

Abstract of thesis entitled

**Colonial Chineseness:
Promoting Culture and Identity in Hong Kong**

Submitted by

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After suppressing the riots of the 1960s, the Hong Kong government attempted to stabilise the colony, foster a sense of belonging, and prolong its rule. This thesis examines how the government sought to accomplish these tasks by shaping and promoting cultural forms of Chineseness. The story begins in the late 1960s, when local officials began to cultivate a local sense of belonging, and ends approximately in the early 1980s, when the government changed the overall policy to prepare for the retrocession to Chinese sovereignty. Through extensive archival research, this study presents three case studies of how colonial officials utilised Chinese culture and traditions, namely language, entertainment, and objects. It first reveals how the colonial government simultaneously controlled and appeased its people in this period. Officials aimed to create a public opinion that would safeguard British and colonial interests. This thesis also reveals that local culture in colonies should not be generalised simply as the product of cultural imperialism, but as one which involved accommodation, negotiation, and compromise between colonisers and colonised. This research also places Hong Kong within its global contexts. It illustrates how the colony became part of the cultural Cold War, and how colonial officials tried to promote Hong Kong globally as an authentic Chinese city.



Chapter One examines the language politics that emerged from the Chinese Language Movement. It reveals why the Official Languages Ordinance did not represent the government's respect towards Chinese, how the government's operation continuously discriminated against Chinese-speaking people, and how local officials utilised education to contain radical patriotism. This chapter also illustrates how the promotion of Cantonese helped shape Hong Kong as a distinct Chinese city. Chapter Two examines entertainment policies. It shows how the government presented and promoted Chinese culture in the Festival of Hong Kong, Chinese festivals, and traditional performances. The government aimed to promote Chineseness in both traditional and modern forms to comfort people of all generations. Chapter Three demonstrates how the British and colonial governments promoted Hong Kong's tangible Chineseness. By cooperating and negotiating with London officials, the colonial government produced postage stamps and commemorative coins which featured Chinese traditions. Local Chinese helped with this process. Meanwhile, the governor and the Executive Council prioritised Chinese heritage when they decided which monuments to preserve. Officials also promoted Hong Kong at home and abroad as a traditional Chinese city. Overall, this thesis illustrates how colonial policies on Chineseness targeted people across generations and borders.

(403 words)

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B.A. H.K.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Philosophy
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July 2020



Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

Signed



PANG Tak Fung Allan

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Introduction

It was an important day. Crowds were gathering to celebrate their festival. Performers were preparing to showcase their talents, dragons waiting to impress their spectators. Everyone could not wait to immerse themselves into the coming weeks of joy. After hearing the British national anthem, the audience applauded and welcomed Governor Murray MacLehose. This was one of the first occasions when people were able to see their recently inaugurated governor giving a speech. Hong Kong, he claimed, was facing a “quiet revolution”: people had started to demand opportunities for leisure and recreation. MacLehose believed that organising a festival would help to meet this demand, and he appreciated the thousands of people who had worked so hard to make it happen.¹ He then dotted a lion’s eye and a traditional Chinese parade began. Spectators could not be more excited to see what was happening: dragons were flying, beauties were dancing, and foreigners were even dressing as Chinese heroes. This was a moment of celebration for Hong Kong people. Chinese culture flowed through the streets of Kowloon Peninsula, and no one seemed to remember the anthem they had just heard or the man who had just given a speech. Military bands, scouts, and Western musicians also performed at this jubilant night, but they appeared almost nowhere in the next day’s newspapers.

This was 6 December 1971, the opening night of the second Festival of Hong Kong. In the following weeks, local Chinese people participated in numerous traditional programmes: music, dramas, dance, operas, and so on. These performances entertained the people in different ways, but they also showcased local Chinese culture and were government initiatives. Indeed, the festival was one of the many occasions in which colonial officials promoted Chinese culture in the 1970s. In 1974 the

¹ *Festival of Hong Kong Commemoration Magazine 1971* (Hong Kong: Universal News Agency, 1971), 9.

Legislative Council passed the Official Languages Ordinance to raise the status of Chinese, at least on paper. Starting from the same year, the Urban Council organised a large-scale lantern carnival to celebrate the Mid-Autumn Festival. Throughout this decade the government also issued postage stamps and coins to commemorate the Lunar New Year. Local Chinese living in this era became surrounded by official initiatives which preserved and promoted their customs, either in traditional or modern forms.

This thesis examines how the colonial government shaped and promoted Chineseness in Hong Kong. The story begins in the late 1960s, when the government started to foster a sense of belonging among local people, and ends approximately in the early 1980s, when the government changed the overall policy to prepare for the retrocession to Chinese sovereignty. After suppressing the riots of 1966 and 1967, the British and colonial governments realised that Hong Kong's future "must eventually lie" with the People's Republic of China.² However, Britain held onto the colony for several reasons. It hoped to gain an advantageous position before discussing Hong Kong's future with the PRC leaders, who under Mao Zedong's leadership held an uncertain stance towards this issue. It also had to keep the colony for intelligence purposes in the Cold War.³ Officials thus stabilised and reformed the colony to secure local people's trust.⁴ This thesis argues that the government shaped and promoted

² "Hong Kong: Long Term Study," 28 March 1969, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (hereafter FCO), 40/341, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), Kew, Surrey, United Kingdom.

³ "The Future of Hong Kong," attached in Wilford to Royle, 28 June 1971, FCO 40/331, TNA; "Conclusions of A Study by Officials of Policy in Hong Kong in the Long Term," attached in Hurrey to Allen and Baker, 16 October 1968, FCO 40/158, TNA; The Future of Hong Kong: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 18 January 1973, Cabinet Office (hereafter CAB) 148/129/4, TNA; Chi-kwan Mark, "Development without Decolonisation? Hong Kong's Future and Relations with Britain and China, 1967-1972," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24.2 (2014): 324-25; Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 212.

⁴ Alan Smart and Tai-lok Lui, "Learning from Civil Unrest: State/Society Relations in Hong Kong Before and After the 1967 Disturbances," in *May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967*, ed. Robert Bickers and Ray Yep (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 154-56.



cultural forms of Chineseness, including language, entertainment, and objects, to comfort ordinary people and make them trust their rulers. The Chineseness that resulted was colonial.

Colonial Chineseness: What and Why

This thesis examines Chineseness in its cultural forms. Specifically, it refers to culture that originated from the history of China, in contrast to culture that flowed from non-Chinese civilisations. Culture involves ideas, customs, arts, and many other social behaviours that constitute everyday life. This research takes three forms of cultural Chineseness as case studies: the language local people spoke and wrote, the entertainment they enjoyed, and the objects they collected or encountered. These case studies illustrate how the government's cultural policies expanded from targeting youth and social activities to people across generations, and to people within and without the colony.

Scholars of Chinese diasporic studies have criticised Chineseness as a lens of research. They view Chineseness as a floating and ambiguous concept that oversimplifies the identities of overseas Chinese, especially those who do not see themselves as Chinese.⁵ In response, cultural studies scholar Law Wing Sang has pointed out several dangers of deconstructing Chineseness. One argument is that these critiques impose a binary framework on Chineseness and colonialism, thus neglecting their relationship in colonial Hong Kong.⁶ Nevertheless, the critics are still partly

⁵ For instance, see Rey Chow, "On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem," in *Sinophone Studies: A Critical Reader*, ed. Shih Shu-mei, Tsai Chien-hsin, and Brian Bernards (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 43-56; Ien Ang, "Can One Say No to Chineseness? Pushing the Limits of the Diasporic Paradigm," in *Sinophone Studies: A Critical Reader*, ed. Shih Shu-mei, Tsai Chien-hsin, and Brian Bernards (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 57-73; Allen Chun, "Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity," *Boundary 2* 23.2: 111-38; Prasenjit Duara, "De-constructing the Chinese Nation," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30 (1993): 1-26; John Nguyet Erni, "Who Needs Strangers? Un-imaging Hong Kong Chineseness," *Chinese Journal of Communication* 5.1 (2012): 78-87.

⁶ Law Wing-sang, *Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 2-3.



correct. They believe that works on Chineseness have made the discourse on Chinese culture monolithic. Culture in several regions that were subordinate to the PRC, such as Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan, became overlooked in these works. Rey Chow, for instance, argues that these regions have their own Chinese culture and should be investigated separately.⁷ In this sense, Chineseness is a relative concept, subject to different definition and interpretation. Historian Ge Zhaoguang has also proposed a “shifting China” that has gone through dissolution, unification, and changing territories and borders. He believes the Chinese culture that so many works refer to is merely the “relatively typical version of Chinese culture,” which again depends on how one defines it.⁸

This thesis accepts Chineseness as a relative notion shaped by different historical actors. In the case of Hong Kong, it was the British rulers who sought to shape and promote Chineseness. This cultural project aimed at making local Chinese trust their colonial rulers. It illustrates a particular form of colonialism in the second half of the twentieth century, when much of the British Empire had been decolonised. Different from those in some former colonies and settlements, British rulers in Hong Kong did not promote an imperial identity to strengthen their rule. Law Wing Sang argues that a “collaborative colonial power” defined Hong Kong history. He has illustrated how colonisers’ collaboration with local Chinese in cultural matters, such as language, university education, and ideology, created and reinforced colonial power. His work shows that the government was more interested in utilising Chinese, instead of British culture, to rule local Chinese. This was because the colonised people cared

⁷ For instance, see Rey Chow, “Can One Say No to China?” *New Literary History* 28.1 (1997): 150; Wang Gungwu, “Chinese: The Dilemmas of Place and Practice,” in *Sinophone Studies: A Critical Reader*, ed. Shih Shu-mei, Tsai Chien-hsin, and Brian Bernards (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 131-44; Helen F. Siu, “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Difference in South China,” *Daedalus* 122.2 (1993): 19-43; Kwai-Cheung Lo, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 2-8.

⁸ Ge Zhaoguang, *What Is China: Territory, Ethnicity, Culture, and History*, trans. Michael Gibbs Hill (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 27, 95-96.

more about their own culture.⁹ Mark Hampton has also revealed that Britishness only existed superficially among local Chinese, even though certain British values and cultural items, such as the notion of the rule of law, were instrumental in forming the Hong Kong identity. He points out that local communities identified more with Chineseness. The colonial government realised this scenario and did not strive to promote a British identity.¹⁰

Colonial Chineseness emerged in the 1970s under these historical contexts. The government recognised the Chinese nature of Hong Kong's majority population, and it adapted to the cultural qualities of being Chinese to suit the people's taste. As later chapters reveal, officials attempted to tell the public how the government cared about their culture. They aimed to build a sense of belonging that would help stabilise Hong Kong before and even after the reversion to Chinese sovereignty.

This thesis does not argue that Chineseness was the only focus in the government's cultural policies. These also included recreation facilities, contemporary arts, and band music. Instead, the thesis illustrates that Chineseness became central to official attempts to foster a local identity. MacLehose wrote in 1972 to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that his strategy was to eliminate local problems to a point in which "by Chinese standards [there was] much to spur civic pride and a sense of achievement everywhere."¹¹ As later chapters reveal, the resulting Chineseness was an outcome of both colonial policies and the cooperation and negotiation with local people. London also monitored how policies worked out in Hong Kong and intervened occasionally.

⁹ Law, *Collaborative Colonial Power*.

¹⁰ Mark Hampton, *Hong Kong and British Culture, 1945-97* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 164.

¹¹ Laird to Wilford, Monson, Logan, and Graham, 15 May 1972, FCO 40/391, TNA.

Official records do not reveal why the colonial government chose to foster a local identity by Chinese standards. However, what happened before and during this era helps explain this choice. During this period, local leaders advocated promoting and preserving Chinese culture because the Cultural Revolution in communist China had destroyed much of it.¹² Preserving Chinese traditions and customs thus helped the government secure support from these influential members of society. Officials also had to pacify people across generations. Creating cultural hybridity might work for youth, but not for older people. As the following chapters illustrate, Chinese traditions, especially festivals, pulled all sectors of the society together. Not only did Chinese traditions appeal to adults, but they also attracted young people's attention. For instance, student publications revealed that youth hoped to see Chinese culture being respected in the colony.¹³

Personal preferences for local and indigenous culture could have stimulated official promotion of Chineseness. Exotic culture and items of the colonised people had been popular and commodified in Europe, especially from the nineteenth century onwards.¹⁴ Official documents reveal that some British officials in Hong Kong were interested in local culture and helped promote Chineseness: David Akers-Jones was interested in local Chinese monuments; James Hayes strove to preserve Chinese traditions during his term as the Tsuen Wan District Officer; and D. B. Donaldson

¹² As later chapters reveal, examples of these local leaders include Urban Council member Denny Huang, who advocated for a better status of the Chinese language, Lantern Carnival Committee chair Yu Lok-yau, who advocated the promotion of Chinese traditions for all generations, and City Hall manager and the later Director of Cultural Services Darwin Chen, who urged colonial officials to save the remains of Chinese culture.

¹³ For instance, see Gu Er 顧兒, "Guoyig zhongguofeng de xinnian" 過一個中國風的新年 [Have a Chinese-styled New Year], *Chinese Students Weekly* 812 (9 February 1968): 2; "Xianggangjie, guoyue, ji qita" 香港節・國樂・及其他 [Festival of Hong Kong, National Music, and Others], *Chinese Students Weekly*, 1113 (5 December 1973): 2; "Guanyu Zhongwen chengwei fadong yuwen huodong 關於中文成為法定語文運動 [About the Movement to Make Chinese an Official Language]," *Chinese Students Weekly* 952 (16 October 1970): 10.

¹⁴ Ruth B. Phillips and Christopher B. Steiner, "Art Authenticity, and the Baggage of Cultural Encounter," in *Unpacking Culture: Art and Commodity in Colonial and Postcolonial Worlds*, ed. Ruth B. Phillips and Christopher B. Steiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 3-9.

supported organising the lantern carnival when he was the Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Tourist Association.¹⁵ Promoting Chinese culture was also an official tactic borrowed and revised from Hong Kong history. Rulers in the 1920s and 1950s had preserved, promoted, and shaped Chineseness, especially in school curricula and universities. They aimed to suppress radical patriotic movements and comfort local Chinese elites.¹⁶ In some ways, cultural policies from the late 1960s on continued this colonial strategy. However, as later chapters reveal, this cultural strategy differed from the earlier ones because it targeted people of all generations, instead of only educated people and elites. Historical contexts from the late 1960s on also made this tactic special: the government aimed not simply to appease its people, but also to show people both inside and outside the colony that Chinese people living under British colonialism were better off than those under Chinese communism.

Historiographic Contexts

This thesis is significant in various ways. It first illustrates the politics of culture in late-colonial Hong Kong. Historians have recently assessed the role of colonialism in Hong Kong by investigating how politics intervened in every aspect of the local population, including economy, society, law, and education.¹⁷ This thesis goes further by revealing how colonial rulers intervened in local *culture*. Later chapters illustrate how the government presented Chinese culture in ways which aimed to please the people, such

¹⁵ Akers-Jones to Hayes, 19 August 1976, Hong Kong Record Series (hereafter HKRS) 410-4-9, Public Records Office (hereafter PRO), Hong Kong; Hayes to Curator of City Museum, 15 May 1974, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO; “Carnival to raise \$24,000,” *South China Morning Post*, 23 December 1974, 24.

¹⁶ Bernard Hung-kay Luk, “Chinese Culture in the Hong Kong Curriculum: Heritage and Colonialism,” *Comparative Education Review* 35.4 (1991): 659-65.

¹⁷ For instance, see Alex H. Choi “State-Business Relations and Industrial Restructuring,” in *Hong Kong’s History: State and Society Under Colonial Rule*, ed. Tak-Wing Ngo (London: Routledge, 1999), 141-61; Christopher Munn, *Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841-1880* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008); Law, *Collaborative Colonial Power*; Edward Vickers, *In Search of an Identity: The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s-2005* (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 2005).



as raising the status of the Chinese language to pacify social activists and holding the lantern carnival to meet people's demands for leisure and celebration.

This research will also reveal how the Hong Kong government simultaneously controlled and appeased the people during the 1970s. Declassified documents have allowed historians to investigate further the colony's recent history. They have presented new and insightful findings on local reforms after the riots of 1966 and 1967. First, reforms in the 1970s were not merely the brainchildren of MacLehose. Rather, they continued Governor David Trench's efforts to stabilise Hong Kong and partly aimed to help Britain prepare to negotiate with the PRC over the colony's future. Second, this was not a "golden era" of reforms. MacLehose was a "reluctant reformer" who faced local and metropolitan constraints. Third, the colonial government took great care to shape how the public perceived it. Public opinion influenced government decisions even though the people did not notice how officials collected and constructed it.¹⁸

This thesis further reveals that the government adopted both oppressive and conciliatory approaches to try to create a public opinion that would safeguard British and colonial interests. On the one hand, officials attempted to show themselves as benevolent rulers who would safeguard, promote, and identify with people's culture. Through approving the use of the Chinese language in government operations, utilising Chinese entertainment in official celebrations, and selling postage stamps and coins that featured Chinese culture, colonial administrators attempted to show they

¹⁸ Lui Tai-lok, "Flying MPs' and Political Change in a Colonial Setting: Political Reform Under MacLehose's Governorship of Hong Kong," in *Civil Unrest and Governance in Hong Kong*, ed. Michael H. K. Ng and John D. Wong (London: Routledge, 2017), 78-79; John D. Wong, "Between Two Episodes of Social Unrest Below Lion Rock: From the 1967 Riots to the 2014 Umbrella Movement," in *Civil Unrest and Governance in Hong Kong*, ed. Michael H. K. Ng and John D. Wong (London: Routledge, 2017), 98-99; Smart and Lui, "Learning from Civil Unrest," 145-59; Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui, "Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social Reforms," *China Information* 24.3 (2010): 249-72; Ray Yep, "The Crusade Against Corruption in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a Zealous Reformer or Reluctant Hero?" *China Information* 27.2 (2013): 197-221; Florence Mok, "Public Opinion Pools and Convert Colonialism in British Hong Kong," *China Information* 33.1 (2019): 66-87.

cared about local customs. On the other hand, they suppressed social movements to avoid a new wave of anti-British sentiments. Through examining cultural policies, this thesis illustrates that post-riot Hong Kong and the MacLehose governorship were not merely about (reluctant) reforms or public opinion, but also about censorship. Suppressing student movements, maintaining the superior status of the colonial language, and ignoring deep-rooted social problems exemplify the suppressive aspects of the governorship.

This case study of Hong Kong shows that local culture in colonies should not be generalised as the product of cultural imperialism, but as one which involved negotiation and compromise between the colonisers and the colonised. While colonial rulers attempted to control part of the local culture (such as the case of the Chinese language, as the next chapter illustrates), they also preserved and promoted local culture to serve their interests. In analysing language education in colonial Hong Kong, Antony Sweeting and Edward Vickers have pointed out that previous studies on colonialism once tended to follow a “crude conspiracy theory” and overgeneralise colonial culture as merely a product of imperial control: the “West” was imposing its norm to the Other.¹⁹ Colonial discourses and theories in the late twentieth century greatly influenced these works. However, as D.A. Washbrook has pointed out in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, such an overview across the “entire colonial (and European) cultural experiences” resulted in anachronism.²⁰ More recent works on the British Empire have investigated the cultural impacts of colonialism in a more

¹⁹ The example that Sweeting and Vickers mention is Alastair Pennycook, *English and the Discourses of Colonialism* (London: Routledge, 1998), which argues that the English language was inherently “imperialist” and that “discourses of colonialism adhering to English” were the “most fundamental and pernicious legacy of British colonialism”; Anthony Sweeting and Edward Vickers, “Language and the History of Colonial Education: The Case of Hong Kong,” *Modern Asian Studies* 41.1 (2007): 2-5.

²⁰ D.A. Washbrook, “Orientals and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the British Empire,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. V (Historiography), ed. Robin W. Winks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 603; also cited in Sweeting and Vickers, “Language and the History of Colonial Education,” 36.

comprehensive way: colonisers also promoted and utilised indigenous culture, tangible or intangible.²¹ As a case study, this study reveals how colonialism both influenced and worked with local culture. It also shows how historical contexts, such as the need to retain Hong Kong, made colonial rulers not simply reinforce the European conceptions of the Other, but also preserve local culture.

This thesis also places Hong Kong within global history. Hong Kong was one of the sites of the “everyday Cold War” between Britain and China. British rulers confronted Beijing’s diplomatic protests and propaganda attacks against Hong Kong regularly from the 1950s to the early 1970s.²² Most historians have focused primarily on the political and diplomatic dimensions of the war.²³ To be sure, recent works have emphasised the social and cultural perspectives.²⁴ However, they largely focus on the early Cold War from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. Hong Kong was still an important base for the United States in the 1970s. British officials wrote in a long-term study report in 1968 that the United States required Britain to stay in Hong Kong for “as long as possible” so it could use the city for gathering intelligence. The United States also hoped to utilise this British colony to showcase the attractiveness of the Free World to communist China.²⁵ Therefore, colonial policies that aimed to make

²¹ For instance, see John M. MacKenzie, *Museums and Empire: Natural History, Human Cultures and Colonial Identities* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 15; Ashley Jackson, *Buildings of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10; Hampton, *Hong Kong and British Culture*, 160-80.

²² Chi-kwan Mark, *The Everyday Cold War: Britain and China, 1950-1972* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 5-8.

²³ The most significant works include Chi-Kwan Mark, *Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949-1957* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); Michael Share, *Where Empires Collided: Russian and Soviet Relations with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2007); and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships* (New York: Twayne, 1994); see Priscilla Roberts, “Cold War Hong Kong: The Foundations,” in *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, ed. Priscilla Roberts and John M. Carroll (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 15-6.

²⁴ Examples include Glen Peterson, “Crisis and Opportunity: The Work of Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals (ARCI) in Hong Kong and Beyond,” in *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, ed. Priscilla Roberts and John M. Carroll (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 141-59; Stacilee Ford, ““Reel Sisters” and Other Diplomacy: Cathay Studios and Cold War Cultural Production,” in Roberts and Carroll, *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, 183-210.

²⁵ “Hong Kong: Long Term Study [Amended Copy],” 23 April 1968, FCO 40/79, TNA.

Hong Kong a better place to live and construct Chineseness also had a Cold War agenda. As Chapters Two and Three reveal, the colonial government attempted to show to the PRC that Chinese people living under British colonialism and capitalism were better off than those under Chinese communism. British officials tried to showcase how the Free World was taking better care of Chinese people than the Chinese government. The PRC regime countered this attempt, for instance when it realised how the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra revealed its cultural backwardness.

Finally, this study also explores Hong Kong history from a transnational perspective, especially in Chapter Three. A “historiographic revolution” took place in the 1990s. Instead of writing history from national perspectives, historians started to think and write about history without borders. The term “transnational history” became popular, making historians investigate more about movement across national boundaries, including people, ideas, and objects.²⁶ This thesis shows how Hong Kong’s Chineseness became transnational. Through selling postage stamps and commemorative coins that featured traditional Chinese festivals to the world, the colonial government promoted Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese city, both within and without Hong Kong.

Sources

This thesis relies mainly on archival documents in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Many of these sources are new to historians. Documents from Hong Kong’s Public Record Office on postage stamp policies are one example. They reveal how the colonial government negotiated with the Crown Agents to produce commemorative stamps. New files from the National Archives in Kew also tell how

²⁶ Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 9-19; C.A. Bayly et. al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” *American Historical Review* 111.5 (2006): 1442-43.



the colonial government used gold coins to sell Hong Kong's Chineseness. This research also utilises a digital archive of the Hong Kong Public Libraries: The Municipal Councils Archives Collection. This collection includes documents from the former Urban Council. The records give new evidence of how the council assisted the government to preserve and promote Chineseness.

Published official sources, such as reports, pamphlets, ordinances, and proceedings of Legislative Council meetings, are also valuable materials. These publications reveal official aims and justification of policies. Proceedings of Legislative Council meetings are particularly helpful. As unofficial council members brought public voices to the government's attention, their speeches in the meetings reminded officials how superficial their policies were and illustrate the gap between state and society. This project also examines memoirs of former colonial officials, such as Eric Peter Ho and David Akers-Jones, to show how certain policies operated.

As classified files and documents are abundant, certain issues, such as the governors' attitude towards the Chinese Language Movement, would remain unanswered if historians merely relied on official archives. This project thus considers documents from both official archives and private collections. There are a few collections in the Hoover Institution Archives which historians have not studied, including the James Hayes Papers, John Walden Collection, and Michael Kirst Papers. Private correspondence and documents retained by these individuals tell important stories not revealed by official documents, such as how high-ranking officials viewed Hong Kong's education system and how they overlooked people's voices. Newspapers also provide valuable evidence. They provide official lines on certain policies that cannot be found from the archives. Press commentaries also reveal public opinion on various issues. Contradictions between government actions shown in the documents and the public opinion reveal the government's bluff over certain matters, such as the

Chinese language issue. Journalists might also record people's enthusiastic responses towards official attempts to promote Chinese traditions, such as Cantonese opera shows and postage stamps commemorating the Lunar New Year. Multimedia sources are also useful. For instance, radio recordings available from (online) radio archives show how the government recognised Chinese culture through official speeches and broadcasts.

Many of the sources are official ones, and they tend to reveal the state's perspectives of its policies. Wherever possible, this study attempts to illustrate how the public reacted to government initiatives. Internal reports, statistics of attendance and sales, and newspapers reveal whether the promotion of Chineseness succeeded. Indeed, as internal reports showed, certain policies did not work out. However, not all impacts of the policies can be measured. For instance, how the Chinese language curricula of the 1970s affected students' mindsets is hard to determine. This thesis thus focuses largely on the government's intentions and attempts while trying to illustrate the impacts of the policies.

Structure

This thesis is organised thematically. Overall, it shows how colonial policies on Chineseness targeted people across generations and borders. The first chapter examines language policies. Inspired by the revolutionary spirit of the Cultural Revolution in mainland China, youth in Hong Kong started the Chinese Language Movement to demand official status for the Chinese language. This chapter reveals how officials pacified these activists through superficially reforming language policies. It first illustrates why the Official Languages Ordinance did not show the government's whole-hearted respect of the people's language, and how officials aimed to pacify and suppress the young activists who participated in the movement. The next

section investigates the use of Chinese within government operations. Although the official rhetoric was to use Chinese more widely and to make the government more transparent to its people, English dominated in the daily operation of departments. The chapter then focuses on how colonial officials contained Chinese patriotism and retained the superior status of English through curricula. It ends with a section on how colonial rulers promoted Cantonese to shape Hong Kong as a distinct Chinese city.

Chapter Two shows how officials utilised Chinese entertainment to comfort people of all generations. By promoting both traditional and modern forms of Chinese leisure, the government attempted to promote a benevolent image of the government. It also hoped to foster a sense of belonging by letting people across generations and sectors participate in the events. The chapter starts with the Festival of Hong Kong, which took place from 1969 to 1973. Chineseness appeared in almost every part of the festival to suit the taste of local people. The next section investigates official celebrations of Chinese festivals. Through the Urban Council, officials attempted to create a festive atmosphere for both adults and youth. The council started holding the lantern carnival in 1974 and it kept on increasing the carnival's scale. It also organised Lunar New Year celebrations in later years. While adults could enjoy traditional performances such as Cantonese opera, lion dances, and classical acrobatics, children and youth could also spend their time in "other age-appropriate" programmes, including DJ shows and pop concerts. The next two sections reveal how officials preserved, promoted, or revitalised traditional performances, including Cantonese opera, instrumental music, and glove puppet shows. Colonial officials did not simply give orders, but also accepted suggestions from local leaders and Chinese officers.

Chapter Three demonstrates how the British and colonial governments promoted Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese city through objects, which included postage stamps, commemorative coins, and monuments. The first section shows how

the colonial government negotiated and cooperated with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Crown Agents to produce postage stamps. These stamps showcased the colony's Chinese culture. The next section reveals how colonial officials worked with the Royal Mint to produce coins that commemorated the Lunar New Year. The colonial government attempted to show that it had promoted and protected its people and culture well. The process of negotiation and compromise between London and Hong Kong also reveals how the British government monitored Hong Kong's affairs closely. The final section examines how the government preserved Chinese monuments. Although colonial and Chinese heritage existed in Hong Kong, the governor instructed his subordinates to prioritise Chinese heritage. This was an attempt to promote local people's tangible heritage. It also aimed to prevent another wave of anti-colonial feelings by downplaying colonial traces.

This thesis presents the names of Hong Kong Chinese people according to the romanisation they used or how they appeared in contemporary English-language sources. Names of local people whose names did not appear in English sources and other Chinese people are transliterated through the Pinyin system. Titles of Chinese books, articles, and newspaper reports are both transliterated into Pinyin and translated into English.

Chapter One

Language

Arise, students from Chinese middle schools! Arise, students from Anglo-Chinese schools! Arise, every thinking and nationally conscious student. The fight to make Chinese an official language depends on us. For the Hong Kong Chinese people of today and tomorrow, please do not keep hesitating, and do not stand by and watch anymore. Let's respond to this movement earnestly.¹

Chinese Students Weekly, 16 October 1970

In December 1967 the leftist riots finally ended after bringing more than seven months of chaos to Hong Kong. Yet not all the anti-imperialistic and nationalistic feelings of the rioters disappeared with the chaos. People in Hong Kong, especially university students, gradually saw the subordinate status of Chinese to English as a national insult.² In January 1968, Chung Chi College of the Chinese University of Hong Kong organised a conference titled “Making Chinese an Official Language.” This event concluded with a statement demanding the Hong Kong government to give Chinese and English equal and official status.

Dissatisfied with the government's response, youth and activists escalated their action. In June 1970, Urban Councillor Denny Huang urged the government to respect Chinese. He also formed a committee and sought support from people across all sectors. A month later, seventeen student associations held another conference, declaring the start of the Movement to Strive for an Official Status of the Chinese Language (or the Chinese Language Movement). Students and social activists spread this movement across Hong Kong. Signature campaigns, posters, badges, open letters to officials, public conferences and so on were all used to call for the official status of

¹ “Guanyu Zhongwen chengwei fadeng yuwen huodong” 關於中文成為法定語文運動 [About the Movement to Make Chinese an Official Language], *Chinese Students Weekly* 952 (16 October 1970), 10.

² Note of a meeting between C.D.C. (K) and Mr. Lam Hung-chow, Chairman of C.C.O.L., 1 September 1970, HKRS 455-4-4, PRO.



Chinese. Local youth's Chinese patriotism, which advocated for a better status of the Chinese people, became a key force in this movement. Some students even borrowed the radical rhetoric from the Cultural Revolution in communist China and the 1968 student movements in the West. The student magazine *Pan Ku*, for instance, published an article in December 1970 supporting the movement in a revolutionary discourse. "The failure of the 1967 disturbances," the student leader wrote, "taught Hong Kong Chinese, especially the younger generation, about the revolutionary spirit, giving them the courage to call for this this unreasonable system to be reformed."³

However, the colonial state responded unfavourably. By superficially reforming language policies, officials attempted to show respect to the Chinese language and pacify movement participants. Existing scholarship analyses the issue mainly through the lens of education. Works on post-war language policies mainly emphasise the administrative perspective, with little attention paid to the historical context.⁴ This chapter investigates how the government attempted to stabilise its people through language policies. The first part investigates the Official Languages Ordinance as a tool for pacifying the movement's participants. Though the government gave equal status to Chinese and English, it did so superficially. The chapter then focuses on the use of Chinese in government operations and its

³ Shi Jianqing 史劍青, "Zhongwen chengwei fadinyuwen yundong" 中文成為法定語文運動 [The Movement to Strive for an Official Status of the Chinese Language], *Pan Ku* 盤古 35 (1970), 16; for a more detailed description of the movement, see Law Wing Sang 羅永生, "Lengzhanzhong de jiezhi: Xianggang 'zhengqu Zhongwen chengwei fadinyuwen yundong' pingxi" 冷戰中的解殖：香港「爭取中文成為法定語文運動」評析 [Decolonisation in the Cold War: A Commentary of Hong Kong's "Movement of Striving for the Official Status of the Chinese Language], *Thinking Hong Kong* 6 (2015): 5-11.

⁴ Kingsley Bolton, "Language Policy and Planning in Hong Kong: Colonial and Post-Colonial Perspectives," *Applied Linguistics Review* 2 (2011): 55-6; for existing works on the history of Hong Kong's language policies, see Stephen Evans, "Language Policy in Hong Kong Education: A Historical Overview," *European Journal of Language Policy* 9.1 (2017): 67-84; Anthony Sweeting and Edward Vickers, "Language and the History Colonial Education: The Case of Hong Kong," *Modern Asian Studies* 41.1 (2007): 1-40; and Stephen Evans, "Language Policy in British Colonial Education: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong," *Journal of Educational Administration and History* 38.3 (2006): 293-312; Ping Chen, "Language Policy in Hong Kong during the Colonial Period before July 1, 1997," in *Language Planning and Language Policy*, ed. Nanette Gottlieb and Ping Chen (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), 111-28.

communications with local people. While officials promised to use the Chinese language more frequently, the superior status of English never faded. The focus then turns to how colonial officials regulated language education to contain Chinese patriotism and maintain the superior status of English. The chapter ends with how the government promoted Cantonese while suppressing the spread of Mandarin. This helped reinforce Hong Kong as a city distinct from communist and nationalist China.

The Official Languages Ordinance

The Chinese language held an inferior position until the 1980s. Though Chinese people could learn Chinese and English in government schools from the mid-nineteenth century on, many could still hardly understand anything from the government as most documents and laws were only in English.⁵ A few months before the 1967 riots broke out, the Colonial Secretariat further marginalised Chinese by removing the Cantonese qualification for overseas officers who worked in Hong Kong (unless “it is considered that a knowledge of Cantonese is necessary for the officer to be able to carry out his duties effectively”).⁶ Chinese language education had been a significant part of the cadet training from the 1860s on. Governor Hercules Robinson proposed in 1861 that cadets serving in Hong Kong should first learn Chinese. Among the 85 officers trained from 1861 to 1941, most of them learnt to speak Cantonese. They included many administrators who later became key local officials, such as Governors Francis May, Cecil Clementi, and Alexander Grantham.⁷ Various retired officials expressed in the

⁵ Chen, “Language Policy in Hong Kong,” 113.

⁶ “Chinese Language Policy,” 25 February 1967, box 374, John Walden Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford.

⁷ Steve Tsang, *Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the Nineteenth Century to the Handover to China, 1862-1997* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 19-22.

late 1980s that learning Cantonese was in fact crucial to their work, and that removing the Cantonese qualification was a mistake.⁸

With the rise of local consciousness and patriotism after the 1967 riots, many local Chinese people, especially youth and activists, demanded an equal status between Chinese and English languages. But only in 1974 was the Official Languages Ordinance passed by the Legislative Council. As articles in local newspapers reveal, many Hong Kong Chinese believed this was a moment for celebration because their wish had finally come true after years of protests.⁹ However, the government introduced the ordinance not just to cater to public opinion, but also to pacify the local population.

After the 1967 riots, some people demanded that the government raise the status of Chinese. As articles in both the Chinese and the English press show, this demand gradually became widespread.¹⁰ City District Commissioner James Hayes observed this phenomenon. As he wrote in a memo to Secretary for Home Affairs

⁸ For instance, David Alexander even described removing the Cantonese qualification as “ridiculous.” See Transcript of an interview with DAVID ALEXANDER Esq CBE of The Administrative Service of Hong Kong (1953-1975), 8 June 1988, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 386, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 17-18; Transcript of an interview with Mr G C HAMILTON, CBE Hong Kong Administrative Service (1941-1969), 18 November 1987, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 388, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 9; Transcript of an interview with Dr D D Waters, ISO, MPhil, PhD, DID IET (MANC), FCIIOB, FBIM of the Education Department of the Hong Kong Government (1954-1981), 4 May 1988, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 331, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 21-2.

⁹ For instance, see “Fading yuwen fa’an zuori fabiaohou zhengfu fayaren lunshu: Zhongyingwen bingzhong shiming” 法定語文法案昨日發表後政府發言人論述：中英文並重使命 [Government Spokesman Claimed After Announcing the Official Languages Bill: A Mission to Take Care of Both Chinese and English Languages], *Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報, 12 January 1974, 5; and “Fading yuwen faan tongguohou: Zhongyingwen jiangxiangyou tongdeng diwei” 法定語文法案通過後：中英文將享有同等地位 [After Passing the Official Languages Bill: Chinese and English will Enjoy an Equal Status], *Kung Sheung Daily News* 工商日報, 11 January 1974, 8.

¹⁰ For instance, L.C.T., “Make Chinese official,” *China Mail*, 16 November 1967, 6; “Xianggang jiaoshihui shangcheng gangdu yuqing: Zhengfu mingling guiding zhongwen fading yuwen” 香港教師會上呈港督籲請：政府明令規定中文法定語文 [The Hong Kong Association of Teachers Request the Governor: Government Should Use Law to Declare the Chinese Language as an Official Language], *Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報, 11 April 1968, 14; “Students’ Poll to Test Second Language Issue,” *South China Morning Post*, 17 September 1970, 6; “Zhuanshang xuelian ji liuxuesheng daibiao fangwu guanfang sanwei daibiao: Cuqing xuanbu zhongyingwen tongwei fading yuwen” 專上學聯及留學生代表訪晤官方三位代表：促請宣佈中英文同為法定語文 [Representatives from the Hong Kong Federation of Students and International Students Met Three Official Representative: Request Declaring Both Chinese and English Languages as Official Languages], *Kung Sheung Daily News* 工商日報, 12 September 1971, 11.

David Holmes in 1970, local people began to care more about their “rights and entitlements” and the youth saw the lack of official status of Chinese as “inequalities.”¹¹ In fact, officials had received loud calls for Chinese to be given official status through the City District Offices. For instance, in December 1970 a City District Officer reported that campaigners had received approximately two hundred signatures supporting the movement within one low-cost housing estate alone in Wong Tai Sin.¹² In Yau Ma Tei, the headmistress of Ching Yee Girls’ School received an even more enthusiastic response: over twenty thousand signatures from her students and their parents. She convinced one hundred other schools to follow.¹³ Even though some people preferred not to sign a petition, they insisted to the officer that they would give their views directly to the official Chinese Language Committee, which investigated the feasibility of using Chinese in government operations.¹⁴

Although the government considered these demands, it responded by discrediting the movement and challenging the idea of official language. The government instructed City District Officers to challenge support for the movement. For instance, the document asked officers to criticise the movement’s leader, Denny Huang, for utilising the movement to win support for the coming Urban Council elections. It also required officers to tell movement supporters that a third force might be supporting the movement, and that the financial support for this movement was doubtful. At the same time, the government also required officers to tell movement participants that the government had never declared English the only official language, or Chinese as not an official language. Officers would also challenge the participants

¹¹ Hayes to Holmes, 26 August 1970, HKRS 455-4-4, PRO.

¹² Chinese as an Official Language: Weekly Progress Report (9.12.70 – 15.12.70), 15 December 1970, HKRS 488-3-36, PRO.

¹³ A Supplement to Town Talk ending 22.12.70.: Chinese as an Official Language, 22 December 1970, HKRS 455-4-4, PRO.

¹⁴ Chinese as an Official Language: Weekly Progress Report, 9 December 1970, HKRS 488-3-36, PRO.

by asking what it meant to make Chinese an official language and whether an official declaration could imply anything practical.¹⁵

When Lee Quo-wei, an influential businessman and a Legislative Councillor, raised the Chinese language issue in a meeting in August 1970, Acting Colonial Secretary David Ronald Holmes responded unfavourably. Holmes claimed that the government had already used Chinese more frequently (though this was a false claim, as the next section illustrates), and that the government “would not accept the delays and complications and expense which would follow on the introduction of unnecessary translation and interpretation services for doctrinaire reasons.”¹⁶ The government also tried to suppress the movement. For instance, on one occasion the police disqualified the signature campaign by claiming that it did not fulfil the licensing requirements.¹⁷ Even though the government announced it would establish a Chinese Language Committee in September 1970 to investigate the use of Chinese in government operations, it did so to counter the open forum organised by the Student Union of the University of Hong Kong.¹⁸ As the City District Officer of the Eastern District later stated, this committee made the signature campaign receive much less support because it was “instrumental in taking away some of the heat of emotion from the language movement.”¹⁹

Moreover, Governor David Trench was outright hostile towards this social movement. He revealed this in an interview with Steve Tsang in the late 1980s. Instead of understanding the concerns of movement participants, he thought making Chinese

¹⁵ Official line to adopt in talking to organizations and individual contacts on the issues of ‘Chinese as official language’, n.d., HKRS 455-4-4, PRO.

¹⁶ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1969-1970* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1970), 829-31.

¹⁷ Weekly Progress Report: Use of Chinese as an Official Language, 10 November 1970, HKRS 488-3-36, PRO.

¹⁸ Minutes of C.D.C.’s Meeting with Kowloon C.D.O.s held at C.D.C. (K)’s Office on 23rd September, 1970, n.d., HKRS 455-4-4, PRO.

¹⁹ Weekly Progress Report: Use of Chinese as an Official Language, 5 November 1970, HKRS 455-4-4, PRO.

an official language would mean nothing more than writing the law in Chinese. And he claimed that translating Hong Kong's laws into Chinese was impossible. He also agreed with Tsang that "the demand for making Chinese into a second official language was more a matter of face than anything else." Both believed making Chinese an official language would simply make people feel "satisfied" and "happy."²⁰

As the movement developed, several Chinese members of the Legislative Council and of the Chinese Language Committee suggested that the government should give an equal status to Chinese and English.²¹ The government finally gave in. In October 1971 newly arrived governor Murray MacLehose announced the equal status of English and Cantonese in the Legislative Council.²² The council passed an amendment to the Standing Order one month later to formalise this change.²³ In August 1972 members of the Urban Council also agreed to amend the council's Standing Order and remove the English language requirement for becoming a councillor.²⁴ In January 1974 the government finally brought the Official Languages Bill to the Legislative Council. The bill passed on 13 February 1974 with the following clauses:

- (1) The English and Chinese languages are declared to be the official languages of Hong Kong for the purposes of communication between the Government or any public officer and members of the public.
- (2) The official languages possess equal status and, subject to the provisions of the Ordinance, enjoy equality of use for the purposes set out in subsection (1).²⁵

²⁰ Transcript of interviews with Sir David Trench, GCMC, MC, DL Governor of Hong Kong (1964-1971), 23-24 April 1987, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 337, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 244-46.

²¹ *The Fourth (and Final) Report of the Chinese Language Committee: Government Translation and Interpretation Services, Hong Kong's Educational System, Chinese as an Official Language* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971), 8-9.

²² *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1971-1972* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1972), 2.

²³ *Ibid.*, 161.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 953-54.

²⁵ Official Languages Ordinance, Legal Notice (L.N.) 10 of 1974, (15 February 1974).

Although many people in 1974 believed this new ordinance illustrated the government's respect towards Chinese people and their language, the evidence suggests otherwise. The government gave in firstly to respect some influential Chinese leaders. MacLehose recounted in the late 1980s that he agreed to give an equal status to Chinese and English languages because this was a recommendation from Kenneth Ping-fan Fung, an influential banker and an important member of various government councils and committees. MacLehose believed that Fung “was a very senior member of Executive Council, so at that level there must have been unanimity [regarding the Chinese language issue].” Pushed further by the interviewer, MacLehose then admitted that he had approved the bill only because of the recommendations from the Chinese Language Committee chaired by Fung, while the “instance pressure groups and popular demand were really... not so important.”²⁶ In fact, after the government announced the composition of the Chinese Language Committee, some people had already complained to a City District Officer that the committee “represented only a small cross-section of the community.”²⁷

The government conceded also partly because the movement might threaten colonial governance. After the Chinese Language Committee submitted its first report in February 1971, the government took no immediate action. It only responded positively to the report on 18 October, when MacLehose gave his first address to the Legislative Council. What happened between these few months made both the British and Hong Kong governments recognise the movement as a threat. On 22 July, the Hong Kong Federation of Students sent a letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) urging both governments to raise the status of Chinese. The federation

²⁶ Transcript of interviews with The Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE, KCMG, KCVO, DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62) Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82), 13 and 26 April 1989, 12-14 and 29 March 1991, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 377, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 180-82.

²⁷ “Chinese as an ‘Official Language’,” 27 October 1970, HKRS 488-3-36, PRO.

wrote that the government's ignorance of people's demands would only make the public perceive peaceful negotiations as useless. The student leaders also wrote that a loss of confidence in the government would only lead to "trouble for all parties concerned."²⁸ E.O. Laird, the head of the FCO's Hong Kong Department, saw this as a threat and informed his colleagues that they should notify the Hong Kong governor.²⁹ Shortly afterwards, the Hong Kong government gave in and started adopting the language committee's recommendations.

Even though the government submitted the Official Languages Bill in January 1974, it still described it as "unnecessary" because "those who trust us [the government] do not need it."³⁰ Moreover, official changes to the status of Chinese were only on paper. Although the Legislative Council changed its Standing Order and allowed its members to speak in Chinese, almost none of its Chinese members did so. The only exception during the 1970s was Wong Lam, the chairman of the Kwun Tong Sports Association and a junior manager at the Kowloon Motor Bus Co.³¹ However, Wong spoke in Cantonese because he did not know English.³²

The Chinese language also remained absent in local courts. Although the ordinance gave equal status to Chinese and English, ironically it exempted courts, where ordinances were put into effect, from realising this equal status. As the ordinance specifies, trials in the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the District Court, and any other courts "shall be conducted in the English language," while only

²⁸ Chui to Royle, 22 July 1971, FCO 40/341, TNA.

²⁹ Laird to Scott and Logan, 27 July 1971, FCO 40/341, TNA.

³⁰ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1973-1974* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974), 414.

³¹ As Eric Peter Ho, the Secretary for Social Services in 1977-83, recounted in his memoir, the government appointed Wong to the council because MacLehose wanted to have council members with 'grass root' background; see Eric Peter Ho, *Times of Change: A Memoir of Hong Kong's Governance, 1950-1991* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 99.

³² For instance, on 2 November 1978 he gave a Cantonese speech in the council addressing various problems of the government, and translators in the Council then translated his speech to English; see *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1978-1979* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1979), 118.

Magistrates' Courts, Juvenile Court, Labour Tribunal, and inquiries by a coroner might have their proceedings in either languages.³³ Many ordinary Chinese people who did not know English would be helpless when confronting English accusations.

British officials justified this absence by arguing for the defects of using Chinese in courts. Attorney General John Hobley cited *The Third Report of the Chinese Language Committee*.³⁴ In the other reports, the committee wrote that the government should use Chinese more widely. However, they allied with the government in the *Third Report* and denied the use of Chinese in courts. The committee members cited views from the legal professions and the Judiciary: judicial officers or lawyers might not be capable of completing their duties effectively in Chinese even though they were familiar with the language. Thus, abandoning the language that were familiar to lawyers did not make sense.³⁵ Committee members also justified their stance with the English origin of Hong Kong's laws. They claimed that if Chinese and English had equal status in courts, the government would face huge difficulties as translating all legal documents into Chinese would be impossible. Laws of the colony, decisions of superior courts from other Commonwealth jurisdictions, and law textbooks all came from the English Common Law system and some of the court decisions dated back to the thirteenth century.³⁶

While these officials and committee members emphasised the pragmatic concerns of operating courts in English, they overlooked the rights of Chinese defendants. Historian Jan Morris has described how magistrates accused Chinese-

³³ *Laws of Hong Kong*, 4.

³⁴ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1977-1978* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1978), 54-5.

³⁵ *The Third Report of the Chinese Language Committee: Court Proceedings and the Language of the Law* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971), 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

speaking defendants “mercilessly” in English.³⁷ Chinese who were accused of breaking laws could only accept penalties if they did not understand English. Millie Carroll, a missionary and social activist, complained about this situation in her open letter to Bar Association and the Legal Aid Department in July 1977. She wrote that her Chinese neighbours received a legal document which required them to pay various court fees. The document was in English except their names, the ways to pay the fees, and what to do if they disputed the claims (but they had to write their counter-claim in English).³⁸ Though the Bar Association’s chairman Henry Litton (who later became a Permanent Judge of the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR) publicly replied to Carroll’s complaint, he just repeated claims made by the Chinese Language Committee in its *Third Report* with no mention of her neighbours’ case.³⁹ Carroll later wrote in another letter that courts provided no Chinese translation of legal forms to the accused.⁴⁰ The memoir of another social activist, Elsie Tu (formerly known as Elsie Elliot), further proves how courts exploited Chinese-speaking people. Tu recalled that before the 1980s all court proceedings were in English, while “almost all the accused spoke only Chinese.” Interpreters only made the situation worse as they were either poor in quality, or they were bribed by lawyers. Tu wrote that bribing the interpreter was the lawyers’ key to win a case as the interpreter “could twist the case any way he wished before an English-speaking judge who knew no Chinese.” To most of the Chinese accused, “the law was a puzzle.”⁴¹

³⁷ Jan Morris, *Hong Kong: Epilogue to an Empire* (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 243; another historian, Frank Welsh, has compared the situation of Welsh under British rule. He describes that Welsh and English have “full equal status in all aspects of life,” unlike the situation of Chinese in Hong Kong; see Frank Welsh, *A History of Hong Kong*, revised edition (London: HarperCollins, 1997), 488-89

³⁸ Millie Carroll, “Why Reluctance to Use of Chinese?” *South China Morning Post*, 14 July 1977, 11.

³⁹ Henry Litton, “Why Chinese is Impractical,” *South China Morning Post*, 20 July 1977, 11.

⁴⁰ Millie Carroll, “Giving Chinese Benefit of the Laws,” *South China Morning Post*, 17 November 1977, 12.

⁴¹ Elsie Tu, *Colonial Hong Kong in the Eyes of Elsie Tu* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 89-90;



Court operations in later years disprove the colonial justifications for an English court system. In the 1980s more lawyers and legal scholars called for an equal use of Chinese and English in courts.⁴² Two years before the retrocession, the colonial government amended the Official Languages Ordinance to give the two languages an equal status in courts: “The English and Chinese languages are declared to be the official languages of Hong Kong for the purposes of communication between the Government or any public officer and members of the public and for court proceedings.”⁴³ Though translating English laws in Chinese remained a difficult task, it took place in the final days of colonial rule. Chinese gradually became the main language used in courts. For instance, from January 1997 defendants could choose to speak in Chinese, while the government amended the Jury Ordinance few days before the retrocession to allow juries to speak in Chinese.⁴⁴

Secretariats for Home Affairs and the New Territories also censored Chinese publications. On the one hand, from the mid-1970s on the government claimed that Chinese and English had equal status and it had no censorship over Chinese publication.⁴⁵ On the other hand, in 1975 it introduced the Objectionable Publications Ordinance. Though local Chinese might have felt in 1974 that their language had higher status than before, in less than a year’s time they might become charged if they published a text that was deemed “objectionable” to the government. While this ordinance mainly aimed to counter “indecent” and “obscene” publications, it also

⁴² For instance, see “Use Chinese in courts more: Bar Association looks to future,” *South China Morning Post*, 20 January 1984, 13; Matthew Leung, “We want laws in Chinese: survey,” *South China Morning Post*, 12 February 1984, 8; “Call to study use of court Chinese,” *South China Morning Post*, 18 December 1984, 22; “Committee to study Chinese use in courts,” *South China Morning Post*, 6 October 1988, 2; “Group examines plan to boost Chinese usage,” *South China Morning Post*, 16 November 1989, 6; Scholar Anne Cheung has also described the continued English dominance in Hong Kong’s courts during the 1980s as a “mischief” of the government, see Anne Cheung, “Language Rights and the Hong Kong Courts,” *Hong Kong Journal of Applied Linguistics* 2.2 (1997): 55.

⁴³ Official Languages Ordinance, Cap. 5, updated on 17 February 2017.

⁴⁴ Cheung, “Language Rights,” 49-76.

⁴⁵ *Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Director of Home Affairs J.C.C. Walden, J.P. for the Financial Year 1975-76* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1976), 16.

banned articles of a “revolting nature,” which had no clear definitions in the document.⁴⁶ Peter Wesley-Smith, an editor of the *Hong Kong Law Journal*, warned that this might threaten the freedom of publications even though the Attorney General had assured the government would not use this ordinance to suppress “legitimate publications.” Wesley-Smith argued that similar promises had often been empty words in British legal history.⁴⁷ This ordinance was accompanied by the Summary Offences Ordinance. Legislative Council proceedings revealed that during the 1970s a clause in this ordinance prohibited “distribution, posting or exhibition of notices in the Chinese language in a public place without the permission of the Secretary for Home Affairs or the Secretary for the New Territories.”⁴⁸ In other words, only notices written in Chinese were subject to colonial control. This official discrimination against the Chinese language ended only in the mid-1980s.

Government Operations

The government also pacified the activists by promising a more frequent use of Chinese in its operations. The story of this half-hearted promise begins in 1968. On 28 February, Governor David Trench announced in a Legislative Council meeting that the government was doing “a great deal towards producing a bilingual society.”⁴⁹ Later in April, the government took the first step by amending a term in the Holiday Ordinance: the Chinese New Year. Secretary for Chinese Affairs David Holmes mentioned in a Legislative Council meeting that “Lunar New Year” was closer to the terms used in the Chinese community, and he proposed to change the term “Chinese

⁴⁶ “Laws of Hong Kong: Objectionable Publications Ordinance,” 1975, HKRS 1443-1-13.

⁴⁷ Peter Wesley-Smith, “Editorial: Objectionable Publications,” *Hong Kong Law Journal* 5.2 (1975): 273-74.

⁴⁸ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1979-1980* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1980), 354.

⁴⁹ General Circular No. 13/68: Official use of Chinese Language, 30 March 1968, HKRS 1443-1-13, PRO.



New Year” in the ordinance to the new one.⁵⁰ Governor David Trench saw “Chinese New Year” as sensitive to the communist and nationalist governments. In October 1967 almost half a year after the leftist riots began, Trench noted that the term Chinese New Year “appears occasionally to give offence [to the Chinese governments].” When Director of Information Services N.J.V. Watt asked A.T. Clark from the Colonial Secretariat why the government discouraged using the term, Clark explained that labelling the festival a Chinese one might make local Chinese feel that the government saw their festival as an abnormal one.⁵¹ The government changed the usage of terms more to eliminate potential anti-colonial sentiments than to take care of the people.

The government showed more (but superficial) respect to the Chinese population in the following years. In 1969 the government agreed to publish a new Chinese edition of official maps, though there is no information on how many people bought these maps.⁵² The government also started communicating legal rights to the Chinese population more strongly. In August 1969 the government published a bill with bilingual versions for the first time. In November 1972 and December 1973 it amended the Companies Ordinance and Security Ordinance respectively to protect Chinese investors.⁵³ Later in March 1976 the government assured the Legislative Council that it would ensure the police could accurately translate Chinese oral witness

⁵⁰ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1968* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968), 236-37.

⁵¹ Clark to Watt, 25 October 1967, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

⁵² J.T. Cooper, “Topographic Mapping of the Colony Reprinting of future editions by Govt. Printer,” 4 December 1968, HKRS 1026-1-9, PRO.

⁵³ The amended ordinances require companies to include a Chinese translation in promotional texts or security offers so that Chinese investors could make informed decisions; see *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1969* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1969), 517; *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1972-1973* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973), 201-2, 292.

testimonies into English.⁵⁴ And in March 1978 the government announced that medical doctors trained in Hong Kong should be able to communicate in Chinese.⁵⁵

The government also established the Chinese Language Authority (later the Chinese Language Division) in 1972 under the Home Affairs Department. The authority was responsible for drafting and implementing policies on the official use of Chinese.⁵⁶ It housed all interpreters and translators serving in other departments and advised the government on Chinese cultural issues.⁵⁷ After the Legislative Council passed the Official Languages Ordinance in 1974, the authority had one more function: to give the Chinese language “equal status with English in communication between the Government and the people.”⁵⁸ The authority also renamed the posts of Interpreter and Translator as “Chinese Language Officer” to expand their duties from merely translating or interpreting to also producing original Chinese documents.⁵⁹

Several high-ranking government officials also claimed that they cared about public opinion expressed in Chinese. For instance, Secretary for Home Affairs Denis C. Bray said in a Legislative Council Meeting in August 1974 that senior officials would receive weekly English reviews of Chinese press commentaries and reports from the Information Services Department. The department would also produce special daily reports when necessary.⁶⁰ Financial Secretary Charles Haddon-Cave also claimed in

⁵⁴ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1975-1976* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1976), 622

⁵⁵ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1977-1978*, 680.

⁵⁶ *Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Director of Home Affairs E.P. Ho, J.P. for the Financial Year 1973-74* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974), 14-5.

⁵⁷ Ho, *Times of Change*, 95.

⁵⁸ *Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Director of Home Affairs E.P. Ho, J.P. for the Financial Year 1974-75* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1975), 12-3.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*; This authority later also engaged in Chinese cultural matters and assisted other departments to produce information leaflets, such as the promotional leaflets for gold coins and postage stamps featuring Lunar New Year. Chapters Two and Three will cover these aspects of the authority.

⁶⁰ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1973-1974*, 1117; Patrick Hase, a former Administrative Officer of the colonial government, recounted in a seminar at the University of Hong Kong in 1999 that this daily news summary would arrive on the Governor and secretaries' desks by about 9:00 a.m. every morning, while he would get it by mid or late morning; see “Patrick Hase: Questions and answers session,” 27 April 1999, box 372, Walden Collection.

February 1981 that he “read three summaries of the Chinese press daily,” “two weekly summaries of opinions expressed in the Chinese press,” and “a weekly summary of news items and opinions expressed on all four T.V. channels” when a Legislative Council member asked whether he was aware of people’s discontent about the tax policies.⁶¹

However, reading those summaries did not mean taking action. Early in 1969, Legislative Councillor P.C. Woo complained that a “communication gap” existed between government and people because officials used only English in official communication.⁶² The response from Acting Colonial Secretary Geoffrey C. Hamilton was disappointing. While Hamilton claimed to agree with Woo’s point, he did not express any intention to solve this problem. He simply revealed that the government had already discovered this problem back in 1861 under Governor Hercules Robinson, yet it had “not succeeded in solving this intractable problem with our usual expedition.”⁶³ Secretary for Home Affairs Donald Luddington’s words also exemplified how officials were unaware of Chinese voices. In 1971 he claimed that the public did not express much opinion about the Antiquities and Monuments Bill because there were only three newspaper articles in response to the bill: two in the *Hong Kong Standard* and one in the *South China Morning Post*.⁶⁴ Luddington’s statement reveals his ignorance of the Chinese press as at least two Chinese newspapers, the *Wah Kiu Yat Po* and the *Kung Sheung Daily News*, covered the publication of the bill.⁶⁵

⁶¹ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1980-1981* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1981), 383.

⁶² *Hong Kong Hansard: Session 1969*, 55.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 56-7.

⁶⁴ Notes of a meeting held in the office of the S.H.A. at 11.00 a.m. on Thursday, 29th July, 1971 to discuss the Antiquities & Monuments Bill, 22 September 1971, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

⁶⁵ See “Baocun gangguwu guji faan jiangti liju,” 保存港古物古蹟 法案將提立局 [Preserving Hong Kong’s Antiquities and Monuments, A Bill Will be Submitted to the Legislative Council], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 19 June 1971, 6; “Zhengfu lili baozhang guwu guji,” 政府立例 保障古物古蹟 [Government Legislates, Protect Antiquities and Monuments], *Kung Shueng Daily News*, 29 October 1971, 1.

This gap was also evident from the government's close ties with the colony's main English newspaper, the *South China Morning Post*. Kenneth Pang, a senior journalist who worked for the *Post* and the *China Mail*, a smaller local newspaper, recalls this situation in his memoirs. During the late 1960s, various officials occasionally visited the *Post* headquarters to discuss public opinions revealed in the commentaries with the editor.⁶⁶ Official correspondence reveals that officials communicated with the *Post* editor and responded to its commentaries only.⁶⁷

Even Chinese elites and businessmen who had cooperated with the government believed officials did not pay enough attention to their language. In October 1970, Lee Quo-wei expressed in a Legislative Council meeting that many official forms and letters were still in English and the public could only use English to fill in various bilingual forms. Chinese-speaking people also did not “receive the same treatment from Government departments as the one speaking or writing in English.”⁶⁸ The Chinese Language Committee also wrote in its second report that the government had not yet implemented “a bilingual policy.”⁶⁹ This situation remained unchanged in the rest of the 1970s. Wong Lam complained about this problem in November 1978 during a council meeting:

Although Chinese is now one of our official languages, it is undeniable that many members of the public still have the impression that the Government is only attaching superficial importance to it. Some people even have the misconception (or perhaps it is no misconception) that senior Government officials read the correspondence columns in English newspapers while junior officials read those in Chinese newspapers. It follows that only complaints published in English papers would carry any weight. It would indeed be disappointing if the above is the case.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Kenneth Pang 彭健欽, *Wo zai nanhua zaobao de rizi* 我在南華早報的日子 [My Days in the Post] (Hong Kong: Glory International Publishing, 2011), 82.

⁶⁷ Wong to Editor of South China Morning Post, 11 December 1972, HKRS 600-1-14, PRO; Wong to Editor of South China Morning Post, 20 December 1972, HKRS 600-1-14, PRO.

⁶⁸ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1970-1971* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971), 62.

⁶⁹ *The Second Report of the Chinese Language Committee: Oral and Written Communication between Government and the Public* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971), 1.

⁷⁰ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1978-1979*, 120.

This official ignorance of Chinese also existed in other aspects of government operations. For instance, in 1970 the Chairman of Hong Kong Productivity Council, T.D. Sorby, complained that the postmaster general intentionally omitted Chinese characters on the postage stamp for the Asian Productivity Year. Prior to the design process, Sorby noted to the government that the postage stamp targeted local people and the council hoped it could bring “maximum impact.” However, the Postmaster General’s Office ignored the local Chinese consumers and excluded Chinese characters on the design.⁷¹ Elsie Tu in 1971 also publicly denounced the local political set-up for creating social problems. For instance, she claimed that the government’s mismanagement of language was a “stumbling-block to education,” “a means of injustice in job opportunity,” and “injustice at law.”⁷² Finally, in 1981 Director of Home Affairs J.Y. Chan complained to Director of Education Colvyn Haye that the Education Department issued a letter with no Chinese translation, and the recipient had to seek help from a City District Office. This contradicted the Chinese Language Authority’s instruction in 1972, which required other government departments to write Chinese letters in Chinese.⁷³

Operations of the Chinese Language Authority also reveal the government’s half-hearted attitude in tackling this language issue. The authority originally included an Enforcement Division which reviewed policies on using Chinese in other departments and (ideally) required these departments to use Chinese more frequently. However, this division disappeared from the Home Affairs Department’s report

⁷¹ Sorby to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary, 1 June 1970, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

⁷² “Social & Political Situation in Hong Kong. Speech delivered at Y.M.C.A.,” 1 July 1971, Elsie Tu Digital Collection, Special Collections and Archives, Hong Kong Baptist University.

⁷³ Minutes of First Meeting with Departmental Liaison Officers, 22 March 1972, HKRS 1238-2-75, PRO.

during 1975-80.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the authority promoted only classical Chinese, which the majority could not understand, even though vernacular Chinese had been the common form of written Chinese language in China for half a century. Chairman of the Hong Kong Civic Association Hilton Cheong-Leen complained in a Legislative Council meeting in February 1974 that the government should avoid using “esoteric and outmoded terms.”⁷⁵ Unfortunately, these “terms” appeared throughout the division’s handbook which taught officials how to write official documents in Chinese. This book contained various sentences which mixed up the usage of classical and modern Chinese languages. In a section, the handbook listed the meaningless function words which should not appear in official writings.⁷⁶ However, these meaningless or clumsy function words appeared everywhere in the handbook.⁷⁷

The authority also lacked manpower to complete its basic job: to translate government documents. For instance, in September 1975 the Home Affairs Department informed all other government branches that it could not provide any translation or vetting services that month because it had received an urgent order to translate a full report related to the Hong Kong Telephone Company and had no spare staff to translate other documents.⁷⁸ In fact, the government was still reluctant to pay equal attention to Chinese and English in the late 1970s. In July 1979 the Government Secretariat announced that it would not publish a Chinese version of the *Government*

⁷⁴ *Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Director of Home Affairs J.C.C. Walden, J.P. for the Financial Year 1975-76*, 13-5; this division re-appeared in 1980, with a new name “Enforcement and Development Division”, see *Department Report by the Director of Home Affairs J.C.C. Walden, J.P. for the Financial Years 1978-80* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1980), 45-6.

⁷⁵ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1973-1974*, 454.

⁷⁶ *Xianggang zhengfu Zhongwen gongwen chuli shouce* 香港政府中文公文處理手冊 [A Handbook of Handling Chinese Official Documents in the Hong Kong Government] (Hong Kong: Home Affairs Department, 1975), 22.

⁷⁷ For instance, the author used meaningless “function words” 虛詞 in classical Chinese including *cha* 查 and *yan* 焉. These were all characters which officials should avoid using, as the later section mentions; *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁷⁸ Chinese Language Authority Circular No. 175: Translation Services provided by the Home Affairs Department, 9 September 1975, HKRS 2238-1-2, PRO.



Gazette because it would be too expensive. It also claimed that translating the legislation in the Legal Supplement was “not feasible,” and that some notices were only “aimed at people who understand English.”⁷⁹

The government did not fulfil its promise until the 1980s. Its aims and plans in spreading the use of Chinese remained largely unchanged in the decade following the enactment of the Official Languages Ordinance. The government only started enforcing its departments to use Chinese widely in 1980 with the following objectives:

- (a) Promote the widest possible use of Chinese in all official business.
- (b) Monitor the performance of departments in implementing Government’s Chinese Language Policy and evaluate the quality of service provided.
- (c) Advising Government departments in implementing Government’s Chinese Language Policy and evaluate the quality of service provided.
- (d) Ensuring that the standard of Chinese used in official communication with the public is of a reasonable standard commensurate with the status of Chinese as an official language.⁸⁰

Only in 1980 were concrete attempts made to require officials to use more Chinese, as the above excerpt shows. These attempts became stronger only in later years. For instance, while Hilton Cheong-Leen requested the government not to use classical Chinese in 1974, the Chinese Language Division did not adopt this suggestion until 1984.⁸¹ Also, the division informed other departments only in 1985 that it would advise on how the government should give Chinese and English equal status.⁸²

Local officials indeed recognised the need to communicate in Chinese. However, they only did so when they had important political messages to disseminate. As the next chapter reveals, the Festival of Hong Kong was an official event aimed to create a local identity. Officials repeatedly required government departments to spread

⁷⁹ General Circular No. 23/79: Chinese Translation of Gazette Notices, 4 July 1979, HKRS 2238-1-2, PRO.

⁸⁰ “Implementation of Government’s Chinese Language Policy,” 28 March 1980, HKRS 147-7-12, PRO.

⁸¹ “Style of Language used in Official Correspondence with the Public,” attached in Notes of the 15th Meeting of the UMELCO Panel on Government’s Chinese Language Policy on Thursday, 26.4.1984 at 2.30 p.m., 16 April 1984, HKRS 147-7-13, PRO.

⁸² “Implementation of Government’s Chinese Language Policy,” 4 October 1985, HKRS 147-7-13, PRO.

information related to the festival in Chinese. In 1969 the festival office informed all City District Officers that they “must concentrate on effective liaison with the Chinese Press and other media, to make the greatest impact.” It also mentioned that the Director of Information Services would provide a full-time Chinese Information Officer when the publicity campaign intensified.⁸³ In 1971 the Public Works Department required all sub-departments to supply a Chinese translation of the exhibition captions and texts.⁸⁴ However, government departments simply ignored the need to communicate in Chinese in their daily operation, when there were no significant political messages to spread.

Although they were in a minority, some officials treated the languages ordinance seriously and attempted to respond to public opinion. John Walden, Director of the Home Affairs Department during 1976-80, is an example. On 12 October 1979 the *Wah Kiu Yat Po* published a reader’s letter which criticised the government for using problematic Chinese terms in official correspondence.⁸⁵ While the government had a substantial record in turning a blind eye to the Chinese press, Walden replied to this complaint himself. On 29 October 1979, the *Wah Kiu Yat Po* published Walden’s response which justified the usage of the Chinese terms and was in Chinese.⁸⁶ Though another reader challenged Walden’s justification, this case reveals that Walden cared about the language of the colony’s majority population. In fact, he had often differed from his colleagues in his career. For instance, in a memo to the Secretary Administration in 1977, he wrote that heads of government departments

⁸³ “Hong Kong Week Publicity” attached in Chen to C.D.C. (H.K.), C.D.C. (Kowloon), C.D.O. (Eastern), C.D.O. (Western), C.D.O. (Wanchai), C.D.O. (Central), C.D.O. (Yau Ma Tei), C.D.O. (Mong Kok), C.D.O. (Wong Tai Sin), C.D.O. (Sham Shui Po), C.D.O. (Kowloon City) (Kwun Tong), 14 May 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁸⁴ Minutes of the 2nd Meeting held at 2.30 on Friday, 10th September, 1971 in the P.W.D. Conference Room, Murray Building, 21st floor, September 1971, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO.

⁸⁵ Shi hanquan 石瀚銓, “Gonghan’ yu ‘daixing” 「公函」與「代行」[“Official letter” and “on behalf of”], *Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報, 12 October 1979, 34.

⁸⁶ John Walden 華樂庭, “Gonghan’ ‘daixing’ liangci yongfa” 「公函」 「代行」兩詞用法 [The Usage of Two terms – “Official Letter” and “on Be Half of”], *Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報, 29 October 1979, 39.

should accept criticism from the public and avoid making the same mistakes.⁸⁷ After he retired, he criticised the colonial government even more for not managing its people well.⁸⁸

Education

Like language politics in other parts of the British Empire, those in colonial Hong Kong involved education. How students learnt Chinese was a political issue. This issue drew even greater attention from the government after the communists took over mainland China. During the 1950s, the government tried to eliminate “patriotic” elements from school syllabuses. Before this decade, schools used textbooks written according to the Chinese Nationalist government’s syllabus of 1941. As these materials came out when China was fighting against Japan, the content was fiercely patriotic.⁸⁹ Also, the subject’s name was *Guowen* 國文, the national language, implying a sense of patriotism. Following the suggestion from the Committee on Chinese Studies in the early 1950s, the government introduced a new Chinese syllabus with no patriotic elements. This syllabus emphasised traditional Chinese language, literature, and culture to shield local students from the anti-imperialist sentiments being spread from mainland China and Taiwan.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Walden to Secretary for Administration, 21 January 1977, box 357, Walden Collection.

⁸⁸ For instance, see John Walden, “1997 and the Media’s Role,” *South China Morning Post*, 9 May 1984, 2; John Walden, “Let the People Speak,” *South China Morning Post*, 19 March 1988, 11; and “Grave Warnings if Package Is Rejected,” *South China Morning Post*, 20 April 1990, 7.

⁸⁹ See “1941 Xiaoxue guoyuke kecheng biao zhun” 1941 小學國語科課程標準 [1941 Standard Curriculum of the Guoyu Subject], *Ersbi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biao zhun – jiaoxue dagang huibian: yuwenjuan* 二十世紀中國中小學課程標準·教學大綱匯編：語文卷 [Standard Curricula in Twentieth-century China’s Secondary and Primary Schools – A Collection of Teaching Outlines: Language], ed. Wu Luping 吳履平 et al. (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1999); and “1941 Liunianzhi zhongxue guowen kecheng biao zhun caoan” 1941 年六年制中學國文課程標準草案 [The Draft of the Standard Guowen Curriculum for the Six-year Secondary School System], *Ersbi shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biao zhun – jiaoxue dagang huibian: yuwenjuan* 二十世紀中國中小學課程標準·教學大綱匯編：語文卷 [Standard Curricula in Twentieth-century China’s Secondary and Primary Schools – A Collection of Teaching Outlines: Language], ed. Wu Luping 吳履平 et al. (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1999).

⁹⁰ Bernard Hung-Kay Luk, “Chinese Culture in the Hong Kong Curriculum: Heritage and Colonialism,” *Comparative Education Review* 35.4 (1991): 664-67.

The 1970s witnessed how the government persisted in regulating Chinese language education. After the 1967 riots the government had tightly controlled education to suppress anti-British and patriotic feelings at schools. For instance, during the early 1970s the FCO instructed the Colonial Secretariat to start “publicity campaigns against communist schools and communist activities” in order to minimise their influence.⁹¹ The colonial government publicised the poor examination results of the left-wing schools, emphasising how their pass rates were lower than the average.⁹² The FCO responded it was “glad” that “for some years you have not missed an opportunity to denigrate Communist schools.”⁹³ This hard line against radical patriotism at schools also persisted in the Chinese curriculum.

The government avoided sowing the seeds of Chinese patriotism by cautiously designing the Chinese curriculum. Education scholar Wong Ting-Hong argues that the government’s policy was to remake, instead of eliminating, Chinese culture and language to prevent political patriotism from infiltrating young minds.⁹⁴ In 1970 the Education Department issued a suggested Chinese syllabus for primary schools. Like the one from the 1950s, there were no patriotic elements. The subject’s name was no longer called the national language in either syllabus. Instead, the Education Department replaced it with a neutral name: Chinese language. The stated aim of this syllabus was to cultivate students’ understanding of the Chinese language, appreciation of Chinese literature, and understanding of “traditional Chinese morality” (while the department did not define the term).⁹⁵ Nationalist aims from the 1941 curriculum, such as to “cultivate children’s emotions and awareness of loving the country” were

⁹¹ Pierce to Crowson, 8 November 1972, FCO 40/382, TNA.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Crowson to Pierce, 17 October 1972, FCO 40/382, TNA.

⁹⁴ T.H. Wong, *Hegemonies Compared: State Formation and the Chinese School Politics in Post-War Singapore and Hong Kong* (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002), 204.

⁹⁵ *Suggested Syllabuses for Primary Schools: Chinese* (Hong Kong: Education Department, 1970), 1.

removed.⁹⁶ Although the Education Department titled this document as a “suggested syllabus,” primary school teachers still had to use materials approved by the department even if they were not following this document. As for secondary schools, the Curriculum Development Committee issued a draft Chinese curriculum in 1975, finalised in 1978. This curriculum also focused on using the Chinese language and understanding Chinese literature.⁹⁷ Unlike the one for primary schools, teachers had to follow this official curriculum. Though the government would not punish teachers who did not follow this official guide, students would suffer in the Certificate Examination if they did not study the content specified in the curriculum. As the examination was based on this curriculum and would determine the future of all secondary school students, teachers had to follow this guide.

Like government operations, the official curriculum in the 1970s also went against the Official Languages Ordinance. In fact, in the post-war era English education dominated the school curriculum. With the Chinese Language Movement becoming more influential, Lee Quo-wei in 1970 asked the government if it was initiating translation and interpretation training in civil service and government schools. Acting Colonial Secretary David Ronald Holmes only replied that the government would encourage the spread of English teaching in primary schools.⁹⁸ In a Home Affairs Department meeting in 1972, officials also agreed that “priority should be given to English language training” for interpreters.⁹⁹ In other words, the government only planned to let youth learn the colonial language better, while ignoring the urgent need to communicate with the majority population who were not at schools anymore.

⁹⁶ “1941 Xiaoxue guoyuke kecheng biao zhun.”

⁹⁷ *Zhongxue kecheng gangyao: Zhongguo yuwenke* (zhongyi zhi zhongwu shiyong) 中學課程綱要：中國語文科（中一至中五適用） [Outline of Secondary School Curriculum: Chinese Language (Applicable to Secondary One to Secondary Five)] (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1978), 9.

⁹⁸ *Hong Kong Hansard: Session 1969-1970*, 829.

⁹⁹ Note of meeting held on 8th May 1972 to discuss the Training Programme for Simultaneous Interpreters, n.d., HKRS 600-1-14, PRO.



Although in 1974 the Education Department established the Chinese Language Training Centre, it did not plan to give equal status to Chinese and English in the education system.¹⁰⁰ Officials were reluctant to resolve problems in the Chinese language examination. In the early 1970s there were voices criticising the official Chinese curriculum as it produced students with poor Chinese, especially those from Anglo-Chinese schools. Instead of saying how it would improve the syllabus, the Education Department replied that it had already done much. At the end of its statement, the department said it “accepts that there is always room for improvement in the teaching of a subject like Chinese.”¹⁰¹ In other words, the government simply believed it could not do much about the Chinese curriculum. History repeated itself in 1974 when C.K.K. Wong from the Secretariat for Home Affairs sent an article from *Ming Pao Monthly* to the Education Department. The author attacked the department for doing nothing for the Chinese curriculum while being aware of its problems existed for so long.¹⁰² The Education Department never responded.

The department, together with the Hong Kong Examination Authority, which was newly established in 1978, further devalued Chinese language education in schools. In November 1978, the authority decided to delete the Chinese subject’s compulsory status for the Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination, which was the matriculation examination of the University of Hong Kong.¹⁰³ Even though Legislative Councillor James Wu complained to the government about this discrediting of Chinese, the

¹⁰⁰ In fact, the department had established the English Teaching Centre a decade earlier in 1965; Anthony Sweeting, *Education in Hong Kong, 1941 to 2001: Visions and Revisions* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 252; *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1978-1979*, 161-162.

¹⁰¹ “On the question of teaching Chinese in our Anglo-Chinese secondary schools, we have received representations to the effect that the standard of Chinese of graduates is generally low. Some suggest that this phenomenon is attributed to the syllabi set for public examination,” n.d., HKRS 147-7-12, PRO.

¹⁰² Cao Chunshan 曹春山, “Zhongwen jiaoyu huanle shenme bing?” 香港中文教育患了什麼病？ [What Diseases is Hong Kong’s Chinese Education Having?], *Ming Pao Monthly* (November 1970), 59-61, attached in Wong to Canning, 16 January 1974, HKRS 147-7-12, PRO.

¹⁰³ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1978-1979*, 80.



Education Department simply responded that this amendment was “to keep entry restrictions to a minimum” and that the authority “did not consider that the determination of the school curriculum was one of its functions.”¹⁰⁴ However, in an intensely examination-oriented society like Hong Kong, deleting a compulsory subject from the examination would inevitably lead to schools devaluing that subject in their curricula.

In December 1978 the Examination Authority proposed a similar change to the Hong Kong Higher Level Examination – the matriculation examination of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The authority amended the examination regulations: students would only have to pass either English or Chinese in the Certificate Examination to enter the Higher Level Examination. In other words, students who wanted to enter this Chinese University would not have to know Chinese. This decision shocked many Chinese activists, who started a Second Chinese Language Movement to protest against this proposal. To prevent this movement from stimulating anti-British sentiments, the government backed down and abandoned the proposal.¹⁰⁵ Although it ended this Second Chinese Language Movement efficiently, its original proposal, together with the change in the Advanced Level Examination, show that it failed to give equal status to Chinese and English.

The government’s failure to follow the Official Languages Ordinance is also evident in the interaction between government officials and a review panel. In 1981 the government invited several education experts to evaluate the colony’s education system. While the panel was supposed to review Hong Kong’s education system including language education, MacLehose told the panel that he “hoped to have a report that could be easy to sell to the public and that would resolve rather than stir

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 162.

¹⁰⁵ MacLehose to FCO, 9 December 1978, FCO 40/1000, TNA.

up controversy in education.”¹⁰⁶ After reading the panel’s draft report which contained various criticisms, MacLehose “suggested that some references in the report were tendentious and incorrect and would be better omitted.”¹⁰⁷ Comparing the draft report with the finalised one reveals the “incorrect references” that were omitted, including those about language education. These two documents have contrasting attitudes towards this issue. The draft report describes the need for Hong Kong students to learn both Chinese and English from kindergarten or primary school on as “an unusual burden.”¹⁰⁸ In the conclusion, the panel believed that Hong Kong’s education system should “shift towards mother tongue education [Chinese language education] in the compulsory years [Primary One to Secondary Three]” while promoting “bilingualism after P6, including the tertiary level.”¹⁰⁹

MacLehose’s pressure made the panel switch their stance towards English education. In the final report, the need for Hong Kong students to learn two languages becomes “an unusual privilege and burden.”¹¹⁰ In the recommendation section, the panel claimed the government should “compromise,” instead of shifting towards a non-English education system. Mother-tongue education for “early compulsory years” would be enough.¹¹¹ However, the panel still added a statement at the end to show its discontent towards the official language policy: “We conclude that the saving of appearances has led to an unfortunate lack of correlation between policy and practice... we suggest that it is timely... to do what has to be done on grounds of

¹⁰⁶ “Overall Review of the Hong Kong Education System: Note of meeting between HE the Governor and the Panel of Visitors, on Monday 29 March 1982,” 30 March 1982, box 1, Michael Kirst Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ *Chinese Essence: Western Science, A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong, 1981, A “Restricted Draft” Report by a Panel of Visitors Invited by the Hong Kong Government to Undertake an Overall Review of the Hong Kong Education System*, box 1, Kirst Papers.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ *A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong: Report by a Visiting Panel* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1982), 25.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 30.

principle rather than as a perpetual temporary expedient.”¹¹² As the panel argued (mainly) in the original report, Hong Kong students would benefit more if they receive tuition in their mother tongue. However, the government still hoped to maintain the superior status of English education, resulting in the very “lack of correlation between policy and practice” that the panel had condemned.

After realising the government’s hostility against mother-tongue education, the panel asked the Education Department whether shifting from English-oriented to bilingual education was possible. MacLehose claimed in the meeting that “the Panel were right to focus attention on” this issue and he “supported a move towards bilingualism in principle.”¹¹³ Replies from various officials were, however, both pessimistic and confusing. The first official replied that the department “have already accepted the need for ‘bilingualism’,” and that the problem was how to achieve it.¹¹⁴ Other officials held conflicting views. The second reply firmly denied bilingualism: “No, this is not feasible. Schools should be given the options of using English or Chinese according to needs.”¹¹⁵ Yet, officials knew well that many schools used English as the medium of instruction (though teachers’ quality of English might be terrifying) and teachers were reluctant to switch to Chinese teaching. Other officials continued to open fire against bilingualism. One even commented that implementing bilingualism “would neither satisfy the pressure groups such as the Chinese Language Movement, nor the stalwart supporters of the Anglo/Chinese system.”¹¹⁶

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ “Overall Review of the Hong Kong Education System,” box 1, Kirst Papers.

¹¹⁴ “Overall Review of Education: Question Arising,” 19 March 1982, box 1, Kirst Papers.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 11.

Cantonese vs. Mandarin

The difference in spoken language between Hong Kong and the PRC (and also Taiwan) had been a “stark contrast.”¹¹⁷ In 1956 the PRC declared that it had to unify the Chinese language through promoting Putonghua, literally meaning “common tongue,” and simplified characters. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan specified Mandarin as the only legitimate language of the country.¹¹⁸ By promoting Cantonese as the common spoken language among local Chinese people, the government shaped Hong Kong as a Chinese city distinct from communist and nationalist China.¹¹⁹ It first did so by preventing Mandarin (or Putonghua) from entering schools. In 1968 a working party appointed by the Director of Education published a report on the teaching of Chinese. At the beginning of the report, the party proposed that primary school students should learn Chinese in Mandarin. Students were to learn written and spoken Mandarin, and Mandarin idiom.¹²⁰

More people called for Mandarin education. At least twice in the Legislative Council, Chinese members requested the government to promote Mandarin as a spoken language at schools.¹²¹ In 1971 a Chinese language professor, James T.T. Hoe, argued in a public lecture that the Education Department should gradually replace Cantonese teaching with Mandarin teaching.¹²² Later in 1979, the Chinese Language Society of Hong Kong under the leadership of Yao Te-huai and Szeto Wah proposed that the government introducing “Kuo-yu (Mandarin)” as a subject in the Certificate

¹¹⁷ Bolton, “Language Policy and Planning in Hong Kong,” 64-5.

¹¹⁸ Hsiao A-Chin, “Language Ideology in Taiwan: The KMT’s Language Policy, the Tai-yu Language Movement, and Ethnic Politics,” *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 18.4 (1997): 303.

¹¹⁹ Agnes Shuk-mei Ku, “Identity as Politics: Contesting the Local, the National and the Global,” in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong*, ed. Tai-lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep (London: Routledge, 2018), 456.

¹²⁰ *Report of the Working Party on the Teaching of Chinese* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968), 3.

¹²¹ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1977-1978*, 1160; *Hong Kong Hansard: Session 1979-1980*, 127.

¹²² “Broadcast Chinese in Mandarin says expert,” *South China Morning Post*, 19 July 1971, 5.

Examination.¹²³ Their common ground for having Mandarin education at local schools was that most of the Chinese people in the world, especially in mainland China, had Mandarin as their common spoken language.¹²⁴ James Hoe even claimed that local Chinese should learn Mandarin because this was the “national Chinese language.”¹²⁵ To a government that had been so suspicious about mainland Chinese influence in Hong Kong, these proposals could go nowhere. In 1979 the government replied to the Chinese Language Society that there was “no reason why it [Mandarin] cannot be considered again” in the Certification Examination.¹²⁶ However, Mandarin, which was then titled “Putonghua,” only entered in the examination syllabus after 1997. This linguistic homogeneity at local schools remained unchanged until the 1990s when the retrocession approached.

At the same time, the government promoted Cantonese. When the government provided Chinese courses to expatriate officials in the 1960s, it had already prioritised Cantonese courses.¹²⁷ It had also increased the portion of Cantonese broadcasting of the Radio Hong Kong in this decade.¹²⁸ In 1971 the Chinese Language Committee recommended that Legislative and Urban Councils members could use

¹²³ Yao and Szeto to Secretary of the Hong Kong Examination Authority, 10 July 1979, HKRS 147-7-363, PRO; earlier in 1975, the government also received a proposal suggesting the inclusion of simplified Chinese characters in school curriculum. Similar to the calls for Mandarin education, the government did not entertain this request; Yo to Leung, 30 July 1975, HKRS 2238-1-1, PRO.

¹²⁴ For instance, see “Xianggang zhongxue huikao zengshe Guoyuke jianyishu” 香港中學會考增設國語科建議書 [A proposal to introduce the Mandarin subject in the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination], July 1979, HKRS 147-7-36, PRO.

¹²⁵ “Broadcast Chinese in Mandarin.”

¹²⁶ Mok to Hogan, 3 August 1979, HKRS 147-7-363, PRO.

¹²⁷ Sidney Lau, *Elementary Cantonese, Vol. I: Lesson 1-10* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1972), v.

¹²⁸ The Chinese channel of the Radio Hong Kong originally had a mixture of spoken languages in its programmes, including Cantonese, Kuoyu (Mandarin), Chiuchow, and Hakka. In 1962, the government started increasing the percentage of Cantonese programming on the Chinese channel so that it would not lose its majority Cantonese audience in facing its competitors. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs agreed with this increased percentage of Cantonese broadcasting based on the ground that “[Cantonese] is the lingua franca of the Chinese in Hong Kong, and should therefore be promoted as soon as possible among the new-comers, thereby assisting their integration into our society. In any case the younger generation growing up in Hong Kong should all be able to use Cantonese as a tool of communication, as Cantonese is the medium of instruction in Chinese schools;” Brooks to Burgess, 21 March 1962, HKRS 41-1-8542, PRO; Brooks to Hon. Secretary for Chinese Affairs and District Commissioner, New Territories, 27 April 1962, HKRS 41-1-8542, PRO.

“English or Cantonese” in meetings while excluding Mandarin, in which many local Chinese people advocated its usage. Later when the Executive Council allowed the Urban Council to amend its Standing Order, it also specified that Council members could only use English and Cantonese.¹²⁹

The government also promoted Cantonese through popular music. It did so by cooperating with the Urban Council and Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK). Local Chinese still did not fully accept Cantopop until the late 1970s.¹³⁰ For instance, when singer George Lam released his second Cantopop album titled *The Passenger* 抉擇 in 1979, many people criticised him for “surrendering” to “popular music of a Chinese dialect.”¹³¹ Earlier in 1977, when the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry started issuing Gold Disc awards in Hong Kong, more than half of the awarded albums were in English.¹³²

However, the Urban Council organised many Cantopop shows when the local population had not fully recognised this musical genre.¹³³ Pop music concerts were

¹²⁹ *The First Report of the Chinese Language Committee: Meetings of the Legislative Council, Urban Council, Government Boards and Committees* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971), 4, 11; Memorandum for Executive Council: Urban Council (Amendment) Bill 1972, Use of Cantonese in Urban Council Meetings, 7 April 1972, HKRS 600-1-14, PRO.

¹³⁰ Scholars generally believe that 1974 was the turning point of Cantopop’s history, as the television drama theme song *A Love Tale between Tears and Smiles* 啼笑姻緣 sung by Sandra Lang made Hong Kong people enthusiastically welcome this musical genre. This might be the point when local people started to accept Cantopop, but it was not the year when Cantopop became greatly popular. Sociologist Ng Chun-hung has pointed out in an oral history volume that Cantopop only became “a truly money-making enterprise” in 1976; Law Kar, Ng Chun-hung, and Sam Ho, “On the Eve of the Golden Age: 1970s Hong Kong Cinema,” in *When the Wind Was Blowing Wild: Hong Kong Cinema of the 1970s*, ed. May Ng (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2018), 28-9. Examples of works that view 1974 as Cantopop’s turning point include John M. Carroll, *A Concise History of Hong Kong* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 168; Yiu-wai Chu, *Hong Kong Cantopop: A Concise History* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017), 44-6; Wong Jum Sum 黃湛森, “Yueyu liuxingqu de fazhan yu xingshuai: xianggang liuxing yinyue yanjiu (1949-1997)” 粵語流行曲的發展與興衰：香港流行音樂研究 (1949-1997) [The Rise and Decline of Cantopop: A Study of Hong Kong Popular Music (1949-1997)], PhD thesis, The University of Hong Kong, 2003, 92.

¹³¹ James Wong 黃霑 (the stage name of Wong Jum Sum 黃湛森), “Lin zixiang chang guangdongge” 林子祥唱廣東歌 [George Lam Sings Cantopop], *Ming Pao*, 29 July 1979.

¹³² Receiving a Gold Disc Award means that the artist’s albums attained 15,000 units of sales, and Platinum Disc Award is equivalent over 30,000 units of sales; “Gold Disc Award Presented [1977-2008],” International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (Hong Kong Group) Limited, accessed 12 December 2018, <http://www.ifpihk.org/gold-disc-award-presented/1977>.

¹³³ Chapter Two will explain the relationship between the colonial government and the Urban Council.

nothing new to local people. After the riots of 1967, the government held various campaigns to stabilise society. Shows featuring pop music were one of them. In the early 1970s singers would usually sing Mandarin and English pop, which were popular among the local population.¹³⁴ The situation changed in the mid-1970s. The Urban Council invited more Cantopop singers to perform. Records from 1976 show that the council started to organise variety shows featuring local pop singers. It invited Cantopop singers such as Cheng Kam-cheung, Wan Kwong, and Cheung Yen-yen (who later changed her stage name to Cheung Tak-lan).¹³⁵ Yet Cantopop was still not yet truly popular at this point. Compared to other entertainment programmes such as popular concerts (which featured Western pop songs and bands) and festival celebration, these variety shows were not the most popular ones.¹³⁶

RTHK also actively promoted Cantopop in the 1970s. Officials and DJs were ordered to produce more programmes targeting youth.¹³⁷ As part of this attempt, RTHK introduced a new programme called the Chinese Pop Chart, which was a weekly top chart for Chinese pop songs. As the programme developed, the pop chart included almost only Cantopop, though Mandarin pop was still popular in Hong Kong. RTHK expanded the scale of Cantopop promotion in 1979 by presenting the annual Top Ten Chinese Gold Songs Awards. It later became an important event on Hong Kong people's calendar. Most of the "Chinese Gold Songs" were Cantopop.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ For instance, see *Festival of Hong Kong: Mandarin Singers' Concert Presented by E.M.I. (HK) Ltd.* (Hong Kong: Festival of Hong Kong Office, 1971); "Evaluation of the July entertainment programme," 27 August 1975, Entertainments and Advertising Select Committee of the Urban Council (Entertainments Sub-Committee) [hereafter UC.CH(E)] 27.75, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the November entertainment programme," 30 December 1975, UC.CH(E).55.75, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁵ "Evaluation of the March Entertainment Programme," 4 May 1976, UC.CH(E).04.76, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁶ Calculated based on statistics from the Urban Council's entertainment programme evaluation reports in 1976-77, which are available in the Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁷ Chan Yum Joe 陳任, "Xianggang zhongwen boyinshi 1928-1997" 香港中文播音史 1928-1997 [A History of Chinese Radio Broadcasting in Hong Kong 1928-1997], MPhil theses, The University of Hong Kong, 2000, 6.

¹³⁸ Wong, "Yueyu liuxingqu de fazhan yu xingshuai," 110.

The colonial government controlled RTHK. Scholars have described RTHK before the 1980s as a “state-governed public sphere” and a “colonial mouthpiece”. The programme *Needlepoint* from the 1970s on exemplifies this situation. Listeners could phone in to express their opinions. However, officials would censor these opinions. Only those who had views acceptable to the government could have their voice appearing in the programme.¹³⁹ In other words, RTHK would only broadcast officially approved voices, including Cantopop.

A “Benevolent Linguistic Despotism”

The official respect for the colony’s linguistic Chineseness was superficial, and this false elevation of the language’s status had already become obvious to many local Chinese. Benjamin T’sou, a linguist who later taught at the City University of Hong Kong, in the *South China Morning Post* accused the government of demonstrating a “benevolent linguistic despotism.” While it seemed to behave benevolently by declaring Chinese an official language, it remained despotic in nature: English still prevailed over Chinese in government operation, and “the elevation of the status of Chinese is only for practical purposes and has no substantive value.”¹⁴⁰ When they recalled memories of the events in 1978, Hong Kong University Students’ Union leaders expressed that the official response to the Chinese Language Movement was just stalling.¹⁴¹ Wong Chai Lok, a former lecturer at the University of Hong Kong’s School of Professional and Continuing Education, later wrote in 1983 that, even

¹³⁹ Kuo Hao Yeh, “State, Technology and Market: How Were the Virtual Public Spheres Created in Hong Kong,” PhD thesis, The University of Hong Kong, 2015, 42-51; Carol Pui-Yee Lai, *Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom and Political Change, 1967-2005* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 169.

¹⁴⁰ Benjamin T’sou, “Benevolent Linguistic Despotism,” *South China Morning Post*, 16 May 1983, 23.

¹⁴¹ *Xianggang xuesheng yundong – huigu yu jiantu* 香港學生運動 – 回顧及檢討 [Student Movements in Hong Kong – Review and Evaluation] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Students’ Union, 1978), 147.



though the Official Language Ordinance had come into practice, Chinese people still had to “work hard” to make this official status truly official.¹⁴²

Meanwhile, the government’s language policies were still successful in some ways. They superficially responded to demands of the youth and stopped the Chinese Language Movement from growing. Though officials did not respect this aspect of Chinese culture whole-heartedly, they introduced the Official Languages Ordinance, some reforms in government operations, and various changes in language education. The developments examined in this chapter reveal how the government attempted to contain Chinese patriotism in Hong Kong and to stabilise the colony through limited reforms of language policies. With the movement gradually fading out in the late 1970s and 1980s, the government succeeded in pacifying the colony’s population.

¹⁴² Wong Chai Lok 王齊樂, *Xianggang zhongwen jiaoyu fazhanshi* 香港中文教育發展史 [A History of Chinese Language Education’s Development in Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Bowen shuju 波文書局, 1983), 7.

Chapter Two

Entertainment

It is accepted that next year more items from the region must be injected [into the Arts Festival], and that there must be more of a specifically Chinese nature – preferably from China itself. Somehow also the organiser must include some local Chinese performers, so as to produce a sense of local identity.¹

Governor Murray MacLehose, 19 April 1973

Superficial reforms might pacify people’s discontent for a while, but they are not likely to help maintain long-term stability. Hong Kong’s colonial rulers had already recognised this problem after the Star Ferry Riots of 1966. The *Report of Commission of Inquiry* reminded the government of the need to take “determined and unfaltering steps” to foster a sense of community. Providing leisure activities would be one of the required steps.² Until this moment, the government had paid little attention to culture or entertainment. The new City Hall was opened in 1962 to host local performing arts and museum exhibitions. However, cultural affairs still occupied a very small share of government policies.³ The Urban Council became responsible for this matter, but it only provided entertainment for the public more actively in the 1970s.

After suppressing the leftist riots of 1967, the government started to promote a sense of community among the local Chinese population. Providing free (or cheap) Chinese entertainment was a way to achieve this aim. This chapter analyses how the government presented Chineseness through entertainment. It argues that to foster a sense of community across generations, the government attempted to promote both traditional and modern forms of Chineseness through entertainment. Providing what

¹ MacLehose to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 April 1973, FCO 40/458, TNA.

² *Kowloon Disturbances 1966: Report of Commission of Inquiry* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967), 141-42.

³ Liu Jingzhi 劉靖之, *Xianggang yinyueshi lun: Wenhua zhengce, yinyue jiaoyu* 香港音樂史論：文化政策、音樂教育 [A Discussion of Hong Kong’s History of Music: Cultural Policies and Music Education] (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2014), 2-4.

the people preferred, in this case Chinese-styled leisure, enabled the public to realise that their government cared about them. As MacLehose recounted in the late 1980s, making people content with the government was a key to developing their sense of citizenship.⁴ Youth were especially a target because the government intended to tackle the “special problems of youth” identified in 1966.⁵ In some cases, the government also tried to incorporate people’s efforts and voices and enable the public to appreciate local Chinese culture. This result met some local Chinese leaders’ hope to preserve Chinese culture. It also helped Hong Kong residents to identify with local culture. Meanwhile, the government aimed to provide entertainment in different traditions, such as shows in Chiu Chowese, Fukienese, and Mandarin, to cater to different Chinese ethnic groups.⁶ This chapter reveals how the state attempted to achieve these tasks through the Festival of Hong Kong, Chinese festivals, traditional performances, and the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra.

The Urban Council, which carried out many of the policies examined in this chapter, operated under government directions. The government declared the council financially and administratively autonomous in 1973 in an attempt to showcase the government’s liberal reforms.⁷ However, the council functioned through an official

⁴ Transcript of interviews with The Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE, KCMG, KCVO, DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62) Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82), 13 and 26 April 1989, 12-14 and 29 March 1991, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 377, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 283, 295-96.

⁵ *Kowloon Disturbances 1966*, 142-44.

⁶ Various Chinese ethnic groups had long-established communities in Hong Kong, some of which can be dated back to a major southward migration of Chinese in the twelfth century. Many of these groups formed into “native place associations (*tongxianghui* 同鄉會)” during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There was a strong sense of community among each group, and leaders of these groups sought to influence the society, and sometimes government policies. James Hayes has recalled that when he was a district officer in Tsuen Wan, he had to negotiate, and sometimes confront, with these community leaders due to issues such as the regulation of religious activities and unauthorized shrines; Peter Y.L. Ng and Hugh D.R. Baker, *New Peace County: A Chinese Gazetteer of the Hong Kong Region* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1983), 22; Hugh D.R. Baker, “Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man,” *China Quarterly* 95 (1983): 471; James Hayes, *Friends and Teachers: Hong Kong and Its People* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), 176-77.

⁷ The government publicly claimed that the council fully controlled Hong Kong’s recreational facilities and cultural services, and that half of the council members were elected by the public. For instance, see

department named the Urban Services Department. The Director of the Urban Services chaired the department, and he or she was responsible to the Colonial Secretary, instead of to council members.⁸ Social activists in 1973 also complained that appointed members occupied half of the reformed council, meaning that the government could disapprove any plans by asking them to vote against the motions. Moreover, the government reduced the council's power. New rules prohibited councillors from discussing issues not clearly within the council's jurisdiction and allowed them to hold only one free-style public debate per year.⁹ Former Regional Secretary of the New Territories James Hayes mentioned in his memoir that from the early 1970s on the government cooperated with the Urban Council to “stir up a sense of citizenship among residents.”¹⁰ Meanwhile, citizens' voices had no role in the council's operation. Hayes recalled that the Urban Services Department never liaised with or took advice from local associations and the people.¹¹

In 1982 the government further took away the council's power by establishing a new Recreation and Culture Department. A set of confidential minutes specified that the new department would take up the duties of organising the “community development programme” and providing a “framework for organized activities for the public,” while the Urban Council and the Urban Services Department would mainly manage the facilities.¹² This reduction of power coincided with MacLehose's proposal

K.S. Pun, “Local Authorities for Development of Human Settlements in Hong Kong” City Monograph Prepared for the Regional Congress of Local Authorities for Development of Human Settlements in Asia and the Pacific, June 1982, box 9, James Hayes Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford. This was a paper presented by the Hong Kong government in an association joined by local authorities of the world; another example of this government publicity appears in *Hong Kong 1974 – Report of the Year 1973* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974), 28.

⁸ Y.W. Lau, *A History of the Municipal Councils of Hong Kong 1883-1999: From the Sanitary Board to the Urban Council and the Regional Council* (Hong Kong: Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2002), 127-28.

⁹ Suzanne Pepper, *Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 167.

¹⁰ Hayes, *Friends and Teachers*, 279.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 202.

¹² Notes of a meeting held on 17th February in the Conference Room of the Urban Services Department, 2 March 1982, HKRS 1101-2-17, PRO.

for introducing more elected seats in the council. While more councillors would be elected by the people after 1983, these representatives of public opinion could exercise less power.

The Festival of Hong Kong

People across districts gathered to celebrate and relax during festivals, such as the Lunar New Year, Mid-Autumn Festival, and Dragon Boat Festival. The government created its own occasions of celebration, the Festival of Hong Kong, to entertain “all sections of the Chinese community.”¹³ It took place three times from 1969 to 1973, and the government hoped to create a sense of community through this carnival. Although officials did not construct the festival as a moment for commemorating Chinese traditions, they utilised entertainment in Chinese traditions, such as folk music, dragon dances, and kung fu, to make local Chinese enjoy their time. The government also aimed to involve as many people as possible in organising the festival so that they would feel part of the community.¹⁴ Children and youth were especially their targets.¹⁵

This event was not the brainchild of the Hong Kong government. Instead, it originated from the Hong Kong Week of 1967. This was an initiative of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries to promote Hong Kong products among local residents and stores. Chairman of the Hong Kong Week Committee Chau Sik-Nin mentioned in a press conference in June 1967 that Hong Kong people held a “general antipathy” towards locally-produced goods, while the “wide variety of top quality Hong Kong products” always amazed overseas customers.¹⁶ As a result, the federation recognised

¹³ Clark to Heads of Department, 29 March 1968, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO.

¹⁴ Minutes of the First Meeting held on Friday 25th April 1969 in the Executive Council Chamber, Central Government Offices, 25 April 1969, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO.

¹⁵ “Game Rallies, Hong Kong Festival 1971,” n.d., HKRS 306-5-9, PRO.

¹⁶ Address by the Hon. Sir Sik-Nin Chau, Chairman of the Hong Kong Week Committee, Press Conference, 28 June 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO; Press Release, 28 June 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO.

the need to create “a sense of pride” among local people towards Hong Kong products.¹⁷ However, as the leftist riots escalated, various sectors of the community, including kaifong (neighbourhood), culture, and education, expressed that the Hong Kong Week should be aimed more at “demonstrating the community’s desire and ability to work together for the benefit of all.”¹⁸ The government thus decided to support the event with public funds. An Executive Council memorandum in 1968 recorded that the week evolved to be “much of the character of a Hong Kong Community Week.”¹⁹

To accommodate local people’s preference, organisers presented programmes that featured traditional Chinese culture. Cantonese operas by local top stars, Cantonese dramas, Chinese folk dances, lion and dragon dances and so on appeared on the agenda as important events, while exhibitions also highlighted local Chinese traditions.²⁰ For instance, a handicraft display showcased ancient Chinese crafts and their modern adaptations, such as jade work, ivory carving, and carpet weaving.²¹ Another exhibition titled “200 Years of Chinese Beauties” displayed clothing and fashion styles in Chinese history, ranging from gowns of the Empress Dowager to mini-skirts in the Republican era.²² The federation also used the Chinese junk *Ding Hao* to promote this “Hong Kong Festival.”²³ The week reached its climax with a pageant

¹⁷ “Address by the Hon. Sir Sik-Nin Chau, Chairman of the Hong Kong Week Committee,” 28 June 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO.

¹⁸ “Head 76 – Subventions: Miscellaneous; Subhead 8. Federation of HK Industries,” 20 September 1967, HKRS 70-1-130, PRO.

¹⁹ Memorandum for Executive Council: Hong Kong Week, 9 July 1968, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

²⁰ Press Release: Something for Everyone in Hong Kong Week, 7 October 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO; *Official Programme of the Hong Kong Week* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Week Committee, 1967), 5.

²¹ Press Release: A Novel Exhibition for Hong Kong, 4 October 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO; Press Preview of Handicrafts Display, 12 October 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO.

²² Press Release: Something for Everyone in Hong Kong Week, 7 October 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO; *Hong Kong Week Report* (Hong Kong: Federation of Hong Kong Industries, 1967), 9-10.

²³ “To Promote Colony’s Festival of Fashions,” 7 September 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO.

composed of traditional Chinese performances, including lion dances, folk dances, and a dance with a 12-foot-long dragon.²⁴

While Chineseness was not the only focus of the week, it became the attraction of many events. Tickets sold out quickly. The exhibition on Chinese fashion, for instance, was so popular that the organisers had to continue the event at the Hilton Hotel in Central after the end of the week. The tickets of the Cantonese play “One Step Beyond” and various Cantonese opera shows were also sold out. Commercial Radio had to broadcast the Cantonese opera performances as too many people hoped to attend the shows.²⁵ The local press also generally viewed the week positively.²⁶ This favourable response towards the programmes showed the colonial government that local residents preferred entertainment with Chinese features, and this could be a key to gather social cohesion and public support. The only faction which criticised the week was the leftists, who accused the week as an “anti-China plot.” They criticised the week because they perceived the organisers as encouraging Hong Kong residents to stop using goods and supplies from mainland China and use only Hong Kong products.²⁷

After witnessing the success of the Hong Kong Week, colonial officials proposed to repeat the event in 1969 and make it a “permanent feature of the Hong Kong calendar.”²⁸ Governor David Trench and the Executive Council approved the proposal, which later acquired a new name: The Festival of Hong Kong. Officially, the

²⁴ The Federation of Hong Kong Industries Press Release: Hong Kong Week Pageant, 3 November 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO; *Official Programme of the Hong Kong Week*, 5.

²⁵ *Hong Kong Week Report*, 9-10 and 16.

²⁶ For example, see “Xianggangzhou – Shengli de biaozi” 香港週——勝利的標誌 [Hong Kong Week – A Symbol of Victory], *Kung Sheung Evening News*, 30 October 1967, 1; “Xianggangzhou kaimu yinlong huoyue” 香港週開幕銀龍活躍 [Hong Kong Week Started with An Active Silver Dragon], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 31 October 1967, 2.1; “Shuilai pohuai ‘Xianggangzhou’, jiugai gunchu xianggang qu!” 誰來破壞「香港週」，就該滾出香港去！ [Whoever Destroys the Hong Kong Week Should Get Out of Hong Kong!], *Kung Sheung Daily News*, 31 October 1967, 2.

²⁷ “Attention News Editors,” 1 November 1967, HKRS 70-1-129, PRO.

²⁸ Memorandum for Executive Council: Hong Kong Week, 9 July 1968, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

government aimed at providing a “week of relaxation, enjoyment and interest for the people of Hong Kong,” especially youth. It also emphasised that this would be a “truly popular week” for local people.²⁹ Meanwhile, fostering a sense of community was a target internally. As an Executive Council memorandum specified, the festival was also a community-wide effort that would develop “civic pride in Hong Kong and a sense of identity” through cultural activities, exhibitions, sport competitions, and so on.³⁰ The rationale was to make as many people involved in the festival as possible, so as to make them realise they were members of the community. While various official committees would hold functions for all districts, the government also required City District Offices and the New Territories Administration to coordinate efforts at district levels. These offices enlisted the efforts of district communities, such as kaifong and business associations, and made them help organise the festival.³¹

Chinese elements were the main attractions, with the float parade the most eye-catching one. The government publicly announced that the parade would showcase the characteristics of Hong Kong, namely stability, harmony, industry, and prosperity.³² It also turned the parade into a Chinese procession so that it would suit the taste of the local population. Officials intended to make the festival be “remembered for many years to come” and be “regarded by many Chinese as a symbol of good luck and general prosperity.”³³ When the government issued its press release in May, it described the parade as if it was a festival commemorating Chinese culture:

²⁹ Festival coordinator I. M. Lightbody stated in an internal notice that the festival had nothing to do with tourism. Even if the festival benefited the tourist trade, this would be “merely a bonus.” Chen to C.D.C. (H.K.), C.D.C. (Kowloon), C.D.O. (Eastern), C.D.C. (Western), C.D.C. (Wanchai) C.D.C. (Central), C.D.C. (Yau Ma Tei), C.D.C. (Mong Kok), C.D.C. (Wong Tai Sin), C.D.C. (Sham Shui Po), C.D.C. (Kowloon City), C.D.C. (Kwun Tong), 1 May 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; I.M. Lightbody (Coordinator, Hong Kong Week, 1969), “Hong Kong Week,” 7 March 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

³⁰ Memorandum for Executive Council: Hong Kong Week, 9 July 1968, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

³¹ Chen to C.D.C.s, 1 May 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

³² “Hong Kong Week: Entertainment Committee,” 15 April 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

³³ “Festival of Hong Kong Entertainment Committee: Plan for Festival Procession,” 2 May 1969, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO.

Three huge 200-foot dragons and six 100-foot lions will dance through the streets to the beat of traditional Chinese music supplied by drums and cymbals. Various troupes will stage tableaux of heroic incidents which form part of the legendary history of China. Stilt walkers dressed to depict well-known Chinese personages whose deeds have been described so often in books, films, and stage plays, will intermingle with the numerous musical and theatrical groups which will make the parade picturesque and entertaining. There will also be clowns, acrobats, gymnasts, motorcyclists and several musical bands to entertain the people with displays of their skills and with music, both ancient and modern Chinese music and the latest in “Pop”.³⁴

Other sources reveal that the parade also included traditional Chinese wedding processions and Chiu Chow music featuring heroic figures from the *Water Margin* and scenes in *Journey to the West*.³⁵

Chineseness filled in almost every part of the festival. Participants could first hear it. When the Music Committee planned the programmes of the festival, they invited both Chinese and Western music groups in Hong Kong, including the Hong Kong Philharmonic Orchestra, the Radio Hong Kong Chinese orchestra and Chinese opera group, and the Hong Kong Youth Orchestra. Yet they stressed that they should search for more “popular Chinese choral and other groups.”³⁶ The committee later decided to hold a series of school concerts of Chinese choral and instrumental music by the Fong Lam College, Aberdeen Technological School, and the YMCA Middle School.³⁷ Committee members also insisted that a Chinese orchestra should perform in the opening ceremony even though the concert hall did not have enough space to accommodate both the Western and Chinese orchestras.³⁸ The Lung Cheung Chinese Opera Troupe of Radio Hong Kong also performed every night during the festival.

³⁴ “THREE MILE LONGPARADE TO BE HELD IN DECEMBER: Grand Finale to Festival of Hong Kong 1969,” Daily Information Bulletin, 10 May 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

³⁵ Hum to Civil Aid Services, Civil Aviation Department, Education Department, Fire Services, R.H.K.A.P., Transport Department, Urban Services Department, Public Works Department, Post Office, 21 October 1969, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO; *Xianggangjie yingji* 香港節影集 [Photo Album of the Festival of Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Sin Poh Amalgamated H. K. Ltd., 1970).

³⁶ Music Committee Report, 15 April 1969, HRKS 489-7-22, PRO.

³⁷ Ng to Hon. Secretary for Home Affairs, 16 June 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

³⁸ “Festival of Hong Kong Opening Ceremony (City Hall Concert Hall, Monday 8th December, 1969),” 30 May 1969, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO.

To cater for the needs of residents in the New Territories, the troupe chose to perform more in that region instead of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island.³⁹

The festival also presented Chineseness visually. Traditional Chinese performances, such as lion and dragon dances, Cantonese opera shows, and folk dances, appeared everywhere in Hong Kong. To infuse society with a festive atmosphere, the government also decorated the colony in traditional Chinese fashion, including hanging lantern displays and erecting Chinese archways [*pailou* 牌樓] that showcased models of dragons and pearls.⁴⁰ The Exhibition Committee held public displays which showcased Chinese artworks and calligraphy.⁴¹ The government also held competitions which promoted Chinese culture, such as Chinese chess and calligraphy contests. In a Chinese calligraphy competition, one of the internal aims was to “revive the arts of Chinese calligraphy.”⁴² Even a beach party at Repulse Bay could not escape from Chinese dragons and phoenixes. Dragon boats and phoenix boats appeared in the party through water displays. Performers also presented dragon and lion dances on the beach.⁴³ The commemoration magazine records that even the local British troops “staged a tableaux of heroic events” in Chinese history.⁴⁴

Both the government and the public considered the 1969 festival a success. The report for the Executive Council stated that the events not only enabled the public to enjoy, but also “enhanced Government’s image in the eyes of the public.”⁴⁵ At the same time, the local press revealed how the public welcomed the festival so much that

³⁹ Entertainment: Second Progress Report, 22 May 1969, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO.

⁴⁰ Lo to C.D.C. (H.K.), 30 May 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; Report on the Festival of Hong Kong, 31 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22.

⁴¹ Exhibition Committee Report, 16 April 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁴² Quangang Zhongwen shufa bisai jianzhang 全港中文書法比賽簡章 [Brief Instructions of Hong-Kong-Wide Chinese Calligraphy Competition], attached in Li to Hon. Director of Education, 24 October 1969, HKRS 1562-2-9, PRO; “Western C.D.O.: Progress of the Four Sub-Committee,” n.d., HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁴³ “H.K. Festival Beach Carnival Meeting,” 15 July 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁴⁴ *Festival of Hong Kong Commemoration Magazine 1969* (Hong Kong: Universal News Agency, 1969).

⁴⁵ Memorandum for Executive Council. Festival of Hong Kong: Proposal for the Future, 12 March 1970, HKRS 931-6-159, PRO.

they wanted the government to repeat it.⁴⁶ The commemoration magazine recorded that journalists believed the festival “manifested traditional Chinese values” which could help educate Hong Kong’s youth.⁴⁷ However, some officials still doubted whether the government should devote so many resources for leisure. Secretary for Home Affairs David Ronald Holmes and his subordinate Denis Bray were the two prominent opponents against the festival within the government as they believed the government should not spend that much money on leisure.⁴⁸

The government responded by asking City District Officers to survey public opinion towards the festival. Though interviewees pointed out problems related to administration, logistics, and other technical arrangements, they viewed the festival favourably overall. According to the report from Wong Tai Sin, people criticised spending so much for leisure purposes before the festival began. However, once the festival started, “people’s attitude turned to one of excitement and enthusiasm again and they were happy to attend and participate in the many events that were organised.” After the festival ended, many residents praised the government for being “so enlightened as to provide a week of such gaiety and enjoyment of the public.” The City District Officer reported that events at both the central and district levels were well attended, while schools, youth groups, and the industrial and commercial sectors were

⁴⁶ Though some people believed the government could improve certain arrangements of the festival, such as dates and location of the parade, the public viewed the festival as a success. For instance, see “Xianggangjie bande chenggong, ying meinian banyici” 香港節辦得成功 應每年辦一次 [The Festival of Hong Kong Was Held Successfully and Should Be Repeated Annually], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 25 December 1969, 2.1; “Xianggangjie haobuhao? Mingnian yingfou zaiban? Qingting shimin de xinsheng!” 「香港節」好不好？明年應否再辦？請聽市民的心聲！ [Was the Festival of Hong Kong Good? Should It Be Held Again Next Year? Please Listen to the Views of Citizens!], *Kung Sheung Evening News*, 26 December 1969, 4; “Yiban yijian renwei qiuri juxing jiaohao Xianggangjie mingnian ying zailai” 一般意見認為秋日舉行較好 香港節明年應再來 [General Views Believed That the Festival Should Be Held in the Autumn, the Festival of Hong Kong Should Be Repeated Next Year], *Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 26 December 1969, 20.

⁴⁷ *Festival of Hong Kong Commemoration Magazine 1969*.

⁴⁸ Holmes to Deputy Colonial Secretary, 8 October 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; Bray to C.D.C. (H.K.) and C.D.C. (K.), 22 October 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; Bray to Co-ordinator, Festival of H.K., 23 July 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; Hayes to C.D.O. (Eastern, Western, Central, Wan Chai, Mong Kok, Kowloon City, Wong Tai Sin, Sham Shui Po, Kwun Tong, Yau Ma Tei), 19 November 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

all highly ready to contribute to the festival. The Chinese-styled parade amused residents so greatly that they were still talking about it “in an excited manner” after the festival, and no interviewee criticised the disruption arising from the closure of Nathan Road during the event. The elderly also compared the parade to what had happened in 1952 during the Queen’s Coronation.⁴⁹

Later reports revealed similar comments. While the programmes included both Chinese and other entertainment, such as a fiesta in Central and a military tattoo, Chinese items drew much of the attention. The Mong Kok report mentioned that people realised the government did care for the “welfare of the people,” and residents there actively participated in the activities.⁵⁰ At the same time, the float parade was the second most popular to Central residents even though they had seen the traditional performance very often. They also enjoyed the Chinese performance in their own district. For instance, the elderly enjoyed the free Cantonese opera performances while children participated in the school variety shows. Local associations also organised lion dances, concerts of Cantonese operatic songs, and Chinese boxing and karate, which were popular among the “very young and the less sophisticated older generation.”⁵¹ Residents of the Eastern District also enjoyed the entertainment. Though City District Officer M. Leung repeatedly criticised the festival as having unclear aims and costing too much, he still agreed that the public welcomed the festival and the government should repeat it with a clearer public aim.⁵² Residents from the Western District also

⁴⁹ James So, “Report on Festival of Hong Kong,” n.d., HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁵⁰ Lam to C.D.C. (K’ln. & H.K.) 30 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁵¹ Report on the Festival of Hong Kong, 31 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁵² Leung believed that the government should not worry about letting the public realise the political implication of the festival, as “anyone with a certain amount of common-sense and intelligence could well guess that the spending of so much Government money and the establishment of a separate Government office and the involvement of all 10 City District Offices in the festival must have a purpose behind it to justify so much Government effort, and they would not be prepared to accept the simple explanation of a festival just for fun”; see Festival of Hong Kong 1969: Report from Eastern District, 30 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

felt that the “most impressive” items of the festival were the float parade and the military tattoo.⁵³

After witnessing its great popularity, City District Officers supported repeating the festival, though they believed holding it biannually would be a better option as the festival was a heavy administrative burden.⁵⁴ The section of the community who widely denounced the festival was, again, the leftists. Officials generally ignored their criticism. David Holmes wrote in 1970 that the strong opposition of local communists was in fact “quite an important additional factor illustrating the Festival’s success.”⁵⁵ Other government departments also supported the officers’ proposal, and the Executive Council decided to hold the festival again in 1971.⁵⁶

The festivals in 1971 and 1973 followed the pattern of their predecessor. The aims of providing weeks of enjoyment and fostering a sense of community remained, but on an even larger scale.⁵⁷ Activities continued to take place at both central and district levels. The government also took the advice of the City District Officers seriously. It tried to minimise their complaints by decreasing their workload. They could organise less activities, while the government attempted to centrally coordinate the works of local organisations.⁵⁸ The Festival of Hong Kong Office also considered the comments from the officers’ reports and repeated the activities that were popular

⁵³ Report on the Festival of Hong Kong (Western District), n.d., HKRS 487-7-22, PRO.

⁵⁴ Lam to C.D.C. (K’ln. & H.K.), 30 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; Report on the Festival of Hong Kong, 31 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO; Chiu to D.S.H.A. (H), 30 December 1969, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁵⁵ Secretary for Home Affairs to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 10 January 1970, HKRS 489-7-22, PRO.

⁵⁶ Memorandum for Executive Council. Festival of Hong Kong: Proposal for the Future, 12 March 1970, HKRS 931-6-195, PRO; “Festival of Hong Kong 1971 Office Accommodation” 20 March 1970, HKRS 931-6-159, PRO.

⁵⁷ Whitley to Hon. Director Public Works, Hon Director of Education, Hon Director of Medical and Health Services, Hon Secretary for Home Affairs, Hon Director of Social Welfare, Hon Director of Urban Services, Hon District Commissioner for the New Territories, Commissioner of Police, Director of Broadcasting, Colonial Secretary’s Office, Civil Aid Services, Director of Fire Services, Director of Information Services, General Manager Railway, 30 September 1970, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO; “Festival of HK 1971: District Participation,” 9 February 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

⁵⁸ Hayes to Hon. S.H.A., 13 October 1970, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO; “Festival of HK 1971: District Participation” 9 February 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

in 1969. In March 1971, the office announced that it would present an even more “colourful” parade.⁵⁹ The result showed that being colourful was equivalent to being traditional. The procession became part of the festival’s opening ceremony. Officials emphasised that it was a “traditional procession” with lions, dragons, and “various other traditional items” performed by students, youth scout, and other groups.⁶⁰ The local press described the parade as if it was a Chinese festival. The *Wah Kiu Yat Po* reported that the parade was full of lion and dragon dances, with women dressed as ancient Chinese beauties dancing and singing with their lanterns. Other Chinese performances include Chiu Chow music, foreigners dressing as Chinese historical figures, and classical acrobatics. The only foreign elements that were briefly mentioned in that report were the national anthem of the United Kingdom, a brass instrumental performance by Welsh musicians, bicycle acrobatics, and MacLehose, who gave a speech and declared the start of the festival.⁶¹ The *South China Morning Post* reported that this “traditional Chinese procession” attracted enthusiastic spectators.⁶² The foreign elements, such as the military band and scouts, were nowhere to be found in the *Post* coverage.

The Festival of Hong Kong Office devoted extra efforts to engage children in the events. Through game rallies in all districts, the government let them become active participants rather than mere spectators. With everyday publicity and school mobilisation, children entertained themselves in games and competitions to win prizes, while youth volunteers had to help organise and run the game stalls. By enlisting their support to these community events, the government hoped to boost a sense of

⁵⁹ “Item Issued on Behalf of the Festival of HK Office” 29 March 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

⁶⁰ “The following is issued on behalf of the Festival of Hong Kong Office,” 19 April 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

⁶¹ “Xianggangjie dengxi dafang guangming, huijing xunyou wanzhong huanteng” 香港節燈飾大放光明會景巡遊萬眾歡騰 [Illuminations of the Festival of Hong Kong Brightens Up the City, Ten Thousands of People were Jubilant about the Parade], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 27 November 1971, 2.2.

⁶² “Giant Crowd Cheers Festival’s Opening Display,” *South China Morning Post*, 27 November 1971, 1.

citizenship among youth and children.⁶³ Similar to the adult programmes, Chinese lions and dragons danced in front of the children. District programmes also included martial arts demonstration.⁶⁴

Everyday programmes also became more Chinese. The festival office first invited the bandmaster of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers to arrange a festival fanfare. However, the fanfare was not in Welsh but in Chinese musical style. Programme booklets recorded that the fanfare was based on a “nonsense song in the pentatonic scale or aeolian mode from Ho Pei Province in Northern China,” while the arranger made it “recognisable as a Chinese tune.”⁶⁵ While the district programmes were a mix of Chinese and Western items (such as magic shows, a police band, and a pop dance), Chinese ones featured every day and everywhere. Cantonese opera, Chiu Chow music, Peking opera, and Mandarin pop music concerts appeared throughout the festival.⁶⁶ The performance by a Chinese classical orchestra was especially popular. A report stated that its concert was “popular and enthusiastically received,” while the “attendance proved the benefit of a single orchestra over a mixed concert.”⁶⁷

District officers also increased the portion of Chinese performances as they planned the programmes. For instance, in October 1971 they replaced a variety show with a Chinese theatrical performance.⁶⁸ With help from the Kowloon Chinese Chess Association, they also held a Hong Kong-wide Chinese chess tournament to “popularise chess as entertainment, and to improve social customs.”⁶⁹ The government also introduced standard application procedures and safety conditions for

⁶³ Game Rallies, Hong Kong Festival 1971,” n.d., HKRS 306-5-9, PRO.

⁶⁴ “Hong Kong Festival Games Rallies 1971,” n.d., HKRS 306-5-9, PRO.

⁶⁵ *Festival of Hong Kong: The United Academic of Music* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971).

⁶⁶ Final Programme, attached in Hassan to All C.D.O.s and D.O.s, 15 October 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

⁶⁷ “Precis of Music Comments – City Hall etc. Festival of Hong Kong, 1971,” n.d., HKRS 1124-2-20, PRO.

⁶⁸ Wong (C.D.O. H.K.) to Co-ordinator, Festival of Hong Kong, 13 October 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

⁶⁹ Hassan to C.D.C. (Kowloon) and C.D.C. (Hong Kong), 9 July 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO.

district leaders and organisations which hoped to decorate the venues with Chinese archways.⁷⁰ This policy not only ensured the safety of participants, but also showed that the government accepted this traditional decoration. As the local press revealed, people continued to welcome and enjoy the programmes.⁷¹ A commentary from the *Kung Sheung Evening News* described the festival as comparable to the colony's Christmas celebration.⁷²

The 1973 festival had the same aim of fostering a “sense of identity and community” through “traditional” entertainment. Officials continued to seek district organisations and leaders to help organise events. However, they came up with certain new elements. First, the government attempted to achieve the same aim by promoting the many achievements of Hong Kong, such as the opening of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel and the development of commerce and industry. It also planned to target the larger world. Through issuing commemorative postage stamps, holding international sports competition, and inviting renowned music groups to perform, the government intended to promote Hong Kong and boost the colony's tourist trade.⁷³ It also established the Local Celebrations Committee to give more autonomy to community leaders to organise district programmes.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Taylor to Hon. S.H.A. and Hon. N.T.A., 31 August 1971, HKRS 489-7-23, PRO; “Festival of Hong Kong 1971 Conditions for Erecting a Pai Lau,” attached in Notes on a Meeting held at the Festival Office, on Friday, 23rd July, 1971 to clarify a Procedure on How to Deal with Pai Lau Decorations, n.d., HKRS 1544-1-7, PRO.

⁷¹ For instance, see “Shimin relie canjia Xianggangjie” 市民熱烈參加香港節 [Citizens Participated in the Festival of Hong Kong Enthusiastically], *Wab Kiu Yat Po*, 27 November 1971, 1.2; “Xianggangjie relie zhankai, chuchu shengping ren huanxiao” 香港節熱烈展開 處處昇平人歡笑 [The Festival of Hong Kong Started with Enthusiasm, Peace, and People's Laughter were Everywhere], *Wab Kiu Yat Po*, 28 November 1971, 3.1.

⁷² “Lun Xianggangjie babi yihuo yedan jiashi” 論香港節巴閉 抑或耶誕架勢 [Whether the Festival of Hong Kong Was Grander or Christmas Celebrations Were Larger-in-scale], *Kung Sheung Evening News*, 6 December 1971, 2.

⁷³ Chapter Three will examine how the government promoted Hong Kong to the world as an authentic city; Browne, Chung, Salmon, Lee, Sales, Sutcliffe to MacLehose, 20 January 1972, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; Tsang to Assistant Secretary, 21 February 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; Mason to Kelley, 19 September 1973, FCO 40/458, TNA.

⁷⁴ “Local Celebrations Committee Paper 1/2: Role of the Local Celebrations Committee,” 12 April 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO.

Chineseness still dominated the festival. While local leaders could decide programmes of their choice, they still preferred Chinese entertainment. Among five types of local programme in their plans, Chinese shows such as Cantonese opera and lion dances were the majority.⁷⁵ In the Western District, organisers also added more Cantonese opera shows by the Lung Cheung Opera Troupe.⁷⁶ The Festival of Hong Kong Office also increased the portion of Chinese music. Minutes of a Music and Performing Arts Committee meeting recorded that officials wanted “Chinese musical items to be increased.”⁷⁷ The committee also decided to have foreign drama, such as the Caucasian Chalk Circle, played with Chinese themes.⁷⁸ However, the same kind of performance appeared so frequently that the spectators became bored. After the festival ended, residents from different regions commented to their district officers that the programmes contained too many lion and dragon dances. They also complained that the festival included too much martial arts. Residents from Wan Chai thought the Chinese boxing teams in the parade were “too predominant,” while Kowloon residents believed the programmes had “undue prominence given to martial arts schools.”⁷⁹ Despite the negative comments on certain performances, the public opinion shown in the newspapers was still very positive.⁸⁰ More people commented that festival programmes were becoming too familiar as they could not find many new

⁷⁵ General Assessment on Local Celebration (urban) Events, December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO.

⁷⁶ Yeung to Cheng, 19 May 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO.

⁷⁷ Minutes of the First Music and Performing Arts Committee Meeting held on 12.1.73 at 4.10 p.m. in the Conference Room, Festival of HK Office, United Chinese Bank Building, 11/F., Des Voeux Rd., Central, Hong Kong, January 1973, HKRS 1124-2-20, PRO.

⁷⁸ Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Music & Performing Arts Committee held on 15th June 1973 at 4.05 p.m. in the Conference Room, Festival of Hong Kong Office, 11th floor, United Chinese Bank Building, Des Voeux Road, Central, Hong Kong, June 1973, HKRS 931-6-164, PRO.

⁷⁹ Leung to C.D.C. (Hong Kong), 13 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; Chiu to C.D.C. (Hong Kong), 14 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; C.D.C. (Kowloon) to D.D., 20 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; Wong to Hon. Secretary for Home Affairs, 28 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO.

⁸⁰ For instance, see “Zuowan Huanghouxiang guangchang kongqian renao” 昨晚皇后像廣場空前熱鬧 [Statue Square Was Unprecedentedly Populous], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 2 December 1973, 2.1; “Xianggangjie yazhou haoxi, Jiulong huache daxunyou” 香港節壓軸好戲 九龍花車大巡遊 [The Grand Finale of the Festival of Hong Kong, Huge Float Parade in Kowloon], *Kung Sheung Daily News*, 3 December 1973, 7; “A ‘Local’ Festival,” *South China Morning Post*, 29 December 1973, 9.

items. However, as in previous years, City District Officers received praise from residents about the “good gesture” of the government in providing free or cheap entertainment.⁸¹

Publications from university students also revealed the festival’s success. Student activists once tended to criticise official celebrations as full of political objectives. They claimed that the festival simply aimed to fool the public by covering up Hong Kong’s problems such as corruption and robberies: without the “May Storm of 1967,” the colonial government would not take such actions to hide its problems.⁸² Others complained that the festival was a waste of money, and some students viewed the arrangements of the festival programmes as unattractive and boring.⁸³ A report in the Hong Kong University Students’ Union *Undergrad* magazine emphasised that what Hong Kong needed was not a sense of belonging, but democracy, social welfare, and a more equal allocation of income.⁸⁴ However, their attitude started to change in 1973. One article in the *Chinese Students Weekly* praised how the festival promoted traditional Chinese music.⁸⁵ Even the *Undergrad* pointed out that the festival succeeded in arranging entertainment and presenting music, though it stressed that this was due to the “cooperative spirit” and “cautious attitude” of local residents.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Hui to C.D.C. (H.K.), 11 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; Leung to C.D.C. (H.K.), 13 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO; Chiu to C.D.C. (H.K.), 14 December 1973, HKRS 489-7-24, PRO.

⁸² “Guanmin tan Xianggangjie” 官民談香港節 [An Official and an Ordinary Person Discussing the Festival of Hong Kong], *Chinese Students Weekly* 1012 (10 December 1971): 8; “Tan Xianggangjie” 談香港節 [Discussing the Festival of Hong Kong], *Chinese Students Weekly* 1113 (5 December 1973): 3.

⁸³ “Xianggangjie jietou renyu” 香港節街頭人語 [People’s Casual Comments About the Festival of Hong Kong on Streets], *Chinese Students Weekly* 909 (19 December 1969): 8; “Xianggangjie yanzou zaji” 香港節演奏雜記 [A Miscellaneous Record of Music Performances in the Festival of Hong Kong], *Chinese Students Weekly* (26 December 1969): 12.

⁸⁴ “Gei Xianggangjie da wenhao” 給香港節打問號 [Putting a Question Mark for the Festival of Hong Kong], *Undergrad* 20 (1 January 1970): 1.

⁸⁵ For examples of university students (partially) praising the festival, see “Xianggangjie, guoyue, ji qita” 香港節·國樂·及其他 [Festival of Hong Kong, National Music, and Others], *Chinese Students Weekly*, 1113 (5 December 1973): 2.

⁸⁶ “Gei Xianggangjie da wenhao”; retired journalist Ching Cheong recalled in 2015 that when he was one of *Undergrad*’s editors during the early 1970s, the editorial team was “pro-China” and advocated studies on China. Their stance could have led to *Undergrad*’s appreciative attitude towards the Chinese

Although the office planned to hold another festival in 1975, the Governor and the Executive Council decided to postpone it due to “extreme” financial difficulty.⁸⁷ This postponement deleted the festival from Hong Kong’s calendar forever, as the government never organised another Festival of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, as the newspapers and district reports illustrate, the festivals provided Hong Kong people with enjoyable entertainment and created a festive atmosphere which differed from the tension between state and society in earlier years.

Chinese Festivals

Although the Festival of Hong Kong was popular among many local Chinese, it was not comprehensive enough to influence every sector of society, and the government stopped holding it after 1973. Nevertheless, the government never stopped trying to create a sense of community through entertainment. From the late 1960s on, it celebrated traditional festivals for local Chinese much more often. Compared to the Festival of Hong Kong, government efforts here were wider in scope to attract participants across generations. Officials incorporated modern or trendy elements, such as balls, pop concerts, and DJ shows into festival celebrations to engage youth in these community events. At the same time, officials included traditional performances, such as folk dance and songs, when celebrating foreign festivals so that adults and elderly could enjoy the joyful atmosphere together with the youth. Even though the

entertainment; see *Xueyuan 60* 學苑 60 [Sixtieth Anniversary of Undergrad] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Students’ Union, 2015), 82, 87.

⁸⁷ The Festival of Hong Kong Office originally proposed to make the festival an event for both local residents and tourists. Its aim was to “promote greater interest in the history of Hong Kong by selecting a number of suitable historical sites to serve as the basis for a tour itinerary”; Moss to All Heads of Departments, 7 November 1974, HKRS 931-6-166, PRO; Memorandum for Executive Council: Report on Festival of Hong Kong 1973 and Proposals for Future Festivals, 17 May 1974, HKRS 1180-3-1, PRO; Roberts to Kan, 17 December 1974, HKRS 1180-3-1, PRO.



level of attendance could be low at some events, the government or the Urban Council insisted on organising them and making them annual events.

Officials had cared about traditional Chinese festivals both before and after the disturbances of the 1960s. The governor's annual speech addressing the Lunar New Year is one example. Governor David Trench started this practice in 1965: he would deliver a speech through Radio Hong Kong at the beginning of each lunar year to express his best wishes to local Chinese. He also greeted the population with traditional Cantonese phrases at the end of each speech. Later in 1970, the government spread this annual speech further by broadcasting a fully Cantonese version. Governor MacLehose continued this practice.⁸⁸

Both the governors and their subordinates cared about these Chinese festivals. In 1969 the Information Services Department issued a statement on the Mid-Autumn Festival. It stated that many local bakery shops showcased signboards that featured the same story: astronauts from the Apollo II mission had brought back not only samples and moon soil, but also “mooncakes given to them by a goddess.” The department also stressed what a unique occasion it was for “three strangers from the West” to be “linked to one of the most colourful and spectacular festivals in the colony – the moon festival.”⁸⁹ The government attempted to show that it respected this local custom by describing the festival as a “colourful” and “spectacular” one. It also revealed to the public that it had always cared about the people and their local affairs. When Patrick Hase took up the position of district officer in the 1970s, his superior John Walden told him that officers had to organise a “big New Year's party” for all district leaders in the New Territories annually and to take great care of this celebration. As Hase

⁸⁸ “RTHK Memory: Governors,” Radio Television Hong Kong, accessed 13 January 2020, <http://app4.rthk.hk/special/rthkmemory/tag/Governors/?lang=eng>.

⁸⁹ “Mooncakes for Apollo Astronauts: Hong Kong brings moon festival up to date,” 1969, HKRS 365-1-366-1, PRO.

recalled, the officers still insisted on holding the party even though the budget was tight. In 1977 the government only granted \$700 for Hase to hold a party for 600 people. Hase was determined to complete this task by asking his staff to search for cheap food and drinks all around Hong Kong. His team succeeded and the food and drinks were so cheap that Hase suspected “they had been stolen.”⁹⁰ As the next chapter reveals, officials also issued postage stamps that commemorated traditional Chinese festivals to showcase how the government cared about the people’s traditions.

The government hoped to engage both the old and the young in its festival celebrations and construct a positive image of itself. It did so through the Urban Council. The first new attempt after the Festival of Hong Kong was the 1974 Lantern Carnival, which took place during the Mid-Autumn Festival. Local organisers saw this a chance to promote Chinese customs. The carnival chairperson, Yu Lok-yau, mentioned in the opening address that the event aimed to provide more local entertainment and to promote the “joyous atmosphere of our country’s traditional festivals.”⁹¹ Yu later mentioned in an interview that this festival was worth celebrating because it was one of the most important festivals among local people, and it was a Chinese festival with “folkish characteristic.”⁹² Even the Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Tourist Association, D.B. Donaldson, believed that Hong Kong had lost many of its Chinese traditions and this was the moment to rescue them, though he approached this issue from the tourist perspective: “we are greatly disturbed by the steady erosion of many traditional Chinese cultural activities and practices in Hongkong as so many of these are of great interest to our visitors.”⁹³

⁹⁰ “The District Office: Dr Patrick Hase, Transcription of tape,” 27 April 1999, box 372, John Walden Collections, Hoover Institution Archives.

⁹¹ “Zhongqiu caidenghui xianci” 中秋綵燈會獻詞 [A Speech for the Mid-Autumn Lantern Festival], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 29 September 1974, 3.2.

⁹² “Yuzhongtongle de caidenghui” 與眾同樂的綵燈會 [A Lantern Carnival in Which One Can Have Fun with Others], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 29 September 1974, 3.2.

⁹³ “Carnival to raise \$24,000,” *South China Morning Post*, 23 December 1974, 24.

As the council's report recorded, the carnival succeeded in making local people enjoy and relax: it became the "most welcomed function of this month," and it "added more colour to the Mid-Autumn Festival and was very well received by the local people as well as tourists." The council cooperated with the kaifong associations of Tsim Sha Tsui and Causeway Bay, and the City District Office of the Eastern District to cater to people's preferences. Around 80,000 people attended the Chinese programmes in Victoria Park, which included dragon and lion dances, an opera show, lantern riddles, fortune telling, and a lantern parade.

The carnival became larger in scale as the Urban Council continued it in later years. In 1975 the council included both traditional celebrations and trendy items, such as a fashion show, DJ show, and performance by Commercial Radio artists. This carnival attracted 100,000 participants, 25% more than the previous year, and "provided more entertainment and fun and was extremely well received by the public at large."⁹⁴ In 1976 the council held a carnival in both Victoria Park and Kowloon Park to cater to residents in Kowloon.⁹⁵ The one at Victoria Park became an eye-catching event as the council invited Cantonese opera star Tang Wing Cheung (under the stage name Sun Ma Sze-tsang) to perform and distribute mooncakes. As the next section explains, Cantonese opera had been an important theatre performance and community activity for Chinese communities. Moreover, Tang was one of the most influential local artists of the twentieth century, and the *Wah Kiu Yat Po* described this performance as his "exception" because, after the 1960s, he usually performed only in charity shows.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ "Evaluation of the September entertainment programme," 3 November 1975, UC.CH(E).38.75, Municipal Councils Archives Collection, Hong Kong Public Libraries, Hong Kong.

⁹⁵ "Evaluation of the September entertainment programme," 28 October 1976, UC.CH(E) 37.76, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

⁹⁶ "Jinwan 'Weiyuan zhongqiu caidenghui' Xinma yu Nan Hong changmingqu, bingzai xianchang paiyuebing" 今晚「維園中秋綵燈會」新馬與南紅唱名曲 並在現場派月餅 [Sun Ma and Nan Hong Will Sing Well-known Songs and Distribute Mooncakes at Tonight's Mid-Autumn Lantern Carnival in Victoria Park], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 8 September 1976, 5.2; Paul Fonoroff, "Sun Ma Sze-tsang 新馬師曾," in *Dictionary of Hong Kong Biography*, eds. May Holdsworth and Christopher Munn (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 410-11.

Tang's willingness to perform in the carnival made the event more significant for Hong Kong people.

In the late 1970s the carnival continued to grow. A council report described the one in 1977 as having a "big scale of operation" and "undoubtedly a very entertaining affair for both young and old." Hot-air balloon rides became the new attraction of the year. The council also cooperated with the Education Department to engage more school children in the events, especially the school band and dance performances and the lantern design competition. On the other side of Victoria Harbour, the council held another smaller carnival in Cheung Sha Wan Playground. Children had a "glorious time" with the band performance, party, and fun fair, while adults enjoyed the Cantonese opera and Chinese folk dance performances.⁹⁷ In 1978 the council held one more carnival in Morse Park. Even though it only attracted 4,600 people, the council still stated that it should continue this practice so that Kowloon residents could have their own carnival.⁹⁸

The council devoted further efforts and resources for the carnival in 1979. It established the Lantern Carnivals Organising Committee to allocate regular staff and resources for this annual event. A set of guidelines stated that the coming carnival should be "mainly related to traditional Chinese arts and culture but well blended with a contemporary element."⁹⁹ The committee specified the aim again when it held the carnival of 1979: "not only to provide the public with rich entertainment during the holidays, but also to revive their interest in various aspects of traditional Chinese festivities." Committee members prioritised programmes that could "blend Chinese

⁹⁷ "Evaluation of the September Entertainment Programme," 1 November 1977, UC.CH(E).73.77, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

⁹⁸ "Evaluation of the September Entertainment Programme," 11 November 1978, Cultural Affairs Select Committee of the Urban Council (Entertainment Sub-committee) [hereafter UC.CA(E)] 126.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

⁹⁹ "Organization of the 1979 Lantern Carnivals," 25 April 1979, Cultural Affairs Select Committee of the Urban Council (Lantern Carnivals Organising Committee) [hereafter UC.CA(LC)] 01.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

culture and folklore with elements of modern and popular interest.” As the report reveals, Chinese items intrigued more people: fortune telling’s popularity had been “ever increasing” and the committee pointed out that it needed more fortune tellers in the coming years. Chiu Chow Opera shows were of a “high standard” and attracted large audiences. Lantern riddles were also a “very popular programme,” and the lantern design competition and exhibition jointly held with the Education Department were “very successful in terms of the quantity and the quality of the entries.” The committee were also impressed by the “amazingly high” standard of students’ lantern designs. This was the first time that the Urban Council had promoted this Chinese festival so vigorously: posters appeared all around the City Hall, City District Offices, social welfare agencies, schools, parks, and so on. The council also distributed 40,000 programme leaflets through these venues, hung banners in Morse Park, and erected Chinese archways to draw Hong Kong people’s attention. Radio Television Hong Kong also broadcast advertisements of the carnival every day.¹⁰⁰ The council also held a Mid-Autumn Festival Ball that enabled local youth to enjoy festive celebrations.¹⁰¹

The council expressed publicly in the 1980s that the goal of the carnival was to preserve Chinese traditions and entertain people of all generations. In 1980 the committee organised three large-scale carnivals, one each in Victoria Park, Morse Park, and Victoria Peak Garden. The evaluation report stated that the rationale was to “blend” traditional and modern performing arts to provide entertainment that “suit all tastes.” In the promotional leaflets, the council also conveyed to Hong Kong people that the carnival was to entertain them, let them rest and relax, and “preserve inherent local

¹⁰⁰ Lantern Carnivals - Preliminary Evaluation Report, 22 October 1979, UC.CA(LC).06.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁰¹ “Evaluation of the October Entertainment Programme,” 27 November 1979, UC.CA(E).155.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

folklore.”¹⁰² When reporting the lantern design contest, the *South China Morning Post* also mentioned that this was an attempt to “revive interest in the traditional Chinese art of lantern design.”¹⁰³ Traditional items such as fortune telling, lantern riddles, and archways remained popular, and the organising committee described them as “clearly essential to successful celebrations and should therefore be provided in future.” It also introduced an All Star Show, featuring Cantopop stars such as Roman Tam, Johnny Yip, Fanny Wong, and Michael Lai, to attract even more participants.¹⁰⁴ In 1981 and 1982 smaller carnivals were all around Hong Kong. City District Offices held their own carnivals, while the council continued its larger ones. Apart from the traditional activities and the All Star Shows, the council further emphasised Chineseness by adding a new photography competition which let participants to photograph models dressed in traditional Chinese costumes. It also invited the Tai Hang Kaifong Welfare Association to perform the traditional fire dragon dance, which became a “popular” event and attracted 16,000 spectators.¹⁰⁵ Overall, the number of participants in the carnivals increased fourfold from 1974 to the early 1980s.¹⁰⁶

One year after the first carnival, the council decided to also celebrate the Lunar New Year for local people. In 1975 the council organised a series of “Operations Kung Hei,” a kind of Chinese opera show to appease the gods, to “co-incide” with the Lunar New Year celebrations. In this first attempt, the council presented eight performances that attracted 5,800 attendants. These shows also attracted local dignitaries and kaifong

¹⁰² Lantern Carnivals - Evaluation Report, 19 March 1981, Culture and Entertainment Select Committee of the Urban Council (Carnivals Organising Committee) [hereafter UC.CE(C)] 07.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁰³ “Lantern Content,” *South China Morning Post*, 25 June 1980, 10.

¹⁰⁴ Lantern Carnivals – Evaluation Report, 19 March 1981, Cultural Services Select Committee of the Urban Council (Carnivals Organising Committee) [hereafter UC.CS(C)] 07.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁰⁵ Lantern Carnivals – Evaluation Report, 5 March 1982, UC.CE(C).05.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁰⁶ Numbers were taken from the Urban Council’s entertainment programme evaluation reports from 1974 to 1978 and its carnival organising committee’s evaluation reports from 1979 to 1982, available in the Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

leaders from various urban districts.¹⁰⁷ The council increased the scale of its celebration in later years. It presented at least ten shows every year, and in 1976 it had already attracted an audience of 11,800, which doubled the figure in the previous year. Programmes from 1976 onwards did not merely include the opera shows, but also other traditional Chinese performances such as dragon dances, folk dances, and acrobatic displays.¹⁰⁸

To expand the scale of the Lunar New Year celebrations, the council organised a series of entertainment programmes titled “Lunar New Year Special” (or sometimes “Chinese New Year Special”) starting from 1978. Similar to the lantern carnivals, it presented the public with a variety of Chinese entertainment. While the event attracted only 1,500 participants due to poor weather, the council insisted that it was the most popular function of the month, and that the public enjoyed it greatly because the performance was in “Chinese style.”¹⁰⁹ The Central Co-ordinating Committee for Youth Recreation also held various activities for young workers and their families. Camps, outings, and youth dances were the more popular ones among them.¹¹⁰ The council cooperated with the committee in 1979 and made the event suitable for both adults and youth. The younger generation could enjoy the band concerts and variety shows, and the older ones could watch the traditional performances. Television Broadcast Limited (TVB) also helped organised a “Hopscotch Chinese New Year Special,” a children party with live broadcast.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ “Evaluation of the February entertainment and recreation programme,” 5 March 1975, Entertainments and Advising Select Committee of the Urban Council (Entertainment Sub-Committee) [hereafter UC.EA(E)] 35.74, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁰⁸ “Evaluation of the February Entertainment Programme,” 25 March 1976, UC.CH(E).72.75, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the February entertainment programme,” 29 March 1977, UC.CH(E).02.77, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the January Entertainment Programme,” 6 March 1979, UC.CA(E).06.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁰⁹ “Evaluation of the February Entertainment Programme,” 3 April 1978, UC.CA(E).06.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹¹⁰ *Hong Kong 1979 – Report for the Year 1978* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1979), 197.

¹¹¹ “Evaluation of the February Entertainment Programme,” 4 April 1979, UC.CA(E).01.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

The council continued to make the Chinese celebrations more attractive and larger in scale. For instance, in 1980 it cooperated with other organisations, such as the South China Athletic Association, Far East Amusement and Movies Co., and the Hong Kong Playground Association, to provide new events such as telegames, cycle displays, and fashion shows.¹¹² In 1982 it introduced three series of celebrations, concluding with a “Chinese New Year Fete” which included a pop concert by Commercial Radio, a Children’s Party by RTHK, and Peking and Cantonese opera shows. This year also featured three festival balls targeting youth.¹¹³ The council later planned to hold a new Spring Lantern Festival in 1983. It invited various local Cantonese opera stars such as Lee Heung-kam, Sun Hoi-chuen, and Nam Fung to perform. RTHK also help co-organise various shows and the council invited artist Ha Chun Chau, famous for hosting the Mark Six lottery draws, to lead the lantern riddle games. Even though the carnival was smaller than the Mid-Autumn one, it still attracted around 24,000 participants. Rain before the Cantonese opera performances did not “damper audience enthusiasm,” and numerous spectators stayed for many other performances “even without seats.” The lantern riddles also attracted “enthusiastic response from participating crowd.”¹¹⁴ In the 1980s, the council also issued its Lunar New Year cards for official use, which was the government’s attempt to show to its people and the world how it conformed to the colony’s traditions. It would distribute these cards to distinguished members of the colony, consul generals, and also Chinese communities

¹¹² Progress Report No. 1 (MAY 1980) Entertainment Section, 14 April 1980, Cultural Services Select Committee of the Urban Council (Cultural Activities Sub-Committee) [hereafter UC.CS(A)] 13.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹¹³ Progress Report No. 23 Entertainment Office, 5 March 1982, Culture and Entertainment Select Committee of the Urban Council (Cultural Activities Sub-Committee) [hereafter UC.CE(A)] 151.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹¹⁴ 1983 Spring Lantern Festival - Evaluation Report, 11 May 1983, UC.CE(C).03.83, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

and organisations in the United Kingdom. Officials could also distribute the cards for private use.¹¹⁵

The government also embedded Chineseness into celebrations of Western festivals so that older generations could also participate. The first type was the Gregorian New Year's Eve or New Year's Day. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the council held various New Year Eve Fiestas and New Year Parties. To "suit different tastes," it incorporated traditional Chinese entertainment, such as Cantonese opera, lantern riddles, and fortune tellers' stalls to let the older generations enjoy the festive atmosphere with the youth. These events usually attracted over 15,000 people.¹¹⁶ Officials did the same for royal occasions. When Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip visited Hong Kong in 1975, the government organised various traditional Chinese shows and celebrations. Processions of lions, dragons, and acrobatic displays paraded in the streets, and a Chinese orchestra also performed on the farewell night.¹¹⁷ MacLehose recounted in his interview with Steve Tsang that the public's enthusiastic reactions towards the celebrations surprised him and his advisers.¹¹⁸ Newspapers reports also described how people welcomed this royal events. Even the *Ta Kung Pao*, the leftist newspaper which had always criticised colonialism, had a neutral report of the event, though the length of its report was much shorter than other newspapers'.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ "Chinese New Year Cards 1981," 16 February 1981, Administration Select Committee of the Urban Council (hereafter UC.ADM) 229.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Chinese New Year Cards 1982," 16 November 1981, UC.ADM.200.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹¹⁶ "Evaluation of the December Entertainment Programme," 4 February 1976, UC.CH(E).60.75, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the January entertainment programme," 2 March 1977, UC.CH(E).71.76, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the January Entertainment Programme," 4 March 1980, UC.CA(E).210.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹¹⁷ *Hong Kong 1976 – Report for the Year 1975* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1976), 3-4.

¹¹⁸ Transcript of interviews with MacLehose, 286-87.

¹¹⁹ "Yingnuwang zuo daoda xianggang" 英女王昨到達香港 [The Queen Arrived Hong Kong Yesterday], *Ta Kung Pao*, 5 May 1975, 4; for examples of how local press illustrated the enthusiastic response of the public, see "Huanying nuhuang fangwen Xianggang" 歡迎女皇訪問香港 [Welcoming the Queen's Visit to Hong Kong], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 4 May 1975, 1.2; "Bengang kabu yilai lishixing shenghui" 本港開埠以來歷史性盛會 [A Historical Event Since the Establishment of Hong Kong], *Kung Sheung Daily News*, 5 May 1975, 1; "Yingnuhuang guanhuai Xianggang qiantu" 英女皇關懷香港前途 [The Queen Cared About Hong Kong's Future], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 5 May 1975, 1.2.

However, some people were critical of this event or of British rule in general. The Hong Kong University Students' Union, for example, had called for a boycott of all activities related to this royal visit.¹²⁰

In 1977 the council introduced the April Fiesta to celebrate the Queen's Silver Jubilee. To make this an event of and for the people, it featured both trendy programmes, such as a pop concert and a musical comedy, and popular Chinese elements, such as lantern riddles, fortune tellers, and Chinese chess demonstration. The council did the same in 1978 to celebrate the Queen's birthday. Official records showed that the fiestas attracted crowds of people, with 8,500 and 20,000 participants in 1977 and 1978 respectively.¹²¹ The local press again expressed no negative comments.

Traditional Performances

The government presented traditional entertainment to local Chinese all year long. Before the late 1960s, the government had recorded and monitored Cantonese opera performances, such as those for ritualistic, religious, or fund-raising purposes in the New Territories. District Offices documented all "Chinese Theatrical Performances" by different associations, such as the Fanling Rural Committee, Wai Chow Union, and the Ku Tung Village.¹²² Starting in 1968, the Urban Council cooperated with the Lung Cheung Opera Troupe to present outdoor Cantonese opera shows. In August 1974,

¹²⁰ *Xueyuan* 60, 27; historian John M. Carroll also recalled that he was critical of this royal visit when he was a high school student in Hong Kong during the 1970s; see John M. Carroll, *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), vii.

¹²¹ "Evaluation of the April Entertainment Programme," 23 May 1977, UC.CH(E).20.77, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the April Entertainment Programme," 2 June 1978, UC.CA(E).35.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹²² District Officers closely monitored gatherings in the New Territories to eliminate any "undesirable influences" of these meetings. For instance, in 1961 the District Officer of Tai Po recommended that "side-shows" accompanying Cantonese opera shows be stopped because gambling was involved; Lupton to D.C., N.T. (A.A.), 13 June 1961, box 25, Barbara Ward Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford.

the council made the performances a regular programme, which later became “one of the most popular” of the council’s initiatives. Cheap tickets and good publicity were two keys to the popularity, and these features attracted both the old and younger generations.¹²³

To provide a greater variety of Cantonese opera, the council later collaborated with more troupes. Critics complained during the 1970s that RTHK’s troupe monopolised the council’s performances. As a result, the council invited other local groups to collaborate.¹²⁴ One was the Chinese Artists Association, a union of local Cantonese opera performers and workers formed in late nineteenth century. The association responded enthusiastically when it received the council’s invitation. It later actively cooperated with the council to provide free outdoor performances. Members of the association also suggested possible casts for the council’s future performances. Council officials later reported that the association was of “significantly higher” standard than RTHK’s troupe, and it strove to create a “real theatre atmosphere” by utilising its own sets and props for council-related performances.¹²⁵

In late 1978 the council also started to present regular Cantonese operatic song performances, in which singers sang selected songs from various plays. Council records reveal that the shows were “quite well received by the public because this form of art is performed rather infrequently these days.”¹²⁶ During the 1970s, the council

¹²³ Zijun 紫均, “Xianggang yuejutuan keyi chengli ma? – fang Luo Jiaying, Li Baoying” 香港粵劇團可以成立嗎? 訪羅家英、李寶瑩 [Can a Hong Kong Cantonese Opera Troupe Be Established? An Interview with Law Kar-ying and Li Po-ying], No. 5 (1979), *Fendou yuekan* 奮鬥月刊, attached in Kwok to Ward, 25 August 1981, box 19, Ward Papers.

¹²⁴ Minutes of the meeting of Cultural Affairs Select Committee of Urban Council, 27 March 1979, UC.CA.270379, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹²⁵ “Outdoor Performances of Cantonese Opera by Chinese Artists Association,” 9 March 1979, UC.CA(E).202.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the May Entertainment Programme,” 10 July 1979, UC.CA(E).202.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the August Entertainment Programme,” 2 October 1979, UC.CA(E).111.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹²⁶ “Evaluation of the December Entertainment Programme,” 8 February 1979, UC.CA(E).171.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

realised that residents of urban districts held an “unanimous opinion” that they wanted more Cantonese opera performances.¹²⁷ As Table 2.1 illustrates, the council had been increasing the number of Cantonese opera performances and the number of viewers rose.

Year	Cantonese Opera Plays		Cantonese Operatic Songs	
	Number of shows	Number of participants	Number of shows	Number of participants
1974 ¹²⁸	28	32,000	/	/
1975 ¹²⁹	41	54,698	/	/
1976	81	88,400	/	/
1977	111	131,800	/	/
1978	117	117,270	4	5,700
1979	119	123,850	20	19,600
1980	124	156,690	21	24,650

Table 2.1. Number of Cantonese Opera-Related Performances Presented by the Urban Council and the Respective Numbers of Participants, 1974-1980.¹³⁰

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the council hoped to present even more Cantonese opera shows. The aim was not only to entertain the older generations but also to preserve and promote these Chinese arts, thus showing local people, especially opera-lovers, that officials cared about their traditions. In 1979 the council added a new goal in its statement of aims: “to promote an appreciation of Chinese operative arts by presenting regular performances of Cantonese, Mandarin and other provincial operas as well as concerts of Cantonese operatic songs.”¹³¹ Local Cantonese opera stars such as Leung Sing-bor had always wanted the government to support the opera sector,

¹²⁷ City Hall Select Committee: Minutes of a meeting held in the Committee Room North, 7th floor, City Hall High Block on 23rd July at 8:45 a.m., 6 August 1974, HKRS 801-1-2, PRO.

¹²⁸ The record of December 1974 is missing.

¹²⁹ This numbers of 1975 only include the counting of seven months. The records of the remaining five months are missing.

¹³⁰ Calculated based on the monthly evaluation reports of the Urban Council’s entertainment programmes from 1974 to 1980 and progress reports of the council’s entertainment section in 1980 available in the Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³¹ “Statement of Aims for 1980/81,” 7 December 1979, Standing Committee of the Whole Council (hereafter UC.CW) 162.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

while other stars such as Law Kar-ying and Li Po-ying felt excited in 1979, when there was news about the Urban Council's plan to form an official Cantonese opera troupe.¹³² In 1981 the council formally started to plan for the Chinese Opera Company to respond to "wide popularity of Cantonese opera" and "its large following." The council also intended to cater to the need of various local communities, such as kaifong associations, rural committees, and clansmen, which celebrated major festivals and religious occasions by staging Cantonese operas.¹³³ Council members later abandoned the plan because they could not find a director willing to lead existing local groups and they wanted to avoid conflicts with the Chinese Artists Association.¹³⁴

However, the council did not stop spreading Cantonese operatic arts. From the late 1970s on, the council held regular Chinese opera festivals. The council's Cultural Affairs Select Committee hoped to present Cantonese opera of "the highest professional standard" and promote it to youth through free shows.¹³⁵ It hoped not only to entertain the public, but also to enable them to appreciate the traditional Chinese arts. For instance, the council distributed booklets in each festival and related performances to enable participants to understand more about the performers and the contexts of each play.¹³⁶ As previous sections reveal, Cantonese opera plays were always an attractive spot in the Festivals of Hong Kong and other festival celebrations. In 1979 the council also introduced Fukienese opera shows, though not as frequently

¹³² Zijun, "Xianggang yuejutuan"; An Oral Interview with Leung Sing Bor, conducted by Director of the Centre of Asian Studies Frank H. H. King, n.d., box 25, Ward Papers.

¹³³ "Chinese Opera Company," 9 July 1981, Culture and Entertainment Select Committee of the Urban Council (Performing Companies Sub-Committee) [hereafter UC.CE(PC)] 22.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁴ Proposal for the formation of a contemporary Chinese opera company, 12 October 1981, UC.CE(PC).39.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Minutes of the meeting of Performing Companies Sub-Committee of Urban Council, 15 October 1981, UC.CE(PC).151081, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁵ Minutes of the meeting of Cultural Affairs Select Committee of Urban Council, 27 March 1979, UC.CA.270379, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁶ *Chinese Opera Festival '81: Cantonese Opera by Law Kar-ying and Li Po-ying* (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1981), box 17, Ward Papers.

as Cantonese opera. The number of viewers was also much lower than those who watched the Cantonese opera plays, ranging from a few hundreds to approximately one thousand.¹³⁷

The council also cooperated with RTHK in the late 1970s to produce television and radio programmes that introduced Cantonese opera and local stars to a wider audience. In February 1978, RTHK introduced the new Radio 5, which broadcast many Cantonese opera performances. The channel also aired a programme titled “the World of Cantonese Operas and Songs” 戲曲天地, which introduced opera plays and interviewed performers. The television section also introduced the show “Cantonese Opera in Hong Kong” 粵曲在香港. This was originally a series of RTHK’s public seminars, and it was later broadcast as a section of the television programme *Hong Kong Connection* 鏗鏘集.¹³⁸ To show its respect towards the Cantonese opera sector, the government also honoured various local stars in the late 1970s, such as Leung Sing-bor in 1977, and Lam Ka-sing and Li Po-ying in 1981, by nominating them to become members of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.

The Urban Council later proposed to form a Contemporary Chinese opera company to continue its efforts to promote Chinese theatrical arts. Its rationale was to present Western opera in a Chinese way, and it believed local Chinese would like the performance for several reasons. First, the plays would attract youth and “western opera-goers” as they were a new type of show that blended Chinese and Western culture. Also, local people had a higher demand for Western-style operas due to

¹³⁷ Fukienese opera sometimes became more popular among the non-Fukienese audience after the council provided subtitles; “Evaluation of the January Entertainment Programme,” 6 March 1979, UC.CA(E).195.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the February Entertainment Programme,” 4 April 1979, UC.CA(E).01.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹³⁸ Liang Peijin 梁沛錦 and Zhan Li Shuzhen 湛黎淑貞, “Xianggang yueju yishu de chengzhang he fazhan” 香港粵劇藝術的成長和發展 [The Growth and Development of Hong Kong Cantonese Operative Arts], in *Xianggangshi xinbian* 香港史新編 [Hong Kong History: New Perspectives], vol. 2, revised and expanded version, ed. Wang Gungwu (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2016), 773-74.

improved education standards and the influence of Western culture. Third, council members believed that Chinese people in general would like these operas because “the characteristic of intricate yet easily understandable drama in the operas... is particularly well-liked by the Chinese people.”¹³⁹ Unlike the case of the Cantonese opera company, the council successfully recruited music directors, local singers, and other staff to manage the company. The company started to perform in 1983 with translated Western operas.¹⁴⁰

These attempts to provide free or cheap theatricals suited the taste of many Chinese communities. While Cantonese opera might have lost part of its appeal in the 1970s due to the advent of television, it was still an important source of enjoyment for many Hong Kong Chinese. Anthropologist Barbara Ward was researching Hong Kong’s Cantonese opera before she passed away in 1983. One of her unpublished works explained the significant role of theatre performances in Chinese societies. Her fieldwork revealed that the connection between this Chinese performing art and traditional ritual remained close in contemporary Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese communities. The plays were popular also because they engaged people in community activities: “spectacle, fun, exultation, illumination, horror, laughter, boredom, dismay – all these and other emotional responses are evoked.” As Ward pointed out based on her observation, even though cinema and television seemed to become more popular, they took “much from the traditional drama, both directly and

¹³⁹ “Chinese Opera Company,” 9 July 1981, UC.CE(PC).22.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Proposal for the formation of a contemporary Chinese opera company, UC.CE(PC).39.81, 12 October 1981, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Interim Report by Mr. Henry Shek, Consultant for the Proposed Chinese Opera Company Project, 10 March 1982, UC.CE(PC).83.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁴⁰ Hong Kong Opera Company: Progress Report No. 1/82, 3 June 1982, UC.CE(PC).30.82, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Hong Kong Opera Company: Progress Report No. 2/82, 9 July 1982, UC.CE(PC).37.82, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

indirectly.”¹⁴¹ The local Chinese press also revealed that people rushed for tickets of these Cantonese opera shows even when admission fees were charged.¹⁴²

The Urban Council also presented numerous types of other traditional entertainment such as puppet shows. These shows consisted of dramas staged with shadow figures or dolls, accompanied by songs and other sound effects. The council started hosting puppet shows in 1974, and throughout the 1970s it invited groups to perform different kinds of puppet shows, including Cantonese, Fukienese, and glove puppet shows. While these shows were smaller in scale, they attracted at least three to five hundred spectators per show, sometimes even more than one thousand.¹⁴³ The council enriched the performances by introducing one new type of “rod puppet” show in 1979. Council members and officials praised it as “interesting and [of] high standard” and recommended to continue staging these performances.¹⁴⁴ Other examples of entertainment included kung fu demonstrations, folk song and dance performances, and traditional acrobatics.

Council documents recorded these Chinese shows as being popular. Kung fu demonstrations attracted over one thousand people even though the weather might be cold and rainy, and the public appreciated the great variety of folk song programmes. Traditional acrobatics attracted large audiences and Chinese folk songs also helped create a “warm and festive atmosphere” during the Christmas celebrations in the early

¹⁴¹ Barbara Ward, “Education, Literacy and Sinicization: a comment with special reference to the Boat People of South East China and the Cantonese theatre,” n.d., box 7, Ward Papers.

¹⁴² For instance, see “Yishujie yuejue yushouxi changxiao” 藝術節演粵劇 預售戲票暢銷 [The Arts Festival will Include Cantonese Opera, Presale Tickets Were Sold Well], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 17 February 1976, 3.3; “Yishujie yuejue zuoyan yanzhouxi” 藝術節粵劇昨演壓軸戲 [Cantonese Opera as the Finale of the Arts Festival], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 23 January 1978, 3.2; “Zai shizhengju zhichixia yanchu shiyan yueju jiang xushangyan” 在市政局支持下 實驗粵劇將續上演 [With Urban Council’s Sponsorship, Experimental Cantonese Operas will Continued to Be Staged], *Kung Sheung Daily News*, 25 January 1980, 9.

¹⁴³ Calculated based on the numbers available in the entertainment evaluation reports from 1974 to 1980, available in the Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁴⁴ “Evaluation of the October entertainment programme,” 6 November 1974, UC.EA(E).16.74, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the May entertainment programme,” 18 June 1975, UC.CH(E).16.75, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the January Entertainment Programme,” 6 March 1979, UC.CA(E).195.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

1980s.¹⁴⁵ The council also attempted to meet the demand of different Chinese ethnic groups. In the late 1970s, it started offering Fukienese entertainment, such as folk songs and dance, magic, and opera. Council records praised the performances and documented that even non-Fukienese audiences enjoyed watching the shows.¹⁴⁶ In 1982 the council also started presenting Chiu Chow operas, though they were less popular than other shows.¹⁴⁷

The Arts Festival also reveals how the government emphasised Chinese entertainment. The festival started in 1955 and temporarily stopped in 1961. A festival committee started to revive this event in 1968, and the festival had become a large-scale annual event since the official sponsorship in 1973.¹⁴⁸ Before this government intervention, the festival focused on both Western and Chinese arts, while foreign culture received more attention. For instance, the festival's press release in 1971 records that features of the year included performers from Thailand, Philippines, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Sweden.¹⁴⁹ In 1972 the focus became a combination of Western and Chinese arts, including music, opera, dance, and drama.¹⁵⁰ With government sponsorship in 1973, the festival became more Chinese. Governor MacLehose reported to the FCO that upcoming Arts Festivals must acquire a

¹⁴⁵ "Evaluation of the November entertainment and recreation programme," 12 December 1974, UC.EA(E).19.74, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the May Entertainment Programme," 29 June 1976, UC.CH(E).17.76, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the December Entertainment Programme," 28 January 1980, UC.CA(E).191.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Progress Report No. 10 Entertainment Section, 13 February 1981, UC.CS(A).162.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁴⁶ "Evaluation of the February Entertainment Programme," 4 April 1979, UC.CA(E).01.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the July Entertainment Programme," 3 September 1979, UC.CA(E).86.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Evaluation of the October Entertainment Programme," 27 November 1979, UC.CA(E).155.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁴⁷ Progress Report No. 23 Entertainment Office, 5 March 1982, UC.CE(A).151.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁴⁸ "\$1 M. for Hong Kong Arts Festival," 20 October 1981, HKRS 545-1-443-1, PRO.

¹⁴⁹ "BOAC Creates Arts Festival in Hong Kong," December 1971. HKRS 545-1-443-1, PRO.

¹⁵⁰ "Hong Kong Arts Festival 1972," 10 July 1972, HKRS 545-1-443-1, PRO.

“specifically Chinese nature – preferably from China itself,” and that the organiser must include local Chinese performers to produce “a sense of local identity.”¹⁵¹

Later festivals followed MacLehose’s recommendation. Programmes from the mid- and late-1970s included more Chinese performances, such as Cantonese and Chiu Chow operas.¹⁵² In 1979 the organising committee devoted one whole week for Chinese opera.¹⁵³ Though foreign artists continued to perform, the organising committee sometimes promoted the festivals as if they were Chinese celebrations. For instance, a tourist leaflet in 1978 used Chinese calligraphy to represent and showcase all kinds of performances, be they Chinese or foreign. As the next chapter illustrates, postage stamps also commemorated the festivals. Indeed, most of the festival performances were popular, and their tickets were mostly sold out. In 1978 and 1979, over 90% of the tickets were sold, regardless of whether the shows were Chinese or foreign in nature.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the government’s emphasis on promoting local identity through Chinese culture did not change. Throughout the 1970s, the government only sponsored performances that were in line with its cultural policies. Singer Rebecca Pan recalls in her memoir that the government never responded when she applied for funding for her musical *Pai Niang Niang* 白孃孃. She described the government as being a “ridiculous authority” when deciding what to sponsor, as it neither explained why her application was rejected nor responded to her enquiries.¹⁵⁵ This was an example of how the colonial government overlooked an important work.

¹⁵¹ MacLehose to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/458.

¹⁵² Minutes of the Committee Meeting held on 4th April, 1978 at 5.30 p.m. in the office of Fung Ping Fan & Co. Ltd., 27/F, Connaught Centre, Hong Kong, 12 April 1978, HKRS 1124-2-36, PRO.

¹⁵³ Notes on Meeting for the programme of 1980 Festival held on 27th February, 1979, 5:00 p.m., in the Boardroom of Fung Ping Fan & Co., Ltd., March 1979, HKRS 1124-2-36, PRO.

¹⁵⁴ “Hong Kong Arts Festival 1979: Weekly Ticket Sales Analysis,” 4 March 1979, HKRS 1124-2-36, PRO.

¹⁵⁵ Rebecca Pan 潘迪華, *Meng lu Pan Dihua* 夢·路·潘迪華 [Dreams · Roads · Rebecca Pan]. (Hong Kong: Red Publish, 2017), 137.

The musical was so impressive that managers of the Broadway Theatre once planned to invite Pan's company to perform in the United States.¹⁵⁶

The Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra

The Urban Council also targeted Chinese instrumental music as a new kind of entertainment. Indeed, it had already sponsored Chinese orchestral performances when it was still under the government's financial control. In 1972 it sponsored a band of fifteen musicians who played traditional Chinese instruments, such as the erhu, dizi, and pipa. This enabled them to perform in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the City Hall.¹⁵⁷ This group of musicians reorganised themselves and formed the Hong Kong Chinese Music Orchestra in August 1973. They continued to perform using the council's venues, and council members witnessed the public's enthusiastic response. Council members believed that sponsoring these concerts would be a "prominent part in the promotion of traditional Chinese music with Chinese musical instruments." Meanwhile, they realised various problems of the existing orchestra, such as lacking "discipline, form and energy," failing to balance various sections of instruments, and using Western instruments such as cello and double bass to replace certain Chinese ones. These limitations prompted the council members to take over the group in 1977 and turn it into an official "Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra." At the same time, promoting "an appreciation of Chinese music" became an aim of the council's City Hall and Entertainments Select Committee in the 1977-78 session.¹⁵⁸ The council

¹⁵⁶ "Yinyue wuju bainiangniang jiangdao Bailaohui shangyan" 音樂舞劇白孃孃將到百老匯上演 [Musical *Pai Niang Niang* Is Going to Stage in Broadway], *Keung Sheung Daily News*, 13 March 1972, 7.

¹⁵⁷ Zhou Fanfu 周凡夫, "Xianggang zhongyuetuan sanshinianlai de fazhan yu yingxiang" 香港中樂團三十年來的發展與影響 [The Development and Impact of the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra in the Past Thirty Years], in *Disjunctive zhongyue guoji yantaohui – chuancheng yu liu bian lunwenji* 第四屆中樂國際研討會 - 傳承與流變論文集 [Collected Essays of the Fourth International Conference on Chinese Instrumental Music – Continuity and Change], ed. Peng Li 彭麗 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, 2012), 109.

¹⁵⁸ "Formation of a Professional Chinese Orchestra," 3 March 1977, UC.CH(E).75.76, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

recruited Ng Tai-kong, a renowned musician in the Sinophone world, as the music director, while the administrative power resided in the Urban Council and the Urban Services Department.¹⁵⁹ The orchestra presented two to three monthly concerts as public entertainment.

The council worked closely with Ng and followed much of his advice to expand the orchestra's scale and reserve more resources for the group's development. When the council first formed the group, it devoted one million dollars for the first nine months of operation. This huge budget ranked second among all council branches. (Though the Hong Kong Philharmonic Orchestra received more money, it had twice as many musicians.)¹⁶⁰ Within a year, the council agreed to increase the monthly expenditure on musicians' salaries by 20%.¹⁶¹ In the following years, the council always approved Ng's requests for more resources. Examples of requests included: purchasing traditional Chinese instruments to "preserve the genuine character of traditional and ethnic Chinese music," commissioning composers to create new works, and further training its musicians.¹⁶² The council also increased the salaries of the musical director and composers to retain these talents.¹⁶³ The government also prioritised the orchestra in using new concert venues, such as the Cultural Complex in Tsim Sha Tsui, Queen Elizabeth Stadium in Wan Chai, and Koshan Road Open Air Theatre in Hung Hom. Members of the Cultural Affairs Select Committee specified

¹⁵⁹ Zhou, "Xianggang zhongyue tuan," 111.

¹⁶⁰ "Formation of a Professional Chinese Orchestra," UC.CH(E).75.76; "Urban Council Cultural Presentation Programme: Financial Position," 1 June 1977, UC.CH(E).24.77, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶¹ "Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra: Renewal of Musicians' Contracts," 3 February 1978, UC.CH(E).123.77, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶² "Musical Instruments for Chinese Orchestra," 1 September 1977, UC.CE(E).59.77, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; "Conditions and Scale of Fees of Composition and Arrangement of Music for the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, 6 July 1978, UC.CA(E).69.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Progress Report No. 16 Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, 5 January 1979, UC.CA(E).166.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶³ Minutes of the meeting of the Entertainments Sub-Committee of Urban Council, 14 August 1978, UC.CA(E).140878, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Minutes of the meeting of Cultural Activities Sub-Committee of Urban Council, 9 December 1980, UC.CS(A).091280, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

that they should have “more performances by Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra (and Hong Kong Repertory Theatre)” in these new venues.¹⁶⁴

Ng also strove to improve the quality of the performances and enable more people to enjoy Chinese music. In 1978 the orchestra gradually increased the number of concerts, lowered the ticket prices, and increased the budget to hire more supporting staff, such as librarians and assistants to the director, and distributed more publicity materials. Council members and Ng also set the target of expanding the orchestra into a group with seventy members so that it could have “an even higher standard of performance.”¹⁶⁵ Members also approved his proposal to improve the quality of musicians. The orchestra provided a compulsory six-month training to all full-time musicians to help them read and interpret the scores, and to improve their intonation and tonal judgement – all crucial skills for professional musicians.¹⁶⁶

To promote the orchestra to the younger generations, the Urban Council also held free concerts for children and youth. For instance, the orchestra presented two free concerts per month for students from the late 1970s. Each student attendee would receive a booklet which introduced all repertoires, notable performers, and the orchestra. The concerts also helped promote the orchestra’s regular concerts through advertisements in the booklets.¹⁶⁷ In 1982 the council noted that the orchestra had built up a “wide scale popularity” of Chinese music in Hong Kong. It then decided to produce disc and cassette recordings of its performances to let people enjoy the music

¹⁶⁴ Minutes of the meeting of Cultural Affairs Select Committee of Urban Council, 27 March 1979, UC.CA.270379, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶⁵ “Revised Five Year Projection Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra,” 30 November 1978, UC.CA(E).145.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶⁶ Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra - Progress Report 8/81, 5 November 1981, UC.CE(PC).42.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶⁷ Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra: Progress Report No. 5/79, 6 September 1979, UC.CA.82.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Request from the Arts Centre Festival of Youth and the Arts 1980, 22 November 1979, UC.CA.82.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra - Progress Report 3/81, 5 June 1981, UC.CE(PC).14.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; *Xianggang zhongyuetuan: xuesheng yinyuehui* 香港中樂團：學生音樂團 [Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra: Student Concert] (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1982).

at home. The council did not care about the revenues. Instead, it chose to sell the records at lower prices as a way of spreading music and entertaining the public.¹⁶⁸ The orchestra also published some of its scores so that music lovers and students could play and enjoy the music themselves.¹⁶⁹ The council also started sending the orchestra to perform in new venues in the New Territories during the 1980s. After receiving good response in the first concerts, the orchestra accepted an invitation from the Tsuen Wan Cultural and Recreation Co-ordination Association to present regular concerts in the district. This policy enabled people living in new towns or outside urban areas to appreciate Chinese orchestral music.¹⁷⁰

Hong Kong people responded to these orchestral performances favourably. The orchestra often achieved over 90% (or sometimes 100%) attendance, and the number of audiences per year increased over 55% from 1978 to 1981.¹⁷¹ Other sources also reveal how the public responded to the orchestra enthusiastically. For instance, in 1978 tickets for the new session's opening concert sold out so quickly that the orchestra had to perform one more show.¹⁷² In 1980 concerts in Tsuen Wan were so successful that Chairman of the Tsuen Wan Cultural and Recreation Co-ordination

¹⁶⁸ Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra: Recording Project, 5 February 1982, UC.CE(PC).69.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Minutes of the meeting of Performing Companies Sub-Committee of Urban Council, 9 February 1982, UC.CE(PC).090282, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁶⁹ "Publication of Musical Works Commissioned by the Urban Council," 6 November 1981, UC.CE(PC).48.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷⁰ "Co-operation with the New Territories in the Promotion of Cultural Activities," 13 August 1981, UC.CW.94.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra Progress Report No. 1/80, 12 April 1980, UC.CS(A).12.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Minutes of the meeting of Cultural Activities Sub-Committee of Urban Council, 17 April 1980, UC.CS(A).170480, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷¹ The number of audiences in 1978 was 30,630, and the number in 1981 was 47,483. Calculated based on the progress reports of the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra available in the Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷² Progress Report No. 7 Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, 4 March 1978, UC.CA(E).01.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

Association Chan Po-fong invited the orchestra to perform regularly in the district.¹⁷³

Stories of the tickets being sold out also often appeared in the local press.¹⁷⁴

Other government departments and organisations also invited the group to perform after witnessing its popularity. The Yaumati and Tsimshatsui District Youth Recreation Co-ordination Committee invited the orchestra to kick off its summer programme in 1978, the Tsuen Wan Arts Festival committee invited it to perform in 1979, and the organising committee of the fourth Festival of Asian Arts also requested the group to perform outdoor. Not surprisingly, records reveal that the orchestra “attracted [a] very big audience.”¹⁷⁵ RTHK invited the orchestra again to participate in its new programmes “Music Makers” in 1981. Its aims were to deepen people’s understanding of local cultural developments and to publicise Hong Kong’s “musical achievement.”¹⁷⁶ The Urban Council also invited amateur Chinese orchestras, such as the Wah Sing Chinese Folk Orchestra, Kong Sing Chinese Folk Orchestra, and Hong Kong Folk Orchestra, to present free outdoor concerts so as to meet the public demand for Chinese instrumental music.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra Progress Report No. 1/80, 12 April 1980, UC.CS(A).12.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷⁴ For instance, see “Xianggang zhongyuetuan shoudao relie huanyin” 香港中樂團受到熱烈歡迎 [Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra Received An Enthusiastic Welcome], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 8 November 1977, 7.2; “Disanjie yazhou yishujie xianggang zhongyuetuan zuo kaimu yanzou” 第三屆亞洲藝術節 香港中樂團作開幕演奏 [Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra Performed at the Opening of the Third Asian Arts Festival], *Kung Sheung Daily News*, 30 July 1978, 6; “Xianggang zhongyuetuan you yi chuangju” 香港中樂團又一創 [Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra Made Another Breakthrough], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 10 January 1981, 4.4.

¹⁷⁵ Progress Report No. 10: Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, 6 July 1978, UC.CA(E).68.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Minutes of the meeting of Cultural Affairs Select Committee of Urban Council, 25 September 1979, UC.CA.250979, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; Fourth Festival of Asian Arts - Report on Outdoor Programme, November 1979, Cultural Select Affairs Committee of the Urban Council (Festival of Asian Arts Organising Committee) [hereafter UC(FAA)] 44.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷⁶ Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra - Progress Report No. 9/80, 12 January 1981, UC.CS(A).158.80, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷⁷ “Evaluation of the December Entertainment Programme,” 8 February 1979, UC.CA(E).171.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the January entertainment programme,” 2 March 1977, UC.CH(E).71.76, Municipal Councils Archives Collection; “Evaluation of the September Entertainment Programme,” 2 November 1979, UC.CA(E).134.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

The council's efforts were significant to the development of Chinese music. Many council members, musicians, and commentators believed that the orchestra helped modernise the instrumental music of China. A council review in 1981 pointed out that the orchestra was a “distinguished” group because of its ability to “amalgamate the cross currents of Chinese and Western cultures and to synthesize Western orchestration with the music and musical instruments in China,” and to promote Chinese music to all sectors of society.¹⁷⁸ In Chinese tradition, musicians played their instruments individually, whereas Western musicians started playing different kinds of instruments, including strings, brass, woodwind, and percussion as a group from the nineteenth century on. Forming a Chinese orchestra was thus an attempt to perform traditional Chinese music in a modern way.¹⁷⁹ This innovative way of playing music attracted audiences to appreciate Chinese music. Music commentator Zhou Fanfu also recalled that the orchestra's performances drastically changed how people viewed Chinese musicians: they were no longer beggars who played Chinese music on the street, but professional artists.¹⁸⁰ In other words, the orchestra did not merely entertain people, but also enabled them to appreciate Chineseness and identify with it.

This effort to promote Chinese music was so significant that even mainland Chinese musicians were aware of it. In a letter to Ng Tai-kong, Liu Wenjin, the resident composer of the Chinese People's Orchestra, described how the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra inspired him:

¹⁷⁸ “Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra: Review of Progress since 1977,” 25 June 1981, UC.CE(PC).15.81, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁷⁹ For instance, the orchestra modelled on how European orchestras organised and arranged the instruments. One example was the string section. In the west, this part consists of instruments that could produce sounds at different pitch ranges. The Chinese orchestra borrowed this and incorporated various *hu* 胡 (string instruments in Chinese music), such as *erhu* 二胡, *zhonghu* 中胡, and *gaohu* 高胡, into repertoires; Liu, *Xianggang yinyueshi lun*, 136.

¹⁸⁰ Zhou, “Xianggang zhongyue tuan,” 115.

We were inspired by your devotion and contributions to Chinese national music. Your attempts and research in Chinese national orchestra also gave us a great deal of encouragement. I should learn from your struggle, your attempts and your creativeness... In fact, I have reported the development and achievement of your orchestra to many comrades who deeply appreciate your success and aspirations. Your orchestra's development will surely play a role in promoting the national music of our country... All in all, I am strongly against the obstinate force which is blocking the progress of our national music...¹⁸¹

The achievements of the Hong Kong orchestra became so widespread among mainland musicians that the communist Chinese state even felt threatened by them. Ng visited mainland China in 1979 to purchase instruments for the orchestra. Through meeting various musicians there, he realised that music circles in China had identified the Hong Kong orchestra as “the best one of its kind.” This threatened the Chinese state, as mainland officials believed that the orchestra exposed China's backwardness. For this reason, they did not allow the orchestra to perform in mainland China and became much less likely to issue exit permits to professional musicians in order to stop them from “jeopardising the development of Chinese music in China.” While some mainland orchestras, such as the Shanghai National Music Orchestra, the Shanghai Opera Company, and the National Music Orchestra of the Central Radio Cultural Troupe, hoped to invite the Hong Kong orchestra to perform, state censorship prevailed. Even though some mainland composers hoped to produce works for the orchestra, they could not post the scores to Hong Kong. Instead, they had to send another person to deliver them.¹⁸² Indeed, the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra became a shelter to many professional musicians who escaped from political oppression in communist China.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Lau to Ng, attached in Progress Report No. 17 Hon Kong Chinese Orchestra, 8 February 1979, UC.CA(E).184.78, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁸² Report on the Procurement of Musical Instruments in China, 1 May 1979, UC.CA(E).24.79, Municipal Councils Archives Collection.

¹⁸³ Liu, *Xianggang yinyue shilun*,

This reaction of the Chinese state illustrates that the Hong Kong orchestra's works had been significant. It also reveals the Cold War dimension of this colonial Chineseness. As the introduction explains, part of the colonial policies aimed at showing to the communists that lives under capitalism were better than theirs. The mainland response in this case reveals that cultural policies were part of this confrontation. Mainland authorities strove to prohibit mainland Chinese from realising their backwardness.

Leisure Across Generations

Local Chinese had more chances to enjoy government activities from the late 1960s on. Adults and elderly people could watch traditional theatrical performances, while the younger generations could enjoy trendy events such as DJ shows or Cantopop concerts during the Mid-Autumn or Lunar New Year celebrations. Nevertheless, all these activities did not take place separately. Within the same occasion, one could see the elderly, adults, and youths enjoying the festive atmosphere together. There were also activities with no age limits: lantern riddles, fortune telling, float parades, and all kinds of Chinese entertainment. This chapter has revealed how the colonial government attempted to promote both traditional and modern Chinese entertainment to enable people to identify with local culture, and thus develop their sense of community. This new era of entertainment started with the Festival of Hong Kong from 1969 to 1973, followed by numerous Urban Council initiatives, including festival celebrations and traditional performances. To engage the youth into this community project, the government made them participate in various events and modernised part of the Chinese arts. It also listened to the voices of local Chinese officials and leaders, such as the City District Officers, the lantern carnival committee members, and the music director of the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra to refine its

efforts. Though the government allowed and presented leisure of both Chinese and foreign origins, it always stressed and targeted Chineseness.

Chapter Three

Objects

A representative of the Hong Kong Tourist Association believed that the association could strengthen overseas promotion of the New Territories, such as distributing guides that introduce the New Territories' rituals, festivals, monuments, scenery, restaurants, hostels, and so on for tourists to consult... [Representative of the Heung Yee Kuk] Chow Li-ping also expressed that related parties should restore and beautify scenic spots and monuments in various New Territories districts in order to attract tourists.¹

Wah Kiu Yat Po, 6 October 1967

The year 1967 was a busy time for the Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong Tourist Association. After five policemen were shot dead in the New Territories village of Sha Tau Kok, overseas journalists sometimes exaggerated the violence in Hong Kong as if the colony had become a city of terrorism. The tourist trade fell as a result and the government had to regain the confidence of the international community in the colony. It launched a global campaign with the association to promote Hong Kong as a safe and attractive tourist destination. They utilised brochures, pamphlets, and postcards to “sell” Hong Kong to 127 countries. They also mounted an information campaign that targeted the United States, which had been the largest source of tourists for decades.²

Though the local tourist trade revived by the end of 1967, government officials never stopped selling Hong Kong. In the 1970s the government persistently promoted the colony across the globe. Nevertheless, stability was not the sole focus. Through

¹ “Xinjie minzhengshu xiangyiju luyouxiehui lianxi huiyi shangtao sujin Xinjie luyou shiye fazhan” 新界民政署鄉議局旅遊協會聯席會議 商討促進新界旅遊事業發展 [A Joint Meeting by District Offices, Heung Yee Kuk, and the Tourist Association Discussed the Development of Promoting Tourism in the New Territories], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 6 October 1967, 3.3; “Qing bengang dajudian zai Xinjie she fendian” 請本港大酒店 在新界設分店 [Hong Kong's Big Hotels: Please Set Up Branches in the New Territories], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 6 October 1967, 3.3.

² Chi-Kwan Mark, “Hong Kong as an International Tourism Space: The Politics of American Tourism in the 1960s,” in *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, ed. Priscilla Roberts and John M. Carroll (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 175-76.



objects, officials advertised Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese city both within and without the colony. As previous chapters explain, the government shaped Hong Kong as a Chinese place to try to pacify its people and prolong its rule. This selling of Hong Kong was also significant in the global context. Chi-Kwan Mark has described how Hong Kong exercised its own agency even under the geopolitical influence of the United States and communist China in the 1950s and 1960s.³

The government made this agency even more powerful in the 1970s by actively showing Hong Kong as a Chinese city more authentic than communist China not only to American, but global audiences. Local Chinese officials, including the Director of Cultural Services, Darwin Chen, realised that the Cultural Revolution had destroyed much of the heritage in mainland China. They thus urged the colonial government to preserve the remaining Chinese tradition in Hong Kong.⁴ This preservation and promotion of Hong Kong's Chineseness thus demonstrated both internally and globally that the colonial government (and the Free World) had protected its people and culture well, in contrast to the destruction of Chinese culture in communist China. This helped the colonial government secure local people's recognition before Britain had to negotiate Hong Kong's future with the PRC.

This chapter examines how the government showcased Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese city to local and global audiences. It does so by analysing official policies on three categories of objects: postage stamps, coins, and monuments. The chapter also demonstrates how the government realised its policies under the shadow of British institutions, such as the Crown Agents and the Royal Mint, and reveals how London closely monitored Hong Kong's affairs. While previous studies of these

³ Ibid., 178-179.

⁴ "Chen Dawen fangtanlu" 陳達文訪談錄 [A Record of Interview with Darwin Chen], in *Yu Xianggang yishu duihua 1980-2014 與香港藝術對話 1980-2014* [Dialogue with Hong Kong Arts 1980-2014], ed. Victor Lai 黎明海 and Eva Man Kit-Wah 文潔華 (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2015), 254-55.

objects have emphasised the symbolism of images or architectural styles, this chapter focuses on how officials produced stamps and coins, and how they decided on whether to preserve a monument.⁵ It reveals the negotiation, compromise, and accommodation between different actors. London required Hong Kong officials to secure its approval before proceeding with the actual production of stamps and coins, and it sometimes disagreed with proposals from the colony. They eventually compromised so they could maintain the policy of preserving and promoting Chineseness. Local Chinese, including officers and artists, also voiced their opinions on how to present their culture well. The colonial government accommodated their views in order to gain the widest possible recognition.

Postage Stamps

The Colonial Office and, later, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), tightly monitored the issuance of postage stamps for British dependent territories, including Hong Kong. They believed that officials in the dependent territories lacked expertise to participate in the global sales of stamps. All issues thus required the approval of the monarch and the British government, which had the “ultimate responsibility in the final analysis.”⁶ The Crown Agents acted as the middleman between London and Hong Kong and other dependent territories. Although the Crown Agents (based in London) was a profitable organisation largely independent of the British government, it followed instructions from London and assisted territories in designing, shipping,

⁵ For instance, see Donald M. Reid, “The Symbolism of Postage Stamps: A Source for the Historian,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 19 (1984): 223-49; Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), 63-90; Syed Ejaz Hussain, “Symbolism and the State Authority: Reflections from the Art on Indo-Islamic Coins,” *Indian Historical Review*, 40.1 (2013): 17-40; David Scott, *European Stamp Design: A Semiotic Approach to Design Messages* (London: Academy Editions, 1995); Donald T. Ariel and Jean-Philippe Fontanille, *The Coins of Herod: A Modern Analysis and Die Classification* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

⁶ Saving Despatch: Postage Stamps, 15 April 1971, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO; Farrell to Lohse, 22 March 1978, FCO 40/916, TNA; Bridger to Farrell, 14 April 1978, FCO 40/916, TNA.

and printing postage stamps.⁷ Whereas Hong Kong officials saw the agents as having a too dominant role and frequently causing delays in stamp production, the agents were backed by London. The Hong Kong government also recognised that cooperating with the agents lowered the production cost and helped the government obtain the Queen's approval more smoothly.⁸

The British government valued postage stamps because they generated revenue, created employment opportunities, and constructed a “respectable image” of the monarch. British officials also attempted to build “a respectable image” of Commonwealth countries and dependent territories.⁹ They believed postage stamps could boost a territory's tourism by “putting it on the map” of collectors.¹⁰ Colonial officials prepared Hong Kong's postage stamps under this British influence. For instance, Hong Kong sought London's approval before it could start designing its first pictorial issues in 1968.¹¹ The FCO also required Hong Kong to submit stamp proposals at least eighteen months beforehand, and officials in London would reject designs that were inappropriate to appear together with royal symbolism.¹² It sometimes instructed Hong Kong and other dependent territories to produce certain stamp issues, such as the one commemorating the Queen's silver wedding anniversary in 1972.¹³

The colonial government valued the issuance of postage stamps above all as a way to promote Hong Kong. In 1966 the Colonial Office suggested that the Hong

⁷ Vincent Ponko, Jr., “History and the Methodology of Public Administration: The Case of the Crown Agents for the Colonies,” *Public Administration Review* (March 1967): 42-3.

⁸ Folwell to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 14 December 1970, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO; Jenney to Postmaster General, 12 January 1971, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO; Palmer to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 14 January 1971, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

⁹ Scott, *European Stamp Design*, 17-8.

¹⁰ “Restricted: Philately,” attached in Bridger to Farrell, 14 April 1978, FCO 40/916, TNA.

¹¹ Memorandum for Executive Council: New Postage Stamps, 7 April 1967, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

¹² Fung to Postmaster General, 28 March 1972, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO; MacLehose to Fung, 10 April 1972, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO; Folwell to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 24 August 1970, HKRS 1082-1-3.

¹³ Circular Saving Despatch No: 35/71, 8 June 1971, HKRS 313-7-1

Kong government issue a pictorial series of postage stamps for tourist promotion.¹⁴ Colonial officials agreed and in 1968 issued a pictorial set featuring Hong Kong's traditional and modern transport.¹⁵ Later, the government also made a stamp issue featuring the colony's participation in the 1970 Osaka Expo. This was to publicise Hong Kong's pavilion to overseas visitors.¹⁶ Officials suggested that selling local stamps could “give added impact to the community project” of fostering a sense of belonging and “increase Hong Kong's image in the eyes of the rest of the world and in particular the tourist trade” when they prepared for the upcoming Festival of Hong Kong issue.¹⁷

Hong Kong people also cared about collecting postage stamps. From 1968 to 1983, the leading local newspaper *Wah Kiu Yat Po* dedicated a bi-weekly section titled “Philately.” During the 1970s, it faced fierce competition from other newly emerged newspapers such as *Ming Pao*, *Oriental Daily*, and *Hong Kong Economic Journal*. A regular section could survive only if it enjoyed a wide readership.¹⁸ The stable appearance of the philately section in the *Wah Kiu Yat Po* reveals the popularity of stamp collecting. As later paragraphs show, postage stamps, especially those featuring traditional Chinese culture, sold well in Hong Kong.

The colonial government utilised postage stamps to promote traditional Chineseness. In 1965 the Crown Agents suggested to Hong Kong's postmaster general that the colony could produce stamps to commemorate the Lunar New Year, and that this could help increase local revenues and publicise the city. As the agents suggested, the government could produce stamps that would “most definitely appeal to the local

¹⁴ Secretary of State for the Colonies to Hong Kong, 28 April 1966, HKRS 2176-1-24, PRO.

¹⁵ Crook to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 23 January 1967, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

¹⁶ Governor to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 5 September 1968, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

¹⁷ Fowler to Postmaster General, 12 August 1970, HKRS 2176-1-49, PRO.

¹⁸ Ding Jie 丁潔, “Huaqiao ribao yu Xianggang Huaren shehui – 1925-1995” 《華僑日報》與香港華人社會—1925-1995 [The *Wah Kiu Yat Po* and Hong Kong Chinese Society – 1925-1995] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2014), 243-44.

Chinese” by featuring the “customary Chinese way of designating lunar years” and the animal of the year.¹⁹ To the Crown Agents, selling postage stamps was about profit. To the Hong Kong government, however, it was an attempt to appease its people. Secretary for Chinese Affairs John Crichton McDouall supported this proposal, not only because of the additional revenue the issue could bring, but because of the “local appreciation of this evidence of Government’s imagination and sensibility to what appeals to Hong Kong people” and the “prestige value for Hong Kong abroad.”²⁰ However, officials implemented this proposal only in 1966, when the government recognised the importance of building a sense of belonging. They emphasised how the designs of the new stamps could please local Chinese. For instance, they commented that designers should use the “lucky Chinese red colour.”²¹ Officials even debated which shade of red would better fit into traditional Chinese celebration.²²

This stamp soon caught the attention of both local and overseas collectors. The Hong Kong Post Office marked the first day of sale by organising a small ceremony, with Colonial Secretary David Irving Gass being the first person to buy the stamps. Many people queued for hours that day to purchase the commemorative stamps, even though the office announced that they would be on sale for the rest of the month. Postmaster General A.G. Crook told the press that the government had issued the stamps so that the public could send New Year greetings to their friends.²³ He later described this issue as “successful” and “well received.”²⁴ Overseas sales also surpassed other Hong Kong stamps. Crown Agents reports reveal that Lunar New

¹⁹ Crown Agents to Postmaster General, 17 September 1965, HKRS 2176-1-24, PRO.

²⁰ McDouall to Crook, 4 October 1965, HKRS 2176-1-24, PRO.

²¹ Folwell to Crown Agents, 21 May 1966, HKRS 2176-1-24, PRO; please refer to the following website for the image of the postage stamp: “First series of Lunar New Year special stamps: 10 cents (1),” Hong Kong Memory, accessed 13 July 2020, https://www.hkmemory.hk/collections/Stamps/All_Items/images/201702/t20170202_83431.html.

²² Folwell to Crown Agents, 17 November 1966, HKRS 2176-1-24, PRO.

²³ “Public Rushes New Year Stamp Issue,” *South China Morning Post*, 18 January 1967, 6.

²⁴ Crook to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 1 February 1967, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

Year issue outsold all others of 1966. The revenue generated by this issue was also greater than all others (Table 3.1). Even though the pictorial issue of 1968 included stamps in six denominations, the average sales volume of each denomination was still lower than that of the 1967 Lunar New Year issue.²⁵

Stamp Issue	Denomination	Sales volume	Revenue (HKD)
Lunar New Year Stamp Issue	10¢	42,700	4,270
	\$1.30	39,430	51,259
	Total	82,130	55,529
World Health Organisation Stamp Issue	10¢	26,200	2,620
	50¢	24,200	12,100
	Total	50,400	14,720
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation Issue	10¢	22,850	2,285
	20¢	20,450	4,090
	\$2	20,450	40,900
	Total	63,750	47,275

Table 3.1. Overseas Sales Volumes and Revenue of the 1967 Lunar New Year Stamp Issue and Other Commemorative Stamp Issues in 1966.²⁶

The Hong Kong government realised the popularity of these Lunar New Year stamps and thus proposed to the FCO that it should produce such stamps every year. Through making a postage stamp series with a complete cycle of the twelve Chinese lunar years, the government could show its “sensitivity to what appeals to Hong Kong people.”²⁷ Postmasters general required designers to incorporate items which they believed looked pleasant to Chinese people on upcoming stamps. In 1967, Postmaster General J.A. Taylor instructed designers of the next issue to include water and trees, which were associated with the year, and red colour, for which the public would “undoubtedly find general favour.”²⁸ In the following year, Taylor required that dogs

²⁵ Statement of Sales by the Crown Agents from Release 24th April 1968, n.d., HKRS 2176-1-16, PRO.

²⁶ Organised from the following documents: Crowley to Crown Agents for Overseas Govt. & Administrations, 15 May 1968, HKRS 2176-1-14, PRO; Statement of Sales by the Crown Agents from Release 1.12.66, 25 May 1967, HKRS 2176-1-14, PRO.

²⁷ Governor to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 6 April 1967, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

²⁸ Taylor to Crown Agents, 19 May 1967, HKRS 2176-1-25, PRO.

appearing on the 1969 stamps should come from folklore and traditional history, while the background should be acceptable colours related to the Year of the Dog.²⁹

Postmasters general relied on Chinese officers from the Secretariat for Home Affairs and the Home Affairs Department to make postage stamp designs conform with Chinese traditions. In 1971 officer H.K. Chan commented that the rats on the 1972 stamp should “look smart and pleasant” and should not be running or eating. Designers should also use dark, red, or white colours instead of yellow, which could imply bad luck in this year. Water could appear in the design as it was an “auspicious element.”³⁰ In 1973 another officer, K.L. Wong, commented that a white rabbit was acceptable from the “traditional point of view,” while twilight and grass were the “auspicious” elements of the year as they symbolised growth.³¹ The department sometimes provided images for designers, who might be foreigners, to draw animals in the proper Chinese ways. For instance, in 1974 Wong informed Taylor that the dragon’s design should follow the style of the renowned Lingnan School painter Chao Shao-an, so that the stamps could show 1975 as “a year of affluence and abundance” with “promises of success.”³² In the following year, the officer reminded Taylor that the snake on the 1976 stamps should match the one described in the ancient Chinese tale “Search for the Sacred” 干寶搜神記: the snakes should be “in a coil with its head raised above the body” to show that snake was a “grateful creature” and “indicative of dignity.”³³ Taylor later chose a design with an unnatural snake because it looked similar to Chinese tradition. In 1976 Wong suggested that the stamps for 1977 should showcase the good qualities of the horse by Chinese standards: “speed, stamina and freedom.” The officer also proposed specific designs, such as “a single white steed

²⁹ Taylor to Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 8 November 1968, HKRS 2176-1-27, PRO.

³⁰ Chan to Postmaster General, 16 February 1971, HKRS 2176-1-27, PRO.

³¹ Wong to Taylor, 9 April 1973, HKRS 2176-1-32, PRO.

³² Wong to Taylor, 5 March 1974, HKRS 2176-1-33, PRO.

³³ Wong to Taylor, 15 April 1975, HKRS 2176-1-34, PRO.

charging at full speed” and “a running horse [that] would signify progress and a free spirit.”³⁴ The Stamp Advisory Committee also recommended that designers reproduce famous Chinese paintings of horses on the stamps.³⁵

Postmasters general also consulted experts on Chinese culture (usually from the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs) to make sure all designs followed traditional Chinese standards. In 1967, A.G. Crook informed the Colonial Secretary that he had to check with the Secretary for Chinese Affairs whether having Chinese characters in white was acceptable, as the colour is often associated with funerals in Chinese traditions.³⁶ In 1969, C.G. Folwell stressed that the design would follow “advice on the traditional requirements” from the secretariat when he reported to the Colonial Secretary about the preparation of the next issue.³⁷

Colonial officials later incorporated this process into their attempts to pacify activists in the Chinese Language Movement. As Chapter One has explained, the government established the Chinese Language Authority in the early 1970s to superficially show respect to Chinese culture. The Home Affairs Department declared that the authority’s mission was to spread the use of Chinese within government departments. In 1974 it created a new Development, Training and Research Division. One of its responsibilities was to advise other departments on Chinese cultural matters. Postmasters general then relied on Chinese officers from this division to design stamps that fitted Chinese traditions.³⁸ In 1974 the division replied to Taylor that the designer should draw the dragon in green and gold, but not draw the abdomen and tail of the

³⁴ Wong to Taylor, 19 May 1976, HKRS 2176-1-35, PRO.

³⁵ Dickson to Wong, 30 July 1976, HKRS 2176-1-35, PRO.

³⁶ Crook to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 22 June 1967, HKRS 2176-1-25, PRO.

³⁷ Folwell to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 3 June 1968, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

³⁸ *Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Director of Home Affairs E.P. Ho, J.P. for the Financial Year 1974-75* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1975), 12.

dragon.³⁹ In 1975 new Postmaster General M. Addi also wrote that he had to double-check with the division to ensure the design did not contradict Chinese tradition.⁴⁰

At the same time, colonial officials eliminated any elements that might imply misfortune or adversity. In 1968 the government had to re-design the stamps because the cock on the design had a “split” tail, which was a sign of bad luck for some Chinese people.⁴¹ In 1970 the Postmaster General also had to remind the designer that only one dog should appear on each stamp because “two dogs side by side would form a Chinese character which conveys the idea of imprisonment,” while three dogs would mean “tempest.”⁴² He also noted that the colour red should not appear as it was destructive to white, the symbolic colour for the year.⁴³

Postmasters general gave similar orders to designers in other years. In 1969 the designer could draw neither a “running pig” nor pigs in pairs because such images would carry “a sense of war.”⁴⁴ In 1971 the designer was asked to draw an ox, but not a tame cow or a bull, and not to use green as it was the “prohibitive colour of the year.”⁴⁵ In 1972 the designer could not draw a white tiger because it was “objectionable from the traditional point of view.”⁴⁶ In 1974 the designer had to revise how he drew the dragon. Chinese officers commented that the original design was unacceptable because “only the head of one dragon should appear in the design and the abdomen and the exterior parts of the dragon should not appear in the stamps,” as this was the “viewpoint accepted by the community at large.”⁴⁷ Even the Executive Council occasionally intervened in the design process. For instance, in 1973 its members

³⁹ Pan to Taylor, 19 March 1974, HKRS 2176-1-33, PRO.

⁴⁰ Addi to Secretary for Home Affairs, 15 January 1975, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

⁴¹ Memorandum for Executive Council: New Postage Stamps, 16 August 1968, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

⁴² Chan to Postmaster General, 18 November 1968, HKRS 2176-1-27, PRO.

⁴³ Chan to Postmaster General, 26 November 1968, HKRS 2176-1-27, PRO.

⁴⁴ Chan to Postmaster General, 11 November 1971, HKRS 2176-1-28, PRO.

⁴⁵ Chan to Postmaster General, 4 November 1971, HKRS 2176-1-30, PRO.

⁴⁶ Leung to Addi, 17 August 1972, HKRS 2176-1-31, PRO.

⁴⁷ The original Chinese phrasing of that “viewpoint” was “神龍見首不見尾”; Wong to Taylor, 5 March 1974, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

required the designer to change the background colour of the stamps from light blue to pale purple or violet. They consulted the Secretariat for Home Affairs and realised that light blue implied “inauspicious” events, such as death.⁴⁸

The government emphasised not only the visual, but also the biological Chineseness of the animals on the stamps. In 1970 officials stressed that the pigs in the image should be a “locally improved breed of Chinese pig.” They did so because, according to the Agricultural and Fisheries Department, local farmers frequently used this type of pig for breeding and this would make local people accept the stamps more.⁴⁹ Local officials also defended the design when a controversy arose over what was considered appropriate in Hong Kong with what was acceptable to London when the design also included royal symbolism, such as the crown.

The Hong Kong government hoped to continue this effort to make local people trust their rulers. However, London officials closely monitored the issuance of postage stamps and objected to what Hong Kong proposed based solely on their personal views. In August 1970, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Alec Douglas-Home, objected to the pig stamps because he believed the design was in “bad taste.”⁵⁰ Governor David Trench defended the design because Hong Kong people valued the Lunar New Year stamp issues, and discontinuing this series would lead to public discontent. “Regret I do not consider it feasible to produce a satisfactory design commemorating the Year of the Pig without incorporating a pig,” Trench replied in a telegraph, “and I also do not consider it possible to explain the

⁴⁸ Memorandum for Executive Council: Postage Stamp Issue for Lunar New Year 1974, 7 February 1974, HKRS 2176-1-31, PRO.

⁴⁹ Memorandum for Executive Council: Special Postage Stamps for Lunar New Year 1971, 10 August 1970, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO; Webb to Wong, 9 March 1970, HKRS 2176-1-28, PRO.

⁵⁰ Secretary of State to Governor Hong Kong, 18 August 1970, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

absence of a 1971 commemorative issue without causing much comment and some ridicule.”⁵¹

London and Hong Kong officials compromised to resolve their conflicts. Trench kept on negotiating with the FCO so that his government could proceed with the stamp issue. He stated that featuring pigs on postage stamps was possible because the definitive issue of British Honduras in 1968 also included a wild pig with the Royal Cypher, while even the local Chinese Muslim community saw nothing offensive about the pig stamps. Trench also pointed out that Taiwan had already followed Hong Kong to issue Lunar New Year stamps, with the next one featuring pigs.⁵² After understanding the significance of the stamps, the secretary softened his tone and expressed that he simply objected to the design, but not the issue. Local officials also compromised. They abandoned the local Chinese pig and include a boar with less determinate sex in the design.⁵³

In the following year, local officials again tried hard to make London approve the stamp issue with rat. They collected public opinion from City District Offices and reported to London that the stamp issue was feasible because of public support. For instance, people expressed that they were enthusiastic about the upcoming issue and believed rats represented “wit, vitality and alertness.” One interviewee greatly supported issuing rat stamps and even suggested putting Mickey Mouse on the design.⁵⁴

These stamps clearly appealed to Hong Kong people. In 1968 one of the stamps featuring the Year of the Monkey were “running out” within the first few days

⁵¹ Governor Hong Kong to Secretary of State, 18 August 1970, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

⁵² Governor to Secretary of State, 18 August 1970, HKRS 2176-1-28, PRO.

⁵³ Folwell to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 24 August 1970, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO; Please refer to the following websites for images of the commemorative stamps: “First series of Lunar New Year special stamps: 10 cents (5),” Hong Kong Memory, accessed 13 July 2020, https://www.hkmemory.hk/collections/Stamps/All_Items/images/201702/t20170202_83423.html.

⁵⁴ Chan to Postmaster General, 16 February 1971, HKRS 1082-1-3, PRO.

of sale.⁵⁵ One month later, Postmaster General Taylor reported to the Crown Agents that all monkey stamps were sold out.⁵⁶ In 1969 the Lunar New Year stamps brought doubled revenue to the Post Office on the first day of sales. Controller of Post S.L. Mak reported that the total revenue on that day was \$140,000, while the daily average revenue was only \$60,000. People also had to queue for a long time even though the office arranged additional staff to serve at counters in the post offices.⁵⁷ One internal report shows that the sales of Lunar New Year stamps were usually higher than those of others (Table 3.2). The Crown Agents also initiated global promotion campaigns for the stamps. Every year the agents reported to the colonial government all advertisements on overseas publication, including those in the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan.⁵⁸

Issue	Sales of LNY Issues (HKD)	Sales of other issues (HKD)
Chinese New Year 1967	97,579	/
SEACOM 1967	/	48,566
Lunar New Year 1968	99,055	/
Pictorial Issue 1968	/	97,640
Definitive Issue 1968	/	88,116
Human Right Year 1968	/	88,147
Lunar New Year 1969	101,855	/
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 1969	/	95,898
Satellite Earth Station 1969	/	69,054
Lunar New Year 1970	101,233	/
Expo '70 1970	/	111,798
Tung Wah Centenary 1970	/	42,278
Asian Productivity Year 1970	/	100,137
Average (Correct to two decimal places)	99,930.50	82,403.78

Table 3.2. Local Sales of Commemorative Postage Stamps, 1967-70.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ "Special Stamps Running out," *Standard*, 3 February 1968.

⁵⁶ Taylor to Crown Agents H. Division, 6 March 1968, HKRS 2176-1-25, PRO.

⁵⁷ Mak to S.C.P. (T), 13 February 1969, HKRS 2176-1-26, PRO.

⁵⁸ For instance, see "Hong Kong. Lunar New Year 1968," attached in Hayball to Postmaster General, 10 May 1968, HKRS 2176-1-25, PRO; "Hong Kong. Lunar New Year," attached in Collins to Postmaster General, 21 April 1970, HKRS 2176-1-27, PRO; "Hong Kong. Lunar new Year. 1971," attached in Jones to Postmaster General, 11 October 1971, HKRS 2176-1-28, PRO.

⁵⁹ Re-organised from "F. D. C. only," n.d., HKRS 2176-1-28, PRO.

Chineseness also became visible on other stamp issues. In 1971 officials planned to produce a new definitive issue for the colony. They required the stamps have “a representation of Her Majesty combined with motifs of an essentially Chinese character.” Several British companies, such as the Harrison & Sons and De La Rue, submitted designs to the government. While all designs followed that guideline, Trench chose the design from Harrison & Sons because it was more Chinese: it had “a Chinese carpet which depicts the peony, symbol of prosperity” which were “often used as temple hangings in the late 17th century,” a “flower panel derived from a 17th century carved lacquer tray,” and also a unit pattern from a Kangxi-era porcelain dish.⁶⁰

Postage stamps commemorating the Festival of Hong Kong also showcased Chineseness, as if the festival was a traditional Chinese one. In December 1970 the Festival of Hong Kong Office submitted draft designs to the Postmaster General. While the Festival of Hong Kong included more than Chinese culture, designs featured only Chinese elements (except the festival logo).⁶¹ Designer Kan Tai Keung recalled in an interview that this issue was a breakthrough as this (together with the stamps of the Year of the Pig) was the first time the government ever invited a local Chinese artist to design the stamps. He believed local stamps should have higher standards comparable to UK designs and should feature Chinese cultural elements. His designs thus showcased Chinese calligraphy and graphics in modern ways. This opened the way for colonial officials to cooperate with local Chinese designers.⁶² The government later emphasised these Chinese elements when it publicised the festival stamps. For

⁶⁰ Folwell to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 15 February 1971, HKRS 1082-1-2, PRO.

⁶¹ Co-ordinator, Festival of Hong Kong Office to Postmaster General, 3 December 1970, HKRS 2176-1-49, PRO.

⁶² Kan Tai Keung, “The Design of the Festival Commemorative Stamps,” 16 September 2009, TW-KTK-LIFE-011, Oral History Interview, Hong Kong Memory Project.

instance, “Chinese girls dancing” and “Hong Kong flower emblem combined with a figure from a Dragon Dance” became the focuses of the stamps.⁶³

The story repeated itself in 1973, when officials were preparing for the commemorative issue of the next Festival of Hong Kong. Postmaster General Taylor noted that “subjects with a distinctive Chinese theme would be preferred.”⁶⁴ Officials liked the 1971 designs by Kan, and they invited him again to design both the stamps and the first day cover. He continued to emphasise Chineseness and focused on calligraphy this time.⁶⁵ The government later introduced the issue as stamps featuring “stylised version of a single Chinese character made up of a combination of festival symbols.”⁶⁶

Even stamp issues commemorating royal occasions showcased Chineseness. In 1971 the Crown Agents informed the British dependent territories that they should issue stamps to commemorate the silver wedding anniversary of Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip. The agents also suggested to the Hong Kong government that the colony’s stamps should include “Chinese junk boats in harbour scene” and “head of a chow” dog, which the agents believed could represent Hong Kong. Though Postmaster General Addi disagreed with using these symbols, he agreed that the Hong Kong stamps should include items that could represent the city. He then proposed to include a dragon and a phoenix, which represent jubilation and luck.⁶⁷ The Secretary for Home Affairs agreed with Addi’s choice and recommended that he refer to the book *Treasures of China* for images of Chinese dragons and phoenixes.⁶⁸ Similar to how former officials prepared for the Lunar New Year issues, Addi consulted experts so

⁶³ Press Release: The Festival of Hong Kong 1971, Commemorative Stamp Issue, attached in Postmaster General to Director of Information Service, 14 October 1971, HKRS 2176-1-49, PRO.

⁶⁴ Taylor to Crown Agents, 30 January 1973, HKRS 2176-1-49, PRO.

⁶⁵ Kan, “The Design of the Festival Commemorative Stamps.”

⁶⁶ Postmaster General to Director of Information Service, 18 August 1973, HKRS 2176-1-54, PRO.

⁶⁷ Addi to Chan, 30 November 1971, HKRS 313-7-1, PRO.

⁶⁸ Chan to Addi, 12 January 1972, HKRS 2176-1-50, PRO.

that the designs would match the perception of the two mythical creatures in Chinese communities.⁶⁹ The Executive Council later also suggested changing the Chinese characters of the stamps into the red colour, the celebrative colour in the Chinese tradition.⁷⁰ Local officials also attempted to make this tangible Chineseness reach the largest possible audience through understanding people's habits. They first planned to issue only a 50¢ stamp. However, they later realised that Hong Kong people seldom used postage stamps of such a high value. They then decided to issue a 10¢ denomination, which was more common in local postage.

The Hong Kong government also emphasised Chineseness in later stamp issues which commemorated royal occasions. In the 1973 issue for the wedding of Princess Anne, the queen's daughter, the government invited Fung Hong-hau, "the most famous calligraphist," to furnish the Chinese characters into a traditional style. It also required the designer to use pink and fuchsia as major colours because "reddish colour is traditionally considered auspicious for such an occasion."⁷¹ In 1976 the Crown Agents invited governments of dependent territories to produce a stamp issue that celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Queen Elizabeth's accession to the throne. The agents also asked each government to include one local scene related to the Queen in the issue.⁷² As with previous issues, the Hong Kong government chose a scene that showcased Chinese tradition in Hong Kong. Postmaster General Taylor selected the scene in which the Queen dotted the eye of a dragon (bringing the dragon to life) during her visit in 1975.⁷³ While the stamps were made to commemorate the royal occasion, they also attempted to show Hong Kong people that even the British

⁶⁹ Addi to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 21 January 1972, HKRS 2176-1-50, PRO; Jenney to Addi February 1972, HKRS 2176-1-50, PRO.

⁷⁰ Jenney to Postmaster General, 10 May 1972, HKRS 2176-1-50, PRO.

⁷¹ Wong to Taylor, 30 July 1973, HKRS 2176-1-55, PRO.

⁷² Davies to Postmaster General, 15 January 1976, HKRS 2176-1-64, PRO.

⁷³ Taylor to Crown Agents, 26 January 1976, HKRS 2176-1-64, PRO.

monarch and government cared about traditional Chinese culture. Taylor later decided to make this “eye-dotting” scene as the design for the \$1.30 denomination, which was usually used for airmail postage to Britain and Europe. He hoped this could help promote Hong Kong’s Chinese culture to the world.⁷⁴

Local officials sometimes emphasised Chineseness on stamps, even for events that were not fully about Chinese culture. In 1972 they started discussing how to design stamps for the Hong Kong Arts Festival of 1974. They concluded that the stamps should only showcase “the performing arts giving emphasis to Chinese culture,” and the designer decided to feature the masks in Cantonese opera, each featuring one mythical or historical figure: Sun Wukong (the Monkey King), Guan Yu (the Martial God), and Bao Zheng (the legendary Judge Bao).⁷⁵ This stamp issue became a way to promote Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese place, while it also commemorated the festival. A report from the *South China Morning Post* commented that “although Cantonese opera does not have a particularly prominent place in this year’s festival, the stamps show the more picturesque side of traditional Hongkong and will perhaps help to draw more overseas visitors to future festivals.”⁷⁶ However, the festival did not merely include Chinese culture. The introductory text from the Hong Kong Tourist Association described the festival as showing “a blend of Oriental and Occidental culture that is characteristic of Hong Kong’s unique position in Asia.”⁷⁷

Similar situations occurred in later years. In 1974 the government planned to issue stamps that featured local festivals. However, the Home Affairs Department suggested to include traditional Chinese festivals only, and the Postmaster General

⁷⁴ Taylor to Crown Agents, 12 March 1976, HKRS 2176-1-64, PRO.

⁷⁵ Hookham to Addi, 24 January 1973, HKRS 2176-1-52, PRO; Hookham to Bellenden, 19 December 1972, HKRS 2176-1-52, PRO; please refer to the following website for the image of the commemorative stamps: “Hong Kong Arts Festival’ souvenir sheet,” Hong Kong Memory, accessed 13 July 2020, https://www.hkmemory.hk/collections/Stamps/All_Items/images/201702/t20170202_83407.html.

⁷⁶ “Arts Festival Stamps,” *South China Morning Post*, 6 February 1974, 4.

⁷⁷ “Wording for Commemorative Stamps stickers,” attached in Postmaster General to Wong, HKRS 2176-1-52, PRO.

agreed.⁷⁸ This issue also showcased Hong Kong's position as more Chinese than China. As the *South China Sunday Post* explained, “the various festival stamps of Hongkong are of interest to folklore students, as this island colony retains, even in this modern age, various ancient Chinese customs which are no longer practised in China itself.”⁷⁹

Later in 1978, London allowed Hong Kong to produce a stamp issue that featured local rural architecture. Local officials decided to include only traditional Chinese structures in the designs, such as the Hakka Wai and various ancestral halls in the New Territories.⁸⁰ The official introductory text of the issue described the architecture as “fine examples of Chinese rural architecture of historical interest.” Images on stamps also showed the traditional Chinese geomancy embedded in the structures: *fung-shui*. The text also revealed that the Hong Kong Tourist Association had assisted the government in how to present these Chinese monuments on stamps.⁸¹ This complemented official efforts to preserve these Chinese monuments, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Commemorative Coins

London and Hong Kong also cared about whether the designs of local coins were in proper Chinese styles. For instance, in October 1977 officials commented on the design of the new one-dollar coin. The Chinese character for “dollar” was “too rounded at the bottom left hand corner” and some of the designs had to be more accurate in the “particular style of Chinese writing.”⁸² In the second half of the 1970s, officials also started using commemorative coins (or “numismatic coins”) for similar

⁷⁸ Wong to Postmaster General, 11 March 1974, HKRS 2176-1-57, PRO.

⁷⁹ “Stamp Story: Festival of Moon Cakes,” *Young Post, South China Sunday Post*, 11 April 1976, 5

⁸⁰ Tam to Secretary for New Territories Administration, 11 July 1978, HKRS 2176-1-72, PRO.

⁸¹ “Special Stamp Issue 1980: Hong Kong’s Rural Architecture,” attached in Taylor to Lanigan, 11 March 1980, HKRS 2176-1-72, PRO.

⁸² Hart to Sewell, 13 October 1977, Royal Mint (hereafter MINT) 34/SR/Z, TNA.

purposes as postage stamps: to show that the colonial government cared about people's customs, and to promote Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese city. The first Hong Kong gold coin for legal tender appeared in 1975 to commemorate Queen Elizabeth's visit that year.⁸³ Officials later suggested issuing coins to celebrate the festival most valued by the local Chinese population: Lunar New Year. From 1976 on, the Hong Kong government commissioned the Royal Mint to produce gold coins to celebrate the festival and to "trace the years of ancient Chinese Lunar Cycle."⁸⁴

The government greatly valued these coins. In 1976, when it issued them for the first time, it emphasised that they were coins from the "Crown Colony of Hong Kong."⁸⁵ It also added value to the coins by declaring them legal tender.⁸⁶ Even though they faced legal problems, local officials chose to negotiate with London instead of giving up. At first, local officials doubted whether the Coinage Order passed in 1936 allowed the government to produce gold coins and to declare them legal tender.⁸⁷ Though the British and Hong Kong governments discovered that issuing commemorative coins was unlawful under the existing Coinage Order, the Hong Kong side still hoped to revise the law so that it could make the coins legal tender.⁸⁸ The FCO once planned to ask Hong Kong to amend the order.⁸⁹ However, the local government disagreed. It hoped to create a separate document which interpreted the original order, so that it could firmly establish the legal status of the gold coins. London finally allowed Hong Kong to revise the Coinage Order in its own way in 1978: the

⁸³ MacLehose to Immediate FCO TELNO 1252, 13 December 1974, FCO 40/520, TNA.

⁸⁴ "1977 is the Year of the Snake," leaflet, 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

⁸⁵ "The Year of the Dragon," 1976, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA.

⁸⁶ "Xianggang jinian jinbi," 香港紀念金幣 [Hong Kong commemorative coins], leaflet, 1976, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

⁸⁷ Callaghan to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 13 December 1974, FCO 40/520, TNA; Timma to Stuart and Rushford, 13 December 1974, FCO 40/520, TNA.

⁸⁸ Roberts to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 17 December 1974, FCO 40/520, TNA; Roberts to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 December 1974, FCO 40/520, TNA.

⁸⁹ Wilmshurst to Hanna, 7 January 1975, FCO 40/520, TNA.

government could declare any coins legal tender.⁹⁰ Local officials also took great care of advertisements. It produced promotional films for the public service slot of local television channels. Officials agreed in 1977 that the government should be “spending a great deal more on advertising” and should stress that the coins were legal tender.

At the same time, the British government monitored coin issues in its dependent territories. Gold coins had always been highly emblematic in the history of British coinage. They were called the “gold sovereign,” in which the head of the monarch appeared on the designs. The gold sovereign had been a symbol of British national identity from the nineteenth century on.⁹¹ A policy statement of the FCO in 1978 stressed that these coins also mattered globally. Collectors around the world focused primarily on ancient, medieval, and rare modern coins before the mid-1960s. However, they had become greatly interested in new gold coins due to their high standard of production. The FCO stated that investors had also paid much greater attention to “coins with high intrinsic value,” and “the demand for coins by collectors” had “increased enormously” as a result.⁹² Thus, the British government always intervened in coinage matters in dependent territories, including Hong Kong. For instance, in 1978 the FCO learned that numismatic coins produced by dependent territories were of questionable legality and were not backed by adequate assets. It therefore commissioned the Bank of England to recommend how the FCO could involve itself more in the coinage matters of the territories. This inquiry was also aimed to protect the royal imagery.⁹³ London also monitored the production of new coins for ordinary circulation later in the same year.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Thompson to Hull and White, 12 January 1978, FCO 40/969, TNA; Murray to Goronwy-Roberts, 11 December 1979, FCO 40/969, TNA.

⁹¹ Martin Daunton, “Britain and Globalisation Since 1850: I. Creating a Global Order, 1850-1914,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 16 (2006): 24.

⁹² “Numismatic Coin Issues in the Dependent Territories,” 26 January 1978, FCO 40/969, TNA.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Thompson to HM Treasury, 12 July 1978, FCO 40/969, TNA; Blye to Thompson, 4 July 1978, FCO 40/969, TNA;

In fact, earlier in 1975 the mint had already proposed to the Hong Kong government that the Lunar New Year coins should be “expected to have great appeal among collectors in all parts of the world and... be a source of useful publicity.”⁹⁵ The Royal Mint persisted in continuing the coin issues even though they were not as popular as officials had expected in the first few years. Instead, the mint promoted the coins even more aggressively by asking branches of the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation in the United States to allow people to redeem the coins. It also sold the coins as jewellery and promoted their “investment potential.”⁹⁶ While the mint viewed the sales mainly as a business opportunity, the Hong Kong government cared more about its people’s response. The mint once considered that Hong Kong should stop the coin series due to the increasing price of gold. However, the Hong Kong government reminded the mint that the government had promised to produce a complete series of twelve coins, and that breaking this promise would harm the image of both the mint and the government. The mint chose not to abandon this project.⁹⁷

Officials attempted to make traditional elements on the coins understandable to people overseas, including the animals and the messages they implied. Promotional brochures introduced the traditional Chinese calendar and the twelve animals in the lunar cycle. Officials also tried to introduce Lunar New Year customs to people overseas. For instance, the 1977 brochure used merits of “snake people” in traditional Chinese culture as the selling point: “Those born in the Year of the Snake, according to Chinese, are attractive and wise,” while snakes were “the traditional guardian of treasure.” It also related this traditional festival to Western civilisation: “Jacqueline Onassis and Princess Grace of Monaco were both born in the Year of Snake as were

⁹⁵ Paper by the Royal Mint on the proposal to issue new Hong Kong coins each Chinese New-Year featuring the animal of the year, attached in Dowling to Douglas, 12 June 1975, MINT 34/TB/Z, TNA.

⁹⁶ Emden to Dowling, 17 May 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

⁹⁷ Blye to Hart, 12 February 1979, MINT 34/TH/Z, TNA.

Picasso, Gandhi, Flaubert, Brahms, Darwin and Abraham Lincoln... If you wish to mark the birth of a child in 1977, or give a Snake person a valuable and delightfully apt gift, you can secure your Year of Snake coin.”⁹⁸ Another advertisement in the American state of Iowa emphasised that “the snake is the guardian of treasure, and thousands of types are to be found in Chinese literature.” It also stressed that people born in the Year of the Snake could get along with those born in the years of ox and cockerel.⁹⁹

While this was a promotional tactic to boost sales, it was also Hong Kong’s attempt to show how it cared about its traditional Chineseness. Even though foreigners might not buy these coins, readers of the leaflets would still be reminded that Hong Kong was a Chinese city under British rule. Hong Kong officials decided what should appear on these promotional materials. Texts on the brochures were prepared by Hong Kong officials every year.¹⁰⁰ Local officials also provided information related to traditional Chinese customs and animals of the year to the Royal Mint. In 1977 they provided information on how to promote horse coins to the Royal Mint. They suggested that the mint could mention that people born in the years of horse were “self-sufficient and independent, well-liked and much admired.”¹⁰¹ The finalised advertisement not only promoted these merits of the horse people, but also how horses appeared in traditional Chinese culture, such as art, tales, classics, worship, and history.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ “1977 is the Year of the Snake,” brochure, 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

⁹⁹ “Hong Kong \$ 1,000 Gold Coin Heralds Year of the Snake,” 28 December 1976, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁰ Note of a Meeting with Mr. Douglas Blye, Secretary of Monetary Affairs, Hong Kong Government, at Grosvenor Gardens on 8th August 1979, 10 August 1979, MINT 34/S7/Z, TNA.

¹⁰¹ Emden to Edge, 4 August 1977, MINT 34/ST/Z, TNA.

¹⁰² Year of the Horse Order Form, 1978, MINT 34/ST/Z, TNA; “Royal Mint Commemorates the Year of the Horse,” 1978, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA; “Horses,” attached in Emden to Cullen, 1 July 1977, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA; Text for leaflet, 1978, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA.

Two years later, when officials were promoting coins for the Year of Monkey, the brochure also stressed that the monkey appearing on the coin was the one “commonly found in Hong Kong and China.” As in previous years, the brochures introduced to foreign audiences how monkeys appeared in traditional Chinese culture. For instance, how the Monkey God was worshipped by Buddhists and Taoists in Hong Kong and how monkeys, such as the Monkey King from the classic novel *Journey to the West*, had been “a source of fascination to the Chinese for many centuries.”¹⁰³ However, officials would eliminate from the advertisement all Chineseness associated with communist China. For instance, “Mao Tse-tung” was deleted from the draft list of famous historical figures.¹⁰⁴ Other overseas promotional booklets, such as those in the UK and America, also required Hong Kong’s approval.¹⁰⁵ Local officials could thus ensure that the mint would properly spread the colony’s image as a traditional Chinese city. Colonial officials also occasionally reminded the Royal Mint that Hong Kong, but not other parties, had the right to decide how to advertise the coins. In 1980, for example, Hong Kong warned the mint that the draft information leaflet was “subject to amendment.” In 1981 officials from the mint re-stated that they had to seek permission from the Hong Kong side before publishing the leaflet.¹⁰⁶

The Royal Mint promoted the coins worldwide after receiving information from Hong Kong. English-speaking countries were not the mint’s only targets. Advertisement also popped up in European newspapers and magazines.¹⁰⁷ In 1981 the

¹⁰³ “the chinese monkey,” 18 October 1979, MINT 34/S7/Z, TNA; “Hong Kong \$1000 Lunar Year Coin: The Year of the Monkey 1980,” 1980, MINT 34/TB/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁴ “Royal Mint to National Press/Coin Mags,” 31 December 1976, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁵ Draft English text for the Year of the Monkey Gold coins leaflet, attached in Hart to Mansley, 22 August 1979, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; Hart to Bendon, 28 July 1981, MINT 34/TK/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁶ Hart to Mansley, 27 August 1980, MINT 34/TK/Z, TNA; Hart to Bendon, 28 July 1981, MINT 34/TK/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁷ “Do you have a snake in your family?” leaflet, February 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; “1977 is the Year of the Snake,” leaflet, January 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; Emden to Blye, 8 August 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; D. Martin Jones, “The Hong Kong Year of the Horse HK \$1000 Gold Coin,” 1978, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA; “Hong Kong Year of the Horse HK \$1000 Gold Coin Unveiled,” 7 February

coins also entered the Southeast Asian market.¹⁰⁸ Television advertisements featuring Chineseness became another promotional tool in the late 1970s. The mint cooperated with the Hong Kong Tourist Association to produce films selling the coins in the United Kingdom and the United States. For instance, in 1978 the association found a Chinese woman to hold the coin in the film.¹⁰⁹ The mint later hoped to promote the coins in Chinese television stations in the United States, and specifically found “someone of Chinese ethnic origin from the Hong Kong Trade Office” as the background narrator. In other words, Hong Kong, through agents such as the mint and the tourist association, promoted itself as a traditional Chinese city. Even though the audience of the promotion might not buy the coins, they would receive the messages about Chinese traditions in Hong Kong.

Communist China was also aware of these Chinese coins. In January 1978, officials believed the image of the Gansu Horse would make the coin more attractive. As the image came from a painting in mainland China, officials decided to seek Beijing’s approval before putting it on the coins. They did so through the Political Adviser office and the New Chinese News Agency, the de facto embassy of the communist Chinese regime in Hong Kong.¹¹⁰ In an era when the British and Hong Kong governments had an uncertain relationship with communist China, this action was unprecedented. It also showed to the communist regime that the colonial state had managed Hong Kong’s Chinese people well by taking care of their traditional customs. The PRC’s State Museums and Archaeological Data Bureau later approved

1978, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; “Ein exclusives Angebot für Sammler und Geldanleger: Die Hongkong-Dollarmünzen in Gold” [An Exclusive Offer for Collectors and Investors: The Hongkong-dollar Coins in Gold], 24 June 1977, MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; “Har De en slange I Deres familie?” [Do You Have a Snake in your Family?], n.d., MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA; “Un dragon d’or pour Hong Kong” [A Golden Dragon for Hong Kong], n.d., MINT 34/S4/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁸ Lotherington to Blye, 18 February 1981, MINT 34/TK/Z, TNA.

¹⁰⁹ Woodman to Emden, 5 January 1978, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA; Woodman to Dunt, 6 January 1978, MINT 34/SV/Z, TNA.

¹¹⁰ Wilson to Masfield, 7 January 1978, FCO 40/969, TNA.

Hong Kong's request. It also thanked the Hong Kong government for choosing the “bronze speeding horse with its hind hoof treading on the flying swallow” as the “effigy of the coin.”¹¹¹ Officials from the Royal Mint later gave a Lunar New Year coin as a gift to the Chinese Ambassador when they visited Beijing.¹¹²

Monuments

The tangible past also helped the local government to promote Chineseness. In the 1970s, Hong Kong officials protected Chinese monuments through the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance. Governors could now declare certain structures as monuments, which would be placed under government protection. Though Hong Kong people could not collect monuments as they did with postage stamps and coins, they still cared greatly about this tangible Chineseness. In 1978 Antiquities and Monuments Office's report stated that “considerable interest in its ancient heritage has already awakened in the Hong Kong public.”¹¹³ Later in 1982, the Antiquities Advisory Board also reported that the repaired Tung Lung Fort on Tung Lung Chau attracted large numbers of people to “enjoy the remarkable seascape” despite lacking regular ferry services.¹¹⁴

In fact, people in the colony had long valued antiquities and monuments. Yet the government overlooked calls for an ordinance to protect them until the late 1960s. S.G. Davis, the Professor of Geography at the University of Hong Kong, wrote publicly as early as 1964 that Hong Kong urgently needed a law to regulate archaeological exploration.¹¹⁵ Legislative Councillors also raised this issue at council

¹¹¹ Wang to Wilson, 28 January 1978, FCO 40/969, TNA.

¹¹² Note of a Visit to the Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong, 19 March 1979, MINT 34/TH/Z, TNA.

¹¹³ Executive Secretary's (Antiquities and Monuments) Report on the work of the Section covering the period October 1976 – December 1977, 6 April 1978, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹¹⁴ *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1982* (Hong Kong: Antiquities and Monument Office, Urban Services Department, 1983), 10.

¹¹⁵ “Archaeological Specimens Lost to Hong Kong,” 12 November 1964, *South China Morning Post*, 12.

meetings during the 1960s. In 1971, when the government finally brought the bill to the legislature, councillor H.J.C. Browne complained that the government took an unreasonably long time to respond to the public's call: "I would like, if I may, to congratulate the honourable Attorney General because I believe that several dozen legal draftsmen have retired since it first came onto the drafting list!"¹¹⁶ The government did not explain why it delayed the legislation for almost a decade, but this passing of the bill in 1971 fitted other attempts to foster a sense of belonging by "Chinese standards" (as the previous chapter has illustrated).

However, the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance had a similar fate as the Official Languages Ordinance until 1976: the government did nothing after appeasing the people. The Secretary for Home Affairs established the Provisional Antiquities Advisory Board in 1972 to prepare for the preservation work. In the second meeting, however, board members believed they were "powerless" because the ordinance had not come into force.¹¹⁷ In June 1974, councillor Wilson Wang Tze-sam asked Secretary for Home Affairs Denis C. Bray whether the government could enforce the ordinance before "it became antique." Bray explained that he could not find a person with the "necessary qualifications and experience" to serve as the Executive Secretary to carry out the work.¹¹⁸ However, the provisional Antiquities Advisory Board had already recommended James Hayes to be the secretary in January 1971, while the Secretariat for Home Affairs simply replied that the post was not yet created.¹¹⁹ Councillor Rogerio Lobo asked the same question in November 1975, but Bray answered in the

¹¹⁶ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1971-1972* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1972), 216.

¹¹⁷ Provisional AAB: Minutes of the Second Meeting held in the Conference Room, Secretariat for Home Affairs, on Friday 21st July 1972 at 2.30 p.m., 5 August 1972, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹¹⁸ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1973-1974* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974), 911.

¹¹⁹ Provisional AAB: Minutes of the Fifth Meeting held in the Conference Room, Secretariat for Home Affairs, on Friday 19th January 1973 at 2.30 p.m., 28 February 1973, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

same way.¹²⁰ In August 1976 councillor Hilton Cheong-Leen complained that “this piece of legislation is almost antique!” Bray replied that the government would start taking action in the same year, but it still could not find a suitable person for the post.¹²¹ In fact, the government had realised this problem back in 1971 but did not attempt to solve the problem whole-heartedly. Secretary for Home Affairs Donald Luddington wrote in the same year that it would be “impossible to administer this Bill without having available... a Government officer with full and sufficient qualifications to enable him to assess monuments and antiquities and to supervise their proper excavation, restoration, display and maintenance.”¹²²

Again, the government fulfilled its promise only when the people voiced their opinion. It hired an executive secretary in 1976, but MacLehose approved the first monument declaration only in 1978. During the mid-1970s the Home Affairs Department initiated the Movement of Opinion Direction (MOOD) scheme to generate confidential reports of public opinions about government policies. Officials also used the scheme to identify possible threats to colonial rule.¹²³ In December 1977 the department reported to the governor that Hong Kong’s population favoured protecting Chinese historical structures: “There was a much stronger sense of identity and attachment for Chinese style buildings which reminded them of such things as the travelling court of boy emperors Ti Ching and Ti Ping in Kowloon at the end of the Sung Dynasty.” The interviewees also told the department that officials should preserve old temples “in their own right as places of worship.” At the same time, these interviewees expressed that they knew little about colonial buildings, such as Murray

¹²⁰ *Hong Kong Hansard: Reports of the Meetings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Session 1975-1976* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1976), 235.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 1114.

¹²² Luddington to Bristow, 31 May 1971, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹²³ Florence Mok, “Public Opinion polls and covert colonialism in British Hong Kong,” *China Information* 33.1 (2019): 70-5.

House and the Marine Department building, and that these European structures were insignificant.¹²⁴ Shortly afterwards, MacLehose required that “consideration should be given to drawing up a positive preservation plan, for example in respect of Chinese villages and temples and some carefully selected and characteristic parts of the urban area.”¹²⁵ Officials responded with lists of potential monuments without any pressure from councillors.¹²⁶ Although some of them reported that “there is little prospect of preserving characteristic parts of the urban areas,” the Home Affairs Department and the governor still requested that they suggest further parts of the urban area that were worthy of preservation.¹²⁷

The government had already prioritised Chinese heritage when it first introduced the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance in 1971. It specified that only “a place, building, site or structure” built before 1800 could be defined as an “antiquity,” meaning that everything from the colonial era could not be listed for preservation.¹²⁸ Although legislative councillors had challenged this definition of antiquity in 1971, Luddington replied that the government should “concentrate on older antiquities and relics” until relevant departments acquired adequate experience of monument administration.¹²⁹ Even though officials wanted to protect nineteenth-century relics from the colonial era, this clause of the ordinance hindered them from doing so. For instance, in 1976 the board had to consult legal advisers and to seek approval from other departments before it could transfer a British canon found in a Mass Transit

¹²⁴ “MOOD: Preservation of old buildings (2,500 respondents); Anti-rabies campaign (1,700 respondents),” 5 December 1977, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹²⁵ Barnes to Director of Urban Services and Secretary for the New Territories, 16 January 1978, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹²⁶ Chau to Secretary for the Environment, 10 July 1979, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO; Fung to Director of Home Affairs, 4 September 1979, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO; Suen to Principal Government Town Planner, 8 October 1979, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹²⁷ Suen to Director of Home Affairs, 9 January 1980, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO; Extract from Minutes of Central & Western City District Committee Meeting dd. 28.2.80, n.d., HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹²⁸ Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, L.N. 64 of 1971 (1 January 1976).

¹²⁹ *Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1971-1972*, 217.

Railway construction site.¹³⁰ The government also required candidates to be familiar with Chinese history, but not colonial or local history, when it hired the Executive Secretary to implement the ordinance.¹³¹ Individual district officers, such as James Hayes from Tsuen Wan, also greatly promoted Chinese heritage in the New Territories through publications, speeches, and assistance by Rural Committees.¹³²

Though the board was not strictly a government department and included unofficial members, it was under heavy government influence. The composition of the board first exemplified this situation. All unofficial members were appointed by the governor. As the governor hoped that the board would prioritise this tangible Chineseness, he thus appointed experts on Chinese heritage, such as Lo Hsiang Lin, Peng Qirui, and Chan Pak Yip, to join the board.¹³³ Other official members dominated the scene. The Director of Urban Services would serve as the board's chairperson, while many other officials, such as Secretary for Home Affairs, the Secretary for New Territories, and representatives from the Public Works Department, were always present in the meetings and influenced the decision-making. Though provisional board members once considered including more non-governmental representatives, such as those from the Archaeological Society, Hong Kong Society of Architects, and the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, the government did not execute this proposal.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Minutes of the Antiquities Advisory Board Meeting held in the Committee Room, 12th floor, U.R.D. Central Government Offices (West Wing) on Friday, 28th January 1977 at 2.30 p.m., n.d. HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹³¹ Notes of a meeting held in the office of the S.H.A. at 11.00 a.m. on Thursday, 29th July, 1971 to discuss the Antiquities & Monuments Bill, 22 September 1971, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO; "Hong Kong Government Vacancies," *South China Morning Post*, 6 October 1976, 16.

¹³² Article for the 4th Tsuen Wan Arts Festival Brochure 1982, 13 November 1981, box 13, James Hayes Paper, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford; "Tsuen Wan: the continuity between old and new, A note by the Town Manager & District Officer Tsuen Wan," n.d., box 13, James Hayes Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.

¹³³ Yeung to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 27 April 1972, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹³⁴ Notes of a meeting held in the office of the S.H.A. at 11.00 a.m. on Thursday, 29th July, 1971 to discuss the Antiquities & Monuments Bill, 22 September 1971, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

MacLehose tightly controlled the declaration of monuments himself. After the board recommended buildings that should be preserved, the governor and the Executive Council could, as the ordinance stated, “direct that the declaration be withdrawn.”¹³⁵ How the governor and the council reached their conclusion remains unknown. As the later Chief Secretary David Akers-Jones recalled in his memoirs, minutes of the council (which are now partly available in Hong Kong’s Public Records Office) never recorded what everyone said.¹³⁶ Moreover, the operation of the board relied on the Antiquities and Monuments Section of the Urban Services Department, a branch of the government. Only in 1982 did the board become semi-autonomous.¹³⁷

At the same time, the government chose to emphasise Chinese monuments and overlook colonial traces. This was to avoid anti-British sentiments from growing again. During the 1970s, the government deleted British and Commonwealth history from school syllabuses.¹³⁸ MacLehose explained to Steven Tsang in the late 1980s that indoctrinating Hong Kong people with British history risked antagonising them. He believed much of Hong Kong’s population settled there simply because it was “obviously preferable to life in China.” Excessively promoting Hong Kong’s British connection or fostering a British identity would not work for a population that still largely identified themselves as Chinese.¹³⁹ MacLehose thus chose to overlook most of the colonial structures in the colony.

¹³⁵ Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance.

¹³⁶ David Akers-Jones, *Feeling the Stones: Reminiscences by David Akers-Jones* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 165.

¹³⁷ *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1980* (Hong Kong: Antiquities and Monuments Section, Urban Services Department, 1981), 4; *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1982* (Hong Kong: Antiquities and Monuments Section, Urban Services Department, 1983), 7.

¹³⁸ Edward Vickers, *In Search of an Identity: The Politics of History as A School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s-2005* (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 2005), 86-7.

¹³⁹ Transcript of interviews with The Lord MacLehose of Beoch, KT, GBE, KCMG, KCVO, DL Political Adviser, Government of Hong Kong (1959-62) Governor of Hong Kong (1971-82), 13 and 26 April 1989, 12-14 and 29 March 1991, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 377, Weston Library, University of Oxford, 285-87.

It was the government, not the board, which decided to protect only prehistoric and Chinese heritage. Indeed, board members suggested both Chinese and colonial buildings to the governor for preservation. On the one hand, they devoted much effort into saving Chinese structures. In 1972, Luddington instructed the board to look first at the list of potential monuments from the District Commissioner of the New Territories, which contained only Chinese structures such as the Tung Chung forts and villages in Kam Tim.¹⁴⁰ The board persisted in emphasising the New Territories when it started publishing reports in the late 1970s. For instance, in 1979 the report stated that “the Board laid considerable emphasis in 1979 on its efforts to secure the preservation of the 11 old New Territories buildings.”¹⁴¹ The board also devoted a section to potential New Territories buildings for preservation in its annual reports.¹⁴² Though the board admitted that preserving certain Chinese heritage was a difficult task due to ownership issues, it still insisted on negotiating with the owners so that the government could preserve the buildings one day.¹⁴³ The board also planned to take care of old Chinese temples in Hong Kong. It later gave up this proposal because the Chinese Temple Committee under the Home Affairs Department had already been in charge of this matter for decades.¹⁴⁴

On the other hand, board members also sought to preserve modern heritage. In 1977 they explained to the government why it should declare various colonial buildings as monuments, such as the Signal Tower, the Marine Police Headquarters, and Murray House.¹⁴⁵ As they stated in the board’s report in 1980, they hoped to

¹⁴⁰ Luddington to Wong and Warner, 31 January 1972, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹⁴¹ *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1979* (Hong Kong: Antiquities and Monuments Section, Urban Services Department, 1980), 7.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 12; *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1980*, 12; *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1981* (Hong Kong: Antiquities and Monuments Section, Urban Services Department, 1982), 12; *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1982*, 15.

¹⁴³ *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1979*, 7.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁴⁵ Memorandum for members of the Antiquities Advisory Board: Historic Buildings, Proposed Declaration as Monuments, 3 March 1977, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

preserve monuments that were related “to modern Hong Kong,” meaning that they also attempted to protect buildings from the colonial era.¹⁴⁶ Various European-styled structures, such as the former Victoria District Court, the Main Building of the University of Hong Kong, and Island House in Tai Po also appeared on the board’s list of preservation.¹⁴⁷ In fact, the board’s focus was sometimes neither Chinese nor colonial, but local. It would also consider whether a structure illustrated traditional “local” architectural style, though buildings listed in this category were usually Chinese heritage.¹⁴⁸

Though the board recommended prehistoric, Chinese, and colonial structures to the governor and the Executive Council, it did not receive a favourable response for the colonial ones. The Governor-in-Council rejected many of the suggestions related to British traces while approving many Chinese buildings on the list to become official monuments. Table 3.3 reveals that the percentage of Chinese heritage’s successful declaration was much higher than that of colonial buildings. Examples of these Chinese structures include the Tung Chung Fort, the Sam Tung Uk village, and the Tin Hau Temple.

¹⁴⁶ *Report of the Antiquities Advisory Board 1980*, 10.

¹⁴⁷ Wilson to Secretary for Home Affairs, 25 November 1981, HKRS 310-1-19, PRO; “Historical Buildings, Proposed Declaration as Monuments – Main Building and Senior Common Room Building of the University of Hong Kong,” 23 March 1978, HKRS 310-2-7, PRO; Memorandum for Executive Council: Proposed Declaration of Island House, Tai Po, New Territories, as a Monument, 23 November 1981, FCO 40/1325, TNA.

¹⁴⁸ “Historical Buildings, Proposed Declaration as Monuments: Hakka Village House, Chai Wan” 15 June 1977, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO; “Historical Buildings, Proposed Declaration as Monuments: Tsui Shing Lau, Ping Sha Pagoda,” 4 August 1977, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO; Memorandum for Executive Council: Proposed Declaration of Tung Lung Fort as a Monument, 6 February 1980, FCO 40/1197, TNA.

	Recommended by the Antiquities Advisory Board	Approved by the Governor- in-Council	Percentage of successful recommendation
Archaeological findings ¹⁴⁹	8	7	87.5%
Chinese heritage ¹⁵⁰	16	12	75%
Colonial heritage ¹⁵¹	17	3	17.6%
Overall	41	22	53.7%

Table 3.3. Monuments Recommended and Approved by the Antiquities Advisory Board and Governor-in-Council Respectively, 1979-82.¹⁵²

Meanwhile, the advisory board helped to screen out buildings that were useless or even harmful to the government. Structures that could not reveal the prehistoric, Chinese, or British colonial traces would not make it onto the list of protection. For instance, board members suggested that the government should not preserve the University Hall of the University of Hong Kong, which originally belonged to the Paris Foreign Missions Society, because “the French Mission did not play an important role in Hong Kong people’s life at that period.”¹⁵³ It also claimed that Béthanie, originally a house of the society until 1975, “was of no special architectural or historical merit” and was not worth to become a monument.¹⁵⁴ Later, the board also overlooked the Pathological Institute as they believed “there is not a single important historical event associated with the building.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ Archaeological findings refer to prehistoric rock carvings and stone circles.

¹⁵⁰ Chinese heritage refers to buildings or monuments that were claimed to be having Chinese origin (from an imperial dynasty) by the board. The approved monuments include two structures that were “agreed in principle” to become declared monuments.

¹⁵¹ Colonial heritage refers to buildings that were related to colonial rule

¹⁵² Calculated based on information from *Reports of the Antiquities Advisory Board, 1979-82*. Numbers are corrected to one decimal place when necessary. See appendix for a complete list of monuments recommended and approved by the Antiquities Advisory Board and Governor-in-Council respectively.

¹⁵³ Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Antiquities Advisory Board held on Wednesday, 17th August 1977 at 2.15 p.m. in the Conference Room, U.S.D. H.Q., 12/F, C.G.O. (West Wing), Lower Albert Road, Hong Kong, n.d. HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹⁵⁴ Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Antiquities Advisory Board held on 16th November 1977 at 2.30 p.m. in the Conference Room, U.S.D. H.Q., 12/F, C.G.I. (West Wing), Lower Albert Road, Hong Kong, n.d., HKRS 310-2-7, PRO.

¹⁵⁵ Minutes of the 17th meeting held on 10th December 1979 at 2:30 p.m. in the Conference Room, U.S.D. Headquarters, 12/F, Central Government Office (West Wing), Lower Albert Road, Hong Kong, n.d., HKRS 310-2-8, PRO.

Due to the MOOD reports, MacLehose and the Executive Council were also careful when choosing what not to preserve. Sites that might provoke unpleasant memories, usually colonial ones, could not enter the government's final list of protection. Murray House was an example. Officials believed that retaining it would only remind residents of their "bitter memories" during the Japanese occupation, hinder traffic, and "pose a great contrast" to the neighbouring high-rise commercial building.¹⁵⁶ City District Commissioners also reported that Hong Kong people were "not impressed" with the history of the building due to their memories from the occupation era. They believed a monument "should serve as some sort of landmark for a country and as something with which the people of a country can identify," which Murray House could not.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, the government opposed preservation that would harm its development projects. Demolishing the Kowloon-Canton Railway station in Tsim Sha Tsui for the proposed Cultural Complex was an example.¹⁵⁸ Although various groups protested against the government's plan and even petitioned Queen Elizabeth to withdraw this decision, they were unsuccessful.¹⁵⁹

While this policy tried to pacify the local Chinese population, it also promoted Hong Kong as a traditional Chinese city to the world, partly to boost tourism, partly to show how it cared about the people's past. Starting from the late 1960s, local communities called for making greater use of their heritage, especially for tourist purposes.¹⁶⁰ The government cooperated with the Hong Kong Tourist Association to

¹⁵⁶ Kwok to Director of Home Affairs, 8 August 1977, HKRS 570-3-19, PRO.

¹⁵⁷ Lam to Director of Home Affairs, 19 August 1977, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹⁵⁸ Wilson to Wong, 23 May 1977, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹⁵⁹ Jones to the Hong Kong Heritage Society, 27 February 1978, Hong Kong Heritage Society Archives, Hung On-To Memorial Library (Hong Kong Collection), The University of Hong Kong; Jones to the Hong Kong Heritage Society, 5 June 1978, Hong Kong Heritage Society Archives; Lan to Wan, 15 September 1980, Hong Kong Heritage Society Archives.

¹⁶⁰ For instance, see "Xinjie minzhengshu xiangyiju luyouxiehui lianxi huiyi"; "Qing bengang dajiudian zai Xinjie she fendian"; "Gehangye gongyou gongyu zuotan xuanyang defang mingsheng guji dui fazhan luyou shiye youzhu" 各行業工友公餘座談 宣揚地方名勝古蹟 對發展旅遊事業有助 [An After-hours Talk for Workers from Different Sectors: Promoting Local Scenic Spots and Monuments Would Help Develop Tourist Business], *Wab Kin Yat Po*, 9 April 1972, 4.1.

accomplish this task. Though the association was not an entirely official organisation, it had cooperated with the government, especially from the 1960s on (as the beginning of this chapter explains). Moreover, government annual reports had always emphasised the tourist industry and the association's contribution since the late 1950s. In 1972 members of the Antiquities Advisory Board raised in a meeting that the government had to cooperate with other organisations, including the Hong Kong Tourist Association, to discover and promote the colony's traditional buildings.¹⁶¹ In 1974, Tsuen Wan District Officer James Hayes also suggested that heritage should be used to promote tourism: "an existing village, or part of one, should be used, since this will provide the authenticity necessary."¹⁶²

Officials implemented this strategy in the late 1970s. The Antiquities and Monuments Section first cooperated with the association and the School of Architecture of the University of Hong Kong to survey traditional Chinese villages and buildings in rural areas. This project covered many of the declared monuments and potential ones recommended by the advisory board. This research resulted in an official publication titled *Rural Architecture in Hong Kong*. The output, such as the list of structures and characteristics of traditional architectural styles, became an important source of information for the association to publish future booklets and brochures.¹⁶³ At the end of the 1970s, the Tourist Association published a series of leaflets suggesting what to do in Hong Kong. The declared monuments became one of the focuses here. The leaflet titled *Exciting Things to Do in Hong Kong* listed various tourist spots, including the historical buildings. The Sung Dynasty Village at Lai Chi Kok, an ancient walled village in the New Territories, the Han Tomb in Lei Cheng Uk, and so

¹⁶¹ Provisional AAB: Minutes of the Fifth Meeting held in the Conference Room, Secretariat for Home Affairs, on Friday 15th December, 1972 at 2.30 p.m., 20 December 1972, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹⁶² Hayes to Curator of City Museum, 15 May 1974, HKRS 310-2-6, PRO.

¹⁶³ *Rural Architecture in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1979), 4.

on appeared together with many other modern attractions.¹⁶⁴ Other leaflets, such as *Sightseeing* and *Lantau Island Walks* also featured some of the official monuments.¹⁶⁵ These materials had a wide circulation among tourists as the association had to reprint them several times in the 1980s.

Officials also promoted Chinese heritage by turning it into museums. Some, such as David Akers-Jones and James Hayes, were personally interested in these Chinese historical remains.¹⁶⁶ In the 1970s their favourable attitude towards these structures echoed the official preservation policy. In 1974, Hayes suggested to other government departments that they could turn an old village house in Chai Wan into a museum. There was a “growing interest” in relics and “evidences of the past,” he claimed, and the government should encourage this trend to grow further.¹⁶⁷ Hayes later added that “the public at large, and especially younger persons, would surely be pleased to have our Chinese heritage preserved,” while “tourists would find it of great interest.”¹⁶⁸ Other officials supported this proposal, and the government followed this recommendation.¹⁶⁹ It later cooperated with the Urban Council to turn this house into the Law Uk Folk Museum (though the government completed restoration only in the late 1980s).¹⁷⁰ Later, officials decided to renovate the Lei Cheng Uk Han Tomb Museum. The curator of the Museum of History, Ho Ching-hin, stated in 1982 that “the upgraded branch museum, complemented by open space and landscaped garden

¹⁶⁴ *Exciting things to do in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tourist Association, 1980).

¹⁶⁵ *Sightseeing* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tourist Association, 1980); *Lantau Island Walks* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tourist Association, 1980).

¹⁶⁶ For instance, in a correspondence Akers-Jones described a Chinese old structure on Lantau Island as “an attractive little building”; see Akers-Jones to Hayes, 19 August 1976, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹⁶⁷ Hayes to Director of Lands and Survey, 17 April 1974, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹⁶⁸ James Hayes, “Talk to New Territories Rotarians, Monday, 27th May 1974,” HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

¹⁶⁹ Wong to C.D.O. (Eastern), 21 June 1972, HKRS 1105-1-18, PRO; Memorandum for Executive Council: Declaration of Law Uk at Chai Wan as a Monument, 4 August 1981, FCO 40/1325, TNA.

¹⁷⁰ Chan to Secretary for Home Affairs and Secretary for Environment, 17 January 1975, HKRS 410-4-9, PRO.

nearby, will greatly enhance the historical and cultural significance of the redeveloped Estate and will be the pride of local residents.”¹⁷¹

Tangible Chineseness

People today might never perceive collecting postage stamps, buying commemorative coins, and visiting historical buildings as “exciting things to do in Hong Kong.” However, they were all significant to colonial officials, local Chinese, and in some cases, foreigners from the late 1960s on. Through selling this tangible Chineseness, the government showed its people that it responded to their voices and cared about their customs. This was partly an attempt to pacify their patriotic or anti-colonial feelings. The above sections have also shown how the British government had always closely monitored Hong Kong’s affairs, and how London and Hong Kong officials negotiated and compromised in order to continue the Chinese cultural policies. At the same time, British rulers demonstrated to the world that they safeguarded their people’s culture well in an era when communist China had destroyed much of its heritage. They told everyone that the Free World had protected the people and their culture better than the communist world. This was also part of the attempt to secure local people’s trust towards colonial rule before the British government had to negotiate Hong Kong’s future with the PRC.

¹⁷¹ Ho to Director of Housing, 24 June 1982, HKRS 1105-1-20, PRO.

Conclusions

It was another important day. Singers were ready to perform their top hits. Award-presenters were ready to give their speeches, fans ready to shout for their idols. Everyone could not wait to immerse themselves into the coming hours of joy. Yet, the result was a surprise. Top Cantopop stars, such as Sam Hui, Teresa Tang, and George Lam received no awards. Everyone thought either Roman Tam or Adam Cheng would receive the honorary award for winning Top Ten Gold Song trophies in five consecutive years. Fans of these superstars became disappointed, as the masters of ceremony announced that no singers had completed the requirement to get the award. Meanwhile, people voted for songs that conveyed patriotic sentiments. Out of the ten Gold Songs, two were heavily patriotic: *My Chinese Heart* 我的中國心 and *Brave Chinese* 勇敢的中國人. This was the first and only year when singer Cheung Ming Man received this award, whereas the singer of the latter song, Liza Wang, said it was her honour to sing this song. She believed that members of the public liked the song not just because of its high quality, but also how it “stimulated everyone’s resonance and aroused everyone’s national awareness deep in their hearts.”¹

This was 4 February 1983, and the prize presentation ceremony was for RTHK’s fifth Top Ten Gold Songs Awards. While it became important news in local newspapers’ entertainment section, it was also significant in another way. It illustrated how the colonial government allowed its people to retain and publicise their Chinese identity even while it was promoting a local sense of belonging. The government recognised from the beginning that promoting a British or imperial identity would not

¹ “Gangtai shida Zhongwenjinqu dapai luoxuanzhe zhong 港台十大中文金曲 大牌落選者眾 [RTHK’s Top Ten Gold Songs: Many Top Stars Did not Receive Any Awards], *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, 5 February 1982, 5.4; “Diwujie shida Zhongwen jinqu banjiangli yinyuehui” 第五屆十大中文金曲頒獎禮音樂會 [Prize Presentation Ceremony and Concert of the Fifth Top Ten Gold Songs Awards], Radio Television Hong Kong, accessed 27 February 2020, <http://app4.rthk.hk/special/rthkmemory/details/extravaganza/774>.

work in Hong Kong, and local people were more interested in their Chineseness, especially culture. After the riots of 1967, the government had to stabilise the colony and secure people's support. This aimed to help the British government to gain more bargaining power before it negotiated Hong Kong's future with the PRC. To accomplish these missions, the colonial government utilised Hong Kong's cultural Chineseness. It attempted to enable local Chinese people to realise how the government respected and cared about their culture, thus making them trust their rulers and identify with this city.

This thesis has demonstrated how the government shaped and promoted cultural forms of Chineseness, including language, entertainment, and objects. It contributes to various fields of history. In terms of Hong Kong history, this thesis has shown that local officials adopted both oppressive and conciliatory approaches: it was an attempt to create a public opinion that would safeguard British and colonial interests. As the introduction has explained, existing works have illustrated why and how colonial officials reformed their Hong Kong policies from the late 1960s on. This thesis further reveals how the government simultaneously controlled and appeased the people.

On the one hand, the government suppressed the Chinese Language Movement while neglecting people's voices. University students and social activists demanded reforms of language policies. However, officials merely aimed to suppress the movement, instead of resolving the problems in government operation. On the other hand, policies on entertainment and objects revealed how colonial officials concurrently appeased the people. The government attempted to suit the tastes of all generations by promoting Chinese leisure in traditional and modern forms. The colonial government also sought to please its people through tangible Chineseness, such as postage stamps and coins that featured Chinese traditions.

This thesis also shows that culture in colonies should not be oversimplified as products of cultural imperialism, but as ones which involved negotiation and compromise between the colonisers and the colonised. As the previous chapters have shown, colonialism both influenced and worked with local culture. Colonisers first influenced local Chinese culture in various ways. From the 1960s on, colonial officials promoted Cantonese through radio, education, and popular music to shape a distinct Chinese identity while they were suppressing Mandarin. Through cooperating with the Urban Council and local artists, officials modernised Chinese performing arts in Western ways. For instance, the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra referenced modern Western orchestras when it re-arranged Chinese instrumental music. The council also presented translated western dramas. Meanwhile, officials celebrated Chinese festivals in Western ways in order to engage local youth. The Mid-Autumn Festival and Lunar New Year were no longer just about the old customs, but also stylish programmes such as balls, band concerts, and parties.

Meanwhile, colonial officials also worked with local people to present Chinese culture that would appeal to the public. Local leaders had called for preserving and promoting Chinese traditions. They believed the Cultural Revolution in communist China had destroyed much of the Chinese heritage. They worried that Chinese culture would gradually disappear. Entertainment in the 1970s was partly a response to their calls. In the late 1970s the council also invited local Chinese leaders to form the Lantern Carnivals Organising Committee and allowed them to lead the preparation of future lantern carnivals. With large-scaled celebrations, more people re-discovered the joy of celebrating Chinese festivals.

Officials relied on local Chinese people to produce objects that could showcase traditional Chineseness. Postmasters general frequently consulted Chinese officers from the Secretariat of Home Affairs and the Chinese Language Authority in the

design process. Whenever they had to plan for a new set of Lunar New Year stamps, they would ask the officers if the proposed designs conformed to Chinese traditions. Meanwhile, local Chinese artists helped them design stamps that featured Chineseness. When the government first formed the Antiquities and Advisory Board, it appointed experts on Chinese history and culture to serve in the committee. This enabled the government to seek advice on what Chinese monuments to preserve.

This research has also explored the global perspective of Hong Kong history. It first revealed how local Chinese culture became involved in the Cold War. In the late 1960s, the United States required Britain to keep Hong Kong partly to show off the attractiveness of the Free World to communist China. Through cultural policies, the Hong Kong government attempted to show that British colonialism and the Free World were taking better care of Chinese people than communist China. The PRC regime felt threatened by Hong Kong's cultural progress, including the development of the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra. Local officials also showed Chinese officials that they strove to present traditional Chineseness. Colonial officials informed Beijing and asked for its permission when they planned to use mainland Chinese images on coin designs, such as the Gansu Horse in 1978. This showed the communist regime that the colonial state had managed Hong Kong's Chinese people well by taking care of their traditional culture.

Finally, this thesis also shows how Hong Kong's Chineseness became transnational. The idea that Hong Kong was a traditional Chinese city crossed national boundaries. In the case of objects, the Hong Kong government cooperated with the Crown Agents and the Royal Mint to sell across the world postage stamps and coins that featured local Chinese traditions. To these British institutions, the sales might have been simply about profit. To the Hong Kong government, however, they were important ways to sell the colony's Chineseness. This helped demonstrate to the world

how British rulers had managed local culture well and promoted it globally. By promoting local heritage, the colonial government also showcased Hong Kong's tangible Chineseness as a tourist spot. These attempts were particularly important in showcasing the attractiveness of Hong Kong the Free World.

Several potential themes in exploring late-colonial Hong Kong appeared as this research progressed. The first is youth policies. The *Report of Commission of Inquiry* in 1966 emphasised the need to minimise local youth's dissatisfaction towards the wider society.² Chapters One and Two have revealed part of the government efforts in suppressing, pacifying, and appeasing them. Nevertheless, other parts of the youth policies, such as education (other than language subjects), recreation, and responses to university activists remain unexplored. They were also important attempts to create a local identity for Hong Kong youth.

Another theme is the colony's role in the British Commonwealth. This thesis has shown how London officials closely monitored Hong Kong's affairs and linked the colony to the British Commonwealth through postage stamps and coins. The Commonwealth continued to exert influence and link the British dependent territories to the metropole and to each other years after the wave of decolonisation.³ People of Hong Kong and other parts of the British Commonwealth also cooperated in different networks.⁴ These linkages, especially in Asia, remain unexplored.⁵

² *Kowloon Disturbances 1966: Report of Commission of Inquiry* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967), 142-43.

³ Sarah Stockwell, *The British End of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 9-10.

⁴ For instance, the National Union of Students of the Universities and Colleges of the United Kingdom declared full support to the Chinese Language Movement in 1971, and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation sometimes invited the Hong Kong government to nominate candidates from local universities or the polytechnic institute to serve as experts in other Commonwealth territories; see Molineux to Chui, 22 September 1971, FCO 40/341, TNA; Tso to Secretary, University & Polytechnic Grants Committee, 8 July 1975, HKRS 482-7-6, PRO; Buchan to Director of Commerce & Industry, 9 July 1975, HKRS 482-7-6, PRO.

⁵ Lo Yui Chim has recently researched late-colonial Hong Kong's role in the Commonwealth from a diplomatic perspective; Lo Yui Chim, "Backstage Crew: Hong Kong and the Commonwealth, c. 1960-1997." Paper presented at the First Annual Conference of the Society for Hong Kong Studies, Hong Kong, 22 June 2019.

One final theme is the idea of Hong Kong in the world. Chapter Three has shown how the colonial government promoted Hong Kong's traditional Chineseness through postage stamps, coins, and monuments. This reveals its attempts to demonstrate how it cared about local culture and the colony's role in the cultural Cold War. Nonetheless, this was only part of the attempts to "sell" Hong Kong. In the final decades of the colonial era, Hong Kong also promoted itself through other media, such as tourism and performance groups. How global audiences perceived Hong Kong and the colony's cultural role in the world can be new topics for investigation.⁶

Colonial Chineseness remained and persisted in Hong Kong. Calls for respecting the Chinese language gradually diminished in the 1980s. History textbooks in postcolonial Hong Kong described the Official Languages Ordinance as implying the rise of Chinese people's political status. The colonial government only further improved the status of Chinese in courts and schools during the 1990s, when the retrocession was approaching. Chinese entertainment kept thriving in the city. Dragons continued to fly in front of Queen Elizabeth when she visited Hong Kong again in 1986, though people stressed more of Hong Kong's uniqueness at this point. Postage stamps and coins continued to feature the Lunar New Year while they were showcasing more foreign elements. More Chinese structures appeared on the list of declared monuments while the Hong Kong government was adding more colonial buildings onto the list in the 1980s and 1990s. This Chineseness did not fade, but accompanied Hong Kong through its final days of colonial rule.

⁶ The Hong Kong Tourist Association had actively promoted Hong Kong to different parts of the world, and the Hong Kong government had also sent performance groups, such as dance teams and orchestras to perform outside the colony; for instance, see "An Amusing Account of Days in the Life of Lorenzo Lo, Information Director for North America of the Hongkong Tourist Association," *South China Morning Post*, 22 November 1968, 48; Hong Kong School Chinese Dance Team: Report on Visit to Edmonton, Canada, 1978, 19 September 1978, HKRS2188-1-18, PRO.

Appendix

List of Monuments Recommended by the Antiquities Advisory Board and Decisions Made by the Governor-in-Council, 1979-82

Year of report	1979	1980	1981	1982
Monuments newly recommended by the board				
Archaeological findings	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rock carvings at Big Wave Bay 2. Rock carvings at Shek Pik 3. Rock carvings at Tung Lung 4. Rock carvings at Po Toi 5. Rock carvings at Kau Sai 6. Rock carvings at Cheung Chau 	/	/	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rock carving at Lung Ha Wan 2. Stone Circle (Fan Lau)
Chinese heritage	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tung Lung fort 2. Tung Chung fort 3. Sam Tung Uk village 4. Tin Hau Temple (Tin Hau Temple Road) 5. Sung inscription on a rock at Joss House Bay 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fan Lau fort 2. Law Uk (Chai Wan) 3. Houses Nos. 10 & 11 Wong Chuk Hang 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Man Lun Fung ancestral Hall (San Tin) 2. Sheung Yiu village 3. Former Chinese Customs Station (Junk Island) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tung Chung battery 2. Remains of pottery kilns (Wun Yiu Village, Tai Po) 3. Pottery kiln (Tuen Mun) 4. Man Mo Temple (Tai Po) 5. Pak Sha O Village (Tai Po)
Colonial heritage	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Murray House 2. Flagstaff House 3. Supreme Court Building 4. Hong Kong Club 5. Marine Department Building 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. District Office, North 2. Bishop's House 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Main Building, the University of Hong Kong 2. Central Magistracy (Arbuthnot Road) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Island House (Tai Po) 2. Tai Po Market Railway Station 3. Victoria District Court (Battery Path)

Colonial heritage (Cont'd)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Western Market 7. Royal Observatory Building & compound 8. Former Kowloon-Canton Railway Station 9. Tsim Sha Tsui Police Station and hill 10. Duddell Street steps and gas lamps 			
Monuments approved by the Governor-in-Council				
Archaeological findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rock carvings at Big Wave Bay 2. Rock carvings at Shek Pik 3. Rock carvings at Tung Lung 4. Rock carvings at Po Toi 5. Rock carvings at Kau Sai 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rock carving at Cheung Chau (gazetted in 1982) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rock carving at Lung Ha Wan (gazetted in 1983)
Chinese heritage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tung Chung fort 2. Sung inscription on a rock at Joss House Bay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tung Lung Fort 2. Sam Tung Uk village (gazetted in 1981) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sheung Yiu village, Sai Kung 2. Fan Lau fort 3. Man Lun Fung ancestral Hall (San Tin) 4. Houses Nos. 10 & 11 Wong Chuk Hang 5. Law Uk in Chai Wan (3-5: Agreed in principle) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tin Hau Temple (Tin Hau Temple Road) 2. Former Chinese Customs Station (Junk Island, gazetted in 1983) 3. Tung Chung battery (gazetted in 1983)
Colonial heritage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Duddell Street steps and gas lamps 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. District Office, North 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Island House (Tai Po, gazetted in 1983)

Recommendations rejected by the Governor-in-Council				
Archaeological findings	/	/	/	/
Chinese heritage	/	/	/	/
Colonial heritage	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Marine Department Building 2. Royal Observatory Building & compound 3. Former Kowloon-Canton Railway Station 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hong Kong Club 	/	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Main Building, the University of Hong Kong

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HKRS 313: General Correspondence Files (Confidential), Home Affairs Department



- HKRS 365: Feature Article Dossiers with Photographs, Information Services Department
- HKRS 410: General Correspondence Files, Secretariat for Home Affairs and Home Affairs Department
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