reconstruct the experience of seeking help and to understand the structural factors that hinder the effectiveness of the DVPL. From their own narratives, we sensed the 'rupture experience' of Vietnamese immigrant women when they sought help via the DVPL.[2] Their experiences in the legal aid process inform us about how they think, choose and act when facing law enforcement in different sub-systems which are not consistently organized by any one principle.

This chapter is drawn from a research project between May 2008 and the end of 2009. Intensive interviews were conducted with subsequent follow-ups, alongside observation of social workers' casework interviews. Of the sixteen interviewees, three women agreed to be interviewed by the researchers without social workers present. The authors remained in contact with them mainly by mobile phone, and also by visiting the participants from time to time to help with particular issues (for example by explaining the ID card application process, finding a better child care centre and listening to their complaints about bureaucracy). Some interviewees also invited the authors to their homes when their husbands were present.

All interviews were voice or video-recorded with the permission of the interviewees, and subsequently transcribed. All conversations were in Mandarin, with a few short conversations in Vietnamese, as most interviewees could speak the former fluently. The ability of one of the authors to speak basic Vietnamese helped build trust between the interviewees and researchers.

The average age of our informants was 25 at the time of interview. The oldest was 33 and the youngest 22. At the time of first interviews (2008), they had lived in Taiwan for an average of 5.3 years; the longest period was ten years and the shortest two. Of the interviewees, six had Taiwanese ID cards (i.e. citizenship), while the others had only resident permits; six were applying for Taiwanese IDs, but four had no idea of the importance of an ID card and had not even thought about applying for one. All sixteen interviewees lived with their in-laws and six had other relatives living with them in addition to their in-laws.

All our interviewees had relatives or Vietnamese friends who had married Taiwanese men. All but one (who had been introduced to her future husband by her brother-in-law) had met their husbands through a marriage broker. Only one interviewee was childless. All interviewees had faced psychological or physical abuse at home at the hands of husbands or in-laws, or even the husband's children from a former marriage. Of the husbands, five were unemployed and six had unstable incomes.

Our research was partially sponsored by the local government, and one of the Centre's social workers was a member of the research team. Casework records were available for our analysis. The researchers were committee members of the Center for the Prevention of Domestic Violence of the city government, and after conducting our research we recommended policies to streamline the bureaucratic process for immigrant women regarding domestic violence and the granting of citizenship.

Learning to be a 'righteous' migrant wife

Stigmatization can be synonymously understood as ideological simplification and unfair imaginary classification in the context of cross-border marriages. Vietnamese migrant women are often thought to marry Taiwanese men simply for their money. If they do not live up to the expectations of a 'foreign bride' (a caring mother, an obedient wife and a filial daughter-in-law; see Tang and Wang, 2011b), these migrant women are easily classified as 'bad' or 'inappropriate'. Consequently, the domestic violence they suffer becomes socially justified, or even permitted, by nationalistic gendered stereotypes towards the migrant 'others'. For example, A-Zhong (阿忠), a Taiwanese husband, explained why he needs to teach his Vietnamese wife 'a lesson':

> Our customs are different from *your* Vietnamese ones. In our country, the husband goes out, and the wife stays home. You should follow your husband and blend into society. You should not persist with your own opinions or insist on going out to work. If you do, that is your fault. Your Vietnamese dishes are different from ours, and if you cook in your own way, your mother-in-law will of course be upset. You have to learn how to cook Taiwanese dishes. As a mother of Taiwanese kids, you need to work harder to learn Chinese to help your kids study, or they will degrade our Taiwanese quality, which is very bad!

In A-Zhong's 'Taiwanese-centric' claim, domestic violence was justifiable since his 'foreign bride' did not want to follow the gendered expectations of Taiwanese society. In a forceful tone, he explained:

> She does not know anything about how we do things in Taiwan. In Vietnam, women go out to work. In Taiwan going out to work is what men do. Women should just stay at home and take care of the children. You (a wife) can't just do what you want and forget what you should do. If you only care about what you want to do, why should I be married to you? If you want to stay married to me, you need to learn my culture and understand our values. If you want to stay here rather than go back to Vietnam, you should understand our (Taiwanese) particular way of life.

There is one common explanation why Vietnamese women wish to marry Taiwanese men: to contribute to the financial improvement of their families' lives in Vietnam. To this end, migrant women are willing to play the roles expected of them. However, if such expectations cannot be met through their husbands, participation in the labour market is one way for these women not only to avoid family conflict (with husbands or mothers-in-law), but also to become financially supportive of their own families. Yet going out to work is hardly straightforward and can further fuel both petty vendettas and domestic violence (Tang *et al*. 2011).

It is difficult, if not impossible, for migrant women to report their husbands' domestically violent behaviour, particularly before they have obtained full Taiwanese citizenship. Due to immigration regulations, Vietnamese migrant wives are 'dependent' on their husbands in the sense that their yearly renewal of temporary residencies must be approved by their sponsors (i.e. husbands). Thus for a foreign wife, to report domestic violence is to directly challenge her husband, and therefore to risk both her marriage and her residency. In the worst case, the husband could divorce her and thus have her sent back to Vietnam.

Whether or not wives can seek statutory help depends entirely on their citizenship status. Yet, before they obtain full citizenship, Taiwanese cultural values and state policies work hand-in-hand to preclude support. As A-Yao (阿瑤) explains:

> He always uses the renewal of my residency visa to control me. For example, he wouldn't let me go to the police station to apply until the last day and said 'I won't let you apply, you f***ing shit'. When I wanted to apply for my Taiwanese ID card, he threatened to divorce me and said 'I want to divorce you! You will have to leave Taiwan and will never see your son again'.

Alongside the unequal access to citizenship faced by migrant brides, these women also face racial and gendered stigmatization from their in-laws. Husbands in our research usually had limited knowledge of Vietnamese culture. For example, in Vietnam, married women are commonly involved in trade and business (Owen and Chandler 2005), and therefore such efforts by married women are usually praised in Vietnamese culture (Tang *et al*. 2011).

However, this gendered virtue is looked down upon by some segments of Taiwanese society. As A-Cheng (阿鄭), a Taiwanese husband, believed:

> I think about eight out of ten Vietnamese wives who go out to work had affairs. Even if they didn't have affairs, they corrupted each other or learned bad habits such as discussing whose husbands had more money. Eventually they teach each other to go out to work, to earn dirty money to work as whores… She is coming to marry not to make money, but going out to work destroys her family completely. Very bad!

Despite the fact that Vietnamese migrant wives wish to participate in the labour market so that they can be filial daughters who are financially supportive of their parents in Vietnam, this duty is usually not acknowledged by their families in

Taiwan. On one hand, filial piety is indeed a virtue in Taiwanese society, yet on the other, such a virtue needs to be congruent with patrilineal values and gender practices. In other words, to be a filial daughter is not as important or legitimate as it is to be a caring mother or filial daughter-in-law.

It is not uncommon for Taiwanese husbands to be paranoid about the possibility of adultery on the part of their migrant wives. For example, as A-Cheng suggested, food vendor bars that employ migrant Vietnamese wives were often assumed to be a front for illicit activity:

> Those food vendor bars are said to help them (Vietnamese wives) not to get homesick. But many of them are not what they appear to be. These shops cause a lot of problems for our society. You (a Vietnamese wife) were a respectable girl who came here to become a dutiful Taiwanese daughter-in-law, but you were tricked into doing something out of line. All you think about is making money and are causing trouble.

As far as Taiwanese husbands are concerned, if Vietnamese migrant wives go out to work, they are likely to be led into temptation or to learn something 'bad'. This common yet discriminatory view permits husbands to perpetuate domestic abuse with little social censure. As one husband commented, 'Yes, I did hit her. But this is not the point. She still insists on going out to work (in the sex industry) and earns dirty money'.

Another example that illustrates Taiwanese husbands' reluctance towards migrant wives going out to work is that of A-minh (阿敏), who married a Taiwanese man thirty-seven years her senior. In the first two years, she was not allowed to go out at all and was especially forbidden from taking work. After two years, A-minh's husband finally got her a job as an assistant in a nearby salon so that he could keep an eye on her. One day she went to a night-market after work and returned home late. Her husband was very upset about her coming home so late and had a serious argument with her. He claimed that he saw her flirting with a male customer and that she was having an affair. Their argument ended in violence and A-minh was never allowed to go to work again. Finally, A-minh went to report her husband and was so frightened that she decided to run away. Instead of looking for her, A-minh's husband filed for divorce after she went missing. With no child and no citizenship, A-minh was ultimately deported to Vietnam.

Husbands' feelings of paranoia are further aggravated by increasing state investigations into phony marriages and the associated media scrutiny that comes with these investigations. Specifically, Vietnamese migrant women who want to be financially independent are often assumed to work in the sex industry. One newspaper even suggested that 'Vietnamese women could do anything, to strip or to play'.[3] This media discrimination can be so prevalent and influential that even though migrant women go out to work in order to financially support to their families (both in Taiwan and Vietnam), their intentions are called into question by those around them. However, the news never provides a balanced account as to why some women may become sex workers in the first place. Hence, Vietnamese

migrant wives' occupations are generally assumed (by their husbands and society) to be sex-associated. This assumption is further perpetuated by the state apparatus of border control and rigorous witch-hunts of 'bad' migrant women who are prostitutes rather than dutiful wives, caring mothers or filial daughters-in-law (Chen 2010).

Tactical resistances against family tightropes

Despite the aforementioned structural constraints, Vietnamese migrant wives use their limited resources to improve upon their disadvantaged positions. On one hand, these women are driven by traditional gendered expectations, to 'live a life for others' (by being a caring mother or filial daughter), and on the other by their desire to go out to work (and to 'have a life of one's own'). This irreconcilable tension between competing desires can nevertheless be resolved if they can find help from others (usually from that of fellow women).

Take A-Ke (阿珂) as an example. Her mother-in-law had looked after her children and the house while she was working. But following her mother-in-law's death, A-Ke needed someone else to step in so that she could continue working. She therefore turned to her mother in Vietnam to help her maintain her demanding work–family balance. Yet this was only a temporary solution due to visa regulations. (A dependent's visiting visa only allows a Vietnamese person to stay in Taiwan for three months.) Unexpectedly, when the visa expired, it was not the husband (A-Fa 阿發) but A-Ke's mother who presented herself to police officers so that she could be deported back to Vietnam:

> I had asked my mom to come to Taiwan and help me, and he (my husband) didn't want my mom to go back. He wanted her to stay and look after the kids so that I could go out and work in order to earn extra money for the family. He didn't let her go, and so my mom went to the police station. But she could not speak Chinese… she wanted to leave… I had asked my mom to stay at home while I was working, but when I came back, she had disappeared. I kept looking for her, with the help of my Vietnamese friends. Not until seven in the evening did the police officer bring my mom home. The police officer talked to my husband and told him to let her go home (back to Vietnam), and he said 'Sure! Sure! Sure!' but he never did.

In the context of Taiwan, Vietnamese women are expected to be responsible for taking care of the family. Unlike their middle-class counterparts, Taiwanese men like A-Ke's husband cannot afford domestic help, so he exploited the unpaid labour of his Vietnamese mother-in-law. Nevertheless, there are at least two motivations for Vietnamese mothers who come to Taiwan and help their daughters: first, family bonding and kin support for their Vietnamese daughter; second, as a convenient way to work in Taiwan without going through the associated state bureaucracy (it costs approximately US$5,400 for Vietnamese migrants to work in Taiwan; see Wang and Belanger 2011).

Instead of applying for a work visa, a dependent visiting visa is a cheaper alternative for Vietnamese mothers to work in Taiwan. In so doing, Vietnamese women such as A-Ke's mother can assist their daughters while simultaneously getting a job without being censored or discriminated against by the state. In comparison to the charges for work visas, the relatively low fine for overstaying also encourages Vietnamese to come to Taiwan via a dependent visa. Thus, the contradictory controls enacted through immigration policies create a potential 'hidden space' for Vietnamese migrant wives and an escape from their work–family tensions in Taiwan.

However, the work–family equilibrium was disrupted when A-Ke's mother went back to Vietnam. Despite the fact that A-Ke's income was indispensable (since A-Fa had lost his job), he still accused her of earning 'dirty money'.

> She was working in a factory at that time. When she finished work, she didn't come home straightway, and lied to me that she needed to work extra hours. Later on, I found out that her boss paid her a couple of thousand (NT) dollars to go out with him… I phoned her boss and he said to me, 'What can you do about it?' So I stopped her from working there. She then decided to work as a masseuse in a massage spa. I went to have a look at where she worked; I saw there was a man's name on the shop licence… I then knew that she [had] become his mistress.

When A-Fa discovered how much money his wife earned, he hid her bankbook and ID cards, and seldom let her use her own money:

> (A-Fa) will hide my IDs. I work and I earn the money for the kids. Why does he have my bankbook? Today is the twelfth and I get paid, but I don't know how much money I earned. He knows exactly how much because he has my bankbook.

When A-Ke's boss found out about the situation, she paid A-Ke in cash so that A-Fa could not take her money. When female migrant women settle down in Taiwan, they begin to develop their own social networks. Through this kind of informal support, migrant women are able to negotiate the demands and controls of their families in Taiwan. This is particularly so when those demands are unreasonable and acknowledged as such by wider society.

Take A-minh as another example. In order to earn more money, A-minh often had to work extra hours. This further jeopardized the couple's already precarious relationship. When A-minh's boss realized her situation, she helped A-minh to open another bank account without letting her husband know. When A-minh's husband realized what had happened, he began to harass A-minh at work and eventually she lost her job.

When A-Yao began to go out to work, her husband also tried to make life difficult:

> I really want to work. But he is never happy about it. If he doesn't give me a hard time at work, he will make a lot of trouble for me when I come home.

> Once when I was showering, he did not let me finish, the soap was still all over me… or if I just tidied up the room, he would throw everything on the floor again, saying 'If you have so much time that you can go out to work, I got jobs for you to do here'.

A-Yao's husband had caused so many scenes at work that her employer did not want to keep her on. 'My previous job only lasted for two months… If a potential boss knows that my husband will make his life difficult, they won't hire me'. Nevertheless, some employers were more sympathetic to Vietnamese migrant wives. For example, A-Xiang was harassed by her husband at work. She had already obtained an order of protection, thus the employer was able call the police, who jailed her husband for one night. Thereafter, he left her in peace at work.

When family conflicts take place, one of the biggest challenges for Vietnamese women is filing for child custody, as these women fear being separated from their children. Thus when migrant wives decide to end their marriages, some of them will take their children back to Vietnam and hope their parents will provide care. They then return to Taiwan and continue to work in order to support the family back home. A social worker who helped A-Ying escape from her domestically violent husband explained:

> She (A-Ying) did not let anyone know about her plan (to go back to Vietnam), not even her oldest son. She acted as normal and still took her son to school. As soon as her partner went off to work, she picked up her son from school. The boy by then knew that his mother was going to take him back to Vietnam… She made it very clear that this time she definitely would make it happen. If the plan went wrong again, she said, she would die.

The social relations experienced by migrant women are complex and often contradictory. Although they are expected to be obedient because of traditional gendered expectations, emerging new gender values engendered by feminist movements in Taiwan (e.g. the anti-domestic violence movement and thus the initiation of DVPL) can also be appropriated tactically in order to escape from domestic violence and their husbands' unreasonable controls. In the context of A-Ying, it was the state's help (through DVPL and the social worker) and her family support back in Vietnam that allowed her to flee from domestic violence. Through the inherent structural contradictions – simultaneously singling out 'bad' migrant women and protecting the 'victims' of domestic violence – Vietnamese migrant wives are able to appropriate some limited resources to escape the prevailing difficulties.

To summarize, in analysing tactical resistances of Vietnamese migrant wives, we need to situate the interplay between the subordinated in relation to the wider social dimensions they encounter. Moreover, the power relations in which Vietnamese migrant wives are embedded are necessarily uneven and asymmetrical in regards to what they are able to negotiate, with whom, how and under what circumstances. However, help from their personal networks, local employers and some state policies allow them to manoeuvre an escape from

constraining family situations. Thus subordination and potential emancipation can be simultaneously experienced by Vietnamese migrant wives. Without recognition of this, the subordinated can be too easily portrayed as one-dimensional 'victims'.

Migrant wives and state tightropes

Alongside family constraints and gendered expectations towards Vietnamese migrant wives, the state also plays an important role in perpetuating gendered stereotypes of Vietnamese migrant women. For example, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Education once made a discriminative (and almost eugenic) comment that migrant women in Taiwan should avoid having children in order to avoid the growth of an 'undesirable' population. He added that female migrant women should integrate into Taiwanese society by learning its customs and values, such as being a 'dutiful wife, caring mother and filial daughter-in-law'[4] (also see Tang and Wang 2011b).

When abused migrant women need to seek help, the state or social-work professionals inevitably keep them under surveillance. A-Yu complained: 'I can't apply for an order of protection because I don't know what they (social workers) talk about. They don't believe me and they only listen to my husband'. Therefore, the possibility of escape from domestic violence often depends upon the judgements of 'professionals' (such as judges, police officers, social workers or doctors). However, these judgements cannot be understood independently from the social values and cultural norms they express. Below, we will elaborate this position by focusing on the interactions between social workers and Vietnamese migrant wives.

It is suggested that a middle-class gender regime (as often espoused by social workers) influences how DV (domestic violence) victims are perceived and treated (Tang and Wang 2011b). Hollander (2002) has pointed out that the social construction of traditional gendered roles makes people believe that only when abused women are 'poor and miserable' can they be sympathetically acknowledged. If abused women cannot fit such 'conventional' images, they are unlikely to obtain help and sympathy.

This stance resonates with our research. As one social worker commented on A-Lich (阿麗): 'I saw her very young, very beautiful and dressed even better than me. I can't imagine that she is an abused woman… really not at all!' A-Lich's appearance thus conflicted with more conventional images of abused women, making the social worker feel more sympathetic towards 'poor' A-Zhao (阿趙, A-Lich's husband). 'When I met A-Zhao for the first time, I told myself, "A-Zhao, look at yourself. You are not able to handle A-Lich."' Conversely, A-Luan (阿鑾), another Vietnamese abused wife, appeared to better fit the image of a DV victim and therefore found it easier to obtain an order of protection. Recalling Hollander's findings, it is the ideology of a middle-class gender regime that decides whether one deserves help or not. As professionals comply with such norms, abused migrant women are further regulated by the legal system as well as the

family tightropes of their domestically violent circumstances. In contrast, if social workers can reflexively distance themselves from such preconceptions, then they can become an important means of support.

The judgements of social workers not only decide whether the abused migrant wives deserve protection; they also have a legal impact upon issues such as child custody, as judges often decide child custody based on social work evaluations. If abused migrant women are portrayed as 'irresponsible' mothers, it will be difficult for them to be awarded child custody. Take A-Lich as an example. The reason A-Lich left home and went out to work was to escape from her husband's abuse. In order to support the children by herself, she needed to work, and therefore often relied on her Vietnamese friends to take care of the children. This gave her social worker the impression that A-Lich was not able to raise the children as well as A-Zhao (her husband) could. In fact, A-Zhao convincingly told the judge in the court: 'I have my whole family and relatives to help me take care of the kids, what does she have?' Child custody was granted to A-Zhao, and A-Lich was deported.

A-Jiao (阿嬌), who escaped from her husband's abuse to live alone with her daughter, experienced a similar dilemma. She was considered by her social worker to be an 'unsuitable' mother. Specifically, A-Jiao was living with her new boyfriend, though she was not yet divorced, and the social worker considered this 'adultery' since A-Jiao was still married. It prevented her from winning custody of her daughter. To be 'suitable' is to be recognized by middle-class gender values that decide who can be a good mother. A-Jiao's already precarious position was further marginalized by both professional discrimination and gendered expectations of 'migrant others'.

Migrant women's personal networks (e.g. friends or neighbours) are like a double-edged sword, restraining them from leaving their Taiwanese families as well as providing a way out of domestic violence. For example, neighbours may at first report violent husbands, yet later do not want to testify in court in order to avoid any confrontation with the husband's family. As A-Luan's brother-in-law explained:

Interviewee: Two of the witnesses are neighbours. They went to the courthouse, but fled as soon as they saw the husband's name on the registration book.

Interviewer: Did they say why they were scared?

Interviewee: Both of them had talked to the husband's mother, and they had heard the horrible things she said to her daughter-in-law. We asked these two to help, to tell the judge how threatening the mother-in-law was. We didn't know why they ran away as soon as they saw the husband.

Not only neighbourly personal networks can turn into obstacles but also those associated with the husband's family. For example, applying for an ID card turned out to be very difficult for A-Luan, despite the fact that she had an order of pro-

tection and had stayed in Taiwan for over three years. Specifically, as one social worker commented:

> The permission from the husband becomes optional if an abused migrant woman is grounded by an order of protection and wants to apply for an ID card. However, some administrators in local registration offices are extremely cautious about this. They even call the husbands to make sure if it is ok. I have already checked that this is unnecessary. But some of them (administrators) are very, very cautious.

This happened to A-Luan when she was applying for her ID card. This 'over-cautious' approach adopted by local officials appears to resonate with how state apparatuses and their censorship keep migrant wives under surveillance. Structural constraints seem to work hand-in-hand with partrilineal values that further restrict the social spaces of resistance.

For migrant wives to escape from domestic violence, becoming financially independent is a prerequisite. For example, A-Luan had to stay with her abusive husband because she could not afford to live by herself and support the children:

> Although I have an order of protection, I still have no place to go. And I was not qualified to live in the care centre because I want to take my kids with me and I need to get a job. I am not ready yet to leave my husband and take the kids with me. I have no place to stay and can only sometimes stay at my Vietnamese friend's place. I have no job and no income to support myself and raise my kids.

If Vietnamese migrant wives want to go out to work, they need to pay for a place in a government-owned nursery to take care of children who are too young for school. Such a pre-condition makes work almost impossible for migrant women with few resources who have left their husbands.

Many interviewees continually reminded us of the primacy of financial independence in escaping domestic violence. Yet teaching a migrant wife to be an obedient and dutiful 'Taiwanese' daughter-in-law appears to be the priority in government policy regarding cross-border marriages. Little support in terms of job-seeking and financial independence is available for migrant wives when domestic violence occurs. Paradoxically, DV shelters provided by government can sometimes be restraining instead of liberating. A-Zhuang (阿莊) explained:

> Social workers thought my husband was very dangerous and therefore put me into a domestic violence shelter. But it was very inconvenient for me to stay there since I need to work in order to support the kids as I was not permitted to do so if I lived there. I rather went home… Social workers explained that I had to follow the regulations, but I felt that I was put into a prison. I regretted seeking help. I would rather just get a job, work harder and stay with my kids.

> But I was told that I needed to take things slowly and be patient. But I don't know how much longer I should wait.

We need to acknowledge here that it is the government's responsibility to provide DV shelters for abused women. However, the government only provides these women what they feel they ought to have, rather than *what they really need*. For these migrant women, DV shelters are like 'prisons'. No free nursery is provided and there is little financial aid. Additionally, women are not allowed to go out and work and therefore cannot become financially self-sufficient in order to support their children, thus moving one step further from being 'responsible' mothers. For many abused migrant wives, going to live in a DV shelter is not the end but a *continuation* of a challenging life.

Tactical resistances against state tightropes

Despite these structural constraints, the women in our research are neither irrational nor naïve in their struggles against the discriminative values of dominant discourses. Instead they logically appropriate limited resources in order to negotiate both pressing social norms and gendered values. For example, a DNA test that can be used by the husband as evidence to prove a migrant wife's adultery can also be appropriated by her to seek child custody. For example, A-Ding (阿丁) complained how his Vietnamese girlfriend was awarded child custody via a DNA test:

> She registered 'our' child under the name of her ex-husband. She had not yet divorced her husband at that time, so when we were fighting for child custody, it was granted to her as 'our' child of course was not blood-related with her ex-husband. This way, she was eventually granted child custody.

In seeking to obtain child custody, getting Taiwanese residency through DVPL represents a last resort for migrant wives. To simply accuse these women of 'suspicious intentions', however, is to deny their tactical appropriation of already limited resources. It also avoids exploring why such a 'dishonest' move is one of the few ways available to them to escape domestic violence in the first place. How the violence of the state is operationalized alongside class inequality, ethnic discrimination and gendered hierarchy is often ignored (Tang and Wang, 2011b).

For abused Vietnamese wives in Taiwan, seeking help is seldom straightforward. Although they hope to obtain support from Taiwan's (discriminatory) bureaucracy, they also need to be financially independent in order to be self-sufficient mothers. These two wishes are often seen as contradictory and are difficult for professionals (e.g. social workers) to acknowledge. For example, A-Ying's (阿瑩) social worker wanted to arrange for her to stay in a DV shelter since it was cheap and comfortable, but A-Ying did not want to stay there. The social worker thus complained:

> If you rent the whole flat, it costs 4500(NT) dollars a month. If you share the flat with someone else, it only costs you about 2000… I took her to the place. She only saw the building, and didn't even go in and decided already she couldn't stay there. Of course, she gave some reasons such as she couldn't go out to work if she stayed there. Actually, she was quite good at doing business, but at the same time, she would also tell you she felt so helpless. This is kind of self-contradictory you know!

What appears to be unreasonable to the social worker can be easily understood if we understand that the priority for A-Ying is not to find a cheap and comfortable shelter, but to start earning money in order to have a new life with her children.

In the end, A-Ying stayed in the assigned shelter, but not for long. As her social worker explained:

> She told one of our colleagues to let her go home, so she could take her motorcycle with her. She said the motorcycle was the only valuable possession she had and she was worried that her partner would throw it away. She was so persistent that the social worker gave in and let her go. I remember that this all happened on a Friday. On Saturday, she insisted that she wanted to work and kept asking us, almost becoming annoying. Our colleague could not stand it anymore and called the boss to ask if A-Ying could go out to work. The boss said that she (A-Ying) was already an adult and we should respect her. If she wished to go, we should let her do so.

Despite the fact that one is not allowed to go out and work while staying in a government-owned DV shelter, there are always exceptions depending on how rules are implemented, by whom and under what circumstances. Thus, staying in a 'prison-like' DV shelter could also provide a temporary solution for A-Ying to escape from her husband's abuse. It further provided a pathway towards financial independence for her.

From the social worker's perspective, A-Ying's was quite a challenging case, in the sense that she found her to be fickle and dishonest. In 2007, A-Ying went back to Vietnam without telling anyone. When the social worker found out, A-Ying promised to get in touch when she returned to Taiwan. But she never kept her word. As the social worker commented:

> I told her (A-Ying) she must call me when she returned. She did tell me the date she was coming back… and she didn't call me. So I called the school to ask if the kids were back. I was told that they all came back. The teacher also asked about A-Ying, and the kids told us that she was now back with her abusive partner… I called A-Ying and she told me that she was still in Vietnam… Later on she told us that she went back to stay with her partner and told us that everything was fine

It was eventually revealed that the reason A-Ying went back to her partner was to save some money and to take care of her children. What appeared dishonest to professionals may actually have been the only practical solution available.

In her most recent flight back to Vietnam, A-Ying took the children with her and then returned to Taiwan alone in order to work. This time she did not contact any social workers and did not go back to stay with her partner. We were told that A-Ying was selling clothes to women who worked in an illicit (erotic) karaoke bar (KTV). A-Ying's social worker suspected, though was not entirely sure, that she also worked there herself:

> Last time she moved back to stay with her partner, she was dressing very nicely and looked very attractive… her partner said that she worked in a KTV, but I wanted to know for myself. So I asked her if she worked there. She told me that her friends worked there because they needed to earn a living, to raise the children. There was nothing else they could do. They are not indecent… She told me that she had tried to work there, but she hasn't done it yet. The money from her clothing business was good enough to support her and her children.

We have no evidence to tell if A-Ying worked in a KTV or not. However, what we are more certain of is that when abused women want to seek help from the state or the legal system, they are likely to 'perform' accordingly to the conventional gendered expectations of what a 'good' migrant wife should be in order to obtain the help they need. Nevertheless, when earning money becomes a pressing issue, these marginalized women may develop different tactics for survival. Their youth or their capital of beauty and physical appearance may be appropriated as gendered artifices to subvert the structural norms that constrain them. In saying this, we are aware of the potential re-embedding of gendered norms via performing femininities as gendered artifice (see Adkins 2002). Yet denying agency of this sort not only risks only certain privileged voices being heard and taken seriously but also bypasses the structural constraints and the politics of resistance of the subordinated.

To summarize, state regulations (i.e. family court or DVPL) and DV shelters can be both a blessing and a curse for subordinated migrant wives in Taiwan. Through a structural disjuncture between how social policies ought to operate and how they are *actually* practised, battered Vietnamese wives were sometimes able to negotiate a way past state-imposed discrimination.

Although we have primarily focused on how agency occurs through structural disjunctions, we have also recognized the agency of the subordinated in terms of utilizing limited resources to their advantage. Specifically, migrant wives such as A-Ying may use their femininity to help them flee domestic violence (yet without being able to entirely escape gendered expectations). Rather than simply dismissing agency of this sort, we suggest that it provides an important insight into how genders are enacted on a structural level. Specifically, feminine attributes such as desirability and beauty are forms of regulation rather than domination and thus

need to be analysed in relation to how they are valued through a masculine gaze. Such gendered artifice is central to understanding how gendered power and inequality are operationalized (Skeggs 2004).

Conclusion

This chapter has sociologically explored the 'hidden spaces' of resistance lived out through subordinated Vietnamese migrant wives in Taiwan. Specifically, we have focused on the structural disjunctions and contradictory powers open for manoeuvring past family/state tightropes. Our findings suggest that: (1) interlinked structural inequalities which work against migrant abused women are dispersed via gendered expectation, classed exclusion and ethnic discrimination; (2) they are further perpetuated by the control of the husband's family, the attitudes of professionals and the censorship of the state; (3) however, small and medium enterprises in Taiwan, alongside the DVPL and the personal networks of the Vietnamese migrant wives, can become resources for them to escape their marginalized positions (although the outcomes are sometimes ambivalent). Previous research on migrant wives in Taiwan has primarily focused on either structural determinism or on the voluntarism of the subordinated. Our study contributes to the existing literature by identifying the social conditions that allow the migrant 'others' to make use of the rules for their own advantages. By understanding agency through conflictual and multi-faceted social structures, we hope to have provided a more complex understanding of the daily politics of subordinated migrant women in Taiwan.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1 Research data is documented in detail in our previous works. For detailed discussions of our research participants, see Tang and Wang (2011a, b).
2 One of the key features identified by IE is 'experiences of disjuncture' in everyday life. By this, it means how individuals feel unjustified or mistreated, yet are not able to speak for themselves.
3 For example, Xu (2009) reported how Vietnamese women were perceived as 'easy' and 'accessible … They would do anything for money, to strip or to play'. *Liberty Times*, 3 October 2009. Available online at www.libertytimes.com.tw/2009/new/oct3/today-center1-2htm (accessed 11 November 2010).
4 According to the official website of Ministry of Education, family members in a 'normal' Taiwanese family include 'father/mother-in-law, husband, wife, sons and daughter'; and an important aspect of having a 'happy marriage' is 'when sometimes your husband is in a bad mood, for the family's sake, you should treat him kindly, to care [for] him and to understand him'. Available online at http://wise.edu.tw/resource/course/foreignbride/index.htm (accessed 13 February 2011).

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12 The life adjustment of children from new immigrant families in Taiwan

Chen Yu-wen

Introduction

I am called a 'new Taiwanese child.'
My dad is old; my mom has to do odd-jobs to support the family.
My grandparents don't like my mom; they always criticize her.
My mom works very hard. She is not happy; she always cries in her room.
My classmates laugh at me when she visits my school.
I know she loves me very much and I love her.
But Mom, please don't bring lunch to my school!

(From a fundraising poster by a non-profit organization in Taiwan, 2010)

The phenomenon of Taiwanese men marrying women from Southeast Asian countries has been portrayed as a social problem by mainstream society in recent years. The above fundraising slogan was a typical (or stereotypical) portrait of these families and what their children experience at home. Children born to mothers from Southeast Asian countries, the so-called 'new Taiwanese children' (新台灣之子), represent a growing segment of Taiwan's increasingly diverse population. The poor performance of these children has become a major concern. Many people in mainstream society are afraid that these children will grow up to be less competitive adults and, as a result, will represent a deterioration in the quality of the population. Some research has suggested that the overall adjustment of these children is poorer than that of their peers, especially in cognitive development and academic performance. Do new Taiwanese children really perform worse than children born to two Taiwanese parents, or is their performance misjudged due to stereotyping? For children entering adolescence, the period in which one tries to mould one's identity (Erikson 1959), would such a social image have an impact on their adjustment? It is crucial to understand how these new Taiwanese children adjust in their academic and social lives, including their educational performance, social interaction with peers, psychological and behavioural problems and other factors associated with their overall adjustment.

According to government statistics (Ministry of the Interior 2009), the number of children born to mothers from Southeast Asian countries has increased rapidly

in recent years, despite the national birth rate dropping. These new Taiwanese children have caught the public's attention because the media has reported that they are at a higher risk of developmental delays, mainly in language and cognitive skills. In addition, some early research supported hypotheses that these children's academic performance, language skills and overall adjustment in schools are indeed poorer than those of their peers. Did these children really perform worse than the average for students in Taiwan? Or were they just 'constructed' as mal-adjusted and problematic?

Hsia, the first scholar to study marriage migration issues in Taiwan, argued that due to classism and sexism, foreign brides and their children were perceived as social problems (2007). The mass media reinforced these ideologies by choosing to present stories of extreme cases, ignoring statistics provided by rigorous surveys. Consequently, the collective national anxiety arose. New immigrant women and their children are thus discriminated against by mainstream society.

Taiwan is mainly a single-heritage, patriarchal society. Its population has not been educated to be culturally sensitive. The increasing number of women immigrating from less developed Southeast Asian countries has forced its society to change. The government is eager to help these immigrant women to assimilate to mainstream society. For example, in 2003 the Premier Yu Shyi-Kun proposed to provide three billion NT dollars to take care of foreign brides and their children. Many Chinese literacy programmes were arranged for these women, and the government developed welfare programmes to help identify early developmental delays in their children. The government also created research grants to study the needs of these women and their children.

Earlier research supported hypotheses that these children's academic performance, language skills and overall adjustment in schools indeed lagged behind those of their peers. However, as more research was conducted, different pictures about these children were presented. Some research found that the overall performance of these children was equal to, and at times even ahead of, that of their peers. For example, Chen (2005) interviewed parents of 1,122 children of new immigrant women in Taipei and found that 43.3 per cent of them had been asked to evaluate possible developmental delays, while in the general population, only 19.9 per cent had been asked to do so. Among those who were evaluated, only 4.2 per cent were found to have signs of developmental delays. This was not higher than the worldwide developmental delay rate (6–8 per cent) estimated by the United Nations. Lai (2006) studied 1,095 children and their peers in elementary and junior high schools and found that, after controlling for family economic status, there were no differences between the two groups. Another national survey conducted by the Ministry of Education (2005) also found that, among a sample of 7,027 elementary students, the overall performance of children from new immigrant families was not different from that of their peers.

Recent studies about these children's performance have been quite inconsistent. In addition, most studies focus more on their academic performance than their overall well-being. New Taiwanese children are Taiwanese citizens. However, they face issues similar to those of mixed-heritage children. Western studies about

mixed-heritage children have found that their self-esteem and ability to adjust tends to be affected by stereotyping and discrimination (Kerwin and Ponterotto 1995). Many studies have attempted to examine their self-esteem and identity development (Bracey *et al*. 2004; Herring 1995; Suyemoto 2004), while others have tried to study their social and psychological well-being. Issues related to the development of mixed-heritage identity are of major concern in many studies, because the topic shapes individuals' attitudes about themselves and their ethnic background. For people with mixed heritage, especially children and adolescents, ethnic identity can be a complex issue since the individuals may identify with one, both, or neither group (Gibbs and Hines 1992; Hall 1992). Those who have difficulty developing an ethnic identity tend to have a more negative view of themselves and as a result they are at a higher risk of not socially adjusting as well as their peers and experiencing mental health problems. Recent studies have not provided consistent answers to the questions set out earlier in this chapter. For example, Campbell and Eggerling-Boeck (2006) found that multiracial adolescents experienced some negative psychological outcomes compared to white adolescents; however, they also found that as a group, mixed-heritage adolescents did not experience more difficulties than members of other minority groups.

Though there were studies indicating no performance differences between new Taiwanese children and their peers, perceived genetic or cultural inferiorities *have* negatively affected some. According to Erikson (1959), pre- and early adolescence is the period at which one begins to acquire their own identity. During this developmental stage, such social stereotypes could impact the development of these children's identities. Research on aboriginal children's and adolescents' identity formation in Taiwan, as well as that of mixed-heritage children in western countries, found that they were more likely to encounter identity problems as they entered adolescence (Herring 1995; Hsu and Lee 2002; Liu *et al.* 1995). These children's views regarding the minority parent were inevitably affected by social discrimination (Roth 2005).

Although studies found that perceived genetic or cultural inferiorities have negatively affected mixed-heritage children's ability to adjust to life, the causality was not direct. Studies that tried to explain the relationship between discrimination and adjustment found self-esteem played a very important mediating role. Social discrimination deepened mixed-heritage children's perception of their minority status, resulting in lower self-esteem (Cavazos-Rehg and DeLucia-Waack 2009; Phinney and Alipuria 1990; Phinney *et al*. 1997; Rowley *et al.* 1998). The crisis created by such minority ethnic backgrounds not only affected their self-esteem, but also led to avoidance of identification with the minority ethnicity. A study by Fatimilehin (1999) found that in mixed-heritage families, children who had more positive ethnic identity toward the minority parent had more positive self-esteem and tended to adjust better than those who did not identify with the minority parent. In other words, self-esteem mediates the relationship between ethnic identity and life adjustment of mixed-heritage children. Similar mediating effects also occurred between perceived social discrimination and life adjustment (Phinney *et al.* 2001; Roth 2005). It is important to note that personal beliefs about existing

discrimination in society tended to have stronger effects on personal well-being than the actual climate of discrimination in one's society (Brown and Bigler 2005). Therefore, the present study examines the impact of perceived discrimination on the self-esteem and life adjustment of new Taiwanese children. In addition to the aforementioned variables, gender and family economic status were also found to impact children's life adjustment. This study treated these three factors as controlled variables in our multivariate analyses.

This chapter intends to contribute incrementally to previous work through multiple steps. The first is to compare the life adjustment of new Taiwanese children and their peers with single-heritage backgrounds. The second is to investigate factors associated with adjustment problems of new Taiwanese children, including educational performance, social interactions with peers and psychological and behavioural problems.

Method

Participants

To recruit eligible respondents for this study, a list of elementary and junior high schools with at least one student from the target group was obtained from the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. The list provided information about the number of students in grades 5 to 9 born to new immigrant women in each school. The sampling frame excluded schools without new Taiwanese children. Based on the population density, Taiwan was divided into four regions (North, South, East and Central). Within each region, schools with eligible respondents were first randomly selected. If schools refused to participate in this study, the random selection procedure was repeated. Eligible children aged 10 to 15 and an equivalent number of their single-heritage classmates were invited to participate in this study. A total of 2,026 students participated. After deleting non-eligible cases or cases with substantial missing data, a total of 1,930 respondents were included in the final analyses. Among them, 920 (47.7 per cent) were new Taiwanese children and 1,010 (52.3 per cent) were peers with single-heritage backgrounds. Participants were 10 to 15 years of age, with a mean of 12.3 years. Males comprised 49.3 per cent of the sample and females 50.7 per cent.

Measures

The present study used measures that have been found to be reliable as well as valid when used on Chinese-speaking participants. As for scales that had to be translated into Chinese for this study, they were first translated from English into Chinese by a research assistant, and then translated back from Chinese to English to check for accuracy. A pilot study using the Chinese version was conducted with sixteen adolescents, four from each region. Based on their feedback, some items were revised to ensure clarity.

Depressive mood

This study used the Chinese version of the Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) to gauge depressive mood. The Chinese CES-D was translated by Chien and Cheng (1985), and permission to use this measure was obtained. This is a widely used, reliable measure of depressive symptoms consisting of twenty self-report items. It asked respondents to indicate how often during the past week they experienced a variety of depressive symptoms. Sampled items include 'I was bothered by things that don't usually bother me' 'I did not feel like eating' and 'I felt that people disliked me'. All items were rated on a 4-point Likert scale. The total score indicated the severity of depressive mood.

Behavioural problems

Behavioural problems were assessed with the Child Behaviour Checklist (Achenbach 1985). This scale has been translated into Chinese (Liu 2003), and was found to have adequate validity and reliability. It includes eight subscales, but only the aggressive behaviour (e.g. fights with others, harassing others and destruction of others' belongings) and delinquent behaviour (e.g. drinking alcohol, running away from home and stealing) subscales were used. The two subscales consisted of thirty-two items, with each rated on a 3-point scale including 1 = *not true*, 2 = *somewhat or sometimes true* and 3 = *very true or often true*. Total score indicated the severity of the problematic behaviour.

Perceived academic performance

Since respondents were selected from different schools, their GPA at the school might not reflect their actual academic performance. This study asked all respondents to evaluate their academic performance on every subject (eight to ten subjects, depending on their grades) in a relative sense; that is, compared with their classmates and in terms of how good they felt about their performance. Responses ranged from 5 = *much better* to 1 = *much worse*. All item responses were totalled and the averaged score represented how well the respondent performed in school. A higher average score indicated better perceived academic performance.

Social interactions with peers

This study adopted a part of the 'Child and Adolescent Social and Adaptive Functioning Scale' (CASAFS for short) used in Carmen, Spence, Sheffield & Donovan (2002). The subscale consisted of seven items to measure the frequency of respondents' interactions with peers in and out of school: for example, '*I will participate in activities with my friends'*. Each statement was rated on a 4-point Likert scale, including 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *agree* and 4 = *strongly agree*. A higher score indicated more social interaction with peers.

Self-esteem

We adopted the most widely used Self-Esteem Scale, that designed by Rosenberg (1979), to examine the degree of approval or disapproval toward oneself. The translated version of this scale consisted of nine statements that asked respondents about perceptions of themselves. Responses to the questions ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*). All scores were totalled to indicate respondents' levels of self-esteem, with higher scores indicating greater self-esteem.

Perceived social discrimination

This scale attempted to measure how respondents perceived social discrimination toward their minority parent's racial heritage. It was a revised version of the Asian-American Racism-Related Stress Inventory (AARRSI; Liang, Lai, & Kim, 2004). The items (e.g. '*You are told "you speak Chinese so well*"', '*Someone tells you that you people are all the same*' and '*You have seen a negative report about new immigrant families*') were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with end points of *'This event happened and I was extremely upset'* (5) and *'This event has never happened to me or someone I know'* (1). They were coded so that higher scores indicated higher perception of social discrimination.

Perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent

The perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent's heritage was examined using the Ethnic Identity Scale developed by local scholars (Hsu and Lee 2002). They adopted and extended Phinney's Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney 1990). This scale was composed of twenty items (e.g. *'I am proud of being a member of the new immigrant families'*, '*I have spent time trying to find out more about my minority parent's ethnic group*' and '*I think a lot about how my life is affected by my mixed-heritage background*') were scored on a 6-point Likert scale, with end points of '*strongly agree'* (6) and '*strongly disagree*' (1). A higher total score indicated more positive feelings toward the minority parent's ethnic group.

Demographics

In addition to gender and age, demographic information regarding respondents' families' economic status, their minority ethnic language proficiency and the age when they first learned of their ethnic backgrounds were also collected. Since most children were not able to provide accurate information regarding family income, this study asked them instead to evaluate perceived relative family economic status as compared to their peers. We used an item to ask respondents whether their family's economic status was '*much better*', '*better*', '*about the same*', '*worse*' or '*much worse*' than their peers' as an index of subjective family

economic status. The language proficiency question asked them to assess how well they spoke their minority parent's ethnic language. Responses ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 4 (*very well*).

Procedures and data analyses

Students were informed that their participation was voluntary and confidential, and they could withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. They would receive a NT$100 gift certificate from a popular nationwide convenient store after completing the questionnaire. Data collection took place from February to June in 2007. Self-reported questionnaires were administrated in the group setting at school break time. The questionnaire took around 25–30 minutes to complete. One member of the research team was at the research site to explain the purpose of the research, to distribute the questionnaire and to answer possible questions.

SPSS was utilized to analyse the data. Independent group t-tests were used to compare differences in the outcome measures. OLS regression models were computed after controlling for age, gender and family economic status to examine the explanatory variables of new Taiwanese children's life adjustment.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Regardless of their ethnic background, 48.3 per cent of respondents thought that their family's economic status was about the same as that of other families. As for the new Taiwanese children, 46.5 per cent thought that their family's economic status was about the same as other families, 1.8 per cent less than the sample group as a whole. In terms of language proficiency, 39.1 per cent were not able to speak their minority parent's ethnic language, 38.3 per cent could speak a little and only 12.4 per cent said they could speak the language fluently. About half (57.3 per cent) became aware of their mixed-heritage background between ages 6–11, 35.4 per cent said they knew of it before age 6 and 7.3 per cent said they did not know of it until they were 12 or older.

How did new Taiwanese children perceive the discrimination they may have experienced in the past? About 40 per cent of them said they felt somewhat or very upset about the negative reports regarding new immigrant families. About one third (31.4 per cent) said their minority ethnic parent was misidentified as a foreign labourer, 20.4 per cent said their Taiwanese grandparents were not nice to their minority parent and, finally, 34.5 per cent said they did not want their minority parent to visit them at school.

As for perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent, it was found that most respondents (78.7 per cent) agreed they felt proud of being new Taiwanese children. However, less than half of the respondents (44.8 per cent) knew the historical and cultural heritages and traditions of their minority parent and only about one third (35.5 per cent) had ever participated in the cultural activities or

festivals of the minority ethnic group. In other words, most respondents did not know much about the culture of their minority parent.

Group comparisons

Group comparisons were carried out by independent group t-test to examine whether group differences existed in all aspects of life adjustment. Statistically significant results meant that any such sample differences could also be found in the general population. We found that depressive mood, social interactions with peers and academic performance were different between groups; however, no group differences were found in problematic behaviour. New Taiwanese children seemed to suffer more severe depression, had less social interaction with peers and evaluated their academic performance as worse than that of their peers.

These findings might echo people's perception that new Taiwanese children do not adjust as well as their peers born to Taiwanese parents. However, the above analyses did not control for other variables that might impact life adjustment. In order to better examine the group differences, this study further controlled for age, gender and family economic status, and then examined the group differences. Control of the above variables enabled us to statistically remove their effects on our results. After controlling for age, gender and family economic status, no group differences were found. In other words, for new Taiwanese children with the same gender, age and family economic status as their peers born to Taiwanese parents, the quality of their life adjustment was the same.

Bivariate analyses

Even though no group differences were found after more sophisticated statistical analyses were done, the life adjustments of new Taiwanese children were not all the same. There should be factors behind such differences. To test this assumption, we needed to conduct further statistical analyses. Before testing the more advanced models, correlation coefficients of all variables among new Taiwanese children were examined (see Table 12.1). All independent variables were significantly associated with depressive mood, problematic behaviour, social interactions with peers and academic performance. Perceived social discrimination was positively associated with depressive mood ($r = 0.34$, $p < 0.001$) and problematic behaviour ($r = 0.29$, $p < 0.001$), and negatively associated with social interaction with peers ($r = -0.17$, $p < 0.001$) and academic performance ($r = -0.20$, $p < 0.001$). Self-esteem and perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent were negatively associated with depressive mood and problematic behaviour and positively associated with social interactions with peers and academic performance. As for relationships between independent variables, self-esteem was positively associated with perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent ($r = 0.27$, $p < 0.001$) and negatively with perceived social discrimination ($r = -0.19$, $p < 0.001$).

Table 12.1 Correlations of variables among new Taiwanese children

Variables	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*
1. Depressive mood	–						
2. Problematic behaviour	0.44**	–					
3. Interactions with peers	−0.31**	−0.04	–				
4. Academic performance	−0.27**	−0.22**	0.14**	–			
5. Cultural pride	−0.23**	−0.13**	0.17**	0.23**	–		
6. Discrimination	0.34**	0.29**	−0.17**	−0.20**	0.03*	–	
7. Self-esteem	−0.55**	−0.23**	0.32**	0.35**	0.27**	−0.19**	–

*p < 0.01; **p < 0.001

Multivariate analyses

Tables 12.2 and 12.3 present the final results of multivariate analyses of the contribution of age, gender, family economic status, perceived social discrimination and perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent to all aspects of life adjustment among new Taiwanese children. Since the mediating effect of self-esteem was to be examined, all independent variables were tested before and after self-esteem was entered into the model. As we can see in Table 12.2, after controlling for age, gender and family's economic status, perceived social discrimination and perceived cultural pride toward the minority parent were all significantly related to depressive mood and problematic behaviour of new Taiwanese children. The effects of self-esteem only partially mediated the effect of cultural pride toward the minority parent and social discrimination since, as self-esteem entered into the model, the effects of cultural pride toward the minority parent and social discrimination were still significant. However, the effect was not as strong, as the standardized beta dropped after self-esteem was entered (last) into the model.

Table 12.2 Multivariate regression analyses of depressive mood and problematic behaviour (standardized regression coefficient, Beta, was presented)

Variables	*Depressive mood*		*Problematic behaviour*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*
Age	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02
Gender[1]	−0.15***	−0.09**	0.11**	0.13***
Family's economic status	−0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05
Cultural pride	−0.25***	−0.13***	−0.13***	−0.09*
Social discrimination	0.34***	0.25***	0.30***	0.27***
Self-esteem		−0.48***		−0.17***
F value	40.21***	88.32***	20.71***	21.42***
R^2	0.20	0.40	0.12	0.14

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; Note 1: 1 = Male, 0 = Female

Results in Table 12.3 were similar to those in Table 12.2. After controlling for age, gender and family's economic status, perceived social discrimination and cultural pride toward the minority parent were all significantly related to the social interactions with peers and academic performance of new Taiwanese children. The effect of self-esteem only partially mediated the effects of cultural pride and social discrimination on these children's social interaction with peers and academic performance, since as self-esteem was entered into the model, the effects of cultural pride and social discrimination were still significant. However, the effect was not as strong, as the standardized beta dropped after self-esteem was entered (last) into the model.

Self-esteem was the factor with the strongest explanatory power for depressive mood. In addition to those with low self-esteem, females, those who had more negative cultural pride toward the minority parent and those who perceived more social discrimination toward their ethnic backgrounds suffered more severe depression.

As for problematic behaviour, males, those with lower self-esteem, those with more negative cultural views regarding the minority parent and those who perceived more social discrimination suffered from more problematic behaviour. The strongest explanatory variable was perceived social discrimination. As for social interactions with peers, those who were older, had higher self-esteem and more positive minority cultural pride and perceived less social discrimination enjoyed better interactions with their peers. Those who were younger, had a positive perception of their family's economic status, had higher self-esteem, perceived less social discrimination and had more cultural pride toward their minority parent were more likely to perform better academically.

As a whole, these variables accounted from 40 per cent to 12 per cent of the variance in all aspects of life adjustment. These results indicate that new Taiwanese children who perceived more social discrimination toward them and had more negative cultural pride toward their minority parent were more likely to suffer from depression and problematic behaviour, had fewer interactions with peers and fared less well academically. Self-esteem played a partially mediating role

Table 12.3 Multivariate regression analyses of social interactions with peers and academic performance (standardized regression coefficient, Beta, was presented)

Variables	*Peer interaction*		*Academic performance*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*
Age	0.26***	0.27***	−0.22***	−0.22***
Gender[1]	0.00	−0.04	0.04	0.00
Family's economic status	0.04	0.00	0.10**	0.07*
Cultural pride	0.19***	0.11**	0.21***	0.14***
Social discrimination	−0.17***	−0.11**	−0.18***	−0.13***
Self-esteem		0.31***		0.26***
F value	21.66***	34.08***	31.90***	38.94***
R^2	0.12	0.20	0.16	0.22

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; Note 1: 1 = Male, 0 = Female

between social discrimination, cultural pride toward one's minority parent and all aspects of life adjustment.

Discussion and conclusions

This study contributes to the existing body of literature by using a national representative sample of Taiwanese children and adolescents to compare their psychological and social adjustment to that of their peers. Its findings have highlighted some issues worth noting. First, can we, from the data above, claim that the life adjustment of new Taiwanese children is worse than that of their peers born to Taiwanese parents? If we don't look closely at the data, the answer might be yes. However, after more sophisticated analyses, we found that this is not the case. The life adjustment of new Taiwanese children with the same gender, age and family economic status as their peers born to Taiwanese parents has been found to be about the same.

These results indicate that what has been observed from single cases is usually a reflection of stereotyping. Stories presented by the mass media tend to be extreme cases and do not represent the general population. However, such stories easily and effectively make an impression on the public, which may lead to the reinforcement of discrimination. It could be argued that these reports were written with good intentions, because they may garner public concern for this population and, as a result, encourage leaders to allocate larger budgets toward their welfare. However, policies that emphasize linguistic and cultural assimilation exert pressure on these families. The encouragement of assimilation into mainstream society may lead to more discrimination and thereby to the social and economic marginalization of these families.

Mainstream society's development of a number of programmes to help minority parents learn to speak Mandarin, cook Taiwanese food and help with their children's' homework highlights a tricky issue. For example, such services are usually not extended to families with a parent from an English-speaking country. Society doesn't worry about these children's Mandarin proficiency. Quite the contrary, most people are amazed by their bilingual capacity. Evidently, assimilation is never an issue or a concern to families with an English-speaking parent. Why is this? One local scholar, Lan Pei-chia, used the term 'racialized classism' to describe the different treatment of migrant workers with different racial backgrounds (2005). Although her article focuses on the experiences of migrant workers, the same idea can be applied to new Taiwanese children and their minority parents. Current policies should stop forcing them to give up their cultural identity. New Taiwanese children should be encouraged to speak their minority parents' host language, to maintain their culture and to orient themselves toward their minority parents' ethnic community. They need to be proud of growing in multicultural backgrounds.

Second, the above data shows that for those who experienced more discrimination and perceived less cultural pride toward their minority parent, their self-esteem tended to be lower. As a result, their life adjustment was worse. Therefore, it is important to reduce social discrimination toward these families. We need to take 'multicultural' policy approaches. The development of strategies

to encourage the acculturation of the dominant group is a must. Today, all acculturation programmes are created for minority parents; there are none for people with mono-racial backgrounds. As the retention of one's minority culture and strong ethnic pride can reduce risks of maladjustment and enhance resilience among these children, we have to develop educational programmes regarding cultural diversity for school-aged children so they can learn to respect others with different cultural backgrounds. Such programmes can also be delivered to Taiwanese family members of new immigrants, so they can learn to appreciate and respect the culture of the minority group.

If it takes a village to raise a child, then it takes the whole society to raise every child in a socially just and culturally sensitive environment. This is a good chance for Taiwan to experience cultural and ethnic diversity. Only efforts made by mainstream society at the institutional and larger societal levels can bring about real changes in the future.

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13 Political socialization in domestic families and families with mainland spouses in Taiwan

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Introduction

Intercultural marriage is a widespread global phenomenon. How adult immigrants and their children adjust to new environments has been studied in various disciplines (e.g. Brubaker 2001; Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993). However, political scientists, especially those from the subfield of political socialization, have not investigated the (re)socialization experiences of immigrants and their offspring during Taiwan's increased immigration of the past two decades (Jennings 2007). This study compares mothers and children from families with spouses from mainland China to their counterparts from domestic families in Taiwan to address this gap in the study of political socialization.

It is common for Taiwanese men who have difficulty finding a Taiwanese wife to travel to China, Vietnam or Indonesia to find a spouse with the assistance of professional matchmakers, their relatives or friends living in these countries. Figure 1 shows the proportion of international marriages in the last decade and indicates that the practice is common, reaching a peak in 2003. Although the proportion has declined since then, international marriages constituted more than 13 per cent of all weddings in Taiwan in 2011. Figure 13.1 shows a large gap between the proportion of foreign bridegrooms and that of foreign brides, with the majority of international marriages composed of domestic (Taiwanese) men and foreign women.

Most of these foreign wives are from mainland China, because of the cultural and linguistic similarities between Taiwan and China. However, because of the long-term political separation of the two sides and their different political systems, people from these two societies have divergent views on politics and the issue of unification/independence between Taiwan and China. It seems that it should be easier for mainland spouses to adjust to their new life after moving to Taiwan than those from other countries; however, because of political differences in Taiwan, in which some people have a positive view toward China and promote closer integration while others take an unfriendly view and promote Taiwan's independence, it is likely that mainland spouses encounter novel political experiences while residing on the island.

Foreign spouses in Taiwan have had substantial numbers of children. According to the official statistics released by the Ministry of the Interior, nearly 10 per cent



Figure 13.1 Proportion of international marriages (2001–2011)

Source: Bulletin of Interior Statistics, week 20, 2012; available online at http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/week/week10120.doc (accessed 13 November 2012)

of newborns in Taiwan in the past decade have been born to families with a foreign spouse.[1] Since 2008, the majority of these newborns have been born in families with mainland spouses, rather than families with foreign spouses from other countries.

It is interesting to observe how these mainland spouses, who developed their political attitudes and values in China, adjust to a completely different political environment. Before the immigration regulations were amended in 2009, most mainland spouses were not allowed employment until they obtained permission for long-term residency. Because this application process used to take several years to complete, most spouses did not have much of an opportunity to acquaint themselves with their new society in the first few years. Consequently, not only did these mainland spouses depend on their husbands and family members to learn about and adjust to their new environment, but they also received most of their political information from their husbands and in-laws. This chapter examines whether the experience of marriage migration to Taiwan alters mainland spouses' political views and attitudes, and assesses the influence of husbands' families in this process.

Although intercultural marriages are not rare in Taiwan, they still comprise a minority of marriages on the island. Therefore, it is critical to examine the possible impact of growing up in a family with a mainland parent on children's political attitudes and behaviours. When these children reach adulthood, they take part in politics and may have a large influence on the political system in Taiwan. Whether and how growing up in families with a mainland parent makes

these children distinct from children of domestic families is a question of importance for political scientists. Therefore, this chapter investigates whether this unusual environment causes these children to be different from their counterparts from domestic families.

Purpose of this article

As mentioned above, women who have moved to Taiwan from mainland China after marrying Taiwanese men are distinct from foreign spouses from other parts of Asia. Mainland spouses and people in Taiwan have similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Therefore, it is possible for spouses to integrate into Taiwanese society. However, Taiwan has been separated from China for more than sixty years because the Kuomintang (KMT; the nationalist party) lost the civil war in mainland China and fled to Taiwan in 1949. Before this separation, Taiwan had been ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty and had been under Japanese colonial occupation for fifty years (from 1895 to 1945). In brief, Taiwan and China are viewed as two different societies, and there are various disparities between them. In particular, because of the complex history between Taiwan and China, people in Taiwan are divided as to how they identify themselves. Although some people take a pro-China stance and consider themselves Chinese, others refer to themselves as Taiwanese, and still others state that they are both Taiwanese and Chinese. Some people in Taiwan have anti-Chinese sentiments and may have different views from their mainland spouses. Regardless of whether this attitude toward mainland spouses is unusual, it is true that mainland spouses were occasionally discriminated against with regard to employment and residency before Taiwan's laws were revised in 2009. Mainland spouses' experiences in Taiwan are possibly different from those of domestic spouses and other foreign spouses. In addition, compared to children from domestic families and those with spouses from countries other than China, the children of mainland spouses may have unique socialization experiences.

In accordance with these situations encountered by mainland spouses and their children, this study investigates two questions: first, does the experience of living in Taiwan because of marriage change mainlanders' political views? According to the literature on political socialization, adolescence and early adulthood are critical periods during which individuals develop their political attitudes (e.g. Inglehart 1981; Miller and Sears 1986). It is useful to study how mainland spouses, who typically move to Taiwan in their twenties or early thirties, perceive the differing political environments between China and Taiwan, and whether their experiences in Taiwan challenge and/or alter attitudes and behaviours that develop while growing up in mainland China. This study investigates whether moving to Taiwan produces a 'resocialization' effect on mainland spouses and measures the persistence and alteration of political attitudes and behaviours formed during early socialization (Jennings & Niemi, 1981).

Second, we examine whether the children of mainland spouses have different socialization experiences from other children in Taiwan. As mentioned,

because of the unique relationship between Taiwan and China, people have differing opinions toward mainland spouses and their children, possibly resulting in mainland mothers and their children being regarded as a distinct group in Taiwanese society. In addition, the children of mainland spouses typically have more exposure to China than do other Taiwanese children, because of their visits to maternal relatives living there. Consequently, these children may develop a unique understanding of mainland China.

Taiwan became a democratic society in the 1980s. Mainland China, in contrast, has remained under the authoritarian rule of the Communist party. Consequently, there are substantial differences between Taiwan and China regarding how people understand the political process and democracy. Furthermore, the political tension and conflict between the two sides is unresolved, although their economic interaction and interdependence is increasing. Hence, mainland Chinese and Taiwanese have complex feelings toward each other. Therefore, in our study we focused on how our interviewees, who comprised children and mothers from both domestic and mainland-spouse families, understood and commented on the differing political systems in Taiwan and China. In addition, it is crucial to ascertain whether mainland spouses' experiences regarding living in Taiwan have influenced their lives and political attitudes.

In addition to describing the (re)socialization experiences of immigrants and their children, this study provides data for political scientists to better understand how children develop political attitudes and behaviours, a topic that has been neglected by political scientists (Jennings 2007). Because children do not participate in politics and do not substantially influence the political system, political scientists have not considered them significant to the political process. Furthermore, adults typically believe that children cannot fully understand politics. Therefore, conducting research on children's political attitudes and behaviours is not encouraged in the discipline of political science. For these reasons, political scientists in Taiwan have seldom investigated children's political attitudes and do not understand the political socialization experiences of children from either domestic families or families with mainland spouses.

However, empirical research indicates that elementary schoolchildren are able to recognize politicians and their roles, and can, to a degree, understand abstract concepts such as government (e.g. Easton and Dennis 1965; Greenstein 1965). Furthermore, children can apply complex moral standards to judge political matters (Gallatin & Adelson 1970). Recent research in developmental psychology has challenged the notion that children's cognitive capabilities are limited, indicating that studying how children develop social categorization skills and identity is a proper approach for political scientists to study how children develop political attitudes and behaviours (Sapiro, 2004). Therefore, political scientists should focus on children's political developmental experiences, attitudes and values. In addition, children's cognitive capabilities develop substantially between the ages of 11 and 13, which is a critical period for the development of political attitudes (Adelson and O'Neill 1966). Studying the socialization experiences and developing attitudes of older

elementary schoolchildren from mainland-spouse and domestic families is crucial to understanding the future political attitudes and behaviours of these two groups of children.

This study does not generalize its findings here to the entire population of mainland spouses and their children in Taiwan. Rather, it determines whether and how family plays a role in the (re)socialization of mainland spouses and their children compared to Taiwanese mothers and their children.

Methodology and ethics

Interviews were conducted in various areas of Central and Southern Taiwan to investigate the (re)socialization experiences and political attitudes of mothers and children from mainland-spouse families and domestic families. In addition to the information we obtained from children and their mothers, the children's teachers were interviewed separately to better understand the children's political socialization experiences. This research design minimizes the bias that results from using a single data source and is frequently used in the field of political socialization (Niemi 1973; Tedin 1976; Westholm 1999). Consequently, this study used multiple data sources on the political (re)socialization experiences of these families. Examining the data collected resulted in a more comprehensive picture of how adult immigrants' political (re)socialization experiences are affected by intercultural marriage. Furthermore, this study investigated how growing up in families formed by intercultural marriage influences the political socialization process of children.

To reduce the interference resulting from the relationships between the researchers and interviewees, all interviewees were introduced to the researchers by the researchers' associates (i.e. the researchers and interviewees did not know each other until the interviews were conducted). The researchers contacted the elementary schoolteachers through the researchers' associates. Teachers who agreed to participate in the interview helped contact the children and parents. Although some of the interviews were conducted in the homes of the parents and children, the majority were conducted in classrooms after school. The interviews were conducted in various formats, including one-on-one interviews, focus groups, wife–husband pairs and mother–child pairs, depending on the availability of the interviewees.

The interviews were conducted in 2009. The typical interview process began with questions related to education, such as the children's learning experiences at school and at home, the interaction between the parents and teachers and children's extracurricular activities. Thereafter, the interview continued with questions regarding the interviewees' experiences in Taiwan and their political attitudes. The purpose of first asking questions regarding the children's education was to help the interviewees feel relaxed before asking questions related to immigration and politics. Educational issues are typically considered stress-free by the public in Taiwan, and political issues are frequently considered sensitive questions. Most of the interviews lasted 30–100 minutes. All of the interviews were recorded or videotaped with the interviewees' consent, and their content was transcribed for analysis. Nineteen groups of interviewees participated in the interviews. Each of

the groups, with a few exceptions, was composed of an elementary school student, the student's mother and a teacher. In all, six third-grade students, five fourth-grade students, three fifth-grade students, three sixth-grade students and two seventh-grade students, along with seven Taiwanese mothers, nine mainland mothers and two Taiwanese fathers, were interviewed. In addition, fourteen teachers participated in the interviews.

A substantial portion of this study concerns children's political attitudes and socialization experiences. Therefore, the children were asked to share their experiences and attitudes to enable an investigation of their socialization experiences. Because some of our participants were minors, some ethical issues were considered prior to conducting the interviews (Holmes, 1998). Taiwanese society offers few rights to children who participate in research projects, partially because codes and policies for ethical research are not well established in Taiwan. Therefore, it was the authors' responsibility to ensure that the children's rights were protected.

Because it was unlikely that the children would refuse to participate, twofold consent by the teachers and the parents was required before the interview process began (i.e. the authors did not contact any children whose parents or teachers did not allow them to participate in the study). When the elementary school-teachers were asked to contact the children and parents, they were provided with a summary of the study to better enable the teachers, parents and children to decide whether they would like to be interviewed. Prior to beginning each interview, the project was introduced and the participants were informed that it was acceptable to stop the interview or refuse to answer any question for any reason. At the end of the interview, the interviewees were asked if any of the questions made them feel uncomfortable. All of the participants successfully completed the interview and stated that nothing asked during the interview made them feel uncomfortable. The majority of the mainland and domestic spouses stated that the interview was similar to chatting with friends and that none of the topics were overly sensitive to them. These responses indicate that discussing politics is not as sensitive as was supposed.

Regarding the concern that asking the children of mainland spouses questions regarding their political socialization experiences might make them feel uncomfortable or cause emotional or psychological injury, several of the elementary school teachers reviewed our interview guidelines and sample questions in advance to avoid any problems. Following each interview, the authors and assistants reviewed the interview process and the children's responses and reactions to examine if any inappropriate questions had been asked. Overall, the children's rights were protected, and any concerns regarding ethical issues in this study were negated.

Data analysis

In accordance with the goals of this study, the following issues are discussed in this section: (1) Did the mainland and Taiwanese mothers have similar views toward politics and democracy? (2) Did the mainland spouses change their

political attitudes after moving to Taiwan? If so, did this change result from the influence of their husbands' family? (3) How have the elementary schoolchildren formed their political attitudes? What family socialization agents shaped these attitudes? (4) Have the children from mainland-spouse families and their counterparts from domestic families experienced differing socialization experiences at home? If so, what are the observable effects of these different family socialization experiences?

Mothers' attitudes toward politics and democracy

During the interviews, with few exceptions, all of the mothers and fathers – regardless of their country of origin – had negative opinions of politics in general. This conclusion is based on repeated conversation patterns encountered during the interviews. These conversations generally developed as follows. The mothers were asked, 'Do you talk about political news with your kid(s) when you watch the news on TV together?' Nearly all of the mothers responded, 'No, I don't. They are too young to understand these issues'. Most of the mothers believed that politics is too complex for children to comprehend. Several mothers consciously avoided discussing politics. For example, when she watched news regarding political protests on TV, Lin-ya,[2] a Taiwanese mother, would immediately change the channel because she did not want her children to watch too much political news.

There were two exceptions to this pattern of conversation. Two Taiwanese mothers, Fan-yun and Ting-yi, frequently discussed politics with their children at home. Fan-yun would discuss political news with her children when they asked her to do so. Ting-yi typically initiated political discussions because she wanted to know what her children thought. In addition, she was willing to share her political opinions with her children. However, as with the other mothers, her husband was conservative and believed that it is not good to frequently discuss politics with children.

The traditional culture shared by Taiwan and mainland China largely explains why most mothers were unwilling to let their children learn about politics. Both societies have a well-known maxim: 'The emperor is as far [away] as the sky.' This maxim indicates that people did not participate in politics during the Chinese imperial era and considered it irrelevant to their lives. In addition, many people in Taiwan believe that engaging in politics, whether under authoritarian or democratic rule, does not produce desirable results. Although Taiwan has been a democratic country for more than two decades, people still have a negative view of politics that originated in the imperial era.

However, a response by one of the participants, Li-xue, demonstrated that some of the interviewees probably attempted to conceal their actual situation at home. Li-xue, a mainland spouse, was quiet during most of the interview and stated that she does not discuss politics with her daughter, Mei-hui, at home and that Mei-hui does not have political opinions. The only response we received from Li-xue was that politics in Taiwan is too problematic. 'The mainland does not have a political problem.' However, Mei-hui clearly expressed her strong partisanship

and favourable attitudes toward President Ma Ying-jeou and mainland China, stating that she and her mother have the same political opinions. Furthermore, Mei-hui stated that Li-xue frequently discusses politics at home and criticizes the former president Chen Shui-bian when they watch the news together. During our interview, Mei-hui vividly imitated what Li-xue would say at home: 'That damn Chen Shui-bian!'

Li-xue's case indicates that she had strong political opinions but was reluctant to disclose them during the interview. Her negative attitudes toward politics and her observations on Taiwanese politics could explain why she concealed what takes place at home. As she mentioned, 'There is a dramatic discrepancy between mainlanders and Taiwanese'. This mainlander/Taiwanese division caused Li-xue to be uncomfortable regarding politics and to hide her true feelings from strangers.

Although none of the Taiwanese mothers directly commented on democracy in Taiwan, several of them indirectly expressed positive attitudes toward democracy. However, the mainland mothers showed divergent views on democracy in Taiwan. Most of them felt that politics are 'too democratic in Taiwan'. Mei-fang is a mainland spouse, and her husband's family members supported different political parties. Therefore, they often had arguments at home. Even the Taiwanese mothers who resided in the same village knew that Mei-fang's family frequently had political disagreements. When she was asked to comment on politics in Taiwan, she stated the following:

> I strongly feel that this thing [politics] has nothing to do with us. We don't participate in politics. But here… the elders just quarrel with others because of that person [Chen Shui-bian]… Not just the elders, but the young people do this as well. This thing is irrelevant to us. When we were on the mainland, it was not relevant to us, right? We don't get involved. We just make an effort to do what we are supposed to do, and not participate. But here, it is very different… They [Taiwanese] just mark which side you are, KMT or DPP… When the elders get together, they just quarrel… It is all very boring.

However, two mainland mothers held a contrasting view. Wen-zhu, who likes Taiwan and wants to permanently live there, felt that the island is not disorderly because of democracy. Regarding the differences between Taiwan and China, she stated, 'It is okay for me to discuss politics [in Taiwan]. It is not okay in the mainland'. Liang-zhi, who had a positive view of her political experiences in Taiwan, felt optimistic toward democracy in Taiwan. In addition, she was impressed with government officials, who are more responsive, friendly and honest than those in mainland China. Liang-zhi had a different opinion from other mainland spouses, who tend to maintain unfavourable views of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). She had not heard of the party before moving to Taiwan, which is common among mainland spouses. However, she felt moved by the speeches and music broadcast by the DPP during a campaign. In addition, the large-scale mobilization during the campaign amazed her, because she had never previously seen this type of activity.

According to the evidence described above, we found similarities and differences between mainland and Taiwanese mothers. Most of the interviewees chose not to allow their children to receive much political information. The most typically stated reason was that politics is too complex for children to understand. However, mainland mothers typically emphasized that politics had nothing to do with ordinary people such as themselves, and that they preferred to focus on their own lives rather than on political issues. We believe socialization experiences that occurred prior to marriage caused these particular viewpoints among the two groups of mothers. Because most mainland spouses are not exposed to democratic practice in mainland China and have other internalized values, such as stability and security, they were not prepared to adopt practices commonly observed in a democratic society, such as competition and disagreement. However, the fierce and widespread disputes regarding the relationship between Taiwan and China may cause mainland spouses to feel uncomfortable regarding democracy, because they may view this controversy as a product of democracy, thereby forming a negative view of politics and democracy.

However, two mainland mothers took the opposite view and approved of democracy because of their personal experiences in Taiwan. Although the influence of early socialization in mainland China remained to a certain degree, they learned from new experiences after moving to Taiwan and adjusted their views on politics and democracy.

The impact of the husband's family

Although several Taiwanese mothers stated that their husbands disagreed with their political views, most mainland mothers told us that they and their husbands shared the same political opinions. One possible reason for this consistency between wives and husbands in mainland-spouse families was that men who were willing to marry a woman from mainland China were likely to have a favourable view of China. Therefore, these husbands' political attitudes were more likely to be in agreement with those of their spouses from there. Some mainland mothers mentioned that because they were not interested in politics, their husbands did not discuss politics with them. None of the mothers stated that their political attitudes had changed after moving to Taiwan. According to the evidence collected in the interviews, no direct influence from the husbands changed or modified the mainland spouses' political attitudes.

However, in a husband–wife paired interview, Cze-hung and Wen-zhu stated that they discuss politics, but Cze-hung typically dominates the discussions because Wen-zhu is not used to discussing the topic, although she has her own preferences. However, Wen-zhu does not change her opinions following discussion with her husband. Wen-zhu is pro-KMT, but Cze-hung does not support the party. Several factors help Wen-zhu maintain her own attitudes, despite Cze-hung's influence. First, Wen-zhu and Cze-hung live with his father, who has been a loyal KMT supporter. Cze-hung's father prefers watching a pro-KMT TV channel. Therefore, the information Wen-zhu receives from the news is consistent with her beliefs.

In addition, according to Cze-hung, although Wen-zhu does not participate in their discussions of politics, Wen-zhu discusses politics with Cze-hung's father because their viewpoints are similar. Wen-zhu's case indicates that although her husband has not directly influenced her, his family has helped Wen-zhu maintain her political beliefs.

The case of Ya-yun demonstrates how differing political views were a source of friction between couples. Ya-yun's husband was supportive of the DPP and had an anti-China position. Ya-yun and her son, You-wei, stated that before the presidential election, Ya-yun's husband said that he would divorce Ya-yun if Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate, lost the election. Ya-yun, who is apolitical, ignored her husband's statement and answered, 'See, you hate mainlanders even though you married one!'

Both Ya-yun and Wen-zhu's husbands tried to influence their political opinions, but they maintained their political beliefs. Whereas Ya-yun ignored her husband's manipulations, Wen-zhu maintained her views by supporting her in-laws and using the information she received from the pro-KMT TV channel. These two interviewees' stories demonstrate, to varying degrees, the persistent effects of early socialization in mainland China.

Children's political attitudes

Most of the children who disclosed their political attitudes and perceptions of the political world were in the fifth grade or higher.[3] Most of the children in the third and fourth grades had not developed political attitudes according to our interpretations of their responses during the interviews. This pattern is consistent with the literature on the development of political orientation among children (e.g. Adelson and O'Neill 1966; Greenstein 1965; Sapiro 2004).

All of the children who expressed their political opinions developed their viewpoints because of influences in their home. In addition to age, the question of whether the children had developed political attitudes because of family influences was determined by two factors. First, the frequency with which the children had opportunities to communicate and interact with socialization agents in the family affected their views. Second, the existence or absence of parents or family members explicitly expressing their political attitudes affected their views, enabling the children to unambiguously perceive messages from the socialization agents (Mclntosh *et al.* 2007).

Ting-yi, a Taiwanese mother, and her son, Kai-hao, discuss political matters frequently, and Kai-hao has been influenced by his mother to develop similar political beliefs. According to Kai-hao and Ting-yi, Kai-hao occasionally argues with his friends at school because they have disagreements on political issues, such as about Chen Shui-bian and his family's corruption scandal. Regarding the development of Kai-hao's political attitudes, the boy's father has not been as influential as Ting-yi for two reasons. First, Kai-hao's father works far from home and only returns on weekends. Thus, he has limited time to interact with his children. Second, similar to most of our adult interviewees, Kai-hao's father does not think it is a good idea

to allow children to learn about politics. Thus, he does not share his political views in front of his children. Therefore, Kai-hao and his siblings have limited opportunities to learn from their father's political beliefs, and hence, Ting-yi has the lead role in forming the children's early socialization experiences.

In contrast to initial expectations, two of the fourth-grade students, Mei-hui and You-wei, revealed their political attitudes without hesitation during the interviews. You-wei liked the DPP because his father was explicitly pro-DPP. As mentioned above, You-wei's mother, Ya-yun from mainland China, is apolitical and is reluctant to allow You-wei to learn about politics. Therefore, You-wei's father is the most influential political socializing agent in You-wei's life. As mentioned, Mei-hui is pro-KMT and pro-China because of her mother Li-xue. Mei-hui used to watch the news with Li-xue, and Li-xue often commented on politics during this period. Therefore, Mei-hui unambiguously perceived Li-xue's opinions and internalized them.

It is crucial for political scientists to assess parents' influences (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Rapoport 1985). This study did not reach a clear conclusion on the relative importance of fathers and mothers in forming children's political opinions, which largely depends on who is closer to the socializee and on whose political views are more clearly expressed.

Comparing children from domestic families and children from mainland-spouse families

All of the mothers and teachers who participated in the interviews stated that none of the children had been discriminated against because of their mothers' backgrounds. In addition, the majority of the children stated that they have never felt different because their mothers are mainland Chinese. However, that does not mean such discrimination never occurs. Pin-jie and Ying-jun were made fun of by their classmates at some points. For example, their classmates stated that they were spies sent by China. Pin-jie told his mother, Mei-fang, about this, and Mei-fang told Pin-jie to ignore them. However, Ying-jun became angry when he was mocked because his mother is from China, and fled to a field and ran until he was exhausted. He did not mention this to his mother Wen-zhu. The cases of Pin-jie and Ying-jun indicate that mainland-spouse families are occasionally unwilling to address this type of unfairness. It will be interesting to learn whether these experiences have long-term effects on children such as Pin-jie and Ying-jun.

All of the children from mainland-spouse families had varying degrees of exposure to China, and most of them had a close relationship with their relatives there. In addition, some of the children visit China once or twice every year and frequently chat with their relatives on the Internet. When we asked them about their identity (i.e. Taiwanese or Chinese), the first response from all of the children was 'I am Taiwanese'. A couple of them, however, added: 'There is no difference between being Taiwanese and Chinese. They are the same.' Zhi-hao was one of these children. He seemed mature for his age and did not show signs of being interested in politics during the interview. He has a close relationship with his relatives

in mainland China. His teacher stated what she observed regarding Zhi-hao in the classroom:

> We were discussing issues related to the dispute on Taiwanese and Chinese identity. One student asked, 'Teacher, is Zhi-hao Taiwanese or Chinese?'… Then I said, 'He was born in Taiwan, so he is definitely Taiwanese.' Then Zhi-hao seemed to feel relieved, and said, 'Yes, I was born in Taiwan so I am Taiwanese!'

Zhi-hao appeared to be confused and anxious regarding his identity. Similar to Zhi-hao, Mei-hui is close to her relatives in China, but she did not seem troubled by this issue. She clearly stated that she was pro-China and used this as a criterion to judge politicians. Because Mei-hui is approximately three years younger than Zhi-hao, age may be a factor for their different reactions to the issue of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. The evidence presented in this study suggests that experiences of being harassed because of their Chinese mothers and their exposure to China are likely to cause children from mainland-spouse families to have unique political attitudes and behaviours in the future.

Conclusion

In accordance with the widespread phenomenon of intercultural marriage in Taiwan, this article focused on two questions: (1) Does the experience of moving to Taiwan following marriage alter mainland spouses' political beliefs? (2) Compared to children from domestic families, do children from mainland-spouse families have unique political socialization experiences? We conducted interviews with elementary school children, parents and teachers in Central and Southern Taiwan to elucidate the (re)socialization experiences of marriage immigrants from mainland China and their children. Regarding methodology, the results showed that multiple sources of information were helpful in minimizing the bias created by having a single source of information in studies on political socialization, especially because politics is considered a sensitive issue by the public.

The mainlander spouses had various methods of adapting to the political environment of Taiwan. Their cases show similar results to the mixed conclusions in previous studies on pre-adult and adult socialization. The evidence presented in this study shows the durability of the effects of pre-adult socialization. The majority of the mainland spouses maintained their political beliefs that had developed in mainland China before moving to Taiwan. However, we observed the effect of adulthood socialization following marriage. Although some of the spouses altered their political beliefs, others developed new political opinions or had their existing political attitudes strengthened. The type of adulthood socialization effect was determined by the environmental factors experienced after moving to Taiwan.

Some of the mainland spouses accepted and appreciated their new experiences in Taiwan and, therefore, changed their political attitudes. However, the mainland

spouses typically preserved, to varying degrees, the political beliefs they developed in mainland China. Therefore, there were differences in opinion regarding democracy in Taiwan between the mainland spouses and domestic parents. However, although there are differences between people's political experiences in Taiwan and China, some values were shared by the mainland mothers and domestic parents. For instance, regardless of their place of origin, most participants had a negative view of politics and agreed that politics is too complex for children to understand.

When confronted with disagreement or challenged, the mainland spouses used various methods to defend their beliefs and preferences, either through efforts to ignore interference or through support from family members who shared the same attitudes. Overall, Taiwanese husbands had little influence on their mainland spouses' political beliefs.

The socialization experiences of children from mainland-spouse families are different from those of domestic families in two respects. First, they have more experience of China than domestic children because they interact with their extended family members. Consequently, they typically have a positive view of China, whereas most children from domestic families have an indifferent or negative attitude toward China. Second, some children from mainland-spouse families have had unique socialization experiences such as being mocked because their mothers are Chinese. Whether these experiences will cause differing attitudes and behaviours in adulthood is a critical issue.

Political scientists have not systematically investigated the phenomenon of intercultural marriage. This preliminary study indicates that the experiences of mainland spouses and their children are unique in Taiwan. Moving forward, researchers could fill this gap in the study of children's socialization experiences and assess the influences of these experiences on them.

Notes

1 For detailed information, see http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/week/week10121.doc (accessed 2 March 2013).
2 All of the names in this study are false and were assigned by the authors to protect the identities of the interviewees.
3 Children in Taiwan start elementary school at the age of 6, therefore, a child in the fifth grade is approximately 11 years old.

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14 The politics of the Mainland spouses' rights movement in Taiwan

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The year 1987 was a critical turning point for Taiwan. It featured the termination of martial law, which had been in place for four decades. That year also saw the ban on travelling to China from Taiwan lifted for the first time since 1949. The latter development not only allowed Taiwanese people to visit their families in China, but also contributed to a wave of marriage migration from China to Taiwan. These migrants have largely been female spouses of Taiwanese husbands and are officially known as Mainland spouses, a term that refers to marital immigrants who are originally from Mainland China and marry people in Taiwan. After over twenty years of this specific type of marriage migration, Mainland spouses represent a diverse community in modern Taiwanese society.

In the early 1990s, in the wake of democratization, Taiwan began to pass legislation and to create governmental and non-governmental organizations to cope with the rapid growth in cross-Strait relations. The central piece of legislation to deal with migrant spouses from China was the 1992 Statute Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland China Area (台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例, hereafter, the Statute). As part of the constitutional revision process, the Statue serves as the fundamental legal guidance for regulating the relationship between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This legislation has created much frustration among Mainland spouses and their families due to its restrictive regulations on citizenship, the right to work and exercising political rights, compared to immigrants from other countries.

The Statute originally stipulated that regardless of the purpose of entering, people from Mainland China who wanted to stay in Taiwan needed to depart and then reapply for re-entry every half-year, including Mainland spouses. This led a group of Taiwanese husbands with Mainland spouses to set up an organization called the Chinese Cross-Strait Marriage Harmony Promotion Association (中華兩岸婚姻協調促進會, hereafter, CCSMHPA) in 1998. This organization is operated by volunteers whose spouses come from China. It was the main mobilizing force behind the first demonstration by Mainland spouses, which will be discussed in detail in this chapter.

Key themes in the existing literature on Mainland spouses include a focus on individual migrants' adaption to life in Taiwan (Chen 2005; Hsieh 2006; Chen 2008), aspects of nationalism, human rights and the immigration policy (Chao 2004, 2006;

Liao 2006; Hsia 2000, 2006; Tseng 2006). In contrast, their collective political action has received less attention. This deficiency is paradoxical given that the political inclination of Mainland spouses was one of the concerns motivating the previous Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government's (2000–8) handling of these new immigrants. Treating their collective action as a social movement, this chapter aims to fill this critical gap and explore the political environment the movement operates in. The focus of this examination is their negotiation with the government over citizenship rights. We discuss how they founded the CCSMPHA to advance their claims to rights and promoted their arguments using the language of human rights. Considering the scope, strength and strategy of their rights-claiming actions, we argue that the emergence of a social movement promoting the rights of Mainland spouses reveals the ways in which these new residents are transforming Taiwanese society. The strategies, organization and goals of this movement are starkly different from those social movements that emerged around the lifting of martial law. To understand the impact of any social movement, it is necessary to examine the political opportunity structure in which it operates. The political environment facing the Mainland spouses' movement presented both challenges and opportunities for it to develop. Thus, this chapter considers how this social movement has interacted with Taiwan's party politics and competing nation-building projects.

Framework of analysis

This chapter regards the Mainland spouses' rights-claim movement as a form of contentious politics. We employ Tilly and Tarrow's concept of contentious politics in the political process theory:

> Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics (2007: 4).

Securing their eligibility for citizenship is the central concern of the migrant spouses' collective action. Turner points out the key role played by citizenship in immigrants' political action; that is, 'as citizenship institutionalizes social expectations which cannot be satisfied by the state under all circumstances, citizenship entitlements fuel political dissent' (Turner 1990: 217). Obtaining citizenship is an active process during which immigrants have to fight for rights and entitlements instead of them being granted automatically. Through taking collective action, Mainland spouses become the subjects of making their claims. Their action opens up political opportunities which had been previously closed to them. At the same time, through continued engagement, the perceptions and attitudes held by the host society, as well as government, towards Mainland spouses will be reshaped in accordance with the growing diversity and publicity of their movement.

In other words, the two actors in this negotiation do not remain static. In a temporal perspective, both actors change their internal composition and adjust their perceptions and strategies accordingly. On the part of Mainland spouses, they cannot be seen as homogeneous. Mainland spouses comprise Chinese women of generational, socio-economic and regional diversity. Inside the movement, Taiwanese husbands are the other source of members, and their legal resources are not the same as Mainland spouses. Furthermore, although in this chapter we focus on one specific social organization, there is a plurality of advocacy groups who claim to represent Mainland spouses. On the part of the government, the changes of ruling party in 2000 and 2008 altered the political environment, where opportunities and restrictions had to be re-configured because of the different policy preferences towards China and the conceptualizing of the relationship between female immigrants and the host society.

In our analysis, we aim to demonstrate how the Mainland spouses' rights-claim movement evolves and adopts different strategies that are relevant to the dominant political discourse and that effectively generate social support and political legitimacy.

Research methods

This chapter employs three sets of data for investigating the interaction between the government and Mainland spouses. The first set is coverage of national newspapers, including *United Daily News*, *China Times*, the *Liberty Times* and *Apple Daily*. A focus of our examination is the slogans and appeals employed by Mainland spouses and their support organization. Through analysis of these materials, this chapter aims to provide an insight into Mainland spouses' articulation of their desire for rights and the basis of their claims. In addition to analyzing the content of media coverage, we use studies commissioned by the government and legislative initiatives proposed by the government and legislators as indications of policy intentions and orientation. Our last set of data is generated from in-depth interviews with participants in this movement, including Mainland spouses and their Taiwanese husbands. Some of them were active members of the organizations and movement. The first author was also a participant observer at the 2002 and 2003 demonstrations and attended the organization's regular internal meetings and events.

This chapter will now move to investigate whether Mainland spouses have been disadvantaged by the legislation. Then it moves on to analysing how people from Mainland China are stereotyped as a result of the re-configured relationship between Taiwan and China since democratization began in the early 1990s. This will render insights as to how Mainland spouses' rights-claiming movement entered the arena of contentious domestic politics, and also the fluctuating relationship between Taiwan and China. It actually started a dialogue with the growing Taiwanese nationalism and the connotations of citizenship. Our findings will show that their movement challenged the discourse of a threatening China and the stereotypes that frame these Chinese women as communist agents or as 'snatching' local women's husbands'[1]

The legal framework under the KMT

To examine how the Mainland spouses' struggle developed into a social movement, we need to first of all understand how they are regulated by the legal system. As part of Taiwan's early democratization, Article 10 of the Constitutional Amendments, which were passed in 1991, authorized the government to adopt a special law to regulate the relationship between the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This was to recognize the fact that although according to the Constitution, people who were under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China (PRC) were also nationals of the Republic of China (ROC), they were in fact not citizens and were outside the jurisdiction of the government of Taiwan. With a view towards future unification of China, the Article created a 'One Country, Two Areas' formula; under this formula, people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are designated as 'People of the Mainland Area' and 'People of the Taiwan Area'. 'One Country, Two Areas' thus became the foundation on which the special law was drafted (EY 1990: 3).

The Statute Governing the Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area was passed in September 1992. In 1991, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was also founded as the organization in charge of Mainland policy. In a draft submitted for parliamentary hearing, the KMT government made it clear that Article 23 of the Constitution gave the necessary authorization with which to subject the People of the Mainland Area to exceptional restrictions on their constitutional rights and freedoms. The restrictions arose from the KMT government's deeply rooted distrust of their indoctrination by communist ideology, the CCP's conspiracy of imposing its policy of 'One Country, Two Systems' and its refusal to rule out the use of military force against Taiwan. This special authorization legalizes the ambiguity of the legal status of People of the Mainland Area. Paradoxically described as 'neither foreign nor domestic' (Chen 1994: iii), Chinese people are not subject to laws regulating foreign nationals or ROC citizens. As analyzed later, the politicization of Chinese people as 'communist ideology indoctrinated' and the legal paradox have had enduring impacts on Chinese people's well-being in Taiwan.

On the other hand, the promulgation was also a response to complex legal issues arising from the increasing visits to China of people from Taiwan after the ban on travelling to China was lifted in 1987. In 1992 the KMT government opened the door for Mainland spouses to enter Taiwan (MAC 2006: 12). However, due to its suspicion towards Chinese people and their government, a practical issue was how to restrict their entry, visitation, employment and residency in Taiwan (EY 1990: 13). These concerns were embodied in Article 17 of the Statute; thus the door to Taiwan was in effect only ajar.

From 1992 to 1999, during the KMT administration, a Mainland spouse's final acquisition of citizenship was formulated into three transitive stages: visitation, residency and citizenship. In terms of the duration of stay in Taiwan, a visitation permit allowed a Mainland spouse to stay in Taiwan for up to six months every year. In practice, they were required to leave Taiwan every half-year and re-apply for a visitation permit after departure. After two years' marriage or after bearing

children, a Mainland spouse was permitted to apply for a residency permit, which allowed a maximum stay of two years. After the two-year residency, they could proceed to apply for citizenship, which was said to be a common goal amongst Mainland spouses (Chen 1994: 1).

However, to rein in the rapid growth in applications, as well as the prospect of chain migration of their family members from China, with the consent of the legislators, the KMT government imposed an annual quota on the number of residency permits. This annual cap, rising from 240 in 1992 to 3,600 in 1999, effectively prolonged the entire qualifying period to eleven years (Chen 1997).[2] The lengthy waiting period was a strong contrast to the much shorter requirement of foreign spouses' citizenship applications.[3] Three research publications commissioned by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) that were conducted in 1994, 1997 and 1999 critically inform how the conservative legislation was perceived by Mainland spouses and how the KMT government reacted to the spouses' calls for reform (Chen 1994, 1997, 1999).

Reactions to the law: Mainland spouses, legislators, women's organizations

In total, the three research publications showed that Mainland spouses were highly critical of the KMT government's regulations. Addressing the regulation of departure every six months and the long waiting time for citizenship acquisition, they defended their humanitarian needs to maintain an undisrupted family life as married couples, parents and children. These humanitarian needs were framed by concepts that evoked traditional Confucian family values. While the studies recognized that the government could not be seen as obstructing the fulfilment of these values, these family-based interests were chiefly measured against the government's consistent cautions about the prospect of chain migration that would lead to uncontrolled population growth. Therefore, although also mentioning the concerns of national security, social stability and the uncertainty of cross-strait relations, the first two studies particularly discussed the potential population growth in detail and offered optimal quotas based on the researchers' meticulous calculations of net growth as a result of birth, death, immigration and emigration (Chen 1994, 1997). Mainland spouses' appeals to traditional family values and the government's manifest emphasis on population control are a contrast to the later negotiation between the Mainland spouses' movement and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration after 2000. As analysed later, in 2002–3, concepts such as 'human rights', 'Love Taiwan' and the China threat were employed by both sides.

These studies are indicative also in the sense of painting a picture of plural actors in this issue area. In the 1997 study, KMT legislator Pan Wei-kang (潘維剛) and New Party (NP) legislator Hsieh Chi-ta (謝啟大; represented by her staff), New Party legislator Li Ching-hua (李慶華) were consulted. As Pan was the director of the Modern Women's Foundation (現代婦女基金會), her participation, together with that of Wang Ching-feng (王清峰), was also regarded as presenting the input of the women's movement (Chen 1997). In the 1999 report, DPP legislator Hsu Jung-shu

(許榮淑) was consulted, together with KMT legislators Hong Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), Chu Feng-chi (朱鳳芝) and New Party legislator Feng Hu-hsiang (馮滬祥). In addition, Jennifer Wang (王如玄), the director of the Awakening Foundation (婦女新知), a long-standing women's movement organization, was also present in the meeting (Chen 1999: 14). In the 1990s the partisan divide on the issue of Chinese migrant spouses was already starting to emerge. Generally the DPP legislators supported the continuation of an annual cap (Chen 1999: 8). In contrast, the NP legislators and KMT politicians associated with the Non Mainstream Faction advocated liberalizing the regulations and attempted to speak on behalf of the spouses by exerting pressure on the executive branch. After 2000, this parliamentarian support was transformed into partisan support that became a major resource which the Mainland spouse movement could call on.

As for the input of the women's organizations, there was a noted divergence of their stances in the three consultation meetings. While Wang Ching-feng supported increasing the annual cap because of humanitarian needs and human rights, she also urged caution due to demographic, social and political concerns (Chen 1997: 8–16). Her cautious support was a contrast to Jennifer Wang's doubt about the authenticity of both sides in the transnational marriages of Southeast Asians and Chinese spouses. She described a Chinese woman who was praised by the media for caring for her bed-ridden husband as locked by the shackles of marriage. She also challenged the legitimacy of permanent residency as it would encourage immigrants not to become citizens, but only to enjoy rights and entitlements without a sense of belonging towards Taiwan (Chen 1999: 19–20). As seen later, Jennifer Wang's arguments acquired primacy in the heated debate about Mainland spouses' citizenship eligibility.

The 1997 research paper noted that the government was under 'pressure [from] public opinions' on this immigration issue. In reaction, the KMT government gradually raised the quota cap four times between 1992 and 1996, to 1,080. This research publication did not name the source of the pressure or the kind of form in which this pressure was expressed. However, it is notable that Mainland spouses were not invited to attend these consultation meetings, but were mentioned as interviewed respondents. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the KMT government's conservative policy had been growing at the time when these research projects were conducted. As we will discuss in the following section, some Mainland spouses and Taiwanese husbands finally established an organization dedicated to improving legal treatment of Mainland spouses. This was the birth of the Chinese Cross-Strait Marriage Harmony Promotion Association (CCSMHPA).

Initially the CCSMHPA mainly assisted individuals to solve regulation breaches, but it later developed into an advocacy group petitioning the government regarding unfavourable regulations. With the help of experienced social movement organizers, it was capable of organizing existing members when the government attempted to amend the regulations. Some members were dissatisfied with the move in this direction as an advocacy group and chose to leave the group.

After cross-strait travel became possible, a large proportion of the early marriages were between elderly Taiwanese Mainlanders and relatively younger Mainland

Chinese women, who were usually from their husband's original hometown. The rising demand for such marriages led to the emergence of commercial match-making services (Wang and Chang 2002).[4] The growing economic and cultural exchanges across the strait have increased opportunities for cross-strait marriage. A recent pattern of cross-strait marriage has been found among those who have studied abroad: as overseas study has become affordable for wealthy Chinese families, cross-strait couples have had the chance to meet at a third place, in a western country. All of these different marriage patterns and the generation gap between early immigrants and newcomers resulted in diverse interests and lifestyles, which led to different needs. This compelled the CCSMHPA to adopt more neutral rhetoric in its activism.

The movement: confronting the DPP government in three major street rallies

The birth of CCSMHPA

After distributing pamphlets outside government offices for some months, in May 1998 the CCSMHPA founding members held their first preparatory meeting. In September 1998, in a public hearing held by NP legislators Li Ching-hua, Fu Kun-chi (傅崑萁) and Feng Ting-kuo (馮定國) at the Legislative Yuan, the CCSMHPA called for the inclusion of Mainland spouses in National Health Insurance (NHI) coverage. Less than a month later, outside the Legislative Yuan, CCSMHPA organized a protest using the slogan 'Marriage is not a Crime' (婚姻無罪), the main appeal of which was defence of their right to reside, work and gain NHI coverage in the country as wives and mothers (Chang 2004: 58–60). In spite of the large number of protesters, the demonstration did not attract media attention (Chao 2006: 91), but twenty days later, they received formal permission from the KMT government legalizing their organization. After celebrating the CCSMHPA's establishment in December 1998, an event which received personal congratulations from NP legislators Li Ching-hua and Feng Hu-hsiang, the organization was issued a formal certificate of registration by the Ministry of the Interior in January 1999.

As the only social organization aiming at improving the well-being of Mainland spouses, the CCSMHPA was active in its first year. It began recruiting a membership that comprised Mainland spouses and their Taiwanese husbands and established an online forum for information distribution and internal discussion (Lin 2005: 78). Representatives not only attended a public hearing hosted by KMT legislator Pan Wei-kang to stress their right to work, but also organized several protests and petitions before the change of ruling party in 2000 (Lin 2005: 79). Nevertheless, despite being a national organization that had local chapters around the country, CCSMHPA was not present in the abovementioned 1999 study.

The DPP's victory in the 2000 presidential election had a significant impact on the political environment in which the Mainland spouse support groups operated. The KMT and NP legislators that had been so supportive of CCSMHPA were now in opposition, while the DPP controlled the executive branch. Nevertheless,

the KMT and its allied parties retained a parliamentary majority, and thus had the power to block any DPP legislation.

In 2000, the DPP government initiated its first round of migration policy reforms. It abolished the most criticized requirement, that of departure every six months. While maintaining the annual cap at 3,600, it created a four-stage transition formula: visitation, family reunion, residency and citizenship. Under this new formula, the total qualifying period for citizenship application became eight years. On the family reunion status, usually after the third year of their stay in Taiwan, Mainland spouses would be eligible for NHI coverage. Also, on gaining this status, Mainland spouses who met the requirements became eligible to apply for a work permit (MAC 2006: 13). The first stage of reforms did not attract significant public or media attention. However, the picture changed radically after the DPP government announced its second round of legislative changes to the governing Statute in September 2002. This period allowed the CCSMHPA to acquire symbolic status as the national advocate of Mainland spouses. It was through the interaction between the CCSMHPA and the DPP government, along with its ally the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), in the Legislative Yuan that the matter of Mainland spouses' rights and entitlements became an issue in electoral and nationalist politics. Intensive coverage in the print media gave the issue a degree of publicity hitherto unseen. The media's coverage of these debates tended to reflect the partisan and ideological loyalties of the main newspapers. Thus for instance the United Daily News tended to be the most supportive of Mainland spouse rights, while the Liberty Times was most critical of the movement (Lin 2005).

The demonstrations: September 2002, November 2002, September 2003

On 30 September 2002 the MAC launched the DPP's second round of reforms and submitted its draft bill to the Legislative Yuan for parliamentary consent (LY 2002a). Summarized as 'loose on living, tough on citizenship' (生活從寬,身分從嚴), the draft bill re-formulated the qualifying period of obtaining citizenship into three stages: family reunion (two years), dependent residency (four years) and long-term residency (five years). To make the rights and entitlements equivalent to those enjoyed by people who acquired citizenship, the draft proposed that from the seventh year onwards – the first year of long-term residency – Mainland spouses were permitted to work, apply for a driving licence, enter Taiwan freely and own property. By enhancing their socio-economic rights in the status of long-term residency, the government intended to promote this status as *de jure* permanent residency and an alternative to citizenship (LY 2002a: 61, 63). It was hoped that the improvement of rights and entitlements would reduce the number of citizenships awarded.

The 'tough on citizenship' part of the draft bill was manifested by the DPP's raising the threshold of the minimal residency duration for citizenship application from eight to eleven years. On top of the lengthened period, the DPP government retained the right to impose annual caps on the number of those granted residency,

long-term residency and citizenship (LY 2002a: 62). Part of the official justification for these proposals was to '[p]revent abuses of cross-strait marriage as "sham marriage[5] for real prostitution" (假結婚真賣淫) and to avoid the increase of social cost and burden'. More importantly, the preface of the draft bill clearly stated that a major consideration behind the amendment was the CCP government's refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan and its negation of Taiwan's international status. As this was a universal statement, it can be argued that this stance also applied to the amendment made to Article 17 (LY 2002a: 36). Months before the contents of the amendment were made public, the CCSMHPA was made aware of the MAC's intent to amend the Statute, and the organization took the initiative to make contact with the MAC. However, the MAC submitted the draft bill without consultation with Mainland spouses or their representative organizations, such as the CCSMHPA (Lin 2005: 80). In interaction with the CCSMHPA in the run-up to the first demonstration, although the MAC disputed the validity of the CCSMHPA's appeals, such as 'Anti-Discrimination', it declined to comment on the amendment extending the qualifying period for citizenship application. It questioned the representativeness of the CCSMHPA, claiming that the latter only spoke for the interests of a small number of Mainland spouses.

In late September 2002, the government's intention to amend the Statute was revealed by the media. In addition to amending Article 17, the MAC proposed to make twenty-six changes affecting nearly all ninety-six articles of the Statute (LY 2002a: 36–9). It was suggested that the MAC was caught by surprise by the fact that media attention was monopolized by the amendment to Mainland spouses' rights and entitlements. Regarded as insignificant, this amendment was given low priority and was meant to be used as a token in exchange for legislators' support for other more 'important' reforms (Chao 2004: 94).

Nevertheless, the serious implications of the amendment gave rise to widespread discontent among Mainland spouses. After staging two petitions, sending out press releases and being interviewed by the media, the CCSMHPA received permission from the police authorities for public assembly on 29 October. This demonstration was attended by more than 3,000 protesters from around the island, and was held in front of the MAC. Opposition politicians, including People First Party (PFP) legislators Li Ching-hua and Lin Hui-kuang (林惠官) and KMT legislator Chin Hui-chu (秦慧珠), joined the event. For the first time the organization made Mainland spouses' criticisms of the proposal heard by the media, as well as the MAC. Their discontent was expressed through slogans such as 'For Human Rights, For Citizenship, For Dignity', 'Anti-Discrimination' and 'Against Extending Duration of Residency for Citizenship' (反居留延長). At the demonstration, MAC officials received the CCSMHPA's petition, but refused to talk to any Mainland spouses. One of the Mainland spouses who participated in the demonstration likened their second-class status to that of Taiwanese people during the Japanese colonial era (1895–1945): 'what the government is doing is exactly the same as what the Japanese did to the Taiwanese in the past' (*China Times* 20 Oct 2002). Several days later, the demonstration was followed by another petition to the MAC at a much smaller-scale rally (Lin 2005: 80).

At the same time, in the wake of this highly publicized street rally, no less than five motions amending the Statute were initiated by the KMT Caucus, PFP Caucus and legislators of these two parties, representing forty-one to fifty-one co-sponsors, and submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review (Interior and Ethnicity Committee 2002).[6]

As noted above, a significant change in CCSMHPA's strategies occurred at this event. Instead of wrapping their demands in language evoking traditional values, they began to use that of human rights – a concept that had acquired fresh political prevalence after the change of ruling party in 2000, and one that had long been a core component of the DPP's self-identity. The strategy of exploiting the potential resources embedded in new political vocabulary such as human rights and 'Love Taiwan' became clearer in the second protest in front of the Legislative Yuan.

After the MAC failed to respond to the CCSMHPA's demands, the organization rallied a second protest on 29 November. This time, the demonstration was held in front of the Legislative Yuan in an attempt to prevent the passing of the amendment bill. The human rights appeal was strengthened by the organization's alliance with the Labor Rights Association, which was also present at the demonstration and which later became a major supporter of Mainland spouses' rights-claim movement (Lin 2005: 80). To refute the statements the MAC had made, the CCSMHPA held a press conference. Several Mainland spouses who attended the press conference issued the declaration 'We Love Taiwan' (*China Times Express* 29 November 2002), stressing their devotion and sense of belonging to Taiwan and the desire to acquire citizenship. Despite the government's efforts, in the end this amendment failed to be given a parliamentary reading. The Mainland spouses' political allies, the KMT, PFP and NP were able to use their parliamentary majority to block the executive's amendment. Therefore, in that respect, it can be said that the demonstration was successful.

Yet in July 2003, the MAC attempted to revive these amendments. In reaction, the CCSMHPA held a third demonstration on 20 September 2003. The interaction between the government and Mainland spouses was noted for its highly explosive, nationalistic vocabulary. As part of the parliamentary debate, TSU legislator Chen Chien-ming (陳建銘) called for the expulsion of Mainland spouses who joined demonstrations, arguing that their actions had violated the professed purpose for which they were permitted to enter Taiwan; that is, to live a family life as part of a married couple. He further argued that, as foreigners, their collective actions had interfered with the domestic politics of Taiwan (BBC Chinese 19 March 2003). At a press conference, he argued that as long as the Chinese government deployed missiles targeted at Taiwan, the minimum period of awarding citizenship should be further extended to fifteen years instead of eleven or eight (*United Daily News* 20 September 2003: A3). The head of the women's department of the TSU, Chien Lin Hui-chun (錢林慧君), supported the argument that Mainland spouses did not enjoy the right of assembly or demonstration: 'Mainland spouses are not citizens of Taiwan. They should go back to their own country to do that if they want to demonstrate' (*TVBS News* 20 November 2003). Allied with the TSU, the DPP legislators asserted that Mainland spouses' loyalty towards China

would erode Taiwan's sovereignty and their political orientation towards the pro-unification KMT would tilt the electoral equilibrium, which would in the long run compromise Taiwan's independence. These assertions were symbolized by the TSU's slogans, such as 'Taiwanese First!', 'Save Taiwan' and 'Preventing Chinese Brides' Annexation of Taiwan!' (*China Times* 10 October 2003, cited by Lin 2005: 68). Similarly, six women's movement organisations[7] speaking 'on behalf of' Taiwanese women sided with the government and supported the proposed reforms.

To discourage Mainland spouses from taking any further action, including demonstrations, MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) made a compromise, allowing spouses who had already acquired long-term residency status exemption from the proposed new regulations (*BBC Chinese* 19 September 2003).[8] In defending the government policy, she argued that the amendment was based on humanitarian considerations and aimed at integrating Mainland spouses through clearly laid-out regulations for their rights and entitlements (*United Daily News* 21 September 2013).[9] In the end, the government's attempt to lengthen the waiting period was again blocked in the Legislative Yuan.

In spite of the DPP's failure to achieve its proposed immigration reforms, other amendments were authorized by the legislators. Under the new law and regulations, Mainland spouses were subjected to collection of their fingerprints and interviews for clearance at the port of entry. Those applying for long-term residency were obliged to be jointly interviewed with their Taiwanese spouse by immigration officers, while those applying for citizenship were required to provide evidence of financial resources and proof of cancellation of their household registration in China. The deputy secretary-general of the CCSMHPA criticized these requirements as being 'against human rights and intervening in marriage through abusing administrative power' (*China Times Express* 1 June 2004). In an informal meeting with legislators discussing the amendment of the Statute, the MAC Chairwoman explained that concerns of population growth was the main reason for extending the required duration of residency (*Central Daily News* 3 November 2002: 6).[10] She also argued that Taiwanese society was not ready yet to fully integrate Mainland spouses (ibid.). After this high-profile confrontation, the CCSMHPA acquired representative status amongst Mainland spouses' organizations. This was evident when, in 2005, the National Immigration Agency (NIA) invited the CCSMHPA for consultation for the first time.

From the above, we can see that the government and Mainland spouses had divergent interests in these proposed reforms. The MAC argued that Mainland spouses' social rights were enhanced once they were granted long-term residency. From the MAC's point of view, the new regulations were more flexible, providing spouses with the option of long-term residency without losing their household registration in China. These offers missed the critical point that, underneath the surface of their campaign for substantive rights, what Mainland spouses were concerned about was the social discrimination institutionalized in these regulations. This protest against social discrimination was found in a comment sent by a Mainland spouse to the *United Daily News*:

> I am a Mainland Bride, Mainland spouse, but I don't like these names because, in today's society in Taiwan, it is equal to prostitution or poverty. And the government's policies are changeable and full of discrimination. (*United Daily News* 7 March 2004)

Post-2008: increased engagement after the change of ruling party

The change of ruling party in May 2008 once again radically changed the political environment in which the Chinese spouse movement operated. The new KMT government was much more willing to engage with Mainland spouses' support groups. For example, in 2008, several representatives of Mainland spouses, together with the Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM), met new MAC Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛). The MAC responded positively to their concern that Mainland spouses were institutionally discriminated against by the Statute. In May 2009, the CCSMHPA was again invited by the NIA to participate in a consultation, this one on improving interviews at entry ports.

The CCSMHPA's appeals to human rights paid off in the context of the 2008 presidential election campaign. Marriage-immigrant women, including Mainland spouses and foreign spouses, were included in the KMT's election manifesto under the heading 'human rights policy'[11] (Cheng and Fell forthcoming). In the Legislative Yuan, between April and November, no less than six motions were initiated by KMT legislators to amend Article 17 of the Statute with regard to employment, financial proof, citizenship qualifying period and annual quota caps (LY 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f). The growing political pressure finally saw a motion to amend the same Article initiated by the KMT government in December (LY 2008g). The KMT government's initiative was passed and significant changes were made to the formula designed by the previous DPP government. The requirement of financial certification was dropped, and in January 2009, the annual cap on long-term residency permission was cancelled as well. Mainland spouses are now permitted to work after entering Taiwan without applying for a work permit. The next goal for the Mainland spouse movement is to equalize the differentiated qualifying periods for Mainland spouses' (no less than six years) and foreign spouses' (no less than four years) citizenship applications.

In short, while many other social movements have felt increasingly excluded from the policy-making process since 2008, Mainland spouses' groups have actually enjoyed expanded consultation opportunities.

In the above, we have analysed the political context of the Mainland spouses' rights claim movement. We will now move to examine the political environment in which their movement operated. We will analyse what kind of restrictions and opportunities they faced, including legal predicaments, identity politics and partisan competition. While analysing their strategies, we will also assess the potential alliance of the Mainland spouses' movement with other social movements, such as the women's movement and the migrants' rights movement.

Restrictions and opportunities embedded in the political environment

Mainland spouses face severe restrictions on their scope for collective action prior to gaining citizenship. First, they are not permitted to found or join social organizations. Article 72 of the Statute stipulates that 'unless permitted by the competent authorities, no individual, juristic person, organization, or other institution of the Mainland Area may become a member of or hold a position in any juristic person, organization, or other institution of the Taiwan Area'.[12] This Article rules out the possibility of Mainland spouses organizing themselves as legally registered social organizations. This means that they cannot lobby the government on their own and must be represented by others, such as their Taiwanese husbands, those who have acquired citizenship or other social organizations who are sympathetic with their causes.

Related to the legal predicament is the Mainland spouses' lack of freedom of assembly. Although there is no clear provision in the Parade and Assembly Law (集會遊行法) that prohibits Mainland spouses from joining demonstrations, in theory they may face deportation if they stage protests. This drastic measure is authorized by Article 18(3) of the Statute, which stipulates that People of the Mainland Area may be expelled if they 'engage in any activity or employment that is inconsistent with the permitted purposes' of their entry.[13] As mentioned above, this stipulation was evoked by TSU legislator Chen Chien-ming, who attempted to deter Mainland spouses from taking collective action. This form of deterrence was also employed in 2002 by a MAC official who commented that assembly and parade were constitutional rights conferred on citizens and that Mainland spouses did not enjoy these rights until they had acquired citizenship (*The Liberty Times* 2 December 2002). The question of whether their participation in street rallies violates the permitted purposes is investigated by the police, and deportations are executed directly by the police as well. The fact that deportation may be determined without a public hearing and trial severely undermines Mainland spouses' civil rights. Nevertheless, the prospect of deportation did not deter Mainland spouses. On the other hand, the possibility of a restrictive interpretation of the law highlights the fact that obtaining citizenship, rather than staying on a long-term residency permit, is the threshold of entitlement to all the freedoms reserved for citizens.

A key element in the movement's strength and resources is whether it can broaden its social base for wider support and collaborate with other social movements. One way in which the movement has tried to solicit wider support is to employ the language of human rights. For example, the slogan 'I want citizenship, I want human rights, I want a job' (我要身分,我要人權,我要工作) was chanted in front of the Legislative Yuan. The observation from one interviewee, Tang Shu, was that if the group mobilized or raised the issue in a broader context like that of human rights, then it could indeed generate more support from different groups (interviewed on 16 September 2010). In appealing to human rights rather than traditional family values, the movement employed the latest political discourse that had become highly symbolic and that tied their demands

in with the DPP's advocacy of the universality of human rights. Appealing to human rights also opened up an avenue along which it was possible to be allied with other social organizations, such as the Migrants' Human Rights Association and AHRLIM. Arguably, an alliance with other migrant advocacy groups could also weaken the politicization of Mainland spouses as agents of the subversive Chinese Communist regime or of the threatening China. It could 'normalize' Mainland spouses as ordinary migrants whose aspiration for citizenship was no different from other migrants.

Another potential ally would be the women's movement, given that the multiple identities of Mainland spouses as wives and mothers may evoke empathy of sisterhood amongst local Taiwanese women. In terms of its ability to promote gender equality legislation, the women's movement has arguably been the most successful social movement since the lifting of martial law (Weng and Fell 2006). However, some women's groups have responded with indifference and aloofness. There are a number of factors undermining this inter-social movement alliance. Some feminist activists, such as Jennifer Wang from the Awakening Foundation, were uncomfortable with the prevalence of marriage migration. This is because the commercial nature of those brokered marriages is viewed as strengthening the underlying patriarchal values against which the Taiwanese women's movement has been struggling for the past three decades. The alleged 'commodification' of brokered marriage (Wang and Chang 2002) gave rise to widespread stereotypes, reinforced by media coverage, of transnational marriages as bogus marriages disguised to enable illegal employment and sex work. This derogatory image has had a negative impact on the level of support and understanding from women in society. Moreover, as revealed in Jennifer Wang's emphasis on immigrants' subjective identification with Taiwan in 1999 and the six women's groups support for the DPP government's attempt at curbing citizenship award in 2003, women's groups were also influenced by the nationalist values that are so central to Taiwanese partisan politics.

Negative stereotypes about Mainland spouses and the linkage to the unification-versus-independence issue all served to limit their scope for expanding their social and political support base. However, the requirement of providing proof of financial sufficiency[14] worked as a juncture of an alliance for Mainland spouses and other marriage immigrants from South East Asia. In September 2007, the 'How Long Are We Gonna Wait For' demonstration hit the road. Not only marriage immigrants from Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia and the Philippines but also guest workers from Thailand and the Philippines joined the demonstration under the banner 'Long Live International Solidarity', demanding that the government 'abolish the financial certification, guarantee basic human rights'. The financial requirement formed a common interest between Mainland spouses and other marriage immigrants by opposing the common disadvantage, and formulated the first actual alliance among all marriage immigrants.

As shown in our analysis of the CCSMHPA's birth and development, it is clear that the movement on the whole and the organization in particular was closely related to electoral politics, partisan competition and contending nation-building projects. When the CCSMHPA first emerged in the late 1990s, during the last

three years of the KMT administration, it formed a close working relationship with KMT and NP (and later PFP) legislators. After March 2008, it continued to count on KMT legislators' support to push reform. These legislators' support should be viewed through the lens of electoral politics in which legislators lobby the executive branch on behalf of their potential constituency.

However, during the DPP era, the CCSMHPA's working relationship with KMT and PFP legislators acquired a different meaning. As the advocate for Mainland spouses, KMT and PFP lobbying efforts became a process of partisan competition as well as contending the DPP's nation-building project. On the part of the CCSMHPA, knowing the risk of being dragged into partisan politics and wanting to avoid politicization, the organization refrained from showing any specific political inclinations in public statements or on the internal online forum (Chang 2004: 56). However, attempts to avoid politicization were not seen as convincing by the incumbent government, who viewed Mainland spouses as KMT allies. Capitalizing on the political correctness embedded in the 'Love Taiwan' slogan, the demonstration of November 2002 was turned into a show of political theatre. The organization and the participant Mainland spouses consciously played out a nationalist script in which they collectively performed their subjective identification with Taiwan, as stressed in their declarations and press conferences (Chao 2004: 122). However, at an apolitical level, as suggested by MAC senior-secretary Mr. Shih, 'Love Taiwan' appeared to be an easy-to-understand slogan, and hence more effective to generate support from wider society (interviewed on 12 October 2010).

On the part of the DPP government, since it advocated strengthening Taiwan's *de facto* independence and Taiwanese national identity, many of its politicians viewed the influx of Chinese spouses with suspicion. The past two decades have seen a consistent decline in Chinese national identity and growth in support of the DPP. The DPP is thus concerned that the rapid rise of Mainland spouse immigration could reverse these trends as they gain voting rights and socialize their children with Chinese nationalist values. This partly explains the negative attitudes towards Chinese spouses discussed earlier by government officials and those of the DPP's ally party, the TSU. An interviewee who has been engaged in supporting the rights of marginalized women in Taiwan indicated that the national character of the Mainland spouse movement is her main concern and has been a drawback for her when any possibility of alliance has been proposed (interviewed on 20 October 2010).

Although the KMT originally promoted a very similar brand of Chinese nationalism to that which Mainland spouses have been accustomed to in China, since democratization the KMT has gradually adjusted its position. It advocates closer economic ties with China but also de facto political independence, and has promoted a dual Chinese and Taiwanese form of national identity. This meant that when the CCSMHPA was established, it tended to receive more sympathy from KMT politicians and their allies. This new alliance naturally also reinforced the suspicion about the Chinese spouse associations amongst the DPP camp.

Thus, the Mainland spouse movement has naturally been affected by the partisan balance of power between the KMT and DPP camps since 2000. Between

2000 and 2008, the DPP controlled the central government on the back of its presidential victories in 2000 and 2004. However, even with the support of its alliance with the TSU, it was unable to achieve a parliamentary majority. Instead, Taiwan experienced eight years of divided government as the KMT and its allies held a parliamentary majority. This partly explains why the DPP-led government failed at its attempt to restrict the citizenship rights of Mainland spouses in the face of the KMT's opposition. Thus, although the Chinese spouse movement faced a hostile government, its alliance with KMT politicians protected it from these changes.

The combination of the CCSMPHA's human rights appeal, the protesters' 'Love Taiwan' performance, the DPP's promotion of Taiwanese identity and the prospect of Mainland spouses becoming eligible voters created niche appeals for election campaigns. This potential was exploited by the KMT for the 2008 presidential election. A KMT campaign manager confirmed that although immigration issues were not at the top of its campaign agenda, the party liaised with social groups and academics that were keen to address immigration issues in the election manifesto. In the manifesto, the issue was presented as women's human rights. This warranted a de-coupling of rights and entitlements from the accusation of 'the KMT soliciting the support of Chinese voters'. By viewing both Southeast Asian and Mainland spouses as wives and mothers whose rights were impaired by the citizenship legislation designed by the DPP government, it also depoliticised Mainland spouses (interviewed on 29 April 2009). This may explain why in the MAC's publicity regarding reforming the legal treatment of Mainland spouses, they were referred to as 'Mothers of Taiwanese Children, Wives of Taiwanese Husbands'[15] in an appeal for empathy.

Nevertheless, the KMT government was under the same structural constraints derived from the contending nation-building projects between the KMT and DPP. The KMT government has to be cautious in how it handles Mainland spouse issues in order to avoid a societal backlash. As the MAC's Senior Secretary, Mr. Shih, explained:

> In my opinion, if we want to further the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, we need support from society. It's not the case that the KMT party or the president can do whatever they want. It's impossible. Nor could the Mainland Chinese government and our government make decisions by themselves without the approval of people in Taiwan. Then, how can we let people in Taiwan say yes? It's not going to work like sitting down and having a rational discussion on the topic. Instead, you have to let people understand what we are doing is beneficial to them and they won't feel any relative deprivation. (interviewed on 12 October 2010)

Conclusion

Our study has examined the politics surrounding the Mainland spouses' support movement. This movement's development reveals patterns of both continuity and change following changes in Taiwan's ruling parties. The discriminatory

regulations faced by Mainland spouses and their support organization emerged under the KMT administration in the 1990s. Much of the DPP's proposed policies and mindset regarding these new immigrants were inherited from its predecessor. Similarly, though the post-2008 KMT government has improved the status of Mainland spouses, the degree of change should not be exaggerated.

To a large extent the impact of the Mainland spouse support movement has been closely related to its political opportunity structure and alliances with political and civil society. Unlike most other social movements, this movement became closely allied with the KMT and its splinter parties. Thus, even though the DPP held the presidency from 2000 to 2008, the KMT parliamentary majority offered some protection against reforms viewed as damaging to immigrants' human rights. Many of the old stereotypes regarding Mainland spouses remain prevalent in Taiwanese society. As Mainland spouses are associated with Chinese communism, Chinese nationalism and fraudulent marriages, politicians are also wary of losing votes by being too closely associated with these marginalized women. Even KMT politicians need the support of anti-unification voters to win elections. Similarly, there is a temptation among other politicians to exploit anti-China sentiment to gain votes by taking a hard line against Mainland spouses. We can see that the Mainland spouses issue has been tightly bound to the national security and nation building concerns. Discourses of the universality of human rights appear to be a legitimate and inclusive appeal to counter the inherent prejudice against Mainland spouses in Taiwanese society. While this external environment is changing, the movement needs to adjust its strategies to legitimize its demands and win wider social support.

Notes

1 Frank Hsieh, who ran for the DPP in the 2008 presidential election, indicated that Mainland spouses came to Taiwan to 'snatch our husbands' (United Daily News, 9 January 2008).
2 It was found that those who by 1997 had already been allocated into the queue for the annual quota would not be granted citizenship until 2006 (Chen 1997: 1). The annual cap remained the same in 2000 and 2001 after the DPP became the ruling party (MAC 2006: 12). In September 2003, the number of residency permit applicants totalled 86,397. Controlled by the annual cap, they would not be granted residency permits until March 2018 (Lin 2005: 2).
3 Since 1999, when the Nationality Act was reformed, a foreign spouse may apply for citizenship after a four-year residency in Taiwan.
4 These were officially banned in 2009.
5 Sham marriage refers to a marriage of convenience in order to enter the country. The exact number of sham marriages in Taiwan is unknown, but is often substituted by the estimated numbers of overstaying and denial of entry after Mainland spouses failed to pass the interview at the port of entry.
6 In March 2002, before the MAC released its amendment bill, PFP legislator Li Ching-hua submitted an amendment to Article 16 of the Statute. He proposed abolishing the annual cap on sponsoring the citizenship of parents who resided in Mainland China and who were beyond the age of seventy years (LY 2002b).
7 They included Taiwan 21st Century Women's Association, Taiwan Women's Link, National Alliance of Taiwan Women's Association and ECPAT Taiwan (End China Prostitution in Asian Tourism) (Wang 2005: 205).

8 BBC Chinese, 19 September 2003. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_3120000/newsid_3122900/3122998.stm (accessed 31 August 2012).
9 Chu, Jo-lan and Chang, Chin-hung, Against Discrimination, Want Identification Card, A Thousand Mainland Spouses Sit-in Strike, *Unite Daily News*, 21 September 2003.
10 Mong, Rong-hua, 'MAC: increases more than ten thousand a year, consider while amending regulations', *Central Daily News,* 3 November 2002, p. 6.
11 Entitled the '2007 Human Rights Declaration', under the heading 'New Immigrants Have the Right to Be Real Taiwanese', the election manifesto advocated the abolishment of the requirement for proving financial adequacy, improving the implementation of the entry interview, protecting immigrants' right to work and social rights, and promoting Southeast Asian cultures and languages. Data available online at www.ma19.net/policy4you/education (accessed 24 March 2008).
12 Article 72: Unless permitted by the competent authorities, no individual, juristic person, organization, or other institution of the Mainland Area may become a member of or hold a position in any juristic person, organization, or other institution of the Taiwan Area. … Rules governing the granting of permission referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be drafted by the competent authorities concerned and submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval. (Translated and published by Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan.)
13 Article 18: In any of the following situations, any of the people of the Mainland Area who enter into the Taiwan Area may be deported by the police authorities; provided, however, that prior approval shall be obtained from the judicial authorities where the judicial proceeding thereof is pending:

    1. Entering into the Taiwan Area without permission.
    2. Entering into the Taiwan Area by permission and staying or residing beyond the authorized duration.
    3. Engaging in any activity or employment inconsistent with the purposes of the permission.
    4. There exists sufficient evidence to establish that a crime has been committed.
    5. There exists sufficient evidence to establish that there is a threat to national security or social stability.

    Any of the people of the Mainland Area referred to in the preceding paragraph may be put in temporary custody before deportation or ordered in addition to perform labor services.

14 For foreign spouses, according to the Enforcement Rules of the Nationality Act, in April 2004, the requirement was laid out as (a) a monthly income twice higher than the official minimum wage (NTD 31,680), or (b) annual savings 24 times higher than the official minimum wage. For Chinese spouses, according to the enforcement rules of the Statute, in March 2004, the required amount was set at either a monthly income twice the official minimum monthly wage or the estimated value of property and real-estate exceeding NTD 5 million. After heavy criticism for overlooking cross-strait couples' financial difficulties, the required value of property was abolished and replaced with savings and/or value of property exceeding 24 times the minimum wage (the same requirement for foreign spouses). From March 2008, vocational certificates issued by the government were also accepted as evidence of financial independence.
15 Available online at www2.mac.gov.tw/mac/default.aspx (accessed 5 March 2013).

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爰提出「台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例第十七條」修正草案, 是否有當？敬請公決) (in Chinese), 14 May.

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15 Taiwan's (extra)ordinary migrations

Tony Fielding

The uniqueness of Taiwanese migration

It would be very surprising indeed if Taiwan, with its totally unique political situation, its remarkable economic growth trajectory and role in the global economy and its unique social and cultural history, did not also have extraordinary migrations. For a start, during almost all of its past 400 years of history, Taiwan has been dominated by immigrant outsiders – and not just by one group, but four! First it was the Dutch in the seventeenth century, then the settlers from mainland China in successive waves, mostly from Fujian Province, during the late Ming and Ching dynasties in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, then the Japanese colonials in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and finally the two million Chinese (mostly Republican KMT) mainlanders in the mid-twentieth century (Lin 2012). Moreover, especially in the past 120 years, the emigration of the Taiwanese to Japan, North America, Southeast Asia, Australasia and now to mainland China as well, has been almost equally remarkable. According to the US Census Bureau there are more than 100,000 US citizens of Taiwanese descent, and according to the 2010 China (PRC) Census there are over 170,000 Taiwanese nationals resident in mainland China.

So what are the distinctive features of Taiwanese migration today? For migration from Taiwan, they are (1) a uniquely high presence in China PRC immigration (many of them *Taishang* or Taiwanese businessmen); and (2) an unusually high level of social success as immigrants in the USA, Canada, Australia and Singapore. For migration to Taiwan, they are (1) a uniquely high level of Indonesian domestic and care worker immigration; (2) a large foreign worker population (mostly 'guestworkers') and (3) an unusually high level of Chinese mainlander and Vietnamese marriage immigration.

The authors of the chapters in this book have captured much of this uniqueness, but I shall focus on just one specific case to represent the many examples. In most parts of the world immigration policies are adjusted to allow preferential treatment for 'co-ethnic' populations, allowing members of these groups to enjoy privileges denied to non co-ethnics. Good examples of this in East Asia are the preferential treatment of *Nikkeijin* (people of Japanese descent from Latin America) in Japan and *Joseonjok* (people of Korean descent from China PRC) in South Korea. The famous European case is the German governments' favourable

policies towards ethnic Germans from Russia and Eastern Europe, the *Aussiedler*. But in Taiwan it is quite the reverse; instead of the 'co-ethnic' women from China PRC migrating to Taiwan to marry Taiwanese men being awarded special privileges, they are selected for especially adverse treatment (see Chapter 14 in this volume). In response to fears, often much exacerbated by the media, that these women might either be a security risk as 'fifth columnists' operating in the interests of China PRC, or be engaged in 'fake' marriages with Taiwanese men in order to enter the Taiwanese sex industry, women from the Chinese mainland had, until very recently, to wait longer than other immigrant wives for naturalisation as Taiwanese citizens, and were subject to higher levels of regulation and control. What this meant in practice was that they were typically unable to work or to organise, and thus had little or no financial independence and no opportunity to air their grievances.

The ordinariness of Taiwanese migration

And yet, despite this all-too-obvious uniqueness, there is much about Taiwanese migration that is common to other developed or rapidly developing countries in East Asia, and to internal and international migration the whole world over. I shall attempt to demonstrate this through linking what has been written here in this book about Taiwanese migration to patterns and processes of migration that are found elsewhere.

Since my example of the uniqueness of Taiwanese migration related to female migration, I shall start there. Figure 15.1 shows the trends in the sex composition of migrants to and from Taiwan over a forty-year period. It shows that, like migrations over most of the world, there has been a distinctive trend towards a feminisation of migration flows. This is particularly so for migrations *to* Taiwan, which have become more than twice as female (from 31.1 per cent to 64.8 per cent) over the period. Who are these women? As we have been told, many are the immigrant brides of Taiwanese men, who, following naturalisation, are fast becoming the new 'mother-citizens' of Taiwan (Figure 15.2).

Is Taiwan unique in this experience? Far from it! Filipina brides have figured for some time in the social lives of rural dwellers in northern Honshu, Japan (Suzuki 2011). Similarly, in China PRC, there is a significant inter-provincial migration of women from inland rural areas marrying men in the eastern coastal provinces (Fan 2008: Chapter 8). And in South Korea, which is perhaps the closest parallel to Taiwan (Kim 2010), there is a clear negative correlation between the distribution of foreign residents as a whole and those (almost entirely female and mostly from Vietnam) who are on marriage immigration visas; the former are clustered in the Seoul capital city-region and especially in the industrial towns around and to the south of the capital, while the latter are to be found in the rural eastern and south-western regions of the country, where immigrant brides usually marry older, socially less successful men who are often from farming or small business households (King *et al.* 2010: 81). More generally, as King and colleagues (2010: 80) write:



Figure 15.1 Sex ratio of migrants to and from Taiwan



Figure 15.2 Acquisition of Taiwanese nationality 1995–2010

> With increasing globalization, marriages between people of different nationalities are on the increase… Where the partners, and the countries from which they originate, are relatively equal in status and wealth, social exclusion and individual exploitation may be avoided. But, all too often, power relations are unequal, and the person from a less advantaged background suffers abuse… In high-income, patriarchal societies, the position of immigrant wives from developing countries can be particularly dire.

Figure 15.3 shows the spatial distribution of Southeast Asian brides in Taiwan for 2010. Two important features stand out: first, the level of concentration is relatively low (and, in fact, is even lower for brides from mainland China – not shown here); second, as in South Korea and Japan, there is a clear tendency for the values to be higher in the rural counties than in the cities; so, for example, the value for Taipei City is especially low (at a location quotient of 0.55, i.e. just 55 per cent of the national proportion).

As we are reminded in Chapter 8's discussion of the 'cosmopolitanism of the underprivileged' and Chapter 11, where we are encouraged to appreciate the 'hidden spaces of resistance', the micro-social relations of inter-cultural partnerships between Southeast Asian women and Taiwanese men are complicated. But if we were to assume from this that the relationships between so-called 'co-ethnics' would therefore be uncomplicated, we would be very mistaken. In the case of Taiwan, co-ethnicity is an issue for both immigration and emigration. In the case of immigration, those of ethnic Chinese descent from Indonesia find themselves in a kind of limbo in which they suffer discrimination and violence in their country of birth for being Chinese, but are subject to social and legal exclusion in Taiwan for being Indonesian (see Chapter 10). This tragic situation is repeated across East Asia, and elsewhere. 'Returnee' co-ethnic migrants from Latin America to Japan *(Nikkeijin)* have faced similar hostility and are 'strangers in their ethnic homeland' (Tsuda 2003). For the most part, they are only 'co-ethnic' on the surface (in name and appearance); deep down they are Portuguese-speaking Catholic Brazilians or Peruvians, who hug one another and who tend to start their boisterous parties just when their Japanese neighbours are going to sleep. In a similar limbo are the *Joseonjok*, the 'ethnic Koreans' from Northeast China, many of whom are women who, like their mainlander equivalents in Taiwan, enter South Korea to marry Korean men (Freeman 2005).

There is another parallel between Chapter 10 on Indonesian co-ethnic women in Taiwan and the situation in Northeast Asia. The 'oldcomer' migrants in Japan were largely Koreans from what is now South Korea who came, or were brought, to Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. When they and their descendants consider returning to their 'homeland', their choice is greatly affected by whether they identify with the western-oriented capitalist South Korea (for example, though the *Mindan* organisation) or with the 'authentic' anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist North Korea (through *Chongryun*) (Ryang 1997; Morris-Suzuki 2007). There are parallels between this and the choices made by ethnic Chinese in Indonesia between 'returning' to China PRC or to Taiwan.



Figure 15.3 Taiwan: Southeast Asian brides 2010

Yet many of the issues surrounding co-ethnicity in this book relate not to immigration to Taiwan, but to emigration from Taiwan. Some emigrants from Taiwan, especially to countries such as Canada that have (in the past) embraced cultural diversity, decide to settle, identify with their new homeland and are keen

to integrate (see Chapter 7). This is far less true in the case of Taiwanese residents in China PRC (see Chapters 3 and 6, but see also Chapter 5, which places more emphasis on integration). So, despite being 'co-ethnics', the levels of social and spatial segregation are high, and the Taiwanese tend not to make friends among the local Chinese; they are, as noted by Keng and colleagues in Chapter 3, 'sleeping in the same bed but with different dreams'. In Chapter 6, Lin goes further; he writes:

> while both immigrants and hosts anticipate that the migration of co-ethnics will be less problematic than other types of migration, the mutual ethnic and social alienation results in a more disorienting situation, forcing both immigrants and hosts to fundamentally reconsider their ethnic identities.

That ethnicities do not remain within the bounds of biological or socio-historical descent should not surprise us. East Asia provides many examples of peoples brought together by migration who, despite a common ancestry, have over time become different in values and practices, beliefs and expectations. Perhaps the most extreme example of this, partly because of the short time-span involved, is the gulf that has come to exist between North Korean refugees and their co-ethnic hosts in South Korea (Chung 2009). On a much larger scale, however, there are the remarkable differences that have opened up between the long-term residents of Chinese cities and their co-ethnic new arrivals, as is demonstrated by Zhang's study of Zhejiang residents in Beijing, significantly entitled 'Strangers in the City' (Zhang 2001).

So how ordinary is the migration of businessmen *(Taishang)* from Taiwan to China PRC? Well, as an instance of intra-organisational transfer within globalising manufacturing and service firms, it is fairly normal. Take again the example of Japan, where the inter-regional transfer of managerial and technical staff was a long-established practice. In the interest of staff deployment within the firm, men were posted alone to new locations *(tanshinfunin)* while their families remained behind, partly to ensure continuity and stability in key family relationships (such as the children's education and care for the elderly; Wiltshire, R 1995). As Japan's economy went global, its 'salarymen' were posted around the world and often, due to their wealth and influence, enjoyed an almost 'colonial' relationship to local populations, so keen were people to secure Japanese investment. Was this not echoed in the early experiences of the *Taishang* in Dongguan and Kunshan?

And, as with the *Taishang*, marriages were threatened by prolonged separation (Okamoto 2011; though with the added twist that Taiwanese businessmen are said to need their Chinese girlfriends in order to achieve legal purchase of local property – see Chapters 2 and 5), and problems arose over the education of their children. When families are split, it is sometimes judged to be worth the mother and children (or even the children alone) residing in a place where the children can be taught in English. This links some Taiwanese families' understandable interest in securing places at Shanghai's many reputable International Schools (see Chapter 4) to the *kirogi* phenomenon in South Korea. *Kirogi gajok* (wild geese

families) are those that arrange for the children to be brought up in North America or Australasia so that they can avoid the Korean education system and become fluent in English, while the father continues to work in Korea or in another non-English-speaking country to which he has been posted (Cho 2007: chapter 2). And while we are mentioning the children in *Taishang* families, Chapter 4 offers hints that there are also problems attached to the re-insertion of children back into Taiwanese schools and social life. This again is not unique; it connects with the well-researched experiences of children in Japanese businessmen's households who after a period abroad, find it difficult, as *kikokushijo* (returnee schoolchildren), to be accepted back in Japan (Goodman 1990).

There is another way in which the *Taishang* chapters in this book link to wider debates. It seems that the migrants associated with foreign direct investment by the major firms in rapidly developing economies, such as those in East Asia, often act as pioneers for later, much more diverse forms of migration. The classic case, perhaps, is that of the Japanese community in London. Its modern origins lie in the rapid development of Japanese business interests in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s, specifically manufacturing branch plants and banking (Sakai 2000). But today, the Japanese community in London is 'super-diverse'; it includes many students (especially postgraduates), independent professionals (especially women), 'cultural refugees' (again mostly women) and all sorts of men and women working in all sorts of jobs. No longer, do the Japanese intra-organisational transferees, their housewife 'trailing spouses' and their children enrolled in Japanese language schools, dominate the 'community', either numerically or socially (Yano 2010). It seems this is beginning to be the case also for Taiwanese migration to China PRC. Chapter 4 emphasises the diversity of migrants from Taiwan now living in the Shanghai city-region – indeed, also including many independent women professionals.

Towards conceptual models for Taiwanese migration

In this final section I want to pull some of the threads together by discussing two conceptual models that I think can help us understand contemporary Taiwanese migrations. The first is the notion of the 'escalator region' (Fielding 2007). This refers to those regions or countries that attract through migration many ambitious, educated young adults at the start of their working lives, then socially and occupationally promotes them at rates higher than those of other regions/countries in the space-economy, and finally loses many of them at or before retirement as they migrate on to other places in the pursuit of career advancement, or return to their regions/countries of origin.

It seems to me that while in the past and during the high growth period Taipei performed the role of escalator region to the internal space-economy of Taiwan, it is now being superseded to a considerable extent by Shanghai, which is fast becoming an 'escalator region' for the whole of the East Asian region. This tendency for processes that formerly operated within the boundaries of one country to begin to operate on an international scale is not at all unusual (this is, after all, the essence of globalisation). But it has a strong message for those who study

migration – the barriers between theories of internal migration and those of international migration *must* be broken down and removed.

In short, it is my judgement that the increasing migration of non-*Taishang* Taiwanese to Shanghai – the 'Shanghai rush' referred to in Chapter 4 – is best understood within this escalator-region conceptual frame. One of the interesting empirical findings within this approach is the particular advantages that escalator regions have for the upward social and occupational mobility of women (Fielding and Halford 1993).

The second conceptual model I want to discuss is the 'new immigration model'. This was first developed to explain the remarkable turnaround in the migration fortunes of the Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe (King *et al.* 1997: Chapter 1). It was then applied to Japan to explain why it was that the country went from net emigration to net immigration just at the moment (1990) when its economy went from high growth to no growth (and moved into its 'lost decades'; Fielding 2010). The new immigration model is designed to apply to countries which have experienced net emigration in the past, but which have recently become countries of net immigration (such as Taiwan). It was developed to explain the paradox of these countries seeing their immigration numbers rising at the same time that their economies were performing poorly and they were experiencing high or rising levels of unemployment.

The distinguishing feature of the conceptual model (see Figure 15.4) is that it links profitability, labour market conditions and both internal and international migration flows within a two-sector (high productivity/low productivity) national economy. The model has three stages:

Stage 1: Due to a surplus rural population (which is still encouraging emigration) and high levels of rural to urban migration, wage levels are kept to a low level – low enough to allow investment in low-productivity sectors as well as high profits



Figure 15.4 The new immigration model

and very rapid capital accumulation in high-productivity sectors. By the mid-1970s, reduced regional income inequality and an effective end to rural labour surpluses alter the conditions for capital accumulation and we enter stage 2 of the model.

Stage 2: The shortage of indigenous labour resulting from past heavy investment (due to high profitability in the high-productivity sectors) is now forcing wages up to levels close to those in the dominant high-income countries (the United States, Germany and Japan). This has the immediate effect of making the low-productivity sectors unprofitable and the longer-term effect of reducing the profitability of the high-productivity sector. The result is that, by about the mid-1980s, we reach stage 3 of the model.

Stage 3: Employers in the low-productivity sectors seek out new sources of low-wage labour (that is, immigrant workers), while at the same time employers in the high-productivity sectors disinvest and lay workers off because the margins between labour costs and market price are too tight for profitability. They invest instead in low-wage economies abroad. The outcome is inevitable – the number of unemployed among the indigenous workforce goes up at the same time as the number of immigrant workers. So the paradox is resolved!

Does this 'new immigration model' apply to Taiwan? Yes, I think it does. The dates of the turning points tend to be a little later than in the general model, but both the processes and their migration outcomes are the same. First, during the period of rapid industrialisation from the 1950s to the 1970s, there was massive rural-to-urban migration (Lin 1998: 81–3). These migration gains to the largest cities slowed down or even reversed after the mid-1980s. Secondly, as wage levels increased, and coinciding with the opening up of China PRC to foreign investment after 1978, Taiwanese firms began to invest heavily in China, especially initially in the Pearl River delta. This led to both the hollowing out of the Taiwanese economy (given great emphasis in Chapter 3) and the emigration of business personnel, sometimes accompanied by their families, to mainland China. This is the point at which the sectoral share of manufacturing in Taiwan's GDP ceased to grow, having increased rapidly from 20 per cent to nearly 50 per cent in the previous thirty years (Lin 1998: 60). Finally, by the late 1980s/early 1990s we begin to see the arrival of foreign workers and their employment in workshop industries and in subcontracting firms.

It would be a major support for the veracity of the 'new immigration model' if we were to find that there had indeed been a shift from net emigration to net immigration around the mid-1980s, and if the location of the foreign residents in Taiwan today coincided with the areas of major industrialisation – in particular the industrial belt, sometimes referred to as Taiwan's 'Silicon Valley', stretching in a south-south-westerly direction from Taipei towards Taichung. On the first point the data is unequivocal: there was a shift from net emigration to net immigration; this was not, however, in the mid-1980s, but in the mid-1990s. From 1971 to 1996 the total net loss of migrants from Taiwan was about 230,000; from 1997 to 2010 the total net gain was about 200,000 (calculated from DBAS, Department of Household Registration, MOI).

On the second point we can turn to Figures 15.5–9. These show location quotients for five major immigrant groups of foreign residents (but – and this is very significant – excluding the over 300,000 Chinese mainlanders). Location quotients measure the local percentage of the population that is in a selected category (for example, Indonesians) as a ratio of the national percentage for that category. The main features of these maps and their interpretation are:

Figure 15.5: Indonesians are far and away the largest group of foreign workers (other than Chinese mainlanders). They show an overall low degree of spatial concentration, but higher values occur in the north than in the south, and especially in Taipei City itself. These are the areas where wage levels are highest. It is interesting that the distribution of Indonesians does not correlate closely with any other group of foreign residents. Of the 172,000 Indonesian foreign workers in Taiwan in October 2011, 148,000 were female, and almost all of these were employed as domestic servants and health care workers. They are thus clearly 'gap fillers' – migrants doing the essential but low-productivity jobs that members of the host population cannot or will not do. Around 7,000 Indonesians work as crewmen in the Taiwanese fishing industry.

Figure 15.6: Vietnamese are the second largest group, at 94,000 (all data are for October 2011). They are strongly concentrated in the industrial belt from Taoyuan to Changhua. Notice the very low figure for Taipei City (0.45). The distribution of Vietnamese foreign workers correlates very closely with those from Thailand ($r = +0.92$), and moderately closely with those from the Philippines ($r = +0.59$). Just under half of the Vietnamese foreign workers are female and about half of those are employed in the care services. The males are largely employed in the metal, machinery and electronics industries. So the Vietnamese conform closely to the new immigration model in that they are industrial workers in sectors where the jobs and wage rates are unattractive to members of the host society.

Figure 15.7: Foreign residents from the Philippines are quite remarkably concentrated in the industrial belt, especially around Hsinchu City. About two-thirds of the foreign workers from the Philippines (total = 83,000) are female, and about half of these work in the care service sector. But the key fact about Filipinos in Taiwan is their contribution to the electronic parts and components industry, where 27,000 of them are employed. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are so concentrated in the industrial belt or that they conform so closely to expectations based on the new immigration model.

Figure 15.8: Foreign residents from Thailand are also strongly concentrated in the industrial belt, and their distribution correlates closely with both the Vietnamese and Filipinos. Unlike the other nationalities, however, the Thais in Taiwan are very predominantly male (61,000 out of a total of 72,000). They are mostly employed in the metal products industry, but also in the textile, machinery, basic metal, plastics and electronics industries. The locations they occupy, however, both geographically and occupationally, conform to what one would expect on the basis of the new immigration model.



Figure 15.5 Taiwan: Foreign residents (Indonesia) 2010



Figure 15.6 Taiwan: Foreign residents (Vietnam) 2010



Figure 15.7 Taiwan: Foreign residents (Philippines) 2010



Figure 15.8 Taiwan: Foreign residents (Thailand) 2010



Figure 15.9 Taiwan: Foreign residents (Japan, Korea and Singapore) 2010

Figure 15.9: Finally, I have mapped foreign residents from Japan, South Korea and Singapore. The contrast with previous distributions is total; these are for the most part highly educated, high-status individuals living in the high-order urban centres, most notably Taipei City itself (LQ = 3.92). The spatial distribution of foreign residents from Japan, South Korea and Singapore correlates extremely closely with those from North America and Australia (r = +0.97) and moderately closely with those from western Europe (r = +0.58) and the rest of the world (r = +0.51). Clearly, this distribution is not covered by the new immigration model, but reflects wider globalisation trends.

Conclusion

This chapter began by joining the rest of the authors in this book in emphasising the uniqueness of Taiwanese international migration flows. It then drew upon the themes developed in the various chapters to show how many similarities there were between migration flows to and from Taiwan and the patterns and processes occurring in other parts of East Asia, and elsewhere. The chapter concluded by discussing two conceptual frameworks – the 'escalator region' and the 'new immigration model' – that, although developed for situations elsewhere, were nevertheless very helpful for understanding the specific case of Taiwanese migration.

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