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BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE BACCA
KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG TOKYO

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University of Malaya,
December 1970.

GOH CHENG TEIK

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CHAPTER 1

Malaysia as a Democracy

AT the outset, it is necessary to establish whether Malaysia (until the National Operations Council interregnum) was a democracy. For this purpose, the definition developed by Carl J. Friedrich in *Constitutional Government and Democracy* is used. Friedrich's notion of democracy emerges clearly from his discussion of (a) the source of political authority and (b) the exercise of power in a polity. In a democracy, there is only one source of legitimate authority, namely, the people.¹ Other sources are possible but they do not bear the stamp of legitimacy. For the purpose of government, this authority is delegated to a select few. This is done through the electoral process at regular intervals of time. By implication, any political authority which does not originate from the people and is not obtained through an honest election is *ipso facto* illegitimate and undemocratic.

The way power is exercised is as important as the source from which authority is derived in determining whether democracy exists. Power which flows from authority has to be constitutionalized in order to make it democratic. Or in Friedrich's words, 'effective regularized restraints have to be placed upon governmental action'.² In a presidential democracy on the American model, power is divided between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and they check and balance each other. In a democracy based upon the Westminster model, the alternation of government between two or three parties is seen as 'perhaps the most important restraint'.³

¹ Friedrich, C.J. *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1950, p. 267.

² *Ibid.* p. 123.

³ *Ibid.*

In other words, a state is democratic when it satisfies two requirements: firstly, its authority is derived from the people and secondly, its power is exercised with restraint.

Source of Authority

Malaysia is a federation formed in 1963. The constituent units were the eleven Malayan states, the island of Singapore and the two states of northern Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah. The Malayan states had been independent since 1957 while the rest were British colonies until they federated with Malaya. In August 1965, Singapore was voted out of the federation. For the purpose of this discussion, Malaysia refers to the Malayan and Borneo states only, unless otherwise stated.

In Malaya, elections to a federal legislature with an elected majority were introduced in 1955. From 1959 onwards, the legislature became fully-elected.⁴ In Borneo, indirect elections were used to choose Members of Parliament (MPs) to sit in Kuala Lumpur when merger occurred. Under this multi-tier system, the ordinary voters elected the local councilors (in 1963). The councilors chose the state assemblymen who, in turn, picked the MPs.⁵ In the 1969-70 elections, the parliamentarians were directly elected.

The elections in the constituent units of Malaysia held before or after September 1963 were conducted with a degree of regularity and honesty that is outstanding in the Third World. In Malaya, the Opposition frequently complained of rigging but irregularities were the exception rather than the rule.⁶ In the

⁴ A useful but superficial survey of constitutional developments in Malaya till the formation of Malaysia is B. Simandjuntak, *Malayan Federation*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.

⁵ On party politics and elections in Sarawak and Sabah, refer R.O. Tilman's 'Elections in Sarawak', *Asian Survey*, October 1963; 'The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian Politics: Borneo Variations on a Theme', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Winter 1964; and 'The Sarawak Political Scene', *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1964-5; C.P. Bradley's 'Communal Politics in Malaysian Borneo', *Western Political Quarterly*, March 1968; and M. Roffs 'The Rise and Demise of Kadazan Nationalism', *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, September 1969.

⁶ The elections in Malaya have attracted extensive scholarly attention. In 1964, they were the object of a Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored study by R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam from the Department of Political Science,

1969 campaign, there were the usual rumours⁷ and, yet, when the results were known, the Opposition parties made massive gains. This should disprove any accusation of partiality against the Federal Election Commission. In Borneo, the 1963 local elections were made the subject of investigation by a United Nations team.⁸ The team reported to U Thant that the electoral registers were properly compiled, the votes properly polled and counted, and sufficient freedom offered to the political parties to organize and express themselves.

From 1955 onwards, the Alliance Party was in power in the federal capital. This party maintained a high regard for the principles of legality and legitimacy. Only those who had been properly elected, whether to the local council, state assembly or federal parliament, were allowed to hold office. This legal scrupulousness reflected, in part, the great respect of the federal and state civil bureaucracies for the rule of law. It is true that Dato Rahman Ya'akub and Taib Mahmud were given ministerial appointments in May 1969 despite the fact that their terms as MPs had expired and they had not yet been given new mandates by their Sarawak constituents. However, this irregularity occurred during the state of emergency when parliamentary democracy was suspended.

There is no substantial evidence to suggest that in the 1955-69 period⁹ the monopoly of legislative and executive power held by the elected Alliance Government was ever seriously

University of Singapore. See F.G. Carnell, 'The Malayan Elections *Pacific Affairs*, December 1955; I. Tinker, 'Malayan Elections: Electoral Pattern for Plural Societies', *Western Political Quarterly*; T.E. Smith, 'The Malayan Elections of 1959', *Pacific Affairs*, March 1960; T.G. McGee, 'The Malayan Elections of 1959. A Study in Electoral Geography', *Journal of Tropical Geography*, October 1962; R.K. Vasil, 'The 1964 General Elections in Malaya', *International Studies*, 1965; and K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, *The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964*, Singapore, 1967.

⁷ These rumours were rife in the states visited by the author during the campaign, namely, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak and Penang.

⁸ This report was re-published by the Malaysian Department of Information under the title 'United Nations Malaysia Mission Report'. It is in fact a rich source of information on Sarawak and Sabah party politics.

⁹ Strictly speaking, the federal legislature was not fully elected until 1959. Of its 98 members, 44 were nominated. However, it was under the control of the Alliance Party which secured 51 of the 52 seats contested.

challenged by the nine Malay princely houses. When the elected elite campaigned for the independence of Malaya in the mid-1950s, this hereditary class displayed signs of anxiety. It feared that the winds of change might bring in republicanism. The celebrated Sultan Ibrahim of Johore even publicly opposed *Merdeka*.¹⁰ However, both independence for Malaya in 1957 and merger with Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah in 1963 did not lead to new risks. UMNO, the leading component in the federal government, stoutly expounded and defended constitutional monarchism. *Parti Ra'ayat* professed a vague republicanism but its view on this matter was not shared by a majority of the Malay population. Given this wall of security and comfort erected by the Alliance Government, the Malay princes had not felt any need to transgress their constitutional limits and challenge the authority of Parliament and Cabinet. The tact and skill of the prince-premier, Tengku Abdul Rahman, greatly contributed to this harmonious relationship between the elected and hereditary political elites of Malaysia.

Exercise of Power

The Westminster model adopted by Malaysia does not contain an institutionalized separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Regularized, effective restraint on governmental action, nevertheless, exists and it comes from the potential alternation of government between two or three parties. In Malaysia, however, a two-party system has never existed. From the time of Malaya's independence until the formation of Malaysia, the Alliance Party dominated the power-structure. Opposition parties were never, at any moment, in a position to combine and pose a threat. However, this one-and-a-half party system should not lead us to the conclusion that there was no restraint on Alliance power at all. The conventional check- and-balance mechanism of the two-party system was absent but, in its place, a check, and-balance mechanism operated within the Alliance Party.

The Malaysian Alliance is, as its name suggests, a confederation of political parties, not a unified, homogeneous,

¹⁰ Means, G.P. *Malaysian Politics*, London, 1970, p. 171.

political organization. Race is the 'badge worn by each constituent unit.¹¹ At its peak, the Alliance was able to represent, to a fair extent, the interests of almost every ethnic group in the federation from Chinese to Kadazans. UMNO was the leading partner in the coalition by virtue of its enormous number of federal seats and its tradition of leadership within the Alliance (dating back to 1955). It could, if it wanted, impose its will on the other partners through its party patriarch, Tengku Abdul Rahman.¹² In practice, an unyielding posture on the part of UMNO would have exposed the allied party leaders to severe pressure from their followers and strained grass-roots loyalty to the confederation.

The Alliance as a political organization was integrated only at the summit and even at this level, integration was confined to certain key personalities, notably Tengku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Ismail, Tun Tan Siew Sin, Tun Sambanthan, Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah, Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan (before the 1966 crisis), Dato Donald Stephens (before his 'exile' to Canberra as High Commissioner) and Tun Mustapha. As for the rank-and-file, they remained apart and tended to agitate only for the interests of their race or tribe. The summit leadership acted as a cushion against excessive communal pressure and as a moderator of conflicting demands. This role compelled them to strive for the preservation of a 'balance of power' within the confederation and the prevention of a rise to hegemony by any single constituent.

In addition, other restraints on the executive and legislative powers of the Alliance Party operated, namely, the fear of disrupting inter-communal peace and the alertness of the Opposition. The Alliance as a plural, political organization had to be sensitive to communal sentiments and to be conscious of the need to maintain the delicate, ethnic equilibrium within the country because inflamed feelings among the population would invariably result in intra-party tension, while a breakdown of social

¹¹ Strictly speaking, USNO, Pesaka and Bumiputra are not communal parties because their members are drawn from several ethnic groups.

¹² A celebrated instance was in 1966 when it compelled the resignation of SNAP's secretary-general, Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan from the Chief Ministership of Sarawak.

peace would be tantamount to a failure of multi-racialism as embodied in the Alliance. Besides, most Alliance leaders were drawn from the aristocratic and bourgeois classes (or had become bourgeois-minded) and they possessed a powerful instinct of self-preservation. They were neither racialists addicted to the doctrine of racial supremacy nor were they social visionaries committed to drastic social reform. For them, the *status quo* was tolerable and comfortable. Change, particularly rapid change, was resisted because its side-effect might be the unleashing of the forces of disorder and chaos which put their power-position in jeopardy. This restraint was not institutionalized but it was constantly present in the minds of the Alliance leaders, in particular the Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman. It led them to tread cautiously on issues that seriously divided Malaysia's plural society and to strive for compromise solutions.

The Opposition in Malaysia laboured under at least two handicaps. Firstly, there existed a self-imposed censorship of the press. The press licences have to be renewed annually and, as operators with an eye on profit, the newspaper proprietors were understandably afraid of government reprisal; hence, their reluctance to print the more trenchant remarks made against the Alliance Party. Secondly, the threat of arbitrary detention was always present. Under existing legislation, any person, including a properly-elected MP, could be arrested and detained without any charge being brought against him in court. Such wide, arbitrary powers could easily be used to stifle or curb the effectiveness of the Opposition. In the 1960s, *Parti Ra'ayat*, *Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu*, the Labour Party of Malaya and the Sarawak United People's Party were the chief targets, and among those detained were Ahmad Boestaman (MP), Hasnul Hadi, Datuk Kampo Radio, Ishak Muhammad, Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (MP), Tan Kai Hee, Lim Kean Siew (MP), Dr. M. Rajakumar and Chan Siaw Hee. In 1967, the Labour Party of Malaya decided to withdraw its representatives from elected local councils, state assemblies and Parliament in protest against the alleged strangulation of democracy in Malaysia by the Alliance Government¹³

¹³ Both *Parti Ra'ayat* and the Labour Party have been treated in great detail in R.K. Vasil, 'Politics in a Plural Society', Kuala Lumpur, 1971.

Despite these two handicaps, the Opposition survived and was able to provide an effective restraining influence on governmental action. Within Parliament, the Opposition members were limited (until May 1969) but they made up for quantity with quality. Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, a Labour Party MP until he joined GERAKAN in 1968, was perhaps the most vigilant watchdog on the Opposition bench. Zulkiflee bin Muhammad (until his death in 1964), Dato Muhammad Asri, D.R. and S.P. Seenivasagam, Dr. Lim Chong Eu and Lim Kean Siew were among the other articulate Opposition critics. During the short period of Singapore's presence in Malaysia (September 1963-August 1965) the People's Action Party's contingent headed by Lee Kuan Yew was singularly effective, and its presence within Parliament in fact stirred up considerable controversy.

Nevertheless, there were two occasions when the top Alliance leaders used their massive strength in Parliament in a seemingly authoritarian manner. On the first occasion (in August 1965), the Alliance chief, Tengku Abdul Rahman, consulted only four party colleagues, Tun Razak, Tun Ismail, Tun Tan and Tun Sambanthan before introducing a bill before Parliament that provided for the separation of Singapore from the Malaysian federation. The other 120-odd Alliance MPs, including Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan and Data Donald Stephens, the Chief Ministers of Sarawak and Sabah respectively, were merely informed of the Big Five's decision and instructed to vote for it an hour before debate on the Singapore bill started.¹⁴ On the second occasion (September 1966), the Alliance Government utilized its over-two-thirds majority in Parliament to amend a state constitution and achieve a political end.¹⁵ The target was Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan, a member of the Alliance Party and Chief Minister of Sarawak. His dismissal from office by the state's Governor on the instruction of the national Alliance

¹⁴ Information from a reliable source in Parliament. On the separation of Singapore, refer M. Leifer, 'Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of Federation', *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 1965; R.S. Milne, 'Singapore's Exit from Malaysia-The Consequences of Ambiguity', *Asian Survey*, 1966 and N.M. Fletcher, *The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia*, Ithaca, New York, 1967.

¹⁵ This crisis has not yet been studied in detail.

Party's central committee was overruled by the High Court in Kuching. To overcome the legal hurdles, the Central Government declared a state of national emergency, ordered Parliament into session and amended Sarawak's constitution in order to give Dato Abang Haji Openg (the Governor) the requisite legal authority to dismiss Dato Ningkan.

CHAPTER 2

The Crisis of Confidence

For six years, democracy was a living reality in the Malaysian Federation. In the case of the eleven Malayan states which obtained self-government in 1955, representative government had been flourishing for fifteen years. Except for the Communist Party and after 1967, the Labour Party, there was no political organization that opposed democracy. Critical remarks made were not directed at the desirability or otherwise of democracy but at government attempts to prevent the full enjoyment of democracy through its powers of arbitrary detention. In fact, even the leftist parties did not object to the democratic system. They merely claimed that democracy's existence was a fiction because the ruling party had failed to allow complete freedom to all parties to organize and to compete for the people's mandate.

Beginning on 10 May 1969, signs began to appear which suggested that this era of quiet satisfaction with and confidence in democracy was coming to an end. While Opposition parties in Malaya felt encouraged and elated by the election returns, certain elements within the UMNO, the main component of the Malaysian Alliance, began to entertain doubts as to the desirability and efficacy of democracy in Malaysia. This mood of doubt developed into a grave crisis of confidence in both democracy and the incumbent UMNO leadership when the May Thirteenth Incident occurred.

The mainspring of this crisis may be traced to the prevailing UMNO concern over the configuration of political power in Malaysia. The deeply-ingrained belief among the Malay people, especially those inhabiting states that have been only lightly

touched by British colonialism, was that the Malay peninsula was the land of the Malays.¹ Before colonization by the British, power was believed to have resided with the respective Malay princely houses. During the colonial era, the peninsula, except those parts directly annexed, was merely held in trust by the British. It was taken for granted that in the post-colonial period, political power or at least the bulk of it would always be held in Malay hands.

For the members and supporters of UMNO, political reality matched their expectations, at least until May 1969. In the years of the Malayan Federation (from self-government in July 1955 till August 1963, the eve of the federation's enlargement), UMNO's grip on federal power was sure and firm, despite a serious UMNO-MCA dispute in 1959. The tripartite UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition made a clean sweep-51 out of 52 seats- in the 1955 federal elections. Both Georgetown and Ipoh-Menglembu, the only two constituencies with registered Chinese voter-majorities then, fell to the Alliance. UMNO alone captured 34 seats. Four years later, the Alliance had to face new disadvantages, namely, widespread discontent among the Chinese minority over its newly-formulated educational policy, internal party disunity as a result of disagreement over seat allocation and Chinese education, and an enlarged Opposition challenge as a result of the Socialist Front and People's Progressive Party's greater effectiveness. And yet it managed to win 74 seats, over two-thirds of the 104 constituencies. UMNO on its own won 52 seats.

From the time of the formation of Malaysia until May 1969, the power-position of UMNO remained steady and steadfast. This was particularly so after the April 1964 general elections. In this contest, the Alliance in the Malayan states won a thumping victory. While UMNO increased its strength by 7 seats, a 13.4 percent gain, MCA gained 8 seats, and increase of 42.1 per cent.² MCA failed to win only 6 of its 33 seats and these were located in the six most urban constituencies of Malaya (Dato

¹ A highly inflexible view has been advanced by Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad in *The Malay Dilemma*, Donald Moore, 1970.

² UMNO won 52 seats in 1959 and 59 in 1964. MCA won 19 seats in 1959 and 27 in 1964.

Kramat, Tanjong, Ipoh, Menglembu, Batu and Bungsar) and lost to six of the Opposition's strongest challengers (Lim Kean Siew, SF; Lim Chong Eu, UDP; D.R. Seenivasagam and S.P. Seenivasagam, PPP; Tan Chee Khoo, SF and Devan Nair, PAP). This massive victory which has been attributed largely to external politics, namely, the *konfrontasi* waged by Sukarno,³ lulled UMNO and MCA into illusions as to their collective popularity and strength after *konfrontasi* had ended, and made both unprepared psychologically for anything but another big victory in 1969.

With merger in September 1963, the federal parliament was enlarged to a 159-member capacity (Malayan states 104; Singapore 15; Sarawak 24 and Sabah 16). The UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition managed to secure new allies in Sarawak and Sabah, though not in Singapore. Sabah contributed 16 seats, and Sarawak 18 before the Kalong Ningkan crisis in 1966, and 17 after it. In August 1965, following Singapore's separation from the federation, the size of the federal House of Representatives dropped to 144 seats. On the eve of Parliament's dissolution in view of the forthcoming 1969 elections, the UMNO- Jed Alliance commanded 122 out of the 144 seats, nearly 85 per cent-in the Lower House.

It was when the 10 May 1969 election returns in West Malaysia came in that the quiet, calm confidence of UMNO members and supporters in the democratic process became rippled with doubt. The middle Chinese pillar collapsed unexpectedly at the polls and UMNO's hold on federal and state power was given a severe jolt. Despite a 10-seat handicap from unopposed allied candidates in Sabah in the federal race, the Alliance 'sailing boat'⁴, which, at past elections was always in the forefront, had, in the

³ 'The main feature of the (1964) election was perhaps the pre-eminence of a single issue. This was the Indonesian "Confrontation" of Malaysia and the threat which it posed to the country's security. From the very outset of the campaign the Alliance showed its determination to make this the central issue and, helped by the PAP, succeeded in compelling the other parties (notably the SF) to concentrate their energies in refuting the various charges of disloyalty that were made against them.' Ratnam and Milne, *1964 Election*, p. 110.

⁴ Symbol of the Alliance Party.

	Entered	Won	Lost
<i>1955</i>			
UMNO	35	34	1
MCA	15	15	0
MIC	2	2	0
<i>1959</i>			
UMNO	70	52	18
MCA	31	19	12
MIC	3	3	0
<i>1964</i>			
UMNO	68	59	9
MCA	33	27	6
MIC	3	3	0
<i>1969</i>			
UMNO	68	51	17
MCA	33	13	20
MIC	3	2	1

words of the *Straits Times*, a 'rough passage' to victory.⁵

The UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition won a total of 66 federal seats in the Malayan states, 23 less than in 1964. UMNO won 51 of the 68 seats it contested, 8 less than in 1964 but 1 less than in 1959. On the other hand, the MCA won only 13 of its 33 contested seats, 14 less than in 1964 and 6 less than even in crisis-ridden 1959. Of these 13 successful seats, 3 had been returned unopposed and 3 were won in Malay-majority constituencies. It was at this stage, when UMNO's basis of power was seen to be eroding, that the crisis of confidence in democracy started.

⁵ *Straits Times*, 11 May 1969. The Alliance was not returned to power until 7.00 a.m. on Sunday, 11 May. *Utusan Malaysia*, 11 May 1969.

The erosion of Alliance strength was seen in terms of the ethnic configuration of power in the federation. UMNO's rank- and-file and its enthusiasts felt that political power was shifting (i) from the Alliance side to the Opposition parties and (ii) from the Malay race to the immigrant minorities. By comparison with the preceding federal elections, the Opposition made a net gain of 23 seats, over one-fifth of the quota in Parliament for the Malayan states. The exclusively Malay-Muslim *Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu*, (PAS) which, in doctrine, probably corresponds to Indonesia's *Darul Islam* gained 3 seats, but the main beneficiaries were Opposition parties under wholly- or largely-immigrant leadership. The People's Progressive Party gained 2 seats in Perak. Two new parties - the Democratic Action Party and *Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia* - won 13 and 8 seats respectively.

The most vivid illustrations of these shifts in political power were offered not by the federal but state contests. A serious erosion of Alliance strength by the fundamentalist Malay-Muslim PAS occurred in Terengganu. PAS enlarged its state representation from 3 seats in 1964 to 11 seats in the 1969 elections. However, this increase was seen as having been dwarfed by the enormous gains of the 'immigrant' parties in Penang, Perak and Selangor.

Table 2
The Malayan Federal Election Results by Party (1964 and 1969)

<u>1964</u>		<u>1969</u>	
Alliance	89		66
UMNO	59	UMNO	51
MCA	27	MCA	13
MIC	3	MIC	2
PAS	9		12
PPP	2		4
DAP	0		13
GERAKAN	0		8
SF	2		0
PAP	1		0
UDP	1		0
Vacant	0		1
	104		104

In Penang, the Alliance suffered a complete loss of state power. Only 4 of its 24 candidates were returned. GERAKAN captured 16; DAP 3 and *Parti Ra'ayat* 1. In Perak, the Alliance failed to win a simple majority. It won 19 of the 40 state seats. PPP captured 12, DAP 6, GERAKAN 2 and PAS 1. In Selangor, it won exactly half of the 28 seats in the state assembly. The rest was shared among DAP (9), GERAKAN (4) and Independent (1).

Table 3 Trengganu State Election Results (1964 and 1969)				
		Entered	Won	Lost
<i>1964</i>	UMNO	23	20	3
	MCA	1	1	0
	PAS	23	3	20
<i>1969</i>	UMNO	23	12	11
	MCA	1	1	0
	PAS	24	11	13

Table 4 Penang State Election Results (1964 and 1969)				
		Entered	Won	Lost
<i>1964</i>	UMNO	10	10	0
	MCA	12	6	6
	MIC	2	2	0
	UDP	21	4	17
	SF	24	2	22
	PAS	4	0	4
	<i>1969</i>	UMNO	10	4
MCA		12	0	12
MIC		2	0	2
GERAKAN		19	16	3
DAP		3	3	0
PR		1	1	0
PAS		5	0	5

Table 5
Perak State Election Results (1964 and 1969)

		Entered	Won	Lost
<i>1964</i>	UMNO	22	22	0
	MCA	16	12	4
	MIC	2	1	1
	PPP	19	5	14
	SF	19	0	19
	PAS	20	0	20
	UDP	15	0	15
<i>1969</i>	UMNO	22	18	4
	MCA	17	1	16
	MIC	1	0	1
	PPP	13	12	1
	DAP	8	6	2
	GERAKAN	2	2	0
	PAS	28	1	27

Table 6
Selangor State Election Results (1964 and 1969)

		Entered	Won	Lost
<i>1964</i>	UMNO	13	13	0
	MCA	12	8	4
	MIC	3	3	0
	SF	26	4	22
	PAS	7	0	7
	PAP	5	0	5
	PPP	4	0	4
<i>1969</i>	UMNO	13	12	1
	MCA	12	1	11
	MIC	3	1	2
	DAP	12	9	3
	GERAKAN	8	4	4
PAS	12	0	12	

Among the more restrained UMNO elements, the instinctive reaction to this apparent change in the power-structure was to re-examine the Malay community's role within the existing democratic system and under UMNO's leadership in the safeguarding of its political position. *Utusan Melayu*, an UMNO-owned Jawi newspaper whose managing director, Dato Hussein Nordin, had lost in a parliamentary fight in Perak to PAS, loudly lamented what it regarded as a split in the Malay race. Malay voters in certain multi-racial constituencies were alleged to have split their votes between UMNO and PAS and, as a consequence of this division of votes, third 'immigrant' parties managed to emerge victorious.

Ampang, a state constituency in Selangor with a Malay-voter majority, was the most celebrated case for lament. The ethnic composition of its electorate in 1969 was as follows: Malays 51.6 per cent, Chinese 42.7 per cent and Indians 5.0 per cent.

And yet a DAP Chinese defeated his next strongest contender, an UMNO Malay. (DAP gained 7,634 votes, UMNO 6,601 votes and PAS 3,560 votes.) 'Bajang', pen-name for *Utusan Melayu's* columnist, wrote: 'If PAS did not field its candidate to contest in the Ampang state constituency, the UMNO candidate would definitely have won the seat'. 'The DAP won as a result of the split of the Malays', he added.⁶ *Utusan Melayu's* leading article urged that every possible effort be made to mend the 'split' among the Malays. 'If this situation is allowed to aggravate, then within a few years, the political power in Malay hands will greatly diminish. This is a bad omen to the future of the Malay race.'⁷

UMNO campaign directors meeting in a closed-door session at UMNO headquarters soon after the elections demanded from the party's national leadership a more Malay-oriented cabinet. Syed Nasir bin Ismail, the controversial ex-director of *Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka* (Language and Literature Agency), was proposed as the new minister of education. UMNO was urged to take over the portfolios of Commerce and Industry and Finance which in the past had been assigned to MCA in view of the important Chinese role in the national economy.⁸ These party campaigners

⁶ *Utusan Melayu*, 13 May 1969.

⁷ *Ibid.* 12 May 1969.

⁸ *Straits Times*, 13 May 1969.

obviously realized that a swing to the Malay extremity of the pendulum in government policy would alienate Chinese and Indian voters even more from MCA and MIC but they probably felt, as *Utusan Melayu* did immediately after the polls, that the 'immigrant' votes could and should be written off and Malay voters be wooed to the fullest.

Among UMNO's less restrained members and supporters, the reactions were highly disturbing. Disenchantment arose not merely over the outcome of the 1969 elections but with democracy itself. It is difficult to document such sentiments, but a banned document entitled 'The Struggle of the Non-Malays: Our Stand' circulating in the name of Raja Mukhtaruddin Dain of the University of Malaya may serve as an index to this school of thought. The non-Malay communities, it was pointed out, had, as a result of concessions obtained from UMNO by MCA and MIC, managed to obtain citizenship and had, through the democratic process, acquired a share of political power. And yet they were not satisfied, as evidenced in their struggle through the 'immigrant' Opposition parties in the 1969 elections for equal rights and against Malay special rights. The writer of the leaflet urged that the extra-parliamentary government instituted upon the declaration of a state of emergency be perpetuated and democracy forsaken. The country was advised to draw inspiration from Burma, Indonesia, Thailand and Kenya, 'revolutionary' countries which had faced the 'fact' that democracy was not workable in the developing countries.

In conclusion, it is evident that the state and federal results of the 1969 elections in the Malayan states gave rise to anxiety and even alarm among UMNO activists and sympathizers that political power was 'slipping out' of 'indigenous' into 'immigrant' hands. Doubts began to arise as to the ability of the democratic system to guarantee an indefinite hold by the Malays on political power. Two views emerged during this crisis of confidence in democracy; firstly, to consolidate UMNO's grip on the Malay votes in the Malayan states through an alliance with PAS and/or firm government measures to win back lost votes, and secondly, to abandon democracy entirely and retain power in 'indigenous' hands through extra-democratic processes.

CHAPTER 3

May Thirteenth

THE mass *amok* which took place in Kuala Lumpur on 13 May has its origins in the perceived change in the ethnic configuration of power and the resultant sense of anxiety and alarm discussed in Chapter 2. The insults and abuse hurled at UMNO and the Malays by unruly Opposition activists and sympathizers during the post-election processions acted upon this insecure state of mind and led to an overflow of racial emotion.

The timing and location of the first fatal incident were not coincidental. The mass violence broke out within the vicinity of the Selangor Menteri Besar's house at about 6 p.m. on 13 May, approximately sixty hours after the last result in the state of Selangor was declared. The Selangor results had evoked feelings of anger, frustration and anxiety within the local UMNO branches. Anger was stirred up by the perceived pattern of voting in the state. While the Malays rejected the 'extremist' PAS and solidly supported UMNO as evidenced by UMNO's loss of only 1 out of 13 seats, the Chinese and Indian voters rejected MCA and MIC and flocked to the 'extremist' Opposition parties. MCA and MIC, lost a combined total of 13 out of 15 seats, and these 13 were in constituencies with Sino-Indian voter majorities. The UMNO anger was, therefore, vented on the Chinese and Indians in the state for 'deserting' the Alliance Party, the vehicle of 'multi-racialism' *en masse*, and consequently placing the UMNO-led state government of Selangor in jeopardy.

Frustration proceeded from the situation of deadlock that UMNO found itself in after the polls. With only 14 Alliance state assemblymen, UMNO could not form an Alliance state government. Dato Harun bin Idris, the state UMNO chief and

incumbent Menteri Besar tried to 'persuade' GERAKAN, a middle-of-the-road Opposition party, to join UMNO, MCA and MIC in the formation of a coalition state government. This invitation was rejected by Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, the party's Secretary-General and the newly-elected state assemblyman for Kepong, with characteristic pungence. 'I have said many times that I will not sleep with Alliance partners', he was quoted as saying.

'Now more than ever when they are castrated, how can I do so?'.¹ The other option open to Dato Harun was to hold a fresh election but in the light of the state-wide and peninsula-wide trend against the Alliance, Dato Harun probably felt that the risk of further losses was considerable. Consequently, from Sunday morning (11 May) till Tuesday evening (13 May) when GERAKAN finally announced its policy of neutrality and broke the political deadlock, UMNO could neither move forward nor backward.

The anxiety² had a more rational atmosphere prevailed would probably not have arisen because a combined Opposition

¹ *Straits Times*, 13 May 1969. Gerakan had been encouraged by its unexpected performance at the polls, and it was not interested in any coalition that might ruin its chances in the future. Its leaders had decided on Monday night (12 May) to adopt a policy of neutrality in both Perak and Selangor. The party's secretary general, Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, was authorized to announce this decision to the press on 13 May. Various developments led to a delay in this announcement. Goh Hock Guan visited Dr. Tan in the morning to persuade him to co-operate in the formation of an Opposition state government. Dr. Tan was offered the post of deputy Menteri Besar by Goh Hock Guan. At lunch-time, it was learnt that MCA had decided to quit the Cabinet. Dr. Tan, who was keen on maximum publicity for his party's statement, was persuaded by a *Straits Times* journalist, Felix Abishenagan, to withhold his announcement until 14 May. The author saw Dr. Tan at approximately 2.30 p.m. as he was leaving for his office. Dr. Tan said that Gerakan would definitely not team up with the DAP or PPP. The Malays, he added, were extremely angry and he intended to say something to calm them down. Later in the afternoon, the then Editor in Chief of the *Straits Times* Group, Tan Sri Leslie Hoffmann, rang up Dr. Tan at his office and advised him to release his statement at once as the Malays were very angry. He assured him prominent space for his statement in the *Straits Times*. At 4.45 p.m., Gerakan's neutral stand in Perak and Selangor was announced to a hurriedly summoned press conference.

² The existence of anxiety among UMNO members and supporters in Selangor was implicitly acknowledged by Dato Harun. He told the police

with exactly half the assembly seats was as incapable as the Alliance side of forming a government. However, the emotional temperature as a result of the apparent shift of power was running high. Moreover, statements made by the DAP and GERAKAN leaders did not help to bring down the temperature. Goh Hock Guan, the DAP's Secretary-General, relentlessly pursued the objective of setting up a DAP-led Opposition government. He was reported in the Malay press as having retorted, when told that the Selangor constitution did not make any provision for a non-Malay to be Menteri Besar, that his lawyers had found no such stipulations.³ Both DAP and GERAKAN repeatedly pressured the federal government through statements in the press to hold fresh elections in Selangor.⁴ With the tide of popularity running in their favour, they were confident of increasing their margins of success.

These feelings of anger, frustration and anxiety had arisen among UMNO and UMNO-sympathizing Malays as a result of the 10 May election and the subsequent politicking over the formation of a new state government. The catalyst that exacerbated these emotions and sent the temperature to boiling point was the way in which DAP and GERAKAN supporters in Kuala Lumpur behaved on Sunday and Monday (11 and 12 May).

Realizing that the UMNO branch in Selangor was in a precarious situation, bands of youthful sympathizers from the DAP and GERAKAN headed towards Dato Harun's house in Jalan Raja Muda and rudely invited him to quit this state residence since he was allegedly no longer Menteri Besar.⁵ At processions held to celebrate individual Opposition successes,

that he wanted the crowd to assemble in the compound of his house for the proposed 13 May procession so that he could 'take the opportunity to inform the Malays of my intention to form the State Government'.

'Thus I might be able to allay any fear they might have on this matter....'
National Operations Council, *The May 13 Tragedy: A Report*. Kuala Lumpur, October 1969, p. 41.

³ *Utusan Malaysia*, 13 May 1969.

⁴ See *Malay Mail*, 12 and 13 May 1969.

⁵ The NOC Report puts it in forceful language. 'Groups of non-Malay hooligans went in front of the Menteri Besar's residence in Kampong Bahru and shouted threats that he would be physically ejected from the house.' Op. cit. p. 35.

youthful Chinese and Indian supporters booed and jeered at Malays they encountered or at Malay houses they passed. The slogans which they shouted (several of which were recorded by Malay eye-witnesses and published by the NOC) showed that they interpreted the political stalemate in Selangor as directly, a defeat for UMNO, the leading Malay political party, and indirectly, a defeat for the Malay people. Some of these were: 'Kapal layar bochor!' (The sailing boat is leaking!); 'Melayu sudah jatoh!' (Malays have fallen!); 'Melayu sekarang ta'ada kuasa lagi!' (Malays now no longer have power!); 'Kuala Lumpur sekarang China punya!' (Kuala Lumpur now belongs to the Chinese!); 'Melayu boleh balek kampong!' (Malays may return to their villages!).

These visits to Dato Harun's house and the slogans shouted at the processions registered vigorous reactions among Dato Harun's supporters, in particular, and Malay inhabitants in the Greater Kuala Lumpur district, in general. They felt outraged that they, the natives of the soil, should have been asked to withdraw from Kuala Lumpur, the capital of *Tanah Melayu*, into Red-Indian-style reservations so that the immigrant communities could gain dominance over it. The most enraged were the Kampong Bahru UMNO youths whose ranks included the specially-trained campaign workers, that is, the *Pemuda2 Tahan Lasak*.⁶ They had actively assisted Dato Harun throughout the electoral battle. The resented bitterly the claim that UMNO had fallen politically and that their chief, Dato Harun, should be asked to vacate the Menteri Besar's official residence, because the Alliance, in

⁶ The creation of this youth organization was a highly controversial matter. Senu bin Abdul Rahman, the head of Malaysia's UMNO Youth announced that 10,000 youths would be chosen and prepared for electioneering work. These 'pemuda2 tahan lasak' (rugged youths) would be taught to defend the independence and sovereignty of the nation and trained to spread the 'revolusi mental' (mental revolution) to the masses. *Berita Harian*, 14 September 1968. Senu vigorously denied allegations that these youths were being trained to carry out the party struggle through illegal means. *Berita Harian*, 16 November 1968. During the campaign, Dato Asri bin Muda, the PAS Menteri Besar of Kelantan alleged that these youths were resorting to unlawful tactics. At Kuala Pilah, he said: 'The UMNO pemuda2 tahan lasak have been carrying out unhealthy acts and pressuring voters into voting Alliance. This is happening not only in Kelantan but in other places where there are PAS candidates.' *Berita Harian*, 18 April 1969.

fact, had not been defeated. And so they urged Ahmad Razali, the Political Secretary to Dato Harun, to obtain permission for them to hold an UMNO procession in order to show to the Opposition parties that 'UMNO, too, had a good reason to celebrate as they were not defeated in the State elections'.⁷

Dato Harun gave his consent for the proposed procession. A police permit was applied for and obtained. Ahmad Razali says he spent four hours on the night of 12 May visiting Malay-inhabited villages in the Greater Kuala Lumpur district, namely, Kampong Dato Keramat, Gombak (81/2 Milestone), Kampong Petaling, Kawasan Melayu, Kampong Haji Abdullah Hukom, Kampong Pandan Dalam and Kampong Jaya, in order to contact UMNO leaders and mobilize support for the counter-demonstration scheduled to start from Dato Harun's house the next day at 7.30 p.m.⁸ The official government report does not state when the crowd started to swell on 13 May but a police officer leading a reserve unit through Jalan Raja Muda at 6.30 p.m. wired to the Selangor Police Control Centre to report that 'a crowd of 4,000 to 5,000' was swamping the front of the Menteri Besar's residency and spilling into its compound and beyond. Some of the would-be demonstrators carried sticks and banners and 'a few were seen to be armed with parangs and kris[es]'.⁹ At about this moment, another police officer commanding a field force testifies that '... a Malay youth, riding a scooter, heading towards the Menteri Besar's residence shouted "Setapak sudah kena langgar" (Setapak has been attacked)'.¹⁰ Ahmad Razali says that when he dashed out of his house which adjoins Dato Harun's at approximately 6.40 p.m., he witnessed a van burning and learnt that its two Chinese occupants had been killed on the spot. He rushed over to Dato Harun's house and found him standing on top of a bus appealing for calm. To the Menteri Besar's appeal, the mob replied: 'Tidak boleh tahan lagi Dato' (We cannot restrain ourselves any longer, Dato).¹¹

⁷ *NOC, Report*, p. 38.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 39.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 50.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 45.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 51.

The location of the May Thirteenth Incident likewise was not coincidental. Selangor was the state in the Malay peninsula where the UMNO-Malay sense of political insecurity was strained to bursting-point by the election results, the post-election politicking and the victory celebrations. The shift in power within the state, if it had taken place in mid-1969, would, in all probability, be from the UMNO-led Alliance to a DAP-led Opposition coalition and would definitely be interpreted as a transfer of power from 'indigenous' to 'immigrant' hands. On the basis of the original election results, there was, technically speaking, no possibility for an all-Opposition government to emerge unless a defection or two from Alliance ranks occurred. However, in the event of a re-election (until GERAKAN's declaration of neutrality, this was the only other constitutional solution to the problem), the Alliance hold on power in Selangor could become precarious.

In Kuala Lumpur, the alertness of the Selangor UMNO branch to changes in the power-configuration was great for a number of reasons. Firstly, this city is not merely Selangor's state capital but is also the federal capital and has served as the seat for the UMNO-led central government since 1955. As such, the local UMNO members and supporters had grown accustomed to living within the shadow of unchallenged UMNO power and had taken this situation for granted. Secondly, Kampong Bahru, the semi-urban Malay sector of the city, is the oldest and most historic UMNO stronghold because it was here in 1946 that UMNO was founded. It is not without significance that the nation-wide Alliance election campaign was launched here in April 1969 by the Prime Minister and leading members of his cabinet. Thirdly, Dato Harun was immensely popular in Kampong Bahru and he had great *rapport* with its UMNO youths.¹² He himself had given up a secure and comfortable job as the state's

¹² At the mammoth Alliance rally on 29 March in the Sultan Sulaiman Club padang, Kampong Bahru, the author was struck by Dato Harun's oratory and the response from the Malay youths present. Other speakers such as the Tengku, Tun Razak, Tun Tan and Tun Sambanthan were either too serious, too stilted or too dull. Only Dato Harun was able to strike up immediate and enthusiastic rapport with the crowd. He quibbled with words and the audience roared with laughter. The youths heckled him, in a friendly way, of course, and he replied with witty remarks.

legal adviser in 1964 in order to enter politics and had, as a consequence, a big personal stake in UMNO's continuation in power in Selangor.

On the other hand, the Opposition parties operating in Selangor were generally indifferent towards UMNO's sensitivity over its power-position. Immediately after the elections, they conducted themselves with a minimum of restraint for at least two reasons. Firstly, both DAP and GERAKAN were newcomers to the political scene. Dr. Tan Chee Khoo and V. David were established figures in Kuala Lumpur but virtually all the rest were raw, even youthful politicians. They tended to speak on issues likely to arouse Malay passions with a marked degree of frankness. Most of their supporters had been recruited during the course of the election campaign through the snowballing process and, as a result, they were not easily amenable to discipline and control. Secondly, the supporters of both DAP and GERAKAN were drawn largely from aggrieved communities. The Chinese and Indians resident in Kuala Lumpur had after fifteen years of Alliance rule developed an acute persecution complex. Despite their numbers, they had allegedly been suffocated and repressed by the heavy weight of the Malay politicians and bureaucrats. Hence, when UMNO's power in the state of Selangor stood on the brink of collapse, the accumulated grievances rushed to the surface and behaviour became unrestrained.

Perhaps it is necessary to inquire why similar mass *amoks* did not break out in Penang and Perak where Alliance power was even more seriously threatened. Let us examine both states individually.

In the state of Penang, power was not perceived as shifting from the 'indigenous' to the 'immigrant' side. Unlike Selangor, Penang has had no traditional ruling house ever since it was detached from Kedah by the East India Company in 1786. As a result of its long tradition of direct administration by foreigners, its Malay population has grown to accept non-Malay and non-Muslim political direction. From August 1957 until May 1969, Penang was administered by an MCA-led Alliance Government with Tan Sri Wong Pow Nee as the Chief Minister.

In addition, GERAKAN was not viewed as an exclusively 'immigrant' party. Professor Syed Hussein Alattas, a Malay and

national chairman of the party, was very conspicuous at election rallies in both Province Wellesley and Penang Island during the last two weeks of the campaign. In fact, it was he who announced that Dr. Lim Chong Eu was the party's choice for Chief Ministership in the event of a GERAKAN victory. At the polls, GERAKAN was able to defeat 5 UMNO state candidates and among them were 2 UMNO 'strongmen', Aziz Ibrahim, a former Chief Minister, and Haji Sulaiman Palestin, a fiery orator and incumbent Speaker of the state assembly.

Perak resembles Selangor in that it is also a Malay sultanate. According to Dato Ahmad Said, the incumbent Menteri Besar, tension rose in the Malay-inhabited parts of the state as soon as the election outcome was made known.¹³ The tension was high in those areas considered to be UMNO strongholds such as Krian, Selama, Padang Rengas, Grik, Lenggong, Kampong Gajah, Batak Rabit and Bagan Datok. And yet, no disturbances broke out anywhere in the state before 13 May.

Several reasons may be suggested to explain the situation in Perak. Firstly, the probability of a PPP-led coalition government coming into power was slight. Without the vote of the lone PAS state assemblyman, Mahmud bin Zainal, a combined PPP-DAP-GERAKAN alliance could muster only 20 votes, one less than the required majority in this 40-member state assembly. Dato S.P. Seenivasagam, the PPP leader, expected to make Mahmud Speaker of the assembly and neutralize his vote.¹⁴ However, according to Dato Ahmad Said, Mahmud had repeatedly assured UMNO that he had no intention of being a party to any conspiracy against UMNO.¹⁵ This was the kind of sentiment the ordinary village Malays expected PAS to entertain, hence their

¹³ Dato Ahmad Said told the author in the course of an interview in Ipoh on 17 April 1970 that since Malay rule had existed in the state of Perak for such a long period, any change or threat of change was likely to result in tension. However, he himself was convinced that with the passage of time, the new situation would become acceptable and tension will decrease. Politics, he added was not a predictable game and ups and downs could always be expected.

¹⁴ Dato Seenivasagam said this during an interview with the author in Kuala Lumpur on 4 March 1970.

¹⁵ Interview on 17 April 1970.

confidence in PPP's inability to form a government. Secondly, UMNO was not united. The supporters of Sulaiman Bulon in the southern parts of the state had long resented the domination of the three northern datos, Dato Kamaruddin Mat Isa from Larut, Dato Hussein Ya'acob from Selama and Dato Ahmad Said from Lenggong. As such, the UMNO branches in the south were not unduly upset over the prospects of a fall of the trio from power.¹⁶ Thirdly, PPP was not yet in the mood for victory celebrations. The party was going through the agony of trying to form a grand coalition of Opposition parties and no cause for either jeering or rejoicing existed. PPP victory parades were scheduled at Telok Anson for 15 May and at Ipoh for 17 May.¹⁷ Fourthly, UMNO's period of anxiety was relatively short. PPP discovered as soon as it started to investigate that GERAKAN was not interested. GERAKAN's two successful state assemblymen-Lim Eng Chuan of Taiping and Ang Chin Wah of Matang-were brought to Penang by Dr. Lim Chong Eu in order to insulate them from PPP's inducements and pressures. Dato Ahmad Said recalled that Radio Malaysia's Malay News Service reported at 5 p.m. on 12 May that Dato Seenivasagam had failed in his efforts. Tension was suddenly released. Scores of UMNO members and well-wishers thronged his house that night to express relief at PPP's failure and hope for an UMNO success.

¹⁶ This information comes from an *Utusan Melayu* reporter whom the author met in Ipoh. The existence of serious factionalism within the Perak UMNO was admitted by Dato Ahmad Said himself.

¹⁷ *Straits Times*, 14 May 1969.

CHAPTER 4

The Restoration of Confidence

THE outbreak of inter-communal violence in Kuala Lumpur on 13 May led to the declaration of a state of emergency. Parliamentary democracy was suspended. Party politics was banned. The balloting then in progress in Sarawak and Sabah was called off. An eight-man 'National Operations Council' under the direction of Tun Razak was formed.¹ In the weeks that followed,

¹ The National Operations Council is modelled after the Operations Council which existed during the State of Emergency from 1948 to 1960. It was originally designed as Tun Razak said in a press conference on 16 May-to coordinate the work of the army and police in the restoration of law and order (*Straits Times*, 17 May 1969), and not to supersede the Cabinet. However, by virtue of the fact that the King had, when he proclaimed the state of national emergency, conferred upon Tun Razak almost absolute powers, the NOC of which Tun Razak was the head emerged as the focal point of decision making in government. The motive behind the formation of this organ was 'primarily the need for swift and decisive action. (Tengku Abdul Rahman, *May 13 Before and After*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, p.109.) It was felt that key officials from the civil, police and military bureaucracies had to be brought into the chambers of decision-making in order to hasten the task of execution. The original composition of the NOC was as follows: Director of Operations: Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein; Ordinary Members: Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Minister of Home Affairs; Hamzah bin Dato Abu Samah, Minister of Information and Broadcasting; Tun Tan Siew Sin, MCA President; Tun V.T.Sambanthan, MIC President; Tan Sri Kadir Samsuddin, Director of Public Services; Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; General Tengku Osman Jiwa, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Tan Sri Mohammad Salleh, Inspector-General of Police. Lt. Gen. Dato Ibrahim bin Ismail was appointed Chief Executive Officer to the NOC (*Straits Times*, 18 May 1969). When Tengku Osman retired, the post of Chief of Staff and the seat on NOC were taken over by Tan Sri General Hamid Bidin. Before long, Tan Sri Hamid also retired and he was succeeded as Armed Forces Chief of Staff by Dato Ibrahim, who retained the post of Chief Executive Officer to the NOC.

the politicians were compelled by circumstances to retire to the background and to allow the security forces under the command of the NOC to restore order to the riot-torn areas. The moratorium on politiking, however, was short-lived. In June, intensive activity revived and it rapidly became apparent that disappointment with both the Tengku's leadership and parliamentary democracy was fairly widespread within the Malay community.

The event which re-opened political controversy that had died down at the outbreak of the riots was Kam Woon Wah's statement outlining MCA's policy on its relationship with the Cabinet. His Party's Central Working Committee had decided at noon on 13 May that it would not join the new Alliance Cabinet because the Chinese voters had refused to give the MCA a vote of confidence at the polls.² Tun Razak's reaction at that moment was that in the light of this decision the Government had no choice but to continue without Chinese representation.³ On 20 May when the new cabinet was finally formed, the MCA associated itself with it but only on the understanding that it would withdraw its association as soon as normal conditions prevailed again.⁴ As the dust of 13 May began to settle down,

² The statement read by Tun Tan Siew Sin 'in a voice charged with emotion' was as follows: 'The Chinese in this country have rejected the MCA to represent them in the Government, if the results of the general election reflect their wishes. As politicians practising parliamentary democracy, the MCA must accept this to be the case. Under the circumstances, the MCA has no alternative but to refrain from participation in the Government in that no MCA representative will accept any appointment in the Cabinet or in the Federal Government or in the executive councils of the respective State Assemblies. However, the MCA will remain in the Alliance,- and all its representatives will be with the Government in order to give it the majority required so that the Alliance can continue in power both at Federal and State level.' *Straits Times*, 14 May 1969.

³ Tun Razak commented: 'I salute them (MCA leaders) as men of principle and courage. This is why we had worked with them for the past 14 years. This means that there will be no Chinese representation in the Government, but the Government itself will go on.' Asked if he was sorry that the MCA had made this decision, he replied: 'This is politics.... [We] told the electorate that if they did not vote MCA there will be no Chinese representatives in the Government. Now there will be none at all.' *Straits Times*, 14 May 1969.

⁴ Three MCA Members of Parliament, Tun Tan Siew Sin, Khaw Kai

Chinese chambers of commerce led by Tan Sri T.H. Tan, also a veteran Alliance politician, urged the MCA to stay in the Cabinet on a permanent basis. In response to these appeals, the MCA Secretary-General, Kam Woon Wah, announced that the Party's Central Working Committee would meet to re-consider the whole question.⁵

These second thoughts of MCA leaders excited several UMNO politicians, in particular those who had suffered defeat as a result of alleged sabotage by the relevant MCA branch organizations. The relations between the MCA and these 'ultra' UMNO politicians had not been cordial since the passage of the Language Act of 1967.⁶ They believed that on this and other crucial occasions, the MCA had pressured UMNO's top leaders into accepting 'compromise' solutions, and thereby betraying 'national ideals'. The poor showing of the MCA on 10 May strengthened the hand of UMNO's 'ultras' and even encouraged UMNO's 'moderates' to doubt the usefulness of MCA's continued alliance with UMNO. Towards the Chinese commercial bourgeoisie as represented by Tan Sri T.H. Tan's Chambers of Commerce, the feelings of the 'ultras' were particularly negative. They saw these organizations as bastions of Chinese chauvinism and their appeals to MCA as gestures of hypocrisy in the light of their alleged sympathy with the Opposition during the elections.

The most upset politician was Dr. Mahathir bin Muhammad, the unsuccessful candidate in the Kota Star Selatan constituency

Boh and Lee Siok Yew, entered the Cabinet as 'Ministers with Special Functions'.

⁵ *Straits Times*, 31 May 1969.

⁶ The *Merdeka* Constitution (1957) provided for English and Malay as official languages for ten years, and at the end of this period Parliament would decide on the future of English. It was widely assumed by the UMNO 'ultras' that English would disappear completely from the administration of the Malayan states. (For Sabah and Sarawak, the year of decision is 1973.) When the Language Act was passed by Parliament in 1967, the 'ultras' led by Syed Nasir bin Ismail protested. The Act makes Malay the sole official language from 1967 onwards but it was felt that the version that won parliamentary approval was 'watered down'. Among other things, it allows the King, on the advice of the Cabinet, to authorize the use of English for specified, official purposes. The UMNO 'ultras' suspected that the MCA had been responsible for these 'loop-holes'.

and a leading UMNO 'ultra'. He had indications that the MCA wards in his constituency had 'treacherously' persuaded Chinese voters to cast their ballots for PAS instead of the Alliance. He lost by a narrow margin of 989 votes (12,032 to 13,021 votes). In an interview with *Utusan Melayu's* news editor, Zainuddin Maidin, he voiced strong objections to MCA participation in the Cabinet and insisted that UMNO should go it alone.⁷ Syed Ja'afar Albar and Syed Nasir bin Ismail, the other two 'ultras', were inclined towards this view but they were restrained in their comments. The question of MCA's relations with the Cabinet, they said, concerned UMNO as much as MCA, and consequently, UMNO's views were equally pertinent. Other UMNO leaders contacted by *Utusan Melayu* adopted similarly guarded standpoints.⁸ These *Utusan Melayu* interviews, which appeared when Tengku

Abdul Rahman was undergoing an eye-operation in Kuala Lumpur, precipitated a crisis within UMNO's leadership. The Tengku was particularly hurt by Dr. Mahathir's comment. As the founder-leader of the original UMNO-MCA Alliance, he has always been deeply committed to the idea of Sino-Malay partnership in government. Towards the MCA, he cherishes a special feeling of attachment because at a critical moment in 1954, the MCA under Dato Sir Cheng-lock Tan's leadership rallied to UMNO's side in the struggle for an elected, independent government. He wrote an angry letter to Dr. Mahathir. In reply, Dr. Mahathir accused the Tengku of consistent capitulation to Chinese 'demands'. He told his party chief that the Malay people, whether in the civil service, police, army or elsewhere, had lost every shred of confidence in his leadership and called upon him to resign as Party Chairman and Prime Minister. This letter was mimeographed and widely distributed before it was banned by Dr. Ismail, the Home Minister.

This allegation of softness and weakness on the Tengku's part towards MCA and the Chinese gained wide currency, especially

⁷ This information came from Zainuddin Maidin himself. However, *Utusan Melayu* toned down Dr. Mahathir's remarks considerably. Dr. Mahathir was quoted as 'supporting' the original MCA decision to quit the Cabinet.

⁸ The interviews were reported in *Utusan Melayu* on 6 and 7 June.

among the Malay-medium school teachers and high-school and college students. These teachers and students had been harbouring grievances against the Alliance Government for a number of years. They wanted Malay to become the sole medium of instruction and administration so that first, a united nation could emerge and, second, they would suffer neither disadvantage if enrolled at institutions of higher learning nor handicap if employed in government departments. They agreed with Dr. Mahathir that the Tengku should resign. As for the government, it should continue under Tun Razak and his Operations Council until the 'aspirations of the Malay race' were fulfilled.⁹

In the power-struggle between Dr. Mahathir and the Tengku, little organized support for the rebel cause was forthcoming from UMNO. Dato Rahman Ya'akub, who was rapidly emerging as the new focus of enthusiasm for the hard-liners, abstained from open support for Dr. Mahathir. Neither did *Utusan Melayu*, the Jawi daily which published Dr. Mahathir's remarks, take issue with the Tengku on the ex-MP's behalf. In fact Pa'Awang, the pen-name for a *Utusan Melayu* columnist, wrote that 'if the ultras are successful in toppling the present UMNO leaders, there is a big possibility that they may change the political route of the UMNO by bowing their heads either to Peking or Moscow'.¹⁰ Musa Hitam did attempt to influence the party's decision-making process against the Tengku but it back-fired and led to his dismissal from the post of assistant minister.¹¹ Sympathy for Dr. Mahathir among Malay students and lecturers at the University of Malaya, the Muslim College and MARA College was quite widespread¹² but this did not make any impact on UMNO's power elite.

⁹ At a students' meeting in Kuala Lumpur held in April 1970, delegates from the MARA Institute of Technology succeeded in moving a resolution which commended the NOC for 'its steps to ensure that the various races in this country will be on equal footing in years to come' and urged it to stay on in power until 'mutual trust ... between the various races in the country' prevailed. See Cheah Boon Kheng, 'Malaysian Students' "Parliament" Meets', *Sunday Mail*, 19 April 1970.

¹⁰ *Utusan Zaman* (Sunday edition of *Utusan Melayu*), 3 August 1969.

¹¹ *Straits Times*, 1 August 1969.

¹² The *Persatuan Bahasa Melayu Universiti Malaya* (PBMUM) was vocal in

The Tengku moved with circumspection and patience, and succeeded in destroying Dr. Mahathir politically, at least for the time being. In order to demonstrate his hold on the party, he manoeuvred Dr. Mahathir's immediate expulsion from UMNO's Central Committee. He appointed himself chairman of the 'National Goodwill Council' and used this position to campaign in those states where support for him was sagging. The Malay press gave his speeches extensive coverage. He climaxed his campaign with the publication of *May 13 Before and After*, a hard-hitting, political memoir. Ironically enough, the Tengku's resurgence was greatly assisted by a 'New Educational Policy'¹³ announced by Dato Rahman Ya'akub without the Tengku's knowledge or authorization. This unilateral declaration of policy was made at the peak of the anti-Tengku campaign and on the eve of Dr. Mahathir's expulsion. It suddenly deflated the highly-charged atmosphere and rendered the Tengku's task less challenging. The Tengku's success was assured when Tun Razak, who was expected by the 'ultras' to lead a political *coup d'etat* against the Tengku broke his silence and threw his weight against Dr. Mahathir.¹⁴

A period of waiting followed the Tengku's resurgence. A distinct section of Malay opinion wanted the NOC regime to continue indefinitely as it felt that this, rather than Parliament, was the best guarantee of the Malay political position. Meanwhile, UMNO's 'Big Three'--the Tengku, Tun Razak and Dr. Ismail--had to play their cards carefully. Both the Tengku and Dr. Ismail stated their commitment to democracy explicitly. 'The Government comes to power through elections and the wishes of the people are clear,' said the Tengku. 'They want

its support for Dr. Mahathir. It organized a modest demonstration in July 1969 against the Tengku at the University of Malaya. A few lecturers took part in this demonstration.

¹³ In his announcement, Dato Rahman stated that as from January 1970, teaching in the Standard One classes of the existing English-medium schools (except during the English, Chinese and Tamil language sessions) would be conducted wholly in Malay. *Utusan Melayu*, 11 July 1969. The next year, the conversion to Malay would take place in Standard Two and so on until Upper Form Six.

¹⁴ *Straits Times*, 19 July 1969.

parliamentary democracy.'¹⁵ Dr. Ismail in an interview with *Utusan Melayu* declared that in the absence of democracy, it would not be possible to judge whether the people supported the Alliance or not. 'A powerful government is one that is not afraid to practise democracy,' he added. 'This is the reason I like democracy.'¹⁶ Tun Razak, who had become the pinnacle of hope for those dissatisfied with the Tengku's regime, was extremely guarded. At the outset, he assured the public that the state of emergency would not be prolonged 'one day' longer than necessary'.¹⁷ However, when calm was restored, he linked the idea of income distribution to the return to democracy.

'Democracy cannot work in Malaysia in terms of political equality alone. The democratic process must be spelt out also in terms of more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity.'¹⁸ At one point, he even implied that an indefinite postponement of the restoration of democracy was necessary. 'Everything possible must be done to correct the economic imbalance among the races', Tun Razak told the governing council of the MARA Institute of Technology. 'Unless the have-nots are assured of a better position in the economic life, and unless the benefits are justly distributed, there is no possibility of the country returning to normal.'¹⁹

The turning-point in the waiting period was the resumed elections in Sarawak and Sabah. These elections to the federal parliament of Malaysia and the State Assembly of Sarawak had been scheduled to coincide with the Malayan elections in May 1969, but balloting, which was planned for a span of several weeks owing to great distances and underdeveloped communications, had to be interrupted by the NOC after the declaration of a state of national emergency. Leaders from four of the five parties in Sarawak protested against the interruption of balloting on the grounds that there were no security risks involved in the continuation of polling. The rioting was confined to Kuala weeks

¹⁵ Ibid. 6 May 1970.

¹⁶ *Utusan Melayu*, 18 July 1969.

¹⁷ *Straits Times*, 13 September 1969.

¹⁸ Ibid. 10 November 1969.

¹⁹ *Sunday Times*, 15 March 1970.

Lumpur and West Malaysia, and there were no signs of unrest in Sarawak. *Parti Pesaka Sarawak* and the Sarawak Chinese Association, allies of UMNO, and the Sarawak National Party and Sarawak United People's Party, pre-election opponents of UMNO, even attempted to send a joint delegation to Kuala Lumpur to see the Prime Minister. Only *Parti Bumiputra* disassociated itself from this move. Dato Rahman Ya'akub, the party's adviser, claimed that those who thought Sarawak peaceful 'have no access to intelligence reports'.²⁰

From time to time, representation was made to Tun Razak, the Director of Operations, to resume the elections. For instance, Stephen Yong (SUPP), Cyril Nichols (SNAP) and Thomas Kana (PESAKA) wrote a joint letter in October 1969 assuring Tun Razak that their parties would not attack the 'sensitive' clauses in the federal constitution and would abide by the verdict of the electorate.²¹ Pesaka had an additional reason, apart from its confidence in the outcome, for wanting the elections. Its Chief Minister, Tawi Sli, was not made the head of the State Operations Council which, during the state of emergency, was the *de facto* government, and instead, Harun Ariffin from the federal civil service was appointed. In February 1970, the Tengku announced that elections would be held 'within two months'. Eventually, it was decided after a spirited discussion whether to hold the elections during or after the harvesting season²² to schedule the balloting for 6-27 June in Sabah and 6 June-4 July in Sarawak.

The top UMNO leaders did not approach the East Malaysian elections with optimism. They expected the loss of a few parliamentary seats in Sabah to the Opposition and a possible defeat in Sarawak itself.²³ Its pessimism *vis-a-vis* Sarawak was

²⁰ *Sarawak Tribune*, 25 and 29 May 1970; *Straits Times*, 27 May 1969.

²¹ *Bernama*, 14 October 1969.

²² It was argued that during the harvest season, the peasants would have no time for voting. After the harvest, they would have a lot of leisure but they might be too drunk with harvest joy and rice wine to bother about voting.

²³ This was revealed to the author by a well placed source in the Alliance Party. He suggested that Tun Razak had reconciled himself before the resumed elections to the possibility of co operation with an SUPP led state government. Tun Razak had held the view that while SUPP was

based on two factors. Firstly, the influence and strength of SNAP and SUPP was estimated to be increasing. SNAP, under the leadership of Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan, who emerged from the 1966 crisis as a political hero, was expected to carry the Iban vote. SUPP, which had demonstrated its hold on the Sarawak Chinese in 1963 was expected to perform better. Secondly, there were divisions within the Sarawak Alliance. The BUMIPUTRA and PESKA Parties had been at odds for a number of years. In fact, Temenggong Jugah made an unprecedented attack on three BUMIPUTRA leaders, Awang Hipni, Taib Mahmud (then state ministers) and Dato Rahman (then a federal minister) at Kapit in October 1967 before other Iban chiefs and in the presence of Tun Razak.²⁴ In the 1969 elections, both parties, despite their Alliance tie, could not agree on the allocation of seats. PESAKA wanted a seat in a predominantly Malay state constituency for its Malay Vice-President, a lawyer by the name of Wan Alwi Ibrahim. BUMIPUTRA disagreed because it insisted that PESAKA was an Iban party and ought not encroach on Land Dayak, Melanau and Malay areas which it had claimed for itself. High-powered delegations from Kuala Lumpur failed to reconcile the two sides.

Both the Tengku and Tun Razak did not link the restoration of democracy to the resumption of polling. Only Dr. Ismail spelt out in full the terms under which the restoration could take place. He believed that uninhibited public debate in the campaign on issues sensitive to the Malays had led to a rise in

'infiltrated', its two key leaders, Ong Kee Hui and Stephen Yong, were sober and moderate socialists.

²⁴ At a traditional dinner in honour of Tun Razak at Kapit, Temenggong Jugah openly accused Taib Mahmud, Awang Hipni and Dato Rahman Ya'akub, all of whom are Muslim Melanau, of neglecting the interests and welfare of the Ibans. 'If this is the way things are going to be, then *this* is not the Malaysia we want', he said. It was not his intention, Temenggong Jugah added, to speak as he did but since he was speaking in his home town, he had to get things off his chest. There were tense moments during the speech amongst the Iban leaders and penghulus and he was loudly applauded. *Eastern Sun*, 9 October 1967. This speech was criticized by the Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, on the ground that as a federal minister, Temenggong Jugah, should have voiced his grievances inside the Cabinet. *Eastern Sun*, 12 October 1967.

the emotional temperature and that this was a contributory factor in the making of the riots. As early as July 1969, when he was asked whether the fear of returning to democracy in the minds of a certain people will be dispelled following the setback of the Alliance in the last general election', he replied: 'The fear is derived from another matter. They fear that the Malay rights will be taken away. They also fear the frequent questioning of Malay special rights by non-Malays.'²⁵ With this in mind, he advocated an amendment of the federal constitution to make it illegal for the public to oppose the existing provisions on language, education, special rights and the position of the sultans. 'The return to parliamentary democracy will now depend entirely on the results of the general election in Sarawak and Sabah,' he said in May 1970.

If the Alliance fails to get the two-thirds majority necessary for approving amendments to the Constitution, then we will have to negotiate with the opposition about support in our wish to isolate in the Constitution the several contentious communal problems. If they do not agree, then I do not see how we can recall Parliament. The blame for this will rest on the opposition. If on the other hand, the Alliance gets the two-thirds majority, then the blame for any delay in returning to parliamentary democracy will rest with us.²⁶

The final outcome was a heartening surprise to the Alliance Party's leaders and, by boosting its sagging morale, it helped to speed up the ultimate decision to return to democracy. In Sabah, not a single parliamentary constituency was lost to the Opposition, not even in the urban, predominantly Chinese constituencies.²⁷ The United Sabah National Organization-Sabah Chinese Association alliance made a clean sweep of all 16 parliamentary seats. In Sarawak, the Alliance partners, despite internal conflicts, managed to win 10 out of the 24 parliamentary seats. BUMIPUTRA picked up 5, PESAKA 3 and SCA 2 seats

²⁵ *Utusan Melayu*, 18 July 1969.

²⁶ *Straits Times*, 5 May 1970.

²⁷ Sabah, since the dissolution of UPKO in 1967, has seen little dissent, whether inside or outside the Alliance Party. The 'one man democrat', Tun Mustapha maintains an iron grip on the power of the state. The only Opposition member in the State Assembly (elected in 1967) was jailed before the 1969 election campaign.

while the remainder was shared between SUPP which captured 5 seats and SNAP which won 9 seats. The big upset win occurred in the state elections of Sarawak. Contrary to the dismal pre-polling prediction of the Alliance Party Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, the three 'allies' rolled up a total of 24 seats, exactly half the size of *Council Negeri*. BUMIPUTRA captured 12, PESAKA 9 and SCA 3 seats. The greatest surprise was the post-election party alignment. With the 48th seat still uncontested, the BUMIPUTRA·PESAKA·SCA alliance had provisionally an absolute majority. And yet, the government formed is headed by Dato Rahman Ya'akub and based on a coalition with BUMIPUTRA and SUPP as the twin pillars of support.²⁸

For Tun Razak who was on the spot in Kuching when the election returns came in, the outcome meant a more secure

²⁸ The formation of Sarawak's present coalition government is a story of intrigue and counter-intrigue. The stage was set by the results-SNAP 12, Bumiputra 12, SUPP 11, Pesaka 9 and SCA 3 which made various permutations and combinations possible. A coalition of the original Alliance partners was widely expected. Its majority (24 to 23) was shaky and might disappear if Bengoh, where balloting was postponed, went Opposition but it could, of course, strengthen itself by 'inducing' individuals from the other parties, to defect to the Alliance side. Negotiations for a renewal of the alliance failed. Bumiputra wanted the chief ministership for Dato Rahman on the grounds that it won more seats than Pesaka. Pesaka insisted that as the Governor is a Malay, the Chief Minister ought to be an Iban. Following this breakdown in negotiations, leaders from Pesaka, SNAP and SUPP met and it was assumed that a coalition of four parties Pesaka, SNAP, SCA and SUPP-was agreed upon, although Stephen Yong did say before departing that he had to consult his party for final approval. On the morning Pesaka, SNAP and SCA leaders were preparing to go to the Governor's residency for the swearing-in ceremony, Temenggong Jugah, in his capacity as federal minister, was invited to witness the swearing-in of Data Rahman as Chief Minister. SUPP, it was learnt, had decided to align itself with Bumiputra. However, a combination of Bumiputra and SUPP yielded only 23 seats, one less than the majority. This puzzle was solved when it was revealed that Penghulu Abok anak Jalin, a Pesaka state assemblyman for Kernana, had joined the coalition government on his own and would be sworn in as a state minister along with Dato Rahman. Still 24 was an insecure majority and Bumiputra was on the look out for more 'volunteers'. Despite elaborate precautions, Pesaka failed to prevent Simon Dembab Maja from slipping at dawn out of Longhouse Hotel, Kuching, where the newly elected Pesaka state assemblymen were staying. Simon was immediately sworn in as Deputy Chief Minister. The above information is obtained from reliable sources in Sarawak.

UMNO hold on the federal and state power-structures. The Alliance strength in the 144-member Parliament rose to 91. If SUPP, which did not join the federal Alliance but pledged its support in Parliament on national issues, were to add its 5 votes, the Alliance would possess a precise two-thirds majority. As for Sarawak, the state in which the Alliance had been in utter disarray, it now came within the grip of a Chief Minister who is noted for his loyalty to UMNO and firmness in leadership.

After the East Malaysian elections, the ground was seriously prepared for the restoration of democracy. The problems of Perak and Selangor were solved through back-door negotiations and inducements. In Perak, three Opposition state assemblymen-Samsuddin bin Harun and Thean Moi Tuck of PPP and Yeoh Eng Chai of DAP -defected, thus providing the Alliance with a majority of 22 to 18. Similarly in Selangor, another two- Chou Yew Koh from GERAKAN and Lim Tuan Siong, an Independent-crossed the floor. This gave Dato Harun a majority of 16 to 12 in the state assembly. On the federal level, T.S. Gabriel of GERAKAN was induced to defect. Ong Kee Hui, SUPP's Chairman and MP for Bandar Kuching, was made a dato, sent to the United Nations General Assembly session and appointed a federal minister. In September 1970 when Tun Razak replaced the Tengku as Prime Minister, the ban on party politics was lifted but not before the NOC amended the existing sedition laws to make it illegal to criticize the relevant constitutional clauses relating to the national language, special rights for the native peoples, the status of the sultans and citizenship rights for immigrant peoples.²⁹ In February 1971 the state of national emergency came to an end, the National Operations Council was transformed into the National Security Council and government by Parliament and Cabinet was restored in full.

²⁹ *Straits Times*, 13 August 1970.

CHAPTER 5

Democracy and Political Stability- I

FROM the foregoing remarks, it is apparent that the May Thirteenth Incident cannot be considered either in isolation from the post-election crisis of confidence in democracy or as a consequence only of provocation. The provocation, vehement though it was, did not act upon an ordinary state of mind. It acted upon minds charged with anxiety and near-alarm. The abusive comments that hurt most were those suggesting that the Malays as a race had lost the Selangor elections and that they should retreat from Kuala Lumpur into Red Indian-style reservations.

If one adopts this viewpoint, then the Incident spotlights perhaps the most thorny problem faced in the operation of democracy in a plural society, namely, the problem of changing the power-configuration without disrupting its equilibrium. Theoretically, when UMNO embraced the Reid Constitution and identified itself with the Proclamation of Independence (1957), it had accepted without equivocation that (i) executive and legislative power is derived from the citizens of the federation and (ii) any party that obtains the mandate of the people as expressed at the polls has the right to rule without regard to race, colour or creed.

The May Thirteenth Incident shows that, in practice, a self-imposed modification of these usual rules of the game may be necessary if the risks of political de-stabilization are to be reduced to a minimum. In general, the Malays, whether inside or outside UMNO, have not yet fully conditioned themselves to accept shifts in power that appear as transfers of power from

them to the immigrant races.¹ Until May 1969, democracy was accepted without murmur. In fact, it was extolled by the modern-minded leaders of UMNO because its operation, in practice, did not hinder UMNO from enjoying and exercising a preponderance of political power. As soon as signs appeared that suggested that this enjoyment might not be permanent, doubts as to the equity and efficacy of democracy began to emerge.

It may therefore be prudent for the sake of political stability in Malaysia for the immigrant communities to observe a voluntary restraint: (i) to refrain from contesting for power at the polls through essentially communal political organizations and (ii) to allow the Malays, Ibans, Kadazans and other native peoples for at least one generation the prerogative of holding the premiership and other highly crucial positions in the federal cabinet. It is anticipated that during this intervening period, the Malay population will progress in political enlightenment and maturity, and will reconcile itself to the principles of free competition and free enjoyment of power which were accepted by UMNO in 1957. This voluntary restraint on the part of the immigrant communities is bound to be challenged on the grounds that it amounts to a curtailment, although self-imposed, of the rights of citizens of immigrant origin. This can only be defended by arguing that this self-restraint will go far to assist the Malays to re-assure themselves that they are not being threatened with displacement from power and there will always be a Malay nucleus in the power-structure of Malaysia in the foreseeable future.

In Indonesia, a parallel situation exists. The Javanese form the largest ethnic group. Theoretically, Indonesians of non-Javanese origin are entitled to equal rights but in practice, the Javanese population is not yet conditioned to accept a situation in which preponderant power is not being held by them. Sukarno, the founding father of this multi-ethnic republic, is said to have remarked that the first three presidents of Indonesia should be Javanese so that the Javanese can have sufficient time to mature

¹ However, this observation, while true in the case of traditional minded, village Malays, is less valid when applied to the modern, educated, middle-class Malays.

politically and to become fully Indonesian and to accept the non-Javanese minorities as equals. It is not coincidental that Harris Nasution, the Mandailing army general, is not occupying the highest seat of power in Indonesia today despite his seniority in service and rank to Suharto.

This proposed adjustment of the rules of the game does not imply that the *status quo* must of necessity be frozen for another generation. On the contrary, it would render change without any risk of de-stabilization possible, even immediately. It merely means that the parties that challenge the UMNO-led Alliance for power may not be essentially immigrant in the composition of their leadership and membership but will have to rest on backbones that are essentially indigenous, whether Malay, Iban or Kadazan.

There are two reasons why the possibility of change in the power-structure has to be immediately present. In the first place, it will encourage a greater degree of governmental responsiveness to popular needs and aspirations. The Alliance Party has been in power in Kuala Lumpur for over a dozen years. Its position has never been seriously threatened though the May 1969 elections did cause concern among the top leaders. Various vested interests have mushroomed within and around this ruling party. The risk of social revolution which can be a threat to the democratic order cannot be entirely discounted especially if, as a result of the absence of serious party competition, the Alliance becomes less and less attentive to the needs and aspirations of the lower social classes. In the second place, the possibility for change may lead to the replacement of the existing one-and-a-half by a two-party system. Intra-party 'balance of power' acted as a restraint on Alliance governmental action but it was not regularized or institutionalized. A party capable of taking over the federal government in case the majority of the voting population wants a change is needed in order to ensure a consistently democratic use of governmental power.

CHAPTER 6

Democracy and Political Stability-II

It is suggested earlier on that the crisis of confidence is over and the path to the restoration of democracy is being cleared. Nevertheless, a residue of anxiety remains and UMNO is bound to appraise its future political strategy within the democratic framework in the light of this experience. UMNO may be tempted by the line of least resistance and develop an electoral strategy using the estimated 46 per cent native Muslim population of Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah as the inner hard-core and contracting alliances with parties based on non-Muslim or non-native minorities whenever circumstances dictate such actions.

This strategy of reliance on an inner Muslim core is legitimate and democratic, and after the disappointment of 10 May, latently popular. However, a serious pursuit of it by UMNO may lead to an unscrambling of the political system. Such an approach implies a sharp contraction of the population that interests UMNO by 54 per cent and entails an almost saturated concentration on the remaining 46 per cent. In the government of the federation, UMNO will have to gear the resources and energies of the state almost wholly towards satisfying the aspirations and expectations of the Muslim component, and overlooking or neglecting the needs of the rest of the population. If this strategy fails, it will create acute and widespread disappointment. If it succeeds, it will give rise to another crisis of confidence in democracy, this time among the non-Muslim peoples who will feel permanently disadvantaged under the existing democratic system.

The experiences of Indonesia in the mid-1950s are instructive. *Masjumi*, a Muslim party which often articulated the interests of

Sumatra, found itself ignored inside the government of which it was a coalition partner, after the 1955 elections. *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, the dominant partner refused to permit *Masjumi* a proportionate share of power. *Masjumi* politicians from Sumatra gradually became frustrated both with the government and the political system. Their party held 57 seats in the 257-member Parliament while its two main allies, *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia* and *Nahdat ul-Ulama*, had 57 and 45 seats respectively. Theoretically, it could threaten to quit the coalition and pressure PNI and NU into more conciliatory positions but, in practice, this bargaining power was neutralized by the parliamentary strength of *Partai Komunis Indonesia* which had 39 seats and was over-eager to replace *Masjumi* as a cabinet partner.

In future elections, the prospects for a *Masjumi* victory were practically nil. The government had provisionally opted for (i) a single-chamber parliament, in keeping with the earlier desire for a unitary republic, and (ii) the principle of proportional representation. As a result, East and Central Java which had 48.8 per cent of the registered electorate wielded great influence within Parliament. Sumatra, which was earning an estimated 70 per cent of Indonesia's total foreign exchange, accounted for only 13.9 per cent of the republic's registered voters. At the 1955 parliamentary and Constituent Assembly elections, the Javanese voters demonstrated that they were Javanese first and Muslim second. They voted solidly for the three Javanese-led parties, PNI, NU and PKI. Accordingly, *Masjumi's* Sumatran leaders felt permanently disadvantaged under the existing democratic system. This realization of hopelessness within the *status quo* was one of the factors that contributed to the decision in February 1958 to set up an alternative Indonesian Government at Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra.¹

For the sake of political stability, it may be equally prudent for UMNO to practise self-restraint, to forsake the temptation of relying exclusively upon primordial instincts and sentiments in its strategy for retaining power. History has shown that it has been possible for UMNO, operating through a multi-racial organization to obtain and hold power in the federal legislature

¹ These experiences of Indonesia are analysed in a forthcoming study by the author entitled 'Sukarno and Democracy-Indonesia'.

<i>Region</i>	<i>Citizens</i>		<i>Eligible Voters</i>	
	<i>In Numbers</i>	<i>In Per cent</i>	<i>In Numbers</i>	<i>In Per cent</i>
East Java	18,023,121	23.40	10,938,488	25.41
Central Java	17,636,821	22.90	10,077,068	23.41
West Java	14,484,941	18.81	7,861,722	18.26
Greater Jakarta	1,642,500	2.13	994,848	2.31
JAVA	51,787,383	67.24	29,872,126	69.39
SUMATRA	11,354,154	14.74	5,994,016	13.92
KALIMANTAN	3,074,545	3.99	1,675,623	3.89
SULAWESI	5,340,510	6.93	2,515,815	5.84
MOLUCCAS	692,882	0.90	364,160	0.85
NUSA TENGGARA	4,767,794	6.19	2,626,659	6.10
INDONESIA	77,017,268	100	43,048,399	100

.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, 2nd rev. ed., The Hague, 1964. Appendix.

at Kuala Lumpur for fifteen years. The outcome of the May elections does give rise to grounds for concern and anxiety but not to grounds for desperation. Perhaps, communalism is in part to be blamed for the pattern of voting but if this is the case, the most pertinent question to ask is why, after fourteen years of unbroken Alliance administration, Malayan society was more, and not less divided.

It is certainly not in the self-interest of any political party that has to depend on the people's votes to stay in power, to blame the people and not themselves for the loss or near-loss of an election. The people are the uncrowned king in a democracy and political parties have to humble themselves before the people. The right way is for UMNO and Alliance leaders democratize their parties and permit grievances, complaints, and criticisms and so on

to float to the top. Nobody can predict the future but a sincere and concerted effort by UMNO and the Alliance Party to set in motion a self-sustaining two-way communication between the top and bottom echelons of society can lead to renewal and regeneration.

GLOSSARY

PARTIES

ALLIANCE

The Alliance Party began in 1952 as an electoral coalition between UMNO and MCA state branches in Selangor. It developed into a full-scale alignment at the national level and in 1955 a third party, the MIC, was brought in. When Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaysia, UPKO, USNO, SCA (Sabah), BARJASA, PANAS, PESAKA, SNAP and SCA (Sarawak) entered the Alliance. SNAP, however, left it in 1966. After the 1970 state elections in Sarawak, SUPP agreed to form a coalition government with BUMIPUTRA and PESAKA. In January 1971, Dato Ong Kee Hui, SUPP's chairman, accepted a federal cabinet post. The party, nevertheless, claims that it is not part of the Alliance. UMNO, by virtue of its continuous enjoyment of solid Malay support (the Malays are the largest single ethnic component of the electorate), has been the leading partner. The prime ministership and the key portfolios of foreign affairs, internal security and defence have always been held by UMNO politicians. Tengku Abdul Rahman, the chairman of the Alliance since the early 1950s, resigned in September 1970. The new chairman is Tun Razak, another UMNO leader.

BUMIPUTRA

Until 1964, the Muslims in Sarawak were split between *Parti Negara Sarawak* (National Party of Sarawak) or PANAS and *Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak* (Front of the Native People of Sarawak) or BARJASA. Rahman Ya'akub (of BARJASA and other young Muslims were unhappy over this rift which had historical roots. After the 1963 elections, PANAS and BARJASA were dissolved and a new organization, *Parti Bumiputra* (Party of the Natives) was created. The result was that in 1970 (unlike in 1963) the Muslim Malays and Melanau voted solidly for BUMIPUTRA. Captured 12 state seats on its own while its electoral ally, SCA, won 3 seats. BUMIPUTRA is now a force to be reckoned with in Sarawak politics.

DAP

Democratic Action Party. Formed in 1966 by Malaysian citizens who were previously members of the PAP's Malaya branch. Stood for equal political rights among the races and multi-lingualism in education. Took over the PAP 'Malaysian Malaysia' slogan. Entered into electoral pacts with PPP and GERAKAN for the 1969 elections and managed to win 13 federal and 31 state seats. Lim Kit Siang, its organizing secretary and newly-elected MP for *Bandar Malacca*, was detained after the May elections for a political speech he delivered at Kota Kinabalu, state capital of Sabah. One DAP state assemblyman defected to the Alliance side in 1970.

GERAKAN

Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement). A middle-of-the-road party formed in 1968 by ex-LPM and ex- UDP politicians with the support of several leading intellectuals. However, its candidate lost his deposit at a state by-election held at *Serdang Bahru* shortly after its formation. The other opposition candidate (from DAP) was also defeated. The result was an electoral pact between GERAKAN and DAP aimed at preventing a split in opposition votes. This pact contributed to that shattering defeat suffered by MCA in 1969. GERAKAN won 8 federal and 26 state seats and captured the state government of Penang. One federal MP and one state assemblyman defected to the Alliance side in 1970.

LPM

Labour Party of Malaya. Formed in 1954 as a merger of existing state labour parties. Routed in 1955 but emerged in 1959 (in alliance with *Parti Ra'ayat*) as a leading Opposition party. LPM opposed the formation of Malaysia on the grounds that the Borneo peoples were not adequately consulted and was accused of treachery by the Alliance Party and the PAP. This accusation hurt LPM's image and helped to check the spread of LPM influence. Only 2 LPM candidates won election to Parliament in 1964. Partly as a result of its anti-Malaysia stance, it met with severe police actions. In 1967 LPM supported a *hartal* in Georgetown, Penang, against devaluation of pre-independence Malaysian currency. Unfortunately, Sino-Malay fighting resulted from this *hartal*. LPM was further repressed. Numerous LPM officials were detained. As moderate leaders left the party, the

extremists decided to boycott all elected organs of government and to abstain from the forthcoming general elections in protest against the 'death of democracy'. The absence of LPM from the 1969 elections assisted the attainment of near-complete unity among urban-based opposition parties and contributed towards the growth of DAP and GERAKAN. LPM now operates on the quiet because new faces who emerge into public view as party officials are likely to be detained.

MCA

Malaysian Chinese Association. Despite its name, it is a party confined to the States of Malaya. Founded in 1949 to do welfare work among rural Chinese uprooted by the Emergency and to preserve the political rights of the Chinese in the face of pressures from Britain. Enjoyed grass-roots support during the colonial period. After independence, steady erosion of this support as a result of the party's identification with Alliance Government policies. Clashed with UMNO in 1959 over seat allocation and Chinese education but had to back down finally. Polled exceptionally well in 1964 largely because of Indonesian Confrontation. Suffered heavy setback in 1969. Party now attempting to regain mass support.

MIC

Malaysian Indian Congress. Founded in 1946 to represent Indian interests. Relatively insignificant political force until it joined the Alliance and became the spokesman for Indian interests in the government. Enjoys little negotiating strength within the Alliance largely because there is no parliamentary constituency in Malaysia where Indians form a majority. The three constituencies allotted to MIC, namely, *Sungei Siput*, *Klang* and *Port Dickson*, are constituencies where the Chinese form over 40 per cent of the electorates. MIC's position in the Alliance, like MCA's, has been criticized within UMNO since the 1969 elections.

PAP

People's Action Party. A Singapore-based political party. Formed in 1954 to fight for merger with Malaya and independence from British rule. Made rapid progress in the mid-1950s as a result of left-wing trade union support. Rode into power in 1959, winning 43 out of 51 seats. In 1961-2, the Chinese-

educated Left seceded and formed the *Barisan Sosialis* (Socialist Front). Skillful manipulation of the government machinery and the co-operation of the Alliance Party of Malaya prevented the PAP government from toppling. In the 1963 elections, the party managed to win 37 out of 51 seats. From then onwards, the hold of the party on the island population has never been in doubt. In 1964-5, it entered the Malaysian political arena and came into conflict with SF, MCA and finally UMNO. The conflict ended only with the separation of Singapore from the Malaysian federation in 1965. Now the PAP rules Singapore single-handedly.

PAS

Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party). Originated as an *ulama* (Muslim teacher) organization which collaborated with UMNO but which withdrew in protest against UMNO compromises with MCA. Like the *Ikwan al-Muslimin* (Muslim Brethren) of Egypt and the *Darul Islam* (World of Islam) of Indonesia, it advocates the implementation of the *shari'a* (Islamic sacred law) by the state. Essentially Kelantanese but it controlled Trengganu from 1959 to 1964 and made inroads into UMNO territory in Perlis and Kedah in 1969. At the January 1971 by-election in *Malacca Selatan*, the first election to be held in the States of Malaya after the May Thirteenth Incident, it failed to make headway at all among the rural Malays despite heavy campaigning by the party's most seasoned politicians.

PESAKA

Parti Pesaka Sarawak (Sarawak Conservative Party). Formed in 1962 by ex-Iban members of PANAS, a multi-racial party of Sarawak. Its strength is drawn primarily from Ibans in the Sungei Rejang district. Joined the Alliance in 1963 but clashed repeatedly with BARJASA, later BUMIPUTRA. Polled weakly in 1970. Party now cannot negotiate from a position of strength because its votes in *Council Negeri* are not vital to the survival of the present coalition government. The present PESAKA state ministers were not nominated by the party hierarchy.

PPP

People's Progressive Party. Began in 1953 as the Perak Progressive Party. Only renamed after the 1955 elections but its sphere of

influence remains Perak, particularly the Kinta Valley. An unknown party (even in Ipoh) until the 1956-7 controversy over Chinese Education. The two Ceylonese Tamil lawyers associated with the party, D.R. Seenivasagam and S.P. Seenivasagam, became famous overnight through championing the cause of the Chinese schools. Captured Ipoh Municipality in 1961 and has retained control over it since then. Growth was curbed in 1964 as a result of the pro-Alliance wave but position in Perak State Assembly and Parliament improved in 1969. Won 12 state and 4 federal seats.

PR

Parti Ra'ayat (People's Party). Formed in 1955 by Ahmad Boestaman after his release from a seven-year detention. Intended to be an agrarian socialist party. However, it failed to rally Malay peasant support behind it. In 1968, young Malay intellectuals led by Kassim Ahmad, a former lecturer in Malay at the London School of Economics, ousted Boestaman and his colleagues from the party hierarchy. Despite this injection of new blood, the party is still without massive agrarian support.

SCA (Sabah)

Sabah Chinese Association. Arose from a merger between the Sabah National Party (SANAP) and a welfare organization, the Sabah Chinese Association. Won 4 state seats in 1967. In the intra-Alliance tussle, allied itself to USNO against UPKO.

SCA (Sarawak)

Sarawak Chinese Association. Founded in 1962 by ex-PANAS members. Limited political influence. Controlled by two timber tycoons, Dato Ling Beng Siew and his younger brother, Ling Beng Siong. Wavered between BUMIPUTRA and PESAKA at a crucial stage in the post-election negotiations (in 1970) and has been denied representation in the present Rahman Ya'akub cabinet.

SF

Socialist Front. Resulted from the alliance between PR and LPM in 1957. Envisaged as an alignment between a rural Malay party and an urban Chinese party. However, while LPM picked up mass urban support, PR failed to make inroads into agrarian society. The alliance broke up in 1965-6 owing to long-standing disagreement over the language and education questions.

SNAP

Sarawak National Party. Formed in 1961 by ex-PANAS Ibans. Its main source of support comes from the Ibans in the Batang Lupar district. A partner of the Alliance when Malaysia was formed but quitted in 1966 when its Secretary-General, Dato Ningkan, was ousted as Chief Minister. Party at the 1969 campaign espoused a mild form of Dayak nationalism.

SUPP

Sarawak United People's Party. Registered in 1959. First political party to be organized in Sarawak. Its main objective was independence for Sarawak either alone or in association with Brunei and Sabah. A multi-racial party but its backbone is essentially Chinese. Accused of having been infiltrated by Communists, especially during Indonesian Confrontation. Launched an intensive election campaign in 1969 but balloting was postponed for one year and resumed in 1970 without renewed campaigning. Managed to win only 12 state and 5 federal seats. Entered into coalition with BUMIPUTRA and PESAKA to form the Sarawak state government. Its leaders have pledged to support the Alliance in Parliament on 'national issues'.

UDP

United Democratic Party. Formed in 1962 by Dr. Lim Chong Eu, ex-MCA president. Managed to obtain support of Dato Zainal Abidin bin Abbas, ex-Secretary-General of UMNO. Party dissolved in 1968 in favour of the newly-formed GERAKAN.

UMNO

United Malay National Organization. Formed at Kampong Bahru, Kuala Lumpur, in 1946 by Malay associations gathered in protest against the proposed Malayan Union. Led at the outset by Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, a Johore Malay. Dato Onn resigned in 1951 when membership refused to open the party to non-Malays. New president: Tengku Abdul Rahman from Kedah. Unexpected success of UMNO-MCA co-operation in Kuala Lumpur led to the formalization of an UMNO-MCA alliance. With organized Chinese support (the Chinese were the second largest community in Malaya), UMNO was able to obtain independence for Malaya and win successive general elections. UMNO-MCA and UMNO-MIC relations suffered as a result of the 1969 elections. Demands have been voiced within UMNO for a

review of its relationship with MCA and MIC. Tun Ismail, the present UMNO deputy president, even suggested separation should MCA and MIC fail to reform and revitalize themselves.

USNO

United Sabah National Organization. Formed in 1961 during the political stir caused by the Malaysia proposal. Main support from the Muslim minorities of Sabah: Bajaus, Sulus and Orang2 Sungei. Led by a traditional Sulu chieftain, Tun Mustapha. Its main rival for power in the state was the *United Pasok-momogun Party* (UPKO), an essentially Christian Kadazan organization led by Dato Donald Stephens, the editor of *The Sabah Times*. USNO managed to win UMNO support in this struggle against a fellow-Alliance party. In the 1967 state elections, USNO won 14, UPKO 13 and SCA 4 seats. The last seat went to an Independent. USNO combined with SCA to form a government and UPKO went into the opposition. Through a 'carrot-and-stick' approach, USNO managed to obtain UPKO's dissolution. Dato Stephens and many others, except Peter Mojuntin, joined USNO. Now USNO is the dominant party of Sabah.

PARTY PERSONALITIES

ALWIN IBRAHIM (WAN)

A Sarawak Malay. Lawyer by profession. Leader of the Malays in PESAKA. Figured prominently in the controversy between BUMIPUTRA and PESAKA. Still Vice-President of PESAKA. Elected state assemblyman for *Kalaka* in 1970.

AZIZ IBRAHIM

A one-time leading UMNO official in Penang. Member of the Penang State Executive Council during the period of Alliance control(1957-69). A strong contender for the Chief Ministership. Defeated at *Glugor*, his home-town and stronghold for over a decade by D.C. Stewart, a politically unknown candidate from GERAKAN in May 1969.

ABDUL RAHMAN (TENGKU)

A prince from Kedah. An administrator and lawyer. Took over the presidency of UMNO from Dato Onn in 1952. Led the campaign for independence. Chief Minister of self-governing

Malaya from 1955 till 1957. Prime Minister of independent Malaya and later Malaysia for 13 years. Towards the end of his political career, the young educated Malays tended to become critical of his leadership. He retired in September 1970.

ABDUL RAZAK (TUN)

A lawyer-bureaucrat from Pahang. State Secretary until his appointment to a federal ministership. Elected deputy president of UMNO in 1951 and retained this post for two decades. A serious-minded, hard-working and absolutely loyal assistant to Tengku Abdul Rahman. Reputed to be a firm advocate of Malay rights. Enjoys wide support even from young educated Malays. Minister of Defence from 1957 onwards. Additional portfolios include education and rural development. When the May disturbances broke out, he was made Director of Operations by the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong and held almost unlimited powers. Upon the Tengku's retirement, Tun Razak has taken over the reins of party and government.

AHMAD BOESTAMAN

In his young days, a radical, anti-colonialist fighter. Sukarno's example and Indonesia's revolution made a deep impression on him. Leader of *Angkatan Pemuda Insaf* (Generation of Awakened Youths) and author of an anti-colonialist document, *Merdeka Dengan Darah* (Independence through bloodshed). Jailed by the British for seven years. Founded *Parti Ra'ayat* when released. Elected as MP for Setapak in 1959. Jailed by the Alliance Government during Indonesian Confrontation for alleged treachery. Now editor-in-chief of *Utusan Sarawak*, a Malay daily circulating in Sarawak.

AHMAD RAZALI

An UMNO politician from Selangor. A fiery speaker. Political Secretary to Dato Harun. Won the state seat of *Kampong Bahru* in 1969. Now secretary to the Selangor UMNO and member of the state executive council.

AHMAD SAID (DATO)

A Malay-educated UMNO politician. Elected state assemblyman for *Lenggong* since 1959. Menteri Besar of Perak until investigations conducted by the Anti-Corruption Agency revealed a conflict of private and public interest. Resigned in 1970 and is now a full-time businessman.

BURHANUDDIN AL-HELMY (DR.)

A leading Malay nationalist in colonial Malaya. Staunch advocate of merger with Indonesia. Founder of the Malay Nationalist Party (banned in 1948) and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. Detained during Indonesian Confrontation for alleged conspiracy in the establishment of an exile government. Disqualified from contesting in 1964. Died in 1970.

CHAN SIAW HEE

A Sarawak Chinese. Assistant Secretary-General of SUPP. Wields great influence within the party by virtue of his respect among the Chinese-educated.

V. DAVID

A trade unionist. General Secretary of the Transport Workers' Union. Vice-chairman of the Labour Party and MP for Bungsar (1959-1960). Joined GERAKAN in 1968 and was made assistant secretary-general of the party. Stood for the state assembly at *Pantai* (Kuala Lumpur) and for Parliament at *Data Kramat* (Penang) in 1969 and won in both places.

DONALD STEPHENS (DATO)

A Kadazan politician from Sabah. Editor of *The Sabah Times*. Founder-president of UPKO. Chief Minister of Sabah from 1963 till 1965. Resigned owing to dissatisfaction over state-federal relationship. Appointed federal Minister. Decided to pull UPKO out of the Alliance after the 1967 state elections. Intense pressure was put on him by USNO and the central government to rejoin the Alliance. Yielded finally. Dissolved UPKO and allowed UPKO elements, including himself, to be absorbed by USNO. Given an ambassadorial post in Canberra. In January 1971, Dato Stephens announced his decision to give up Catholicism and embrace Islam.

GOH HOCK GUAN

An architect. Secretary-General of DAP. Won at *Salak* (state) and *Bungsar* (federal) constituencies in 1969. After the May disturbances, he left Malaysia and announced from abroad his intention to resign as DAP Secretary-General. Now, still an active member of the party.

HARUN BIN IDRIS (DATO)

An UMNO politician. During the Japanese Occupation, he joined the resistance organization, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. Read law at London in the 1950s. Appointed Deputy Public Prosecutor and later Legal Adviser to the Selangor Government. In 1964, he was asked by the Tengku to resign from government service and enter politics. Up till then, Selangor UMNO had been badly split between supporters of Aziz Ishak, a federal Minister (dismissed in 1962) and supporters of Dato Abu Bakar Baginda, the Menteri Besar of Selangor (retired in 1964). Dato Harun won at *Morib* (state) constituency and emerged as the new Menteri Besar. Reelected at *Morib* in 1969. Chosen Chairman of UMNO Youth in January 1971.

HIPNI BIN ANU (AWANG)

A Muslim Melanau from Sarawak. Leading official of BARJASA, later BUMIPUTRA. State minister in both the Tawi Sli and Dato Rahman cabinets.

HUSSEIN NORDIN (DATO)

Journalist, politician and industrialist. Managing Director of *Utusan Melayu* Press, an UMNO concern. Member of the Perak UMNO and unsuccessful candidate for the parliamentary seat of *Parit* in 1969. Holder of directorships in several industrial enterprises.

HUSSEIN YA'AKUB (DATO)

An *ulama* (Islamic religious teacher) from Selama, Perak. Elected UMNO state assemblyman since 1955. Member of the Perak State Executive Council. One of the old pillars of Perak UMNO.

IBRAHIM BIN ABU BAKAR (SIR)

Sultan of Johore. Reigned from 1895 till 1959, a period of 64 years. Noted for his excessive loyalty towards the British Crown. Openly opposed the UMNO-MCA campaign for immediate independence. Even threatened to pull Johore out of the Malayan federation.

ISHAK MUHAMMED

Writer and politician from Perak. A leftist of long standing. Member of the pre-war *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (Young Malay Union). Co-founder of the post-war Malay Nationalist Party.

Appointed Chairman of the Labour Party to strengthen the rapport between Malay and Chinese socialists. Now, living in retirement.

ISMAIL BIN DATO ABDUL RAHMAN (TUN DR.)

A private medical practitioner until he entered the government. Actively assisted Tengku Abdul Rahman in forging UMNO-MCA unity and in campaigning for independence. Ambassador to the United States and United Nations, Foreign Minister originally and later Minister of Interior. Presented Malaysia's complaint against alleged Indonesian aggression before the UN Security Council in 1964. A noted advocate of the rule of law. Resigned from the Cabinet in 1967 owing to ill-health. Retained his parliamentary seat in 1969 and was hurriedly called back to the Cabinet when the May disturbances broke out. Now Deputy UMNO President, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior.

JUGAH ANAK BARIENG (TAN SRI)

A Christian Iban chieftain from Kapit, Sarawak. Appointed *temenggong* (paramount chief) of the Ibans in the Sungei Rejang district by the colonial government. Founder chairman of PESAKA. Openly criticized BUMIPUTRA ministers in 1967. An aspirant to the governorship of Sarawak but has been consoled with the federal ministership for Sarawak affairs.

KAMWOON WAH

Advocate and solicitor. MCA politician. MP for *Sitiawan* from 1964 till 1969. Secretary-General of MCA since 1967. Failed to secure reelection to Parliament in 1969.

KAMARUDDIN MATESA (DATO)

An UMNO politician. State assemblyman for *Larut*, Perak. Member of the State Executive Council. Replaced Dato Ahmad Said as Menteri Besar in 1970.

KAMPO RADJO (DATUK)

A leftist Malay politician. Joined *Parti Ra'ayat*. Detained for his political views. Stood against Tun Tan Siew Sin in *Malacca Tengah* in 1969 but failed to win.

THOMAS KANA

An Iban politician from Sibul, Sarawak. Secretary-General of PESAKA. A participant in the PESAKA-BUMIPUTRA controversy. Elected state assemblyman for *Machan* in 1969.

LEE KUAN YEW

A Singapore politician. Secretary-General of PAP. Co-operated with the Tengku in the formation of Malaysia. However, PAP was not accepted as a partner in the Alliance Party. Lee, sought to persuade UMNO to end its alliance with MCA and accept PAP instead, by entering the 1964 Malayan elections. Attempt miscarried and ended in a political brawl between PAP and UMNO. Lee became prime minister in his own right when the federal parliament voted in August 1965 for the separation of Singapore.

LIM CHONG EU (DR.)

A private medical practitioner. Forsook medicine for politics. Defeated Tun Tan Cheng Lock for the MCA presidency in 1958. Resigned after the 1959 UMNO-MCA crisis. Founded UDP in 1962 but dissolved it in 1968 when GERAKAN was created. Led GERAKAN to victory in the state of Penang at the 1969 elections. Chosen as Chief Minister by his party.

LIM KEAN SIEW

Advocate and solicitor. Active LPM member and Secretary-General of the SF. MP for *Dato Kramat* from 1959 till 1969. Detained briefly for his support of the 1967 *hartal* in Penang. Resigned from Parliament in 1969 in keeping with LPM's decision to boycott all elected organs of government in protest against alleged strangulation of democracy. In name, still Chairman of LPM.

LIM TUAN SIONG

An ex-LPM politician. Stood in *Sungei Rawang* (Selangor state constituency) as an Independent and won. In 1970, he announced his decision to join the Alliance Party and his acceptance of Data Harun's offer of membership in the State Executive Council.

MAHATHIR BIN MUHAMMED (DR.)

Studied medicine at the University of Malaya (in Singapore). A

private practitioner since 1957. An UMNO politician from Kedah, the home-state of Tengku Abdul Rahman. Elected to Parliament from *Kota Star Selatan* in 1964. A highly vocal Alliance backbencher. Acquired a reputation for extremism on racial matters. Commonly referred to as an UMNO 'ultra'. Failed to secure re-election in 1969. Blamed the MCA organization in his constituency for working against him. After the elections, he advocated the non-representation of MCA in the federal Cabinet. Clashed with the Tengku. Expelled from UMNO's Central Committee and from UMNO itself. Author of *The Malay Dilemma*. Now a quiet and prosperous medical practitioner in Alor Star.

MUHAMMED ASRI BIN MUDA (DATO)

A Kelantanese. School teacher, journalist and finally politician. A founder-member of PAS. Succeeded Dr. Burhanuddin as party president. MP for *Pasir Puteh* since 1959 and Menteri Besar of Kelantan (a PAS-controlled state from 1959 onwards) since 1964.

MUSA HITAM

A student activist until his recruitment into government service. Appointed UMNO's Executive Secretary in 1955. As a party *apparatchik*, he built up his reputation and influence. Won the *Segamat Utara* (federal) by-election in 1968. Re-elected in 1969. Appointed an assistant minister but was soon dismissed. Obtained a master's degree from Sussex University in 1969-70. Now UMNO Youth Vice-President and a University of Malaya lecturer.

MUSTAPHA BIN DATU HARUN (TUN)

A Muslim Sulu chieftain from Sabah. Joined the resistance movement in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation. An administrative officer until his appointment as Minister for Sabah Affairs in 1963. Founder-president of USNO. Now Chief Minister of Sabah. Maintains a tight grip on the state through his highly-organized personal and party machinery.

DEVAN NAIR

A Malaccan by birth and teacher by profession. Took part in teacher union activities in Singapore and ended up in politics. A founder-member of the PAP. Detained from 1951 to 1953

and from 1956 to 1959. Won the *Bungsar* parliamentary constituency in 1964. Only PAP candidate to win. Secretary-General of DAP but withdrew in 1967 in favour of Goh Hock Guan. Did not re-contest in 1969. Now a full-time resident of Singapore.

ONG KEE HUI (DATO)

A Sarawak Chinese. Descendant of a distinguished *Kapitan China* of Sarawak. Educated at Kuching, Singapore and the College of Agriculture, Serdang. Founder-president of SUPP. President of the Kuching Municipal Council. A socialist by his own profession but he is also deeply involved in big capitalist enterprises. Holds directorships of several large firms in Kuching. In 1970, lost at *Kuching Barat* (state) constituency but won at *Bandar Kuching* (federal) constituency. Agreed to SUPP's coalition with BUMIPUTRA in Sarawak. Now a federal minister.

OPENG BIN SAPI'EE (TUN)

A Sarawak Malay administrator. Rose to a position of great influence within Malay society largely by virtue of his bureaucratic rank. Retired from government service in 1958. Appointed Governor of Sarawak in 1963. Died in 1969.

RAHMAN YA'AKUB (DATO)

A Muslim Melanau from Sarawak. Educated at Kuching. Worked as a government officer before he read law at Southampton. Resigned from the legal service and joined BARJASA. Entered Parliament in 1963 through the indirect election system. Appointed Cabinet Minister in 1965. After the May Thirteenth Incident, appointed Minister of Education. A fiery speaker, he was soon hero-worshipped by Malay students at institutions of higher learning in Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya. Primarily responsible for the policy of converting English-medium into Malay-medium schools. Successful at *Kuala Rajang* (state) and *Payang* (federal) constituencies in 1970. Emerged as the new Chief Minister of Sarawak.

M.K. RAJAKUMAR (DR.)

A private medical practitioner and Labour Party politician. Chairman of the Selangor Labour Party branch since 1963. Detained by the federal government from 1965 till 1967. In name, still a leader of LPM.

V.T. SAMBANTHAN (TUN)

An Indian politician from *Sungei Siput*, Perak. A planter until he entered politics. Took over control of MIC from K.L. Devaser in 1956 and has been MIC President ever since. MP from *Sungei Siput* and Cabinet Minister.

SAMSUDDIN BIN HARUN

The only high-ranking Malay official of PPP. Elected at *Sungei Raia* (state) constituency in 1969 on a PPP ticket. Decided after the elections to defect to the Alliance side.

D.R. SEENIVASAGAM

Advocate and solicitor. Main driving force behind the PPP. Entered Parliament in 1957 through a by-election at *Ipoh- Menglembu*. An arch-critic of the Alliance Government. On one occasion, threatened with arrest by the Tengku (when he was Prime Minister). Died shortly before the 1969 elections.

S.P. SEENIVASAGAM (DATO)

Advocate and solicitor. PPP politician. President of the Ipoh Municipal Council since 1961. After D.R. Seenivasagam's death, he has become the main force behind the PPP.

STEPHEN KALONG NINGKAN (DATO)

A Sino-ban politician from Sarawak. Founder-Secretary-General of SNAP. Emerged as Chief Minister of Sarawak's Alliance Government in 1963. Came into conflict with Taib Mahmud and UMNO leaders. Dismissed as Chief Minister by Governor Openg but reinstated by the High Court at Kuching. Removed finally after the declaration of a state of emergency and an amendment to the federal constitution. Such 'strong-arm' tactics by the federal government made Ningkan a Dayak nationalist hero overnight. Elected at the *Layar* (state) constituency in 1970.

SULAIMAN BULON

A controversial UMNO politician from Lower Perak. A *penghulu* until he became Speaker of the Perak State Assembly and then Deputy Menteri Besar. Clashed with UMNO leaders from Upper Perak. Elected MP for *Bagan Datoh* in 1964 and was made an assistant minister in the federal government. Later dropped from the central government. Re-elected MP in 1969. Now an ordinary Alliance backbencher.

SULAIMAN PALESTIN

An UMNO politician from Province Wellesley. A fiery orator. Supporter of Dr. Mahathir. State assemblyman for *Alma* and Speaker of the Penang State Assembly until his defeat in 1969 by Harun Sirat, formerly GERAKAN's Deputy Chief Minister.

SYED HUSSEIN ALATTAS (DR.)

An Amsterdam-trained sociologist. Author of *The Sociology of Corruption*. Taught at the University of Malaya until his appointment as Professor of Malay Studies at the University of Singapore. Founder-chairman of GERAKAN.

SYED JA'AFAR BIN ALBAR (TAN SRI)

A Makassarese by birth. Worked in Singapore and Johore as a journalist and teacher until his rise as an UMNO politician. A fire-brand. Soon made himself famous and popular. Served as UMNO publicity chief and later as Secretary-General. Led the UMNO confrontation with the PAP in 1964-5. Advocated the detention of Lee Kuan Yew. Absented himself when the separation of Singapore was voted upon in Parliament. Relieved of his post as UMNO Secretary-General by the Tengku. Still a popular member of UMNO's Central Committee. However, most of his time is now devoted to business. Holds directorships of several leading firms in Kuala Lumpur.

SYED NASIR BIN ISMAIL (DATO)

An UMNO politician from Johore. A state inspector of Malay-medium schools until his appointment as director of a newly-established institution, *Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka* (Language and Literature Agency). Stirred up controversy by his excessive zeal in making Malay the sole national and official language. Retired from this post in 1968 and is now in publishing and other businesses. In January 1971, he was elected a Vice-President of UMNO.

TAIB MAHMUD

A Muslim Melanau from Sarawak. Nephew of Dato Rahman Ya'akub. A BARJASA, later BUMIPUTRA politician. State minister in the Dato Ningkan cabinet. Clashed repeatedly with his Chief Minister. Was even sacked once. This Taib-Ningkan conflict led eventually to Dato Ningkan's fall from the government. Taib won at *Samarahan* (federal) constituency in 1970. Now an assistant minister in the central government.

TAN CHEE KHOON (DR.)

A private medical practitioner. Elected to Parliament from *Batu* in 1964 on an LPM ticket. Highly conscientious MP and articulate Opposition spokesman. Resigned from LPM in 1968 when it was veering to the extreme left. Founder-Secretary-General of GERAKAN. Re-elected at *Kepong* (state) and *Batu* (federal) constituencies in 1969.

TAN CHENG LOCK (TUN SIR)

A distinguished bourgeois Chinese leader of colonial Malaya. Ardent defender of Chinese political rights. Founder-president of MCA. Opposed, on the one hand, the Communist-led rebellion of 1948 (and was wounded by a hand-grenade) and on the other, British attempts to curtail Chinese education. By the mid-1950s, he was in his seventies and was declining in effectiveness. Replaced as MCA president in 1958 by a young medical practitioner from Penang, Dr. Lim Chong Eu.

TAN KAI HEE

Young Chinese-educated socialist. Highly effective organizer for LPM. Associated closely with Dr. Tan Chee Khoon. Described as a moderate socialist. Has been detained by the government since 1965.

TAN SIEW SIN (TUN)

Only son of Tun Tan Cheng Lock. A wealthy landed proprietor. Followed his father's footsteps into politics. Now MP with the longest experience in *pre-merdeka* and *post-merdeka* legislatures. President of MCA since 1961. An assimilated Chinese. Speaks Malay but no Mandarin or any Chinese dialect. Hence an easy target for Opposition attack and ridicule. The May 1969 setback for MCA shocked him into introspective reflection. Now making a serious bid to establish rapport with the Chinese masses through the traditional guilds and associations.

T.H. TAN (TAN SRI)

Journalist until his appointment as MCA's Chief Executive Secretary in 1952. Played significant roles in UMNO-MCA negotiations and in the joint UMNO-MCA struggle for independence. At present, Secretary-General of the Alliance Party but he is extremely active in industry. Holds directorships of several vast firms.

TAWI SLI (DATO)

An Iban *penghulu* from the Batang Lupar district, Sarawak. An unknown PESAKA politician until he replaced Dato Ningkan as Chief Minister in 1966. Not regarded as a forceful personality. Elected at *Lingga-Sebuyau* (state) constituency in 1970. Now an ordinary member of *Council Negeri*.

WONG POW NEE (TAN SRI)

A school teacher until his appointment in 1957 as Chief Minister of Penang. Led the Alliance state government for over a decade. Defeated in his bid to gain re-election and to retain control of the state in 1969. Now Malaysia's Ambassador to the Vatican.

STEPHEN YONG

An advocate by profession. Secretary-General of SUPP. Elected at *Kuching Timor* (state) and *Padawan* (federal) constituencies in 1969. Now a Deputy Chief Minister in the Sarawak coalition government.

Appendix-I

MCA'S FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS

Alor Star

Electorate:	38,631	Malays 52.7%	Chinese 39.7%
		Indians 7.2%	Others 0.4%
Lim Pee Hung		MCA	9,016
Haron bin Omar		PAS	7,258
Geh Teng Kheng		GRM	8,543
		Rejected ¹	579
		Percentage ²	65.1

Kulim-Bandar Bahru

Electorate:	30,274	Malays 53.9%	Chinese 32.6%
		Indians 13.4%	Others 0.1%
Tai Kuan Yang		MCA	14,381
Khatib Shorbaini bin Haji Hassan		PAS	6,378
		Rejected	1,512
		Percentage	73.6

Bagan

Electorate:	24,793	Malays 30.8%	Chinese 53.2%
		Indians 15.7%	Others 0.3%
Tan Cheng Bee		MCA	Uncontested

Penang Utara

Electorate:	47,083	Malays 22.4%	Chinese 66.5%
		Indians 9.5%	Others 1.6%
Geh Chong Keat		MCA	13,379
Dason Peter Paul		DAP	20,930
		Rejected	1,730
		Percentage	76.5

¹ This refers to ballots spoiled and not counted

² Percentage of electorate that voted

Tanjong

Electorate:	33,747	Malays	6.8%	Chinese	83.3%
		Indians	9.3%	Others	0.6%
Chua Teng Siew		MCA		4,496	
Lim Chong Eu		GRM		19,656	
Khoo Yat See		PPP		775	
		Rejected		1,072	
		Percentage		77.0	

Dato Kramat

Electorate:	31,053	Malays	15.2%	Chinese	74.8%
		Indians	9.7%	Others	0.3%
Lim Chong Hai		MCA		5,635	
V. David		GRM		17,272	
		Rejected		1,048	
		Percentage		77.1	

Larut Selatan

Electorate:	47,472	Malays	34.6%	Chinese	52.0%
		Indians	13.4%	Others	0.0%
Lim Swee Aun		MCA		10,774	
Haji Mohamed Tahir bin Haji Abdul Rauf		PAS		4,962	
Ng Hoe Hun		GRM		15,641	
		Rejected		1,233	
		Percentage		68.8	

Bruas

Electorate:	29,421	Malays	41.2%	Chinese	47.2%
		Indians	11.6%	Others	0.0%
Chiew Biow Choun		MCA		7,900	
Mohamed Rus bin Jaafar		PAS		4,033	
Su Liang Yu		PPP		8,368	
		Rejected		975	
		Percentage		72.4	

Sitiawan

Electorate:	27,930	Malays	28.3%	Chinese	59.5%
		Indians	12.1%	Others	0.1%

Kam Woon Wah	MCA	7,964
Richard Ho Ung Hun	DAP	11,607
	Rejected	921
	Percentage	73.3

Ipoh

Electorate:	40,718	Malays 10.9%	Chinese 73.9%
		Indians 14.9%	Others 0.3%
Toh Seang Eng	MCA	5,231	
R.C. Mahadeva Rayan	PPP	23,979	
	Rejected	926	
	Percentage	74.0	

Menglembu

Electorate:	51,913	Malays 13.2%	Chinese 79.9%
		Indians 6.6%	Others 0.3%
Hew Chai Kee	MCA	6,818	
S.P. Seenivasagam	PPP	29,089	
	Rejected	1,391	
	Percentage	71.8	

Ulu Kinta

Electorate:	24,475	Malays 35.8%	Chinese 51.9%
		Indians 12.3%	Others 0.0%
Chin Foon	MCA	7,591	
Chan Yoon Onn	PPP	10,706	
	Rejected	841	
	Percentage	78.0	

Batu Gajah

Electorate:	27,081	Malays 21.5%	Chinese 65.3%
		Indians 13.2%	Others 0.0%
Ng Fah Yam	MCA	6,812	
Adnan bin Hashim	PAS	901	
Lim Cho Hock	DAP	12,240	
	Rejected	1,137	
	Percentage	77.9	

Kampar

Electorate:	40,527	Malays 24.8%	Chinese 65.9%
		Indians 9.1%	Others 0.2%

Liew Why Hone	MCA	8,827
Abdul Kadir bin Sohor	PAS	2,884
Fan Yew Teng	DAP	17,532
	Rejected	1,469
	Percentage	75.7

Tanjong Malim

Electorate:	26,295	Malays 37.5%	Chinese 44.5%
		Indians 17.7%	Others 0.3%
Lee Seck Fun	MCA	7,822	
Abu Samah bin Majid	PAS	1,296	
Keoh Cheng See	DAP	7,787	
	Rejected	1,155	
	Percentage	68.6	

Telok Anson

Electorate:	35,475	Malays 28.7%	Chinese 55.4%
		Indians 15.7%	Others 0.2%
Ng Kam Poh	MCA	8,523	
Maslan bin Abdullah	PAS	1,417	
Chan Fu King	DAP	12,297	
	Rejected	1,274	
	Percentage	66.2	

Bentong

Electorate:	28,187	Malays 33.5%	Chinese 58.2%
		Indians 8.1%	Others 0.2%
Chan Siang Sun	MCA	Uncontested	

Batu

Electorate:	50,181	Malays 17.2%	Otinese 71.9%
		Indians 10.0%	Others 0.9%
Yap Chin Kwee	MCA	8,772	
Tan Chee Khoo	GRM	22,720	
	Rejected	1,189	
	Percentage	60.3	

Setapak

Electorate:	57,969	Malays 41.5%	Chinese 45.8%
		Indians 11.7%	Others 1.0%

Teh Hock Heng	MCA	13,871
Walter Loh Poh Kuan	DAP	17,137
	Rejected	2,165
	Percentage	57.0

Bungsar

Electorate:	81,086	Malays	13.4%	Chinese	71.9%
		Indians	12.8%	Others	1.9%
Lew Sip Hon		MCA		9,648	
Goh Hock Guan		DAP		37,050	
		Rejected		1,302	
		Percentage		59.2	

Bukit Bintang

Electorate:	50,631	Malays	29.0%	Chinese	62.2%
		Indians	7.6%	Others	1.2%
Tan Toh Hong		MCA		9,137	
Yeoh Teck Chye		GRM		18,488	
		Rejected		1,410	
		Percentage		58.0	

Damansara

Electorate:	41,331	Malays	17.3%	Chinese	62.1%
		Indians	20.2%	Others	0.4%
Michael Chen Wing Sum		MCA		12,089	
Hor Cheok Foon		DAP		15,567	
		Rejected		1,002	
		Percentage		69.3	

Selangor

Electorate:	20,844	Malays	34.6%	Chinese	46.6%
		Indians	18.1%	Others	0.7%
Lee Siok Yew		MCA		8,450	
Oh Keng Seng		DAP		6,701	
		Rejected		950	
		Percentage		77.4	

Ulu Selangor

Electorate:	20,845	Malays	37.0%	Chinese	45.5%
		Indians	17.5%	Others	0.0%

Khaw Kai Boh	MCA	8,278
Liong Ah Nai	DAP	6,755
	Rejected	820
	Percentage	77.0

Seremban Timor

Electorate:	32,222	Malays 25.4%	Chinese 57.7%
		Indians 16.5%	Others 0.4%

Wong Sen Chow	MCA	8,073
Chen Man Hin	DAP	13,475
Chin See Yin	UMCO	791
	Rejected	905
	Percentage	72.1

Seremban Barat

Electorate:	27,900	Malays 35.4%	Chinese 56.6%
		Indians 15.6%	Others 0.4%

Tai Kon Chin	MCA	7,277
S. Seevaratnam	DAP	11,705
Tan Kee Jon	UMCO	710
	Rejected	978
	Percentage	74.1

Malacca Tengah

Electorate:	35,617	Malays 63.7%	Chinese 33.7%
		Indians 2.4%	Others 0.2%

Tan Siew Sin	MCA	13,790
Mohamed Kamal bin Sudin	PAS	6,161
Kampo Radjo bin Dato Baginda Kayo	PR	6,490
	Rejected	1,620
	Percentage	78.5

Bandar Malacca

Electorate:	42,679	Malays 15.6%	Chinese 75.3%
		Indians 6.4%	Others 2.7%

Koh Kim Leng	MCA	7,346
Lim Kit Siang	DAP	18,562
Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi	PR	4,621
	Rejected	955
	Percentage	73.8

Segamat Selatan

Electorate:	29,730	Malays 36.3%	Chinese 50.8%
		Indians 12.7%	Others 0.2%
Lee San Choon		MCA	14,470
Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Rassol		Independent	5,183
		Rejected	1,652
		Percentage	71.7

Muar Pantai

Electorate:	30,558	Malays 44.8%	Chinese 52.7%
		Indians 2.4%	Others 0.1%
Seah Teng Ngiap		MCA	13,755
Khoo Chin Tow		DAP	7,108
		Rejected	715
		Percentage	70.6

Batu Pahat

Electorate:	27,010	Malays 39.4%	Chinese 58.7%
		Indians 1.9%	Others 0.0%
Soh Ah Teck		MCA	Uncontested

Kluang Utara

Electorate:	25,334	Malays 31.5%	Chinese 59.5%
		Indians 8.5%	Others 0.5%
Tiah Eng Bee		MCA	8,937
Lee Kaw		DAP	7,914
		Rejected	1,125
		Percentage	72.5

Kluang Selatan

Electorate:	30,171	Malays 31.9%	Chinese 60.2%
		Indians 7.7%	Others 0.2%
Chu Chee Peng		MCA	12,754
Lee Kuo Ming		DAP	7,053
		Rejected	1,418
		Percentage	70.0

Appendix- II

STATE ELECTION RESULTS: SELANGOR

Tanjong Karang

Electorate:	17,344	Malays	77.9%	Chinese	20.5%
		Indians	1.6%	Others	0.0%
Kamaruzaman bin Ahmad		UMNO		6,096	
Adnan bin Haji Hashim		PAS		4,462	
		Rejected		1,423	
		Percentage		69.1	

Kuala Selangor Pekan

Electorate:	13,723	Malays	47.9%	Chinese	24.5%
		Indians	27.6%	Others	0.0%
N.S. Maniam		MIC		4,215	
Ismail bin Amil		PAS		1,929	
Nadaraja		GRM		3,398	
		Rejected		882	
		Percentage		76.0	

Kepong

Electorate:	30,401	Malays	20.0%	Chinese	70.9%
		Indians	8.3%	Others	0.8%
Lee Kim Sai		MCA		6,291	
Tan Chee Khoon		GRM		13,310	
		Rejected		1,203	
		Percentage		68.4	

Penchala

Electorate:	19,780	Malays	12.9%	Chinese	73.0%
		Indians	12.9%	Others	1.2%
Lim Jew Siang		MCA		2,735	
Ho Cheuk Fuen		DAP		8,389	
		Rejected		797	
		Percentage		60.3	

Jeram

Electorate:	12,727	Malays	71.8%	Chinese	17.0%
		Indians	11.2%	Others	0.0%
Hussain Abdullah		UMNO		5,153	
Jarmani bin Mohamed Umar		PAS		3,367	
		Rejected		1,080	
		Percentage		75.4	

Sementa

Electorate:	13,641	Malays	29.8%	Chinese	57.3%
		Indians	12.8%	Others	0.1%
Wong Tai Mooi		MCA		3,059	
Haji Norhadi bin Haji Hasan Ali		PAS		1,118	
Chua Kow Eng		DAP		4,664	
		Rejected		682	
		Percentage		69.8	

Serendah

Electorate:	13,929	Malays	23.2%	Chinese	51.5%
		Indians	25.1%	Others	0.2%
Lim Cy Howe		MCA		4,220	
Ganga Nayar		GRM		4,504	
		Rejected		840	
		Percentage		68.7	

Kuang

Electorate:	10,836	Malays	35.8%	Chinese	45.5%
		Indians	18.4%	Others	0.3%
Oon Seng Lee		MCA		3,088	
Mohamed Yusuf bin Ma'aya		PAS		1,129	
Chou Yew Koh		GRM		3,119	
		Rejected		611	
		Percentage		73.3	

(Note: Chou Yew Koh subsequently crossed over to the Alliance side.)

Kajang

Electorate:	14,830	Malays	52.5%	Chinese	41.0%
		Indians	6.2%	Others	0.3%

Mohamed Nazir bin Haji Abdul Jalil	UMNO	5,022
Loh Chee Foon	GRM	4,352
	Rejected	701
	Percentage	67.9

Semenyih

Electorate: 8,312	Malays 49.6%	Chinese 37.2%
	Indians 12.9%	Others 0.3%

Salmah binti Haji Mohamed Salleh	UMNO	3,102
Tang Kun Kek	GRM	2,641
	Rejected	552
	Percentage	75.7

Ampang

Electorate: 31,899	Malays 51.6%	Chinese 42.7%
	Indians 5.0%	Others 0.7%

Muhyeeddin Zakaria	UMNO	6,601
Yunus Haji Yatimi	PAS	3,560
Wong Swee Oy	DAP	7,634
	Rejected	1,118
	Percentage	59.3

Sentul

Electorate: 26,070	Malays 29.0%	Chinese 49.7%
	Indians 20.0%	Others 1.3%

P.T. Arasu	MIC	5,242
Lee Beng Cheang	DAP	8,424
	Rejected	657
	Percentage	54.9

Pantai

Electorate: 36,961	Malays 21.7%	Chinese 55.5%
	Indians 19.5%	Others 3.3%

C.K. Cheah	MCA	6,088
V. David	GRM	16,117
	Rejected	967
	Percentage	62.7

Salak

Electorate:	44,125	Malays	6.5%	Chinese	85.6%
		Indians	7.4%	Others	0.5%
Seow Yu Boon		MCA		4,141	
Goh Hock Guan		DAP		20,335	
		Rejected		1,210	
		Percentage		58.2	

Bukit Nanas

Electorate:	34,965	Malays	13.2%	Chinese	77.1%
		Indians	8.3%	Others	1.4%
Loong Foong Beng		MCA		4,590	
Lee Lam Thye		DAP		13,275	
		Rejected		1,659	
		Percentage		55.8	

Kampong Bharu

Electorate:	15,666	Malays	60.5%	Chinese	32.7%
		Indians	6.4%	Others	0.4%
Haji Ahmad Razali		UMNO		3,805	
Muhammad bin Haniff		PAS		1,696	
Mohamed bin Mohamed Soom		GRM		3,552	
		Rejected		392	
		Percentage		60.3	

Serdang

Electorate:	28,595	Malays	17.0%	Chinese	66.8%
		Indians	15.6%	Others	0.6%
Thuan Paik Phok		MCA		7,920	
Yap Pian Hon		DAP		11,234	
		Rejected		903	
		Percentage		70.1	

Bukit Raja

Electorate:	12,736	Malays	17.8%	Chinese	51.4%
		Indians	30.4%	Others	0.4%
S.S. Murugesu		MIC		3,442	
K. Ramasen		DAP		4,773	
		Rejected		488	
		Percentage		68.3	

Port Swettenham

Electorate:	16,700	Malays	37.4%	Chinese	39.0%
		Indians	22.5%	Others	1.1%
Raja Zulkifli bin Raja Borhan		UMNO		5,265	
Mohamed Hussain Sukor		DAP		4,895	
		Rejected		505	
		Percentage		63.9	

Kampong Jawa

Electorate:	17,535	Malays	30.3%	Chinese	45.7%
		Indians	24.0%	Others	0.0%
Cheong Jin Hoe		MCA		5,280	
Lim Thian Kheng		DAP		5,860	
S.P. Sarathy		Independent		352	
		Rejected		1,194	
		Percentage		72.3	

Telok Datoh

Electorate:	12,523	Malays	63.1%	Chinese	22.7%
		Indians	14.1%	Others	0.1%
Hormat Rafei		UMNO		4,730	
Tanawi bin Haji Dahalan		PAS		2,825	
		Rejected		1,294	
		Percentage		70.7	

Morib

Electorate:	12,450	Malays	55.7%	Chinese	28.6%
		Indians	15.5%	Others	0.2%
Haji Harun bin Idris		UMNO		5,038	
Mohamed Shahid Arshad		PAS		2,922	
		Rejected		1,121	
		Percentage		72.9	

Dengkil

Electorate:	10,647	Malays	36.1%	Chinese	46.0%
		Indians	17.2%	Others	0.7%
Haji Mohamed Suhaimi bin Haji Kamaruddin		UMNO		Uncontested	

Sungei Rawang

Electorate:	10,197	Malays	33.3%	Chinese	47.3%
		Indians	18.8%	Others	0.6%
Shim Kim Siang		MCA			3,147
Ibrahim bin Mat Saman		PAS			842
Lim Tuan Siong		Independent			3,564
		Rejected			573
		Percentage			79.7

(Note: Lim Tuan Siong subsequently joined the Alliance Party.)

Sabak

Electorate:	13,752	Malays	74.8%	Chinese	19.1%
		Indians	6.0%	Others	0.1%
Lope Salleh bin Haji Zainal Abidin		UMNO			6,284
Khalil bin Ahmad Sumeri		PAS			2,329
		Rejected			1,069
		Percentage			70.4

Sungei Besar

Electorate:	15,793	Malays	90.0%	Chinese	8.7%
		Indians	1.3%	Others	0.0%
Taiban bin Hassan		MCA			5,787
Hassan Shukri		PAS			3,524
		Rejected			1,247
		Percentage			66.9

Ulu Bernam

Electorate:	11,207	Malays	39.1%	Chinese	35.5%
		Indians	25.2%	Others	0.2%
Shoib bin Haji Ahmad		UMNO			4,569
Lamsah bin Haji Azhari		DAP			3,130
		Rejected			666
		Percentage			74.6

Kuala Kubu

Electorate:	9,638	Malays	33.9%	Chinese	57.4%
		Indians	8.7%	Others	0.0%
Chan Keong Hon		MCA			3,520
Liong Ah Nai		DAP			3,403
		Rejected			558
		Percentage			77.6

