

Seaways and Gatekeepers

Seaways and Gatekeepers

Trade and State in the Eastern Archipelagos of
Southeast Asia, c.1600–c.1906

Heather Sutherland



NUS PRESS
SINGAPORE

© 2021 Heather Sutherland

Published by:

NUS Press
National University of Singapore
AS3-01-02, 3 Arts Link
Singapore 117569

Fax: (65) 6774-0652
E-mail: nusbooks@nus.edu.sg
Website: <http://nuspress.nus.edu.sg>

ISBN 978-981-3251-22-9 (paper)

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

National Library Board, Singapore Cataloguing in Publication Data

Name(s): Sutherland, Heather.

Title: Seaways and gatekeepers : trade and state in the eastern archipelagos of Southeast Asia, c.1600-c.1906 / Heather Sutherland.

Description: Singapore : NUS Press, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifier(s): OCN 1153924568 | ISBN 978-981-3251-22-9 (paperback)

Subject(s): LCSH: Southeast Asia--Commerce--History. | Trade routes--Southeast Asia--History. | Southeast Asia--Boundaries--History. | Southeast Asia--History.

Classification: DDC 382.0959--dc23

A considerable range of material, including modern and historical maps, contemporaneous representations (including many in colour) and photographs are available at <https://epress.nus.edu.sg/seaways>.

Cover image: View of a Settlement on the Island of Workey, Aru, by A.J. Bik, 1824. ["Gezicht op een nederzetting van de oostkust van Workai, Aru-eilanden, Zuidoost-Molukken" (Probably the village of Afara). Adrianus Johannes Bik, 24 April 1824. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RM RP-T-1999-173. Persistent Url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.364704>. Public Domain].

Typeset by: Oigma Solutions Pvt Ltd
Printed by: Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

Contents

<i>List of Maps</i>	vii
<i>List of Images</i>	ix
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
Chapter One Introduction	1
PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS	
Chapter Two The Cradle of Geography	35
Chapter Three Encounters	78
Chapter Four Patchwork Polities	122
PART TWO: GLIMPSED HISTORIES	
Chapter Five Commodity Wars before 1684	169
Chapter Six Ungovernable Tides, 1684–1784	208
Chapter Seven Pivotal Decades, 1784–1819	250
Chapter Eight Equivocal Policies, Converging Trade, 1819–47	287
Chapter Nine Free Trade and Phantom Fleets, 1847–69	335
Chapter Ten Steam and Capital, 1869–1906	382
Chapter Eleven In Restrospect	440
<i>Appendix</i>	449
<i>Bibliography</i>	462
<i>Index</i>	528

List of Maps

1.	Comparison of Europe and Indonesia, to scale	5
2.	Eastern Archipelagos	9
3.	Main Chinese trade routes	37
4.	Physical geography of the Eastern Archipelagos	46
5.	The Trading areas of West New Guinea	48
6.	Maluku	69
7.	The Southwestern and Southeast Islands	102
8.	Sama Bajau	109
9.	The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century polities of Flores, and the Solor and Alor Archipelagos	172
10.	The Sulu Sea, Mindanao and the Sulu Islands	178
11.	Traditional Kingdoms of Maluku, early fifteenth century, and the spheres of influence of Ternate and Tidore, sixteenth to seventeenth century	183
12.	Central Maluku	186
13.	North and Central Sulawesi	189
14.	Sumbawa	194
15.	Makassar's Sphere of Influence before 1669	198
16.	East Borneo and the Makassar Straits	239
17.	Timor, showing Dutch (west) and Portuguese (east) territories, c.1900	246
18.	South Sulawesi	273
19.	Colonial East Borneo, showing the main sultanates, 1880	345
20.	Bali and Lombok	375
21.	Sumba, early twentieth century	380
22.	The development of steam shipping lines, Dutch East Indies	398
23.	North Borneo	409

List of Images

1.	Carrying dyewood to the port of Waingapu, Sumba, pre-1940	12
2.	Detail of a tomb cover, West Sumba, showing four gongs, 1910	19
3.	Natives of Aru shooting the Great Bird of Paradise, 1869	27
4.	Sumba landscape, c.1913	50
5.	“Bejadju” (Pulau Petak) Dayaks, Southeast Kalimantan, 1839	53
6.	Preparation of sago in the Upper Kumbe region, Southwest New Guinea, 1910	54
7.	A Dani man, from the West New Guinea Highlands, with a pack of salt, 1920	66
8.	View of Sambaliung, Berau, illustrating its riverine location, 1901	74
9.	A Malay chief from Sulu, c.1843	94
10.	Two Alifuru portraits from Maluku (Seram), 1865–79	98
11.	Trading perahu off Selayar, 1899, South Sulawesi	106
12.	Seven unknown Bugis in Singapore, 1865	113
13.	Chinese men in Manado, 1873	117
14.	Ma Suling fighters of Merasa, Upper Mahakam, 1896–97	127
15.	The Raja of Anakalang, West Central Sumba, 1937	130
16.	The Raja of Honitetu and Consort, Southwest Seram, before 1920	136
17.	Don Josef Ximenes da Silva, Raja of Sikka, Flores, 1927	139
18.	Main gate of the Krobokan palace, Denpasar, South Bali, 1920	144
19.	Sultan Muhd. Jamalul Kiram II, Sultan of Sulu (r.1894–1936), c.1890	149
20.	The Sultan of Kutai (Aji Muhammad Suleiman) with his pangerangs (princes), 1875	165
21.	Chinese ships, 1697	170
22.	View of Batavia, 1619–80	175
23.	A warship and the galley of the King of Ternate, 1599	184
24.	Manipa costume and an Orang Kaya of Manipa, 1724	227
25.	View of Makassar’s Castle Rotterdam from the sea, 1750	230
26.	Two men of Rawak, northeast Waigeo, making fire, 1822	256
27.	Warriors of Ombai (Alor), 1825	261
28.	Waru, north coast of East Seram, c.1839	270
29.	Inhabitant of Timor, 1822	283
30.	On Board the naval corvette Triton, en route to New Guinea, 1828	290
31.	Junk in Singapore, late 1830s	293
32.	Makassarese processing trepang, Port Essington, North Australia, 1845	298
33.	Iranun pirates from Tempasuk, North Borneo, 1848	304

34.	Road to Tondano in the Minahasa, late 1820s	311
35.	Island of Masmapi, Dore Bay, Northwest New Guinea, mid-1830s	322
36.	Dutch steamship <i>Vesuvius</i> , off Ambon, 1870	340
37.	View of the Barito River at Banjarmasin, c.1915	360
38.	Gusti Ngurah Ketut Jilantik, Raja of Buleleng with his clerk, 1865	376
39.	Toraja collecting damar resin, near Towuti Lake, Central Sulawesi, 1911	390
40.	The KPM ship <i>Generaal Pel</i> , with the <i>Saladin</i> and <i>Nördenskjold</i> , Makassar, 1893	401
41.	Datu Piang, “king of Mindanao”, and American officers, 1910	407
42.	Oil fields, presumably in Kutei, 1903–07	421
43.	Chinese small trader in outrigger canoe, northeast Halmahera, c.1915	423
44.	Tanimbar canoe off Selaru, south of Yamdema, 1903	430
45.	East Ende women (Flores) carrying rice to market, date unknown	436
46.	Gathering giant clams and view of the Island of Obi, from Bacan, 1779	444
47.	Pearl-shell fishermen near New Guinea, c. 1900	445

List of Abbreviations

ANRI	Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia
ANU	Australian National University, Canberra
ASM	Amsterdam Scheepvaart Museum (Amsterdam Maritime Museum)
<i>BIS</i>	<i>Bureau of Indonesian Studies, Leiden</i>
<i>BKI</i>	<i>Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde</i>
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor
CNWS	Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies, Leiden University
IIAS	International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden
IPB	Institut Pertanian Bogor
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
<i>JESHO</i>	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i>
<i>JMBRAS</i>	<i>Journal of Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
<i>JSBRAS</i>	<i>The Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
KIT	Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam
KITLV	The Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Jakarta
MVV	Museum Volkenkunde, Leiden
NIAS	Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen
NMVW	Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, The Netherlands
NYPL	New York Public Library
NUS	National University of Singapore
P dan K	Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta
RM	Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
RSPS	Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Canberra
SEAP	Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University
<i>TNI</i>	<i>Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie</i>
<i>TITLV</i>	<i>Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land- en volkenkunde</i>
UNSW	University of New South Wales, Sydney

Preface

This book is both ambitious and cautious. The ambition was born of necessity. While working on the history of an east Indonesian port city, Makassar, I had been first impressed by the systematic documentation of its trade,¹ and then shocked to realise how little I knew about the wider region. This was a water-centred world, as broad as the entire Mediterranean, yet it harboured a mere handful of states. These were, most notably, the seafaring Sultanates of the Southern Philippines, the riverine polities of East Borneo, the spice-trading kingdoms of Ternate and Tidore, powerful Makassar on Southwest Sulawesi (the Celebes) and Bali's Indian-influenced realms. But much smaller, yet often complex societies were more typical of the region: apparently isolated beachfront settlements, raiders' strongholds and coastal rajadoms. These centres, large and small, connected fishing communities, inland foragers and shifting cultivators to exchange systems stretching as far as Europe, India, China and Japan.

I became intrigued by the enduring paradoxes between separation and connection, between exchange and autonomy, and between low levels of political organisation and ties to transoceanic commercial networks. Despite the diversity of scholarly categorisation, and the borders imposed by colonial regimes, I also wanted to illuminate the common underlying patterns that extended from the Sulu to Timor Seas. At the same time, I sought to convey a sense of the specific characters of individual islands and settings.

Caution was imperative. While there were a handful of excellent pioneering studies of individual regions, most histories barely mention the places considered here. If they were named, they were usually plucked out of context and presented as anonymous suppliers of spices, fragrant timbers and pepper to contending European fleets. But it was not just the scarcity of sources that gave me pause. I was also uneasy with the conventional conceptual vocabulary. Moreover, the usual themes in the historical grand narrative of maritime Southeast Asia—state formation, the rise and fall of regimes, the transformative role of European trade—seemed too abstract and dismissive of local agency.

This combination of ambition and caution led me to divide the book into two sections. The first, *Foundations*, traces the geographic, economic and political patterns which constituted a deeply rooted sub-stratum knitting this extensive region together. These synchronic chapters provide the basis for the cautious part two, *Glimpsed Histories*. I tread carefully here. Although I emphasize the trading ties and political alliances that connected diverse regions into shifting clusters, I try to give politically unincorporated societies their due share of attention. Trade rather than the state is the central motif. The resulting story

¹ See Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004).

is one of adaptation, opportunities grasped and lost, and of tenuous but very resilient webs within wider systems. But it is all very incomplete: local perspectives are extremely rare. Rather than forcibly merging these *Glimpsed Histories* into one explicit theme I have deliberately chosen to leave the fragments where they lie. The results may be jagged, but a little uncertainty is preferable to a misleading homogenisation which could preclude promising avenues of enquiry.

Connectivity is central to this story. Interlocking chains of exchange also carried cultural and political information. The chronological chapters in part two open with brief overviews of distant yet relevant events. In some cases, generalisations are buttressed by suggestions of further reading; if these became too long, I simply refer to the bibliography, giving the author's surname and short title. A forthcoming monograph on the history of Makassar (c.1600–2018) and a collection of essays on the city's representation should provide further context.

Two very different resources should help readers place the societies discussed here. Straightforward maps and a selection of images are included in the printed text, but these cannot offer more than a tiny sample of the available visual archive. A dedicated website (<https://epress.nus.edu.sg/seaways>) presents a considerable range of material, including modern and historical maps, contemporaneous representations (including many in colour) and photographs, images that communicate more directly than any written words. Some photographs were taken years after the period considered here; all are dated. Purists will be irritated but forewarned is forearmed. The second resource, the book's appendix, is less immediately appealing. Since most of the area covered here lay within the Netherlands East Indies, this summary of its nineteenth century administrative territories and their population numbers provides a necessary schematic overview of a very complex region. It also conveys both a sense of the colony's regional fragmentation and the small scale of many societies.

Makassar has been the focus of my own archival and field research; when venturing further afield I have relied on secondary sources and published contemporaneous accounts. I have made grateful use of work by other scholars, notably Anthony Reid on early Southeast Asia, and on regional studies by, most prominently, Leonard Andaya, Gerrit Knaap, David Henley and James Warren. I have also benefited greatly from ideas developed by archaeologists and anthropologists. Peter Bellwood, David Bulbeck, Ian Caldwell and Campbell Macknight have opened wider perspectives on early history, while the Australian National University's Comparative Austronesian Project has generated valuable insights. Roy Ellen's publications on subsistence, trade and regional ecosystems were also illuminating. Since I had moved well out of my own comfort zone to write this book, I was grateful that friends and colleagues reviewed different sections at different times. Without the generous help of Greg Acciaioli, Howard Dick, Hans Hägerdal, David Henley, Gerrit Knaap, Roger Knight, Campbell Macknight, Henk Schulte Nordholt and Eric Tagliacozzo I would have fallen into many pitfalls. Some errors will have slipped through their nets; I accept the consequent responsibility and embarrassment.

I have incurred many debts over the decades of my interest in Makassar and the eastern archipelago. It would be invidious to attempt to name all the individuals and institutions which have done so much to assist me. But I must record my debt to colleagues in Makassar, even if I can only mention a few: the late Darmawan Masud Rahman, Dias Pradadimara

and Suriadi Mappangara provided advice and introductions. Students in Indonesia and the Netherlands asked searching questions. I owe many thanks to indefatigable archivists and librarians—particularly those at the now dissolved libraries of the Amsterdam Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and the Leiden Royal Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). I have also benefited from the assistance of helpful staff at the National Archives of the Netherlands, and those of Indonesia, both in Jakarta and Makassar. I will thank all these unsung but indispensable colleagues by proxy, by naming the generous curators of three photographic collections: Ingeborg Eggink of the KIT, Liesbeth Ouwehand of the KITLV and Sara Keijzer of the Amsterdam Maritime Museum. My former employer, the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, provided time for research, funds and welcome institutional support.

Maritime Southeast Asia has traditionally been defined in contrast to “the mainland”. The former encompasses most of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, while the latter consists of Myanmar, Thailand, the former Indochina and adjoining areas. Indian and Chinese influence shaped state development on the mainland, where most peoples were speakers of Austroasiatic languages. Austronesians predominated in the islands, along with Melanesians to the east.¹ The maritime zone’s typical open seascapes, scattered islands, low population densities and dispersed commodities are commonly invoked to explain their weakly institutionalised polities.

Most narratives of Southeast Asian history are organised around political hierarchies; these are used to rank the relative significance of communities. Narrative arcs are typically driven by the interplay between indigenous polities and intrusive actors, whether they were (proto)colonial forces or Chinese enterprise. Outside agency is emphasised; coordinated foreign dynamism is implicitly contrasted with apparently arbitrary rulers and presumably lethargic “traditional” communities. Where states seem weak, the “rhetoric of collapse” focuses on cycles of coalescing and disintegrating polities, with unspoken suggestions of “success” or “failure”.² An implicit comparison of Southeast Asian polities with their impressive neighbours underlies such assumptions. Even the major states of the mainland and Java appeared puny in comparison with India’s armies and courts, or with China’s bureaucratic hierarchy. Southeast Asian economies also lacked the Asian giants’ sheer capacity for production, commerce, and consumption.

Consciously postcolonial accounts tend to attribute this marginalisation of the free-floating indigenous to self-congratulatory Eurocentrism, but the cause is deeper: a conventional reliance on analytic categories derived from Western models. When the reconstruction of past events and the identification of actors proved impossible, agency was typically attributed to bounded entities such as states or groups defined by ascribed ethnicity, class or function. Southeast Asia’s economies have commonly been presented

¹ Roger Blench, “Origins of Ethnolinguistic Identity in Southeast Asia,” in *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Junko Habu, et al. (New York: Springer, 2015).

² See the introduction to R.M. Ehrenreich, C.L. Crumley, and J.E. Levy, eds., *Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies* (Arlington: Archaeological Papers, 1995).

terms of ethnic categories.³ Even when such analytic units seem defined, organised and purposeful, crediting them with concerted intent and centrally managed capacity can be a gross simplification. The little that we do know suggests identities and political projects were prone to reconstitution, so the locating of agency is at best hypothetical. When there is no hierarchical state to serve as a framing structure, as in much of the region described here, local populations become “people without history”.⁴

States are generally defined as having centralised and stratified organisations, with entrenched (settlement) hierarchies, ideological conceptions of the relative roles of ruler and ruled, and a monopoly of legitimate force over a given territory’s population. Stateless societies, of which there were many in the maritime zone, are defined by the qualities they lack: they are acephalous, or headless, and decentralized. Kings and sultans could command men to build temples, palaces and mosques, and order the chronicles that confirmed their status for posterity. Stateless societies, particularly in tropical regions where stone or brick constructions were rare, leave no such records.⁵ As James C. Scott remarked “[W]hat blocks a clear view of the peoples of mainland Southeast Asia for most of their history is the state: classical, colonial and independent”.⁶ Even in accounts of the less institutionalised archipelagos, this held true.

All boundaries within typologies are to an extent arbitrary, but those that categorise races, peoples and ethnic groups are among the most misleading. Ethnic category sets impose artificial order and stability upon mobile populations with shifting loyalties and mutable cultural (self)identifications. In *Leaves of the Same Tree*, Leonard Andaya discussed ethnic formation around the Melaka Straits, where trade and interaction created self-conscious, fluid and potentially multiple identities such as the Malay and the Minangkabau.⁷ These processes were also in play in the east, as will be described in chapters 3 and 4.

The implicit disregard for the simple societies on Southeast Asia’s maritime fringe overlooks an interesting paradox: for millennia many of these islands had been feeding sea and forest commodities to transoceanic trading systems. The most valuable goods often came from territories which were either “stateless” or under the very tenuous control of loosely structured polities. This calls into question the role of the state in trade, and of trade

³ Heather Sutherland, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang (Durham/London: Duke, 2011).

⁴ Eric Wolf’s term from forty years ago; inclusion in history was conferred by virtue of interaction with European traders. Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

⁵ James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale, 2009), 33. Walter Hawthorne, “States and Statelessness,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 77–86. Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁶ Scott, *Art of Not Being Governed*, 32. For a recent perspective, see Paul Carter, *Decolonising Governance: Archipelagic Thinking* (New York: Routledge, 2019).

⁷ Leonard Y. Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 2009).

in the state. From a historiographical point of view this is a rewarding subject, as the realms of politics and commerce dominate analysis of trans-local interaction.

Like many historians of commerce and social change, I have been inspired by Fernand Braudel and the equally far-ranging Karl Polanyi. Braudel, as an historian, was sensitive to the specifics of time and place, and was unhappy with Polanyi's dismissal of pre-nineteenth century markets. However, as I have observed elsewhere, Braudel gives no guiding advice for those who would emulate his work.⁸ Jamie Peck has said much the same of Polanyi:⁹

While many are drawn to Polanyi by the seductiveness of his metaphors, by the polemic force of some of his writing, or by the encyclopaedic reach of his more-than-capitalist analyses, those seeking methodological templates, unequivocal theoretical injunctions, or models of case-study exposition will probably have been frustrated.

Braudel and Polanyi forgo reductive prescription and, by example, teach us to see differently, to understand in new ways.

Tim Ingold has suggested that: “[f]rom a purely neutral stance, there seems to be a dichotomy between two dichotomies: between a kind of relation thinking and a kind of entity thinking”.¹⁰ I prefer the former. This “relational thinking”, advocated by Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu, is also evident in Stuart Hall’s emphasis on the “understanding of social formations as articulated structures”.¹¹ Bourdieu himself “identifies the real not with substances but with relationships”.¹² This is very much in tune with Frederic Barth’s stress on the role of boundary maintenance strategies in structuring identification rather than on essentialised ethnic qualities.¹³ Similarly, we need to see politics not as interlocking structures of formal institutions but rather in terms of networks, predispositions and informal ties.

⁸ Heather Sutherland, “Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 34, no. 1 (2003).

⁹ Jamie Peck, “Disembedding Polanyi: Exploring Polanyian Economic Geographies,” *Environment and Planning* 45 (2013).

¹⁰ He explains that there are two ways of thinking about dichotomies: ‘On the one hand, [there is one] in which the paired terms signify mutually constitutive aspects of a single phenomenal field; on the other hand we have dichotomies referring to a division between two independently constituted domains which may then be supposed to interact with one another. This latter view gives rise to the classic problem of dualistic thinking, namely, how is interaction possible between entities that belong to substantially separate domains...’ (Ingold, “The Debate,” in *Key Debates in Anthropology*, ed. Tim Ingold [London: Routledge, 2003], 87). For more on this debate see, for example, work by Anthony Giddens, Margaret Archer, et al.

¹¹ Charles Tilly, *Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2005); Emirbayer, “Tilly and Bourdieu,” *The American Sociologist* 41, no. 4 (2010): 400–22; Clarke, “Stuart Hall and the Theory and Practice of Articulation,” *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 36, no. 2 (2015): 275–86

¹² David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997), 61.

¹³ Frederic Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organisation of Cultural Differences* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969); Thomas Hylland Erikson, *Fredrik Barth. An Intellectual Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

Why There, Why Then?

The eastern archipelagos of Southeast Asia provide an ideal environment for exploring these questions. They may lie on the edge of Asia, but they were within reach of the trade routes connecting the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The seaways referred to in this book's title range from the major maritime corridors linking China and the Indian Ocean, to labyrinths of lesser routes that connected them to local harbours, estuaries, bays and beaches. These served shipping in the Sulu and Sulawesi (or Celebes) Sea to the north, the waters surrounding Maluku, Banda and Flores as well as less frequented circuits in the Savu, Timor and Arafura Seas.

Tropical forest products had initially been exported from Southeast Asia's western archipelago, which was close to the Melaka Straits and the South China Sea. Camphor, benzoin, fragrant eaglewood (*gaharu*), the medicinal red resin known as dragon's blood, and animal parts were such commodities.¹⁴ Some more easterly islands had these, but were the sole suppliers of some spices and birds of paradise plumes.¹⁵ Cloves and nutmeg from Maluku (the Spice Islands) were known in ancient China, Mesopotamia and Rome. By the tenth century, at the latest, cargoes of valued marine products including tortoiseshells and corals were arriving in China from the Sulu Sea or as re-exports from Java ports. Kings, chiefs and entrepreneurial coastal communities profited from these exchanges.¹⁶

Dividing space and time is always problematic. As I have argued elsewhere, boundaries defining territories or eras are always contingent devices, selected to serve a specific enquiry.¹⁷ My contingent region, the "eastern archipelagos", extends from the southern Philippines to the east Java Sea, and from the eastern Borneo coast to the far shores of west New Guinea. The area is vast: if a map of the archipelagos was placed over one of western Europe, it would include both eastern England and western Turkey.

Trade has never respected state borders, so I include the closely linked southern Philippines' Sulu archipelago and Mindanao; non-Indonesian northeast Borneo, the

¹⁴ Eric Tagliacozzo, "Onto the Coasts and into the Forests; Ramifications of the China Trade on the Ecological History of Northwest Borneo, 900–1900 CE," in *Histories of the Borneo Environment: Economic, Political, and Social Dimensions of Change and Continuity*, ed. Reed L. Wadley (Leiden: KITLV, 2005); Andaya, *Leaves*.

¹⁵ Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands Until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996).

¹⁶ R.A. Donkin, *Between East and West: The Moluccas and the Traffic in Spices Up to the Arrival of Europeans* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2003); Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, "Provincializing Rome: The Indian Ocean Trade Network and Roman Imperialism," *Journal of World History* 22, no. 1 (2011); Clifford Sather, "Sea Nomads and Rainforest Hunter-Gatherers: Foraging Adaptations in the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago," in *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bellwood, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryon (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006); Roderich Ptak, *China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1999).

¹⁷ Heather Sutherland, "Contingent Devices," in *Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska, Remco Raben, and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Singapore/Leiden: NUS Press/KITLV Press, 2005); Heather Sutherland, "The Problematic Authority of (World) History," *Journal of World History* 18, no. 4 (2007).



Map 1 Comparison of Europe and Indonesia, to scale.

later Sabah; and Timor-Leste (East Timor).¹⁸ During the period considered here the Dutch sphere of interest lay in west Timor, that of the Portuguese in the east. The latter encompassed, until a simplification in 1859, enclaves in west Timor, most notably Oecusse (with its capital Pante Makassar or Makassar Beach) and, directly to the north across the Savu sea, settlements on the islands off eastern Flores: Solor, Adonara, Lembata (or Lomblen), Pantor and Alor. Political boundaries in huge Borneo and New Guinea also evolved in the nineteenth century. Dutch Borneo, now Indonesian Kalimantan, was bordered by British territories to the west and north, the later Sarawak and Sabah. The Dutch claimed west New Guinea (now Papua); in the 1880s eastern territories were taken by Britain and Germany, and later united as Papua New Guinea.

In this book boundaries are based on the intensity of interaction, and the shared patterns described in chapters 2 to 4. The irrelevance of colonial boundaries is clear, for example, in the case of the Sulu and Celebes Seas which connected north Borneo (Sabah), the southern Philippines and the long arm of northern Sulawesi. The peoples of the Philippine south migrated, raided and traded alongside those from Sulawesi, Maluku and Northeast Borneo. Islam strengthened ties along the coasts, marking their difference from inland communities.

Three east Indonesian regions receive the most attention here. Firstly, the Spice Islands of Maluku, where the historically important yet tiny islands of Ternate and Tidore were dwarfed by sprawling Halmahera, mountainous Buru and Seram. Sulawesi and the adjoining islands provide the second recurring focus, while Nusa Tenggara (also known as the lesser Sundas) is the third. In this book the division between eastern and western Nusa Tenggara follows colonial usage, rather than that of modern Indonesia.¹⁹ Bali and Banjarmasin are considered here because both had long and often underestimated ties to Southwest Sulawesi networks. Despite their obvious relevance, particularly before the 1620s and after the 1890s, northeast Java ports are excluded: the pull of Batavia far outweighed ties to the east.²⁰ Early commercial priorities and the consequent VOC (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, United East India Company, 1602–1800) structure determined Dutch territorial administration until the mid-1800s.²¹

¹⁸ In brief: to the east of Indonesian Papua, or west New Guinea (once Irian Jaya) is Papua New Guinea; the northern and eastern parts of Borneo include Eastern Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah) and the Sultanate of Brunei, while the former Portuguese territories of east Timor liberated themselves from Indonesia to become Timor-Leste.

¹⁹ The Dutch, basing themselves on pre-colonial spheres of influence, included Sumbawa and western Flores (Manggarai) in the Makassar-centred government of Celebes until 1908. Bali and Lombok were a single division. See Appendix. In 1958 Bali was made a separate province; Lombok and Sumbawa became Western Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Barat, NTB). Timor was the main island in Eastern Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara, NTT), which included Sumbawa and all Flores after 1908. Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, eds., *Indonesia beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009).

²⁰ See e.g. Gerrit Knaap, *Shallow Waters, Rising Tide: Shipping and Trade in Java around 1775* (Leiden: KITLV, 1996), 24.

²¹ See appendix. The VOC distinguished four main regions in the east. Ternate or the “Molukken” covered the sultanates of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan, north Sulawesi, and land and waters as far north as Mindanao. Amboina covered the Amboina-Lease or Uliasser Islands and east Seram, while Timor’s Kupang supervised Solor and Kisar. Banda was a small group of nutmeg producing islands (<https://www.vocsite.nl/geschiedenis/handelsposten/index.html>).

The arrival of European traders in the late sixteenth century intensified local competition, while foreshadowing the demarcation of spheres of influence and eventual colonial borders. The time frame of this book extends from the early seventeenth century to the early twentieth, when colonial military campaigns crushed the last centres of resistance in Sulawesi, Bali and the Southern Philippines.

Foreign trading companies had disrupted and reshaped some regional political economies; they also created massive new archives. The foundations had been laid during “the Age of Commerce” (c. 1450–1680), as described by Anthony Reid.²² I share his emphasis on changing trade patterns and am indebted to his work. But where he emphasizes the role of “cities”, I focus on more basic relationships. In the final decade of the 1800s regional trade was already being transformed by intensified exploitation of marine and forest resources, cash-crops, steam-shipping and colonial interventions.²³

In the communities discussed here experience shaped perceptions of time and space. Seasonal winds and weather governed fishing, trading, raiding and war, in both long- and short-term rhythms. Subsistence cycles of foraging and hunting, swidden or shifting cultivation, sowing and harvesting existed alongside traditions of travel and trade. Settlements were separated by mountains, forests, marsh and seas, but also bound together by exchange, alliance, kinship and ritual. Open, unclaimed zones were frontiers for colonisation and exploitation, as well as buffers. As Horden and Purcell explain: “[It is] the interplay of ecological factors that gives each [region] its apparent identity or definition; ... [yet] the principal elements in a microecology’s character derive as much from its changing configuration within the web of interactions around it, across aggregates of ‘short distances,’ as any lasting peculiarities”.²⁴

Most of our archipelagos lay east of the border—or better, frontier—between “Indianised” and “non-Indianised” societies, a distinction once seen as key to Southeast Asian “state formation”. This is posited as being a north-south line running west of the Philippines, between east Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and down to the east of Sumbawa. In lands to the west “Indian influence made itself felt from the early centuries of the Christian era and [was] where Indian religions were introduced, especially in circles associated with

²² Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680: Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds*, 1st ed., 2 vols., vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680: Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). See also Victor Lieberman, “Mainland-Archipelagic Parallels and Contrasts c.1750–1850,” in *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid (London: Macmillan, 1997).

²³ This is not to say that twentieth- and twenty-first-century developments have rendered the questions posed here irrelevant. See Birgit Bräuchler and Maribeth Erb, “Introduction—Eastern Indonesia under Reform: The Global, the National and the Local,” *Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 39 (2011): 114; Smith Alhadar, “The Forgotten War in North Maluku,” *Inside Indonesia* 63 (2000); A.K. Hermkes and Jaap Timmer, “Conflicting States: Violent Politics in North Maluku, Indonesia,” *Etnofor* 32, no. 2 (2011).

²⁴ Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (London: Blackwell, 2000), 53.

the royal courts”.²⁵ Borneo, Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa lay within this western zone, although adaptation of these new ideas was extremely variable.

Inscriptions found in east Borneo’s Kutai indicate significant early links to the west. In fact, Kutai’s stone “sacrificial posts” bear the oldest examples of Sanskrit in maritime Southeast Asia. These date from the fifth century CE and testify to Indian interest in Kalimantan’s gold.²⁶ Southeast Borneo’s Banjarmasin had extensive contact with Indian-influenced Java, while there are also relevant inscriptions in Bima on Sumbawa. Traces of Indian influence are slight to the east of this line although indirect trade had connected the outer islands to the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea since at least the third or fourth centuries BC. But from the early fifteenth century onwards it was Islam that was adapted as the main template for aspiring polities. However, lack of Indian models or the Muslim faith did not preclude the emergence of strong states in Southwest Sulawesi. After careful consideration powerful Makassar finally adopted Islam in 1605.²⁷

Academic Context

A central theme in descriptions of maritime Southeast Asia is its openness to outside influence, so it provides appealing parallels to the twenty-first century world. The final decades of the 1900s were marked by a widespread perception that familiar worlds were being destroyed by “globalisation”;²⁸ the consequent anxiety has generated intellectual curiosity as well as populist politics. While some fret, others emphasise that such integration is not only inevitable but positive, fuelling the “creative destruction” that sustains modern capitalism. Moreover, they add, globalisation is not new. Some argue that it goes back to the industrial mid-nineteenth century, or to the intensification of long-distance commerce during the long 1600s, or even to the preceding trans-Atlantic Colombian encounter.²⁹ By modern standards, the eastern archipelagos experienced “thin” globalisation³⁰—high extensity, low intensity, low velocity and low impact—but long-distance trading ties had great resilience.

²⁵ I.W. Mabbett and J.G. de Casparis, “Religion and Popular Beliefs of Southeast Asia before c.1500,” in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*. Volume One, Part One: from Early Times to c.1500, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 304.


²⁶ Himanshu Prabha Ray, *The Archaeology of Seafaring in Ancient South Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 150. The inscriptions might date from closer to the eighth century: Jan A. Schoterman, “Traces of Indonesian Influences in Tibet,” in *Esoteric Buddhism in Mediaeval Maritime Asia: Networks of Masters, Texts, Icons*, ed. Andrea Acri (Singapore: ISEAS, 2016), 114. On Bima, see Henri Chambert-Loir, “State, City, Commerce: The Case of Bima,” *Indonesia* 57 (1994): 87.

²⁷ William Cummings, “Islam, Empire and Makassarese Historiography in the Reign of Sultan Ala’uddin (1593–1639),” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2007).

²⁸ Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, eds., *The Globalization Reader*, 4th ed. (Chichester: Blackwell, 2012); Leslie Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 277.

²⁹ Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson, *Globalization and Global History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

³⁰ David Held, et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).



Map 2 Eastern Archipelagos

For many centuries the wider Indian Ocean (including the South China Sea) had formed the central axis of world commerce, exerting a powerful pull upon the islands. “Southeast Asia” wrote Oliver Wolters, should be seen as part of “the single ocean.... [T]he vast expanse of water from the coasts of eastern Africa and western Asia to the immensely long coastal line of the Indian sub-continent and on to China”.³¹ By the mid-sixteenth century the Spanish galleon traffic between Manila and Acapulco (1565–1815) had added a new trans-Pacific connection; exchange with the USA and Australian coasts increased in the early 1800s. Long-range exchange systems extended their tendrils through the eastern archipelagos. As historians have sought to transcend national boundaries oceanic histories have found their place in academic curricula.³²

The study of transnational commodity chains has also grown steadily in popularity since 1985, following the publication of Sidney Mintz’s classic study of sugar and Henry Hobhouse’s *Seeds of Change: Five Plants that Transformed Mankind*—the first of many such titles.³³ A year later the trend gained multidisciplinary cachet through the success of Arjun Appadurai’s *The Social Life of Things*.³⁴ In 1991 a special collection highlighted Asian products,³⁵ while the trade in birds’ nests was vividly described by Leonard Blussé.³⁶ The typical focus has been on the relatively well-documented goods destined for European or Chinese rather than regional markets. Subsequent academic studies included work on such key east Indonesian commodities as spices, fragrant sandalwood and the

³¹ O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, revised ed. (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Program, 1999), 44.

³² Each history has its own interpretive traditions, with trade at the centre: slaves and silver for the Americas; pepper, textiles and spices for the Indian Ocean; ceramics, silks and teas for Chinese waters; silver for the Spanish Pacific, and guano, sea-products and copra for the 19th century Pacific islands. There is also a considerable and growing literature on sea histories; see bibliography: Bentley; Bentley, Bridenantha and Widen; Cannadine; and Paine. On the Indian and connected seas: Chandra and Ray; Newitt; Alpers; Beaujard; Bose; Chakravarti; Chaudhuri; L.S. Davidson, “Woven Webs”; Pearson, *The Indian Ocean*; Pearson, *Trade, Circulation, and Flow*; and Vink, “Between Profit and Power”. See also Frost; Mukherjee; Armitage and Braddick; Bailyn; Greene and Morgan; Matsuda; Cushman; Iglar; and Spate.

³³ Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Commodity Chains: Construct and Research,” in *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, ed. Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); Jennifer Bair, ed., *Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Sidney W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Viking, 1985); Henry Hobhouse, *Seeds of Change: Five Plants that Transformed Mankind* (Washington: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005). See also bibliography: Clarence-Smith and Topik, *The Global Coffee Economy*; Nuetzenadel and Trentmann, *Food and Globalization*.

³⁴ Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

³⁵ Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, eds., *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c.1400–1750* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang, eds., *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011).

³⁶ Leonard Blussé, “In Praise of Commodities: An Essay on the Crosscultural Trade in Edible Birds’-Nests,” in *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c.1400–1750*, ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, 317–35 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991).

dyestuff sappanwood as well as marine commodities such as tortoiseshell and trepang (sea-cucumbers).³⁷

Until the early 1980s the study of the “indigenous Southeast Asian [maritime] tradition” was generally “neglected”, despite J.C. van Leur’s work in the late 1930s.³⁸ This perspicacious scholar defied convention and insisted that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the European role in Asian trade was marginal. This viewpoint was further developed by Wolters and M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs in the early 1960s,³⁹ and is now generally accepted. More controversially, van Leur also argued that indigenous traffic was restricted to the “peddling” of luxury goods. This was in contrast to India and China where there was an extensive bulk trade in cheap textiles and foodstuffs.⁴⁰ However, as the variety and range of indigenous Southeast Asian shipping has become better known, this contrast has broken down.⁴¹ As Hans Dieter Evers observed:⁴²

Van Leur stresses quite rightly the flexibility of this kind of [peddling] trade but neglects the systematic aspects of the trading networks that made its persistence possible....The forms and customs remain stable over long periods of time, but the configurations in which they occur, the articulations with other forms of trade, and the relative significance change over time.

Pierre-Yves Manguin also understood that: “In times of economic expansion of either the eastern or western neighbours of Southeast Asia (or both) only the enduring local peddling networks would have kept region-wide economies alive.”⁴³

³⁷ Trepang (*holothurian* or *bêche-de-mer*) were a prized Chinese food. See in bibliography: Bulbeck, et al., *Southeast Asian Exports*; Coclanis, “Southeast Asia’s Incorporation”; Zheng, *China on the Sea*; Ptak and Rothermund, *Emporia*; Tagliacozzo and Chang, *Chinese Circulations*; Blussé, “In Praise of Commodities”; Pearson, *Spices*; Villiers, “Vanishing Sandalwood”; de Roever, *De Jacht Op Sandelbout*; Souza, “Dyeing Red”; Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise*; Tagliacozzo, “Necklace of Fins”; Mazzaoui, *Textiles*; Trocki, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy*; Sutherland, “Trepang and Wangkang”; Dalby, *Dangerous Tastes*; Turner, *Spice*; Shanley et al., *Tapping the Green Market*; Macknight, *Voyage to Marege*; and Sutherland, “Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain.” See also the commodities special issue in *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 3, no. 3 (1999) and “Commodities of Empire,” *Journal of Global History* 4, no. 1 (2009).

³⁸ Pierre-Yves Manguin, “Trading Ships of the South China Sea. Shipbuilding Techniques and Their Role in the History of the Development of Asian Trade Networks,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 36, no. 3 (1993): 274.

³⁹ O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce: a Study of the Origins of Śrīvijaya* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967). M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

⁴⁰ J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Publishers Ltd., 1967). See also Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra, eds., *On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History. Van Leur in Retrospect* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).

⁴¹ N. Steensgard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies: the Structural Crisis in European-Asian Trade in the Seventeenth Century* (Copenhagen, 1973); Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade*; Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004).

⁴² Hans-Dieter Evers, “Traditional Trading Networks of Southeast Asia,” *Archipel* 35 (1988): 91.

⁴³ Pierre-Yves Manguin, “The Vanishing Jong: Insular Southeast Asian Fleets in Trade and War (Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries),” in *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 213.



Image 1 Carrying dyewood to the port of Waingapu, Sumba, pre-1940⁴⁴

The term peddling should not be taken to mean insignificant. As Braudel commented in *The Wheels of Commerce*: “Taken all together ... the activities of the peddlars had massive effects.... More than once, they were pioneers of expansion, opening up a market”.⁴⁵ The role of these itinerant men and carters who travelled through seventeenth-century Europe were comparable to the sailors of the *perahu* (prow, indigenous vessels) which travelled along the archipelago’s coasts and across the seas. Their cumulative contribution was fundamental to the whole trading system. Lesser *perahu* provided cargoes to the larger indigenous, Chinese, Indian and European vessels, and supplied local markets with foodstuffs, artisan manufactures and imports. Over the centuries, archipelago communities received goods ranging from Indo-Chinese bronze drums, Indian textiles and Chinese jars to guns made in Connecticut and cotton yarns spun in Manchester.

Iron Fist, Invisible Hand: Politics and Economies

Polanyi’s influence encouraged the dubious view that pre-modern markets were essentially apolitical.⁴⁶ He refers, for example, to the ancient “silent trade” of the Carthaginians in

⁴⁴ “Sumbanezen dragen verfhout naar Waingapu”. From the collection of the Netherlands’ Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), now in the Netherlands Museum of World Cultures, est. 2014. Hereafter KIT/NMVW. KIT/NMVW nr.TM-10012538. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/230236>. Public Domain Anonymous 70 EU. By permission of the Museum.

⁴⁵ Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century. Volume II. The Wheels of Commerce* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1985), 76–7.

⁴⁶ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944). As Appelbaum has observed, the separation of state and market “seems unnatural, even dangerous”. Bryan Mabee adds: “The modern conception of a functionally differentiated ‘private’ sphere could not be said to exist in

Africa, as described by Herodotus. Visiting traders would leave their goods on the beach, while the locals left gold. Both then withdrew but came back to add more to their offerings until the other party was satisfied and removed the gold or goods; the two sides never met. More sophisticated exchange developed in the classical Greek emporium.⁴⁷ The early modern Indian ocean incarnation of such emporia were politically sheltered harbours where traders could find the facilities and cargoes that they needed.⁴⁸

“Ports of trade” were a later development in Polanyi’s typology; they were “capable of dealing with the security requirements of trade under early state conditions ... often a neutrality device...”⁴⁹ Within these “politically deactivated” zones,⁵⁰ transactions were protected. A port of trade has four central characteristics:⁵¹

[It] is an autonomous, specialized town, city or small state formed for trade; it is a transshipment point between different ecological regions; it is often a neutral buffer zone; and few indigenous people except port officials are involved in the exchanges. Traders seldom had the freedom to move about the city and were restricted to foreign quarters.

Like the ecological edge systems known as ecotones, ports of trade allowed economic actors “access to more than one system or sphere, while minimizing exposure to the sphere’s risks and constraints”.⁵² These systems were eventually replaced by modern market societies, guided by mechanisms of supply, demand and price.⁵³

Douglass North, like Polanyi, also sought to historicise the relationship between economic and political organisations. He acknowledged that “throughout history, institutions have

the early-modern period of state formation,... the separation of state and economy, and consequently of public and private, was highly contingent on the development of industrial capitalism ... there was no clear distinction between commerce and politics, and the idea that there were separate processes of ‘market allocation’ and ‘authoritative allocation’ is a severe anachronism”. Kalman Appelbaum, “The Anthropology of Markets,” in *A Handbook of Economic Anthropology*, ed. James G. Carrier (Wiley, 2006), 282–3. Bryan Mabee, “Pirates, Privateers and the Political Economy of Private Violence,” *Global Change, Peace and Security* 21, no. 2 (2009): 8.

⁴⁷ In Roman times emporia were legal markets on known coasts but outside Rome’s dominion, where non-Roman authorities imposed non-Roman dues; John N. Miksic, *Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea, 1300–1800* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), 38.

⁴⁸ K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, 1st. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 224–8.

⁴⁹ Karl Polanyi, “Ports of Trade in Early Societies,” *The Journal of Economic History* 23, no. 1 (1963). For a discussion of Polanyi and his influence, see Gareth Dale, *Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market* (New York: Wiley, 2013).

⁵⁰ Laura Lee Junker, *Raiding, Trading and Feasting. The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 204–6.

⁵¹ Miksic, summarizing the description by the economic anthropologist Anthony Leeds on 16th century India; Miksic, *Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea*, 40.

⁵² Terrel Gallaway, “Life on the Edge: A Look at Ports of Trade and Other Ecotones,” *Journal of Economic Issues* 39, no. 3 (2005): 707–26.

⁵³ John Lie, “Embedding Polanyi’s Market Society,” *Sociological Perspectives* 34, no. 2 (1991).

been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange”.⁵⁴ North concluded that a “mixture of voluntary and semi-coercive bodies, or at least bodies that effectively could cause ostracism of merchants who didn’t live up to agreements, enabled long-distance trade to occur”. Under the modern state organisational matrices solidified, and markets became less personal and more efficient, with lower transaction costs.⁵⁵

According to North “some seemingly primitive forms of exchange” were unable to make this transition. He identifies these as firstly tribal societies, where, he argues, generally accepted standards prevented innovation. Secondly, the Suq, or bazaar, was characterized by “continuous effort at clientization (the development of repeat-exchange relationships with other partners, however imperfect); and ... intensive bargaining at every margin”. Finally, there was the caravan trade. On the last North quotes Clifford Geertz on Morocco, where “[p]rotection is personal, unqualified, explicit”, as “a man who counts stands up and says ... this man is mine; harm him and you insult me; insult me and you will answer for it”.⁵⁶ For North, such forms of exchange remained “primitive”, in contrast to the new economic relationships which evolved in late seventeenth-century Britain and Spain after fundamental political and organizational transformations.

The historical horizons of Polanyi and North were far-reaching; many non-historians had been content with much shorter views. David Henley describes how two mid-twentieth-century anthropologists, Alice Dewey and R.F. Barton, anticipated ideas central to the New Institutional Economics. Working on Java and India, respectively, they claimed that their research enabled them to understand how “informal exchange-supporting institutions could emerge, where none had previously existed” (Java), and could create “order out of anarchy, and economic interdependence out of isolation” (Kalinga).⁵⁷ They completely overlooked much earlier informal institutions, seeing innovation rather than evolution. Such truncated perspectives contrast to the diversity and adaptability of archipelago trading systems. In practice, variations of Polanyi’s silent trade, emporia, and ports-of-trade co-existed within archipelago exchange systems, as did relationships typical of North’s primitive forms. Different and often complementary types of transaction constituted a changing repertoire of possibilities, shaped by such factors as market demand, environmental circumstances and security considerations.

⁵⁴ Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97. North was central to the New Institutional Economics; Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirley, eds., *Handbook of New Institutional Economics* (Berlin: Springer, 2008); Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁵⁵ Douglass C. North, “Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: the Challenge of Karl Polanyi,” *Journal of European Economic History* 6, no. 3 (1977); Matthijs Krul, “Institutions and the Challenge of Karl Polanyi: Economic Anthropology after the Neoinstitutionalist Turn,” *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers* 168 (2016).

⁵⁶ North, “Institutions,” 104.

⁵⁷ David Henley, “From Tribes to Transaction Costs: How Two Anthropologists of Southeast Asia Anticipated the New Institutional Economics,” in *Promises and Predicaments: Trade and Entrepreneurship in Colonial and Independent Indonesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, ed. Alicia Schrikker and Jeroen Touwen (Singapore: NUS Press, 2015). Alice G. Dewey, *Peasant Marketing in Java* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); R.F. Barton, *The Kalingas: Their Institutions and Custom Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

Paradoxically, despite his separation of pre-modern markets from politics, Polanyi has been a pioneer of the concept of “embedding” which rejects the extrapolation of economic relationships from their social context. This debate was revitalised after Mark Granovetter published his much-cited article on the “problem of embeddedness” in 1985. This shifted the focus from abstract systems to networks of personal relationships.⁵⁸ The subsequent emphasis on face-to-face ties and political constraints on markets has led to criticisms that the idea of embeddedness has become “over-territorialised”, ignoring global linkage,⁵⁹ and that it tends to “to smother or to negate any commercial motivation that nonmodern peoples may have had”.⁶⁰

The cultural anthropologist David Szanton, who has studied social interaction underlying local markets in the Philippines, observes that the term embeddedness “neither conveys nor encourages the idea that systems and processes may be interacting, interpenetrating, even mutually redefining”.⁶¹ The conclusion must be that it is clearly fruitless to try to explain the history of states and markets as if they evolved in separate spheres, or to claim that one is embedded in the other. Christopher Garraty points out that they are co-evolutionary,⁶² while Gernot Grabher states: “Instead of incessantly reassuring ourselves that the economic is embedded in the social, we might move on to further substantiate the proposition that economic action, rather than being socially embedded, is fundamentally social.”⁶³

Trade and State in Asia

Indian rulers and Chinese emperors generally sought a symbiosis with commercial elites, leaving maritime trade in private hands. Subramanyan has observed: “states needed trade, and traders even in commercial activity, needed to come to terms with political power”. He continued:⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 3 (1985). This approach was further developed in new actor-centred theories, and in the metaphor of the rhizome. See quotations in Gernot Grabher, “Trading Routes, Bypasses, and Risky Intersections: Mapping the Travels of ‘Networks’ between Economic Sociology and Economic Geography,” *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 2 (2006): 178. Martin Hess, “Spatial Relationships? Towards a Reconceptualization of Embeddedness,” *Progress in Human Geography* 28, no. 2 (2004): 178–82.

⁵⁹ Hess, “Spatial relationships?”

⁶⁰ Rahul Oka and Chapurukha M. Kusimba, “The Archaeology of Trading Systems, Part 1: Towards a New Trade Synthesis,” *Journal of Archaeological Research* 16, no. 4 (2008). They attribute the belief that trade and exchange had a “social rather than an economic context” to a combination of “cultural materialism, economic anthropology, and ethnographic studies”. See also Jennifer Bair, “Analysing Global Economic Organization: Embedded Networks and Global Chains Compared,” *Economy and Society* 37, no. 3 (2008).

⁶¹ David L. Szanton, “Contingent Moralities: Social and Economic Investment in a Philippine Fishing Town,” in *Market Cultures: Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalisms*, ed. R.W. Hefner (Boulder: Allen & Unwin, 1998).

⁶² Christopher P. Garraty, “Investigating Market Exchange in Ancient Societies: A Theoretical Review,” in *Archaeological Approaches to Market Exchange in Ancient Societies*, ed. Christopher P. Garraty and Barbara L. Stark (Boulder: Colorado University Press, 2010).

⁶³ Grabher, “Trading Routes,” 181.

⁶⁴ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Of Imarat and Tijarat: Asian Merchants and State Power in the Western Indian Ocean, 1400–1750,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, no. 4 (1995).

States engaged with traders either as powerful mediating individuals (magnates, or as I have called them elsewhere, ‘portfolio capitalists’) or in the form that they best understood from an earlier period, namely as communities. This in turn gave traders access to political power.

Magnates combined state office with extensive commerce. While such figures could be found elsewhere in Southeast Asia, they were exceptional in the archipelagos, where chiefs and rulers themselves were often active in trade.⁶⁵ However, the second form of representation was common: foreigners would choose their own leaders to negotiate with political elites. In the prototypical Malay Sultanate of Melaka leading merchants known by the Persian title *syahbandar* enjoyed commercial privileges; they were responsible for their communities’ political obligations. The Portuguese and Dutch tended to use military designations, as in the case of the Kapitan China.⁶⁶

But the “state” was often troublesome to both buyers and sellers. Supply and demand were disrupted by erratic levies of tribute and expropriations and could be closed down by warfare. Rulers had to balance their desire to maximise income against the need to remain as attractive as possible to foreign traders.⁶⁷ States could promise protection and, more certainly, they could inflict punishment. Looking back through the prism of late colonial societies, it is easy to underestimate how just how effective the fighting forces of major states could be.⁶⁸

Trade remained precarious in “markets with poor means of communication and transport [which] have difficulty in stabilizing supply and demand”; fluctuations could destroy merchants. Wholesale markets, brokers and middlemen reduced risk.⁶⁹ The main blessing a political system could offer commerce was protection of life and property, alongside

⁶⁵ For Java, see Luc Nagtegaal, *Riding the Tiger. The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast Coast of Java, 1680–1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 163–80.

⁶⁶ Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomaz, “The Malay Sultanate of Melaka,” in *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Mona Lohanda, *The Kapitan China of Batavia 1837–1942* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1996).

⁶⁷ Garraty, “Investigating,” 10. Pearson’s conclusion that these ports “operated on a basis of freedom, where merchants were encouraged to call ... a crucial element was the very existence of free markets” overstates the case. M.N. Pearson, “Merchants and States,” in *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 73–4.

⁶⁸ Gerrit J. Knaap, “Kora-kora en kruitdamp, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en vrede in Ambon,” in *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, ed. Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV, 2002); Leonard Andaya, “De militaire alliantie tussen de VOC en de Buginezen,” in *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, ed. Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV, 2002); Gerrit Knaap, Henk den Heijer, and Michiel de Jong, *Oorlog en Overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat buiten Europa, 1595–1814*, Volume 5 *Militaire Geschiedenis van Nederland* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015). See the special issue “Warfare in Early Modern Southeast Asia,” *South East Asia Research* 12, no.1 (2004). On the “military revolution” in Southeast Asia, see Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680: Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 219–33. Peter A. Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁶⁹ C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansionism, 1770–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For a discussion of the power of local agents, see also Farhat Hasan, *State and Locality in Mughal India, Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

help with debt collection.⁷⁰ Despite the costs in gifts and levies, transoceanic shippers carrying low volume, high value commodities favoured major ports, where security, buyers and return cargoes were more likely to be available. This predictability made it possible for large vessels to make the turnaround required by the monsoon winds. Standardized measures and coins also facilitated commerce, as did the presence of specialist officials, such as harbourmasters, who were familiar with diverse communities. Petty traders, who relied on many small transactions to accumulate cargoes, tended to frequent seasonal meeting places along coasts far from the exactions of lords and princes.

Almost all states lacked the access to capital and the systematic capacity for coercion that, according to Charles Tilly, determined state development in Europe.⁷¹ Functional differentiation at the centre seldom went beyond the rewarding of military skill with titles and enhanced power, and the co-option of foreign merchants. In more densely populated areas with a relatively settled peasantry there was some functional differentiation within the elite and more regular taxation, but most polities relied on tribute. This could be generated in many ways: as protection money, as punitive plunder, as gifts expressing status-enhancing submission, through intermittent levies of men, ships and produce in time of war, or as symbolic reaffirmations of belonging by distant (often emigrant) communities. These issues will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

Without going into detail, it is worth highlighting factors commonly cited as causes of state formation, leaving gatekeeping aside for the moment. Voluntary submission or conquest could create centralised hierarchies. The most obvious incentive for the former was the desire for protection, either by uniting fighting forces or designating superior mediators to resolve tensions within and between groups. Conflicts could arise from crises (e.g. demographic, ideological) or more mundane issues of status or access to resources and might be exacerbated by traditions of village rivalry or headhunting. People could also willingly unite to achieve peaceful goals which exceeded their individual capacities: building great temples, for example, or organising impressive rituals, or coordinating work on mutually beneficial structures such as irrigation systems.

On the other hand, force might be the key to political expansion, as wars were fought to increase security, guarantee supplies, and further the ambitions of chiefs and warriors. Some communities on rich rice-growing lands prevailed simply because they could muster more men. Once dominance was achieved, power could be enhanced by establishing dynastic rule and creating a more diversified hierarchy to collect tribute. As always, access to resources increased power, and vice versa. Monocausal and teleological accounts have been replaced by a greater emphasis on economic variation, non-linear change and network theory.⁷²

Even among those who agree on the centrality of commerce in maritime Southeast Asia there are sharp differences. Some see the magic of the market at work, as the desire

⁷⁰ David Henley and Peter Boomgaard, eds., *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930; From Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsi to Cooperative* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009). See also Barry Hawk, *Law and Commerce in Pre-Industrial Societies* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 118–34.

⁷¹ These attributes were decisive in centralising strategies, particularly in preparations for war. See Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

⁷² Scott F. Abramson, “The Economic Origins of the Territorial State,” *International Organization* 71, no. 1 (2017). David S. Sandeford, “Organizational Complexity and Demographic Scale in Primary States,” *Royal Society Open Science* 5, no. 171137 (2018).

of demand and the possibility of supply combine to generate voluntary and mutually advantageous alliances. Others, focussed on the perceived inequality of exchange, describe predatory elites controlling traffic, extracting tolls and tribute, and using their ill-gotten gains to buy the weapons and prestige goods that reinforce their power. More recently still, warfare and violence have been given a renewed emphasis.⁷³ Nineteenth century narratives of pirates, head-hunters and warring chiefdoms, once largely discounted as legitimations of imperial intervention, are being reassessed.⁷⁴

In his overview of Southeast Asian state formation, Peter Boomgaard, concentrating on the early mainland and Java, notes that from 500 CE onwards there were “signs of increased integration and centralization”. He concludes that the basis lay in wet rice cultivation and the taxes which supported rulers, courts and religious establishments. These in turn “generated an enormous demand for rare objects (gold, silver, copper and bronze items, ceramics, textiles and rare woods...perfumes, spices, drugs) which could be met only by supply from outside”.⁷⁵ Here Boomgaard emphasises the role of the state as a driver of consumption. Coastal riverine states, he adds, “formed a series of enclaves that could not be easily dominated”.⁷⁶ Most of the eastern archipelagos remained “illegible” in Scott’s terminology; that is, leaders had not “arranged the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription and prevention of rebellion”.⁷⁷ However, the circulation of prestige goods delineated ties of obligation and reciprocity. Bronzes from Vietnam and beads from India enhanced the status of those able to possess them.⁷⁸

Similar practices were found in early Europe. Kristian Kristiansen observes with reference to prehistoric Denmark that relationships were “intensely personal and highly fluid, but they become materialized by the gifting of wealth objects.... The Danish chiefdoms relied heavily on networked strategies, using systems of wealth finance to structure political hierarchies”.⁷⁹ In the early nineteenth century George Windsor Earl listened with “incredulous surprise” as Bugis traders told him of the “great value that the

⁷³ Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800–1830. Volume 1. Integration on the Mainland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Victor T. Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830, vol. 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Scott, *Art of Not Being Governed*; David Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King. Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004).

⁷⁴ John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer, eds., *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010); Jules de Raedt and Janet Hoskins, eds., *Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

⁷⁵ Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2007), 61,76. On mainland Southeast Asia, see Dougal O’Reilly, *Early Civilizations of Southeast Asia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

⁷⁶ Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*, 63–4.

⁷⁷ James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.

⁷⁸ Laura Lee Junker and Larissa M. Smith, “Farmer and Forager Interactions in Southeast Asia,” in *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Junko Habu, et al. (New York: Springer, 2015).

⁷⁹ Kristian Kristiansen, “The Rules of the Game. Decentralised Complexity and Power Structures,” in *Socialising Complexity: Approaches to Power and Interaction in the Archaeological Record*, ed. S. Kohring and S. Wynne-Jones (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2007), 68.

inhabitants of Aru placed on elephants' tusks, brass gongs and large porcelain dishes [that they] hoarded up ... and gave prices which enabled the Bughis traders to buy up these articles on any terms. Siam and Cochin China were then the chief sources of supply of ivory".⁸⁰ In Northern Halmahera such commodities included bronze, porcelain plates, iron weapons, woven cloth and glass bottles.⁸¹



Image 2 Detail of a tomb cover, West Sumba, showing four gongs, 1910⁸²

Christie notes that finds of bronze drums from North Vietnam dating from the early centuries CE are clustered in Java, but:⁸³

[A] string of smaller concentrations and single finds extends eastwards in the islands encircling the Flores and Banda Seas towards the Maluku group and Timor. The pattern of distribution of these drums is markedly similar to that of trade goods distributed through

⁸⁰ G.W. Earl, *The Native Races of the Indian Archipelago, Papuans* (London: Hippolyte Bailliere, 1853), 103; Leonard Andaya, "The Social Value of Elephant Tusks and Bronze Drums among Certain Societies in Eastern Indonesia," *BKI* 172, no. 1 (2016).

⁸¹ Jos D. M. Platenkamp, "Sovereignty in the North Moluccas: Historical Transformations," *History and Anthropology* 24, no. 2 (2013): 217.

⁸² "Rijkversierde deksteen van een graf te Goeloe Woenta (Nggoeloe Woeneta) (Kampoeng even boven het bivak Bata Kapoeda, landschap Lamboja, West-Soemba), met een lamba, twee marangga's, en 4 gong's. Daarachter de opstaande monolieth (watoe pakadoe) van den tweede, overigens onversierd, graf met vleugel-achtige versiering en daarin in 't midden een dubbel menschenhoofd (een janus-kop op een stel seraf-vleugels, zoo te zeggen): 20 nov. 1910" Beschrijving is van G.P. Rouffaer zelf". Photograph G.P. Rouffer. From the collection of the Royal Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) now held in the Leiden University Library. Hereafter all photographs identified as KITLV come from that collection, which is available online through a Creative Commons CC BY License. KITLV 503715; persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:780359>.

⁸³ Jan Wisseman Christie, "State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia. A consideration of the theories and the data," *BKI* 151, no. 2 (1995): 249–51; Miksic, *Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea*; Ambra Calo, *Trails of Bronze Drums Across Early Southeast Asia: Exchange Routes and Connected Cultural Spheres* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013).

the same circuit by Javanese and Balinese traders operating out of the states of the first and second millennia.

In 1997 Anthony Reid concluded that: “In Indonesia the state has always been essentially coastal and sustained by foreign resources, while the highlands have been mirages of statelessness, tenuously held together by kinship systems and ritual obligations rather than bureaucracy”.⁸⁴ This binary opposition implicitly overstates the capacity of coastal polities, while overlooking the skeins of relationships within states and among allies, vassals, seafaring, coastal and inland communities. Many of these were “purchase societies” as described by Mary Helms, who offers “a framework for analysing adaptations by simpler societies on economic frontiers. Members of purchase societies, unlike peasants, maintained their political autonomy. They engaged in trade to obtain imported goods which had become cultural necessities and adapted to engage in these exchange networks”. Such “acquisitional polities” judged outsider protagonists as either helpful or threatening to their aims.⁸⁵

This debate entered wider academic discourse with James Scott’s *The Art of Not Being Governed* in 2009. Building on Willem van Schendel’s concept of the unincorporated upland mass of “Zomia”,⁸⁶ Scott explored the “purposeful statelessness” which enabled highlanders to escape coercive regimes and their territorialised authority. He writes of the distinction “between a settled, state-governed population and a frontier penumbra of less governed or virtually autonomous peoples”.⁸⁷ Seafarers had even more opportunity to evade oppressive elites than mountain-dwellers, so the discussion of his hypothesis in a maritime environment offers intriguing possibilities. This has already been undertaken in the relatively extreme case of the so-called “Sea Gypsies” of Southeast Asia.⁸⁸ This book considers such questions in a wider context.

The activities of the early European trading companies have been the leitmotif of histories covering the early modern period. Andrade has suggested that: “European states were able to establish their seaborne empires in Asia because they played by strange rules,

⁸⁴ Anthony Reid, “Inside Out: the Colonial displacement of Sumatra’s Population,” in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 1997), 80.

⁸⁵ Mary W. Helms, “Observations on Political Ideology in Complex Societies in the Tropics and Elsewhere,” *Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association* 9, no. 1 (2008): 195–200; Helms, “The Purchase Society: Adaptation to Economic Frontiers,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (1969): 325–4; Helms, *Craft and the Kingly Ideal: Art, Trade, and Power* (Austin: University of Texas University Press, 1993).

⁸⁶ Lying southeast of the Himalayan massif, Zomia incorporated much of Yunnan in southwest China while related mountain ranges and peoples extended into Myanmar, western Thailand, over Laos and the neighbouring western Vietnam. Schendel, “Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance”.

⁸⁷ Scott, *Art of Not Being Governed*, 3–4.

⁸⁸ Olivier Ferrari, “Borders and Cultural Creativity. The Case of the Chao Lay, the Sea Gypsies of Southern Thailand,” in *From Padi States to Commercial States: Reflections on Identity and the Social Construction Space in the Borderlands of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar*, ed. Frédéric Bourdier, et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015); Jacques Ivanoff, “The ‘Interstices’: A History of Migration and Ethnicity,” in *From Padi States to Commercial States*.

bringing patterns of armed seaborne commercial projection to maritime Asia.”⁸⁹ They were classic mercantilists, categorising shipping as friend or foe, and regarding “plunder [as] a means to power in an economic system predicated on an overall idea of relative gain”.⁹⁰ They internalised protection costs and, as Frederic Lane pointed out, when military force was deployed to guarantee the security of commerce, the excess of revenue over costs represented profit.⁹¹ Unlike indigenous polities, the chartered companies tried to control the high seas, not just neighbouring waters.

Gatekeepers and Interlocutors

Early modern states generally sought to accumulate wealth and power by maximising their own trade advantages at the expense of rivals, emphasising the control of circulation over production. In maritime Southeast Asia, writes Jan Wisseman Christie, “control of trade appears to have provided the key to political development”. She explained how strategically located individuals and communities sought to maximise their advantages by managing exchange at key sites, enabling prominent chiefs or clans to accumulate not only surplus foodstuffs (to support followers) but also textiles, potent prestige objects and weapons. This could lead to the domination of one particular centre over others, a status subject to challenge.⁹²

Foreigners could access commodities at their source or later, in the exchange chain. Where commodity production was fixed to a specific location it was relatively easy for traders to come to the site, as in the exploitation of birds’ nest caves, pearl banks or, more generally, mines; witness exports of gold, or the first millennium iron trade of central Sulawesi’s Luwu. This does not seem to have led to hierarchical encapsulation. The first South Sulawesi chiefdoms, c.1200 CE, were associated with agriculture and rice exports from around the Cenrana valley. As trading links increased, connections developed between Bugis from the south and Luwu, which became a power in the valley in the sixteenth century.⁹³

⁸⁹ Tonio Andrade, “Asian States and European Expansion: An Approach to the Problem of European Exceptionalism,” in *Asian Expansions: The Historical Experiences of Polity Expansion in Asia*, ed. Geoff Wade (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 52.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*; Mabee, “Pirates, Privateers and the Political Economy of Private Violence.”

⁹¹ Frederic C. Lane, *Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises*; N. Steensgard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979). Dutch traders in the Baltic, and later in Asia, were able to internalize both protection costs and access to capital through their naval power and joint stock company structure. In a sea-dependent area, such as the Baltic, a man who could protect sea routes became a credible ruler of land territories. See bibliography: Glete, “Cities, State Formation and the Protection of Trade”; and Vink, “Between Profit and Power.”

⁹² Christie, “State Formation,” 249–50, 277. Bennett Bronson, “Exchange at the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes Toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia,” in *Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography*, ed. Karl L. Hutterer (Ann Arbor, 1977).

⁹³ Bulbeck and Caldwell, *Land of Iron: The Historical Archaeology of Luwu and the Cenrana Valley. Results of the Origin of Complex Society in South Sulawesi Project (OXIS)* (Hull and Canberra: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hull; School of Anthropology and Archaeology, Australian National University, 2000), 106–7.

Frederik Cooper describes the central role of gatekeeping in his discussion of modern African states:⁹⁴

Colonial states had been gatekeeper states. They had weak instruments for entering into the social and cultural realm over which they presided, but they stood astride the intersection of the colonial territory and the outside world. Their main source of revenue was duties on goods that entered and left its ports; they could decide who could leave for education and what kinds of educational institutions could come in; they established rules and licenses that defined who could engage in internal and external commerce. Africans tried to build networks that got around the state's control over access to the outside world and to build economic and social networks inside the territory which were beyond the state's reach.... The development effort of late colonial regimes never did provide the basis for a strong national economy; economies remained externally oriented and the state's economic power remained concentrated at the gate between inside and outside.

This applies equally well to early maritime Southeast Asia, *mutatis mutandis*. There indigenous leaders had little difficulty in "entering" their societies, but they did have considerable problems in sustaining exploitation.

Profound cultural differences separated local societies and visiting trans-regional shippers; these were bridged by common interests, reciprocal accommodations and lasting ties. Face-to-face relationships played a central role in establishing the terms within which communication and exchange occurred. Both sides needed reliable interlocutors capable of negotiating at least a likelihood of mutual safety and profit. Ideally, these would be recognisable leaders with enough knowledge and authority to speak for and organise others. Such interlocutors bridged what Burt calls the "structural holes" within networks.⁹⁵ Recurring beneficial contact could establish ongoing circuits and partnerships; these were cemented by credit and the judicious exchange of information on commodities, local commercial practice and potential dealmakers. Reputation was the main predictor of good faith in commerce. New men would benefit from word-of-mouth recommendations by established partners. If all went well, relationships would be carried over into subsequent trading seasons, even if centres relocated. Visitors to unfamiliar coasts had to establish who their appropriate interlocutors were; titles, clothing and insignia helped identify men of authority when there was little visible variation in material circumstances.⁹⁶

The participants in these encounters could differ in their interpretations. Men who took the lead in transactions could be seen as chiefs by outsiders, mistaking specifically defined precedence for a generally dominant role in a single hierarchy. Local communities, on the other hand, may well have given such figures recognised roles as spokesmen, but no

⁹⁴ Frederic Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 156–90.

⁹⁵ Ronald S. Burt, *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Burt, "The Network Structure of Social Capital," in *Research in Organizational Behavior*, ed. R.I. Sutton and B.M. Staw (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000), 345–423.

⁹⁶ Leonard Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), 107.

authority outside this context. Douglas Kammen suggests that in East Timor “kingdoms” should be understood “both as an expression of supra-‘house’/clan alliance and recognitions and as the primary nodes of interaction with foreign actors”.⁹⁷ If a particular lineage could dominate transactions with incoming shipping, they could well become pre-eminent. Moreover, the impulse provided by shippers seeking particular commodities could stimulate successful harbour communities to claim tribute from surrounding territories in order to maximise supplies.

Connections in the Eastern Archipelagos

Prized commodities from the outer islands of Southeast Asia were valued by merchants sailing the South China Sea and Bay of Bengal. These goods passed through many hands on their way to the great ships, but both production and exchange were not comparable to the institutionalised businesses of, for example, South Asian textiles or East Asian ceramics. Demand stimulated the collection of spices, sea and forest products, but these exchange goods were typically supplied through foraging, so only gatekeepers at points of exchange could benefit.

Writing specifically of early maritime Southeast Asia, Pierre-Yves Manguin has proposed that the presence of foreign traders was fundamental to the definition and indeed the very existence of a state:⁹⁸

Trade is thus seen as a prerequisite for a centre of political power to become a full-fledged state ... polities come into existence when and only when a merchant from overseas moves into the picture.... This is when the pre-existing or potential central places are put in touch with their peripheries, that is, the various circles that constitute their social spaces. It is in fact the dramatic broadening of social space brought about by such direct involvement in far-ranging trade networks that would probably have given birth to myths establishing an explicit relationship between sea-going merchants, trade, and the founding of a viable polity.

In this view, the desire of incoming shippers for specific products stimulated local leaders to seek supplies and guarantee future cargoes by constructing new networks of obligation.

The strongest eastern archipelago states the Europeans encountered in the late sixteenth century were Buayan, Maguindanau (Cotabato) and Sulu in the Southern Philippines, Banjarmasin in southeast Borneo, the Maluku Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, and Makassar or Gowa-Talloq in Sulawesi. There were also the Javanised realms of Bali, and a growing number of lesser Muslim polities. Beyond the kingdoms were a range of other entities encompassing nomadic foragers, shifting cultivators, itinerant trading and raiding bands, settled village federations and coastal rajas. The more remote coasts, like mountainous inland regions, were seen as not just inaccessible, but as chaotic and dangerous. The commitments binding both states and markets to specific places were shallow; their reach expanded and contracted in response to the waxing and waning of

⁹⁷ Douglas Kammen, “Queens of Timor,” *Archipel* 84 (2012): 160.

⁹⁸ Pierre-Yves Manguin, “The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted Centres, Extended Peripheries,” *Moussons* 5 (2002): paras. 44–5.

their competitors. Political allegiance and the concomitant economic demands were only intermittently enforced; bursts of violence might disrupt ties, and then the costs and benefits of linkage to accessible wider systems would be recalculated.

In eastern Southeast Asia there were clear differences between indigenous traders and merchants from China and India. These were apparent in the scale and styles of business, access to information and transport technology, management practice and culturally preferred relationships. Nonetheless, these various levels were integrated within symbiotic systems. As these expanded, professional or regular part-time traders became more common in coastal communities. They followed market cycles connecting different levels of exchange and matching commodity flows.⁹⁹ It was among this group that the entrepreneurial qualities could be found that, for Kipp and Schortmann, identified true commerce.¹⁰⁰

It could be argued that in the eastern archipelagos most transactions belonged to the world of trade rather than commerce, as financial arrangements and management were personal rather than institutionalised. However, as Rahul Oka and Chapuru M. Kusimba have suggested, “there was a strong correlation between the presence of literacy/epigraphic records ... and the socio-economic paradigm. Those with extensive epigraphic records had trade, traders, and commerce. Those without those attributes did not have commercial trade or considerable attempts were made to negate those aspects of exchange”.¹⁰¹ Much the same could be said of political systems: “real” states had documents, hierarchies and organisational differentiation.

The Englishman Thomas Salmon, writing in the 1720s, noted that tobacco was more plentiful on Mindanao than on any other island in the Indies except Manila (Luzon), and was of an “excellent sort”. He added:¹⁰²

[B]ut the people have not the art of managing it to advantage as the Spaniards do at Manila ... the people of Manila, by well ordering their tobacco sell it all over India [the Indies] at a very great price, while that of Mindanao, which is really as good, is sold exceeding cheap.

Even in the nineteenth century, most buyers and sellers outside the main trading centres had little sense of a wider market. Emanuel Francis, visiting Timor in 1831, commented that there were no set criteria for exchange, so that price was determined by “the temporary desire that the buyer has to possess what he has bought”; any calculation of profit was impossible.¹⁰³ In the 1880s a Dutch official concluded that the Tanimbar people were

⁹⁹ Peter F. Bang, “Imperial Bazaar: Towards a Comparative Understanding of Markets in the Roman Empire,” in *Ancient Economies, Modern Methodologies: Archaeology, Comparative History, Models and Institutions*, ed. Peter F. Bang, Mamoru Ikeguchi, and Harmut G. Ziche (Bari: Edipuglia, 2006), 53–5, notes 8 and 11; Garraty, “Investigating.”

¹⁰⁰ Rita Smith Kipp and Edward M. Schortmann, “The Political Impact of Trade in Chiefdoms,” *American Anthropologist* 61, no. 2 (1989): 372.

¹⁰¹ Oka and Kusimba, “Archaeology of Trading,” 351.

¹⁰² Thomas Salmon, *Modern History Or the Present State of All Nations, Volume 1* (London: T. Longman et al., 1774), 97.

¹⁰³ E. Francis, “Timor in 1831,” *TNI* 1, no. 1/2 (1838): 50–1.

capricious and had no sense of value. If they had goods to exchange, and wanted a knife they would refuse much more advantageous options: they wanted a knife!¹⁰⁴ Around the same time, J.G.F. Riedel, the Dutch Resident (highest territorial official) of Maluku, was clearly distinguishing when he remarked: “Trade—the exchange of gold, brass, pottery and textiles for unworked iron, weapons, wax, rice, tobacco and maize, sometimes also horses, buffalo, pigs, sheep and goats—remains very inconsequential, and is engaged in by everybody. As soon as people begin to collect forest products like rattan and damar [for export], however, commerce will flourish”.¹⁰⁵ Here Riedel is foreshadowing the idea of a dual economy, in which modernity is implicitly identified with the Western sector.¹⁰⁶

Markets were also limited in what they could supply. In February 1796, Captain Walter Lennon of the Madras Army, attached to Admiral Ranier’s British fleet, became rather peevish when they arrived in South Sulawesi’s Bulukumba. This was reputed “to be very plentiful in all sorts of supplies”. Lennon complained:¹⁰⁷

Indeed, in all descriptions of places like this, it were to be wished that those who make them, could divest themselves of that kind of rapture, which their arrival at a friendly port, where they chance to get their immediate wants supplied and the novelty of the scene altogether are so apt to excite, particularly after a voyage of any length; and that they would confine themselves to a just representation of what a place really can produce and the use that it may be to navigators in general.

One of the best-known accounts of any eastern archipelago trading settlement is Alfred Wallace’s 1857 description of Dobo, the main trading centre of one of the Aru islands, off the west coast of Papua:¹⁰⁸

I dare say there are now near five hundred people in Dobbo of various races, all met in this remote corner of the East, as they express it, “to look for their fortune”, to get money any way they can. They are most of them people who have the very worst reputation for honesty, as well as every other form of morality—Chinese, Bugis, Ceramese, and half-caste Javanese, with a sprinkling of half-wild Papuans from Timor, Babber, and other islands—yet all goes on as yet very quietly. This motley, ignorant, bloodthirsty, thievish population live here without the shadow of a government, with no police, no courts, and no lawyers; yet they do not cut each other’s throats, do not plunder each other day and night, do not fall into the anarchy such a state of things might be supposed to lead to. It is very extraordinary! It

¹⁰⁴ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, “Tanimbar en Timorlaet-eilanden,” *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 179.

¹⁰⁵ J.G.F. Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua* (Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1886), 80.

¹⁰⁶ J.H. Boeke, *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, as Exemplified by Indonesia* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1953); R. Garnaut and P.T. McCawley, eds., *Indonesia: Dualism, Growth and Poverty* (Canberra: RSPS ANU, 1980).

¹⁰⁷ W.C. Lennon, “Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands under the Command of Admiral Rainier,” *JSBRAS* 7 (1881). Lennon was secretary to Admiral Peter Rainier, Commander of the British Navy’s East Indies station (1794–1805); Peter A. Ward, *British Naval Power in the East, 1794–1805: The Command of Admiral Peter Rainier* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013).

¹⁰⁸ Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*, 335–6.

puts strange thoughts into one's head about the mountain-load of government under which people exist in Europe, and suggests the idea that we may be overgoverned.... Here we may behold in its simplest form the genius of Commerce at the work of Civilization. Trade is the magic that keeps all at peace, and unites these discordant elements into a well-behaved community. All are traders, and all know that peace and order are essential to successful trade, and thus a public opinion is created which puts down all lawlessness.

Wallace goes on to describe how after an attempted theft “the chief traders of the place, Bugis and Chinese, assembled, the offender was tried and found guilty, and sentenced to receive twenty lashes on the spot ... not very severely. The disgrace seemed to be thought of as much as the pain; for though any amount of clever cheating is thought rather meritorious than otherwise, open robbery and housebreaking meet with universal reprobation”.¹⁰⁹

Captain Dirk Kolff's description of Dobo some thirty years earlier gives a different impression:¹¹⁰

The traders, with the assistance of the natives, erect houses wherein they reside and deposit their goods, the guns belonging to their vessel being planted around it.... The trade is conducted with great regularity, and if differences now and then occur, they are always put an end to by the mediation of the *Orang Kaya* [Malay, lit. Rich Man, local leader]. The commanders of the trading vessels pay a certain amount of arrack and cloth, and although the amount paid by each is small, the number of traders is so great as to render this an important source of income to the inhabitants.

Wallace makes no mention of the security provisions noted previously by Kolff, nor did he refer to the island's original inhabitants and their chief. It is possible that the decline of piracy and slave raiding in the late 1840s had created a climate in which cargoes could be left relatively unguarded, and that the role of the local *orang kaya* had declined or had always been restricted to mediating conflicts between visitors and locals. But it is also probable that Wallace was making an ideological point, as he had firm opinions on social issues.¹¹¹ In any case, de Clercq, writing of trade on the even more remote New Guinea coast in the 1880s, concluded “Mutual trust plays a great role, and is fully earned, as arguments over the agreements are extremely rare”.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 336.

¹¹⁰ Dirk Hendrik Kolff, *Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga through the Southern and Little Known Parts of the Moluccan Archipelago during the Years 1825 and 1826*, trans. G.W. Earl (London: James Madden, 1840), 196–7.

¹¹¹ Tiffany Tsao, “Paradise Observed: Taxonomic Perspective in Alfred Russel Wallace's The Malay Archipelago,” *Australasian Journal of Victorian Studies* 15, no. 2 (2010): 30; Martin Fichman, “Wallace as Social Critic, Sociologist, and Societal ‘Prophet’,” in *An Alfred Russel Wallace Companion*, ed. James T. Costa, Charles H. Smith, and David A. Collard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020).

¹¹² F.S.A. de Clercq, *De West- en Noordkust van Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea. Proeve van beschrijving volgens de mededeelingen en rapporten van reizigers en ambtenaren en naar eigen ervaringen* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1893), 128–9.




Image 3 Natives of Aru shooting the Great Bird of Paradise, 1869¹¹³

In the eastern archipelagos, as elsewhere, trade and politics were not separate domains, but linked arenas offering complementary resources. The market was centred on the acquisition of commodities in pursuit of advantage, which was by no means limited to economic gain. In politics the aim was to maximise the ability to command people. Both arenas were competitive and personalised. Ambitious chiefs and adventurous traders alike strove to attract and retain access to commodities and to balance short- and long-term gains, while being subject to broadly similar constraints. In modern states law can be called upon to enforce obligations, but in the archipelagos, persuasion, tempered by negotiation and ideas of reciprocity, was important. So too were coercion and opportunistic predation, but in the open seas shipping could not be contained by force, while unincorporated coasts and vast forests enabled people to withdraw from political control.

¹¹³ Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), plate facing p. 336, First published in 1869.

In maritime Southeast Asia the contrast between unstable states and shifting markets on the one hand, and enduring economic and social patterns on the other is quite clear. Writing of the maritime state of Srivijaya (seventh to thirteenth centuries), Oliver Wolters observed that “[T]he rhythm of Malay history established by the operation or abeyance of tributary trade is more significant than periodic changes in the fortunes of emperors”.¹¹⁴ Similarly, Jan Wisseman Christie commented that in early southeast Sumatra “the economic base of these polities was trade, and since most of them survived by trading the goods produced by others, individual states were economically quite fragile and historically often ephemeral, although the political tradition itself was very resilient”.¹¹⁵ The interlocking layers of early Hokkien Chinese trading networks were also, according to James Chin, “pliable and strong, and whenever the system was pressed by external sources, the interwoven networks would quickly respond and help the system to recover to its original state”.¹¹⁶ Perhaps not the “original state”; adjustments were made, but the overall sets of networks, beliefs and obligations that kept goods moving were able to absorb passing shocks. To quote Wolters once again: “The trading connections that linked the opposite ends of maritime Asia resemble links in a chain which would join together again even if one link was temporarily broken”.¹¹⁷

Geography determined patterns of production and travel, while exchange was sustained by informal institutions and the “practical reasonableness”¹¹⁸ of people seeking to survive. Geoffrey Hodgson defines informal institutions as “systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions ... [they] can usefully create stable expectations of the behavior of others ... imposing form and consistency on human activities ... institutions both constrain and enable behavior”. Through repetitive interaction, informal institutions become ingrained as habits, “creating strong mechanisms of conformism and normative behavior”.¹¹⁹ Bourdieu’s view is similar. In the *Logic of Practice*, he explained: “The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions.... Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor”.¹²⁰

In his exposition of Bourdieu’s key concepts, Karl Maton writes:

Each social field of practice (including society as a whole) can be understood as a competitive game or ‘field of struggles’ in which actors strategically improvise in their quest to maximise their positions.... Simply put, habitus focuses on our ways of acting, feeling, thinking and being. It captures how we carry within us our history, how we bring this history into our

¹¹⁴ O.W. Wolters, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 41, 47.

¹¹⁵ Christie, “State Formation,” 277.

¹¹⁶ James K. Chin, “Junk Trade, Business Networks and Sojourning Communities: Hokkien Merchants in Early Maritime Asia,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 6, no. 2 (2009): 198–9.

¹¹⁷ Wolters, *History*, 42.

¹¹⁸ Gary Chartier, *Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹¹⁹ Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “What Are Institutions?,” *Journal of Economic Issues* XL, no. 1 (2006).

¹²⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 53.

present circumstances, and how we then make choices to act in certain ways and not others. This is an ongoing and active process—we are engaged in a continuous process of making history, but not under conditions entirely of our own making.¹²¹

I also see habitus as enabling, rather than just inhibiting, individual action, although this may seem contrary to the general trend in Bourdieu's thought.¹²² But as Craig Calhoun has observed: "Bourdieu stressed the generative role of the habitus, the ways in which embodied knowledge transmutes past experience into dispositions for particular sorts of action".¹²³ According to Bourdieu practice over the long term creates "the feel for the game". This is fundamental to habitus, which "is the social game embodied and turned into a second nature".¹²⁴ The metaphor of the game, of interaction combining improvisation and understood rules, is useful. Li observes: "Articulation, in [Stuart] Hall's formulation, is a process of simplification and boundary making as well as connection. The forms it takes are not predetermined by objective structures and positions but emerge through processes of action and imagination shaped by the 'continuous play of history, culture and power'".¹²⁵

David Szanton, in his study of contemporary Philippine markets, concluded that the central regulatory mechanism was a "locally defined morality of various types of economic behaviour" and describes how this "directly shapes entry into and local forms of economic organization ... that morality must be understood as highly differentiated and capable of evolving reciprocally and dynamically with local, national and global economic and political forces".¹²⁶ It could also be seen as a codification of dispositions formed by the habitus, and as a set of contingent, informal institutions.

Sources and Knowing

"The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived"; George Berkeley (1710).¹²⁷

¹²¹ Karl Maton, "Habitus," in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, ed. M. Grenfell (London: Acumen, 2008). Maton summarizes: "Habitus can be described as the totality of an individual's acquired, internalized and un-conscious qualities, which create 'dispositions or tendencies' [that] are 'durable in that they last over time, and transposable in being capable of becoming active within a wide variety of theatres of social action'".

¹²² Philip Gorski, in a book on *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis* argues against the view that Bourdieu is deterministic. Sherry Ortner, however, feels Gorski goes too far, but adds, on a positive note, that in Gorski's book: "'History' here is the simple but mind-opening idea that the social world is always being made, unmade, or held in place by real social actors, that it was different in the past and can be (made to be, though not easily) different in the future". Philip S. Gorski, "Introduction," in *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis (Politics, History, and Culture)*, ed. Philip S. Gorski (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Sherry Ortner, "Bourdieu and 'history'," *Anthropology of this Century* 8 (2013).

¹²³ Craig Calhoun, "Pierre Bourdieu in Context," *SCRIBD* (2014).

¹²⁴ Quoted in Robert Nye, "The Transmission of Masculinities: the Case of Early Modern France," in *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis (Politics, History, and Culture)*, ed. Philip S. Gorski (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 289.

¹²⁵ Tania Murray Li, "Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 1 (2000): 174.

¹²⁶ Szanton, "Contingent Moralities," 251–3, 265.

¹²⁷ George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (Chicago: Open Court, 1904), Section 45.

In his *New Account of the East Indies*, first published in 1727, Alexander Hamilton commented: “I never met with any Body that could give me any tolerable Account of the Islands to the eastward of *Timor*, or of *New Guinea*, or *New Holland*, and so I’ll pass them by”.¹²⁸ His reaction is understandable. In 1986 two eminently qualified authors came to disquieting conclusions concerning aspects of early maritime Southeast Asia; they were reduced to using such phrases as “depressingly under examined” and “impenetrably obscure”.¹²⁹ After half a century matters have improved, but not to a great extent. Even when working on the contemporary, observable world, answering the questions posed in this book remain difficult. Szanton concluded that any attempt to describe a “complex interactive system” over time is “genuinely daunting”.¹³⁰

While closely focussed local studies can incorporate indigenous knowledge,¹³¹ wider regional accounts typically depend on documentation by outsiders—usually Chinese or European. But these only provide a selective searchlight, refocusing as political priorities and demand for commodities change. Subjects are illuminated if and when they interest the makers of our sources; what remains in shadow is all too often dismissed as “traditional” and assumed to be unchanging. To early observers much of what they saw was incomprehensible or irrelevant and hence unreported. Clive Moore describes European attitudes to Papua, or west New Guinea:¹³²

Europeans thought that Melanesia lacked regular government, and depicted the small-scale societies as each isolated from the other. They failed to realize that Melanesian society was constructed on the basis of close relationships between descent, language and territory, and reciprocal exchange “roads” and “passages”, rather than on large and permanent territorial entities.

The notion of isolation was negated by the speed with which the American sweet potato and tobacco spread to become two of New Guinea’s most widely cultivated plants.¹³³

Historians of regions such as the eastern archipelagos are confronted by many black boxes. We struggle to describe and analyse events, personalities and structures on the basis of rare glimpses: an inscription recording a royal grant, a king receiving an embassy, a ship’s manifest, or an official’s report to his superiors, describing, explaining, justifying. We can all read archives “against the grain”, but when there is nothing there, even the most sophisticated interpretation falters. Moreover, when commentators do describe some

¹²⁸ Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies: Giving an Exact and Copious Description of the Situation*, vol. 2 (London: Argonaut Press, 1930), 75.

¹²⁹ Pierre-Yves Manguin, “Shipshape Societies: Boat Symbols and Political Systems in Insular Southeast Asia,” in *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, ed. David G. Marr and A.C. Milner (Singapore/Canberra: ISEAS/ RSPS ANU, 1986), 201. C.C. Macknight, “Changing Perspectives in Island Southeast Asia,” in *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, 224.

¹³⁰ Szanton, “Contingent Moralities,” 251–3, 265.

¹³¹ For example, Genevieve Duggan and Hans Hägerdal, *Savu: History and Oral Tradition on an Island of Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2018). Stephen C. Druce, *The Lands West of the Lakes: A History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009).

¹³² Clive Moore, *New Guinea: Crossing Boundaries and History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 2003), 11.

¹³³ Paul Michael Taylor, *Western New Guinea: The Geographical and Ethnographic Context of the 1926 Dutch and American Expedition* (Washington Smithsonian Institution Libraries, Digital Editions, 2006), 5.

“new” phenomenon, it is often impossible to know if this was really an innovation. Perhaps officials were merely asking new questions, or moving into unknown territory?

What comes down to us from external sources are geographical labels and the names of “states”, “rulers” and “peoples”. But even basic geography seems unhinged; rivers have multiple names, depending on subjective assessments of the relative importance of various tributaries and stretches of trunk streams. We might believe that a particular king governed a specific ethnic group from his named capital city at a given location and write our histories accordingly. However, new evidence could reveal that the ruler’s name was simply a local honorific, as rendered by outsiders; that the “realm” was just one member of a large and changeable federation of variegated polities. It might emerge that the royal centre was itinerant, its shifting sites reflecting changing political fortunes, evolving ecologies, trade flows or belief in good or bad fortune. It might have been anywhere along a particular coastline, or on a completely different island. As for peoples, a group’s name could simply mean “those from over there”, “the people who live by the sea” or “in the mountains”.

A place without commercial or political significance was literally off the map.¹³⁴ In 1708, the Leiden publisher Pieter van der Aa issued a depiction of “The Moluccas and other Spice Islands of the East Indies”, covering an area from the East Borneo coast to the tip of West New Guinea.¹³⁵ As was to be expected, most detail was given to Maluku. On Borneo, the Sultanates of Kutai and Banjarmasin were recorded as the most important, alongside such sailors’ landfalls as “Cape Dread” and “Snake Catcher’s Graveyard”.¹³⁶ Gorontalo and Manado on Sulawesi’s northern peninsula were given due prominence, but on the west coast, directly opposite Kutai, “Cellebes” was presented as a single locality to the north of Mamuju. Below this the Talloq and Makassar kingdoms were somewhat misplaced, but Tobungku and Banggai were clearly indicated on the eastern littoral. The great Gulf of Tomini was shown as inland “Tominee”.

The VOC’s private charts were no doubt more comprehensive, but Van der Aa’s map reminds us that geography was utilitarian.¹³⁷ Archaeologists working on the Aru islands, close to the southern shores of western New Guinea, concluded that “The degree of Aru’s involvement in these early trading systems has been historically neglected, due in part to the dominance of the north Moluccan and Bandanese trade-polities of the 15th and 16th centuries”.¹³⁸ When Europe’s interest in commodities from Maluku and Nusa Tenggara

¹³⁴ Kees Zandvliet, *Mapping for Money. Maps, Plans and Topographic Paintings and their role in Dutch Overseas Expansion during the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1998).

¹³⁵ Pieter van der Aa, *Naauwkeurige versameling der gedenkwaardigste zee en landreysen na Oost en West-Indien* (Leiden: van der Aa, 1708).

¹³⁶ Python skins were valuable.

¹³⁷ For an overview of VOC visual material see Arend de Roever and Bea Brommer, *Grote Atlas van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. Vol. III. Indische Archipel en Oceanië: Malay Archipelago and Oceania* (Voorburg: Asia Maior, 2008).

¹³⁸ Sue O’Connor, Matthew Spriggs, and Peter Veth, “On the Cultural History of the Aru Islands: Some Conclusions,” in *The Archaeology of the Aru Islands, Eastern Indonesia (Terra Australis 22)*, ed. Sue O’Connor, Matthew Spriggs, and Peter Veth (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), 307–14. “We think it is likely that the Islamic-influenced structures of Ujir [a small island in northwest Aru], situated adjacent to a protected deep water harbour, likely served as an entrepôt for the trade in birds of paradise, marine

declined during the 1800s, their outlying islands lost their monitoring role, and began to fade from historical narratives.

The organisation of this book reflects the fragmentary historical record. Part 1 of the book, “Foundations”, is a description of fundamental patterns common to most of the region; each chapter has a specific focus. Chapter 2, “The Cradle of Geography”, outlines routes and the physical characteristics that shaped settlement and exchange; chapter 3, “Encounters”, introduces communities and their relationships, while chapter 4, “Patchwork Politics”, reviews various political systems. Together they sketch the matrix which gave coherence to the many scattered places and peoples. While these chapters do not focus on change over time, they must not be taken as suggesting that societies were unchanging. Indeed, part 2, “Glimpsed Histories”, traces narratives which unfold over a period of some four hundred years, placing events in evolving webs of connection rather than formal political frameworks. In many parts of the archipelagos exchange between transregional or even transoceanic shippers and local traders was direct, with no political mediation by overarching authorities.

Regional histories are clustered according to geography and patterns of interaction. This slicing and dicing is deliberate, and rejects the reduction of regional events to mere illustrations of an imposed grand narrative. Readers are reminded that these histories are snapshots, recorded from a specific perspective. But they are not random: they are selected because they illuminate highly local stories that are nonetheless rooted in the matrix described in the first chapters. These sections often end abruptly; any conclusion bundling them together would necessitate the subordinating of their imperfectly understood and diverse experience to an imposed and assumed set of priorities.

produce, and sago. The historic evidence for trade in other parts of Maluku, suggests that the original settlement could have been established by the late fifteenth century ... it is clear that a settlement of this permanence and extent implies an involvement in regional, if not global, trading systems” (312).

PART ONE
FOUNDATIONS

Terrain and climate determine the potential productivity of local environments and the relative ease of exchange. People, objects and ideas move along the resulting routes, weaving the fabric of interconnected histories. In pre-industrial eras it was geography that set limits, creating risks, imposing constraints and conferring opportunities. Unless this is fully recognised, history seems arbitrary. In Southeast Asia's eastern archipelagos, land met sea in horizons created by the thrust of rugged mountains, or the flat expanse of water. The territories, relationships and events described in the rest of this book were shaped by the realities described in this chapter. The first sections are organised around the main seaways that bound regional webs of exchange to markets as far away as Rome, Persia and China. As we trace the paths followed by ships and men, we become acquainted with the main places and polities along the way. Most emerge again in the later historical chapters as sites of interest, precisely because of their location.

China lay to the north of the eastern islands, while the narrow passages of the Melaka and Sunda Straits led west, to the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian sea, the Middle East and ultimately to Europe.¹ The impressive manufacturing capacities and consumer appetites of India and China encouraged their entrepreneurs to create dynamic commodity chains, drawing distant local economies into their orbits. Within both Asian giants there were various regional and local trajectories. Predictably, southern China and eastern India have been most closely intertwined with Southeast Asia, exchanging goods, technology, plants and ideas for millennia.² Unique products drew traders to the archipelago's remote harbours. The great attraction in the southeast was spices from Maluku, the Moluccas or Spice Islands. By the third or fourth centuries BCE these were being traded across the Java and South China Seas, with mainland Southeast Asia and India.³ Cloves grew in many islands, but Banda to the south was the only source of nutmeg and mace. The island was also a natural entrepot for the shipping of Seram, Aru and also of west New Guinea, which

¹ The Melaka Straits between West Malaya and East Sumatra is one of the world's great gateways and choke points; the Sunda Straits, between south Sumatra and west Java is a lesser alternative.

² Pierre-Yves Manguin, A. Mani, and Geoff Wade, eds., *Early Interactions Between South and Southeast Asia: Reflections on Cross-cultural Exchange* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2011); Tom G. Hoogervorst, *Southeast Asia in the Ancient Indian Ocean World, Combining Historical Linguistic and Archaeological Approaches* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2013).

³ John N. Miksic, *Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea, 1300–1800* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), 25–32.

relied on visiting seafarers to carry their commodities to distant markets.⁴ Further south still, across the Banda Sea, Nusa Tenggara's Timor and Sumbawa produced sandalwood and the red-dye producing sappanwood.

A thousand years later adventurous skippers from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf were visiting the ports of Sindh and Gujarat in northwest India or Calicut on the Malabar Coast; some sailed as far as Guangzhou (Canton) and Quanzhou in China. Enterprising peoples along the way could tap into passing traffic, particularly after linked shorter passages began to replace trans-oceanic voyages sometime before the twelfth century. A Chinese description of Maluku from the mid-fourteenth century makes it clear that junks were sailing there every year, seeking cloves; traders were also familiar with Sulu pearls and Timor sandalwood.⁵ Early European voyagers marvelled at Asia's environmental riches.⁶

As Braudel has remarked, traditional geographic descriptions are static; features are "briefly listed and never mentioned again, as if the flowers did not come back every spring, the flocks of sheep migrate every year, or the ships sail on a real sea that changes with the seasons".⁷ In Asia, including the archipelagos, monsoon winds governed the rhythms of sowing and sailing. From April to September the monsoon in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal comes from the southwest; from October to November the direction is reversed. This annual cycle of two seasons allowed sailors to complete round trips within a year. In the eastern archipelagos the (south) east monsoon blew (and blows) up from northern Australia from May through September, carrying ships through the Java and Flores seas towards China and the Melaka Straits. From October through March the (north) west monsoon filled the sails of skippers coming from the South China and Sulu Seas to the Melaka Straits or eastern Indonesia.⁸ Variation in the winds' timing and strength made sailing unpredictable; a shipper who misjudged the seasons could lose a voyage. Winds and currents continued to shape shipping cycles until the gradual rise of steam in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Most shipping linking India and China passed through the Melaka Strait, a meeting place for traders from west and east. The eponymous emporium of Melaka (Malacca) flourished from the early 1400s until its conquest by the Portuguese in 1511; during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries most voyages went no further. Foodstuffs from the Southeast Asian mainland supplied the port, where Indian textiles were exchanged for


⁴ In mid-2018 considerable attention was paid to the identification of a Triton sulphur-crested cockatoo (*Cacatua galerita triton*) or yellow-crested cockatoo (*Cacatua sulphurea*) from New Guinea/North Australia depicted in a mid-thirteenth century manuscript from Sicily; the bird was a gift from an Egyptian noble; Heather Dalton, et al., "Frederick II of Hohenstaufen's Australasian cockatoo: Symbol of Detente between East and West and Evidence of the Ayyubids' Global Reach," *Parergon* 35, no. 1 (2018).

⁵ Roderich Ptak, "The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea – Sulu Zone – North Moluccas (14th to early 16th century)," *Archipel* 43 (1992): 29–31.

⁶ Victor R. Savage, *Western Impressions of Nature and Landscape in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1984); Richard H. Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan, eds., *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2007).

⁷ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1975), 20.

⁸ Variable and unpredictable winds characterise the periods between the monsoons, c. April and October.



Map 3 Main Chinese trade routes

Chinese products; a few vessels also arrived from Japan and the Philippines. While there were some impressively large Southeast Asian vessels before the sixteenth century, they lost ground to foreigners from Gujarat and China as commerce expanded. Chinese and Indians dominated ocean traffic, and Thomaz concluded that most Javanese visiting Melaka were small traders.⁹ The historian M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, when considering Melaka's traffic, was "struck by the existence of fixed routes and ports of call and, above all, by the division of the sailing routes into regular crossings".¹⁰

Coming from the North

The southeastern archipelagos could be reached by branches from two China Sea trunk routes: the northwestern and the eastern. The Selden map, a rare early seventeenth-century Chinese sailing guide for China and Southeast Asia, includes a sketch chart showing scale and navigation points, as well as a diagram of shipping lanes.¹¹

The trunk route was in a T-shape. One route [the northwestern] ran parallel to the coast of Fujian, linking Nagasaki ... Hirado ... and central Vietnam.... Another [eastern] route started from near Quanzhou and went south to Manila in the Philippines. The importance of the maritime trade between China, Japan and the Philippines could thus be seen. This trunk route witnessed heavy traffic in the early seventeenth century from Chinese merchants, Japanese Red Seal Ships and the Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company.

By the fourteenth century, junks from China were following the eastern route. This originated in a sea-oriented stretch of coastal Fujian, first in Quanzhou, and then Yuegang (Moon Harbour), while later Zhangzhou and Xiamen (Amoy) rose to prominence. This trunk branched out into some 46 seaways, focussed primarily on the Philippines and Sulu; passage along Mindanao's east coast was difficult. This was the most important route under the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368) but it declined during the early Ming (1368–1644) ban on private trade.¹² Vessels sailing between Melaka and China took the first Sulu tribute missions to China in 1417; two rulers were accompanied by some 300 followers and slaves, bringing pearls, gems, spices and turtle-shell.¹³ Malays from Borneo probably

⁹ Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz, "Malaka et ses communautés marchandes au tournant du 16^e siècle," in *Marchands en hommes d'affaires asiatiques dans l'Océan Indien et la Mer de Chine 13^e–20^e siècles*, ed. Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin (Paris: Editions de l'École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales, 1988), 37–8; Pierre-Yves Manguin, "The Vanishing Jong: Insular Southeast Asian Fleets in Trade and War (Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)," in *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

¹⁰ M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 87–8.

¹¹ Hongping Annie Nie, *The Selden Map of China: A New Understanding of the Ming Dynasty* (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2019). To examine the map, go to <https://seldenmap.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/>.

¹² Ptak, "Northern Trade Route"; Nie, *The Selden Map*. See also Wu Xiao An, "China meets Southeast Asia: a Long-Term Historical Review," in *Connecting and Distancing: Southeast Asia and China*, ed. Ho Khai Leong (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009).

¹³ Laura Lee Junker, *Raiding, Trading and Feasting. The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 102.

settled in Sulu somewhat later. North Borneo networks brought Islam to the southern Philippine realms of Maguindanu and Sulu in the same century; Chinese settlement increased in the Philippines.¹⁴

Certain coasts were pivotal, where branches of trunk routes came together or diverged, depending on the seasons. The Austronesian Cham ports on the central littoral of the later Vietnam and Borneo's southwestern and northern corners were such turning points. From the seventh century CE to the eighteenth century, sailors could leave the northwestern route at the Cham coast to follow either of two paths to the eastern islands. One continued along the mainland to the Malay peninsula. From there they could either go on to the Melaka Straits region or turn east to pass the southwestern tip of Borneo and enter the Java Sea, passing along the north Java coast towards Nusa Tenggara and Maluku. Alternatively, from Champa they could turn directly east and cross the South China Sea toward north Borneo. Here again several options were possible. They could then sail north towards western Luzon, or veer east into the Sulu Sea, going to northwest Mindanao (Butuan, for example), or proceeding further south towards north Sulawesi and Maluku. Such diverse trajectories were not minor technical matters: they determined the flow of trade, and the economic and political fortunes of peoples along the way.

Brunei, on the northwest Borneo coast, benefited from this traffic. It reached the height of its powers in the mid-sixteenth century, asserting hegemony over the island's long littorals, as well as parts of Mindanao and Palawan in the southern Philippines. The Brunei Sultanate even claimed a cluster of Muslim chiefdoms in Manila Bay, where cloth, spices and cinnamon purchased at Melaka were exchanged for goods from China. The Manila settlements were destroyed by the Spanish in 1521, the same year that the distant Aztec realm in Mexico became New Spain. The first galleon sailed between Asia and the Americas in 1565, initiating the exchange of American silver for prized commodities shipped from South China's Fujian ports. For almost a century this was the most profitable traffic between China and Southeast Asia, until Manila was surpassed by Batavia.¹⁵

Spanish Manila's trade was also governed by the monsoons. In his detailed account of Manila's traffic in the late sixteenth century, Antonio de Morga identified the trading seasons for the junks:¹⁶

Every year thirty or even forty ships are wont to come, and although they do not come together, in the form of a trading and war fleet, still they do come in groups with the monsoon and settled weather, which is generally at the new moon in March. They belong to the provinces of Canton, Chincheo [Chiang-chu, the modern Quanzhou] and Ucheo [Fujian], and sail from those provinces. They make their voyage to the city of Manila in fifteen or

¹⁴ Harriet Zurndorfer, "Oceans of History, Seas of Change: Recent Revisionist Writing in Western Languages about China and East Asian Maritime History," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 13, no. 1 (2016). P.N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 34–7.

¹⁵ Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).

¹⁶ H.E.J. Stanley, *The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan, and China at the Close of the Sixteenth Century by Antonio de Morga* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1868), 337.

twenty days, sell their merchandise, and return in good season, before the *vendavals*¹⁷ set in—the end of May and a few days of June—in order not to endanger their voyage.

Shipping from the South China Sea usually entered the Sulu Sea through the Balabac Strait south of Palawan and north of Borneo's offshore island of Balambangan. Skippers heading further south to the Celebes (or Sulawesi) Sea then sailed out of the Sulu Sea through the narrow Basilan Strait, north of the main Sulu island of Jolo and south of Mindanao's Zamboanga Peninsula. They passed Ilana Bay, where the Pulangi River provided access to the vast Cotabato basin. Further along, island-studded Sarangani Bay was a rendezvous for traders, supplying provisions, water, wood and information for shipping either going north along the Mindanao coast to the Davao Gulf, a source of forest products, or south through the Sulawesi Sea. The Sulu-Sulawesi sea route was the "crucial thoroughfare" linking the eastern archipelagos to the north east, including not only China, the Indo-Chinese coast and the Gulf of Siam, but also to the north Borneo route to the Straits of Melaka.¹⁸

From the Celebes Sea two main seaways led south: the Makassar Straits or the more rewarding Maluku Sea. For those en route to Maluku, the Sangihe (Sangir) and Talaud (Salibabu) archipelagos, north of Sulawesi, were a natural landfall. Swadling notes that Chinese traders had been visiting Talaud and Sulawesi in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and had reached West New Guinea's Onin by the fifteenth century.¹⁹ Archaeological work at Bukit Tiwing, in Talaud, indicates involvement with inter-regional trade from at least the 1500s.²⁰ Captains sailing further south then passed between Sulawesi's northeast coast and western Halmahera, where the off-shore island-based sultanates of Ternate and Tidore competed for control over export commodities, notably spices but also sea and forest goods, including New Guinea bird skins.

A Chinese source from the fourteenth century mentions Northern Sulawesi, the long arm that divides the great Gulf of Tomini from the Celebes Sea; Manado (on the northeast coast) probably traded directly with Malacca at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Manado and Gorontalo-Limboto (on the southern littoral) were fertile and populous; gold was mined in the interior. Rice was plentiful as was maize (introduced in the sixteenth century), so passing ships and those visiting from the Philippine Spanish settlements came for provisions.²¹

¹⁷ E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, 55 vols. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903–09), vol. 4. Spanish sources from the 1570s describe the two seasons of the year. During the dry season, the *brisa*, which begins in November, blows from the southeast to the north; in the wet season the *vendavales* blow from the northwest to the south-southeast, beginning by the end of May to the middle of June. These two are separated by the "gentle winds" of the *calladas* [silence].

¹⁸ Ptak, "Northern Trade Route," 34–5.

¹⁹ See map 2 in Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands Until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996).

²⁰ Rintaro Ono, Santoso Soegondho, and Joko Siswanto, "Possible Development of Regional Maritime Networks during the 16th to 19th Centuries: An Excavation Report of the Bukit Tiwing Site in the Talaud Islands, Eastern Indonesia," *People and Culture in Oceania* 29 (2013).

²¹ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 31–3, 51–68, 71, 96–9; David Henley, "A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi," *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 47, 50.

No major junk route passed through the Makassar Straits, and early European travellers avoided them.²² Exchange between China and South Sulawesi was conducted in other harbours, including East Javanese ports, Banjarmasin and, after 1557, Portuguese Macau, as well as on less formal shores. Sailors from South Sulawesi brought cargoes back to the island for local use and further distribution. It is said that the first junk came directly from China to Makassar in 1613.²³ After 1632 the Portuguese began using Makassar as a regular stopover on voyages between Timor/Larantuka and Macau.²⁴

From the West

As was mentioned above, while some sailed down this eastern route, others continued to arrive from the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal via the Java Sea.²⁵ This was a major thoroughfare for shipping moving between the Melaka Straits, eastern Nusa Tenggara, the Maluku entrepot of Banda and the harbours of Ternate and Tidore. The passage along the northern littoral of productive and populous Java was attractive to Asian traders, who bought and sold along the way, accumulating cloth and other goods for the Maluku market. Banten in West Java was already a major emporium for fifteenth-century Indian, Chinese and Southeast Asian shippers, who could load foodstuffs and pepper.²⁶ But the early sixteenth-century writer Tomé Pires advised Portuguese shippers to avoid this coast, as they had no need to add to their cargoes and should minimize the risk of attack by their Javanese rivals. The valuable Portuguese vessels could make a faster and safer journey by going north in the Java Sea, along the southern Borneo and Sulawesi coasts to Buton and then on to Maluku, where they could obtain spices.²⁷

Vessels that did keep to the south Java Sea travelled as far as north Bali's Sembiran. Located not far from the later port of Buleleng, this had been participating in trans-oceanic commerce since at least the first century CE.²⁸ From Bali there were again several possibilities. One was to head north towards South Sulawesi and its islands, where supplies could be obtained, before continuing via Selayar and Buton to Maluku. Alternatively, skippers travelling beyond Bali and Sumbawa could either proceed along the northern

²² Ptak, "Northern Trade Route."

²³ D.K. Bassett, "English Trade in Celebes, 1613–1667," *Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 31(1958): 4.

²⁴ Arend de Roever, "The Warlords of Larantuka and the Timorese Sandalwood Trade," in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 230, note 11.

²⁵ Ships headed for the Java Sea from the Indian Ocean passed either along Sumatra's east coast, and then through the Melaka Straits, or down Sumatra's west coast before turning north through the Sunda Straits at the tip of Java. More rarely, they could sail along the south Java coast to enter the Flores and Banda Sea by passing up through Nusa Tenggara straits to enter the Flores Sea, but these were treacherous waters, far from the main western sea lanes.

²⁶ Atsushi Ota, *Changes of Regime And Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State And the Outer World of Banten, 1750–1830* (Leiden: Brill, 2006). See map 2 in Swadling, *Plumes*.

²⁷ Jennifer L. Gaynor, *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 36.

²⁸ Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 96.

coasts of the Eastern Nusa Tenggara islands of Flores, Alor and Timor, or they could turn south between the islands towards Timor. The two Nusa Tenggara straits most used by long-range shipping were the Sape or Alas Straits, between eastern Sumbawa (Bima) and Komodo, or the more easterly Ombai Strait joining the Banda and Savu Seas; this was bordered by north Timor and east Alor (Ombai). The Lintah Strait, separating Komodo and west Flores, was famously treacherous. The difficult passage between Bali and Java, and the calmer Lombok Strait between the eponymous island and Bali were frequented by regional shipping and, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by European traders. Transit was risky, both because of natural hazards and pirate predation.²⁹

In the fourteenth century the Javanese realm of Majapahit had claimed suzerainty over a whole swathe of the archipelago, from Sumatra to New Guinea and the Manila Bay region of Luzon, so we know that it was at the least familiar with these locations.³⁰ Southern Sulawesi's Luwu, Makassar, Bantaeng, Buton, and Banggai were also listed in Majapahit's chronicle, the *Désawarnana* (or *Nagarakertagama*)³¹ as were north Sulawesi's Gorontalo and Sangihe and Talaud. Bali and New Guinea's Onin peninsula were also named, along with Ambon, Banda, Buru and Seram in Maluku. In Nusa Tenggara Dempo and Bima on Sumbawa island, and places on Flores, Lombok and Timor have also been identified. Majapahit also had connections with the river mouths of southeast Borneo. However, in the fifteenth century, Majapahit lost control of Java's north coast to smaller trade-oriented realms; of these Gresik and Jepara were particularly focussed on trade with the eastern islands.³²

Bali had been conquered by Majapahit in 1343, but by the beginning of the sixteenth century the kingdom of Gelgel was independent. Meilink-Roelfosz notes: "Although the inhabitants of the lesser Sunda islands visited the nearby coastal districts of Java in small boats, they did not extend their expeditions to Malacca, and the Malacca merchants had to go themselves to fetch the products from their islands".³³ From 1512 Sembiran

²⁹ Despite the Bali Strait's turbulence there was frequent traffic between east Java and Bali. In the Alas straits off east Lombok the reef-protected harbour of Labuhan Haji was an excellent source of provisions, attracting large perahu from Makassar and Ambon and, from the later eighteenth century, Western traders. Ampenan on the opposite coast of the Lombok straits later became more important. Sape Bay, in the eponymous strait between the eastern tip of Sumbawa and Komodo, had a similar reputation; the village lay about three quarters of a mile inland on a creek. Good water and provisions were available. Milburn commented: "Of the value of money they seem to have no knowledge", so the usual red and blue cotton handkerchiefs, large clasp knives, empty bottles, iron hoops and muskets were used in barter. William Milburn and Thomas Thornton, *Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader's Complete Guide: Containing a Geographical and Nautical Description of the Maritime Parts of India, China, Japan, and Neighbouring Countries, including the Eastern Islands, and the Trading Stations on the Passage from Europe ... And a Description of the Commodities Imported from Thence into Great Britain, and the Duties Payable Thereon* (London: Kingsbury, Parbury and Allen, 1825), 393. See also Francis Henry Hill Guillemard, *Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel. Australasia: Malaysia and the Pacific Archipelago, Edited and Extended by A.R. Wallace. Volume 2* (London: E. Stanford, 1908), 360, 364.

³⁰ The economies of early east Javanese states were "based on international trade and rice exports"; Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 79.

³¹ Mpu Prapanca and Stuart Robson, *Désawarnana: (Nagarakertagama)* (Leiden: KITLV, 1995).

³² Kenneth R. Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume One, Part One: From Early Times to c.1500*, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 208–26.

³³ Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade*, 87.

was a port of call for the biannual Portuguese voyages, and in 1597 the Dutch visited in search of rice, meat and other provisions.³⁴ Bali was a reliable source of supplies; Javanese traders came to buy rice, cotton cloth and female slaves, while Makassarese bought cotton yarn and textiles; cattle were also traded. Members of the ruling elite were the principal entrepreneurs, dealing with Malays, Chinese and, later, Europeans.³⁵

Political events conspired to increase shipping sailing north from Java to southern Kalimantan and Sulawesi. In the early seventeenth century, Java's powerful Mataram conquered the main coastal polities trading to the north and east, while the Dutch took over the key spice islands of Banda and Ambon, as will be described in chapter five. Many traders turned to ports outside Java, increasing traffic to Banjarmasin and Makassar. In 1619 the Directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC or *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, United East India Company, 1602–1800) had established Batavia, on Java's northwest coast, as their capital in Asia. It became a centre for local shipping and exchange with China. The Company decreed that all Dutch voyages between Asia and Europe, and between the western and eastern archipelagos, had to pass through Batavia.³⁶

The Company's own voyages blended into trade patterns governed by the monsoon winds. Shipping for Siam and China departed Batavia in April and May, for Japan in May and June, for Bengal and Coromandel in May to August, those for Ceylon, Surat, Persia and Mocha somewhat later, for Sumatra and Malacca in September, while vessels bound for the eastern islands left in November and February, sailing to the Company centres of Makassar, Timor and Maluku.³⁷ On the south China coast Guangzhou (Canton) became an important harbour; Portuguese settled there in 1516. Xiamen (Amoy) emerged from Quanzhou's shadow as a smuggling base in the 1500s; later it became a hub in the main routes linking Southern China and Southeast Asia. Junks from the south China ports of Xiamen, Guangzhou, Chenghai (Guangdong or Canton province) and Ningbo (Zhejiang province) became regular visitors in Batavia.³⁸

The development of the eastern archipelagos' traffic in the later decades of the 1700s can only be understood in the context of the West's avid interest in the China trade. Shipping increased, so too did interest in navigation. In September 1758, in a season when passage from west to east through the China Sea was considered impossible, Captain William

³⁴ Hans Hägerdal, "From Batuparang to Ayudhya: Bali and the Outside World, 1636–1656," *BKI* 154, no. 1 (1998): 76–84.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Femme Gastra, *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline* (Zutphen: Walburg, 2003); Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade*; Els M. Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië. De handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2000).

³⁷ Leonard Blussé has written extensively on Batavia; for an introduction see Leonard Blussé, "On the Waterfront: Life and Labour Around the Batavian Roadstead," in *Asian Port Cities 1600–1800: Local and Foreign Cultural Interactions*, ed. Haneda Masashi (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009). See also in bibliography: Blussé, et al., 1991; Blussé, 1996; Chin, 2009.

³⁸ Ng Chin-Keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 42–61; Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 97–105. For an overview of Batavia's demographics, see Atsushi Ota, "Toward Cities, Seas, and Jungles: Migration in the Malay Archipelago, c.1750–1850," in *Globalising Migration History: The Eurasian Experience (16th–21st Centuries)*, ed. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

Wilson from Madras threaded the English East India Company's *Pitt* through the narrow straits between two of Papua's Raja Ampat islands, Batanta and Salawati.³⁹ Wilson worked out this new route to China "by crossing the line and taking advantage of the contrary monsoons that prevail at the same time in north and south latitudes". The Pitt Passage (or Sagewin Straits) opened a route from the Banda and Arafura seas, past the eastern coasts of the Philippines up to Guangzhou and Xiamen, through waters that had previously been almost unknown to Europeans. This was an example of the paradoxes and laborious calculations necessary for sailors, who sought the most favourable winds and currents. The length of the Pitt's Passage eastern route to Macau was 3,725 nautical miles, while from the Sunda Straits a direct voyage would have covered 1,800, but by sail the former was the faster.⁴⁰ More than a century later, steamers were able to travel in straight lines.

Water and Fire

The peoples described here were all island-dwellers. Some of the most prominent polities were based on small, but strategically located, patches of land rising out of the sea; Sulu's Jolo, Ternate and Tidore are examples. Other islands were very extensive, with forested mountains, inland plateaus, and ramified rivers. Many of Indonesia's c. 18,000 islands are in the eastern part of the country, including ten of Indonesia's thirteen largest. New Guinea and Borneo are the second and third biggest in the world; the scale of the Southern Philippines' Mindanao, "the flooded land", is also impressive.⁴¹ The seas at the heart of this study were connected to both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The most northern, the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas, are now grouped in the SSME (Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion). This covers some 900,000 square kilometres, with offshore zones claimed by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.⁴² The southern reaches of the SSME overlap with Wallacea, our central zone. This covers Sulawesi, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara (east of Bali and west of Tanimbar) straddling the famous Wallace line dividing Australian and Asian fauna.⁴³

The Wallace line was cross-cut by political and cultural ties. It separated Bali from Lombok, but in practice a sharper break lay further east, between fertile Lombok and

³⁹ The two other main Raja Ampat islands off the northwest New Guinea coast were Misool and Waigeo; there were more than 600 others.

⁴⁰ Stephen Davies, *East Sails West: The Voyage of the Keying, 1846–1855* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 86; Jean Sutton, *The East India Company's Maritime Service, 1746–1834: Masters of the Eastern Seas* (Martlesham: Boydell & Brewer, 2010), 83.

⁴¹ The area is over 100,000 square kilometres. See Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

⁴² This SSME, which lies within the Coral Triangle, has become the focus of a broad coalition of governments and conservation groups; Evangeline F.B. Mclat and Romeo B. Trono, "One Vision, One Plan, Common Resources, Joint Management Conserving the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea," *Tropical Coasts* 15, no. 1 (2008).

⁴³ After the pioneering classificatory work of Alfred Russel Wallace. Chris Ballard, "Oceanic Negroes': British Anthropology of Papuans, 1820–1869," in *Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750–1940*, ed. Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 174–7. See also the Alfred Russel Wallace Page, Western Kentucky University, <http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/index1.htm>.

Sumbawa. The latter was itself diverse, as history modified geography: by the seventeenth century the inhabitants of West Sumbawa were oriented to Lombok, those to the east were closer to Makassar in South Sulawesi. The outermost waters described here are those around eastern Kalimantan (Indonesian east Borneo), Bali and West New Guinea or Indonesian Papua. They lie beyond both the SSME and Wallacea but are included because of their commercial links. The more easterly Kei and Aru archipelagos were a transition zone between Indonesian and Papuan ecologies; the boundary between these has always been very porous.⁴⁴

The southeastern boundaries of Wallacea and of Indonesia are defined by two geological arcs to the east of Java. The inner or Banda arc is a continuation of the active circum-Pacific 'Ring of Fire', which runs along west Sumatra and Java before sweeping through Bali, Flores and the Southwestern Islands east of Timor to the Banda archipelago.⁴⁵ In 1831 the official E. Francis visited Bima and commented: "The multiple, terrible natural phenomena ... make the population very superstitious. They are surrounded by burning mountain tops ... the earth moves beneath their feet, and the sea rages across the shoreline." The resident local official had experienced seven earthquakes in eleven months.⁴⁶

This "Ring of Fire" re-emerges north of Seram. There is a high concentration of volcanoes on both sides of the Maluku Sea, around northeast Sulawesi's Minahasa region (the tip of Sulawesi's northern arm) and the Sangihe and Talaud archipelagos, as well as in northwest Halmahera and adjacent islands, many of which had been formed by past eruptions. The Sulu archipelago and Mindanao in the Southern Philippines continue the line. Several active peaks are clustered around Mindanao's Cotabato, while Sulu's main island of Jolo is also of volcanic origin. In contrast to the volatility along the inner arc, there was little or no volcanic activity in the outer belt that stretches south and east of Banda, through Timor up to mountainous Seram and Obi. There the main islands are Sumba, Timor, Kei and Seram.

Eruptions destroyed livelihoods, so uprooted peoples had to find ways of surviving. In 1673 Mount Gamkonora in northwest Halmahera exploded, triggering a tsunami and forcing inhabitants to flee.⁴⁷ In 1765, with similar consequences, Mindanao's Mount Ragang to the south of Lake Lanao erupted.⁴⁸ The greatest relatively recent—geologically speaking—volcanic disaster was that caused by Sumbawa's Mount Tambora in 1815, which was more powerful than the better known Krakatoa event in the Sunda Strait (1883). Many shoreline settlements must have been obliterated in 1815, as although the tsunami was moderate, at some 4 metres, this more than enough to inundate low-lying


⁴⁴ The ambiguity is reflected in the more easterly Weber and Lydekker lines.

⁴⁵ Patrick L. Whelley, Christopher G. Newhall, and Kyle E. Bradley, "The Frequency of Explosive Volcanic Eruptions in Southeast Asia," *Bulletin of Volcanology* 77, no. 1 (2015).

⁴⁶ E. Francis, "Van Batavia naar Timor Koepang," *TNI* 1, no. 1 (1838): 12–3.

⁴⁷ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 92–3.

⁴⁸ James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), 407; Warren, "Volcanos, Refugees and Raiders: The 1765 Macaturin Eruption and the Rise of the Iranun," paper, Asian Studies Seminar, University of Western Australia, 2011; Ronald K. Edgerton, "Frontier Society on the Bukidnon Plateau," in *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982).



Map 4 Physical geography of the Eastern Archipelagos

coasts. The total death toll, including post-eruption famines, is thought to have been up to 117,000 on Sumbawa, Lombok and Bali.⁴⁹ Francis arrived in Sumbawa sixteen years after the Tambora explosion:⁵⁰

⁴⁹ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Since c.1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 173; Bernice de Jong Boers, "Mount Tambora in 1815: A Volcanic Eruption in Indonesia and its Aftermath," *Indonesia* 60 (1995). Gillen D'Arcy Wood, *Tambora: The Eruption That Changed the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Even a much lesser eruption could be very destructive, as on Makian island near Ternate: "But on 29th December, 1862, it again burst forth with as great violence as before, and destroyed nearly the whole population. Over 4,000 perished, the greater number from drowning, overcrowding the praus in their frantic efforts to escape. The sand and ashes thrown up by the volcano reached Ternate, thirty miles off, the next day and formed a cloud so dense as to darken the air and make it necessary to light lamps at midday. They fell to the thickness of three or four inches over that island, and even to a distance of fifty miles, destroying all the crops, and doing great injury to shrubs and fruit-trees"; Guillemard, *Compendium*, 321. See also in the bibliography: Oppenheimer, "Climatic, Environmental and Human Consequences"; Christie, "Under the Volcano"; Reid, "History and Seismology in the Ring of Fire."

⁵⁰ Francis, "Van Batavia," 12–3.

The need among the people became so acute that all natural ties were broken; men sold their wives, mothers gave their children away for just a handful of food, people died of starvation along the sides of the roads, and great migrations took place, to Java, Bali and Sulawesi, as well as to Timor and other [neighbouring] places.

Since death seemed inevitable, slavery appeared merciful.

Coastal Configurations

The east Borneo coast is interrupted by two jutting promontories. The Dent Peninsula in modern Sabah separates the Sulu and Celebes Seas. The disputed modern border with Indonesia enters the latter south of the peninsula, at Sebatik Bay. Further down along the coast of Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo, lies Cape Mangkalihat, the second notable promontory. This marks the northern end of the Makassar Straits and the southwestern border of the Celebes Sea. North of the Cape Borneo's coastal plain was generally marshy, while to the south the east Kalimantan littoral was characterised by silt-laden rivers and their muddy mouths.⁵¹ The shore was often quite inaccessible because of extensive intertidal zones and mangrove forests, which were exploited for their timber and marine resources. Mangroves also lined the coasts of southern Papua, although the northwest of the island, up to and including the broad Cenderawasih (previously Geelvink) Bay was free of these. This was also true of the waters of Mindanao, Maluku and most of Nusa Tenggara, except for southern Yamdema in the Tanimbar archipelago.⁵²

Halmahera and Sulawesi each consisted of four sprawling peninsulas dominated by forested mountain chains, creating absurdly long coastlines and deep gulfs. Western Halmahera is essentially a line of volcanoes; Mount Gamkonora lies near the middle of the chain. The Gamkonora territory was once an independent kingdom. Down the east coast the northernmost peninsula separates the long and relatively narrow Kau Bay from Buli Bay. The former reaches deep into Halmahera towards the west coast and the islands of Ternate and Tidore. Buli and the southerly Weda bays are wider. The peninsula between the last two was associated with an alliance known as the Gamrange, which united Maba on the north coast; Patani on the long finger pointing southeast to the island of Gebe; and Weda on the eponymous bay. Patani's links to Gebe, located almost midway between Halmahera and west New Guinea, were especially close.⁵³

Sulawesi's west coast is generally divided into several stretches; from north to south these are the Kaili, Mandar, and Ajattapparang littorals. Kaili is centred on Palu Bay, where the valley of the eponymous river extends into the interior. This deep fissure marks the narrowest point of the northern peninsula, where a well-travelled path linked Palu on the Makassar Strait to Parigi, located by a river mouth on the Tomini Gulf's west coast.⁵⁴ South of Kaili a narrow coastal plain stretched from Polewali to Mamuju. This was home

⁵¹ R. Broersma, *Handel en bedrijf in Zuid- en Oost-Borneo* ('s-Gravenhage: G. Naeff, 1927), 241–2.

⁵² J. Honculada-Primavera, "Mangroves of Southeast Asia" (paper presented at the workshop on Mangrove-Friendly Aquaculture, Iloilo City, 2000).


⁵³ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 10.

⁵⁴ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 29, 231–5, 432.

to one of the region's major trading peoples, the Mandarese. Further south the deep and sheltered Parepare Bay provided a harbour for the Ajattapparang domains; the innermost indentation of this is still known as Suppa Bay, after an early trading polity.

The southern coast of Sulawesi was broken open by the long Gulf of Bone, cutting north to the heart of the island. "South Sulawesi" conventionally refers only to the southwestern peninsula. The Gulf's western side was connected to the Makassar Straits by the interlinked lakes and rivers of Sidenreng and Wajo, easing traffic and transport between the Gulf and the Makassar Straits. The Bone Gulf's eastern coast presented a much wilder aspect, as the shore was hemmed in by mountain ranges and overshadowed by towering Mount Mekongga.

Two great indentations were carved into Sulawesi's east coast, separated by the Luwuk Peninsula. The tip of this, along with the adjacent islands comprised the region known as Banggai. The wide V of the Tolo Gulf is to the south, opening into the Buru Sea. Tomori Bay was the deepest part of the Tolo Gulf. To the north the generous Tomini Gulf or Bay, rich in marine life, was tucked under the curving arm of North Sulawesi. The northern shore of this faces across the water of the Celebes Sea towards the Sulu Islands.



Map 5 The Trading areas of West New Guinea⁵⁵

The westernmost part of New Guinea can be seen as a projecting head with a gaping mouth. The Birds' Head (or Doberai peninsula) forms the upper part. Just west of its "nose" lie the four main Raja Ampat islands and more than a thousand smaller ones. The open mouth to the south is the MacCluer Gulf (or Berau Bay), with Bintuni Bay as the innermost indentation. The lower "jaw" is the Bomberai peninsula. The western point of this, the lower lip as it were, is the Onin or Fakkak peninsula, jutting towards Seram. The eastern part of this large Maluku island, and the small archipelagos which trail away to the southeast, had ancient trading ties with the New Guinea coast. On Seram east-

⁵⁵ Redrawn from figure 2 of Warnk, "Coming of Islam."

west mountain chains encouraged different parts of the coasts to engage with overseas interlocutors rather than develop inland alliances. However, north-south paths crossed the thinnest part of the island, as was the case in Flores, where a corridor of lower land connected Maumere on the north coast to Sikka on the dangerous southern shore.⁵⁶

Eastern archipelago seas shelter the world's richest concentrations of coral reefs. There are some 26,000 square kilometres of reef in the Philippines, and twice that in Indonesia. Sulu waters contained Southeast Asia's historically most renowned pearl and pearl-shell beds; exports from there long precede those from Indonesia's Aru islands.⁵⁷ Extensive reef systems are particularly evident around the Sulu and Celebes Seas, off the east Sulawesi coast, in the waters between southern Sulawesi and Sumbawa, and those of the Raja Ampat and Cenderawasih regions of New Guinea.⁵⁸ These shelter high concentrations of fish and other forms of marine life, such as turtles, trepang (sea-cucumbers) and shellfish.⁵⁹ Reefs are also found along the northeast Borneo coast, while further south the submerged Great Sunda Barrier Reef lies 60 km off shore and is 630 km long.⁶⁰ There the intermittently populated Balabalagan (or Small Paternoster) islands were famous for their wealth of turtles.

Sulawesi is surrounded by reefs, notably those of the Spermonde complex off the southwest Sulawesi shore⁶¹ and the coral archipelagos found near Selayar, in the Gulfs of Bone and Tomini (particularly around the Togian archipelago) and around the Tukang Besi islands in the Banda Sea to the east. Eastern Sulawesi's Banggai shoreline and islands are particularly well endowed, with a barrier reef north of Tomori Bay. Like the shores of northern Flores, all these waters were popular with sea-focussed Sama Bajau or Samal communities, which will be described in the following chapter. Lombok and Sumbawa also benefit from reef systems, as do Timor and the Savu islands. But Indonesia's most biologically diverse waters are to be found around West Papua's Raja Ampat islands, although much of the main island's coast is muddy. In Maluku reefs are pronounced around Buru, Seram, Ambon-Lease, and Banda as well as some of the Southwestern (Leti, Moa) and Southeastern Islands, i.e. parts of Tanimbar, Kei and Aru. All reefs were hazardous to shipping but provided essential marine resources.

⁵⁶ Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1900: A Documented History* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), 131.

⁵⁷ Charles Hugh Stevenson George Frederick Kunz, *The Book of the Pearl: Its History, Art, Science and Industry* (New York: The Century Company, 1908), 213–21.

⁵⁸ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), "Koraalriffen".

⁵⁹ For an extensive account of marine exploitation see Lance Nolde, "Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2014).

⁶⁰ Tomas Tomascik, et al., *The Ecology of the Indonesia Seas*, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Periplus, 1997); Mark Spalding, Corinna Ravilious, and Edmund Peter Green, *World Atlas of Coral Reefs* (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), excerpted at http://www.reefbase.org/global_database/default.aspx?section=r2®ion=0&country=IDN; P. Boomgaard, "Resources and People of the Sea in and around the Indonesian Archipelago, 900–1900," in *Muddied Waters: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Management of Forest and Fisheries in Island Southeast Asia*, ed. P. Boomgaard, D. Henley, and Manon Osseweijer (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005).

⁶¹ The Spermonde system of reefs and well over 100 islands (also known as the Pabbiring islands) stretches from the Jeneberang River in south Makassar up to Labakkang in Pangkajene.

Habitability

The monsoons not only governed the movements of ships at sea, but also determined precipitation. In South Sulawesi and some areas of Maluku there are clear distinctions in rainfall patterns on the different sides of landmasses, depending on their relative exposure to the winds. In Kalimantan there is rain throughout the year, as in much of Maluku.⁶² While parts of eastern Indonesia are covered by moist tropical forests (notably New Guinea, Halmahera, Buru, Seram, most of Sulawesi—except the southwest, Kei and Tanimbar), some woodland is deciduous, particularly in the south. There is a pronounced dry season in Nusa Tenggara, where much of Lombok, northern Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Timor and Wetar endure six to nine dry months per year on average. Barren soils and, at least by the late nineteenth century, deforestation contributed to regular subsistence crises.⁶³ Horses flourished on the grass lands of Sumbawa and Sumba, and to a somewhat lesser extent on Timor and Savu.⁶⁴



Image 4 Sumba landscape, c.1913⁶⁵

⁶² Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, 21.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 20–1; Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 74–8.

⁶⁴ Greg Bankoff and Sandra Swart, eds., *Breeds of Empire: The Invention of the Horse in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa 1500–1950* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2008).

⁶⁵ “Landschap in Soemba”. Photograph Jean Demmeni. From the collection of the Leiden Ethnographic Museum (*Museum voor Volkenkunde*), no. A5-3-5, now administered by the Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen. Hereafter MVV/NMVW. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/907623>. Plate 105 of a series issued for use in schools by a committee under Professor J.F. Niermeyer, 1911–13. CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication. By permission of the Museum.

Monsoon storms pounded windward coasts, generating high-energy waves. The southern shores of Java and Nusa Tenggara suffered under the southerly winds of the east monsoon, while the west monsoon battered eastern Mindanao, Halmahera and Papua.⁶⁶ Moorings unusable in certain seasons could be welcoming during quieter months. Elsewhere constant rough seas, reefs, mud and mangrove forests made many coasts inhospitable. The accessibility of harbours could be compromised by the silting of rivers, extensive shallow deltas and sandbars, particularly along the Borneo coast. Kalimantan's geography, particularly in the south, was fluid in every sense. Low lying marshland fringed the southeast Borneo coast, lining the lower courses of rivers, blurring the separation of land and sea. The east coast was characterised by tidal estuaries, coastal sand bars, meandering rivers, stranded lagoons and creeping shorelines. Delta coastlines grow out to sea, sometimes as much as ten metres a year.⁶⁷

Sometimes peninsulas offered all-year shelter as the two sides were exposed during alternate monsoons. In the best cases they were close enough to allow the transfer of goods overland. This was true, for instance, of the two ports of Badung, a realm in south Bali. Kuta lay on the west beach of the small peninsula, Tuban on the east; a stream facilitated transport between the two.⁶⁸ Manado and Kema in northeast Sulawesi were similarly paired.⁶⁹ Shipping congregated in protected niches, straits and in the lee of land; estuaries and offshore islands sheltered settlements on open coasts. Mindanao's Cotabato and Davao, Palu and Parepare in west Sulawesi, Kayeli (Buru) and Elpaputi (south Seram), and Nusa Tenggara's Kupang and Bima are examples of suitable moorings in large bays. Shippers naturally preferred the safer harbours. In the Maluku Spice Islands, that of Ternate was much better than Tidore's. Ambon's main settlement lay deep in the gulf between northern Hitu and southern Leitimor. On Banda Neira, the main island of the Banda archipelago, the most important mooring was tucked safely between islands. Such simple facts helped determine histories.

According to later twentieth-century reckonings, Sulawesi had the highest proportion (5 per cent) of suitable agricultural land, but also the most "useless" terrain. Most soils in Kalimantan, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara and Papua have been classified as only "conditionally suitable" for agriculture,⁷⁰ although in Southeast Borneo river flats could be cultivated, and swamps converted into wet ricefields.⁷¹ In Lombok population was concentrated in the central belt. The west was well-watered and fertile, separated from the less favoured east

⁶⁶ Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, 20.

⁶⁷ J.J. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar: A Study in Malay Historiography*, KITLV Bibliotheca Indonesica 1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), 192–200.

⁶⁸ P.H. van der Kemp, "Het Verblijf van Commissaris van den Broek op Bali van 18 December 1817 tot 24 Juni 1818," *BKI* 50, no. 1 (1899): 354–5.

⁶⁹ Guillemard, *Compendium*, 294, 299–300.

⁷⁰ Wolf Donner, *Land Use and Environment in Indonesia* (Hamburg: Hurst, 1987), 191. The 232,000 ha of good land in Nusa Tenggara was probably mainly on Bali and west Lombok.

⁷¹ Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880*, Verhandelingen KITLV no. 189 (Leiden: KITLV, 2001), 52–5. See also Anthony J. Whitten, Muslimin Mustafa, and Gregory S. Henderson, *The Ecology of Sulawesi* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1987).

by dense forest.⁷² The Pulangi river plain of Mindanao, North Sulawesi's Gorontalo and Minahasa (particularly the fertile Tondano plateau), west Sulawesi around Donggala and parts of Sumbawa were similar favourable zones.

Subsistence

In recent years scholars from several disciplines have been reassessing Southeast Asia's frontier ecologies, the various adaptations to upland, forest and coastal environments.⁷³ The productivity of traditional practices such as agroforestry (the combination of useful trees and crops), foraging and swidden (shifting) cultivation are increasingly recognised.⁷⁴ Hills, valleys, inland plateaux and coastal plains supported agriculture; indeed, the interior was often the more productive. Moreover, it was probably safer, as in times of unrest land close to the sea was perilously exposed.⁷⁵

Everywhere foraging was an important source of both food and commodities. Pigs, both wild and domesticated, were a favoured source of protein for the animist and non-Muslim peoples of the interior. Sago and tubers could be found in the forests.⁷⁶ This safety-net was vital, not only because of uncertain harvests, but also because forests could provide refuge from the headhunting, slave-raiding and small-scale warfare which were endemic in much of the region.⁷⁷ Some communities depended completely on foraging, while for many it was supplementary to shifting cultivation. Local knowledge governed multi-year cycles of movement to exploit resources.

⁷² Alfons Van der Kraan, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870 1940* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980), Map 1, 1–4.

⁷³ Philip Hirsch, ed. *Routledge Handbook of the Environment in Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2017); Friedhelm Goltenboth, et al., eds., *Ecology of Insular Southeast Asia: The Indonesian Archipelago* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006).

⁷⁴ Michael R. Dove, "Theories of Swidden Agriculture, and the Political Economy of Ignorance," *Agroforestry Systems* 1, no. 2 (1983); David Henley, "Swidden Farming as an Agent of Environmental Change: Ecological Myth and Historical Reality in Indonesia," *Environment and History* 17, no. 4 (2011); "Traditional Knowledge for Sustainable Forest Management and Provision of Ecosystem Services —Special Issue," *International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management* 12, no. 1–2 (2016). See also in bibliography: Morrison and Junker, *Forager-Trader*; Sather, "Sea Nomads and Rainforest Hunter-Gatherers."

⁷⁵ In bibliography, see Bronson, "Exchange"; Reid, "Inside Out"; Sutherland, "On the Edge of Asia."

⁷⁶ Han Knapen, "Epidemics, Drought and Other Uncertainties in Southeast Borneo During the 18th and 19th Century," in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 1997), 129. Gerrit J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indisch Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Foris, 2004), 220–2.

⁷⁷ Jules de Raedt and Janet Hoskins, eds., *Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). On Timor, H.G. Schulte Nordholt, *The Political System of the Atoni of Timor* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 326–67.



Image 5 “Bejadju” (Pulau Petak) Dayaks, Southeast Kalimantan, 1839⁷⁸

Swidden farming cycles incorporated fallow years, when gardens were either rotated around a permanent settlement, or villages themselves moved, usually through defined territories. Tubers, such as yams and taro, were essential in many areas, as were bananas, while sago was a fundamental, reliable and easily stored (and traded) food-source. In parts of the eastern archipelago these carbohydrates remained central well into the late twentieth century, and they have remained a stand-by option in many others, should rice be scarce or expensive.⁷⁹ In the drier outer arc of Nusa Tenggara lontar palm juice was a food staple,

⁷⁸ “Bejadjoe-Dayakkers, zich ten veldarbeid begevende”. Plate 50 from Salomon Müller, *Land-en Volkenkunde: Verhandelingen over de Natuurlijke Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche overzeesche bezittingen*, ed. C.J. Temminck (Leiden: S. en J. Luchtman en C.C. van der Hoek, 1839), plate 50. Temminck was the general editor of publications for the *Commissie* (1820–50). Müller uses “Bejadu” to refer to the river also known as the Small or Lesser Dayak River (as opposed to the Great Dayak River, the Kahayan) and now called the Kapuas. The surrounding district was known as Pulau Petak. See Müller, 337.

⁷⁹ In the mid-twentieth century, consumption of tubers was the mainstay in the Banggai, Sangihe and Tukang Besi archipelagos, while bananas were a vital crop on the Mandar coast; David Henley, “Rizification Revisited; Re-examining the Rise of Rice in Indonesia, with Special Reference to Sulawesi,” in *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 2004), 111. Sago remained the staple in, among others, Luwu on the Gulf of Bone, North Sulawesi’s Buol and Tolitoli, the Togian islands, east Sulawesi’s Tobungku coast, parts of Minhasa, Sangihe and Bolaang Mongondow; Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 62; Roy Ellen, “The Distribution of Metroxylon Sagu and the Historical Diffusion of a Complex Traditional Technology,” in *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 2004). Karel Heyne, *De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch Indië* (Batavia: Ruygrok, 1927).

notably on Rote and Savu; it also provided a fall-back on other islands.⁸⁰ In dry and hilly Timor an early nineteenth-century observer noted that the main crop was maize, “but except in uncommonly plentiful years, they are always obliged to depend for subsistence, during one part of the year, on the sugar of the lontar palm”.⁸¹

Sago palms grow wild in low-lying coastal forests and swamps in Papua and eastern Maluku. Semi-cultivated stands are also managed there, as in Brunei and eastern Malaysia, the southern Philippines, parts of Sulawesi, Borneo, Thailand and Eastern Melanesia.⁸² However, the ease with which this tree starch could be obtained led the colonial Dutch to write of the “curse of sago”, as they believed it removed incentives for morally and economically beneficial work.⁸³ In the mid-nineteenth century Wallace, writing of the island of Waigeo in the Raja Ampat group, observed:⁸⁴

The people of Muka live in that abject state of poverty that is almost always found where the sago-tree is abundant. Very few of them take the trouble to plant any vegetables or fruit, but live almost entirely on sago and fish, selling a little tripang or tortoiseshell to buy the scanty clothing they require.



Image 6 Preparation of sago in the Upper Kumbe region, Southwest New Guinea, 1910⁸⁵

⁸⁰ James J. Fox, *Harvest of the Palm Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

⁸¹ “Short Account of Timor, Rotti, Savu, Solor etc.” in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, The Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochinchina, Malayan Peninsula*, ed. J.H. Moor (1837), 6.

⁸² Ellen, “Distribution.”

⁸³ Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*, 218–23; Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*, 155.

⁸⁴ Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), 404. See also 289–92.

⁸⁵ “Het kappen en wassen van sago aan de Boven-Koembe in Zuid-Nieuw-Guinea”. Photographer unknown. KITLV 12298; persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:907504>. Creative Commons CC BY License.

Stands of useful trees, such as those producing sago or damar resin, were sometimes exploited within their natural swamp or forest environment. Closer to villages, such *dusun* or forest gardens could include sago, coconut and fruit trees, and later commercial tree-crops.⁸⁶ In 1856 Wallace described such a managed landscape: “Some of the villages ... are scattered about in woody ground, which has once been virgin forest, but of which the constituent trees have been for the most part replaced by fruit trees, and particularly the large palm, *Arenga saccharifera*, from which wine and sugar are made”. Brodbeck notes that in Central Sulawesi this is still true today.⁸⁷

Sorghum and millet had long been grown in the region but were of secondary importance. Rice was well established in southwest Sulawesi, and in Tobungku, Sangihe, the Minahasa, and in the interior. It was adopted in other parts of the island (notably Palu and Gorontalo) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁸⁸ In many areas rice was primarily obtained through trade and, Henley argues, might have been more important as a commodity than as a food. Higher population densities could be sustained in wet rice growing areas, but the farmers were tied to the land. In swidden farming the labour input required was lower, and mobility high.⁸⁹ Southern Bali became a striking example of intensive rice cultivation, with its good soils, high rainfall and irrigation systems, although the northeast, in the rain shadow of the mountains, was drier, the climate being closer to that of Sumbawa, where maize and root crops predominated.

Various vegetables and fruits had been introduced from China, India and the Middle East, in some cases thousands of years ago. The Post-Columbian exchange brought American roots such as manioc (cassava, tapioca) and sweet potatoes which became essential sources of carbohydrate; peanuts were also widely adopted.⁹⁰ The Portuguese contributed the tomato and probably the horse.⁹¹ Maize and perhaps cacao came from the Spanish.⁹²

⁸⁶ For a description of mid 19th century Seram, see Carl Benjamin Hermann Rosenberg, *Reis naar de zuidoostereilanden: gedaan in 1865 op last der regering van Nederlandsch-Indië* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1867). For modern Seram, see Laure Ducos, *Importance of the Traditional Land-use and Land-tenure Systems of Waraka, Seram Island, Maluku*, Working paper no.144 (Bogor: CIFOR, 2014). On Ambon, see Geneviève Michon, *Domesticating Forests. How Farmers Manage Forest Resources* (Bogor: CIFOR, 2005).

⁸⁷ Frank Brodbeck, *Structure and Processes in Traditional Forest Gardens of Central Sulawesi* (Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag, 2004), 1.

⁸⁸ Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*, 180–2; Henley, “Rizification,” 111; Campbell Macknight, “The Rise of Agriculture in South Sulawesi before 1600,” *RIMA* 17 (1983).

⁸⁹ Henley, “Rizification,” 113–6.

⁹⁰ Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*, 177–80; R.D. Hill, “Towards a Model of the History of ‘Traditional’ Agriculture in Southeast Asia,” in *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 2004), 32–5.

⁹¹ Peter Boomgaard, “Horses, Horse-trading and Royal Courts in Indonesian History, 1500–1900,” in *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 2004), 224–27. Horse breeding on Sumbawa was established by the early 16th century, and later spread to other islands in Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi; it was closely controlled and sponsored by political elites.

⁹² Jouke S. Wigboldus, “A History of the Minahasa c. 1615–1680,” *Archipel* 34 (1987): 77–83; David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*; Henley, *Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, C.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 28–33. See also in bibliography: Bankoff and Swart, *Breeds of Empire*; Clarence-Smith, “Horse Trading.”

“Maize and rice”, observes Fowler, “differ markedly in their antiquity in the region. Rice has been associated with Austronesian societies in eastern Indonesia for at least 6,000 years and is considered to be an indigenous plant.”⁹³

Maize was introduced to eastern Indonesia from the Americas in the mid-1500s; by the late seventeenth century it was cultivated throughout the region, including East Java and Bali.⁹⁴ “It could be grown”, notes Boomgaard, “in areas that were too high, too steep, too dry or too infertile for ‘dry’ [non-irrigated] rice”; it was also less likely to fail.⁹⁵ By the 1670s (at least) maize was firmly established in Amboina, Ternate, Tidore, Timor, southwest Sulawesi (south of Makassar), Buton, the Minahasa and Gorontalo. It became the primary foodstuff in most of Nusa Tenggara, as well as the drier regions of Sulawesi, including Palu.⁹⁶ In the later 1660s the Malay chronicler of the Makassar war cursed the perfidious Butonese as “maize-worshippers” and “yam worshippers”, expressing the contempt of a rice-eater.⁹⁷ In some areas, such as Sumba, maize became not only a staple crop, but also a sacred symbol.⁹⁸

Tobacco, another Amerindian plant, was being consumed in China and Japan by the mid-1500s, in north Maluku by the late sixteenth century, and in the Philippines by the early 1600s. By the mid-seventeenth century the smoking habit had spread throughout eastern Indonesia, perhaps as an import from Mindanao; tobacco was also used as a medicine and mixed with betel nut for chewing. The Dutch East India Company encouraged cultivation around their Batavia headquarters and by 1671 it was an important export commodity from Ternate, where nearby Makian was a centre of production. Tobacco growing was also documented in Papua, Timor and Kalimantan. By the early nineteenth century it was one of Bali’s chief exports; somewhat later it was also being cultivated in other Nusa Tenggara islands as well as Seram, Buru, and Kei. Boomgaard concludes that it “seems likely that maize and tobacco were instrumental in creating upland societies with quite distinct identities which have persisted to the present”.⁹⁹ However, the main commercial tobacco-producing regions remained Mindanao, Luzon and south-central Java. At the end of the seventeenth century coffee was brought in by the Dutch Company, which had an outpost in Yemeni Mokha, but initially the plants failed to flourish.¹⁰⁰

As will be described in chapter 3, the specific qualities of diverse environments necessitated exchange between inland forests and coasts, between dry and well-watered

⁹³ Cynthia Fowler, “Why is Maize a Sacred Plant? Social History and Agrarian Change on Sumba,” *Journal of Ethnobiology* 25, no. 1 (2005).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Peter Boomgaard, “Maize and Tobacco in Upland Indonesia, 1600–1940,” in *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands. Marginality, Power and Production*, ed. Tania Li (London: Routledge, 2002), 64.

⁹⁶ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 51–68, 317–62; Donner, *Land Use*, 15–31.

⁹⁷ C. Skinner, *Sja’ir Perang Mengkasar (The Rhymed Chronicle of the Macassar War)* by Entji’ Amin, vol. 40 (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1963), 105.

⁹⁸ Fowler, “Maize.”

⁹⁹ Boomgaard, “Maize and Tobacco,” 48. Anthony Reid, “From Betel-Chewing to Tobacco-Smoking in Indonesia,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 44, no. 3 (1985).

¹⁰⁰ Gerrit Knaap, “Coffee for Cash: The Dutch East India Company and the Expansion of Coffee Cultivation in Java, Ambon and Ceylon 1700–1730,” in *Trading Companies in Asia 1600–1830*, ed. Jur van Goor (Utrecht: HES, 1986).

regions, and between territories able to produce surplus foodstuffs and those with populations unwilling or unable to sustain themselves.¹⁰¹ People produced for markets through the artisan manufacturing of textiles, pottery or other commodities, or through the exploitation of specific resources, such as pearl banks, birds' nest caves, or mines.¹⁰² We now have a better understanding of the role of non-contiguous territories linked by economic, political and often cultural relationships to a central place.

Moving

One of the archipelago's most striking characteristics was the high level of mobility. While this might be expected of sea-oriented peoples, many inland groups also migrated for longer or shorter periods. Environmental and political insecurity, or simply the desire for a better situation, also led to population shifts. Hunter-gatherers and swidden farmers were both mobile, the former over extensive tracts, the latter over more circumscribed areas. But both were tied to territories, if not localities. Groups colonised distant coasts, either permanently or temporarily.¹⁰³ Foragers collecting, and sometimes processing, forest or marine products would also stay for weeks on some shores; notable examples include fishing for trepang, as on the Balabalagan Islands or the exploitation of specific trees, such as the widespread collection of damar resin, used in lighting, dyes, incense and medicines, or, especially on Buru, the distilling of *kayuputih* (eucalyptus) oil.

Maps showing language distribution display the effects of trade and migration, particularly in border zones, such as the Celebes and Banda Seas. Most of the many languages belong to the Malayo-Polynesian branch of the Austronesian category and can be grouped into four major families. The first, the Philippine, is also found along the arm of north Sulawesi and in coastal North Borneo. The second, the Sunda-Sulawesi family, includes most of Sulawesi, the south and east Borneo littorals, and Sumatra and Java. The third, the central Malayo-Polynesian, is centred on the Banda and Flores Seas. The final and fourth cluster is that of the Halmahera-Cenderawasih group.¹⁰⁴ Languages in this category are predominant in eastern Halmahera, the Raja Ampat islands, and in a central band extending from south to north Papua, from Onin up to southwestern Cenderawasih

¹⁰¹ On Maluku, R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 50–3. On Sulu, James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 95–102. In the 1770s Captain Thomas Forrest commented on the Sulu traders, coming to buy rice on Mindanao, "for the crop of rice at Sooloo can never be depended on...". Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: Including an Account of Magindano, Sooloo, and Other Islands; and Illustrated with Thirty Copper Plates: Performed in the Tartar Galley, Belonging to the Honourable East India Company, during the years 1774, 1775, and 1776* (London: G. Scott, 1779), 280.

¹⁰² Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds*, 1st ed., 2 vols., vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 90–119.

¹⁰³ For example, see J.G.F. Riedel, "De vestiging der Mandaren in de Tomini-landen," *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 19 (1870); J.G.F. Riedel, "De oorsprong en de vestiging der Boalemoërs op Noord-Selebes," *BKI* 34 (1885).

¹⁰⁴ Harald Hammarström, et al., eds., *Malayo-Polynesian*, Glottolog 3 (Jena: Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, 2017).

Bay; it also encompassed most of the Biak (formerly Schouten) islands. These are all long-established trading regions.

Papuan, not Austronesian, languages are spoken in north and west Halmahera, including Ternate and Tidore, and are dominant in the north and east of the Doberai Peninsula (the Bird's Head). Those used around the McCluer Gulf and along most of the southern coast and in its hinterland languages are related to the languages of Nusa Tenggara's east Timor, Alor and Pantar, which distinguishes them from their mainly Austronesian neighbours.¹⁰⁵ This is a palimpsest of past migrations, as well as an indicator and facilitator of trade links. Ongoing interaction sustained these cultural bonds.¹⁰⁶

Communities, like individuals, could weigh their options and choose to move to another environmental or political niche. In the late 1820s, when Batavia was renewing treaties on the north Sulawesi coast, it noted the existence of the small domain of Bolang Bangka. This consisted of "five hundred people who had left Gorontalo" and lived under their leaders; they had no treaty with the colonial government but delivered gold.¹⁰⁷ In the mid-1800s a Dutch official noted "The Christian population of the island Boano [off Western Seram], totalling 419 souls, without permission or knowledge of the administration in Ambon, moved in July 1847 to the island Bacan but, with the help of the Sultan there, was brought back in the course of 1848".¹⁰⁸

For some inland communities, long-distance expeditions, upriver and overland, combined the pleasure of adventure, the need to collect new skulls and the possibilities of seizing or trading valuable commodities. Trans-local expeditions required extensive preparation and organisation, whether they were overland or by sea. Seaborne raiding also offered opportunities for coastal groups to gain prestige and goods, particularly slaves.¹⁰⁹

Piracy and raiding also forced migration, either as people fled, ex-raiders sought new homes, or governments tried to stabilise and pacify shores by settling groups in villages. From the later 1700s Obi served as a forward base for Tobelo raiders from Halmahera: "Semi-sedentary communities consisting of women and slaves were left behind when the men went on annual raiding expeditions". The Obi islands were virtually uninhabited

¹⁰⁵ See Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 33–5. See the Linguistic map of New Guinea and surrounding islands, from Wikimedia Commons, from Timothy Usher and Edgar Suter, *Newguineaworld*, either on the dedicated site or at <https://sites.google.com/site/newguineaworld/>.

¹⁰⁶ See the discussion of Solheim's ideas in Leonard Y. Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), 21–2. On the wider context, see Glenn R. Summerhayes, "Island Southeast Asia and Oceania Interactions," in *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Junko Habu, Peter V. Lape, and John W. Olsen (Springer, 2017).

¹⁰⁷ *Ikhhtisar keadaan politik Hindia-Belanda tahun 1839–1848* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1973), 363.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 331.

¹⁰⁹ A. McWilliam, *Paths of Origin: Gates of Life, a Study of Place and Precedence in Southwest Timor* (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 129–57. See also in bibliography: de Raedt and Hoskins, *Headhunting*; Knaap, "Headhunting, Carnage and Armed Peace"; George, *Showing Signs of Violence*; Hoskins, "Heritage of Headhunting"; ENI, "Koppensnellen"; Schulte-Nordholt, *Political System of the Aton*; Needham, *Sumba and the Slave Trade*; Spyer, *Memory of Trade*; Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*; Rocque, *Headhunting and Colonialism*; Barnes, *Sea Hunters and Fishers*; Schrauwers, *Colonial Reformation*; Metcalf, *Life of the Longhouse*.

in the late nineteenth century, although they were frequented by foragers from Bacan, Makian, Tidore, Tobelo, and Galela, who stayed for a few months while gathering sago, nutmeg, damar, rattan, pearls and pearlshell.¹¹⁰ North Sulawesi gold mining was another activity dependent on seasonal migration, although the Dutch made two hundred people settle close to the Limboto goldmines in 1765.¹¹¹

People travelled by water, across the seas, along the coasts and rivers. Land travel was much more arduous, but often necessary. Island size and structure, as well as opportunities for cultivation, foraging and exchange, determined the relative advantages of journeying. On the largest islands, rivers could be central to development, as in the case of Borneo and Mindanao, but elsewhere, where rivers tended to be shorter, as in much of Sulawesi and Bali, coastal traffic was of more general use. The next three sections discuss specific geographic features shaping regional histories. Islands were relatively safe sites, rivers provided water and facilitated communication, while trails were used for exchange overland.

Islands

Trading and raiding vessels might be at sea for an entire monsoon cycle, or even much longer, but they could only carry food supplies for a couple of weeks; water was needed more frequently. Consequently, they had to anchor regularly so the crew could go ashore. For seafarers, islands favoured by winds and sea currents were natural stopovers, as long as they could provide fresh water and provisions, and ideally the materials required for ship maintenance as well. Some islands and harbours located along popular sailing routes became established ports-of-call where ongoing relationships overcame distrust. Examples are the Sarangani, Sangihe and Talaud archipelagos in the Sulawesi Sea, Gebe between central Halmahera's Patani and the Raja Ampat of west new Guinea. The Southwestern and Southeastern Islands chains, defined by their location vis-à-vis Banda, curved southwest through the Banda Sea, from New Guinea to Timor.¹¹²

For settlers, security was paramount. "Very small islands", notes Henley, "probably offered ... defensive advantage. The more convex the coastline the more difficult it was for an attacker to approach undetected, and the shorter the distance from the shore settlements to the higher ground", where there were defensible places.¹¹³ Islands located near the mouths of navigable rivers were popular with incomers. In Borneo, extensive and growing deltas were studded with islands, providing welcome possibilities for settlement on generally inhospitable coastlines. Similar advantages were offered by river islands, such as Tatas, formed by the junction of the Barito, Martapura and a lesser stream, and the

¹¹⁰ Esther Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines: Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion in Eastern Sulawesi, 1680–1905" (Murdoch, 2002); Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 85; *ENI*: "Obi".

¹¹¹ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 97.

¹¹² The main Southwestern (now Barat Daya) islands are Wetar, Romang, Kisar, Leti, Moa, Lakor, Babar, Damar, Teun and Nila; most are surrounded by smaller islands. Philippus Pieter Roorda van Eijsinga, *Handboek der Land- en volkenkunde, geschied-, taal-, aardrijks- en staatkunde van Nederlandsch Indie*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: L. van Bakkenes, 1841), 216–27, including map; H.C. Van Eijbergen, "Aanteekeningen op een reis naar de Zuidwester-eilanden," *BKI* 12, no. 1 (1864). The Aru, Kei and Tanimbar archipelagos comprised the Southeastern islands.

¹¹³ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 25.

archipelagos off Sulawesi, along the island chains stretching from Seram Laut¹¹⁴ to Flores and in the island groups off the Papua (West New Guinea) coast.

Banda was by far the best known entrepôt because its exclusive nutmeg production attracted shipping, as did its location. It lay about 200 km southeast of the clove island of Ambon, and southwest of Papua. Long distance traders had probably been arriving there intermittently from the ninth century. Song ceramics suggest increased contact in the 1200s, and a detailed Chinese description survives from the mid-fourteenth century. Spices were shipped to Melaka, while inter-island commerce also linked Banda to the east, to Southeast Seram, Kei, Aru and west New Guinea, sources of foodstuffs, sea and forest products. A late sixteenth century Portuguese account describes a similar settlement on Seram Laut (or perhaps on Gorom, also known as Gorong) of about five thousand 'wealthy merchants', with a stone fort, and eight different quarters in the village. The inhabitants built ships and sailed to Timor (or Kei or Aru), Papua's Onin, Nusa Tenggara, Java and Bali, and also to Makassar, east Sulawesi's Buton and Tobungku.¹¹⁵

On less frequented coasts, such as New Guinea's, island settlements were the usual exchange sites for incoming vessels. An early nineteenth century visitor to the Raja Ampat described "the harbour of Efbe [Jef Bie]" which lay between the eponymous island and the coast of Misool. "The village of Efbe is small, and the houses are all built upon posts in the water. Presents are necessary to the Rajah, in the event of a vessel touching here for refreshments".¹¹⁶ Adi Island, off the southern Bomberai peninsula provided similar services; in the mid-nineteenth century it was settled by local Papuans, men from Tidore and Seram, and frequented by Makassar traders.¹¹⁷ Later travellers to New Guinea described Onin and other local trading centres, where the populations fluctuated according to the trading season.

Kampung (village, settlement) Sorong was ideally located on Doom Island, in a small archipelago right at the northern entrance of the strait separating the Raja Ampat island of Salawati from New Guinea itself, not far from the northern end of Pitt's Passage.¹¹⁸ Italian travellers in the 1870s described Sorong as being divided in two parts, half Muslim and half "native". Most of the former were traders from Sulawesi, Seram, Halmahera, Ternate and Tidore. About twenty years later it was described as completely Muslim, including a few Bugis, who had settled and married locally. F.S.A. de Clercq, Resident of Ternate (1884–88), noted that Sorong consisted of about two hundred people with

¹¹⁴ Seram Laut encompassed the very easternmost tip of Seram, and the offshore archipelago, including the islands of Seram Rei (also known as Keffing after the main settlement), and Geser. Kilwaru island (or Kiltai) was identified in the mid-nineteenth century as the focus of a domain of allied villages which covered both Seram Laut and Geser. On the complex geography of the region, see Ellen, *Edge*. Note maps on pages 11, 23 and 33; C.B.H. van Rosenberg, "Beschrijving van eenige gedeelte van Ceram," *TITLV/TBG* 16, 5th series, part 2 (1866).

¹¹⁵ Ellen, *Edge*, 67–71.

¹¹⁶ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 403.

¹¹⁷ Holger Warnk, "The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011): 123.

¹¹⁸ Pulau Doom was the initial site of Dutch administration in the Bird's Head, a copra harbour and from 1935 was developed by the *Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij* (NNGPM); the city centre moved to the mainland.

“twenty houses, all but a couple built on piles by the water”.¹¹⁹ Sorong was an important harbour for shippers from Makassar seeking cargoes from the Onin Peninsula or the Biak (formerly Schouten) islands.¹²⁰ These lay about 50 kilometres off the northwest Papua coast, straddling the entrance of Cenderawasih (Geelvink) Bay. This trading centre was less visited by sailors from the west, probably because the Biak-Numfor people themselves were formidable traders. They migrated west and created major trading and raiding networks, as close as Dore on the Bay, and as far west as Halmahera.¹²¹

The Aru archipelago, the most important of the Southeastern Islands, lie in the Arafura Sea, some 240 km from New Guinea, but formed part of the related trading zone. Population and trade were concentrated in the “front” (*voorwals*) or western islands, particularly the small Wamar (site of Dobo harbour) and its much larger neighbour of Wokam. But the main source of the trepang and pearls for which the archipelago was famous came from the backshore (*achterwal*), the *belakang tanah* of the reef-rich, and treacherous, eastern coasts.¹²²

An example of how an offshore settlement could become the bridgehead for expansion on to an adjoining mainland is provided by the tiny island later known as Manado Tua, or old Manado.¹²³ This was strategically located off northeast Sulawesi and close to trade routes. Traditions recall that this ‘ancient kingdom of Manado’ encompassed other islands scattered along the coasts, probably including Lembeh, just outside the modern ocean harbour of Bitung. The people were said to come from the Sulawesi mainland, as well as Mindanao, Sangihe, Ternate and Tidore;¹²⁴ many would have been shippers seeking forest products, foodstuffs and slaves. The men from Manado Tua were said to be ‘bold and feared sea-pirates’, friendly with Ternate and Tidore. In the early seventeenth century the island was abandoned in favour of the shore, and creole coastal settlements developed, including small Spanish-led communities. The first ‘king’ was said to be a mestizo from Lembeh.¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ F.S.A. de Clercq, *De West- en Noordkust van Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea. Proeve van beschrijving volgens de mededeelingen en rapporten van reizigers en ambtenaren en naar eigen ervaringen* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1893), 128–9.

¹²⁰ Warnk, “Coming of Islam,” 125–6. The port is now the main container terminal for the entire region.

¹²¹ Freek Ch. Kamma, *Koreri Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area* (Leiden: KITLV, 1972).

¹²² Sue O’Connor, Matthew Spriggs, and Peter Veth, “On the Cultural History of the Aru Islands: Some Conclusions,” in *The Archaeology of the Aru Islands, Eastern Indonesia (Terra Australis 22)*, ed. Sue O’Connor, Matthew Spriggs, and Peter Veth (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), 312.

¹²³ Wigboldus explains that in 1623 Spanish settlers arrived in an insignificant coastal settlement called Wenang, which they renamed Manados; presumably Manado Tua also had an earlier, indigenous name. Wigboldus, “History,” 68.

¹²⁴ W.H. Makaliwe, “A Preliminary Note on Genealogy and Inter-marriage in the Minahasa Regency, North Sulawesi,” *BKI* 137, no. 2 (1981).

¹²⁵ Wigboldus, “History.” For a less romantic account of early Spanish activity, see Antonio C. Campo López, “La presencia española en el norte de Sulawesi durante el siglo XVII. Estudio del asentamiento español en el norte de Sulawesi ante la oposición local y la amenaza holandesa (1606–1662),” *Revista de Indias* 77, no. 269 (2017).

Rivers

In riverine polities permanent villages and political centres were typically located upriver, some way from the perilous shore, where they were well-placed to intercept and tax foodstuffs and forest products coming down from the interior and imports moving upstream. The classic Malay distinction between *ulu* and *ilir* (up and down river) also applies to exchange relations in the archipelagos, particularly in the larger islands.¹²⁶ A similar distinction existed in Mindanao, between the coast, *sa-ilud*, home to the Cotabato sultanate of Maguindanau, and *sa-riaya*, upriver on the Pulangi where the rival realm of Buayan was located. Neither division was absolute in social or economic terms but served as a central organising principle in conceptualising relationships.¹²⁷ Outsiders pushed inland along the rivers. Even when the streams themselves were not navigable, their valleys provided relatively easy passage through difficult and forested terrain. In Mindanao and Borneo, the main states were inseparable from their rivers.

Tributaries of Mindanao's Rio Grande de Cagayan system rise in both the Buknidon-Lanoi mountains to the north and the southern Tiruray Highlands. The main stream is the Pulangi which flows through a great south-central plain. After the confluence with the Kabacan it becomes known as the Mindanao. Before it enters the sea at Ilana bay the Mindanao forks into the Cotabato in the north and the Tamontaka in the south. These are separated by a peninsula about 180 metres wide, which was an ideal settlement site. McKenna comments that "For the Magindanaon, the Pulangi River system, with its tributaries, channels, and estuaries, has been a source of food and water, a principal thoroughfare, and the means of trade and communication with the outside world. Control of the Pulangi has thus been crucial for the acquisition and maintenance of political power by the rulers of the Cotabato Valley throughout the historical period".¹²⁸ The island's two main sixteenth century sultanates lay on the Pulangi: Buayan on the fertile upper reaches, Maguindanau (Cotabato) downriver, close to the sea.¹²⁹ The Koronadal and Buayan valleys provided relatively easy access from the Cotabato basin to the south coast's Sarangani Bay, though a break in the southwestern Tiruray ranges. Overland travel to the east coast's Davao Bay was blocked by the central Mindanao highlands.

Borneo's rivers have been channelling commodity flows between the coast and interior for many hundreds of years. Since the fifteenth century most of Borneo's littoral had been

¹²⁶ For example, Srivijaya centred on the Musi river with Palembang at the mouth, Jambi-Melayu on the long Batanghari, or Samudra-Pasai by the mouths of the Jambi and Pasai rivers in the northwest. See Barbara Andaya, *To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993); Christie, "State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia"; Timothy P. Barnard, *Multiple Centres of Authority: Society and Environment in Siak and Eastern Sumatra, 1674–1827* (Leiden: KITLV, 2003); Kenneth R. Hall, "Upstream and Downstream Unification in Southeast Asia's First Islamic Polity: The Changing Sense of Community in the Fifteenth Century 'Hikayat Raja-Raja' Pasai Court Chronicle," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44, no. 2 (2001): 198–299.

¹²⁷ See also Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Magindanao, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Utto of Buayan* (Cornell: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1971), 2. A version of this with a new introduction was published in 2007; all references in this book refer to the Cornell publication. Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Magindanao, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Utto of Buayan* (Manila: Anvil, 2007).

¹²⁸ McKenna, *Muslim Rulers*, 30. For a description of the settlements in the region in the late eighteenth century see Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea*, 177–83.

¹²⁹ Andaya and Andaya, *Early Modern*, 162–4. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers*.

claimed by the west coast's Brunei sultanate, but the north and east were expansion zones for Banjarmasin in the south and Sulu across the eponymous sea. The Sulu Sultanate wrested the northeast coast from Brunei in the late seventeenth century, and by the end of the eighteenth the north coast was divided into three territories. Marudu stretched west to Sandakan Bay, while Magindora was centred on the bay and the navigable Kinabatang River which flowed into it. The third, known in Sulu as Tidung (or Tirun), extended south to include the northern Berau region. This was named after the river and the old Dayak-Malay realm and later sultanate (c. seventeenth to eighteenth centuries) of Berau. The Tidung lands were the northernmost of the territories claimed by the Dutch, who distinguished them from Berau.¹³⁰ River mouths were colonised by incomers from Sulu and, further south, by people from Sulawesi.

The greatest river systems of East Kalimantan, those of the Barito and the Mahakam, sustained the sultanates of Banjarmasin and Kutai. Forest commodities, gold and diamonds travelled downstream to coastal settlements where they were exchanged for salt and other imports. These rivers were characterised by webs of tributaries, while tidal downstream waters flowed through complex estuaries. Their histories will be described in more detail as one of the three case studies concluding this chapter.

Sulawesi's coastline was extremely long in relation to its landmass, so rivers were less crucial to exchange. Island domains, or those based on narrow coastal plains, were sea oriented. This was the case in the northern Mandar lands of southwest Sulawesi. There the competitive polities depended on fishing, trading and raiding in the neighbouring waters of the Makassar Straits, and on the production of commodities such as textiles. The main Mandar kingdom of Balanipa controlled the southern mouth of the Salo Mandar river, becoming pre-eminent on that stretch of coast in the sixteenth century. Further south the long Saddang River system connected Sulawesi's west coast to the interior of northwest Sulawesi, the later Enrekang. The Saddang now enters the Makassar Straits just south of the Mandar Gulf, but its original estuary was much closer to Parepare. By approximately 1300 CE the Saddang was already providing water for rice cultivation and good transport links. As the river shifted navigation became problematic, but footpaths along the valleys remained important.¹³¹ Trade was important to the early Suppa-Sidenreng polities, because of connections made possible by the Saddang and a break in the peninsulas north-south mountain chain.

On the Bone Gulf's eastern shore, a Tolaki sub-group founded the inland domain of Mekongga. There were no significant rivers here, although several streams flowed into Mekongga Bay, where the harbour of Kolaka developed in the later 1800s; it was commonly called Mekongga.¹³² Further north and east the political geography of mountainous central Sulawesi, with its many languages and tiny polities, was shaped by three rivers: the Poso,

¹³⁰ Mika Okushima, "Ethnic Background of the Tidung: Investigation of the Extinct Rulers of Coastal Northeast Borneo," *The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies* 21 (2003).

¹³¹ Stephen C. Druce, *The Lands West of the Lakes: A History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), 100–28. Map on p. 119.

¹³² Esther Velthoen, "Mapping Sulawesi in the 1950s," in *Indonesia in Transition: Work in Progress*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gusti Asnan (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003), 113–5.

which runs from the eponymous lake to Tomini Bay, the Kalaena, running south to the Gulf of Bone, and the Laa, which empties into the Mori Gulf to the east.¹³³

The southeastern Sulawesi peninsula is marked by two diagonal mountain ranges running parallel northwest to southeast. The Tangkeleboke mountains are to the north, while the Mekongga range is close to the west coast. North of the Tangkeleboke lies the catchment area and hills of the Lasolo-Lalindu rivers. The two main mountain chains are separated by the less elevated land and plains of the Kanawehea (or Konowehea) river system, which flows south between ranges. As is the case with Kalimantan river systems, the names of different stretches and tributaries change according to customary identifications. The river is joined from the west by the Andolaki and then, from the north, by the Toma and Arenua as well as by lesser streams. The large Wawotobi dam has now been built where the Kanawehea turns east, entering an extensive plain. It is joined there by the Lahambuti (now also dammed). Their combined lower course and estuary were called the Sampara by the Bugis who had settled there by 1700. The Sampara was navigable for several hours going upstream, and sustained rice cultivation. A composite Tolaki polity, Konawe, was centred on the Kanawehea. The kingdom was traditionally, if loosely, linked to Bugis Bone; its rulers probably became Muslim in the eighteenth century. Coastal Laiwui, one realm of Konawe, came to dominate the inland polities as it had easier access to imported goods including weapons. Kendari became the main southeastern port in the late nineteenth century; locals continued to call it Konawe.¹³⁴

The long-established trading networks of the Buton archipelago at the foot of the peninsula are reflected in the relatively early date of the dominant Wolio ruler's conversion to Islam; this is traced back to the mid-sixteenth century teachings of an Arab from Johor.¹³⁵ Smaller polities, such as Tiworo, were also engaged in sea-borne commerce, politics and warfare.¹³⁶

Before the late nineteenth century, few outsiders travelled in Papua's interior; trade was conducted through intermediary coastal communities. The main West New Guinea trading regions were the Raja Ampat archipelagos (Weigeo, Salawati, Misool), the west coast's McCluer Gulf (Teluk Berau), particularly the Onin (Fak Fak) region round the southern tip, and the northern Cenderawasih Bay far to the east, including Dore (Manokwari) and the Biak Islands. All benefited from relatively accessible coastlines and sheltered waters; Onin rivers provided access to the interior. The flat lands bordering the McCluer Gulf were drained by "relatively deep, sluggish streams, many of which are [in 1943] navigable by small steamers".¹³⁷ On the north coast there were no such navigable rivers before eastern Cenderawasih Bay, but there the littoral was also low and flat, so canoes and small boats

¹³³ Albert Schrauwers, *Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi Indonesia, 1892–1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000), 64–5.

¹³⁴ In the 1830s, nine separate kingdoms were identified in the Laiwui region: "Laiwoei, Latona, Koenawai, Roraija, Laija, Lakara, Kolona, Moeramoe, Laontie". *Ikhhsar*: 292.

¹³⁵ Ibid., J. Schoorl, "Belief in Reincarnation on Buton, S.E. Sulawesi, Indonesia," *BKI* 141, no. 1 (1985). Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines"; Gaynor, *Intertidal History*.

¹³⁶ Gaynor, *Intertidal History*.

¹³⁷ Matthew Williams Stirling, *The Native Peoples of New Guinea. War Background Studies, no. 9* (Washington: The Smithsonian Institution, 1943), 2.

could travel upstream. The great Mamberamo River, with its western Tariku (Roeffaer) and eastern Tariatu (Idenburg) tributaries drains the basin north of the mountain range. It runs “through gorges” and “a vast system of swamps and meander-belts between the central mountains and the north coast” before debouching into the Pacific Ocean west of Yapen in Cenderawasih Bay. The Biak people believed their original homeland lay east of the Mamberamo.¹³⁸

Trails

Overland trails and waterways formed an integrated system. Over much of Papua the heterogeneous peoples of the interior were connected by inland trails, along which goods such as shells, stone tools, and imports were carried. According to the Australian Tim Flannery, who travelled there in 1990, “one of the world’s great foot-only trade routes” ran along the mountains:¹³⁹

This magnificent pathway which traverses East-West along Irian Jaya’s [Papua’s] mountain spine is an ancient trade route. In parts it is so well constructed that it resembles an Inca road, and would certainly be capable of admitting a small vehicle. In others, however, it dwindles to a muddy track which descends steep declivities, or else a line of slippery logs leading through a morass. Produce, such as the plumes of birds of paradise, had probably travelled along it for millennia on its journey to places as far afield as Sri Lanka and China.

In many parts of Borneo trails connected river systems. Rugged tracks crossed mountain ridges to connect river valleys, and to allow passage to settlements further inland. Trails took advantage of “a river, a valley, or a saddle between high peaks ... the paths follow a major river or trail along parts of its course, only to leave this and follow a smaller tributary downstream; at times the trails stretch across vast, forested territories to reach the headwaters of a river flowing in the following direction”.¹⁴⁰ On the east coast Pasir was separated from the Barito river system by a ridge of mountains to the west. These were lower than the more southerly Meratus range, so Pasir had relatively easy overland access to the Barito’s upper reaches where forest products and inland crops (including pepper) could be obtained. In the mid-1800s it was noted that Ngaju Dayak of Pulau Petak (Kuala

¹³⁸ Paul Michael Taylor, *Western New Guinea: The Geographical and Ethnographic Context of the 1926 Dutch and American Expedition* (Washington Smithsonian Institution Libraries, Digital Editions, 2006), 7; J.W. Langelier and L.A.C.M. Doorman, “Nieuw-Guinee en de exploratie der ‘Meervlakte’,” *De Aarde en haar Volken* (1918).

¹³⁹ Tim Flannery, *Throwim Way Leg: An Adventure* (London: Penguin, 1998), 240–1. Even now: “Trading is a regular business with the mountain Papuans, and hundreds of people are continually moving along the trail in small groups, coming and going, buying and selling. Often, they are away from their homes for eight or ten weeks or more at a time, sometimes staying at a village *en route* and then moving on again.”

¹⁴⁰ Cristina Eghenter, “Trading and Migration Routes in the Interior of Borneo. Physical Configurations of Economic and Social Networks,” *IIAS Newsletter Online* 19. For paths in the Siang Murung district of the Barito, see C.A.L.M. Schwaner, *Borneo: Beschrijving van het stroomgebied van den Barito en reizen langs eenige voornamelijk rivieren van het zuid-oostelijk gedeelte van dat eiland in den Jaren 1843–1847*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Amsterdam: van Kampen, 1853), 129–30.

Kapuas), on the lower Barito, carried goods overland to trade at the Katingan, halfway across the island to the west. They exchanged salt, tobacco and cloth for gold, bird's nest and other products: "No Malay has the courage to accompany them on these overland expeditions".¹⁴¹



Image 7 A Dani man, from the West New Guinea Highlands, with a pack of salt, 1920¹⁴²

East Kalimantan's southern corner was a narrow coastal strip crossed by many short rivers, geographically and politically fragmented. The role of the sea (*laut*) is exemplified in the name of the large offshore island, Pulau Laut, and that of the southernmost tip of land, Tanah Laut. There the main settlement of Tabanio lay by the mouth of the Tabuniau River. In the late nineteenth century this was navigable up to the settlement of Kupang, a 'general market for the coastal and interior people'.¹⁴³ Around the southeastern corner of Borneo the Tanah Bumbu lands were small, predominantly Bugis polities; the most important were Pegatan and Kusan.

Halmahera and Sulawesi paths crossed thin and elongated peninsulas, traversing mountain passes to link opposite coasts and opening the way to the interior. Halmahera's rivers are generally deeply incised, only opening into plains close to the coast where they debouche into the main bays, for example where the Kau enters the eponymous bay, and where the Kobe flows into Weda Bay. On Halmahera's northwestern peninsula the island-

¹⁴¹ Schwaner, *Borneo. Vol. 1*, 1: 128, 131–44. J. Pijnappel, "Beschrijving van het Westelijke Gedeelte van de Zuider-en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo (De Afdeeling Sampit en de Zuidkust)," *BKI* 7 (1860). On the contemporary Pasir mountains see Tsing, *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen*; Bakker, "Community, Adat Authority and Forest Management."

¹⁴² "Dani, afkomstig uit Doegindora, met een pak zout, vermoedelijk gewonnen uit zoutbronnen en zoutwaterplanten in de Kemandora-vallei in Centraal Nieuw-Guinea". Photographer unknown. KITLV 113849; persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:818825>. Creative Commons CC BY License.

¹⁴³ Broersma, *Handel*; Cribb, *Historical Atlas*; Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*; *ENI*: "Tanah Laut".

sheltered shores of the old kingdom of Loloda were connected to the lowlands edging Galela Bay in the northeast by a mountain trail and the Taliabu river valley. In the seventeenth century this fertile area produced a surplus of sago and rice and was tributary to the chief of Gamkonora on the west coast, which was in turn under the Ternate Sultanate.¹⁴⁴ Where the northern peninsula was pinched in to its narrowest extent, another, probably more frequented trail, began on the west Halmahera coast, opposite Ternate's island of Makian. It took less than an hour for men on foot to travel from Dodinga bay on the west coast through the eponymous pass to Bobane Igu on the opposite shore, in Kau Bay.¹⁴⁵

Mid-nineteenth century traders found this an arduous but rewarding passage: "with tremendous difficulty and expense [perahu arriving at Ternate] are unloaded and then the cargo is taken by porters along the land-road through the Dodinga pass to the other end of the trail, where they are reloaded at Bobane [for further shipping]".¹⁴⁶ In 1686 two forts protected travellers using the trail, one was maintained by the VOC, the other by Ternate.¹⁴⁷ Tidore also had at least three overland passages from west Halmahera to the east coast, leading from the settlements of Gita, Toseho and Pahaye to converge on the relatively well-developed harbour of Weda.

In north Sulawesi traders in Gorontalo and Manado also used trans-peninsula paths. Gorontalo, sited on an estuary on the northern arm's south coast, was connected to the interior by three rivers. Two (the Bone and Tamalate) connected the port to fertile and productive inland territories, while the third, the Topadu formed part of an important trail linking the Tomini Gulf with the Sulawesi Sea. The Topadu's narrow valley allowed boats to pass up-river to Lake Limboto. This was fed by five rivers, draining well-cultivated lands. From the lake a pass enabled travellers and traders to descend to Kuandang on the opposite, northern, coast, close to the seaways linking northeast Borneo, the southern Philippines and Maluku. Less frequented routes were also used to transport iron, gold and damar resin down to the coasts. Lake Tondano, at the centre of the Minahasa plateau, was connected to the northern sea by the eponymous river. The low-lying hinterland of the southwestern port of Amurang was drained by the Ranoiapo River, but this was exceptional; most other harbours—Manado, Likupang and Kema—lay at the mouths of minor streams.¹⁴⁸ As the Dutch developed intensive rice and coffee cultivation in the early nineteenth century new roads became essential.

¹⁴⁴ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 93–4.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 95. Andaya describes Bobane as "a day's row" from the mouth of the Kau river; perhaps names, or the coastline, changed in the intervening two centuries. F.S.A. de Clercq said it took about an hour to traverse the road: "Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890," in *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, ed. and trans. Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards (Washington DC, Smithsonian Digital Libraries Editions: <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/1999>). This English translation is used here. The Smithsonian Libraries also provide a digital version of the Dutch original: F.S.A. de Clercq, *Bijdragen tot de kennis der residentie Ternate* (Leiden: Brill, 1890), <https://library.si.edu/digital-library/book/bijdragentotdek00cler>.

¹⁴⁶ C. Bosscher, "Memorie van Overgave, C. Bosscher (1859)," in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapijan (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980), 181.

¹⁴⁷ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 95.

¹⁴⁸ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 31–3; Christian Pelras, *The Bugis, The Peoples of South-East Asia and the Pacific* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 6.

Henley states that in all North Sulawesi, “the most important single concentration of trade, historically, was the narrow base of the northern peninsula, where gold and other products were carried overland from the Gulf of Tomini, from the long coasts of which they had been brought together by sea, to the Palu Bay, itself an important producer of coconut oil and a gateway to the interior of western Central Sulawesi”.¹⁴⁹ The Donggala (or Banawa) and Palu realms were located on Palu Bay. Dialects of the Kaili language were spoken throughout Palu and were used as a trading lingua franca over a much larger area of western Central Sulawesi.¹⁵⁰ The Portuguese built a small fort at Parigi in 1555, drawn by gold supplies and the concentration of traffic.¹⁵¹

An important Central Sulawesi path enabled travellers to go from Poso Bay on the Tomini Gulf’s southern shore up the eponymous river to inland Lake Poso, passing through forest for five hours before reaching inhabited land; from the lake they could go over the pass to the valley of the Kalaena river and then south to the Gulf of Bone. Numerous Mori and Laki groups (Tomori, Tolaki) jostled for position in the Tobungku, Laiwui and Kendari territories of eastern Sulawesi. The Tobungku lands, between Luwu and Laiwui, had access to the same iron ore deposits as Luwu. From Tomori overland paths ran to the Gulf of Bone, passing through Lake Matano and then descending to Ussu bay, as well as leading to the great bay or gulf of Tomini in the north.¹⁵² In many mid-sized islands in the east, such as Flores, Timor and particularly Seram, mountainous terrain meant coastal journeys by perahu were easier than going overland. Yet even on Seram, divided by its central mountain range, two main paths crossed the mountains to link the north and south coasts.¹⁵³ The goods moving along most forested trails were carried by porters, but packhorses were also used, particularly in South Sulawesi and eastern Nusa Tenggara.

Around 1830 an American missionary, Dickinson, was impressed when he visited southwest Sulawesi:¹⁵⁴

We now come to most important state in Celebes, the kingdom of *Boni*. . . . There is a road for horses, (a thing scarcely known beyond the limits of European settlements, in any of these islands, except Java,) extending from Marus [Maros], quite across the peninsula, to the town of Tabonan [?] in Boni, situated near the mouth of a small river which empties itself into the bay of Boni. The length of this road is sixty miles or more. It crosses the chain of mountains which extend from Bontain [Bantaeng] northward, the whole extent of the peninsula.

¹⁴⁹ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 72.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁵¹ Whitten, Mustafa, and Henderson, *The Ecology of Sulawesi*, 86. These opportunities had also attracted Malays (for example, two Minangkabau are known to have settled there in 1602) and, from the late seventeenth century, assertions of hegemony by the Maluku Sultanate of Ternate.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*; Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 87.

¹⁵³ Rosenberg, *Reis naar de zuidoostereilanden*, 157–82.

¹⁵⁴ Dickinson, “The Indian Archipelago: the Journal of Mr. Dickinson,” *The Panoplist, and Missionary Herald; American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* 34 (1834).

In the nineteenth century a “great road” crossed rice-exporting Lombok, from Ampenan in the west via Cakranagara to the ports of Labuan Haji and Piju on the east coast. Subsidiary roads went northeast through Kota Raja to Lombok, and southeast via Kediri and Praja to Piju. The roads were made by the Balinese rulers.¹⁵⁵

Arenas of Early Trade I: The Maluku and Flores Seas



Map 6 Maluku¹⁵⁶

Commodities specific to Maluku and eastern Nusa Tenggara had been attracting visitors for many centuries. Valuable fine spices had been traded since at least five hundred years BCE. Cloves grew wild on many islands, but most came from the Ambon- Lease archipelago (the Uliassers); nutmeg trees, source of nuts and their inner film of mace, only

¹⁵⁵ *ENI*: “Lombok”, 431. Alfons van der Kraan, “Bali and Lombok in the World Economy,” *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* 27, nos. 1–32 (1993).

¹⁵⁶ Based on Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*, 1st ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1993), map 2, 48.

grew on Banda. Links with east Java ports were probably the main conduit for trade and for the advance of Islam; the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore emerged in the late fifteenth century.¹⁵⁷ Their home islands were little more than mountain tops piercing the sea, with rough coasts, densely forested interiors and little arable terrain. The boundaries between their spheres of influence became institutionalised following the violent involvement of Europeans in Maluku politics during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.¹⁵⁸

Ellen proposed the existence in Maluku of “three reasonably distinct trading nexuses... Each is focussed on a densely populated spice producing centre, dependent upon an extensive sago-producing periphery. The three spice-producing foci are Ternate/Tidore, Ambon-Lease islands and Banda; the major sago-producing peripheries are, primarily and respectively, Halmahera, West Seram and east Seram-Kei-Aru-New Guinea”.¹⁵⁹ Stark and Latinis add that early Malukan foragers, the people later known as the Alifuru, played three roles: as providers, foragers and political subordinates, supplying their rulers and coastal trading centres with sago, spices and other necessities.¹⁶⁰ However, they underestimate the autonomy of Alifuru communities, which were almost impossible to control. Their subordination was contingent.

Two trading corridors ran down from north Maluku past Seram into the Banda Sea. These sea-lanes would have been significant “long before the beginning of the 16th century”.¹⁶¹ One passed Hoamoal, Seram’s western peninsula, the islands lying between Hoamoal and Buru and Ambon’s northern peninsula (Hitu). The other ran along eastern Seram and the Seram Laut islands. From there travellers could go to the Onin region of New Guinea or follow the Gorom and Watubela archipelagos down towards Kei and Aru, the largest of the Southeastern Islands. Aru in particular was a source of marine and forest products. The Tanimbar group, part of which was also known as Timor Laut, was more isolated.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century traders from the northern Maluku Sultanates, most notably Tidorese, were familiar with the northern coast of the West New Guinea Bird’s Head or Doberai peninsula. This had been a slavers’ hunting ground for centuries, with ships arriving from Weda and Patani in east Halmahera’s Gamrange, their allied island of Gebe, and the Raja Ampat’s Waigeo and Salawati. Slaves, massoi [prized fragrant and medicinal tree bark]¹⁶² and nutmeg were exchanged by the Raja Ampat shippers for iron

¹⁵⁷ Christiaan F. van Fraassen, “Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel” (Leiden University, 1987), 29–30.

¹⁵⁸ Knaap, “De Ambonse eilanden.”; Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*; Andaya, *World of Maluku*; Ellen, *Edge*.

¹⁵⁹ Roy Ellen, “Trade, Environment and the Reproduction of Local Systems in the Moluccas,” in *The Ecosystem Approach in Anthropology: From Concept to Practice*, ed. Emilio F. Moran (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 214. For a more recent and complete account, see Ellen, *Edge*.

¹⁶⁰ Ken Stark and Kyle Latinis, “The Response of Early Ambonese Foragers to the Maluku Spice Trade: The Archaeological Evidence,” *Cakalele* 7 (1996). Their research tends to confirm Ellen’s model, but they note that in their site the main food source, from 1100 CE to the seventeenth century, seems to have been the *canarium indicum* nut, which in that region may have been produced by traditional arboriculture, as in New Guinea.

¹⁶¹ Katrien Polman, *The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983), 1–2.

¹⁶² The bark of the massoi tree *Cryptocaria massoia* (also known as *Massoia aromatica*) was a highly valued commodity in the archipelago. Leonard Y. Andaya, “Massoi and Kain Timur in the Bird’shead Peninsula of New Guinea, the Easternmost Corner of the Indian Ocean World,” in *Trade, Circulation, and Flow in*

and cloth in Tidore, or with local Tidorese at recognised collecting centres such as those of the Gamrange.¹⁶³ In the early decades of the seventeenth century the Dutch forcibly encapsulated the once central nuclei of Ambon and Banda.

The Tidore kings received intermittent tribute of sago, forest products, ambergris, tortoiseshell, birds of paradise, slaves, and spices from their Gamrange territories and the Raja Ampat islands. Together they formed a trade circuit framing the northern border of the Halmahera Sea, extending south to Seram.¹⁶⁴ After the destruction of Banda in 1621 Seram and Aru lost their main western contact, making cargoes from Papua's coasts and Raja Ampat archipelago crucial. Seram's slave traffic became a lifeline. A busy slaving route connected Papua's Onin with the islands off eastern Seram. Goram was a major entrepot; so too were the Seram Laut islands, notably Kilwaru, Geser and Keffing. Shippers from Onin would exchange slaves for cloth worth 25 to 30 reals (Spanish dollars) or for iron knives and swords from Tobungku. Two to three hundred slaves a year came from the Muslim realm of Rumbati on the McCluer Gulf; they were exchanged for ten Tobungku swords each. Most were sold to local coastal Muslims from Seram Laut or other sites in Tidore's territories.¹⁶⁵ The Dutch increasingly used Tidore to legitimize their presence in this trading zone which traditionally had been oriented to Banda.¹⁶⁶ The Dutch Company eventually confirmed Ternate as the theoretical overlord of the remaining spice producing areas.

The Flores Sea was a similar arena. It was linked to transoceanic connections by the north Java route to the east, and by shipping through Nusa Tenggara's Sape Strait. Bima, located on Sumbawa's relatively well-watered east, was close to the strait and a pivotal landfall for ships from Sulawesi, Bali and Java or, to the east, Timor, Flores and beyond. The kingdom seems to have been in contact with India as early as the ninth century. Political centres in eastern Sumbawa are mentioned in Majapahit's fourteenth-century domain list. Bima sold sappanwood to fifteenth-century Melaka, while Javanese traders took Sumbawa and Bima cloth to Maluku. By the sixteenth century, at the very latest, local sailors from South Sulawesi were already familiar with Sumbawa, particularly Bima.¹⁶⁷

Javanese, Chinese and other merchants had been visiting Timor since the fourteenth century, collecting sandalwood and beeswax. The first description by a Chinese is from the mid-fourteenth century and that by a European from the early sixteenth century. The island of Solor, off east Flores, was an established exchange site. Portuguese traders who

the Indian Ocean World, ed. Michael Pearson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). The similar but less popular *kulit lawang* (*Cinnamomum cullilawan*) could be found throughout the archipelagos, but that of Ambon and Seram was particularly prized. *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 55–7, 72, 82–112; Ellen, *Edge*.

¹⁶⁴ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 94–5, 100–9, 170. In the early nineteenth century it was noted that the Halmahera or Jailolo (Gilolo) passage between the islands to the east, north of Gebe “is now much frequented, especially by vessels from America bound for China”. Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 26.

¹⁶⁵ Leonard Andaya, “Local Trade Networks in Maluku in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries,” *Cakalele* II, no. 2 (1991): 83–4.

¹⁶⁶ Knaap, “De Ambonse eilanden.”; Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*; Andaya, *World of Maluku*. Ellen, *Edge*.

¹⁶⁷ J. Noorduyn, *Bima en Sumbawa. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Sultanaten Bima en Sumbawa door A. Ligtoet en G. P. Rouffaer* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1987); Andaya, “Local Trade Networks,” 88.

had been visiting Timor from 1515 and Macau from 1535 developed close links with Chinese.¹⁶⁸ In 1521 Antonio Pigafetta visited Timor and reported that gold could be found there, and that traders from Malacca, Java and Luzon visited for sandalwood and beeswax. Wax was used for printing batik textiles on Java and was an important item in the tribute paid to overlords.¹⁶⁹

By the end of the 1500s Portuguese traders and missionaries were established at Larantuka, on the eastern tip of Flores. Lifau, on the north-central coast of Timor itself, was another sandalwood port. From the later sixteenth century, if not earlier, Lifau was frequented by black (mestizos or Asian Catholic converts) and white Portuguese as well as by Makassar traders. One of the first Dutch visitors to Timor lamented in 1614 that “the greatest damage is to be feared from the Chinese, as they trade in articles which are unprocurable for us. Besides, they can afford to pay much more than we, as in China manufactured goods are abundant and cheap”.¹⁷⁰ This was an early expression of what was to become a familiar complaint.

Arenas of Early Trade II: Rivers and Seas in Southwest Sulawesi

On the southwest peninsula’s southern shore Makassarese-speaking kingdoms evolved from small settlements that had developed along the numerous streams that ran from the mountains to the sea. Each river became a small domain. Some at least participated in long distance trade, while further up the west coast fifteenth century Siang attracted foreign traders.¹⁷¹ In the middle of the peninsula a complex landscape of lakes and rivers encouraged the expansion of rice cultivation and, from the thirteenth century, the rise of stronger states. Early Bugis realms were concentrated around the Cenrana and Wallenae valleys, where fertile land lay close to strategic trade routes. The Wallenae River runs from south to north up the peninsula’s centre almost as far as Lake Tempe, where it joins the Cenrana River. This flows southeast from the same lake to the Gulf of Bone. The Cenrana was navigable by sea-going ships along its entire length and had been a major trade route since at least 1300. The combination of the fresh-water lake Tempe, the deep Cenrana, fertile land along the river’s upper reaches, proximity to the sea, and the existence of a network of pack-horse trails linking the lakes with the west coast, all combined to create

¹⁶⁸ Hans Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600–1800* (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), 262–9.

¹⁶⁹ Laura S. Meitzner Yoder, “Political Ecologies of Wood and Wax: Sandalwood and Beeswax as Symbols and Shapers of Customary Authority in the Oecusse Enclave, Timor,” *Journal of Political Ecology* 18 (2011): 11–3.

¹⁷⁰ Schulte Nordholt, *The Political System of the Atoni of Timor*, 165.

¹⁷¹ David Bulbeck and Ian Caldwell, *Land of Iron: The Historical Archaeology of Luwu and the Cenrana Valley. Results of the Origin of Complex Society in South Sulawesi Project (Oxis)* (Hull and Canberra: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull; School of Anthropology and Archaeology, Australian National University, 2000); Ian Caldwell and Wayne A. Bougas, “The Early History of Binamu and Bangkala, South Sulawesi,” *BKI* 160, no. 4 (2004); Wayne A. Bougas, “Bantayan: An Early Makassarese Kingdom, 1200–1600 A.D.,” *Archipel* 55 (1998).

an ideal base for settlement. Rice cultivation sustained concentrations of former hunter-gatherers and swidden farmers.¹⁷²

Notable early states were Cina in this central belt, and the linked realm of Luwu at the northern end of the Bone Gulf.¹⁷³ The Malangke region, somewhat further east than the current Luwu capital of Palopo, was rich in foodstuffs, including sago and marine products from the mangrove forests; it was also linked by river valleys to inland sources of iron and forest commodities. The Cerekang River offered limited access for boats. Development was centred on the Ussu Bay area, which was connected by a network of paths to both inland sources of iron near the lakes Matono and Towuti as well as the Tomiri inlet in the east Sulawesi Tolo Gulf.¹⁷⁴ While there were no great streams, Luwu's centre can be visualised "as a single catchment area, with the river valleys and sea coast providing well-defined lines of communication and trade".¹⁷⁵ The harbours of the northern Bone Gulf were outlets for slaves, forest products, gold and iron from the interior; evidence of trade goes back c. 2,000 years.

With its established local smelting technology and access to high grade iron ore from the Lake Matano area Luwu enjoyed a "meteoric rise" between 1300 and 1600 CE; it seems to have reached its greatest extent in the later 1500s.¹⁷⁶ "Unlike most chiefdoms with a dendritic [river based] economy, Luwu exploited a hinterland resource to manufacture goods perceived as essential, especially weapons."¹⁷⁷ Bulbeck and Prasetyo conclude that: "Luwu was not the oldest of the Bugis chiefdoms, but it does provide our first evidence of the aggressive organizational skills for which the Bugis became renowned in later times".¹⁷⁸ The Walennae River channelled Luwu's ambitions down the western Gulf coast and then inland, towards the later Wajo and Soppeng polities. By the mid-sixteenth century Luwu was being effectively challenged by Wajo and Bone, losing control of the Cenrana to the latter.

The pre-eminent Makassarese kingdoms emerged on Sulawesi's lower west coast facing the Makassar straits, but with easy access to southern sea-lanes. The estuary of what was later to be known as the Jeneberang River was controlled by the small domain of Garrasiq. Since the beginning of the fourteenth century Gowa's royal centre Kale Gowa had lain somewhat inland, about 6 km from the mouth of the Jeneberang. Sometime after 1500 the somewhat upriver realm of Gowa absorbed Garrasiq. A short distance to the north, the sea-oriented polity of Talloq was located on the mouth of the eponymous river. In the 1530s,

¹⁷² Druce, *Lands*, 92–4.

¹⁷³ Ian Caldwell and Kathryn Wellen, "Finding Cina. A New Paradigm for Early Bugis History," *BKI* 173, no. 2–3 (2017): 313–20.

¹⁷⁴ David Bulbeck, "Sacred Places in Ussu and Cerekang, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Their History, Ecology and Pre-Islamic Relation with the Bugis Kingdom of Luwuq," in *Transcending the Culture–Nature Divide in Cultural Heritage: Views from the Asia-Pacific Region* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013).

¹⁷⁵ Bulbeck and Caldwell, *Land of Iron*, 9. F. David Bulbeck, "Economy, Military and Ideology in Pre-Islamic Luwu, South Sulawesi," *Australasian Historical Archaeology* 18 (2000).

¹⁷⁶ Nickel was discovered at the beginning of the twentieth century in this Verbeek mountain range.

¹⁷⁷ Bulbeck, "Economy," 12–3.

¹⁷⁸ F. David Bulbeck and Bagyo Prasetyo, "Two Millennia of Socio-cultural Development in Luwu, South Sulawesi, Indonesia," *World Archaeology* 32, no. 1 (2000); Caldwell and Wellen, "Finding Cina."

Gowa defeated Talloq. Elite fusion created the shared state known as Makassar.¹⁷⁹ With the expansion of Gowa's rice trade and Talloq's maritime networks the adjoining coast developed into Makassar's main harbour; in the 1630s the court relocated to Somba Opu, by the estuaries of the Garrasiq and the Jeneberang ("new river").¹⁸⁰ Kale Gowa remained the ritual centre.

Arenas of Early Trade III: Riverine Polities in East Borneo



Image 8 View of Sambaliung, Berau, illustrating its riverine location, 1901¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ F.D. Bulbeck, *A Tale of Two Kingdoms. The Historical Archaeology of Gowa and Tallok, South Sulawesi, Indonesia* (Australian National University, 1992).

¹⁸⁰ Anthony Reid, "The Rise of Makassar," in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000).

¹⁸¹ "Sambalioeng vanuit het lucht genomen." Photograph C.H. de Goeje, 17 August 1901. MVV/ NMVW A114-6-6. By permission of the Museum.

The three most important rivers north of Cape Mangkalihat were the Sesayap, the Bulungan and the Berau. The Sesayap was the main connection between the coast and the interior, entering the Celebes Sea well north of Tarakan. Atypically, there was no sandbank before the Sesayap's mouth, so ships could enter straight from the sea.¹⁸² A handful of coastal, predominantly Bugis, polities nestled by the broad estuaries of lesser rivers which decided their names, incomes and influence. Sama Bajau exploiters of marine resources frequented the shores and islands. Highly valuable pearls and birds' nest were exported.¹⁸³

In the late eighteenth century, as Berau faded, Bulungan became independent, centred on the eponymous river connecting the inland territories of the Apo Kayan Dayak with the coast. In 1834 the Dutch conquered Berau. By the mid-1800s the minor sultanates of Gunung Tabur and Sambaliung (or Tanjung) had emerged at the point at which two streams, the Segah from the north and the Kelai from the south, came together to become the Berau River which then flowed east to the Celebes Sea. The two sultanates were located on opposite sides of the Berau, separated by the promontory of Tanjung Redeb. The domains of Gunung Tabur were focussed on the Segah, while Sambaliung was defined by the Kelai.

Kutai was based on East Kalimantan's greatest river. The Mahakam was nearly a thousand kilometres long and navigable for hundreds of miles up-river; its catchment area was over 77,000 square kilometres. It is thought to have been, around the fourth century CE, "one of the earliest focuses of South Asian interest in Southeast Asia", because of its alluvial gold.¹⁸⁴ The first capital of early modern Kutai, known as Kutai Lama (1300–1732) lay on the north bank of the Mahakam, just before the delta. In the turbulent eighteenth century it moved upstream to the safer Pamarangan (1732–82), before re-locating even further upriver, to Tenggarong, where the Sultan again imposed tolls on passing traffic.¹⁸⁵ In 1847 Tenggarong was described as having 800 inhabitants, including 100 Buginese and 3 Chinese. Of the houses, 97 were built on rafts on the river and 25 on land.¹⁸⁶

By the mid-nineteenth century there were three main trading centres on the Mahakam. The delta's Samarinda had been established by settlers from South Sulawesi after Makassar's defeat by the Dutch in 1669. The second was at Tenggarong, while the third was at Muara Pahu, "the last Malay village". This was located where the Kedang Pahu River joined the Mahakam, between the lakes (Semayang and Melintang) and the rising mountains to the west and north. Beyond that were Dayak territories. Muara Pahu was about 190 miles from the coast and was later reachable by steamer. Custom decreed that the Sultan should not go further upriver more than one day's travel from Muara Pahu. Foreign traders were similarly

¹⁸² Bianca Maria Gerlich, *Marudu 1845: The Destruction and Reconstruction of a Coastal State in Borneo* (Hamburg: Abera, 2003). In the mid-nineteenth century there were six river-based domains in the Tidung lands, and two centred on islands; J.G.A. Gallois, "Korte aanteekeningen, gehouden gedurende eene reis langs de oostkust van Borneo," *BKI* 4, no. 1 (1856): 250–1.

¹⁸³ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 77–93; Nolde, "Changing Tides," 216–20.

¹⁸⁴ E. Edwards McKinnon, "A Bronze Hoard from Muara Kaman, Kutei," in *Buddhist Dynamics in Premodern and Early Modern Southeast Asia*, ed. D. Christian Lammerts (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 140; H.R. van Heekeren, *The Bronze-Iron Age of Indonesia* ('s-Gravenhage: KITLV, 1958), 41.

¹⁸⁵ Okushima, "Ethnic Background of the Tidung"; S.W. Tromp, "Eenige Mededeelingen Omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetei," *BKI* 36, no. 1 (1887).

¹⁸⁶ Broersma, *Handel*, 207

restricted.¹⁸⁷ Banjarese immigrants settled somewhat downstream, at Muara Muntai; fierce competition with established Bugis traders followed.¹⁸⁸ In the 1880s it was noted that “heavy palisades still surround the royal settlement of the sultan at Tenggarong, and the numerous, though now neglected, smaller [*lila*] and larger cannon found everywhere around the *kraton* [palace] attest to the dangers that threatened from both the Dayaks upstream and even more from the downstream Buginese”.¹⁸⁹ Further south the Pasir River connected the eponymous settlement with the sea. The Pasir was also known as the Kendilo, after the major northern tributary. The village of Tanah Grogot developed downstream from the confluence of the main tributaries, at the point where a cross-stream linked the mid-Pasir to the lower Kendilo.¹⁹⁰

Southeast Borneo’s three main rivers debouche into the Java Sea: they are the Kahayan, the Kapuas (the downstream section of which is the Kapuas Murung) and the Barito. The most complex system was that of Banjarmasin’s Barito, which included the Negara and its tributaries.¹⁹¹ The webs of waterways were so long and so ramified that it is not easy to distinguish trunk rivers and tributaries; stretches of both commonly bore different names. Moreover, they were linked by cross-streams. In places old sections of riverbed, *antasan* or *terusan*, were used as short-cuts between meanders, or to link different rivers. Sometimes shallow waterways were excavated to create canals and obtain earth to build up marshy areas.¹⁹² Travel up the Barito to the royal seat of Martapura was made easier by a system dug on royal orders in the 1780s. These interventions, and the wandering of natural streams, created extensive areas of land surrounded by water, so inland settlements often bore names including such terms as *pulau* (island) or *kuala* or *muara*; these last two terms both mean river mouth, where one either joins another stream or enters the sea.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁷ ENI: “Koetei”; Broersma, *Handel*, 155–222; John Dalton, “Borneo. Mr Dalton’s Thoughts on Coti,” in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands etc.*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore: J.H. Moor, 1837).

¹⁸⁸ J. Thomas Lindblad, “The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery,” in *The Emergence of a National Economy: an Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 90–1.

¹⁸⁹ Tromp, “Boegineezen van Koetei,” 185.

¹⁹⁰ Broersma, *Handel*, endmap. Graham Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo: a Study in Diplomatic Rivalry* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1967), 153–4.

¹⁹¹ Eight main streams flow west from the Meratus mountains into the Barito or Dusun river: the Martapura (or Banjarmasin) enters the end of the same estuary as the Barito, while somewhat upstream the Kuwin connects the two. The settlement of Martapura lies where the eponymous river divides into two: the northerly Riam Kiwa and the southerly Riam Kanan, draining the district of Martapura. Further north, well past a stream joining the Kapuas to the Barito, is a major junction at Marabahan, where the considerable Negara River (aka Margasari, aka Bahan) joins the Barito; it is by far the most important tributary. Its own subsidiary streams sustained major settlements at Marabahan (aka Bekumpai), Margasari, Negara and Amuntai. The upper reaches of the Barito diverge to the northwest, here the river is also known as the Dusun, and the surrounding territories are grouped together as Upper and Lower Dusun. Imported goods had travelled these waters for many centuries, as finds of beads and Buddhist remains reveal.

¹⁹² Knapen, *Forests: of Fortune?*, 232–3.

¹⁹³ For detailed maps of the Barito region, showing locations, vegetation and land-use, see H.J. Schophuys, *Het Stroomgebied van de Barito. Landbouwkundige kenschets en landbouwvoorlichting* (Wageningen: H. Veenman, 1936). See also “Verslag van een Geologisch Onderzoek in het Zuid-Oostelijke Gedeelte

Pulau Petak or Kuala Kapuas was “the chief settlement of a numerous and industrious Dayak population”. It was centred inland at the point where the Murung River was joined by the two main tributaries: the Kapuas, flowing from the northwest, and the western Barito from the northeast.¹⁹⁴ Kuala Kapuas was also linked by a canal to the main Barito mouth, while a cross-stream further up the Kapuas connected it to a tributary of the Kahayan. Kuala Kapuas thus had access to the major rivers flowing across the south Borneo lowlands from the hills, and to three Java Sea estuaries. Consequently, the Pulau Petak Ngaju Dayak could tap exports from three distinct ecological zones. These were the extensive peat forests to the east (now the Sebangau National Park), drained by the Mendawai, Katingan, Sebangau and Kahayan Rivers; the dry forest east of the Barito; and the fertile farming land on the Negara tributary around Kandangan and Amuntai, west of the Meratus range. With increasing trade the Dayak were also able to access prestige goods more readily; Sillander suspects that the formal exchange expeditions known as *roing* also evolved around this time.¹⁹⁵ Pulau Petak’s location enabled the local Dayaks to dominate traffic, benefiting from the later decline of the Bekumpai (see chapter 8).¹⁹⁶

The small Sultanate of Kotawaringin further west was centred on low land crossed by three main rivers (the Pembuang, or Seroyan; the Sampit, or Mentaya; and the Mendawai, or Katingan). Kotawaringin had been ruled by a branch of the Banjarmasin royal family since the sixteenth century and was a source of gold and iron.¹⁹⁷

van Borneo,” *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap der Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 17(1839): 95–6; *ENI*: “Borneo”, 247; Michael R. Dove, “Political Ecology of Pepper in the ‘Hikayat Bandjar’: The Historiography of Commodity Production in a Bornean Kingdom,” in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 1997), note 25, 352; Idwar Saleh, “Pepper Trade and the Ruling Class of Banjarmasin in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1978* (Leiden: BIS, 1978).

¹⁹⁴ For a sketch map and a description of the fort there, written at the end of the Banjarmasin War, M.J. Perelaar, “Wandeling door de benting van Kwala-Kapoeas,” *De Militaire Spectator: Tijdschrift voor het Nederlandsche Leger en dat in de Overzeesche Bezittingen* 31 (1864).

¹⁹⁵ Kenneth Sillander, *Acting Authoritatively: How Authority is Expressed Through Social Action among the Bentian of Indonesian Borneo* (Helsinki: Swedish School of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, 2004), 53–5.

¹⁹⁶ Knapen, *Forests of Fortune*, 92–4; Kristina Grossman, “The (Ir)Relevance of Ethnicity among the Punan Murung and Bakumpai in Central Kalimantan,” in *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies*, ed. Michaela Haug Cathrin Arenz, Stefan Seitz and Oliver Venz (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017).

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*; Schwaner, *Borneo*, 1: 1. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar*, 618–23.

In the early thirteenth century, the supervisor of maritime customs at the great Song port of Quanzhou (Chuan-chou) in Fujian compiled an account of trade with the barbarian lands to the south. Zhao Rugua (Chau Ju-Kua) drew on the stories of visiting shippers and merchants to describe these southern seas.¹ In Zhao's account we can recognise different levels of exchange: a north Borneo emporium, the regional hub of Mayi, and the profitable but dangerously ungoverned shores of Sansu. Similar constellations can be found throughout subsequent centuries, and the pattern of advancing goods and returning to collect the products in exchange also remained typical. Zhao wrote about Boni, (or Po-Ni or Po-Li) on Borneo's north coast, which lay on the Southwestern route linking China and the Malacca Straits, and had been mentioned in tenth century Chinese accounts. Boni is often identified with Brunei, but probably refers to various coastal polities mediating exchange with the interior.² By the time Zhao wrote his account relations between the Chinese and the Boni elites were well established. Protocols minimized risk:³

The ship's people cover the gang-plank with silk brocades, receive them [the indigenous chiefs] reverently, treat them to all kinds of wine, and distribute among them, according to rank, presents of gold and silver vessels, mats with cloth borders and umbrellas.... It is customary, before they touch upon the question of bartering, for the traders to offer the king daily gifts of Chinese food and liquors: it is for this reason that when vessels go to Poni they must take with them one or two good cooks. On the full moon and new moon they must

¹ E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, 55 vols. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903–09), 34: 181–655; Friedrich Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-fan-chi* (New York: Paragon, 1966), Wellcome Collection: <https://wellcomecollection.org/works/hxk9f992/items?sierraId=b29353087&langCode=false&canvas=1>.

² Johannes L. Kurz, "Boni in Chinese Sources from the Tenth to the Eighteenth Century," *International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 10, no. 1 (2014); Graham Saunders, *A History of Brunei*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002); Stephen Charles Druce, "The 'Birth' of Brunei: Early Polities of the Northwest Coast of Borneo and the Origins of Brunei, Tenth to Mid-fourteenth Centuries," in *Brunei: History, Islam, Society and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Keat Gin Ooi (London: Routledge, 2016).

³ Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua*, 155–9. Robert S. Wicks, *Money, Markets and Trade in Early Southeast Asia: The Development of Indigenous Monetary Systems to AD 1400* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1992).

also attend the king's levee, and all this for about a month or so, after which they request the king and grandees of his suite to fix with them the prices of their goods; this being done, drums are beaten, in order to announce to all the people near and far that permission to trade with them has been granted.

Zhao also described a Philippine realm, *Mayi* (Mai). This has been identified as a paramount chiefdom on northern Mindoro, an island at the extreme northwest of the Sulu Sea. However, it may have been located yet further north near Manila Bay:⁴

The country of Mai is to the north of Borneo. The natives live in large villages on the opposite banks of a stream and cover themselves with a cloth like a sheet or hide their bodies with a loin cloth. There are metal images (Buddhas) of unknown origin scattered about in the tangled wilds. Few pirates reach these shores. When trading ships enter the harbor, they stop in front of the official plaza, for the official plaza is that country's place for barter and trade and once the ship is registered, they mix freely. Since the local officials make a habit of using white umbrellas, the merchants must present them as gifts.

The method of transacting business is for the savage traders to come all in a crowd and immediately transfer the [Chinese] merchandise into baskets and go off with it. If at first they [the visiting traders] can't tell who they [the takers] are, gradually they come to know those who remove the goods so in the end nothing is actually lost. The savage traders then take the goods around to the other islands for barter and generally don't start coming back until September or October to repay the ship's merchants with what they have got. Indeed, there are some who don't come back even then, so ships trading with Mai are the last to reach home.... The local products are beeswax, cotton, true pearls, tortoise shell, medicinal betel nuts and *yuta* cloth. The merchants use such things as porcelain, trade gold, iron pots, lead, colored glass beads and iron needles in exchange.

Since the *Mayi* ruler sought to monopolise valuable commerce, some traders sought more direct sources of supply, despite the perils. Zhao Rugua records that at "Sansu" (San-hsu, "Three Islands", off the western Philippine coast) the visitors did not dare to stay on land:⁵

The foreign traders ... live on board ship before venturing to go on shore, their ships being moored in mid-stream, announcing their presence by beating drums. Upon this the savage traders race for the ship in small boats, carrying cotton, yellow wax, native cloth, coconut heart mats, which they offer for barter. If the prices (of goods that they may wish to purchase) cannot be agreed upon, the chief of all the (local) traders must go in person, in order to come to an understanding, which being reached the natives are offered presents of silk umbrellas, porcelain, and rattan baskets, but the foreigners still retain on board one or

⁴ Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua*, 159–61. Go Bon Juan, "Ma'i in Chinese Records—Mindoro or Bai? An Examination of a Historical Puzzle," *Philippine Studies* 53, no. 1 (2005); William Henry Scott, *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994).

⁵ Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-Kua*, 161–2. Wicks, *Money, Markets and Trade*.

two (natives) as hostages.⁶ After that they go on shore to traffic, which being ended they return the hostages. A ship will not remain at anchor longer than three or four days, after which it proceeds to another place, for the savage settlements of Sansu are not connected by a common jurisdiction.

Beach Exchange

In some parts of the eastern archipelagos the most basic methods of exchange in the seventeenth century were not very different from those described above or even Herodotus' "silent trade"; such accounts were usually based on hearsay but are common enough to give them some credibility.⁷ Clive Moore quotes the learned G.E. Rumphius (d.1702, Ambon) on trade in New Guinea:⁸

The natives place the *massoi* on the beach, the bundles placed on top of each other. The most courageous appear on the scene and with signs explain what they [would] like to have in return for their *massoi*. The articles given in return for their goods consist of swords, hatchets to peel the *massoi*, poor quality rugs, sago bread, rice and black sugar, although rice and black sugar has to be given before the natives are willing to get the *massoi* from the forest.

Moore adds that this was "standard New Guinea trade-at-a-distance". This might seem to suggest a people unaccustomed to trade, but the Southwest Bomberai peninsula's Onin and Kowiai coasts were mentioned in the fourteenth-century *Désawarnana* (or *Nagarakertagama*).⁹ Later, small Islamised polities developed in areas having regular contact with east Seram and Gorom vessels: on the Raja Ampat islands, as well as at Onin and Kowiai.¹⁰ The best documented ongoing exchange ties were the *sosolot*, arrangements

⁶ Wang's paraphrase of his translation is very different, specifically on the critical issue of hostages: "To break Mayi's monopoly of their business, some Song-dynasty Chinese merchants sailed directly to Sandao and Pulilu 蒲哩嚕 (present-day Manila). They probably fetched higher prices for their goods. In the meantime, they, however, lost the effective protection that the powerful Mayi chieftain had once offered them. Chinese merchants now dared not go ashore after they had reached a tribal settlement. Instead, they anchored their ships in the middle of the river and announced their arrival by drumbeats. Local merchants came to meet them with their rafts loaded with local products. Goods now changed hands on Chinese ships. And the spirit of mutual trust was lost. At times, the head of local merchants had to step in to mediate disputes over the value of goods. To smooth the mediation, Chinese merchants presented him with silk umbrellas, porcelain, and rattan containers as gifts. Distrust prompted local merchants to request that one or two Chinese stay ashore as hostages, and that exchange of goods also be conducted ashore. Chinese hostages were allowed to return to their ships only after trading had been completed. Chinese merchants developed a sense of insecurity as well. They often left a tribal settlement after only a few days of trading there". Zhenping Wang, "Reading Song-Ming Records on the Pre-colonial History of the Philippines," *Journal of East Asian Cultural Interaction Studies* 1, no. 249–60 (2008): 253.

⁷ P.D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 12–3.

⁸ Clive Moore, *New Guinea: Crossing Boundaries and History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 2003), 62.

⁹ Mpu Prapanca and Stuart Robson, *Désawarnana: (Nagarakertagama)* (Leiden: KITLV, 1995).

¹⁰ By the late nineteenth century the nine Islamic polities were Rumbati, Patipi, Wertua, Sekar, Arguni, Atiati, Fatagar, Kowiai (Namatota) and Aiduma. Rumbati was the dominant Onin rajadom in the seventeenth century, later Kowiai became the other most powerful McCluer Gulf polity. Thomas E.

between visiting traders, coastal communities, and inland peoples in the Bomberai peninsula. Specific beach sites were marked as belonging to certain Seram shippers; a seventeenth-century Dutchman described “a hill or harbor, where a flag was planted and where no other may trade on pain of death”. Restricting traffic suited the Onin and Kowiai chiefs as well as the visiting traders.¹¹ Sosolot ties may have been unusually institutionalized because the coast was so dangerous that trust had to be safe guarded.

In 1828 Modera described this trade between east Seram and the Onin peninsula, distinguishing between the coastal people he calls Papuans, and the mountain people or Alifuru:¹²

With the arrival of the West Monsoon the Seramese go down to these regions, and stay there the whole monsoon, which they are more or less forced to do, because the massoi—a bark ... is only brought by the Alfuren, or mountain dwellers, in small quantities and from time to time, so that it can take four or more months before their perahu have a fair cargo.... The Papuan princes exercise authority over the Alfuren, and receive some tribute from them, in the form of massoi, *belisharij*,¹³ pearls, tripang etc.

The Seram shippers had their own sturdy houses in small settlements on the coast, where they cultivated, and regularly renewed, enduring relationships. Goodman describes the sosolot ties as “bound together by ritually and commercially valuable exchange items, chain-like webs of trade friendships, and a dominant trading culture (or cultures) in the islands and coastal areas southeast of Seram”.¹⁴ Networks also channelled textiles and other goods into the northern Bird’s Head, the Doberai peninsula, feeding the socially embedded trading system known as the *kain timur* (“Eastern cloth”) complex. This exchange of slaves for cloth, first mentioned in the sixteenth century, originated in simple overseas trade, but became embedded in local social cycles. Slaves were sold to obtain imported cloths which in turn were central to advantageous marriages; ultimately,

Goodman, “The Sosolot Exchange Network of Eastern Indonesia during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Perspectives on the Bird’s Head of Irian, Jaya, Indonesia (Proceedings of the Conference, Leiden 13–17 October 1997)*, ed. Cecilia Odé Jelle Miedema, Rien A.C. Dam, and Connie Baak (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999); Ellen, p. 121 provides a good map. West and east Kowiai were marked by two bays named after Dutch ships: *Triton* and *Etna*.

¹¹ Thomas E. Goodman, *The Sosolot: An Eighteenth Century East Indonesian Trade Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 423.

¹² J. Modera, *Verhaal van eene Reize naar en langs de Zuid-Westkust van Nieuw-Guinea Gedaan in 1828 door Z.M. corvet Triton* (Haarlem: Vincent Loosjes, 1830), 107–10. See also the description, some 30 years later: “This south-west part of New Guinea, known to the native traders as “Papua Kowiyee” and “Papua Onen,” is inhabited by the most treacherous and bloodthirsty tribes. It is in these districts that the commanders and portions of the crews of many of the early discovery ships were murdered, and scarcely a year now passes but some lives are lost. The Goram and Ceram traders are themselves generally inoffensive; they are well acquainted with the character of these natives and are not likely to provoke an attack by any insults or open attempt at robbery or imposition. They are accustomed to visit the same places every year, and the natives can have no fear of them, as may be alleged in excuse for their attacks on Europeans”. Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), 286–7.

¹³ Modera explains that *belisharij* was a sweet-smelling wood, also used as medicine; Modera, *Verhaal*, 109.

¹⁴ Goodman, “The Sosolot Exchange Network,” 446.

forced marriages expanded networks central to cloth acquisition.¹⁵ On-going exchange, rooted in symbiotic trust, developed into complex and ritually reinforced relationships between communities.¹⁶ Malay was widely used as a lingua franca alongside Tidorese in the seventeenth century.

In the 1600s there was no polity integrating coastal traffic on the Mindanao littoral; this had also been the case in Zhao's Mayi. Many small settlements were visited each year by traders from Maluku, Sulawesi, Borneo and elsewhere. Laarhoven uses contemporaneous Dutch sources for her description:¹⁷

They came in their trading perahu which they would beach at the spot where at certain times of the year they were to meet the coastal people; there they would camp and wait for other people to come down from the mountains or from inland river settlements to the coast to meet them. The receiving party and visiting traders would negotiate an agreement on the terms of exchange, for example: two corges¹⁸ of Guinea cloth for one pikul¹⁹ of wax. The receiving party would withdraw and return with the required goods. In the meantime, the traders would move on to make more such agreements along the coast or stay in the vicinity for anywhere between five or eight months. They would prepare their boats for the return journey and make themselves "as much at home as turtles".

Barter was not a simple matter of exchanging items. As Zhao had reported, deciding equivalent value involved negotiation, and this remained common through the nineteenth century. Prices were typically calculated in terms of equivalent goods, sometimes including coins (which will be discussed shortly). Textiles or slaves were often the pegs to which exchange was tied.²⁰ In mid-nineteenth century Banggai, in east Sulawesi, "any article whatsoever" was "always expressed as a certain number of slaves", who were themselves held to be worth 20 *ringgit* each.²¹ Ringgit was the common name for the Straits dollar, minted by the British after 1844. This was worth the same as the long-established and widely used

¹⁵ Jaap Timmer, "Cloths of Civilisation: Kain Timur in the Bird's Head of West Papua," *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (2011); Leonard Y. Andaya, "Massoi and Kain Timur in the Bird's Head Peninsula of New Guinea, the Easternmost Corner of the Indian Ocean World," in *Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean World*, ed. Michael Pearson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 83–108. Eventually local weavers in Sorong began producing their own "eastern cloth."

¹⁶ Goodman cites van Baal on this point; Goodman, "The Sosolot Exchange Network." See also Polly Wiessner and Akiu Tumu, *Historical Vines: Enga Networks of Exchange, Ritual, and Warfare in Papua New Guinea* (Washington: Smithsonian, 1999).

¹⁷ Ruudje Laarhoven, "Lords of the Great River: The Magindanao Port and Polity During the Seventeenth Century," in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 175.

¹⁸ One corg consisted of 20 lengths of cloth.

¹⁹ C 62 kg.

²⁰ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 72–5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 74. The word *ringgit* refers to the serrated edge of the coin, which was recognised as currency in the Straits (of Melaka) Settlements in 1847.

Spanish dollar or *reaal* (see below), and the Dutch *rijksdaalder* (rds., rix-dollars), itself worth 2.5 fl., florin or guilders).

De Bruijn Kops reported that in the mid-1800s slaves in northwest Papua's trading port of Dore were worth about fl. 25 to fl.30:²²

A slave is the standard of value throughout the western parts of New Guinea, as is the case with a musket in Timor and the neighbouring islands, so that when the price of any article is said to be so many slaves, it is intended to mean the value of a slave in blue and red calico or other articles of trade, all of which bear a fixed proportionate value. It is, therefore, like the "pound sterling" an imaginary standard of value.

By this reckoning (approximate given local variations) the slaves in Dore were much cheaper (10 to 12 ringgit) than in Banggai.

In mid-nineteenth century Seram, central Maluku, the "true mountain dwellers come to the coast solely for the purpose of trade, that is, to exchange pigs, sago, lories, white cockatoos, green cockatoos, cassowaries, and damar resin for glass beads, large plates, salt, bush-knives, copper rings, earrings, red cotton, guns, spices and such like".²³ J.G.F. Riedel gives a revealing account of the trade of the inland Wemale of west Seram, who had no contact with the Dutch:²⁴

The interior trade is by barter ... by men or women in groups of up to twenty, who come to the beach from the interior, [and exchange their goods] primarily for plates ... bowls, gongs ... weapons ... old plates ... *patola* [Indian] sarongs ... *uti uti* sarongs [?]. Moreover, forest and field products [are exported], such as sago, [wild] nutmeg,²⁵ *damar* [resin], rattan, wooden objects, tobacco, beans, rice, roots and suchlike. There is no market on Seram... The nominal value of goods exchanged are as follows: one gun ... for a hundred and fifty packs of wet sago worth 0.24 Dutch cents per pack; or five hundred ... bamboo measures of about a half kilo of un-hulled rice; an old plate for a hundred and fifty to three hundred bamboos of rice or sixty to eighty packets of sago; a red sarong for twenty five bamboos of rice or twelve packs of sago; a four metre length of chintz for fifteen bamboos of rice or six packs of sago ... a large gong, for two hundred and fifty bamboos of rice or a hundred and twenty packs of sago ... a pack of sago for 200 nutmegs or 20 small packets of damar.

The colonial *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* (*ENI*) reported that at the end of the nineteenth century the Wemale, "continued to be convinced that the coastal population, supported by the Dutch, were allowed to oppress, steal and pillage them." The rajas of the

²² G.F. De Bruijn Kops, "Contribution to the Knowledge of the North and East Coasts of New Guinea," *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 6 (1852): 316–8, 331.

²³ E.W.A. Ludeking, "Schets van de Residentie Amboina," *BKI* 3 (1868): 65.

²⁴ J.G.F. Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua* (Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1886), 127. Local names for objects have been omitted. Maria J.C. Schouten, "Nineteenth-Century Ethnography in West Timor and the Wider World: The Case of J.G.F. Riedel," *Journal of Asian History* 48, no. 2 (2014).

²⁵ These were presumably the shelled seeds of the *Myristica agentea*, of New Guinea origin, which are called Papua or "long" or "wild" nutmeg as opposed to the highly prized true Banda nutmeg, *Myristica fragrans*.

littoral always painted the peoples of the interior in the blackest of colours and tried to prevent any communication between them and outsiders.²⁶

On Seram's coast tobacco was used as a basis for reckonings. It was packed in bamboos of 4 or 5 lbs weight, worth about 5 *duiten* per Amsterdam pound; the *duit* was a low-value Dutch copper coin.²⁷ Four bamboos would buy a *parang* (bushknife, machete) from Ambon, while two would get one from Makassar. Eight would be enough for a prized European axe, five for a Sumenep sarong, and two to three for a red cloth from India or Europe. Gongs were so expensive that they could not be bought with tobacco, but only by offering prized *wortelhout* wood.²⁸ In 1680 a supra-village council fined the two parties in a west Seram conflict fifty gongs. A Dutch observer explained: "this is the Alifuru way of sentencing, for after those under sentence had given one or two gongs, the remainder could be substituted by pieces of cloth, knives, Chinese dishes and so on".²⁹

Forty years later, far to the south and east, in Wetar, an island just north of Timor, the peg was beeswax, weighed in the local *mata*.³⁰ This was also used for sophisticated new imports: for example, "a keg of arak [distilled spirits], twenty *mata*; a tin of Huntley and Palmers Reading Biscuits (*bisikutu*), one *mata*".³¹ Elsewhere there were rough equivalents for the most prized items, such as guns, knives and *parang*.³²

²⁶ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), "Ceram," 342. Around the same time a visiting British naturalist described the Sula Islands in the middle of the Maluku Sea; the main islands were Taliabo (Xulla Taliabo) and Sanana (Xulla Bessi). They were, he wrote, "peopled by a timid, inoffensive race of semi-pagans.... They live in large communal houses like the Dyaks of Borneo, practise circumcision, and are little acquainted with the metals, their weapons even being made of wood ... they were suffering from some form of malaria, which, aided by total neglect of sanitary laws, had then killed 3000 out of the 9000 inhabitants." Francis Henry Hill Guillemard, *Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel: Australasia, Malaysia and the Pacific Archipelago*, Edited and Extended by A.R. Wallace. Volume 2 (London: E. Stanford, 1908), 303–4. "Circumcision" here probably refers to the pre-Islamic practice of incision; Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds*, 1st ed., 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 1: 149–51.

²⁷ Eight *duiten* made up a *stuiver*; 160 a guilder.

²⁸ "Iets over Ceram en de Alfoeren," *BKI* 5, no. 1 (1856): 85–7. *Wortelhout* (root wood) did not come from a specific tree but referred to growths with a very complex grain which appeared on the trunks of some species. It was highly valued by 17th and 18th century furniture makers, and was usually described as coming from Ambon, which—in administrative terms—included Seram.

²⁹ Gerrit J. Knaap, "The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram); An Account of Its 'Discovery' and Interpretation between about 1675 and 1950," *BKI* 149, no. 2 (1993): 262. On the peoples of Seram see Valerio Valeri, *The Forest of Taboos: Morality, Hunting, and Identity Among the Huaulu of the Moluccas* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2000).

³⁰ Equal to the more common *kati*, of c. 1.25 Amsterdam pounds.

³¹ Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen*, 457.

³² In 1831 Kupang traders from Timor visiting the nearby island of Rote knew that one ordinary gun, worth at most fl.24, could be exchanged for a slave or a pikul of wax, worth fl.80, or a horse; 7 bush-knives that cost fl.3, could be swapped for 15 sheeps, while 700 *parang* (machete) at fl.0.50 each or a total of fl.350, could be used to obtain 500 pikul of rice; 2 *parang* would get the trader a pikul of palm syrup, worth fl.4 in Kupang, while one *parang* equalled a pikul of mung beans (*kacang ijo*). E. Francis, "Timor in 1831," *TNI* 1, nos. 1–2 (1838): 365.

Money and Barter

Money served administrative rather than commercial purposes, having been used for taxation on Java and Bali long before it became current in markets. Robert Wicks notes that thirteenth-century sources show that “large-scale (and not so large-scale) trade could be carried on with peoples of widely divergent cultural backgrounds, without a common measure of value and without the use of physical money”.³³ In the eastern archipelagos, only the gold-rich Philippines and Bali had developed metal money prior to the fourteenth century. Gold coins were current in the former between the tenth and twelfth centuries, while the latter was influenced by its close ties to Java. In later centuries some states produced their own currency; low value *pici* of lead and tin could be locally minted, as in Makassar, which also made the silver *mas*. Buton had its own cloth equivalent.³⁴ Bali was exceptional in its wide-spread and long-lasting use of Chinese *kepeng*.

Spanish Manila supplied the region with American silver, and the most popular coins were the Spanish-Portuguese *reaal* from Mexico; they were the most widely used coins until the mid-nineteenth century. Silver “pieces of eight”, worth 8 *reaal*, were minted in Mexico and Peru and shipped to Manila from the end of the sixteenth century. Spanish coins were traded for their silver content and preferred to Dutch-minted coins of the same face value. The VOC imported a confusing range of coins but valued them all in terms of guilders or *rijksdaalders*. In the late eighteenth century Makassar traders sent many to Sumbawa to pay for sea and forest products. By the 1740s the sturdy VOC copper *duit* were being used for small reckonings. In Timor, in 1830, it was stated that “[a]n equivalent money value between native and imported goods does not exist, and coins are primarily collected to use as ornaments or to melt down for jewellery”.³⁵ Coins as money were distrusted, often with good reason, as filing down and counterfeiting were not uncommon.

Even the transoceanic commerce of the early VOC was structured to take advantage of price differentials through cycles of barter. De Roever writes:³⁶

Without money changing hands the Dutch were able, between 1613 and 1632, to change iron into silver, by buying iron at next to nothing prices in Japan, then forging this into thousands of *parang* (large knives) and exporting these to Timor to exchange them for sandalwood, which was brought to Banten and Jacatra [the later Batavia], where with the

³³ Wicks, *Money, Markets and Trade*, 284–6, 312.

³⁴ The rather conservative Sultanate of Buton and its territories retained the use of small pieces of woven cloth as currency into the early twentieth century. There was always a need for exchange media of small value, and these scraps of cloth, “about the size of a couple of fingers” filled that need. The women of the royal family wove them, or had them woven, and they were worth either 40 new *dubbeltjes* (before the currency reform of 1854) or 160 of the old coins. A. Ligtoet, “Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton,” *BKI* 2, no. 4 (1878).

³⁵ Willem G. Wolters, “Managing Multiple Currencies with Unit of Account: Netherlands India 1600–1800,” in the *XIV International Economic History Congress* (Helsinki, 2006); Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 87–8; Francis, “Timor,” 50–1. See also in bibliography Wolters, “Managing Multiple Currencies”; *ENI*, “Muntwezen”; Kwee, “Money and Credit”; Claver, “A Money Paradox.”

³⁶ Arend de Roever, “The Warlords of Larantuka and the Timorese Sandalwood Trade,” in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 230, note 5.

yearly arriving Chinese fleet it was traded for silk that was exported to Japan, where they were paid in silver. As the preference of the Chinese nachodas [ships' captains] to get paid in sandalwood was well known, anyone who could obtain access to or get control of Timor, had an important head start in the China trade.

More widely available marine and forest commodities took over the role of sandalwood in the eighteenth century.

Barter was inconvenient but deeply rooted. G.F. Davidson, who traded in Singapore from the 1820s, wrote:³⁷

Trade by barter is the system generally adopted; and notwithstanding long-continued exertions on the part of the European mercantile community to establish the cash system, their success has been so very partial, that nine-tenths of the remittances to Europe and India in return for goods consigned here for sale, are made in produce. Severe losses have been sustained here, from time to time, by the European mercantile firms, in consequence of their giving credit, to an almost unlimited extent, to Chinese and other dealers, many of them mere men of straw... these losses have amounted to very considerable sums. This has led to renewed and more strenuous exertions to establish a cash system, but, I fear, with indifferent success.

Monetisation was slow. Even in the Dutch Minahasa, where the coffee monopoly had paid farmers in cash since 1825, money only began to be generally used after the introduction of a cash poll-tax in 1852.³⁸ The relative importance of tax, rather than trade, as the driving force in monetisation is further indicated by reactions when the Manado Resident attempted to prohibit barter in September 1889. Manado- and Makassar-based traders rose in revolt, and trade was paralysed.³⁹ However, by the 1860s it was said that Buton and Makassar traders buying New Guinea commodities in east Seram's Kilwaru paid mainly in cash.⁴⁰

Governed Harbours: Makassar, Banjarmasin and Sulu

Some realms were able to achieve a measure of control over trade, usually by a combination of coercion and the attractions of their larger, regulated markets. Seventeenth-century Makassar was a transit hub, handling eastern archipelago commodities like wax and turtle shell, as well as slaves from Borneo, the southern Philippines and the southeast fringe of

³⁷ G.F. Davidson, *Trade and Travel in the Far East or Recollections of Twenty-One Years Passed in Java, Singapore, Australia, and China* (London: Madden and Malcolm, 1846), 66.

³⁸ Helmut Bucholt and Ulrich Mai, "Markets, Trade and the Reproduction of Trader Households," in *Continuity, Change and Aspirations: Social and Cultural Life in Minahasa, Indonesia*, ed. Helmut Bucholt and Ulrich Mai (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), 156–7; Mieke Schouten, *Minahasa and Bolaangmangondow: An Annotated Bibliography, 1800–1942* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 13.

³⁹ D.H. de Vries and Ruard Wallis de Vries, *Een Amsterdamse koopman in de Molukken 1883–1901* (Baarn: Ambo, 1996), 241.

⁴⁰ C.B.H. van Rosenberg, "Beschrijving van eenige gedeelte van Ceram," *TITLV/TBG* 16, 5th series, part 2 (1866): 134.

Indonesia (Flores, Solor, Timor, Alor, Tanimbar). These, together with valuable sandalwood, were exchanged for textiles from India. Gold was gathered from many sources and exported to the rich sultanate of Aceh in North Sumatra. Chinese porcelain brought in from Macau, Manila and Cambodia was sent to Aceh and Borneo ports, while manufactured ironware, mainly parang and axes from Sukadana (west Borneo) passed through Makassar en route to Nusa Tenggara and South Maluku. These southern islands also wanted goods such as swords, brass, textiles and elephant tusks so they exported local cinnamons,⁴¹ amber, tortoise shell, slaves and wax. Certain consumption goods remained in Makassar, including sugar, tobacco, horses and textiles, while some locally produced textiles, coins, rice and iron were exported.⁴²

Gujerati and Chinese shippers do not seem to have been early visitors to Makassar; most acquisition of their valuable cargoes would have taken place at other harbours. However, through most of the seventeenth century Portuguese, English, Dutch and, for a while, Danish companies maintained factories (trading posts) in Makassar to buy provisions, spices and other commodities. Occasional French vessels also passed through. Officials led by the *syahbandar* (harbourmaster) collected taxes on behalf of the Gowa ruler: 10 per cent on traffic through the port, on timber and bamboo brought downriver, and on piece-goods from the weavers of Mandar. Anchorage fees were also charged, and gifts were necessary. After Makassar's conquest in 1667–69 a Dutch harbourmaster collected fees and protected Dutch monopolies. Buginese and Chinese shippers were the main Asian traders.⁴³

Banjarmasin, a sultanate since 1526, was established as a pepper exporter by the early seventeenth century. Chinese were central to commerce, and not only as exporters. In 1765 a castaway Japanese sailor named Magotaro was sold by Sulu slavers to a Banjarmasin shop-owner called Taikon, a Hokkien-speaker from the inland city of Zhengzhou on the Yellow River. Magotaro described “a thriving port”, where “an office called *babean* [*pabean* or customs office] was set up [c. 2 km] downstream from the city. It was equipped with cannon, spears, guns and the iron chain of [c. 30 metres] in length and a garrison of native soldiers”. This was probably the Dutch outpost established on the basis of the 1747 treaty, which will be described in chapter 6. Taikon was probably of gentry origin, a dealer in porcelain and cloth. “Customers were first served tobacco as a token of hospitality and, afterwards, with a cup of tea accompanied with betel”.⁴⁴ All the neighbouring shops were owned by his former clerks, but he himself had little interest in the pepper trade, a useful reminder that for every junk that came and went there were clusters of ancillary businesses. Taikon and his younger brother both went back to China every other year to register in the

⁴¹ Local cinnamons included *kulit lawang* (*Cinnamomum cullilawan*) and *Cinnamomum iners*. *Cinnamomum burmannii*, the Indian and Southeast Asian *cassia ligna*, was less sweet than Chinese cassia (*Cinnamomum aromaticum*). All were in high demand for their medicinal, culinary or industrial (dyeing, tanning) uses.

⁴² J. Noorduyn, “De Handelsrelaties van het Makassaarse Rijk volgens de Notitie van Cornelis Speelman (1669),” in *Nederlands Historische Bronnen* (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983).

⁴³ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*.

⁴⁴ Betel was a mixture of areca nut (berry) and betel leaf (similar to kava and pepper), when chewed its effects are similar to that of tobacco; with which it is often mixed. Anthony Reid, “From Betel-Chewing to Tobacco-Smoking in Indonesia,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 44, no. 3 (1985).

census and buy goods for their shops, a voyage that took about six months.⁴⁵ They would have been among the many passengers when the junk arrived in Banjarmasin, the high-point of every trading year.

After the Indies were returned by the British in 1816 the Dutch commissioner J. van Boeckholtz visited Banjarmasin, and described the excitement attending a junk's arrival:⁴⁶

Activity reached a peak ... when one of the Chinese *wangkang* [mid-sized junk] sailed in. General excitement prevailed at the court and among the nobility. Hundreds of stalls were set up, on board and along the banks, with silk fabrics, glassware, pots, pans, delicacies etc. The fair had come to Banjar. An innumerable fleet of boats, decorated with many coloured flags and banners, packed with princes, princesses and rowers, all dressed in their finest clothes, add life to the spectacle. The King, with his entire family, left [the palace at] Kota Inten, accompanied by 2 to 3,000 people, including his retinue, dancers, craftsmen, children in multi-coloured clothes, and all sorts of rabble. The *wangkang*, sailing in from the sea, was towed upriver by 60 to 80 perahu until it reached the Sultan's house at Tatas, which lies on the left-hand side of the river along with that of the Chancellors and the Chinese quarter.

Both Makassar and Banjarmasin had their specific geographic strengths: the former encompassed rice-producing plains and a sheltered harbour, while the latter's grip on the river enabled it to dominate traffic. Sulu, a much smaller state, owed its prominence to its location astride the corridor connecting the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas, ensuring it at least half a millennium of commercial prominence and close ties to China.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the English East India Company's John Hunt described Sulu's commerce. On arrival from China the junk captain and the supercargoes representing investors had to buy a new mast from the *datus* (local lords), hire a factory, and provide risky credit for the *datus* and sultan during their stay, from 300 to 500 dollars each: "some pay [back] and some do not". The nobles always rated their own commodities at double their true value. Part of the remaining cargo would be given to resident Chinese to be paid for in produce at a fixed price; the junk Chinese kept the rest to trade with local shippers as they arrived. Despite being subject to "great extortion" the traders reckoned that even if only one ship out of three returned, they would be in profit. Each junk cargo was always freighted by "a great number of speculators", who typically spread their loads among several vessels to reduce possible losses.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Toora Nomura, "A Japanese Sailors Record of South Kalimantan in the Eighteenth Century," *Sejarah: Jurnal Jabatan Sejarah University Malaya* 1 (1988): 128–32. See also Shinzō Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), 102–8. See also the extract from Daniel Beekman's 1714 account, published in Tineke Hellwig and Eric Tagliacozzo, eds., *The Indonesia Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Duke University Press, 2009), 153–8.

⁴⁶ P.H. van der Kemp, "Het Afbreken van onze Betrekkingen met Banjarmasin onder Daendels en het herstelling van het Nederlandsch gezag aldaar op den 1n Januari 1817," *BKI* 49, no. 1 (1898): 79.

⁴⁷ John Hunt, "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia," in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: being a Collection of Papers*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore, 1837). His report was originally published in the *Malayan Miscellanies* by the Sumatran Mission Press at Bencoolen (Bengkulu) in 1820.

Hunt also describes the mix of free and controlled trade encountered by private shippers in Sulu:⁴⁸

Traders to succeed in the Sulu trade, must arrive there in March, and must remain there at least six months or about fifteen or twenty days before, and as many after the arrival of the Chinese junks; a convenient factory must be hired ... the vessel should be fast and well-armed ... the friendship and protection of one or two leading chiefs is necessary, and may be indirectly purchased.... A Chinese sorter and a few China and Bugis coolies are absolutely necessary ... formerly ships have come here, and traders were treated with liberality and respect, but since the reign of the present sultan, force is in a great measure the rule of right, and too many precautions cannot be taken.... Some English vessels, not willing to remain for the season, open a shop in the Sultan's palace ... the prices are fixed on both sides, but by this method it is impossible to sell much. The cargoes are so slender and come in so slowly ... besides all the small traders dislike selling in the palace.

Exchange between the Interior and Coasts

There was no rigid divide between “connected coastal” and “isolated inland” peoples. The latter could become shore dwellers, littoral communities could retire inland. The Ngaju Dayak of south Kalimantan left the coast for the interior to avoid wars and taxes in the early 1800s.⁴⁹ The great majority of the animist communities in the Philippines still live in upland Mindanao, but many retreated to the interior relatively recently, under pressure from first the Spanish and then land clearance for American plantations. They now define themselves as Lumad (Cebuano: native, indigenous), rather than “tribal”.⁵⁰ In southwestern Mindanao's Cotabato region the main “pagan” groups were the Tiruray, Manobo (who include the Bagobo) and Bila'an who lived in the central uplands and along the coast.⁵¹ The Tiruray (or Teduray, “upriver”) were farmer-foragers in the southwestern highlands who traded closely with downstream Cotabato. They depended on Maguindanau for woven cloth and metals, offering in exchange wax, other forest products and tobacco.⁵²

Documents from the 1660s show that Maguindanau shippers were already exporting “*manobos* tobacco” to Dutch Ternate (and, perhaps indirectly, to Ambon and Java),⁵³ as in “thousands *manobos* tobacco”. While the phrasing could suggest that *manobos* was a quantity measurement it should be noted that the Manobo people who lived in the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880*, Verhandelingen KITLV no. 189 (Leiden: KITLV, 2001), 91.

⁵⁰ Ibid.; B.R. Rodil, *Minoritization of Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago*, 2nd ed. (Davao City: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 2004).

⁵¹ Jeremy Beckett, “The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato under Colonial Rule,” *Asian Studies* 5 (1977).

⁵² Ruurdje Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: the Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century* (Quezon City: New Day, 1989), 157.

⁵³ Gerrit Knaap has qualified Laarhoven's suggestion of Mindanao's direct trade with these regions in the seventeenth century; personal communication, 11 September 2019.

forested hills of eastern Mindanao along the Agusan River were known for their tobacco cultivation and had access to the trade of the Davao Gulf.⁵⁴ At the end of the century, after his return to England, William Dampier wrote “Of the Inhabitants, and Civil State of the Isle of Mindanao”:⁵⁵

[H]ere are besides the Mindanayans, the Hilanoones (as they call them) or the Mountaineers ... [they] live in the heart of the country: they have little or no commerce by sea, yet they have [river] proas with 12 or 14 oars a piece. They enjoy the benefit of the gold-mines and with their gold buy foreign commodities of the Mindanao people. They have also plenty of beeswax which they exchange for other commodities.

In west Seram the Alune (or Makahala) people lived between Piru Bay to the west and their Wemale neighbours to the east. According to tradition, the name Alune derived from the woven girdle made by their women folk, in contrast to the Wemale, who wore bark-cloth. Makahala means rice-eater, as the Alune grew rice whereas the Wemale, it was said, could not. Within both communities there was a distinction between inland and coastal peoples. In both cases the latter had come down from the hills and intermarried with sojourners and settlers; they were no longer swidden farmers but focussed on fishing and on trade, which seems to have been well established by the fifteenth century. This did not erase their cultural identification with the interior.⁵⁶ But the clove-producing Ambon islands lay just across the water and the Dutch East India Company’s drastic demographic, economic and social interventions disrupted trade patterns. Further from Ambon, East Seram and the adjacent archipelagos were better able to defend their seafaring and trading traditions.⁵⁷

In 1840 the Mekongga Tolaki (*to* meaning people) lived both inland and along the east coast of the Bone Gulf, where there was also a handful of Bugis traders and Sama Bajau settlements. When the *HMS Maeander* under Henry Keppel visited the headhunting “Minkoka” they proved to be keen traders. From their canoes they offered “sago, wax, coconuts, arms, ornaments, fowls, mats, &c. which they freely gave for cotton handkerchiefs and bottles: pickle and mustard bottles they preferred; and for one of the former either a large or two small fowls were given. The wax is of excellent quality and may be had in considerable quantities.” Keppel commented that “the Bugis made good profits taking wax to Singapore”, but “the collection was tedious and annoying”.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Karl M. Gaspar, “No End to Lumad Dislocation from Their Homeland: The Case of the Sarangani Manobo and B’laans in Davao Occidental,” *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* (2017); Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory*.

⁵⁵ William Dampier, *A New Voyage Around the World* (London: James Knapton, 1697).

⁵⁶ The two peoples’ languages were distinct, the former were patrilineal, the latter matrilineal. Knaap, “Saniri Tiga Air.”

⁵⁷ D. Kyle Latinis and Ken Stark, “Roasted Dirt: Assessing Earthenware Assemblages from Sites in Central Maluku,” in *Earthenware in Southeast Asia*, ed. John N. Miksic (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003); R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), 10–3, 102–8.

⁵⁸ Henry Keppel and James Brooke, *A Visit to the Indian Archipelago, in H.M. Ship Maeander* (London: Bentely, 1853), 163–4.

Exchange patterns and the porous distinction between coastal and interior peoples were broadly similar throughout the archipelagos. Bernard Sellato has reconstructed transitions in north east Borneo's Bulungan first from tribal entities to Indianised trading kingdoms, and then to Muslim Sultanates. He emphasizes two main points: "the crucial role of trade ... and the shift of trading places from the coastal island towards the interior between the seventeenth and the turn of the twentieth century." Traders settled in offshore locations, exchanging sago and forest commodities for imports.⁵⁹ Alliances and inter-marriage among immigrant sea-faring Tausug from Sulu, Sama Bajau, and Bugis on the one hand, and local groups such as Berusu Dayak on the other, gradually forged the ties that made inland expeditions possible. The main beneficiaries were established elites who organised and sponsored the collection of forest products. Coastal aristocracies used slaves and their own bound labour to obtain commodities and, later, to grow profitable crops.⁶⁰ Over time exchange sites moved further upriver towards less depleted regions.

Rousseau notes that the entrepreneurs and established leaders from the coast who organised expeditions into the interior depended on local goodwill, cultivating marriage and blood brotherhood ties with inland peoples. Some "Malays" (to use the generic term for coastal Muslims) settled in the Borneo interior; most were men who had fled inland because of some crime. There they married into chiefly families, and since they thus became members of the community they were allowed to trade.⁶¹ The resulting upriver trading posts could develop into petty kingdoms tied to downriver centres.

The main coastal settlement on Misool, the most southerly of the Raja Ampat islands, was described in the late sixteenth century:⁶²

In this village there are about four thousand people living under a King whom they have elected. They call him Fu Moi. He has many yndios in the interior,⁶³ where they cultivate vegetables and landan [*ladang*, Ind.Malay, dry fields for cultivation] gardens for them; [this] is a [kind of] bread they eat [baked sago], similar to biscuits and very nutritious.

Resident de Clercq visited the southern side of the McCluer Gulf in the late nineteenth century. Muslim rajas on the island settlements there maintained ties with the upriver communities which accumulated commodities for the Rajas' Seramese sosolot partners.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Bernard Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People in Bulungan: Elements for a History of Settlement, Trade, and Social Dynamics in Borneo, 1880–2001* (Bogor: CIFOR, 2001), 37–8; Kenneth Sillander, *Acting Authoritatively: How Authority is Expressed Through Social Action among the Bentian of Indonesian Borneo* (Helsinki: Swedish School of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki Research Institute, 2004).

⁶⁰ Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People*.

⁶¹ Jérôme Rousseau, "Central Borneo and its Relations with Coastal Malay Sultanates," in *Outwitting the State*, ed. Peter Skalnik (London: Transaction, 1989).

⁶² J. Sollewijn Gelpke, "The Report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of His Voyage in 1581–1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf and Seram," *BKI* 150, no. 1 (1994): 129–30.

⁶³ J. Sollewijn Gelpke explains (note 20) that the people of the interior are Papuan, but if de Brito was consciously identifying them as *indio* (i.e. like the inhabitants of the Philippines), he could be referring to slaves and hostages from Seram.

⁶⁴ E.S.A. de Clercq, *De West- en Noordkust van Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea. Proeve van beschrijving volgens de mededeelingen en rapporten van reizigers en ambtenaren en naar eigen ervaringen* (Leiden: Brill, 1893), 128–9.

De Clercq commented: “The more enterprising people from Rumbati and Sekar [two of the rajadoms], sometimes also Seramers, Makassarese and a few Arabs from Surabaya” advanced beads, plates, ironware, guns and so on against a promise of specified quantities of “wild” nutmeg and massoi to be handed over when the traders returned three months later.⁶⁵ One of the settlements (Turin) consisted of 30 people and 2 longhouses, the second (Darembang) had c. 150 inhabitants in six longhouses. Both communities were Muslim, and their headmen bore titles of Portuguese origin, *kapita* in Turin, and *mayor* in Darembang. All lived in the territory of the Raja of Argunung, and so were subject, in the second degree, to his overlord, the Raja of Rumbati. De Clercq added: “All these places have Papuans under them, who live in the mountains, and who sell nutmegs, massoi and sometimes a few bird skins to the Muslim coastal groups. They are under their tribal leaders but acknowledge the authority of the Muslim chiefs.”⁶⁶

In Sulawesi symbiotic relationships between littoral groups and those in the interior were typically regularised through formal agreements. In the fifteenth century ambitious Sidenreng, on the southwest coast, wanted to exploit the rich lands north of the lakes, so established tributary relations with the coastal alliance of the *Pituriawa*, the “Seven Below”. It thus also gained indirect access to the allied confederation of the *Pituriaseq*, the “Seven Above”. The rice producing lowlands sent rice, salt and dried fish up through the Bila and Bulucenrana river valleys, in exchange for the hills’ damar resin, camphor, rattan and perhaps slaves.⁶⁷ In the sixteenth century the squabbling kingdoms on the Mandar coast united into two co-operating federations, the *Pitu Ulunna Salu* and the *Pitu Ba’bana Binanga*, or the Seven Headwaters and the Seven River Mouths. Salt, rice, opium, dried fish, weapons, ceramics and cloth from the coast were exchanged for rattans, resins, and fragrant woods from the interior.⁶⁸

Over 25 languages are spoken in Central Sulawesi. In the interior, west of Toho Bay, the nomadic Wana provided their overlords—first Ternate, then later the rajas of Tomini’s Tojo and East Sulawesi’s Tobungku—with intermittent tribute of beeswax and rice. The Bongka River provided their main route to the southeast Tomini coast. The Wana only settled in a defined area at the end of the twentieth century.⁶⁹ Further south, in the mountains stretching between the Gulfs of Tomini and Bone, the To Pamona were living in settled villages by the late 1800s, rotating swidden fields within their territory.⁷⁰ Despite the very difficult terrain, these peoples exchanged their products with imports coming from the coasts of the Makassar Straits, the Tomini and Tolo Gulfs.

Rousseau has also described the tension between symbiosis and exploitation that characterised relations between the inhabitants of central Borneo and the coast Malays.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Clercq, *De West- en Noordkust*.

⁶⁷ Stephen C. Druce, *The Lands West of the Lakes: a History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), 161–7, 213–35.

⁶⁸ Darmawan Mas’ud Rahman, “Puang dan daeng: kajian budaya orang Balanipa Mandar” (Hasanuddin, 1988), 65–8.

⁶⁹ Jane Monnig Atkinson, *The Art and Politics of Wana Shamanism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 188.

⁷⁰ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 39.

Commodity blockades could go both ways: the people of the interior wanted goods such as “jars, bronze cannons, gongs, glass beads, shell and other ornaments”. But they could manage without them and, with difficulty, compensate for the lack of imported tin and salt. However, the very existence of coastal traders in places like Berau and Bulungan was predicated upon their access “to birds’ nests, camphor, various kinds of wild rubber, medicinal products, bezoar stones, rhinoceros horns, deer antlers, animal skins, swords, baskets, mats, gold and rattan” from the interior.⁷¹ The balance of power could tilt either way, depending on circumstances.

Tania Murray Li has worked among the Lauje people, who live inland from Tinombo on north Sulawesi’s eastern Tomini coast. The “scattered swidden farmers [were] loosely organised into family groups, threatened by slave raiders and by sometimes hostile neighbours, and involved in important but tense and unstable trade and tribute relationships with coastal powers”. She explains the coastal kingdoms interest in the interior:⁷²

[Their] principal goal was to monopolize trade, and in some cases, to control labour through direct enslavement or debt bondage. Coastal powers were often thwarted in both these endeavours by the capacity of interior people to subsist on their swidden fields, avoid trade engagements, and retreat to inaccessible places when faced with violence or unreasonable demands.... Domination and difference therefore emerged within a single political and cultural system, as distinctive identities began to be attributed to, imposed upon, and forged by interior populations through a complex and resistance-permeated process.

A move from the interior to the coast, or vice versa, could represent a conscious decision to exchange involvement in one way of living for another. A participant in unpredictable wider circuits of exchange, opportunity and exposure could opt for a relatively isolated group existence in an almost self-sufficient community. Young men might prefer to leave the village for a more adventurous life on the coast. Han Knapen sees a “broad geographical distinction” between “gamblers” and “isolationists” in Southeast Borneo: “Dayak groups living close to centres of Malay settlement were involved in more or less regular communications with the outside. They exposed themselves to numerous risks, but of course with the hope for potential success, fortune and prestige.”⁷³ The remote Dayak groups in the interior, however, “chose to refrain from communication with the outside world, which meant that they had to make their own salt, continue to use stone axes, etc.”⁷⁴

As Knapen points out, Dayak populations that migrated had to adapt to very different environments, “when moving from the hills to the tidal zone (Ngaju) or from the swamps of the Hulu Sungei to the hills (Ma’anyan).... A most striking case are the Ngaju who changed from inland swidden agriculture to a life as coastal raiders and traders, later to

⁷¹ Rousseau, “Central Borneo.”

⁷² Tania Murray Li, “Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 1 (2000): 50, 58.

⁷³ Han Knapen, “Epidemics, Drought and Other Uncertainties in Southeast Borneo During the 18th and 19th Century,” in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 1997), 133.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

return again to more terrestrial forms of subsistence”.⁷⁵ Peluso also concluded that forest villagers may have shifted from agriculture to hunting and gathering forest produce for trade, making an economic choice “encouraged by the traders with whom they dealt”.⁷⁶ Inland peoples weighed their options, responding to economic opportunity and the desire for security.⁷⁷ Many chose to evade outside states.⁷⁸



Image 9 A Malay chief from Sulu, c.1843⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*, 61, 77–8, 92, 101.

⁷⁶ Nancy Lee Peluso, *Markets and Merchants: the Forest Products Trade of East Kalimantan in Historical Perspective* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1983).

⁷⁷ For detailed accounts of interior settlements, Cristina Eghenter, Bernard Sellato, and G. Simon Devung, eds., *Social Science Research and Conservation Management in the Interior of Borneo. Unraveling Past and Present Interactions of People and Forests* (Jakarta: CIFOR, WWF, 2003).

⁷⁸ Michael Eilenberg, *At the Edges of States: Dynamics of State Formation in the Indonesian Borderlands* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 75–112.

⁷⁹ “Malay Chief, Sooloo”. Frank Marryat, *Borneo and the Indian Archipelago with Drawings of Costume and Scenery* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1848), 101.

Nonetheless, exchange between ecological zones remained highly desirable. Andrew McWilliam has described the symbiotic relationship between the Konu Ratu of the small Timorese coastal settlement of Com, and inland Pa'ir: "Konu Ratu was granted opportunities to farm agricultural land on the southern forested plateau, Pa'ir gained access to the sea. The communities were connected along a designated path of communication and exchange from the southern highlands to the coast referred to as the 'great path' (*ia lafae*)".⁸⁰

Defining Inland Peoples

States, or more precisely officials, were not the only ones who needed to make their environment "legible" in order to manage interaction. Communities and individuals also created schema to explain their own place in their world relative to others. When the range of social contacts expanded or deepened, so too did social typologies. Ranking occurred among individuals and population groups. Within each group categories were necessarily more nuanced than were those classifying outsiders, and each recognised more variation and gradation in their own communities than they did in others. Charles Frake explains: "identity was constructed and maintained locally as part of a struggle by individuals and groups to affirm and maintain high rank in a region-wide discourse of hierarchy".⁸¹ Allocating status at the top and bottom within a ranking system was not so difficult, as the relative place of the highest categories relative to that of the lowest would be generally acknowledged, but the middle ground was unpredictable. Coastal peoples regarded those of the interior as backward, but many also felt that they had access to ancient knowledge and powerful magic. Even non-volcanic mountains were frequently laden with symbolic meanings.⁸² Processes of definition have been, and still are, contested as "tradition" is mobilised for contemporary purposes.⁸³

Shore settlements could be affiliated with more powerful polities across the water, identifying with their norms and emphasising their own difference from inland peoples. By the sixteenth century Ende and Larantuka were in intensive contact with overseas allies: Muslim Makassar in the case of Ende, Catholic Portuguese in the case of Larantuka.

⁸⁰ Andrew McWilliam, "Harbouring Traditions in East Timor: Marginality in a Lowland Entrepot," *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 6 (2007).

⁸¹ Charles O. Frake, "The Cultural Construction of Rank, Identity and Ethnic Origins in the Sulu Archipelago," in *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather (Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996). See also Tania Murry Li, "Relational Histories and the Production of Difference on Sulawesi's Upland Frontier," *Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 1 (2001); Anna L. Tsing, *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁸² Peter Boomgaard, "The High Sanctuary: Local Perceptions of Mountains in Indonesia, 1750–2000," in *Framing Indonesian Realities: Essays in Symbolic Anthropology in Honour of Reimar Schefold*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas, Gerard Persoon, and Rivke Jaffe (Leiden: KITLV, 2003).

⁸³ See in bibliography, Hauser-Schäublin, 2013; Tyson, *Decentralization*; Davidson and Henley, *Revival of Tradition*.

Religious change marked social divisions.⁸⁴ Bima and Makassar competed for control of the coast of west Flores or Manggarai, adjoining the challenging Lintah Strait. The petty domains of the interior produced little for export, as swidden farmers they cultivated corn, kept pigs, wove textiles and could be subject to raiding. In the 1770s a Dutchman noted that the Muslim Bimanese were forbidden “to join their Manggarai spouses when they go to inland territory. They [the Bimanese] have to stay in coastal Reo, Pota, Bari, Talo or Nangaili, otherwise they spoil their religion and their adat [custom]”.⁸⁵ In the 1920s an ex-colonial official wrote:⁸⁶

Native [inland] Manggarai people could be sure that they would be cheated and despised in the Bimanese coastal places, if they were so lucky not to be injured or even to be taken away as slaves. Only in urgent cases do they come to these places with the goods for sale that they could offer: wax, sleeping mats and cinnamon. For some products like salt and iron, for the more beautiful textiles, they had to go there . . . Bimanese people only went to inland regions in great and well-armed parties. Their common purpose was to collect fines (this was the name for their robberies) for their own profit and to incite one *dalu* [chief] against another, which should lead to new wars and this again to new fines.

These fines had officially replaced the numerous slaves who were previously acquired during such expeditions.

The self-given names of communities (the endonyms) and names used by outsiders (exonyms), were often based on (presumed) places of origin. People “of the mountains” and those “of the sea” were not only complementary in exchange relationships but also in oppositional self-definition. This was despite the fact that, as Jérôme Rousseau has pointed out, migrations, intermarriage, symbiotic exchange and shared histories make such differentiation complex and contingent.⁸⁷

Nonetheless, geography and history conspired to create, throughout the region, a fundamental distinction between coastal and inland societies. Anthropologists have found recurring binary oppositions throughout the archipelagos: between insiders and outsiders, mountains and sea, native and immigrant,⁸⁸ as well as the use of ship symbols and stories of stranger-kings from overseas.⁸⁹ The indigenous population of the large

⁸⁴ E. Douglas Lewis, *People of the Source: the Social and Ceremonial Order of Tana Wai Brama on Flores* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1988), 7–8; Rodney Needham, *Mamboru: History and Structure in a Domain of Northwestern Sumba* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); *ENI*, “Flores” identified the Ende domains of Ende, Dona, Keo, Roka, Langa, Nutukau, Woroare, Orakaro and Olibari.

⁸⁵ Karel Steenbrink, “Dutch Colonial Containment of Islam in Manggarai, West-Flores, in Favour of Catholicism, 1907–1942,” *BKI* 169 (2013): 108.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁸⁷ Jérôme Rousseau, *Central Borneo: Ethnic Identity and Social Life in a Stratified Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

⁸⁸ David Maybury-Lewis and Uri Almagor, eds., *The Attraction of Opposites: Thought and Society in the Dualistic Mode* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1989).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* Pierre-Yves Manguin, “Shipshape Societies: Boat Symbols and Political Systems in Insular Southeast Asia,” in *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, ed. David G. Marr and A.C. Milner (Singapore: ISEAS; Canberra: RSPS/ANU, 1986).

and mountainous Maluku island of Buru called themselves *geb fuka*, “the people of the mountains”, as opposed to the “people from across the sea” (*geba fi lawe*) many of whom came from the Buton and Sula archipelagos.⁹⁰ In north central Seram contrasts were drawn between the *ita hoto mui*, “we of the mountains” and the *asie lau tasiam*, “they of the sea/coast”, a division which once coincided with that between the followers of animist beliefs and Muslims.⁹¹

Dampier referred to the “Alfoores”. The *ENI* notes that the term “Alfuren” (more correctly, Alifuru) was used to refer to the interior peoples of Buru, Seram, Halmahera, the Banggai and Sula Islands, as well as to North Sulawesi populations, particularly those of the Minahasa and Bolaang Mongondow. The term Alfur probably derived from a combination of the Tidorese term for “land, earth” and the Ternate/Tidorese word for “wild, uncultivated, non-domesticated”, so “people of the un-cultivated land”.⁹² In 1633 a VOC official commented that the western Seramese Alifuru were “undisciplined, wild and barbaric people, cannibals whose dwelling places were never seen by anyone of our people”.⁹³ Riedel described them as “truly people of nature (Dutch: *natuurmenschen*)... their partiality to pork prevents them from embracing Islam. Their diet consists of sago... They are completely at home in the forest. Neither rain nor wind will keep them from foraging... who will take them out of their forests, so inaccessible to strangers? The forests are their shelter and home...”⁹⁴

Descent, language, ritual and territory were brought into play when identifying “ethnic groups”; this was not a neutral process. In the later 1800s colonial officials, missionaries and ethnographers were busily defining “ethnic groups”, particularly those of non-Muslim peoples who might be ripe for conversion. J.G.F. Riedel is a telling example. The son of a missionary, he went on to achieve high positions in the Dutch administration of North Sulawesi and Maluku. His 1886 book on *The Smooth and Frizzy Haired Races between the Celebes and Papua* was very influential. He and the later missionary A.C. Kruyt were largely responsible for replacing the pejorative term Alfur with that of Toraja to refer to the peoples

⁹⁰ Barbara Dix Grimes, “Mapping Buru: The Politics of Territory and Settlement on an Eastern Indonesian Island,” in *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*, ed. Thomas Reuter (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006). For a description of Buru’s peoples in the 1760s see the extract included in George Miller, ed., *To The Spice Islands and Beyond: Travels in Eastern Indonesia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26–7.

⁹¹ Valeri, *Forest of Taboos*, 22–3.

⁹² *ENI*: “Alfoeren.” Bleeker described many mid-19th century Alfur communities: comparing Seram-Buru: 22–4, 9–10, 19–21; Halmahera, 257; Sula Banggai, 260, 264; Balante-Mondono, 266; Tobungku, 267–8; Kayeli, 18; Buru, 19; Seram, 207–13. The Governor of Ternate, at about the same time, compared the Muslim and Alifuru populations, favouring the latter: see J.H. Tobias, “Memorie van Overgave, J.H. Tobias (1857),” in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapijan (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980), 29–30. See also J. Platenkamp, “Sovereignty in the North Moluccas: Historical Transformations,” *History and Anthropology* 24, no. 2 (2013).

⁹³ Knaap, “Saniri Tiga Air,” 257. For an early nineteenth-century account of the north Sulawesi Alifuru, see F. Watuseke and D. Henley, “C.C. Predigers verhandeling over het plaatselijke bestuur en de huishouding van de Minahasa in 1804,” *BKI* 150, no. 2 (1994).

⁹⁴ F.S.A. de Clercq, “Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890,” in *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, ed. and trans. P.M. Taylor and Marie N. Richards, Smithsonian Digital Libraries Editions, <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/>. F.S.A. de Clercq, *Bijdragen tot de kennis der residentie Ternate* (Leiden: Brill, 1890).

of central Sulawesi.⁹⁵ Inland communities were subsumed in this new identity, under a name deriving from the Bugis distinction between *to ri aja*, people [to] of the uplands, as opposed to *to luu*, people of the sea.⁹⁶



Image 10 Two Alifuru portraits from Maluku (Seram), 1865–79⁹⁷

The Borneo equivalent of Alfur was Dayak, which was the general term used by the Dutch for the peoples of the interior;⁹⁸ it is variously held to derive from indigenous words

⁹⁵ Albert Schrauwers, *Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi Indonesia, 1892–1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000), 31–3; Schouten, “Nineteenth-Century Ethnography”; Hans Hägerdal, “The Native as Exemplum: Missionary Writings and Colonial Complexities in Eastern Indonesia,” *Itinerario* 37, no. 2 (2013); Kees Buijs, *Powers of Blessing from the Wilderness and from Heaven. Structure and Transformations in the Religion of the Toraja in the Mamasa Area of South Sulawesi* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

⁹⁶ Roxana Waterson, *Paths and Rivers: Sādan Toraja Society in Transformation* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), 9–11.

⁹⁷ “Portret van een Molukse vrouw met hoofddoek en diverse sieraden” and “Portret van een man uit de Molukken met een met veren versierde hoofddoek en sieraden”. Photographs by Henri Beingsick, MVV/NMVW nos. A84-8. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/911624> and A84-6. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/911626>. License CC BY-SA 4.0. With permission from the Museum.

⁹⁸ Kenneth Sillander and Jennifer Alexander, “Belonging in Borneo: Refiguring Dayak Ethnicity in Indonesia,” *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 17, no. 2 (2016); Cathrin Arenz, et al., eds., *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017). Kenneth Sillander, “Local Integration and Coastal Connections in Interior Kalimantan: The Case of the Nalin Taun Ritual among the Bentian,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 37, no. 2 (2006); *ENI*: “Dajaks.”

meaning “man”, or “inland”. Both Alfur and Dayak are lump categorisations that freed observers of the need to grapple with local distinctions. The essential contrast was between coastal “Malays” and the non-Muslim swidden farmers and foragers of the interior, who were also referred in Malay as mountain (*gunung*) or upriver (*ulu*) people. The Apo Kayan people of north Kalimantan and Sarawak consisted of three subgroups, the Kenyah, Kayan and Bahau, with local variants. There are some Bidayuh and Murut close to the Sarawak border. In the Barito catchment area further south the closely related Ngadju, Ot Danum and Ma’anyan predominate, with Bekumpai.⁹⁹

The British in Sarawak and Sabah generally followed the more discriminating categorisations used by the “white rajah” James Brooke. He distinguished the “Sea Dayak” or Iban (now predominantly Christian) from other, mainly Muslim, coastal populations (such as the Melanau and Kadayan). In northeast Borneo, the later Sabah, European observers typically saw a cultural hierarchy (in descending order) between the Malays of the coast, the Dusun cultivators (*dusun*, Malay: garden) and the Kadazan-Murut headhunters of the interior.¹⁰⁰

It is not surprising that relationships between inland and coastal peoples were often tense. Differing estimates of goods’ value, or quarrels over women, could trigger violence. Limited inter-village warfare was part of the yearly cycle in many areas. Headhunting and slave raiding made life precarious. Expeditions were directed against people on distant shores or on unallied communities in the raiders’ own hinterlands. Headhunting occurred in Mindanao, Borneo, the Minahasa, central and east Sulawesi, Halmahera, Seram, Kei, Tanimbar, the southwest islands, east Timor, Solor and west New Guinea and, until the seventeenth century in Ambon and the islands east of Seram. It was fundamental, rooted in spiritual beliefs, life cycle rituals, ideas of fertility and masculine prestige. David Henley’s map shows “endemic warfare” in most of north Sulawesi into the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁰¹ Land fighting and attacks by seafarers generated saleable slaves.

Littoral Identities

Many shore communities consisted of subsistence fishers and foragers, but the populations of exchange sites and harbours were much more diverse, at least during the trading season. The larger ports absorbed incoming people, ideas and aspects of material culture, accommodating passing ships, sojourning strangers and settlers, for whom cohabitation with local women was the norm.¹⁰² Along the shores of the Indian ocean, creole societies gave birth to new identities, from the Swahili of East Africa to the Mappila of Malabar, the

⁹⁹ Raymond G. Gordon, ed., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* (Dallas: SIL, 2005).

¹⁰⁰ Sillander, “Local Integration and Coastal Connections”; *ENI*: “Dajaks”; Margaret Clark Roff, *The Politics of Belonging. Political Change in Sabar and Sarawak* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974).

¹⁰¹ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 32; David Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004).

¹⁰² Barbara Andaya, “From Temporary Wife to Prostitute: Sexuality and Economic Change in Early Modern Southeast Asia,” *The Journal of Women’s History* 9, no. 4 (1998).

Indian Chulia and the Jawi Pekan of Penang.¹⁰³ Identities were shaped not only by place of origin, language and religion, but also by political affiliation. When individuals or groups were asked to explain themselves, they could refer to the ruler or patron to whom they owed loyalty in exchange for protection.

Anthony Reid has identified fifteenth-century Sino-Indonesian creole groups in coastal Java, Sumatra and the trading centres of Melaka, Brunei and Manila. These subsequently gave birth to “Javanese” and “Malay” communities of mixed ethnic origins.¹⁰⁴ During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries these were the most prominent indigenous long-range shippers. Their languages and customs, and later their religion (Islam) were fundamental to the evolving trading world of the archipelagos. In the east, “Malay” or “Javanese” might simply indicate that the person came from the western archipelago, while almost any mix of coast-based peoples tended to be called Malay as long as they were Muslim, even if their origins lay far from the Straits. Lombard and Salmon rightly reject retrospective insistence on an enduring opposition between the expansion of Chinese and Islamic networks; these were, they conclude, “two parallel developments ... driven by the same spirit of enterprise, even though they were in lively competition with one another”.¹⁰⁵ In some cases, fusion created one strand out of these two threads.¹⁰⁶

New faiths added a significant dimension to supra-local identification. Contacts with the Muslim west had created small Islamic communities in north Sumatra in the early 1200s, but wider acceptance came with the expanding commerce and prestige of fifteenth century Muslim Melaka. The Sultanate of Sulu was born at the beginning of the 1400s, those of Maguindanau and Buayan in the early 1500s; tradition links their founding to Arabs and Johor. The spice-trafficking port-cities of Java’s northeast coast converted to Islam in the early sixteenth century. Demak, the most important of these polities, is said to have been founded by a Muslim Chinese towards the end of the 1400s. Elites in Tuban, Gresik, Surabaya, Demak, and Japara controlled rice exports, and invested in trade and shipping, often in association with prominent merchants, to whom they provided goods and protection. Crews consisted of slaves and followers, alongside men “of very diverse

¹⁰³ For examples, see in bibliography: Dale, *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier*; Arasaratnam, *Maritime Commerce and English Power*; Nasution, *The Chulia in Penang*; McPherson, “Chulias and Klings.”

¹⁰⁴ Anthony Reid, “Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 32, no. 3 (2001); Heather Sutherland, “Performing Personas: Identity in VOC Makassar,” in *Contingent Lives: Social Identity and Material Culture in a VOC Settlement*, ed. Nigel Worden (Cape Town: Historical Studies Department, 2007); Anthony Reid, “Historical Dynamics of ‘Chinese’ and ‘Malay’ Categories as Southeast Asian Creoles,” paper presented for workshop, “Globalization and Creolization in World History,” Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon, “Islam and Chineseness,” *Indonesia*, no. 57 (1994); Alexander Wain, “China and the Rise of Islam in Java,” in *Islamisation: Comparative Perspectives from History*, ed. A.C.S. Peacock (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

¹⁰⁶ Heather Sutherland, “The Makassar Malays: Adaptation and Identity, c.1660–1790,” in *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries*, ed. Timothy P. Barnard (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004).

origins, speaking several languages, who spent part of their lives, wandering along the coasts of all Southeast Asia and India, moving from one port to another.”¹⁰⁷

Northeast Java's trading partners in the eastern archipelago were interested in the new religion. A sultan was ruling Ternate in the early 1500s. Pockets of the faith subsequently emerged in Tidore and parts of Halmahera, Gorontalo and eastern Sulawesi. Banjarmasin's king converted around the same time as Ternate, Kutai's followed almost a century later. Makassar's rulers embraced Islam and imposed the religion on neighbouring states, parts of Sumbawa and Lombok in the early seventeenth century.¹⁰⁸ For the Spanish, with their memories of their fifteenth century Reconquista of Spain, the Philippine Muslims of the south were “Moros”, Moors or Muslims. The southern islands became a religious frontier, as conversion to Christianity advanced in the north. Everywhere, the main identity markers—livelihood, language, religion and custom—were subject to redefinition, both by those who bore them and by outsiders.¹⁰⁹

Over much the same period Catholic Christianity found a footing in Portuguese outposts at Nusa Tenggara's Ende, Solor and Larantuka, in parts of north Sulawesi along the main route to Manila, and around the spice-trading centres of Ternate and Ambon. The Jesuit Francis Xavier stayed in Ternate for six months in 1546–47 and led the first successful mass conversions.¹¹⁰ The Dutch, however, were firmly against any public manifestations of Catholicism,¹¹¹ so Protestant communities developed in Northern Sulawesi (the Minahasa, parts of the Sangihe islands), Ambon and Timor. Populations further from centres of VOC power tended to be mixed. In Seram, for example, Muslims were concentrated on the north and east coasts, which were traditionally claimed by Ternate, Tidore and Bacan, while Christians lived primarily on the southwest coast, near Dutch Ambon.


¹⁰⁷ H.J. Graaf and Th.G.Th. Pigeaud, *Eerste moslimse vorstendom op Java. Studiën over de staatkundige geschiedenis van de 15de en 16de eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 24–5; M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 40–6.

¹⁰⁸ R. Michael Feener, “Southeast Asian Localisations of Islam and Participation within a Global Umma, c.1500–1800,” in *The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3, The Eastern Islamic World*, ed. Anthony Reid and David O. Morgan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*, 63–7; William Cummings, “Scripting Islamization: Arabic Texts in Early Modern Makassar,” *Ethnohistory* 48, no. 4 (2001).

¹⁰⁹ Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 94–5, 141–7.

¹¹⁰ Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, eds., *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 9–136; Brett Baker, “Indigenous-driven Mission: Reconstructing Religious Change in Sixteenth-Century Maluku” (PhD diss., Australia National University, 2012); Gerrit J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indisch Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Foris, 2004), 105–23. Today eastern Nusa Tenggara is about 85 per cent Christian, with a Catholic majority; much of Maluku, from Halmahera to Aru and Wetar, is predominantly Muslim, but with a strong Protestant minority, while Papua is mainly Protestant but with a Muslim minority. Sulawesi is also diverse, with South Sulawesi mainly Muslim, east Sulawesi almost exclusively so, while Central Sulawesi has a larger Christian minority, and northern Sulawesi is almost evenly divided, with a clear demarcation between predominantly Muslim Gorontalo and the Christian Minahasa and Sangihe and Talaud islands. See Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, 44–51.

¹¹¹ G.J. Schutte, ed., *Het Indisch Sion: de Gereformeerde kerk onder de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002).



Map 7 The Southwestern and Southeast Islands

By the end of the nineteenth century the Southeastern and Southwestern islands were partly Christian, but still predominantly “heathen”. Religion defined the “Mestizos of Kisar”, creole descendants of VOC garrisons based on this small island southeast of Wetar.¹¹² The VOC encouraged conversion of strategically located non-Muslim groups, but with its decline these islands were essentially abandoned.¹¹³ In the 1820s Dutch missionaries resumed contact but left again in 1841. After this withdrawal Leti reverted; in the late 1800s this island east of Kisar was described as “very uncivilized; headhunting is popular, and trade is exclusively by barter”.¹¹⁴ Christians and “heathens” lived separately.¹¹⁵

They [the people of Leti] inhabit various villages which—with the exception of the Christian settlements of Serwaru and Serai—are all built on high stone outcrops on the beach, surrounded by rock walls, that have to be climbed without ladders. Houses are very close

¹¹² J.S.C. Elkington, “The “Mestizos” of Kisar, Dutch East Indies,” *The Medical Journal of Australia* (1922); Ernst Rodenwaldt, *Die Mestizen auf Kisar*, Mededelingen van den Dienst der Volksgezondheid in Nederlandsch-Indie (Batavia: Kolff, 1927).

¹¹³ The whole Leti archipelago population was thought to number c. 20,000, of whom 10 per cent were Christian; Leti island had an estimated population of 2,500, in 1825, which at the end of the 1800s was said to have increased to c.7,500, including 741 Christians. Of Luang’s population of c.1,223, 59 were Christian. See the place names of the individual islands in Chris de Jong, *A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies: The “Little East” in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, unpublished paper, September 2013, <http://www.cgfdejong.nl/Little%20East.pdf>. The Appendix gives population estimates.

¹¹⁴ *ENI*: “Wetter.”

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, “Letti.” At the end of the 1800s, Aru had small Muslim and Christian minorities, around 500 each, Kei was about one-third Muslim, with very few Christians, and Tanimbar completely unconverted.

together, in no particular order, and are on low piles, except for those of Christians, which are on the ground.

It should not be assumed that the acceptance of a new faith was necessarily imposed from above. The term “conversion” could encompass both the simple adoption of new names and rituals, used to reinforce an existing spiritual armoury, or radical change disrupting social structures. Pragmatic, selective and intermittent adaptation was probably common.¹¹⁶ Local interest and social dynamics were often decisive.¹¹⁷ Religion became entangled in local politics in both Maluku and Nusa Tenggara, where the Dominicans were active.¹¹⁸ If existing relationships were not threatened, coexistence was common. The agrarian “Hindu” Balinese were quite happy to live alongside their trade-oriented Muslim neighbours.¹¹⁹

Some peoples faded from history. Until the beginning of the seventeenth century the coastal inhabitants of northern Halmahera were known to the Portuguese as Moro, which may simply mean they were Muslim.¹²⁰ In the sixteenth century their numbers were estimated to be about 20,000, but they had virtually vanished by the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Moro, Ternate subjects, had been caught up in the fighting between the regional sultanates of Jailolo, Ternate and Tidore, which were themselves entangled in Spanish-Portuguese confrontations. Many Moro died or moved. From the mid-1600s the Tobelo, who were already well known as raiders, began to colonise former Moro lands along the coasts of east Halmahera and Morotai. There, notes Platenkamp, they developed “a territorial order dividing the Tobelo coastal territory into various domains (Tobelo *hoana*)” distancing themselves from the fearsome Tobaru of the interior.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Cummings, “Scripting Islamization”; Roy F. Ellen, “Pragmatism, Identity and the State: How the Nuaulu of Seram have Re-invented their Beliefs and Practices as ‘Religion,’” *Wacana: Jurnal Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya* 15, no. 2 (2014); Jennifer Connolly, “Christian Conversion and Ethnic Identity in East Kalimantan,” in *Casting Faiths: Imperialism and the Transformation of Religion in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Thomas D. DuBois (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Ambon and the Minahasa were example of radical Christianisation. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*; M.J.C. Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983* (Leiden: KITLV, 1998).

¹¹⁷ See, for example, Emilie Wellfelt and Sonny A. Djonler, “Islam in Aru, Indonesia,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 47, no. 138 (2019); Baker, “Indigenous-Driven Mission.”

¹¹⁸ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*, 1st ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1993), 125–34; Hans Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600–1800* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 29–33, 154–5, 286–9; Barbara Watson Andaya, “Between Empires and Emporia: The Economics of Christianization in Early Modern Southeast Asia,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53, no. 1–2 (2010).

¹¹⁹ Adrian Vickers, “Hinduism and Islam in Indonesia: Bali and the Pasisir World,” *Indonesia* 44 (1987); Frederik Barth, *Balinese Worlds* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

¹²⁰ Campbell MacKnight has kindly pointed out that this was a region where Jesuits made significant numbers of converts in the sixteenth century. See Baker, “Indigenous-Driven Mission.”

¹²¹ The Tobelo were one of the non-Austronesian speaking groups in north Maluku. C.L. Voorhoeve, “Contact-Induced Change in the Non-Austronesian Languages in the North Moluccas, Indonesia,” in *Language Contact and Change in the Austronesian World*, ed. Darrell T. Tryon Thomas Edward Dutton (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994). J. Platenkamp, “The Severance of the Origin: A Ritual of the Tobelo of North Halmahera,” *BKI* 146, no. 1 (1990).

The Tobelo's new neighbours were the Galela, whose original homeland also lay in the hilly inland, by the volcanic lakes. Until at least 1666 the Galela lived on the shores of the eponymous lake. They had been first subject to Gamkonora, a powerful realm on Halmahera's west coast, and then to their mutual overlord Ternate. By the early seventeenth century fertile and well populated Gamkonora had become one of Ternate's most important tributaries. However, in 1673 the eruption of Mount Gamkonora destroyed sago forests, ending Gamkonora's prosperity and forcing many Galela to adopt a wandering life.¹²² Fighting between the Dutch and Ternate in 1679–81 caused further emigration.

The long sea-borne campaign of Prince Nuku of Tidore (1781–1801) had a similar centrifugal effect on the Tobelo. During the nineteenth century they settled along the Sulawesi coasts, particularly around Buton and along the eastern littoral. They became renowned raiders, so the name Tobelo became synonymous with "pirate". They were still considered a serious threat in the nineteenth century, until Dutch anti-piracy actions led most to return and settle in Maluku and abandon raiding.¹²³ Later, at the end of the twentieth century, Tobelo and Galela were prominent in Halmahera's religious conflicts.¹²⁴

The Ternate Resident, J. Tobias, described these peoples in 1857:¹²⁵

Both Galela and Tobelo are in their true element when they live like nomads. One can find migrant Tobelo and Galela people on all the islands that make up the kingdom of Bacan [the small Maluku Sultanate south of Ternate and Tidore] and on most of the "uninhabited" islands that surround Ternate, on the Obi islands south of Halmahera, and on the Sula and Banggai islands, where they settle for a shorter or longer period making gardens, collecting resins (damar) or making a livelihood catching fish, turtles and trepang. When they have saved enough, they go back to their homelands, and bury their treasure in deepest secrecy, only to bring all or part of it out to buy a bride, as is their customary way of marriage. Many of these rovers consort with pirates, and other evil rabble, who are happy to have them join their enterprise, as they excel in courage and dismiss dangers.

In the larger ports, visitors, sojourners and settlers from beyond Southeast Asia had their own complex cultural spectra. Labels such as Chinese, Moor (Indian Muslim), Portuguese or European could each cover a range of identities, from those newly arrived from the homeland to local creole communities almost indistinguishable from the locals. These will be described below. Such poly-ethnic centres tended to be, as in Metcalf's description of Brunei, "a place not so much united by a common culture as precariously balanced between intense rivalries".¹²⁶

¹²² Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 92–3.

¹²³ Esther Velthoen, "Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 201–6. Muridan Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780–1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

¹²⁴ Christopher R. Duncan, *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

¹²⁵ Tobias, "Memorie," 31.

¹²⁶ Peter Metcalf, *The Life of the Longhouse: An Archaeology of Ethnicity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 158.

Along Maluku's shores immigrants from Tidore, East Seram, Ternate and Sulawesi mixed with indigenous people. In North Sulawesi, close to long-established trade routes and rich in gold and other commodities, mixed coastal communities such as that of Manado Tua handled exchange. The Muslim inhabitants of Borneo's shores were known as Malays, Bugis, and Suluk (Taosug) but originated through the blending of partially Islamised Dayaks from the interior with such immigrants. The "Banjar Malays" or Banjarese of southeast Kalimantan were Muslim Dayaks with a strong admixture of Javanese and other maritime peoples. In most cases Dayak origins dissolved into a Banjarese identity, but on the western side of the lower Barito a strategically located group known as the Bekumpai were regarded as Dayak by the Banjarese, and as Banjarese by their community of origin, the Ngaju Dayak.¹²⁷ In the early twentieth century, one Dutch writer described the Mandarese population of the west coast Sulawesi harbour of Parepare as being "by descent Toraja", suggesting that inland tribal origins had been subsumed in a Muslim identity.¹²⁸

West Papua's coastal populations were usually Muslim and of mixed local, Seramese and Tidorese origin.¹²⁹ By the beginning of the sixteenth century people from Biak-Numfor were moving west, to the coasts of Cenderawasih Bay (particularly the north coast trading centre of Dore), the Raja Ampat islands and east Halmahera. In Dore they distanced themselves from the ethnically related inland groups they called "Alfuren".¹³⁰ In the Gamrange Biak communities blended with locals. They and the people of Gebe became the intermediaries between Biak and Tidore. During the 1500s, as trade around Cenderawasih Bay and Biak increased, the Numfor language became a regional lingua franca as far west as Sorong, alongside those used by other sailing communities such as those from Geser, South Sulawesi (Bugis, Butonese) and the Tukang Besi (Butonese, Sama Bajau) islands. By the nineteenth century "Papuan" was primarily used to refer to the "black and frizzy-haired" inhabitants of all New Guinea and adjacent islands.¹³¹

Seafaring Communities

Sailors and shipbuilders are predisposed to mingling with strangers, exchanging information and tinkering with boat-design. As traffic patterns changed and innovations adapted, ship construction changed. Examples of such fundamental shifts in the maritime environment include the gradual replacement, after the first millennium, of extreme long-haul voyages by shorter relays between intermediate harbours and the disappearance of the very large indigenous *jong*, non-Chinese junks. These had carried commodities across the western Java Sea before the mid-sixteenth century. These voluminous oceanic ships

¹²⁷ Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*, 61, 77–8, 92, 101.

¹²⁸ H. Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie. Deel Twee.*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1907), 451.

¹²⁹ In the Raja Ampat, the Muslim coastal "Ma'ya", mainly living in Misool, were originally from Waigeo; Bert Remijnsen, *Word-Prosodic Systems of Raja Ampat Languages* (Utrecht: Landelijke Onderzoekschool Taalwetenschap, 2001), Appendix C.

¹³⁰ *ENI*: "Alfoeren".

¹³¹ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 104–5; Holger Warnk, "The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011): 117; Moore, *New Guinea*: 71–2.

were replaced by fleets of rather smaller vessels, including “the South China Sea variant” which combined elements of Chinese design and that of the bigger local vessels they were replacing. This emerging synthesis could have begun after Kublai Khan’s expedition to Java in 1293, when many Chinese remained behind, and may be connected to the changes in routes. Warships evolved in the opposite direction, becoming bigger galley-type vessels under the influence of Turkish and Portuguese shipwrights.¹³²

In Southwest Sulawesi *pinisi* vessels are seen as cherished symbols of the Bugis and Makassarese seafaring traditions. The *pinisi*, with fore-and-aft Western rigging, was developed in the second half of the nineteenth century to compete with the growing fleet of Western schooners, barks and brigantines. It had been preceded by the flexibly rigged *paduwakang*, a three-masted ship with rectangular sails, double rudders, and a distinctive profile characterised by a long bow and high, protruding stern. This was the most common South Sulawesi ship type in the eighteenth century. The *paduwakang* itself had displaced earlier non-Sulawesian types such as the *chialoup*, hybrid European sloops built on Java, and local boats, such as the small *pankor* and the *gonting*.¹³³



Image 11 Trading perahu off Selayar, 1899, South Sulawesi¹³⁴

¹³² Pierre-Yves Manguin, “Ships and Shipping in Southeast Asia,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Asian History* (2017); Anthony Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia,” in *Sojourners and Settlers. Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 17–8.

¹³³ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 45–52. See also, Adrian Horridge, “The Lambo or Prahú Boat: a Western ship in an Eastern Setting” (London: National Maritime Museum, 1979); Adrian Horridge, *The Prahú: Traditional Sailing Boat of Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981); Adrian Horridge, *Sailing Craft of Indonesia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).

¹³⁴ “Handelsprauw zeilend ten zuiden van Celebes”. Photograph G.F. Tydeman, from the Amsterdam *Scheepvaartmuseum* (National Maritime Museum, Amsterdam, henceforth ASM). ASM S.3319 (207)a. Courtesy of the Museum. This shows a *pinisi*-rigged vessel on a *palari*-type hull.

Maluku and Philippine boats were typically *kora kora*, outrigger canoes.¹³⁵ These were usually paddled, although the larger vessels also carried a simple sail. In the late sixteenth century the *kora kora* proved to be essential to early European travel in the waters around Papua and Maluku.¹³⁶ In Maluku *orembaai*, built-up ships with a keel, were used for passenger transport, but there was great variation in types, ranging from canoe-like boats to fully fledged sailing vessels. The seagoing Sama Dilaut and Sama Bajau lived much of their lives in their houseboats, the *lepa* or *lepa lepa*, the larger of which were known as *kumpit*.¹³⁷

In his voyage through the eastern archipelagos in the mid-1770s Thomas Forrest sailed a “Tartar-galley, ... a Sooloo boat, or prow, of about ten tons burthern”, with a 25-foot keel, a draft of three-and-a-half feet, and a single triangular sail. In Maluku he raised the sides by one plank, to cope with the New Guinea waters, and “at Magindano (when I had leifure [sic], I decked her, and turned her into a schooner”.¹³⁸ In 1856 Wallace sailed from Bacan to Ternate on a *kora kora*:¹³⁹

The boat was ... quite open, very low, and about four tons burthen. It had outriggers of bamboo about five feet off each side, which supported a bamboo platform extending the whole length of the vessel. On the extreme outside of this sit the twenty rowers, while within was a convenient passage fore and aft. The middle portion of the boat was covered with a thatch-house, in which baggage and passengers are stowed; the gunwale was not more than a foot above water, and from the great top and side weight, and general clumsiness, these boats are dangerous in heavy weather, and are not unfrequently lost. A triangle mast and mat sail carried us on when the wind was favourable,¹⁴⁰—which (as usual) it never was, although, according to the monsoon, it ought to have been. Our water, carried in bamboos, would only last two days, and as the voyage occupied seven, we had to touch at a great many places.

¹³⁵ For descriptions, see *ibid.*; Alfred C. Haddon, *The Canoes of Melanesia, Queensland, and New Guinea* (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1937).

¹³⁶ “The nautical characteristics of the *kora-kora* made it a perfect instrument for the coastal navigation and to navigate both among shoals and through the vast number of small islands. Light and swift, with a shallow draught, the *kora-kora* proved to be a major key in the success of Miguel Roxo de Brito’s expedition”, J. Doumenjou, “*Kora-kora, Junks and Baroto: Insulindian Boats in Portuguese Warfare and Trade according to the Relaçion of Miguel Roxo de Brito (1581–1582)*,” *Anais de Historia de Alem-Mar* 12(2011): Abstract.

¹³⁷ Jesusa L. Paquibot, “*Lepa: The Sea as Home*,” in *Traditional Shipbuilding Technique*, ed. Kwon Huh (Korea: UNESCO, 2016).

¹³⁸ Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: Including an Account of Magindano, Sooloo, and Other Islands; and Illustrated with Thirty Copper Plates: Performed in the Tartar Galley, Belonging to the Honourable East India Company, during the years 1774, 1775, and 1776* (London: G. Scott, 1779), 9–11.

¹³⁹ Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*, 266.

¹⁴⁰ *Kora kora* could only be sailed before the wind; in bad weather, Olivier reported, the “the foremost rowers can be underwater to their hips, or even their necks”: Johannes Olivier, *Land- en zee-toegen in Nederland’s Indië, en eenige Britsche etablissementen, gedaan in de jaren 1817 tot 1826* (Amsterdam: C.G. Sulpke, 1827–30).

Kora kora, manned by multiple rows of paddlers seated on the main hull and outriggers were eminently suited to warfare and piracy. Johannes Olivier, writing around 1824, described them as the “true warships”, extremely fast. They normally carried sixty to seventy rowers, some fifty warriors, a few small cannon, swivel guns and firearms. The last were generally in poor condition.¹⁴¹ The largest boats could carry a couple of hundred men, their tempo fixed by drums and song. Rulers were generally not averse to offering cover to useful pirates, in exchange for protection for their own shipping and a share of the spoils.

Boundaries between pirates, privateers and traders were flexible, as was noted in chapter one.¹⁴² Chiefs and rulers alike commonly saw the attacking of vessels belonging to hostile competitors as doubly advantageous. Friendly shipping would be protected, and visiting traders offered security, at least in port and offshore waters, while defeated enemies lost goods and prestige. Individual skippers were not always averse to easy pickings when the opportunity offered. In some societies this was institutionalised and annual, as was the case in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries among the southern Philippines Iranun and Balangingi, described below.

Shore-dwellers from west Papua were also feared pirates. Their *rak*, or expeditions, were already ravaging eastern Indonesian coasts in the sixteenth century. The annual “Onin Flotilla” headed south to Aru, Kei or Tanimbar, (south)west to Seram Laut, Seram, Buru and Ambon, or north to the Sula Islands, Banggai and North Sulawesi.¹⁴³ Most fleets, often from Misool and Salawati in the Raja Ampat archipelago, also included people from Maluku, men from the Gamrange region of Southeast Halmahera, and others from Seram’s north coast or the Ambon islands. Collaborative efforts were directed at kidnapping and trading people for ransom, which was more important than slave-selling before the later seventeenth century. Allied local groups captured people from the interior for delivery to the ships.¹⁴⁴ Peaceful trade in Papua’s massoi, plumes and slaves was primarily handled by visiting shippers from Seram and Banda.¹⁴⁵

The people most closely identified with the sea were those grouped together under the exonym of Sama Bajau. These Austronesians are thought to have originated in the Southern Philippines and then spread through the eastern archipelagos from the eleventh century. Sometimes described as “sea nomads” or “sea gypsies”, they specialised in the exploitation of marine resources throughout the waters of Sulu, northeast Borneo, North Sulawesi, west Halmahera, southeast and southwest Sulawesi, and the north coasts of

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² From the very extensive literature, see the bibliography: Mabee, “Pirates, Privateers and the Political Economy of Private Violence”; Antony, “Piracy and the Shadow Economy”; Campo, “Asymmetry, Disparity and Cyclicity”; Prange, “Trade of No Dishonor”; Teitler, “Piracy in Southeast Asia”; Velthoen, “Sailing in Dangerous Waters.”


¹⁴³ Goodman, “The Sosolot Exchange Network,” 438.

¹⁴⁴ Gerrit Knaap, “Robbers and Traders: Papuan Piracy in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010); Muridan Widjojo, “Papuan Raiding Enterprise in the Moluccan Waters of the 18th Century,” in *TANAP* (Xiamen, 2003).

¹⁴⁵ Andaya, “Massoi.”

Nusa Tenggara.¹⁴⁶ They lived on their boats, moving with the seasons. This distinguished them from land-dwelling traders who undertook regular trans-regional voyages, although these could stay away for six months a year, carrying their own cargoes or others on commission. Some boats were tramps, remaining at sea until they had accumulated sufficient commodities to return to their homes.

Sama Bajau roles and identities were complex and varied; degrees of settlement, conversion to Islam, changing lifestyles and links with land-based states meant they were often classified as being Tausug, Makassarese, Malay or Bugis. In Sulu the sea-dwelling communities, the Sama Dilaut, like their land-based equivalents, “rank near the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy; they identify themselves internally by provenance, but there are status differences among the places of origin; those with no strong ties to a particular site all choose to name themselves *sama balangingi*.”¹⁴⁷



Map 8 Sama Bajau¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Kemp A. Pallesen, *Culture Contact and Language Convergence*, LSP Special Monograph Issue, 24 (Manila: Linguistic Society of the Philippines, 1985); David E. Sopher, *The Sea Nomads: a Study of the Maritime Boat People of Southeast Asia*, 2nd ed. (Singapore: National Museum, 1977).

¹⁴⁷ Frake, “Cultural Construction of Rank.”

¹⁴⁸ Adrian Lopian, “Orang Laut - Bajak Laut - Raja Laut: Sejarah Kawasan Laut Sulawesi Abad XIX” (PhD diss., Universiti Gadjah Mada, 1987).

Sometime in the mid-thirteenth century Sama Bajau, led by their lord or *Papug*, settled in southwest Sulawesi. From the early sixteenth century, they served early kingdoms such as Luwu and Siang (Pangkajene). Sama Bajau tradition records that the Gowa King promised them “freedom in regard to the laws, in regard to the adat of Papuq. They would also be free to use the rivers, the wells as well as wood.... The door of Gowa is open for you”.¹⁴⁹ Sama Bajau were also skilled sea fighters; they spearheaded the expansion of Makassarese influence along the coasts of east Borneo, north and east Sulawesi, around Buton, Ternate, Tidore, Lombok and Sumbawa. The “Makassarese” sent fleets to Nusa Tenggara in the fifteenth century. Talloq was the driving force, as its maritime capacity was based on long alliance with the Sama Bajau from the offshore islands. These allies were rewarded with their own realm, Sandao. This encompassed much of west Flores. In Manggarai the main ports, Pota and Reo, were centres for the trade in sea and coastal products as well as slaves.

Cornelis Speelman, the admiral commanding the forces which conquered Makassar in 1669, commented:¹⁵⁰

The people that men call Badjous, lived here in quite large numbers before the war, under the jurisdiction of Makassar, and mostly dwelt on the islands before Labakkang [Pangkajene], particularly on Salemo.... They also voyage to all the islands further out to sea, in order to collect tortoise-shell from them. This they are obliged to deliver to the King of Makassar. Furthermore, they must always be ready to go with their boats in any direction they may be sent, wherever the king from time to time sees more advantage to be gained, since they are the type of men who are known as slaves of the king [*hamba raja*].... They are a very useful people.

Following Makassar’s defeat some Sama Bajau became clients of Bone, the VOC’s main Bugis ally. The port of Bajoe developed into a new Sama Bajau realm, the Lolo Bajau polity. Nolde concludes: “The Sama Bajo polities headed by the Papuq and the Lolo Bajo were instrumental in the creation, expansion, and maintenance of trade networks which fed the ports of Makassar, Bajoe, Pota and Reo in Sandao, and elsewhere, thereby contributing to the wealth and power of their allies in Gowa-Talloq and Bone respectively”.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Lance Nolde, “Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period” (PhD diss., University of Hawai’i, 2014), 244–57.

¹⁵⁰ John Villiers, “Makassar: The Rise and Fall of an East Indonesian Maritime Trading State, 1512–1669,” in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 145–6. See Speelman’s 1669 manuscript typed out in 1949–1950 on the initiative of W. Coolhaas and H.J. De Graaf of the KITLV Leiden. Cornelis Speelman, “Notitie dienende voor eenen corten tijt en tot nader last van de Hooge Regeeringe op Batavia, tot naarrigtinge van de Onderkoopman Jan van den Oppijnen, bij provisie gesteldt tot Opperhoofd en Commandant in ’t Casteel Rotterdam, op Maccasser, en van den Capitain Jan Fransz; als hoofd over de Militie, mitsgaders die van den Raadt,” in *Manuscripts No. H 802*, ed. KITLV (1669).

¹⁵¹ Nolde, “Changing Tides,” 286–342; Jennifer L. Gaynor, *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 87–97; Christian Pelras, “Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l’archipel Nusantaraien,” *Archipel* 3 (1972).

The mobility and skills of the Sama Bajau were highly valued, as Forrest noted on his travels. He described the many Bajau fishermen at Sulu “who by their long residence, are become vassals of the Datoos [chiefs], but as they were originally from another country, and speak, beside the Sulu, a language of their own, their superiors are more tender at oppressing them, than their immediate vassals on the islands”.¹⁵² Such “tenderness” reflected the datu’s awareness that the Bajau could move on if demands became oppressive.

The well-informed George Windsor Earl observed that most east Borneo river mouths harboured:¹⁵³

Orang Badju, a kind of sea-gipsies.... They dwell in boats of eight- or ten-tons burthen, which are covered, when in harbour, with a roof of matting. Each boat contains about fifteen inhabitants, men, women and children, who employ themselves chiefly in catching and curing fish and trepang, and in making salt from sea-weed.... During the Southeast monsoon, when the weather is fine in the southern parts of the island, they cruize about Passir and Pulau Laut; but when the monsoon changes, and the weather becomes tempestuous, they sail to the northern parts of the island.... Many of the Badjus remain throughout the year near the Dutch settlement off Macassar ... where they are found very useful in carrying despatches. They are chiefly employed by the Chinese in fishing for trepang, or sea-slug, and according to the policy invariably adopted by the latter in their dealings with the natives, are generally involved in debt, from which extrication is nearly hopeless. The demand against each boat or family usually averages about four hundred guilders (twenty-five pounds sterling): and, extraordinary as it may appear, no instance is on record of their ever having absconded to avoid the payment of their debts.

The Sama Bajau were established in Mindanao and Sulu before the arrival of the Tausug, who asserted their dominance and claimed precedence.¹⁵⁴ Names reflect perceptions of origins; the Tausug were the “people of the current”, while Mindanao’s Maguindanau were the “people of the plains”. However, by the mid-seventeenth century the Maguindanau and the related coastal Iranun (Ilanun) and Maranao (the “people of the lake”) were established seafarers. The last two were never actually incorporated into the Sultanate but lived under their own petty rulers within the realm. The “Lanun” were infamous raiders during the late eighteenth century, but by its end they had been surpassed by the Balangingi Sama.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), 329, 330, 374.

¹⁵³ G.W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1837), 334–6.

¹⁵⁴ Thomas Kiefer, *The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1972).

¹⁵⁵ James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002); James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981).

Despite the southern Philippines reputation as the home of pirates, peaceful trade had been the region's main resource, as Saleeby describes:¹⁵⁶

The Sulus are natural-born sailors, and their famous pearl industry has prompted them to trade since time immemorial. Their boats [indirectly] brought silk, amber, silver, scented woods, and porcelain from China and Japan; gold dust, wax, dyes, saltpetre, slaves, and food stuffs from Luzon, the Bisayas, and Mindanao; gunpowder, cannon, brass, copper, iron, rubies, and diamonds from Malacca and Brunei; pepper and spices from Java, the Moluccas, and Celebes. Chinese merchants traded with Sulu long before the arrival of Legaspi, and while Manila and Sebu were still small and insignificant settlements, Jolo had reached the proportions of a city and was, without exception, the richest and foremost settlement in the Philippine Islands. Jolo, with the exception of Brunei, had no rival in north-east Malaysia prior to the seventeenth century.

The long-range seafarers of South Sulawesi come from the west or south of the island; the peoples of the north and centre, such as the Manadonese and Gorontaloese, were not sea oriented. The true sailors from the southwestern peninsula were the Mandarese of the west coast, the Buginese of the central and east coasts and the Makassarese of the southern coast.¹⁵⁷ The Butonese from the tip of the southeastern peninsula were sailors, but less wide-ranging. Arable land was limited in Mandar and Buton, which encouraged reliance on marine resources. Conversely, the fertile and rice producing Bugis and Makassarese lands provided the resource bases sustaining overseas expansion and attracted traders seeking provisions.

The Wajo Bugis, living near a junction of land, lake, river and sea-routes, may have been active shippers in the thirteenth century; this could also have been the case with Suppa on the west coast. Before the fall of Makassar there were about a thousand Wajorese living there.¹⁵⁸ At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese apothecary Tomé Pires, in Melaka soon after its defeat, described two sorts of sailors from “Makassar” who came to Melaka.¹⁵⁹ The first have generally been assumed to be “Bugis”, while the second, the corsairs who take women to sea, were Sama Bajau. However, Gene Ammarell describes “small Bugis kingdoms taxing and trading with foreign merchants while directing their own seafaring activities towards diplomacy and the adventures of young nobles”.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Timothy Marr, “Diasporic Intelligences in the American Philippine Empire: The Transnational Career of Dr. Najeeb Mitry Saleeby,” *Mashriq&Mahjar* 2, no. 1 (2014).

¹⁵⁷ Particularly those from the Konjo-speakers of Bira; with thanks to Greg Acciaolili for this point.

¹⁵⁸ J. Noorduyn, “The Wajorese Merchants’ Community in Makassar,” in *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaoli, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 188 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000). Kathryn Anderson Wellen, *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora* (DeKalb: NIU, 2014), 19–20. During the 1500s the “formidable and influential maritime alliance” of the Ajattaparang, led by Suppaq, had ties extending up to Toli-toli on the North Sulawesi coast and down to Bantaeng on the southern; but was defeated by Makassar in the mid-sixteenth century. Druce, *Lands*, 223–45.

¹⁵⁹ Gaynor, *Intertidal History*, 36–44.

¹⁶⁰ Gene Ammarell, *Bugis Navigation* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Program, 1999), 11.



Image 12 Seven unknown Bugis in Singapore, 1865¹⁶¹

An early Dutch visitor commented: “The Makassarese are lazy and a very slow race, mainly occupied with fishing and planting rice; there are a few who sail to Solor and thereabouts”.¹⁶² They were more focussed on land trade, while the nobility taxed the sea-traffic of the Sama Bajau, Malays and Javanese. However, Portuguese influence stimulated elite investment and participation in sea-borne commerce.¹⁶³ By the eighteenth century the Makassarese were known as fishermen and gatherers of marine produce, sailing as far as Australia.¹⁶⁴

Voyaging became much more extensive when many fled Sulawesi following Makassar’s defeat by the VOC (1669); they established settlements scattered through the islands. Refugees included Makassar’s Bugis Wajorese allies; a second wave left Wajo after its conquest by Bone in 1671. In the early 1700s the head of Makassar’s Wajorese community, Ammana Gappa, codified a set of laws governing trade. His priorities are revealing. The sixth clause specifies 15 assets required by a *nakhoda* or captain. The first was light and heavy weapons, and ammunition, the second a strong ship, the third capital, and the rest referred to crew management and knowledge of navigation.¹⁶⁵ Over time, the Bugis further

¹⁶¹ “Portret van zeven onbekende Boeginezen in Singapore. Bugis. Singapoer (titel op object)”. RM RP-F-2001-7-1122H-55. Published in J.F. Watson and J.W. Kaye, *The People of India; a Series of Photographic Illustrations, with Descriptive Letterpress, of the Races and Tribes of Hindustan* (London: India Museum, 1868). Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.605250>.

¹⁶² Netherlands National Archives, The Hague, VOC collection (NA VOC) 1127 f.575.

¹⁶³ B.J.O. Schrieke, “The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth century,” in *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), 64–72.

¹⁶⁴ C.C. Macknight, *The Voyage to Marege: Macassan Trepanners in Northern Australia* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1976).

¹⁶⁵ Ph. O.L. Tobing, *Hukum Pelajaran dan Perdagangan Amana Gappa* (Makassar: Jajasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, 1961), 51.

developed their sea-faring traditions and knowledge.¹⁶⁶ The Wajorese were the archipelagos most renowned traders. The Mandarese were also sailors, shippers, traders and raiders, but never achieved the same level of fame among nineteenth-century European observers as did the Wajorese.

By the eighteenth century, outsiders were using the term “Bugis” to refer not just to Buginese-speakers originating from South Sulawesi and their scattered settlements, but also to linguistically distinct but culturally similar peoples such as the Mandarese and Makassarese. Muslim trading groups, including Malays, Banjarese, settlers from the southern Philippines and Sama Bajau could be absorbed into Bugis communities, just as individual Bugis might become Malay or Banjarese. It is also possible that during Makassar’s hegemony travellers might have chosen to identify themselves as Makassarese, while with Bone’s ascendancy after 1669 the Bugis label may have conferred greater prestige and perhaps protection. However, in the late 1800s, a writer on Aru remarked of incomers “they are either Chinese or Makassarese. But these last are all inhabitants of Celebes, mainly Buginese and Wajorese. There are few real Makassarese on Aru”.¹⁶⁷

The extent to which identifications faded, persisted or mutated depended on context. For example, Leirissa suggests that the fused Makassarese-Bugis trading groups in Ambon and Ternate evolved quite differently. The Makassar-Bugis identity persisted in Ternate, where their cultural coherence, maintained through intermarriage and Islam, was also demarcated by their ties to the Sultan. Their corporate existence was reinforced by the granting of military titles to their leaders. But they were by no means a homogenous group. In the late 1800s a well-informed official commented of Ternate’s “Makassarese”: “The name “Moslem citizens” would really be more suitable for this group”; people even spoke of the “Javanese Makassarese”.¹⁶⁸ In Ambon, however, there was no indigenous ruler; there the Makassarese-Bugis blended with the local population.¹⁶⁹

G.W. Earl believed that the maritime pre-eminence of Bugis over Makassarese was reinforced by their respective connections with Singapore (est. 1819). The former’s networks dominated trade between independent harbours and Singapore, while Makassarese from the Dutch-dominated southern peninsula tended to be fishermen. In 1848 Earl explained:¹⁷⁰

The Dutch settlement at Macassar is small and of little importance, except that it acts as a check on the commercial enterprise of the Macassars, who are even more skilful navigators than the Bughis. The trade of the eastern islands was once chiefly in their hands, but the prohibition on the importation of British calicoes at Macassar, together with the great discouragement given by the authorities to intercourse with Singapore, has enabled the

¹⁶⁶ C.C.F.M. Le Roux, “Boegineesche zeekaarten van den Indisch Archipel,” *Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* 2de Serie 52, no. 5 (1935).

¹⁶⁷ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, “De Aroe-eilanden, geographisch, ethnographisch en commercieel,” *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 99–100.

¹⁶⁸ Clercq, “Ternate,” 11.

¹⁶⁹ R.Z. Leirissa, “The Structure of Makassar-Bugis Trade in Pre-Modern Moluccas,” *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993): 79–80.

¹⁷⁰ Macknight, *Voyage to Marege*: 15. This quotation is from the Parliamentary papers, House of Lords; no. 149, 1843, and was reprinted in *The Nautical Magazine* 20, no. 1 (1851).

Bughis successfully to rival them in all branches of the eastern trade, excepting that with the north coast of Australia, which, being a fishery and not requiring articles of European manufacture, the Macassars still retain.

Access to Singapore cargoes undoubtedly strengthened Bugis commerce, but the divergence between the Sulawesi seafaring peoples had deeper roots and had been reinforced by political trends from the late seventeenth century.

Early sixteenth century Europeans knew “Papua” as a place east of Banda. To Iberians “the Papuans” were the Biak people “the seafarers of New Guinea, who from time immemorial had exported massoia bark, birds, slaves and jungle products to the Indonesian Archipelago”.¹⁷¹ They used canoes with a single outrigger for shorter trips, but for long trading journeys and war preferred a double outrigger with bulwarks. Their raids took them far beyond the Raja Ampat and Onin, reaching Halmahera, Gorontalo, Buton, Ambon, Aru and Tanimbar.

Not all coastal populations were inclined to seafaring; Nusa Tenggara offers several examples.¹⁷² In the early 1800s, Earl described the Balinese as “averse to engaging personally in maritime enterprise”, noting that sea-borne trade was carried out by foreigners, mainly Chinese from Java and Makassar, as well as Buginese from Bone and Mandar. Among the islands stretching from Sumbawa to west Timor, Makassarese and Bugis dominated maritime exchange.¹⁷³ In Flores, for example, it is said that visitors from Sulawesi frequented the north coast around the later Maumere during the late sixteenth century.¹⁷⁴ Timor was well known to Chinese, Javanese and Melaka traders long before the arrival of Europeans, but the Timorese themselves had no ships, and were said to have a great (“almost hysterical”) fear of the sea; they depended on visitors for the export of their sandalwood.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, throughout most of Nusa Tenggara immigrants, sojourners and passing vessels handled non-local shipping. A late nineteenth-century Dutch observer compared attitudes within the island chain stretching from Papua to Timor: “If on the Tanimbar and Leti islands the inhabitants eagerly await the annual arrival of foreign traders, this is less the case on Luang, because the people there are seafarers who can take their own products wherever they are in demand”.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Gelpke, “Origin of the Name Papua,” 326. “Clearly, the people referred to as ‘Papua’ in the sixteenth-century Portuguese and Spanish sources belonged almost exclusively to the Biak tribe.... In the same way, the evidence from maps and charts points to the region of East Halmahera, Gebe, Gag and Waigeo as the cradle of the name Papua. A considerable proportion of the inhabitants of this area belong(ed) to the Biak tribe.” Donahue, “Some trade languages.” See also Earl, 1853; Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen*; Ballard, 2008.

¹⁷² G.W. Earl, “The Trading Ports of the Indian Archipelago,” *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands etc* 4 (1850): 542.

¹⁷³ I Gde Parimartha, “Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815–1915” (Vrije Universiteit, 1995).

¹⁷⁴ E. Douglas Lewis, *The Stranger-Kings of Sikka* (Leiden: KITLV, 2010), 250.

¹⁷⁵ Roever, “Warlords of Larantuka,” 230, note 3.

¹⁷⁶ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, “De Afdeeling Babar en Leti-eilanden,” *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 198.

Conversely, some groups generally thought of as land-bound also traded by sea; in many cases this could reflect seagoing traditions dating back to earlier coastal settlement. This was true of the Ngaju Dayak of the Lower Kapuas and Barito, notably those of the neighbouring areas of Bekumpai and Pulau Petak. In the early nineteenth century the Bekumpai Dayak controlled most of the downriver trade, and also launched raids into the Java Sea.¹⁷⁷ In the mid-1800s the Ngaju of Pulau Petak, (introduced in the previous chapter) were described as having “a great love of trade”. They built large sea-going perahu, mainly for Singapore voyages. The “whole overseas trade [of Mendawai, east of Banjarmasin] is largely in the hands of the Dayaks of Pulau Petak, who have settled there with that purpose”.¹⁷⁸

Incomers

Local and regional exchange systems were connected to transoceanic trade by the seasonal activities of shippers from the China Sea and Indian Oceans, by sojourners and settler communities.¹⁷⁹ James Chin distinguishes seven main pre-seventeenth century overlapping spheres of Hokkien activity in Southeast Asia, that is, of Hokkien-speaking Chinese from southeastern Fujian province. Batavia was the focus of the first zone, which encompassed most of the Indonesian archipelago: Java, the south of Sumatra and Borneo, as well as Makassar and Maluku. The second was centred on Melaka and Patani, including the Malay Peninsula and North Sumatra. The third, dominated by Ayutthaya, consisted of South Siam and Cochin China. The fourth, focussed on Hoi-An (Champa) stretched from South Vietnam to Macau. Sulu was the leading entrepôt in Chin’s fifth sphere, covering the Southern Philippines and northern Borneo; the sixth, with Manila as the hub, extended over south Fujian, Taiwan and Luzon, while Nagasaki was the chief port of the seventh.¹⁸⁰

Such helpful categorisations inevitably underplay cross-cutting traffic and the magnetism of major entrepôts. The eastern archipelagos, as defined here, lay between Chin’s first (Batavia) and fifth (Sulu) spheres. But the ports of Spanish Manila and Dutch Batavia drew traffic from multiple zones, despite restrictions. Both were hubs for traffic with China, and their Chinese communities were sources of credit and capital. Moreover, Manila was an old trading partner of Makassar; the fact that Makassar Chinese were once commonly called “sangleys”, the term used for Manila’s Chinese, indicates early close connections.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*, 73–4, 90–1.

¹⁷⁸ J. Pijnappel, “Beschrijving van het Westelijke Gedeelte van de Zuider-en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo (De Afdeeling Sampit en de Zuidkust),” *BKI* 7 (1860): 305, 345.

¹⁷⁹ Reid, “Flows.”

¹⁸⁰ James K. Chin, “Junk Trade, Business Networks and Sojourning Communities: Hokkien Merchants in Early Maritime Asia,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 6, no. 2 (2009). For an analysis of another highly structured trading network see Sebouh Aslanian, “Social Capital, ‘Trust’ and the Role of Networks in Julfan Trade: Informal and Semi-formal Institutions at Work,” *Journal of Global History* 1, no. 3 (2006).

¹⁸¹ A.A. Cense, “Sanggalea, an Old Word for “Chinese” in South Celebes,” *BKI* 111, no. 1 (1955); Henning Klöter, *The Language of the Sangleys: A Chinese Vernacular in Missionary Sources of the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).



Image 13 Chinese men in Manado, 1873¹⁸²

Settlers who could afford to travel to and from China maintained double households and families in both locations. Profit was invested in business, but also in Southern Chinese land. Young kinsmen were sent to distant but promising commercial centres, with the specific intention of extending trading networks. The need for Chinese sons was also strong, so traders often adopted promising new arrivals, or married them to their daughters. More formal social strategies were based on southern Chinese institutions; specific cults were popular among shippers and in the diaspora. Temple and clan organisations were essential to commercial networks, as their bonds of trust sustained ties among scattered emigrant communities and connections with the homeland. Sworn brotherhoods (“secret societies”) ensured loyal and if necessary militant followings for local leaders, who were also the main merchants.¹⁸³

¹⁸² “Chinese mannen te Manado”. Photographer unknown. KITLV 90616. <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:811451>. Creative Commons CC BY License.

¹⁸³ Kwee Hui Kian, “The Expansion of the Chinese Inter-Insular and Hinterland Trade in Southeast Asia, c. 1400–1850,” in *Environment, Trade and Society in Southeast Asia: A Longue Durée Perspective*, ed. David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: Brill, 2015). Kwee Hui Kian, “Pockets of Empire: Integrating the Studies on Social Organizations in Southeast China and Southeast Asia,” *Journal of Contemporary Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 27, no. 3 (2007). Chin, in “Junk Trade,” 58, notes that the Lin genealogies record 202 buried overseas: 58 in Batavia, 32 Manila, 31 Semarang, 22 Cambodia; others sojourned in Banjarmasin, Cirebon, Denmark, Ambon, Bangkok, Ligor, Annam and Japan.

Indian activities are less well known than Chinese, although Arabs, Persians and Indians had sailed between the Arabian and South China Seas for hundreds of years.¹⁸⁴ The actual origin of merchants labelled “Moor” or “Khoja” in Southeast Asian ports is often uncertain.¹⁸⁵ “Khoja” could refer to Persians, Gujerati, traders from Coromandel, Malabar, Bengal and even Armenians. Before the nineteenth century foreign Muslims concentrated in quarters like the Pekojan in Batavia, clustered around “Moorish” mosques going back to the mid-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The role of these communities was never as great in the eastern archipelagos as in the west. Late seventeenth-century Indian textile imports were theoretically monopolised by the Dutch, but Bugis and Malay shippers smuggled them in from western archipelago ports. Local weaving continued, although this tradition was eventually changed by the wide-spread adaptation of western yarns and cloth. These displaced Indian textiles.¹⁸⁶

In the mid-1700s Arabs from the Yemeni Hadhramaut were increasingly active in the Melaka Straits and along the west Kalimantan coast. Many bore the title of *sayyid*, or less commonly *sharif*, indicating that they were descended from the Prophet; their prestige enabled them to maintain close ties with Muslim courts, chiefs and traders.¹⁸⁷ Their role was initially limited in the east, but their share of shipping grew in the early nineteenth century (in Java their fleet more than doubled between 1820 and 1850), particularly in Maluku and Nusa Tenggara. Later they made effective use of the new commercial possibilities opened by steam shipping.¹⁸⁸ There were also many less integrated adventurers, such as Sharif Muhammad Taha, leader of the Maguindanao “pirate” colony at Tolitoli on the high northwest coast of Sulawesi in the later nineteenth century.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁴ Ranabir Chakravarti, “Seafaring, Ships and Ship Owners: India and the Indian Ocean (AD 700–1500),” in *Ships and the Development of Maritime Technology on the Indian Ocean*, ed. Ruth Barnes and David Parkin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Sushil Chaudhury, “Maritime Trade in the Indian Ocean, c. 1600–1800,” *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh* (2010).

¹⁸⁵ R.J. Barendse, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe East Gate Books, 2002).

¹⁸⁶ Prasannan Parthasarathi, *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); William G. Clarence-Smith, “The Production of Cotton Textiles in Early Modern South-East Asia,” in *The Spinning World: A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200–1850*, ed. Giorgio Riello and Prasannan Parthasarathi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

¹⁸⁷ R. Michel Feener, “Shaykh Yusuf and the Appreciation of Muslim ‘Saints’ in Modern Indonesia,” *Journal for Islamic Studies* 18–19 (1999): 112–3; Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim: Geneology and Mobility across the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). From the bibliography. Freitag and Clarence-Smith, *Hadrami Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen*; Barendse, *The Arabian Seas*; Andaya, *World of Maluku*; Kathirithamby-Wells, “Hadhrami Projections of Southeast Asian Identity.”

¹⁸⁸ F.J.A. Broeze, “The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820–1850,” *Archipel* 18 (1979): 257; William Gervase Clarence-Smith, “The Economic Role of the Arab Community in Maluku, 1816 to 1940,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 26, no. 74 (1998): 36–8; William G. Clarence-Smith, “Entrepreneurial Strategies of Hadhrami Arabs in Southeast Asia, c. 1750s–1950s,” in *The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation?*, ed. Ahmed Abushouk and Hassan A. Ibrahim (Leiden: Brill, 2009); William G. Clarence-Smith, “Horse Trading: the Economic Role of Arabs in the Lesser Sunda Islands, c.1800 to c.1940,” in *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s*, ed. Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

¹⁸⁹ R.Z. Leirissa, “Bugis-Makassar in the Port Towns Ambon and Ternate through the Nineteenth Century,” *BKI* 156, no. 3 (2000): 245.

European incomers arrived in state-backed fleets,¹⁹⁰ but the evolution of local communities was varied. Portugal was a small country. Lisbon's state in the east, the *Estado da Índia*, was centred on Goa on the northwest Indian Konkan coast (1509–1961). It was short of ships, men and money, leaving settled Portuguese-Asian communities in Macau, Timor, Flores and Makassar to sustain Lusitanian trade in the South China Sea and archipelagos. Catholicism was the crucial integrating force in these societies, while creole *casados* (householders) were their backbone. The distinction between white (incoming) and black (mestizo or converted) Portuguese was universal. In the late sixteenth century, when monopolistic “concession” voyages were sold by the authorities, private Portuguese and Asian shippers began to develop their own routes. Macanese from Macau were the most active in the east.¹⁹¹ Souza describes how this multi-ethnic community organised the small fleets that sailed not just to regional Portuguese enclaves, such as Makassar (before 1660) and Timor, but also to Aceh, Mauritius, Coromandel, Manila and Batavia.¹⁹²

In the early seventeenth century increasing Dutch strength on the Coromandel coast, Maluku and Ambon reduced Portuguese opportunities. Subrahmanyam concluded that this led, in the medium term, “to the decline of the *casado* (married, or burgher) merchant, and the emergence ... [by 1640] of a new, free-wheeling merchant, of a type that was sometimes called a *solteiro* (literally bachelor)...”¹⁹³ There were also the *Lançados* (the thrown out), free-lance soldiers working as mercenaries in local states.¹⁹⁴ The Dutch Company would have handled such renegades harshly; it was much more institutionalised, paying salaries, enforcing regulations and frowning on too flagrant a display of corruption.¹⁹⁵ Schrieke quotes an early seventeenth-century Dutch source on the Portuguese:¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰ Roderich Ptak, “China and Portugal at Sea: The Early Ming Trading system and the Estado da India Compared,” *Revista de Cultura (Macau)* 13/14 (1991).

¹⁹¹ For an overview, Byrne, “Luso-Asians and Other Eurasians”; Om Prakash, “The Trading World of India and Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Period,” *Archipel* 56 (1998): 31–42; Subrahmanyam, *Portuguese Empire in Asia*; Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia*; Andaya, “Between Empires and Emporia.”

¹⁹² George Bryan Souza, “The Portuguese Merchant Fleet at Macao in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005). Macau was governed by a municipal council, the *Senado da Camara*, which also set customs duties. Everyone, including Canton Chinese and the church, invested in maritime trade. The local fleet was small: 6 to 8 vessels in 1684, which expanded to 13 or 15 in the late 1710s. It only began to expand in the late 18th century with cargoes of cotton and opium from India, and as Portugal benefited from its neutrality in the European wars (until 1807). Timor was important both politically and economically.

¹⁹³ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “A Dominican Voyage through the Indies, ca. 1600,” *Archipel* 57, no. 2 (1999): 226.

¹⁹⁴ In Africa: Philip J. Havik and M.D.D. Newit, *Creole Societies in the Portuguese Colonial Empire* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2015).

¹⁹⁵ Francisco Bethencourt, “Low Cost Empire: Interaction between Portuguese and Local Societies in Asia,” in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 124–5.

¹⁹⁶ Schrieke, “Shifts,” 45.

[Their] situation is completely different from that of our [Dutch] burghers [private citizens] and the Company's trade ... the larger number [of the Portuguese and their descendants] consider the Indies as their fatherland, no longer thinking of Portugal; they trade with it [Portugal] little or not at all and sustain and enrich themselves from the advantages of the Indies as though they were natives and did not have any other fatherland.

Following the 1641 Dutch conquest of Melaka many Portuguese, including the religious hierarchy, moved to Makassar; ten years later there were about 3,000 Catholics there.¹⁹⁷ In 1660, when the Company forced the Makassar court to expel the Portuguese, many moved to Timor, Flores, Ayutthaya, Macau or India.¹⁹⁸

This VOC insistence on Company interests and cultural purity was possible, Francisco Bethencourt concludes, because “the Dutch had the necessary capital to invest in ships, manpower and equipment, and did not depend on mixed-race groups”.¹⁹⁹ Early in the seventeenth century the VOC had encouraged their former employees, the “time-expired” men, to marry (and convert) local women. Although their culturally mestizo children were granted European status, the *vrijburgers* (free citizens) were not permitted to return to Europe with their Asian wives. It was not until 1727 that their descendants were admitted, grudgingly, to the lower ranks of Company employment. Burghers had few opportunities to earn a living; most artisans were Chinese. Possibilities in such popular services as tavern-keeping were restricted, so trade in useful non-monopolised goods, such as foodstuffs and slaves, was their most easily available option. Social, if not legal, categorisation reflected class as well as colour and culture; there was considerable variation in social mores and stratification between the different settlements.²⁰⁰

The English East India Company allowed private shippers more scope. Before the late eighteenth century European regional trade in Asia was concentrated in the hands of Company officials acting on their own behalf. However, there were also limited numbers of “free merchants” engaged in the coasting traffic around India, and between India and the seas east of the Cape of Good Hope. By mid-century “the threads of indigenous and British capitalism were intertwined and had started weaving the economic fabric of the ‘country trade’”.²⁰¹ The “country traders”, specialised in intra-Asian traffic, could be British, Indian, American (after independence in 1776), Armenian or indeed almost anything. They were subject to some restrictions: they had to live in India, their vessels had to be registered in

¹⁹⁷ C.R. Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo: A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624–1667* (s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 25–32; Stefan Halikowski Smith, *Creolization and Diaspora in the Portuguese Indies: The Social World of Ayutthaya, 1640–1720* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

¹⁹⁸ Leonard Andaya, “The ‘Informal Portuguese Empire’ and the Topasses in the Solor Archipelago and Timor in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (2010): 402–3.

¹⁹⁹ Bethencourt, “Low Cost Empire,” 126.

²⁰⁰ See also, from bibliography, Carla van Wamelen, *Family Life onder de VOC* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2014); Niemeyer, *Batavia*; Raben, “Batavia and Colombo”; Heather Sutherland, “Teacherous Translators and Improvident Paupers: Perception and Practice in Dutch Makassar, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53 (2010): 319–56.

²⁰¹ Alain Le Pichon, ed., *China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong 1827–1843* (Oxford: The British Academy for Oxford University Press, 2006), 4.

their home ports, and they had to sail under British colours. Ships built in India could not sail to Europe until the end of the eighteenth century.²⁰² The private shippers exploited new commercial frontiers and participated enthusiastically in the China trade, from which they were formally excluded. Consequently, they could not send their profits to England. They paid their money into the East India Company fund at Canton in exchange for treasury bills cashable in London. The Company welcomed this inflow of expensive silver which it could then use in China. Indeed, finding suitable exchange cargoes for tea was always a problem. However, tropical sea and forest products sold well in China and were increasingly in demand. Private Western trade in the eastern archipelagos expanded, as did knowledge of the region's potential.²⁰³

A new colonial era was ushered in by steam shipping, the end of the Companies' monopolies, the Napoleonic wars, military interventions and high-volume exports of raw materials. Better connections and greater security allowed white enclaves to distance themselves from their Asian environments. By the 1880s, as populations and government services expanded, coastal settlements became towns, centres of trade, administration and armed forces. European suburbs, Chinese quarters and semi-urban villages developed increasingly distinct lifestyles. In the Dutch East Indies Makassar²⁰⁴ and Banjarmasin²⁰⁵ were the largest towns, but population numbers varied greatly depending on definitions. Other settlements were smaller.²⁰⁶ In 1905 the Chinese community was largest in the commercial centres of Makassar (18 per cent of the population), Manado (26 per cent) and Banjarmasin (15 per cent), while (creole) Europeans were concentrated in old settlements like Ambon (11 per cent) and Banda Neira (16 per cent).²⁰⁷

²⁰² Anne Bulley, *The Bombay Country Ships 1790–1833* (Mitcham: Curzon, 2000).

²⁰³ D.K. Bassett, "British Commercial and Strategic Interest in the Malay Peninsula during the Late Eighteenth Century," in *Malayan and Indonesian Studies: Essays Presented to Sir Richard Winstedt on his Eighty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. John Bastin and R. Roolvink (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 137.

²⁰⁴ Makassar's population was 21,451 in 1890, including 838 Europeans, 3,899 Chinese and 154 "other", mainly Arabs. In the 1905 census, it was 26,145, including 1,059 Europeans, 4,672 Chinese, and 141 Arabs. P. Boomgaard and A.J. Gooszen, *Population Trends 1795–1942*, vol. 11 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991), 245; A. Cabaton, *Les Indes néerlandaises* (Paris: Guilmoto, 1910), 332.

²⁰⁵ According to one count, in 1890, Banjarmasin had 39,532 inhabitants; the *ENI* claimed 42,548 for 1893; the 1905 census gave 16,708 included 455 Europeans, 2,581 Chinese and 910 Arabs; Samarinda's population was 4,733. Boomgaard and Gooszen, *Population Trends*, 11; Cabaton, *Les Indes*, 319–20.

²⁰⁶ See appendix.

²⁰⁷ Cabaton, *Les Indes*.

Between 2500 and 1500 BCE Austronesians from the north settled in “coastal and favourable inland regions of the Philippines, Sulawesi, Northern Borneo, Halmahera, and ... as far southeast as Timor.”¹ They adapted to specific environments and developed in different ways as they moved through Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Madagascar. James Fox summarised:²

Such social diversity ranges from that of simple hunter-horticulturalists such as the Buid of Mindoro, the Ilongot of Luzon, the Penan of Borneo, the Sakkudei of the Mentawai islands, or the Huaulu of Ceram to the elaborate command states of the Merina of Madagascar, the Javanese of the Majapahit and Mataram periods, or the complex island kingdoms of Tonga, Tahiti, and Hawai‘i; from migratory sea populations such as the Sama-Bajau, or the trading societies of the Moluccas and of the Massim with their inter-island networks of ritualized exchange valuables to the predatory seafaring societies of the Malays, Bugis, Makassarese and Tausug.

The eastern archipelagos provide most of Fox’s examples of simple and sea-faring societies but are absent when he refers to “elaborate command states” and “complex island kingdoms” although there were significant regional polities. These included dendritic (river-based) exchange systems, such as those in Borneo and Mindanao; these were characterised by “diverse social landscapes and intertwined economic structures, including foragers”.³ The dominant polities of Southwest Sulawesi and north Maluku claimed suzerainty over considerable territories, albeit through fragile chains of authority.⁴ In Bali the kingdoms

¹ Peter Bellwood, “Austronesian Prehistory in Southeast Asia: Homeland, Expansion and Transformation,” in *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bellwood, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryon (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006).

² James J. Fox, “Austronesian Societies and Their Transformations,” in *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bellwood, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryon (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006).

³ Laura Lee Junker and Larissa M. Smith, “Farmer and Forager Interactions in Southeast Asia,” in *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Peter V. Lape, Junko Habu, and John W. Olsen (New York: Springer, 2017), 628.

⁴ Kenneth Hall has attempted to grapple with these problems: “Rather than focus on the structure and function of political institutions as these might define early societal development in the eastern Indonesia archipelago, the alternative proposed here is that a focus on maritime networking can lead to a better understanding of the early patterns of centralisation. Eastern Indonesia archipelago maritime port polities were the product of the movement of commercial commodities, confrontations between alien cultures, the

were similar to those of Java. It should be noted that most “Malays, Buginese and Makassarese” depended on agriculture, and that “predatory” is a one-sided description of their sea-going communities, who were central to exchange systems that also served farming and foraging peoples.

Precedence and Heterarchy

The early Austronesian terms *datu* and *wanua* or *vanua* refer to fundamental concepts shaping Southeast Asian leadership and communities. The signifier *datu* does not seem to have had any fixed and precise use. It could, observes Peter Bellwood, mean “(1) political leader, chief; (2) priest; (3) aristocrat noble; and (4) ancestor ... so the original meaning of *datu* still presumably floats somewhere in the hazy zone of authority, unspecified as to ascription or achievement”.⁵ It seems likely that in proto-historic Austronesian Indonesia, including Java and Bali, *wanua* or *vanua* typically referred to “indigenous communities or settlements within a larger polity”, the leaders of which were usually designated by kinship-derived titles.⁶ In these societies, both lower order geographical/ritual entities—such as the *vanua*—and clans participated within larger systems.⁷ The number of their members was limited by the need to ensure adequate food supplies.

In the eastern archipelagos, as in Micronesia and Melanesia, higher status was granted to “those who descend from earlier rather than later kin group founders”. “Founder rank enhancement” is a process by which men who were junior founders in one community could establish senior lines by moving into “relative or absolute isolation (such as a new island, previously inhabited or not) [this enabled them] to aggrandize their resources, and attempt to ensure methods of genealogical inheritance that would retain privileges for their descendants”.⁸ “Founders” could establish inland or coastal settlements, but their higher status was more likely to be challenged in maritime settlements, where series of incoming groups disrupted patterns of precedence. In communities ranging from Mindanao and Halmahera through Buru, Seram and Banda to Flores and Timor a binary opposition between autochthonous “insiders” and immigrants is entrenched. Origin

formation of plural societies, dual loyalties, and multiple affiliations, all inclusively early demonstrations of regional globalisation. While the focal networks examined in this study were commercial, and this was their chief purpose, the intersections of different types of community interests were foundational to the increasingly complex ethnic and cultural complexity of the region.” Kenneth R. Hall, “Sojourning Communities, Ports-of-Trade, and Agrarian-Based Societies in Southeast Asia’s Eastern Regions, 1000–1300,” in *New Perspectives on the History and Historiography of Southeast Asia: Continuing Explorations*, ed. Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin and Kenneth R. Hall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 68–9.

⁵ Peter Bellwood, “Hierarchy, Founder Ideology and Austronesian Expansion,” in *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather (Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996), 20; Jeremy Beckett, “The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato under Colonial Rule,” *Asian Studies* 5 (1977).

⁶ Jan Wisseman Christie, “State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia: A Consideration of the Theories and the Data,” *BKI* 151, no. 2 (1995): 242.

⁷ James J. Fox, “Postscript—Spatial Categories in Social Context: Tracing a Comparative: Understanding of Austronesian Ideas of Ritual Location,” in *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*, ed. Thomas Reuter (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006). See also the individual essays.

⁸ Bellwood, “Hierarchy, Founder Ideology and Austronesian Expansion,” 20.

stories of settlements and sultanates often began with marriages that linked external sources of prestige—divine beings, mysterious strangers, Malay kingdoms, Arabs and even Chinese—to indigenous lineages. Such binary divisions could derive from different sources of authority, most notably those defined by kinship and those based on ties to the land.⁹

Druce explains that origins determined claims to precedence: “a priority, seniority or superiority in various matters that can relate to rights over land, resources, political offices or, in some cases, simply the ritual seniority of one group over another which may not necessarily translate in any political or economic ascendancy”.¹⁰ James Fox emphasises an essential point about Austronesian precursor societies, explaining that: “precedence is structurally relative, temporarily contingent and often disputed...it is not the equivalent of hierarchy. Based on differentiation, precedence may be used to create or undermine what are generally regarded as ‘hierarchic structures’”. Precedence was often expressed in oppositional categories such as male/female, old/young, inside/outside and so on.¹¹ In practice, precedence in one field could provide access to resources that could enhance precedence in another, within limits imposed by communal judgements. Frake stresses that respective positions changed depending on context, “the rank of an individual as a subject vis-à-vis some other individual must be defined in terms of a field of scope”.¹² From a somewhat different perspective, Benjamin confirms that social ranking in parts of Southeast Asia emerged prior to the emergence of states, and in island Southeast Asia probably “arose by differentiation from within the same cultural matrix”.¹³ The “scaling-up” of sets of precedence, of leaders with followers, was fundamental to the larger agglomerative polities of the region.

⁹ In a number of Indonesian Austronesian-speaking farming and foraging communities, there is a figure described as the *tuan tanah* (“lord of the land”) or custodian of the land. See, for example, Reimar Schefold, “Visions of the Wilderness on Siberut in Comparative Southeast Asian Perspective,” ed. Geoffrey Benjamin and Cynthia Chou (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002); E. Douglas Lewis, *The Stranger-Kings of Sikka* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010), 120.

¹⁰ Stephen C. Druce, *The Lands West of the Lakes: a History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009); Steven C. Druce, “The Decentralized Austronesian polity: Of Mandalas, Negaras, Galactics, and the South Sulawesi Kingdoms,” *Suvannabhumi* 9, no. 2 (2017); Michael P. Vischer, ed., *Precedence: Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009).

¹¹ James J. Fox, “The Transformation of Progenitor Lines of Origin: Patterns of Precedence in Eastern Indonesia,” in *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather (Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996), 133–4; For a path-breaking account of precedence: E. Douglas Lewis, *People of the Source: the Social and Ceremonial Order of Tana Wai Brama on Flores* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1988). For a critical analysis of male/female, see Douglas Kammen, “Queens of Timor,” *Archipel* 84 (2012).

¹² Charles O. Frake, “The Cultural Construction of Rank, Identity and Ethnic Origins in the Sulu Archipelago,” in *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather (Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996), 10. On the Austronesian heritage in Timor, see Daniel Fitzpatrick, Andrew McWilliam, and Susana Barnes, *Property and Social Resilience in Times of Conflict: Land, Custom and Law in East Timor* (London: Routledge, 2016).

¹³ Geoffrey Benjamin, “Egalitarianism and Ranking in the Malay World,” in *Anarchic Solidarity: Autonomy, Equality and Fellowship in Southeast Asia*, ed. Thomas Gibson and Kenneth Sillander (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 2011). Benjamin works primarily on Malaya and the western archipelago.

When preparing the 1999 revised edition of his collection of seminal essays Oliver Wolters was “excited” because he had “stumbled on a long-awaited launching pad in Southeast Asian prehistory. I refer to the concept of ‘heterarchy’ in contradistinction to ‘hierarchy’, the concept usually associated with the region”.¹⁴ Wolters was impressed by Joyce White’s essay in a collection of archaeological papers. In her introduction Carole Crumley criticized “the almost unconscious assumption of hierarchy-as-order” noting that this “makes it difficult to imagine, much less recognize and study, patterns of relations that are complex but not hierarchical”. Crumley argued for the term heterarchy, which “may be defined as the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways”. She explains:¹⁵

[T]he hierarchy-heterarchy relation admits both temporal and spatial flexibility; for example, governmental heterarchies ... can move over time to hierarchies and vice versa without invoking the rhetoric of collapse. Heterarchical relationships among elements at one spatial scale or in one dimension (members of the same club) may be hierarchical at another (the privilege of seniority in decision making). Heterarchy is both a structure and a condition.

Different sets of precedence operated within heterarchic structures. White’s essay pointed out that “[t]wo key elements of heterarchy, namely flexible hierarchy and horizontal or lateral differentiation, are critical dynamics that have been neglected or under appreciated in the analysis of Southeast Asian societies....”¹⁶ Heterarchy is a more liberating concept than hierarchy because it allows for multiple social roles with levels of authority dependent on specific contexts. A leader in one sphere is often a follower in another, conceding precedence according to custom. When unfamiliar environments emerged—for example, through migration of groups, or through new sets of relationships with incomers—new sets of rights and obligation could create precedence for new authorities with their own arena of competence. Negotiations with foreign traders or bonds with new allies or vassals could be concentrated in particular hands without infringing customary connections based on precedence; typically, these innovations would be legitimised in terms derived from existing structures.

¹⁴ O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Program, 1999), 122. In 1986 Arjun Appadurai had already commented, of Louis Dumont’s *Homo Hierarchicus*: “like many great works, it appears now not to have been the inspiration for a new way of thinking but the swan song for an older one.” Appadurai attributed this to increasing anthropological work in India, undermining reification of rural society. Arjun Appadurai, “Is Homo Hierarchicus?,” *American Ethnologist* 13, no. 4 (1986); Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). See also Dougald J.W. O’Reilly, “From the Bronze Age to the Iron Age in Thailand: Applying the Heterarchical Approach,” *Asian Perspectives* 39, no. 2 (2000).

¹⁵ R.M. Ehrenreich, C.L. Crumley, and J.E. Levy, eds., *Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies* (Arlington: Archaeological Papers, 1995).

¹⁶ Joyce C. White, “Incorporating Heterarchy into Theory on Socio-Political Development: The Case from Southeast Asia,” in *Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies*, ed. R.M. Ehrenreich, C.L. Crumley, and J.E. Levy (Arlington: Archaeological Papers, 1995). For an anthropological analysis based on a similar insight, see Susan McKinnon, *From a Shattered Sun: Hierarchy, Gender, and Alliance in the Tanimbar Islands* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).

Chiefs and Warriors

During the first millennium CE fortified settlements emerged as political nuclei in Austronesian Southeast Asia. Peter Boomgaard explains:¹⁷

Often these centers formed a cluster from which one place emerged as a supra-regional center. Such clusters were seldom stable for a long time, undergoing processes of fission and fusion.... Early states were based on dyadic relations between the ruler of a supra-regional center and a number of regional rulers. Such dyadic links were highly personal patron-client relations, based on the wealth, prowess, and charisma of the supra-regional leaders. From the latter, protection, honor and gifts were expected while the client regional ruler would reciprocate with material and spiritual support, including manpower in times of war.

Chiefs and rulers could impose fines, confiscations, and reduction to slavery or death in judicial procedures.

During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries trade increased dramatically along the western coastlines of the Philippines. Beeswax, tortoiseshell and woods were exchanged for Chinese porcelain, ironware and cloth. This encouraged, concludes Junker, “endless cycles of political consolidation and fragmentation” as “power coalesced around the leaders of shifting alliance networks rather than more permanent, territorially defined political units”.¹⁸ Goods were provided “in exchange for chiefly services”: protection, mediation, adjudication, sponsorship of raiding and trading, capital investment and the redistribution of surplus. The “wealth for generating, maintaining and expanding political power came from a number of production and exchange contexts that are intimately intertwined, including foreign luxury goods trade, local production of status goods by attached craft specialists, bride-wealth and other status good exchanges between local elites, goods circulated through the ritual feasting system, tribute mobilization, and seizure of valuables during raids”.¹⁹

In highly competitive societies demonstrations of courage and wealth conferred prestige. In Borneo, the inland (Austronesian) Dayak “rajas” were actually “principal traders and warriors who proved themselves and rose to power by collecting the heads of their enemies, sometimes in battles over access to the forest products”.²⁰ Johsz. R. Mansoben distinguished four types of political leaders in Melanesian West New Guinea: Big Men, rajas, clan chiefs and mixed.²¹ Displays of goods, oratory and bravery enabled

¹⁷ Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2007), 59–77.

¹⁸ Laura Lee Junker, *Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 57, 72, 193, 373–85.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Nancy Lee Peluso, “Merchants, Manipulation and Minor Forest Products on the Mahakam: Bugis Politico-Economic Strategies in Pre-Colonial Kutei,” in *Authority and Leadership in the Bugis World*, ed. Kees Van Dijk and Greg Acciaioli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991); Eric Tagliacozzo, “Onto the Coast and Into the Forest: Ramifications of the China Trade on the Ecological History of Northwest Borneo, 900–1900 CE,” in *Histories of the Borneo Environment: Economic, Political and Social Dimensions of Change and Continuity*, ed. R.L. Wadley (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005).

²¹ Johsz. R. Mansoben, “Summary,” 393, 403, <http://papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/mansoben/12.pdf>. This must refer to Johsz R Mansoben, *Sistem politik tradisional di Irian Jaya* (Jakarta: LIPI/RUL, 1995).

individuals to claim a higher status as Big Men; “political reputations are built through public exchanges with competing rivals”. Those who had proved themselves in voyages to the unpredictable outside world gained in reputation, while the gifting of objects brought back from such expeditions marked ties of obligation and reciprocity. Wealth enabled these men to stage feasts of merit, but these dissipated their assets, preventing their hosts from building hereditary high status.²² In other areas, including some Malayo-Polynesian chiefdoms, such competitive displays helped consolidate the status of leading families, increasing social differentiation.²³ The west New Guinea coastal rajadoms had been created by centuries of trade; the most important were the four kingdoms of the Raja Ampat islands, the three traditional rajas of Onin (Rumbati, Atiati and Fatagar) and those of Kowiai (Nomatota and Aiduma).²⁴




Image 14 Ma Suling fighters of Merasa, Upper Mahakam, 1896–97²⁵

Timothy Earle has described how chiefs struggled to harness “highly dispersed flows of energy, labor, and materials; they are inherently hard to control, because commodity chains form a decentralized web that can circumvent attempts to control them.... Economies channelled flows of key resources ... [these] create bottlenecks.... Chiefs emerged in

²² Christophe Sand, “Melanesian Tribes vs. Polynesian Chiefdoms: Recent Archaeological Assessment of a Classic Model of Sociopolitical Types in Oceania,” *Asian Perspectives* 41, no. 2 (2002).

²³ Laura Lee Junker, “The Evolution of Ritual Feasting Systems in Prehispanic Philippine Chiefdoms,” in *Feasts: Archaeological and Ethnographic Perspectives on Food, Politics, and Power*, ed. Michael Dietler and Brian Hayden (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2001).

²⁴ Mansoben, “Summary.”

²⁵ “Groepsportret van jonge mannen van de ‘Wa Soeling stam in de Boven-Mahakam, aangevoerd door Ibau Li”. Photograph Jean Demmeni. MVV/NMVW RV-A9-37. Deepink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/888595>. CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication. By permission of the Museum.

prehistory at these strangle points”.²⁶ In chiefdoms, concluded Earle, “much of what goes on below is left unchallenged, because it is irrelevant to the operation of the higher level or it is prohibitively costly to change”.²⁷

The fact that some leaders claimed more exalted status, such as that of raja or sultan, did not negate the compound, repetitive and largely decentralised character of these chiefdoms or confederations of chiefdoms. Earle:²⁸

Chiefly confederacies are pragmatic associations of chiefly polities, typically involving alliance, intermarriage, and specialists.... Such confederacies are highly contingent, based on common interests between chiefs and their chieftaincies; they are inherently dynamic, forming and dissolving opportunistically according to changing strategic openings and interests in the political arena. They have no permanent structural form. All relations of chiefs to chiefs and to non-chiefs in their chieftaincies and confederacies are political, contingent and negotiated. The degree of formal political institutional development in chiefdoms is limited and unstable, creating a constant cycling of political structures.

Whether or not such small domains (either individually or in clusters) should be labelled “states” has been the subject of often fruitless debate.²⁹ Much depends on perspective and preference. Timor is a case in point.³⁰ Each of the many small Timorese realms had a population of only three to four thousand people when the Europeans arrived. Unstable alliances expressed through ritual, kinship ties, tribute and warfare (including headhunting) bound these “small and fragile entities” together.³¹ In the 1820s a sailor who had been shipwrecked on Timor recorded his impressions:³²

²⁶ Timothy Earle, “Chiefs, Chieftaincies, Chiefdoms, and Chiefly Confederacies: Power in the Evolution of Political Systems,” *Social Evolution & History* 10, no. 1 (2011): 48. On pp. 33–4 he explains: “leaders whether of the state or below try to centralize power by controlling access to the sources of power. Sometimes they are successful, and often they fail. They regulate economies, limit access to weapons, and establish religions, but their abilities to monopolize access to one or more of the sources of elemental power depend on the distribution and creative fashioning of bottlenecks in the political economies on which power is based. Bottlenecks, or choke points, are limits to flows of resources, personnel, and knowledge”.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 29–34.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ For a brief summary of events, which avoids imposing categorical definitions, see Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*, 55–89; Heather Sutherland, “Contingent Devices,” in *Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska, Remco Raben, and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Singapore: NUS Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005).

³⁰ Susana Barnes, Hans Hägerdal, and Lisa Palmer, “An East Timorese Domain: Luca from Central and Peripheral Perspectives,” *BKI* 173, no. 2–3 (2017).

³¹ Hans Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600–1800* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 59–60.

³² The account by the ship’s captain, J. Battis, was published in two parts: J.D.K[ruseman], “Beschrijving van het Sandelhout Eiland,” *Oosterling: tijdschrift bij uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie* 2 (1835): 72–5.

The sandalwood islands have neither king nor lesser chiefs.... The highest rank is Anakoda³³ which means a well-off man, who is master of a large piece of land, four or five buffalos, two horses and other cattle, however he exercises no control over anyone except his own servants, whose subordination only exists in name, because master and man eat from the same dish and work peacefully together. They have a hereditary nobility, encompassing rich and poor. The right conferred by this position is that of being able to speak at council meetings, [the] nobles [are] called “Meraboo”, which could be translated as the elders of the people.

The author stressed the “great importance of these meetings”. Flores was similarly fragmented, home to six major ethnolinguistic groups (Sikka, Manggarai, Ngada, Ende, Lio and Larantuka) and a shifting mosaic of polities. The people of the interior, particularly in the east, remained unincorporated.

Around the same time a description of the troublesome islands south of Banda concurred in that “they could not really be regarded as having rulers”, since their chiefs “had very little influence over their subjects, whose opinions they had to respect, and accommodate their administration to them”. But the writer added: “many villages, with small populations, are bitterly divided, and frequently fight bloody conflicts”.³⁴ Early nineteenth-century European observers commented that conflicts were not particularly lethal. The shipwrecked sailor on Timor wrote that local “wars have more in common with children’s games than real fighting”.³⁵ Violence was usually relatively small scale, typically consisting of headhunting raids, inter-village conflicts, or attacks by seaborne fleets seeking slaves and plunder.³⁶ Honour was satisfied by the spilling of blood and few deaths. On the Southwestern Island of Kisar Earl commented that “[M]uskets are used in warfare throughout the group; but the people are so unskilful in the use of them, and the ammunition they use is so bad, that a battle frequently ends without loss of life, or at most with the death of only one or two.”³⁷

Evidence suggests that this comparison is misleading, as it implicitly contrasts incidental organised warfare between contending states with endemic insecurity. The on-going fear of attack undermined the resilience of small communities, leading to food shortages, disease and migrations. In his robust rejection of accounts minimizing entrenched violence in North Sulawesi, Henley comments: “In some places larger chiefdoms, often based on control of harbour settlements and headed by kings (Malay: *raja*; in local languages: *datu*, *kolano*, *mokole*) were also present, but their influence was limited, and their mutual

³³ Nakhoda was a common term for ship’s captain.

³⁴ *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837 (Staatkundig Overzicht van Nederlandsch Indie) 1837* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1971), 155. For a broad discussion, David Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004).

³⁵ J.D.K[ruseman], “Beschrijving van het Sandelhout Eiland.”

³⁶ Michael W. Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare, 1300–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); R.H. Barnes, “Alliance and Warfare in an Eastern Indonesian Principality Kédang in the Last Half of the Nineteenth Century,” *BKI* 157, no. 2 (2001); Barbara Watson Andaya, “History, Headhunting and Gender in Monsoon Asia: Comparative and Longitudinal Views,” *South East Asia Research* 12, no. 1 (2004).

³⁷ G.W. Earl, “An Account of a Visit to Kisser, One of the Serawatti Group in the Indian Archipelago,” *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 11, no. http://archive.org/stream/jstor-1797637/1797637_djvu.txt.

relations, like those of their vassals, frequently violent.”³⁸ Given levels of insecurity it is all the more remarkable how many important trading sites were barely, if at all, incorporated into larger polities.



Image 15 The Raja of Anakalang, West Central Sumba, 1937³⁹

Since dominance within a Sumba domain was not hereditary, there was constant armed competition among the nobility (*maramba*), the central villages' leading clans, as they sought to display their courage and capture food, horses and women.⁴⁰ Janet Hoskins has suggested, in connection with head-taking in west Sumba, that perhaps colonial pacification, recent as it was, nonetheless “produced a distorted picture of indigenous political leadership, emphasizing entrepreneurial feast-givers (“Big Men”) who held center stage during recent periods of ethnographic investigation over headhunters and feuders, whose power and prestige may have equalled or surpassed them in the past”.⁴¹ As for Timor, even in the 1940s past patterns of Timorese warfare could only be reconstructed

³⁸ David Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King. Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004): 91.

³⁹ “De Radja van Anakalang, West-Sumba, met twee andere hoogwaardigheidsbekleders omringd door lijfwachten”. Photographer unknown. KIT/NMVW, image TM-10001936. Deepink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/16131>. Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License. By permission of the Museum.

⁴⁰ Rodney Needham, *Mamboru—History and Structure in a Domain of Northwestern Sumba* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). On recent history, see Jacqueline Vel, “Campaigning for a New District in West Sumba,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Subarto Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 96–104.

⁴¹ Janet Hoskins, “On Losing and Getting a Head: Warfare, Exchange, and Alliance in a Changing Sumba, 1888–1988,” *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 3 (1989): 420.

through stories of headhunting raids.⁴² Contemporary attitudes and rumours centred on headhunting and sacrifice testify to the potency of these memories.⁴³ The precautions taken by settlements also suggest the threat was real. This pattern held true for many of the easternmost islands.

Walls, palisades or thick hedges protected many settlements. Some fortifications were ancient and associated with ancestors and clan identity; in Timor many have been dated to c. 1,000 CE.⁴⁴ In the late nineteenth century, Kei, Tanimbar and Sumba villages were built on elevated sites, raised further by piles, and protected by walls of stacked coral rocks, often enhanced by thorny hedges. The search for security was also reflected in placatory rituals; oath-taking ceremonies were intended to strengthen agreements.⁴⁵ Ancestor figures and protective carvings flanked doorways.⁴⁶ The colonial official G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell noted that most houses on the Babar islands were “built on steep heights and provided with heavy walls, which is necessary because of the constant state of war. But nowhere did I see such heavy and high walls as on the islands Dawera and Dawelor ... [where they were] three meters thick and six metres high, all made of sandstone blocks, and provided with doors”.⁴⁷ Noble families in the more sophisticated states of Bali lived in walled compounds, as did many villagers. In Papua sites protected by rivers and high vantage points were favoured, while Dayak strongholds were well palisaded.

Weapons and strategies changed as technologies, competition over resources and political alliances evolved; they were also closely linked to cultural preferences. Bladed weapons, spears, shields and armour had characteristic forms. In the west, in Kalimantan and Sulawesi, blowpipes were favoured for hunting and fighting; in the east, in parts of Halmahera, and throughout Papua and the easternmost islands bows and arrows were common. By the late nineteenth century these were only used for display on Ambon, while they remained popular in eastern Timor long after firearms had replaced them in the west. Europeans bringing higher quality firearms were welcome as allies, and imports gradually displaced locally made firearms, such as those manufactured along Kalimantan’s Negara river.⁴⁸

The archipelagos’ political fragmentation makes them ideal laboratories for historical applications of the concept of the “Stranger King”. These were outsider-rulers who played a central negotiating role in settling conflicts. Local myths could describe such an arrival in supernatural terms, as is the case with South Sulawesi *tomanurung*, “one who has

⁴² H.G. Schulte Nordholt, *The Political System of the Atoni of Timor* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971).

⁴³ Stefan Danerek, “Construction Sacrifice in Eastern Indonesia,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 45, no. 131 (2017).

⁴⁴ Peter V. Lape, “Chronology of Fortified Settlements in East Timor,” *Journal of Island and Coastal Archaeology* 1, no. 2 (2006).

⁴⁵ In west Seram, agreements by the Saniri Tiga Air peace-seeking council were sealed with the drinking of *makatau*. In 1771 the palm-wine “contained all sorts of objects, including a bushknife, an arrow, the figure of a crocodile, and an effigy of a human smallpox patient”; Gerrit J. Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram): An Account of Its ‘Discovery’ and Interpretation between about 1675 and 1950,” *BKI* 149, no. 2 (1993): 264.

⁴⁶ Nico De Jonge and Toos van Dijk, *Forgotten Islands of Indonesia: The Art & Culture of the Southeast Moluccas* (Singapore: Periplus, 1995).

⁴⁷ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, “De Afdeeling Babar en Leti-eilanden,” *BKI* 33 (1890): 192.

⁴⁸ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), “Wapens”; Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*.

descended” (to earth).⁴⁹ Andaya explains that Bugis Bone’s origin story emphasises two aspects of the ruler: “as an arbiter between man and god; and as a special individual serving as an arbiter among men”. He or she maintained the balance that protected against harvest failure, disease and disaster.⁵⁰ David Henley has stated that the positive contributions of the state in eastern Indonesia have been “demonized”, as some form of conflict resolution could only be advantageous “against a background of endemic competition and conflict ... Indigenous leaders ... possessed a Hobbesian awareness of the inevitability of conflict in tribal life”. The chiefs’ mutual “jealousy and mistrust made it easier to accept outsiders ... in the role of arbiters”.⁵¹

Such mediators could be quite foreign, Arab or European, and included VOC representatives.⁵² Captain Dirk Kolff’s account of his journey through South Maluku in 1825 has many accounts of mediation.⁵³ If indeed “the fundamental purpose of statecraft ... is to manage social conflict, and this is what really justifies the fact that taxes are claimed and taken from subjects...”⁵⁴ then Stranger Kings make sense. They could be seen as non-partisan, at least until they were co-opted by local factions. Lewis notes that stranger-king myths in Flores are concentrated in what he calls the ‘Portuguese corridor’, areas of eastern Flores and Timor.⁵⁵ There trade, with its potential for unequal access to wealth and contested rights to resources, would have created both a greater need for mediation transcending highly localised traditions and provided foreign candidate-rulers with interests in local societies.

In his account of the island of Kisar in the early 1800s Earl observed:⁵⁶

Kisser is the only island of this group in which there is a raja, or head chief. In all the others each village is independent and consequently jealousies and quarrels arise, often ending in

⁴⁹ Greg Acciaioli, “Distinguishing Hierarchy and Precedence: Comparing Status Distinctions in South Asia and the Austronesian World, with Special Reference to South Sulawesi,” in *Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World*, ed. Michael P. Vischer (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009); Thomas Gibson, *And the Sun Pursued the Moon: Symbolic Knowledge and Traditional Authority among the Makassar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).

⁵⁰ Leonard Andaya, “The Nature of Kingship in Bone,” in *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, ed. A. Reid and L. Castles (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1975), 117.

⁵¹ Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King,” 86–8.

⁵² David Henley and Ian Caldwell, “Kings and Covenants: Stranger Kings and Social Contract in Sulawesi,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 36, no. 105 (2008). See also, from bibliography: Lewis, *The Stranger-Kings*; Prager, “Appropriation of the ‘Stranger King’”; Hägerdal, “White and Dark Stranger Kings”; Gibson, *And the Sun Pursued the Moon*; Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King”; Sahlins, “The Stranger King”.

⁵³ Dirk Hendrik Kolff, *Reis door de weinig bekende zuidelijke Molukse archipel en langs de geheel onbekende zuidwestkust van Nieuw-Guinea, gedaan in de jaren 1825 en 1826* (Amsterdam, 1828).

⁵⁴ Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “A New Imperial Idiom in the Sixteenth Century: Krishnadevaraya and His Political Theory of Vijayanagara,” in *Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 1500–1800*, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 70.

⁵⁵ Lewis, *Stranger-Kings*, 196–7. No such myths existed in western Flores and Sumba, he argued, but were concentrated in east Flores, Solor, Adonara, Lembata, Timor and Roti. He was not sure about Savu.

⁵⁶ Earl, “Account of a Visit to Kisser.”

wars, which, however, are rarely attended with much bloodshed.... These quarrels, however, have the effect of rendering the inhabitants of the islands in which they take place turbulent and disagreeable. At Letti, in particular, we found this to be the case. Had the chiefs of the different villages any supreme authority to which to appeal for a decision of their disputes, I am convinced that the case would be materially altered.

Thirty years later Wallace wrote:⁵⁷

In the island of Goram, only eight or ten miles long, there are about a dozen Rajahs, scarcely better off than the rest of the inhabitants, and exercising a mere nominal sway, except when any order is received from the Dutch Government, when, being backed by a higher power, they show a little more strict authority. My friend the Rajah of Ammer (commonly called Rajah of Goram) told me that a few years ago, before the Dutch had interfered in the affairs of the island, the trade was not carried on so peaceably as at present, rival praus often fighting when on the way to the same locality, or trafficking in the same village. Now such a thing is never thought of—one of the good effects of the superintendence of a civilized government. Disputes between villages are still, however, sometimes settled by fighting, and I one day saw about fifty men, carrying long guns and heavy cartridge-belts, march through the village. They had come from the other side of the island on some question of trespass or boundary and were prepared for war if peaceable negotiations should fail.

On Banda and Ambon European traders had great difficulty in finding reliable interlocutors (see next section). A VOC official, writing before 1621, described decision making on Banda:⁵⁸

Whenever they gather to discuss important matters, the Orang Kayas take their place [on the low platform under the tree], each according to his descent and age, showing great deference to each other, while the common people ... sit on the ground, the *uli siwa* [federation] on the west and south, the *uli lima* [federation] on the east and north.... [N]o serious political matters or war can be decided alone.... [The representatives of the different villages] always want to be cock of the walk, but have to respect the others [or they must pay a large fine]. In this way they keep each other in check, so that they can all be equal, which causes great dissension.

VOC officials did their best to recruit useful interlocutors in Alifuru communities, but it was virtually impossible. In 1633 a Dutch commissioner in Ambon spoke with rajas from the west Seram Wemale people. He found them “much more like beggars than noblemen, not to mention kings”. While village federations did exist, and such centres existed in Sahulau and Sumit in the south, and Siseulu in the north, they were unable to compel obedience from individual settlements. When the rajas inevitably failed to impose peace, the Company had to use expensive military force.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), 285.

⁵⁸ P.A. Leupe, “Beschrijvinge van de Eijlande Banda,” *BKI* 3, no. 1 (1855): 75–6.

⁵⁹ Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air,” 255–8.

Alliance

From the 1400s at the latest Banda's small coastal settlements were governed by 'an elective oligarchy' of *orang kaya* (Malay: "rich men") who had acquired status through trade. This role or status was not necessarily confined to a particular group. They were predominantly foreign, and included Javanese semi-permanent residents, men with local wives. They capitalised on their access to networks and knowledge, linking overseas and local partners. This social capital was their main advantage.⁶⁰ Villiers concludes: "As commercial activity in the Banda islands increased during the fifteenth century... so the *orang kaya* consolidated their position as a mercantile aristocracy acting in concert to control a group of very small but prosperous coastal communities". He adds that by the end of the [sixteenth] century "trade with the Moluccas and the Banda Islands had come to be dominated by merchants from Melaka and Java".⁶¹ This trade-oriented 'Bandanese' community, primarily Muslim since the sixteenth century, seems to have existed alongside the walled settlements of non-Islamic, presumably autonomous and indigenous inhabitants well into the 1600s.⁶² In the early 1600s there were thought to be about 30 settlements, seven of which were large enough to be considered villages. There were several warring village federations.⁶³

In Maluku *uli* or ritually enhanced village alliances were common. The *uli lima* (of five) and *uli siwa* (of nine) predominated. Their origins are obscure but seem to reflect the division between coastal and inland, and later Islam and Christianity.⁶⁴ These village federations were administered by councils within which one man would be recognised as *primus inter pares*. Despite interpretations that equate them with trade competition between Ternate and Tidore, the *uli* seem to pre-date the sultanates and have retained an ideological force. Like the idea of the *pela-gandong* tradition of mutual help, the *uli lima*

⁶⁰ Narrowly functionalist approaches to social capital emphasise material utility, while others, recognizing that all economic behaviour is embedded, tend to conflate social capital with access to networks. They regard this as generally beneficial. Indeed, reciprocity is central to Robert Putnam's definition of social capital as 'the networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit'. Thomas G. Poder, "What is Really Social Capital? A Critical Review," *The American Sociologist* 42, no. 4 (2011): 347; Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

⁶¹ John Villiers, "The Cash-Crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 91, 93.

⁶² Gerrit J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indisch Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Foris, 2004), 9–15; Meilink-Roelofs, writing at the beginning of the 1960s, was open to the possibility of a plural Bandanese population: M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 96. See also Loth, "Pioneers and Perkerniers"; Villiers, "Trade and Society"; Winn, "Slavery and Cultural Creativity."

⁶³ Gerrit Knaap, "Military Capability and the State in Southeast Asia's Pacific Rimlands, 1500–1700," in *Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context*, ed. Kathryn Wellen and Michael W. Charney (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2017).

⁶⁴ Valerio Valeri, "Reciprocal Centers: The Siwa-Lima System in the Central Moluccas," in *The Attraction of Opposites: Thought and Society in the Dualistic Mode*, ed. Uri Almagor David Maybury-Lewis (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1989), 118–9.

and *uli sewa* brotherhoods have been used in recent decades both to intensify hatred and aid reconciliation between communities.⁶⁵

On Ambon genealogical and geographical units overlapped, so precedence was contingent upon both kinship- and territory-based claims. Gerrit Knaap has described the many levels of sociopolitical organisation in the seventeenth century, centred variously on place, descent and alliance. A sketch of Ambon's sociopolitical organisation would encompass hamlets, villages, village federations, and federations of village federations as well as families grouped in patrilineal exogamous clans which combined, probably for security, into "tribes" or *uku*, which could in turn join an alliance (*aman*, *hena*). Many of these became identified with neighbourhoods or village (*negeri*) quarters, the political-territorial *soa*. Immigrants, without family ties, could also form *soa*. These *soa* were typically led by men selected by entitled members, such as elders, who formed advisory councils.⁶⁶

On Ambon small groups of eight or nine people, probably kin-based sub-sets, were brought together in *dati* responsible for delivering goods or service. These later provided labour for clove production under the Dutch East India Company. Coastal villagers were also united in *uli*, typically *uli lima* and *uli siwa*. Knaap concludes that some groupings, such as Hitu and Luhu, could be seen as early states. Others might see them more as village federations. The former, Hitu, lay along the north coast of Ambon island, the latter on the Hoamoal peninsula of west Seram. The largest alliance, under Hitu, may have had 10,000 members at the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁶⁷

The *soa* was the basic socio-political unit in Ternate. As in Ambon, precedence determined relationships with kin-groups and the land. "In this period", writes Andaya, referring to the sixteenth century, "the various villages and towns were divided into soas. Each of these soas was under a *bobato* who appears to have been the head of a large extended family group which composed the soa."⁶⁸ Others take a broader view, seeing the *bobato* as chiefs in general, who could be secular or spiritual leaders, mediating between the interests of the people and those of the elite.⁶⁹ Van Fraassen regarded all *soa* as sharing three essential qualities: their chiefs were hereditary, they were formally recognised by higher political authorities, and were responsible for organizing the delivery of goods and services to those authorities.⁷⁰ The term was used throughout Maluku, but their political role shifted, as will be described below.

⁶⁵ Birgit Bräuchler, *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁶⁶ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen*, 10–5. Gerrit Knaap, "De Ambonse eilanden tussen twee mogendheden," in *Hof en Handel: Aziatische vorsten en de VOC 1620–1720*, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004).

⁶⁷ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen*, 9–15; Knaap, "De Ambonse eilanden," 39–42.

⁶⁸ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 260, note 96.

⁶⁹ Muridan Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780–1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 47–52.

⁷⁰ Christiaan F. van Fraassen, "Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1987), 694, 183–6, 266–81.



Image 16 The Raja of Honitetu and Consort, Southwest Seram, before 1920⁷¹

In west Seram *pataliwa* (of five) and *patawiwa* (of nine) also existed, but another alliance was politically more significant. In 1684 VOC officials had been baffled by the complexity of west Seram's social organisation, but further investigation revealed the existence of the Saniri Waele Telu, (Malay: Saniri Tiga Air), the Council of the Three Rivers.⁷² This seems to have been an overarching council intended to settle disputes and so limit the damage caused by endemic warfare and headhunting. Because the region was so close to Dutch-controlled Ambon, Knaap has been able to document the ways in which this federation evolved. In 1717 for example, the council had two sessions, a *bicara di darat* (an inland meeting), from which Company officials were excluded, and a *bicara di laut* (a meeting by the sea), which was held in front of the VOC tent.⁷³ The Dutch remained dissatisfied. In 1772 one complained “these uncivilized, wild and barbarous people” swore many oaths

⁷¹ “The Radja en njora of Honitetoe op Ceram”. Photographer unknown. MVV/NMVW image RV-A40-1-49. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/889309>. Public Domain Anonymous 70 EU. By permission of the Museum. On contemporary Honitetu see Catriona Croft-Cusworth, “‘The Forest Belongs to the Community’: Making the Call for Tenure Reform in Maluku, Indonesia,” *Forests News*, CIFOR (website), 22 January 2018, <https://forestsnews.cifor.org/53571/forest-belongscommunity?fnl=e>.

⁷² The Tala, Sapalewa and Eti; Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air,” 260.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 263.

to the VOC simply “to earn themselves some presents from the Company, without ever bothering for even a moment about fulfilling these promises”.⁷⁴

Intermittent Saniri meetings continued. In the nineteenth century its sphere of influence was said to cover west Seram, from Elpaputih Bay to Hoamoal; it was then commonly referred to as the Kakean or Kakian alliance. It united coast and hill populations but could not guarantee peace; in fighting at one meeting in the late 1800s warriors from Honitetu killed a delegate from Saniri.⁷⁵ The alliance disapproved of unsanctioned headhunting, but also organised raids. The missionary A. van Ekris acknowledged that some saw the Kakian as nothing more than an opportunity “to get away from wives and children, to feast, drink, and let loose (*brassen*)” but he regarded it as more important than that. He viewed the Kakian hostility to Islam with favour, but deplored the fact that all members had to place loyalty to the alliance above religious duties: “As long as the Mohammeden joins in the *kakian* feasts, as long as the Christian persists in visiting the *roema setan* [the devil’s house; presumably a *kakian*-connected sacred place], they are left alone, but if they do not, then they come into conflict with the alliance”. By the 1860s, wrote Akris, the Kakian was already losing influence along the coast, and by the end of the century meetings were chaotic. Batavia opted for armed pacification rather than attempting to use any form of traditional mediation.⁷⁶

Eastern Nusa Tenggara, like Maluku, was an early focus of European interest. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Timor’s sandalwood trade was centred on Solor, off east Flores. A federation of five sea-oriented chiefdoms occupied Solor and the adjoining island of Adonara.⁷⁷ The Topassers or “Black Portuguese” emerged there as a distinct community, but later were concentrated on Larantuka in eastern Flores. From the mid-seventeenth century they also settled at Lifau on the north Timor coast. Their grip on the sandalwood trade enabled them to become a formidable force, ruled by the alternating de Hornay and da Costa dynasties. A Dutch report in 1659 estimated that there were about 300 Topassers of mixed descent, while the rest were described as “blacks with shotguns”, that is, locals armed with European weapons and the Catholic religion. By the mid-1600s they dominated eastern Flores (Larantuka), Solor and Adonara, as well as the main west Timor polities; by 1670 they were imposing some authority over the eastern lowlands.⁷⁸ Their local networks were far stronger than those of the Dutch, as they intermarried with influential indigenous families and formed alliances with the chiefs of the interior.⁷⁹ Unlike other early armed domains profiting from trade, such as the “pirate” enclaves of the coasts, the Topassers combined indigenous and European political strategies.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 264.

⁷⁵ Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air,” 267.

⁷⁶ A. van Ekris, “Iets over het Ceramse Kakian-Verbond,” *BKI* 16 (1867): 312, passim; Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air,” 265–7.

⁷⁷ Knaap, “Military Capability and the State,” 191–2.

⁷⁸ Arend de Roever, *De jacht op sandelhout: De VOC en de tweedeling van Timor in de zeventiende eeuw* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2002). Leonard Andaya, “The ‘Informal Portuguese Empire’ and the Topasses in the Solor Archipelago and Timor in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (2010).

⁷⁹ Hans Hägerdal, “Colonial or Indigenous Rule? The Black Portuguese of Timor in the 17th and 18th Centuries,” *ILAS Newsletter* 44 (2007); Andaya, “Informal Portuguese Empire.”

Hans Hägerdal comments: “The Topass leaders managed their affairs as local merchant princes, akin to many a native Southeast Asian ruler: ordering deliveries of sandalwood to be brought down to the coast so that they may be picked up by foreign traders”.⁸⁰ During a period when the Europeans were weak or distracted the Topassers exploited valuable sandalwood exports from the border zone between Dutch and Portuguese authority. When Dutch forces mobilised in 1749 the Topassers were crushed.

In western Timor two centres with greater prestige exercised a loose authority over smaller polities. The mid-nineteenth century Dutch regarded their leaders, the *liurai*, as the paramount chiefs of two “kingdoms” or federations: Sonbai, which they thought had once occupied all southwest Timor, and Wewiku-Wehale, centred on relatively flat and fertile south-central Timor. By the late nineteenth century, according to the *ENI*, the last *liurai* of Sonbai was left with one directly ruled kampong; the rest of his territory consisted of individual petty polities, only some of which continued to acknowledge his influence. A shrunken Wehale continued into the twentieth century.⁸¹ Whether this limited effective power, as opposed to symbolic significance, was in fact very different from the early seventeenth century situation is uncertain. Wewiku-Wehale was the ritual counterpart of Luca, the preeminent realm on Timor’s southeast coast.⁸²

Assembling States

Colonial scholars usually had low opinions of local societies and cultures, regarding external influence, particularly from India, as fundamental to political structures in most of early Southeast Asia. Any significant states, they reasoned, had probably been founded by foreigners. Druce has examined the evidence for the north-west coast of Borneo, including Brunei. According to Pires, sixteenth-century Brunei exported foodstuffs, meat, fish, rice and sago as well as forest products such as honey, wax, rattan, pitch, cowries, valuable camphor and poor-quality gold. Druce concluded that despite “the incorporation of the region into a major international trading network from the tenth century onward ... [t]here is no evidence to suggest any [states] were founded by people from outside Borneo ... these polities should be seen as inherently local”.⁸³

The more elaborate, particularly the Indianised, Southeast Asian states have been described as decentralised and personalized “galactic”, “mandala” or “solar system” polities.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea*, 9, 183, 363–75. On one Topass leader, in 1831, Francis wrote: “Colonel Don Lorenzo Dias Vieira, King of Larantuka, ... has learnt to read and write Portuguese fairly well, although he has never been outside his own country. He is a man of about 28 years of age and has added the dignity of priest to that of king, because he is also the head of the church in his kingdom. His association with the Buginese has taught him the use of opium, which he loves greatly”. E. Francis, “Timor in 1831,” *TNI* 1, nos. 1–72 (1838): 394–5.

⁸¹ *Ikhtisar keadaan politik Hindia-Belanda tahun 1839–1848* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1973), 403–4. *ENI*: “Timor,” 330–1.

⁸² Barnes, Hägerdal and Palmer, “An East Timorese Domain.”

⁸³ Stephen Charles Druce, “The ‘Birth’ of Brunei: Early Polities of the Northwest Coast of Borneo and the Origins of Brunei, Tenth to Mid-fourteenth Centuries,” in *Brunei: History, Islam, Society and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Ooi Keat Gin (London: Routledge, 2016).

⁸⁴ See the summary in Druce, “Decentralized Austronesian Polity.” The seminal study was Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, “The Galactic Polity in Southeast Asia,” in *Culture, Thought, and Social Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973).

Oliver Wolters described early Southeast Asia as a “patchwork of often overlapping mandalas, or ‘circles of kings’”; one king claimed hegemony over the other rulers, who were his “obedient allies and vassals”.⁸⁵ Borderlands were “unclaimed wild forests and sometimes transition zones characterized by multiple sovereignties. Multiple distant rulers could make overlapping claims on people, their labour, and local resources” while “serfs and slaves were classified not by their residence in a bounded territory, but by their category of serf and their common subordination to a master”.⁸⁶ These key elements were also present in the main eastern island polities.

As was described in the first chapter, prestige objects obtained as tribute or through exchange would be displayed or distributed to create and reward clients, and to demonstrate linkage within and between communities. Highly valued possessions became central to ceremonial and ritual life, exemplifying precedence within families, villages and political alliances.⁸⁷ Shared social space was delineated by the dispersal of the trade goods that passed through the raja’s harbour. The movements of bronze drums, large Chinese jars, ivory, cloths and women reflected rights and obligations, confirming gradations of prestige and precedence. This did not necessarily require the presence of a complex state.



Image 17 Don Josef Ximenes da Silva, Raja of Sikka, 1927⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Wolters, *History, Culture and Region*, 27.

⁸⁶ Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Lee Peluso, “Territorialization and State Power in Thailand,” *Theory and Society* 24, no. 3 (1995): 387–9, 392–5. For a description of a much more personalised and territorially vague frontier realm see Bianca Maria Gerlich, *Marudu 1845: The Destruction and Reconstruction of a Coastal State in Borneo* (Hamburg: Abera, 2003).

⁸⁷ For comparative context: Mary W. Helms, *Ulysses’ Sail: An Ethnographic Odyssey of Power, Knowledge, and Geographical Distance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Helms, *Craft and the Kingly Ideal: Art, Trade, and Power* (Austin: University of Texas, 1993); Aimée M. Plourde, “Prestige Goods and the Formation of Political Hierarchy: A Costly Signaling Model,” in *Pattern and Process in Cultural Evolution*, ed. S. Shennan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 374–88.

⁸⁸ “Thomas da Silva, radja van Sikka, met gouden helm en andere waardevolle gouden sieraden”. Photographer unknown. KITLV 11118; persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:767577>. Creative Commons CC BY License. Don Jozef Thomas Ximenes da Silva was raja from 1921 to 1952, and regent 1949–50.

The Flores realm of Sikka provides an illuminating example. This consisted of more than 40 chiefly federations, which E. Douglas Lewis calls *tana*. Each was “a loosely organized region defined by a centre and whose peripheries form no clear boundary”; ritual leaders from specific clans performed the ceremonies that identified their *tana*, as in the Austronesian *vanua* tradition. Overseas trade provided the chiefs of Sikka Natar, the south coast village of Sikka, with a powerful way of establishing and manifesting political allegiance through the distribution of elephant tusks. Lewis describes “paths of ivory” along which the giving and receiving of prestige-enhancing tusks from the port demonstrated the bond between the raja and the recipient domains. Tusks were also incorporated into bridewealth exchange: “every ivory tusk not only signals a marriage, but evokes remembrance of the rajadom”.⁸⁹ Even in the relatively sophisticated states of South Sulawesi, the sacred authority of rulers was buttressed by objects, not persons.⁹⁰

The most basic level in Sulawesi’s conglomerate polities was the small community, with leaders chosen from among the people according to rules of precedence and personal authority. Kinship and ritual ties typically bound them together. In Central Sulawesi the “small, hilltop settlements” of the interior joined larger political confederations clustered in river valleys. Although these claimed a cultural unity derived from their sets of ancestors, in fact their origins were quite diverse. Albert Schrauwers concluded that they “should not be treated as units of cultural consistency ... but as nascent political confederations that emphasised their unity through shared descent”. The ties that bound them came not through the political efforts of their chiefs, but from the family ties between villages, and the “alliances between their constituent kinship groups”.⁹¹

Looser and more extensive alliances, linking upland and lowland groups, were common, as we saw in the preceding chapter. The coastal domains were headed by paramount chiefs or rajas who could validate inland chiefs’ appointments, intervene in conflicts, and exchange imported goods for inland products. The downstream communities were usually Muslim, although in the south-western islands and eastern Nusa Tenggara many became Christian. Realms were typically federations of federations, bound together by trade and custom.

The desire to create trust and avoid war meant that voluntary alliances occurred among villages and between federations. In the seventeenth century the five Gorontalo composite domains, *Pohala’a*, consisted of lesser entities under *marsaoleh*; by 1681 the Gorontalo ruler had recognised the VOC’s suzerainty.⁹² An account from the mid-1800s described

⁸⁹ Lewis, *Stranger-Kings*, 133–7; Leonard Y. Andaya, “The Social Value of Elephant Tusks and Bronze Drums among Certain Societies in Eastern Indonesia,” *BKI* 172, no. 1 (2016); James J. Fox, “Precedence in Perspective,” in *Precedence: Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World*, ed. Michael P. Vischer, 1–12 (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009), 5.

⁹⁰ Andaya has argued that sovereignty itself rested in these objects; more recent work has modified this image. See, Andaya, “Nature of Kingship in Bone”; William Cummings, *Making Blood White: Historical Transformations in Early Modern Makassar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002); Martin Rössler, “From Divine Descent to Administration: Sacred Heirlooms and Political Change in Highland Goa,” *Bijdragan Tot De Taal-, Land-En Volkenkunde* 156, no. 3 (2000): 539–60.

⁹¹ Albert Schrauwers, *Colonial ‘Reformation’ in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi Indonesia, 1892–1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000), 67–9.

⁹² Gorontalo consisted of 5 *marsaoleh*, Limboto 4, Bone 3, Boalemo and, Atinggola 1; *ENI*: “Gorontalo.”

Gorontalo's history, how a capable and ambitious man came down from the mountains to the coast. He founded a village, married into a local family, and persuaded other chiefs to accept him as leader. They became "rajas with an overlord", not subjects.⁹³ Tradition similarly records that Bolaang Mongondow, between Gorontalo and Manado, originated in the early 1400s as a voluntary federation of coast dwellers (the Bolaang), who had left the hills many centuries before, and the inland Mongondow. Trade developed with the Europeans, and in the late sixteenth century the political centre moved to the coast; some converted to Christianity, but a mid-nineteenth century ruler turned to Islam.⁹⁴

In the Raja Ampat archipelago off northwest New Guinea webs of allegiance and authorities at different levels handled inseparable social and trading ties. Despite the coincidence of the name (Kalana Fat, Raja Ampat or Four Kings) and the fact that the archipelago had four main islands, the four realms were located on just three of the islands. Waigeo and Misol each had their raja while on Salawati the eponymous kingdom was based on the north coast, and Sailolof on the south.⁹⁵ The Sultan of Tidore claimed hegemony over the Raja Ampat through his ties with the raja of Sailolof and with southeast Halmahera's Gamrange settlements (Maba, Patani and Weda). In the mid-nineteenth century Sailolof had ties to Waigeo and claims over Tanjung Sele on the Papua mainland, at the southern entrance of the Sele strait. This was strategically located to control traffic threading its way through the narrow, island-littered strait. Salawati claimed the north-western coast of the Bird's Head.⁹⁶ Gamrange communities were linked by immigration, descent and language with north-west New Guinea's Biak archipelago and the Raja Ampat. These ties were mediated through the headman on Gebe island, located between Halmahera and New Guinea.⁹⁷ In their turn the Raja Ampat rulers exercised authority on the New Guinea littoral through local chiefs.

The archetypical maritime state in Southeast Asia was "Srivijaya", located in the strategic Melaka Straits and centred on southern Sumatra. Once regarded as an enduring empire, lasting from the eighth century to the twelfth century, "Srivijaya" is now seen as a generic name for a series of thalassocracies, or sea-based polities.⁹⁸ The Greeks were the first

⁹³ C.B.H. Rosenberg, *Reistogten in de Afdeeling Gorontalo gedaan op Last der Nederlandsch Indische Regering* (Amsterdam: Frederick Muller, 1865), 16–8.

⁹⁴ "Sejarah Daerah di Sulut: Kerajaan Bolaang Mongondow," *Tribun Manado* online, 25 June 2013, <https://manado.tribunnews.com/2013/06/25/kerajaan-bolaang-mongondow>. See also W. Dunneber, "Over de Vorsten van Bolaang Mongondow," *BKI* 105, nos. 2–3 (1949).

⁹⁵ F.S.A. de Clercq, *Het gebied der Kalana fat of vier Radja's in Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea* (Leiden: Brill, 1889).

⁹⁶ F.C. Kamma, "De Verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoeese Eilanden in legende en histories. Deel drie," *Indonesie* 2, no. 2 (1948).

⁹⁷ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 99–110. Widjojo, *Revolt of Prince Nuku*.

⁹⁸ O.W. Wolters, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 19–48; Leonard Y. Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 2009), 60–8. See also, from bibliography, Munoz, *Early Kingdoms*; Hall, *History of Early Southeast Asia*; Salmon, "Srivijaya, la Chine et les marchands chinois"; Anton O. Zakharov, "Constructing the Policy of Srivijaya in the 7th–8th centuries: The View According to the Inscriptions," in *The Indonesian Studies Working Papers*, no. 9, Department of Indonesian Studies at the University of Sydney, 2009.

to use the term *thalassocracy*, referring to Minoan Crete, and it has since been applied to polities ranging from South India's Cholas (who attacked Srivijaya), to sixteenth century Portugal, another invasive presence in Southeast Asia. However, land-based states that happened to dominate connecting seas were hardly true thalassocracies. Braudel himself doubted whether even Crete qualified, as "contacts, defence posts and facilities, usually on a friendly footing, did not add up to an empire". He preferred to emphasise Crete's role as "a sphere of cultural influence" that pervaded "the whole of the Aegean".⁹⁹ The relationship between cultural, political and economic hegemonies is similarly contested in the case of Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁰

Manguin has described the concentric circles of relationships which constituted the realm. The core was the *kadatuan* at Palembang, the place of the datu, while the most distant relationships reached far to the east and west. Each circle had its own relations with other systems, and "the sum of all these specific spaces constitutes the global social space of the polity of Sriwijaya".¹⁰¹ This extensive domain was sustained, as Leonard Andaya points out, by allegiance to the datu himself; his charismatic lineage, spiritual force and ritual significance made him the unifying focus. On his behalf, the *buluntuhan* (his extended family and retainers) exercised authority over the webs of allied kinship groups which were the foundation of the kingdom.¹⁰² Jan Wisseman Christie adds:¹⁰³

[Srivijaya was a] less stable, more primitive version of the multi-port Sultanate which later dominated the Malacca Straits and its trade through the same combination of force, bribery and spiritual power, drawing some small states into its structure with their leadership intact, and forcing members of the ruling family upon others.... The building blocks of seventh-century Srivijaya were apparently the previously independent wanua under the leadership of rulers called datu.

It was trade that gave the Srivijaya datu the prestige and resources to ensure the loyalty of the *buluntuhan* and funded the display appropriate to his status. Manguin notes that a typical description of a king would record that "he was very fond of all merchants;" "many merchants came and went to trade there. And all the people from countries without a raja congregated there".¹⁰⁴

There were three main causes of the instability of these states. First was the problem of communication and control, given the geographic constraints outlined in chapter 2. Secondly, there was an oversupply of potential heirs, as bilateral, or more correctly, cognatic

⁹⁹ Fernand Braudel, *Memory and the Mediterranean* (New York: Vintage, 2002), 108.

¹⁰⁰ For a summary, Sutherland, "Contingent Devices," 29–33.

¹⁰¹ Pierre-Yves Manguin, "The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted Centres, Extended Peripheries," *Moussons* 5 (2003): para. 38.

¹⁰² Andaya, *Leaves*, 54–68.

¹⁰³ Christie, "State Formation," 264–9, 272.

¹⁰⁴ Manguin, "Amorphous Nature," para. 43.

kinship systems prevailed.¹⁰⁵ Within elite circles polygamy, involving wives and concubines of different ranks, complicated claims to the throne, particularly as there was no decisive preference for primogeniture. The third cause was the difficulty of matching royal income and expenditure. “A strong king” points out Boomgaard, “had to be a generous king, who would bestow liberal gifts on the regional leaders and religious establishment”. The easiest way to augment an empty purse was war, by launching raids to seize people and property, so it was common.¹⁰⁶

Sustaining political links was difficult, requiring regular affirmation. Military expeditions, punitive raids and plunder were tied to the seasonality of trade, which was in turn linked to agricultural cycles and monsoon winds. Even the more stratified states were only intermittently present in their peripheries, when they or their proxies demanded tribute, manpower, or attendance at ceremonies. Paramount chiefs or overlords had to regularly assert, and personally enforce their rights to tribute and labour from their theoretical subordinates. Power was legitimised through complex myths, described in familial terms (father and son, older and younger brother) and maintained through the continual and calculated dispensation of rewards and punishment. Strong individuals, groups or polities expanded into areas where countervailing authorities were weaker. The Bugis, one of the most dispersed of the archipelago’s peoples, were succinct. They acknowledged the “three tips” that were basic to statecraft: that of the tongue, for diplomacy; that of the penis, for marriage alliances; and that of the lance, for war.¹⁰⁷

By the early seventeenth century most rulers of the eastern archipelago’s larger states had converted to Islam, unlike many of their peoples. The new religion came through their connections to Melaka, Brunei and the north Java coastal cities. The Muslim state provided a model that could bring scattered, small communities within an over-arching framework. The Balinese kingdoms preserved a different, Indianized lineage, going back to Majapahit via Gelgel.¹⁰⁸ The Balinese kingdoms were culturally close to Java, with their elaborate brick buildings and temples, but Schulte Nordholt’s account of Mengwi’s rise also applies to the sultanates:¹⁰⁹

Marriages, adoptions, violence and even the mass movements of groups of people—from Buleleng [north Bali] to Mengwi and vice versa, to draw potential adversaries into the central orbit and to place loyal subjects in faraway places—were inadequate means to eliminate instability.... The relations between centre and satellites were marked by mutual rivalry, successions of alliances, and conflicts. In this tension-filled context royal authority was highly diffuse.

¹⁰⁵ For illuminating editorial comments and essays: Kathleen M. Adams and Kathleen A. Gillogly, eds., *Everyday Life in Southeast Asia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), chapter 2; Fiona Kerlogue Monica Janowski, ed., *Kinship and Food in South East Asia* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2007).

¹⁰⁶ Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*, 60.

¹⁰⁷ Gene Ammarell, “Bugis Migration and Modes of Adaptation to Local Situations,” *Ethnology* 41(2002).

¹⁰⁸ Adrian Vickers, *Journeys of Desire. A Study of The Balinese Text Malat* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 263–4.

¹⁰⁹ Henk Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics: 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 44.



Image 18 Main gate of the Krobokan palace, Denpasar, South Bali, 1920¹¹⁰

In south Sulawesi, in both Gowa and Bone, the geographical tracing of marriage alliances has proved a fruitful way of mapping domains and understanding their origins. Caldwell and Wellen conclude that the two early Bugis realms of Cina and Luwu were “ruled initially by a single corporate cognatic descent group that later bifurcated into two different kingdoms. At least until the mid-fifteenth century one could consider Cina and Luwuq as complementary elements of a single political complex”.¹¹¹ Much the same could be said of Makassarese Gowa and Talloq. This joint realm was sustained by the combination of Gowa’s rice lands, Talloq’s maritime skills, the talents of the ruling dynasties and, from the

¹¹⁰ “Main Gate of the Palace of Krobokan, Pura Perbekel, Den Pasar, Indonesia”. Photograph J.J. de Vink. With permission from the Kern Collection, Leiden University, image no. P-O4573. Also available (with a slightly different description and date) from KITLV no. 8339; persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:706714> . Creative Commons CC BY License.

¹¹¹ David Bulbeck, “The Inside View of Makassar’s 16th to 17th Century History: Changing Marital Alliances and Persistent Settlement Patterns,” *Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 12, supplement, no. 1 (2016); Ian Caldwell and Kathryn Wellen, “Finding Cina. A New Paradigm for Early Bugis History,” *BKI* 173, nos. 2–3 (2017): 319.

early sixteenth century, resident Malay and Portuguese traders.¹¹² The union of the realms made Makassar a powerful force from the mid-1500s. Power sharing was not without tension.¹¹³ During much of seventeenth-century Makassar's golden age, the Talloq elite was dominant, but Gowa's name was more widely known among foreigners. A mid-sixteenth century visitor to the peninsula reported trade in iron, slaves, sandalwood, textiles and ivory, and described the land as rich in rice, meat and fish.¹¹⁴

In larger polities, rulers held power together with their councils. A distinction should be made between the nobles gathered in court, and the leaders of lesser constituent domains or communities within the kingdom, each of whom had their own recognised role. The former were typically representatives of powerful lineages, who derived power from their clans, their own hereditary territories, their followers, and from closeness to the ruler. The latter, like chiefs in a confederation, retained their own customary identities and rights, rooted in the land which provided their livelihood.¹¹⁵ Agreement between elites was required, or at least desirable, in matters of war, high diplomacy and transregional trade.

Take Ternate as an example. The sultan had his own territory, but so too did the other aristocrats of the *kolana* class. The ruler's precedence over these men, and over the chiefs known as bobato, depended on his personal authority. As was noted above, Andaya defined these bobato as heads of soa, embodying ties with the land, and it was in that capacity they constituted the council of 20 "elders" who advised the sultan. Andaya suggests that there was a distinction between lineage and territorially focussed authority which broke down after 1652 when the bobato lost control over clove production.¹¹⁶ From a heterarchic perspective there is not necessarily an either-or choice between the two sources of status. The bobato could have been highly localised authorities, some of whom were also counted among Ternate's high elite. In other words, the same individuals claimed different levels of precedence in specific spheres.

In Sulawesi the interplay of territorial and descent-based claims to power determined the composition of councils. In the 1870s Ligtvoet observed: "It has never happened in the whole territory of Celebes that the conquest of one land by another has resulted in the conquered ruler or his followers being admitted to the Council of Great Men (the *hadat*) of the victorious kingdom".¹¹⁷ Mattulada explains that in the more institutionalised Bugis and Makassarese states villagers were subsumed in autonomous territorial units under powerful leaders of kin-groups, men or women. These were known by local names such as *wanua*, *bori'* and *bate*; their leaders bore such titles as *arung*, *karaeng*, *gallarang* or

¹¹² From bibliography: Cummings, *Making Blood White*; Reid, "Pluralism and Progress"; Leonard Andaya, *Heritage of Arung Palakka*; Sutherland, "The Makassar Malays"; Villiers, "Cash-Crop Economy and State Formation."

¹¹³ William Cummings, "'Only One People but Two Rulers': Hiding the Past in Seventeenth-Century Makasarese Chronicles," *BKI* 155, no. 1 (1999).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*; Brett Baker, "South Sulawesi in 1544: A Portuguese Letter," *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 39, no. 1 (2005).

¹¹⁵ Immigrants could also retain their own autonomy within the territory of a polity, this applied, for example, to fourteen settlements within South Sulawesi's Sidenreng and the Bugis in Kutei; S.W. Tromp, "Eenige Mededeelingen Omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetei," *BKI* 36, no. 1 (1887).

¹¹⁶ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 60–71, 167–8.

¹¹⁷ A Ligtvoet, "Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton," *BKI* II, no. 4 (1878): 20.

sulewatang. Their domains were, with varying degrees of constraint, incorporated into wider realms called *tana* (B.) and *butta* (M.).¹¹⁸ Bugis chronicles describe the formation of states such as Bone as deriving from the absorption of “pre-existing agricultural communities (*wanua*)”.¹¹⁹

No matter how important the new territory, the domain’s original core settlements—those of the founders—retained their position in the council. As the kingdoms expanded these nuclei were reduced to a small area of the kingdom but they retained their central symbolic role. In Luwu, where connections with the inland Toraja people remained strong, they were represented in the council. In southwest Sulawesi’s Bugis Bone and Makassarese Gowa the representatives of the original component domains had similar status. In Gowa they were known as the Nine Banners (*bate-salapang*) and in Bone as the Council of Seven (*ade’-pitu*) or the Seven Lords (*aru pitu*).¹²⁰ From the later seventeenth century, after the Dutch conquest of Makassar, the Bone king was able to achieve an atypical concentration of power, asserting his suzerainty over subject and tributary domains. Access to the highest positions was increasingly determined by the degree of “white blood” or birth status within the intermarried nobility, but the councils continued to embody the realm.¹²¹

In Wajo’s founding myth the *gallarang* (or *ranreng*), the rulers of the three core *wanua* (*limpo*), explicitly defined their relationship with the paramount ruler, the *arung matoa*.¹²²

We make you king over us, but you are not king over our possessions...you ask for things that it is correct for you to request, and we will give it to you, but you are not to take things away from us. The king is not to decide on any matter concerning domestic affairs without the *gallarang*, and the *gallarang* are not to decide anything concerning war without the king.

Two leaders (political and military) from each *limpo* formed Wajo’s over-arching advisory council, the Six Lords (*petta ennengnge*). But authority was further delegated to other members of each *limpo*: four judges, four deliberators and an envoy. Together all these

¹¹⁸ H.A. Mattulada, “Some Notes on the Nineteenth Century Dutch Colonial System of Power Control in the South Sulawesi Region,” in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference Held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1978* (Leiden: BIS, 1978), 165–6, 172.

¹¹⁹ Caldwell and Wellen, “Finding Cina,” 309.

¹²⁰ Cummings, *Making Blood White*, 29, 100–2. Christian Pelras, *The Bugis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 175–81.

¹²¹ Heather Sutherland, “Political Structure and Colonial Control in South Sulawesi,” in *Man, Meaning and History: Essays in Honour of H. G. Schulte Nordholt*, ed. R. Schefold, J.W. Schoorl, and J. Tennekes (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 236–8; Pelras, *The Bugis*, 176–8; H.A. Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat, dan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan* (Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1998), 49–58, 348–52. For a summary of the theoretical formal structure of late eighteenth-century Bone, see Rahilah Omar, “The History of Bone A.D. 1775–1795: The Diary of Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh Syamsuddin” (PhD diss., University of Hull, 2003), 193–200. For an example of the emphasis placed on such councils as precursors of democracy in Southwest Sulawesi see A. Rasyid Asba, “Demokrasi Yang Merana: Terabaikannya Nilai-Nilai Lokal Dalam Pengembangan Demokrasi Di Indonesia,” paper presentation, Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Politik (STISIP) Muhammadiyah, 2011. Anthony Reid, “Merdeka: The Concept of Freedom in Indonesia,” in *Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. David Kelly and Anthony Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹²² Mattulada, “Some Notes,” 174.

leaders elected and assisted the arung matoa. The total was known (despite actual numbers) as the Forty Lords (*arung patampulu*). Collectively they constituted the Wajo political system, which was flexible, relatively very open, and if united quite capable of expelling the arung matoa, the pre-eminent king.¹²³ Rulers typically had rather short reigns, often ending in their withdrawal from office; long reigns tended to be by exceptional men such as La Salewangeng To Tenriruwa Arung Sengkang (r.1713–36) and the warrior La Maddukelleng (r.1736–54).

The checks and balances within Wajo's system were significant. La Maddukelleng was blamed for prolonging wars (see chapter 6), for undermining Wajo's consensual politics and breaking the sacred Tellumpocoe oath of 1582 which enshrined the alliance with Bone. He withdrew as ruler in 1754 and died, perhaps executed, in 1768.¹²⁴ In the sixteen years after his withdrawal four arung matoa ruled, all of whom chose to resign. From 1770 to 1795 there was no arung matoa at all; a pious and perhaps suitably passive leader followed, ruling for c. 22 years. In 1859 La Cincing Akil Ali, brother of the powerful Sidenreng ruler, became arung matoa. He chose to spend much of his time at the latter's port of Parepare, ignoring the calls for his return from the six lords. This was a time of conflict in Wajo, as mediating mechanisms broke down; many migrated.¹²⁵ Wellen concludes that Wajo remained "a federative ethno-nation" until its conquest by the Dutch in 1906.¹²⁶

In January 1840 James Brooke visited the west coast of the Bone Gulf, calling at Bone and Wajo; he sent a message to the Bone ruler, who was at his capital two hours inland from the port of Bajoe. The king replied, "that he should be glad to receive us, but that it would be previously necessary to call together the other different rajahs, in order to have their opinion and advice." Rumours were circulating that the British were seeking to expel the Dutch from Sulawesi. Delays followed, and Brooke suspected prevarication. But his "very good friend", the Arab Sayyid Muhammad, explained that "the invariable rule was that there must be a muster of all the king's relations and chiefs before a stranger could be admitted to an audience". Since the noble chief minister (the *tomarilaleng*) was pro-Dutch, he could block such contacts; Brooke saw this as a "dirty web" of "sinister influence", but recognised the complex balance of power at the heart of government.¹²⁷ The extent to which the Bone ruler was actually constrained by custom is uncertain; but if he should need the loyalty of his subordinate lords in serious matters, such as questions of war, it would have been unwise to ignore them. Powerful allies had to be consulted as they

¹²³ Kathryn Anderson Wellen, *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora* (DeKalb: NIU, 2014), 23–7.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 23–7, 137–59; *Peristiwa Tahun Tahun Bersejarah daerah Sulawesi Selatan dari abad ke XIV s/d XIX* (Ujung Pandang: Balai Kajian Sejarah, 1985), 153–4; Kathryn Anderson Wellen, "Credit among the Early Modern Wajoq," in *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930: From Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsi to Cooperative*, ed. David Henley and Peter Boomgaard (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 82–3. I have followed Wellen's chronology rather than in the *Peristiwa* which is unclear, as is often the case in chronicles if there are questions of legitimacy.

¹²⁵ Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat*, 349–50; *Peristiwa Tahun Tahun*, 195–201.

¹²⁶ Wellen, *The Open Door*, 23.

¹²⁷ James Brooke, *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes down to the Occupation of Labuan from the Journals of James Brooke, Esq.*, ed. R.N. Captain Rodney Mundy, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1848), 34–7. On Sayyid Abdullah, see also pp.108–9.

would be expected to commit men to a possible conflict, while the aru pitu's support could provide a necessary moral authority.

When Brooke finally met the Bone ruler he was received with due ceremony: "A body of 3000 or 4000 men were ranged within and without the courtyard, dressed precisely alike, in skull caps and blue sarongs.... A dead silence was preserved as we passed through them.... Eight or ten spearmen, clad in coats of bright mail, guarded the entrance".¹²⁸ Brooke's opinion of Bone did not improve. He found it despotic and its etiquette absurd, much less sympathetic than the unruly and friendly Wajo. A few years later Henry Keppel's visit to Bone convinced him of royal power:¹²⁹

[T]he natives, with much politeness, begged me not to go [inland] previous to my visit to Boni, as they would be answerable for allowing strangers to see the country without orders from the chief rajah. All I see and hear convinces me that the Rajah of Boni has great power over the entire country.

Keppel implicitly recognised that even the Bone king was a *primus inter pares*, "the chief rajah".

The ruler's position as first among equals is obvious in sultanates such as Banjarmasin and Sulu, where he was typically the victor in on-going struggles between competing kin-groups. In Banjarmasin the sultan could not bypass the court council in which the royal family, the nobility, representatives of communities and lower officials were all represented; he could take no policy decision without their consent, nor could he meet alone with foreigners or Chinese. In mid-nineteenth century east Kalimantan the theoretical representatives of the rulers pocketed most of the tribute.¹³⁰

Although Sulu had probably been relatively centralised under Sultan Shahabuddin (1685–1710), it seems to have reverted to form in subsequent years.¹³¹ A similarly ambitious Sulu sultan, Muhammad Alimuddin I (1735–73) had been effectively deposed after he tried to centralise power.¹³² Hunt, who visited Sulu at the beginning of the nineteenth century, observed that the "Sultan [was] a mere cypher, neither feared nor respected; his orders disputed by the meanest individual, unable to decide on the most trivial points". Sultan Aliyud-Din I (1808–21) tried to reduce the number of datu in the council, but such was the resistance of the main chiefs that the council ended up being considerably

¹²⁸ Ibid., 134.

¹²⁹ Henry Keppel, *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the Suppression of Piracy: With Extracts from the Journal of James Brooke, Esq. of Sarawak* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1846), 1: 85–6.

¹³⁰ Idwar Saleh, "Pepper Trade and the Ruling Class of Banjarmasin in the Seventeenth Century," in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1978* (Leiden: BIS, 1978), 211. Writing of the smaller realms to the northeast, Gallois concluded that in two Sultanates, Gunung Tabur and Sambaliung "the influence of these counsellors in within reasonable limits, but in Bulungan, on the contrary, it is much greater, and frequently oppressive for the Amiril [ruler]."

¹³¹ Adrian B. Lopian, "Laut Sulawesi: The Celebes Sea from Center to Peripheries," *Moussons* 7, no. 3–16 (2003).

¹³² H. de la Costa, "Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735–1773," *JMBRAS* 38, no. 1 (1965).

expanded. All members shared, to varying degrees, in the 5 per cent levied on British cargoes, and a payment by each junk. This was the only state revenue.¹³³



Image 19 Sultan Muhd. Jamalul Kiram II, Sultan of Sulu (r.1894–1936), c.1890¹³⁴

In the late 1830s the Spanish Governor General described the sultanate:¹³⁵

The total population credited to the Archipelago is from 149,000 to 150,000 souls, 6,800 of which inhabit Jolo, and in this number are included 800 Chinese. The houses, or rather huts, of the principal place, are estimated to number 3,500, and that of the petty king, called Sultan, cannot be distinguished from the rest except for its greater size; all are of bamboo and nipa [palm leaves, in roofs], weak and poor as their owners, but with cannons of various calibers which mark the residences of the datus, descendants of the petty kings, and who themselves constitute the oligarchy of their Government. I have already stated that the Sultan can do nothing, all matters being decreed by the convention, or Ruma Bichara of the datus, where the owner of the greatest number of slaves always decides the questions. Wealth, influence and power, are measured among them solely by the number of slaves, and this is why they cannot but be pirates, in order to acquire this wealth, nor can they offer any guaranty, if it must be accompanied by the renunciation of this pursuit.

In 1842 the American Wilkes agreed.¹³⁶

¹³³ John Hunt, “Some Particulars Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia,” in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: being a Collection of Papers*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore, 1837).

¹³⁴ “Sultan Moh. Jamalul Kiram II van Sulu met islamitische geleerde en waarschijnlijk hoge ambtenaar”. Photograph G.R. Lambert & Co. KIT/NMVW image TM-60001376. Deepink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/328035>. CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication. By permission of the Museum.

¹³⁵ Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 340–1.

¹³⁶ “The government of the Sulu Archipelago is a kind of oligarchy, and the supreme authority is vested in the Sultan and the Ruma Bechara or trading council. This consists of about twenty chiefs, either datus, or their next in rank, called oranges, who are governors of towns or detached provinces. The influence of

In such complex states, birth titles, court ranking, and functional designations were governed by elaborate regulatory norms. The relative status of rulers, nobles, chiefs, followers, freemen and slaves was expressed in a multitude of ways, from dress and language to marriage rights and roles in ritual. Some colours (yellow) and types of clothing were reserved for the ruler alone; luxury commodities could also serve to display power and wealth in hierarchical polities. In South Sulawesi, for example, degrees of royal blood were calculated in fractions, publicly demonstrated in ceremonies and a decisive factor in marriage strategies. Primary wives should be of equivalent rank, providing heirs with the highest degree of “white blood”, while secondary wives could be lower, and were often drawn from politically useful lesser territories.¹³⁷ Much the same applied in Bali;¹³⁸ more simple applications of this principle were extremely common. If authority was to be projected over any distance a judicious combination of insider unions that strengthened the core with outside alliances that extended its reach was absolutely essential.

Sustaining Power

Although the pre-eminence of the elite as a whole was deeply entrenched at the apex of more centralised states, competition within the nobility led to regular crises. Direct personal control over economic resources was always an advantage. This included heritable land that was worked by slaves or tributary peasants, as well as the personal ability to recruit kin and followers to mount raids and thus obtain slaves and booty. These assets could be leveraged into a private fief, which might be incorporated into a more formal polity. But often such domains were just one of many trading and raiding strongholds.

On the fringes of polities swidden farmers were notoriously difficult to control, although the obligation and desire to attend specific ceremonies reinforced ties and generated tribute. But polities with a denser and more settled population could impose regular taxation and mobilize more manpower. Rulers sought to increase their income by promoting the opening of new land, intensive rice growing and the collection or production of commodities. Surplus foodstuffs and goods were used to retain clients, including subordinate chiefs and princes. Such lesser leaders retained as much as possible of the tribute passing through their hands. Some was earmarked for their overlords, while some was their personal due from their own domain.

Pre-sixteenth century slave markets supplied powerful households with domestic labour, women, retainers and workers. House slaves of powerful men could be privileged and armed retainers, while others could farm or trade on their own. This led many observers to

the individual chiefs depends chiefly upon the number of their retainers or slaves, and the force they can bring into their service when they require it”. Wilkes, “Manila.” Of course, authors borrowed from each other, and sources were seldom specified.

¹³⁷ Acciaioli, “Distinguishing Hierarchy”; F. David Bulbeck, “The Politics of Marriage and the Marriage of Polities in Gowa, South Sulawesi, during the 16th and 17th Centuries,” in *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather (Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996).

¹³⁸ James A. Boon, *The Anthropological Romance of Bali 1597–1972: Dynamic Perspectives in Marriage & Caste, Politics and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

contrast “mild and domestic” Asian slavery with both the horrors of the African trade, and the precarious position of unprotected people.¹³⁹ In 1842, Wilkes reported from Sulu:¹⁴⁰

[T]he slaves of Sulu are invariably better off than the untitled freemen, who are at all times the prey of the hereditary datus, even of those who hold no official stations ... the lower class of freemen are obliged to put themselves under the protection of some particular datu, which guards them from the encroachment of others. The chief to whom they thus attach themselves, is induced to treat them well, in order to retain their services, and attach them to his person.

Such comments ignore the brutalities of the trade itself, and the very real vulnerability of many slaves to cruelty and arbitrary transfers. However, debt-bondage or voluntary servitude was, and still can be, a way out of social difficulties.¹⁴¹

In the relatively few pockets of intensive production for the market the use of slaves is well-known. People were exported from the east to work in pepper growing territories further west, in Borneo and Sumatra.¹⁴² Weaving was an essential task for women throughout textile exporting regions, such as Mandar or eastern Nusa Tenggara, those with access to slave labour also used it for commercial cloth production. Sulu’s use of slaves, or at least bound labour, for the collection of marine products has been documented by Jim Warren.¹⁴³ Mindanao had been growing tobacco since the later seventeenth century; given the prevalence of slavery, it may well have been partly slave-grown.¹⁴⁴ But slaves were also part of much simpler households. Wallace, writing of the inhabitants of Waigeo in the Raja Ampat islands off the west New Guinea coast, commented: “Almost all of them, however, possess one or more Papuan slaves, on whose labour they live in almost absolute idleness, just going out on little fishing or trading excursions, as an excitement in their monotonous existence”.¹⁴⁵

Leaders existed by virtue of their followers, who could be tied to them by kinship and custom, by the obligations of clients to their patrons, or the less forgiving bonds of debt, servitude and slavery.¹⁴⁶ The relocation of population groups was a familiar

¹³⁹ Reid, *Slavery*.

¹⁴⁰ Wilkes, “Manila.” For a full description, see James Francis Warren, “The Structure of Slavery in the Sulu Zone in the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” *Slavery & Abolition* 24, no. 2 (2003).

¹⁴¹ Reid, “Closed,” 160–1; Hoskins, “Slaves, Brides and other ‘Gifts’: Resistance, Marriage and Rank in Eastern Indonesia,” *Slavery and Abolition* 25, no. 2 (2004).

¹⁴² Sutherland, “Slavery,” 267.

¹⁴³ Warren, *Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981); Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002); Sutherland, “Review Article: The Sulu Zone Revisited,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 35, no. 1 (2004).

¹⁴⁴ Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 33.

¹⁴⁵ Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*, 404, see also 289–92.

¹⁴⁶ Classic early formulations: Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia”; Adas, “From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in Colonial and Precolonial Southeast Asia”; Reid, *Slavery*.

political strategy, enabling rulers to gain followers, deprive competitors of subjects or settle recalcitrant groups close to intimidating centres of power. Ternate sultans sometimes moved entire communities to strengthen their rule, repopulating and reinforcing important territories.¹⁴⁷ In 1683 the Maluku's Obi islands, for example, were taken from the Sultan of Bacan by the Dutch, and it is possible that their existing populations were transferred by the ruler to Bacan itself, which was under-populated. The VOC did much the same; when new forts were established the Company encouraged amenable groups to settle nearby. Spice growing regions deemed capable of threatening the Dutch monopoly were deliberately depopulated. In 1621 almost the whole population of Banda was killed, expelled or enslaved, and there were forced migrations in Ambon, including the 1655 removal to Ambon of some 12,000 people from the Hoamoal peninsula of Seram and the islands to the west.¹⁴⁸ Villages were destroyed, a razed earth campaign devastated the countryside, and islands receiving refugees came under considerable strain.¹⁴⁹

In the early nineteenth century, "friendly" peoples in eastern Nusa Tenggara, such as the Savunese, were encouraged to move to violent Sumba by local Dutch officials, just as some Buginese communities were given favoured status if they undertook to fight piracy on the principle that an ex-poacher made the best gamekeeper.¹⁵⁰ But coercion alone was not enough to retain authority, given the value of people and the availability of free settlement sites. An awareness of reciprocal obligation was strong, if difficult to enforce. In many societies, notably in southwest Sulawesi, the role of followers (*joa*), or clients, was codified.¹⁵¹ Testing the strength of neighbouring states by probing raids was common, warfare a constant factor in challenging, centralizing and retaining influence.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ Andaya, *World Maluku*, 59, 67, 80, 95–6, 153.

¹⁴⁸ Collins, "Language Death in Maluku: The Impact of the VOC."

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.; Gerrit J. Knaap, "The Demography of Ambon: Evidence from Colonial Proto-Censuses," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1995); Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea*, 200–3.

¹⁵⁰ Wielenga, *Soemba* ('s-Gravenhage: Zendings-studieraad, 1926). An example is Daeng Magassing, Bonerate chief, anti-pirate fighter, and raider; Velthoen, "Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 200–21. In 1789 Batavia allowed Captain Buton, a Mandarese, to settle on Java's south coast, as he had offered to fight pirates. Kwee Hui Kian, *The Political Economy of Java's Northeast Coast c.1740–1800: Elite Synergy* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 210.

¹⁵¹ For modern examples, see H. Th. Chabot, *Kinship, Status and Gender in South Celebes* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996); Susan Bolyard Millar, *Bugis Weddings: Rituals of Social Location in Modern Indonesia* (Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, 1989).

¹⁵² Schouten, *Leadership*. On followings: Christian Pelras, "Patron-Client Ties Among the Bugis and Makassarese of South Sulawesi," *BKI* 156, no. 3 (2000). On violence: David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 252–7. On insecurity in south Kalimantan: Pijnappel, "Beschrijving van het Westelijke Gedeelte van de Zuider-en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo (De Afdeeling Sampit en de Zuidkust)," *BKI* 7 (1860): 324–39. And on Timor: Schulte Nordholt, *The Political System of the Atoni of Timor* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 326–57.

The indeterminate frontiers typical of states claiming to control extensive territories should not be taken as implying that land rights were not important. On the contrary, claims over territorial resources were crucial in the delicate balance between elites and rural populations and among neighbouring villages. Local leaders and communities vigorously protected their rights to specific resources. Because Southwest Sulawesi states were compilations of lesser polities, their composition and boundaries were delineated in extensive domain lists. There were, however, vast areas of forest and coast that were unclaimed, open to those willing to risk isolation.¹⁵³

Most eastern maritime states were archipelagic not only in their geography, but also in their dependence on dispersed nuclei of specific environmental and human resources. Rulers' power and longevity depended on their ability to hold their core territories and largely autonomous subaltern realms together. Their primary concern was to secure a reliable supply of foodstuffs; their grip on sago and rice-producing centres was basic to their security. Where possible, these territories were tightly incorporated into the political system.¹⁵⁴ The seventeenth-century port of Malacca, for example, was once described as having no hinterland and by implication dependent on trade. Now the crucial role of separate but connected territories is recognised.¹⁵⁵ Banda relied on neighbouring islands and shipping for supplies; sago was so valuable it was used as a currency.¹⁵⁶ Imports of sago or rice were also essential to the sultanates of Ternate, Tidore and Sulu. The Sulu sultanate, for example, consumed rice from the northern coast, from Palawan, Cagayan de Sulu (Tawi-Tawi) and Mindanao.¹⁵⁷ Sixteenth-century Makassar was fortunate in that it could draw on contiguous agricultural and maritime resources. Once food supplies were guaranteed, ambitious leaders would try to gain control of exchange points where

¹⁵³ Druce, *Lands*; Bulbeck, "Politics of Marriage"; Thomas Reuter, ed., *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006). See also Caldwell's rejection of "Indian" political models for Luwu: Ian Caldwell, "The Myth of the Exemplary Centre; Shelly Errington's Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 22, no. 1 (1991). There is an extensive literature on the management of resources. On Kalimantan's east coast, an early 20th century official noted: "Only the indigenous population is allowed to collect rattan. It is forbidden for Buginese and other foreigners, unless they are in the service of the chiefs, because they are more interested in the quantity than quality of the harvest, and do not spare young plants". "Beschrijving van het landschap Pasir," *BKI* 58, no. 1 (1905): 557. See, from the bibliography: Brookfield, et al., *In Place of the Forest*; Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People in Bulungan*; Warren and McCarthy, 2009; Dedi Supriadi Adhuri, "Traditional and 'Modern' Trempang Fisheries on the Border of the Indonesian and Australian Fishing Zones," in *Macassan History and Heritage: Journeys, Encounters and Influences* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013), 183–20; Adhuri, *Selling the Sea, Fishing for Power: A Study of Conflict over Marine Tenure in Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013); Dedi Adhuri and Tomoya Akimichi, "Marine Resource Use in the Bajo of North Sulawesi and Maluku, Indonesia," *Senri Ethnological Studies* 42 (1996); Thornburn, 2000; Bubandt, 2005; Zerner, "Men, Molluscs and the Marine Environment."

¹⁵⁴ On Maluku, R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 50–3. On Sulu: Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 95–102.

¹⁵⁵ Manguin, "Amorphous Nature."

¹⁵⁶ Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade*, 93–6.

¹⁵⁷ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 97, 99.

commodity flows converged. Ideally, the elite would have privileged access to products from inland, coastal and maritime ecosystems.

Druce explains how rice exports shaped developments in South Sulawesi, stimulating a shift from dry swidden to expanding wet-rice production. He concludes:¹⁵⁸

This set in motion a radical transformation of South Sulawesi societies from simple scattered chiefdoms with ranked lineages to numerous larger political entities...The most successful were the chiefdoms who controlled, or came to control, the most productive agricultural land, trade routes or external trade outlets. Less successful chiefdoms entered into tributary relations with the more successful ones, either through defeat in war or voluntary agreements.

The Bugis nobility was not a landed class in the European sense. There was a customary distinction between personal and *ex officio* income, between private and state land. The Bone realm as such held extensive territory, including that gained by war, land clearance, or through judicial procedures. Incorporated vassals lost their own hereditary territory on conquest, but the victorious king usually returned usage right to the local nobility, who then owed him goods and services.¹⁵⁹ Ministers and officials were allocated appanage territories and their populations, so they could claim percentages of products, while taxing crops, markets and gambling as well as goods entering harbours.¹⁶⁰ Lords and chiefs could also use statutory labour (corvee), slaves or share-croppers to cultivate family land, retaining all or a proportion of the harvest. There was always the risk that if appanage holders became too entrenched, they would try to convert usage into hereditary rights.

In 1607, when Talloq's ruler was preeminent in Makassar's combined court, the Dutch admiral described his policy: "Throughout the whole country in every town and marketplace he has erected fine barns full of rice, which is not allowed to be sold until the new crop is in, so as to suffer no shortage in any unseasonable year. He is very diligent in drawing trade to his country."¹⁶¹ Moreover:¹⁶²

He makes great effort to get traffic in his land, to which end he expressly keeps an agent in Banda who he supplies every year with rice, cloth, and everything wanted there, in order to get as much mace in his land as possible and thus to attract some traders thither; he can

¹⁵⁸ Druce, "The Decentralized Austronesian Polity," 17.

¹⁵⁹ See the summary in Barbara Sillers Harvey, "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950–1965" (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1974), 19–24.

¹⁶⁰ Pelras, *The Bugis*, 186.

¹⁶¹ Quoted in Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 24.

¹⁶² B.J.O. Schrieke, "The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), 68.

also buy up large lots and is able to give gifts to the Bandanese popes¹⁶³ so that it gives him a great advantage there.

After Makassar's defeat by the Dutch in 1667–69 much of the nobility lacked the means to support a following and so lost much of their significance. Mattulada explains that the “special rights they had obtained from the state, such as the *ongko* (monopoly) of the produce from a certain piece of forest, tract of land etc, the collection of *baratu* (tax, levy) on gambling or festive celebrations, and other sorts of advantages had now been terminated by the royal government”. It was members of this level of the nobility, excluded from power, who continued to leave South Sulawesi after the fall of Makassar, “taking with them not only their kin but also their loyal followers (*joa*)”.¹⁶⁴

In 1666, during the first phase of Makassar's war against the VOC, Gowa despatched a fleet of 450 ships carrying food supplies for seven months to begin the siege of Buton; the army numbered 15,000.¹⁶⁵ Few states could muster and provision such a force. Both sea and land forces consisted of subject people called to arms by their chiefs. The armies mustered by rice-producing Southwest Sulawesi states and nineteenth century Bali were formidable.¹⁶⁶ A man could fight only if he was fed; a Makassarese account explained:¹⁶⁷

If there are three men in one household, one is to be sent to war and two are to plant rice. If there are two men in one household, one is to go to war, and one is to plant rice. If there is but one man in the household, do not send him immediately to war. Only if it is absolutely necessary should he be sent.

The mid-seventeenth century Dutch were initially very doubtful of their chances against Makassar. In a decisive battle in August 1667, 30,000 troops fought for Makassar against VOC-led forces totalling 10,000, of which 7,000 were Buginese; the Company was eventually victorious.¹⁶⁸ In 1733, 12,000 warriors faced each other in battle in north Bali, while over a century later, in the 1840s, the colonial army made a poor showing when faced by “organized units fighting under a strictly maintained discipline ... over 10,000 Balinese drawn up in close battle array”.¹⁶⁹ As in medieval Europe, there was a tension between the traditional warrior code of a self-sufficient aristocracy, “legitimizing a violent response to

¹⁶³ This intriguing reference suggests ties between Gowa and religious authorities on Banda. Hans Hägerdal points out that the oldest Portuguese sources imply that Islam was established by traders in Banda by the second half of the fifteenth century; personal communication, September 2019.

¹⁶⁴ Mattulada, “Some Notes,” 164.

¹⁶⁵ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 76.

¹⁶⁶ Hans Hägerdal, “Expansion and Internalization of Modes of Warfare in Pre-Colonial Bali,” in *Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context*, ed. Kathryn Wellen and Michael W. Charney (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2017).

¹⁶⁷ Andaya, *Heritage*, 89.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 88.

¹⁶⁹ Schulte Nordholt, *Spell of Power*, 33. Hägerdal, “Expansion and Internalization.”

personal injury or insult,” and attempts by kings to subordinate the use of violence “to the needs and interests of the ruler”.¹⁷⁰

The ability to mobilise a maritime fighting force was essential for any state aiming to project power and protect their harbour. Fleets were despatched to chastise rivals, recalcitrant allies and reluctant subjects, while accumulating plunder. There was a particularly close nexus between the Sama Bajau and rulers in Sulu and Sulawesi.¹⁷¹ The tribute of sea-faring subjects included contributions of boats, rowers and fighters to both their immediate chiefs and, indirectly, to their overlords. Some larger maritime states, including Mindanao, the Maluku sultanates and Ambonese federations could raise fleets of *kora kora*, large outrigger canoes. Gerrit Knaap calculates that in the seventeenth century Ternate could deploy 30 to 40 such vessels, Tidore about 20, Hitu on Ambon 7 to 10, while Banda, before its conquest by the Dutch, could launch 10 to 15. Since each vessel carried between 60 and 80 oarsmen and fighters and was typically armed with one or two swivel guns, these were dangerous enemies. In the case of expeditions from Makassar, the Sulawesi boats were likely to use sail as their main means of propulsion.¹⁷²

Tausug datu were patrons of the Samal of Balangingi, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi, their connection expressed in tenuous ritual and tributary ties. The Sulu Sultan’s commander (*panglima*) represented him to the Samal, but individual datus had “titular rights and imposed jural authority over specific islands and populations”. The panglima were often Samal, but all datu were Tausug. The Samal paid tribute in trepang, pearlshell, and salt in return for trade opportunities and for protection from rival Tausug.¹⁷³ Tomás de Comyn visited Sulu in 1810, when it was a famous raiders’ base:¹⁷⁴

The great number of renegades, of all casts, who have successively naturalized themselves there; the abundance of arms, and the prevailing opulence, have, in every respect, contributed to render this Island a formidable and powerful state. The capital is surrounded with forts and thick walls, and the famous heights, standing near it, in case of emergency, afford a secure asylum where the women can take refuge and the treasures of the sultan and public be deposited, whilst in the plains below the contest may be maintained by more than 50,000 combatants, already very dexterous in the use of the musket and of a bold and courageous character. The navy of these Islanders is also very respectable, for, besides a great number of smaller prows and war-boats, they have some of a large size, capable of carrying heavy

¹⁷⁰ Warren C. Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe. The Medieval World* (Harlow: Pearson, 2011). Leonard Andaya, “Nature of War and Peace among the Bugis–Makassar People,” *South East Asia Research* 12, no. 1 (2004).

¹⁷¹ Lance Nolde, “Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period” (PhD diss., University of Hawai’i, 2014), 121, 260–342. Christian Pelras, “Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l’archipel Nusantaraien,” *Archipel* 3 (1972).

¹⁷² Knaap, “Military Capability and the State.”

¹⁷³ Jim Warren, “Who Were the Balangingi Samal? Slave Raiding and Ethnogenesis in Nineteenth-Century Sulu,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 37, no. 3 (1978): 484.

¹⁷⁴ Tomás de Comyn, *State of the Philippine Islands: Being an Historical, Statistical, and Descriptive Account of that Interesting Portion of the Indian Archipelago* (London: Allman, 1821).

artillery on their decks, mounted on corresponding carriages, and not suspended in slings as is the custom of the people of Mindanao.

From the mid-seventeenth century, Ternate's Ambon fleets were institutionalised as the regular, VOC-organised *hongji* expeditions that enforced the spice monopolies around Ambon and extorted tribute, particularly from New Guinea. At the approach of a *hongji*, families and belongings would be hidden. However, as Resident Tobias described, this sometimes failed to ensure the community's safety:

But often the roving crews of the kora-kora find the place where the women, children and valuables are hidden, and then the peaceful scene changes into a spectacle of savage violence, as everything that has been found is seized and people declared slave. That is why many of these tribes, when they hear that a *hongji*-fleet is on its way, wait for it at Dore, with all sorts of goods, to buy off such a visit with apparent willingness.

When rulers controlled exchange sites for long-distance shipping they gained direct access to foreign credit and the goods which enhanced their status, as well as weapons for their warriors and consumption items such as opium. Rulers and chiefs claimed monopsonies, an exclusive right to take or buy (at suitably low prices) profitable goods. Those that came from specific locations, such as gold, birds' nests or diamonds were, of course, much easier to supervise. All these funds flowed directly into the kings' coffers. An eleventh century Chinese account of Srivijaya noted that recently "Sanfoqi [Srivijaya] has established (its own) monopoly in Sandalwood. The ruler orders merchants to sell it to him. The cost of the product (therefore) increases several times. Foreign merchants do not dare to purchase it privately. This is a clever system". Wicks thought this apparent innovation was probably copied from the Javanese and Balinese practice of *pamli*, or compulsory purchase, first documented in tenth and eleventh century inscriptions.¹⁷⁵ Other specific geographical features could also be exploited, such as the grasslands in Sulawesi and eastern Nusa Tenggara. Most of the Sulawesi and Sumbawa rulers, like the chiefs of Sumba, had their own horse herds. These provided horses for the cavalry, hunting parties, and trade. In the mid-1800s that of the ruler of Bone was said to consist of at least 800 or 900 animals, and possibly 1,200 or 1,500. The ruler of Talloq and the Turatea chiefs also owned large herds.¹⁷⁶

The benefits from the archipelagos' trade were considerable, although they could not compare with the wealth of the large Javanese states, such as pepper-rich Banten.¹⁷⁷ Levies on visiting ships and duties on trade passing through their harbours, rivers or lands enriched elites. They also accumulated commodities through prior access to and discounted prices

¹⁷⁵ Robert S. Wicks, *Money, Markets and Trade in Early Southeast Asia: The Development of Indigenous Monetary Systems to AD 1400* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1992), 312.

¹⁷⁶ D.F. Liedermoy, "De Nijverheid op Celebes," *TNI* 16 (1854): 349–50.

¹⁷⁷ In the good year of 1766 the Sultan of Banten received 143,250 guilders ((107,134 Spanish real); of this 104,000 came from the pepper trade (64,000 from royal sales, 40,000 collected as tribute), other export products (diamonds, resin, rice: 13,638), trade related taxes (customs, Chinese head and gambling tax, market and opium taxes: 17,806); tax on other products (bananas, timber: 1,699); and income from the Chinese sugar industry (rent, timber supplies: 4,783). Atsushi Ota, *Changes of Regime and Social*

for incoming cargoes. Shippers' gifts to the right people were a prerequisite to obtaining permission to trade. Customs charged were typically a fixed percentage of value; anchorage fees were imposed, and markets were taxed. In major harbours, some economic rights were leased out. Generally, these revenue farmers were foreigners who had the knowledge, contacts and languages to handle visiting ships and their cargoes, while they posed no threat to the ruler.¹⁷⁸ Such tax farms could cover customs duties, the right to trade in specific commodities, to collect traffic tolls, or to manage markets. They guaranteed a certain income, while relieving rulers of complex administrative duties.

Many chiefs and rulers invested directly in trade, owning and fitting-out ships; some even sailed on them. Henley comments of Sulawesi: "Political leaders were almost always traders".¹⁷⁹ In the early modern period rulers and nobles in export-oriented states tended to pool their activities with foreign merchants in commenda partnerships.¹⁸⁰ In 1715 a new arung matoa took measures to increase Wajo's military and economic resources, buying arms and encouraging his son to organise a fund to provide credit for Wajo traders.¹⁸¹ The Bone ruler Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh Syamsuddin (r.1775–1812) described regular disputes over his trade rights between himself and Dutch officials in his diary.¹⁸²

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British Lieutenant Governor of Java, T.S. Raffles, observed that among the "active and enterprising" peoples of Sulawesi (Celebes):¹⁸³

The character of a merchant is held in esteem, and the sovereign princes reckon it no disgrace to enter into commercial speculations. Unfortunately, however, they are actuated by the narrow spirit of the trader, to the prejudice of the liberal policy of the monarch and make their power subservient to their love of gain, by establishing in their own favour monopolies against their subjects. Monopolies are common on every state in the island, but most of them are only of a temporary nature. The sovereign of Luwu monopolized the trade in brass; the raja of Soppeng that of *siri* (betel leaf), which yields him three hundred dollars a month; and the Raja of Sidenreng that of salt and opium.

Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750–1830 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 80–1. From the bibliography, see Subrahmanyam and Bayley, "Portfolio Capitalists"; Knaap, *Shallow Waters, Rising Tide*; Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*.

¹⁷⁸ John Butcher and Howard Dick, eds., *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming* (London: St. Martins Press, 1993).

¹⁷⁹ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 76.

¹⁸⁰ Ron Harris, *The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade: The Commenda and the Corporation* (3 November 2008). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294095> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1294095>. Arun Das Gupta, "The Maritime Trade of Indonesia, 1500–1800," in *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800*, ed. Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987).

¹⁸¹ *Peristiwa Tahun Tahun*, 153–4. Wellen, "Credit," 82–3.

¹⁸² Omar, "Diary of Sultan Ahmad," 147–54.

¹⁸³ Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, *The History of Java* (London: J. Murray, 1830), 2: 182 (Appendix F9). The British occupied Dutch Java between 1811 and 1816 in the context of the Napoleonic wars; see chap. 7.

B.F. Matthes commented in the 1870s that “the ruler of Sidenreng and his brother, both very clever and fairly civilized Buginese nobles ... [are] great traders, like some other leading men of that kingdom, to such an extent that they frequently just eat maize, so that they can sell the rice”.¹⁸⁴

Rulers and chiefs sought to extract profit from every possible source. The mid-nineteenth century Sampit region, west of Banjarmasin, illustrates a combination of revenues. Royal family members were stationed on the rivers to control traffic; the nobility monopolised imports of salt and iron, which they distributed in the interior, thereby rewarding clients but also removing one of the main incentives to produce for the market. Income from harbour customs was limited, as the royal lineage owned three of the c.24 large perahu involved in overseas trade, and the elite controlled most commodities, which of course they did not tax. The main product was rice cultivated by their Dayak and, to a lesser extent, Malay subjects (who may have included Banjarese). It was also grown on land belonging to the aristocracy, using slave or statutory labour. Muslim residents, mostly Malay traders, paid a head tax of two Dutch guilders, while the Dayaks paid the same in rice. The rulers also claimed 10 per cent of all gold produced. Well over half of their revenue came from the Dayak's rice tribute.¹⁸⁵

The income of the early nineteenth century Sultan of Bima on the island of Sumbawa was also fairly typical. Since the ruler was considered to own all land, he could either have it farmed in exchange for tribute in kind or allocate it as appanage fields to support his officials. They usually rented the land out and lived on the proceeds. The sultan collected customs duty on all trade, except that of Europeans, who were exempt. He also controlled opium sales, took all white birds' nests, and all fines for crimes that exceeded 80 Spanish dollars; lesser fines went to other officials in decreasing amounts correlated to rank. The ruler also owned several native-rigged ships that traded in Java and Singapore. Both he and the chief minister were thought to be very rich.¹⁸⁶ The mid-nineteenth century revenues of the rulers of Ternate and Tidore illustrate how diverse sources of income were standardised by the colonial regime.¹⁸⁷

Too much interest by foreign traders tended to weaken regimes. Pepper had been exported to China from Sumatra from the late fifteenth century, and in the early 1600s Southeast Borneo began to produce for the global market. In Banjarmasin this brought

¹⁸⁴ B.F. Matthes, “Eenige opmerkingen omtrent en naar aanleiding van dat gedeelte van Dr. J.J. de Hollander's Handleiding bij de beoefening der land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, hetwelk handelt over het Gouvernement van Celebes en onderhoorigheden,” *BKI* 19, no. 1 (1872).

¹⁸⁵ Pijnappel, “Beschrijving van het Westelijke Gedeelte van de Zuider-en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo (De Afdeeling Sampit en de Zuidkust),” 287–89.

¹⁸⁶ E. Francis, “Van Batavia naar Timor Koepang,” *TNI* 1, no. 1 (1838): 12. On the earlier history, including the designation of special “guilds” according to tributary obligations, see Henri Chambert-Loir, “State, City, Commerce: The Case of Bima,” *Indonesia* 57 (1994).

¹⁸⁷ C. Bosscher, “Memorie van Overgave, C. Bosscher (1859),” in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapien (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980), 184–98. F.S.A. de Clercq, “Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890,” in *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, ed. and trans. Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards, Smithsonian Digital Libraries Editions, <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/>. Pieter Bleeker, *Reis door de Minabassa en den Molukschen archipel, gedaan in de maanden september en oktober 1855* (Batavia: Lange & Co., 1856), 1: 216–22.

wealth to the court, but exports proved impossible to control. Clandestine buyers and sellers took advantage of the webs of waterways and overland trails, undermining all attempts at monopoly.¹⁸⁸ Upriver appanage holders and Dayak growers joined with Bugis, Chinese, English and other foreigners in pepper smuggling, as will be described in subsequent chapters. The sultan sought to control river traffic by restricting settlement as well as through travel in specific regions, which irritated the Dutch. In the 1826 contract the ruler finally agreed to abolish the “pernicious *talians*, a despotic abuse that perhaps exists only at Banjar, by which the inhabitants’ traffic among themselves is forbidden, on pain of the death penalty”.¹⁸⁹

Wealth accrued was seldom spent in ways that outsiders expected. Travellers typically remarked on the apparent poverty of elite housing, usually timber constructions that suited the climate and could be dismantled and moved if necessary. Early nineteenth-century European visitors found local spending priorities incongruous. Around 1831 a Dutch official called on the chief minister of Bima:¹⁹⁰

The place where we sat looked like an open warehouse.... Chests, cupboards, tables, chairs, old, worn-out, ragged couches were jumbled together. But on the wall hung an array of fine and expensive weapons, including four heavy gold-embossed old guns (*buksen*) that surpassed all others in their beauty. I admired these pieces, whereupon the chief minister said they had been made in Stambul (Constantinople) and that he had many more such examples in his store-rooms...we were required to see all his treasures: a French sewing box in a mother of pearl container; and an English watch, hanging on a chain. We were asked what we thought it was worth. I said “fl.300”; the old man replied, with some heat, “No, fl.700”. He had another chest brought, and showed us a golden spoon and fork, and a gold-plated knife, a gold siri-pestle [for preparing betel-nut quids].., a gold chest-plate, a fine golden kris, and an old black jacket, with 20 gold Spanish pieces of eight as the buttons, and ten Dutch copper coins on the collar...“Look at that”, he said “a few gold pieces that I wear when I go out; and I never leave for war without wearing gold to the value of a thousand guilders”.

Ten years later the American Wilkes had a similar reaction on visiting a Sulu datu:¹⁹¹

The interior put me in mind of a barn inhabited by a company of strolling players. On one side were hung up a collection of various kinds of gay dresses, here drums and gongs, there swords, lanterns, spears, muskets, and small cannon; on another side were shields, bucklers, masks, saws, and wheels, with belts, bands, and long robes. The whole was a strange mixture of tragedy and farce; and the group of natives were not far removed in appearance from the supernumeraries that a Turkish tragedy might have brought together in the green room of a theatre.

¹⁸⁸ Michael Dove, *The Banana Tree at the Gate: A History of Marginal Peoples and Global Markets in Borneo* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 45–72.

¹⁸⁹ P. Mijer, “Kroniek van Nederlandsch Indie, loopende van af het jaar 1816: De jaren 1822 en 1823,” *TNI* (1842), 179–80.

¹⁹⁰ Francis, “Van Batavia,” 7.

¹⁹¹ Wilkes, “Manila.”

Weapons, status-enhancing goods (particularly textiles) had long been highly prized; in some regions opium and liquor became necessities. Conspicuous consumption could be erratic. The smiles were less superior when Dutch colonial forces seized the Lombok ruler's stronghold in 1894. The palace was burned, but the gold and silver recovered from the ashes was valued at between one and one and a half million guilders. It was taken to the Netherlands, where it became famous as "the treasure of Lombok".¹⁹²

Symbolic Capital

Despite assertions of hegemony, complex genealogies, cosmological analogies and fine-sounding titles the capacity or indeed the desire of these composite states to control events was very variable. Status and power were expressed, created and confirmed in ritual. This was also true of smaller settlements and confederations. Some larger unions were "kingdoms of words", which defied "Western norms of political strength and have limited executive power, while still commanding a considerable amount of ritually laden prestige".¹⁹³ The relationship between domains of words and ritual, and that of violence and power, is anything but clear cut. Barnes, Hägerdal, and Palmer describe contemporary East Timor:¹⁹⁴

In the new nation-state of Timor Leste (2002–present), away from the historical and present-day machination of state rule and party-political power, localized Timorese claims to place and power continue to resonate around clan identities and histories with deep Austronesian and Melanesian influences. These localized social structures and shifting alliances are based on the continued activation and honouring, through ritual, of meshworks of place-centred cosmic power and inter-relationships between people and their ancestral domains.

This analysis is convincing and seems unproblematic, as the bonds described appear to be divorced from the modern state.¹⁹⁵

Access to, or control of, spiritual power enhanced the right to rule. Practices to develop or harness such forces were developed in animist, Indianised and Islamic beliefs. Danilyn Rutherford depicts Biak travellers sailing to the Sultanate of Tidore, where they acquired titles, ceremonial wealth, and "*barak*, the Biak version of the Arabic word for the magical

¹⁹² Cees Fasseur, "De schat van Lombok," in *De Weg naar Paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995). Ewald Vanvugt, "*De schatten van Lombok.*" *Honderd jaar Nederlandse oorlogsbut uit Indonesië* (Amsterdam: Jan Smets, 1995). After various squabbles about value, most was displayed in Dutch museums, before a large part was returned in the 1970s.

¹⁹³ Barnes, Hägerdal and Palmer, "An East Timorese Domain," 328. Sven Cederroth, *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah: A Sasak Community on Lombok* (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis: Göteborg 1981).

¹⁹⁴ Barnes, Hägerdal and Palmer, "An East Timorese Domain," 352.

¹⁹⁵ Analysing how different realms of power interacted before organisational specialisation advanced under (proto)colonial rule is more difficult. The "meshworks" described could be powerful assets. Vel, "Campaigning for a New District in West Sumba"; Sven Cederroth, "Traditional Power and Party Politics in North Lombok, 1965–1999," in *Elections in Indonesia: the New Order and Beyond*, ed. Sven Cederroth and Hans Antlov (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).

power that pervaded the sultan's person and surroundings".¹⁹⁶ Fragmentary memories of past kingdoms tended to crystallize around charismatic figures. As in other areas of Indonesia, such men could become the focus for revivalist and nativist movements. Two of the best known east Indonesian examples are the Batara Gowa of Southwest Sulawesi's Makassarese and the Raja Jailolo of Halmahera. In Sulawesi the exile of the king Batara Gowa in 1767 provided the founding story for a series of rebellions, the most important of which broke out a few years after the event.¹⁹⁷ The original Jailolo kingdom became entangled in Spanish-Portuguese fighting after 1521 and was subjugated by the latter in 1534, but memories have been mobilised again and again, particularly among the Tobelo of Kau, and in Tidorese, anti-Ternate circles. This occurred in 1765, in 1796, and in the 1820s, when the Sultanate was restored in north Seram, and in the revolt of 1875–76.¹⁹⁸

In his discussion of *The World of Maluku*, Leonard Andaya attributes considerable agency to the mythically buttressed model of the ideal polity. He emphasises the force of the recurring motif of "four pillars" which support each political level, and the dualism between the rival sultanates of Ternate and Tidore.¹⁹⁹ Ellen and Henley, among others, doubt the influence of ideal types on behaviour; I share their view. Platenkamp, on the basis of his work in Halmahera, sees myths as forms of retrospective valorisation, rather than a force affecting actual relationships.²⁰⁰ Ellen concludes of East Seram that "the symbolic character of relations with Tidore had negligible consequences for day-to-day affairs. Like the common use of kinship terminology to describe unequal relationships (younger and older brothers, fathers and sons) origin stories and myths could express hierarchy, precedence and moral obligation; like other foundational texts, they could be flexibly used."²⁰¹ *Use* is the key word: origin narratives, like title hierarchies and typologies, were cultural repertoires that could be called upon to support, reinforce or devalue claims to status, rights or actions. Their relevance depended on that of their invoker, and the issues in play, which were contingent. The evolving role of custom (*adat*) in Indonesian local politics is one contemporary example.²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Rutherford, *Raiding*.

¹⁹⁷ J. Tideman, "De Batara Gowa op Zuid-Celebes," *BKI* (1908). One example was the case of the retired sweeper of the Malay mosque in Makassar who had "through his preparations of magic charms, and such" created a following and in 1841 declared himself to be Batara Gowa. He and his followers, with "flags, the usual toys and weapons" headed for the core territory of the former kingdom. The Dutch officials at first thought this was a wedding procession, but on the second day captured several and dispersed the rest. The leader was quickly hanged. *Ikhtisar*, 269–70.

¹⁹⁸ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 121–2. Velthoen, "Pirates," 204–5; R.Z. Leirissa, *Halmahera Timur dan Raja Jailolo: pergolakan sekitar laut Seram awal abad 19* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1996). See also Nils Bubandt, *Democracy, Corruption and the Politics of Spirits in Contemporary Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2014).

¹⁹⁹ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 54–5, 80–1.

²⁰⁰ J.D.M. Platenkamp, "Tobelo, Moro, Ternate: the Cosmological Valorization of Historical Events," *Cakalele* 4 (1993).

²⁰¹ Roy Ellen, "Faded Images of Old Tidore in Contemporary Southeast Seram: A View from the Periphery," *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 34.

²⁰² Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, eds., *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: the Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism* (London: Routledge, 2007); Adam D. Tyson, *Decentralization and Adat Revivalism in Indonesia: The Politics of Becoming Indigenous* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

Local ranks, names and titles give a misleading impression of hierarchy. Much of our knowledge of early titles was recorded by foreigners seeking helpful interlocutors and has been transmitted through various linguistic and cultural filters. Europeans tended to transpose relationships into forms they understood. As Ellen comments:²⁰³

The Portuguese translated these offices into feudal terms that would have been familiar in the Europe of the time, but it is likely that the holders of titles on the distant periphery of Maluku and the New Guinea coast differed in function from the nobility of Ternate and Tidore who were referred to in the same way: they [the former] were representatives of their respective rulers and agents for the purpose of collecting taxes rather than “warrior nobles”.

The interlocking of trade and politics were reflected in the ubiquitous use of the Malay term *orang kaya* (rich man) in early European accounts to refer to the “great men” they encountered. *Orang kaya* was also a title within many local polities. Its use was well established in both the western and eastern archipelagos before the Portuguese arrived, reflecting Malay’s role as a *lingua franca*. In the west harbourmasters or *syahbandars* (a title of Persian origin) were often called *orang kaya*.²⁰⁴ In the east so too were “rulers” or persons of influence in Seram, while in Banda it was used for “the achieved leader [of every village] whose power at the time of Portuguese contact appeared to derive from his monopoly of the export of spices”. In Ambon traditional chiefs were called *orang kaya*, and in clove-producing areas they acted as local commercial agents, advancing cloth in exchange for cloves.²⁰⁵ Early Portuguese contact in Flores explains the religion and names of local *rajas*. It is thought that the Catholic da Silva of Sikka and the da Cunha of Maumere originated in the Topass or Black Portuguese community in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, while the Diaz Viera de Godhino of Larantuka may have emerged somewhat later.²⁰⁶

The significance of titles was contingent; they could be ascribed according to descent; or awarded by political centres (when they might or might not be associated with specific offices and privileges); or just taken by assertive individuals. Java was a popular source. On Sumba, for example, honorifics were drawn from Java, Bima, Ende and Savu while leading men bore titles of Makassarese, Bugis, Selayarese, Butonese, Sama Bajau and Banjarese origin.²⁰⁷ These could reflect ongoing connections with, for example, Bimanese or Makassarese claiming noble lineage, or (temporary) marriage ties between local families and visiting shippers, or just the borrowing of impressive nomenclature to enhance prestige.

²⁰³ Ellen, “Faded Images,” 25.

²⁰⁴ Harbourmasters or *syahbandar*, often bore the title, while it has been suggested that in Srivijaya a similar categorisation referred to non-royal ministers; Nik Hassan Shuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahman, “The Kingdom of Srivijaya as Socio-political and Cultural Entity,” in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990).

²⁰⁵ Roy F. Ellen, “Conundrums about Panjandrums: On the Use of Titles in the Relations of Political Subordination in the Moluccas and Along the Papuan Coast,” *Indonesia* 41 (1986): 49–50.

²⁰⁶ Lewis, *Stranger-Kings*, 196–203. Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1900: A Documented History* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), 84–123.

²⁰⁷ H. Kapita, *Sumba di Dalam Jangkauan Jaman* (Waingapu: Panitia Penerbit Naskah-naskah Kebudayaan Daerah Sumba, 1980).

Ambitious men from the Papua coast would go to Tidore to request the right to certain designations not because they sought a specific rank, but because they wanted to confirm the links that could reinforce their role as local “Big Men”. In New Guinea even merchants and missionaries bestowed titles to reward and reinforce loyalty.²⁰⁸

Whether granted or claimed, titles could be read as recognition of subservience within a centralized hierarchy; but they could also be an assertion of ties which enhanced local status while subjugation remained symbolic. They could even embody a claim to equality, as Henley suggests for Gorontalo. He notes that “indigenous power structures do not seem to have been affected in any concrete way by this terminological borrowing”.²⁰⁹ Officials from Batavia recorded that local chiefs in early nineteenth-century Timor used a range of titles including Keizer (in Dutch-influenced regions) and Lieutenant General (Portuguese territories), but then concluded that despite these carefully graded distinctions the bearers were all equal in “their miserable [levels of] civilisation and way of life”.²¹⁰

Kutai provides an illuminating example of how the granting of titles could strengthen central control. Bugis had founded the port settlement of Samarinda in the seventeenth century and were self-governing under their self-chosen head (the *Pua Adu*) and council; they were not subjects of the sultan. However, in the course of time the sultan, who lived upstream, granted titles to those Buginese who had distinguished themselves in his service. Typically, they had contributed the most armed men to fight the sultan’s foes in internecine conflict, or against marauding Dayaks and pirates. The titles conferred on the Bugis were, in ascending order, those of *panglima* (Malay), *anreguru* (Bugis) and *kapitan* (Portuguese/Dutch). These were a great honour, bestowed with ceremony in the mosque; the recipients swore an oath of loyalty to the sultan. From then on, they maintained a direct relationship with the ruler, rejecting the independent leaders chosen by the Bugis community. The inevitable result of these overlapping and competing hierarchies was constant conflict over who had legal jurisdiction over the Buginese.²¹¹

During the long and increasingly interventionist reign of Sultan Muhammad Suleiman (1845–1899) tensions became so high that he formally defined Bugis rights; this very fact, of course, confirmed his suzerainty.²¹² His strategy to strengthen his authority over the Dayak chiefs of the interior was similar. He granted the title of *manti*—similar to the common *mantri* for lower official—to some, but not all of the “self-appointed elders who acted as the heads of extended families or house groups” among the Bentian Dayak. This increased their prestige and bound them to the ruler. Every two years the *erau* ritual brought community leaders from the interior to court, so they could bring tribute, witness central state rituals, show their loyalty to the sultan and be rewarded with honours. The

²⁰⁸ Holger Warnk, “The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c.1500–1920,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011). For details of titles used in Papua see F.C. Kamma, “De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoese eilanden in legende en histories, deel III,” *Indonesie* 2, no. 2 (1948): 180–3.

²⁰⁹ David Henley, “A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi,” *Cakalele* 4 (1993).

²¹⁰ Francis, “Timor,” 393–4.

²¹¹ Tromp, “Eenige Mededeelingen,” 185–91.

²¹² Tromp, “Eenige Mededeelingen,” 185–91.

celebrations lasted at least a week, and up to forty days. Sultan Muhammad made this an annual event. He also sent envoys to persuade the Dayaks to settle in “proper villages”.²¹³ The sultan’s considerable wealth, derived from expanding exports of forest products, enabled him to distribute the largesse and stage the spectacles that conferred real prestige.




Image 20 The Sultan of Kutai (Aji Muhammad Suleiman) with his pangerangs (princes), 1875²¹⁴

More material manifestation of favour included medals, silver-topped staves and the right to fly specific flags and pennants on vessels, as well as more incidental and personal gifts such as clothing. These favours were an asset in power and status plays. Their meaning could be enhanced or devalued over time; they might fall from use, unless they were reinvigorated by renewed contacts. As Captain Dirk Kolff sailed through the eastern waters in 1825, he admonished the recalcitrant and bestowed favours. His actions in Tanimbar, one of the most remote island groups, were typical. “A few nobles, here and there, were appointed as orang kaya and given silver government buttons (*bestuursknopen*), a few received a large flag as well”. Eleven years later another government mission distributed more buttons.²¹⁵

²¹³ Kenneth Sillander, *Acting Authoritatively: How Authority is Expressed Through Social Action among the Bentian of Indonesian Borneo* (Helsinki: Swedish School of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, 2004), 57–8. The erau celebrations ceased with the abolition of the Sultanate in 1960 but were reintroduced by the chief government official in 1971. They are now a major tourist attraction.

²¹⁴ “De sultan van Koetai temidden van zijn pangerans”, KITLV 90542. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:809291>. Creative Commons CC BY License.

²¹⁵ P. Drabbe, *Het leven van den Tanembarees, ethnografische studie over het Tanembareesche volk* (Leiden: Brill, 1940), 11.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the 18 hereditary rajas of the Kei islands still held the silver-mounted sticks conferred upon them by the VOC.²¹⁶

Despite the importance the Dutch attached to Tidore's authority in New Guinea, the sultan's power was largely symbolic. Banners and flags symbolized allegiance, while special clothing and other physical objects displayed the wearer's bonds with their distant lords. A mid-nineteenth century source described the arrival of the Tidore *honggi* fleet in Papua: "Ranged one behind the other, they approached in short tacks, pulling to the sound of the *tifa* [drum] and gong, ornamented with standards, pendants, ensigns and flags, as well as the Dutch, also that of the Company, and the native colours of Tidore, Salawati and Waigio".²¹⁷ When a Papua chief died, an emissary would go to inform the sultan, taking presents of slaves and birds of paradise. He would usually be named as successor, receiving "a yellow *kabaya* [shirt], breeches and a headkerchief". From then on he was bound to pay "a yearly tax to the Sultan of a slave, and to reinforce the *honggi* with three vessels and to furnish it with provisions".²¹⁸ Such obligations were met only intermittently, depending on circumstances, as we will see in the following chapters.

²¹⁶ Francis Henry Hill Guillemard, *Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel. Australasia: Malaysia and the Pacific Archipelago*, Edited and Extended by A.R. Wallace, vol. 2 (London: E. Stanford, 1908).

²¹⁷ G.F. De Bruijn Kops, "Contribution to the Knowledge of the North and East Coasts of New Guinea," *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 6 (1852): 322. For a precise description of the various flags, and banners in Ambiona, see R.Z. Leirissa, et al., eds., *Maluku Tengah di masa lampau: gambaran sekilas lewat arsip abad sembilan belas* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1982), 12–3. For illustrations, J.G.F. Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua* (Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1886).

²¹⁸ Kops, "Contribution," 315.

PART TWO
GLIMPSED HISTORIES

This chapter sketches the early history of the eastern archipelagos and their trade, concluding with 1683, the year rebel Formosa fell to the Qing. In the archipelagos themselves the most dramatic event of the later 1600s was undoubtedly the fall of Makassar in 1669, which destroyed a major regional power. However, the effects of China's official reopening were more widely transformative. In Maluku 1683 was also of great symbolic significance, marking the reduction of the Ternate Sultanate to vassal status.

Bans on overseas voyages had been intermittently enforced in China since the later fourteenth century, particularly during dynastic transitions. Overseas trade had flourished under the maritime-minded southern Sung dynasty, prior to the late thirteenth century; resources and capital increased. Under the Ming emperor Yongle (1402–24) the famous expeditions by Zheng He (1405–33) had marked the high point in China's interventions to the south and west.¹ However, after Yongle's death private trade was officially banned; imports were channelled through the so-called "tribute system". This was an efficient way of managing trade rather than a rejection of sea-borne commerce. A "network of multilateral exchange [developed] among merchants whose states submitted tribute trade to the Ming".²

Shipping out of China increased from the early 1500s; about 50 licensed junks a year were sailing to Southeast Asia by mid-century. The arrival of Portuguese on the Zhejiang and Fujian coasts in the 1520s increased traffic and widened networks. But then the conflicts, maritime bans and piracy that accompanied the decline of the Ming and rise of the Manchu Qing (1644–1912) hindered commerce, causing economic crises along the south China coast. The Qing struggled to control illicit trade by Ming loyalists and "pirates" for several decades, prohibiting long-range travel. The coast was completely closed in 1655, but the fall of the hostile Zheng regime on Formosa in 1683 enabled the emperor to repeal the ban. Customs offices were opened in Macau, Guangzhou (Canton) and Xiamen (Amoy), among other ports. Vigorous trading centres emerged in Korea, in Kyushu, along

¹ Geoff Wade, "The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment," ARI Working Paper No. 31 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2004); Ying Liu, Zhongping Chen and Gregory Blue, *Zheng He's Maritime Voyages (1405–1433) and China's Relations with the Indian Ocean World: A Multilingual Bibliography* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

² Harriet Zurndorfer, "Oceans of History, Seas of Change: Recent Revisionist Writing in Western Languages about China and East Asian Maritime History," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 13, no. 1 (2016): 71.

the south China coast, in Taiwan and in Macau.³ “[O]vernight, pirates became merchants, contraband goods became export commodities, and clandestine operations became a business network”.⁴ Every year some 200 junks left Yuegang for the South China Sea.⁵




Image 21 Chinese ships, 1697⁶

³ Angela Schottenhammer, “Characteristics of Qing China’s Maritime Trade Politics, Shunzhi through Early Qianlong Reigns,” in *Trading Networks in Early Modern East Asia*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2010). See also, from bibliography: Sen, “Formation”; Chin, “Junk Trade”; Reid, “Flows and Seepages”; Zhao, *Qing Opening to the Ocean*; Ptak, “Northern Trade Route”; Wade, “Asian Expansion.”

⁴ Timothy Brook, *Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World* (New York-London: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 164; quoted in Zurndorfer, “Oceans of History.”

⁵ Wu Xiao An, “China Meets Southeast Asia: A Long-Term Historical Review,” in *Connecting and Distancing: Southeast Asia and China*, ed. Ho Khai Leong (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 12. See the well-illustrated general history by Robert Nield, *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2010).

⁶ “Verschillende Chinese vaartuigen”. Print by Jan Luyken, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, hereafter RM, no. RP-P-1896-A-19368-1138. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.144101>.

By the sixteenth century long-distance exchange in Southeast Asia was controlled by cliques of local nobles in alliance with visiting merchants, including Malays and Javanese alongside Chinese, Gujerati and others. Powerholders and courts exploited these connections to obtain gifts and privileged access to commodities and shipping; by seeking unthreatening commercial partners from overseas they may have hindered the development of a comparable indigenous mercantile elite.⁷ Europeans also collaborated with local powers. The trading companies of the Portuguese (*Estado da India*) and Spanish (*Indias orientales españolas*, administered from Manila) were sixteenth century creations, while those of the English (East India Company, EIC) and the Dutch VOC emerged at the beginning of the 1600s.⁸ Western trading companies and merchants fought to achieve dominance of or at least entry into local markets. They brought with them attitudes honed in Mediterranean wars and early modern mercantilism, and were both willing and able to use force to achieve their economic aims.⁹ Alliances with local rulers were the cheapest way of guaranteeing cargoes, particularly if the states were robust. But this was seldom the case, even when rulers were willing.

The fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511 accelerated political and economic realignments. Johor, Aceh and Portugal competed for power in the Straits. Tomé Pires described the main trading circuits, including those to the east. Java exchanged textiles for foodstuffs, rough textiles, slaves and horses with Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. These islands then used Indian and Javanese textiles to obtain sandalwood from the southeast, Timor and Sumba. The sandalwood islands also traded with Maluku, seeking spices and offering Sumbawa cloth, Javanese cash and Indian sundries. Indian textiles were used by both Melaka and Java to obtain basic foodstuffs from South Borneo, as well as prized diamonds, gold and camphor. Finally, sailors from Sulawesi took slaves, rice and gold to Melaka, Java, Brunei, Siam and the Malay peninsula, seeking Indian textiles and specific forest products.¹⁰

European traders tried to maximise their access to spices and sandalwood within this extensive east-west trading system. Sulu and Mindanao, much closer to China, had their own ramifying connections through the eastern route from China, which was also tied to


⁷ Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, "Restraints on the Development of Merchant Capitalism in Southeast Asia before c.1800," in *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993). Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 245–66.

⁸ Ashin Das Gupta, "The Maritime Trade of Indonesia: 1500–1800," in *South East Asia: Colonial History*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska and Peter Borschberg (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1: 104.

⁹ Philip J. Stern, "Companies: Monopoly, Sovereignty, and the British East Indies," in *Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire*, ed. Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind (New York: Oxford, 2014). The Europeans' arrival was accompanied by the diffusion of matchlock guns; Tonio Andrade, *The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 169.

¹⁰ See the summary in M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Since c.1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 24. Campbell Macknight points out that while Chinese ceramic imports were limited by Ming policy, Vietnam and Thailand were still supplying the market; personal communication.

Maluku and Timor.¹¹ The earliest European trading settlements were located on the small islands of Solor and Ende, off the east and south Flores coasts respectively, which had easy access across the Savu Sea to Timor and Sumba.



Map 9 The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century polities of Flores (top map), and the Solor and Alor Archipelagos¹²

Solor was a transit port on the Java Sea routes between Maluku and Melaka, and had been frequented by Javanese, Malays and other shippers for centuries before the Portuguese arrived in the early decades of the sixteenth century. The Portuguese fort was constructed in 1560 and served as their main regional base until it was replaced by Kupang in 1657. By the 1540s Portuguese were trading regularly in China and in 1557 they were officially ensconced in Macau (Guangdong province), an island (later isthmus) 145 km southwest of the great port of Guangzhou (Canton), Macau's connections gave new impetus to Portuguese trade with Melaka, Nagasaki and Manila as well as, less grandly, with Makassar and the territories around Timor. An alliance with Ternate had been concluded in 1523, but the Portuguese were expelled from the sultanate in 1575. They also faced competition

¹¹ For example, Roderich Ptak, *China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1999); Ptak, "The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to China and Macao, c.1350–1600," in *China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1999); Ptak, "China and the Trade in Cloves, circa 960–1435," in *China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)*, ed. Roderich Ptak (Aldershot: Variorum, 1999).

¹² Redrawn from Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), maps 3.37 and 3.38, p. 98.

from the north Java coast traders, who began to reclaim traffic in the 1590s.¹³ As the Dutch Company strengthened its hold over Maluku the eastern archipelagos' Portuguese were forced to focus on their Nusa Tenggara settlements and the community in Makassar. They kept their trading factory at Banten, the great pepper port in West Java, until 1601.

The Spanish claimed Manila in 1571. The galleon trade between Mexico and Manila began the following year; "strictly speaking, the 'Manila galleons' were galleons transporting Chinese merchandise".¹⁴ Manila became an immensely attractive, silver-rich port, connecting East Asian, Southeast Asian and European exchange systems in an arena where China and Japan were quite capable of challenging the Spanish. In Manila "annually at least 100,000 kilograms of silver circulated".¹⁵ The fabulous cargos brought in by Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese and other shippers at the beginning of the seventeenth century have been extravagantly described by De Morga, who concluded: "did I refer to them all, I would never finish, nor have sufficient paper for it".¹⁶

Two generations of Portuguese and Spanish had been active in eastern waters by the time the north Europeans arrived.¹⁷ Although Asians were welcome in the Spanish port, the "Manilha trade", was closed to other Europeans except the Portuguese. The Dutch Republic had been in open rebellion against the Spanish occupation since 1579; after the union of the two Iberian crowns (1580–1640) this enmity extended to Portugal, including Brazil and their settlements in the eastern archipelagos.¹⁸ Calculations of profit and loss blunted the impact of distant rules, and the northern companies, who needed the silver and Chinese commodities available in Manila, made the necessary arrangements. They made use of ostensibly Asian shipping, especially Armenian and Portuguese; the latter

¹³ Luc Nagtegaal, *Riding the Tiger. The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast Coast of Java, 1680–1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 17–8. Portuguese factories (commercial bases) existed at Banten, 1545–1601; Ternate, 1522–74; Tidore, 1542–45, Spanish, 1578–1605 (at Gamalama); Ambon, 1528–1605; Banda, 1523; Flores: Larantuka, Solor, 1562–1613; Timor: Lifau, 1702–69; Dili, 1769–1975. The VOC had 13 main outposts: Ambon, 1569–1605; Banda, 1609; Aru, 1623; Kei, 1623; Goram, 1637; Solor, 1646; Tanimbar, 1646; Kupang, 1657; Tidore, 1657; Buru, 1658; Makassar, 1667; Savu, 1674; Minahasa, 1679; Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, 105–9. George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Hongping Annie Nie, *The Selden Map of China: A New Understanding of the Ming Dynasty* (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2019). The Philippines were ruled through New Spain (Mexico), where the Aztecs had been conquered in 1521. The galleons from Manila would arrive at Acapulco on Mexico's west coast. Cargoes would be carried by mule to Mexico City and then on to the Caribbean port of Veracruz for shipment to Spain. Arturo Giráldez Dennis O. Flynn, "Born with a 'Silver Spoon': The Origin of World Trade in 1571," *Journal of World History* 6, no. 2 (2001); Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez and James Sobredo, eds., *European Entry Into the Pacific: Spain and the Acapulco-Manila Galleons* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001).

¹⁵ Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2015), 17. For context: William S. Maltby, *The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

¹⁶ Quoted in H.E.J. Stanley, *The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan, and China at the Close of the Sixteenth Century by Antonio de Morga* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1868), 341–2.

¹⁷ The first Spanish fort in Maluku must have been the temporary structure on Tidore built by shipwrecked sailors in 1525; Benito J. Legarda, *After the Galleons. Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1999), 13.

¹⁸ Jonathan Israel, *Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585–1713* (London: Hambledon Press, 1997).

continued to trade freely in the Philippines even after the unity of the crowns had ended.¹⁹ The VOC was discomfited by this trade, but the Surat merchants who were crucial to the Company's activities in Gujerat insisted on it; Dutch officials were personally in favour because of the possibility of lucrative private business.²⁰

The EIC's charter was approved in 1600, and their trading post in West Java's Banten (1602–82) was founded before any of their factories (establishments) in India. From 1604 EIC ships began visiting Ternate, Tidore, Amboin and Banda, and trade increased considerably through the seventeenth century.²¹ By 1613 the English Company had an impressive, if short-lived, array of outposts in Siam, Japan, Amboina and Banda (four, including Run and Lontor), nine in northern Maluku (three in Ternate, three on Makian, one each on Tidore, Moti and Bacan), in addition to representatives at Solor, Buton, Banten, Gresik, Sukadana, Patani and Makassar. The EIC claimed the usual national privileges, including a monopoly of trade between England and Asia; until 1662 it vainly tried to control intra-Asian commerce as well.²² But the VOC soon drove the English out, leaving Banten and Makassar as the main EIC eastern Factories; both could offer pepper, while the latter had supplies of Maluku spices as well.²³

The Dutch Company's strength came from intra-Asian trade, as it exchanged goods obtained in one Asian port for desired commodities at another, making a profit on most transactions. Chinese goods were brought to Batavia by junks, while the VOC had close ties to Japan, even after 1641 when the Tokugawa ruler initiated the closure of ports (1641–1857). Only the Dutch could continue trading, restricted to the artificial island of Deshima (Dejima).²⁴ However, the export of Maluku spices to Europe was always among the VOC's most rewarding activities. Outside Amboin and Banda, the VOC relied on contracts with local rulers and chiefs to obtain the supplies and commodities it needed. Maintaining these relationships involved participation in local wars; this required a powerful fighting force. Indeed, as Gerrit Knaap points out, for much of its existence the Company's core business was warfare.²⁵

¹⁹ Ruurdje Laarhoven and Elizabeth Pino Wittermans, "From Blockade to Trade: Early Dutch Relations with Manila, 1600–1750," *Philippine Studies* 35(1985); Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 85.

²⁰ F.S. Gastra, "Merchants, Middlemen and Money: Aspects of the Trade between the Indonesian Archipelago and Manila in the 17th century," in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, Laage Vuursche, The Netherlands, June 1980* (Leiden: BIS, 1982). Surat replaced Cambay as the main Gujerati port as the latter silted up from the late 1400s; Portuguese were dominant through most of the sixteenth century; British visited, (from 1608) and replaced the Portuguese after 1615. Ashin Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat*, vol. 40, Beitrage zur Sudasienforschung (Heidelberg: Sudasien-Institut, Universitat Heidelberg, 1979).

²¹ Emily Erikson, *Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600–1757* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 5.

²² Ibid.

²³ Jürgen G. Nagel, *Der Schlüssel zu den Molukken: Makassar und die Handelsstrukturen des Malaiischen Archipels im 17 und 18. Jahrhundert: eine exemplarische Studie* (Hamburg: Kovac, 2003), 296–313.

²⁴ Goodman, *Japan and the Dutch 1600–1853* (London: Curzon, 2000). Others could continue indirect trade through, for example, the Ryukyu kingdom, Korea and Russian harbours.

²⁵ Gerrit Knaap, *De 'Core Business' van de VOC: markt, macht en mantaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief* (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 2014); Gerrit Knaap, Henk den Heijer and Michiel de Jong, *Oorlogen Overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat buiten Europa, 1595–1814* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015), 219–41; Piet Hagen, *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië: Vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing* (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018).



Image 22 View of Batavia, 1619–80²⁶

²⁶ “Gezicht op Batavia. Aldus verthoont Hem t’ Casteel ende stadt Batavia geleegen op t’ Eijlant Java Maior in t’ Coninckrijck van Jaccatra (title on object)”. Print by Julius Milheuser. RM RP-P-1975-226. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.418806>.

After Batavia's founding in 1619 it became the Company's chief garrison and port.²⁷ Batavia's Indian connections and independent junk traffic enabled the VOC to surpass China-focussed Manila as a centre for Asian trade. By 1620 there were already eight hundred Chinese in Batavia; this was a small population compared to that of Manila.²⁸ However, Batavia's heterogeneous inhabitants included "sojourners and settlers" who came from coasts stretching from the Middle East to Japan; the population including many Southeast Asians alongside Chinese, Indians and Arabs.²⁹ In 1677 the Company extended its control along Java's strategic north coast by expelling private European and Indian traders, although the west Java Sultanate of Banten, with its EIC lodge (1602–82), survived a few more years. Wars in central Java also tested the VOC in the 1680s.³⁰

For decades the VOC limited all Chinese junks to Batavia, fearing that their trade with other harbours would strengthen competing markets and shipping. Although the tonnage of junks visiting from Guangdong (from Guangzhou and Macau) was much the same as that that from Fujian, Batavia's Chinese community consisted primarily of Hokkien-speakers originating from the latter province. Trade flourished from the 1620s, as the VOC port exported pepper, cloves, nutmeg, opium, silver and the red dye-producing sappanwood in exchange for silk, linen, zinc, and ceramics.³¹ During the troubled decades of the mid-seventeenth century, as the Qing slowly defeated Ming forces, emigration from China increased. Many who came to Southeast Asia were Ming loyalists; they rejected the Manchu Qing's repressive measures, including the enforced hairstyle with a shaved front and a pigtail or queue behind.³² In 1695 these die-hards petitioned the Dutch to impose a

²⁷ For a concise overview of VOC development, see G.L. Balk, F. Van Dijk and D.J. Kortlang, *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta): Arsip-arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) dan lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan kota Kota Batavia (Jakarta)* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

²⁸ Manila's Chinese population experienced phenomenal growth, from c.150 in 1572 to perhaps 10,000 in 1588, reaching a peak in 1603 with between 24,000 and 30,000. Licensed junk arrivals ranged between 171 and 314 in the years between 1580 and 1650, uniting the sailors with the sojourners who stayed in Manila to act as agents, retailers, and to accumulate commodities. The real volume of shipping would have been much, much higher, as the chance to exchange silks for silver was irresistible. Birgit M. Tremml, "The Global and the Local: Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular Trade in Early Modern Manila," *Journal of World History* 23, no. 3 (2012).

²⁹ Remco Raben, "Batavia and Colombo. The Ethical and Spatial Order of Two Colonial Cities, 1600–1800" (PhD diss., University of Leiden, 1996); Hendrik E. Niemeijer, *Batavia: Een Koloniale Samenleving in de 17de Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2005).

³⁰ Gerrit J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indisch Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Foris, 2004); Kwee Hui Kian, *The Political Economy of Java's Northeast Coast c.1740–1800. Elite synergy* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

³¹ George Bryan Souza, "The Portuguese Merchant Fleet at Macao in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005).

³² Shi Zhihong, "China's Overseas Trade Policy and Its Historical Results: 1522–1840," in *Intra-Asian Trade and the World Market, Studies in the Modern History of Asia* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

special tax on those wearing the Qing queue, which was still enforced in the 1730s;³³ the Dutch referred to these conservatives as the “unshaved Chinese”.³⁴

The Sulu Sea

Since the 1570s the Spanish had been exploring the southern Philippine islands, sending military expeditions south during the 1590s. These were fiercely attacked, in the first phase of the so-called “Moro Wars”. At the end of the century coastal Cotabato “was merely an important seaport and a staging area for Magindanao pirate fleets” but was strong enough to pose a serious challenge to Spanish forces. At this stage the southern Philippine Muslims were oriented towards Ternate. In the 1590s Buayan, centred on fertile land up-river on the Pulangi, had called on the Maluku sultanate for help against the Spaniards; the thousand warriors and light artillery from Ternate helped disperse Manila’s forces, but Buayan was defeated by the Spanish in 1606. This enabled downstream Maguindanau to prosper and consolidate its position on the coast. Sulu, home to many Samal, was visited by Chinese junks, a trade the Spanish wanted to capture.³⁵

For several decades the Spanish largely left the south to its own devices (1599–1635). James Warren observes: “The geopolitical setting of the Mindanao-Sulu region was characterized by a competitive, multicentred situation where Maguindanau, Maranao, Samal, Tausug, and the Europeans engaged one another in rival processes of state formation, economic development and colonization”.³⁶ Jolo was Sulu’s political centre, but on Mindanao there was no single, dominant entrepot; many small settlements were visited each year by traders from Maluku, Sulawesi, Borneo and elsewhere. The Samal and Iranun peoples were “coastal front-line groups ... a very important component in the network of alliances that the Magindanao sultans had attracted to themselves, and the success and maintenance of the sultan’s supremacy over the region largely depended on them. Strategic points along the main seaways were tightly controlled.”³⁷

Maguindanau rose to prominence in the first half of the seventeenth century, when Spanish pressure was slight.³⁸ After the Zamboanga fort on Mindanao’s southwest peninsula was built in 1635 it became Spain’s main outpost in the south. However, it was abandoned

³³ Gang Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684–1757* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), 159. John E. Wills, “Contingent Connections: Fujian, the Empire, and the Early Modern World,” in *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time*, ed. Lynn Struve (Leiden: Brill E Book, 2004).


³⁴ Leonard Blussé *Strange Company. Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986). Before the 1645 decree imposing the Manchu custom, different hairstyles within the Indies Chinese community had already distinguished between the “unshaved” and “shaved”; the former were “Chinese”, the latter were converts to Islam, and usually bore Muslim or indigenous names.

³⁵ Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Magindanao, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Utto of Buayan* (Cornell: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1971), 3–6.

³⁶ James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), 27.

³⁷ Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi*, 27.

³⁸ Ileto, *Magindanao*, 6–9.



Map 10 The Sulu Sea, Mindanao and the Sulu Islands³⁹

³⁹ Map redrawn from Ruudje Laarhoven, "Lords of the Great River: The Magindano Port and Polity During the Seventeenth Century," in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 160.

again in 1662, when Spanish forces were concentrated in Manila in case of an attack by the anti-Ming rebel Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga). To the Spanish, China was an existential threat; their massacre of Manila's Chinese in 1603 had been born of fear of both political intervention by China and of the local Chinese population.⁴⁰

In the mid-seventeenth century Francisco Combés commented on the people known as Lutao, "he who swims or bounds over water". They were the "most foreign" of the Southern Philippine subjects, wore "Moorish" dress and were, he thought, connected to Ternate. Pirates and traders, they lived under the protection of the Muslim sultans and the coastal chiefs. Combés wrote:⁴¹

The Mindanao [Maguindanau or Cotabato] king has become so feared in the latter years that although he of Buhayan is the true and legitimate king, he is coming to be less esteemed; for the Mindanao king has many Lutaos, he has also the power to make war. And although the king of Buhayan has twenty-fold more vassals, he can make no-one uneasy because he has no subjects of this [Lutao] nation; consequently he has no weight in these islands.

Sopher identified the Lutao as the Samal or Sama Dilaut, who were indigenous to the Philippines, whereas Combés suggests a connection with Ternate-Maluku.

Ileto connects Cotabato's surpassing of inland Buayan to the realignments attending VOC campaigns in Maluku.⁴² During Combés' residence in Mindanao (1645–57) VOC attacks were causing considerable migrations.⁴³ At its peak, under Sultan Kudrat (c.1619–71), Cotabato's claims stretched southeast to include the Sangihe islands off north Sulawesi. The Sarangani islands were incorporated into the sultanate in 1625; their inhabitants were, commented Laarhoven, "more accurately described as slaves rather than subjects". Mindanao was a major exporter of slaves, rice and wax, while "drugs or medicinal plants, gums, wood, cowries and other sea-products, sugar, salt, saltpetre, sulphur, rattan, abaca cloth were all possible export items". Trade was only allowed with the sultan's permission; a few Chinese visited for beeswax. Merchants, including the sultan himself, were involved in intensive exchange with Ternate, more so than with Manila and Batavia. There was also occasional traffic with Borneo, Sulu, Sangihe, Java, Makassar, and Amboina. Chinese junks from Iloilo and Manila visited, as well as the large 400-ton vessels from China itself.⁴⁴ By the second half of the seventeenth century Mindanao was exporting large quantities of tobacco to Batavia.⁴⁵ Dampier later commented: "The Dutch come here in sloops from

⁴⁰ José Eugenio Borao, "The Massacre of 1603: Chinese Perception of the Spanish in the Philippines," *Itinerario* 23, no. 1 (1998). Joshua Eng Sin Kueh, *The Manila Chinese, Community, Trade and Empire c.1570–c.1770* (Georgetown University, 2014), 38–71.

⁴¹ Quoted in Ileto, *Magindanao*, 5; Warren, *Iranun*, 30–3.

⁴² Ileto, *Magindanao*, 4–5.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁴ Laarhoven, "Lords," 166, 171–3. In 1600, during the Netherlanders first circumnavigation of the globe, they noted that over 400 junks a year came to the Philippine islands from Zhangzhou to exchange silk for silver; Vibeke Roeper and Diederick Wildeman, eds., *Om de wereld: de eerste Nederlandse omzeiling van de wereld onder leiding van Olivier van Noort, 1598–1601* (Nijmegen: Sun, 1999), 141–5.

⁴⁵ Anthony Reid, "Economic and Social Change, c.1400–1800," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume One, part two: from c.1500 to c.1800*, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 499.

Ternate and Tidore and buy rice, beeswax, and tobacco; for a great deal of tobacco grows on this island, more than any other island or country in the East Indies".⁴⁶

The first significant Spanish successes occurred against Maguindanau in 1637 and Sulu in 1638. In response, Buayan and Maguindanau forged a close alliance, while in Sulu Spanish forces faced years of strong resistance. In the 1640s treaties between local rulers and the Spanish acknowledged this reality.⁴⁷ In 1658 and 1673 Brunei, seeking allies against its enemies, ceded much of northeast Borneo to Sulu. Manila was unable to conquer the southern islands, but the wars and the pulling power of the harbours of Manila and Cebu weakened Sulu's trade.⁴⁸

The Makassar Straits

The Straits were an expansion zone for ambitious polities and enterprising traders. Clusters of Bugis and Makassarese origin were already scattered along the central and upper west coasts of Sulawesi by the seventeenth century. Traders benefited from access to the traffic focussed on the Palu-Parigi crossing, described in chapter 2. Shipping gathered in Palu Bay, where the main, albeit small, states were Banawa or Donggala on the southern side, close to the Makassar Straits, and Palu itself, by the river mouth deep in the Bay. The Bay was initially claimed by Ternate, but authority passed in the seventeenth century to Makassar. The Palu valley was relatively densely populated, which was exceptional for this northern coast. To the north lay settlements grouped together as Tawaeli (or Towaeli).

Traditionally there were seven coastal Mandar kingdoms: Balanipa, Sendana (later Cenrana), Banggae (Majene), Pamboang (Pembuang), Tapalang, Mamuju and Binuang (the later Polewali). Makassar conquered Mandar in the mid-seventeenth century, but their rulers proved unreliable allies, fighting for the Dutch-Bugis forces. After Makassar's defeat the VOC claimed suzerainty over the littoral.⁴⁹ By 1700, five Bugis-speaking lands south of the Mandar Gulf were united in the Ajattappareng federation, "the land west of the lakes". Parepare was their main harbour, and Sidenreng eventually became the most important polity.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, smaller settlements to the south expanded as agricultural production and trade increased in the 1500s; these later became the Bugis states of Soppeng and Tanette.

Across the Makassar Strait, on the north-central Borneo coast, by the mid-1600s seven small complex domains (*benua rantau*) had come together in the Berau kingdom; these including Sesayap and Bulungan. In his history of Bulungan and the Tidung inhabitants of the Sesayap region, Bernard Sellato suggests that the population of a seventeenth-century Kayan (Dayak) kingdom on Tarakan island was born of the fusion of inland tribal people,

⁴⁶ William Dampier, *A New Voyage Around the World* (London: James Knapton, 1697), 1: 333.

⁴⁷ Laarhoven, "Lords."

⁴⁸ Dianne Lewis, "British Trade to Southeast Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries Revisited," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009).

⁴⁹ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 50, 77–8.

⁵⁰ The five realms were Sidenreng, Sawitto, Suppa, Rappang and Alitta; Stephen C. Druce, *The Lands West of the Lakes: a History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 CE* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), 25, 201–48.

such as the Berusu Dayak, with Bugis, Tausug and possibly Sama Bajau. Communities relatively close to the coast would gradually have submitted to demands for tribute and labour, while those further inland traded freely along streams and across watersheds.⁵¹ Expeditions into the interior could be launched any time, but typically occurred between rice cycles. “Purchased goods mostly fell into two categories: goods of general use by the community at large (salt, iron, cloth, tobacco) and prestige goods for the aristocratic leader (ceramic jars, gongs etc.). Other purchased goods, such as cannon, were both general use and personal-prestige items”.⁵²

Turtle-shell was a major export. This was collected by Sama Bajau from the Balabalagan islands and the great reef system on which they rested, mid-way between Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Most was shipped from Berau, subject to the Sulu ruler, but some also came from Pasir and Kutai. Pasir, south of Kutai, was a busy port. The origins of the sultanate are said to lie the sixteenth century realm of Sadurengas, based in inland Amuntai, across the Meratus Mountains at the junction of the Negara River and two of its tributaries. Later links with Wajo strengthened maritime connections. By the mid-seventeenth century the sultanate’s capital lay some sixty miles up the eponymous river. In the 1660s, it was estimated that 30 to 40 Javanese perahu visited Pasir each year, bringing salt as well as some rice, Javanese cloth, sugar, onions, garlic etc. Indian textiles were brought in by traders from Batavia and Banten. Gold, wax, excellent rattan and birds’ nest were taken in exchange. About 1,000 people from Berau, male and female slaves, lived at Pasir.⁵³ Kutai’s exports were similar, but of lesser quality. Both ports gained greater prominence with seventeenth-century immigration from South Sulawesi.

Ternate, Banda, Ambon and North Sulawesi

The expanding market for cloves encouraged Ternate to increase contact with Java and regional harbours; by the end of the fifteenth century the Sultanate was extending its influence over Seram. Meanwhile, increasing demand, supply and commercial traffic had drawn the attention of Chinese networks; Ternate’s sojourning and resident Chinese mainly came from Manila. By the late 1500s demand had led to a shift from gathering spices from wild trees to the cultivation of gardens.⁵⁴ The first Europeans to arrive were the Portuguese in 1511, the same year in which they took Melaka. The Ternate sultan made vague promises to his new allies. These were optimistically interpreted as the granting of monopsonies, the sole right to purchase specific products. Until 1522 all traders were

⁵¹ Bernard Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People in Bulungan: Elements for a History of Settlement, Trade, and Social Dynamics in Borneo, 1880–2001* (Bogor: CIFOR, 2001); James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 85–6.

⁵² Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People*, 17–9, 48.

⁵³ J. Noorduyt, “De Handelsrelaties van het Makassaarse Rijk volgens de Notitie van Cornelis Speelman (1669),” in *Nederlands Historische Bronnen* (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 114–6.

⁵⁴ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*, 1st ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1993), 56, 135–6. Christiaan F. van Fraassen, “Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1987), 30. The “gardens” would most likely have been carefully tended trees, in agroforestry, rather than newly planted ones.

welcome at Ternate, including Javanese, Malay, and even Turkish shippers and sailors. But from then until the late sixteenth century the Portuguese fought to establish a monopoly.

As the various companies sought advantage, those at the apex of local political hierarchies were offered support, subjected to threats and pressured into treaties. Europeans provided ships and armaments, while local states provided military forces and a veil of legitimacy. The newcomers had a vested interest in polities which could deliver the goods they required, so they helped local states consolidate their realms. The Portuguese assisted Ternate's expansion in Halmahera with the conquest of Jailolo in 1534, and in fighting in Ambon. But the companies were soon demanding more than the loose and personalised political systems could normally deliver, eroding their authority.

After the successful wars of Sultan Babullah (r.1570–83) Ternate was “unquestionably the most prosperous trading centre in Eastern Indonesia” frequented by “some thousand Javanese, Sangleys (Chinese from the Philippines), and Acehnese”.⁵⁵ Ternate defeated the Portuguese in 1571, after a breakdown in relations. The Portuguese began to focus more on Ambon and building ties with Tidore. The Spanish assumed Iberian leadership in Maluku, leading actions against Ternate from 1580.⁵⁶ Ternate's defeat in 1606 triggered the kingdom's ultimately fatal alliance with the VOC.⁵⁷ A stand-off emerged between the Dutch and Ternate on the one hand, and the Spanish and Tidorese on the other; widespread political instability was exacerbated by an increase in Papuan raiding.⁵⁸ Andaya concluded that by the mid-seventeenth century there was “a vastly increased wealth at court and a correspondingly greater poverty and dependence among the people” in Ternate's territories.⁵⁹ The Spanish remained in Ternate until 1663, when Zheng Chenggong's threat to Manila forced the withdrawal of their garrison from Maluku as well as Zamboanga.⁶⁰

The VOC's chief priority was control of the spice trade, and they were highly focussed and quite brutal in realising their aims. Ternate was expected to assert its fragile hegemony in the VOC's interests, although it was also under pressure from the expanding power of Makassar. Ternate appointed governors (*kimelaha*) on Buru and Hoamoal, the western peninsula of Seram which extended south towards Ambon; together these territories controlled the Manipa Strait leading to the clove-producing islands. The *kimelaha*, like the local elites (for example, the four clan heads of Hitu, north Ambon), levied percentages on local trade and the export of spices to foreigners, as well as receiving labour services and fees for mediating conflicts.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 56.

⁵⁶ Manuel Lobato, “War-Making, Raiding, Slave Hunting and Piracy in the Malukan Archipelago,” in *Piracy and Surreptitious Activities in the Malay Archipelago and Adjacent Seas, 1600–1840*, ed. Y.H. Teddy Sim (Singapore: Springer, 2014).


⁵⁷ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 95, 136, 153, 159, 167, 180; Fraassen, “Ternate,” 28–57.

⁵⁸ Gerrit Knaap, “Robbers and Traders: Papuan Piracy in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 151–4.

⁵⁹ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 57.

⁶⁰ Charles J. McCarthy, “On the Koxinga Threat of 1662,” *Philippine Studies* 18 (1970). The Spanish abandoned their fort at Gammalamo in southern Ternate; this was founded on a sixteenth-century Portuguese structure.

⁶¹ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*; Andaya, *World of Maluku*.



Map 11 Traditional Kingdoms of Maluku, early fifteenth century, and the spheres of influence of Ternate and Tidore, sixteenth to seventeenth centuries⁶²

⁶² Redrawn based on Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, Map 3.47, p.103.




Image 23 A warship and the galley of the King of Ternate, 1599⁶³

Although there were initial indications that the Dutch Company in Maluku would exercise its control indirectly through Ternate and local elites, the VOC soon tightened its hold over clove-planting. At the beginning of the seventeenth century both Ternate and the Dutch claimed territory in the Ambonese islands. Their domains were separated by three more or less independent Islamic states,⁶⁴ where Makassarese traders were frequent visitors. But the Dutch drove the Portuguese from the Christianized southern part of Ambon in 1605. Cloves grew in many Maluku islands, and had in fact originated in the north, but the Company concentrated production in areas they could dominate. In 1607 VOC officials mobilised their allied subjects in the first expedition to destroy (“extirpate”) other trees; the annual *hongji* fleet of armed kora kora “was a well-planned and well organized visitation of terror on the populations of Ambon and Seram”.⁶⁵ English competition was eliminated when the EIC factory was wiped out in the “Amboina massacre” of 1623.⁶⁶

Banda, sole source of nutmeg and entrepot, depended on imported foodstuffs and textiles. Malays brought in cloth from Nusa Tenggara, which the residents used to obtain Aru and Kei sago.⁶⁷ The Portuguese first visited Banda in 1512, the year after their Melaka victory. The islands population was then perhaps 3,000 strong, and it was thought that

⁶³ “Scheper van het eiland Madura, 1599. Een oorlogsschip en de galei van de koning van Ternate. Hierbij ook een vliegende vis. Onderdeel van de illustraties in het reisverslag van de Tweede Schipvaart naar Oost-Indië onder Jacob Cornelisz. van Nes en Wijbrant van Warwyck in 1598–1600. No. 22.” RM RP-P-OB-75.398. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.450074>.

⁶⁴ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*, 19–21.

⁶⁵ Muridan Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780–1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 35.

⁶⁶ Adam Clulow, *Amboina, 1623: Fear and Conspiracy on the Edge of Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).

⁶⁷ Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996), 30.

about eight large vessels visited Banda each year. An early seventeenth-century report by an English ship's captain described Banda as "a collectious nation of many people compounded"; by then the inhabitants were said to number approximately 15,000, including about 1,500 Javanese.⁶⁸ European interest led to a sharp increase in prices.⁶⁹ But no individual orang kaya could compel obedience and collect large amounts of nutmeg and mace, so it was difficult for foreigners to accumulate the large cargoes they required. In 1599 Dutch ships had to stay in port for three and a half months. In 1602 some orang kaya did sign a treaty with the VOC, offering a monopsony in exchange for protection against the Portuguese and English. But compliance would have destroyed the island's commerce, as without the possibility of selling spices the Bandanese had no cargoes to exchange for essential imports.

The Dutch Admiral Cornelis Matelieff visited Banda several times at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and concluded:⁷⁰

The island of Banda is worth its size in gold, and is governed in the form of a republic, and it is a group of roguish, haughty, brave, poor beggars; and however much income they have, they are still always in arrears, they rely on it that everyone needs them, and have a good word for no-one; nor do they have any means to protect themselves, but the disunity among the kings around gives them strength; many suitors there have been and still are: the ruler of Ternate in his time, the one of Tuban [East Java], the one of Makassar, and also the one of Surabaya.

One suitor who was not prepared, or able, to pay court to Banda's many orang kaya was the VOC. In 1621 the company devastated the island. Only a couple of thousand people were spared, mainly those on outlying islands. Banda traders dispersed to Pasir, Bali, East Java, East Seram and islands such as Kei. Rescue fleets from Seram and Makassar were sent to remove survivors. Some stayed in east Seram's Keffing, while others went to Makassar, bringing their commercial expertise and contacts with them. Many shippers subsequently described as Seramese or Makassarese were in fact from Banda.⁷¹ The VOC created new nutmeg plantations worked by slaves supplied by the Company at a fixed price.⁷² These land parcels were known as *perken*, and the planters as *perkeniers*. However, Banda's location ensured that there were always tempting opportunities for trade, and mestizo plantation

⁶⁸ Peter V. Lape, "Political Dynamics and Religious Change in the Late Pre-Colonial Banda Islands, Eastern Indonesia," *World Archaeology* 32, no. 1 (2000): 149.


⁶⁹ J.L. van Zanden, *The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy: Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 75–7.

⁷⁰ Quoted in J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Publishers Ltd., 1967), 35.

⁷¹ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*, 33–4, 53–7; R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 79–88; Peter V. Lape, "On the Use of Archaeology and History in Island Southeast Asia," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 45, no. 4 (2002); Vincent C. Loth, "Pioneers and Perkeniers: the Banda Islands in the Seventeenth Century," *Cakalele* 6 (1995). See also in bibliography: Leirissa, "Structure of Makassar-Bugis Trade"; "Changing Maritime Trade Patterns."

⁷² Zanden, *Rise and Decline*, 77–9; Loth, "Pioneers and Perkeniers."

families soon took to seafaring, exploring the waters around Aru and Papua.⁷³ They were increasingly drawn into general trade, rather than simply stocking their plantations with slaves and sago supplies.



Map 12 Central Maluku⁷⁴

Aru, the largest and most easterly of the Southeastern Islands, had been “discovered” in 1606, and in 1623 “all the kings” signed a treaty promising to trade only with Banda and Ambon, and always with a Dutch pass.⁷⁵ Pearls and pearl shells were recognised as potentially valuable commodities. Valentijn records how the Aru village of “Workey” would send out fleets of 70 to 80 large vessels to work the banks in the late sixteenth century. Foreigners were driven away, and the Company’s efforts to control the fishery were strongly resisted.⁷⁶ In 1645 the VOC sought to check Seram Laut commerce in Aru, and in 1658 a new treaty was signed with the Aru chiefs, who agreed to exclude the Seram Laut boats and leave the trade in damar, pearls, turtle-shell, bird skins (and from the 1720s trepang) to the Dutch burghers of Banda.⁷⁷ After a disastrous Company expedition to southwest New Guinea’s Onin in 1678, European trade there was also abandoned to the Banda burghers.⁷⁸

Ambon’s people also suffered a bloody subjugation. Ternate, on behalf of Batavia, demanded increased clove production. The Ambon orang kaya supervised the dati tribute groups, each of which was assigned a number of clove trees; growers were forbidden to leave the village under the so-called *grondslavernij*, “land-slavery” regulations. The orang kaya received a production fee (*hasil-geld*) at harvest time.⁷⁹

⁷³ Peter V. Lape, “Contact and Colonialism in the Banda Islands, Maluku, Indonesia,” *Bulletin of the Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association* 20 (2008); Loth, “Pioneers and Perkerniers.”

⁷⁴ Based on Katrien Polman, *The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983), x.

⁷⁵ Patricia Spyer, *The Memory of Trade: Modernity’s Entanglements in an Eastern Indonesian Island* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

⁷⁶ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië (ENI)*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), “Paarl- en Paarlemoervisscherij.”

⁷⁷ Swadling, *Plumes*, 137; Ellen, *Edge*, 85–7.

⁷⁸ Swadling, *Plumes*, 138.

⁷⁹ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*.

On Hitu the largely Muslim coastal population rebelled, rejecting Ternate's impositions. The sultan turned to the VOC for support, initiating the Company's war on Hitu (1641–46). Makassar's rulers had supported the rebels, but the destruction of their fleet off the coast in 1642 ended their overt role in the Ambonese islands.⁸⁰ From the early 1650s the VOC imposed forced production of cloves on the Ambon-Lease islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut. All other clove trees were to be cut down. The sultans of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan received the military backing of the VOC plus annual payments in compensation for lost income. Ternate surrendered its rights to Seram's Hoamoal and adjacent islands of west Seram, and to eastern Buru. The Company's imposition of stringent limitations on Hoamoal's clove production led to the Great Ambon War (1651–56); this left the peninsula virtually depopulated. The VOC also relocated Buru's chiefs, re-settling them on the more accessible south coast of Kayeli Bay, where Makassarese once traded.⁸¹ Between 1630 and 1660 the population of Company-controlled areas in Maluku declined by about a third, primarily as a result of the wars, but also because of the VOC's brutal spice eradication campaigns. Except for Hoamoal and the sago-producing coastal gardens supplying the Company, Seram itself was generally ignored.⁸²

The Company's monopsony proved very lucrative, but dislocated local economies.⁸³ Centuries old trading patterns were suddenly forbidden; the Makassarese, Javanese and others were banned from shipping Maluku spices, Indian textiles and Chinese goods. But these key commodities were so enticing and so familiar to shippers that clandestine exchange was endemic. Despite the VOC's best efforts spices were passed along chains stretching from east Seram, Obi and the west Papuan islands to the north and west, while Buginese and Butonese continued to sail the waters around Sulabesi (Sanana, the largest of the Sula Islands), Banggai and Tobungku, defying Ternate.⁸⁴

Essential local imports were allowed into Ambon, such as sago from Seram and Buru, but only specific, relatively trusted groups were granted Company passes to visit the *pasar kompeni* (Company markets) at Ternate, Ambon and Banda. Trade was limited to European (usually mestizo) civilians and, reluctantly, the Chinese. Ships belonging to the small Ternate Chinese community continued to import rice from Mindanao. But they

⁸⁰ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 56–7, 71, 164; J. Keuning, "Ambonese, Portuguese and Dutchmen: The History of Ambon to the End of the Seventeenth Century," in *Dutch Authors on Asian History*, ed. M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs (Dordrecht: Foris, 1988), 392–4; Christian F. van Fraassen, "Historical Introduction," in *The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography*, ed. Katrien Polman (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983), 17; Fraassen, "Ternate," 47; and Map 3.47 in Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, 103.

⁸¹ Barbara Dix Grimes, "Mapping Buru: The Politics of Territory and Settlement on an Eastern Indonesian Island," in *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*, ed. Thomas Reuter (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006).

⁸² VOC fortifications in the Ambon islands, built to control the spice trade, became the nuclei of new settlements: these were the main Fort Victoria on Ambon, while the lesser Fort Duurstede on Saparua became the centre for the Uliase islands (Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut) and Western Seram. Fort Amsterdam at Hila controlled Seram's Hoamoal peninsula, while lesser redoubts were found at Haruku and Amet on Nusalaut, while others remained on Hoamoal, Buru and North Seram after the Ambon war. R.Z. Leirissa and Djuariah Latuconsina, *Sejarah Kebudayaan Maluku* (Jakarta: P dan K, 1999), 69–73.

⁸³ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*.

⁸⁴ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 181–5.

also engaged in covert spice exports in alliance with the Maluku sultans, who opposed all Dutch efforts to expel the Chinese. Eventually the Company decided to tolerate those Chinese they regarded as useful but to prevent further immigration; a small and stable community developed.⁸⁵

Castles, outposts, local fleets and a considerable number of sailors and soldiers were dedicated to protecting this traffic. A series of forts guarded the Ambon-Lease islands; they and the tiny Banda archipelagos were closely controlled. Company ships patrolled the coasts of Seram and Buru to the north. Outposts in the Southeastern and Southwestern Islands monitored traffic and supplied Banda with necessities. The most important were those established at Aru and Kei in 1623, in Gorom in 1637 and Tanimbar in 1646; a tiny garrison was based at Kisar from 1668.⁸⁶

North Sulawesi had long been supplying Ternate, theoretical overlord, with gold from Gorontalo, sandalwood, turtle-shell, wax and coconut oil. But the sultanate struggled to impose its hegemony over the region's many small domains; politics tended to be "fluid, violent, personal, and pragmatic". Henley surmises that "the annual trading expeditions from North Sulawesi to Ternate in the early sixteenth century were already perceived—albeit perhaps more clearly by the people of Ternate than by those of Sulawesi—in terms of homage and tribute". Ships from Makassar also traded in North Sulawesi, exchanging Indian textiles for coconut oil and forest products; they were later joined by Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese.⁸⁷ In theory some settlements sent turtle-shell once every three years to Makassar as tribute, "sometimes they did, sometimes they didn't".⁸⁸

The Spanish came to Manado from Ternate, where they had been active since the 1520s; their priority was the ensuring of food supplies for Maluku, although they also hoped to acquire allies and converts. The late sixteenth century ruler of Sangihe's Siau, Don Gerónimo, became a loyal Catholic ally of Manila; immigration from Sangihe to the Sarangani islands off Mindanao increased.⁸⁹ Early Spanish accounts also describe a "king" of Manado ruling around the coastal settlements of Manado and Amurang. He had no authority in the very violent interior, where warfare was chronic. Other rulers were centred at Kaidipan and, three days to the south, Bohol.⁹⁰ However, the largest Manado settlement was inland, at Tondano by the lake; this had more than 700 houses. In 1619 Spanish envoys also visited Kakaskasen,

⁸⁵ Ibid., 158–62; Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*, 279–92, 340–2. Gerrit Knaap, "De Ambonse eilanden tussen twee mogendheden," in *Hof en Handel: Aziatische vorsten en de VOC 1620–1720*, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 56. R.Z. Leirissa, "The Structure of Makassar-Bugis Trade in Pre-Modern Moluccas," *RIMA* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993); Knaap, *Kruidnagelen*, 265–92; *ENI*: "Scheepvaart en Handel," 527.

⁸⁶ Details at the VOC site: "Amboina," at <https://www.vocsite.nl/geschiedenis/handelsposten/amboina.html>; and "Molukken," at <http://www.voc-kenniscentrum.nl/gewest-molukken.html>; and in Cribb, *Historical Atlas*, Map 3.50, p. 106.

⁸⁷ David Henley, "A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi," *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 40, 47–54.

⁸⁸ Noorduyn, "De Handelsrelaties," 116–8.

⁸⁹ Shinzo Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003).

⁹⁰ If this refers to sea travel, this could refer to Buol.

Tomohan, Sarongson, Tanawangku and Kema. The Spanish presence in the Sulawesi Sea increased after their fort at Zamboanga was completed in 1635.⁹¹



Map 13 North and Central Sulawesi⁹²

From 1607 onwards, VOC ships visited the Manado coast to buy rice, but were harassed by the Spanish. Fighting broke out in 1614. The Dutch then took over Siau, while the Spanish built a fort on the coast facing Manado Tua. In 1651 the Spanish and Makassarese united to try and defend Amurang, a coastal settlement claimed by the Bolaang ruler, but the Dutch proved stronger. The first VOC settlement at Manado dated from 1653, the fort from 1657. Outposts were established at Limboto, by the lake near Gorontalo; at Kuandang on the north coast; and at Sulabesi (Sanana), in the Sula Islands. These were to protect gold and essential rice supplies as well as monitoring traffic between the Southern

⁹¹ Antonio C. Campo López, “La presencia española en el norte de Sulawesi durante el siglo XVII Estudio del asentamiento español en el norte de Sulawesi ante la oposición local y la amenaza holandesa (1606–1662),” *Revista de Indias* 77, no. 269 (2017): 52–6.

⁹² Map based on David Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004).

Philippines, Sulawesi and Maluku.⁹³ In 1658 the Dutch evicted the Spanish from the Minahasa; four years later the Spanish also retreated from Ternate and Tidore.

Henley concludes:⁹⁴

As a result of all this competition, the long-distance trade goods that were in demand in North Sulawesi—most importantly luxury textiles and European firearms—became widely available in North Sulawesi through several different channels. Ternate [the sultanate] now had nothing unique to offer by way of economic patronage, and so its continuing demands for tribute in gold, slaves, wax and [coconut] oil became correspondingly more difficult to enforce.

In 1679 Robertus Padbrugge, the Ternate Governor, signed a treaty with the leaders of nineteen Minahasan *walak*, each a small domain of several allied settlements; five other *walak* remained, for a few years, subject to the ruler of Bolaang. This treaty officially established the Company's supremacy in the Minahasa.⁹⁵ The signatories agreed to provide rice and timber as well as labour services to the VOC in exchange for vague promises of protection. Typical regional sea and forest commodities were also exported, as well as bark cloth.⁹⁶

Tidore

The Dutch supported the two main north Maluku sultans in different ways. Andaya explained: "In Ternate the ruler relied on the Dutch for guns, ships and men to assist in the war expeditions to subdue his subjects, while in Tidore the ruler used Dutch compensation in the form of valuable products to redistribute in the traditional manner, and thereby strengthen ties between the ruler and his subjects."⁹⁷ While the Ternate sultan became dangerously dependent on Batavia, the Tidore ruler endeavoured to strengthen his hold over his shrunken domain through traditional bonds, rewards and punishments.

During the first half of the seventeenth century the sultanate participated in opportunistic shifting alliances and wars. But despite assistance from the Portuguese and Spanish, Tidore had lost control of its traditional food-supplying territories on west Halmahera, including Payahe, by 1649.⁹⁸ Moreover, it no longer received revenue from former clove growing areas. After the VOC's subjugation of Ambon and installation of Ternate as the guardian

⁹³ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 67; "Ternaten/Molukken," the VOC site, <http://www.vocsite.nl/geschiedenis/handelsposten/molukken.html>; Jouke S. Wigboldus, "A History of the Minahasa c.1615–1680," *Archipel* 34 (1987).

⁹⁴ David Henley, "A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi," *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 50.

⁹⁵ Wigboldus, "History"; M.J.C. Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 19–42.

⁹⁶ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 71.

⁹⁷ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 172.

⁹⁸ For contemporary resonance, see Chris Wilson, *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God* (London: Routledge, 2008).

of the Company's spice trade, Tidore of necessity intensified its links with Bacan, the Gamrange and Raja Ampat, seeking to ensure continued access to sago and commodities.⁹⁹

Early descriptions record the presence of Chinese porcelain and Indian beads at Biak and slaving around the McCluer Gulf.¹⁰⁰ New Guinea's Raja Ampat rulers are said to have recognised the suzerainty of Tidore around the end of the fifteenth century; they were expected to pay homage and bring gifts in person to the sultan once every five years. However, they were largely independent in the early 1600s, and this had probably been the reality all along. By the mid-1600s there were some converts to Islam in west Papua's coastal settlements.¹⁰¹ As has been described, chains of patronage and obligation connected Muslim polities along the southern coast of the McCluer Gulf to settlements inland and along New Guinea's northern shore. The sultan's main political instruments were punitive raids by the hong'i. Biak oarsmen and fighters served in the Tidore hong'i, while the sultanate's ties with the Gamrange were used to attract warriors from Raja Ampat and Onin. Andaya describes Javanese traders bringing textiles from Java, Bima, Sumbawa and India to feed into the massoi exchange network.¹⁰²

The Tidore sultan also cultivated ties with the firmly independent trader-chiefs of eastern Seram. Seram Laut shippers, like those of Gorom, were central to the Papuan trade, cruising the Raja Ampat waters for slaves, massoi, ambergris, birds of paradise and spices. They continued to associate with other traders, including the Makassarese who lent them ships and supplied goods on credit. In 1633 it was said that Keffing could muster 4,000 fighting men, while Seram Laut could field some 3,000.¹⁰³ Onin continued to be visited by two or three Seram Laut traders every year; they brought prized prestige goods such as elephant tusks and large porcelain dishes to exchange for forest products, including massoi and birds of paradise. By the 1670s Seram traders were moving further east along west Papua's southern coast to Kowiai, as massoi supplies to the west diminished.¹⁰⁴ Relations between interior and coastal peoples were tense. In the early nineteenth century Modera noted that people from the interior had to be extremely wary, or the coastal Oninese

⁹⁹ Leonard Andaya, "Eastern Indonesia: A Study of the Intersections of Global, Regional and Local Networks in the 'Extended' Indian Ocean," in *Reinterpreting Indian Ocean Worlds: Essays in Honour of Kirti N. Chaudhuri*, ed. Stefan C.A. Halikowski Smith (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011).

¹⁰⁰ Widjojo, *Revolt*; Paul Haenen, "Enkele historisch-antropologische aantekeningen omtrent het Bintuni gebied in Irian Jaya," in *Tales from a Concave World: liber amicorum Bert Verhoeve*, ed. Connie Baak, Mary Bakker, and Dick van der Meij (Leiden: Leiden University, 1995).

¹⁰¹ Holger Warnk, "The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011).

¹⁰² Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 104–10, 192, 216; F.C. Kamma, "De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoeese eilanden in legende en histories," *Indonesie* 2, no. 2 (1948). See also in bibliography: Thomas E. Goodman, "The Sosolot Exchange Network"; and Huizinga, "Relations between Tidore and the North Coast of New Guinea."

¹⁰³ Widjojo, *Revolt*, 156–7.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas E. Goodman, "The Sosolot Exchange Network of Eastern Indonesia during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *Perspectives on the Bird's Head of Irian, Jaya, Indonesia (Proceedings of the Conference, Leiden 13–17 October 1997)*, ed. Cecilia Odé Jelle Miedema, Rien A. C. Dam, and Connie Baak (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 439.

would seize their wives and children, selling the latter to visiting Seramese, Makassarese and Chinese.¹⁰⁵

In 1657 Sultan Saifudin (r.1657–89) accepted an allowance in return for agreeing to allow the VOC to destroy all spices in his territory.¹⁰⁶ Under pressure from the Spanish, Tidore needed Batavia's support again in 1662 and so undertook to contribute to the hongji fleets imposing Dutch hegemony. The sultan cooperated with the VOC in raids against pirates and denied Chinese and indigenous shippers the right to visit the Raja Ampat islands. In 1667 Tidore promised again to provide slaves and spices, and to contain Papuan raiding; in return Batavia recognised the sultan's authority over trade in his periphery, including the eastern Halmahera Gamrange, the Raja Ampat islands and the tip of western New Guinea.¹⁰⁷

The VOC expected the sultan to control his territories, but the court was incapable of demanding more than the usual intermittent tribute and honours. Despite the 1667 treaty, Ellen notes:¹⁰⁸

[There was] little evidence for Tidore interference in trade [in east Seram].... Tidore was certainly involved in the politics of the region. Its rulers encouraged clandestine trade in east Seram during the seventeenth century, at the time when the Dutch were seeking to consolidate their monopoly in spices ... [but the region's] natural focus has always been Banda.

In 1678 a Dutch attempt to gain a foothold in west New Guinea proved fruitless, and the region was left under the largely theoretical suzerainty of Tidore. It was noted that the Tidore sultan was at least feared because of "his piracy and hongji raids".¹⁰⁹ A Dutch visitor to New Guinea's Onin peninsula in the late seventeenth century noticed little sign of Tidorese influence but met several traders from Makassar.¹¹⁰

The non-spice commodities that Tidore could provide were of little interest to the VOC, but the military alliance with the sultan was important. So the Dutch helped the sultan suppress rebels on the northeast coast of Seram and the Gorom islands, enabling the Company to claim in 1687 that it governed these on behalf of the sultan.¹¹¹ Although, under duress, the East Seram chiefs themselves also signed treaties with the VOC, they remained recalcitrant and a frequent target of Company-initiated hongji. The consequent destruction of property and disruption ensured both the declining welfare of east Seram and their increasing focus on their own more remote networks, particularly connections to New Guinea.¹¹²

¹⁰⁵ J. Modera, *Verhaal van eene Reize naar en langs de Zuid-Westkust van Nieuw-Guinea Gedaan in 1828 door Z.M. corvet Triton* (Haarlem: Vincent Loosjes, 1830), 107–10.

¹⁰⁶ Warnk, "Coming of Islam"; Ellen, *Edge*, 102.

¹⁰⁷ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 99, 169–70, 190.

¹⁰⁸ Roy Ellen, "Faded Images of Old Tidore in Contemporary Southeast Seram: A View from the Periphery," *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 24–6.

¹⁰⁹ Swadling, *Plumes*.

¹¹⁰ Warnk, "Coming of Islam"; Ellen, *Edge*, 102.

¹¹¹ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 84, 192–201.

¹¹² Widjojo, *Revolt*, pp. 45–7.

Southwest Sulawesi, Makassar and Sumbawa

Southwest Sulawesi polities seem to have become assertive in the fifteenth century. Bugis Wajorese founded their own state, building on the advantages of their fertile land and relatively easy access to both the west and east coasts of the peninsula, to rice and iron, as well as to the forested interior. The rule of the first *Arung Matoa* or paramount ruler is dated to the 1470s.¹¹³ Makassarese Talloq and Sama Bajau fleets attacked coastal territories in Nusa Tenggara in the 1400s, subjugating Lombok, Sumbawa, Sikka and Ende on Flores as well as parts of western Timor. Around the beginning of the sixteenth century Bone successfully challenged Luwu in the Gulf of Bone while competing with Ternate and Makassar for influence on Sulawesi's east coast.¹¹⁴ An exceptional king had presided over the rise of Makassarese Gowa in the early sixteenth century. Talloq was conquered in the 1530s, creating the composite "Makassar". Bone checked Makassar's expansion in 1565, but since the latter retained the southernmost territories it could still control the crucial sea-route between Selayar and Sulawesi.¹¹⁵ The dual kingdom was fortunate in that it could call upon the talents of both royal lineages and from the end of the 1500s an able joint leadership guided the realm for over four decades. Makassar continued to assert its power in the strategically important waters between southwest Sulawesi and Sumbawa and Flores. In 1602 Makassarese fleets sought tribute and slaves in Flores, attacking Sikka, one of the first Portuguese settlements, and Ende, a south Flores trading enclave where the Portuguese Dominicans had built a small fort in 1595. The Makassarese leaders also invited Maumere, on the Flores north coast, to submit, but the chiefs refused, saying they owed allegiance to Ternate, although they were happy to trade with Makassar. An agreement was made with the ruler of Ende, confirming an alliance.¹¹⁶ Makassar's rulers converted to Islam in 1605 and spread the new faith by force of arms.

There were six realms on Sumbawa in the early 1600s; the two most important were the eponymous kingdom to the west, and fertile Bima.¹¹⁷ Sanggar (later wiped out in the Tambora eruption of 1815) submitted immediately after Makassar's fleets arrived and so retained its independence. It wanted to protect its horse exports from Kore to Sulawesi,

¹¹³ Christian Pelras, *The Bugis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 112–5; Kathryn Anderson Wellen, *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora* (DeKalb: NIU, 2014).


¹¹⁴ Andaya, *Heritage*, 20–1, 29–31; Druce, *Lands*, 91–134, 213–34; Lance Nolde, "Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2014).

¹¹⁵ Pelras, *The Bugis*, 130–2; Andaya, *Heritage*, 29–31; Arend de Roever and Bea Brommer, *Grote Atlas van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. Vol. III, Indische Archipel en Oceanië: Malay Archipelago and Oceania* (Voorburg: Asia Maior, 2008), 168.

¹¹⁶ In 1605 the Endenese united to expel the Portuguese: A.J. Heuken, "Catholic Converts in the Moluccas, Minahasa and Sangihe-Talaud," in *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, ed. Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 78; Andaya, "Eastern Indonesia." Dominicans were active in north central Flores after establishing themselves at Solor and Larantuka; Hans Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600–1800* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 27–32.

¹¹⁷ The other kingdoms were small; two were obliterated by the eruption of the Tambora volcano in April 1815. Bernice de Jong Boers, "Mount Tambora in 1815: A Volcanic Eruption in Indonesia and its Aftermath," *Indonesia* 60 (1995); M. Aubert, et al., "Pleistocene Cave Art from Sulawesi, Indonesia," *Nature* 514 (2014); I Gde Parimartha, "Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815–1915" (PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit, 1995).

where they were important for warfare and hunting.¹¹⁸ The other kingdoms followed; Sumbawa came under Gowa's control after the first major attack in 1618, and converted to Islam.¹¹⁹ From then on, like the others, it sent agricultural produce, coarse cloth, sappanwood and above all horses as tribute to Makassar, as well as supplying manpower when required.¹²⁰ By the time Makassar was defeated by the Dutch it claimed suzerainty over all coastal Sulawesi up to the Sangihe and Talaud islands, including the Tomini Gulf, and also along the east coast down to Buton, challenging Ternate.¹²¹



Map 14 Sumbawa¹²²

Bima had claimed both Sumba and Manggarai in western Flores since the fifteenth century, but by the early seventeenth century Makassar was fiercely contesting its control over the strategic harbour of Pota. This was located in the Sama Bajau domain of Sandao, on western Flores, which included Manggarai.¹²³ Bima was defeated in 1618; VOC envoys who came

¹¹⁸ B.D. de Jong Boers, "The 'Arab' of the Indonesian Archipelago: The Famed Horse Breeds of Sumbawa," in *Breeds of Empire: The 'Invention' of the Horse in Southern Africa and Maritime Southeast Asia, 1500–1950*, ed. Greg Bankoff and Sandra Swart (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007); Peter Boomgaard, "Horses, Horse-Trading and Royal Courts in Indonesian History, 1500–1900," in *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004).

¹¹⁹ J. Noorduyn, "Makasar and the Islamization of Bima," *BKI* 143, nos. 2–3 (1987): 320–1. Adrian Vickers, "Hinduism and Islam in Indonesia: Bali and the Pasisir World," *Indonesia* 44 (1987); Hans Hägerdal, "Bali in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Suggestions for a Chronology of the Gelgel Period," *BKI* 151, no. 1 (1995); Hans Hägerdal, "From Batuparang to Ayudhya: Bali and the Outside World, 1636–1656," *BKI* 154, no. 1 (1998); Alfons van der Kraan, "Bali and Lombok in the World Economy," *RIMA* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993).

¹²⁰ Susanto Zuhdi and Triana Wulandari, *Kerajaan Tradisional di Indonesia: Bima* (Jakarta: Departemen P dan K, 1997).

¹²¹ Anthony Reid, "A Great Seventeenth Century Indonesian Family: Matoaya and Pattingalloang of Makassar," in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000).

¹²² Map based on J. Noorduyn, *Bima en Sumbawa: Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Sultanaten Bima en Sumbawa door A. Ligvoet en G. P. Rouffaer* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1987), x.

¹²³ Nolde, "Changing Tides," 345–6.

to buy rice encountered devastation. In 1619 Bima lost again to Makassar; the ruler soon converted to Islam. Thereafter the royal families often intermarried, confirming Bima's orientation north to Makassar, rather than west to Java.¹²⁴ The new sultanate continued independent trade with Bali, Banjarmasin, Makassar and Maluku. In the 1620s it was exporting rice, slaves, sappanwood, tamarind, sulphur, cassia (a sort of cinnamon)¹²⁵ and palm sugar. Tribute was sent to Makassar from the 1630s.¹²⁶

For many years Bima continued to deny Makassar's claims to Manggarai, arguing that the wider domain of Sandao was divided into three: one part under the Sama Bajau ruler or *Papug*, another under Makassar, while Reo, the third, was retained by Bima. Pota was exempted from tribute to Bima, as it was directly under Makassar's supervision. A relatively high-ranking representative of Bima was based at the port of Reo, a lesser agent at Labuhan Bajo.¹²⁷ The *dalu* chiefs of the Flores interior delivered tribute to Bima in the form of slaves, horses and wax.¹²⁸ Bima's aspirations to local hegemony reached beyond Flores. In 1663, according to Dutch sources, the sultan claimed that the inhabitants of Sumba had been his subjects "since antiquity", and that he had always controlled the trade in sandalwood from the island. Such claims were often made, and probably reflected trading connections and intermittent tribute.¹²⁹ In 1675 Bima sought VOC assistance in crushing rebellions on Sumba. The Company, which maintained an outpost on Bima to acquire sappanwood, replied: "The ruler of Bima can do as he liked in the areas that he controls, but the Company can give him no help; however, the authorities recognize that he must wage war on Sumba, because he has enemies there".¹³⁰ Dutch sources record that Portuguese ships arrived in Bima from Makassar every December or January to obtain sappanwood; the cargoes were then carried back to Makassar before being taken to Macau in July and August.¹³¹

The Portuguese had been visited Makassar intermittently during the 1500s, and within a hundred years they had become essential to long-distance exchange with India and China. The VOC's drastic remaking of Banda led to a sharp expansion of Makassar's Bandanese and Portuguese communities. For a few decades from the 1620s Makassar also benefited from Dutch advances in Maluku and from Mataram's disruption of commerce along Java's northeast coast. The Sulawesi port became a significant open market for spices. It also

¹²⁴ Noorduyn, "Makassar and the Islamization of Bima." Zuhdi and Wulandari, *Bima*.

¹²⁵ *Cassia lignea*, or *cinnamomum burmannii*, was a type of cinnamon bark found in Indonesia, of lower quality than the Ceylon cinnamon. It was also distinct from the Chinese and Vietnamese cinnamons.

¹²⁶ Nagel, *Der Schlüssel*, 421–2. Discrepancies in dating between sources are due not only to the scarcity of exact information but also to the difference in timing between formal agreements and actual—often irregular—action.

¹²⁷ Nolde, "Changing Tides," 345–6.

¹²⁸ Nagel, *Der Schlüssel*, 421–2.

¹²⁹ Janet Hoskins, *The Play of Time: Kodi Perspectives on Calendars, History, and Exchange* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1997), 36–7.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Chambert-Loir, "State, City, Commerce: The Case of Bima," *Indonesia* 57 (1994): 71–88; Chambert-Loir and Salahuddin, *Bo' sangaji kai: Catatan Kerajaan Bima* (Jakarta: Ecole française d'Extreme-Orient, Yayasan Obor, 2012).

handled local rice and cloth, Banjarmasin and Jambi pepper and slaves.¹³² From the early 1630s the thriving Portuguese traffic between Macau and Timor was conducted by way of Makassar. Malays, Chinese, and Portuguese (both white and black) traded freely. Makassar served these ships as an entrepot and rest-place, as well as being a source of Indian textiles. The Macau Portuguese exchanged Chinese commodities there for goods from the west, notably sandalwood from Siam, wax, elephants' tusks ("the bigger the better") and pepper from Borneo. Sandalwood and wax from Bima were also available.¹³³

The Dutch were seasonal visitors to Makassar after 1601. Other Europeans established trading posts: the English in 1613 and the Danes in 1618; the French were briefly present, between 1622 and 1625. These northern Europeans were forbidden to travel and had to confine their activities to their lodges.¹³⁴ Eastern archipelago commodities like sandalwood, cloves and tortoiseshell were also favoured in China's markets, and as Makassar's trade network grew more Chinese visited; by the 1620s they were a familiar presence in the port.¹³⁵ Makassar continued to profit from its role in shipping on the Macau-Nusa Tenggara route.¹³⁶ The early 1640s saw major changes, the most notable being the Dutch conquest (1641) of Portuguese Melaka. Several prominent Portuguese and Muslim merchants from the Coromandel Coast moved to Makassar, hoping to establish direct access to the spices they had previously obtained in the Straits. At the same time, the VOC was fighting the Hitu War (1641–46) in Ambon, disrupting the clove trade. However, Makassar's Malay, Indian, Portuguese and Chinese networks enabled it to continue being a direct but fragile link between India and the Spice Islands, at least for several decades.¹³⁷

Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo became the leading foreign merchant and a close friend to Makassar's king. He had arrived in Goa from Portugal around 1622 or 1623, establishing himself as a trader on the Coromandel coast; by the late 1630s he was handling Timor sandalwood. He was also an active agent for Iberian interests and an advisor to the Governor of Portuguese India at Goa. With the end of the Iberian union and the fall of Melaka Vieira decided to join the Portuguese in Makassar, where he presented an elephant to the king in 1642. Vieira became the most prominent intermediary between the Makassar elite and Portuguese representatives, working to limit Dutch expansion. He continued to

¹³² Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*.

¹³³ Noorduyn, "De Handelsrelaties," 105.

¹³⁴ C.R. Boxer, *Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo: A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624–1667* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1967); Pelras, *The Bugis*, 118–20; Heather Sutherland, "Trade, Court and Company: Makassar in the Later Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries," in *Hof en Handel: Aziatische vorsten en de VOC 1620–1720*, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004); Hägerdal, *Lords*, 83–91; B.J.O. Schrieke, "The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), 68–9; F.W. Stapel, *Het Bongaais Verdrag* (Leiden: University of Leiden, 1922); Boxer, *Francisco Vieira*. Vieira came to Makassar direct from the Coromandel coast.

¹³⁵ Anthony Reid, "Pluralism and Progress in Seventeenth-Century Makassar," in *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaioli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000); Sutherland, "Trade, Court and Company"; Ptak, *China's Seaborne Trade*.

¹³⁶ Noorduyn, "De Handelsrelaties."

¹³⁷ Sutherland, "Trade, Court and Company."

trade from Makassar until the mid-1660s.¹³⁸ The other most prominent foreign merchants were two Indian Muslims: Mapule, who traded with the VOC and its officials and “Mamet Saphy”, the agent of the chief minister of Indian Golconda. A few Chinese were also active in long-range commerce, but the VOC paid them little heed. Batavia was well served by the visiting junks and was wise enough to avoid pointless interventions in the South China Sea.¹³⁹ Chinese shipping reported around Timor was linked to both local and Makassar-based Portuguese.¹⁴⁰

The twin-kingdom continued to seek opportunities in Nusa Tenggara, where it competed with Balinese for authority in Lombok and Sumbawa. In 1641 Makassar tried to expand its role in the sandalwood trade, cutting out Portuguese intermediaries. A large fleet carrying five to seven thousand men sailed from Talloq to Larantuka; the coast was ravaged, and 4,000 slaves taken. But the gains were not consolidated, and Portuguese influence returned. Five or six Makassarese vessels continued to visit east Timor each year, while allied Endenese traded in Sumba. In 1664 Makassar, aware of both the imminent threat from the VOC and of Bimanese claims to west Flores, once again sent fleets to eastern Nusa Tenggara; 29 ships and a thousand men were dispatched to guard its interests in the Savu Sea. Some participants settled at Ende, reinforcing the existing trading and raiding Muslim community.¹⁴¹

The Makassar court also maintained a special relationship with the sultanates of Pasir and Kutai, seventy and eighty miles away on the other side of the Straits. No traders from their ports lived in Makassar, as the east Borneo rulers monopolised commerce. Although dynastic and marriage ties with Makassar ensured that the sultans were friendly, they remained warily independent. Every year each of the two Makassar rulers sent a perahu across the Makassar Straits, laden with the Bima and Selayar textiles they had received as tribute. Sometimes a high official, such as the chancellor, also sent a ship. Like the tribute missions to China, the official vessels were accompanied by many small private traders, 200 to 250 perahu, each carrying men with goods to exchange. On their return, they carried gold, wax, rattan, sometimes birds’ nests and turtle-shell. Of special interest was wood suitable for blowpipes, a weapon favoured by the Makassarese.¹⁴²

In 1660 the VOC attacked Makassar after a series of disagreements about salvage rights to wrecked Company ships and the on-going defiance of Company trade restrictions. Thirty ships and 2,600 men sailed from Ambon; the VOC-led fleet destroyed seven Portuguese trading vessels and captured the Panakukkang fort.¹⁴³ In the subsequent treaty

¹³⁸ Boxer, *Francisco Vieira*.


¹³⁹ Sutherland, “Trade, Court and Company”; Heather Sutherland, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011).

¹⁴⁰ Sutherland, “Trade, Court and Company,” 92–4.

¹⁴¹ Hägerdal, *Lords*, 85–91, 165–6.

¹⁴² Noorduyn, “De Handelsrelaties,” 113–5.

¹⁴³ For the military context see Knaap, Heijer and Jong, *Oorlogen Overzee*, 97–109.



Map 15 Makassar's Sphere of Influence before 1669¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Based on the map of the same name in Sutherland, "Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain," 175.

the Makassarese were forced to agree to the deportation of the Portuguese.¹⁴⁵ This was bitterly resisted, but by 1661 most were gone, to Macau, Timor and other islands; a considerable contingent went to Siam, where the capital, Ayutthaya, was familiar. The EIC staff was expelled at the same time; at least in theory. The English factor suggested in vain that the EIC should also relocate to Siam, as it was “a seat of great trade, ... the staple for the Manila, Japan, Macao and Cochin China [trades] ... the wealthiest of the Portuguese and Malayan [people driven out of Makassar] intend that [this should be] their station”.¹⁴⁶ Two EIC agents remained in, or returned to, Makassar. In 1667 they fought against the Dutch; their artillery skills were praised by the Malay writer of the war’s chronicle.¹⁴⁷

Batavia was reluctant to engage in an all-out war with Makassar, a formidable and feared military power, but had little choice, particularly after allies in Ternate’s Buton and the Sula islands were attacked in 1665. These were important sources of fighting men and supplies for the Dutch. In response, the Company mustered 21 ships and 1,900 men, including Ternate fighters and a crucial Buginese contingent led by the Bone prince Arung Palakka, a sworn enemy of Makassar. When the VOC forces confronted some 15,000 Makassarese near Buton in January 1667, many defected to follow the Bugis leader, joining the anti-Makassar coalition.

By the middle of the year Company ships were blockading the coast, while Arung Palakka led gruelling inland campaigns. The war’s first year ended with Batavia’s imposition of the Treaty of Bungaya in November 1667. The terms were extremely harsh; fighting flared up again a few months later. Further campaigns were necessary before Gowa’s main fortified settlement of Somba Opu fell in 1669. An exodus followed as leading Makassarese nobles fled overseas, hoping to regroup and return. Many Wajorese, who had fought alongside them, also left, as did Malays and Sama Bajau. Over the following years refugees continued to leave South Sulawesi, seeking to escape famine and the continuing warfare which marked Arung Palakka’s rise to political dominance.¹⁴⁸

Makassar was broken, the kingdom divided. Talloq in the north was separated politically and geographically from Gowa in the south. The new Dutch-ruled centre was primarily a garrison-port enclave, Fort Rotterdam sheltered a small settlement of Chinese, Malays and (mainly mestizo) Europeans; this was surrounded by Makassarese and Buginese *kampung* (semi-rural quarters). Seventeenth-century trade was officially confined to exchange with

¹⁴⁵ The treaty signed in Europe in 1661, establishing peace between Portugal and the Netherlands and transferring Brazil to Portugal, would have made no difference, as the VOC was determined to destroy Makassar. In any case, it was too late.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in Stefan Halikowski Smith, *Creolization and Diaspora in the Portuguese Indies: The Social World of Ayutthaya, 1640–1720* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 60. See also Chris Baker, “Ayutthaya Rising: From Land or Sea?” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2003).

¹⁴⁷ One EIC man had been in Makassar since 1659, the other since 1662. On James Bale and Henry Pearl see C. Skinner, *Sja’ir Perang Mengkasar (The Rhymed Chronicle of the Macassar War) by Entji’ Amin* (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1963), 145, 267–8.

¹⁴⁸ Andaya, *Heritage*; Stapel, *Het Bongaais Verdrag*; Leonard Y. Andaya, “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas,” *JMBRAS* 68, no. 1 (1995). Wellen, *The Open Door*; Nolde, “Changing Tides.”

other Company centres in Maluku and Java.¹⁴⁹ The VOC decreed that spices, Chinese and Indian commodities must be channelled through Batavia. Bima came under the direct control of the Makassar Governor.

After Bone's successful war against Wajo in 1671, it gained control of the vital Cenrana River; the eponymous island at the estuary became Bone's main base for controlling trade. Arung Palakka welcomed Sama Bajau to Bajoe. This harbour flourished, and became the centre of a new Sama Bajau domain, Lolo Bajo. The alliance between Bone and these Sama Bajau was to last three hundred years.¹⁵⁰ A crescent of Sama Bajau activity developed, incorporating off-shore islands and extended south past Kajang.¹⁵¹ Bone's historic capital of Watampone lay inland from Bajoe

The VOC had rewarded its ally Ternate in 1667 with the tributary lands seized from Gowa.¹⁵² In theory, the Maluku sultanate then controlled all the islands north of Sulawesi as far as Mindanao, as well as the Tomini Gulf from Gorontalo to Palu, the Obi and Sula Islands, Banggai, Tobungku and Buton. Selayar was its most western outpost.¹⁵³ However, the Ternaten court resented the effects of Dutch control over the spice trade, particularly the limitations imposed on their own freedom to sail westwards. In 1671 war broke out between the sultanate and the VOC; Tidore supported the Company. The fighting culminated in the surrender of the Ternate sultan in 1681; the realm's reduction to vassal status followed two years later. Some nobles and traders then left Ternate; this was a smaller and less commercially oriented exodus than the early migrations from South Sulawesi. Tidore retained its independence for another hundred years.¹⁵⁴ Some Ternate territories were taken over by the Company, including north Sulawesi's Gorontalo and Manado, as well as Christian settlements along the Tomini coast and the main Sangihe and Talaud islands. The VOC also took the opportunity of formally assuming control of Solor, off east Flores.¹⁵⁵ Ternate's subordination to the Dutch may have strengthened the VOC in central Maluku but it weakened the sultanate in contested zones of lesser importance to the Company, making it easier for Bone to expand its influence.

Eastern Sulawesi

The European obsession with spices should not obscure the fact that other commodities, most notably sea and forest products, continued to be prized in Asian markets. These

¹⁴⁹ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*; Heather Sutherland, "Eastern Emporium and Company Town: Trade and Society in Eighteenth-Century Makassar," in *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th–20th Centuries*, ed. Frank Broeze (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1989).

¹⁵⁰ Nolde, "Changing Tides," 286–342.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*; Horst Liebner, "Four Oral Versions of a Story about the Origins of the Bajo People of Southern Selayar" (Universitas Hasanuddin, 1996), 20.

¹⁵² Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 83–98; Ternate claimed the north Banda Sea, including northwest Halmahera, the northeast Sulawesi peninsula, the Gulf of Tomini, Banggai with capital Luwuk, the Sula islands, west Seram, including the clove producing Ambon islands, East Flores, Solor, Adonara, Lomblen and Alor.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 84, 89. From 1683 the Dutch in Makassar governed Selayar "on Behalf of the Sultan Ternate."

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 185–7, 211, 227–8.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 181–90.

could be found in abundance along Sulawesi's very sparsely inhabited east coast. Makassar's defeat, Ternate's decline and VOC shipping restrictions gave Bugis warrior chiefs and traders greater freedom to sail and settle along those shores and islands. Traffic along the coast and in the Tomini Gulf increased as Bugis traders congregated at the estuaries of the navigable Sampara and La rivers, exporting rice, wax and tortoiseshell. Some Bugis adventurers claimed to represent Bone, gaining prestige and giving their extortions a veneer of legitimacy. The most powerful polities along the coast were the rajadoms of Banggai and Tobungku and the Buton sultanate. From the end of the seventeenth century Buton's Sama Bajau were key players in the expansion of marine commodity exports.¹⁵⁶

Banggai was mentioned in fourteenth century Chinese and Javanese sources, which recorded its wealth of rice and sago. In 1515 Tomé Pires had observed that a "great deal of iron comes from outside, from the islands of Banggai, iron axes, choppers, swords and knives";¹⁵⁷ he may have been including Tobungku's nearby harbours. Mining and forging iron were the primary occupations of communities living near Lake Matano.¹⁵⁸ Sama Bajau exploited off-shore reefs and coasts, providing a wealth of turtle-shell, sharks fins and pearl-shell. Forest products were also readily available, including edible birds' nests, beeswax and sandalwood. These were exchanged for textiles, as well as brassware, porcelain, weapons and later opium.¹⁵⁹ In 1679 it was estimated that Banggai's inhabitants numbered around 10,000; mostly non-Muslim.¹⁶⁰ The kingdom signed a contract with the VOC in 1689.¹⁶¹

The homelands of neighbouring Tobungku lay further down the coast. These were very fruitful and even more populous than Banggai. In the later seventeenth century it was estimated that around 15,000 people were living around the bay, 6,000 of whom were concentrated in the ruler's settlement; Sama Bajau frequented the coast. Theoretically under Ternate, Tobungku was too strong to be controlled easily, maintaining an effective independence by manipulating ties with both Ternate and Bone.¹⁶² Tobungku could also tap iron supplies from around Lake Matano and the upper reaches of the Kalaena River, but by the end of the 1600s this may have been a diminishing asset, as metal was then being exported from the opposite side of the peninsula, through Bugis networks around Ussu and Malili.

¹⁵⁶ Esther Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines: Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion in Eastern Sulawesi, 1680–1905" (PhD diss., Murdoch University, 2002); Jennifer L. Gaynor, *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

¹⁵⁷ Armando Cortesao, *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, an Account of the East from the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512–1515* (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944), 216.

¹⁵⁸ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 82.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 71–2.

¹⁶⁰ Andaya, *World*, 85–9.

¹⁶¹ J.J. Dormeier, "Geschiedkundige aantekeningen betreffende Banggai en Gapi," *BKI* 102 (1943): 564–5.

¹⁶² David Bulbeck and Ian Caldwell, *Land of Iron: The Historical Archaeology of Luwu and the Cenrana Valley. Results of the Origin of Complex Society in South Sulawesi Project (Oxis)* (Hull and Canberra: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull; School of Anthropology and Archaeology, Australian National University, 2000), 103; Andaya, *World*, 85–9, 136; Pelras, *The Bugis*, 248–52; Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 243.

By around 1542 the Buton kingdom, at the foot of the peninsula, had become the Islamic sultanate of Wolio; this was conquered by Ternate in 1580. When Ternate was at its height under Sultan Babullah, he appropriated Buton's ties with the Solor Strait. He also decreed that all subordinate territories in Tobungku, Banggai, Buton and islands could only trade at Buton, to maximise revenue. In 1613 the Buton ruler turned to the VOC, signing a treaty of "eternal friendship".¹⁶³ It was then described by the Governor General as "a large and populous land, where fine timbers can be obtained, from which ships could be built, providing you supplied the workmen. The ships' roads and bay are very fine; the people are poor, slaves are cheap; there is little in the way of trade, as the people here mostly cultivate certain roots, called Ubi and Keladi."¹⁶⁴

In the 1800s, and no doubt in previous centuries, the most important forest products exported from Buton included dyestuffs (*bingkuru* roots for red and *soga* bark for black), *balasari* (or *pulusari*) for incense, and the *karoro* mats, plaited or woven from *borassus* or palmyra palm fibres, which were used for sails.¹⁶⁵ Through most of the seventeenth century the Buton sultans called upon the VOC, and occasionally Ternate, for protection, but it was nonetheless subject to Makassar from 1626 to 1646, when it fought against the Dutch in Hitu, and again from 1655 to 1660. In mid-century Buton was again subordinate to the Company (1646–55), which it assisted in several wars. It later played an important role in the VOC's final campaigns against Makassar.¹⁶⁶

The east Sulawesi interior territories of Balantak and Mendono were exporting rice and sago to Maluku in the early 1600s. The relatively concentrated populations of these inland regions made them a source of immigrant manpower for both Banggai and Ternate, including—predominantly—those taken as slaves. Many moved from east Sulawesi to Gorontalo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, either voluntarily or as captives.¹⁶⁷ As Mendono's prosperity increased, it began to assert itself against Banggai. The Mori (or Tomaiki) home of the Tomori communities lay inland from the eponymous bay, exporting rice from the hills and alluvial plains as well as forest products such as wax. The Tomori were frequently at war with Tobungku. Further south were the small chiefdoms of Laiwui.¹⁶⁸

Banjarmasin

Gold and diamonds had been exported from West Borneo for millennia; production in the east was smaller, but significant. Dayaks panned for alluvial gold in the upriver territories of the Mahakam and Barito systems. Connections with the north Java ports, particularly Demak, had shaped Banjarmasin's culture, notably during its mid-sixteenth century conversion to Islam. The port of Banjarmasin had been providing Java Sea traders with forest products such as wax and foodstuffs for hundreds of years. Banjarmasin's pepper

¹⁶³ Gaynor, *Intertidal History*.

¹⁶⁴ J.W. Schoorl, "Het 'eeuwige' verbond tussen Buton en de VOC, 1613–1669," in *Excursies in Celebes*, ed. Harry A. Poeze and Pim Schoorl (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991), 28. *Ubi* and *keladi* are common tubers.

¹⁶⁵ A Ligtvoet, "Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton," *BKI* II, no. 4 (1878): 5, 21.

¹⁶⁶ Schoorl, "Het 'eeuwige' verbond"; Andaya, *World*, 88–9, 136.

¹⁶⁷ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 242.

¹⁶⁸ Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines."

began attracting shippers much later than the West Java sultanate of Banten. By the early 1600s Banjarmasin's fortunes were tied to the world's appetite for pepper. First came the Chinese, then the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch from 1606, and the EIC from 1614. Banjarmasin's Martapura was the main diamond producer and had also attracted Dutch and English attention by the early seventeenth century.

China had been importing Sumatran pepper since the 1400s. Later most came from Banten which had consolidated its control over the South Sumatra pepper territories during the final decades of the sixteenth century. To Dutch arrivals, Banten was "the best and largest port of all". It was soon subject to VOC blockades, as the Company tried to prevent Portuguese and English ships from loading pepper. The Banten regent responded by decreeing that only the court could trade in pepper. By the 1620s the VOC and EIC were the main suppliers of Europe's pepper, mostly drawn indirectly or directly from Sumatra. Demand outstripped supply, creating opportunities for Banjarmasin.¹⁶⁹

European traders sought monopolies. These were granted if and when the sultan needed support against his enemies, but neither the sultan nor his European allies were capable of enforcing them. In practice, Chinese managed the actual traffic. Growing wealth enabled early seventeenth-century Banjarmasin to claim suzerainty over the whole east coast, although it later clashed with Sulu, which was reaching south as Brunei retreated. The shifting frontier zone between Sulu and Banjarmasin eventually settled just north of Cape Mangkalihat. The powerful ruler of Java's Mataram, Sultan Agung (r.1613–46) was also drawn to profitable pepper. He subdued the Sumatran pepper-trading centres of Palembang and Jambi, and from 1637 and 1659 Banjarmasin had to send tribute to Mataram. More Javanese traders from the north coast settled in Banjarmasin, but Mataram was unable to maintain its control.¹⁷⁰

The demand for pepper soared for much of the seventeenth century, leading to an expansion of Banjarmasin's pepper gardens in the interior. Chinese, English and Sulawesi traders defied VOC restrictions, while shifting alliances of Dayaks, Banjarese and Bugis (including forces from Pasir and Kutai) competed for pepper.¹⁷¹ The Banjarmasin court chronicles describe the country as "bustling and prosperous, and traders came in great numbers".¹⁷² By the mid-1600s Banjarmasin's Chinese population numbered several thousand. Most were involved in the exchange of pepper and birds' nests, forest and sea products for silk, tea, salt, copperware and porcelain from Xiamen.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ Reid, *Age of Commerce, Volume Two*, 249–50. Barbara Andaya, *To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), 43–8. Atsushi Ota, *Changes of Regime And Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State And the Outer World of Banten, 1750–1830* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 15–18. In 1683 the Dutch took control of the Banten sultanate.

¹⁷⁰ Ricklefs, *History*, 56. On the Sumatran pepper trade, Andaya, *To Live as Brothers*, 38–73.

¹⁷¹ Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880*, Verhandelingen KITLV no. 189 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001), 176; J.C. Noorlander, *Bandjarmasin en de Compagnie in de Tweede Helft der 18de Eeuw* (Leiden: M. Dubbeldeman, 1935).

¹⁷² Michael R. Dove, "Political Ecology of Pepper in the 'Hikayat Bandjar': The Historiography of Commodity Production in a Bornean Kingdom," in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Frek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), 351.

¹⁷³ Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*, 68–80.

In 1635, the Company had negotiated its first treaty with the Banjarmasin sultan (represented by the syahbandar “Codia Babouw”) obtaining preferential purchasing rights over pepper in exchange for military support. Their main adversaries were the Makassarese who traded spices and other banned commodities. In the course of the military expedition the Dutch destroyed all Makassarese boats found along the Borneo coast, at Pulau Laut, Pasir and Kutai. Their priority was to weaken Makassar’s ties to “Ceram, Buru, Xulla [Sulabesi], Manipa, Kelang, Tidore, Halmahera, Seram-laut and neighbouring places”.¹⁷⁴ But Batavia never came close to controlling the traffic. Much of the harvest continued to go to Cochin China and Makassar; the latter shipped some on to the Philippines. Pepper was also carried away by private Portuguese traders from Macau as well as on Chinese junks. In 1638 Batavia’s refusal to allow the sultan to sell pepper to Makassar traders led to an attack on the Dutch lodge and the flight of the survivors. By the mid-seventeenth century the company was no longer attempting direct pepper purchases in Banjarmasin; most of the VOC’s pepper was then supplied by Chinese traders sailing to Batavia. This worked so well that the amount exceeded that which the EIC could obtain directly at the Banjarese centre of Martapura.¹⁷⁵

According to J. Hageman’s mid-nineteenth century account, in the time when Karaeng Pattingalolang was chief minister of Gowa (1638–54) envoys from Makassar arrived in Banjarmasin to request that the harbour of Pasir be opened for Bugis trade.¹⁷⁶ The Banjarmasin Sultan was then Mustain Billah or Marhum Panembahan (r.1595–1638), which suggest the year was 1638. It might seem surprising that Makassarese Gowa-Talloq would seek privileges for Bugis, but they were probably intended to benefit the Wajorese trading community in Makassar.¹⁷⁷ The *Hikayat Banjar*, a chronicle of the Banjarmasin Sultanate from the early 1800s, describes a flurry of diplomatic activity in the final years of Marhum Panembahan’s reign, suggesting weakness. He cancelled Pasir’s tributary obligations (as a wedding gift) and those of Sambas (in exchange for two large diamonds). Berau was also relieved of its tributary burden. Soon after, the Banjarmasin ruler ceded Pasir and the other east Kalimantan dependencies to Makassar “on loan”.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.; *Surat-surat perdjandjian antara kesultanan Bandjarmasin dengan pemerintahan V.O.C., Bataafse Republiek, Inggerris dan Hindia-Belanda, 1635–1860* (Djakarta: Arsip National Republik Indonesia, 1965), 2–3.

¹⁷⁵ J. Hageman, “Geschiedkundige aanteekeningen omtrent Zuidelijke Borneo,” *TNI* 23, no. 4 (1861): 212–8; Noorlander, *Bandjarmasin*, 6–10.

¹⁷⁶ Karaeng Pattingalolang was ruler of Talloq 1641–54; it was customary that the ruler of Talloq was also chancellor (*tumailalang*) of Gowa. William Cummings, *Making Blood White: Historical Transformations in Early Modern Makassar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 112, 210.

¹⁷⁷ Four villages were designated as open for Buginese: “Satoei, Assem-assem, Katak and Soerangan”. J. Hageman, “Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Borneo,” *BKI* part 6, new series, vol. 3 (1857): 243; J. Noorduyt, “The Wajorese Merchants’ Community in Makassar,” in *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaoli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000). This predates, by almost 30 years, the dispersal of South Sulawesians following the Dutch conquest of Makassar in 1669.

¹⁷⁸ J.J. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar: a Study in Malay Historiography* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), 51; Hageman, “Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Borneo,” 243.

The expanding pepper market led local chiefs and rulers to increase cultivation. In the mid-seventeenth century the Dusun Ma'anyan, a subgroup of the Ngaju Dayak, were growing dry rice and pepper in their swidden fields in the Ulu Sungei, as well as gathering forest products. The Bekumpai, Muslim Malay/Ngaju Dayak who had settled at the junction of the Negara and Barito, emerged as key mediators between the up-river pepper growers of the Hulu Sungai and the Banjar Malays, and hence, ultimately, the sultan. By the 1670s Portuguese ships from Macau were visiting Banjarmasin on an annual basis, but their attempts to impose a monopoly also failed.¹⁷⁹ The Dayak farmers' limited production capacity restricted elite profits, and so they were pushed aside. Coerced, or at least encouraged, by their chiefs, waves of Banjarese Malays moved "into the hilly lands bordering the Hulu Sungai basin, [where] they planted more and more pepper up to 250 km from Banjarmasin ... most of it on princely 'apanage' lands extended by a nobility heavily involved in the export trade".¹⁸⁰ Labour shortages imposed a reliance on debt-bondsmen and slaves. Pepper was then being grown in gardens owned by the elite, as well as by smallholders, ensuring competition among both sellers and buyers.

The *Hikayat Banjar*, a compilation of earlier, oral traditions, provides a classic warning of the dangers of trade:¹⁸¹

And let not our country plant pepper as an export crop, for the sake of making money, like Palembang and Jambi. Whenever a country cultivates pepper all foodstuffs will become expensive and anything planted will not grow well, because the vapors of pepper are hot. That will cause malice all over the country and even the government will fall into disorder. The rural people will become pretentious towards the townfolk if pepper is grown for commercial purposes, for the sake of money. If people grow pepper it should be ... just enough for personal consumption ... if it is grown extensively as a crop; then the country would inevitably be destroyed.

Informed by memories of late seventeenth century crises, and perhaps warned by foresight of the troubled decades to come, the chronicler recorded his foreboding. As he feared, the ruler lost his capacity to monopolise trade and power, and wealth dispersed to lesser lords and chiefs. A nineteenth century Dutch historian concluded that this "produced an unending ferment within the Banjarese upper classes. Usurpation, internal power rivalry, intrigues and factionalism became common, with governmental weakness and disorder as the sequel".¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Souza, *Survival of Empire*, 124–8.

¹⁸⁰ Harold Brookfield, Yvonne Byron, and Leslie Potter, *In Place of the Forest: Environmental and Socio-economic Transformation in Borneo and the Eastern Malay Peninsula* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995), 29–30; Alfred B. Hudson, *Padju Epat: The Ma'anyan of Indonesian Borneo* (New York: Irvington, 1983); Knapen, *Forests of Fortune?*, 92–4.

¹⁸¹ Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar*, 267–8.

¹⁸² Quoted in Idwar Saleh, "Pepper Trade and the Ruling Class of Banjarmasin in the Seventeenth Century," in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1978* (Leiden: BIS, 1978), 210; Dove, "Political Ecology of Pepper."

Nusa Tenggara

Bali was only separated from Java by the narrow albeit often turbulent Bali Strait, so their politics were entangled. Gelgel, which evolved from ties with Majapahit, was a powerful sixteenth century polity centred on the south-eastern coast of Bali, where irrigated rice fields helped support a relatively dense population. Gelgel's authority apparently stretched from the Blambangan region of east Java to Lombok, challenging not only local leaders but also Javanese centres (Pasuruan, Mataram) as well as expansionist Makassar and Bima. The relatively weak polities in the islands east of Bali were regarded as expansion zones by both Bali and Makassar. The latter maintained ties with migrants from southwest Sulawesi who were already settled on the shores of southern Sumbawa and Flores. Gelgel lost authority in Sumbawa and parts of Lombok to Makassar in 1619.

Gelgel began to fragment with the ruler's death in the mid-seventeenth century (probably in 1651). The kingdom of Klungkung then claimed suzerainty, but the island was divided between a number of realms, including Karangasem, Mengwi and Buleleng.¹⁸³ A Dutch source records that a noble Balinese from Buleleng, on the north coast, had become ruler of Selaparang on Lombok in 1656. However, despite several Balinese campaigns, including a major invasion in 1692, it was not until the mid-eighteenth century that Bali controlled all of Lombok. Clashes with the Makassarese increased after 1677, when the Balinese crossed through Lombok's central forest to join forces with the Sasak chiefs in the east. By the end of the century Gelgel and Makassar had defined their respective spheres of influence, leaving Bali dominant in Lombok, and Makassar in Sumbawa and islands to the east.¹⁸⁴

In Bali the VOC traded like other nations. Hägerdal has described the protocol for VOC shipping to Bali in 1646:¹⁸⁵

According to [VOC instructions] the Dutch ships, after buying provisions in South Bali on their way to Banda, were to leave some men on the island. These persons were to travel overland to Buleleng [in the north], under escort of the king's men, in order to purchase more commodities and then to be picked up by the Dutch ships on their return from Banda to Batavia.

North Bali imported wax, cotton and dried areca nuts from Makassar, but most trade focussed on Batavia, as the VOC wanted slaves, rice and timber, offering Indian textiles and opium in exchange.¹⁸⁶

By the 1660s the VOC's main strategic aims in Maluku had been achieved, but their position was less satisfactory in Timor, where the Company faced strong competition from Portuguese, Chinese and Sulawesians. The extraordinary profits on spices had been sufficient to warrant expensive military campaigns in Maluku, but the Dutch tried to avoid

¹⁸³ Hägerdal, "Batuparang," 64, 70–4; Helen Creese, "Balinese Babad as Historical Sources; A Reinterpretation of the Fall of Gèlgèl," *BKI* 147, no. 2 (1991).

¹⁸⁴ Vickers, "Hinduism and Islam." Power was contested, leading to the wars of the later 1650s and Gelgel's decline: "The traditional picture of a mighty and unified kingdom in Gèlgèl at the end of the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century may thus be more one of imagined past glory and prosperity than the reality as portrayed by the Balinese sources"; Creese, "Balinese Babad," 255.

¹⁸⁵ Hägerdal, "Batuparang," 76–84.

¹⁸⁶ Robert van Niel, *Java's Northeast Coast 1740–1840: A Study in Colonial Encroachment and Dominance* (Leiden: CNWS, 2005); Nagtegaal, *Riding the Tiger*; Kwee, *Political Economy*.

major interventions in Nusa Tenggara. Solor remained a Portuguese trading and religious (Dominican) settlement for half a century but was taken by the Dutch in 1613, causing the Portuguese to move across the strait to Larantuka on the main island of Flores. Their community later absorbed refugees fleeing the Dutch conquests of Melaka (1641) and Makassar (1660s).

By the 1630s VOC pressure was causing the *Estado* real difficulty on Timor, so it was left to pockets of private Portuguese, often mestizo, to maintain Portugal's Timor-Macau traffic.¹⁸⁷ Their networks paralleled, and were probably linked to, the trade of the Macau Chinese. The best-known were the so-called "Topassers", or "Black Portuguese", described in the preceding chapter. They became the VOC's main competitors after the Dutch took Kupang on the southwest coast in 1653.¹⁸⁸ When Francisco Vieira arrived in 1665, having been forced to leave Makassar by the VOC, he expanded the political and economic connections of local Portuguese. Vieira was familiar with the region, because of his long experience in the sandalwood trade. De Hornay acted as his agent. Together they ran "an extremely efficient company", until Vieira's death in 1667.¹⁸⁹ Vieira also tried to coordinate Portuguese political activities, but this effort was undermined by escalating internal rivalries, which culminated in factional fighting.¹⁹⁰ It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that the VOC and the Portuguese Estado finally managed to check Topass power, as we will see in the following chapter.

¹⁸⁷ Leonard Andaya, "The 'Informal Portuguese Empire' and the Topasses in the Solor Archipelago and Timor in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (2010); Francisco Bethencourt, "Low Cost Empire: Interaction between Portuguese and Local Societies in Asia," in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005); Teddy Y.H. Sim, "Survival of the Portuguese Estado da Índia: Political Economy and Commercial Challenges 1700–50," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 13, no. 3 (2012).

¹⁸⁸ Andaya, "Informal Portuguese Empire."

¹⁸⁹ Arend de Roever, "The Warlords of Larantuka and the Timorese Sandalwood Trade," in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 226; Hägerdal, *Lords*, 141–56. De Roever dates Vieira's expulsion from Makassar to 1667, but see Boxer, *Francisco Vieira*, 45.

¹⁹⁰ Hägerdal, *Lords*, 141–6.

Neither European institutions nor indigenous polities could effectively channel growing traffic on the high seas. Control was only possible where patrolling was feasible, at choke points where routes converged or in the waters close to Dutch Maluku or the more powerful states. Not even Ternate and Makassar, keystones of the VOC's repressive apparatus, could fully control nearby seas, while Banjarmasin illustrates how geography undermined attempts at monopoly. Shippers generally had little to fear, apart from encounters with pirates, possible punitive raids on repeat offenders' home villages, and the ever-present perils of the sea. Private trade became increasingly important in all commercial arenas, be they European, Chinese, Indian or regional.¹ Commerce became more diffuse as trade diversified, both geographically and socially. Our recognition of this complexity has been made easier by the widening range of sources and more sophisticated use of the massive archives left by the European trading companies.

The perspicacious Dutch historian J.C. Van Leur was typically forthright when he vigorously rejected colonial Dutch historians' depiction of the eighteenth century Indies as stagnant. In their eyes the most important eighteenth-century trend was purely negative: the waning of Dutch power and the ascendancy of the British. However, van Leur, writing before the Second World War, stated: "That century did not know any superior Occident, nor any self-isolating Orient.... It knew a mighty East, a rich fabric with a strong broad weave with a more fragile Western thread...."² Subsequent research has confirmed his view, describing dynamic commercialisation in Japan and China and the galvanising impact of the China trade throughout the region.³

It is now common to refer to a "Chinese century" stretching from the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, acknowledging the range and wealth of China's commerce after the repeal of trade bans. In 1685 foreigners received permission to trade under government supervision. The policy was interrupted in 1716, when the Chinese emperor,

¹ Emily Erikson, *Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600–1757* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Chris Nierstrasz, *Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textiles: The English and Dutch East India Companies (1700–1800)* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Gang Deng, *Maritime Sector, Institutions and Sea Power of Premodern China* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999).

² J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Publishers, 1967), 289.

³ Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra, eds., *On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 170–1.

annoyed by coastal piracy and illicit rice exports, forbade traffic to Manila and Batavia. This limited prohibition had little effect and appeals from Chinese coastal authorities led to its lifting in 1727.⁴ In fact, trade at the burgeoning port of Xiamen was at its most impressive between 1683 and 1737.

The 1700s were difficult years for the Netherlands, trapped in a downward trend in wealth and influence which is conventionally summarised as “the decline of the Dutch Republic”.⁵ This retrogression was partly due to internal politics, and partly to growing pressure from France. The rivalry between the English and Dutch had moderated by the 1680s; eighteenth-century European politics were dominated by Anglo-French hostilities. The *ENI* entry on English commerce in the islands opens with an apposite maritime metaphor: “For the English in the archipelago the years between 1624 and 1684 were an ebbing tide, from 1684 to 1734 still water, and from 1734 to 1814 continual high tide”.⁶ Madras, the early leader in the country trade, was surpassed by Bengal’s Calcutta in the 1720s, which was outfitting some forty ships a year. From the mid-1700s country vessels were responsible for approximately 30 per cent of the China trade.⁷

The VOC faced its own challenges as European consumption patterns changed; coffee, Indian textiles and tea became popular. Traffic in these commodities developed beyond the circuits of intra-Asian exchange traditionally controlled by the Dutch, who remained focussed on Maluku spices. Strong Indian connections, like those of the EIC, facilitated access to textiles and opium but the VOC was losing ground in the subcontinent. The supply of Indian textiles, a universal means of exchange, diminished as piece-goods were diverted from Asian to European markets, weakening Batavia’s ability to obtain other commodities.⁸ Meanwhile, wars in Java drained manpower and capital; after the Trunajaya rebellion (1674–80) a relatively peaceful couple of decades was followed by a turbulent half century.⁹

The Dutch had finally expelled the EIC from Banten in 1684, so the English Company urgently needed a new trading post. In 1685 a fortified factory was established on the west coast of Sumatra at Bengkulu (Bencoolen). The local ruler hoped for support against pressure from Banten and the Dutch, while the English wanted pepper and smuggled

⁴ Ng Chin-Keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 2–3, 56–61; Carl A. Trocki, “Chinese Pioneering in Eighteenth-Century Southeast Asia,” in *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid (London: Macmillan, 1997).

⁵ J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

⁶ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), “Engelschen in den Maleischen Archipel (De)”. For context, see David Ormrod, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁷ Anthony Webster, *The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790–1860* (Boydell, 2013), 26–8, 70–4. See also, from the bibliography, Nierstrasz, *Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textile*; Marshall, “Private British Trade”; Palsetia, *The Parsis of India*.

⁸ Els M. Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië: De handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2000), 219–20.

⁹ There were various wars of succession in Mataram (1704, 1719) and a rebellion by Surabaya (1719). Eventually, in 1755, Mataram was partitioned. M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: Since c. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 91–139.

spices.¹⁰ Although Bengkulu lay between two rivers, the Sungai Limau and Sungai Itam, the demands made on inland pepper growers were onerous. Pepper had to be brought down from the interior to the coast; “where the journey could not be covered by light boat or raft, he [the grower or seller] was obliged to convey the pepper on buffalo, or even on his own back, without reimbursement for his trouble”.¹¹ Smuggling was common, overland between rivers, and by sea; this proved impossible to eradicate. The English traded with Java, Bali and islands further east; they mainly carried salt and were seeking spices.¹² Regional traders, notably the Bugis, did good business. The outlines of a symbiotic Anglo-Bugis commercial axis were already becoming apparent.

Van Rossum’s heroic attempts to quantify intra-Asian shipping over two centuries indicate that, in terms of tonnage, the VOC reached its peak in the later seventeenth century. Volume remained fairly stable through the first half of the eighteenth, before quadrupling in subsequent decades. This sounds impressive, but it was nothing like the growth of private “English” cargo capacity, which he thinks grew eleven-fold over the 1700s. “Asian” shipping declined in the later seventeenth century, as the Dutch imposed restrictions, but by the beginning of the eighteenth it had virtually recovered to the level of the early 1600s. Unsurprisingly, within that sector the volume of Chinese craft was the greatest, growing by perhaps 20 per cent between the early seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries. That of the Bay of Bengal and Arabian seas declined a little. Van Rossum concludes that, despite the enormous expansion of capacity the Europeans brought to Asian waters, “Asian shipping did not suffer a structural decline”.¹³ The number of VOC ships in the intra-Asiatic fleet peaked around 1660–70, but decreased during the eighteenth century, reaching a low in 1760–70.¹⁴ It should be noted that this was before the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–84), which is often seen as initiating the Company’s decline.

VOC, EIC and China

The Dutch Company had been sending ships to China since the early seventeenth century without much success, lagging far behind the EIC. The English had opened a factory on Taiwan in 1672; this was moved to Guangzhou around 1711. Since the 1690s the VOC had left the Batavia-China traffic to the more efficient junks. They brought in high-value East Asian commodities and purchased goods of much greater worth. Moreover, they paid

¹⁰ J. Kathirithamby-Wells, *The British West Sumatran Presidency (1760–85): Problems of Early Colonial Enterprise* (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, 1977), 22–6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹² D.K. Bassett, “British ‘Country’ Trade and Local Trade Networks in the Thai and Malay States, c. 1680–1770,” *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 4 (1989); Kathryn Anderson Wellen, *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora* (DeKalb: NIU Press, 2014), 58–60.

¹³ Matthias van Rossum, “De Intra-Aziatische Vaart. Schepen, ‘de Aziatische Zeeman’ en Ondergang Van de Voc,” *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 8, no. 3 (2011): 43–6, 61. His calculations show that in fact there was a slump at the end of the seventeenth century, followed by a sharp recovery at the beginning of the eighteenth century. There was then an irregular pattern of peaks and troughs, but the overall trend was a decline leading up to c.1740; despite a short-lived sharp recovery thereafter, a series of wars and crises affected trade, especially mid-century.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Figure 1, p. 51.

various fees, including customs, poll-taxes on the crews during their stay, and safe-conduct fees. Nevertheless, the VOC decided in 1728 that it needed a post in Guangzhou to obtain tea. The resulting traffic was supervised from Batavia, where some ships continued to arrive. Others went straight to Europe. After 1756 a special Company committee in Holland managed the tea trade, with direct VOC shipping from Guangzhou.¹⁵

Substantially increased immigration from China created severe tensions in both Manila and Batavia. Mercantile interests in Cadiz and Seville had long blamed Manila's Chinese for Spain's poor sales in Mexico and for the extremely high silver-drain from New Spain to China. Decrees in Spain and Mexico limited the galleon trade, and many Chinese were banished from Manila itself in 1709. This encouraged them to extend their networks throughout Luzon. In 1741 immigrants were formally distinguished from the Chinese mestizos who were Catholic and generally pro-Spanish. Despite attempts in the second half of the 1700s to limit the number of incoming Chinese, between 20 and 40 ships a year sailed from Fujian to Manila, carrying anything between six and twenty thousand people. Settlers also arrived from Japan on the Red Seal ships that sailed under special license from the Shogun. The Spanish ordered expulsions of immigrant Chinese in 1755 and again in 1766, after the English occupation of Manila.¹⁶

In Batavia, where the Chinese population had reached 10,000, mutual suspicion was intensified by problems in the Chinese-run sugar industry. West Indian competition led to the dismissal of thousands of Chinese workers; most remained unemployed. The city's administrative elite was divided over the response to what was generally felt to be a threatening situation. In 1741 a riot by sugar workers triggered a massacre, as the town mob joined soldiers in the killing; approximately 8,000 died. This sparked off the Chinese War (1741–43), initiating 17 years of unrest on Java as Javanese royal factions took sides.¹⁷ In China officials, though shocked, realised that a prohibition on relations with Batavia would be counterproductive.¹⁸ So although Batavia's junk trade did decline through the eighteenth century, this was caused by changing trade patterns, not outrage. If in the 1730s some 20 vessels arrived each year from China, by the 1770s the average was five.¹⁹

¹⁵ On the VOC and the China trade, see, from the bibliography: Yong Liu, *Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China*. See also by Leonard Blussé: *Strange Company; Tribuut aan China*; "No Boats to China"; "Chinese Century"; and "Junks to Java."

¹⁶ Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2015), 21; Joshua Eng Sin Kueh, "The Manila Chinese, Community, Trade and Empire c. 1570–c. 1770" (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2014); Craig A. Lockard, "Chinese Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia Before 1850: Making Fields From the Sea," *History Compass* 11, no. 9 (2013).

¹⁷ Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), 94–5. Bondan Kanumoyoso, "Beyond the City Wall: Society and Economic Development in the Ommelanden of Batavia, 1684–1740" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2011).

¹⁸ Ng, *Trade and Society*, 211–2.

¹⁹ Leonard Blussé, "Junks to Java: Chinese Shipping to the Nanyang in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011), 230; Anthony Reid, "Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia," in *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996).

In China itself old commercial hierarchies were being questioned. For many decades, ocean guilds had controlled the silver trade and contacts with foreign shippers, but in 1747 they lost their monopoly. Individual Chinese merchant houses could then act as partners, guarantors and mediators on behalf of non-Chinese traders. However, the Westerners resented restriction, and were vocal in their complaints. This reinforced the Emperor's desire to control foreigners, while the powerful Guangzhou trading houses sought to increase their profits. The result was a recentralisation of control under a cartel of merchants with full legal powers in what became known as the Canton system (1757–1842).²⁰

These developments were of great personal benefit to Bengkulu's EIC officials. They used their own ship for private voyages, particularly to Banjarmasin, Pasir and Bali, competing with country traders. The Bengkulu merchants established an Opium Society in 1763.²¹ Two years later they pooled their considerable personal capital and formed a "General Partnership" to strengthen their hand. In 1765 the Company's warehouse keeper, Commander Edward Coles, sent five well-armed perahu to Seram. Coles, a Eurasian once described as "the greatest rascal in the whole island of Sumatra", later became Governor of Bengkulu's Fort Marlborough (1781–85).²² The EIC servants also maintained a busy commerce with Batavia, providing Indian goods and receiving provisions (and no doubt spices).²³ Batavia's private shippers were involved in both legitimate and clandestine trade, particularly with Bali, where they traded in slaves alongside Chinese and Sulawesians.

The EIC's decisive victory over Indian and French forces at Plassey in 1757 had given it considerable financial, military and naval power in Bengal, increasing access to opium. Production and sale was managed as an EIC monopoly from 1775 and, from 1797, by an EIC-administered agency.²⁴ During the Seven Years War (1756–63) when Britain (and others) fought France and Spain (and others), the overseas territories in the West Indies, India and even the eastern archipelagos became battle grounds. In the Philippines the lifeline linking Mexico and Manila was cut. Spanish Navy frigates then carried commodities directly between Cadiz and Manila, deviating from the centuries-long customary connection via the Americas. The British took control of Manila and the port of Cavite on the southern side of the Bay (1762–64). They were welcomed by the Chinese, which cost the latter dearly when the Spanish returned. Many non-Catholic Chinese were expelled. Some went to the Sulu archipelago, strengthening local ties with

²⁰ Angela Schottenhammer, "Characteristics of Qing China's Maritime Trade Politics, Shunzhi through Early Qianlong Reigns," in *Trading Networks in Early Modern East Asia*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2010); Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011).

²¹ D.K. Bassett, "British Trade and Policy in Indonesia 1760–1772," *BKI* 120, no. 2 (1964): 210.

²² *Ibid.*, 204–8. The description of Cole is from Brian D. Smith, "English in Indonesia," *English Today* 26 (1991).

²³ Bassett, "British Trade and Policy," 210; Jean Sutton, *The East India Company's Maritime Service, 1746–1834: Masters of the Eastern Seas* (Martlesham: Boydell & Brewer, 2010), 82–3.

²⁴ George Bryan Souza, "Opium and the Company: Maritime Trade and Imperial Finances on Java, 1684–1796," *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009): 63–4. In the eastern islands opium use spread somewhat later than in the west: Hans Derks, *History of the Opium Problem: The Assault on the East, ca. 1600–1950* (Leiden: Brill, 2012). For context see in bibliography: Bayley, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*; Webster, *Gentleman Capitalists*; Lewis, "British Trade to Southeast Asia."

Chinese and British networks.²⁵ From the end of the war the EIC insisted on their right to free navigation in the archipelagos, despite Dutch objections. This marked a decisive shift.

These eighteenth-century realignments were less dramatic than the wars a century earlier, but they changed transregional dynamics, within and between China, India, Europe and Southeast Asia. Taken together, the rise of British power in Bengal, the expansion of the intra-Asiatic “country trade” and the emergence of new sources of spices undermined the very foundations of the VOC. During the 1700s the Company became increasingly dependent on the Asia-Netherlands exchange; the ratio between European and intra-Asian trade shifted from 1.4 to 3.4 between 1700 and 1800.²⁶ The first cargo of Java coffee reached Amsterdam in 1711. However, the VOC’s commitment to spices was only very gradually diluted even as the European appetite for sugar, coffee, tea and luxury goods soared.²⁷ By the 1720s Java’s sugar was being challenged by Caribbean harvests, so spices seemed to offer safety. But the Maluku monopoly was broken in 1769 when the French took clove plants from Ambon to cultivate in Mauritius; around the turn of the century cloves were also planted in Zanzibar. This led to falling prices. From 1785 the obligatory planting and delivery of nutmeg was introduced on Ambon to supplement clove production.²⁸

The Bugis

Another label for the eighteenth century, at least in the Malay world, is “the Bugis period”, a designation that reflects their extensive influence, particularly around the Melaka Straits. Traders and fighters from Bugis settlements were initially welcomed by Malay rulers. Bugis gained influence in Selangor and Linggi on the Straits eastern coast and assumed effective power in Riau-Johor in 1721.²⁹ Sulawesi diaspora networks extended from Siam and Sumatra to Aru, building on old connections reinforced by post-conquest emigration. Wajorese were the most notable, partly because their long-range connections and apparently open dealings with foreign merchants distinguished them from, for example, the Mandarese. The dispersed settlements and traders of the Wajorese contributed to their homeland’s growing power in the eighteenth century. Bugis networks were of concern to the Company, which sent envoys to nearby harbours, such as those on the Makassar Straits, to gather information. Even so, officials remained ignorant of the Bone-Sama Bajau port of Bajoe until 1714, nearly half a century after its founding.³⁰

²⁵ Peter Borschberg, “Chinese Merchants, Catholic Clerics and Spanish Colonists in British-Occupied Manila, 1762–1764,” in *Maritime China in Transition, 1750–1850*, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin Keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004). On British policy in Indonesia in this period, see Bassett, “British Trade and Policy.”

²⁶ Jacobs, *Koopman*, 215.

²⁷ David Bulbeck, et al., *Southeast Asian Exports Since the 14th Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee and Sugar* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1998); Maxine Berg, “In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History and British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century,” *Past and Present* 182 (2004).

²⁸ E.W.A. Ludeking, “Schets van de Residentie Amboina,” *BKI* 3 (1868): 96.

²⁹ Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

³⁰ Lance Nolde, “Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period” (PhD diss., University of Hawai’i, 2014), 193–5.

The growth of the tea trade had profound effects in the eastern archipelagos, located as they were either astride routes to China or very close to them. The islands also offered the sea and forest products which could partially replace expensive silver as an exchange cargo in Guangzhou.³¹ Their traffic with the west, particularly the Melaka Straits region and South Sumatra grew strongly. Bugis and Mandar shippers met EIC and country traders in Selangor, Kedah and Riau to exchange illicit spices for Bengal and Coromandel commodities, including opium. Traders based in central and east Java also preferred to avoid the Company's Batavia, and deal directly with junks and private skippers from India in independent ports.³² The EIC servants tried to persuade these shippers to come to Bengkulu instead, but it was on the wrong side of Sumatra. Moreover, pepper had become less profitable. In 1714 the British in Bengkulu strengthened their position by building Fort Marlborough. There the Bugis provided the local militia and wielded authority over all inhabitants other than Chinese and Europeans.³³

Bugis settled on the tin-producing island of Bangka, which was subject to the sultan of south Sumatra's Palembang. Tin joined pepper as a profitable local export.³⁴ Junks came not just in search of tin, but also for the cargoes offered by Bugis networks. Chinese skippers also began to avoid expensive Batavia and sail to Malay ports, such as Riau and Terengganu, to access Indian and local commodities. In 1731 VOC support enabled the Palembang sultan to defeat the Bangka Bugis, who were replaced by Chinese miners. Twenty-five years later it was estimated that there were 25,000 to 30,000 Chinese on the island.³⁵ The remunerative transport and provisioning of the mine's Chinese labour force attracted yet more shipping. "The navigation to Johor and other ports near the [Melaka] Straits", concluded Blussé, "had fundamentally changed the flow of Chinese trade".³⁶

British, Bugis and Chinese interests continued to exploit a trading network extending from Bugis-led Riau in the west to Makassar, drawing on links created in the sixteenth century with Melaka and later encouraged by British from Bengkulu. The VOC did not permit shippers from the eastern archipelagos to sail further west than Batavia. Doing so would have contravened a Riau treaty of 1757 and undermined Dutch Melaka. Yet such voyages remained completely outside the control, and often even the knowledge, of the VOC.³⁷ This eventually became too much for Batavia, and the VOC made an abortive assault on Riau in 1784. The outraged Riau ruler then attacked Melaka; a

³¹ Robert Paul Gardella, *Harvesting Mountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Nierstrasz, *Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textiles*; Yong Liu, *The Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China: 1757–1781* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Jason Lim, *Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese Merchants in the Fujian–Singapore Trade, 1920–1960* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

³² Blussé, "Junks to Java," 493–4; Knaap, "All about Money."

³³ Kathirithamby-Wells, *British West Sumatran Presidency*.

³⁴ Reinout Vos, *Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince: the VOC and the Tigh trope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740–1800* (Leiden: KITLV Press), 1.

³⁵ Ricklefs, *History*, 88–90; Vos, *Gentle Janus*.

³⁶ Blussé, "Junks to Java," 247.

³⁷ Dianne Lewis, *"Jan Compagnie" in the Straits of Malacca, 1641–1795* (Athens Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1995); Nordin Hussin, *Trade and Society in The Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).

large Company fleet was required to relieve the outpost.³⁸ The significance of these connections between British, Chinese and Bugis cannot be overstated.

Visits by country ships brought new life to coastal trading centres, as their skippers offered desirable imports that were officially banned in Dutch territories, such as guns and opium. Towards the end of the century English manufactures, coming through India, were also being distributed. The effects of growing commerce could be seen in the increasing capacity of the junks visiting Makassar.³⁹ The massive growth in the sea-products trade with China generated a commercial revolution. Sulu and Makassar became central entrepot in this traffic, which remained a staple of regional commerce through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴⁰ Official Dutch records illuminate fundamental changes in the commerce of the islands involved. Take just one example: the East Sulawesi realm of Buton. In the 1720s this had only imported a few agricultural products from Makassar, but by the 1780s it was absorbing an impressive range of manufactured goods. These were balanced by burgeoning exports of sea products destined for China and of slaves for the Dutch.⁴¹

Trade and the Dutch East India Company

It can often seem as if the VOC was a closed system, particularly in contrast to the EIC. But Company establishments ran shops and held auctions, selling imported goods such as Indian textiles to private traders of all nationalities. This official commerce was paralleled by the personal enterprise of Dutch officials. In the 1730s public sales in Batavia occasionally had to be cancelled, because buyers found it more advantageous to attend “the public auctions held in front of the houses of inhabitants acting as the agents of officials based in the VOC’s west Asian branches, especially Bengal, Coromandel and Surat”.⁴² George de Souza has examined the Company’s Batavia business with foreign shipping and provides illuminating insights into this understudied trade. He concluded that between 1684 and 1764, unsurprisingly, exchange with China was the most important. Most of the tin (85 per cent of the total sold), and much of the pepper (28 per cent) and opium (17 per cent) went there. In terms of total tonnage China took 76 per cent, most going to three ports: Xiamen (43 per cent), Macau (38 per cent), and Canton (13 per cent). Imported tea from China was the main item purchased in Batavia (53 per cent), though zinc and some textiles

³⁸ Hussin, *Trade and Society*.

³⁹ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 99, 145–9.

⁴⁰ On Sulu, James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981); Heather Sutherland, “Review Article: The Sulu Zone Revisited,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 35, no. 1 (2004).

⁴¹ Heather Sutherland, “Power, Trade and Islam in the Eastern Archipelagos, 1700–1850,” in *Religion & Development: Towards an Integrated Approach*, ed. Philip Quarles van Ufford and Matthew Schoffeleers (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1988); Heather Sutherland, “Trepang and Wangkang: The China Trade of Eighteenth Century Makassar,” in *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. R. Tol, K. van Dijk and G. Acciaioli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000); Kathleen Schwerdtner Máñez and Sebastian C.A. Ferse, “The History of Makassan Trepang Fishing and Trade,” *PLoS One* 5, no. 6 (2010).

⁴² *ENI*: “Scheepvaart en Handel,” 529; Chris Nierstrasz, *In the Shadow of the Company: The Dutch East India Company and its Servants in the Period of its Decline (1740–1796)* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

were also brought in. Manila shippers focussed on cinnamons (17 per cent of the total) and cloth (4 per cent). Other private imports bought by the VOC were diverse, led by gold, Manila silver, sappanwood, Japanese copper and cotton textiles.⁴³

The Company itself clung to its familiar path, despite attempts at re-evaluation. In 1741 the experienced VOC official Gustaf Willem Van Imhoff (later governor general, 1743–50) declared that “all trade has this characteristic, that it must be either entirely enforced or entirely free: a mixture is full of contradictions and is more damaging than advantageous”.⁴⁴ But subsequent governors general had contrasting views: Van Imhoff’s successor, Jacob Mossel (1750–61) set the Company’s interests firmly above all others, only to have the priorities reversed by his successor P.A. van der Parra (governor general 1761–75) who sought to encourage the “prosperity and development of the Batavian colony”. This relaxation, eventually confirmed in 1781, was soon overtaken by events.⁴⁵ In any case, private trade continued to grow in ports and products marginal to Dutch-imposed patterns. In 1775 Bali and Pasir, both well outside Company control, were two of the four eastern Indies ports with the most frequent shipping to Java; the former led, with most vessels sailing to Gresik and Surabaya.⁴⁶

The slave trade is a prime example of the inter-dependence of the VOC and Asian trading circuits. The VOC’s constant need for labourers for its fortifications, building construction, ship-building and workshops, and for the individual households of its officials, created an insatiable market. Slaves were a major commodity in Batavia. Bali, southwest Sulawesi, Buton and Timor were the main suppliers. Many from Sulawesi were actually re-exports from eastern Nusa Tenggara, notably Sumba, but also from Sumbawa and Flores (particularly Ende). By the mid-eighteenth century the seas around Timor were considered unsafe because of the numbers of raiders and pirates.⁴⁷

From 1752 Makassar burgers were shipping slaves under contract to the Company. Under this new quota system about 1,500 “pieces” were exported in the first four or five years. The quota peaked in 1756 with an order for 500 slaves. It is estimated that the value of slaves exported from Makassar increased four-fold during the 1700s; the number shipped from Sulawesi through other channels was much higher.⁴⁸ Women from South Sulawesi were very popular. In the late eighteenth century Captain J.S. Stavorinus of the Dutch Company visited Makassar and commented:⁴⁹

⁴³ George Bryan Souza, “The Portuguese Merchant Fleet at Macao in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 353–9, 362–5.

⁴⁴ Quoted in *ENI*: “Scheepvaart en Handel,” 531. G.W. Van Imhoff and J.E. Heeres, “Consideratiën over den tegenwoordigen staat van de Nederlandsche Oost Indische Maatschappij,” *BKI* 66 (1912).

⁴⁵ *ENI*: “Scheepvaart en Handel,” 531–2.

⁴⁶ Gerrit Knaap, *Shallow Waters, Rising Tide: Shipping and Trade in Java around 1775* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), Table 6, p. 52.

⁴⁷ Remco Raben, “Cities and the Slave-trade in Early-Modern Southeast Asia,” in *Linking Destinies: Trade, Towns and Kin in Asian History*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Dick Kooiman, and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008); Rodney Needham, *Sumba and the Slave Trade*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No. 31 (Melbourne: Monash University, 1983), 20–1.

⁴⁸ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 117–8, 125.

⁴⁹ J.S. Stavorinus, *Reize van Zeeland over de Kaap de Goede Hoop en Batavia, naar Samarang, Macasser, Amboina, Surat, enz.*, vol. 1 (Leyden: A. en J. Honkoop, 1797), 144–6.

The slave trade here is very much in vogue, supplying most of the places in the East [i.e. of the archipelago] as well as Batavia and Java. The slaves are for the most part stolen, and sold quietly to the Europeans, who transport them in their vessels.... The [Bugis] Bone women are generally more handsome than any other Indies Nation ... they are all very passionate for Physical love, and in the pursuit of that instinct they leave nothing untried in order to satisfy it. For these reasons the Bone girls are sought after as Concubines by the Europeans.

Indigenous rulers, traders and shippers were enthusiastic partners with the VOC in the slave trade, but they continued to reject and evade Dutch monopolies on spices, Indian and Chinese wares. Ternate's Fort Oranje and Makassar's Fort Rotterdam sheltered the officials, ships and garrisons that fought to keep the northern and southern seaways to Maluku closed to outsiders. These "keys to the east" proved inadequate, particularly when local rulers or Company officials were complicit. Patrols by armed ships and punitive expeditions could act as a deterrent, but there was no way the seas, beaches and estuaries where regional shipping congregated could be controlled. The high government in Batavia knew this, but tried to limit the damage.

Makassar and Banjarmasin were both important harbours with roughly the same level of activity; but the former was a major Dutch administrative and military centre, while the sultanate struggled to realise its claims over much of south and east Borneo. The resources upon which they could call were very different. As a key Company garrison Makassar had hundreds of trained soldiers, its own small ships, and could call on Batavia in a crisis. The Banjarmasin sultan depended on contingent ties with leading clans, Malay and Bugis settlers and Dayak subjects. The control of trade was the highest priority for both regimes, yet virtually impossible. Their aspirations were frustrated by geography and the ingenuity of a multitude of shippers and sailors.

The status of the Company and its relationships with indigenous authorities was based on series of treaties. These were enforced when necessary by military means, but the specified obligations were seldom met in full. A sense of vulnerability in the east is perhaps the reason that within a period of less than three years from 1755 more than two thirds of those (re)negotiated by the Governor General Mossel were in east Indonesia. Mossel's trusted envoy in missions to South Sumatra's Palembang, Banjarmasin and Timor was the able J.A. Paravicini.⁵⁰ The later 1773 treaty with Banggai can be seen as typical. This was signed by the relevant parties, the Dutch Governor of the Moluccas and "the two subordinate kings of Banggai and Peling", and witnessed by the Sultan of Ternate's representative and the Ternate harbourmaster.⁵¹ It determined that all turtle-shell, mother-of-pearl, shells and wax must go to the Company for stipulated payments. Eleven contracts were also signed

⁵⁰ F.W. Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum, zesde Deel* (1753–99) ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955). The Spanish born Johannes Andreas Paravicini (1710–71) had come to the Indies as a simple *ziekentrooster* (medical assistant) and gained the trust of Mossel. A robust realist, Paravicini was successful in his missions; Vos, *Gentle Janus*, 31–45.

⁵¹ Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, 343–9. Peling was the most densely populated island in the Banggai archipelago; considered part of Banggai, at this point it had achieved some independence. J.J. Dormeier, "Geschiedkundige Aanteekeningen Betreffende Banggai En Gapi," *BKI* 102 (1943): 555–7. F.S.A. de Clercq, "Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890," in *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, ed. and trans. Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards, Smithsonian Digital Libraries Editions, <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/>.

with northern Sulawesi chiefs.⁵² Four Mandarese states renewed the Bungaya agreement in 1756, but continued to pay it no heed, while the sultanate of Talloq was declared VOC territory in 1780.⁵³ The Kaili coast had been transferred to the Company by its theoretical overlord, Ternate, in 1707, as the Dutch wanted some control over the Palu-Parigi crossing.

Such agreements varied in their levels of moral exhortation, but the core was the same: an undertaking to exclude foreigners, to send manpower and fighting forces to the VOC when required, and to provide products at fixed, low prices.⁵⁴ Different communities reacted in diverse ways to involvement with the Company; tactical and opportunist alliances with particular states in specific periods could decide, at least temporarily, the balance of power. But the VOC's strategic preference for a few specific peoples and individual polities reinforced political hierarchies and encouraged migration. While this can often only be inferred, it was evident in Maluku and parts of Nusa Tenggara.⁵⁵

In 1767 in a new general VOC regulation summarized trade policies, confirming that a pass from Batavia expired on reaching Amboina, Banda, Ternate, Makassar and Timor; new documents were then required for any subsequent journey. Exchange was still permitted between Amboina, Banda and Makassar, as Sulawesi rice was essential in Maluku. Apart from limited exceptions, shipping from these ports was only allowed to sail to Batavia. Contacts with the Southwestern and Southeastern islands, traditional facilitators for vessels travelling between Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua, were restricted. Timor was prohibited from any navigation to these archipelagos; the Southeastern islands, such as Aru, were only allowed to trade with Banda. Junks were forbidden to visit any ports in the east, except Banjarmasin and Makassar.⁵⁶ The specificity of these rules indicate where Dutch controls were being most vigorously evaded. Makassar could admit one or two Chinese vessels per year, but the duties charged on imports were more than four times those imposed in Batavia.⁵⁷ No wonder illicit trade flourished.

⁵² Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, 129–48, 157–8, 161–76, 177–80, 184, 204–5, 273–9, 282–8.

⁵³ *Ikhtisar keadaan politik Hindia-Belanda tahun 1839–1848* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1973), 275, 287, 297.

⁵⁴ For the 1765 treaty with Bima and Sumbawa, see J. Noorduyn, *Bima en Sumbawa: Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Sultanaten Bima en Sumbawa door A. Ligtoet en G. P. Rouffaer* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1987), 125–30.

⁵⁵ Examples of lasting commitment are the Dutch alliances with the Ternate sultanate, and the reliance on Rotenese and Savunese communities in the territories theoretically subject to Dutch Timor. Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*, 1st ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993); James J. Fox, *Harvest of the Palm Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977). On the VOC involvement in Rote and Savu, see Hägerdal, *Lords*, 221–33.

⁵⁶ T.S. Raffles reporting to Earl of Minto, Governor General of India, 18 Feb. 1811, quoted in Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 15.

⁵⁷ Edward L. Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX: studi tentang kebijakan perdagangan maritim* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002), 62.

Mindanao, Sulu and North and Northeast Borneo

In the last two decades of the 1600s Dutch, Chinese, English and Spanish shippers were the Maguindanau Sultanate's main foreign visitors. The most popular commodities were wax, turtle-shell and slaves. The Dutch took the largest range of goods; thirteen are mentioned in their documents, as opposed to seven in English sources. Chinese were interested in areca nuts as well as the three basic exports, while the Spanish preferred *cassia lignum*, or "Chinese cinnamon" over slaves. Sailors from eastern archipelago ports also came in search of wax, rice, tobacco, coconut oil, sulphur and iron bars. Cloth was the sultanate's main import; Dutch and Chinese shippers also brought in iron (including scrap), Chinaware, brass (including scrap) and knickknacks; in addition, the latter also carried silk. Ignoring VOC regulations, Dutch traders brought in guns and opium, as well as slaves, coins, knives and minor goods. English and Spanish cargoes also included weapons.⁵⁸ The Cotabato court was closely involved in smuggling cloves from Maluku, with the connivance of both sultans and the linked Chinese communities of Maguindanau and Ternate.⁵⁹ Maguindanau was traditionally oriented towards Ternate, while Sulu was closer to Brunei and southwest Sulawesi.⁶⁰

The people of Mindanao were prominent shippers in regional trade. Dampier observed in 1687:⁶¹

They build very serviceable ships and vessels both for trade and pleasure, and have some ships of war; they trade chiefly to Manila whither they transport gold and bees-wax, and bring back calicoes, muslins and China silks; they maintain a trade also with the island of Borneo; the Dutch come hither in sloops from Ternate and Tidore, and purchase rice, bees-wax and tobacco.

In the following chapter he added: "The Mindanayans are no good accountants, therefore the Chinese that live here do cast up their accounts for them".⁶²

The Cotabato sultans of the late seventeenth century were relatively strong, able to capitalise on Sultan Kudrat's impressive legacy.⁶³ However, during the early 1700s tensions among the Maguindanau datu escalated. Sultan Kuda (r.1699–1702) decided to raise revenue by introducing ships passes (*pascedule*), with predictable results: "The people refused his self-serving strictness and the panditas, ulamas, datus, shabandars, and all their following left him and set up a new political unit with some of the sons of the late Sultan".

⁵⁸ Ruurdje Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: the Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century* (Quezon City: New Day, 1989), 213–21.

⁵⁹ Ruurdje Laarhoven, "The Chinese at Maguindanao in the Seventeenth Century," *Philippine Studies* 35 (1987).

⁶⁰ Ruurdje Laarhoven, "Lords of the Great River: The Magindanao Port and Polity During the Seventeenth Century," in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990).

⁶¹ William Dampier, *A New Voyage Around the World* (London: James Knapton, 1697), chap. 12.

⁶² *Ibid.*, chap. 13.

⁶³ Laarhoven, *Triumph*, 149–59.

The sultanate was divided, partly because of the inability of Sultan Bayan (r.c.1702–18) to restrict the trade in arms and luxury goods.⁶⁴

The breakaway crown prince Manamir created a rival court at Tamontaka in 1710, by one of the two mouths of the Pulangi. He was on good terms with the VOC in Manado, with the ruler of Bolaang, and was also connected to the Makassar Captain of the Chinese, Ong Watko. Once independent, Manamir intensified his trade with Ternate and Tidore, with the north Sulawesi ports of Manado and Kaidipang on the Celebes Sea coast, as well as with Kema on the passage to Maluku and the Tomini Gulf's Gorontalo-Limboto. The displaced Maguindanao Sultan desperately appealed to the VOC for support and artillery. But, in 1726 the rebel prince assumed the title of sultan, surviving a retaliatory attack by the combined forces of 9,000 men from Sulu, Maguindanao, Buayan and Iranun. The original sultan retreated upriver to Buayan, while Cotabato's influence among the Iranun declined.⁶⁵

This internecine conflict weakened Cotabato, while it was coming under increasing pressure from Manila. Since the mid-seventeenth century the Spanish had accepted their limited power in the south, but after they rebuilt their fort at Zamboanga in 1719 they actively intervened in Maguindanao's increasingly fractious politics; by 1730 they had gained considerable influence at court. During the eighteenth century Cotabato and Buayan were still the main polities in Mindanao, but the lesser Sultanate of Tumbao or Kabuntalan emerged as a buffer state on a fork of the Pulangi by the middle 1700s.⁶⁶ After the devastating eruption in 1765 of Mount Ragang, to the south of Lake Lanao, many Iranun moved to Sulu; the Sarangani raja also acknowledged Jolo's suzerainty.⁶⁷

Interventions from Zamboanga restricted Maguindanao's trade, so ships tended to take a slightly more westerly course through the Sulu archipelago.⁶⁸ When the EIC's Captain Thomas Forrest visited Mindanao in the 1770s he reported:⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Laarhoven, "Chinese at Maguindanao"; Ruurdje Laarhoven, "Letter from Sultan Kuda of Maguindanao (r.1699–1702) Concerning the Trading Activities of Chinese Nakhoda and the Need for Military Support, 16 November 1699," in *Harta Karun: Hidden Treasures on Indonesian and Asian-European History from the VOC Archives in Jakarta, Document 17* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2014).

⁶⁵ Ariel Cusi Lopez, "An Exploration into the Political Background of the Magindanao 'Piracy' in the Early Eighteenth Century," in *Piracy and Surreptitious Activities in the Malay Archipelago and Adjacent Seas, 1600–1840*, ed. Y.H. Teddy Sim (Singapore: Springer, 2014).

⁶⁶ Shinzō Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003); James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangigi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), 28–30.

⁶⁷ Warren, *Iranun*, 407; Warren, "Volcanos, Refugees and Raiders: The 1765 Macaturin Eruption and the Rise of the Iranun," paper presentation, Asian Studies Seminar, University of Western Australia, 2011; Ronald K. Edgerton, "Frontier Society on the Bukidnon Plateau," in *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. by Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 361–90. Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory*; Laarhoven, "Lords."

⁶⁸ Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory*. On the eighteenth century, see also John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906), 133–8.

⁶⁹ Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: Including an Account of Magindano, Sooloo, and Other Islands; and Illustrated with Thirty Copper Plates: Performed in the Tartar Galley, Belonging to the Honourable East India Company, during the years 1774, 1775, and 1776* (London:

[T]he Spaniards have long hindered Chinese junks, bound from Amoy to Magindano, to pass Zamboangan [Zamboanga]. This is the cause of the little trade at Magindano, no vessel sailing from Indostan thither, and the little trade is confined to a few country Chinese, called Oran Sangly, and a few Sooloosans who come hither to buy rice and pady [hulled rice].

In the course of the 1770s the 33 or so sultanates around Mindanao's Ilana (or Iranun) Bay, claiming a total population of just over 60,000, transferred their allegiance to Sulu, which eclipsed Maguindanau as a maritime power by the end of the century.⁷⁰

Brunei had already ceded land to Sulu in exchange for military help in the 1600s; in 1704 most of northeast Borneo passed to the Sulu Sultanate. From the mid-1700s more Samal from Sulu and Iranun from southwestern Mindanao began to settle along northeastern Borneo coast and its fertile hinterlands, where the inland valleys were inhabited by wet-rice-growing Dusun. Sama DiLaut frequented the coast. During the 1770s Tausug incursions challenged Brunei's authority, and by the end of the eighteenth century "Northeast Borneo was the core of the Sulu Sultanate's procurement trade".⁷¹

Some imaginative entrepreneurs were attracted by Mindanao's fertility. One such was the naturalised Spanish (and Catholic convert) former EIC merchant from Scotland, Nicholas Norton Nichols. He sent a memorandum to the Spanish king in 1759 deploring monopoly and arguing for direct trade between the islands and Spain. He described existing exports from the southern Philippines to the main Asian centres: rice, sugar, indigo, rattan, trepang, pepper, turtle-shell, mother-of-pearl, brazil wood (sappanwood), ebony, dried meat, cattle sinew, edible birds' nests and, when available, lead, all went to China. India and Bengal received sugar, indigo, sappanwood, pepper, cowries, birds' nests, cotton and rice, while the Malabar coast and Persia paid cash for large quantities of sugar. Nichols proposed that he be granted land in Mindanao for a ten-year period so he could cultivate cinnamon, nutmeg and pepper. This was agreed, and he arrived on the island in 1762. But he died the next year in a fall; subsequent cinnamon schemes had little success.⁷²

The Spanish return to Zamboanga had heightened tensions in Sulu. Sultan Muhammad Alimuddin I (1735–73) was seeking to centralise power, juggling relations with Manila and his nobility. He was effectively deposed and sought help from the Spanish. However, they distrusted him and imprisoned him in Manila.⁷³ Trading networks linking the two southern Philippine sultanates were strengthened when Chinese expelled by the Spanish in 1754 moved to Mindanao and Sulu. Before 1760, 14 or 15 Bugis perahu a year came to Jolo, many arriving from Maluku, Kaili and east Kalimantan's Pasir and Samarinda. Forrest described how they brought spices, birds' nests, sugar and rice from Manado, as

G. Scott, 1779), 280. He also noted that some six miles upstream from the bar of the Pulangi river there lived "many Chinese families; mostly carpenters, arrack distillers and millers". The Zamboanga fort, built in 1635, had been abandoned in 1663.

⁷⁰ Warren, *Iranun*, 27.

⁷¹ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 75.

⁷² Benito J. Legarda, *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1999), 57–8; Serafin D. Quiason, *English "Country Trade" with the Philippines, 1644–1765* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1966), 63.

⁷³ H. de la Costa, "Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735–1773," *JMBRAS* 38, no. 1 (1965).

well as cloves, carried at great risk from Dutch patrols. Gunpowder was the most profitable cargo; this was brought by the larger Bugis vessels that sailed from Batavia, Melaka and, later, Penang. In exchange they took slaves, spices, wax, cotton cloth and coffee. In the 1770s “several hundred” Filipino slaves were sold at markets in Batavia, Melaka and Banten, ignoring a 1762 agreement forbidding trade in Spanish subjects.⁷⁴ In the 1770s the first steps were taken to establish friendly commercial relations between Manila and the sultanate; Sulu ships were soon sailing to Manila, and by the late 1780s Chinese and Spanish skippers were trading at Sulu. From 1786 direct traffic was established between Sulu and Bengal.⁷⁵

An enterprising young EIC official, Alexander Dalrymple, sailed through the islands in the 1760s;⁷⁶ he concluded that the Sulu archipelago would be an ideal site for a British post. Dampier had thought the same of Mindanao. Both were intrigued by the pro-British attitude of rulers seeking foreign allies. Dalrymple argued strongly that an open port in the region, where all nations could trade, would attract former Chinese traders from Manila. Buginese would also come, as “a great part of the Bugguese traffick is in the eyes of the Dutch, clandestine, and carried on to countries where they are very jealous of intruders, there is an evident necessity for some neutral port”.⁷⁷

Dalrymple pointed out that sea and forest products for the China trade could be readily purchased in Sulu, while new markets for opium and weapons would be opened. Supplying London- and Birmingham-made guns would not only be profitable but, he suggested, even advisable, as well-armed local chiefs could hold the Spanish and Dutch at bay. Dalrymple arrived in Jolo in 1761 to negotiate an agreement with the Sulu Sultan. He noted that several junks came each year from Xiamen, bringing coarse cottons and ironware, and taking pearls, pearl-shell, birds’ nests, trepang, oysters, timber and seaweed in return.⁷⁸ Dalrymple believed other potential exports included gold, diamonds, amber, saltpetre, wax, animal products such as bezoar and civet, copal, pepper and spices, excellent sago and other forest products, sharks’ fins and shells, as well as cacao and coffee.⁷⁹ In 1764 Dalrymple was instrumental in extracting the Sulu sultan from his prison and returned him to the throne.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ James Francis Warren, “The Sulu Zone, the World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination: Problematizing Global-Local Interconnections and Interdependencies,” *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu (Southeast Asian Studies)* 35, no. 2 (1997): 10–6.

⁷⁵ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 53–8.

⁷⁶ Dalrymple arrived in Madras as a writer for the EIC in 1753; four years later he set sail, spending two and a half years in the eastern archipelagos. Howard T. Fry, *Alexander Dalrymple and the Expansion of British Trade* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

⁷⁷ Alexander Dalrymple, *A Plan for Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom: and of the East-India-Company* (London: J. Nourse, 1769), 83. Quoted in Chris G.F. de Jong, “Alexander Dalrymple en Thomas Forrest: twee Britse empire builders aan het eind van de 18de eeuw,” unpubl. paper, 2016, <http://www.cgfdjong.nl/f.%20Engelsen%20en%20de%20VOC%20in%20de%2017de%20en%2018de%20Eeuw.pdf>.

⁷⁸ For a description of the pearl fisheries, see: Alexander Dalrymple, “Account of the Natural Curiosities at Sooloo,” in *An Historical Collection of the Several Voyages and Discoveries in the South Pacific Ocean* (London, 1770).

⁷⁹ Jong, “Alexander Dalrymple en Thomas Forrest.”

⁸⁰ Sultan Alimuddin held effective power 1735–48; 1764–74 (or 1773); Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 18–9.

Various treaties were signed by Dalrymple between 1761 and 1764, including agreements with North Borneo chiefs. These documents became the foundation for further British diplomacy in the region. He also discussed the tea trade with Chinese from Amoy and met with the Gowa ruler's envoy. The British Library holds the English, Malay and Tausug versions of four of Dalrymple's Sulu treaties. As was often the case, articles which local counterparts might find important or unpalatable were variously presented in the vernacular texts. In the 1761 Treaty, for example, clause 1 of the English version states that the British will have "perpetual possession" of the land granted them; this does not appear in the Malay version. A very explicit clause added at the request of Sulu stated:

The aforementioned trade goods prohibited by his highness Sultan Muhammad Muizzuddin are opium, while no kinds of arms, big or small, may be sold to anyone, even to the children and grandchildren of His Highness the Sultan, without the express permission of His Highness the Sultan; only His Highness the Sultan may buy these goods.

The English version was laconic: "Opium in contraband & arms & ammunition to any but the Sultan".⁸¹

Although the Labuan islands off the northwest Borneo coast were still theoretically under Brunei Dalrymple's 1761 treaty with Sulu mentioned them as a possible site for a British outpost. However, he favoured Balambangan island some 13 miles off the northernmost tip of Borneo; he raised the flag there in 1763. This became the basis for the EIC's disastrous 1773 settlement.⁸² Textile sales proved disappointing, but the self-expanding market in opium and arms was gratifyingly successful. The head of the factory, John Herbert, previously of Bengkulu, was continuing its lucrative traditions; the administration was "a riot of fraud and peculation". In February Sulu "pirates" destroyed the settlement, and the officials fled to Brunei.⁸³ After Dalrymple's visit court factions in Sulu increasingly used their ties to the respective European powers to strengthen their competitive positions. By the end of the eighteenth century there was a British naval station in Sulu; their ships bombarded Zamboanga in 1798, but were withdrawn from

⁸¹ See the British Library's well-illustrated Asian and African blog, 5 June 2014, by the Lead Curator, Annabel The Gallop: <http://britishlibrary.typepad.co.uk/asian-and-african/2014/06/alexander-dalrymples-treaties-with-sulu-in-malay-and-tausug.html>.

⁸² Andrew Griffin, "London, Bengal, the China Trade and the Unfrequented Extremities of Asia: the East India Company's Settlement in New Guinea, 1793–95," *Electronic British Library Journal*, 1990, p. 157, <http://www.bl.uk/eblj/1990articles/article13.html>; Alexander Dalrymple, "Memoirs of Alexander Dalrymple Esq.," *European Magazine* 42 (1802); Fry, *Alexander Dalrymple*, 50–5. Balambangan was, as Raffles later pointed out to Lord Minto in India, "one of the small islands off the northern extremity of the island of Borneo, and included in the Sulu grant to the English". It is not to be confused with the Blambangan at the eastern end of Java. Trading relations with EIC expanded, to the concern of the Spanish. Sophia Raffles, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S. &c., Particularly in the Government of Java 1811–1816, and of Bencoolen and its Dependencies 1817–1824: with Details of the Commerce and Resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and Selections from his Correspondence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 60; Edward Belcher, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, During the Years 1843–46* (London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeve, 1848), 284–93.

⁸³ Griffin, "London, Bengal, the China Trade."

Sulu in 1805. However, London retained an interest in the sultanate, regarding it as an open frontier in an increasingly contested region.

Three distinct regions were distinguished in north and northeast Borneo: Marudu, Mangindora on Sandakan Bay and the Kinabatang River, and Tirun or Tidung. The language of the last was spoken from Darvel (Lahad Datu) Bay to just south of Bulungan.⁸⁴ The Sulu datu eventually became “the chief entrepreneurs”; some controlling whole river systems. Coast-based traders provided imported goods to roving Sulu pedlars who travelled up- and downriver on rafts. On the journey inland they provided goods on credit, collecting payments in kind as they returned downstream.⁸⁵ Although occasional Sulu settlements grew up south of the bay, they were incidental to an essentially Bugis-dominated southern coast.⁸⁶

Western Makassar Strait polities were increasingly under pressure from Bugis settlers pushing north, and Sulu people migrating south.⁸⁷ The waning of Banjarese influence and local conflicts led to fragmentation. Assorted minor chiefdoms broke free, and new political entities crystallized. In the northern Tidung lands eight domains emerged, while a civil war in Berau in 1770 further weakened unifying ties; Bulungan pressed north towards the Tawau River. Sulu sacked Berau in 1789. Some coastal peoples moved inland to avoid Sulu raids, and specialised in collecting forest products. Other groups settled down, converted to Islam and redefined themselves, while yet others remained “pagan pirates”.⁸⁸

The sultans and datu of both Maguindanau and Sulu were linked by ritual and tributary ties to the Mindanao Illanun, and to the Samal of Balangingi, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi. From the 1770s their large-scale and systematic raiding made “lanun” and “Magindanao” synonymous with piracy throughout the archipelagos. Annual raiding fleets of up to two hundred vessels terrorised coastal populations from the Gulf of Siam and the Melaka Straits to west New Guinea. Their depredations were most intense along the Philippine and north Borneo coasts, but they also attacked northern Sulawesi and Maluku. During the 1770s raids on northern Sulawesi caused the Dutch considerable anxiety, as they threatened Maluku’s rice supplies from Mindanao. These raiders acted together with related communities along the north Borneo coast, as well as Tobelo and Sama Bajau; they also established settlements in, for example, Bonerate, eastern Sulawesi and Riung (on Flores).⁸⁹

⁸⁴ A.A. Cense and E.M. Uhlenbeck, *Critical Survey of Studies on the Languages of Borneo* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 29–30.

⁸⁵ Singh, “Structure of the Indigenous Economy in Sabah in the 1860s and 1870s,” in *Historia*, ed. Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Historical Society, 1984), 400.

⁸⁶ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 75–93.

⁸⁷ Bernard Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People in Bulungan: Elements for a History of Settlement, Trade, and Social Dynamics in Borneo, 1880–2001* (Bogor: CIFOR, 2001), 21–2.

⁸⁸ Mika Okushima, “Ethnic Background of the Tidung: Investigation of the Extinct Rulers of Coastal Northeast Borneo,” *The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies* 21 (2003).

⁸⁹ Warren, “Who Were the Balangingi Samal? Slave Raiding and Ethnogenesis in Nineteenth-Century Sulu,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 37, no. 3 (1978): 484; Warren, *Iranun*; Warren, *Sulu Zone*; Laarhoven, *Triumph*. Warren, the authority on their activities, locates actual bases of the Iranun and Balangingi in northeast Borneo, including Berau, and on the northern (including Tontoli) and eastern (Tobungku) peninsulas of Sulawesi, on the island Jampea between Selayar and Bonerate, and in the Sama Bajau

Maluku and Papua

The sultans of Ternate and Tidore continued to provide the Company with political cover, access to resources, fighters and vessels, while Batavia remained committed to protecting the rulers' authority. In 1777, for example, Ternate undertook to send "Alfuren" to Manado to man the fleet of locally based *rorehe* (small kora kora), which patrolled against pirates. VOC ships and soldiers reinforced the sultanates' war-fleets or *hongi* when major expeditions were necessary to punish wayward subject rulers or disruptive communities. East Sulawesi was a frequent target. In 1689 and 1741 contracts had stipulated that Banggai was to supply specified tribute to both Ternate and the Company, but by mid-century the sultanate's declining influence over the periphery concerned VOC officials. Andaya describes a "growing disillusionment" with the rulers of Ternate and Tidore.⁹⁰ Batavia hoped, to no avail, that the appointment of a new Ternate sultan in 1752 could "get the kingdom back on its feet".⁹¹

The sultans' diminished revenue was both cause and effect of their declining authority. Tidore was expected to scour the islands for illicit spice trees and provide tribute and labour despite its exclusion from the spice trade. Anger at what were experienced as excessive demands culminated in widespread rebellion by Gamrange and Papuan chiefs in 1716 and increased raiding. Despite Dutch attempts at mediation, this Tidore crisis was only resolved in 1728.⁹² The contract with the Tidore sultan was renewed in 1733; in this the Company formally endorsed an extension of his authority further east to encompass Cenderawasih (Geelvink) Bay. Trade was to be limited to those whom the VOC regarded as minimal threats: the burghers and Chinese. The intermittent acceptance of obligations to Tidore by the Biak-Numfor peoples in the islands and along the north coast gave the sultans' claims to suzerainty a certain credibility; they occasionally sent slaves, birds, amber and massoi as tribute.⁹³

The Company itself had only begun to show real interest in Papua at the beginning of the eighteenth century, after Cenderawasih Bay had been "discovered" by a VOC expedition in 1705. The EIC's Thomas Forrest spent about three weeks at Cenderawasih Bay's Dore in early 1775, recording busy traffic. While he was there a Tidore kora kora visited, flying Dutch colours. Forrest also met Tidore's Prince Muhammad Amiruddin (b.1738–d.1805), better known as Nuku. The prince's links with the EIC and country

frequented Lombok and Sape Straits; Warren, *Iranun*, 127. See also, from the bibliography: Iletto, *Magindanao*; Velthoen, "Wanderers, Robbers and Bad Folk"; Velthoen, "Sailing in Dangerous Waters"; McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*.

⁹⁰ Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 214–6.

⁹¹ F.W. Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum, Zesde Deel (1753–1799)* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), 56.

⁹² Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 176–213.

⁹³ Holger Warnk, "The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011): 116–8; Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands Until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996), 143; Gerrit Knaap, "Robbers and Traders: Papuan Piracy in the Seventeenth Century," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010).

traders from India were to be of great help to him in his coming rebellion against the Dutch.⁹⁴

North Maluku was torn apart by this revolt. The seeds of rebellion had been sown in 1768 when Tidore ceded East Seram to the Company. Batavia hoped that it might then be better able to constrain the islands' lively illicit trade. However, this renunciation alienated some Tidore nobles, including Nuku.⁹⁵ The crisis erupted in 1780, a year after the Dutch banished the Tidore sultan, Nuku's father, and reduced Tidore's status from ally to vassal. The new sultan undertook to send "as a token of their loyalty and obedience, and as homage, besides their letters, two male slaves, two female slaves, ten cockatoos, and ten parrots with red heads, without the Company desiring more than that".⁹⁶ Nuku, outraged at Tidore's new subservience, fled to Seram and proclaimed an alternative sultanate in exile, describing himself as "Prince Nuku, Sultan of Raja Ampat and Seram". Followers flocked from both these regions, as did Papuans from Onin and Biak-Numfor groups from Cenderawasih Bay. The following year the Tidore ruler, no doubt encouraged by his Dutch overlord, claimed authority over settlements on the Papua main island; previously he had only asserted his rights over trade.⁹⁷ The further course of this rebellion will be described in the following chapter.

Although Tidore was turbulent, and Ternate fading, business proceeded as usual. In the closely controlled spice-producing territories and Banda VOC employees supervised the lesser chiefs (*orang kaya*) in Ambon and worked with Banda's mestizo *perkeniers* or planters who managed production. Since in both cases the spice monopoly had removed the main, indeed the only, incentive that could attract foreign shippers, imports had to come from other VOC centres, notably Batavia and Makassar. The local Company establishments, with their hundreds of soldiers and sailors, provided a market for artisans, gardeners, distillers and saw millers; on Ambon these were often Chinese or Makassarese.⁹⁸

Each year the feared VOC *hong*i fleet from Ambon cruised along the coasts of Seram and Buru, searching for illicit clove trees, inspected the Company's sago forests, capturing any deemed to be smugglers or pirates. Every Ambonese family-man had to serve four weeks on the *hong*i and join occasional military campaigns; they received only meagre provisions from the VOC.⁹⁹ In 1702 the *hong*i consisted of 61 *kora-kora* and 6,718 rowers.¹⁰⁰ Dutch officials also forced local villagers to join extremely arduous inland expeditions looking for hidden groves of clove trees; "over half came back sick or incapacitated" from such journeys. In the islands closest to Ternate these "extirpations" had some effect, but in places

⁹⁴ Griffin, "London, Bengal, the China Trade," 158–60; Muridan Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780–1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 165–86.

⁹⁵ The most comprehensive account is Widjojo, *Revolt*. See also Andaya, *World of Maluku*.

⁹⁶ Clercq, "Ternate," p. 120, note 85, p. 121, note 92. The same duties were specified in 1807.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Gerrit J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indisch Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Foris, 2004); Knaap, "A City of Migrants: Kota Ambon at the End of the Seventeenth Century," *Indonesia* 51(1991).

⁹⁹ Widjojo, *Revolt*, 38–42.

¹⁰⁰ François Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën, vervattende een naaukeurige en uitvoerige verhandeling van Nederlands mogentheyd in die gewesten, enz.* ('s-Gravenhage: H.C. Susan, 1858), vol. 1.



Image 24 Manipa costume and an Orang Kaya of Manipa, 1724¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ “‘Der Manipesen dracht’ en ‘Een Orangkaya van Manipa die Tsjakalild, of schermd, met schild, en swaard’. From François Valentyn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indië. Beschryving van Amboina ... Met zeer veel nette prentverbeeldingen verciert*, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Van Braam, 1724), 32–3. Plate 6. KITLV 37C171. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:856367>. Creative Commons CC By License.

like Halmahera this must have been slight.¹⁰² Eradication of non-Company clove trees was almost impossible, as they were native to the region's mountainous forests.

On Banda Neira a new society developed, focussed on the obligatory sale of nutmeg and mace to the VOC. But trade with the southeastern islands, particularly Aru, remained an essential supplement to the perkeniers' income from the plantations. Their relatively large and well-armed vessels traded as far as New Guinea, seeking "wild" Papua nutmeg (as distinct from the Banda nuts), as well as local "cinnamons", including kulit lawang. Chinese shippers carrying passes from both the Sultan of Tidore and the VOC also visited the coast. They collected massoi, trepang, tortoiseshell, pearls, birds, and slaves in exchange for iron tools, axes, baftas [textiles], china, beads, plates and coarse Surat cloth. Mother-of-pearl became an increasingly important commodity from the 1720s, and a consortium of Banda burghers was granted a license to exploit the banks around Aru; after 1760 their role declined because of increasing competition.¹⁰³

The VOC tried to gain access to marine commodities through its outposts in islands south of Banda, but with very little success. In 1692 it was suggested that a post be established on Leti to buy up wax, tortoiseshell and coconut oil. However, officials decided that it would be cheaper to continue relying on the VOC's sergeant at Aru. From there he could go to Tanimbar two or three times a year to buy up the accumulated tortoiseshell. This proved unsuccessful. Private traders from Banda could also sail to the Southwest Islands providing they only sold to the VOC, but the results were again disappointing. The Company's subsequent efforts to expand supplies of sea products typically combined intimidation with adjustments in prices and the limits of approved trading zones. In 1726 the sergeant on Aru, reproached for inadequate results, replied that people did not want to trade with the VOC, as more rewarding alternatives were offered by the many trepang fishing ships frequenting neighbouring waters. Batavia's declining belief in the value of monitoring eastern waters was revealed in the abandoning of outposts. In the 1770s, Tapa on Damar's west coast was overrun, and all were killed; the post was never revived.¹⁰⁴

North Sulawesi

At the opposite geographic extreme of the VOC's island territories, in North Sulawesi, Dutch interest was strong and growing. There larger garrisons guarded the gold monopoly, dealt in local commodities and organised Company food supplies from the fertile

¹⁰² Andaya, *World of Maluku*, 176–213. Quotation, from 1686, on p. 203.

¹⁰³ P. Boomgaard, "Resources and People of the Sea in and around the Indonesian Archipelago, 900–1900," in *Muddied Waters: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Management of Forest and Fisheries in Island Southeast Asia*, ed. P. Boomgaard, D. Henley, and Manon Osseweijer (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005); Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolization and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens/Singapore: Ohio University Press/NUS Press, 2008), 150–9; R.Z. Leirissa, "Changing Maritime Trade Patterns in the Seram Sea," in *State and Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago*, ed. G.J. Schutte (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994).

¹⁰⁴ W.Ph. Coolhaas, et al., eds., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, 14 vols. ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1960–). These are listed here by volume and page numbers: vol. 7: 662, 711, 714; vol. 8: 70, 132, 190, 184; vol. 9: 72.

Minahasa region around lake Tondano.¹⁰⁵ Treaties were renewed several times, with the Dutch becoming more forthright in demanding the cessation of headhunting and human sacrifice. This was not just because they found these practices inherently reprehensible, but also because the continuous unrest disrupted rice cultivation, as did epidemics, pirate raids and natural disasters. In 1704 a Dutch official complained that “it is not possible to get these savage people to change their local customs to any extent”.¹⁰⁶ Violence and headhunting continued through the eighteenth century; widespread migration was one result. Yet, as Henley observes, “[By 1750] as many as a dozen Dutch forts, [were] stretched over a distance of some 800 km from Parigi, near Palu in central Sulawesi, to Tabukan in the Sanghir islands”.¹⁰⁷

The petty rajahs on the southern shore of Sulawesi’s northern arm, facing the Tomini Gulf, were subject to the “contractual or compulsory sale” of Gorontalo gold to the VOC. Similar demands ensured coconut oil supplies from the Sangihe archipelago. In 1729 two forts in the Gorontalo delta supervised traffic. The new one belonged to the VOC (Fort Nassau), the other (Kota Raja) to the Gorontalo ruler. His walled settlement included the raja’s house, mosque and market.¹⁰⁸ All gold had to be sold to the new outpost, for fl.10 per real. Batavia was immediately warned that this was too little, as prices were lower than those offered by independent traders. The results were predictable. The claimed monopsony persisted for 120 years, but most was sold to Buginese private traders. In 1774 it was estimated that “not even one eighth” of gold was going to the official single buyer, the VOC.¹⁰⁹ By the 1720s the Gulf and the strategic Togian Islands had already come under Bugis and Mandar control. Gorontalo handled tortoiseshell from Togian, while other Tomini sea products went to Tobungku, another area contested by Bone and Ternate.¹¹⁰ In the mid-1700s “the famous bandit, Daeng Mamby”, had established himself in the mountains not far from Parigi, with 700 to 800 men ensconced in a fort; he was too strong for the Dutch to risk an attack.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ “Ternaten/Molukken,” the VOC site, <https://www.vocsite.nl/geschiedenis/handelsposten/molukken.html>, accessed 23 Mar. 2017. Manado provided turtle-shell and Gorontalo hardwoods; posts at Ternate, Makian and Bacan were central to the early clove monopoly, while those at Limboto, Kuandang and Sanana (on Sulabesi) monitored shipping.

¹⁰⁶ M.J.C Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 42.

¹⁰⁷ David Henley, “Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004): 87.

¹⁰⁸ C.B.H. Rosenberg, *Reistogten in de Afdeeling Gorontalo gedaan op Last der Nederlandsch Indische Regering* (Amsterdam: Frederick Muller, 1865), 3–5.

¹⁰⁹ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 93.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 433 note 66. Andaya, “Eastern Indonesia.”

¹¹¹ J.B.J. van Doren, *Herinneringen en schetsen van Nederlands Oost-Indie en reizen in die gewesten* (Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1857), 1: 344.




Image 25 View of Makassar's Castle Rotterdam from the sea, 1750¹¹²

¹¹² "Gezicht op kasteel Rotterdam te Makassar. Gezicht van het kasteel Rotterdam met het dorp Vlaardingen op Oedjong Pandang tot Maccassar van de nieuwe Sabandhary tot aan de hoek van Pannakoekang te zien van de Vrymans rheedde (title on object)". Anonymous, RM RP-T-00-3236. Persistent uri: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.451285>. Style, subject and date suggest this is by J.M. Aubert.

Makassar, Southwest Sulawesi and Sumbawa

On Sulawesi's southwest peninsula the VOC depended heavily on Bone's military and political support, but the Bugis state was unreliable, ambitious, and resented by its neighbours. Dutch strategy focussed on preventing any common cause between Bone and the defeated, but still influential Gowa-Talloq. Just how crucial this was became clear in the 1730s, when disaffected factions in Gowa, Bone and Wajo united. They came close to shattering the delicate balance of power.

By the 1720s Makassar was the established home harbour for the fleets that sailed east and south to collect the prized trepang or sea cucumbers; these were then graded and bought by Makassar's Chinese merchants for shipment on to China.¹¹³ The VOC's standing prohibition on any Chinese vessels visiting ports east of Batavia meant that Makassar's trepang had to be carried south to Batavia to meet the junks which would then take it north. The bulk of the capital came from Batavia and, probably, from Fujian merchants; subsequent profits went largely to the investors. The importance of the traffic was such that Batavia acquiesced when in 1746 a Chinese junk "in distress" sailed into Makassar, initiating a period of intermittent direct contact. At first the trepang came from neighbouring harbours, but towards the end of the eighteenth century they were being gathered as far away as Australia.¹¹⁴ From the late 1760s it was no longer necessary to ship Makassar trepang via Batavia, as the Xiamen junk's arrival had become an annual event.

Stavorinus has left a detailed account of a mid-sized junk or *wangkang* anchored at Makassar in the late 1770s.¹¹⁵

The length of the junk ... was, according to my estimation, a good one hundred and forty feet. The hull was separated into as many compartments as there were Merchants on board, each having his own place to store his commodities, separate from the others.... At the stern were several levels of little rooms, or bamboo huts, for the Heads of the vessel as well as for the Merchants. Right in the middle, among these, was the place whence the ship was steered, and in the centre of it was a sort of chapel, in which their joss, or idol, was placed. Every year they bring a new one from China that is then placed in their temple, while that from the previous year is taken back to China. This idol, which is of gold, and about four inches high, is taken ashore before the goods are unloaded from the junk. Here aboard, as well as on shore, lights and incense are kept burning, and in the evening silver paper is burned before the idol.

Many of the merchants on board were members of *kongsi* or business associations with leading Chinese in Batavia and Makassar as well as in China. These men helped with the accumulation of exports and the distribution of Chinese imports.

¹¹³ Sutherland, "Trepang." Nolde has discovered that the earliest reference to the Chinese community leaders trading in trepang was 1695, some 15 years earlier than was previously thought. Nolder, "Changing Tides," 156.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.; C.C. Macknight, *The Voyage to Maregé: Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1976); Máñez and Ferse, "History"; Campbell Macknight, "Studying Trepangers," in *Macassan History and Heritage: Journeys, Encounters, and Influences* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013).

¹¹⁵ Stavorinus, *Reize van Zeeland*, 1: 222–3.

The main registered commodities leaving Makassar in the 1720s were trepang for Batavia and coins to Sumbawa. Makassar's main imports were consumer goods. Indian cloth came via Batavia, tobacco and salt from Semarang, coconuts and oil from Kaili and rice from Bima. Rice and salt were mainly re-exported to Maluku. By the mid-eighteenth century south-north traffic was increasingly significant. Dutch records show that Nusa Tenggara was supplying Makassar's markets with rice and raw cotton from Bima and Sumbawa and with coconut oil from Ende on south Flores. Marine commodities and slaves were being trafficked through circuits that evaded VOC registration. Arak, distilled liquor, was a major import from Batavia, and was no doubt already being sent on to the islands to the southeast. Because of the demand for marine commodities, the eastern archipelagos were able to import more, particularly Chinese manufactured goods, such as textiles and crockery.¹¹⁶ Most trepang fishers were Makassarese coming from either VOC-controlled Makassar districts or Gowa-Talloq's rump territories.

A thriving clandestine traffic continued to link Bugis Makassar and other Sulawesi harbours to the Straits of Melaka, the coasts of Kalimantan, the Sulu Sea, southern Maluku and Nusa Tenggara. Bugis networks distributed goods illicitly imported from the west.¹¹⁷ Wajorese and Mandarese were doing brisk business with the Anglo-American country traders from India who frequented the coasts of Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sulu, seeking sea and forest products to exchange for tea in China.¹¹⁸ It is highly probable that some inhabitants of Makassar participated in this trade. Just up the coast from Makassar, for example, the settlement of Soreang was linked by pack-horse trails to the inland lakes, and from there, by the Cenrana river, to east Sulawesi harbours.¹¹⁹ In reality the VOC only controlled traffic between their main settlements, particularly those on Java and in Maluku.

Wajo remained independent. Wellen concludes that by 1730 "the relative power of Wajoq and Bone had reversed. Wajoq had now regained a considerable amount of its strength whereas Bone, Wajoq's former tormentor, was suffering from political turmoil".¹²⁰ Bone's grip on the peninsula's trade had clearly weakened. Governor J.J. Sautijn (1732–37) of Makassar commented:¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 120. It must be emphasized that this data is drawn from official registers and does not cover illicit traffic, which could have been one-third or more of the official trade. Moreover, since the Dutch harbourmaster did not tax vessels under c.2 tons, and since local coastal traffic (including hubs like Bira and Bonerate) was generally exempt, his brief only covered inter-regional trade by Dutch subjects. It is estimated that even in this sector c.20% trade was unreported. There was dramatic growth in the volume of trepang in rds: 1720s: 3,500; 1760s: 78,000; 1770s: 103,000; 1780s: 173,000. *Ibid.*, 98–102.

¹¹⁷ Sutherland, "Power," 157–62.

¹¹⁸ Nationaal Archief, The Hague, VOC 3243 ff.73–81; Warren, *Sulu Zone*; Heather Sutherland and David S. Bree, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to the Study of Indonesian Trade: The Case of Makassar," in *Dari Babad dan Hikayat sampai Sejarah Kritis: Kumpulan karangan dipersempatkan kepada Prof. Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo*, ed. T. Ibrahim Alfian, et al. (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1987).

¹¹⁹ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 20.

¹²⁰ Wellen, *The Open Door*, 84; Kathryn Gay Anderson, "The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2003), 35–59.

¹²¹ Quoted in Wellen, *The Open Door*, 84; Anderson, "The Open Door," 35–59.

When the Bonean government was in its prime and not bastardized, this sort of thing [clandestine trade] did not usually happen, because if any Bugis or Wajorese should attempt it, the king of Bone knew how to discover the transgression, and the transgressors or adventurers were stripped of everything they had in the world, even their wives, children and slaves, and the king of Bone became master of these, which served as an example.

VOC interventions created crises of royal legitimacy in Gowa; between 1689 and 1712 there were four rulers. The worst nightmare for Dutch officials was an alliance between Gowa and Bone, so they were wary of the two kingdoms occasional cooperation in military campaigns, like those against the Toraja in 1705 and Sumbawa in 1709. Batavia was truly shaken when the Gowa Sultan, deposed in 1712, handed the realm's powerful royal regalia over to Bone. This weakened the legitimacy of the Company's newly appointed Gowa ruler, while reinforcing the Bone kings claim to Gowa's throne, which was feasible because of family ties. The Company tried to seize the regalia back but failed.¹²²

The Makassarese rulers retained their interests in trade, albeit with a necessarily low profile. Both the Jeneberang and Talloq estuaries were established smuggling sites. In 1733 the governor of Makassar, writing a report for his successor, made special mention of the Sama Bajau, the *Turijene* (Mak: water people), because they were so important to the Gowa king. The ruler “makes powerful use of them”, wrote the governor, and they should be reckoned to be “the Muscles and Nerves by which the Sinister court increases her status and power”.¹²³

Powerful factions in Gowa remained hostile to the Dutch: “friends in appearance, enemies in deeds”.¹²⁴ Gowa and Wajo wanted to break Bone and expel the Company. Hostilities began with unrest in Gowa in 1734, spread to involvement in a revolt by Wajo in 1735 and the alliance of these disaffected forces with a Bone noble. The Wajo rebel leader was La Madukelleng, Arung Singkang, a Wajo prince who had fled Bone for east Borneo; by the 1720s he was well established in Pasir. This trading and raiding centre had become a sultanate in the early eighteenth century, and was frequented by Malays, Bugis and English. La Madukelleng accumulated influence and wealth, becoming leader of the expanding Wajorese community. In 1728 he drove out the Malay ruler and assumed the title of sultan. The deposed king fled to Kutai. When the sultan there refused to surrender him, La Madukelleng attacked Kutai, burnt the town, enslaved those who had been unable to flee and threatened Banjarmasin.¹²⁵ He returned to South Sulawesi in 1735, bent on attacking the VOC and Bone.¹²⁶

¹²² H.A. Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat, dan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan* (Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1998), 296–305.

¹²³ Transfer memorandum (MvO) of governor Joshua van Arrewijne in the Makassar branch of the Indonesian National Archives, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) Mak.398/3, 79.

¹²⁴ According to the Makassar governor in 1738; Coolhaas, et al., *Generale Missiven* 9 (2004): 119.

¹²⁵ Wellen, *The Open Door*, 138–9.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*; Kathryn Wellen, “La Maddukelleng and Civil War in South Sulawesi,” in *Warring Societies of Pre-colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context*, ed. Michael W. Charney and Kathryn Wellen (2017).

The resulting turmoil forced the Dutch-backed rulers of Gowa and Bone to seek protection under the guns of Fort Rotterdam. The rebellious Gowa Karaeng Bontolangkasa took the royal capital and the throne, while La Madukalleng became ruler of Wajo (1736–54). After the Karaeng's defeat and death in 1739, La Madukalleng withdrew to Wajo, where he was attacked the following year by Company and Bone forces. The Bugis recaptured Cenrana and the troops advanced on Tosara, the Wajo capital.¹²⁷ Stalemate followed. In 1741, according to Dutch sources, an oral agreement was reached with Wajo in which it was stipulated that the two Bugis kingdoms were to be regarded as equal, with the Dutch mediating in any dispute. Wajo also undertook to leave certain regions to Bone, particularly the Tomini Gulf and Timurung.¹²⁸ Towards the end of the century the VOC had to rescue Bone yet again, when Sidenreng and Tanette united against it in the Segeri wars of 1796–98.

By the mid-eighteenth century Wajo had fought both Bone and the VOC to a standstill.¹²⁹ This was confirmed in 1759 by Makassar's Governor Roelof Blok (1756–60): "For who would have thought that in this island Celebes a powerful nation could be found, entirely free, and almost equal in trade to the Company? Yet, it is indisputable that, according to the law of nations, Wadjo since the last war ought to be regarded as such". He added that the "realm and Court of Bone, deprived by the last internal war with Wadjo of their treasures and valuables, and also, it may be said, of great part of their former respectability, became and remain to this day very poor". The considerable tension between the two states led to another war in 1762–63; Bone gained "but little reputation and no possessions but Chinrana". However, the recapture of the Cenrana outlet forced the Wajo ruler to move inland to Sengkang.¹³⁰

Batavia had to intervene in regional politics again after Gowa challenged Bima over Manggarai. Bima was always regarded as a VOC ally. In the first half of the eighteenth century Bima asserted both its own independence and its domination of Manggarai, imposing levies on the Sama Bajau and Bugis trade at the west Flores harbours of Reo and Pota. These claims were resisted by the chiefs of the main realms of Bajo, Reo, Todo and Cibai, who probably complained to Gowa, their old overlord. In 1759 Gowa forces occupied the former Manggarai territories in west Flores, but three years later Bima, with VOC assistance, attacked Reo and expelled them from Manggarai.¹³¹ In 1765 the VOC settled court disputes in Sumbawa and Dampo. A new contract was signed in February,

¹²⁷ The main rebels were Karaeng Bontolangkasa of Gowa, Arung Kaju from Bone and the undefeated La Madukalleng. *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837 (Staatkundig Overzicht van Nederlandsch Indie) 1837* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1971), 122. Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat*, 295–9; Coolhaas, et al., *Generale Missiven* 8 (1985): 76; Wellen, *The Open Door*, 140–59; Gerrit Knaap, Henk den Heijer, and Michiel de Jong, *Oorlogen overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat buiten Europa, 1595–1814* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015), 137–8.

¹²⁸ Wellen, *The Open Door*, 152.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 141–55.

¹³⁰ R. Blok, *History of the Island of Celebes, Continued from the Memoir of Mr. R. Blok, Governor of Makassar, and from Those of his Successors*, trans. J. von Stubenvoll (Calcutta: Calcutta Gazette Press, 1817), 1: 8.

¹³¹ Jürgen G. Nagel, *Der Schlüssel zu den Molukken: Makassar und die Handelsstrukturen des Malaiischen Archipels im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert: eine exemplarische Studie*, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Kovac, 2003), 421–3, 588; E. Douglas Lewis, *The Stranger-Kings of Sikka* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010), 172–4.

confirming the position of Datu Jereme in Sumbawa and reconciling royal brothers in Dompō. The rulers promised to pay Batavia money owed. However, in 1766 renewed conflict required another mission and a “renovated” treaty, which was also signed by a noble from Bone.¹³² This emphasised the VOC’s rejection of Gowa’s ties with Nusa Tenggara. However, this was not the end of conflict in Manggarai, which remained a focus of concern for Bima’s Sultans.¹³³

By 1703 Bima’s forests were too “chopped out” to provide sappan-dyewood to the VOC, so the Company introduced a six-year moratorium and restrictions on felling. Such measures were more effective for the fast-growing sappan trees than for sandalwood, which was left largely unprotected.¹³⁴ As Timor sandalwood became harder to find, Sumba—also known as Sandalwood Island—became more attractive to traders. It had retained its forests, but these primarily benefited outsiders, as customary law forbade Sumbanese from felling the trees. Boomgaard ascribes the persistence of this prohibition into the 1800s to the fact that Sumba’s ruling lineages could export slaves and horses while the Timor rajas only had sandalwood and slaves.¹³⁵ Exports other than sappanwood were less attractive to Batavia. Cassia (a type of cinnamon) which was exported from Bima to Makassar, came from Sumba via Manggarai, while pearls came from Dompō.

Dalrymple visited Makassar in 1761, when the situation was unstable. He thought there might be opportunities there for England.¹³⁶ When he was visiting Sulu the regent of Gowa heard of Dalrymple’s presence and tried several times to contact him, with a view to a possible anti-Dutch alliance. Failing to make contact, he appealed instead to the Spanish, with no success. When another of the regent’s envoys arrived in Sulu in August 1762, Dalrymple was present. The Gowa king’s representative explained that “they were under no engagements with the Dutch ... but they had antiently [sic] a Treaty with the Spaniards”. Dalrymple and the Makassarese drew up Articles of Friendship and Commerce. This came to nothing, however, as the envoy and his retinue were killed by Mindanao pirates, and the conflict in Sulawesi ended inconclusively.¹³⁷

In the mid-eighteenth century some Dutch critics rejected the VOC’s traditional reliance on the Makassar garrison, arguing that this was misconceived. One concluded

¹³² *Ikhtisar*, 319–24; Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, 268–70.

¹³³ Henri Chambert-Loir and S. Maryam R. Salahuddin, *Bo’ sangaji kai: catatan kerajaan Bima* (Jakarta: Ecole française d’Extreme-Orient, Yayasan Obor, 2012).

¹³⁴ Bernice de Jong Boers, “Sustainability and Time Perspective in Natural Resource Management: The Exploitation of Sappan Trees in the Forests of Sumbawa, 1500–1875,” in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997); George Bryan Souza, “Dyeing Red: S.E. Asian Sappanwood in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *O Oriente* 8 (2004); John Villiers, “The Vanishing Sandalwood of Portuguese Timor,” *Itinerario: European Journal of Overseas History* XVIII, no. 2 (1994).

¹³⁵ Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2007), 172–5; Villiers, “The Vanishing Sandalwood of Portuguese Timor.”

¹³⁶ The Gowa elite was searching for allies; the Raja Amas Madina (r. 1758–67, known as Batara Gowa). He was still a minor in 1761; later he abandoned his throne, in 1766, so great was the pressure of the Dutch, who suspected him of secret dealings with the English fled to Sumbawa; tension was high between Bone and Wajo. Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat*, 300–1, 307.

¹³⁷ Fry, *Alexander Dalrymple*, 140–2.

“I cannot describe Makassar as the key to the east, but rather as a damaging cancer in the Company’s purse and power”.¹³⁸ Makassar’s fort could do little against the “less powerful but cunning nations such as those of Borneo, Mindanao, the Papua lands etc”, especially if they allied themselves with the “Makassarese, Wajorese, Mandarese etc.” as such trade occurred far beyond the reach of Dutch guns.¹³⁹ Rather than keeping a costly garrison and political establishment cooped up in Makassar it would, he argued, be more effective to concentrate forces around Ambon and Banda, and to base a strong fleet at a small military outpost near Selayar. Treaties could define political responsibilities, and the Company could cede conquered lands back to Gowa and Bone. This was an accurate diagnosis as far as trade was concerned but ignored the possibility that hostile states could come to dominate South Sulawesi. It also underestimated the Company’s emotional investment in Makassar, which it had won with such difficulty.

In 1767 the Company’s Makassar harbourmaster carried out an official enquiry into the “present condition of trade, not only insofar as it concerns the small number of our inhabitants, but all the principle places of commerce in this Government”. He sought “the true cause of the collapse of our sales, and why it is that the native can obtain English goods¹⁴⁰ in better quality and for a lower price than the Company is able to deliver, as well as to why native woven goods are preferred to those which the Company brings”. His report describes perahu from Wajo and Mandar (both regions with a strong weaving tradition) carrying local textiles to Riau where they were sold for Spanish dollars. These they took north, to the Malay sultanates of Kedah and Selangor, where the coins were more valuable. On their return they purchased “English” cloth for sale in Sulawesi and further east.¹⁴¹

Dutch authority was again seriously challenged in the 1770s. The spark was struck in 1776, igniting nine years of conflict. Sangkilang, a former slave, claimed to be Batara Gowa, the Makassarese king who had been exiled to Sri Lanka in 1767. He gained support from those Makassarese nobles who still nurtured their denial of the Dutch-backed ruler’s legitimacy. Sangkilang was chosen as Gowa’s king in 1777, and his forces captured the Dutch outpost of Maros in the same year.¹⁴² The embattled Company called on Bone to retake this important rice-growing district, which it duly did, but then refused to withdraw. The Bone ruler consolidated his influence over the crucial “northern provinces” that sustained VOC settlements in Maluku.¹⁴³ Batavia could do nothing.

The Company had more success in confronting the Makassarese. In 1778 VOC forces, aided by Butonese auxiliaries, besieged the Gowa capital. A new contract and a new ruler were imposed in 1781. The Somba Opu royal complex was again destroyed, as were all

¹³⁸ Nagel, *Der Schlüssel*, 442.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 439–43.

¹⁴⁰ This refers to products of British India, such as textiles and opium.

¹⁴¹ Sutherland and Bree, “Quantitative and Qualitative,” 398–9.

¹⁴² M.P.H. Roessingh, “A Pretender on Gowa’s Throne. The War of Batara Gowa I. Sangkilang in South West Celebes, 1776–c.1790,” *Itinerario: European Journal of Overseas History* 2 (1985).

¹⁴³ Heather Sutherland, “Trade, Court and Company: Makassar in the Later Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Hof en Handel: Aziatische vorsten en de VOC 1620–1720*, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004).

Gowa's other fortifications. The Makassarese were forbidden to have any settlement within a mile of the coast and could only trade with the Company; they also had to acknowledge that all Sama Bajau seafarers were VOC subjects. This was a deliberate destruction of Makassar's remaining maritime role. Envoys from Bone witnessed, and signed, the document.¹⁴⁴ However, fighting continued even after Sangkilang's death in 1785. The Gowa kingdom was to remain divided for thirty years.

Buton remained close to the VOC. For most of the eighteenth century the Company kept a small force of twenty to twenty-five soldiers there to keep an eye on the sultan and destroy illicit spice trees. For the sultan, this alliance was primarily useful as a counterweight to Ternate and Bone. He trod a fine line. He agreed, for example, to sell teak to the VOC, but refused to sign any contract obliging him to do so. In 1782 he called upon the Governor of Makassar to support him in his complaints about the many Bone subjects who were settling on his island territory of Muna, causing conflicts. The governor concluded that any such protest to the Bone ruler would be fruitless, as "they [the immigrants] are all Boniers from the interior and the islands of the Gulf of Bone, over whom the ruler has insufficient power". In any case, the VOC regarded the Buton Sultan as also being responsible for the unrest on Muna.¹⁴⁵

Banjarmasin and the East Kalimantan Coast

Throughout the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries fierce commercial competition in Borneo's southeast involved fighting among Dayaks and Banjarese, and Banjarese and English, while both local Buginese and Makassar Straits polities, such as Pasir, were involved in shifting alliances and outright attacks.¹⁴⁶ The EIC had established a factory at Banjarmasin in the early eighteenth century, having overruled Martapura in 1701; this was rather grandly called the First Anglo-Banjarese war.¹⁴⁷ Hohendorff commented:¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Blok, *History*, 1: 1; Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat*, 315–8; J. Tideman, "De Batara Gowa op Zuid-Celebes," *BKI* (1908).

¹⁴⁵ A Ligtvoet, "Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton," *BKI* II, no. 4 (1878): 72–3, 85–6. Ligtvoet, who cites this letter, suggests that although the settlers were Buginese, they were not necessarily Bone subjects at all, as there was no reason why the Bone ruler could not control his own subjects. The Buton Sultan thought differently. Nagel, *Der Schlüssel*, 425.

¹⁴⁶ John Dalton, "Mr. Dalton's Papers on Borneo. c, On the Present State of Piracy, Amongst These Islands, and the Best Method of Its Suppression," in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, & Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, The Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore: Mission Press, 1837).

¹⁴⁷ Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880*, Verhandelingen KITLV no. 189 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001), 67–70. For an early eighteenth-century description see Daniel Beekman, *A Voyage to and from the Islands of Borneo, in the East Indies* (London: Dawsons, 1973). An extract on Banjarmasin is given in Tineke Hellwig and Eric Tagliacozzo, eds., *The Indonesia Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Duke University Press, 2009).

¹⁴⁸ Johan Andries van Hohendorff, "Radical beschrijving van Banjermassing, door den Raad van Indie A. Baron van Hohendorff, 1757," *BKI* 8, no. 1 (1862): 170.

By around 1707 they [the English] were so advanced that a well-palisaded wall enclosed their warehouses and dwellings; they were attracting Chinese shipping, as well as that of natives from Java, Makassar, Timor, Sumbawa, Lombok, Bali etc.... From there a multitude of [native] vessels swarmed out to Java and the east, and they [the English] intend to make this [Martapura] the capital of their trade in the Indies, slyly evading the Company's claims to the spice trade, and drawing all the trade in textiles and opium to themselves ... causing great concern and danger to the Company.

However, the EIC's profits were disappointing, their local partners unreliable, and risks considerable. Moreover, their arrogance created considerable hostility.¹⁴⁹ In 1707 Banjarese forces of around 5,000 men and 150 perahu attacked the factory and destroyed it.¹⁵⁰

Banjarmasin's pepper remained the sultanate's main attraction in the early decades of the 1700s, despite fluctuations in harvests, deliveries and prices.¹⁵¹ Visiting traders came to the river port of Tatas which lay a short way inland by the confluence of the rivers Kuin (Kween, or Antasan) and the Martapura (also known as the Cina). Each trading season junks from China, up to seven a year, brought earthenware, silk, metal and other manufactures to exchange for pepper, diamonds, and wax. Some junk commodities were then taken to Semarang by Chinese traders.¹⁵² In 1727 it was reported that about three hundred ships a year came to Banjarmasin, comparable to Makassar's traffic.¹⁵³ Over the following years attacks from Pasir, including assaults by La Madukelleng's forces, disrupted trade. Banjarmasin turned to the Dutch and had to sign a new contract in 1733. This gave the Company the right to supervise Chinese shipping; any number of vessels was allowed, but only one junk could load pepper, as the VOC had agreed to buy most at a set price. From then on, approved trade between Makassar and Banjarmasin virtually vanished from the Company records.¹⁵⁴ In the mid-1700s the EIC's Captain Cope recorded that "[a]mong their minerals is Gold, which the Mountaineers get out of the Sands of their Rivulets in the dry Seafon, and dispo[e] of it to the Banjareens, from who the Euorpeans [sic] receive it". Pepper was also exported, as were forest products, including camphor and bezoar.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ According to Alexander Hamilton, who first published his *Account* in 1727: "Their Factory was not half finished before they began to domineer over the Natives, who past in their Boats up and down the River, and very imprudently would needs search one of the King's Boats, who was carrying a Lady of Quality down the River, which so provoked the King, that he sware[sic] Revenge"; Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies: Giving an Exact and Copious Description of the Situation. vol. 2* (London: Argonaut Press, 1930), 77–8.

¹⁵⁰ J. Hageman, "Geschiedkundige aantekeningen omtrent Zuidelijke Borneo," *TNI* 23, no. 4 (1861): 212–3.


¹⁵¹ Jacobs, *Koopman*, 67–72; Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 27–8.

¹⁵² Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 27–8.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 28–9.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 197; *Surat-surat perdjandjian antara kesultanan Bandjarmasin dengan pemerintahan V.O.C., Bataafse Republik, Ingggris dan Hindia-Belanda, 1635–1860* (Jakarta: Arsip National Republik Indonesia, 1965).

¹⁵⁵ Captain Cope, *A New History of the East-Indies: With Brief Observations on the Religion, Customs, Manners and Trade of the Inhabitants* (London: W. Reeve, 1754), 82.



Map 16 East Borneo and the Makassar Straits¹⁵⁶

The logistics of loading pepper were onerous; very little could be bought at markets. Tatas was ideally located for controlling traffic, although the pepper gardens were at least seven days journey upriver. Supplies had to be arranged well in advance by middlemen, mostly Chinese. The pepper was then brought down to Tatas by the local Biayu (Ngaju Dayak). As vessels drawing more than ten feet could not reach Tatas, cargoes often had to be ferried downriver to ships waiting in the roads; this depended on the availability of boats. In 1729 two waiting Dutch vessels had to use their small sloop and pilot boat to shuttle between Tatas and the coast. A round trip under ideal circumstances took a day but could easily last four or more. The 1729 voyage required ten months in all, but with better luck (and connections) an ordinary East Indian could load a pepper cargo in two months.¹⁵⁷

From the mid-1740s the VOC prohibited contact between Makassar and Pasir because of La Madukelleng's rebellion. This was to the great advantage of the independent Mandarese and Wajorese shippers sailing from the Kalimantan, Mandar and Kaili coasts, taking marine and forest products (and probably spices) from Pasir to Sulu for the junks from China. In return they obtained slaves and gunpowder.¹⁵⁸ The English briefly returned to Pasir in 1772, found it too insecure and in the same year withdrew to Bengkulu.

¹⁵⁶ Enlarged detail from map on p. 9.

¹⁵⁷ Nagel, *Der Schlüssel*, 692–9.

¹⁵⁸ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 28–9.

In 1747 a new treaty granted the Dutch “a settled base [at Tatas] and exclusive trade”. A tripartite division of the Sultanate’s territory was imposed. Banjarese independence was clearly eroding, and VOC officials were increasingly involved in court politics.¹⁵⁹ The Sultan retained his core political territory of Kayutangi and Martapura as well as authority over the upriver lands of Dusun, Amuntai and Sampit. The VOC assumed control over key “smuggling” sites at Tatas and, southeast of Banjarmasin, Tabanio, Tanah Laut, Tanah Bumbu and also at Kotawaringin. A Dutch fort was built at Tabanio at the mouth of the river, which was well placed to check shipping heading for Banjarmasin. However, illicit pepper sales increased, despite the new outpost. Tanah Laut was also a centre of local and transgressive trade. The rajas of this rather lawless area were partly of Bugis origin, and partly Banjarese.¹⁶⁰ From the late eighteenth century, at the latest, gold and diamond mines in Tanah Laut were exploited by Chinese for the Banjarmasin Sultan; some gold mines could be up to ten metres deep and cover an area of some ten hectares.¹⁶¹ Pegatan, near Pulau Laut, was “a true Bugis aristocratic republic”. It was founded around 1750 by Wajorese who had abandoned turbulent Pasir to seek a better trading climate in Kalimantan’s southeast corner.¹⁶²

The Banjarmasin Sultanate had never fulfilled the hopes nurtured by the VOC. In 1757 the Company’s chief counsellor in Batavia, the later Governor General (1778–80) Reynier de Klerck concluded:¹⁶³

That kingdom can, without doubt, be called the main centre of all the Eastern smugglers, consisting of Balinese, men from Billiton [Belitung], Buton, Seram and Makassar, who bring, and for low prices, good loads of cloves, nutmeg, mace, tin, wild cinnamon and slaves, to the great detriment of the Company that, despite so many repeated efforts, has never been able to achieve more than a commercial treaty, and that with so many disadvantageous conditions, that it was renewed and amplified in 1747, [but] that has had, up until now, as little success as all the previous ones.

¹⁵⁹ Hohendorff, “Radicale beschrijving,” 176–7. A notable intervention occurred in 1753 when the Dutch helped block the accession of Muhammad Aminullah. He fled to Tabanio, where he organised “pirates” against the VOC and Sultan, disrupting the pepper trade and leading to direct VOC intervention in 1756. The Company then signed treaties with both claimants; Muhammad became Sultan in 1759.

¹⁶⁰ Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 118–9; Knapen, *Forests*. In 1787 the VOC established formal ties with Tanah Laut, and in 1817 the region was in theory taken under Dutch ruler, but authority was immediately ceded back to the chiefs. Pegatan signed a contract with the Dutch in 1838, but most real intervention only began after 1857.

¹⁶¹ L. Horner, “Verslag van het Geologisch Onderzoek in het Zuid-Oostelijke Gedeelte van Borneo,” *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap der Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 17 (1839).

¹⁶² *ENI*: “Pegatan”. Pegatan was always regarded as a pirate stronghold, as was Pulau Laut. Most of the local rulers were Bugis with ties to the Banjarmasin ruling family, their people a typically complex mix of Banjarese, Bugis and people from Pasir. Anderson, “The Open Door,” 161; C. Nagtegaal, *De voormalige zelfbesturende en gouvernementslandschappen in Zuid-Oost Borneo* (Utrecht: Oosthoek’s Uitgeverij, 1939); Cribb, *Historical Atlas*: 118–9. Knapen, *Forests*.

¹⁶³ Quoted in Hohendorff, “Radicale beschrijving,” 213. Hohendorf noted that VOC relations with the Kingdom of Martapura had begun with contacts in 1606 and 1607, and that trade agreements had been renewed in 1659, 1678, 1711 and 1726. For a lively account of Paravicini’s dealing with the court, see *ibid.*, 220–40.

These eastern shippers were not just loading pepper; Banjarmasin could also offer goods from the south and west, from Java and the Melaka Straits. Banjarmasin's commerce was increasingly directed to Semarang and, to a growing degree, Surabaya. By the 1770s Banjarmasin's Chinese were also trading trepang.¹⁶⁴

The recurring pattern of VOC-Banjarmasin relations was simple: Batavia wanting a pepper monopoly, the Sultan seeking military support. Both received partial satisfaction. The ruler was granted weapons, and occasionally actual intervention, if not security; the Company enjoyed privileged access to pepper shipments, but never a monopoly. The market remained open and competitive. The VOC's attempts to use Indian textiles as a means of exchange also proved ineffective, as Banjarmasin was well supplied from Makassar and Java. However, silver remained in demand, and opium was welcomed by the Chinese community.¹⁶⁵ De Klerck summed up his views on the long history of Dutch trade with Banjarmasin:¹⁶⁶

[T]he voyages are difficult and show little profit, although that island may be called one of the richest of the whole globe, bearing in its bosom diamonds, gold, tin etc, pepper, bezoar, and supplying dragon's blood [bright red medicinal resin] and other desirable commodities such as birds' nests, wax, different rattans. These wonderful products are generally traded through barter for Spanish reals, opium, Coromandel, Bengal and Surat textiles; Chinese fabrics and porcelains; a load of Neurenberg goods from home,¹⁶⁷ Java's salt, rice, onions, sugar etc.

Banjarmasin's recalcitrance was mainly due to the sultan's structural weakness; he was unable to control travel, trade and politics in the outlying pepper territories and along the coast. The various rulers did what they could to reinforce their positions through outside alliances. Ties with the Chinese community had been formalised in 1736, when they were given permission to build their own kampong close to Tatas. The community head, the kapitan, agreed to pay a monthly levy to the sultan, and promised to supply perahu and money as required. In 1740 the syahbandar formally permitted English vessels to trade, and when in 1761 the sultan tried to establish a grip on the southeast coast by building his own outpost at Tabanio he allowed the English to visit. Tabanio soon re-emerged as a centre of pepper smuggling, at least in Dutch eyes. By the mid-eighteenth century the sultanate was still claiming tribute as far north as Berau but had lost territory to Sulu and trade to Pasir, with its thriving exports of illicit pepper. After Sultan Muhammad's death (1761) conflict intensified, as did private trade between the EIC and disobedient servants of the sultan.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 140–1.

¹⁶⁵ Nagel, *Der Schlüssel*, 692–4. The success of later Company cargoes of rice and mixed goods depended on local harvests and the extent to which private traders had supplied the market.

¹⁶⁶ Hohendorff, "Radical beschrijving," 213.

¹⁶⁷ These were small goods produced by piecework artisans in Neurenberg, particularly small brass, iron, steel, glass and paper products such as mirrors, boxes, files, needles, nails, brushes, toys etc.

¹⁶⁸ Sulandjari, "Politik dan Perdagangan Lada di Kesultanan Banjarmasin (1747–1787)" (MA thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1991); Idwar Saleh, "Pepper Trade and the Ruling Class of Banjarmasin in the Seventeenth Century," in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1978* (Leiden: BIS, 1978).

Traders remained very wary of going into the Borneo interior; heads were highly valued, and anyone travelling outside their home territory was at risk. Moreover, fighting was common, aggravated by raids and competition for control over pepper gardens and trade routes. As in other commodity-producing regions, demands for tribute intensified so that goods could be used to acquire attractive imports such as guns. This pressure alienated growers and led to Dayak “pretensions”; this was thought to be the cause of the war between the Hulu Sungai Dayak and the Banjarese between 1711 and 1717.¹⁶⁹ Buginese from Pasir and Kutai became involved in hostilities in 1730, 1735 and 1753, and there was another insurrection by pepper planters in the Hulu Sungai in 1763. A rebellion of the “forest people” in 1780 threatened pepper production and led to the subjugation of several thousand Dayak.¹⁷⁰

The sultan’s grip on the pepper trade was never strong. He depended on supplies from the interior, from regions governed by officials known as *mantri*. In theory they were his representatives, supervising his subjects’ pepper planting, and holding appanage lands at the sultans’ pleasure. Agreements with Dayak community leaders were a prerequisite for the *mantri*’s ability to operate. However, diverting pepper to foreign traders enriched the *mantri* and provided them with imports; their personal wealth, like the growers’ livelihoods, benefited from the highest possible prices. These interests coincided with those of the Pasir Bugis, who were pressing overland into upstream areas, seeking cargoes for English shippers. In 1771 the Banjarmasin ruler tried to strengthen his hand by moving further downstream to Martapura, at the convergence of the Riwa Kian and Riwa Kanan. This was closer to the diamond districts and better located for keeping an eye on traffic heading downriver. The sultan demanded that his *mantri* formally pay their respects twice a year, rather than once. He also sought to expand his holdings in the Dusun region by capturing “troublemakers” and forcing them to cede him their land. The Chinese and the Dutch, anxious to protect their own commercial arrangements, supported the sultan in his efforts to drive the Bugis from the rivers and to control the *mantri*. There was fighting along the Negara in 1774, while the Bekumpai continued to control trade with the upriver Hulu Sungai.¹⁷¹

Kutai, lacking Pasir’s mountain backdoor into Banjarmasin’s pepper territories, seems to have been remote from this traffic, although the Samarinda Bugis were very active traders. They were also an essential military buffer between Kutai’s royal centre on the Mahakam and Sulu or other raiders. The main source of conflict between the sultan and the Bugis was, inevitably, the collection of customs duties. As trade grew, the sultan insisted on having his own harbourmaster (*Sebandar*) at Samarinda, but this appointee remained “rather isolated and weak.”¹⁷² Kutai suffered from attacks by Maguindanau raiders; in 1781 a civil war led to the relocation of the capital to Tenggara.

¹⁶⁹ Michael R. Dove, “Political Ecology of Pepper in the ‘Hikayat Bandjar’: The Historiography of Commodity Production in a Bornean Kingdom,” in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), 363–5.

¹⁷⁰ Knapen, *Forests*, 171–80.

¹⁷¹ Sulandjari, “Politik dan Perdagangan,” 90–102; Knapen, *Forests*, 92–3.

¹⁷² S.W. Tromp, “Eenige Mededeelingen Omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetei,” *BKI* 36, no. 1 (1887): 185.

East Java Sea, Bali and Lombok

During the late seventeenth century Sumbawa and the east Balinese kingdom of Karangasem competed for power over Lombok.¹⁷³ As was noted above, Makassar accepted Balinese control over Lombok in exchange for a free hand in Sumbawa. The Balinese state of Mengwi, north of Badung, began its rise in the early eighteenth century. Together with its recalcitrant secondary ally Buleleng, it challenged Karangasem in Bali itself, in neighbouring east Javanese Blambangan and in Lombok.¹⁷⁴ The last was an attractive colony, as Lombok was more suited to rice growing than Bali, had better ports with easier access inland and the population was conveniently concentrated on the edges of the central plain. In Bali approximately two-thirds of the people lived in rugged terrain south of the central mountains.¹⁷⁵

By 1740 there were six Balinese domains on the western side of Lombok. Karangasem controlled Lombok's main west coast port, Ampenan, and encouraged the extension of wet-rice cultivation. Balinese rule was exercised through high officials, *punggawa*, who were based in fortified compounds within the main villages. The established Sasak aristocracy of Muslim East Lombok, once an area of strong Makassarese influence, was hostile to alien rule. When the Balinese were distracted by internecine conflicts, the Sasak rulers were often able to regain much of their independence.¹⁷⁶

In east Java Blambangan's king resented Mengwi's dominance; in 1763 he fled west to Dutch Pasuruan and tried to persuade the VOC to cooperate in expelling the Balinese.¹⁷⁷ But Batavia was uninterested, despite Mataram's formal cession of its (non-existent) authority over the eastern end of Java in 1742. However, as usual, illicit trade and signs of British interest forced the Company to act. Defying VOC regulations, English traders were bringing in relatively cheap opium, firearms and textiles, which attracted Buginese, Mandarese, Javanese, Malay and Chinese shippers. For Mandarese and Buginese Blambangan was easier to reach than Bengkulu, and a useful source of Indian and Western commodities.

In July 1766 the VOC decided on an expedition but were pre-empted, as in August "three large British ships followed by three *chialoup*, twenty-five *pancalang* and one hundred smaller vessels carrying Buginese and Madurese noblemen aboard arrived in Blambangan" under the command of Edward Cole from Bengkulu.¹⁷⁸ They were welcomed by the ruler

¹⁷³ See Hans Hägerdal, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Lombok and Bali in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2001).

¹⁷⁴ Sri Margana, "Java's Last Frontier: the Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan, c. 1763–1813" (University of Leiden, 2007), 177–209.

¹⁷⁵ Alfons van der Kraan, "Bali: 1848," *Indonesia Circle* 62 (1994): 6–7.

¹⁷⁶ Alfons van der Kraan, "The Nature of Balinese Rule in Lombok," *JMBRAS Monograph* (1975): 95–6; Alfons Van der Kraan, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980). The main eighteenth-century Balinese domains on Lombok were Mataram, Karangasem (Singosari), Pagasangan and Pagutan; armed conflict was not unusual. See also Hägerdal, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Lombok and Bali in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*.

¹⁷⁷ The following paragraphs are based on Margana, "Java's Last Frontier."

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 39. *Chialoup* were European in origin, in eighteenth-century Makassar; they averaged 31 last (a ship's measurement of 1,250 kg, later 2,000) with a crew of some 20 men. *Pancalang* were smaller, fast Asian-rigged vessels of a western archipelago design, of an average 11 last and with a 17-man crew. On ships, see Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 46–52.

of Mengwi, and with the help of a Chinese merchant they exchanged guns and opium for rice. Cole was so impressed by the possibilities that he abandoned plans to sail on to Sumbawa and hurried back to Bengkulu. But before the British could act, the Dutch force of some 500 troops and 2,000 Madurese auxiliaries arrived, in 1767. They encountered carnage; a revolt against the Balinese had broken out, the Malays and Bugis switched sides, bringing Balinese heads to the Company men as proof of loyalty.¹⁷⁹

The VOC appointed Muslim leaders in the east as a bulwark against Bali, but these chiefs were soon negotiating with Mengwi. A new expeditionary force was sent from Batavia in 1771, and foreign traders were expelled from Blambangan. Nusa Barang became an anti-Dutch stronghold, home to Mandarese, Buginese and other assorted “pirates”, but the island was taken by the Dutch in 1777. Fortunately for Batavia, Chinese merchants from Surabaya were interested in local birds’ nest caves, and eventually the Chinese leaseholder assumed responsibility for sea-patrols against the Mandarese and Buginese.¹⁸⁰

As was described earlier, the Balinese themselves were not true sea-goers. The “Bali traders” who frequented harbours like Bengkulu mostly originated in Sulawesi, just as those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries might well have been Javanese. However, the role of Balinese ports should not be underestimated, nor were the rulers uninterested in trade. They may not have been personally involved in shipping, as the Sumbawa sultans were, but they were keenly interested in profiting from commerce, particularly the sale of slaves and crops that they could acquire as tribute from the peasantry. Kings did deals with British country shippers, often mediated by Chinese. For Bali was more than just an exporter of local rice, oil, and coconuts, it was also an entrepôt. Local traders dealt in goods brought in by foreigners, including textiles, cotton, and opium. This traffic was, as far as the VOC was concerned, nothing other than brazen smuggling.

The main Balinese ports were Kuta in Badung and Buleleng. In 1764 a Buginese shipper described Kuta’s trade to Dutch officials. He noted that about eighteen ships a day visited; he himself had counted fourteen on his arrival. These included five from Banjarmasin, two from Bengkulu, two from Palembang and six from Batavia. Ten days later, Mandarese merchants arrived aboard four vessels. Most sailed under British or Dutch flags, bringing in iron, porcelain, gold thread, rattan, gum benzoin, cloth, and slaves, while Muslim merchants (perhaps Malay?) carried white, black, and red textiles. Traders from the west, including Batavia, arrived with the monsoon, connecting with Buginese and others from the eastern archipelagos before they sailed home. Many Buginese visiting Bali came via Bengkulu and exchanged opium for foodstuffs.¹⁸¹ There were also shippers from Eastern Indonesia, mostly Seramers carrying nutmeg and mace.

¹⁷⁹ Margana, “Java’s Last Frontier,” 35–50, 163–8, 177–98.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.; Claudine Salmon, “The Han Family of East Java: Entrepreneurship and Politics (18th–19th Centuries),” *Archipel* 41 (1991).

¹⁸¹ Margana, “Java’s Last Frontier,” 179–80. Margono translates an important Balinese export, *cartas caili*, as paper, or *kertas*. This is obscure; presumably it refers to products from either Kaili (west Sulawesi) or even Kayeli (Buru).

Bugis enclaves were common and welcome on Bali, providing they made no moves to claim political power. Bugis were central to the growth of trade between Jembrana on Bali's west coast and eastern Java and Surabaya, and to those harbours connections with other Bugis settlements. By the mid-1700s, Bugis were acting as harbourmasters on Lombok's main east coast ports, such as Labuan Haji and Piju, facing Sumbawa, with its traditional ties to Sulawesi. But even many lesser west coast ports appointed Bugis to handle their shipping.¹⁸² These settlements were a thorn in the side of Company officials; Bali Strait traders often clashed with Dutch patrols.

Timor, the South Flores and Savu Seas

Timor had been fought over for much of the seventeenth century; fighting between local petty states continued to be entangled with the commercial interests of Dutch, Portuguese and Topassers. From 1702 a "white" Portuguese governor was stationed at Lifau, the old Dominican settlement on the north coast of east Timor. Macau Portuguese sent one or two ships each season to Timor's north coast, carrying gold, ivory, silk and other textiles. Circumstances permitting, they would collect rice en route to feed the Lifau garrison, and they could call at other harbours, in regions including Madura, Bali and Larantuka.¹⁸³ Batavia's authority remained very limited in Timor. An enclave of Dutch officials and a handful of allied settlements huddled around Fort Concordia at Kupang, while much of the island was dominated by the Topass creoles and their confederates.¹⁸⁴

The Company still only effectively controlled Kupang, and depended on support from the neighbouring, friendly islands of Rote and Savu. It also claimed Solor and Alor.¹⁸⁵ The Dutch establishment at Kupang collected tribute from the places most under its control—Rote, for example, sent slaves, bees wax, and occasionally rice and millet—but we know little of the trade in local products. Slaves were exported by Dutch, Portuguese and Makassarese in exchange for blue and white linen, knives, parang (bushknife, machete), goldwork, porcelain, copper wire and weapons.¹⁸⁶ Kupang's Chinese traders collected cargos for their compatriots from Batavia who came every year to Solor and Timor for sandalwood, which they took back to the VOC capital to sell to the visiting junks.¹⁸⁷ From the late seventeenth

¹⁸² Such as Tanjung Karang, Padang Reak; I Putu Gde Suwitha, "Perahu Pinisi di Sunda Kecil: Suatu Studi Tentang Pola-Pola Perniagaan Abad XVIII-XIX," in *Arung Samudra: persembahan memperingati sembilan windu A.B. Lapien*, ed. Edi Sedyawati and Susanto Zuhdi (Depok: PPKB LPUI, 2001), 130; I Gde Parimartha, "Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815–1915" (Vrije Universiteit, 1995), 112.

¹⁸³ Geoffrey C. Gunn, "The Timor-Macao Sandalwood Trade and the Asian Discovery of the Great South Land?," *Review of Culture* 53 (2016); Arturo T. de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese Trade in the Orient during the 18th Century," in *As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente: Actas do VI Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa: Macao and Lisbon*, ed. Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luís Filipe F. Reis Thomaz (Lisbon, 1991).


¹⁸⁴ Hans Hägerdal, "White and Dark Stranger Kings: Kupang in the Early Colonial Era," *Moussons* 12 (2008).

¹⁸⁵ On the Savunese, see Fox, *Harvest*, 160–1.

¹⁸⁶ Boers, "Sustainability," 264. Hägerdal, *Lords*. Anne Lombard-Jourdan and Claudine Salmon, "Les Chinois de Kupang (Timor), aux alentours de 1800" *Archipel* 56 (1998): 395.

¹⁸⁷ Blussé, "Junks to Java," 97.

century, as sandalwood supplies dwindled, the Timor Chinese explored the possibilities of more distant islands.¹⁸⁸ Chinese also held the tax farms or leases which had been imposed on sandalwood, wax and slaves in 1732.¹⁸⁹



Map 17 Timor, showing Dutch (west) and Portuguese (east) territories, c.1900

Neither the white Portuguese nor the Dutch could match the Topassers' local strength, particularly in the 1720s when they had joined forces with the *liurai* chiefs. The west Timorese realms of Amarasi, Amanuban and Amakono were strong supporters of the Portuguese. In mid-century the VOC consolidated its position, rebuilt the fort (1746) and beat off Topass attacks. However, the latter, determined to get rid of the Company, invaded VOC territory in 1749, with tacit Portuguese approval. Thousands were killed in the battle of Penfui. The aftermath left the Topassers much weaker and the Company stronger. But after the Topassers murdered a Dutch official and his staff in 1761, Batavia decided that the benefits of any further advance to the east were outweighed by the probable costs.¹⁹⁰ The Portuguese position in Timor was drastically weakened after Penfui, although they retained Sikka on Flores and parts of Solor. The scant Portuguese coastal traffic sailed alongside friendly Makassarese. In 1769 the Portuguese Governor moved Lifau's 1,200 inhabitants to a safer albeit swampy site to the west; this became Dili.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., Hägerdal, *Lords*.

¹⁸⁹ Lombard-Jourdan and Salmon, "Les Chinois," 395.

¹⁹⁰ Hägerdal, *Lords*, 363–75.

¹⁹¹ Gerald Telkamp, "The Economic Structure of an Outpost in the Outer Islands in the Indonesian Archipelago: Portuguese Timor 1850–1975," in *Between People and Statistics*, ed. Francien van Anrooij, et al. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), 72.

In 1756 Batavia's envoy Paravicini summoned an impressive array of chiefs and princes to Kupang. The resulting contract was signed by seventeen Timorese (many of whom were overlords of federations), fifteen Rotenese, five Savunese, nine Solorese and eight Sumbanese. This treaty framed relations between the VOC and eastern Nusa Tenggara rulers until well into the nineteenth century. Paragraph 20 of the Timor contract was typical of its sort:¹⁹²

All the kings and regents undertake to do everything possible to ensure that in the future all products and commodities that come from their country or districts, with no exceptions, especially gold, wax, slaves, and now also pepper, indigo and other things of that sort, will be delivered and sold to the Company at a reasonable price, to the exclusion of all foreign white and black nations, such as Frenchmen, Portuguese, Spanish, English, Makassarese, Malays, Javanese, and Seramers, no matter what they are called.

Three mestizo *posthouders* ("place-keepers", low level representatives) were appointed in Timor, while the VOC confirmed its sole right to buy all sandalwood at a fixed low price. The Savunese signatories took their pledge to support the Dutch seriously; they fought alongside the Company during the 1758–59 campaigns against the Topassers, and they continued to be a reliable force for Batavia through the nineteenth century.¹⁹³

Endemic small wars and slavery continued to be common. In 1772 a French visitor to Portuguese Timor noted that, apart from cloth, the commodities most in demand were firearms, powder and sabres; these were exchanged for slaves, horses, buffaloes, honey and sandalwood. The guns were brought by Makassarese who arrived every couple of years in their ships of twenty to thirty tons. A gun was worth two buffaloes or one good horse. Coffee and sugar cane were also available, but not cultivated.¹⁹⁴ These islands were too far south to be much affected by the rapidly increasing traffic further north.

English Advances, Dutch Defeats

The EIC remained intrigued by the possibility of establishing an eastern outpost. Dalrymple, who had argued that spices could be grown at Balambangan island, hoped to obtain plants for cultivation, following the French success in taking cloves to Mauritius in 1770. When the Maguindanau heir-apparent, the Raja Muda of Cotabato, visited Balambangan a member of his entourage, Tuan Haji, reported that such plants could be found in places unclaimed by the VOC. It was then decided that a voyage of discovery should be sent to the eastern islands, with the secondary, and less openly avowed, task of collecting specimens. The man chosen for this adventurous task was Captain Thomas Forrest, an officer in the Bombay Marine, the EIC's naval fighting force.¹⁹⁵ He had been

¹⁹² Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, 87–107.

¹⁹³ Hägerdal, *Lords*, 389; Nico L. Kana, *Dunia orang Sawu* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983), 19.

¹⁹⁴ Geoffrey C. Gunn, *History of Timor* (Lisbon: ISEG-Universidade de Lisboa, 2010), 63–4, 71.

¹⁹⁵ As will be described in the next chapter, the Marine officers John McLure and John Hayes were active in west New Guinea waters in the 1790s.

sailing Indian Ocean waters since 1753,¹⁹⁶ operating as a Free Merchant between periods of service in Bengkulu. In fact, Forrest had been reprimanded for trading during his official voyages, rather than speedily carrying out his duties. He was “believed to have amassed large profits during the Seven Years War by distributing opium”.¹⁹⁷

In November 1774, Forrest set off in his small Sulu boat, manned by an eighteen man crew drawn from all over the archipelago, and two “good, plain” English seamen. Forrest wrote: “I had one person of rank, education, and good behaviour with me, Tuan Hadjee”.¹⁹⁸ We can piece together something of Tuan Haji’s life from references in English sources. He was “a lesser noble of Celebes who navigate[d] a small prahu through the Sangihe islands, the Moluccas and Sulu” for the Raja Muda.¹⁹⁹ Forrest mentioned that Tuan Haji had come from Tukaran, Pagadian Bay (Zamboanga), where he had married a daughter of the Sultan (presumably of Maguindanao), who was the sister of the Raja Muda’s wife. The name he is usually given, “Tuan Haji”, is very generic, meaning simply “master Haji”, indicating he had completed the pilgrimage to Mecca. His personal name was Ismail, so he was Tuan Haji Ismail.²⁰⁰ During the journey Forrest frequently remarked on the range of Tuan Haji’s acquaintance and the respect with which he was treated. The relationship deteriorated after Tuan Haji heard that Sulu had taken Balambangan from the British in 1775. In the presence of the Raja Muda Tuan Haji distanced himself from the English, saying he had no obligation to them. Forrest then reminded him that he had served as a Captain of Bugis in Bengkulu, and had accepted payment.²⁰¹ The men parted in anger.

Tuan Haji appears again in the 1790s, in the memoirs of David Woodard, a captured American sailor who lived on the northwest Sulawesi coast for a couple of years. He described Tuan Haji as a “Mohammadan priest” of about sixty, who spoke a few words of English and some Portuguese, and had visited Bengal and Bombay on his way to Mecca. He had been a “great pirate” in Mindanao, commanding a perahu with four carriage guns²⁰² in an action against “Oreo” a settlement on “Bantang” in the Melaka Straits; this probably refers to an action at Bintang island, in Riau. Tuan Haji captured several Dutch sloops and many belonging to the “tabogees” or black merchants, presumably Bugis [*To Bugi*, or Bugis people]. Tuan Haji carried a letter of recommendation from John Herbert of Bengkulu, testifying to his honesty and willingness to help any Englishman in trouble. This was from 1771, and probably dated from his time there as Captain of Bugis. The stranded Woodard went to Tuan Haji’s house in Palu, to ask him if he would take him

¹⁹⁶ “Forrest, Thomas (c. 1729–c. 1802),” in *Dictionary of National Biography* (London: Smith, Elder, 1885–1900).

¹⁹⁷ Kathirithamby-Wells, *British West Sumatran Presidency*, 152, note 103; Jong, “Alexander Dalrymple en Thomas Forrest.”

¹⁹⁸ Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea*, 9.

¹⁹⁹ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 161.

²⁰⁰ Widjojo, *Revolt*, 200–4.

²⁰¹ The two men then disagreed over the pay due to Tuan Haji’s men, some of whom were slaves from Halmahera, and also over ownership of a small boat. The Raja Muda said they owned it equally, to Tuan Haji’s anger. Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea*, 225–8.

²⁰² Guns mounted on a timber carriage, as opposed to the common, rail-mounted swivel guns.

to Donggala, which was Tuan Haji's main home. When Woodard arrived Tuan Haji had to be summoned from bed and his very young wife (Woodard estimated she was perhaps sixteen); he was unable to go to Donggala, but the two men became friendly, playing drafts together.²⁰³

While Forrest was exploring possible new gains for the English, Dutch officials were facing stagnation. The VOC's profits had been declining since the 1730s and the directors had begun to consume capital and rely on short term loans. The British had better access to cottons, opium, tea and, after campaigns in Malabar in 1790, also pepper. Their ships were generally more modern, and their fleets more flexible.²⁰⁴ The invention of the mechanical multi-spindle spinning frame in 1764 had been a step towards the machine manufacture of textiles. The subsequent industrial revolution confirmed the country's pre-eminence. In 1781–84 Britain fought the Netherlands in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Like the three earlier confrontations, this was essentially about trade and fought primarily at sea. The cause was the refusal of Dutch shipping to recognise the British blockade of the American coast during the latter's War of Independence (1775–83).²⁰⁵ The British shut down sea traffic between Asia and the Netherlands, creating a sudden loss of VOC shipping capacity in Asia. Batavia accumulated a stock-pile of commodities which were then sold to Americans and neutrals, which would have been unthinkable in normal circumstances. American vessels were also used for inter-island Dutch shipping. Officials later reported to the VOC administrators in Amsterdam that "In the years 1781 to 1783 the Company had sold coffee, tin, pepper, cloves, nutmeg, sugar etc to foreigners, to a value of 1,084,945 rds."²⁰⁶

Like the Seven Years War, that of 1780 involved fighting in the colonies: in the East and West Indies, south America, Africa and India. The British occupied many Dutch possessions, most of which were returned by the 1783 Treaty of Paris. The war exposed the republic's weakness and the Company's rigidity; it was an "an especially disastrous war from the Dutch perspective", severely weakening the economy.²⁰⁷ The British were confirmed in their navigation rights in eastern waters, where an enterprising new nation was also asserting itself. In 1776 the Americans had declared their independence; this was confirmed in the 1783 treaty. Years of uncertainty followed, as the Netherlands exchanged the old Anglo-Dutch alliance for French protection. In the Indies the Company's traditional dependence on intra-Asian commerce became untenable.

²⁰³ David Woodard, *The narrative of captain David Woodard and four seamen, who lost their ship while in a boat at sea, and surrendered themselves up to the Malays, in the island of Celebes; containing an interesting account of their sufferings . . . , and their escape from the Malays, . . . : also an account of the manners and customs of the country* (London: J. Johnson, 1803), 33–6, 103.

²⁰⁴ Joop de Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin: De Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel 1595–1950* ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu, 1998), 141–64. Jacobs, *Koopman*.

²⁰⁵ Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

²⁰⁶ *ENI*: "Scheepvaart en handel".

²⁰⁷ Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, *The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 52–84.

During this eventful period profound cultural, political and economic shifts in both Europe and the Americas directly affected the eastern archipelagos. The new spirit of enquiry was exemplified in the great sea voyages of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville (1768), James Cook (1770–71) and the French explorers of the early nineteenth centuries.¹ On 4 July 1776 the Americans had rejected British colonial rule, and 1789 marked the crumbling of the *ancien régime* in France. During the French revolutionary wars (1792–1802) the Netherlands were occupied (1794–95), while English blockades again broke connections between Asia and Holland. Napoleon imposed his Civil Code in France in 1804, creating a template for a stronger bureaucratic state. From 1807 to 1814 the English, Portuguese and Spanish fought the French during the Peninsula War, but it was not until the battle of Waterloo in June 1815 that the wars were finally over, confirming British pre-eminence. Dutch possessions in Asia were occupied twice by the British, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. An unsatisfactory treaty between the two nations in 1814 did little to resolve specific issues or address the new balance of power. The VOC came to an inglorious and indebted end in 1800.

Meanwhile, the British were still searching for an alternative to Bengkulu. The shortcomings of its location on Sumatra's west coast had become increasingly evident as trade around the Melaka Straits increased. Forrest had been instructed to open an agency at Riau in 1784, but the Dutch moved first, capturing it the same year. More Bugis traders then dispersed along the Straits. In 1786 Captain Francis Light, a trader based at Phuket (Tanjung Salang, Junk Ceylon), was granted the island of Penang by his friend the Sultan of Kedah. Light explained his reasons to the acting Governor General in India:²

[At Penang] all vessels bound to China may procure refreshments and those articles of trade which best suit the Chinese markets, the Malays and Buggesses [Bugis] will have a place of Safety to come and purchase Opium, Piece Goods and Europe Manufactures. You

¹ Kapil Raj, "18th-Century Pacific Voyages of Discovery, 'Big Science,' and the Shaping of an European Scientific and Technological Culture," *History and Technology* 17, no. 2 (2000); Bronwen Douglas, *Science, Voyages, and Encounters in Oceania, 1511–1850* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

² Quoted in Andrew Griffin, "London, Bengal, the China Trade and the Unfrequented Extremities of Asia: the East India Company's Settlement in New Guinea, 1793–95," *Electronic British Library Journal*, 1990, p. 162, <http://www.bl.uk/ebj/1990/articles/article13.html>. See also Nordin Hussin, *Trade and Society in The Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).

will likewise in a short time, obtain a more exact knowledge of the state and utility of the Eastern Commerce.

The decision to establish a British outpost in Australia in 1786 was intended not only to solve the overcrowding in British prisons but also to gain a strategic foothold in the Asia-Pacific trade. Later settlements on the north Australian coast were meant to demonstrate British sovereignty and connect the southern colonies to Asian trade routes. The commitment to Australia increased London's focus on archipelago waters.³ John McLure of the Bombay Marine reached New Guinea in 1791, and his fellow officer John Hayes passed through when returning from his mapping of Australian coasts. Hayes, backed by Calcutta merchants, went on to found a short-lived settlement (New Albion, 1793–95) at the New Guinea trading centre of Dore, close to modern Manokwari. Massoi and nutmeg trees were planted, but the venture soon came to a miserable end.⁴

In transoceanic Asian trade Chinese tea and Indian opium had become the main commodities, locking Bengal, Surat and Coromandel in the west to China in the east. In India the number of so-called “free merchants” was still limited but grew rapidly as the thirst for Chinese tea mounted. Drinking tea became much more popular in England after the 1784 Commutation Act reduced duty from 119 per cent to 12.5 per cent.⁵ Chinese commodities continued to be the main prize, but the necessity of dealing with the Chinese themselves was increasingly experienced as irksome. The 1793 encounter between Qianlong, Emperor of China (r.1736–96) and the British envoy Lord George Macartney has become emblematic of both British confidence and of the diverging perspectives of the participants. Macartney's request for greater freedom for foreign merchants reflected their frustrations. He represented a Britain increasingly inclined towards free trade, while the Emperor saw overseas commerce in the context of state-managed ‘tribute missions’.⁶ The British brought scientific instruments to impress the Chinese, while Qianlong wrote a poem:⁷

Formerly Portugal presented tribute;
Now England is paying homage.
They have out-travelled Shu-hai and Heng-chang;

³ Paul Battersby, *To the Islands: White Australia and the Malay Archipelago since 1788* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007).

⁴ Griffin, “London, Bengal, the China Trade,” 151–2. The EIC was unimpressed, as the nutmeg was the wild New Guinea variant, not the true, round Banda nut. John McCluer's visit is commemorated by the naming of the McCluer Gulf, now Teluk Berau, the mouth of the Bird's Head.

⁵ Chris Nierstrasz, “The Popularization of Tea: East India Companies, Private Traders, Smugglers and the Consumption of Tea in Western Europe, 1700–1760,” in *Goods from the East, 1600–1800: Trading Eurasia*, ed. Felicia Gottmann, Hanna Hodacs, and Chris Nierstrasz (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁶ Henrietta Harrison, “Chinese and British Diplomatic Gifts in the Macartney Embassy of 1793,” *English Historical Review* 133, no. 560 (2018). David C. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); James L. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Mission of 1793* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

⁷ Cynthia Klekar, “‘Prisoners in Silken Bonds’: Obligation, Trade, and Diplomacy in English Voyages to Japan and China,” *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 6, no. 1 (2006): 84.

My Ancestor's merit and virtue must have reached their distant shores.
 Though their tribute is commonplace, my heart approves sincerely.
 Though what they bring is meagre, yet,
 In my kindness to men from afar I make generous return,
 Wanting to preserve my good health and power.

A triangular pattern of trade was gaining shape. Indian and Western imports, as well as regional commodities such as textiles were brought to Southeast Asian harbours where they were exchanged for cargoes of sea and forest products. As was noted in the previous chapter, this traffic was increasingly concentrated around the Melaka Straits, continuing the traditions of China's western seaways. These commodities were taken to China and used to obtain tea, silk and other goods. Trade along the old eastern route, focussed on the Sulu and Sulawesi seas, was limited by escalating insecurity, although it was to enjoy a semi-clandestine renaissance which came to be epitomised in the role of British Labuan after 1846.

As had been the case in the Seven Years War, Dutch and Spanish overseas territories were strategic assets during the revolutionary and Napoleonic campaigns. In the 1790s the English seized Dutch colonies in the first of two series of occupations. Batavia refused to surrender Java in 1795, but, with the aid of Tidore's rebel Prince Nuku, Banda was taken in 1796 and Tidore in 1797 (see below). Ternate, however, held out until 1801 and Kupang successfully resisted.⁸ The Timor chiefs expressed their own view to a British naval squadron in 1797, explaining "We rajas have the land, and Tuan [the VOC] has the sea". They then killed the British soldiers, and the ship retired, bombarding the settlement to rubble.⁹ The shoreline Chinese settlement suffered the most.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the British Resident of the Moluccas felt able to declare that his compatriots could now enjoy "the great advantage of the free and extensive command of the commerce of the Great East".¹¹

The British navy had planned to invade Manila, but forces had to be diverted to India. However, some ships were sent to Philippine waters to protect the EIC's annual, and extremely valuable, China Fleet. But in January 1797 a French squadron located the fleet in the Bali Straits, but the attack was deflected by a ruse. The British blockaded Manila during the Spanish-British war (1796–1803). A raid by British ships on Zamboanga in 1798 also tested Spanish defences.¹² The Manila Spanish allowed Chinese to dominate risky shipping. Trade between Manila and Sulu increased strongly, with Spanish and Portuguese European-rigged vessels sailing alongside native craft. By the early nineteenth century more

⁸ Peter A. Ward, *British Naval Power in the East, 1794–1805: The Command of Admiral Peter Rainier* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013).

⁹ Hans Hägerdal, *Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600–1800* (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), 405. The raja's statement was reported by the Dutch.

¹⁰ Steven Farram, "Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart and the British Interregnum in Netherlands Timor, 1812–1816," *BKI* 163, no. 4 (2007).

¹¹ Nicholas Tarling, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780–1824* (St Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1962), 60. R.Z. Leirissa, "The Structure of Makassar-Bugis Trade in Pre-Modern Moluccas," *RIMA* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993).

¹² C. Northcote Parkinson, *War in the Eastern Seas, 1793–1815* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954).

than a thousand Chinese in Jolo town were living, writes Warren, in “insecurity and fear”; they could only trade as clients of powerful datu.¹³

British knowledge of the eastern archipelagos deepened during their occupations of Spanish and Dutch colonies, while Dalrymple continued to promote the seas he knew so well. In 1795 he became the Admiralty’s first Hydrographer. Contributions to navigational knowledge also came from experienced shippers. James Horsburg, a Scots sailor with the EIC since 1762, had undergone several shipwrecks as a result of poor charts, and decided to make his own; these included, in the early 1790s, one of the Makassar Straits. He published his *Compendium* in 1810; it served as a standard navigation guide through the first half of the nineteenth century.¹⁴ William Milburn of the EIC also saw an opportunity; he issued the first version of his guide to “Oriental commerce” in 1813. This was an encyclopaedia of useful information on Asian ports, products, pricing and commercial opportunities: everything an enterprising captain needed to know. The first edition of a similar standard work by the American Nathaniel Bowditch had appeared earlier, in 1802. These books were regularly updated.¹⁵

By the 1780s, three archipelago commodities which had been fundamental to the Dutch Company’s profits had all become less rewarding. Timor’s sandalwood forests were depleted, pepper prices were falling, and cloves were no longer the luxury they had been a century earlier. But the VOC stubbornly pursued its familiar course. The fine spice trade, while never a complete monopoly, had been an economic success, so cloves and nutmeg remained central to economic strategy. But in 1780 the Company had been unable to pay its debts; government intervention was required, and a supervisory Committee imposed in 1790. In 1792, for the first time, it was necessary for the Dutch Navy to send ships to Asia to support the weakened VOC fleets.¹⁶ The winding-up of the VOC was painfully slow, unfolding during a period of political conflict, civil war and ideological fervour.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Dutch control was limited to Southwest Sulawesi and the subordinate territories on Sumbawa and Bima, the Obi-Ambon-West Seram corner

¹³ James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 126–30. Jolo’s Chinese population was thought to be about 1,200 in 1803 and about 1,000 in 1814.

¹⁴ Andrew S. Cook, “Establishing the Sea Routes to India and China: Stages in the Development of Hydrographical Knowledge,” in *The Worlds of the East India Company*, ed. H.V. Bowen, Margarete Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002); Andrew S. Cook, “Surveying the Seas: Establishing the Sea Routes to the East Indies,” in *Cartographies of Travel and Navigation*, ed. James R. Akerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

¹⁵ William Milburn and Thomas Thornton, *Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader’s Complete Guide: Containing a Geographical and Nautical Description of the Maritime Parts of India, China, Japan, and Neighbouring Countries, including the Eastern Islands, and the Trading Stations on the Passage from Europe ... And a Description of the Commodities Imported from Thence into Great Britain, and the Duties Payable Thereon* (London: Kingsbury, Parbury and Allen, 1825); Nathaniel Bowditch, *The New American Practical Navigator: Being an Epitome of Navigation* (New York: E. & G.W. Blunt, 1837).

¹⁶ G.L. Balk, F. Van Dijk, and D.J. Kortlang, *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta): Arsip-arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) ... Kota Batavia (Jakarta)* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 26; Jaap R. Bruijn, “Facing a New World: The Dutch Navy Goes Overseas,” in *Colonial Empires Compared: Britain and the Netherlands, 1750–1850*, ed. Bob Moore and Henk van Nierop (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

of the north Banda Sea, some small stretches of coast on Ternate and Bacan and of course Manado. Van Goor comments that “Batavia was on its way to becoming a Dutch-ruled free port, inhabited by mestizos and Chinese.”¹⁷ This may have been somewhat exaggerated in the case of the VOC capital, but it was certainly true of Makassar. Britain’s European blockades were renewed from 1803; from 1806 these were matched by Napoleon’s trade embargo.

Entrenched Interests, Tactical Liberalisation

In London, Dalrymple’s view that it was possible to dominate trade without the military and administrative expense of formal government was gaining acceptance. The loss of the American colonies in 1783 “provided an unintended step towards the Smithsonian belief that colonies represented a misallocation of capital and resources”.¹⁸ The relative merits of free trade and protectionism were hotly debated in business and government circles, in Spain and Holland as well as England.¹⁹ After the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Paris in 1784 the Netherlands reluctantly agreed to allow British ships freedom of navigation, a right which they had in fact been exercising since the 1760s.²⁰ The founding of the Australian colonies after 1788 brought more traffic to the eastern archipelagos. Several important transregional trends emerged, including an accelerated expansion of private maritime trade and a continuing diffusion of firearms.

Private trade by EIC officials in India had flourished until it was forbidden in the Cornwallis code of 1793.²¹ This opened greater possibilities for the free merchants, including Indian shippers, among whom were many Parsis. By the early nineteenth century there were up to 30 Bombay ships carrying opium to Guangzhou.²² These country traders continued to sail to Melaka Straits ports where they could obtain commodities such as tin and spices. Riau became a central rendezvous, reinvigorating clandestine traffic in the eastern archipelagos.²³ As shipping increased commission traders evolved into “agency houses”, pooling the capital and management skills of several partners. Their combination of commerce and banking helped bridge the geographical and institutional gaps in cross-regional business.²⁴ From 1797 the EIC took control over the production as well as the

¹⁷ Jurrien van Goor, “From Company to State,” in *Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in Asia*, ed. Jurrien van Goor (Hilversum: Verloren, 2004), 9.

¹⁸ Kenneth Morgan, “Mercantalism and the British Empire,” in *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914*, ed. Donald Winch and Patrick K. O’Brien (Oxford University Press, 2002), 194.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Tarling, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry*.

²¹ Anthony Webster, *The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790–1860* (Boydell, 2013), 26–8, 70–4; Chris Nierstrasz, *In the Shadow of the Company: The Dutch East India Company and Its Servants in the Period of its Decline (1740–1796)* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), chapter 4.

²² Jesse S. Palsetia, *The Parsis of India: Preservation of Identity in Bombay City* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

²³ Els M. Jacobs, *Koopman in Azie: De handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw* (Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2000), 158–9, 163–72.

²⁴ Anthony Webster, *The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta, 1767–1836* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007). Wong Lin Ken, “The Trade of Singapore 1819–69,” *JMBRAS* (1960): 11–16.

sale of opium, selling to licensed traders at auctions in Calcutta. When China renewed its ban on opium imports in 1799 the EIC prohibited exports in theory while requiring in practice that country traders continue to distribute it. Opium imports continued to soar through the 1800s.²⁵

With independence, the Americans were at last able to participate directly in the China trade. From 1787 discriminatory Navigation Acts made goods entering the new United States Federation prohibitively expensive unless they arrived on domestic vessels; this also applied to Asian commodities such as tea.²⁶ Skippers from northeastern ports (Boston, Salem, New York and Philadelphia) became more adventurous, and soon benefited from British blockades of Dutch and Spanish shipping in both Europe and Asia.²⁷ As trade with the east expanded, so too did their need for suitable exchange cargoes. Those from Boston tended to carry furs, but Salem shippers were often opportunistic “tramps” trading their way around Africa, India and maritime Southeast Asia. Manila was a favoured destination.²⁸ US shippers tended to bring in arms, European goods, Mexican dollars and, from the early 1800s, opium.²⁹

The British used American sales of arms to justify their own role in continuing to supply guns to Southeast Asian peoples. A certain hypocrisy was involved. Since the late eighteenth century there had been a notable and connected growth in the eastern archipelagos’ trade in both arms and slaves. Walter Lennon of the Madras army, serving in British-occupied Maluku, commented in 1796:³⁰

The trafacking of arms and military stores among a people very little civilized and who are sufficiently prompted by the possession of their arms to unprovoked hostilities against their neighbours is at all times dishonorable and unworthy of a great nation to permit;... In the

²⁵ Gregory Blue, “Opium for China: the British connection,” in *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Berkeley: University of California, 2000).

²⁶ Douglas A. Irwin, “Revenue or Reciprocity? Founding Feuds over Early US Trade Policy,” in *Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s*, ed. Douglas A. Irwin and Richard Sylla (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2010). The hated British Navigation Acts had been an important cause of the war. On the wider context, see: David Bulbeck, et al., *Southeast Asian Exports Since the 14th Century. Cloves, Pepper, Coffee and Sugar* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1998); Paul A. Van Dyke, *Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and Diplomacy on the South China Coast* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012); Jacques M. Downs, *The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784–1844* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014).

²⁷ “Scheepvaart en Handel,” in *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* (hereafter *ENI*), 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), 531–2.

²⁸ Thomas R. McHale and Mary C. McHale, *Early American-Philippine Trade: The Journal of Nathaniel Bowditch in Manila, 1796* (New Haven: Yale University, 1962).

²⁹ James R. Fichter, *So Great a Profit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

³⁰ W.C. Lennon, “Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands under the Command of Admiral Rainier,” *JSBRAS* 7 (1881): 359–60. Also in J.E. Heeres, “Eene Engelsche lezing omtrent de verovering van Banda en Ambon in 1796 en omtrent den toestand dier eilandengroepen op het eind der achttiende eeuw,” *BKI* 60 (1908). On Lennon and his role in Admiral Rainier’s expedition, see Tillman W. Nechtman, *Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 66–7.

course of the insurrection at Amboina there were taken from the natives in more than one instance muskets with the English E.I. Company's mark, which, being carried by the ships from Bengal to Warouw on the N.E. coast of Ceram, found their way from thence and were smuggled for cloves at Haroekoe and the coast of Hitoe, according to the confession of the people in whose hands they were found.

Penang competed with Dutch Melaka. In January 1794 Light emphasized the importance of the Bugis to this strategy:³¹

The Buggeses ... come annually to trade and remain two or three months ashore to the number of one or two thousand, they are during the time of their residence a part of our society ... they are the best merchants among the eastern islands ... their cargoes either in bullion or goods with the quantity of opium and piece goods they export make their arrival much wished for by all mercantile people.



Image 26 Two men of Rawak, northeast Waigeo, making fire, 1822³²

Bugis cloth was their main import. By 1800, most Bugis traders came from Borneo and Sulawesi; some settled by the Penang river.³³ However, Penang was too far west to conveniently serve the China trade and eastern archipelagos. London considered sites such

³¹ Quoted in Hussin, *Trade and Society*, 63, note 31.

³² "Twee inwoners van de eilanden Rawack en Waigeo in Indonesië maken vuur". By J.E.V. Arago, RM RP-P-1908-644. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.72122>. Published in Arago, *Promenade autour de monde*. Waigeo is one of the Raja Ampat islands, just west of New Guinea.

³³ *Ibid.*, 56, 63, 76–7. In the early nineteenth century ports of origin were Makassar, Pasir, Banjarmasin, Bali, Mandai (Mandar) and Sumbawa.

as Mindanao, where the sultan was willing, or even Sulawesi. But these were deemed too close to Spanish and Dutch territory. Other less feasible options included the northwest New Guinea coast, near Pitt's Passage by the Raja Ampat, or even Gebe.³⁴

The Philippines' enervating dependence on the trans-Pacific exchange began to be questioned in the late eighteenth century. The easy money gained through shares in galleon cargoes had stunted the private sector, which lagged far behind that of other Westerners.³⁵ Philippine Governor Jose Basco y Vargas (1778–87) reversed the old policy of limiting private commerce, in an attempt to increase income from taxation.³⁶ Basco focussed on cash crop production; indigo, pepper and hemp were grown for export. Tobacco became a government monopoly (1782–1883), which enabled Manila to become financially independent of Mexico. He also encouraged Chinese immigration; the last Chinese expulsion took place in 1785. These policies were largely irrelevant in the south.³⁷

From 1778 Manila merchants had been allowed limited free trade with Mexico and Madrid. In 1785 the Royal Company of the Philippines (RCF; *Real Compañía de Filipinas*) was formed and Asian shipping was admitted to Manila.³⁸ The RCF was intended to develop direct exchange between the Americas, the Philippines and Spain, in the hope that Manila would again become a centre for regional traffic. However, French and British shipping remained the port's chief suppliers of Indian and European goods; spices were concentrated in Dutch hands. Despite opposition, Manila was declared a free port for Western shipping carrying Asian (not European) goods in 1789. Traders were, however, forbidden from entering retail trade or the provinces. In the seas east of the

³⁴ Griffin, "London, Bengal, the China Trade," 161–6. Muridan Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-making in Maluku, c.1780–1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

³⁵ Ander Permanyer-Ugartemendia, "Opium after the Manila Galleon: The Spanish Involvement in the Opium Economy in East Asia (1815–1830)," *Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research* 10 (2014): 157. The Spanish *Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País* (Economic societies of friends of the country) were private associations introduced in the Philippines in 1781; they were established so like-minded men in business, industry and the professions could discuss ways of developing the islands and their resources, in accordance with enlightenment ideas. Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and James Sobredo, eds., *European Entry Into the Pacific: Spain and the Acapulco-Manila Galleons* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001).

³⁶ Tina S. Clemente, "Spanish Colonial Policy Toward Chinese Merchants in Eighteenth-Century Philippines," in *Merchant Communities in Asia, 1600–1980*, ed. Lin Yu-ju and Madeleine Zelin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); Arturo Giráldez, *The Age of Trade: The Manilla Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 188–9. Benito J. Legarda, *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1999), 71–85.

³⁷ Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 90; Ed. C. De Jesus, *The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines: Bureaucratic Enterprise and Social Change, 1766–1880* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980).

³⁸ The initial liberalisation was for three years, but it was apparently extended into the 19th century. John Bowring, *A Visit to the Philippine Islands* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1859); McHale and McHale, *Early American-Philippine Trade*, 1–15; Josip M. Fadera, "The Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy: A Survey of Recent Research of the Spanish Colonial Era," *Australian Economic History Review* 44, no. 3 (2004); Daniel F. Doeppers, *Manila 1900–1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial City* (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Monographs, 1985).

Bay of Bengal the significance of the Manila trade for the English was second only to the traffic with China.³⁹

Like Manila, Batavia increasingly concentrated on crops for world markets, particularly sugar and coffee from Java, where Dutch control was extended. After 1740 investment by Europeans in sugar mills had increased on Java, following the massacre of the Chinese planters and millers. Coffee production was initially managed by local elites but had become a VOC monopoly in 1723. The early nineteenth century witnessed further expansion in production for the market. American shippers had been big buyers of pepper and coffee since the late eighteenth century, while demand for cloves and pepper was also growing in Europe. However, these appetites were increasingly satisfied from sources outside the archipelagos, and prices were dropping.⁴⁰ For Manila and Batavia, commodity production was to prove a life-line in the early nineteenth century, when the colonies were struggling to overcome severe financial difficulties. The post-Basco Philippines and the VOC's promotion of coffee planting marked a shift which was eventually to transform rural Luzon and Java, the central regions of Spanish and Dutch control.⁴¹

Commercial shipping required some semblance of security, but seaborne raiding and piracy had grown dramatically since the 1770s, encouraged by the increased volume and value of commercial shipping and the diffusion of guns. Fierce "sea wolves" from Northern Borneo, the Sulu archipelago and the southern coasts of Mindanao attacked from the north; Papuan fleets from the southeast.⁴² Lennon observed: "The propensity to piracy ... is nowhere more dangerous than among the islands round the Moluccas viz. the Papoos or natives of New-Guinea, the people of Magindano and Sooloo and those of Borneo.... The Dutch [VOC] always kept a marine force for this purpose of several sloops, called pantjallangs, of about 16 guns each, but they were of a very rude construction and incapable of pursuing the prows to windward."⁴³

Changing Regimes

When the French moved into Holland in 1795, they were welcomed by the like-minded revolutionaries of the Batavian Republic (1795–1806). In 1796 the VOC directors resigned. A committee was formed in 1800 to run the Company, but it was deadlocked and ineffective. Napoleon's younger brother Louis was installed as king (1806–10); the Netherlands were absorbed by France in 1810. New ideas were introduced, but seldom

³⁹ Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 77–90; Permanyer-Ugartemendia, "Opium after the Manila Galleon"; Birgit Tremml-Werner, "Spain and the Opium Trade of East Asia: A Review of *La Participación Española en la Economía del Opio en Asia Oriental tras el Fin del Galeón* (The Spanish involvement in opium economy in East Asia after the Manila Galleon), by Ander Permanyer-Ugartemendia," *Dissertation Reviews*, March 31, 2015, <http://dissertationreviews.org/archives/10928>.

⁴⁰ Bulbeck, et al., *Southeast Asian Exports*; William G. Clarence-Smith and Steven Topik, eds., *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1500–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁴¹ Peter Boomgaard, *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History* (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2007).

⁴² J. Olivier, *Reizen in den Molukschen archipel naar Makassar, ... in het gevolg van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederland's Indië in 1824 gedaan en volgens de dagboeken en aanteekeningen van ondersch. Reisgenooten beschreven*, vol.1 (Amsterdam: Beijerinck, 1834), 228–9, 298.

⁴³ Lennon, "Journal of an Expedition," 361–2.

implemented.⁴⁴ With no clear colonial policy towards what soon came to be called *Nederlands-Indië*, or the Dutch East Indies, Louis sent the Dutch-born French army general H.W. Daendels out to Java to be Governor General (1808–10). His was the first of several regimes that sought to replace the VOC system based on “economically-feudal spheres of influence” with rational economic exploitation guided by a modern state.⁴⁵ The old, syncretic personalised system had to go. This project was also central to the policies of his successors: the British T.S. Raffles (1811–16), the Commissioners General (appointed by the Dutch king, 1816–18) and Governor General van der Capellen (1816–19).⁴⁶

In 1807 Daendels set sail on an American vessel, leaving a Europe in crisis. His priority was the defence of Java. He tried to raise revenue by selling land for private estates and intensifying tax-farming, which was almost all Chinese controlled. Surabaya was made the centre of Dutch naval power; Makassar was side lined. Daendels regarded virtually all the “outer islands” as not worth defending. The VOC outposts on Borneo’s west coast had already been given up in 1791, and he was eager to slash the prohibitively expensive garrison system even further. The base on Aru’s main island of Wokam (Tanah Besar) was closed in 1808 and that on Kisar in 1810. Numerous small forts around Banda and Ambon followed. This was not unjustified. Lennon had described the Company’s presence in the Southwestern Islands:⁴⁷

The S.W. Islands consist of 7, the chief of which is Kissur, where the Resident lives; his garrison consists of 50 men, a few of whom are detached to the adjoining islands. The only advantage drawn from these islands is some sandalwood, salted deer and a few slaves and the intercourse with it but once a year, when a small vessel is sent about the end of March and returns with the next monsoon in May. The natives of these islands are also represented as very ferocious and savage.

But Daendels had much bigger reductions in mind; Banjarmasin was abandoned in 1809. His advisors and (and the later, transitional Commissioners General, 1816–19) were more inclined to compromise, so moderation prevailed in the case of Ternate, which Daendels would have relinquished.⁴⁸

After British forces occupied the islands in 1811 Thomas Stamford Raffles became governor of “Java and its dependent territories”; by then the “territories” consisted only of Makassar and Kupang. The population of the latter once again resisted successfully. Raffles had long been sceptical of Dutch claims to control commerce in eastern waters.

⁴⁴ Johan Joor, “The Napoleonic Period in Holland from a Dutch Historical Perspective,” in *Napoleon’s Empire. European Politics in Global Perspective*, ed. Ute Planert (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

⁴⁵ Joop de Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin: De Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel 1595–1950* (’s-Gravenhage: Sdu, 1998), 167–80. Michael Rowe, ed. *Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State Formation in an Age of Upheaval, c.1800–1815* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

⁴⁶ Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin*, 174.

⁴⁷ Lennon, “Journal of an Expedition,” 354.

⁴⁸ P.H. van der Kemp, *Het herstel van het Nederlandsch gezag in de Molukken in 1817, naar oorspronkelijke stukken* (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1911), 387–400; Herman Willem Daendels, “Molukko’s,” in *Staat der Nederlandsche Oostindische bezittingen, onder het bestuur van den gouverneur-generaal Herman Willem Daendels, 1808–1811. Bylagen. Organique Stukken. Derde Stuk.* (1814).

Enterprising EIC and country shippers had been visiting some harbours for decades, particularly Bugis settlements round the Melaka Straits, on Bali, Borneo and Sulawesi. In a letter to his superior in India, Lord Minto, Raffles described the well-established trading ties between English, Wajorese and Mandar shippers.⁴⁹ Despite recent tensions “arising from the impossibility of explaining to the eastern nations the English system of blockade”, Raffles was convinced of the pro-British disposition of the Sulawesi states. He added that western Halmaheran settlements, ruled by a son of “our old ally the Sultan of Tidore” (Nuku) “have lately taken every means of evincing their tried attachment to the English nation”. He believed that Sulawesi, Halmahera and Bali were “capable of being rendered extremely formidable, through our means, to any other European power”.⁵⁰

The slave trade had long been a mainstay of regional commerce, but Raffles was a fervent opponent of the traffic. British interventions in the slave-exporting centres of Bali and South Sulawesi were in part driven by his conviction. During the 1780s anti-slavery movements in England, the US and revolutionary France gained support; abolition was formally placed on the political agenda in England with the 1783 Quaker petition to Parliament. New sensitivities also developed in the Netherlands, where in 1787 the highest VOC authorities expressed concern at the high levels of sickness, injury and death among slaves delivered to Batavia. They urged the Makassar authorities to ensure more humane treatment.⁵¹ From January 1, 1813, the slave trade was no longer permitted in the occupied islands. Slavery itself continued, but all slaves were to be registered and taxed.

VOC policies of monopoly and forced labour were retained in Manado, Maluku and Banda, even as the great increase in contact with British shipping forged new free-trading connections.⁵² Earl later observed that when the British left Aru’s trade free to follow its own course, “Bugis and Macassar sailors from Celebes, and Chinese from Java, entered into the traffic”. They became dominant “despite repeated attempts by the Dutch in Banda to restore it [shipping] to its old channels.”⁵³ British trading houses were already well

⁴⁹ Sophia Raffles, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S. &c., Particularly in the Government of Java 1811–1816, and of Bencoolen and Its Dependencies 1817–1824: with Details of the Commerce and Resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and Selections from his Correspondence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 66–8.

⁵¹ From the Netherlands Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Archief van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, hereafter VOC, by number and folio (page). VOC 3959: 56–7; Gerrit Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 118–20.

⁵² See, for example, comments by Lennon and Wallace that justified coerced labour: Lennon, “Journal of an Expedition,” 345; Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), 196–7.

⁵³ G.W. Earl, “The Trading Ports of the Indian Archipelago,” *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands etc.* 4 (1850): 493. The American traveler Albert Bickmore commented: “The period when the trade at Amboina was most flourishing was when it was last held by the English, from 1814 to 1815. The port was then free, but, when it once more passed into the hands of the Dutch, duties were again demanded, which forced the trade into other channels, where it still remains.” Albert Smith Bickmore, *Travels in the East Indian Archipelago* (New York: Appleton, 1869).



Image 27 Warriors of Ombai (Alor), 1825⁵⁴

established on Java before the occupation and continued to outnumber Dutch businesses even after 1816.⁵⁵

The young United States eventually declared war on Britain (1812–15). When all the fighting finally ended, in 1815, British maritime hegemony was unquestioned. Raffles was aware that American activities demanded “vigilant attention”:⁵⁶

Previous to the late embargo they were beginning to frequent the islands of Ceram, Goram and Ceram Laut, with other islands to the eastward of the Moluccas, for the purpose of picking up articles for the Chinese market, such as birds’-nests, sea-slug or tripang, tortoiseshell etc, and occasionally engaging in contraband trade in spices. Of late they have become still better acquainted with many of these islands, from their vessels having been employed by the Dutch.... The Americans, wherever they go, have no object but commercial

⁵⁴ “Guerriers de L’île Ombai”. J. Arago. Plate 33 from Louis-Claude Desaulces de Freycinet, Ch.H. Persoon, and C.A. Agardh, *Voyage autour du monde ...; exécuté sur les corvettes de S.M. l’Uranie et la Physicienne ...; 1817-20. Atlas Historique par Ms, J. Arago, A Pellion Etc.* (Paris: Pillet, 1825). Copy courtesy of the ASM.

⁵⁵ Alexander Claver, “Commerce and Capital in Colonial Java: Trade Finance and Commercial Relations between Europeans and Chinese, 1820s–1942” (PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, 2006), 42–46. Also, Joost Jonker and Keetie Sluyterman, *At Home on the World Markets. Dutch International Trading Companies from the 16th Century Until the Present* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000); G. Roger Knight, *Trade and Empire in Early Nineteenth-Century Southeast Asia. Gillian Maclaine and his Business Network* (Martelsham: Boydell & Brewer, 2015). G. Roger Knight, “Neglected Orphans and Absent Parents: The European Mercantile Houses of Mid-Nineteenth-Century Java,” in *Commodities, Ports and Asian Maritime Trade Since 1750*, ed. Ulbe Bosma and Anthony Webster (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁵⁶ Raffles, *Memoir*, 86.

adventure, and as firearms are in the highest request, these would be considered as the most profitable article. They have already filled the different clusters of islands in the South Seas with fire-arms, and they would not fail to do the same in the different Eastern islands.

The East India Company's renewed Charter of 1813 opened trade between Britain, India and Southeast Asia to Britain-based shippers; they could hire ships and trade with Asia as long as their ships weighed more than 350 tons. Private traffic was restricted to the main EIC Indian settlements. To protect English textile manufacturing Indian cotton goods could not be imported, boosting the manufacture and export of cheap British cloth and undermining India's own exports. Some ships from Britain brought cargoes directly to the islands, goods which had once been transhipped in Madras or Bombay. But since vessels using British ports had to be relatively large, the re-distributive space occupied by smaller, country trade ships increased, benefiting American and India-based skippers.⁵⁷ The EIC retained the monopoly on Britain's commerce with China.

In 1814 general terms were agreed for Britain's return of the Dutch colonies, but differing interpretations generated a decade of complex negotiations.⁵⁸ The idea of being responsible for large swathes of territory remained repugnant to both the Dutch and British governments, but they also needed to protect their core interests. For the Netherlands, this meant maintaining the territorial integrity of the area they claimed, even if they did not really administer it, while London focussed on protecting the sea-lanes, ports and, eventually, the coaling stations that served trade routes, particularly those leading to China.⁵⁹ Until wool became more important in the 1830s the Australian colonies depended primarily on whaling and sealing. Most sailed in southern waters but some hunted sperm whale in the Arafura and neighbouring seas which were, after all, their near north.⁶⁰

After the French defeat in 1815 the House of Orange returned to power in the new Kingdom of the Netherlands under Willem I (1815–39). The debate on colonial exploitation was renewed.⁶¹ When the Dutch returned in 1816 Batavia had virtually no sea-power, although two copper-bottomed schooners were taken over from the British for use as cannonade-boats (*kanonneerboten*) on anti-piracy, anti-smuggling and other duties.⁶²

⁵⁷ Wong, "Trade of Singapore," 29; Anthony Webster, *Gentleman Capitalists: British Imperialism in Southeast Asia 1770–1890* (London: Tauris, 1998).

⁵⁸ Harry J. Marks, *The First Contest for Singapore 1819–1824* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959).

⁵⁹ Webster, *Gentlemen Capitalists*, 88–110. Leigh R. Wright, *The Origins of British Borneo* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988); Cees Fasseur, "Een koloniale paradox: de Nederlandse expansie in de Indonesische archipel in het midden van de 19e eeuw (1830–1870)," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* (1979): 162–86.

⁶⁰ John Newton, *A Savage History: A History of Whaling in the Southern and Pacific Oceans* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2013).

⁶¹ J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944), 54–79.

⁶² P.H. van der Kemp, "P.T. Chassé's werkzaamheid als commissaris voor de overneming van Makassar en onderhoorigheden gedurende September–October 1816, blijkens eenige van hem uitgegane en nog niet uitgegeven rapporten," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 73, no. 1 (1917): 439.

The Netherlands navy temporarily ear-marked vessels to a colonial Auxiliary Fleet in 1813, but they eventually proved completely inadequate in combatting piracy, their main task. In practice, the distinction between “piracy” and the punitive hongî was blurred; this was certainly so in a case involving one early nineteenth-century Ambon official.⁶³ The capturing of slaves for sale remained big business in the eastern islands; in 1819 43 per cent of Batavia’s slaves were imported via Sulawesi (including Buton), nearly 20 per cent from Bali, and over 13 per cent from Nusa Tenggara.⁶⁴

Both the Netherlands and Spain had emerged from the Napoleonic wars exhausted. They were confronted by a triumphant Britain, maximising the advantages of its domestic coal and iron while benefiting from strong Indian and Chinese connections, a modern fleet, and an expanding, machine-driven textile industry.⁶⁵ The Netherlands had to re-organise their domestic political system, re-establish their authority in the Indies, most of which had been effectively abandoned, while generating profits for the battered home economy.⁶⁶ Spain was in similar straits, drained by the Peninsula War, turbulent politics, and the rebellions in Spanish America. Manila’s key exchange of silver for silks, and Batavia’s of Indian textiles for spices, were out of step with the new commercial focus on tea and, increasingly, opium. Because of the Spanish government’s war-time alliance with Britain an English firm had been allowed to operate in Manila since 1809, and from 1814 all nations could trade and settle in Philippine ports. In both Madrid and The Hague there were those who argued that free trade was the way to recuperate, but such market exposure was daunting. In both cases older reflexes prevailed.⁶⁷

By 1819 it seemed possible that a decisive shift towards a liberal trading regime was underway in maritime Southeast Asia. In that year Baron G.A.G.P. van der Capellen became governor general of the Netherlands Indies (1819–26); he had been one of the three general commissioners who arrived in Java in 1816 to re-assert Dutch control. This enlightened man sought to promote free trade, protect indigenous societies, curb the excesses of private business and reform administration.⁶⁸ More immediately, the founding

⁶³ R.Z. Leirissa, “Lambertus Schmit de Haart, Resident of Saparua, 1817–1823,” in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, Laage Vuursche, The Netherlands, June 1980* (Leiden: BIS, 1982).

⁶⁴ S. Abeyasekere, “Slaves in Batavia: Insights from a Slave Register,” in *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Lucia, Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1983).

⁶⁵ Paul Johnson Roderick Floud, ed., *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1. 1700–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁶⁶ Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, *The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 111–20.

⁶⁷ Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 94–6. Michael P. Costeloe, “Spain and the Latin American Wars of Independence: The Free Trade Controversy, 1810–1820,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 61, no. 2 (1981); Leonard Blussé, “Koning Willem I en de schepping van de koloniale staat,” in *Het begin van het koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, ed. Ido de Haan, Paul den Hoed, and Henk te Velde (Amsterdam: Prometheus/Bert Bakker, 2013); Charles Jurgens, “Op zoek naar betrouwbare informatie. De commissarissengeneraal en de stichting van de koloniale staat,” in *Het verre gezicht, politieke en culturele relaties tussen Nederland en Azië, Afrika en Amerika*, ed. J.T.L. Lindblad and A.F. Schrikker (Franeker: AHM, 2011).

⁶⁸ P.H. van der Kemp, *De Teruggave der Oost-Indische Koloniën 1814–1816* (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1910).

in 1819 of the British free port of Singapore at the foot of the Melaka Straits brought a bracing confrontation between protectionist aspirations and the unruly reality of trade.

Mindanao and Sulu

After the Sulu sacking of British Balambangan in 1775 regional trade increasingly focussed on Jolo, which grew in influence as the Maguindanau elite fragmented. Warren has described Sulu's commerce flowering in the late 1700s as Xiamen junks, Macau Portuguese and country traders from India sailed to Jolo carrying Indian textiles, metalware and, in the early nineteenth century, opium from the west. Spanish and Chinese shippers from Manila brought Chinese goods, imports from Spain, and probably sugar. Regular direct trade with Manila only began after 1787, as Spanish restrictions relaxed.⁶⁹ Since trepang was the main Sulu export, a predominance of Chinese was to be expected. Most Sulu products were re-exported from Manila to Portuguese Macau or Guangzhou. Manila merchants were interested in Cotabato's possibilities, concluding commercial agreements in 1794 and 1805.⁷⁰ The Sultanate continued to be closely monitored from the Zamboanga fort. The datu played a dangerous game, invoking help from Spain in their factional struggles. As Beckett points out: "The problem was, however, to prevent the allies from becoming masters."⁷¹

As was noted above, the founding of the Royal Philippine Company in 1785 and the opening of Manila to foreign shipping encouraged the development of cash crops in the northern islands, notably indigo and, more successfully, sugar. A cosmopolitan merchant class developed in Manila; foreign merchants handled 60 per cent of indigo, and 88 per cent of sugar. During and after the British blockade of 1796–1803 Chinese from Manila took a leading role in Luzon-Sulu traffic; the Spanish then preferred to invest in Chinese shipping rather than risk losing their cargoes.⁷²

After the blockade ended the Manila trade resumed. In 1804 an Englishman reported that: "a great part of [this] trade (say one half) has of late years been engrossed by the Dutch, the Portuguese, the Spaniards and the Americans, in consequence of the English not possessing any commercial depot, or port of exchange in these countries".⁷³ The Chinese community increased. Warren describes the resident Chinese in Sulu as low status clients of the datu, artisans, servants (including for rich Chinese), labourers and a few shopkeepers. Distributive trade was in the hands of Tausug datu, who would provide them with protection and sometimes capital for trade enterprises.⁷⁴ The "rich" Chinese no doubt did business with

⁶⁹ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 38–66.

⁷⁰ Shinzō Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003).

⁷¹ Jeremy Beckett, "The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato under Colonial Rule," *Asian Studies* 5 (1977): 54.

⁷² Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 80–90; Fadera, "Historical Origins."

⁷³ Quoted in Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 50.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 62–6, 126–7. Heather Sutherland, "Review Article: The Sulu Zone Revisited," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 35, no. 1 (2004).

the datu. In 1805 Sulu agreed to prevent foreigners from settling there without Spanish consent, a move meant to discourage adventurers from reinforcing the raiding fleets.⁷⁵

In 1810 Tomás de Comyn, the Manila agent of the Philippines' commercial company, published a detailed description of the territories:⁷⁶

[T]he Island of Mindanao alone, at the present moment, contains a population equal, if not larger, than that of Luzon, and the margins of the immense lake [Lake Lanao], situated in its center, are covered with well-built towns, filled with conveniences, the fruits of their annual privateering, and of the traffic they carry on with the inhabitants of the Island of Jolo. True it is, and it may be said, equally fortunate, that they are greatly divided into parties, subject to a variety of "datus," or independent chiefs, in name only inferior to the one who styles himself the sultan of the whole Island.

According to de Comyn Sulu was more united, formidable and wealthy than Maguindanau, as was mentioned in chapter 4.⁷⁷ A year later, when the EIC's John Hunt visited in 1811, he reckoned there were twelve "piratical establishments" at Jolo, with a total of approximately 200 perahu and 8,000 fighting men.⁷⁸

Accounts of Sulu usually emphasize raiding and marine exports, but Sulu was also an entrepot. De Comyn:⁷⁹

The sultan is absolute⁸⁰ and his subjects carry on trade with Borneo, Celebes, and the other Malayan tribes scattered about this great Archipelago.... The Chinese of Amoy, as well as the Dutch and British, carry them manufactured goods, opium and arms, receiving, in return, black pepper, bees' wax, *balato* [swords?], edible nests, tortoise-shell, mother-of-pearl, gold dust, pearls, etc., and from Manila also a vessel usually goes once a year with goods; but all act with the greatest precaution in this dangerous traffic, guarding, as much as possible, against the insidious acts of that perfidious government.

According to William Milburn's later account, tailored to the needs of country traders, several Chinese junks came to Sulu each year in March or April, departing in August. He later observed that trepang were sold, but "there is no great quantity of these articles to be

⁷⁵ Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908).

⁷⁶ Tomás de Comyn, *State of the Philippine Islands: Being an Historical, Statistical, and Descriptive Account of that Interesting Portion of the Indian Archipelago* (London: Allman, 1821). This was reprinted as Tomás de Comyn, "State of the Philippines in 1819," in *The Former Philippines thru Foreign Eyes*, ed. Austin Craig (New York: D. Appleton, 1917).

⁷⁷ Comyn, *State of the Philippine Islands*.

⁷⁸ John Hunt, "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia," in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of Papers*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore, 1837), 50–60. James F. Warren, "In the Name of Sovereignty: Spain's Tackling of Moro Piracy in the Sulu Zone, 1768–1898," in *In the Name of the Battle against Piracy: Ideas and Practices in State Monopoly of Violence in Europe and Asia in the Period of Transition*, ed. Atsushi Ota (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

⁷⁹ Comyn, *State of the Philippine Islands*.

⁸⁰ The power of the sultans varied considerably, depending on their ability to control the datu, but this description seems exaggerated.

obtained, perhaps not more than two or three cargoes during the season". The famous Sulu pearls were also an item of commerce. Milburn added that, despite the dangers, country ships from India occasionally visited.⁸¹ Bugis from southeast Borneo would come to Jolo and stay for six or eight months, leaving in January or February to collect illicit cargoes of spices and pepper from Maluku, returning to Jolo before the monsoon changed. Traditional meeting places for traders included the Sarangani islands and the small channel between Tambesan island and the northeast Borneo coast.⁸² These would have been typical sites for Sama Bajau to exchange commodities with visiting shippers. The Bugis were mainly interested in Sulu's slave markets.

Maluku, Tidore and the East

By 1780 the people of Maluku were involved in two existential crises: the political upheaval of the Nuku rebellion, and the steady erosion of the spice-focussed system which had dominated the region for over a hundred years. Centuries of migration, politico-commercial exchange and ritual ties had forged an enduring axis connecting Tidore, the east Halmaheran Gamrange (Maba, Patani, Weda), east Seram and west New Guinea. This had been strengthened by the re-orientation of Tidorean interests following the Sultanate's forced withdrawal from the spice trade in 1657. This axis reasserted its power during Nuku's rebellion. His core supporters from the Raja Ampat and Seram were joined by men from the Gamrange, west Halmahera's Gamkonora and by Galela, Tobelo and Tobaru from northeast Halmahera. Men from Aru, Kei and Maguindanau also mobilised; these groups had histories of shared experience in raiding and trading fleets. Most would have been experienced maritime fighters, skilled in the use of bows and arrows, spears and swords. The rebellion slackened around 1790; the Dutch forced the Gamrange people to move to the west coast, closer to Ternate. But they soon re-joined the cause, and Nuku was stronger than ever. The status of the various contingents' leaders wavered between that of pirate chief and petty king; this was by no means unusual, but in this case was played out at a higher level than most such histories.

The English country traders and Nuku were natural allies; both were opposed to Ternate. The prince supplied the British with intelligence, men, ships and spices, receiving weapons, ammunition and recognition in return. In 1783 a Dutch fleet was captured; all VOC outposts on Tidore were taken, and the Europeans killed. In 1796 the EIC took Ambon and Banda; Nuku provided most of the fleet when their joint forces captured Ternate in 1801. Nuku was confirmed as Sultan Amir Muhammad Saifuddin of Tidore (1801–05). Trading ties with the western archipelagos increased. Although the 1802 Peace of Amiens ended overt EIC backing for Tidore, captains continued to offer tacit support as any weakening of Dutch claims increased British freedom of navigation. Nuku continued to defy Batavia until his death in 1805.⁸³

⁸¹ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 412.

⁸² Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 11–2.

⁸³ Widjojo, *Revolt*.

To ensure Halmaheran support, in 1797 Nuku had appointed a raja (or sultan) of Jailolo, Muhammad Arif Bila (1797–1807), thus ending a royal vacancy of just over 140 years. However, many Halmaherans, particularly in areas traditionally under Ternate, resented Jailolo's subordinate relationship with Tidore and refused to accept their Makian-born ruler. The Jailolo raja led a familiar coalition of raiders, linking Halmaherans (Tobelo, Galela and Loloda) plus seafarers from Raja Ampat, north and east Seram and Mindanao. Batavia regarded him as just another pirate warlord, despite his ties to Tidore. When in 1806 Nuku's successor as ruler of Tidore was unable or unwilling to deliver the recalcitrant Jailolo raja to the Dutch, the Sultan was deposed and Tidore's fortifications razed. The rulers of Tidore and Jailolo then fled to east Halmahera's Gamrange along with assorted nobles; the Jailolo raja died there in an accident. His son and successor, Muhammad Asgar (1808–18) bent the knee and acknowledged Ternate. However, he remained dependent on raiding for a large part of his revenues and was consequently a hunted man. During the occupation the English refused to recognise him as ruler, captured him and sent him into exile.⁸⁴

The struggle was continued by Muhd. Asgar's brother, Hajuddin, who led the wandering life of a noble in search of a state. Hajuddin attracted about 3,000 followers, and eventually he and his people settled on Seram's north coast, where Dutch influence had effectively evaporated with the end of the Ambonese hong'i. This self-proclaimed raja Jailolo's subjects were not only east Halmaherans, but also Tobelo, Kao and Galela from the north, Papuans, north and east Seramese as well as disaffected Tidorese who rejected the post-1806 Tidore sultan. Soon their forces numbered seven to eight thousand. Allies from the Gamrange communities raided pro-Dutch settlements but were driven away by the Ternaten hong'i in 1822.⁸⁵

Such turbulence was by no means unknown; trade had often co-existed with heightened raiding and warfare. In the early nineteenth century demand for New Guinea commodities such as slaves and birds' nests was so high that commerce surged.⁸⁶ This traffic was still generally dominated by shippers from Seram, Tidore and regional Chinese. Seram Laut's Kilwaru played a key role. Southeast Seramese sailed as far south as Timor, and to Java in the west. They carried gold, cloth and rice from Bali, gold, amber, cloth and wax from Bima, and cloth and gold from Buton. In exchange they fetched textiles and rice from Java and, from Makassar, Indian piece-goods, European guns, Chinese porcelain and bronze gongs. Bugis and Bali-based vessels also traded at Seram Laut; the former brought Western

⁸⁴ This paragraph is based on Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines"; Widjojo, *Revolt*; Leonard Y. Andaya, *World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*, 1st ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), 220–38, esp. 222, 233.

⁸⁵ Esther Velthoen, "Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 204–5. R.Z. Leirissa, *Halmahera Timur dan Raja Jailolo: pergolakan sekitar laut Seram awal abad 19* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1996). Christiaan F. van Fraassen, "Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1987), 57.

⁸⁶ Typical cargoes were plumes, karet, trepang, massoi, damar and pearls, which were exchanged for sago, rice, salt, tobacco, opium, Indian clothes and Javanese sarongs, red and blue calico, Chinese ceramics and porcelain, swords, daggers and knives, axes, guns and rifles, gunpowder, silver ornaments, brass and copper wire and coral.

and Chinese goods from Singapore, Makassar and other ports; the latter offered rice while seeking Papuan slaves. Sago and other foodstuffs were available as provisions or cargo.⁸⁷

Buginese, Butonese and Seram traders continued to trade at Onin, where the Geser-Gorom language was the trading lingua franca, alongside Malay. The traders intermarried, introduced new ideas, including Islamic beliefs and practice, and raided for slaves with their Papuan allies. Dore was the main base for bird traders and hunters, but boats sailed far beyond Cenderawasih Bay, seeking plumes, wax, tortoiseshell and slaves. For the Dutch, Tidore's value lay primarily in its monopoly enforcement and its claims to authority over the islands and coasts handling the west Papua trade. These seemed remote to Batavia, and their products of little interest to Europeans. However, the growth of the China trade and British involvement in Maluku wars changed the equation, giving the Sultanate a revived, transregional significance.

Ambon and Banda

Cloves and nutmeg had kept the VOC focussed on Maluku, but the machinery of spice production, based on monopsony, serfdom and slavery, was unable to respond effectively to changing world markets. In Banda the creole planters themselves had to adjust to changing prices and commercial competition, while Batavia was directly responsible for Ambon's economy. Clove prices were falling, helped by recurrent overproduction in Ambon. Despite this, the islands' growers were tied to their villages and their allocated trees, producing superfluous harvests through relentless forced labour. This downward spiral was of great concern to Batavia. As was noted above, the forced cultivation of nutmeg trees had been added to that of cloves. In 1785 people were forced to plant and maintain 10,000 of these trees, producing c. 3,000 pounds of nutmeg and mace a year. As for cloves, in 1792 there were still some 300,000 trees. After three years of good harvest the market was choked. Nonetheless, the monopoly was maintained by "force and violence", the death penalty applied to those who sold spices to anyone other than the VOC.⁸⁸

In June 1785 the Governor of Ambon prepared the usual transfer memorandum for his successor. He described the problems caused by the clove surplus and his attempts to introduce cotton "in order to provide the native with a means of livelihood, on the one hand, and on the other to distract him from too careful a cultivation of his clove trees". This proved unsuccessful, as did "pepper growing, rice plantations, indigo and sandalwood cultivation". Although cacao had been growing in Ambon since the second half of the seventeenth century, samples were rejected as inferior by "the administrators of Batavia's medicine store" who tested commodities. Local sandalwood was used in shipbuilding but was also deemed unsuitable for export.⁸⁹ The governor concluded: "But

⁸⁷ R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 103–4. Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands Until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996), 142.

⁸⁸ E.W.A. Ludeking, "Schets van de Residentie Amboina," *BKI* 3 (1868).

⁸⁹ Gerrit Knaap, *Memories van Overgave van Gouverneurs van Ambon in de Seventiende en Achtiende Eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 475–7; W.G. Clarence-Smith, *Cocoa and Chocolate 1765–1914* (London: Routledge, 2000).

the indolent nature of the inhabitants ... is suited above all else for the cultivation of coffee, seeing it flourished here and needs no great labour or care". However, he added, since the Company obtained all the coffee it needed from Java there was no point in encouraging it in Ambon.⁹⁰ The British had easily occupied Ambon and Banda in the first wave of occupations (1796–1803).

Daendels, preoccupied with the Indies defence, decided to kill two birds with one stone in Ambon. He decreed that all inhabitants, including those from the villages (*negrri*), could enter the army; previously such freedom of movement had only been extended to the town's inhabitants. Initially two to three thousand fled to Batavia; somewhat later there was another similar migration. After the 1814 formation of a separate colonial army, the later KNIL (*Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger*, the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) the Ambonese and their fellow Christians from the Minahasa became favoured recruits.⁹¹ More of Ambon's people were also leaving the villages to seek work closer to home. Some found a new urban identity as *borger* (the Ambon term for *burger*) joining the town-dwelling and culturally creole community.⁹² The arrival of the missionary Joseph Kam in 1816, with his teachers' training institute, fortified local Christian identities, widening the gap with Muslim fellow-islanders but reinforcing identification with the colonial regime.⁹³

On Banda the VOC had encouraged burgher planters to sail to Papua and the Southeast Islands to buy slaves, but their interests soon diversified. Under the British trade restrictions were in abeyance, so Banda's true trade was documented. Local shippers were taking manufactures and foodstuffs (rice, sago) to Aru with the December to February monsoon to exchange for slaves, pearls, birds' nests, tortoiseshell, trepang and birds of paradise. Tanimbar-bound vessels left somewhat later, taking much the same cargoes and seeking similar products. Ellen describes Seram traders as gatekeepers for the New Guinea and Aru trade, with Goromese selling protection to Makassarese and Chinese in Aru.⁹⁴ Some well-armed ships went as far as New Guinea itself for sea and forest products as well as slaves. Lennon noted:⁹⁵

One Burgher alone here, mr. Steemberg, has seven brigs in this trade. For the purpose of guarding the trade, there is a party of 40 men [on Aru] under the Resident; but the year before last the garrison was cut off; however it was shortly after reinstated by the above gent., who was well known to the inhabitants and put an end to hostilities with his own slaves, who are very numerous.

⁹⁰ Knaap, *Memories*, 477.

⁹¹ Olivier, *Reizen*, 130; Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolization and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens and Singapore: Ohio University Press and NUS Press, 2008), 166–73.

⁹² R.Z. Leirissa, "Social Development in Ambon During the 19th Century: Ambonese Burger," *Cakalele* 6, no. 1–11 (1995): 150–9. For Dutch attitudes, see M.J.C. Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983* (Leiden: KITLV, 1998), 55.

⁹³ Marianne Hulbosch, *Pointy Shoes and Pith Helmets: Dress and Identity Construction in Ambon from 1850 to 1942* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

⁹⁴ Ellen, *On the Edge*, 105.

⁹⁵ Lennon, "Journal of an Expedition," 353–4.



Image 28 Waru, north coast of East Seram, c.1839⁹⁶

Banda traders visited Timor in September and took Batavian cargoes to Ternate in August–September; in September–October they went to Ambon. In April, they sailed to the Seram Laut islands, offering coarse textiles in exchange for commodities brought from New Guinea. These would be taken back to bigger merchants in Banda who sent them to Java. Between June and September Banda shippers sailed to Batavia, Timor and Ternate, and somewhat later to the Ambon islands.⁹⁷ Some of those merchants were probably Arab. The first evidence of Banda’s well-known Baadilla family is the 1797 gravestone of Said bin Aidit, an Arab who may have arrived in the wake of the English. Family tradition connects him with the later head of Banda’s small Arab community, Desa Abdullah, who had come from Melaka during the British occupation of 1810–11. Maluku’s Arabs competed with Chinese traders from Makassar, particularly in Ambon and Banda. By the 1820s Ambon’s Arab community had its own recognised headman, the agent for a rich Arab trader on Java.⁹⁸

In Maluku the British interregnums had been relatively prosperous. Raffles had hoped, in vain, that the islands would remain British, and a treaty between the British and Maluku rulers was signed in 1814. When Batavia’s rule resumed in March 1817, hard times returned. Nicolaus Engelhard, one of the Commissioners charged with the restoration of Dutch authority in Maluku, was a man whose “detailed knowledge of the concrete

⁹⁶ “Rade et village de Warrou (île Ceram)”. Drawing by Louis de Breton. Plate 126 in Jules Sébastien César Dumont d’Urville, *Voyage au Pôle Sud et dans l’Océanie sur les corvettes l’Astrolabe et La Zélée, exécuté par ordre du Roi pendant les années 1837, 1838, 1839, 1840. Atlas pittoresque* (Paris: Dide, 1846). Copy from the library of De Gray, 70100 France; accessed through Wikimedia Commons Images.

⁹⁷ Ellen, *On the Edge*, 103–4; Heeres, “Engelsche,” 354.

⁹⁸ Des Alwi, *Friends and Exiles: A Memoir of the Nutmeg Isles and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell SEAP, 2008), 11–3. Desa Abdullah was said to be the elder brother of the Malacca-born Munshi Abdullah, Raffles’s teacher and adviser, a man of Tamil and Yemeni descent. But he writes in his autobiography that all his brothers died. Said was the father of Awad Baadilla, who was the father of Abdullah Baadilla who used a steam ship in his trade with Gresik, East Java. Ellen, *On the Edge*, 238–9.

phenomena made him sceptical of new speculative ideas”. He believed that that “no system of free enterprise could yet replace the Company’s tributary system”.⁹⁹ He had no illusions about Maluku’s trade potential:¹⁰⁰

Throughout the Moluccas the trade in the government settlements is extremely limited, consisting of birds’ nests, trepang, agar-agar, wax, massoi, pearls, mother-of-pearl, turtleshell, dried birds of paradise and wooden objects, which are brought from New Guinea, the Papuan Islands [Raja Ampat] and Halmahera, or shipped in by the Serammers, in exchange for fine Chinese goods, such as raw silk, silken materials, nankin [textiles], or other Chinese linens, porcelain, steel pans, western or Chinese cloth, rice, arak, corals, bush-knives, mirrors, machetes etc, which are brought in from Java or Makassar; some is re-exported by the Serammers by way of smuggling to Borneo or Bali. Gross profits are made on this traffic, but it is also accompanied by many losses, dangers and trouble, because of the nature of the peoples with whom the trade is conducted, in particular, the New Guineans and the Papuans, alongside which you also have the multitude of pirate vessels, which make the seas unsafe, and impede the traders’ voyages.

The re-established Dutch Government of the Moluccas confirmed the spice monopoly and continued extirpation expeditions. It was immediately confronted by a Christian-led revolt on Saparua, which lasted more than six months.¹⁰¹ The Ternate and Tidore sultans duly raised the hong; nobles and chiefs led their “Alfuren” to fight for the colonial government, first in Saparua in 1817, and again in the Java War (1825–30). In return Batavia helped keep them on their thrones and continued to pay compensation for the Sultans’ long-lost spice income—Ternate received fl.16,320, Tidore fl.12,800.¹⁰² Some might have wondered if the Sultans’ amenability in fighting for Batavia might undermine their legitimacy, but punitive raids were a well-established tool for enforcing authority.

Trade on the eastern frontier also offered opportunities for foreigners. A very small handful of European traders managed to thrive, mainly in the New Guinea traffic. Captain Deighton was an English resident of Manado, whose ships sailed from Ternate to Halmahera and New Guinea. Deighton and Co. had been visiting “trading stations above the great [Cenderawasih] bay” every year since the early 1800s. His schooners would lie for weeks or months in the bay, loading cargoes of trepang, massoi and turtle-shell. He maintained several warehouses, employing local men as agents; he even had a house built on the island Roon, near the Wandeman gulf in the Bay. He could trade there because he had built good relations with the locals and was generally trusted.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ J.J. van Klaveren, *The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953), 78.

¹⁰⁰ Kemp, *Het herstel*, 397–8. This book reprints articles from BKI.

¹⁰¹ “Nederlandsch Indie in 1817,” *TNI* 23, no. 5 (1861): 339–48; Kemp, *Het herstel*; Leirissa, “Mestizos.”

¹⁰² Fraassen, “Ternate,” 58.

¹⁰³ Wallace, *Malay Archipelago*. Roelof Broersma, “Koopvaardij in de Molukken,” *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 23 (1934): 11–16; A. Goudswaard, *De Papoea’s van de Geelvinkbaai* (Amsterdam: H.A.M. Roelants, 1863). See also the note *De Papoea’s van de Geelvinkbaai* (Timo de Jong en Martijn van den Brink at <https://historiek.nl>).

Sulawesi

Divergence between the main political arenas of Sulawesi increased considerably in the late-1700s and early 1800s. Makassar remained the main port for trans-regional traffic and the diplomatic and military representative of Dutch Batavia. On the northern peninsula Manado's fertility led to direct exploitation, while Gorontalo began to emerge as a port handling regional commodities, encouraging increased migration and thickening commercial networks. These were part of the on-going diffusion of Bugis trade, which was linked to the third and widest arena, where Bone, Ternate and other states competed for influence. The Makassar Governor's main preoccupation was keeping track of the competitive manoeuvres and shifting alliances of the peninsula's restless inhabitants. In the early nineteenth century Bone rulers remained crucial allies; they were still spending a couple of months a year at their court at Bontoala, just east of the city, controlling much of densely settled north Makassar and the vigorous Bugis market. This was frequented by those traders, such as the Wajorese, who had links to Bone or just preferred to avoid the higher fees, customs duties and cargo inspections of the Dutch harbour in front of the fort.

Makassar's late eighteenth-century junk was larger than that of previous and later decades; such transoceanic junks could easily measure 400 *lasten* or 800 tons, carrying a crew of more than a hundred sailors as well as passengers.¹⁰⁴ The annual visit of these vessels was the high point of Makassar's trading year. They usually stayed months in port (February to June was typical), and were huge compared to local craft. Fishermen and traders sailed out to gather their sea and forest produce in anticipation of its arrival. Chains of transactions collected the outward-bound cargo and distributed imported goods.

The seventeen petty realms along the north Sulawesi and Tomini coasts had been contracted by the VOC to deliver rice, gold and coconut products. They included Kuandang on the northern and Bolaang Mongondow on the southern shore. Strategic Parigi was also considered part of Manado. Six small Gulf polities, including Poso and Tojo, had no relations with Batavia. The Dutch had always paid less than independent traders, and hence had only received a small proportion of valuable cargoes such as gold.¹⁰⁵ The Company had already dropped all claims to marine products such as turtle-shell and mother of pearl.¹⁰⁶

The differences between the Manado coasts and those of the rest of the island had become pronounced by the early nineteenth century. Since the mid-1600s the Minahasa had been providing the VOC with rice, and despite frequent raids from the north it continued to supply Dutch settlements. Export-focussed agriculture produced rice, cocoa (mainly for Manila) and later coffee. A limited clandestine trade continued with Mindanao and Maluku; this included some spices. The pattern remained much the same

net/de-papoeas-van-de-geelvinkbaai/69671/, accessed 24 February 2017. They describes the agent G.J. Fabritius, a retired naval lieutenant, who lived on Roon in Papua's Cenderawasih Bay for fifteen months. G.W. Earl, *The Native Races of the Indian Archipelago: Papuans* (London: Hippolyte Bailliere, 1853), 78.

¹⁰⁴ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 49, 72, 99, 147.

¹⁰⁵ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 93.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 93, 98–9; J.E. Heeres and F.W. Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, vol. 6 (1955), 571–2.

at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Resident in Manado called upon the *walak* or district chiefs for goods such as rice and timber as well as services.¹⁰⁷ After the harvest the chiefs brought their deliveries to the Resident or to the commandants of the four outposts at Kema, Likupang, Tanawangko and Amurang. The commandants were not Company employees, but individual creole rice and textile traders. Once or twice a year they reported to Manado and collected their dues.¹⁰⁸ The Manado Chinese had mostly arrived via Manila; Dutch officials blamed their exports for declining supplies of wax.¹⁰⁹ In 1810, just before the British arrived, Batavia introduced a rice monopsony; this remained in force until 1852.¹¹⁰ Dutch exploitation of the fertile Minahasa began to resemble that of Ambon and Banda in its intensity.



Map 18 South Sulawesi¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Schouten, *Leadership*, 54–6.

¹⁰⁸ F. Watuseke and D. Henley, “C.C. Predigers verhandeling over het plaatselijke bestuur en de huishouding van de Minahasa in 1804,” *BKI* 150, no. 2 (1994): 375–81; Schouten, *Leadership*, 54–6.

¹⁰⁹ Schouten, *Leadership*, 55–6; Watuseke and Henley, “C.C. Predigers verhandeling,” 368.

¹¹⁰ Henley, *Fertility*, 67.

¹¹¹ Map based on John Villiers, “Makassar: The Rise and Fall of an East Indonesian Maritime Trading State, 1512–1669,” in *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 144.

On the southwest peninsula Bone had few challengers. The influence of Luwu, at the northern end the Gulf of Bone, had faded. Its outlets in the Palopo area had lost their iron exports to Tobungku and Bugis harbours in the Bone Gulf. Sidenreng's ties with the southern Toraja of the interior had surpassed those of Luwu. Wajo's power, which had been so aggressively displayed during La Madukelleng's wars, had subsequently declined as he had undermined the traditional collective leadership. Between the end of his reign in 1754 and 1770 there were four different arung matoa, and between 1770 and 1795 there was no paramount ruler at all. Diaspora involvement in Wajo politics seems to have decreased, perhaps because the overseas communities were becoming integrated into more wide-ranging commercial networks.¹¹² The VOC continued to regard Ternate as their surrogate in the east, but the political dynamics favoured Bugis Bone,

Velthoen makes the crucial point that the origins of Ternatan and Bone Bugis diaspora groups were very different, as were their relationships with their rulers. Bugis who had migrated from Bone territories tended to be traders, forging advantageous links with local headmen, or establishing themselves as key economic and political brokers. Their links with the Bone elite were often diffuse. They might present themselves as Bone subjects when this offered chances of protection or advantage, and they would have been obliged to make appropriate gifts when returning home or if they encountered Bone envoys. Only the most established Bugis settlements paid regular tribute or trade dues to the ruler.¹¹³ Moreover, since the later 1600s Bone had benefited from maintaining courts at Bontoala as well as Watampone, giving it greater familiarity not just with VOC officials, but also with west coast trading communities handling long-distance traffic. Dutch-backed Ternate's approach was more narrowly political. The Sultans placed aristocratic envoys in strategic centres who worked with local authorities to ensure tribute, prevent hostile alliances among their clients, and mobilise manpower. This is not to say that the Ternate representatives, the *utusan* or envoys, did not cultivate their own local interests; some also sought adventure and profit by sea.

The British who occupied Makassar between 1812 and 1816 faced a complex political situation. Several Bugis rulers, led by Bone and including the datus of Tanette and Suppa, insisted that the Dutch defeat had cancelled all treaties, so they were again fully independent. In 1812 a British expedition was organised to teach them otherwise, but it was repulsed. Bone effectively demanded recognition as co-ruler in Makassar, suzerainty over Talloq, and control over the Northern districts and part of Bulukumba. This was unacceptable. Two years later British forces, supported by Gowa, Soppeng and Sidenreng, succeeded in expelling the autonomous Bugis community from Makassar, and dispersed their settlements around Parepare. Wajo had remained neutral, Gowa divided. The "mountain Makassarese" continued to be loyal to Sangkilang and his "bandit" son, Karaeng Data, who the British had allowed to settle in Galesong, just south of the city. But Karaeng Data continued his raiding, supported by Bone, defying the Dutch-appointed Gowa ruler who was accepted in the coastal plains.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Kathryn Anderson Wellen, *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora* (DeKalb: NIU, 2014), 137–59.

¹¹³ Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines."

¹¹⁴ Christian Pelras, *The Bugis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 272; Abdurrazak Daeng Patunru, *Sedjarah Gowa* (Makassar: Jajasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, 1972).

Bone had been developing Parepare on Sulawesi's west coast as a potential alternative to Makassar. The harbour, some 130 km to the north, was closer to the Mandar coast and the Palu-Parigi crossing, serving Makassar Straits ports and ships using the partly overland route to the Tomini Gulf. The latter also led to east Sulawesi's Tobungku, Tomori Bay and Banggai. An alternative was to sail along the south Sulawesi coast and then turn north. Parepare also traded with Banjarmasin, Riau, Palembang and Sulu. Bone's main ports on the west peninsula's east coast were the Sama Bajau settlement of Bajoe, which had long ties to the court, and Palima, a couple of miles up the Cenrana River.¹¹⁵ The British campaigns made little difference to Bone's overall pre-eminence, but the loss of their Makassar lands transformed the town and reoriented Bone's political horizons, intensifying competition with the rising state of Sidenreng to the west.¹¹⁶

The growing demand for marine and forest commodities increased interest in Sulawesi's southeastern peninsula, which offered these in abundance. The Bone ruler rejected Ternate's claims to Banggai, where there was continuing penetration by Bugis shippers and settlers. The shores were frequented by Sama Bajau, who congregated in the waters off the Banggai archipelago.¹¹⁷ These coasts were dangerous, troubled by local wars, headhunting and heavy raiding by Sulu-Mindanao fleets. Neighbouring Tobungku communities combined exchange with active links to predatory fleets from the southern Philippines and Tolitoli in north Sulawesi. Their ten main settlements were located on river estuaries, and well situated to connect with ships sailing between southwest Sulawesi, Maluku and the Tomini gulf.¹¹⁸

In the early nineteenth century the strategic Togian islands in the middle of the Tomini Gulf began to surpass the east coast as a source of natural goods. The Gulf remained an open commercial frontier, linked to the main east Sulawesi coast via trails and coastal shipping, but it was also close to the west coast, particularly the Mandar regions, via the Parigi-Palu trail, and was subject to intensifying Mandar and Bugis exploitation. The history of the small domain of Tojo on the southeastern Gulf reflects these changing political tides. It was once tributary to Limboto, near Gorontalo, but its location made it a very attractive base for eighteenth century Bugis who settled there to export the wax, damar and rattan gathered by the shifting cultivators of the interior. Increased migration tightened ties with Bone, and Tojo became a satellite state of the Bugis kingdom.¹¹⁹

In theory the federations of many small domains further towards the south of the eastern peninsula had come under Dutch suzerainty with the defeat of Makassar. But the highland territories of Laiwui, north of the Sampara plain, had no contact with the Dutch, despite an early treaty. Most of inland southeast central Sulawesi was uninhabited, except for small groups of semi-nomadic, headhunting communities. Even many of the relatively accessible settlements remained independent, while others more to the south acknowledged

¹¹⁵ Horst Liebner, "Four Oral Versions of a Story About the Origins of the Bajo People of Southern Selayar," unpublished paper, Universitas Hasanuddin, Makassar (1996), 12, 17.

¹¹⁶ Heather Sutherland, "Power and Politics in South Sulawesi: 1860–1880," *RIMA* 17 (Winter/Summer, 1983).

¹¹⁷ Widjojo, *Revolt*; Velthoen, "Pirates"; Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 160–97; Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines," n.p.

¹¹⁸ Henley, *Fertility*, 242–7. Pelras, *The Bugis*.

¹¹⁹ *ENI*: "Todjo".

the Kendari raja, who had some influence in the Kanaweeha /Sampara valleys as well as on the coast.

Kendari Bay was long and narrow, with an almost invisible entrance. It was easy to defend, with an abundance of food, fresh water and timber. It was well known to visiting traders seeking marine commodities; most were Bugis who settled on a small island near the entrance. There they could barter with Tolaki from the interior, while having some protection from their raids. Sama Bajau communities frequented the offshore islands; in the early nineteenth century their presence in Kendari Bay increased. The mixed coastal populations consisted of Buginese, Sama Bajau and settlers from Ternate and Seram; inland lay the Tolaki kingdom, Konawe, with an estimated 1830 population of 7,000; it was rich in forest products and red rice. Kendari was one of the two Bugis settlements on opposite sides of Sulawesi's southeastern peninsula that were destined to grow into significant ports in the later nineteenth century: Kolaka on the western side, linked to the Mekonggo realm, and Kendari (or Konawe) to the east.¹²⁰

Banjarmasin

During his long reign Sultan Tahmidullah II, (r. 1761–1801) of Banjarmasin, like his predecessors and successors, struggled to survive treacherous court factions, up-river rebellions and Bugis incursions. Pasir, across the Meratus Mountains on the east coast, was frequented by Borneo, Sulu, Bugis and country traders; a major attraction was pepper siphoned from Banjarmasin territories, and smuggled spices. Some 45 miles up the eponymous river, Pasir in the early nineteenth century consisted “of about 300 houses, built of wood, situated on the N[orth] side of the river, most of them inhabited by Bugis merchants. The house and fort of the Sultan is on the S[outh] side, a short distance from the river”.¹²¹ Earl commented in the 1830s that “the place was formerly of some importance, a considerable trade being carried on with the Spice Islands, but the dissolute habits, and the extortions of the chiefs, have reduced it to a den of infamy and piracy”.¹²² Trade on the lower Barito and Kapuas was controlled by the independent Bekumpai. All these factors combined to diminish royal access to pepper.

In 1774 the sultan had been able to sell the VOC 11,303 pikul of pepper and promised to provide 9,000 pikul yearly from then on. But by 1781–82, large-scale smuggling had drained the harvest from the territories of the Ot Namun Dayak (“Dusun”) territories. No pepper arrived in Banjarmasin, and no perahu were available to go up-river to seek it, except at exorbitant prices. Although the Sultan's envoys scoured inland markets the amount he could offer fell progressively, from 6,669 in 1783 to 2,496 in 1786. He sought to increase his labour force and so extend the land under his own control, driving up the

¹²⁰ Velthoen, “Contested Coastlines”; Jennifer L. Gaynor, *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

¹²¹ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 4–22.

¹²² G.W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1837), 334.

price of slaves; the cost of a man rose from 19 rds in 1771 to 23.5 in 1781.¹²³ In 1782 the rebellious prince Amir fled to Pasir; overland raids on Banjarmasin increased. Amir assaulted Banjarmasin alongside his Bugis allies and Bekumpai Dayak forces in 1785. The Banjarese and VOC counter-attacked; an English vessel was sunk, but Pasir refused to submit. However, Amir was captured and exiled in 1787.¹²⁴

Batavia then announced that it had assumed “total ownership” of the Kingdom of Banjarmasin. The Sultan, the crown Prince and the chief officials of the state acquiesced because of their “inability to defend it, and in order that it should not again be exposed to the violence of superior and hostile forces”. The Sultan agreed that all pepper was to be sold to the VOC, which also monopolised spice and opium imports. Dutch officials were allowed the right of free travel through the Sultan’s domain. Batavia allowed the arrival of “the annual Chinese *wangkang* [medium sized junk]”. From then on mantri appointments had to be approved by the VOC.¹²⁵ In 1790 the Company established military outposts at Kotawaringin, Tabanio, Tanah Laut and Tanah Bumbu; a stronger fort was built at Tabanio in 1792. These had to check smuggling and defend against raids by both the Bugis coastal chiefs and the Barito-based Bekumpai. The latter’s attacks on the southeastern territories were probably not unwelcome to the Sultan, who had ceded them to the Dutch.

Because the power of the mantri in Banjarmasin’s interior was broken, upriver areas remained in chaos for a further two years as Apo Kayan Dayak and Bugis forces raided pepper gardens. Fundamental shifts occurred in Banjarmasin’s economy and society. By around 1810 commercial cultivation of pepper had ceased and was progressively replaced by such new crops as coffee, sugar, cotton, indigo and tobacco. Pepper gardens were burnt off, and replaced with grassland for deer, buffalo, and later cattle.¹²⁶ It was probably around this period that many Bugis left the interior. Some went to Pulau Laut, where they exported gold, birds’ nests wax and rattan. Others, mainly Wajorese, went to Kutai’s Samarinda, which was said to be home to five and a half thousand Bugis.¹²⁷ In any case, as pepper prices declined, outside interest in Banjarmasin waned; the English abandoned Tabanio and Pasir.¹²⁸

In 1797 the VOC decided it would be more efficient to have the Sultan govern his territories, under certain conditions. He was allowed the income from land tolls and birds’

¹²³ Sulandjari, “Politik dan Perdagangan Lada di Kesultanan Banjarmasin (1747–1787)” (MA thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1991), 102, 112–3.

¹²⁴ J.C. Noorlander, *Bandjarmasin en de Compagnie in de tweede helft der 18de eeuw* (Leiden: M. Dubbeldeman, 1935).

¹²⁵ *Surat-surat perdjandjian antara kesultanan Bandjarmasin dengan pemerintahan V.O.C., Bataafse Republiek, Ingeris dan Hindia-Belanda, 1635–1860* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1965), 90–121 (quotation, p.128). The implication that perhaps only one junk was coming seems unlikely, and may reflect the rule that only one was allowed to load pepper.

¹²⁶ Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880* (Leiden: KITLV, 2001), 495.

¹²⁷ John Leyden, “Dr. Leyden’s Sketch of Borneo,” in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago* (Singapore, 1837), 17; James Francis Warren, “The Sulu Zone, the World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination: Problematizing Global-Local Interconnections and Interdependencies,” *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu (Southeast Asian Studies)* 35, no. 2 (1997).

¹²⁸ Noorlander, *Bandjarmasin. Surat-surat ... Bandjarmasin*, 46–78. Knapen, *Forests*, 176. Sulandjari, “Politik dan Perdagangan.”

nests, and to the poll-tax—providing that he paid Batavia 3,662 Spanish dollars per year and undertook to enforce payment of all debts owed to the Company. The Sultan was also permitted to supervise the pepper harvest—except for the farm leased by the Chinese “which remained inseparable from the Company”. Sovereignty remained with Batavia. The ruler was on probation; his authority would be extended only if a Dutch commissioner found his performance satisfactory.¹²⁹ J.C. Noorlander concluded:¹³⁰

The flourishing trading kingdom of the early eighteenth century had been reduced to a shadow of its former self by the end of the century. Its trade and the so important pepper cultivation had been totally destroyed, while instead of welfare, disorder and poverty dominated the exhausted kingdom.

This image of a worn-out political system succumbing to the Dutch was to recur some 60 years later.

For the Dutch, Banjarmasin was always a burden, loss-making and troublesome, which was why Daendels abandoned it in 1809. But during the British interregnum Raffles' disreputable friend Alexander Hare saw possibilities. As Commissioner for Borneo, he signed a new treaty with the Sultan in 1812. This specified that the EIC would take all the pepper at a low price, and that Arabs be excluded from the Sultanate.¹³¹ Hare is mainly remembered for “the Banjarmasin Enormity”. In addition to land granted to the government, Hare broke the rules by accepting a personal “gift” from the Sultan of a huge domain of over a thousand square miles to the north of Tanah Laut. Three to five thousand workers, mainly prisoners, were sent from Java to produce cash crops such as rice, sugar, pepper and coffee. Hare became the dissolute ruler of a short-lived kingdom which failed to produce anything.¹³² In Banjarmasin itself turmoil in the interior continued, with rebellions against the Sultan and the appanage-holding nobles.

When the British withdrew from the former Dutch colonies, they argued that since the Netherlands had renounced all claims to Banjarmasin, the Sultan was free to make any arrangements he chose. The resulting negotiations were tense, but the Dutch prevailed, signing a new contract with Banjarmasin in 1817. The Sultan abandoned all claims to the south and east coasts of Kalimantan, surrendering Kotawaringin, Tabanio, Pegatan and Pulau Laut. Control over Tanah Laut was immediately ceded back to the established chiefs. The strategic Barito island of Tatas came under direct Dutch rule. The Sultan only retained the hinterland of Banjarmasin itself, inland from Martapura to the upper limits of Malay, i.e. non-Dayak, influence on the mid-Barito. The handover of Kutai, Pasir and Berau was essentially theoretical, but the Dutch were granted full permission to fell timber and exploit gold and diamond mines throughout most of the realm. The exceptions were

¹²⁹ *Surat-surat ... Bandjarmasin*, 137–56 (see in particular article no. 3, p.139). The VOC controlled the farms for opium, customs, gambling and the “Tjoe,” probably some Chinese activity. Knapen, *Forests*, 176; Noorlander, *Bandjarmasin*.

¹³⁰ Noorlander, *Bandjarmasin*.

¹³¹ *Surat-surat ... Bandjarmasin*, 192.

¹³² F. Andrew Smith, “Borneo’s First ‘White Rajah’: New Light on Alexander Hare, His Family and Associates,” *Borneo Research Bulletin* 44 (2013).

Lahut, Dukun Kiri and Dukun Kanan, territories along the eponymous river. Batavia recognised the Sultan's private trading interests, his "sending a few small perahu every year to Java, Bima and along the Borneo coasts" to buy goods for the royal household; he was allowed a maximum of four per year without having to pay any customs fees. More importantly, "one of the middle-sized Chinese *wangkang* that came each year" was exempted from import and export duties.¹³³

East Java, Bali and Lombok

Local polities in the eastern Java and southern Flores Seas ranged from Balinese kingdoms to very small chiefdoms. The jockeying for power on Bali, and by extension in east Java and Lombok, continued through the late eighteenth century. Mengwi was in decline, slowly losing its north coast territory to Buleleng in the later 1700s, Blambangan on east Java to the VOC (1771) and the Jembrana ports to Badung (1804). The origins of the fighters involved reveal the diverse interests in play: "Chinese, Buginese, and Mandarese merchants cum pirates, Madurese auxiliaries of the VOC, supporters of the different Blambangan factions, and, of course, the troops deployed from Mengwi".¹³⁴ Attacked by Badung in 1809–10, Mengwi was further challenged by Karangasem to the east, which had conquered much of fertile west Lombok in the preceding century.

The seas around Java's southeast coast were still unsafe, despite attempts by the Chinese holder of the birds' nest lease to defeat the pirates who robbed his caves. The arrival of Captain Buton in 1789 proposed a measure of order. He, his family and followers had left Buton after a conflict with the sultan; they first went to Bali, and then Lombok, seeking a suitable place to live. Dissatisfied, he moved to fertile east Java. In return for permission to settle, he organised a coalition with partners from Buton and Pasir to neutralise the Bugis. His settlement attracted many Mandarese, and Captain Buton became the head of the community, Kepala Mandar. He was mistakenly killed in 1793 on the orders of a drunken VOC officer.¹³⁵

Buleleng on Bali's north coast was a busy harbour. In 1805 Ince Buang, a Malay trader, reported to the Dutch commander at Surabaya that as many as 500 to 600 Buleleng Makassarese, Buginese and Mandarese vessels were sailing to Bengkulu and Penang to exchange regional commodities for opium. Smuggling of the drug expanded, despite opposition from defrauded Balinese rulers and Chinese harbourmasters. Competing Bugis enclaves were also entrenched in other trading centres. Although Jembrana on the west coast was theoretically subject to Badung actual control was in the hands of about 1,200 Buginese, who were ideally placed for smuggling opium into Java. In 1804 Badung, helped by Kuta-based Buginese, overran the Jembrana ports. Four years later Daeng Nakhoda, (a Sulawesi trader by his title), led a revolt in Jembrana's Kampung Wajo. This was suppressed by the Buleleng ruler, who told the Badung king that if he could not eradicate

¹³³ C. Nagtegaal, *De voormalige zelfbesturende en gouvernementslandschappen in Zuid-Oost Borneo* (Utrecht: Oosthoek's Uitgeverij, 1939). *Surat-surat ... Bandjarmasin*, 196–213, particularly articles 25 and 30.

¹³⁴ Henk Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power. A History of Balinese Politics: 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 34, 44, 96–100.

¹³⁵ Sri Margana, "Java's Last Frontier: The Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan, c. 1763–1813" (PhD diss., University of Leiden, 2007), 199–208.

the troublesome Bugis, he would. Buleleng duly conquered Jembrana in 1809, where the Kapitan Mandar was killed in the fighting.¹³⁶ The Bugis were also the major opium importers into Buleleng, both sanctioned and illicit.¹³⁷

Bali had always been central to networks smuggling opium into Java. The British faced the same problem; like Batavia, they were reluctant to admit how impossible it was to impose a monopoly. The English officer William Thorn commented:¹³⁸

The Chinese population is very considerable in Baly, particularly at Boleeling. Opium, which, before the conquest of Java, used to be brought to Boleeling by English traders, was once smuggled into Java, at an enormous profit; but, at present, the monopoly of this article by our Government has excluded private persons from participating in so valuable a traffic.

The devastating eruption of Mount Tambora on Sumbawa occurred during the British interregnum, in 1815. Bali was also badly affected. Buleleng's trade was disrupted, as was that of Kuta; the survivors were impoverished, and people wandered in search of food. Imports of rice, opium, Javanese tobacco and Chinese goods decreased. In 1817–18 the Dutch political envoy van den Broek visited the main kingdoms and described a land suffering from hunger and distress. As he travelled from Badung to Gianyar, he noted the extensive rice fields and the dense population, but he also counted the starved corpses (34) he passed on the way. Despite the high rice production, he concluded that Bali could only cover half of its needs, so “the inhabitants ate horse and dog meat to still their hunger”. Van den Broek ascribed this devastation to the English prohibition of the slave trade, but it was due primarily to the effects of the eruption. Although he noted internal trade in textiles, he ignored the significant traffic in foodstuffs and cotton. He was, however, correct in commenting that slaves were traditionally the dominant export.¹³⁹

It has been estimated that one to two thousand slaves a year had been exported from Bali during the late eighteenth century.¹⁴⁰ The destruction wrought by the eruption, the consequent demographic changes due to starvation and migration, and the ultimate increase in the land's fertility would have affected access to land and labour in both Bali and Lombok. Food production may well have diversified and intensified as peasants used every possible technique to win sustenance from the remaining arable land. Bali's commercially aware ruling class would have appreciated the value of such cash crop production, which may also have contributed to the decrease in slave exports.¹⁴¹

On Lombok ongoing conflict following the death of the Balinese ruler of the Lombok realm in 1775 led to the consolidation of four competing Balinese ruling houses in the west of the island: Cakranegara (Karangasem-Lombok), Mataram, Pagasangan and

¹³⁶ Suwitha, “Perahu Pinisi”; Kraan, “Bali and Lombok.”

¹³⁷ Lekkerkerker, “Bali 1800–1814,” 325; Kemp, “Het Verblijf van Commissaris van den Broek op Bali van 18 December 1817 tot 24 Juni 1818,” *BKI* 50, no. 1 (1899): 331–85 124–5, 334–6, 341–2; Suwitha, “Perahu Pinisi,” 124–5.

¹³⁸ William Thorn, *The Conquest of Java* (Singapore: Periplus, 2004), 320.

¹³⁹ Kemp, “Het Verblijf ... op Bali,” 360–3.

¹⁴⁰ Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power*, 41–4.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 96–100.

Pagutan. In the east, where Balinese ruled but remained alien, the Sasak chiefs claimed greater freedom.¹⁴² At the beginning of the 1800s Lombok's Alas Straits ports, facing east to Sumbawa, were the most important, particularly Piju, with an excellent harbour safe in all seasons, as well as the more northerly Labuhan Haji and Lombok. A Balinese official (*pembekel*) was stationed at the latter.¹⁴³ At that stage the island was exporting perhaps 2,000 tons of rice a year. By the 1820s shipments had increased to c.12,000, as Lombok's irrigated rice fields export capacity expanded.¹⁴⁴ The west coast ports of Tanjung Karang and Ampenan surpassed those to the east.¹⁴⁵ Ampenan was closest to the capital of Mataram, and solidly within Lombok's Balinese sphere.

In the early nineteenth century coffee growing in the Balinese hills expanded rapidly; this provided a commodity which could be exchanged for opium. Chinese began exporting it from Buleleng. Previously marginal highlands gained new value, as the rulers and Chinese combined to open new land for settlements growing coffee and rice. In a significant re-orientation, agrarian commodities, especially rice from the south, began to replace slave exports, particularly after Raffles closed the Batavia market, a major destination for shippers from Bali.¹⁴⁶ French traders from Mauritius, which had been British since 1810, also visited Lombok, where they exchanged weapons for rice.¹⁴⁷

Timor, South Flores and Savu Seas

Inter-island trade in the south Flores and Savu Seas was mainly in the hands of Chinese, Sama Bajau, Bugis, Makassarese and a few mestizos. They visited Ampenan on Lombok, Sumbawa's Bima, and sailed along Timor's north coast and lesser islands, collecting sandalwood, wax, birds' nests, dyestuffs and slaves. They exchanged imported foreign goods from Java, Sulawesi and Ambon such as textiles, Chinese earthenware, ironware (pans, bushknives) and sea-products for sandalwood, beeswax, sappanwood, maize, other foodstuffs and livestock. Horses and buffalos were shipped to the island of Bourbon (Reunion, east of Madagascar).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² Alfons Van der Kraan, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980), 5–6.

¹⁴³ Lekkerkerker, "Bali 1800–1814," 334–5; *ENI*: "Lombok".

¹⁴⁴ F.J.A. Broeze, "The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820–1850," *Archipel* 18(1979): 269–70.

¹⁴⁵ Bernice de Jong Boers, "Mount Tambora in 1815: A Volcanic Eruption in Indonesia and its Aftermath," *Indonesia* 60 (1995).

¹⁴⁶ Schulte Nordholt, *Spell of Power*, 93–6, 107–8, 25–8, 30–1.

¹⁴⁷ Chris de Jong, *A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies: The "Little East" in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (<http://www.cgfdejong.nl/Daalder,%20BlankPage.pdf>, 2013). Alfons Van der Kraan, *George Pocock King: Merchant Adventurer and Catalyst of the Bali War, 1846–49* (Hull: University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1992). Mauritius also had a significant Chinese community. Deborah Brautigam, "Local Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: Networks and Linkages to the Global Economy," in *Asia and Africa in the Global Economy*, ed. Ernest Aryeete (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), 111.

¹⁴⁸ I Gde Parimartha, "Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815–1915" (Vrije Universiteit, 1995), 89–114.

Overarching Makassarese, Buginese and Chinese trading circuits may have been strongest in specific zones, but these were by no means mutually exclusive. Makassarese were most evident in the areas traditionally oriented to Gowa-Talloq, especially in east Sumbawa and Bima. Makassarese and Buginese seldom visited the interior, preferring to remain on the coasts, except in Sumbawa, where they may have been safer given the ties of local leading families with those of Sulawesi. In Manggarai, West Flores, groups from the interior carried their goods to the shore, to meet seasonal Sama Bajau and Bugis shippers and exchange local products for weapons and Sulawesi cloth.¹⁴⁹

Chinese were pre-eminent in Lombok and Timor, but also handled exports for Bali's rulers. On Timor they were the main exporters of sandalwood destined for China via Makassar. Chinese also traded extensively with Batavia; beeswax was particularly profitable. Much of this would have been destined for the Javanese batik industry, but it was also in demand for the manufacture of candles.¹⁵⁰ At the end of the eighteenth century, Chinese houses were said to line the Kupang shore. They either relied on locals to collect cargoes, or they sent agents to the interior, who might spend months accumulating products before the packhorses could take them down to meet the seasonal ships.

By 1792 Dutch Timor's sandalwood profits had so diminished that Dutch officials debated whether the monopoly should be abolished, hoping that import and export duties would generate more revenue. In 1799 a commissioner was sent to organise tax farms, which produced fl.11,312 in 1800, which almost covered costs.¹⁵¹ British returned to Kupang in 1811, but were again defeated. The town eventually surrendered at the beginning of 1812. The British were reluctant to subsidise the outpost but retained control because of its importance for Australian shipping and fishing in the Southern Seas.¹⁵² After Dutch rule was resumed there were, in theory, seven Timor domains under Kupang, but six merely flew the flag

The Portuguese, besieged by the Topasses, had abandoned Lifau in 1769, moving to Dili which became their official centre. A period of stability, if not development, followed. Hans Hägerdal sums up the situation on Timor in the early nineteenth century thus: "A weakened Dutch enterprise in the west balanced a somewhat stabilized Portuguese establishment in the east, an establishment that had managed to co-opt its old mestizo enemies".¹⁵³ Tensions between the two colonial regimes continued. In 1818, local Chinese in the Portuguese river port of Atapupu resisted paying customs duties. They were encouraged in their defiance by their Kupang compatriots; after a successful Dutch armed raid Atapupu became a new and useful source of revenue for Batavia.¹⁵⁴ The Residency

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 106–8.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 102.

¹⁵¹ J.D.K[ruseman], "Beschrijving van Timor," *Oosterling: tijdschrift bij uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie* 1 (1835): 3–4.

¹⁵² Farram, "Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart," 472.

¹⁵³ Hägerdal, *Lords*, 409.

¹⁵⁴ Freycinet, et al., *Voyage*, 3; Geoffrey C. Gunn, *History of Timor* (Lisbon: ISEG - Universidade de Lisboa, 2010), 72–3.

of Timor was established in 1819 on the legal basis of the 1756 treaty,¹⁵⁵ but the area of Dutch influence had, if anything, contracted. Dutch expenditure outstripped revenue, as occasional actions against slave traders were deemed necessary, and some involvement in local wars was unavoidable.



Image 29 Inhabitant of Timor, 1822¹⁵⁶

Dutch Kupang, like Portuguese Timor's Dili and Sumba's Waingapu, was frequented by ships sailing for Australia, and whaling and fishing fleets from Australia and the Pacific. Crews exchanged manufactured goods such as hats, slippers, cloth, and knives for provisions. Each east monsoon, between April and September, over 20 such ships would

¹⁵⁵ In the 1830s this officially encompassed part of Timor (essentially the Kupang enclave), the northern (Solor, Adonara, Lomblen, Pantar, Alor) and southwestern (Savu Roti, Semau) islands as well as Ende on Flores with its small islands, and Sumba; *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837 (Staatkundig Overzicht van Nederlandsch Indie) 1837* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1971), 108.

¹⁵⁶ By J.E.V. Arago, from RM RP-P-1908-637. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.72118>. Image published in J.E.V. Arago, *Promenade autour de monde pendant les années 1817, 1818, 1819 et 1820, sur les corvettes du roi l'Uranie et la Physicienne, commandées par M. Freycinet* (Paris: Leblanc, 1822). Arago was one of the artists on the de Freycinet expedition.

arrive at Kupang.¹⁵⁷ Trepong fleets heading to North Australia would also call there.¹⁵⁸ Regional shippers supplemented their cargoes by visiting smaller harbours in the region, such as Atapupu and Solor before going north to Makassar. Others went to Surabaya via Waingapu.

In the course of his global circumnavigation (1817–20) Louis de Freycinet visited Timor, leaving an encyclopaedic account of the island.¹⁵⁹ A summary of his account of the island's commodities in 1818 listed:¹⁶⁰

[S]laves, up to 100 piastres for a women, according to beauty, one third of that for a man; cane ... sold to Goa in 1799; leather and a certain amount of copper exported from Dili to Macau; cachalot [sperm whale] and especially ambergris, much sought after by English and American whalers; bamboo, exported to China; tobacco, grown to supply the needs of foreign vessels, along with fruits, corn, rice and fresh vegetables; trepong, a small quantity collected at Kupang, along with rattan and bird's nests; honey, great quantities exported; salt, long an article of trade; buffalo skins and live animals, including buffalos and horses all exported. Certain other potential export products such as sago and cotton were for local consumption only.

Before the eruption of Mount Tambora Sumbawa had been divided into six realms: four on the northern peninsula (Papekat, Tambora, Sanggar and Dompou), Sumbawa in the western half of the island, and Bima in the east. After the eruption Tambora and Papekat were wiped out. According to one estimate Sanggar lost almost 80 per cent of its inhabitants, Dompou 50 per cent, Sumbawa a third and Bima a quarter. Lombok's population, also affected, diminished by 5 per cent.¹⁶¹ Raffles sent Lieutenant Phillips to Sumbawa to investigate. He encountered a perahu whose captain informed him that "many of the inhabitants were dead from famine". He himself saw the aftereffects:¹⁶²

The extreme misery to which the inhabitants have been reduced is shocking to behold—there were still on the road side the remains of several corpses and the marks of where many others had been interred—the Villages almost entirely deserted—and the houses fallen down—the surviving inhabitants having dispersed in search of food.

¹⁵⁷ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 107. In 1839 a delegation from the new, and nearby, north Australian settlement of Port Essington (which included G.W. Earl) was officially welcomed in Dili; Gunn, *History of Timor*, 71–2.

¹⁵⁸ Of the 88 ships that called at Kupang in 1838, 36 were Dutch, 42 British, 9 American and 1 each from Portugal and France. Traffic grew in the 1850s, but declined as more harbours were opened to foreign vessels; Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 108–9, 149–56.

¹⁵⁹ Freycinet, *Voyage*, vol. 2, part 1, book 3, pp. 487–721.

¹⁶⁰ Gunn, *History of Timor*, 54.

¹⁶¹ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 80–9. Hans Hägerdal, *Held's History of Sumbawa: An Annotated Translation* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 141–70.

¹⁶² David Higgins, "Textuality, Empire, and the Catastrophic Assemblage: Sir Stamford Raffles and the Tambora Eruption," *British Romanticism, Climate Change, and the Anthropocene: Writing Tambora* (London: Palgrave Macmillan Pivot, 2017), 23–53.

Makassar and Bima continued to compete for influence in Manggarai on west Flores, with its coastal populations of Sama Bajau, Bugis and Bimanese. The rajas of Sulawesi-oriented Ende in the south and Catholic Larantuka in the east also claimed to be overlords of many lesser domains, but these were essentially autonomous. A raja of Ende signed a contract with the VOC in 1793, as did another in 1839.¹⁶³ Ende's Sulawesi settlers and visiting perahu traders exchanged slaves with visiting Portuguese and Dutch shippers for such goods as blue and white linen, knives, bush-knives, gold-work, porcelain, copper wire and weapons. Sikka was the main polity in the central part of the island. In the interior and on the islands to the east domains of a few thousand people, fortified villages and small federations of settlements struggled to survive environments that were harsh in every sense.¹⁶⁴

The *dalū* or petty lords of the west Flores interior acknowledged Bima's suzerainty, sending a few slaves as tribute each year. Annual fighting among the dalū guaranteed a regular supply of slaves. Rea and Pota on the northwest coast were established harbours, as was the primarily Bugis Geliting further to the east and Sape on east Sumbawa. Geliting was drawing trade away from close-by Maumere, a long-established harbour on the north coast of the densely populated Sikka territories.¹⁶⁵ Slaves, sea and forest products, notably wax, were exported along with goats and other foodstuffs. The colonial authorities had little knowledge of these place, let alone control over them.¹⁶⁶

Slaves were mainly exported from Manggarai, Sumba and Timor, where they were both a product and cause of cyclic warfare. An English report noted:

[In the interior there were a] great number of petty states (many of them not consisting of more than one village) who are constantly at war for the purpose of making slaves, for whom they always find a ready sale at the coast.... Great numbers of them were imported annually at Macassar before the prohibition of the slave trade; numbers however are still introduced on those parts of Celebes not under the authority of the European government.

British commentators were always happy to point out Batavia's weakness in the easternmost islands. An 1820 account of eastern Nusa Tenggara was no doubt based on experience acquired in the islands during the interregnum.¹⁶⁷ Of Timor, for example, it was noted that the Dutch and Portuguese had no authority outside their enclaves and were "only

¹⁶³ E. Douglas Lewis, *The Stranger-Kings of Sikka* (Leiden: KITLV, 2010), 177.

¹⁶⁴ For examples, see: Hägerdal, *Lords*, 51–82; Gregory L Forth, *Rindi: An Ethnographic Study of a Traditional Domain in Eastern Sumba* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981); Rodney Needham, *Sumba and the Slave Trade*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No. 31 (Melbourne: Monash University, 1983); Charles E. Grimes, et al., *A Guide to the People and Languages of Nusa Tenggara* (Kupang: Artha Wacana, 1997), <http://ausil.org.au/sites/ausil/files/1997%20Grimes%20etal%20Nusa%20Teng%20Guide.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 90–114. In the late nineteenth century Maumere had about 400 inhabitants, and was renowned for its tamarind supplies; *ENI*, "Flores," 525.

¹⁶⁶ Stefan Dietrich, "Flores in the Nineteenth Century: Aspects of Dutch Colonialism on a Non-profitable Island," *Indonesia Circle* 31 (1983).

¹⁶⁷ This, and other articles from the *Malayan Miscellanies*, were subsequently reprinted in J.H. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago* (Singapore, 1837). *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*.

acknowledged by such of the Chiefs as need their assistance against their more powerful neighbours". Occasional flurries of colonial interest in neighbouring islands were caused by the looting of shipwrecks (as was permitted by custom) and the occasional enslaving of foreign crews.¹⁶⁸ West Flores, or Manggarai, was described as being:¹⁶⁹

In fact a colony of Bimanese, and the place to which delinquents of rank were generally exiled; some of whom have raised a rebellion,¹⁷⁰ and driven out the chiefs, who were placed over them by the Sultan of Bima ... all the prows from Bima that have gone to Mangray since the revolution have been cut off, but their ports are still open to Macassar and Buginese prows.

The writer went on to explain that the VOC had maintained a fort at Ende, "a principal part of [south] Flores" but "within the last ten years, the place has been taken possession of by a colony of Buginese, who have not only declined acknowledging the European authority, but have declined to trade with Coupang". The author overestimated early Dutch influence in Sumba, when he wrote that it "was formerly under the authority of the Dutch; but about twenty years ago they threw off their allegiance.... Since that time there has been little communication, and that by way of Ende".¹⁷¹ The British left the islands in 1816, but the imposition of their rule and trade policies demonstrated the effects of 30 years of declining Dutch influence. The implications of British hegemony and emphasis on free trade were not lost on governments in The Hague and Madrid, but their economic and naval resources were much more limited. These constraints shaped their policies over the next 30 years, while in the islands themselves maritime economies responded to new opportunities.

¹⁶⁸ As when, in 1838, an English crew were enslaved by Endenese; H. Kapita, *Sumba di Dalam Jangkauan Jaman* (Waingapu: Panitia Penerbit Naskah-naskah Kebudayaan Daerah Sumba, 1980), 16–29.

¹⁶⁹ "Short Account of Timor, Rotti, Savu, Solor etc.," in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago* (Singapore, 1837).

¹⁷⁰ The context suggests this could have been a rejection of Bima's influence in favour of the Bugis and Makassarese traders during the British period.

¹⁷¹ "Short Account."

Chapter
8

Equivocal Policies, Converging Trade, 1819–47

In 1813 the EIC had lost its stranglehold on trade between India and Britain, but to the frustration of commercial lobbies China remained closed.¹ In cities such as Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow factory owners fumed at restrictions on their exports. For these men, free trade made calculated sense: Britain was the world's biggest producer of cotton textiles and other manufactures. Food producers on the other hand, were wary of open markets, hence the bitter debates before the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. This is often seen as introducing a glorious era of London-led liberalisation.² In fact, France proved more progressive, there the 1860 Treaty of Commerce “really ushered in the age of nineteenth century ‘globalization’”.³ Bread prices in Britain were of less importance in Asia where, since the days of Dalrymple, merchants had favoured an informal empire centred on trade, investment, naval power and extra-territorial rights.⁴ Dutch and Spanish colonial policy makers were forced to adjust. Decisive moments in the extension of free trade in the archipelagos were the founding of Singapore (1819) and Makassar becoming a (semi)free port (1847). These events frame this chapter.

Three years after their return to the East Indies the founding of Singapore confronted Batavia with an unpalatable reality. A symbiotic relationship developed between the British port and Makassar, in which the former was the stronger, although the Sulawesi harbour continued to benefit from its location, sheltered harbour and strong networks. Batavia faced a recurring dilemma: whether these advantages could best be exploited by free trade (with the government taking an indirect slice of an expanding pie) or through taxation (with fees and duties flowing directly into state coffers).

The 1824 Treaty of London finally resolved issues that had delayed agreement between London and The Hague for a decade. Effective lobbying ensured Britain's retention of

¹ Anthony Webster, “The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization: The East India Company Charter Act of 1813,” *The Economic History Review*, second series 43, no. 3 (1990).

² Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, *From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).

³ John V.C. Nye, “The Myth of Free-Trade Britain,” *The Library of Economics and Liberty*, March 3, 2003. <https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Nyefreetrade.html>. See also Schonhardt-Bailey, *Corn Laws to Free Trade*.

⁴ Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade.”

Singapore.⁵ Each signatory became a “most favoured nation” in the other’s territories. The Dutch ceded their Indian possessions and Malacca to Britain, receiving in return Bengkulu and assurances regarding their position in islands southeast of Singapore. This definition of spheres of influence gave the Netherlands Sumatra, Java, Maluku and West Papua, while Britain claimed Malaya and Singapore and retained an interest in North Borneo. The principle of free navigation, set in the 1784 Treaty of Paris, was reaffirmed.⁶

The Indies’ progressive high commissioner (1816–19) and governor general (1819–26), G.A.G.P. Baron van der Capellen was committed to the reform of both the Indies administration and economy. However, the hard-pressed Dutch government demanded a limitation on expenses. Inertia also played its part.⁷ Moreover, in the Netherlands itself interest in reform had slackened; the king reverted to mercantilist views, founding the state-supported *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* (NHM, Dutch Trading Society) in 1824.⁸ This was designed to strengthen the role of Dutch shipping in the export of Java’s agricultural commodities and in cloth imports, so helping the Twente textile industry. These privileges hindered private traders;⁹ they bitterly parsed NHM as *Niemand Handelt Meer* (no-one trades any more).¹⁰

Van der Capellen’s ideas were deemed unrealistic and expensive. The Java War (1825–30) devastated central Java, costing the lives of at least 200,000 Javanese and 15,000 soldiers, including 8,000 Europeans. It left the Dutch with control over Java, but wrecked budgets; the loss of Belgium (1830) was another blow to a weak economy. Batavia was determined to wring the maximum profits out of Java. From 1830 the cultivation system used quotas and forced labour to produce crops for world markets; though run by the state and favouring the NHM, there were also opportunities for entrepreneurs. This system was an “extraordinary success” from the motherland’s point of view, funding projects like the building of the Netherlands’ railways.¹¹

⁵ Harry J. Marks, *The First Contest for Singapore 1819–1824* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959).

⁶ Anthony Webster, *Gentleman Capitalists: British Imperialism in Southeast Asia 1770–1890* (London: Tauris, 1998), 83–111; Nicholas Tarling, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780–1824* (St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1962), 121.

⁷ G.A.G.P. van der Capellen, “Het journaal van den baron Van der Capellen op zijne reis door de Molukko’s, Tweede gedeelte,” *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 17, no. 7–12 (1824): 374; Th. Stevens, *Van der Capellen’s Koloniale Ambitie op Java: economische beleid in een stagnerende conjunctuur, 1816–1826* (Amsterdam: Historische Seminarium Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982).

⁸ Jurrien van Goor, “From Company to State,” in *Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in Asia*, ed. Jurrien van Goor (Hilversum: Verloren, 2004), 85, 90–9.

⁹ J. Jonker and K. Sluyterman, *Thuis op de wereldmarkt: Nederlandse handelshuizen door de eeuwen heen* (Den Haag: Sdu, 2000), 160–2, 200.

¹⁰ Chris te Lintum, *De Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij* (Amsterdam: Iepenbuur, 1914). Ton de Graaf, *Voor Handel en Maatschappij: Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824–1964* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012).

¹¹ Ulbe Bosma, “The Cultivation System (1830–1870) and Its Private Entrepreneurs on Colonial Java,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2007): 275–92. The quotation is from Joop de Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin: De Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel 1595–1950* (’s-Gravenhage: Sdu, 1998), 199–216.

Dutch fear of British gains in the archipelagos was revived in 1839, when the ex-soldier James Brooke arrived in north Borneo. His successful dealing with the sultans of Brunei and Sulu, and his subsequent appointment as Raja of Sarawak (1841–68) thoroughly alarmed Dutch officials, nominal overlords of the neighbouring territories.¹² In May 1844 they appointed a commissioner for South, East and West Borneo; he was to supervise the two Residents in West Borneo and one in Banjarmasin, appointed in 1815. The commissioner's instructions were explicit: "this appointment was not to lead to administrative or financial interventions...but was to investigate the political circumstances and relationships of the various lands, peoples and rulers".¹³ Building on Dalrymple's 1761 Sulu treaty, Brooke went on to acquire the Labuan islands in 1846.¹⁴ Although he became famous for his anti-piracy strategy,¹⁵ Brooke's Sarawak was also a commercial frontier. Administration was based on river systems. Forts were established at strategic junctions; settlements and markets grew up near the forts; rows of Chinese shophouses soon appeared. Malays lived on the fringes. These outposts became the focus of new direct relationships between producers, foragers and Chinese traders.¹⁶

Western determination to gain access to China's commodities and markets led to the Opium Wars, the first was fought from 1839 to 1842, the second from 1856 to 1860.¹⁷ The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 enforced the opening of five ports: Shanghai, Guangzhou (Canton), Ningbo, Fuzhou and Xiamen (Amoy). Two were traditional trading partners of Makassar: Guangzhou and, in particular, Xiamen. The founding of Hong Kong in 1844 created a new hub, especially for the opium trade; its population and shipping grew rapidly, strengthening Cantonese networks. The established junk trade also faced added competition, as overseas Chinese could now use western shipping without fear of discrimination on arriving in China, and could also build and sail their own vessels.¹⁸ Any Singapore worries about possible negative effects of the opening of the China Treaty Ports

¹² Bob Reece, *The White Rajahs of Sarawak: A Borneo Dynasty* (Singapore: Didier Millet, 2001).

¹³ *Ikhtisar keadaan politik Hindia-Belanda tahun 1839-1848* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1973), 151–2.

¹⁴ Sir James Brooke, *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes down to the Occupation of Labuan from the Journals of James Brooke, Esq.*, ed. R.N. Captain Rodney Mundy, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1848).

¹⁵ Angeline Lewis, "Rajah Brooke and the 'Pirates' of Borneo: A Nineteenth Century Public Debate on Sea Power" (Thesis, UNSW Canberra, 2019).

¹⁶ Amarjit Kaur, *Economic Change in East Malaysia: Sabah and Sarawak since 1850* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 75–93.

¹⁷ Stephen R. Platt, *Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018). Song-Chuan Chen, *Merchants of War and Peace: British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017).

¹⁸ John Mark Carroll, *A Concise History of Hong Kong* (Lanham: Rowman Littlefield, 2007). Jennifer Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell SEAP, 1993), 50, 61–2.

and Hong Kong soon faded, as her commerce expanded steadily. Traffic with Borneo and Sulawesi remained stable.¹⁹

Throughout the nineteenth century the Dutch colonial state in the “outer islands” remained a ramshackle construction, evolving more on paper than in practice. History rather than need determined the status of administrative units. Low-level *posthouders* (place-keepers) and *gezaghebbers* (authorities) were the only Dutch representatives in the most outlying districts. These were not professional officials; they were often Eurasian traders or Ambonese Christians who flew the flag, provided information, promoted coastal settlement and Christianity, as well as assisting the occasional armed expedition. The function of *civiele gezaghebber* (civil authority) was also given as an additional task for military men, such as the commanders of isolated garrisons. They generally outranked *posthouders*.²⁰



Image 30 On Board the naval corvette Triton, en route to New Guinea, 1828²¹

¹⁹ Atsushi Kobayashi, “The Role of Singapore in the Growth of Intra-Southeast Asian Trade, c.1820s–1852,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 3 (2013); Wong Lin Ken, “The Trade of Singapore 1819–69,” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1960): 255.

²⁰ Cornelis van Vollenhoven, *Mr. C. van Vollenhoven's verspreide geschriften* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1934), 3: 160–1. “Posthouders, civiele gezaghebbers en de marine in den Indische archipel,” *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 14, no. 2 (1852). For later posthouders on Flores, see Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1900: A Documented History* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), 84.

²¹ “De korvet Triton op hare reis naar Nieuw Guinea, in het gezigt de Banda-eilanden”. Pieter van Oort. Plate 13 from Müller, “Land-en Volkenkunde.”

Local rulers and chiefs were increasingly depicted as parasitic oppressors. In his review of Dutch policy, van Goor argues that: “After 1816 the distrust of local chiefs reached an all-time high, which resulted in a permanent institutional conflict between civil servants and native rulers”.²² The Dutch focussed all their energy on exploiting Java, leaving the other islands to drift. Officials in Banjarmasin, Manado, Ternate, Makassar and Kupang were expected to be parsimonious and passive, doing the minimum required to maintain a nominal Dutch presence.²³ This “policy of abstention” (*onthoudingspolitiek*) was generally followed from the 1830s to the 1870s.²⁴

Singapore and Shipping

Since the Dutch destruction of Riau in 1784 there had been no single entrepot connecting the Melaka Straits region with the eastern archipelagos. Penang was primarily focussed on exchange between India and Aceh in north Sumatra; around the Straits Bugis trade with lesser harbours in Selangor, Johor, Terengganu and Siak flourished, but the volume of traffic was insufficient to guarantee a range of return cargoes. Raffles, Lieutenant Governor of Bengkulu since 1817, had continued to argue the benefits of a new free port.²⁵ London eventually agreed, and Raffles considered several sites before choosing the island of Singapore at the southern end of the Straits.²⁶ A deal was done with the Sultan of Johor, the nominal overlord of the existing settlement, and the new trading post opened for business in 1819. This reinvigorated the Melaka Straits historic role linking the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, serving the interests of local shippers, country traders, China’s merchants and British manufacturing.²⁷

The realignments caused by Singapore’s spectacular growth affected commerce far beyond the Straits of Melaka; its pulling power was felt from the Gulf of Siam and China’s southern coast to Manila, New Guinea and Australia. The British free port rapidly became

²² Goor, “From Company to State,” 94.

²³ J. Thomas Lindblad, “The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery,” in *The Emergence of a National Economy: an Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Leiden: KITLV, 2002); Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin*, 231–9.

²⁴ Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism, 1830–1907* (Ithaca NY: Cornell SEAP, 2003); Bob de Graaff, *Kalm temidden van woedende golven: Het ministerie van koloniën en zijn taakomgeving 1912–1940* (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997); J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944), 148–74.

²⁵ Nordin Hussin, *Trade and Society in The Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830*. (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).

²⁶ On Singapore’s earlier history, see John N. Miksic, *Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea, 1300–1800* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013); Peter Borschberg, ed., *Iberians in the Singapore–Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Centuries)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004).

²⁷ For a summary of Singapore’s role, see Lindblad, “Outer Islands,” 84–90. For information on British trade in Asia between 1816 and 1845 see the following EIC sponsored journals: *The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British India and its Dependencies* (1816–29); *The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australasia* (1830–43); *The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Miscellany* (1843–45). These have been digitised as *The Asiatic Journal*, in three series.

the main hub integrating exchanges between the South China Sea, Europe and the United States. The transregional role of ports like Bangkok and Makassar was reduced.²⁸ After 1826 Singapore was the most important of what were then called the Straits Settlements, the others being Penang and once-Dutch Melaka; this passed to the British in 1824.

Chinese from Dutch Melaka were early and influential arrivals in Singapore, while in 1820 a community of Bugis, complete with wives and children, moved there from Dutch Riau, settling between the Johor Sultan's palace at Kampong Glam and the Rochor River. A thriving Muslim kampung developed, housing, among others, Malays, Bugis (including many Wajorese) and Arabs. In 1824 this community numbered 1,851, over 17 per cent of Singapore's 10,683 total population.²⁹ Orang Laut, sea-people with a similar way of life to the Sama Bajau, lived in their boats in the neighbouring marshes and streams of the Kallang estuary.³⁰ There was considerable intermarriage among the Muslim communities; wealthy immigrants could return home to claim higher status. For the Wajorese this was formalised in customary law as "blood acquisition" or *mang'elli dara*, an arrangement permitting rich commoners or men of petty nobility to marry women of rank upon payment of very high fees.³¹

Other immigrants came from throughout the region, India and China. Arabs arrived from established communities in Palembang and Pontianak, and directly from the Hadhramaut in Yemen. Armenians sailed in from Brunei and the Philippines.³² Chinese from elsewhere in the archipelagos developed their own Singapore communities and connections. Some Makassar Chinese moved to Singapore, and vice versa. By 1863 there were thought to be several hundred Chinese from the Melaka Straits in Jolo, and the number had risen to over a thousand by 1871. They strengthened the southern Philippines ties to the western seaway to China, alongside the traditional eastern route past the western shores of Luzon.³³ Competition from Singapore undermined attempts elsewhere to channel trade through coercion.

As established trading groups moved to Singapore the web of converging networks thickened, and the port's attractions increased in proportion. Older Melaka Straits routes adjusted, as the new harbour offered a range of potential business partners. In the 1820s there was still more Chinese shipping (in terms of tonnage) in the South China Sea than European. Most was concentrated on Siam and Vietnam, but Singapore soon claimed a central position, although Sulu and Borneo ports remained important to the junks.³⁴ In

²⁸ Wong, "Trade." For later history and context: Wong, "Trade," 31–4; Webster, *Gentleman Capitalists*; Michael Barr, *Singapore: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018).

²⁹ Wong, "Trade," 75.

³⁰ David E. Sopher, *The Sea Nomads: a Study of the Maritime Boat People of Southeast Asia*, 2nd ed. (Singapore: National Museum, 1977).

³¹ Christian Pelras, *The Bugis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 327.

³² Atsushi Ota, "Toward Cities, Seas, and Jungles: Migration in the Malay Archipelago, c.1750–1850," in *Globalising Migration History: The Eurasian Experience (16th–21st Centuries)*, ed. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

³³ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 126–30.

³⁴ Goh Chor Boon, *Technology and Entrepôt Colonialism in Singapore, 1819–1940* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013).

1820 the East Indonesian harbours were well down the list of Chinese destinations. All the Borneo-bound junks sailed from Guandong (Canton province); one vessel of 600 tons visited Banjarmasin. Java's 5,300 tons burden came mainly from Fujian, but also from Guangdong (3,300 versus 2,000 tons). Makassar's 1,000 tons were down to two Fujian ships, while one Fujian junk, of 500 tons, sailed for Ambon.³⁵



Image 31 Junk in Singapore, late 1830s³⁶

As Lee Poh Ping explains, Singapore linked foreign capital providers with the regions where their money was set to work, typically by consigning goods to agency houses. These held and distributed stock either through credit arrangements or direct barter with Chinese traders. In the former case goods were advanced for a specified period, typically three to six months, before being repaid with suitable produce.³⁷ John Phipps, writing in the 1830s, described four main sectors in Singapore's trade, centred respectively on European vessels, junk fleets, Chinese shipping from Siam and Cochin China, and that of the "natives", notably Buginese.³⁸ In every case, Chinese traders handled transfers between sectors. Although the British always maintained that Singapore was a shining example of free trade, it was the ready availability of opium and arms in particular which made the

³⁵ Anthony Reid, "The Unthreatening Alternative: Chinese Shipping in Southeast Asia," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993): 27.

³⁶ "Jonque chinoise à Singapour". Plate 136 from d'Urville, *Voyage au Pôle Sud...Atlas pittoresque*. Copy from the library of De Gray, 70100 France; accessed through Wikimedia Commons Images.

³⁷ Lee Poh Ping, *Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), 3–15.

³⁸ John Phipps, *A Practical Treatise on the China and Eastern Trade; Comprising the Commerce of Great-Britain and India, Particularly Bengal and Singapore, with China and the Eastern Islands* (London: Allen, 1836), 263.

new port an instant success. Singapore exported thousands of guns and large quantities of gunpowder.³⁹ These were popular in Sulu. With the opening of Singapore the sultanate had a new and cheaper source of commodities from India and Europe. Spanish and Portuguese vessels visiting Singapore from the northeast would sail back via Sulu. After the takeover of Labuan as a British colony in 1846, about half of Sulu's Singapore traffic passed through Labuan.⁴⁰

Traders in Singapore distinguished two main peaks of activity, the "Bugis" and "junk" seasons, their timing fixed by the monsoons. "Bugis" ships, often Wajorese but including Mandarese and others, arrived towards the end of the year, those from southern ports between January and March, a couple of months later. For junks coming from Xiamen and Guangdong the journey to Singapore was easier than that to Makassar.⁴¹ In 1825 it was estimated that about seven hundred Wajorese perahu sailed the archipelago, with the largest concentrations (c.100) based in Makassar, Kaili and Mandar.⁴² At their peak Bugis sailor/traders "almost monopolised Singapore's trade with the eastern islands of the archipelago".⁴³ Makassar's exports slackened after 1819, but the harbour's role in distributing imports increased. After 1819 much of Makassar's traditional transit trade from eastern archipelago harbours bypassed the port, going to Singapore for transshipment to China and Europe. Initially there was a marked decline in perahu traffic between Makassar and Singapore, which declined in value by around 40 per cent. However, the growth of Western-rigged shipping soon made up for the loss. Sulawesi's

³⁹ In 1823 12,000 muskets and 5,600 lbs of gunpowder were exported; in 1825 6,432 muskets and 73,616 lbs of gunpowder. Previously, noted Crawford, such sales were illegal, making the usual references to American suppliers; John Crawford, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochinchina* (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830), 546–7.

⁴⁰ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 104–6, 111–2.

⁴¹ The journey from Amoy to Makassar via the Bashi Channel (south of Taiwan and north of Philippines) and Balabak Straits (between North Borneo and southern Philippines) covered 1,920 miles—1,860 if the straits of Mindoro were used—while to Singapore the distance totalled 1,680 miles from Amoy and 1,500 from Canton. Moreover, sailing from Makassar to Singapore proved hazardous; "twenty-five to forty days through pirate infested seas", and timing the monsoons was very tricky, twice the fleets missed the monsoon. In 1843 and 1863 the winds changed prematurely, and shippers had to go to Surabaya, Gresik, Lingga. Wong, "Trade," 102–3, 196.

⁴² Pelras, *The Bugis*, 311. The information probably came from Singapore Wajorese. An estimated 66 sailed from eastern Kalimantan, 50 from Wajo itself, Bali and Lombok, Flores, Bonerate and Java; 40 from Sumbawa, 20 from Western Kalimantan and 10 from Parepare. Crawford confirmed this general estimate: "Altogether, the number of the Bugis praus, usually known by the name of Padewakan, carrying on foreign trade, is thought not to be short of 800, of the burden of about 50 tons each. In their navigation they use charts and compasses, the former from European originals, with the names in the Bugis character, and the last made for them by the Chinese of Batavia"; John Crawford, "Bugis," in *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries* (London: Bradbury & Evans, 1856).

⁴³ C.M. Turnbull, *A History of Singapore, 1819–1975* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977), 38–9. Turnbull gives two figures for estimated number of Bugis crew: 2,000 (p. 38) and 6,000 (p. 39); the number on such a long and profitable voyage, was most likely between the two, maybe 3,000; on ship types (here probably *paduwakang*) and crew numbers, Gerrit J. Knaap and Heather Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004).

exchange with Singapore more than tripled between 1830 and 1832, climbing from a value of under fl. (Dutch guilders) 95,000 to fl. 323,396.⁴⁴

On their return journey many of the larger perahu called at Makassar, even if they were based in ports elsewhere. They did not necessarily moor at the Dutch port but joined the existing clandestine traffic evading regulation and taxation. Talloq and the mouth of the Jeneberang were favoured by incoming opium smugglers, evading 8 per cent to 9 per cent in taxes; some was then infiltrated into Makassar. Other perahu seeking Western and Chinese cargoes could access them at Makassar, avoiding the long and hazardous journey to Singapore. Even more could be saved, approximately 35 per cent, by landing Chinese commodities at independent Sidenreng's Parepare or Bone's Cenrana. When Dutch war patrols interrupted trade elsewhere on the peninsula, Makassar's imports from China and Macau increased sharply, as other Sulawesi harbours became difficult to reach.⁴⁵

James Brooke, who achieved fame as the "White Rajah" of north Borneo, described Bugis trade with Singapore in the 1830s:⁴⁶

The Chief manufacture of the Bugis land is the cloth for sarongs ... the thread procured at Singapore is far cheaper but less durable than the Bugis cotton ... the manufacture is chiefly carried on by females; in every house a number of hand-loom being at work. The cargoes brought by the Bugis prahus are in part procured from the eastward. Tortoise-shell, gold, mother-of-pearl, shell etc come from the eastern islands, or the northern extremity of Celebes. The staples of Bugis lands are sarongs and coffee.... The export of sarongs is very unprofitable, as they usually cost more than they sell for at Singapore.⁴⁷ Coffee is more advantageous.... It is on the return cargo that the Bugis usually make their profits; it consists chiefly of arms, gunpowder, opium, and cottons. These, particularly the first, sell at an enormous advance.... The nakhodas [skippers] are by far the most liberal and civil class, and generally speak Malay well.

Gold, arms, gunpowder and opium were key commodities, and all were in theory prohibited by the Dutch. Coffee is considered below.

Writing at much the same time, G.W. Earl commented: "[in] the eastern portion [of the archipelagos], comprising the extensive and highly fertile islands of Gilolo [Halmahera], Ceram, Buru, New Guinea, Arru etc, strange and unaccountable as it may seem, the British have no commercial intercourse". He should have written "*direct* commercial intercourse", as these were the regions where the Bugis distributive trade flourished. Earl explained: "The Celebes traders have immense advantages over those of Banda in being able to obtain their European manufactures, which form the most important item of their cargoes for Arru,

⁴⁴ Edward L. Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX: studi tentang kebijakan perdagangan maritim* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002), 114, 138. Values calculated from Wong, "Trade," 255. Anthony Reid, "Chinese Trade and Southeast Asian Economic Expansion in the Later Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: An Overview," in *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*, ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana (Oxford/Singapore: Rowman and Littlefield/Singapore University Press, 2004), 30.

⁴⁵ Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX*, 145–7.

⁴⁶ Mundy, *Narrative of Events*, 117–9.

⁴⁷ Such "unprofitable" production was still worthwhile, if the labour involved had no alternative use.

direct from Singapore". He added: "British cottons are highly prized [sic] by the natives of these islands, but, from their great distance from Singapore, they can only obtain them through the medium of the Dutch settlement of Makassar ... to which place they resort to obtain them from those natives of Makassar who trade to Singapore."⁴⁸ It was the range of commodities that these Bugis networks acquired from Singapore Chinese that enabled them to operate on a higher level and over greater distances than the traders of Banda, Seram and Papua.

Despite the new and somewhat looser shipping regulations introduced in 1818 and 1819 trade in the Indies waters was still restricted. Junks were forbidden to enter any ports east of Batavia other than Banjarmasin and Makassar. Discriminatory duties were imposed on products imported on foreign Western shipping, at double the rate charged on Dutch goods on Dutch vessels. A further liberalisation of trade followed in 1824, but highly discriminatory tariffs remained. Makassar, for example, could trade freely with traditional partners such as Buton, Bonerate and Selayar, and import goods from Java without paying duties, but shipping arriving from other Indies ports paid 6 per cent and foreigners 12 per cent. Exports to China were taxed highly, at a rate four to five times that imposed in Batavia.⁴⁹ The new regulations were applied first in Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, followed by Riau in 1829 and Kalimantan's main west coast ports (Pontianak, Sambas).⁵⁰ Even when internationally agreed lower tariffs were introduced, those levied on incoming Dutch cargoes were repaid by the government on the basis of secret contracts. Tariffs penalising British imports were only abolished after 1872.⁵¹ This protected metropolitan interests but did not help colonial enterprise. Coastal trade remained closed to ships from the Netherlands until 1851, they then paid the same port dues as Indies vessels.⁵² In reality, this was a decentralization of control rather than the introduction of "free" trade. Local shipping was still obliged to rendezvous with larger vessels at the designated centres.⁵³

Sailing vessels in the Netherlands Indies were classified as European or native, depending on their rigging. The same vessel changed categories if the owner decided to take advantage of the more flexible sailing abilities of the European system and changed masts and sails, keeping the hull.⁵⁴ In the 1820s most agency houses maintained their own western ships to carry their cargoes. However, around 1840, these trading firms began to sell them, leaving transport to others. European-rigged vessels were then increasingly sailed by indigenous

⁴⁸ G.W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1837), 430–1.

⁴⁹ Poelinggomang, *Makassar abab XIX*, 68–70.

⁵⁰ "Vrijhavens," in *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906).

⁵¹ Kobayashi, "Role of Singapore," 458–60. Thomas Lindblad, "De handel in katoentjes op Nederlands-Indië, 1824–1939," *Textielhistorische Bijdragen* 33 (1993): 90.

⁵² Gerrit J. Knaap, *Transport 1819–1940* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1989), 17–20.

⁵³ D.W. van Welderen Rengers, *The Failure of a Liberal Colonial Policy Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1830* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1947).

⁵⁴ According to J.N.F.M. à Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij: stoomvaart en staatsvorming in de Indonesische archipel 1888–1914* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1992), 383. Knaap, however, says the distinction was based on the type of vessel as a whole: Knaap, *Transport 1819–1940*, 13. Practice was probably inconsistent.

traders and skippers, Chinese and particularly Arabs.⁵⁵ Some local rulers, such as the sultan of Bima, also owned square-riggers.⁵⁶ European ships' numbers and share of cargo capacity decreased in the Indies as a combination of efficient perahu and steam claimed more traffic. Yet they continued to play a significant role. Their cargo share, 85 per cent in 1850, was still 33 per cent in 1875.⁵⁷ From the 1830s fast new "tea" and "opium" Baltimore clippers raced to bring their China cargoes to market.

Harbours on Bali, Borneo and Riau continued to act as regional entrepôt, handling traffic between eastern Indies ports and Java as well as Singapore. Square-rigged vessels first became common in Borneo waters, and then in Bali, but arrived later around Sulawesi where the perahu were well established and cost-effective. In Sulawesi perahu design continued to evolve, as the *pinisi* (*pelari*) was developed in the second half of the nineteenth century. This resembled a Western schooner with fore-and-aft rigging, but was "the only indigenous vessel sailed by Southeast Asians able to survive in the age of steam and motors".⁵⁸ In 1845 European-rigged ships in Borneo waters accounted for 83 per cent of cargo capacity, around Sulawesi for 70 per cent and in the Bali traffic 60 per cent. These ships had been recorded as arriving in Singapore in the mid-1830s from Borneo and from Bali in the early 1840s. Their numbers declined rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet their capacity grew, at least until the mid-1880s, when their final decline began. In 1825, the total number of ships—both European and native-rigged—trading with Bali was high, but their cargo volume was low. Fewer used Maluku and Sulawesi ports, but they could carry more. Borneo ports scored relatively highly on both indicators.⁵⁹

Native rigged sailing vessels, such as the Sulawesian *paduwakang*, remained important, although their relative combined capacity shrank steadily as larger ships became more common: it went from one-third in 1825 to one-twentieth of the total in 1875. However, in absolute terms their tonnage increased strongly after 1850, reflecting the general growth in traffic.⁶⁰ These statistics only refer to ships large enough to qualify for government-issued permits; smaller native boats would not have been listed.⁶¹ Most perahu were sailed by owner-skippers, who collected regional produce and took it to market—including, for some, relatively distant ports such as Singapore—where they exchanged or sold their cargo and acquired goods to take back. In the early nineteenth century Europeans (including mestizo) and Chinese operating out of eastern archipelago ports worked in much the same way, as did most European-rigged vessels. They were tramps, seeking cargoes in archipelago

⁵⁵ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 382–7. J.N.F.M. à Campo, "Perahu Shipping in Indonesia 1870–1914," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993).

⁵⁶ In the mid-nineteenth century the Bima Sultan owned two barks, another noble a schooner; for examples of the growth of shipping in mid-1800s in Nusa Tenggara, see I Gde Parimartha, "Perdagangan dan politik di Nusa Tenggara, 1815–1915" (Vrije Universiteit, 1995), 136–41, 151–3, 188, 274–6, 284.

⁵⁷ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 382–8. Reid, "Chinese Trade," 30.

⁵⁸ Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 47.

⁵⁹ J.D. Kruseman, *Verslag van den handel, scheepvaart en inkomende en uitgaande regten op Java en Madoera in het Jaar 1825* (Batavia: s' Lands Drukkerij, 1827), 13–4.

⁶⁰ It rose from 60,000 cubic metres in 1885 to a peak of 225,000 in 1904. Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 382–8. Campo, "Perahu Shipping."

⁶¹ Knaap, *Transport 1819–1940*, 13; Howard W. Dick, "Perahu Shipping in Eastern Indonesia, Part I," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 2, no. 2 (1975).

ports, hired by traders and company agents, either individually or collectively, to carry their commodities.⁶² The trepang fleets were a special case, integrated into a well-organised commodity chain extending from the northern Australian coasts and the scattered eastern islands, through Makassar to southern China.




Image 32 Makassarese processing trepang, Port Essington, North Australia, 1845⁶³

In 1825 a new era was opened with official fanfare when the first steamship in Batavia was launched by a consortium of English trading firms, led by Maclaine Watson & Co. The vessel, tactfully named *ss Baron van der Capellen*, was immediately hired by the government. It made the first steam voyage to Singapore in 1827. A similar English group founded the Dutch Indies Steamboat Company (NISbM) in 1842 for trade along Java's north coast, between Batavia and Surabaya.⁶⁴ New vessels only began to arrive from the Netherlands from 1836. British shipping set the pace in modernisation, with steamers sailing to Hong Kong and the Straits from 1844.⁶⁵ In 1841 the steamship *Nemesis* had destroyed war junks in China, emphasising the military advantages of the new technology, which was to prove decisive in anti-piracy campaigns in the archipelagos. Steam only began to have a major

⁶² Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 383–4.

⁶³ From C.C. Macknight, *The Voyage to Marege: Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1976), plate 11. Courtesy of Campbell Macknight.

⁶⁴ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 40–1; F.J.A. Broeze, “The International Diffusion of Ocean Steam Navigation: The Myth of the Retardation of Netherlands Steam Navigation to the East Indies,” *Economisch- en Sociaal Historisch Jaarboek* 45 (1982): 79.

⁶⁵ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 272–339. P&O opened the “overland mail” in 1844, all sea except for Alexandria-Suez; in 1853 fortnightly mail services began. From 1865 competition from the Ocean Steam Ship Company (Holt's Blue Funnel), initiated an accelerating advance in communications. Broeze, “International Diffusion of Ocean Steam Navigation”; J. Forbes Munro, *Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and his Business Empire, 1823–1893* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2003).

commercial impact in the second half of the century, when Chinese entrepreneurs were to play an important role; this will be discussed in the following chapter.⁶⁶

The NHM was granted a monopoly of opium imports in 1829 and was the sole permitted carrier of government goods between Europe and the colony. Moreover, from 1830 it was charged with collecting and transporting goods generated under forced cultivation. The NHM, which owned no ships, was obliged to hire privately owned Dutch vessels built in either the Netherlands or the Indies. This gave solid support to the shipping industry, but such guarantees discouraged innovation, and the Indies merchant fleet was ultimately unable to compete with outsiders. It is estimated that between one-third and two-thirds of ship arrivals in Java between 1830 and c.1870 were NHM charters.⁶⁷ From 1836 the NHM was permitted to directly load its own chartered vessels at several smaller east Javanese ports, including Pasuruan and Besuki.⁶⁸

Regional patterns of trade showed considerable continuity, blunting the apparent need for change. Kobayashi's tables covering Singapore's trade with Celebes and Borneo (1828–52) show a predictable preponderance of sea and forest product imports into the British harbour, matched by exports of opium and piece goods from Europe and India. However, "Malay cotton goods", or locally produced cloth (from Sulawesi and, probably, Nusa Tenggara) were the second most valuable cargo brought from Sulawesi.⁶⁹ Kobayashi does not give details on the less significant trade with Bali, but according to Newbold Bali's main exports to Singapore in 1836 were rice, tobacco and Spanish dollars, and the main imports were opium, copper coins, and Indian piece goods.⁷⁰

Commercial Constraints and Opportunities

The Dutch had never doubted Britain's ultimate intentions, stating that "the whole purpose of the founding of Singapore ... is ... to establish England's trade in this archipelago on the rubble of our own."⁷¹ Batavia may have felt threatened, but Manila's commercial elite was ruined by events in South America: the independence of New Spain in 1810, the rupture of ties with Mexico, Mexican independence and the capture of the 1821 galleon. Rodau

⁶⁶ J.C. Westermann, "De Overwinning op den afstand: te water," in *Daar werd wat groots verricht: Nederlandsch -Indië in de XXste eeuw.*, ed. W.H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1941), 234.

⁶⁷ Gerrit Knaap, "Steamers, Freightling Contracts and Dock-Harbours Reflections on the History of the Java Sea, 1830–1930," *Itinerario* 30, no. 1 (2006): 45; Graaf, *Handel*.

⁶⁸ E.J.A. Broeze, "The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820–1850," *Archipel* 18 (1979).

⁶⁹ Kobayashi, "Role of Singapore," 463–6.

⁷⁰ Thomas John Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits Of Malacca*, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1839), 1: 291.

⁷¹ *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837 (Staatkundig Overzicht van Nederlandsch Indie) 1837* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1971), 120. The British trading community in Singapore was keenly interested in the Indies' commercial potential. John Crawford, who had succeeded Raffles as Resident in 1823, wrote to his superiors a couple of months later, requesting permission to issue a "Commercial News Paper," with the chief aim of conveying "useful intelligence to foreign merchants." C.A. Gibson-Hill, "The Singapore Chronicle (1824–37)," *JMBRAS* 26, no. 1 (1953). *The Singapore Free Press* was Singapore's second English language newspaper after the *Singapore Chronicle*.

comments: “with three main island territories remaining under Madrid’s control, and the galleon route a memory, the Philippines were in a position to further the reforms.... But this would not be an easy task”.⁷² From 1830 Spain hesitantly acknowledged the need to liberalise trade in the Philippines, though policies were contradictory. In 1834 the monopoly of the Royal Company of the Philippines expired, removing trade barriers at Manila.⁷³ John Bowring, later British Governor of Hong Kong and a true apostle of liberalisation, saw this as a turning point, commenting “commerce may be regarded as progressive from that time”.⁷⁴ During the first half of the nineteenth century, when the non-Christian Chinese were under heavy pressure from the Spanish, the Catholic mestizos’ role continued to grow.⁷⁵

One issue that had delayed the London treaty had been the Dutch insistence on retaining the spice trade monopoly. The Hague managed to gain an exemption to this illiberal regime, promising that there would be fundamental changes. These were regularly considered in Batavia but always rejected. In new treaties with Ternate and Tidore free clove planting was allowed, but the government continued to claim monopoly rights.⁷⁶ However, profits were being eroded by clove harvests in the Mascarene Islands and Zanzibar. Batavia began to explore other economic possibilities in Maluku, such as the agricultural potential of Halmahera.⁷⁷ Van der Capellen decided that he needed a personal “ocular inspection” of Maluku before he could judge the possible impact of trade liberalization, including a possible end to the spice monopoly.

In 1824 the governor general visited Ambon, Banda, Ternate, Manado and Makassar.⁷⁸ He made an almost Biblical speech to the assembled Amboina chiefs:⁷⁹

People of Lay Timor [Lietimor], of Hitu, of Oma [Haruku], of Nusa Laut, of Seram, of Buru, of Ambelau, of Manipa, of Bonoa and Gorom, and of the surrounding islands... You are poor, while Providence has granted you the richest products of these lands; you are dependent upon other nations, you have remained unable to enjoy the fruits of your own diligence and industry...you are averse to labour, because it is associated with coercion and obligation.

⁷² Florentino Rodao, “Departure from Asia: Spain in the Philippines and East Asia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in *Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne*, ed. Brian D. Bunk, Sasha D. Pack, and Carl-Gustaff Scott (Madison: Parallel Press, 2008), 105.

⁷³ Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 73–105. William Lytle Schurz, “The Royal Philippine Company,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 3, no. 4 (1920).

⁷⁴ Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 77–88.

⁷⁵ Edgar Wickberg, “Early Chinese Economic Influence in the Philippines: 1850–1898,” *Pacific Affairs* 35, no. 3 (1962); Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850–1898* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001).

⁷⁶ *Laporan Politik Tabun 1837*, 150–4.

⁷⁷ Governor Tobias described Halmahera as the “pearl in the crown” of Ternate’s territories because of its fertility; J.H. Tobias, “Memorie van Overgave (1957),” in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lopian (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980), 28–34.

⁷⁸ Capellen, “Het journal.” For the subsequent administrative structure, see Appendix.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin*, 192.

The last remark touched upon a very real problem. Labour had always been an issue in the eastern archipelagos. People would not do tasks they regarded as unrewarding, hence the importance of slavery and the exchange of protection for work in patron-client relationships. Many liberal English observers such as Lennon at the end of the eighteenth century and Alfred Wallace in the mid-1800s struggled to explain the necessity of compulsion to their readers.⁸⁰

Van der Capellen's instincts led him to favour free trade. He was struck by the commercial role of the Bugis, writing: "Many products, especially those destined for the Chinese market, are taken to Singapore by the people of Mandar, Wajo and other inhabitants of Celebes. There, free of duties and formalities, they have found a good and open market. Every year some junks from China arrive to collect the commodities in exchange for Chinese goods".⁸¹ He observed that:⁸²

Recently these busy traders have taken over all the shipping, and cover these seas with their vessels, without ever having obtained permission, and in contravention of still extant regulations. These regulations will now have to be changed in their favour. In Makassar I will have to make very earnest enquiries, in order to regulate these matters.

In 1828 an NHM ship sailed to the eastern islands to investigate trade opportunities. These did not seem particularly bright, but established merchants were approached to become NHM agents. In Banda, van de Sloys and Pinege were selected, as were Deighton & Co. at Manado; van Duivenbode at Ternate, and Weijergang at Makassar. An official was to act on the Company's behalf at Ambon.⁸³ Dutch interest in the islands agricultural potential was sharpened by the wealth generated by the forced cultivation system on Java, and the productivity of the Minahasa. Local farmers responded to new demand. Coffee had been introduced in Manado in 1797, and thousands of bushes had been planted to such effect that Batavia introduced a monopoly (1822–99). Cacao had also been enthusiastically adopted in north Sulawesi, but after 1841 the promise was blighted by the cocoa borer moth.⁸⁴ Coffee was first listed as a commodity in Timor at the beginning of the 1800s; by mid-century it was the island's main export.⁸⁵ It became particularly popular among smallholders in the hills of Sulawesi, Bali, and Lombok. In some regions, rulers promoted cash crop production; South Sulawesi and Bali were notable examples in the case of coffee. Most coffee continued to be produced by individual farmers.

⁸⁰ See for example W.C. Lennon, "Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands under the Command of Admiral Rainier," *JSBRAS* 7 (1881): 345. Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), 196–7.

⁸¹ Capellen, "Het journal," 377.

⁸² Letter to Falck, Manado, 9 June 1824; quoted in Johan Albert Spengler, *De Nederlandsche Oost-Indische bezittingen onder het bestuur van den gouverneur-general G.A.G.P. baron van der Capellen, 1819–1825* (Utrecht: Kemink, 1863). See also Capellen, "Het journal," 272.

⁸³ Roelof Broersma, "Koopvaardij in de Molukken," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 23 (1934): 10.

⁸⁴ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 82–3.

⁸⁵ Geoffrey C. Gunn, *History of Timor* (Lisbon: ISEG - Universidade de Lisboa, 2010), 52, 67–8; Christopher J. Shepherd and Andrew McWilliam, "Cultivating Plantations and Subjects in East Timor: A Genealogy," *BKI* 169, no. 326–61 (2013).

Another commercial crop which flourished and spread during the early nineteenth century was tobacco. Seeds had been brought from America in the late sixteenth century and, as was noted in chapter 3, was widely established by the 1600s; it did particularly well in Mindanao.⁸⁶ Boomgaard observes that in the early 1800s it was known in southwest Sulawesi, Selayar and New Guinea, but was grown primarily for local consumption. Makian, an island to the south of Tidore, was also an early cultivation site; it was an exporter by mid-century, but subsequently disappeared from the sources. By the 1830s, at the latest, tobacco had spread to the Kei islands and was already being shipped from Timor, Flores and Savu. In the Minahasa tobacco and maize leaves were used to feed livestock. Boomgaard describes an evolving maize-livestock-tobacco production complex that gave previously marginal lands new value. Timor, a major maize producer also known for its horses, illustrates this symbiosis. On Bima and Sumbawa both maize and tobacco were also grown, but *kacang ijo* (mung bean) was used for fodder. On Seram, “an otherwise not very ‘commercial’ island, much care was given by the Alifuru to the cultivation of tobacco, including the use of separate seed-beds”.⁸⁷

By the 1840s coffee, tobacco and lesser cash crops were established throughout the eastern archipelagos, being grown either for exchange or for personal use. In 1840 Henry Keppel of the Royal Navy visited Sinjai on southwest Sulawesi’s east coast and reported:⁸⁸

The chief product of the country is coffee, which is grown in great quantities on the hills, but brought down as it ripens, when it is collected by the Bugis merchants for their yearly shipments. The yearly produce is stated to be 2000 coyans or 80,000 peculs [pikul].⁸⁹ The price is from fifteen to sixteen Java rupees the picul, to which must be added the trouble and expense of storing and clearing from the inner skin. Tortoiseshell is brought in by the Badjows; and mother-of-pearl shells in any quantity there is demand for.

By 1846 the Netherlands government had finally accepted the necessity of liberalising trade, seeking to break the eastern Indies integration into Singapore-centred commercial networks. The Minister for Colonies and Governor General agreed that Makassar was an excellent candidate for “free port” status. The former praised “its excellent location, good harbour and the commercial spirit of its inhabitants”.⁹⁰ The latter, over-optimistic, stated:⁹¹

⁸⁶ Ed. C. de Jesus, *The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines: Bureaucratic Enterprise and Social Change, 1766–1880* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980), 2.

⁸⁷ Peter Boomgaard, “Maize and Tobacco in Upland Indonesia, 1600–1940,” in *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands. Marginality, Power and Production*, ed. Tania Li (London: Routledge, 2002), 63.

⁸⁸ Henry Keppel, *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the Suppression of Piracy: With Extracts from the Journal of James Brooke, Esq. of Sarawak*, vol. 1 (London: Chapman and Hall, 1846), 85–6.

⁸⁹ A *pikul* was a measure of volume rather than weight, referring to “a load”, which varied according to the content. It was generally around 67 kg but could be as little as 60. A koyang was 30 pikul; when referring to a vessel’s cargo space it equalled a Dutch last, or two ton. *ENI*: “Maten en gewichten.”

⁹⁰ *ENI*, “Vrijhavens,” 662.

⁹¹ N.P. van den Berg, *Munt-, crediet- en bankwezen, handel en scheepvaart in Nederlandsch Indie; historisch-statistische bijdragen* (s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907), 346–7.

A glance at the map shows that Makassar's location is as favourable and central as is possible. . . . Everything brought forth by the Celebes and Borneo, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sundas, by Timor and the eastern islands shall be brought by the seafaring Buginese to Makassar. It is *there* [italics in original] that the great exchange trade will occur between oriental products and those of China, of the Philippines and perhaps also of Australia. When Makassar rises as a free port, Singapore will inevitably be abandoned.

The effects of this decision will be described in the following chapter.

The Sulu and Sulawesi Seas

The combination of growing cargo values and uncertain political control encouraged piracy. For a century, from the 1770s to the 1870s, increasing predatory attacks on shipping and coastal settlements disrupted trade and drove coastal people into the interior. From their epicentre in the Sulu Sea fleets raided the Philippine coast, north and west Borneo, Malay shores and the Gulf of Siam. They also sailed east, ravaging northern and east Sulawesi, and down through the Makassar Strait to harass the Java Coast, west and south Sulawesi, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara.⁹² The English Captain Belcher described the *modus vivendi* between the Illanun raiding fleets and the Cotabato sultan in the 1840s:⁹³

The Illanons . . . are a distinct race, inhabiting the great Bay of Illanon . . . they submit to their own pirate Chief, and who, acknowledging the supremacy of the Sultan of Mindanao, shields the latter from blame by this semblance of independence; it is well known, however, that any matters referred to the Sultan of Mindanao, respecting the acts of the Lanoons, especially upon questions of ransom, are speedily and effectively arranged by the Sultan.

Networks of settlements supported the fleets, stretching from the Southern Philippines and north Borneo to east Timor: Mindanao, Tolitoli, Pulau Laut, Bonerate, Jamepa (by Selayar), Rusa Raja (Raja Ampat), the Riung islands (off the north coast of Flores) and Larantuka. Finally, in 1821, following VOC precedents, Batavia decided to deploy fast perahu very like those used by the pirates themselves. These were under regional Dutch officials (the Residents), but since they were not regarded as fit to accommodate Europeans, their crews were all Asian. They usually carried about 24 men, a small cannon and some swivel guns; they were also used as couriers and in hongis against spice smugglers.⁹⁴

⁹² C  mpo, "Gauging Globalization: Maritime Piracy in Insular Southeast Asia in a Global Context," Working Paper for the International Workshop "Globalization and Creolization in World History," Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam, 21–23 March 2002.

⁹³ Edward Belcher, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, During the Years 1843–46* (London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeve, 1848), 263–4.

⁹⁴ Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie. Deel Twee*, 2: 9. For the Dutch parliamentary debate on the Indies fleet and piracy from the 1820s, see *Koloniaal Verslag 1853*, 393–401; Teitler, Dissel, and Campo, *Bijdragen tot de Nederlandse Marinegeschiedenis. Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in de Indische archipel (19de eeuw)* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005); Chi-Kong Lai, "From Seagoing Junk to Modern Enterprise: The Transition of Steamship Business, 1826–1873," in *Maritime China in Transition*




Image 33 Iranun pirates from Tempasuk, North Borneo, 1848⁹⁵

The backbone of Sulu's late eighteenth-century raiding fleets had been drawn from the Ilana Bay chiefdoms. However, as was noted in chapter 3, by the 1830s the Iranun's fearsome reputation had been surpassed by that of the Balangingi. These Sama-speakers inhabited islands and atolls stretching between Basilan and Jolo, where they dug wells and built forts, as on Basilan and Tawi-Tawi. They were related to similar groups on southwestern Mindanao.⁹⁶ They acknowledged ties to Sulu but were far from dependent. In Maluku waters the alliances, dissatisfactions and ambitions embodied in the Nuku rebellion fuelled raiding, albeit in a less politically integrated fashion. In Flores the Tobelo joined southern Philippine and Tolitoli fleets; in the early nineteenth century attempts were made to resettle Tobelo on the island of Jampea, south of Selayar, and on the East Sulawesi coasts.⁹⁷ The Minister of Colonies in The Hague ordered the construction of specially designed iron *roversboten*, anti-pirate vessels which could operate with sail and steam. After several failures two were successfully built in 1837 and 1838 and sent to the Indies in parts to be assembled. As the *Hekla* and the *Etna* they saw considerable action.⁹⁸

Milburn's detailed description of Sulu was intended to serve the more courageous country traders:⁹⁹

1750–1850, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-Keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004); Reid, "Unthreatening." For early anti-piracy tactics, see for example "Nederlandsch Indie in 1817," *TNI* 23, no. 5 (1861): 282–9.

⁹⁵ From the Yale Center for British Art, Paul Mellon Collection, B1977.14.10968. The published version appeared in Frank Marryat, *Borneo and the Indian Archipelago with Drawings of Costume and Scenery* (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1848).

⁹⁶ Warren, *Iranun*; Warren, "The Balangingi Samal: 'Pirate Wars', Dislocation and Diasporic Identities"; Esther Velthoen, "Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 200–21.

⁹⁷ Esther Velthoen, "Sailing in Dangerous Waters: Piracy and Raiding in Historical Context," *IIAS Newsletter* 36 (2005); Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines: Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion in Eastern Sulawesi, 1680–1905" (PhD diss., Murdoch University, 2002).

⁹⁸ Dirkszwaeger, "Scheepsbouw," in *Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890. Deel IV: Delfstoffen, machine- en scheepsbouw. Stoom. Chemie. Telegrafie en telefonie*, ed. H.W. Linzen (Zutphen: Walburg, 1993), 76–8. The ships were initially called the *Ternate* and the *Banda*. For an account of the *Hekla*, see J.F.G. Brumund, *Indiana: Verzameling van Stukken van onderscheiden aard, over landen, volken, oudheden en geschiedenis van den Indischen Archipel*, 2: 104–9.

⁹⁹ William Milburn and Thomas Thornton, *Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader's Complete Guide: Containing a Geographical and Nautical Description of the Maritime Parts of India, China, Japan, and Neighbouring Countries, including the Eastern Islands, and the Trading Stations on the Passage from Europe ... and a Description of the Commodities Imported from Thence into Great Britain, and the Duties Payable Thereon* (London: Kingsbury, Parbury and Allen, 1825), 412.

The town is of considerable size; the houses are built after the manner of the Malays. The number of inhabitants on the island is stated to be 60,000, most of them pirates.... Country ships from India occasionally visit Sooloo, notwithstanding the danger they run of being cut off. They import brasiery [brassware], cutlery, cloth, gunpowder, glass-ware, guns of all sizes, hardware, iron in bars, ironmongery, looking-glasses, opium, piece-goods, saltpetre, shot of all sorts, swords, tin ware, tobacco, sugar, vermilion, and watches. At Sooloo and the neighbouring islands is a famous pearl-fishery.... The large pearls are the property of the Datoos, on whose estates they are found. The Chinese merchants, however, often contrive to purchase from the fishermen pearls of considerable value.

The products of Sooloo have been divided into four classes:

1st.—Articles of value, but such as are either in no great abundance, or occupy little space: —Ambergris is frequently to be had, birds-nests in great plenty, civet,¹⁰⁰ small quantities only; camphire [camphor], in great abundance on Borneo; gold, extremely fine and plentiful; gum anise, or copal, in considerable quantities; lac, a little only; pearls, many of the finest water; tortoise-shell, in great abundance; and wax in small quantities.

2d. —Staples, which must form the cargoes of ships frequenting the place: —Agal agal [agar agar, specific seaweeds], betel-nut, beech de mer [trepang], canes, cowries, dammer [damar resins], ebony, kemoo shells, rattans, shark-fins, sago, and sea-weed.

3d. —Goods which may hereafter become staples, but being in no demand, are at present in small quantities: —Cinnamon, clove bark, cotton, coffee, dying woods, ginger, indigo, pepper, rice, red-wood, saltpetre, sapan-wood, sugar, sandal-wood, and wheat.

4th. —Productions which may be useful, but can scarcely be reckoned articles of trade: —Timber of various kinds, fit for ship-building and all other uses, in any quantity ... with several other commodities, such as coco-nut oil, earth oil, gumatty [*gumati*, fibre from the arenga palm, used in ropes etc] honey, wood oil, Etc.

The China junks import brass salvers, brass wire, beads of sorts, China-ware, cloths, cangans [textile type] dried fruits, drugs, fireworks, furniture, iron, kowsongs, black [textile type]; kompow, white [textile type]; lackered ware, paper, quallis [*kuali*, wok, metal pans], raw silk, silk piece-goods, steel, sugar candy, tea of kinds, tutenague [rough zinc], wines, and wearing apparel.

The cargoes of the Chinese junks, homeward bound, consist of agal agal, beech de mer, birds' nests, blackwood, clove bark, cassia, camphire, gold, mother-of-pearl shells, pearls, rattans, sago, shells, pepper, tortoiseshell, and wax.

The Bugis also trade here, bringing chiefly the cotton manufactures of Celebes; the principal traffic is in slaves.

¹⁰⁰ The musk produced by the glands of the civet “cat”, a small carnivorous mammal, was prized as a medicine, a flavouring and a scent by perfume manufacturers.

In 1836 a commercial agreement with Sulu allowed the establishment of a Spanish trading post at Jolo, and fixed taxes and fees on trade between Manila, Zamboanga and Jolo.¹⁰¹ Shippers in the Sulu trade had to be enterprising, cautious and brave. None knew this better than the Spaniards. The Governor General in Manila, Andres G. Camba (1837–38) outlined the situation on behalf of his superiors:¹⁰²

Thus it is that during the period elapsed since the year cited, 1646, up to the present time, no Spanish merchant has himself had direct dealings with the inhabitants of Sulu, the Chinese alone being engaged in this trade.... Sulu, which contains a population of pirates and slaves, is nothing more than a shipping point where certain products are collected from the other islands of the south.... The total population credited to the [Sulu] Archipelago is from 149,000 to 150,000 souls, 6,800 of which inhabit Jolo, and in this number are included 800 Chinese.

A very different treaty was concluded between Spain and Maguindanau the following year, after Manila's effective intervention in a Mindanao succession dispute, reducing Cotabato to a virtual protectorate of Spain (see below).¹⁰³ Raiding fleets continued to sail from Mindanao and the north Borneo coasts.

As the 1836 commercial agreement indicated, Sulu was more than just a "pirates' nest"; the Spanish wanted access to the islands' China trade. Some well-connected private shippers made the most of the Sulu islands commercial opportunities, exchanging Sulu sea-products for arms in Singapore.¹⁰⁴ The American Gamaliel Ward sailed a Spanish-flagged schooner, but the Jolo-based Englishman William Wyndham was the best known. By 1842 he was married to an Iloilo mestiza, owned his own schooner, was a friend of the sultan and acted as British representative. He lived at Jolo for at least fifteen years but faced growing competition from Chinese, who were becoming dispersed over the islands. Their competition, and the fact that offered higher prices, irked Wyndham so much that "he obtained from the Sultan an order for their recall to the capital [Jolo]".¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Najeem M. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 193–6, 323. For the text, see his Appendix XII, p. 212. "The principal part of the treaty was an agreement regulating boat licenses and the duties to be paid by Sulu boats in Manila and Zamboanga and by Spanish vessels in Jolo. In another document bearing the same date and signed by the same parties, an alliance was declared guaranteeing general peace and safety to Sulu boats in Philippine waters and to Spanish and Filipino craft in the Sulu Sea. The sultan further consented to have a Spanish trading house constructed at Jolo for the safe storage of merchandise under the charge of a Spanish resident agent."

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 340–1.

¹⁰³ Najeem M. Saleeby, "History of Maguindanau," in *The Muslim Filipinos. Their History, Society and Contemporary Problems*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad, 1974), 192. Shinzō Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003).

¹⁰⁴ Emrys Chew, *Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 204–5.

¹⁰⁵ James Francis Warren, "Ransom, Escape, and Debt Repayment in the Sulu Zone," in *Bonded Labour and Debt in the Indian Ocean World*, ed. Gwyn Campbell and Alessandro Stanziani (London: Routledge, 2013), 93. Quote in Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 128.

While Sulu was advancing south, the young sultan of Maguindanau, Kudrat the second, or Untang (r.c. 1830–53/54) signed the 1837 treaty in which he accepted subordinate status as the “Feudatory King of Tamontaka”. Madrid assumed the right to appoint the sultans. This reduced competition for the throne among members of leading lineages, a source of regular conflict. Links to Manila and its officials then became the main focus for the ambitious. Spain also obtained the right to license all boats sailing beyond Zamboanga, and opened a colonial trading post at Paygwan, on the mouth of the Pulangi. A powerful datu then granted the west coast of the Zamboanga peninsula to Madrid, obtaining protection in return for helping against slavery. The sultan reaffirmed the 1837 treaty in 1845.¹⁰⁶ After Maguindanau’s submission, Buayan followed.¹⁰⁷ In the mid-nineteenth century nearly all Chinese still lived at Manila, but their role as representatives of European firms encouraged many to settle in rural areas on the main Spanish islands.¹⁰⁸

Although maritime exchange between North Sulawesi, the Philippines and Sulu continued, it was discouraged by fear of the pirates. Settlers avoided the north Sulawesi coast, it was just too dangerous.¹⁰⁹ Dutch patrols in the Celebes Sea could not differentiate between traders and maritime marauders; consequently they harassed all Mindanao vessels and the gatherers of marine commodities with whom they exchanged goods. Both trading ships and raiders began to avoid the Makassar straits; instead they skirted the northern tip of Sulawesi, passed the mouth of the Tomini Gulf and sailed down the east coast, acquiring commodities and making new alliances. The more predatory joined raiding fleets.¹¹⁰ Manado and Kema were the northern peninsula’s main ports, the former on the north, the latter on the south coast. During the west monsoon Kema was a safer harbour, and regularly visited by English and American whalers. The main traders were ethnic Chinese, who often came from Manila, alongside a few Europeans. Sama Bajau and Ternate and Tidore fishermen also sailed these waters; it would not be surprising if some carried clandestine cargoes, such as spices, or rice and coffee.

Southwest Sulawesi

Makassar remained an outpost on a politically volatile peninsula, and was economically weakened as the junk link was made redundant by Singapore. In 1824 an attempt was made to revitalise traffic by applying a basic 6 per cent duty on all coastal shipping. It was hoped this would increase the supplies of the sea products so popular in China. But such a marginal change was not enough; the visiting *wangkang* became progressively smaller.¹¹¹ The 1828 ship was the last annual junk to arrive from Xiamen.¹¹² This was a great blow to Makassar. On the other hand, as was noted above, Bugis trade with Singapore was strong;

¹⁰⁶ Saleeby, “History of Maguindanau,” 192. Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory*.

¹⁰⁷ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 125–32.

¹⁰⁸ Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*.

¹⁰⁹ Henley, *Fertility*, 430–1.

¹¹⁰ Velthoen, “Contested Coastlines.” Velthoen, “Pirates”; Esther Velthoen, “A Historical Perspective on Bajo in Eastern Indonesia” (Master’s thesis, Murdoch University, Perth, 1994); Velthoen, “Sailing.”

¹¹¹ Capellen, “Het journaal,” 375–7.

¹¹² Intermittent connections with Macau continued, but with smaller vessels.

Raffles had estimated that “The cargoes of their vessels, particularly in opium, gold and cloths, often amount to fifty or sixty thousand dollars each”.¹¹³

As had been the case in Maluku, declining revenue forced an exploration of potential alternative commodities. Assessments were made of Makassar’s surrounding territories to provide van der Capellen with information. All commented on the significance of textile exports. In 1823 commissioners noted that land was well suited for cotton, but that not nearly enough was grown to meet local demand; most was imported from Buton, Selayar, Bima and Manggarai.¹¹⁴ There was very little coffee but they believed that security for farmers and a more liberal commercial policy would increase cultivation. Horses were shipped to Java, about 300 in 1824 (averaging 50 per perahu, with consequent losses).¹¹⁵ Although the commissioners noted the centrality of the trade in sea products with China, they had little interest in it, as it was inaccessible to Europeans.¹¹⁶

Johannes Olivier, who accompanied van der Capellen, praised the land’s fertility, noting the abundance of rice, as well as sago, maize, manioc, areng [palm] sugar, sugar cane, cotton, and tobacco. He added the conventional proviso: “Tobacco flourishes in Bantaeng in the southern districts...[but] people only plant enough for the natives’ daily use.... The Dutch government has applied itself to increase tobacco planting, but the oft-mentioned indifference of the natives frustrates even the most industrious efforts”. The same applied to indigo and sugar. Though the rice was excellent, according to Olivier it did not keep well; moreover, the needs of the local populations far exceeded production.¹¹⁷ He added that silk cloth was also produced, “but the raw silk is brought here from China”.¹¹⁸ Given Batavia’s wariness of any involvement in the interior, agrarian development was not a high priority.

Peninsula politics continued to present Batavia with familiar frustrations: states were either too strong or too weak to be useful; direct administration was too expensive. Bone continued to assert that the Netherlands surrender to the British had forfeited any claims they might have had to political authority. Although Bone’s war against the British had been inconclusive, the expulsions of the Buginese from Makassar and the environs of Parepare had weakened its position on Sulawesi’s west coast.¹¹⁹ In 1824 van der Capellen sought to confirm Dutch ties with all the main Sulawesi states by renewing the Bungaya

¹¹³ Quoted in Pelras, *The Bugis*, 305.

¹¹⁴ ANRI Mak.348–21. In 1833 there was one mention of slave labour being used to produce textiles for export; ANRI Mak.3/2 General Report 1833.

¹¹⁵ Capellen, “Het journaal,” 377–8.

¹¹⁶ “Aantekening omtrent den Handel”, NA Schniether Collectie 127.

¹¹⁷ Dutch rice-growing districts (Makassar, Maros, the Southern Districts, Topejawa, Bulukumba and Bantaeng), had difficulty feeding their own populations while paying taxes and tribute. In other nearby territories outside colonial administration, such as Polombangkeng and Galesong the ratio of rice yields to the number of inhabitants was even worse; J. Olivier, *Reizen in den Molukschen archipel naar Makassar, ... in het gevolg van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederland’s Indië in 1824 gedaan en volgens de dagboeken en aantekeningen van ondersch. reisgenooten beschreven*, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Beijerinck, 1837), 183–4. Bima’s rice exports were an important reason for Makassar’s seventeenth-century interest; in the course of the eighteenth-century exports of rice from Makassar declined (Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 208–26).

¹¹⁸ Olivier, *Reizen*, 2: 195.

¹¹⁹ *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*, 123–4. *Ikhtisar*, 278.

Treaty. But their rulers refused to accept that murders could no longer simply be absolved by fines; given the frequency with which the nobility resorted to violence, such objections were understandable. However, eventually most signed.

The traditionally cooperative states of Sidenreng and Buton came on board. Four of the seven Mandar principalities followed, the same four (Balanipa, Pamboan or Pembuang, Binoang, Majene) which had done so in 1674. Suppa and Tanete also set their signatures under the new contract, but Bone persuaded them to renege, and war followed (1824–25). The initial Dutch attack was rebuffed. The fighting caused the dispersal of the Sama Bajau communities along the west coast of the Bone Gulf; many went to east Sulawesi, including the Salabangka and Wakatopi archipelagos, respectively off the central east coast and southeast Buton.¹²⁰ A second larger force consisted of 1,400 colonial troops, and a total of 12,000 auxiliaries from the Dutch provinces east of Makassar, Selayar, and from Gowa, which contributed some 3,200 men. When the Bugis king withdrew to friendly Wajo, the Dutch attacked up the Cenrana River.¹²¹ Stalemate followed. Sidenreng was granted control of Parepare's fine harbour; customs revenue was to be shared and a Dutch military post established. But the Java War distracted Batavia and Sidenreng's trade was left virtually unchecked.¹²²

The Bone court was split between the determined Sultana Saleha Rabiutuddin (r.1823–35) and her compromise-inclined *mangkubumi* (chancellor) La Mappangara. He withdrew to Makassar in 1833; with the death of the queen two years later he was able to organise a contract between the new Arumpone and the governor.¹²³ But the ruler remained hostile. At one point he formally declared war on the Dutch, but they declined to respond. He died in 1845.¹²⁴ Wajo had successfully resisted the VOC since the 1730s, even though Batavia was anxious about the “lively” trade between Singapore and the Gulf of Bone. The flexible and enterprising Sidenreng ruler La Pangorisang (1837–89) developed Parepare into a flourishing port, following the agreement with Batavia.¹²⁵

James Brooke recorded his impressions of Bone, Wajo and Luwu in 1840. He visited Cenrana, a settlement of about 180 houses commanding the river's mouth in the Gulf of Bone, more than 30 km from Bone's inland capital of Watampone. At Cenrana duties were levied on all passing vessels; the largest perahu paid as much as eighty reals; the revenue supported the Bone chief's “war establishment”. Brooke then sailed up the Cenrana, with Wajo on the right bank and Bone on the left. He visited the river port of Pompanua, noting that it could be reached by sea-going vessels of up to 150 or 200 tons, and handled

¹²⁰ Sopher, *Sea Nomads*, 149. Natasha Stacey, “Boats to Burn: Bajo Fishing Activity in the Australian Fishing Zone” (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h9b6>.

¹²¹ Gerrit Knaap, Henk den Heijer, and Michiel de Jong, *Oorlogen Overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat buiten Europa, 1595–1814* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015).

¹²² *Ikhtisar*, 279.

¹²³ H.A. Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat, dan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan* (Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1998), 340–48.

¹²⁴ The minister was La Mappangara Arung Sinri, the Tomarilaleng of Bone; the hostile ruler was La Mappaséling Sultan Adam Nazim ud-din [Matinroé-ri Salassana] (1835–45).

¹²⁵ *Ikhtisar*, 278, 290–2. *Gegevens over Land en Volk van Enrekang* (Amsterdam: Koloniaal Instituut, 1933). Heather Sutherland, “Power and Politics in South Sulawesi: 1860–1880,” *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 17 (1983): 161–207.

much of the trade of northern Bone and Soppeng as well as of Wajo. He counted about 600 houses there, and 19 perahu, many of which were large.¹²⁶ At this time Wajo, “nearly independent” according to Brooke, was without a paramount ruler, as conflict with six core chiefs had caused him to leave, and they pointedly refused to ask him to return.¹²⁷ Brooke described Luwu as wracked by civil war and small pox, and “wretchedly poor”; its import trade was limited to rice and salt from Bone or Makassar, and exports of wax.¹²⁸

North Sulawesi

Batavia’s revenues from the Minahasa were substantial, but in the hills life was hard; coffee regions were poorer than those on the coast or in the wet rice growing areas near Lake Tondano. The demand for forced labour was crushing. Batavia demanded at least 100 days services per year from peasants; this was regularly exceeded. People were used for infrastructure works, such as roadbuilding, as well as for the planting, care, harvesting and delivery of coffee. The government only paid low prices to producers, but the number of bushes increased from 200,000 in 1822 to 6.4 million in 1865. This monopoly generated so much profit that one well-informed observer described the Minahasa as “the most important region ... in the Dutch possessions ... east of Java”.¹²⁹ The cultivation of nutmeg, cacao and Manila hemp was also enforced.

North Sulawesi’s gratifying flow of products led Batavia to consider the possibilities offered by fertile land on the southern side of the peninsula, especially near Lake Limboto. In 1822 Gorontalo’s first coffee gardens were laid out by skilled government employees sent from Java. By 1824 an estimated 400,000 bushes had been planted. “The coffee trees”, wrote van Doren, “can be divided in government gardens, or those for which a part of the population are set to work by their Rajas, and the private gardens, which were laid out by the Rajas, the great men, the chiefs or by common natives”. Government cultivation was carried out by about 1,000 families, each of which looked after 400 bushes. This was the total number of people available “after subtracting those who have to play soldier for the Radja of Gorontalo, then a certain number of workers ... for the goldmines, and finally the large numbers of great men, chiefs and their families [who were exempt from statutory labour]”. Output declined from the late 1820s. The rajas were meant to pay growers the price they received from the government, but only paid 50 per cent, claiming the beans lost half their weight during preparation. In fact, weight loss was c. 20 per cent. The chiefs’ private gardens were worked by the population as corvee labour, with no payment whatsoever. But locals planting for their own use produced good quality beans.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Brooke, *Narrative of Events*, 155–6.

¹²⁷ La Padengngeng Puanna La Palaguna (1839–45); Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat*, 349–50.

¹²⁸ Brooke, *Narrative of Events*, 155–6. Politically, Toraja-Bugis Luwu was weak, and strongly influenced by the Bugis states to the southwest; Dutch attempts to sign a contract failed in 1824 and 1825, only succeeding after the defeat of Bone in 1859–60. *ENI*: “Loewoe”.

¹²⁹ E. Francis (1859) quoted in Maria J.C. Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983* (Leiden: KITLV, 1998), 54.

¹³⁰ J.B.J. van Doren, *Herinneringen en schetsen van Nederlands Oost-Indie en reizen in die gewesten*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1857), 334.




Image 34 Road to Tondano in the Minahasa, late 1820s¹³¹

In Gorontalo the colonial government lacked the free political hand that gave them access to land and labour in the Minahasa. Gorontalo never became a significant coffee producer; the main exports continued to be forest products: timber, resins, rattan and wax. Milburn described Gorontalo in the 1820s:¹³²

A considerable trade is carried on here. The Rajah is the principal merchant. For what they have to dispose of, they ask double the price they will take; and for what they want to purchase, they will not at first offer above half what is asked. The articles most in demand are opium, iron, gunpowder, piece-goods of a common kind, and coarse cutlery. Very few European goods answer on this part of the island. Gold is one of the principal exports.... The mines are about a degree to the W. of Gonong Tallo [Gorontalo]. Rice, wax, beech de mer [sea cucumber, trepang], and a few other articles may be got reasonably. Tortoiseshell is procured here in considerable quantities.

¹³¹ "Route de Tondano. (Iles Célebès)." Plate 208 Jules S.C. Dumont d'Urville, *Voyage de la corvette l'Astrolabe exécuté par ordre du roi: pendant les années 1826-1827-1828-1829* (Paris: J. Tastu, 1830–35). General Research Division, The New York Public Library, 1830–35. <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-8300-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>.

¹³² Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 412.

Gorontalo also imported sago from Paguat and the Togian Islands as well as rice from the south coast of the Tomini Gulf. Locally woven cloth was exported.¹³³

From 1828 a *gezaghebber* was stationed at Gorontalo, who monitored trade and the local rulers. These included the two rajas of Gorontalo-Limboto, one of whom handled relations with the Dutch, the other local affairs. There were also their two highest officials (*jugugu*), a *kapitan laut* in charge of military matters, the four *marsaoleh* or *marsuli*, the village heads of the core settlements who chose the rajas, 30 *walupulo* or lesser village heads, 40 leading men, and a number of minor chiefs.¹³⁴ Gorontalo's eight rajadoms were contractually obliged to accept Batavia's suzerainty and to deliver gold for the set price of f.16 per reaal.¹³⁵ Most Gorontalo inhabitants were subject to "feudal service". The lowest category, *budak*, were slave captives; they and their descendants could be sold "but not into other countries or provinces". Between 1829 and 1840 the colonial authorities established or renewed their treaties with the "rajas and leading men" along the central coast of the northern peninsula and also at Bolaang Mongondow. Around 1840 the ruling elite wore western dress, while the middle class, a mixture of Ternatens, Tidorese and Bugis, dressed in the Bugis fashion.¹³⁶ The Tomini Gulf remained a typical coastal zone of local chiefs, Bugis traders, foragers and fishers. In 1847 an official was despatched to investigate the situation, but he encountered "such a situation in Muton and Parigi that he did not dare disembark, for fear of hostile treatment". The Mandar states were equally unknown.¹³⁷

The Coasts of East and Northwest Sulawesi

Dutch strategy along Sulawesi's east coast was simple and well-tried: to support Ternate, suppress attempts at independence and curtail the growing power of Bone.¹³⁸ The rulers of the key domains in east Sulawesi, Banggai and Tobungku, were increasingly drawn into Bone-oriented trading networks; Ternate could not compel their obedience. By the 1820s Tobungku was "by far the largest port on the east coast of Sulawesi"; it rebelled regularly against Ternate, and became "the centre for raiding in eastern Sulawesi".¹³⁹

¹³³ Henley, *Fertility*, 96–9.

¹³⁴ *Ikhtisar*, 373–4. Henley, *Fertility*, 96–9.

¹³⁵ North coast rajas' names included Bolon Kodu Iskandar Moopanga (Atinggola) and Mohammed Tururu (of the somewhat inland Kaidipang), and further west Solomon Datunsolong (Bintauna) and Daniel Pinto (of the neighbouring Bolang Itang). To the southwest, still on the north coast, Buol (1829), Tolitoli (1832) and Parigi (1832) also signed. *Ikhtisar*, 359–95. On the amount of the gold they had to deliver: Gorontalo, 700; Limboto, 550; the group Bone Suwawa and Bintauna, 100; Bualemo, 75; Onda'e, 60; Moutong, 50; *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*, 158.

¹³⁶ "Some Notices on the Northern or Dutch Part of Celebes," in *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, ed. J.R. Logan (Singapore: J.R. Logan, 1848).

¹³⁷ *Ikhtisar*, 297–8, 394–5.

¹³⁸ Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines."

¹³⁹ Esther Velthoen, "'Wanderers, Robbers and Bad Folk': The Politics of Violence, Protection and Trade in Eastern Sulawesi 1750–1850," in *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid (London: Macmillan, 1991), 378–80. *Ikhtisar*, XLIII.

Popular resentment against Ternate's extortions continued to fuel migrations to areas less subject to oppression, and also encouraged Tobelo and Galela raiding out of Halmahera. Banggai's trade suffered from the depredations of fleets from Sulu and Papua, as well as from punitive hongis sent by Ternate. These expeditions, often supported by Dutch vessels, "castigated" Banggai and Tobungku in 1826, 1834, 1839 and 1841, and Makian in 1849. Unrest became chronic in eastern Sulawesi, as local powerholders tried to balance the demands of overlords and warlords.¹⁴⁰ Some groups moved inland, or to the north and east Sulawesi coasts, seeking to avoid attacks from the sea and/or excessive demands by local rulers. Maguindanau raiders settled in east Sulawesi, while Tobelo from Halmahera also established colonies along the east coast and as far south as Nusa Tenggara. Raiding and colonial anti-piracy measure disrupted trade and the seasonal migrations of trepang fishermen. The relationships between sea-faring adventurers, wandering nobles and coastal populations generated instability in local waters.

The east Sulawesi career of Arung Bakung in the 1820s is a good example.¹⁴¹ Esther Velthoen has discussed these events in some detail.¹⁴² Arung Bakung settled for a while on the north coast of Kendari Bay, near the Sampara estuary in Laiwui, where the leader of the local Makassarese and Maguindanau raiders was a relative. He became "a key patron of the trepang trade in Kendari bay". He was also close to the influential Arab Sarib (Sharif) Ali and had married a princess from Tiworo (Tijoro), a subordinate realm on Muna.¹⁴³ These connections enabled him to be a player in Buton politics. Backed by allied raiding groups, including men from Tolitoli, he declared Muna independent of its overlord Buton, and a four-year war followed. Dutch intervention on behalf of Buton was decisive, and Arung Bakung was forced to leave. He was then invited by a Tolaki chief, Tebau, to settle at Kendari, which he did in 1824. By the late 1820s his patronage and protection had enabled Kendari to develop into "a prosperous trading settlement with a large number of semi-nomadic Bajo and traders". When Arung Bakung left, so too did most Sama Bajau and Bugis traders; Tebau and the Tolaki lost their main source of wealth. But a younger relative of the Sharif introduced Tebau to a Dutch adventurer and trader, J.N. Vosmaer (1803–36), and the Tolaki chief invited him to settle at Kendari as Arung Bakung's replacement.

Vosmaer's brother was a colonial official, but Vosmaer himself was a cartographer who had mapped Kendari Bay before he left the navy to become a merchant/shipper. He learnt Buginese and Makassarese, and befriended Sarib Ali, which enabled him to travel safely on the east coast. Vosmaer saw the possibilities of this frontier region and settled there in 1830. He developed, in his own words, "a certain influence, I may well say a following". He bought a brig in 1831, and traded along the gulf of Bone, around Buton, and up to Tobungku, centres of the booming trepang trade. The protection of Sarib Ali enabled Vosmaer to forge, and indeed depend on, an alliance with Tobelo raider chiefs on Selayar, as well as Daeng Magassing from Bonerate, later viewed by Batavia as

¹⁴⁰ *Ikhtisar*, 292–7, 334–7.

¹⁴¹ Velthoen, "Pirates," 208.

¹⁴² Velthoen, "Contested Coastlines"; Velthoen, "Wanderers, Robbers and Bad Folk"; Velthoen, "Pirates."

¹⁴³ Jennifer L. Gaynor, *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

an infamous pirate. Vosmaer, like his predecessor Arung Bakung, became a key figure in the Kendari trepang trade.

However, Vosmaer also had an unusual aim: he hoped to provide an alternative, peaceful way of life for Tobelo raiding groups. His settlement served agriculture as well as trade, growing coffee, pepper, Chinese and western vegetables. To that end “he brought together a medley of tribes, each with their own traditions, faith and customs: heathens and Muslims, farmers, pirates, fishermen and traders, headhunters and cannibals”.¹⁴⁴ Initially this initiative enjoyed government support, but this carried with it a risk of entanglements, and Batavia’s commitment faded, leaving him vulnerable.¹⁴⁵ As Velthoen notes: “Vosmaer’s ability to create alliances with Bajo fisherfolk and Tobelo raiders and the possibility of him founding a lucrative trading settlement supported by the government had the potential to upset both local regional balances of power”.¹⁴⁶

Luwu, Buton and Bone all had claims on Kendari; the last two complained to the Dutch who remained sympathetic to Vosmaer but did little to support him. Bone’s claim was based on its authority over the Sama Bajau and their allied Bugis traders. The ruler of Buton put a price of 100 slaves on Vosmaer’s head and offered Tobelo the right to a settlement at Kalengsusu, north Buton, if they would attack the Dutchman’s settlement. But they refused. As it turned out, the Sultan’s bounty was never needed, because Vosmaer died in Buton *en route* to Kendari. In 1837, after Vosmaer’s death, Batavia decided to pay his European subordinate at Kendari Fl.40 a month to represent government authority there, but he returned to Makassar in 1840 after a devastating outbreak of the pox had killed most of the population, including Tebau. The final blow came when Buton sent 1,000 fighters to attack the settlements allied Kendari Bay raiders, beheading all ringleaders. However, the attractions of the location remained, and trade revived in 1850, but under the authority of Bone. The first meaningful Dutch contract with Laiwui was only signed in 1887, when authority was vested in the raja on Kendari, assisted by a council of three, including the chiefs of the Bajau and Buginese communities.¹⁴⁷

While local immigrant traders on Sulawesi’s west coast were generally distrusted, individual Bugis and Arab who had become close to European officials were sometimes used as unofficial Dutch representatives. Batavia had no desire to establish a presence on the Kaili coast, for example, but at the same time some source of trusted information and possible mediation would be useful. In 1822 a Bugis trader, Daeng Matona, helped the Dutch crush a rebellion at northwest Sulawesi’s Tolitoli. The Makassar governor subsequently ceremonially installed the daeng as “*leenbezitter*” or fief-holding lord of Tolitoli. He was granted authority over all the Buginese, Makassarese, and other foreigners living and trading along the coast; in practice, this meant that he would report serious

¹⁴⁴ Anita M.C. van Dissel, “Grensoverschrijdend optreden: Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in Nederlands-Indië,” *Leidschrift* 26, no. 3 (2011): 165–7; J.N. Vosmaer, “Korte Beschrijving van het Zuid-Oostelijk Schiereiland van Celebes, in het bijzonder van de Vosmaers-Baai of van Kendari; verrijkt met eenige berigten omtrent den stam der Orang Badjos, en meer andere aantekeningen,” *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap* (1839); *ENI*: “Laiwoei.”

¹⁴⁵ A. Ligvoet, “Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton,” *BKI* 2, no. 4 (1878): 94–5.

¹⁴⁶ Velthoen, “Pirates,” 206.

¹⁴⁷ *Ikhtisar*, 292–4.

issues to the Dutch, in exchange for some protection. However, the “pirates” counterattack was so fierce that Daeng Matona had to withdraw to Donggala. Batavia then organised an anti-pirate force 1,500 strong, which reinstated the “lord”. When he died in 1844 his son succeeded him.¹⁴⁸ The family continued to hold power as Majors of Kalangkangan, named after the mountain north of Tolitoli, although their authority beyond Donggala was very limited.¹⁴⁹

The 1824 London treaty had given the colonial government the right to place officials with the three independent Kaili principalities of Palu, Donggala and Towali. As always, the government demanded that benefits had to be weighed against costs, so Batavia continued to rely on their Bugis “lords”, who were given military titles. The situation on the Kaili coast was described by John Dalton, a Singapore trader who regarded all Bugis as pirates:¹⁵⁰

[The shore’s inhabitants are] entirely Bugis; perhaps seven tenths of all ammunition landed in the first place at Palawan [on the far west of the Sulu Sea] and Megindana [Maguindanau] eventually find their way to Kylie, and supplies the whole coast of likewise all those islands... In the various native ports and rivers of Kylie, there are not less than 700 prows of various sorts... Along the whole line of coast are depots of ammunition, most of which belong to Kylie rajahs. The prows from Boni bay and other parts of Celebes ... take away as much as they can pay for.

Bugis traders also supplied Kutai and other ports directly from Singapore. Here, as was often the case, the active Mandar sailors were regarded as Bugis.

Banjarmasin and East Borneo

In 1823 the visiting Commissioner to Banjarmasin found “chaos in the surrounding territories, a high degree of despotism, an old and weak ruler, a multitude of authorities held by many princes and great men, and an incorrect attitude toward the Dutch government.” He arranged an *Alteration and Amplification* of the 1817 treaty. One change was that the sultan was enjoined to encourage coffee cultivation as well as pepper; he was to sell all the harvests to the Company at fixed prices (coffee for fl.20 per pikul, pepper fl.12). A fanciful suggestion was that while farmers were obliged to give 20 per cent of their harvest to both the sultan and the Dutch, they could retain absolute rights over the remaining 60 per cent. Batavia’s officials, tired of “daily quarrels” about the Sultan’s trade rights, abolished them all, granting him and his envoys fl.600 p.a. in compensation. Article Two of the *Alteration* confirmed the sultan’s cession of most of south and east Kalimantan to the Dutch, including Kutai and Berau “and all their subject territories”.¹⁵¹ Batavia was determined to eliminate

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., XXXVII.

¹⁴⁹ “Het landschap Donggala of Banawa,” *BKI* 58 (1905): 528.

¹⁵⁰ Dalton, “Particulars,” 27.

¹⁵¹ *Surat-surat perdjandjian antara kesultanan Bandjarmasin dengan pemerintahan V.O.C., Bataafse Republiek, Ingeris dan Hindia-Belanda, 1635–1860* (Djakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1965), 219–22, 246; *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*; Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 118–9.

pirates, and after the bloody Bekumpai War (1824–25) the estuaries and coast were more secure.¹⁵² This stimulated trade, including that of the Pulau Petak shippers. In 1826, a contract with the new ruler (Sultan Adam, 1825–27) confirmed this, and the heir apparent and the chief minister were each granted an allowance of fl.100 p.a. (art.28). Customs duties could only be changed with Dutch approval.

The 1826 contract abandoned any pretence of peasants having “absolute rights”. However, the pious hope was expressed that “His Highness shall, at the request of the [Dutch] commissioner, give full consideration to the possibility that it could be more advantageous to his own interests, and to the land’s well-being” if he took 40 per cent of harvests, allowing the producers “free transport and sale” of the remainder. Article 27 reflected the declining demand for pepper. It placed “coffee and pepper gardens” under the Dutch. The sultan could choose to sell the harvest elsewhere, but if he did not, and if no other buyers appeared, then the Resident would purchase the produce at a price he would decide. The new sultan signed away extensive inland territories and promised to leave all government matters in the hands of the Dutch approved chancellor (mangkubumi). The sultan confirmed his (largely symbolic) cession to the Dutch of the three Berau realms of Gunung Tabur, Bulungan and Sambaliung (or Tanjung), as well as Kutai, Batu Licin-Pasir, Pulau Laut and Pegatan. Various islands on the coast and along the rivers were also handed over; a colonial representative was later posted at the Tabanio estuary. The sultan retained the right to hunt in specified territories, and, as a concession, he could also receive, free of duty, one annual Chinese junk. The hated talian tolls were (again) abolished.¹⁵³

In 1845 a renewed treaty between the Dutch and Sultan Adam confirmed the main points made in 1826 while colonial control over trade was fully institutionalised. Customs dues on all river traffic vessels were to be levied at Batavia’s Tatas outpost. The compensation payments remained the same. The border between Banjarmasin and the east Kalimantan polities, running along the Meratus mountain range, was also clarified.¹⁵⁴ The waning influence of Banjarmasin along the western shore of the Makassar straits was increasingly replaced by Sulu.

Kutai and Pasir had come under Batavia’s nominal control in 1824, but no civil official visited either before 1839. However, in October 1827 John Dalton and a Dane called Hecksler left Singapore in a perahu belonging to the Sultan of Kutai to investigate commercial possibilities at the “ports of Pasir and Coti [Kutai] [which] originally belonged to the king of Banjarmasining”.¹⁵⁵ Dalton found Buginese and Arabs exporting considerable amounts of wax, rattan, birds’ nests, gold dust and turtle-shell. Wax harvests were declining, but Dalton heard that upriver at Muara Pahu a [Benuaq] Dayak chief had 900 men gathering bees’ wax and had accumulated 1,430 pikul. The Sultan at Tenggarong and Samarinda Bugis also had large stocks. Birds’ nest and gold were available; Dalton noted

¹⁵² Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880* (Leiden: KITLV, 2001), 73–4.

¹⁵³ *Surat-surat...Bandjarmasin*, 229–47. Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo*, 16–21, 35–41, 46–9; Knapen, *Forests*, 72–3; *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*, 100–1, 142–9.

¹⁵⁴ *Surat-surat...Bandjarmasin*, 248–57; *Ikhtisar*.

¹⁵⁵ John Dalton, “Borneo. Mr Dalton’s Thoughts on Coti,” in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands etc.*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore: J.H. Moor, 1837).

their prices. Two Bugis perahu were said to have taken 92 kati of gold to Singapore. It was the Bugis who brought in salt, tobacco and rice, mostly from Makassar. Only the Bugis and Arabs handled salt, the price of which had increased twenty-fold by the time it reached Muara Pahu. He estimated that Samarinda housed about 300 perahu and 4,000 people; the men were brave, but addicted to gambling, cockfighting and opium.¹⁵⁶

Dalton described Bugis control of Kutai's salt and tobacco imports:¹⁵⁷

When it is considered that every grain of salt consumed on this part of the coast of Borneo, comes from Makassar, the prows containing which can enter the country of Coti [Kutai] by no other channel than this one river, and that there is not, at any one period, more than two or three months consumption on hand, any person must be convinced that by stopping the supply of this necessary article, he has the whole of the people absolutely in his power. The principal reason why the Bugis have such an ascendancy over the natives is that the whole of the salt is in their possession; it is an exclusive monopoly in the hands of about twenty of the anakodas [ships captains] and principal inhabitants of Semerindan.... The next grand article to salt, is Java tobacco; they procure this article from most of the ports of Java, but chiefly from Samarang.... To give some idea of the large profits derived by the Bugis people from the salt trade, and the importance it possesses in every respect... every transaction being a barter in which they put their own price upon what they take in return. I have seen beeswax, sold for equal weight in salt; the same with regard to black birds-nests; further up the country the salt price was still higher: indeed the profit the Bugis make in bartering with the poor Diaks is incredible.

According to a later Dutch report Dalton had nothing but “contempt for the land and its people”; he fell out with both the Sultan and his Danish companion, fleeing to Mamuju on the Mandar coast.¹⁵⁸

In another article Dalton described the arms traffic between Sulawesi and east Kalimantan. He personally saw the Sultan of Kutai buy ten barrels of gunpowder from a perahu from Pasir, adding “it need not be wondered at, that such an extensive trade should be carried on; for on every part of this coast, it is the same, and there is not a single individual who has not his connexions [sic] at Bone, or some part of the island in the neighbourhood of Makassar”. The Americans made handsome profits on both the gunpowder and muskets they brought to Borneo, and on the gold they took back to sell in Singapore.¹⁵⁹ Ships from Salem specialised in carrying cargoes of “muskets, pistols, swords and gunpowder” to Sulu.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ R. Broersma, *Handel en bedrijf in Zuid- en Oost-Borneo* ('s-Gravenhage: G. Naeff, 1927), 166–9.

¹⁵⁹ John Dalton, “Account of the Dyaks of Borneo,” in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands etc.*, ed. J.H. Moor (Singapore, 1837). Earl observed that the Dyaks were “nominally under the control of the Bugis of Coti, who are enabled to keep them in awe in consequence of the dread with which the Dyaks entertain of fire-arms and also from the latter being dependent on the Bugis for the supply of salt.” Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 330.

¹⁶⁰ Chew, *Arming the Periphery*, 204–5.

Ambon, Banda and Ternate

Once the core of the VOC spice system, Ternate, Ambon and Banda had become backwaters by the 1820s. Since these islands lacked alternative attractive exports, trade was waning. Ternate produced almost nothing itself; the main exports were New Guinea products such as wild nutmeg, turtle-shell, trepang, birds' nests, dyewoods, massoi, wax, and mother of pearl. Like Tidore over a century earlier, Ternate was forced to concentrate on the eastern traffic. The government imported rice and textiles from India and distributed them through official channels.

Milburn provides an account of actual, rather than just Dutch-approved trade. At Ternate “[g]old-dust, tortoiseshell, wax, and smuggled spices, are exchanged for European and Asiatic produce, including opium, but the demand is small”. Each year a couple of brigs also came from Manila, bringing tobacco, including cigars, and other goods.¹⁶¹ Ternate's trade with Makassar and Sulawesi harbours was probably more significant; imports included Mandar cloth, rice, ironware and alcohol, as well as weapons and ammunition. Local Ternate merchants, Buginese, Makassarese, Chinese and a few Europeans also redistributed Singapore goods to the Ternate periphery, to Seram, Buru, Halmahera, Raja Ampat, Sula, Banggai, Kei and Aru.¹⁶² Exchange cargoes were trepang and turtle-shell, destined for Chinese merchants in Makassar, as well as massoi, cloves and New Guinea nutmeg. In the Seram Laut islands Kilwaru continued its dominant role; by 1870 it rivalled Dobo on Aru in importance.¹⁶³

Insecurity made much of Maluku perilous. On Seram Hajuddin, the self-proclaimed Sultan of Jailolo, remained a problem for the Dutch; he wanted to leave Seram and become ruler of all Halmahera. In 1825 Merkus tried to introduce some control by bringing back the second Sultan, Muhd. Asgar. Hajuddin was offered the rank of crown prince (Raja Muda) under his older brother who, as sultan, would remain on Seram. In 1826 Muhd. Asgar duly swore allegiance to the Dutch crown. However, north Seram's inadequate sago forests meant the sultan still had to rely on raiding to maintain his following and hence his position. Some of his people moved to sparsely settled Dutch-owned Obi; many wanted to return to Halmahera.¹⁶⁴ A request that the Jailolo sultanate be moved to Obi was rejected by Batavia. Piracy continued; the result was the dissolution of the sultanate Jailolo and the temporary exile of the whole royal family in 1832.¹⁶⁵ However, some of his followers, particularly Tobelo and Galela, continued to live on Seram's north coast and Obi.¹⁶⁶ From

¹⁶¹ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 407–8. R.Z. Leirissa, “Changing Maritime Trade Patterns in the Seram Sea,” in *State and Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago*, ed. G.J. Schutte (Leiden: KITLV, 1994).

¹⁶² R.Z. Leirissa, “The Structure of Makassar-Bugis Trade in Pre-Modern Moluccas,” *RIMA* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993); Leirissa, “Changing Maritime Trade Patterns.”

¹⁶³ R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 102–5.

¹⁶⁴ Velthoen, “Pirates,” 205.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 204–5; Fraassen, “Ternate,” 57.

¹⁶⁶ The Jailolo issue was to remerge later in the 1800s, and be revived in the twenty-first century; that is, the rebellion of Muhammad Arif Bila's nephew, Dana Baba Hasan, who claimed the throne (1875–78). Valerio Valeri, *The Forest of Taboos: Morality, Hunting, and Identity Among the Huaulu of the Moluccas* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2000).

1836 the Dutch maintained a garrison at Wahai, on Seram's north coast; this was regularly attacked, provoking the predictable reprisals.¹⁶⁷

Since spices had become much less valuable Batavia was prepared to recognise the "misery that the prevailing system had caused". E.W.A. Ludeking described the situation in Ambon under the monopoly as "unnatural", one in which "force is used to grow a product on which the government loses money... and planters are denied access to paid labour".¹⁶⁸ Van der Capellen forbade a series of entrenched abuses in Ambon, freeing cultivation of all products, ending the honggi, and allowing such practices as picking fruit. Most of these reforms were never implemented, although the principle of trying to maintain high prices in world markets by imposing rigorous production ceilings was abandoned in favour of maximising production by paying growers higher prices.¹⁶⁹ One of van der Capellen's most important steps, the ending of Ambon's *grondslaverij* that tied farmers to the land, was reversed in 1828. This was deemed necessary "as the native, flighty (*wisselziek*) and unattached to his land, would, at the slightest problem, leave his village and settle elsewhere",¹⁷⁰ thus depriving the clove trees of their care. The "completely pernicious" 1828 rules also retained the death penalty for the sale of cloves to any private buyer. The regents, or local chief-officials, also kept the sanctions they could use to their own advantage.¹⁷¹ The Dutch monopsony was retained, and confirmed in contracts with Ternate, Tidore and Bacan in 1828; officials were placed on Halmahera.¹⁷²

Ambon and Banda depended on other islands, notably Buru and Seram, not only for sustenance, but also as markets for the few exports that they could muster. In the mid-1820s Buru supplied Ambon with rice, sago-flour, and other provisions, precious timbers, and the "famous cajeputa [*kayuputih*, eucalyptus] oil". Kayuputih oil, various timbers and wax were the main official exports, against imported textiles, rice and assorted consumer goods. Milburn added illicit cloves, nutmeg and mace as possible cargoes, and recommended obtaining kayuputih oil "by bartering knives and common Coast cloths; for so little do the natives know the value of money, that they prize a common Lascar knife as much as half a dollar in silver".¹⁷³ In 1824 Buru was incorporated into the colonial administrative

¹⁶⁷ Ellen, *Edge*, 144. *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*, 152. Marie-Christine Boulan-Smit, "We, of the Banyan Tree: Traditions of Origin of the Alune of West Seram" (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1998).

¹⁶⁸ The intellectually active Everhardus Wijnandus Adrianus Lüdeking trained as an army doctor in the Netherlands, and worked in Ambon from 1861 to 1863. E.W.A. Ludeking, "Schets van de Residentie Amboina," *BKI* 3 (1868): 2.

¹⁶⁹ *ENI*: "Nagelen (Kruid-), Nagelcultuur"; R.Z. Leirissa, et al., eds., *Maluku Tengah di masa lampau: gambaran sekilas lewat arsip abad sembilan belas* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1982), 121–32.

¹⁷⁰ Pieter Bleeker, *Reis door de Minahassa en den Molukschen archipel, gedaan in de maanden september en oktober 1855*, vol. 1 (Batavia: Lange & Co., 1856), 88. Bleeker's volume 1 describes Manado and its territories, and Ternate and Tidore; volume 2 describes Amboina and Banda.

¹⁷¹ Leirissa, "Structure." Ch.F. van Fraassen, "Historical Introduction," in *The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography* ed. Katrien Polman (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983), 32–5, 40–1; Ludeking, "Amboina," 93–4; Rengers, *Failure*.

¹⁷² *ENI*: "Nagelen (Kruid-), nagelcultuur."

¹⁷³ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 402.

system;¹⁷⁴ shipping declined sharply after Merkus's 1827 liberalization of trade, which is described below.¹⁷⁵

In 1825 Olivier was not much impressed by Ambon's commerce. There were a few Serammers and Ambon burgers who exported amber, tortoiseshell, woodwork, birds and the usual goods. Chinese who had settled on Seram and Ambon brought in textiles, rice, salt and provisions. Olivier was taken by a leading Arab to meet his business agent, the deputy head (*Letman*) of Ambon's Chinese community. The man seemed rich, with a big brick house, all paid for from trade.¹⁷⁶ Elsewhere, when commenting on the wealth of a Chinese trader in Banda, Olivier described how Alifuru from Seram brought fine wood, birds and other forest products to Ambon to sell to Chinese, receiving a mixture of cash and goods in exchange. The Alifuru also took goods on credit. Olivier noted that repayment may take "six, seven, yes, sometimes twenty years, but it is certain they will pay their debt, often in wood products or other goods". The Ambon Kapitan China also had a *paduwakang* trading to Aru.¹⁷⁷

Decisions taken by the energetic, experienced and well-connected Pieter (Pierre) Merkus,¹⁷⁸ Governor of the Moluccas (1822–28) were to have a lasting impact. In 1827 he imposed clean weeded planting methods for clove trees, while surrendering nutmeg production to "the free will of the people". They, fearing the monopsony might be reintroduced, immediately felled their nutmeg trees. But once it was clear that this change was lasting, they began to plant on their own account. Nuts that once had been smuggled out of the islands entered open trade. If the average production before 1827 had been 3,000 pounds p.a., in 1838 over 50,000 pounds of nutmeg were harvested and exported to Java and, via Singapore, to China. Despite these favourable circumstances prices soon fell; Ludeking attributed this to over-exploitation and the farmers desire to maximise profits by selling immature and poorly prepared nuts.¹⁷⁹ On Banda the perkeniers were still obliged to sell all nuts and mace to the government.¹⁸⁰

Another 1827 decision by Merkus had much wider consequences. Hoping to revive trade, he decided to allow free movement of regional shipping among Java and Maluku ports. Dutch vessels could visit Maluku, and spice sales through ports in Ternate Residency

¹⁷⁴ Barbara Dix Grimes, "Mapping Buru: The Politics of Territory and Settlement on an Eastern Indonesian Island," in *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*, ed. Thomas Reuter (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), 144–8.

¹⁷⁵ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 129–33.

¹⁷⁶ J. Olivier, *Reizen in den Molukschen archipel naar Makassar, ... in het gevolg van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederland's Indië in 1824 gedaan en volgens de dagboeken en aantekeningen van ondersch. reisgenooten beschreven*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Beijerinck, 1834), 243.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* A *paduwakang* was a medium-sized perahu, the dominant ship type visiting Makassar in the second half of the eighteenth century; there it typically weighed 6 last and carried a crew of 13; Knaap and Sutherland, *Monsoon Traders*, 45, 47–8.

¹⁷⁸ Merkus was nephew to a Dutch minister, and worked in the political heart of Batavia from 1815 to 1822; he later became Governor General, 1841–44. A.J. van der Aa, *Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden: Bijvoegsel* (Haarlem J.J. van Brederode, 1878), 650–1. On his private life, see also Jean Gelman Taylor, *Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia*, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 127.

¹⁷⁹ Ludeking, "Amboina," 94–8.

¹⁸⁰ *ENI*: "Notenmuskaat, Notencultuur."

and Java were permitted. However, traders offered even lower prices than the government had done, so the change effectively increased the planters' burden.¹⁸¹ There was, of course, absolutely no intention of allowing traffic to Singapore. But it was impossible to track a multitude of perahu in a complex marine environment. A ship ostensibly heading for west Java might well up in British territory. Makassarese and Buginese could sail openly for Seram, New Guinea and the Southeast and Southwest Islands, and then covertly take trepang, turtle-shell, mother-of-pearl, wild nutmeg, massoi, kapok and other products to Singapore. They returned with cargoes designed for the eastern islands, including textiles, elephant tusks, copper- and iron ware, and opium. As a result of Merkus' liberalisation both Ambon and Banda lost their role in regional traffic; for the Banda planters, who depended on this trade, this was yet another hard blow. They had suffered from a volcanic eruption in 1815 and were heavily indebted.¹⁸² For the Bugis, 1827 opened great opportunities.

The man chosen by the NHM in 1828 as its representative in Ternate was Maarten Dirkz van Duivenbode (b.1804–d.1878). He was from “an old Dutch family in Maluku”. At 24, Maarten Dirkz had obviously been recommended to the NHM as a promising businessman, a reputation that probably derived from his family's local history. Around 1830 he founded a company in Ternate to trade in plumes and other eastern exotica. He became the owner of three schooners and a barque, a coffee plantation just outside town, and the Doalasi section of town. He led Ternate's civilian militia and was a leading light in local society. In 1860 he applied, for and was granted, the right to add “van Renesse” to his name, because of a family connection on his mother's side.¹⁸³ He married twice, his second wife was Chinese; one of his sons established the family business in Manado, another converted the firm into a limited company, yet another continued to trade in Ternate.¹⁸⁴

In January 1846 the colonial government organised an enquiry into the “declining situation” of Maluku. The conclusion was that Dutch moral and political responsibilities had been poorly served, but that little could be expected “as long as the limited naval power meant that only a single schooner and a brig were available to Maluku, so that the Dutch flag could only occasionally be shown in a limited part of their extensive territories”. The grim conclusion was that a “too strict an application of the principle of thrift, would inevitably lead to perdition”.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Olivier, *Reizen*, 2: 342. See also Ellen, *Edge*, 104–5; F.S.A. de Clercq, “Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890,” in *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, ed. and trans. Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards (Washington DC: Smithsonian Digital Libraries Editions, 1999), <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/>.

¹⁸² Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 132, 261; Leirissa, “Structure,” 87; Ludeking, “Amboina,” 115–7. After the British interregnum trade had been relatively lively. On average, between 1816 and 1820, Banda's main port, Neira was visited by 8 large vessels of almost 200 tons for interregional traffic and over 260 smaller craft (of c. 13 tons) which sailed around Maluku itself.

¹⁸³ Navorscher, 35 (New Series 18): 134–6; *De Indische Gids*, 30: 1594; C.J. Heij, *Biographical Notes of Antonie Augustus Bruijn (1842–1890)* (Bogor: IPB Press, 2011).

¹⁸⁴ Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being “Dutch” in the Indies: A History of Creolization and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens and Singapore: Ohio University Press and NUS Press, 2008), 164–370; Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands Until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996), 127.

¹⁸⁵ *Ikhtisar*, 329–30.

Tidore and the Indies East

Expanding demand for products from the most easterly islands benefited Tidore. The attitude of the country trader, untroubled by Dutch regulations, is again expressed by Milburn:¹⁸⁶

There is a great trade here with New Guinea, Gilolo [Halmahera], and with the N. islands; and the Chinese, who are an industrious people, are much interested in it. The commodities imported are as follows [list].¹⁸⁷ Duties. —There are no duties levied on imports or exports, but presents are made to the Sultan and his principal men, according to the business done. Provisions and Refreshments of all kinds are scarce and dear. Rice is imported from Manado on Celebes.



Image 35 Island of Masmapi, Dore Bay, Northwest New Guinea, mid-1830s¹⁸⁸

The seafaring communities of East Seram and the Seram Laut islands welcomed traders like Milburn. The products they brought were simple, and included tin, “which the natives greatly value, and convert into ear-rings, &c”.¹⁸⁹ Country traders visiting New Guinea could obtain the same sea and forest commodities as in Seram, as well as ambergris,

¹⁸⁶ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 407–8.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 402–3, 408: “China-ware, scarlet cloth, coarse cutlery, guns and muskets, gunpowder, glass-ware, iron in bars; ironmongery, looking-glasses, lead; lace, gold and silver; nails, piece-goods of sorts, shot, steel, and watches. The proas import from Sooloo, New Guinea, Gilolo, Waygiou [Waigeo, Raja Ampat], and the other islands, agal agal [agar-agar seaweed], birds’-nests, black-wood, beech de mer [trepang], birds of paradise, Massoi bark, nutmegs, pearls, pearl shells, rattans, sago, stick-lac [resin-like insect secretion, dye-stuff, source of shellac], sandal-wood, tortoise-shell, and wax, taking in return the produce of India and China, before mentioned.”

¹⁸⁸ “Vue prise sur l’île Masmapi. au Hâvre Dorey”. Plate 112 from d’Urville, *Voyage de la corvette l’Astrolabe*. General Research Division, The New York Public Library. 1830–35. <http://digitalcollections.nysl.org/items/510d47da-7905-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>.

¹⁸⁹ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 403. Other goods listed: coarse blue, white, and red piece-goods, India silks, opium, iron, coarse cutlery, looking-glasses and lead.

pearls, pearl shell, and slaves; Milburn adds brass wire, gold and silver lace to the products favoured as exchange goods.¹⁹⁰ When the French explorer Dumont d'Urville came in 1827 he complained bitterly that the Papuans “demanded expensive Spanish silver dollars instead of cheap necklaces”.¹⁹¹ After visiting Keffing and Gorom in the mid-1820s Olivier noted that there used to be “a Dutch outpost, but the population has heard nothing from the Dutch for many years, except a few insignificant letters”.¹⁹²

Aru's commerce flourished. Bik describes three Chinese agents of Makassar merchants he encountered in 1824; they had already been in Aru for two months buying up trepang. In 1826 the islands produced birds' nests, trepang, sharks' fins, copra, wood, and mother-of-pearl to the total value of fl.881,810, of which fl.245,889 was down to mother-of-pearl. This was, as usual, given to Chinese to pay off goods advanced earlier.¹⁹³ Increased traffic had driven prices higher. Once the Bandanese could obtain a pikul of trepang for a sarong or cloth worth perhaps 8 guilders, and 20 birds' nests for a machete, but by the mid-1820s the trepang price was 14 to 18 guilders. Such goods would “yield a large profit were it not necessary to remain among the Arus for a period of four months to collect a cargo of any importance”.¹⁹⁴ The differences between prices paid in Aru and received on sale in Makassar were so considerable that many were prepared to be patient.¹⁹⁵ Skippers of larger ships continued to call at Kei, where renowned boat-builders sold the smaller vessels that enabled traders to hive-off from the mothership to cruise shallow seas and streams accumulating cargoes. By the 1820s the Southwestern archipelagos and their Christian minorities were left entirely to their own devices, while they benefited from the increased demand for traditional sea and forest products.

Batavia had been disturbed by McCluer's abortive settlement at Dore in 1793, so when Merkus heard rumours that the British had settled again in New Guinea he sent Captain D.H. Kolff to investigate. No such base existed, but it was decided that a demonstration of Dutch resolve was required; Tidore's vague claims were unlikely to convince foreign governments. In 1828 the Government of the Moluccas territory was extended far to the east, encompassing the southern coast of New Guinea west of 141 degrees longitude.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 403.

¹⁹¹ Holger Warnk, “The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011).

¹⁹² Olivier, *Reizen*, 2: 343.

¹⁹³ Broersma, “Koopvaardij,” 38–9; Dirk Hendrik Kolff, *Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga through the Southern and Little Known Parts of the Moluccan Archipelago during the Years 1825 and 1826*, trans. G.W. Earl (London: James Madden, 1840), 27–32. Patricia Spyer, *The Memory of Trade. Modernity's Entanglements in an Eastern Indonesian Island* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 15–6; A.J. Bik, *Dagverhaal eener reis, gedaan in het jaar 1824, tot nadere verkenning der eilanden Keffing, Goram, Groot- en Klein Kei en de Aroe-eilanden* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1928).

¹⁹⁴ Kolff, *Voyages of the Dutch Brig*, 175.

¹⁹⁵ This was particularly true of the type known as *tripang batu* which cost 80 to 100 guilders in Aru, and were sold for 150 to 160 guilders in Makassar. Heather Sutherland, “Trepang and Wangkang: The China Trade of Eighteenth Century Makassar,” in *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. R. Tol, K. van Dijk and G. Acciaioli (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), 88–9.

¹⁹⁶ On West New Guinea borders, see Paul W. Van der Veur, *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: from Torres Strait to the Pacific* (Canberra: ANU Press, 1966).

Care was taken to avoid offending Tidore. A Dutch outpost was to be built, demonstrating sovereignty. As Merkus was anxious not to breach the east Seram traders' exclusive trading rights the 1828 expedition was instructed to avoid their favoured harbours. However, the south coast site selected, east of the Onin peninsula, was regularly visited by Seram traders, whose local partners supplied them with slaves.¹⁹⁷ The ill-fated Fort Du Bus (Merkusoord) was located at the renamed Triton Bay, after the ship that had brought them there. Merkusoornd proved to be a disaster, in human and financial terms. Its closure was suggested in 1834 since it had nothing to offer apart from "a few items of little worth" and consequently there need be no fear of interlopers. In 1836 the remnants of the garrison were withdrawn.¹⁹⁸

Bali and Lombok

After the conquest of Blambangan by the VOC in the late eighteenth century Java's extreme east was very sparsely populated. It has been estimated that the number of inhabitants had fallen from approximately 80,000 to 8,000. This frontier region was supervised by Dutch officials based further to the west; eventually it became a sub-division of Java's Besuki Residency. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that immigration surged, and with it smallholder production of coffee and tobacco for delivery to Dutch processors. This tied it more closely to Java's agrarian economy.¹⁹⁹ Clandestine traffic with Bali no doubt continued.

Once the ash had been cleared from the fields, both Bali and Lombok emerged enriched by the eruption of 1815, which helped farmers recover from the devastation. The elite was increasingly reliant on agriculture, particularly as the demand for slaves had fallen sharply. However, rice and coffee exports were growing. Although Tambora's eruption had caused widespread starvation, ultimately it added to the value of labour and the fertility of the soil.²⁰⁰ Before 1815 Bali was a rice importer, but from 1825 exports were significant; much was shipped through Singapore, destined for the hungry markets of China. Badung and its port of Kuta benefited most notably.²⁰¹ In 1824 Batavia sent the prominent Surabaya Arab trader Sayid Hassan al Habshi to Bali to test the mood of the rajas. In his report he

¹⁹⁷ Clive Moore, *New Guinea: Crossing Boundaries and History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 95–6; Stuart Upton, "The Impact of Migration on the People of Papua, Indonesia: A Historical Demographic Analysis" (New South Wales, 2009), 115–6. The garrison consisted of 13 Europeans, 20 soldiers from other parts of the Dutch East Indies, and 10 Javanese convict labourers. The desirable cargoes of trepang, turtleshell, massoi and wild nutmeg had been destined for Asian markets and were to be handled by regional traders. *Ikhtisar*, 351–4.

¹⁹⁸ *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*, 156. Moore, *New Guinea*.

¹⁹⁹ Sri Margana, "Java's Last Frontier: The Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan, c. 1763–1813" (PhD diss., University of Leiden, 2007). Frans van Baardewijk, *The Cultivation System, Java 1834–1880* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1993), 55. P. Boomgaard and A. J. Gooszen, *Population Trends 1795–1942* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991), Table 2; *ENI*: "Banjoewangi", "Besoeiki."

²⁰⁰ Henk Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics, 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 96–7.

²⁰¹ Alfons van der Kraan, "Trade, Rajas and Bandars in South Bali," in *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming*, ed. John Butcher and Howard Dick (London: St. Martins Press, 1993), 103–4, 110–4.

described the concentrations of pirates from Sulawesi, Borneo and Sulu who found shelter in Balinese harbours, leading to visits by Dutch warships in 1825 and 1827.²⁰²

The Java War caused a surge of demand for foodstuffs as well as a revival of interest in Balinese soldiers. A Dutch recruiting agent, Pierre Dubois, was stationed at Kuta in Badung between 1827 and 1831; he was expected to engage 1,000 men a year for the colonial army. This was a new twist on the VOC's custom of buying Balinese slaves for military service. However, although the ruler was to receive a bounty of 20 *Spaanse matten* (*realen*, Spanish dollars) per recruit, barely five hundred could be mustered. Like the slaves, the soldiers served a limited term; most also stayed on in Java after their contract expired. Both were reasonably well treated by contemporaneous standards.²⁰³ Dubois' reports contained a wealth of information on Bali.²⁰⁴

In 1826 Merkus asked the skipper Juragan Yusuf to report on the role of Bugis and Makassarese traders in Nusa Tenggara. He described how the main shippers went to Bali (Buleleng, Badung, and to Padang, facing Lombok), to Lombok itself, Sumbawa, Bima, Manggarai and Buton. They provided capital and goods, and often ships, to the petty traders who supplied them with sea products, which they then sold to merchants in Java or Singapore.²⁰⁵ In 1829 it was stated that the Balinese produced double the amount of rice they needed.²⁰⁶ The *bandars* or leaseholders managing Bali's ports did well. These "tax-farmers" were officially privileged traders who had paid for exclusive rights to handle specified commodities, impose customs duties, and maintain trading posts which enjoyed royal protection. The Chinese who controlled rice exports were central to Bali's economy and the rulers' wealth.²⁰⁷

The experienced Captain G.F. Davidson commented:²⁰⁸

From the islands of Lombok and Bally, directly eastward of Java, the market of Singapore receives a large annual supply of rice of fair quality, a small quantity of coffee, and some coarse native cloths, to which I may add, a few good stout ponys. The boats from these islands resemble those from Celebes, and are sometimes classed among the Bugis traders: they carry back, as return cargoes, opium, muskets, copper cash, a little gold and silver thread, cotton yarn, and cotton manufactures. These islands have their own Rajahs and laws, but are narrowly watched and kept in check by their neighbours, the Dutch.

²⁰² Willard Hanna, *Bali Chronicles: Fascinating People and Events in Balinese History* (Hong Kong: Periplus, 2004), chap. 3.

²⁰³ C. Lekkerkerker, "De Baliërs van Batavia," *Indische Gids* 40, no. 1 (1918).

²⁰⁴ Helen M. Creese, *Bali in the Early Nineteenth Century. The Ethnographic Accounts of Pierre Dubois* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

²⁰⁵ Leirissa, "Structure," 87. Parimartha, "Perdagangan."

²⁰⁶ Schulte Nordholt, *Spell of Power*, 93–5.

²⁰⁷ Alfons van der Kraan, "Trade, Rajas and Bandars in South Bali," in *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming. Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*, ed. John Butcher and Howard Dick (London: St. Martins Press, 1993).

²⁰⁸ G.F. Davidson, *Trade and Travel in the Far East or Recollections of Twenty-One Years Passed in Java, Singapore, Australia, and China* (London: Madden and Malcolm, 1846), 63.

Officials arriving in Bali from Batavia were often disconcerted by the lack of respect and the robust independence displayed by the islands' kings. The *Dewa Agung* of Klungkung claimed to be the supreme ruler of Bali and Lombok and was not inclined to acknowledge European pretensions. However, emissaries were sent with increasing frequency, as the Dutch were concerned about possible British intervention. They also wanted to gain privileged access to the rice harvests of Bali and Lombok, as production on Java was inadequate.²⁰⁹ The burgeoning trade of Bali and Lombok also attracted foreigners, all of whom depended completely on their relations with Balinese ruling families. As one visiting official commented in 1838:²¹⁰

A European merchant coming to Bali, has to address himself to the raja by way of the syahbandar [harbour master] if he wants to achieve anything. And only after the raja has made his choice for himself and those who belong to him, may the merchants start his business. This has to be conducted by giving credit to Balinese women, who will carry the goods around in the hinterland. This may take two or sometimes three months.

Bali was also supplying rice, coconut oil, cotton and tobacco to Java and Sulawesi, while manufactures from Europe, India and China came via Java, Sulawesi and Singapore. Rice, tobacco and coarse cotton cloths were exported to Seram and the eastern islands. Seram and Gorom traders brought in massoi bark.²¹¹ In 1846 the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce was worried about Dutch activities on Bali, which was "the chief granary for Singapore". The members urged the British government to take a strong stand against such encroachments.²¹²

On Lombok Ampenan had become the main port; in the 1830s its inhabitants included an estimated hundred Bugis and twelve Chinese.²¹³ Two Europeans settled there in 1834: the Bengal-born G.P. King and the Danish Mads Lange (b. 1806–d. 1856). King was aligned with the realm of Karangasem-Lombok (or Karangasem-Sasak), and Lange with Mataram. King paid fl.2,000 a year for the right to trade. Both must have been assiduous in their giving. King had earlier been a partner in a trading business in Batavia, while Lange and his three brothers were former employees of the Danish Asiatic Company.²¹⁴ Lange's Lombok

²⁰⁹ Schulte Nordholt, *Spell of Power*, 159–64.

²¹⁰ Schulte Nordholt, "The Mads Lange Connection: A Danish Trader in Bali in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," *Indonesia* 32 (1981): 23.

²¹¹ On "Bali Badung," see Earl, "Trading Ports," 535, 541–55. The missionary W. Medhurst visited Bali in 1829 "... every family has its loom, which is worked by the women ... weaving ... with cotton thread the produce of the country and intertwined with coarse gold thread, imported by the Chinese.... Potteries are common.... The Balinese blacksmiths are also able to make gun barrels, and even rifle-pieces with spiral grooves, but for the locks they are indebted to the Chinese, who import them from Java". W.H. Medhurst, "Short Account of the Island of Bali, Particularly of Bali Baliling," in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago* (Singapore, 1837).

²¹² Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo*, 115.

²¹³ "Beschrijving van het Eiland Lombok," *TNI* 2, no. 1/22 (1839): 661–2.

²¹⁴ Schulte Nordholt, "Mads Lange"; Alfons Van der Kraan, *George Pocock King: Merchant Adventurer and Catalyst of the Bali War, 1846–49* (Hull: University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1992). See also Willard A. Hanna and Tim Hannigan, *A Brief History of Bali: Piracy, Slavery, Opium and Guns: The Story of an Island Paradise* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 2016).

company exported rice on ships plying the NSW-Manila-China and NSW-Singapore-Bengal-Europe routes. Vessels that had delivered cargoes and emigrants to Australia were available to carry commodities to China, Mauritius, Singapore or even England.²¹⁵ King was also a big rice exporter, freighting cargoes on boats sailing to Australia, Singapore, China, Manila, Mauritius and the Cape Colony. The Europeans soon replaced Chinese and Buginese as rice *bandars* in Ampenan, Buleleng and Kuta.²¹⁶

At Ampenan King developed a thriving trade, buying up rice and other island products such as ducks, dried fish, cod liver oil, ponies and horses, cattle, Lombok cotton (said to be the best in the Indies), coffee and sago. His presence attracted more passing Western ships, and the port was popular with American whalers who visited between May and September.²¹⁷ King collaborated and competed with Chinese and Bugis in intra-island commerce, dealing with perahu from Sumbawa, Timor, Seram and South Sulawesi which distributed grain, tobacco and other goods from Singapore and China. King's influence reached its peak in the 1840s, when there could be as many as ten or twelve square-rigged vessels in port at the same time.²¹⁸ From the 1830s Lombok exported rice to Sumbawa, Timor, Makassar and Maluku. Imports included salt from Bali and Makassar and weapons and guns from Singapore. Gold came from Europe, Mauritius and China; strong drink from Singapore, Sydney, and France; regional textiles from Bali and Makassar, and batik from Java. Opium had to be smuggled in, because the raja had forbidden it.²¹⁹

In 1838 war broke out between the two main Balinese kingdoms on Lombok. Mataram's new ruler, Ratu Agung Agung Ketut Karangasem defeated Karangasem-Lombok and flouted Klungkung's authority.²²⁰ Each European trader sided with his own royal patrons: King with Mataram, Lange with Karangasem-Lombok. Both earned money shipping troops from Bali to Lombok, but Lange also did an opportunistic deal with Mataram. This proved expensive; he lost his royal protection, most of his ships, his factory and fl.30,000 in outstanding debt.²²¹ The Dutch, ever anxious about foreign interlopers, dispatched an envoy to Bali five times between 1840 and 1843 to conclude treaties. Between 1846 and

²¹⁵ Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 86–92. Schulte Nordholt, "Mads Lange."

²¹⁶ Alfons van der Kraan, "Bali and Lombok in the World Economy," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993): 95–7; Geertz, *Negara*, 86–92; I Putu Gde Suwitha, "Perahu Pinisi di Sunda kecil: Suatu Studi tentang Pola-pola perniagaan Abad XVIII–XIX," in *Arung samudera: persembahan memperingati sembilan windu A.B. Lapien*, ed. Edi Sedyawati and Susanto Zuhdi (Depok: PPKB LPUI, 2001), 128.

²¹⁷ Earl, "Trading Ports," 396–9.

²¹⁸ Kraan, "Bali and Lombok," 95–7.

²¹⁹ "Beschrijving van het eiland Lombok," 661–2.

²²⁰ Alfons Van der Kraan, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980), 5–6. The title of the ruler is not clear here.

²²¹ Schulte Nordholt, "Mads Lange"; Jurrien Van Goor, "Said Abdullah, Politicus in de marge van het imperium," in *Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders overzee*, ed. Jurrien Van Goor (Utrecht: HES, 1982), 64–5, 80–7. Alfons van der Kraan, "Bali: 1848," *Indonesia Circle* 62 (1994); Alfons Van der Kraan, *Bali at War: A History of the Dutch-Balinese Conflict of 1846–49* (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1995).

1849 three Dutch military expeditions were also sent. On Lombok Mataram eventually emerged triumphant, as will be explained in the next chapter.²²²

The island's successful trade led the NHM to consider a post on Lombok, but the Buginese refused to trade with the agent; King's position was too strong, and conflict was disrupting traffic. So in 1839 the company accepted the eager invitation of the Badung king to settle at the south Bali port of Kuta. But the NHM was forbidden to supply opium and guns, two of the most popular imports. The company itself had briefly controlled the opium traffic (1827–33) but rampant opium smuggling had caused such losses that the Government had reinstated the opium import monopoly and farmed out distribution.²²³ Arms importing had always been prohibited by Batavia, though this did nothing to deter private traders. The NHM's Kuta factory was a disaster; after losing fl.180,00 it closed in 1844.²²⁴

In 1839 Mads Lange moved to Kuta, in south Bali's Badung, where he was appointed as the Kuta *perbekel* or representative of the raja of Badung; he did much better than the hamstrung NHM. Lange lived in fine style at Kuta with his women, servants, dogs and employees.²²⁵ His core business was the exchange of Balinese rice for *kepeng*, (Chinese copper coins) although he also imported textiles and other goods. During the 1840s he bought the kepeng in China, for c.1400 to the dollar, while in Badung they were worth double. Lange was then exporting 5,000 to 12,000 tons of rice per annum; King on Lombok handled 16,000 to 20,000, at about fl.40 to fl.60 per ton. Lange also sold coconut oil in Singapore, at a profit of 200 to 300 per cent, as well as livestock, dried meat, hides, cotton, tobacco and coffee. His network of mainly Chinese agents "organized the interisland trade centred on Kuta". He owned several European rigged vessels for longer routes, while smaller boats gathered regional produce from Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Bima and Timor and minor Balinese harbours. "Balinese noblewomen", notes Schulte Nordholt, "also played a crucial role in the trade, acting as Lange's inland agents and providing the larger part of the Balinese export products". But then the wars of the late 1840s disrupted both production and trade, as the hinterland was in turmoil. Smallpox broke out, and plagues of rats damaged harvests. Buleleng on the north coast was attracting more traffic. Kuta's declining trade deteriorated further; Lange died in 1856, reputedly by poison.²²⁶

A trading voyage to Bali in 1846 is described in a Siamese manuscript. The vessel was loaded with 10,000 dollars' worth of goods provided by a Thai investor. When the ship arrived in Buleleng the Sino-Thai skipper was received by the chief *bandar*, who was also the captain of the local Chinese community. He told the new arrival that there were about 80 or 90 Chinese in Bali. The Buleleng Captain accompanied the skipper to the royal capital at Singaraja, where the ruler approved his stay. Royal instructions ensured

²²² Alfonds van der Kraan, "Lombok under the Mataram Dynasty," in *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid (London: Macmillan, 1991).

²²³ *ENI*: "Opium."

²²⁴ *Ibid.*; Graaf, *Handel*, 67.

²²⁵ Ludvig Verner Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East, and Journeys to California in 1849, and to the White Sea in 1878* (London: W.H. Allen, 1882).

²²⁶ Schulte Nordholt, "Mads Lange."

the arrival of a guide and horses for his trading expedition to Mengwi. His translator was a Balinese woman. The skipper spent six weeks in Bali, buying coffee, rice, tobacco, dried buffalo meat and hides, as well as coconut oil. The Balinese kings asked him many questions; each time that the trader explained he was looking for jewels the rulers replied they could offer rice, tobacco, coffee and foodstuffs, but no such valuables. His visit ended as a hostile Dutch vessel arrived in Buleleng.²²⁷ Chinese networks were central to the most long-range levels of Bali's export-oriented economy, but Bugis were active in inter-island traffic as well as voyages to Singapore. To the east, in Timor, the Dutch and Portuguese regimes discouraged Chinese immigration,²²⁸ as their networks were too independent for colonial comfort.

Sumbawa to Timor

Java, Bali, Maluku, Mauritius, Macau, England, Port Jackson and the Swan River [Melbourne and Perth] were Bima's main trading partners. After Tambora's eruption refugees settled where they could; Bima's population began to recover. Some exports increased, such as birds' nests and salt, either because they were undamaged by or because they had been developed more intensively to provide a livelihood. An earthquake in 1821 further impoverished the island. But by 1830 Bima was again producing rice, cotton and teak, birds' nests, wax, salt, pots and pans and exporting about 300 horses a year to Java. Women wove textiles and grew tobacco, but Francis does not mention these as significant exports. In the case of the former, at least, this seems to be another example of a product being ignored simply because it was irrelevant to European buyers. Mung beans (*kacang ijo*) and trepang went to regional markets. People from the interior brought cotton, tobacco and tamarind to the coast for exchange. Bima's chiefs had made good profits exporting slaves from its Manggarai territories, but by the 1820s these were—officially at least—only providing small amounts of wax and coarsely woven mats.²²⁹

Bima cost the Dutch more than it was worth, some fl.10,000 per annum, and in exchange they only received about 2,000 pikul of sandalwood, and that in a good year. The wood had lost so much value that on occasion no ship was even sent to collect it.²³⁰ The surviving Sumbawa realms of Bima, Sumbawa and Dampo refused to accept the 1824 contract, stating that they preferred to renew the original one negotiated in 1765. This was then signed by Mohd. Salahudin of Dampo in 1822; by Ismail, Sultan

²²⁷ Elizabeth Graves and Charnvit Kaset-siri, "A Nineteenth-Century Siamese Account of Bali with Introduction and Notes," *Indonesia* 7 (1969).

²²⁸ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 120–9. Heinrich Zollinger, *Verslag van eene reis naar Bima en Soembawa, en naar eenige plaatsen op Celebes, Saleijer en Floris, gedurende de maanden Mei tot December 1847* (Batavia: Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1851), *Ikhtisar*, XLI–XLII.

²²⁹ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 81–9, 139–40.

²³⁰ E. Francis, "Van Batavia naar Timor Koepang," *TNI* 1, no. 1 (1838): 8–15. In 1831 the main products were still sandalwood, wax and horses, insignificant amount of trepang, turtle-shell and birds' nests. The most popular imports were alcohol, coarse textiles, European-made coloured head-cloths, Javanese tin and copperware, various sorts of beads, heavy bush knives and sundries, while guns and gunpowder were always in demand everywhere on Timor.

of Bima, in 1832; and Amar Ullah of Sumbawa in 1846.²³¹ Batavia was quite happy to abandon six decades of theoretical authority, because the island “was of little interest to the Government”.²³²

Milburn considered the islands east and south of Timor to be generally very dangerous (“they are all cannibals”); the people of independent Sumba did “trade in wax and bird-nests, but they are savage and treacherous”. He described both Dutch and Portuguese power on Timor as “almost nominal”, although controls on Dili’s trade were stricter than those of Kupang.²³³ Dili’s traffic was also more extensive, as local Portuguese and Chinese traders sent forest products and sandalwood to Macau. Private trade was permitted between the two ports, with customs duties of 5 per cent. The annual Macau-Dili vessel also called regularly at Kupang bringing provisions for the local Chinese, while at Dili Chinese commodities were exchanged for about 1,000 pikul of sandalwood and 500 of wax. Dili’s general exports included wheat, beeswax, wax candles, sandalwood, buffalo and horses; imports were cotton and silk textiles, firearms, swords, pottery and so on from Europe, British India, Java, Siam, Burma, Manila and China. Cattle were shipped to Ambon and Mauritius.²³⁴

The trade commissioner J.D. Kruseman visited Kupang in 1824. He reported that foreign traders sought sandalwood, of which at least 8,000 pikul were exported, along with some 20,000 pikul of bees’ wax. Wax contributed about 60 per cent of the value of Timor’s exports; under 30 per cent came from sandalwood, and over 3 per cent from horse exports. Most (c. 90 per cent) went to Java, while Dili took sandalwood (c. 4.5 per cent of export value) for forwarding to Macau. Makassar received a lesser amount. Kruseman thought that Sulawesi “smugglers” took away from Timor as much wax as was exported officially from Kupang.²³⁵ Each year 25 to 30 Western fishing boats, whalers, and Australian vessels also moored at Kupang; locals benefited from their seasonal provisioning, obtaining clothes, textiles and ironware in return.

Kruseman estimated that there were about two hundred Chinese families in Kupang, with many houses and temples. More were arriving from Singapore. Francis commented that in Timor:²³⁶

[A]ll the trade is in the hands of three hundred Chinese from Macau, and twenty from Amoy [Xiamen], who have settled at Kupang, Tialarang [Atapupu], Batu Gede and Dili. Their connections to the interior have been made through marriage or other relationships. A few burgers play a small commercial role, but their lesser capital and effort mean they are far behind their Chinese competitors.

²³¹ *Ikhtisar*, 319–24.

²³² *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*, 130.

²³³ Milburn and Thornton, *Oriental Commerce*, 393–6. Chris de Jong, *A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies: The “Little East” in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, <http://www.cgfdejong.nl/Little%20East.pdf>.

²³⁴ Gunn, *History of Timor*, 53; Zollinger, *Verlag, khtisar*, XLI–XLII.

²³⁵ J.D.K. [Kruseman], “Beschrijving van Timor,” *Oosterling: tijdschrift bij uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie* 1 (1835): 5–10.

²³⁶ E. Francis, “Timor in 1831,” *TNI* 1, no. 1/2 (1838): 50.

Kupang shippers handled the coastal trade around Timor (except the Portuguese east) and with neighbouring Roti, Savu and Solor. They were fairly prosperous; a few were rich. About 30 perahu were based in Kupang. Their boats were built locally, with the help of slaves and labourers from Solor, who also formed the crews. Typical inter-island trading journeys lasted four to six weeks. Cloth from Java and Sulawesi, Chinese earthen- and iron-ware and sundries were exchanged for wax, sandalwood, maize, gold, fibre ropes, cattle and wooden items. Traders did deals with coastal chiefs, giving them goods on credit. Kruseman described how four Kupang-based vessels made longer voyages, sailing each year to Java and Makassar.²³⁷ One or two *paduwakang* and some smaller ships also arrived from Makassar and Bima, bringing Sulawesi textiles and Chinese goods worth eight to nine thousand guilders; perahu from Ambon brought money to buy buffalo and pigs. Occasional Kupang ships also carried the animals to Maluku. A French merchant, Bechard, who had settled in Kupang in 1821, had a flourishing business, mainly exporting horses and buffalo to Isle de France (Mauritius). Despite this activity, Kruseman concluded that little progress could be expected beyond the Kupang enclave unless there was intensified Dutch administrative investment.²³⁸

Sailors of predominantly Sulawesi origins dominated the waters between south Flores' Ende and north Sumba's Waingapu. The VOC had maintained a post at Ende, which remained theoretically subordinate to Dutch Timor. But, explained Francis (confirming the early English observation), "since the fall of the Company some Buginese and Makassarese have settled there; they are not only the law of the land, but also dominate trade." In fact, of course, they had been there much longer. Francis described two main settlements on Ende bay, a Makassarese and a Buginese. Active traders were exporting trepang, birds' nests, textiles, *gumuti* rope (from arenga palm fibres), karet, sharks fins, coconut oil, wild cinnamon, sandalwood and foodstuffs.²³⁹ Most went to Singapore; by 1831 only one or two vessels a year sailed to Kupang.²⁴⁰ Ende also maintained contacts with subsidiary settlements on the Flores coast, as well as with Bima and Sape.²⁴¹

In Batavia, Ende was known as a pirate and slaving centre. The Endenese monopolised Sumba's trade; they would, wrote Francis, murder anyone who dared intrude. Slaving remained common and profitable, despite the ban on the traffic.²⁴² In 1820 a Dutch ship's captain had been stranded in Sumba; he described a mountainous but fertile island, with rice, maize and root crops in the hills, and wet-rice fields in the valleys.²⁴³ However,

²³⁷ Kruseman, *Verslag*. A brig, four schooners and a paduwakang, totalling c. 50 tons.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ Francis, "Van Batavia"; E. Francis, "Timor in 1831," *TNI* 1, no. 1/2 (1838).

²⁴⁰ J.D.K. [Kruseman], "Beschrijving van Timor," 40–1.

²⁴¹ Suwitha, "Perahu Pinisi."

²⁴² Francis, "Timor," 366–7. Janet Hoskins, "The Heritage of Headhunting : History, Ideology, and Violence on Sumba, 1890–1990," in *Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia*, ed. Janet Hoskins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

²⁴³ J.D.K.[ruseman], "Beschrijving van het Sandelhout Eiland," *Oosterling: tijdschrift bij uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie* 2(1835): 64–65. Janet Hoskins, *The Play of Time. Kodi Perspectives on Calendars, History, and Exchange* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1997), 39–47.

16 years later an observer concluded that the slave trade was “destroying” Sumba; endemic warfare between Sumba’s more than 30 small rajadoms ensured supplies for coastal shippers.²⁴⁴ In 1838 two Dutch naval vessels were sent to cruise the waters around Timor and Solor to punish pirates. It was soon Ende’s turn. Seven villages and 50 vessels were burned after “friendly and peaceful” efforts to persuade the chiefs and people to submit failed.²⁴⁵ In a new treaty the Endenese promised to protect trade, encourage the cultivation of crops for the European market such as coffee, pepper, cotton, indigo and cinnamon, provide recruits for the colonial army, and abandon traditional rights to plunder wrecked ships. They then attacked Sumba.

At first glance it might seem paradoxical that the Endenese were first “disciplined” for raiding, and then proceeded to attack their neighbour. G.W. Earl, writing from the settlement at Port Essington, north Australia, placed this rather strange sequence of events in a regional context. He describes the 1838 anti-slaving campaign, and goes on to explain:²⁴⁶

As a reimbursement of the expenses of the war, the chiefs of Ende agreed to reduce Sandalwood Island [Sumba] for the Dutch; an enjoyment, rather than a task, as the Ende’s [sic] people, who are more warlike than the others, would be enriched by the plunder of their more industrious and peaceful neighbours, They are now busily employed in desolating sandal-wood, under the command of a son of the Sultan of Pontianak, in Borneo, who had been banished by the Dutch to Timor, for some political offence.

In 1840 a new raja (or sultan) of Ende was recognised, Syahbandar (Harbourmaster) Gani; he was probably a Buginese.²⁴⁷

A deal such as that described by Earl would have been characteristic of the enterprising Diederik Johannes van den Dungen Gronovius, the Resident of Timor (1836–41).²⁴⁸ The “son of the Sultan of Pontianak” Earl referred to was Sayyid ‘abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr al-Qadri who was indeed a relative of the Hadhrami Sultan of Pontianak, but not his son. The Sayyid had become close to van den Dungen Gronovius when the latter was posted to west Borneo in the early 1820s. This proved useful after Sayyid Abdul Rahman was exiled from west Kalimantan in 1829. Van den Dungen Gronovius, sent to Kupang as Timor

²⁴⁴ Francis, “Timor,” 353–62. Needham, *Sumba and the Slave Trade. ENI: Soemba*, 8. Four rajadoms, Taimanu, Kedumbu, Kampera and Majili, signed treaties with the Dutch in the early 1840s; in 1874 the ruler of Lewa was acknowledged by the Dutch.

²⁴⁵ *Ikhtisar*, 422–5. Such actions continued through the 1850s. Brumund, *Indiana*.

²⁴⁶ G.W. Earl, “Letter to the Royal Geographical Society,” *The Literary Gazette and Journal of the Belles Lettres* (1841): 737–8.

²⁴⁷ *Ikhtisar*, 422–5.

²⁴⁸ Van den Dungen Gronovius (b. Leiden 1798 d. Batavia 1854) was an illegitimate son of the Dutch lawyer Jean Gronovius who legally conferred his surname upon him and brought him to the Indies in 1815. Van den Dungen Gronovius lived in West Borneo for 15 years and was Resident of Sambas and Pontianak between 1825 and 1836. His predecessor was killed by pirates.

Resident in 1836, invited the Sayyid to accompany him.²⁴⁹ The Resident advanced the Sayyid the considerable capital of fl.14,000 and gave him permission to live in Sumba in 1840, after the Ende campaigns. The Sayyid's high birth, religious credentials and political connections made him an attractive son-in-law; he married a daughter of the sultan (presumably of Ende) and settled in Waingapu. The Sayyid became the leading horse (and slave) trader in Sumba and virtual ruler of the port. Van den Dungen Gronovius was a partner in his business, at least initially.²⁵⁰ The Resident's attitude to the slave trade was in complete contrast to policies proclaimed in Batavia. During the 1840s an estimated 1,000 people a year were still being shipped from Sumba to Lombok, where each was exchanged for 40 pikul of rice. This was forbidden by the Lombok ruler in 1851 and again in 1886, but the regional trade continued into the early twentieth century.²⁵¹ The export of horses to Java and Mauritius began in 1841.

On Sumba the best landing places were on the north coast, at Memboro and Waingapu, where settlements of Endenese, Makassarese and Arabs had developed. But other immigrants were also arriving. The people of the nearby small and dry Savu islands had been particularly closely linked to the Dutch since the 1756 treaty, which they took seriously. With the encouragement of colonial officials, Savunese had been moving to Sumba since the end of the 1830s.²⁵² Four hundred had settled at Kadumbul on Sumba's east coast, where it was hoped they could improve their own lives and check Endenese raiding. Savu traditions record a marriage between the Sumbanese Raja of Melolo, and the "raja" or *fetor* of Haba in northwest Savu; this is seen as the prelude to Savunese migrations to Sumba, particularly to the east.²⁵³ This alliance is often dated to 1848, but as the 1831 description makes clear, Savunese were well established in Sumba before then.²⁵⁴

The Savunese wanted closer Kupang involvement in Sumba and arranged a visit to Kupang by a couple of the island's lesser chiefs; this led to a treaty in 1845. Kupang traders

²⁴⁹ Ibid. James J. Fox, *Harvest of the Palm Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 163, 172. The Resident was an enterprising man; he was contacted by Batavia at the beginning of 1839 about the possibility of established a government horse-herd, his response was very positive. On his own initiative he then bought 200 mares and set up an establishment on Roti. However, in 1841 the government decided not to go ahead. The *Encyclopaedie*, seemingly with some satisfaction, added: "the resident of Timor, because of his high-handed actions, was left with the expense of fl.21,000". In 1849 he was sent to explore the northern coast of New Guinea; G.F. De Bruijn Kops, "Contribution to the Knowledge of the North and East Coasts of New Guinea," *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 6 (1852).

²⁵⁰ Clarence-Smith, "Horse Trading," 146–7, 151, 155; Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 138, 147–8, 265; H. Kapita, *Sumba Di Dalam Jangkauan Jaman* (Waingapu: Panitia Penerbit Naskah-naskah Kebudayaan Daerah Sumba, 1980), 16–29. Between 1866 to 1873 a junior Dutch official with 12 policemen was established in a less hostile Savunese settlement in order to buy horses for the Indies' government, but constant unrest and insecurity led to his withdrawal; *ENI*: "Soemba."

²⁵¹ Needham, *Sumba and the Slave Trade*; I Gde Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 147–8; Hoskins, *Play of Time*, 47–50; *Laporan Politik Tahun 1837*.

²⁵² D.K. Wielenga, *Soemba* ('s-Gravenhage: Zendings-studieraad, 1926), 6. On Savu, see: Genevieve Duggan and Hans Hägerdal, *Savu: History and Oral Tradition on an Island of Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2018).

²⁵³ Nico L. Kana, *Dunia orang Sawu* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983), 19.

²⁵⁴ Hoskins, *Play of Time*, 50–1.

saw opportunities of gaining access to Sumba's numerous stands of sandalwood. As was explained above, these had remained relatively untouched as Sumbanese themselves would not fell the trees, although it was permitted for foreigners. There were also birds' nests, karet, trepang and Sumba horses, held to be the archipelagos best.²⁵⁵ Endenese attempts to expel the Savunese failed, and from then on the Endenese concentrated on the north and west Sumba coasts. By 1876 the number of Savunese immigrants was so large they seemed to be in danger of taking over, but epidemics of smallpox (1869) and cholera (1874, 1878) on Savu itself reduced population pressure and incentives to migrate.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ Francis, "Timor," 366.

²⁵⁶ Kana, *Dunia orang Sawu*, 18–9.

During the nineteenth century changes in industrial production, patterns of consumption and maritime technology enabled Western economies to surpass Asian.¹ This was accompanied by a growing commercialisation of colonial primary industry; the output of such crops as rice, sugar, tobacco, coffee, tea, hemp and cotton all soared as new cultivation methods were introduced to meet, and create, expanding demand. In many areas this intensification was realized on plantations, but in the eastern archipelagos small holders were the main producers, either freely, or under political pressure. New commodities created opportunities in regions with the right ecological and political climate. Western power in Asia was confirmed when the British suppressed the Indian rebellion of 1857 and attacked Guangzhou in the second Opium War. In Japan, where the Dutch in Nagasaki had been the only permitted western traders since 1641, the forced “opening” of ports in 1854 by the American Commodore Perry marked another decisive shift.²

The rising number of potential international players in Southeast Asia encouraged imperial powers to regularise their borders. Despite converging colonial interests, boundaries in Borneo and the eastern archipelagos remained dangerously porous. This suited local populations and worried colonial officials. James Brooke’s Sarawak was recognised as an independent state by the USA in 1850, and by Britain in 1864. The family continued to rule until 1946.³ Brooke was appointed Governor of Labuan when it became a Crown Colony in 1848. British officials hoped it would become a new entrepot linking Borneo, Sulu and China. Significant traffic did develop after some Chinese and Indian traders moved from Brunei to Labuan. Sulu Sea perahu began to call, particularly after a Spanish port regulation of 1855 decreed that they had to call first at Zamboanga for clearance to trade. Journeys to the west (and southeast) were more likely to avoid Spanish attention

¹ Paul Johnson Roderick Floud, ed., *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1: 1700–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Wouter Ryckbosch, “Early Modern Consumption History: Current Challenges and Future Perspectives,” *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 130, no. 1 (2015).

² Louis M. Cullen, *A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

³ Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 10–2, *passim*.

than those to the north. The British colony became a subsidiary of Singapore, specialising in arms trafficking.⁴

Imperial Arrangements

In 1859 an agreement was reached between The Netherlands and Portugal to reorganise their Timor territories. The former gave the latter fl.200,000 and the coffee region of Maubara, west of Dili, while receiving formerly Portuguese Flores, Solor, Adonara, Lembata, Pantor and Alor in exchange. The boundaries remained vague and contentious but were largely settled by the Treaty of Lisbon between the Portuguese and Dutch in 1904.⁵ British and Dutch negotiators finally resolved their border issues in the western archipelago with the Anglo-Dutch Treaties of 1870–71.⁶

Although the Spanish had claimed Sulu by treaty in 1851 other European powers regarded the Sultanate as an independent nation with which they could do business. The British and Germans still recognised Sulu in 1877, and French, Austrian and Italian entrepreneurs developed interests there. This strengthened Madrid's conviction that Sulu had to be subjugated despite the military risks. Under heavy pressure, the Sultan sought German friendship. In 1864 he met William Frederick Schuck, a German captain sailing between Sulawesi and Sulu, and granted him some land near Sandakan Bay. Schuck established ties with the German firm of Carel Schomberg in Singapore, intensifying German involvement in Sulu and North Borneo.⁷ Americans also saw possibilities in this open frontier. In 1865 the US consul to Brunei, Charles Moses, leased territory on the north Borneo coast from the Brunei Sultan, selling it the same year to a consortium of Chinese investors and American adventurers, the rather short-lived American Trading Company (ATC). The Sultan gave the ATC's Joseph William Torrey the traditional power of life and death over the local inhabitants, and the title Raja of Ambong and Marudu. The enterprise was bankrupt within a year, but Torrey was unable to sell the lease until 1875, as will be described in the next chapter. Torrey went on to become the American vice-consul in Siam.⁸

⁴ James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 106–11; Emrys Chew, *Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 93–8; Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore 1819–69," *JMBRAS* (1960); Volker Schult, "Sulu and Germany in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic* 48, no. 1 (2000).

⁵ Gerald Telkamp, "The Economic Structure of an Outpost in the Outer Islands in the Indonesian Archipelago: Portuguese Timor 1850–1975," in *Between People and Statistics*, ed. Francien van Anrooij, et al. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), 72. In 1838, a Dutch expedition shelled and burnt Larantuka; their defence was that they were unaware of the Portuguese claims; after intergovernmental protests and discussion, the Dutch decided that Portugal's status was "uncertain". *Ikhtisar keadaan politik Hindia-Belanda tahun 1839–1848* (Jakarta: ANRI, 1973), 425.

⁶ Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades*, 10–3.

⁷ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 114–5. On the later fortunes of the Schuck family, John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906), 594, note 18.

⁸ Frank Tatu, "The United States Consul, the Yankee Raja, Ellena and the Constitution: A Historical Vignette," *Archipel* 40 (1990); K.G. Tregonning, "American Activity in North Borneo, 1865–1881," *Pacific Historical Review* 23, no. 4 (1954).

In the late 1840s Britain abolished many tariffs in the belief that faster growth would be advantageous. In industrialising England, with its lock on Indian exports and good connections with China, free trade was appealing. But we should avoid falling into the same trap as such eminent English leaders as William Gladstone, who identified British with global priorities, as Cain describes:⁹

The British statesmen believed they were helping to spread universal economic truths and a new moral order based on international peace and mutual prosperity. Their European counterparts thought mainly of their own national producer interests and how to strengthen them, promote nation building, and increase military strength. When, during the prolonged depression of the late 1870s, it appeared to them that freer trade no longer served these aims, they readily reversed the process.

The debates over the merits of free trade in maritime Southeast Asia generally focus on free merchants, tariffs and competition between Western powers. But this was just one level of commerce. A large part of regional trade was untroubled by European regulations, as it was deemed either too insignificant or just too difficult to track. Some was clandestine in intent. These phantom fleets sustained systems of exchange that were almost invisible, but fundamental to local and inter-regional systems of exchange.

After 1848 “colonial questions” in the Netherlands came under scrutiny from the new parliament. This culminated in the 1855 *Regerings-Reglement voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, a general Regulation (or constitution) governing the colony. Initiatives favouring the liberalisation of commerce coexisted uneasily with the fact that the legal and political justifications for the Dutch presence still depended on up-dated versions of VOC contracts. In 1857 J.H. Tobias ended his report on his tenure as Resident of Ternate by pointing out the “increasingly sharp contrast” between the “liberal government principles that have been made much of in the last few years” and the ways in which “the subjects of the native princes” were still ruled.¹⁰

The Netherlands continued to cherish its principle of non-involvement, convinced that a cheap reliance on “feudal” institutions could sustain their authority. Restructurings of territorial administration in the mid-1820s and mid-1860s usually did little more than change nomenclature even in areas purportedly under direct rule. Most of the eastern islands remained under their own rulers and chiefs who retained control of most economic resources. They could do deals with foreigners willing to cope with the insecurity.¹¹ The Hague and Batavia were eventually forced to become more interventionist as the economic

⁹ P.J. Cain, “British Free Trade, 1850–1914: Economics and Policy,” *ReFresh: Recent Findings of Research in Economic and Social History* 29 (Autumn 1999): 1. See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: 1688–2000* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).

¹⁰ J.H. Tobias, “Memorie van Overgave, J.H. Tobias (1857),” in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapien (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980), 93–5. Tobias was born in Zwolle, in 1816; Adri Lapien, “Kata Pengantar,” in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapien (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980).

¹¹ Karel E.M. Bongenaar, *De ontwikkeling van het zelfbesturend landschap in Nederlandsch Indië, 1855–1942* (Zutphen: Walburg, 2005). Border changes did alter the organisation of the colonial archives, however, so terms like Manado or “the Molukken” could cover quite different areas at different times. See Appendix.

frontier moved east.¹² In the mid-nineteenth century the well-connected Dutch naval officer and cartographer P. Baron Melvill van Carnbee applied for the right to exploit gold mines over an area of 11,000 square miles in North Sulawesi. Although this was refused the number of similar requests led to a new mining regulation in 1850. This allowed credible Dutch investors to apply for forty-year inheritable leases over promising land, while the government undertook to protect their interests.¹³ In 1852, a special government corps of mining engineers was established.

The new law cleared the way for exploration and investment,¹⁴ but security remained extremely problematic. This was demonstrated by events in Kalimantan. The first government coal mine, the patriotically named Oranje Nassau, was opened by the Governor General at Pengarong, north of Banjarmasin, in 1851. Two years later a former government official was granted a private concession at Banyu Iirang, near Kalangan in Tanah Laut. In this deep mine forced labour was by debtors, primarily Dayak, purchased from their creditors.¹⁵ In 1854 a second government mine began on Pulau Laut. The coal industry proved short-lived, as mines were attacked, and personnel killed at the outbreak of the Banjarmasin war against the Dutch in 1859. The works were destroyed and abandoned.¹⁶

Shipping was also seriously constrained by the risk of attack. Commercial and anti-slavery lobbies forced Spanish, Dutch and English colonial regimes to coordinate antipiracy efforts more efficiently in the 1840s. Steam gunboats were deployed, and “pirate lairs” and “nests”, were attacked, following James Brooke’s ultimately controversial Sarawak example. Antipiracy campaigns intensified, reinforced by gunboats. British radicals were outraged by the carnage and cost of the fighting. The bloodshed was certainly exaggerated, because between 1825 and 1850 a bounty was paid per head for each pirate killed or forced to flee. This income was welcome to the sailors, who were the only eyewitnesses. One commander claimed to have killed 350 in an action

¹² Claver, “Commerce and Capital in Colonial Java: Trade Finance and Commercial Relations between Europeans and Chinese, 1820s–1942” (PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit, 2006), 67–8; Lindblad, “The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery,” in *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 82–111; Lindblad, “Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in Indonesia, 1870–1914,” *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 1 (1989).

¹³ Cees Fasseur, “Een koloniale paradox: de Nederlandse expansie in de Indonesische archipel in het midden van de 19e eeuw (1830–1870),” in *De Weg naar Paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995), 63–4. Pieter Bleeker, *Reis door de Minabassa en den Molukschen archipel, gedaan in de maanden september en oktober 1855. Vol. I* (Batavia: Lange, 1856), 141. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* (hereafter *ENI*), 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), “Mijnbouw, mijnwezen,” 644–5.

¹⁴ P.A.C. de Ruiter, *Het Mijnwezen in Nederlands-Oost-Indië 1850–1950* (Utrecht: FIsme Scientific Library 2017).

¹⁵ M. Idwar Saleh, “Agrarian Radicalism and Movements of Native Insurrection in South Kalimantan (1858–1865),” *Archipel* 9 (1975): 150.

¹⁶ J. Baks, “De Steenkolen-Maatschappij ‘Poeloe Laoet’ in Zuidoost-Borneo,” in *Het belang van de Buitengewesten*, ed. A.H.P. Clemens and J. Th. Lindblad (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1989); Saleh, “Agrarian Radicalism.” R. Broersma, *Handel en bedrijf in Zuid- en Oost-Borneo* (’s-Gravenhage: G. Naeff, 1927), 67–70; J.N.F.M. à Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij: stoomvaart en staatsvorming in de Indonesische archipel 1888–1914* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1992), 430. Graham Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1967), 163–5.

off Halmahera, whereas the local Dutch official reported 16 dead and 40 wounded.¹⁷ In 1848, Manila obtained three English-built steam gunships, so naval blockades and expeditions became increasingly effective.¹⁸

About 200 punitive expeditions were launched in the nineteenth century Indies. Most took place between 1845 and 1865 in the eastern, rather than the western, archipelagos. Particularly aggressive actions in the 1840s were directed against settlements in Mindanao, Tolitoli, Pulau Laut, Bonerate, Larantuka, Jampea (by Selayar), Rusa Raja (Raja Ampat) and the Riung islands. Even the largest actions only involved a couple of steamers supported by smaller sailing vessels; they typically ended in amphibious landings and hand-to-hand fighting. Antipiracy actions sent shockwaves through maritime communities, disrupting fishing economies and trade, in a manner not so dissimilar from the on-going annual raids by Sulu-based fleets.¹⁹

These campaigns both coincided with, and legitimised, military support for threatened client states.²⁰ Dutch forces intervened to sustain Ternate's waning authority over the rebellious east Indonesian realms of Banggai and Tobungku, while new restrictive treaties were signed with native states in Sulawesi (Toratea, Mandar, Buton, Sidenreng, Baru and Tanette) and Sumbawa: (Bima, Sumbawa, Dompu and Sanggar).²¹ In mid-century the steamer *Etna* was regularly used as gunboat in attacks on pirates, either supporting expeditions or bombarding settlements. The *Hekla* played a key role against Daeng Magassing "who used to be the Raja of Bonerate under the king of Bone". Through "his faithless conduct and addiction to piracy" Daeng Magassing had ended up as leader of a heavily-armed band sheltering in Sumbawa, where he was related to the ruler's wife.²²

G.F. de Bruijn Kops, who had travelled along west Papua's north coast in 1849, published a description of ships and shipping in the eastern archipelagos, including an analysis of piracy. Some raiding expeditions would last two to five years, he wrote, others only a few months. Their vessels, manned by 20 to 50 men, usually had one or two cannon, a few swivel guns, and a good supply of smaller firearms, pikes, krisses and swords; gunpowder was usually made in Sulu. He identified Sulu and Balangingi groups as the driving forces,

¹⁷ Bob Reece, *The White Rajahs of Sarawak: A Borneo Dynasty* (Singapore: Didier Millet, 2001). Irwin, *Nineteenth-century Borneo*, 127–50 (on the Halmahera death toll, see esp. 146). See also, from the bibliography: Keppel, *Expedition to Borneo*; Campo, "Gauging Globalization"; Teitler, "Piracy in Southeast Asia"; Anderson, "Piracy in the Eastern Seas"; Antony, "Piracy and the Shadow Economy."

¹⁸ J.N.F.M. à Campo, "Gauging Globalization: Maritime Piracy in Insular Southeast Asia in a Global Context," working paper, international workshop, "Globalization and Creolization in World History," Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2002; J.N.F.M. à Campo, "Asymmetry, Disparity and Cyclicity: Charting the Piracy Conflict in Colonial Indonesia," *International Journal of Maritime History* 14, no. 1 (2007).

¹⁹ Esther Velthoen, "A Historical Perspective on Bajo in Eastern Indonesia" (MA thesis, Murdoch University, 1994).

²⁰ Atsushi Ota, ed., *In the Name of the Battle against Piracy: Ideas and Practices in State Monopoly of Violence in Europe and Asia in the Period of Transition* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

²¹ Edward L. Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX: studi tentang kebijakan perdagangan maritim* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002), 80.

²² J.F.G. Brumund, *Indiana. Verzameling van Stukken van onderscheiden aard, over landen, volken, oudheden en geschiedenis van den Indischen Archipel* (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1853–54), 2: 104–9; James Francis Warren, *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), 88.

while Maguindanau and Tobelo, primarily those settled on the east Sulawesi coast, were also active. The main fleets could be 50 to 60 strong; these would divide into separate raiding groups. After a period of action, they would meet again and regroup. Kalatua island off Flores' north coast had once been the main rendezvous, but that had been so often and so effectively attacked by gunboats (particularly the *Hekla* in 1850) that pirates no longer went there. The raiders' main aim was to capture people to sell at markets on islands off the north Flores coast (particularly around Manggarai); failing that they would be sold during the voyage home.²³

Cooperation between Spanish, Dutch and British forces, and the gunboats, turned the tide. Balangingi was reduced to rubble in 1850; in 1856 a decisive defeat of raiders off north Sulawesi sharply reduced the threat to the coast. In 1864, for the first time since 1777, Ternate did not have to man the *rorehe* perahu used to protect Manado, so the last 150 men sailed back to their homes on Makian or other Maluku islands.²⁴



Image 36 Dutch steamship *Vesuvius*, off Ambon, 1870²⁵

The gunships also began to play a more important role in land campaigns. Around 1850 there were only some two and a half thousand colonial army (KNIL) soldiers in the whole

²³ G.F. De Bruijn Kops, "Contribution to the Knowledge of the North and East Coasts of New Guinea," *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 6 (1852).

²⁴ F.S.A. de Clercq, "Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890," in *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, ed. and trans. Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards, Smithsonian Libraries Digital Editions, 1999, <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/>.

²⁵ "Zr. Ms. Vesuvius, schroefstoomschip 3e klasse, op de rede van Ambon". Woodbury and Page. KITLV 26760; persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:785081>. Creative Commons CC BY License. See also the lithograph from the collection of the Netherlands Institute of Military History depicting the ship off Bali (NIMH, Nr. 2158_014522).

eastern archipelago; the strongest garrisons were in Makassar and Ambon.²⁶ The troops fought in the Bone wars of 1824 and 1859–60, against simmering guerrilla resistance in the nearby rice-producing Northern Districts (1860–80) and in a punitive expedition against Mandar's Balanipa in 1867.²⁷ Batavia worried about the expense. The resulting half-heartedness was all too apparent in the campaigns against Bali (1846, 1848 and 1849); these were followed by wars against Banjarmasin and Bone in the 1850s. Local forces knowledge of the terrain and their skilfully fortified positions made them formidable foes. In Bali the KNIL "victory" was typically Pyrrhic, as they faced heavily armed forces estimated at 8,000 in the first campaign, in well-defended strongholds. The result was a formal recognition of Dutch supremacy and withdrawal of the colonial troops. Nothing had changed.²⁸

After Bali, it was recognised that steam gunships were indispensable for transport, blockades and the shelling of hostile shores; colonial sea and land forces were expanded.²⁹ In Bone, the KNIL faced Bugis infantry armed with lances, heavy klewang swords, stabbing kris and a few old guns, such as flintlocks. The cavalry's main weapon was the lance; their mail coats could check a sword, but not a bullet. The first Dutch expedition to South Sulawesi in 1858 ended in disaster, the second in 1859 was more successful from Batavia's point of view, but the blockade only ended in early 1860. Once again, the engagements were bloody but essentially inconclusive, even though the Netherlands took over Bone's coffee districts on the east coast. The lack of political will stalled the colonial offensive by 1860; by then it was clear that "the conquest of the Outer Islands had failed".³⁰

Increased security at sea helped edge the Netherlands and Spain towards a liberalisation of colonial commerce. Policies remained contingent and highly contested, as in the opening of Makassar (1847) and Philippine provincial ports (1855). The Netherlands could take tentative steps towards free trade because forced cultivation on Java provided colonial revenues, and it was hoped that a liberal regime could check Singapore's influence in the outer islands. At the same time, as the limitations and costs of Java's state exploitation became clear, the government began to abandon control of specific sectors. Tea and tobacco were left to individual planters after 1842; and the role of private enterprise in the colony

²⁶ The Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger was separated from the Dutch army in 1830; the officers were European, while about half of the strength was European, and NCOs and soldiers were increasingly drawn from Java and local (particularly Christian) areas such as Ambon and Manado. J.A. de Moor, "Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth-Century Indonesia," in *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa*, ed. Jaap A. de Moor and H.L. Wesseling (Leiden: Brill, 1989). There were garrisons totalling 230 in east Borneo, 800 in Sulawesi, 100 for Timor and Flores, 200 in Ternate, 300 in Banda and 700 in Amboina; 300 men were stationed in West Borneo. On colonial forces to the west, Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades*, 53–66.

²⁷ Heather Sutherland, "Power and Politics in South Sulawesi: 1860–1880," *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 17 (Winter/Summer 1983). The Mandar expedition weakened the traditionally pre-eminent Balanipa; thereafter all rulers claimed the title of Maradia. B.F. Matthes, "Eenige opmerkingen omtrent en naar aanleiding van dat gedeelte van Dr. J.J. de Hollander's Handleiding bij de beoefening der land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, hetwelk handelt over het Gouvernement van Celebes en onderhoorigheden," *BKI* 19, no. 1 (1872): 61.

²⁸ Moor, "Warmakers," 56–7.

²⁹ Jurrien Van Goor, "Said Abdullah, Politicus in de marge van het imperium," in *Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders overzee*, ed. Jurrien Van Goor (Utrecht: HES, 1982), 72.

³⁰ Moor, "Warmakers," 68.

increased.³¹ But the conversion to free trade was never whole-hearted. Similar policies were introduced in the Philippines, where cash crop production was increasing. The decision to open three provincial ports had been taken at a local level before Madrid agreed. In Spain and Manila some “authorities were determined to preserve the advantages held exclusively by Spanish and local interests in the coasting trade”.³² Madrid only acquiesced to liberalisation because commercial domination of British, American, German and other foreign traders congregated in Manila was resented. It was hoped that more direct provincial access to global traffic would give Spaniards greater opportunities.³³

Regional officials were interested in the potential customs revenue, while others saw personal advantage in increasing traffic.³⁴ Sual was an old galleon trade port, while in Zamboanga, the main Spanish settlement on south-west Mindanao, the only product deemed on any commercial significance remained the monopoly of a well-connected Spaniard. Of the three, only Iloilo (also a Sulu Sea harbour) was rated significant.³⁵ Aguilar emphasises that this policy shift was not a rational and inevitable response to a changing world economy, instead arguing that:³⁶

The 1855 decision to open the ports of Iloilo, Zamboanga and Sual ... happened in the midst of political flux within a crumbling empire and in the crevices of administrative inefficiency in the colonial apparatus, which was rent by conflicting vested Spanish interests concerning the ports.

Britain's Asian ports were much more robustly committed to free trade.

The increasingly liberal economic climate in the Netherlands led to the opening of lesser archipelago ports for Dutch shipping from Europe and that of friendly foreign powers. Direct access to North Sulawesi's Manado and Kema was permitted from 1849, followed by Ambon, Banda, Ternate and Kayeli (Buru) in 1854. These could now admit Chinese junks, so traffic between China and Indies outer ports also grew.³⁷ Some export products could then be loaded directly at smaller ports: coffee, from Parepare, Gowa and Bantaeng; pepper from Kalimantan; Sulawesi cotton from Selayar, Takalar, Jeneponto,

³¹ Joop de Jong, *De waaier van het fortuin: De Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel 1595–1950* (s-Gravenhage: Sdu, 1998), 269–70. The private sector's share of trade climbed from less than 20 per cent before 1845 to above 40 per cent by 1871.

³² Filomeno V Aguilar, “Beyond Inevitability: The Opening of Philippine Provincial Ports in 1855,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1994): 71.

³³ Schult, “Sulu and Germany.” P.N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

³⁴ Aguilar, “Beyond Inevitability.”

³⁵ Foreman, *Philippine Islands*, 260–3; Alfred W. McCoy, “A Queen Dies Slowly: The Rise and Decline of Iloilo City,” in *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. De Jesus (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982).

³⁶ Aguilar, “Beyond Inevitability,” 75.

³⁷ J.H.M. Mollerus, *Geschiedkundig overzicht van het handelsstelsel in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Utrecht: Kemink, 1865). *ENI*: “Vrijhavens.” As always two dates may apply: the decision on the Maluku ports was made in 1853 and applied in 1854. Jennifer Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell SEAP, 1993).

Bone and Buton; and tobacco from Maros. Differential tariffs were gradually abandoned.³⁸ After 1850 new shipping regulations gave British-flagged vessels the same rights as Dutch; and the distinction between Netherlands and Indies shipping was dropped. Foreign vessels were admitted to more “free” (*vrij*, in Dutch territories) and “native” (*Inlandsche*) ports.³⁹ Small harbours elsewhere in South Sulawesi were opened for inter-regional traffic after 1863.⁴⁰ There was a sharp increase in the growth rate of inter-insular traffic, from the low level of 0.5 per cent between 1825 and 1848, to 5.5 per cent between 1848 and 1873 and accelerating to 7.5 per cent between 1875 and 1911.⁴¹ The decline of the forced cultivation system weakened the NHM and Dutch shippers who had enjoyed privileged access to commodities for Europe.

In the Indies increasing demand eased access to capital and credit, allowing private enterprise to diversify. Growth was focussed on Java and Sumatra’s East Coast, where the Sultan of Deli had leased land to a far-sighted tobacco grower in 1863. The plantation economy expanded exponentially, the labour force consisting of imported Chinese and transferred Javanese workers.⁴² In the east, where there were no comparable labour-intensive enterprises, the limited work force hindered European enterprise. In 1884 the Manado-based trader Dirk de Vries wrote home: “If ever I have been disappointed in a place, then that is the famous Moluccen.... Everywhere there is excellent land, treasures underground that only have to be excavated, and nowhere ... people, who cannot be obtained at any price. What use then is energy, or progressive drive?”⁴³

By the time slavery was abolished in 1860 population growth was making more workers available in densely settled areas. Where slave labour had provided the only secure labour, in some elite-managed foraging and agricultural enterprises, mobilisation by political pressure, the expansion of debt-bondage and migration provided some compensation. In more remote areas the traffic continued.⁴⁴ Small-holders positive response to market opportunities proved a more reliable source of supply, although coffee prices declined as Brazil started to eclipse the Indies as a producer in the 1840s.⁴⁵

³⁸ Atsushi Ota, “Tropical Products Out, British Cotton In: Trade in the Dutch Outer-Islands Ports, 1846–1869,” *Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 3 (2013).

³⁹ J.C. Westermann, “De Overwinning op den afstand: te water,” in *Daar werd wat groots verricht: Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste eeuw*, ed. W.H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1941), 238; P.H. van der Kemp, “Over de Kustvaartwetgeving in Nederlandsch-Indië van 1825 tot 1912,” *De Economist* 65 (1916).

⁴⁰ Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX*.

⁴¹ Gerrit Knaap, “Steamers, Freight Contracts and Dock-Harbours Reflections on the History of the Java Sea, 1830–1930,” *Itinerario* 30, no. 1 (2006): 45–8.

⁴² Lindblad, “Outer Islands,” 103.

⁴³ D.H. de Vries and Ruard Wallis de Vries, *Een Amsterdamse koopman in de Molukken 1883–1901* (Baarn: Ambo, 1996), 130.

⁴⁴ Anthony Reid, ed. *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* (St. Lucia, Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1983); David Henley and Peter Boomgaard, eds., *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930: From Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsis to Cooperative* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).

⁴⁵ William G. Clarence-Smith and Steven Topik, *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1500–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

The last traces of the old VOC economy vanished with the belated end of the spice monopolies. Clove production and trade was free from the first of January 1864. In February the Maluku Resident reported, with some satisfaction that the year 1863 ended “the long list of years in which the old East India Company monopoly system exercised a negative influence on the people, and a new era begins, more in accordance with the needs and liberal direction of the times”.⁴⁶ Pieter Bleeker saw this easing of restrictions as the second step in the islands’ emancipation, comparable to the first liberalisation (at least in theory) that had been introduced by van der Capellen in 1824.⁴⁷ He failed to mention Merkus’s plans, presumably as they were confined to one Residency. By then steam was changing shipping patterns.

In 1845 the only privately owned steamship in the Indies belonged to the British-run NISbM, (Dutch Indies Steamboat Company). However, in 1849 the Dutch ex-navy officer W.F.K. Cores de Vries submitted a plan for a new line. Within a year he was running two government-subsidised lines, one serving the north Java coast, the other going once a month via Semarang and Surabaya to Makassar, Amboina, Ternate and Manado. In 1851 connections were established between Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya and Makassar.⁴⁸ A proposed extension would have run from Singapore to Sydney via Dili.⁴⁹ Cores de Vries opened another route to Singapore in 1854, and a link to Banda. By the following year Batavia, Makassar, Ambon, Ternate, Semarang, and Surabaya were all connected by steamer. The NISbM declined to renew its contract, leaving Batavia reluctantly dependent on Cores de Vries. Kupang was added to the eastern route in 1856, Lombok’s Ampenan in 1858 and then Buleleng (north Bali) in 1871. In 1866 the government contract went to the NISM (in English NISN), a newly constituted (1865) British firm allied to the British India Steam Navigation Company.⁵⁰ Yet it was not until almost 1870 that steamer tonnage entering Singapore exceeded that of sail. This shift confirmed the lead of European over Chinese and Arab shipping on supra-regional routes.⁵¹

Steam received a boost when local supplies of coal were discovered at Martapura, southeast Borneo in 1846; subsequent discoveries at Kutai and Pulau Laut confirmed the richness of the Borneo fields. The need for dispersed coaling stations was already pressing. When Resident Gallois set off for a six-week inspection tour of Borneo’s east coast in 1850 the steamship *Semarang* could only carry enough fuel for six days, although all available space, including the decks, was piled with coal. Envoys were sent ahead to ensure

⁴⁶ R.Z. Leirissa, et al., eds., *Maluku Tengah di masa lampau : gambaran sekilas lewat arsip abad sembilan belas* (Jakarta: ANRI, 1982), 140.

⁴⁷ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 260.

⁴⁸ Dick and Rimmer, *Cities, Transport and Communications*, 84; Pradadimara, “Modal Britania di Indonesia Masa Kolonial (Britain’s Capital in the Colonial Period in Indonesia)”; Claver and Knight, “A European Role in intra-Asian Commercial Development: The Maclaine Watson Network and the Java Sugar Trade c.1840–1942.”

⁴⁹ From 1850 to 1865 the Cores de Vries line held the contract. Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 40–55; Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX*, 110–24; J.N.F.M. à Campo, “Perahu Shipping in Indonesia 1870–1914,” *RIMA* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993).

⁵⁰ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 47–54. The English name was the *Netherlands Indies Steam Navigation Company*; Dick and Rimmer, *Cities, Transport and Communications*: 84.

⁵¹ Knaap, “Steamers,” 43–4.

that supplies en route could “be dug up, or better, broken off” from the surface layers at Tanjung Pemancingan on the northern corner of Pulau Laut. It was hoped that more could be obtained from coal deposits on the Mahakam bank, just below Samarinda, and from those on the right bank of the Segah, just above Gunung Tabur.⁵²



Map 19 Colonial East Borneo, showing the main sultanates, 1880⁵³

⁵² J.G.A. Gallois, “Korte aanteekeningen, gehouden gedurende eene reis langs de oostkust van Borneo,” *BKI* 4, no. 1 (1856): 222.

⁵³ Redrawn from map 1, from J. Thomas Lindblad, *Between Dayak and Dutch: The Economic History of Southeast Kalimantan 1880–1942* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1988).

After 1847 Singapore-Sulawesi trade increased, although it was interrupted briefly by Singapore's economic crisis of the early 1860s.⁵⁴ In mid-century this traffic was thought to be worth about c.100,000 Spanish or Straits dollars (S\$); Sulawesi's share was c. S\$39,000, almost double Bali's S\$21,000 and much more than Maluku's S\$13,000). In the first half of the 1850s Makassar's trade with other Sulawesi ports increased sharply, especially exports to the independent states.⁵⁵ However, Singapore became a more important trading partner for the rest of Sulawesi than did Makassar, at least in terms of ships large enough to be counted. In 1848 the Bone king banned his subjects from using Makassar. He was enraged by the change in the Dutch governor's title from that of Governor of Makassar to Governor of Celebes and Dependencies, which seemed to imply Bone was subordinate, whereas they were, stressed the king, equal allies.⁵⁶

Bali's percentage in Singapore traffic rose, while that of Riau declined.⁵⁷ The 1847 decision had also made it easier for Singapore's merchants to open their own offices in Makassar, increasing imports and enabling them to tap regional traffic directly. Eastern archipelago connections with British traders ramified, while old connections with familiar harbours intensified. The value of the Singapore-Makassar traffic also grew, increasing the range of imported goods available at the Sulawesi port, where exchange with lesser harbours such as Ternate expanded.⁵⁸ Imports from Europe were already changing local economies: scrap iron and yarns from the west made the production of metal-ware and weaving easier, but finished goods, such as industrial textiles, competed directly with local products.⁵⁹

The Netherlands government needed to squeeze more revenue from the eastern islands to replace lost monopolies. Customs fees seemed an obvious source, but Dutch "free ports", with their not-so-hidden costs, could not compete with independent native harbours. Moreover, Makassar's open status remained uncertain. Some in Batavia and The Hague remained convinced that it would be more advantageous to impose customs duties in Makassar, as well as in Kema, Ternate, Banda, Ambon and Kaili. In 1860 the Makassar Governor proposed taxing coffee exports, and four years later the future Minister himself (E. de Waal, 1868–70) suggested abolishing all free ports.⁶⁰ The Sulawesi Governor J.A. Bakkers (1864–73) and both the Makassar and Surabaya Chambers of Commerce objected strongly. They pointed out that Makassar's overall shipping to Java still exceeded that with Singapore, and that since most commodities passing through were in transit the presence of English and Chinese traders enhanced traffic. These arguments prevailed for over three decades, mainly because the existence of independent harbours precluded

⁵⁴ Wong, "Trade," 102–5, Table IX:22.

⁵⁵ Atsushi Kobayashi, "The Role of Singapore in the Growth of Intra-Southeast Asian Trade, c.1820s–1852," *Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 3 (2013).

⁵⁶ *Ikhtisar*, 309–10. Christiaan Heersink, "The green gold of Selayar : a socio-economic history of an Indonesian coconut island, c. 1600–1950: perspectives from a periphery" (Vrije Universiteit, 1995), 98–9.

⁵⁷ Wong, "Trade," 255.

⁵⁸ Ota, "Tropical Products."

⁵⁹ David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 98.

⁶⁰ *ENI*, "Vrijhavens"; such ideas were still strong in the 1870s.

new levies.⁶¹ The only real solution was forcible incorporation of the native states into the colonial customs regime (*tolgebied*). In the eastern Indies this only became feasible in the twentieth century.⁶² For many small shippers these distinctions were only of academic interest, as perhaps two-thirds of all goods actually traded in Makassar itself around 1840 were unregistered and untaxed.⁶³

Since 1842 Hong Kong had become the main locus of Chinese-British commercial cooperation, particularly in finance. Jardine Matheson and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank played a leading role. The two main immigrant groups were the predominant Cantonese and the Hokkien-Teochiu.⁶⁴ In Southeast Asia the expanding mining and plantation sectors need for cheap labour generated the coolie trade. From 1845 to 1852, Xiamen was the main exporter but was replaced by Macau after 1852.⁶⁵ Spontaneous emigration from China increased after the Taiping rebellion. Between 1850 and 1864 this caused massive destruction and loss of life in southern coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, adjoining Fujian.⁶⁶ The social balance of power in the south was disrupted as more firearms became available; many Cantonese left troubled Guangdong province to settle in Hong Kong and Shanghai. In these ports, compradors acted as brokers linking Chinese and Western businesses.⁶⁷

Hong Kong's most important Chinese firms were organised in the colony's first Commercial Association, the roots of which extended into the century's early decades. It was officially established in 1868. This became known as the Nam Pak Hong Association, as it specialised in the south-north trade between the Nan Yang (southern seas) and China.⁶⁸ By the 1870s these merchants dominated Hong Kong's entrepôt traffic. Their members

⁶¹ "De Handelsbeweging van Makassar," *De Indische Gids* 10, no. 1 (1888). Data provided by Belgian Consul, Makassar. Poellingomang's totals for the value of trade show higher and increasing values—1884: 4, 736, 356; 1885: 4, 874, 367; 1886: 7, 479, 874. *Poellingomang, Makassar abad XIX*, 168.

⁶² G. Resink, "Inlandsche staten in den Oosterschen Archipel (1873–1915)," *BKI* 116, no. 3 (1960): 334.

⁶³ ANRI Mak.7/7, 9/4. Lindblad, "Outer Islands," 94–5.

⁶⁴ Elizabeth Sinn, "Hong Kong as an In-between Place in the Chinese Diaspora, 1839–1849," in *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*, ed. Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerde (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Pui Tak Lee, "Business Networks and Patterns of Cantonese Compradors in Nineteenth Century Hong Kong," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 31 (1996).

⁶⁵ Yen Ching-Hwang, *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch'ing Period (1851–1911)* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), 54–5; Yen, "Chinese Coolie Emigration, 1845–74," in *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora*, ed. Tan Chee-Beng (London: Routledge, 2013).

⁶⁶ David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁶⁷ David R. Meyer, *Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). By 1915 the main geographical partners of Hong Kong's Chinese firms were in China, Shanghai, Yunan and Amoy (Canton was not specified); in Southeast Asia Singapore was by far the most important, followed by Saigon and Manila, and then, again at a distance, Bangkok and Penang.

⁶⁸ "The business and operation of Nam Pak Hong during the early stage involved export and import, bank remittance of funds, insurance, shipping etc. Some barterers who charged a fixed trading commission at 2% subsequently appeared, and therefore, Nam Pak Hong was also known as '98% traders'." See the association's website at <http://www.nampakhongassn.com/sdp/1544875/4/main-6201617/0.html>

increased from 215 in 1876 to 395 in 1881; the total number of Chinese traders jumped from 287 to 2,377. Chinese entrepreneurs in Singapore and Hong Kong collaborated in developing manufacturing.⁶⁹

North Western Waters: The Sulu Sea

The Spanish tightened their control over the Basilan Strait in 1842, constructing a fort on Basilan itself, opposite Zamboanga. Davao was occupied in 1849, and a Spanish port was opened. In 1848 the Balangingi raiders settlements were destroyed by Spanish actions, and in 1850 the last strongholds were taken. By the mid-1800s Cotabato was within the Spanish sphere of influence, while Sulu remained an independent state. In 1851 a naval base was built at Pollock Harbour by the Pulangi mouth. The Cotabato sultan, anxious as always for support against Buayan, requested a Spanish garrison in 1855. Five years later Cotabato replaced Zamboanga as the military governor's headquarters; migration by the sultan's disillusioned subjects from the coast to the interior increased. British and Dutch steam vessels were stationed off the Mindanao coast in 1862 as part of a coordinated antipiracy campaign; Spain also purchased eighteen additional steam gunboats from Britain.⁷⁰ However, according to Bowring, the Spanish still only controlled less than a tenth of the island, just a narrow strip parallel to the coast and strategic points along the river.⁷¹

Many Mindanao datu continued to resist Spanish pretensions, but Sulu was Madrid's main enemy. Saleeby notes:⁷²

As hostilities between Spain and Sulu increased, Sulu traders became less daring and grew fewer and fewer. Chinese traders, on the other hand, were less molested and conditions encouraged their increase. The "Chinese pier" is a very old business establishment, and Chinese traders and merchants have resided in Jolo for many generations. Their number, in 1851, exceeded 500.

In 1851 Jolo itself was razed. However, it was not immediately occupied, although the Sultan relocated to the old capital of Maimbung on the southern coast.⁷³

(accessed 12 Mar. 2016). The other, later main organisation, the Kim Shan Chong, dominated the Pan-Pacific trade; Huei-Ying Kuo, *Networks beyond Empires: Chinese Business and Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

⁶⁹ Huei-Ying Kuo, "Agency Amid Incorporation: Chinese Business Networks in Hong Kong and Singapore and the Colonial Origins of the Resurgence of East Asia," *Review: Fernand Braudel Center* 32, no. 3 (2009).

⁷⁰ Stefan Eklöf Amirell, *Pirates of Empire: Colonisation and Maritime Violence in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 42–95.

⁷¹ John Bowring, *A Visit to the Philippine Islands* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1859), 346–52; Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 104–25.

⁷² Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), 132.

⁷³ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 122–3, 131. Maimbung was destroyed in 1887.

Spain and Sulu then signed the “act of incorporation into the Spanish Monarchy”.⁷⁴ For merchants, this had one very practical effect:⁷⁵

The Sultan and Datus together guarantee the credits left in Sulu [by traders] as a result of commercial operations, which advantage they have not heretofore enjoyed, but waited on the will and good faith of the debtor, who paid if he pleased and when he pleased, or perhaps never, and there existed no means of compelling him as there now is, by recourse to the Government.

In 1864 a substantial expedition of Spanish troops together with auxiliaries led by Datu Uto, the son of the Buayan Sultan, was sent against rebellious Talayan, southeast of Cotabato. Datu Uto switched sides almost immediately. He gained great prestige (and lost an eye), becoming the de facto leader of Buayan and “the leading figure of independent Maguindanao”. A decade of skirmishes between his forces and the Spanish followed.⁷⁶ As Beckett observed: “she [Spain] was left with allies whom she could scarcely control, and whose loyalty was very much in doubt. She had brought down the old political order, but a new style of datu had emerged in place of the old”.⁷⁷

Many Chinese had fled Jolo during the fighting, establishing shops in outlying villages. They were joined by immigrants from the Straits, creating trading networks connecting Labuan, Singapore, Jolo and Zamboanga. Bowring noted the importance of Manila’s trade with Jolo, which shipped typical cargoes: birds’ nests, trepang, sharks’ fins, mother-of-pearl, wax and gold dust. The round trip typically took seven to eight months.⁷⁸ This trade depended on communities such as the Jama Mapun. These “people of Mapun” were the Muslim Samal inhabitants of Cagayan de Sulu, later known as Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. Their islands were ideally located for interregional trade, being close to the centre of a triangle of sea between southern Palawan, Sulu and Sandakan. The Jama Mapun were among the earliest shippers to frequent Labuan, supplying it with coconuts, oil, mats and birds’ nests. After the Labuan Governor regularised the market and imposed fees in 1868 they shifted their trade to Brunei and then, following the Spanish blockades of Sulu from 1871, to north Borneo’s Sandakan Bay.⁷⁹ Increasingly effective Spanish naval blockades and expeditions in the south strengthened both Chinese and English interests in the region, albeit for different reasons.

⁷⁴ For the text, see Warren, *Sulu Zone*. See also Foreman, *Philippine Islands*, 139–40.

⁷⁵ Saleeby, *Sulu*, 323.

⁷⁶ Iletto, *Magindanao*; Foreman, *Philippine Islands*.

⁷⁷ Jeremy Beckett, “The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato under Colonial Rule,” *Asian Studies* 5 (1977),” 54.

⁷⁸ Bowring, *Visit*, 299.

⁷⁹ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 136. Eric S. Casiño, *The Jama Mapun: A Changing Samal Society in the Southern Philippines* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1976); Schult, “Sultans and Adventurers: German Blockade-Runners in the Sulu Archipelago,” *Philippine Studies* 50, no. 3 (2002).

North and North West Sulawesi

Very different economies continued to coexist in northern Sulawesi. On the peninsula, swidden cultivation of roots and tubers, hunting and foraging existed alongside commercial crops old and new. The colonial government exploited the intensively cultivated Minahasa: officials based in Manado supervised the Minahasa's twenty to thirty *walak*-chiefs. Some lineages were already achieving higher status than the others, through their ties with the colonial regime; Christianity became steadily more central to social life.⁸⁰ The maritime frontiers on the northern (Bolaang) and southern (Gorontalo) coasts were largely left alone, not to mention the still animist people of the interior.

According to Bleeker, along Sulawesi's northern littoral "pirates [had] destroyed what remained of trade".⁸¹ The reality was less absolute, as established shipping was used to dealing with risk. The southern Philippine, Sangihe and north Sulawesi ports were typical entrepôt, redistributing cargoes that arrived from their catchment areas. Chinese sailing from the southern Philippines and Sangihe carried in goods imported from further north and west: silks, linen, tea, sugar, English chintz, Chinese porcelain and earthenware. Manado's merchants, Chinese and a handful of Europeans, offered in exchange tortoiseshell, trepang, birds' nests, wax, honey and Dutch textiles.⁸² Some of these cargoes originated in Ternate and Sangihe.⁸³ Rice, coffee and gold-dust were still government monopsonies, but were smuggled out.⁸⁴ The obligatory gold deliveries had become very irregular by the 1840s.⁸⁵ The six rajas on the Sangihe and "heathen" Talaud islands ignored Dutch regulations; those on Talaud remained very hostile to any outside intervention.⁸⁶

Cocoa, which could be freely traded, had been quickly adopted by north Sulawesi's small holders after a slow start. Almost all went to Manila; cigars and tobacco were among the return cargoes. A few Manila Chinese vessels arrived each year to exchange cloth for cocoa, marine commodities and gold. Competition from these Manila traders forced the NHM Manado agency to close in the 1850s. Bowring described the trade between

⁸⁰ Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, eds., *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 419–54; M.J.C. Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983* (Leiden: KITLV, 1998); Mieke Schouten, "Myth and Reality in Minahasan History: The Waworuntu-Gallois Confrontation," *Archipel* 34 (1987). See also the agricultural map in Henley, *Fertility*, 54.

⁸¹ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 139.

⁸² C. van der Hart, *Reize rondom het eiland Celebes en naar eenige der Moluksche eilanden, gedaan in den jare 1850, door Z.M. schepen van oorlog Argo en Bromo, onder bevel van C. van der Hart* ('s-Gravenhage: K. Fuhri, 1853), 231.

⁸³ Schouten, *Leadership*, 53–64; Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 44; Henley, *Fertility*, 67; Ulrich Mai and Helmut Buchholt, *Peasant Peddlars and Professional Traders: Subsistence Trade in Rural Markets of Minahasa, Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), 12–8.

⁸⁴ David Henley, "A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi," *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 55.

⁸⁵ Hart, *Reize*, 219–22.

⁸⁶ Gorontalo politics: Bolaang-Magondow, Bolaang-Bangkia, Bolaang-Itam, Bintauna, Kaidipan, Buol and Toli-toli. Sangihe and Talaud rajas: Tagulandang, Siau, Manganitu, Taruna, Kandahar, Tabukan. See Nicolaas Graafland, *De Minabassa, haar verleden en haar tegenwoordige toestand: eene bijdrage tot de Land- en Volkenkunde* (Rotterdam: M. Wijt en Zonen, 1867–69), 24–6.

Manila and Maluku as being similar to that between the Spanish port and Jolo, but with clandestine spices added to the sea and forest products.⁸⁷

By the mid-nineteenth century: “North Sulawesi [was] far ahead of [the spice islands of] North Maluku in economic and political importance [to the Dutch].”⁸⁸ After Manado’s compulsory rice deliveries were replaced by a cash head-tax in 1852 local mestizos travelled in the interior exchanging textiles for rice. The planting of coconut trees was increasing. Tontemboan peasants in the Minahasa escaped from forced coffee growing by moving down from the hills to low land south of the Ronojapo River to cultivate coconuts. By then there were also well-established copra regions in similar areas such as Tonsea (near the south coast port of Kema) and along the shore.⁸⁹ A very few steamers visited Manado regularly, disrupting previous supply patterns and, according to some, driving up prices. Bleeker believed that demand would soon attract more shipping, noting that while the number of European-rigged vessels in Manado remained the same, native craft had increased considerably.⁹⁰

An Assistant Resident was based in Muslim Gorontalo, on the peninsula’s south coast. The local rajas and chiefs still ruled their small domains. Some rajas were hereditary, others were chosen, but all had to be confirmed by the Manado Resident. By the mid-1800s most were reconciled to the colonial presence, their traditional predatory practices diminished, perhaps because coffee was providing an income. Conflicts among the Gorontalo rajas were common, disrupting their subjects’ lives. Nevertheless, in 1854 the government planted some coffee bushes and c.123,000 cacao trees in Gorontalo and 8,536 in Bolaang. As in Manado, forced cultivation was being replaced by a fl.5 p.a. head-tax, albeit gradually. But this was still far more money than most inhabitants could manage.⁹¹

Mid-nineteenth century European observers shared a very negative view of the Gorontalo elite:⁹²

The chiefs are ignorant, indolent and arrogant; they live on the products of their subjects, both slave and free. They “borrow” their possessions and never return them. There is no security of property, as the law is in the hands of the rajahs. There is no incentive to work, and poverty is growing; so that ... many inhabitants abandon their land, seeking a better existence in [less oppressive states or open frontiers] ... most chiefs are addicted to opium.... Because the Buginese smuggled opium into Gorontalo, the government [tax] farm did not provide the revenue it should. Manado traders brought, in their own ships, lots of white linen, used for the dead as well as the living, European sarongs and sitsen [chintz], and take native textiles, horses and gold, but if there are not enough cargos, they will take money.

Gorontalo was the main harbour on the Tomini Gulf, while Donggala and Palu served the central west Sulawesi coast. Bleeker describes the role of the hundred or so Bugis traders

⁸⁷ Bowring, *Visit*, 299.

⁸⁸ Henley, “Superabundance,” 55.

⁸⁹ Schouten, *Leadership*, 57–8, 170.

⁹⁰ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 42, 105.

⁹¹ Bleeker, *Reis*, 2: 354–7.

⁹² Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 136–7.

living in these centres. All had done well, and some had become rich: “they arrived in poverty and gained increasing respect and wealth at the same pace that the locals went under”. The Bugis sailed to Singapore, Penang and Makassar, bringing back textiles, opium, guns, lead and gunpowder. These were carried overland from Donggala (Palu) to Parigi, which took about seven hours. At Parigi they hired boats to carry their cargoes to the Togian archipelago; from there small perahu distributed it around the Tomini Gulf. Parigi and Muton were theoretically subordinate to Gorontalo, but effectively under Bone. Bleeker estimated their joint population at approximately 22,000, and that of the Togian islands at 700 to 800. These islands, in the middle of the Gulf, were “one of the best-known smuggling centres”. Traders there, including Wajorese settlers, handled European textiles, raw cotton, tobacco, gambir, damar, incense, sago and consumer goods. North Sulawesi Bugis also traded to the east, with Maluku.⁹³

Other Bugis became the “peddlers” of the Gulf, trading with Gorontalo, Togian and Banggai, exporting trepang and tortoiseshell. Bleeker writes:⁹⁴

The Buginese barter or buy on a large scale [from outside merchants] and then supply the natives with small amounts on credit with an interest of 3, 4 or more per cent [per month]. Payment is gradual, in sarongs, padi, coconuts, gold and money. The Buginese takes everything, at very low prices. The locals are always in debt, and so the Buginese slowly gets rich, without having a lot of capital.... Most of the money paid out for the gold deliveries ends up in the hands of these money-wolves and in those of the opium farmer. The first deposit the money in the government fund and take letters of credit which is the easiest way to pay back the merchants [from whom they have borrowed], while the latter provides the opium he gets from the government and pays his lease.

The intriguing reference to a “government fund” is unexplained; perhaps it was a local initiative, but it was more likely a service provided by the NHM, which had an office in Manado from 1837 until it closed in the 1850s.

In 1847 the Dutch had discovered that Bone had appointed harbourmasters in Tojo (Ampana) on the southern shore of the Gulf, and on the Togian Islands. They imposed taxes and mobilised labour (which was also used to lay out coffee gardens) on behalf of the Bone ruler.⁹⁵ This suggests that the king regarded these strategic frontier settlements as part of the realm and was collecting tribute in kind. Bleeker was not convinced, writing “[a]s a result of their resilience and higher level of development the Buginese traders, who dominate in the Tomini Gulf, have succeeded in making most local rulers dependent on them. In order to serve their own interests, they maintain the fiction that they are subjects of Bone, and now and then some even claim to be collecting tribute on behalf of their king.”⁹⁶ This “fiction” was probably no more unreal than the intermittent, opportunistic and symbolic ties that had linked many outposts to distant rulers; in some cases it could have been a lot

⁹³ Esther Velthoen, “Contested Coastlines: Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion in Eastern Sulawesi, 1680–1905” (PhD diss., Murdoch University, 2002); Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 128.

⁹⁴ Bleeker, *Reis*, 2: 132–3.

⁹⁵ *Ikhtisar*, 395–6.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

closer. There were several Bugis harbourmasters along the east coast, including at Kendari, operating in concert with local rajas and chiefs.⁹⁷

Chains of “Bugis” trading connections encircled the main mass of Sulawesi; some would have been tied to Bone-controlled territories, others came from frontier regions. Many, particularly in the west, would have been Mandarese and Wajorese, including those from communities on the other side of the Makassar Straits. In mid-century the rulers of Parigi, Tojo and the Togian Islands were reluctant to sign any contract with the Dutch, saying they regarded themselves as Bone subjects. However, the Parigi ruler, who traded with both Makassar and Gorontalo, finally signed in 1863.⁹⁸ Ternate’s authority was increasingly restricted to the north—the upper Sulawesi coast and Sangihe.

The only sign of Batavia’s claimed authority over the Kaili and Mandar rajas was the occasional visiting warship. “[T]he head of the Buginese community at Donggala, who had been granted the title of Major” remained the official link to Dutch Makassar. The Kalangkanang officers were Batavia’s informers and diplomats, punishing and mediating as required. However, both rajas and officers were marginalised as coastal trade increased. As in the Tomini Gulf, incoming traders were able to by-pass local hierarchies to make direct contact with local trading communities. An official complained that the (realist) Mayor of Kalangkanang failed to exercise his rights, while “foreigners”, the “Buginese, Makassarese, Malays and bastard-Arabs [of mixed descent]”, paid no heed to the petty local kings, undermining their authority.⁹⁹ In 1854 the Celebes Governor signed a new contract with three Kaili rulers and appointed La Matupuang Patana La Bandu as Lieutenant of Kalangkangan. In 1861 a steamship was sent to cruise the coast and attack pirates.

When the Governor visited Palu in 1866 treaties was still being ignored. Matthes, who accompanied the mission, commented later that since the rajas could neither read nor write, “it is not surprising that the head of the Buginese, the Lieutenant Kalangkangan, had more to say than any one of the rulers, and actually has all authority”,¹⁰⁰ at least in the context of a Dutch state visit. In 1874, La Matupuang Patana La Bandu was promoted to become Kapitan of Kalangkangan, and his son La Raga Lieutenant. An early twentieth-century official concluded that “It was thanks to the great influence that the late Patana La Bandu had gained over the Kaili kings that Palu Bay no longer offers, as it used to, a safe hiding place for pirates, several of whose daughters married kings there”.¹⁰¹ An official *posthouder* to represent Batavia was only appointed in 1891.

Despite its greater proximity to Dutch controlled areas, the Mandar coast had fewer colonial contacts than Kaili. The sea-focussed Mandarese paid no heed to Dutch admonitions against raiding and free trading. In 1847 Batavia suggested establishing a government outpost on the Mandar coast, but the local rajas objected, saying they would

⁹⁷ Esther Velthoen, “Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905,” in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 213.

⁹⁸ Bleeker, *Reis*, 2: 132–3.

⁹⁹ “Het landschap Donggala of Banawa,” *BKI* 58 (1905): 528.

¹⁰⁰ Matthes, “Eenige opmerkingen,” 59. Matthes was impressed that the Bugis leader had a chair and tables.

¹⁰¹ “Het landschap Donggala,” 526–8.

need the prior agreement of the Gowa and Bone rulers. The official report of 1848 concluded that despite attempts to obtain treaties in 1825 and 1839 “all efforts were in vain”; continuing “all political relations with Mandar lapsed, so at the end of the year 1848 the Government did not know what the attitude of the rulers might be, and which signatories to the 1825 treaty were still alive, and if so, whether they could still be regarded as allies or not”.¹⁰²

The main Mandar settlements of Balanipa, Mamuju and Pamboan (Pembuang) were “large, sprawling coastal villages surrounded by coconut trees”; Balanipa consisted of about thirty houses inhabited by rich traders. It was regarded as the senior Mandar realm but had little authority. In 1850 Mamuju and Pembuang accused Balanipa of seizing and enslaving some of their subjects; fighting broke out. Batavia reluctantly decided to intervene, as the growing importance of trade demanded some semblance of control. It was decided that the Mandar states must sign new contracts, re-establishing the bond which had theoretically existed since the signing of the Bungaya treaty in 1674.¹⁰³ An emissary was sent off to the relatively friendly state of Sidenreng, south of the Mandar coast, hoping the king would set a good example, but he refused. The envoy, wary of Balanipa, then tried his luck at Majene. The ruler had vaguely heard of the Bungaya treaty and said he would sign if the Balanipa king agreed. This consent was finally obtained, in the same year, after much manoeuvring.¹⁰⁴ This had no effect on Mandar piracy. Although a further expedition against Balanipa in 1862 led to a new contract, the Mandarese continued to exchange slaves for weapons from Sulu. A more serious force was finally sent north from Makassar in 1867. New contracts followed, and security off the Sulawesi west coast slowly improved as Bone, Sulu and Banjarmasin also came under more sustained pressure.¹⁰⁵

Makassar and Southwest Sulawesi

As was described in chapter 8, most of Makassar’s trade restrictions had been dropped in 1847, making it a (partially) free port;¹⁰⁶ foreign ships and merchants were freely admitted.¹⁰⁷ A comparison of the trade figures for 1846 and 1847 is startling. The value of Western textile imports rose almost tenfold, while those of Western yarn increased sevenfold. Cloth arrivals from Eastern Indonesia were almost double in 1847; their exports were three times the level of the preceding year. Tortoiseshell and trepang imports rose respectively threefold and by about 50 per cent, their exports fivefold and by more than 150 per cent. The trade in mother-of-pearl also grew dramatically. Rice imports fell by

¹⁰² *Ikhtisar*, 297–8.

¹⁰³ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 157–9.

¹⁰⁴ Fasseur, “Zoutwaterheld,” 78–84.

¹⁰⁵ A. Rasyid Asba, “Mandar War 1868: Annihilation Operation Against Pirates,” *Sosiohumanika* 8, no. 1 (2015).

¹⁰⁶ Edward E. Poellingomang, “The Dutch Trade Policy and its Impact on Makassar’s Trade,” *RIMA* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993).

¹⁰⁷ Wong, “Trade,” 222–3; “De Handelsbeweging van Makassar.”

about 20 per cent, but exports climbed to six times the level that had prevailed in 1846. Opium traffic trebled.¹⁰⁸

This apparent upheaval allows some insight into previously clandestine trade, although accumulated stocks, previously hidden, might also have been released following liberalisation. The overall rise in registered commodities between the years 1846 and 1847 amounted to 145 per cent among imports and 123 per cent among exports. The later increase in the value of total registered trade between 1847 and 1848 was far less impressive. Makassar proved to be not quite as free as was claimed.¹⁰⁹

British merchants found the vaunted new “freedom” far from complete; one commentator on maritime affairs wrote:¹¹⁰

It is true that, within the last few years, Macassar has been made a free port, in the Dutch acceptance of the term. But this is a very questionable advantage to the British trader; for, while he is permitted to enter Macassar with all such articles as are not prohibited, he is at the same time excluded from every other port in Celebes which was previously open to him. But the commercial enfranchisement of Macassar was not owing to a voluntary departure from the principle of monopoly on the part of Holland, but of jealousy of the movements of Great Britain in that part of the world. This, apparent from many circumstances, is placed beyond doubt from the fact that small Dutch vessels of war have been sent northward to intercept the native prahus on their way to Singapore, and compel them by force to enter Macassar.

An extremely well-placed Dutch observer, NP van den Berg, governor of the *Javasche Bank* (1873–89), later looked back and concluded “It is dubious if Makassar was not a free port in name rather than substance”. Imports which originated from outside the Indies were still taxed, opium and arms were banned, while government-favoured shipping lines retained special privileges. Van den Berg added “But what was decisive, above all else, in stifling the flight that Makassar could have taken, was the pernicious belief that sooner or later the decree of 1846 would be repealed”.¹¹¹ Officials and Chinese merchants alike felt that the policy was so antithetical to Dutch instincts that it was only a matter of time before it would be reversed. In such circumstances Singapore seemed a safer bet, particularly to those seeking not just a convenient entrepot, but also a home for themselves, their business and, perhaps most important, their capital.

Although Makassar was a central exchange market for the perahu traffic, only a small proportion of the boats were large enough to warrant entry in Dutch registers. Before 1870 most did not qualify for the annual pass which formed the basis of shipping administration, and even then the minimum tonnage remained so high (until 1908) that it was enough to

¹⁰⁸ Heather Sutherland, “By the Numbers: Makassar’s Trade, Centralised Statistics and Local Realities,” *Masyarakat Indonesia* 39, no. 2 (2013).

¹⁰⁹ Sutherland, “By the Numbers.”

¹¹⁰ *Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine* 3 (1849).

¹¹¹ N.P. van den Berg, *Munt-, credit- en bankwezen, handel en scheepvaart in Nederlandsch Indie; historisch-statistische bijdrage* (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907), 351–2. Van den Berg’s comments are the same as *ENI*, “Vrijhaven.” Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX*, 169.

exclude most indigenous vessels.¹¹² Makassar's role as a hub for the trepang fleets remained a strength. This was recognised by the Dutch naval officer Captain C. van der Hart, who sailed in the eastern Indies in the mid-nineteenth century. He observed:¹¹³

If Makassar wants to equal and surpass Singapore (a well-grounded hope held by many) then every effort must be made to invigorate and support trade in the region, and all resources must be dedicated to revive the connections the former East India Company had with the Badjo people, the most industrious trepang and tortoiseshell fishers of the archipelago.

A variety of enterprises linked regional harbours with Makassar, supplying European concerns as well as local markets and inter-island shippers. Many businesses were run by Chinese and Arabs; indigenous merchants—a category which would have included many local rulers and chiefs—were also likely to be under-represented in the sources. Much of the coastal and regional traffic evaded Dutch controls.¹¹⁴ Despite South American competition coffee shipments from Dutch Makassar rose from 18,000 pikul in 1852 to 35,000 by 1860. A considerable quantity was also taken by pack-horse to independent native ports, a traffic that “cannot, with the best will in the world, be controlled”.¹¹⁵ It has been estimated that about a third of south Sulawesi coffee was exported directly, through Bone, Bantaeng and the Mandar states.¹¹⁶

Makassar remained the main gateway for Westerners with business interests in the Indies' eastern islands. By 1860 there were 14 major shipping and trading firms in the port, excluding the local NHM which was then trading in coffee on its own account (not on consignment or commission for the government). One of the most prominent and long-lived companies was W.B. Ledebøer, first listed in 1861; this was a Dutch concern although occasionally described as German. “Foreign” firms were particularly active in exploring the frontiers of commerce. In 1864 burgeoning business led the Java Bank to open its first outer-island branches. These were at Padang (West Sumatra) and Makassar, where it was housed in the NHM offices.¹¹⁷ In that same year a Chamber of Commerce was established in Makassar, Padang and the three main Java ports.¹¹⁸ Western firms usually bought from

¹¹² Gerrit J. Knaap, *Transport 1819–1940*, vol. 9 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940*, ed. P. Boomgaard (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1989), 14.

¹¹³ Hart, *Reize*.

¹¹⁴ Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX*, 145–7. Howard Dick, “State, Nation-State and National Economy,” in *The Emergence of a National Economy: an Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 94–5. This and the following paragraph are taken from Sutherland, “By the Numbers.”

¹¹⁵ ANRI Mak.7/7.

¹¹⁶ ANRI Mak.7/7, 9/4; Lindblad, “Outer Islands,” 94–5; Christopher J. Shepherd and Andrew McWilliam, “Cultivating Plantations and Subjects in East Timor: A Genealogy,” *BKI* 169, no. 2–3 (2013).

¹¹⁷ H.W. Tijdeman, *De Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij. Bijdrage tot hare geschiedenis en waardeering in verband met het Koloniaal beheer* (Leiden: Hazenberg, 1867), 334–5; ANRI Political Report 1860, Mak.1/6.

¹¹⁸ “Oprigting van Kamers van Koophandel en Nijverheid te Batavia, Semarang, Surabaija, Padang en Makassar,” *Koloniale Jaarboeken* 4 (1864).

Chinese and prepared the raw products for the European and American markets.¹¹⁹ As liberalisation expanded larger ships were allowed to enter Makassar, and the NHM was given permission to import goods directly from Europe. Cargoes which previously had to go via Batavia, to pay taxes and be transhipped there, could now be loaded at Makassar onto ocean-going Dutch vessels. Overall traffic spiked between 1846 and 1847, but then grew more steadily to reach a peak round 1870.¹²⁰

Chinese enterprise in Makassar is poorly documented. The Lie and the Nio were the two most prominent lineages through the eighteenth and almost all the nineteenth centuries. Their genealogies show that centuries-long movement to the south in mainland China had been followed by emigration, a pattern typical of overseas Chinese. In 1858 Nio Boen Liang owned two schooners and a brig, while the trader Lie Ing Guang, first listed in the Government Almanac 1860,¹²¹ owned two quite large schooners by 1868. Like leading members of their community elsewhere, the Lie, and even more so the Nio, achieved an advantageous symbiosis of wealth, power and status in the colonial officer system. The Letnan and future Kapitan Nio Tek Hoe (in office from the 1850s to 1880) and the Letnan Ong Im were substantial ship-owners, while in 1884 Kapitan Lie Ang Djian registered the pre-existing chop (stamp, brand) Eng Goan trading house as the Lie Tjeng Yan Company. The Oei, on the other hand, were active in shipping and trade from at least 1852 but did not play a prominent role in colonial politics.¹²²

Arab traders were well established in the interiors of Wajo and Bone. The mid-nineteenth century travel accounts of the learned Bible translator B.F. Matthes provide an interesting glimpse of the networks involved. In 1856, when Matthes was leaving for the interior, Weijergang, a prominent Makassar mestizo trader, arranged for him to collect funds from “an Arab trading acquaintance”, Tuan Sayye [Sayyid] Sappi. On a subsequent trip, when Matthes’s injured foot kept him in the port of Parepare, he visited the Sayyid repeatedly. “The Arab” he wrote “does a great deal of business in the interior. Formerly he lived at Pompanoewa,¹²³ where his trading activities spread prosperity among the people ... he had great influence at the Bone court”.¹²⁴ A change of ruler then brought him into disfavour, so he left for Parepare; there he remained, despite subsequent royal invitations to return to Bone.¹²⁵ Sayyid Sappi was the patron of another, half-Arab friend of Matthes, Tuan

¹¹⁹ B. Veth, *Handelsprodukten van de Macassaarsche markt* (Makassar: Eekhout, 1883).

¹²⁰ Poelinggomang, *Makassar abad XIX*, see esp. 100, 195 and graphic on 148.

¹²¹ The *Regerings-almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indie* (Dutch East Indies Government Almanac), 1815–1942, published lists of shipowners and enterprises as well as government officials.

¹²² Family genealogies and interview material, Makassar, 2000–10. The Oei business *chop* Gie Goan also dates from the 1850s, and incorporated in 1904 as Oei Leang Giok Co. These will be discussed in my forthcoming history of Makassar. See also Yerry Wirawan, “La Communauté Chinoise de Makassar (XVIIe-XXe s)” (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2011), 96–107.

¹²³ This Cenrana River port was described in the preceding chapter.

¹²⁴ Matthes identifies the period of his influence as lasting through the reign of two kings: La Mappaselling-Sultan Adam Najamuddin MatinroE ri Salassa’na (c.1835–45) and La Perenrengi Sult. Akhmad Muhiddin Arung Pugi MatinroE ri Ajang Benteng (c.1845–57).

¹²⁵ H. van den Brink, *Dr Benjamin Frederik Matthes: zijn leven en arbeid in dienst van het Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap* (Amsterdam: Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap, 1943), 186, 219.

Abdullah, who had welcomed Matthes with open arms; Abdullah's fast trading perahu took Matthes on several trips in search of manuscripts. Matthes explains that:¹²⁶

Abdullah was, as the natives say here, an ana-goeroe of the Arab [Sayyid Sappi]. This word literally means "pupil", but simply indicates a trader who, because he lacks the necessary capital, joins with a large-scale trader. He then becomes, as it were, the latter's subordinate, his follower, and carries out the orders of his master, retailing goods on a small scale, for a certain share of the profits.

Wealthier Arabs such as the Sayyid were often moneylenders, using particular financial constructions to evade the Islamic proscription on usury.¹²⁷

Batavia's political strategy on the peninsula continued to focus on ensuring the succession of amenable rulers and preventing hostile alliances. Since 1781 Gowa had posed no threat to colonial interests, and although there was unrest in the mountains and a couple of local rebellions, in 1859 and 1868, it was essentially peaceful. The Bugis kingdoms were more restive, as old alliances, competing interests and family ties complicated relations between Sidenreng, Wajo and Bone. In Wajo discord continued; the council refusing to call back the errant paramount ruler. His successor, La Cincing (r.1859–83), was even worse, as he declined to live in Wajo.¹²⁸ La Cincing was a descendent of Wajo rulers on his mother's side, but he chose to stay at Parepare in Sidengreng on the peninsula's west coast. There his brother, the enterprising La Pangorisang, was consolidating his rule. Parepare was a flourishing port, and Batavia feared that other European shipping might turn to it. The imposition of direct colonial rule on Parepare was considered but instead a new treaty was signed with Sidenreng in 1848. La Pangorisang reluctantly agreed to ban foreign ships, while stipulating that he should continue to take Parepare's revenue.¹²⁹

Despite Batavia's efforts, Wajo and Bone remained effectively independent. Dutch frustration with Bone overrode caution in 1859; eight steamships and 3,000 men sailed for Sulawesi. The attack on Bajoe and the Cenrana estuary was badly planned and hesitantly led, although some shipping was sunk. The rainy season left the army bogged down and cholera broke out. The subsequent blockade and the support of a royal pretender to Bone's throne made the second invasion in 1860 a modest colonial success. Dutch troops fought their way from the Bajoe harbour towards Watampone. A new king and a new treaty followed. Bone's southern coastal provinces of Old Bulukumba, Kajang and Sinjai came

¹²⁶ Brink, *Matthes*: 182, 209–19. In 1856 the Dutchman spent four months in Lagusi, the capital of the important Wajo realm of Pamana; there he had been helped by La Umpa, the son of one of the aristocratic court ladies. On a later trip he met La Umpa's son, who put him in touch with his sister's husband, Tuan Abdullah, "an Arab with a Buginese mother."

¹²⁷ Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, "Hadhrami Projections of Southeast Asian Identity," in *Anthony Reid and the Study of the Southeast Asian Past*, ed. Geoff Wade and Li Tana (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012).

¹²⁸ La Cincing Akil Ali Datu Pammana Pilla Wajo (1859–83); He supported his brother who had seized power in Sidenreng after a family conflict. H.A. Mattulada, *Sejarah, Masyarakat, dan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan* (Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1998), 349–50.

¹²⁹ *Ikhtisar*, 279.

under direct Dutch rule.¹³⁰ These important coffee producing lands were the only territories where colonial administration was introduced. Wajo remained neutral, while Bone's defeat encouraged the ambitions of rival Sidenreng.

Banjarmasin and East Kalimantan

The patriotically named Oranje Nassau coal mine was ceremonially opened at Pengarong by the Governor General in 1851. He had had to endure thirteen days in a perahu to get there; eight years later he could have arrived in comfort by steamer, as the connection between Surabaya and Banjarmasin opened in 1859. Two more mines were opened at Martapura but the quality of the coal was poor. That produced after 1862 by Kutai's Pelarang, on the lower estuary of the Mahakam, was no better. The mines were expensive to run and unproductive, while British coal was cheaper and better. Nonetheless, these investments had encouraged the Dutch Resident to become more interventionist.¹³¹ In 1852 the heir apparent to the Banjarmasin throne died. The Dutch threw their weight behind a candidate of dubious legitimacy: Tamjidullah II (r.1857–59). This son of a half-Chinese, half-Dayak secondary wife was rejected by many nobles, who supported the last sultan's legitimate grandson, Pangeran Hidayatullah. In April 1859, the Pelarong mine was attacked, and all the Dutch staff and many miners, who had fought in self-defence, were also killed. The mine never re-opened. Banjarmasin was torn by in-fighting among the nobility, Muslim leaders and insurgent bands in the interior. The Pangerang, supported by the population of the upstream Negara, was declared Sultan (r.1859–62). Dutch invasion and the Banjarmasin war followed (1859–63).¹³² The Sultanate was declared to be in abeyance (1860) and the ruler himself captured and exiled in 1862.¹³³ Members of the royal lineage used royal titles until 1905.

Willem Rees, a respected Dutch military expert, dismissed claims that the Banjarmasin war was caused by Islamic fanaticism or a refusal to adjust to the modern world. Indeed, he noted, the sultan encouraged European business. Rees concluded that:¹³⁴

[The reasons lay in] the Banjarese dynasty, that had lost its nerve, and was worn out, had no internal strength, no longer exercised power, and was only good at intrigue; in the Banjarese population, that had fallen so low, and was so drained it was capable of anything. It was also caused by the diverging views of the various [Dutch] administrations, that believed they could maintain their prestige by continuing to support the ruler, who had no right to their support, and had none from his own people.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 306–11. M.T.H. Perelaer, *De Bonische Expeditien, Krijgsgebeurtenissen op Celebes in 1859 en 1860*, 2 vols. (Leiden: G. Kolff, 1872).

¹³¹ Lindblad, *Between Dayak and Dutch*, 32–5.

¹³² J. Hageman, "Over de Geschiedenis van Bandjarmasin, in de laatste jaren, 1857–1860," *TNI* 23, no. 2 (1861): 89–90.

¹³³ W.A. van Rees, *De Bandjermasinsche Krijg van 1859–1863* (Arnhem.: D.A. Thieme, 1865).

¹³⁴ W.A. van Rees, *De Bandjermasinsche Krijg van 1859–1863 nader toegelicht* (Arnhem: D.A. Thieme, 1867), 37–8.

Rees ridiculed one colonial officer's claim to have captured 37 foes, observing: "These were native traders from Mandar, who were watching the fight from their vessels".¹³⁵ Thereafter, despite a short-lived revolt in 1870 and intermittent attacks on the Dutch in the mid-1880s, Banjarmasin remained generally peaceful.




Image 37 View of the Barito River at Banjarmasin, c.1915¹³⁶

In 1850, J.G.A. Gallois, Resident of the recently reconstituted Division of South and East Borneo, steamed up the east Kalimantan coast to establish or revise contracts with rulers, to explore the possibilities of posting officials there, and to investigate English incursions.¹³⁷ He visited the Berau realms in the northeast. He estimated the population of Gunung Tabur at about 8,000, plus a tributary colony of about twenty Sama Bajau perahu households in the islands. Sambaliung was thought to have approximately 7,000 inhabitants, with a higher proportion of Buginese settlers than Gunung Tabur. Both populations were divided equally between Muslim and Dayak.¹³⁸ The Dayaks washed gold and cultivated rice, mainly for export alongside valuable timber, rattan, gum, birds' nests, turtle shell and trepang. Trade details were sparse, as no customs' duties were levied. The Berau sailors were not, wrote Gallois, "very enterprising", venturing no further than Kutai and Bulungan. Perahu from Kutai, Pasir, Sulawesi's west coast and Sulu were the main traders, while Bugis were the chief consumers of opium.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹³⁶ No title, photographer unknown. Courtesy of the ASM, 1994-5771.

¹³⁷ Gallois, "Korte aantekeningen." In 1848 Batavia had divided the Government of Borneo (1846-48) restoring the earlier division from 1830.

¹³⁸ In 1850 Gunung Tabur had 6 or 7 houses and Sambaliung 57; like other ruler, the sultans feared raiders, and so facilitated the slave trade. That they profited from this does not disqualify their fears. Buginese and Arabs were generally safer; the Arab vessels that sailed to Berau and Bulungan from Singapore were well armed (Broersma, *Handel*, 227).

Berau's forest products and coal also attracted European traders. The Englishman William Lingard had discovered his own channel through the complex Berau estuary after 1848 and traded there for more than twenty years, from at least 1864 to 1885. His help to the Sultan of Gunung Tabor had been rewarded with a land concession at Tanjung Redeb, where he established the first permanent trading post. In the novels *Almayers Folly* (1895) and *Outcast of the Islands* (1896) Joseph Conrad loosely based his 'Sambir' on Berau, and his Lingard on this historical William Lingard.¹³⁹ The Dutch soon despatched a gunboat to investigate; from then on Lingard kept a low profile. Paulus van Hartrop, an agent of the Makassar firm of J.G. Weijergang and Co., also sailed regularly up the Berau; he had lived in Bulungan for several years. The usual suspicions and rivalry for the sultans' favours complicated the men's relationship. In 1868 a Dutch official noted that "the two merchants are the only ones who advised the Sultan [of Gunung Tabur] on this and that, but they remain traders, for whom commerce and financial profit are the priorities".¹⁴⁰

When Gallois arrived at Kutai's Samarinda he met G.P. King (introduced in the preceding chapter) and his bookkeeper Joseph Carter. While in Lombok's Ampenan, King had become interested in Kutai's coal mining potential. After the consolidation of Dutch influence on Bali in the later 1840s he moved to Kutai, where he was living on a well-fortified, half-beached ship when Gallois arrived. In 1848 King had been offered the customs monopoly for 600 fl. per month, but he refused. Understandably: his exports then were worth fl.259,500 guilders, in rattan, wax, resins, birds' nests; his imports, worth fl.226,700, were salt, tobacco, sundries, rice, and Chinese copper coins.¹⁴¹

King and Carter explained to Gallois that "lawlessness" had reduced the sultan's income to 100 dollars a month, insufficient for his own household. This was because "all the products from the interior are monopolised by the respective chiefs ... no traders can sail further up-river than Tenggarong, where the Sultan lives, and all trade transactions are concluded only after the King and the other great officials had obtained their privileges". Since the sultan was then a young child, he was unable to defend his rights. Later he became a very effective ruler: Ratu, then Aji Muhammad Salehuddin bin Aliuddin (1838–99; r.1845–99). He proved to be enterprising and shrewd, managing to balance the competing claims of his various subjects (Dayak, Bugis, Banjarese and Malay), his religious obligations,¹⁴² and the increasingly assertive Dutch. But in 1850 power was still held by the Pangeran Perbatasari, with whom both Europeans were at odds. According to King the Pangerang levied illegal

¹³⁹ See Ian Watt's introduction to Joseph Conrad, *Almayers Folly: A Story of an Eastern River* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915). On the promontory of Tanjung Redeb, see above, chapter 2. In the late nineteenth century Berau became a centre for European and Arab trade with Singapore. Norman Sherry, *Conrad's Eastern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 90–102; Anita van Dissel, "Pioneering in Southeast Asia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," in *Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600–2000*, ed. Catia Antunes and Jos Gommans (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in J.N.F.M. à Campo, "A Profound Debt to the Eastern Seas: Documentary History and Literary Representation of Berau's Maritime Trade in Joseph Conrad's Malay Novels," *International Journal of Maritime History* 12, no. 2 (2000).

¹⁴¹ Broersma, *Handel*, 171–3.

¹⁴² From the late eighteenth century there was increasing Islamic influence; see Mujiburrahman, "Islamic Theological Texts and Contexts in Banjarese Society: An Overview of the Existing Studies," *Southeast Asian Studies* 3, no. 3 (2014).

and excessive tolls on timber going down river; he also refused to pay the impressive 3,740 *realen* (Spanish dollars) he owed King, no doubt for imports obtained on credit. Carter, who had a son by one of the Pangeran's slaves, wanted to buy her, but the Pangeran refused. Gallois mediated in these disputes; King was paid in a mixture of dollars and rattan.¹⁴³ Carter had to negotiate further.

Kutai's royal income was still based on ineffective royal monopolies over and privileged access to forest products, including gold and diamonds; these were in theory protected by limits on upriver travel. The 1848 offer to King may have been made in the hope that the Englishman could recreate the mutually profitable relationship between traders and rulers that prevailed on Bali, but geography, demography and political systems were very different. However, a new regime introduced in Kutai soon after 1850 opened the river to commerce. This made it possible for traders to advance rice, goods or money to agents who then went upriver to collect commodities. Revenue was to be generated by a *hasil* (levy) of 10 per cent on production, 4 per cent on goods passing Tenggarong, and then a tax of 8 per cent on export from Samarinda. Every year 12 big sailing vessels arrived, while Kutai itself was homeport to a schooner and perahu.¹⁴⁴

Twelve years after Gallois' visit a novice mining engineer, Jacobus H. Menten, arrived in Kutai to run the coal mine at Pelarang. This was a small and uncertain enterprise, where a few Chinese worked. Menten's appointment was brief—but long enough for him to notice the presence of oil floating on the Sanga Sanga river. He also surveyed possibilities on the island of Tarakan, to the north. But he left in 1863, and the mine closed nine years later. In 1881 a private company tried to revive the business, but it never amounted to much. Menten was to return to Kutai in the 1880s and make his fortune.¹⁴⁵

On his return journey Gallois stopped at Pasir and the Tanah Bumbu lands. Pasir, the second east coast trading centre after Kutai, offered cargoes of gold, rattan, good timbers, birds' nests, turtle-shell, trepang and wax, and was home port to a brig and ten to fifteen sea-going perahu. It was visited each year by about forty Buginese ships, their cargoes estimated to be worth c. fl.150,000. The local Bugis were said to be heavy consumers of opium. The ruler's income derived from a monopsony on gold, import duties of 4 per cent, a 10 per cent export levy on rattan, a poll-tax of one guilder per household, income from the birds' nest cliffs and, as always, fines and gifts. Of all these sources of income, however, "only a very small part enter the Sultan's treasury, but enrich some officials, so that the ruler, instead of being well-off, lives in very straitened circumstances."¹⁴⁶ Both Gallois and the Pasir Sultan deplored the diffuse and unstable nature of elite power. The Sultan complained about the wide-spread obstructionism which he frequently encountered from his princes. This verged on outright disobedience, completely disrupting attempts at government. The Resident addressed the assembled princes and influential representatives of the people, reminding them that any obstruction of the commands and advice of their lawful King

¹⁴³ The 12,932 bundles (*bos*) of rattan were valued at 795 dollars.

¹⁴⁴ Broersma, *Handel*, 174.

¹⁴⁵ Irwin, *Nineteenth-century Borneo*, 163–6; J. Thomas Lindblad, "Strak beleid en batig slot: De Oost-Borneo Maatschappij, 1888–1940," *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 48 (1985); Ian Cummins and John Beasant, *Shell Shock: The Secrets and Spin of an Oil Giant* (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2005).

¹⁴⁶ Gallois, "Korte aantekeningen," 259.

was extremely wrong. It was also punishable; the Resident threatened all who continued to behave in this way with the Government's displeasure.¹⁴⁷

When Gallois arrived at the thinly populated and poor Tanah Bumbu lands, at the southern tip of East Kalimantan, Bugis Pegatan was ruled by an influential Aru. The ruler of nearby Kusan, Pangeran Abdul Kadir, of the Banjarmasin Sultans' family, told the Resident a familiar tale. "The financial position of the King is very confused", wrote Gallois. "He is deeply in debt to various people, and so he is unable to benefit from his right to buy up many products of the land, which would be very profitable". Nonetheless, like Pasir, Pegatan was an important export harbour, handling gold, good wood, rice, rattan, birds' nests, turtle shell and trepang.¹⁴⁸

Maluku

The declining profits of the spice monopolies made their continuation impossible. All the Sultans and a whole range of lesser officials still received considerable compensation payments for the seventeenth century destruction of spice trees in their territories, but there were no longer commensurate advantages for the Dutch. Nevertheless, Maluku's Residents continued to reject liberalisation. They could see little economic alternative to coercion, and feared that growers, if set free, would cut down their trees as they had when Ambon's forced nutmeg cultivation was abolished in 1827.¹⁴⁹ There were attempts at diversification, with some success, as in the case of cacao, but Buru's eucalyptus (kayuputih) oil continued to be Maluku's main export. Sales increased as the European market expanded. The oil was distilled in the extensive woods around Kayeli; about 10,000 bottles a year were sent to Ambon and Makassar or bought up by visiting whalers.¹⁵⁰

The inevitable dismantling of Ambon's monopolies moved a decisive step closer when in 1859 Batavia organised a meeting with local chiefs. They agreed to give up their "*hasselgelden*", the production payment they received at every harvest, but only under certain conditions. They specified that they should receive an equivalent sum "for some years", that freedom of movement be introduced; that international shipping be allowed at the port of Saparua, and that other harbours be opened for regional trade. Then they would be willing to stimulate the planting of crops other than spices, in the hope that trade would provide revenue. Although the registered traffic in Ambon's port did not show a dramatic decline, sources indicate a general sense of stagnation.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 265.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 262.

¹⁴⁹ E.W.A. Ludeking, "Schets van de Residentie Amboina," *BKI* 3 (1868): 94.

¹⁵⁰ Of the 62 adult male Christian inhabitants of Buru, 14 were involved in one way or another with kayuputih oil production; the other main activities were sago exploitation (22, including 10 brewers of palm-wine) and 15 hunters and fishermen. Their main assets were their houses, perahu, fine fire arms, and plantations of coconut palms (estimated at 2,000 trees) and sago trees (c. 3,000). Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 31, 18. Arabs were well represented in the kayuputih trade; William G. Clarence-Smith, "The Economic Role of the Arab Community in Maluku, 1816 to 1940," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 26, no. 74 (1998): 36–8, 40.

¹⁵¹ For the years 1858–62, see Leirissa, et al., *Maluku Tengah*, 163–4. For the years 1827–31, see Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 132.

On Seram officials encouraged Alifuru to move from the interior to the coast. Many did so and became keen coffee growers. The government supported the development of smallholder gardens and modest plantations by sending seedlings and experienced men from Manado; it also offered to buy at fixed prices. Elpaputih bay on south Seram became a minor centre of coffee production; independent migrants from Ambon-Lease moved to Seram.¹⁵² Rice production for the market also developed, particularly around Malowan, North Seram. There was some trade off the north coast, but the Dutch tendency to regard independent shippers as pirates inhibited traffic.¹⁵³ Under the earlier spice regime coastal chiefs had enjoyed considerable power and they resented losing their control of traffic with the interior. They persuaded Dutch officials that serious uprisings were disrupting the inland villages. In the second half of the nineteenth century a series of colonial military expeditions was sent into Seram's little known interior, effectively punishing enterprising traders trying to establish their own networks.¹⁵⁴

Atiahu and Teluti, settlements on Teluti Bay, south Seram, became trading centres linking the Banda Sea with the interior. Inland Alifuru also came down to the coast to trade, offering valuable timbers, "sago, tubers, foodstuffs, *wortelhout*,¹⁵⁵ birds, tobacco, *kulit lawang* [medicinal essential oil].... They put a lot of effort into growing tobacco". In exchange they obtained beads, ironware (knives, bushknives, axes), red clothes (from Bengal and Europe) and handkerchiefs, rock salt (from Saparua), gilded buttons, gongs, (Europe and China) salemपुरis (Bengal), sarongs (from Sumenep) etc. Tobacco was somewhat cheaper at Atiahu than Teluti, because of the "numerous inhabitants, greater production, and lesser quality". It was estimated that the three most productive south Seram settlements (Atiahu, Teluti and Laimu) together produced about 230 pikul or nearly 15,000 kg.¹⁵⁶

After 1824 the Residency of Banda (see appendix) included the Banda, east Seram, Aru, Kei, Tanimbar and Southwestern archipelagos. Bugis influence and ties to Makassar had grown since Merkus's 1827 decree. In mid-century it was reported that "the government has little authority and has even lost all political contact with various islands."¹⁵⁷ Shipping based in Banda itself was predominantly Chinese. Earl noted:¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Leirissa, et al., *Maluku Tengah*, 119–20.

¹⁵³ Roelof Broersma, "Koopvaardij in de Molukken," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 23 (1934).

¹⁵⁴ This was Riedel's opinion; he was Ambon Resident, 1880–83. J.G.F. Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua* ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1886). The military were sent to Paulohi, southcentral Seram (1858); Waisamu in Kairatu, an Alifuru settlement on the west coast south of Piru (1860); to Marhuru and a series of interventions in Kaibobo in west Seram (in 1865 and the following years, including 1875); *ENI*: "Ceram", 342.

¹⁵⁵ As noted in chapter 3. *Wortelhout* (root wood) did not come from a specific tree but referred to growths with a very complex grain which appeared on the trunks of some species.

¹⁵⁶ "Tets over Ceram en de Alfoeren," *BKI* 5, no. 1 (1856): 81–8. Here the amount is given in Amsterdam pounds: c. 30,000. Note the tables comparing prices at different points in the trade chain.

¹⁵⁷ *Ikhtisar*, 332. Daya and Tenggara islands were used by Bugis fleets sailing to Australia for trepang.

¹⁵⁸ G.W. Earl, "The Trading Ports of the Indian Archipelago," *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries* 4 (1850): 550.

The smaller traders are Chinese, or rather of Chinese extraction, for as far as I could discover, every individual of their community was a native of Banda, Amboyna, or Macassar. One of the wealthiest of these, who holds the post of Captain China, is owner of a small brig which is employed on trading voyages to Timor laut [Tanimbar], Ceram and the west coast of New Guinea. This, with a few paduakangs or large prahus, also owned by Chinese, and manned by natives of Tenimbar (Timor Laut and Baba) constitute the entire mercantile marine of Banda, and small as it is, it exceeds that of Amboyna [Ambon], the capital of the [central] Moluccas.

Banda, like the other main Maluku, Manadonese and Buru ports, was opened to trade from 1854; this had little effect in reversing the decline following the expansion of Bugis shipping and the resulting concentration of traffic in Makassar. Trade figures make it clear that while imports (including rice for plantation workers) had maintained similar levels since 1826, exports plummeted, as the trade in eastern island products by-passed Banda.¹⁵⁹ The rules governing the Banda plantations were changed in 1864; after a transition period lasting some nine years forced cultivation and delivery of nutmeg and mace were phased out. Most of Banda's harvest then went overseas via Singapore, which was supplied primarily by Makassar Chinese.¹⁶⁰

The Southwestern Islands had always been part of Banda's maritime sphere; before 1621 they had supplied Banda Neira with foodstuffs as well as commodities. Under the VOC their role remained much the same, although their most lucrative incoming and outgoing commodities were illicit and many of their visitors clandestine. In 1850 van der Hart observed: "The Buginese are in complete control of the trade in these parts; they have powerful influence and many privileges".¹⁶¹ They exchanged the usual textiles, iron- and earthenware, guns and powder for sea and forest products, dealing with Muslim or Christian coastal elites.¹⁶² Another naval officer, P. van der Crab, described the products available in the different islands. Luang could provide about 600 pikul of trepang and the same amount of tortoiseshell. Wetar was the next most important, providing 200 pikuls of wax and 25 cattie of tortoiseshell. Babar and Romang were good for 50 cattie of shell, Babar for 20, and Leti and Moa could each muster 10.¹⁶³ Bleeker later expressed the hope that if perahu captains from the Southeastern and Southwestern islands and East Seram could trade freely at Banda Neira, they would provide essentials such as sago, tubers, coconuts and coconut oil, building materials and earthenware. But exchange cargoes were

¹⁵⁹ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 257–63.

¹⁶⁰ ENI: "Notenmuskaat, Notenkultuur," 36. Willard A. Hanna, *Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and Its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands* (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1978).

¹⁶¹ Hart, *Reize*, 244.

¹⁶² Chris de Jong, *A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies: The "Little East" in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, 2013, <http://www.cgfdejong.nl/Daalders,%20BlankPage.pdf>; Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 302–5.

¹⁶³ Petrus van der Crab, *De Moluksche eilanden: Reis van Z.E. den Gouverneur-Generaal Charles Ferdinand Pahud, door den Molukschen Archipel* (Batavia: Lange, 1862): 96–111.

hard to find in Banda. He noted that four small schooners had been built on the Sula Islands, to sail from Ambon to the Southwest islands for onions, pigs and wax.¹⁶⁴

Lesser and more remote harbours attracted few visitors unless they provided cargoes for visiting shippers. If they could, they did well. Tombra, on the north coast of Leti in the Southwestern islands, was described as having been “a dirty village of 25 small and shabby huts” at the beginning of the nineteenth century; 50 years later the same observer noted that it had developed into “a large and prosperous settlement of 140 well-built houses”; large sailing perahu of up to 100 tons came from Macassar, Bone and Surabaya to trade. The same was true of the flourishing village of Luhulele, also on Leti. For despite the frequent lack of rain, which could force people to move temporarily to neighbouring Moa, Leti exported food and livestock (buffalo, pigs, sheep and goats).¹⁶⁵

Ternate’s Mid-Century Crisis

Casparas Bosscher, Resident of Ternate (1857–59) was a uniquely well-informed official.¹⁶⁶ When he first visited there in 1855, he had noted Ternate’s deep decline, and watched it get worse in subsequent years. He brought this “pitiful” situation to the attention of high officials in Batavia. They acknowledged Ternate’s “unfavourable material and moral” condition but dismissed his views as “exaggeration ... and fine-sounding speculation”. Discouraged, Bosscher nonetheless tried to develop trade, agriculture and production despite the limitations imposed by the rulers’ contracts and attitudes.¹⁶⁷

In 1853 Ternate’s Chinese were revenue farmers, artisans and traders, while the twenty-two Arabs were all traders.¹⁶⁸ Although port entry was liberalized the following year, traffic remained sparse; the highlights were intermittent visits by de Vries steamers and an annual Manila brig.¹⁶⁹ Java and Makassar provided Ternate’s imports of textiles, rice, salt and

¹⁶⁴ See Crab, *De Moluksche eilanden*: 129–30, which notes the shipbuilding capacity of Taliabo’s inhabitants, and observed that the Sultan had had a schooner of c.140 tons built there, which he sold to the trader M.D. van Duivenbode for fl.2,000; Bosscher doubted if the builders had been paid properly for their work. C. Bosscher, “Memorie van Overgave, C. Bosscher (1859),” in *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapien (Jakarta: ANRI, 1980), 192.

¹⁶⁵ Jong, *Footnote; ENI*: “Letti.”

¹⁶⁶ Bosscher was an Amsterdammer (b.1820) who arrived in Ambon in 1847. He spent five years there and was sent on various exploratory voyages in the more remote islands; from 1853 to 1857 he was Assistant Resident in Kutai, then became Resident of Ternate and later served in Madura and Kediri before achieving heights in Batavia, where he was appointed Director of the Civil Service (*Binnenlandsch Bestuur*) in 1876. Governor General Loudon (1872–75) remarked that “Bosscher was not a refined man, but a clever and above all a tough man”, just the sort Loudon needed to clean the “ Augean stable” of Bangka; Henk Boels, “Instusschen hield ik hem door vormelijke beleefdheid in toom” James Loudon over vormen en gedrag in de politiek,” in *Het persoonlijke is politiek: egodocumenten en politieke cultuur*, ed. Janny de Jong Remieg Aerts, Henk te Velde (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002), 94. For an example of Bosscher’s early travels, see: C. Bosscher, “Staat aantoonende der voornaamste eilanden der Aroe-groep, benevens de voornaamste negorijen en het aantal van hare bewoners en huizen,” *TBG* 1(1853). Tobias, “Memorie.”

¹⁶⁷ Bosscher, “Memorie.”

¹⁶⁸ Clarence-Smith, “Economic Role.”

¹⁶⁹ Tobias, “Memorie”; R.Z. Leirissa, “Changing Maritime Trade Patterns in the Seram Sea,” in *State and Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago*, ed. G.J. Schutte (Leiden: KITLV, 1994).

coconut oil; these were monopolised by the “Sultans and princes”, so prices were arbitrary and high.¹⁷⁰ Van Duivenbode was the only successful European trader, owning three schooners engaged in the New Guinea and related East Seram and Seram Laut traffic.¹⁷¹ A few poorer Europeans traded in symbiosis with Chinese, who opened *toko* (small stores) in Ternate, Halmahera and other islands, distributing imports and buying up local produce. With the effective end of the spice monopoly the aristocracy had lost much of their power and access to illicit profits, although some still tried to collect tribute goods they could trade, or to summon unpaid labour to work in their personal commodity gardens.¹⁷²

Ternate’s economic and political difficulties were most apparent on the Sulawesi east coast, where the traditionally semi-independent rajas of Banggai and Tobungku sought to break completely with the sultanate.¹⁷³ Bone’s increasing influence was tied to Bugis commercial networks. The proliferation of exchange points for traders and increasing demand for sea and forest products made Ternate’s claims irksome.¹⁷⁴ During the 1840s rebellions, local involvement with raiders from the north and south, and the resulting colonial military actions caused displacement, migration and the collapse of regional commercial networks.¹⁷⁵ When Raja Agama of Banggai (r. 1829–47) revolted against Ternate in 1846–48, he was supported by the Bugis, including the Captain of the Togian Buginese. In 1850 van der Hart noted that along the Tomini south coast all the kingdoms “acknowledge the ruler of Bone as their lawful overlord”. Van der Hart described how the Banggai ruler had once depended on the annual arrival of 100 to 150 Sama Bajau boats, bringing marine produce to Peleng. He estimated that by the time of his visit the number had dwindled to 30 or 40. He observed that the whole Sulawesi east coast, from Kendari to Balantak was “completely deserted, the population having withdrawn into the interior or moved elsewhere”.¹⁷⁶ This migration was due to fear of sea-borne attack as well as malaria.¹⁷⁷ In 1852 the Bone ruler officially requested that the Dutch recognise his suzerainty on the Sulawesi east coast, but was refused on the grounds that it belonged to Banggai and Ternate.¹⁷⁸

Batavia came to Ternate’s aid, invoking the need to combat piracy. Velthoen concluded that then “local raiding was the only way in which Ternaten officials could support themselves after the Bugis trade networks collapsed”.¹⁷⁹ In 1856 a particularly large force was sent against rebellious Banggai and Tobungku, including a couple of Dutch steamships, 180 European-officered troops, and a force of 600 auxiliaries mustered by Ternate. The results were inconclusive, although two villages were burnt and 124 families relocated to

¹⁷⁰ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 43–51, 139–43, 99–205.

¹⁷¹ Tobias, “Memorie,” 79.

¹⁷² Christiaan F. van Fraassen, “Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1987), 57–9.

¹⁷³ *Ikhtisar*, 43: 343–7.

¹⁷⁴ For a summary of the various polities in the mid-nineteenth century see Tobias, “Memorie,” 1–74.

¹⁷⁵ Henley, *Fertility*, 70–1.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Henley, *Fertility*, 243–6; Velthoen, “Contested Coastlines.”

¹⁷⁸ Velthoen, “Historical Perspective,” 20.

¹⁷⁹ Velthoen, “Pirates,” 213.

Labuha on Bacan.¹⁸⁰ It seems that Banggai was not only defying Ternate's hegemony over its eastern Sulawesi territories, but also exploiting divisions within the Sultanate's financially constrained elite. In 1859 there was a "riot at Kau on Halmahera because the people are forced by a few princes to surrender their sago dusuns [gardens, small plantations] for little or no payment ... to people from Banggai".¹⁸¹ This probably reflects debt ties between Ternate nobles and (Bugis?) traders based in Banggai. In the same year a Dutch official proposed that "two capable and trusted Ternate chiefs [be based] at Mondono and Boalemo [on the north coast of the east central Sulawesi's Balantak peninsula], to keep a watchful eye on Banggai's leading men and chiefs, and on the machinations of the foreign Buginese in the region".¹⁸²

The coastal Tobungku and more inland (To)Mori were the two most powerful alliances south of Banggai. After Tobungku's weakening by Dutch-Ternaten attacks various peoples, including the Tomori, fought for control of the iron trade between the coast and the inland Matano region. In 1859 Bosscher succeeded in negotiating a contract between the Ternate representative and the raja and leading men of Tobungku on the one hand and the Tomori leaders on the other.¹⁸³ The Tomori agreed to return the lands they had conquered and to pay back the tribute Tobungku had thus lost, while both captive Tobungku and exiled Tomori were to be allowed to return home. Then the actual grievances were addressed. It was stipulated:¹⁸⁴

That the inhabitants of both sides were to be allowed to trade freely in both territories, with whoever they chose, and chiefs were not to intervene ... everyone would be free to sell his goods or not for the offered price, so that the Tombuku must cease taking the goods of the Tomori against a price set by themselves (the Tombuku).... That the Tombuku could not block any ship under the Dutch flag from sailing up the Tampiera [Sampara] river to trade directly with the Tomori.... That the Tombuku would not prevent the Tomori from making salt on the beach, or hinder them in any way.

Tidore and the Indies Far East

The colonial presence in Tidore's domain was much weaker than in Ternate.¹⁸⁵ On the island of Tidore itself there was no Dutch administration, community or garrison, unlike Ternate. The Ternate Resident Tobias believed that the ruling class in Tidore was much closer to its subjects than that of Ternate; the aristocracy lived soberly among their people,

¹⁸⁰ Velthoen, "Pirates," 213.

¹⁸¹ Clercq, "Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890," 132. Bosscher, "Memorie," 164.

¹⁸² Bosscher, "Memorie," 150.

¹⁸³ The chiefs were "the Macole's of Patasea and Tofontuku, and the Bonto and Kerus of Tomori"; *ibid.*, 141.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 141–3. J.B.J. van Doren, *Herinneringen en schetsen van Nederlands Oost-Indië: vervolg op de Fragmenten uit de reizen in die Gewesten* (Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1860), 326–46.

¹⁸⁵ The Tidore territories included the Tidore islands, the two eastern peninsulas of Halmahera, the northern part of the southern peninsula, Gebe and west New Guinea.

demanding none of the “slavish subjugation” seen on Ternate. A mere twenty state slaves did the heavy work around the palace. The few relatively well-off nobles had created their own wealth through trade or their *dusun* (gardens) “unlike the idle and parasitic Ternatens”.¹⁸⁶ His successor, Bosscher, shared this preference, finding the Tidore ruler more willing to adjust to changing circumstances.¹⁸⁷ The Tidore Sultan had already substituted local products for slaves in the obligatory contributions from his subjects, but the former proved much harder to collect, so “in the last three years [since 1856] there has been almost no *hasil* [tribute] at all”.¹⁸⁸

In 1848 the Tidore Sultan agreed to Batavia’s suggestion that he clarify his rights over Papua. This was followed by a secret decree extending Dutch claims east to include all the New Guinea territory between the 141st meridian, in the south, to Cape Bonpland (Saprop Maneh, east of Humboldt Bay) in the north; a few territories in the west remained under the nominal rule of Tidore.¹⁸⁹ The chief (*sengaji*) of Gebe continued to be the channel through which the Sultan exercised his authority over west Papua. Bosscher described Gebe and the Raja Ampat as “the source of wealth for rulers and great men”, but the income had been steadily decreasing. Previously, before “more philanthropic attitudes” limited the slave trade, many were brought from New Guinea and sold or hired out to the government. The east Halmahera Gamrange population (of Maba, Weda and Patani) paid tribute to Tidore in the form of 30 pikul of nuts, 20 pikul of trepang and a half kati (0.6 kg) of turtle-shell; they were also liable for three manned perahu for the *hong*i in New Guinea, and thirty men for duty in the palace. There had been Dutch officials in the Gamrange, but these had been withdrawn in 1826; however, the chiefs continued to receive their compensation payments.¹⁹⁰

The sultanate’s main political instrument remained the *hong*i. These were also a cover for slave-raiding expeditions from Gebe, south Halmahera’s Weda and Patani, and the Raja Ampat’s Waigeo. Either acting on their own accounts, or pretending to be “emissaries” from Tidore, they seized captives, presenting some to the sultan, while selling others in Seram markets.¹⁹¹ Resident Tobias, horrified at the carnage, had banned the *hong*i. This “strange decision”, wrote his successor Bosscher, removed an important means of “restraining the savage population, to some extent at least”. He allowed the fleets to sail again.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ Tobias, “Memorie,” 56–7.

¹⁸⁷ Bosscher, “Memorie,” 173–6.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 198; Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 214–22.

¹⁸⁹ Paul W Van der Neer, *Search for New Guinea’s Boundaries: from Torres Strait to the Pacific* (Canberra: ANU Press, 1966); Bosscher, “Memorie,” 196–8; *Ikhtisar*, 351–4; Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 222, 273–8. Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands Until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996), 118, 146.

¹⁹⁰ The three main chiefs received fl.624 each, the small Gita fl.128; Bosscher, “Memorie,” 187.

¹⁹¹ Jelle Miedema, *De Kebar 1855–1980: Sociale structuur en religie in de Vogelkop van West-Nieuw-Guinea* (Dordrecht: KITLV, 1984), 12–5; Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 139, 195, 311. For traditional accounts of the relationship between the Gamrange, Papua and Tidore, see Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1993), 104–6.

¹⁹² Bosscher, “Memorie,” 106–7.

Tribute collecting voyages traditionally began with a few kora kora under one or two prominent princes who sailed from Tidore for west New Guinea. Other vessels joined along the way until twelve or more ships reached the coast. De Bruijn Kops described the effect:¹⁹³

On the news of the arrival of the *hongi*, the women and children took flight with the small canoes, carrying with them everything of the least value.... The [local] chief went at once to Captain Amir [the Tidore Sultan's son who was in command] and took with him, as a token of his submission, a great number of birds of paradise and a slave as a present. It is not to be wondered at that the *hongi* instil such fear wherever they come; the crews pillage and steal as much as they can; they destroy the plantations [gardens].... It is through means of the *hongi* voyages that the Sultan maintains his power, for on failure of obedience or negligence in the execution of orders, such a fleet is sent to murder or make prisoners of the population, to destroy the kampongs [villagers], and thus to punish all in a severe manner.

Participation in such expeditions confirmed the ties between the sultan and his subjects; booty and adventure rewarded the fighters.

In 1857 a *hongi* of about 300 men was mustered by Tidore for a punitive expedition against the Onin slaving settlements. Bosscher persuaded the sultan to send the fleet first to Seram to subdue unrest before going to New Guinea. When the word went out that a *hongi* against Seram was planned, “volunteers poured in from all sides, mostly Alfuren from Tobelo and Kau”; ultimately there were some 1,500 auxiliaries from Maluku.¹⁹⁴ Many of these had supported Nuku's revolt, and continued to trouble the Dutch, but they could not resist the opportunity to join the expedition. The *hongi* leaders were under strict instructions to avoid violence if possible. Since Bosscher was anxious to preserve Tidore's authority he let their nobles lead the Onin *hongi*. But when the fleet arrived the Papuan chiefs would not hand over the chief raider, so the raja of Rumbati was taken back to Ternate as a hostage. On the Tidore sultan's advice Bosscher persuaded the raja to swear that he would deliver the suspect if he could return, which he duly did.¹⁹⁵

East Seram and the Southeastern islands remained brokers in the Papua trade, including slave-trafficking. But as more Bugis and Chinese traders extended their reach east, Seramese rajas with traditional *sosolot* rights on the Papua coast had begun to exploit these indirectly. Instead of organising their own voyages, they could allow other shippers to trade, in exchange for goods.¹⁹⁶ In any case, maintaining exclusive access to shores where others were anxious to buy and sell was increasingly problematic. Bosscher writes of Onin: “It is a pity that the trade is completely under the control of the Makassarese and Buginese, who are busily corrupting the peoples of Upper and Lower Onin by habituating them to

¹⁹³ Kops, “Contribution,” 322.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Bosscher, “Memorie,” 122, 199.

¹⁹⁶ R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 130.

the use of opium and strong drink. They also import gunpowder and fire-arms, which the natives then use to fight each other".¹⁹⁷

By the mid-1860s Seram Laut's Kilwaru was rivalling Aru's Dobo as a central marketplace. Von Rosenberg's description of Kilwaru illustrates why:¹⁹⁸

Kilwaru is the main entrepot¹⁹⁹ for the not unimportant trade between New Guinea and Goram on the one hand and Buton, Makassar and Singapore on the other.... Towards the end of the west monsoon traders from here and all the neighbouring coasts go to New Guinea to barter for wild nutmeg ... massoi ... trepang, pearl shell, dried birds of paradise and live birds. Returning with the east monsoon, they all gather at Kilwaru to await the traders from Buton and Makassar. These appear at the end of the west monsoon, buy mostly for cash, and with the end of the monsoon sail for home. In this period there are usually 120 to 150 trading perahu moored around the settlement.

Von Rosenberg reckoned that the total sales of agar-agar (seaweed) alone were worth an average of fl.1,500; it sold for fl.2 per pikul. He believed the key to Kilwaru's success was the fact that it offered safe mooring through the whole year, either to the east of the island or between Kilwaru and Geser." It is a pity", he added, "that both anchorages are not suited to [European] ships, because of the surrounding shallows."²⁰⁰

By the mid-nineteenth century the seas of Seram and Banda, like that of Arafura to the south, were increasingly crossed by vessels sailing to and from Australia. Aru was a natural port-of-call. British shipping in these waters worried the Maluku Resident, who thought that Dutch claims should be visibly reinforced by stationing a Dutch vessel there. In 1844 the posting of a minor official had been proposed "since [Aru] has a population of about 30,000 and produces valuable commodities".²⁰¹ But four years later it was decided that it would be enough if the Southwestern and Southeastern Islands were "visited as often as possible, but at least once a year", by a Dutch warship.²⁰² Van der Crab commented in 1850: "The general judgement is that trade has declined in recent years. The Alfurens ascribe this to the exhaustion of the places where the pearlshell is found, the traders blame the growing faithlessness and laziness among the Alfur population of the Back-Island [of Aru], while others believe the bad trading habits of the Buginese and Chinese traders are the cause."²⁰³ Several years later Bleeker estimated that Aru's main exports were mother-of-pearl to the considerable value of c.fl.130,000. Other commodities included fl.15,000 in pearls, fl.50,000 in trepang and fl.10,000 in birds.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁷ Bosscher, "Memorie," 199.

¹⁹⁸ C.B.H. van Rosenberg, "Beschrijving van eenige gedeelte van Ceram," *TITLV/TBG* 16, 5th series, part 2 (1866): 29–31.

¹⁹⁹ He uses the term *hoofdstapelplaats*, chief staple port, this conveys the sense of unloading and breaking cargo for sale, but the formal medieval European rules did not apply.

²⁰⁰ Rosenberg, "Beschrijving," 31.

²⁰¹ *Ikhtisar*, 332–3.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Crab, *De Moluksche eilanden*: 84.

²⁰⁴ Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 297–8.

Wallace's account of the island's mid-nineteenth century trade remains unrivalled. In 1857 Dobo, the main port on Wamar, just off the main island of Wokam (Tanah Besar) was visited each season by small perahu and larger ships from Makassar, less than ten days sail away. They arrived around the beginning of the west monsoon, in December, and sailed northwest to Makassar and the Seram islands in June and July. But, noted Wallace, "Some of the small traders remain the year round, picking up produce at a greater profit when there is less competition; and some of the larger merchants leave agents to do the same for them". He wrote:²⁰⁵

The trade of Arru is very considerable, and is all carried on with the port of Macassar and with the islands of Goram and Ceram. In the present year [1857] fourteen large prows, of from fifty to one hundred tons, and one brig arrived at Dobbo from Macassar. The owners are Bugis, Chinese, or Dutch, and the gross value of their cargoes about 20,000 l.[pounds sterling]. Besides these, not much short of two hundred boats and prows of small size arrived from Ké, Goram, and Ceram, the whole value of whose cargoes may be 7000 l. or 8000 l. or more.²⁰⁶ The Macassar traders bring rice, tobacco, gambir [used in betel-nut chewing], muskets, brass cannon, gunpowder, gongs, swords, knives, choppers, axes, English and Chinese crockery, calicoes and cottons, Bugis cloth and arrack. The prows from Goram and Ceram bring principally sago-cakes, which are there manufactured for the supply of all the eastern part of the archipelago. The Ké islanders bring boats and prows for sale, wooden bowls, native earthen vessels, cocoa-nuts, and plantains. The produce obtained consists of pearl-shell, pearls, tripang, tortoiseshell, edible birds'-nests, and birds of paradise. Of these, the tripang, birds'-nests, and I believe most of the pearls and tortoiseshell find their way to China, the mother-of-pearl shell principally to Europe. The largest and most bulky items are pearl-shell and tripang, or "beche-de-mer," with smaller quantities of tortoise-shell, edible birds' nests, pearls, ornamental woods, timber, and Birds of Paradise. These are purchased with a variety of goods. Of arrack, about equal in strength to ordinary West India rum, 3,000 boxes, each containing fifteen half-gallon bottles, are consumed annually. Native cloth from Celebes is much esteemed for its durability, and large quantities are sold, as well as white English calico and American unbleached cottons, common crockery, coarse cutlery, muskets, gunpowder, gongs, small brass cannon, and elephants' tusks. These three last articles constitute the wealth of the Aru people, with which they pay for their wives, or which they hoard up as "real property." Tobacco is in immense demand for chewing, and it must be very strong, or an Arru man will not look at it. Knowing how little these people generally work, the mass of produce obtained annually shows that the islands must be pretty thickly inhabited, especially along the coasts, as nine-tenths of the whole are marine productions.

²⁰⁵ Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*, 368. On modern Aru, Patricia Spyer, *The Memory of Trade: Modernity's Entanglements in an Eastern Indonesian Island* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

²⁰⁶ Elsewhere Wallace explains "The Macassar cargoes are worth about £1,000. each, and the other boats take away perhaps about £3,000, worth, so that the whole exports may be estimated at £18,000. per annum" (The Alfred Russell Wallace Page, online, at <http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/wallace/S041.htm>).

Tensions between Aru's local populations and visiting traders intensified during the 1840s and 1850s. Hokkien-speaking Chinese from Singapore had become seasonal visitors, either buying sea and forest commodities at Dobo, or sending their own agents to outlying coasts.²⁰⁷ Growing commerce increased the value and exploitation of natural resources, the demand for imports, and the webs of debt tying collectors to shippers. On the main island of Wokam people killed seven Bugis creditors before fleeing into the interior. In 1864 the debts were still unpaid, but the Bugis and their agents had disappeared.²⁰⁸ Fighting also occurred in other islands, such as Moa in the 1850s and 1860s.²⁰⁹

There was a fair amount of local trade in the Kei islands, mainly shippers from Banda and Makassar seeking trepang and turtle-shell. Kei-constructed perahu were still much in demand. These could be 70 feet long and up to 15 tons burden and were exchanged for textiles, slaves, guns and light cannon. From about 1856 a Singapore trader sent Buginese-crewed perahu to Kei; their main cargo was guns and ammunition.²¹⁰ Wallace remarked on the "magnificent timber" at Kei when he spent two weeks there in 1856–57. His skipper organised the construction of two small perahu, while every day canoe traders brought "fish, coconuts, parrots and lories, earthen pans, sirih leaf, wooden bowls and trays, &c. &c." The most popular exchange goods were knives, cloth and arak; money was unknown.²¹¹

The Tanimbar archipelago remained little known until the mid-nineteenth century, when Bosscher "discovered" it. The people lived mainly on tubers, wild pigs and fish, exporting sago and rice through visiting Makassarese and Buginese. In 1854 a former Kapitan of Banda's Chinese community obtained a cargo of trepang there, but this was considered unusual.²¹² Before negotiations could begin the traders had to produce arak, and the equivalent values of commodities were fixed; for example, a slave equalled two Tobungku *klewang* swords and three sets of gold earrings; a first quality elephant's tusk was worth three *maas* (a seventeenth-century gold coin from Makassar), a few sets of gold earrings and a quantity of textiles; but there were no really fixed prices. In the later nineteenth century Tanimbar imports and exports were worth about fl.5,000 each.²¹³

The coastal export of birds from Papua was controlled by the Dore people of Cenderawasih Bay. De Bruijn Kops described Dore's commerce, in which incoming cloth, iron- and copper-ware and beads were exchanged for trepang, turtle-shell, massoi bark and mother-of-pearl. "Each one trades for himself", sailing as far as Timor. Most traffic was by

²⁰⁷ M. Osseweijer, "We Wander in Our Ancestors' Yard': Sea Cucumber Gathering in Aru, Eastern Indonesia," in *Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and its Transformations: Critical Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. R. Ellen, P. Parkes and P. Bicker (Amsterdam, 2000), 59.

²⁰⁸ Jong, *Footnote*.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ "De Keij eilanden, ten N.W. van de Arroë-eilanden," *BKI* 10, no. 4 (1863). The surname given for the Singapore trader, Pielaat, was a Makassar mestizo name.

²¹¹ Wallace, *Malay Archipelago*, 321–3.

²¹² Bleeker, *Reis*, 1: 300.

²¹³ Riedel, *Sluik*, 289. The commodities listed by Riedel were: exports, c. 300 pikul tripang, 4 pikul karet; 6 pikul sharksfin, 60 pikul black mother-of-pearl, 50 pikul kamuning wood, worth c. 5000 fl. Imports were thought to be worth less than fl. 6000 in textiles, earthen-copper-iron ware; tusks, arak, knickknacks, also illicit guns and gunpowder.

perahu; foreigners only stayed long enough to scrape together a cargo, except for Captain Deighton's more established agents.²¹⁴ Renesse van Duivenbode also had a representative there in the 1850s, who supplied guns to Papuan bird hunters and traded in shells from the Bay.²¹⁵ German missionaries settled at Dore in 1855, with the Tidore Sultan's permission.²¹⁶ Their outpost provided information for visitors, while their provisioning was another source of income for shipping along west New Guinea's north coast.

Bali and Lombok

Between 1846 and 1849 there were three Dutch military expeditions to Bali. The most successful campaign (from Batavia's point of view) resulted in a major agreement between the Dutch and the Balinese rulers in 1849. This confirmed colonial supremacy in north Bali, and considerably enhanced the power of Badung in the south at the expense of Klungkung.²¹⁷ Buleleng's north coast location and the fact that the harbour was better suited to steamers than that of Kuta ensured that the former became Bali's main trans-regional port and a major outlet for imports from Singapore. Inland Singaraja became the administrative capital. Buleleng's subordinate realm in west Bali (Jembrana) came under Dutch influence in 1855. By 1861 there was an Assistant Resident at Buleleng, and a Controleur at Jembrana. Until 1888 both officials were supervised by the Resident at East Java's Banyuwangi. Opium both legal and illicit, was the most important commodity.²¹⁸

One result of the turmoil was the consolidation of the Karangasem lineage's power over territory in both Bali and Lombok. Since 1838 the ruling family of Lombok's Mataram had been trying to free themselves from Balinese Klungkung, the dominant overlord on Lombok. The main Mataram ruler, Ratu Agung Agung Ketut Karangasem (1838–70, or 1872), from a junior branch of the Karangasem royal family, became an ally of the Dutch, fighting against Klungkung. He also sent troops to overturn the senior line in Karangasem Bali itself. Batavia's victory, the consequent settlement and his own campaigns enabled him to confirm Mataram's position in both islands. The realm became known as Karangasem Lombok or Karangasem Sasak. Subsequent rulers remained generally accommodating to Dutch demands, while retaining authority in both Lombok and Bali.



²¹⁴ Kops, "Contribution," 316.

²¹⁵ Miedema, *De Kebar 1855–1980*, 16; Holger Warnk, "The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011): 123; W.C. Klein, *Handel: Overdruk uit Nieuw Guinea, deel III* ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij 1954), 537, 557.

²¹⁶ The missionaries were later employed by the Dutch Protestant Mission, the Utrechtse Zendingsvereniging, and became an important source of information for the government. "Nieuw-Guinea," in *Berigten van de Utrechtsche Zendingsvereniging* (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1862).

²¹⁷ *Ikhtisar*, 434–98. Alfons Van der Kraan, *Bali at War: A History of the Dutch-Balinese Conflict of 1846–49* (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1995). Henk Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics: 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 166–72.

²¹⁸ Schulte Nordholt, *Spell of Power*, 166–72. On Bali opium smuggling see James Rush, *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860–1910* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 68–72.



Map 20 Bali and Lombok²¹⁹

²¹⁹ Developed from maps in Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Bali: an Open Fortress,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Subarto Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 388. John M. Macdougall, “Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Subarto Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 282.



Image 38 Gusti Ngurah Ketut Jilantik, Raja of Buleleng with his clerk, 1865²²⁰

Trade was concentrated in two ports, Ampenan on the west coast and Labuhan Haji on the east. Chinese and Arab traders leased monopolies over specific commodities, most notably rice and tobacco.²²¹ Ampenan's excellent harbour was connected by a network of roads to the rice-growing interior. Control was strict, and taxation high, particularly on land and the Sasak population; port revenue came primarily from the leased customs farms and anchorage fees. In 1866 the ruler changed the name of his kingdom to Cakranegara, after the capital, and became less inclined to acknowledge Batavia's hegemony.²²² By the 1850s

²²⁰ "Goesti Ngoerah Ketoet Djilantik, radja van Boeeleng en zijn schrijver Wajan Toeboek met een lontar in de hand". Photograph Isidore van Kinsbergen, KITLV 408106. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:845661>. Creative Commons CC BY License. The clerk is holding a *lontar* (palm-leaf manuscript).

²²¹ Alfons Van der Kraan, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980), 4–12.

²²² *ENI*: "Lombok," 433; Kraan, *Lombok*. Henk Schulte Nordholt, "The Mads Lange Connection: a Danish Trader in Bali in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," *Indonesia* 32 (1981); Alfons van der Kraan, "The Nature of Balinese Rule in Lombok," in *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, ed. A. Reid and L. Castles (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1975). Goor, "Said Abdullah," 64–5, 80–7; Alfons van der Kraan, "Bali: 1848," *Indonesia Circle* 62 (1994); Kraan, *Bali at War*.

Ampenan was exporting considerable quantities of rice to Ambon, Makassar, Hong Kong, Surabaya and Singapore. In 1846 there were thought to be about 5,000 Bugis in Lombok, 10 to 12 Chinese and 4 Europeans. Three of the Europeans stayed in Ampenan, where there was also a concentration of Bugis, though many of the latter also lived along the north coast and, to a lesser extent, other shores.²²³ Of the 13 European ships which arrived in 1855–56 more than half (8) sailed under the British flag, although Surabaya (4), Makassar (3) and Singapore (2) were the main ports of origin.²²⁴

In 1856 Wallace called at Buleleng, providing a glimpse of Chinese–Balinese relations:²²⁵

We cast anchor in the dangerous roadstead of Bileling [Buleleng] on the north side of the island of Bali. Going on shore with the captain and the Chinese supercargo, I was at once introduced to a novel and interesting scene. We went first to the house of the Chinese Bandar, or chief merchant, where we found a number of natives, well dressed, and all conspicuously armed with krisses, displaying their large handles of ivory or gold, or beautifully grained and polished wood. The Chinamen had given up their national costume and adopted the Malay dress, and could then hardly be distinguished from the natives of the island.

Sumbawa, Timor, the Flores and Savu Seas

Bima remained the main centre of Dutch influence to the east. In 1847, Heinrich Zollinger visited Bima and Sumbawa. He described how the inhabitants of the Bima sultanate were divided into hereditary groups, *dari*, defined on the basis of the services they were obliged to perform for the sultan or other political leaders and their corresponding right to designated rice fields. Special sections of town were reserved for some groups. The Bugis and Malays slotted into this system, under their *matoa* and *penghulu* respectively. Like the small Chinese community and the Arabs (37 in 1869) they had their own quarters.²²⁶ Most trade was with South Sulawesi and Java.²²⁷ With the fall in sandalwood prices Batavia had less interest in the island; internal conflicts between 1855 and 1857 affected trade. New treaties were signed with Bima in 1857 and Sumbawa in 1858. True to tradition, the Sumbawa treaty specified that the sultan had to deliver fifty koyangs of sandalwood for fifty guilders per koyang.²²⁸

By 1848 Batavia distinguished three variants of colonial influence around Timor: firstly, the directly ruled enclaves of Kupang and Atapupu; secondly, areas theoretically under Dutch rule; and thirdly those which “only to a certain extent, depending on their

²²³ H. Zollinger, “Het Eiland Lombok,” *TNI* 9, no. 2 (1847): 320–1.

²²⁴ I Gde Parimartha, “Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815–1915” (PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit, 1995), 188.

²²⁵ Alfred Russel Wallace, *On the Organic Law of Change: A Facsimile Edition and Annotated Transcription of Alfred Russel Wallace’s Species Notebook of 1855–1859* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2013).

²²⁶ Henri Chambert-Loir, “State, City, Commerce: The Case of Bima,” *Indonesia* 57 (1994): 80–2.

²²⁷ Parimartha, “Perdagangan,” 139–42.

²²⁸ A *koyang* was equivalent to 32 pikul, or almost 2,000 kg. *ENI*: “Soembawa”; Hans Hägerdal, *Held’s History of Sumbawa: an Annotated Translation* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017).

distance from Kupang, recognised Dutch authority to a greater or lesser degree". The second category included the territory around Kupang Bay and the islands off Timor, including Roti, Savu, Sumba, Ende on Flores and parts of Solor. Batavia's influence varied considerably and was virtually absent on Sumba. The last grouping covered most of Timor, where there were more than 60 self-governing domains, in which, according to Dutch officials, "the rulers and chiefs exercise an absolute and arbitrary authority over their subjects".²²⁹

Kupang traders, mainly Chinese, sailed to Batavia either via South Sulawesi (Makassar, Buton), or via Bali, or directly from Kupang. They also developed outposts on Timor's south (Kolbano) and north coasts (Sutrana). Chinese and Buginese from Sumbawa and Lombok maintained networks of agents in the interior who negotiated with the rajas, collecting cargoes to be sent or brought to the coast to await shipping.²³⁰ From the 1830s Chinese travelled in the interior themselves, using pack-horses on the mountain trails. In 1855 there were 615 Chinese men in Kupang town, and 105 in the neighbouring kingdoms; by 1871 it was estimated that there were not many more than 800 Chinese and 15 Arabs in the whole of Dutch Timor.²³¹

Coffee replaced sandalwood as Portuguese Timor's main export after 1860. Shepherd and McWilliam emphasise that "during the second half of the nineteenth century, coffee cultivation proceeded as a negotiation between the Portuguese and the *liurai* [rulers, chiefs]", as the Europeans had almost no direct access to land or labour. Governor Afonso de Castro (1859–63) of Portuguese Timor was inspired by the Dutch East Indies forced cultivation system and introduced a version in Timor, making land grants to officials and even to some criminal deportees from the homeland. The rulers of some thirty of the fifty realms had a working relationship with the Portuguese; they responded to the officials requests by calling on lesser chiefs to use statutory labour and slaves to produce coffee. Production remained restricted to smallholders in the hills around Dili until the end of the 1800s when the Portuguese introduced plantations.²³²

Paragraph seven in the 1859 treaty between the Netherlands and Portugal recognised Dutch sovereignty over the realms of Larantuka, Sikka, and Paga on Flores, and Wureh on Adonara and Pamang Kayu' on Solor. The boundaries between these polities was unclear, and authority contested.²³³ The treaty guaranteed freedom of religion; the Portuguese heritage in Flores and Timor was to be respected. Old Catholic communities existed at Solor, Larantuka and Maumere. But the Dutch Jesuits who then came to Larantuka were less flexible than their Dominican predecessors, and hostile to the syncretic religion of the

²²⁹ *Ikhtisar*, 400–3.

²³⁰ Parimarta, "Perdagangan," 102–8, 149–56.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 149–50.

²³² Shepherd and McWilliam, "Cultivating Plantations and Subjects in East Timor." For context, see Clarence-Smith and Topik, *Global Coffee Economy*.

²³³ Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1900: A Documented History* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), 127.

nominally Catholic rulers of Larantuka and Sikka. The former was the more important, exercising authority over parts of Adonara, Solor, Lomblen and, after 1865, Sikka.²³⁴

Batavia's control over the diverse coastal settlements of the east Flores and Savu Seas was minimal. Occasional antipiracy and anti-slaving measures had been the only evidence of Dutch claims to Flores before a posthouder was appointed at Solor in 1848; he had no authority to intervene in local issues. Subsequent officials found their half-and-half position intensely frustrating.²³⁵ Concentrations of Bugis-Makassarese and Sama Bajau engaged in coconut cultivation, fishing and trade were clustered around the straits and on the north Flores shores, at Geliting, Bolang-Bolang and Larantuka. In 1861 Geliting was "a kampong of around three hundred souls, almost all Makassarese. A very few Christians came to trade".²³⁶ Visiting raiders frequented the north coast; and Batavia had no hesitation in labelling sea-faring settlements "pirates' nests". This they may have been, at least on occasion, but they also distributed imported goods from Singapore such as textiles and ironware, in exchange for birds' nests, tortoiseshell, trepang, sharks' fins, whale oil and *kayu manis* (local cinnamon). There were regular connections with Sulawesi. No taxes were levied at Solor, and it was used as an exchange site by traders and fishermen from Sulawesi.²³⁷

The Dutch had always regarded the use of compliant indigenous leaders as the most cost-effective means of obtaining commodities and controlling local populations. However, they were often asking more of customary authorities than they could rightfully claim or effectively deliver. Mid-nineteenth century Flores provides one example. There the rajas were caught between "conflicting responsibilities beyond their control" and were consequently losing authority at the very time that Batavia was demanding more effective management.²³⁸

Without realising it, the colonial regime in Flores came to be seen as supporting Paji, the predominantly Muslim alliance of three realms which had joined with two on Solor to form the Watan Lema, the "Five Coasts". This was one of two very loose clusters that structured the Lamaholot culture of eastern Flores, around Larantuka and Solor. The other main grouping was the inland Demon of the high country, whose "heathen" members' loyalties were focussed on the raja of Larantuka. The raja's Catholicism dated back to the early Portuguese period, but in 1859 the Netherlands assumed control. The new Dutch

²³⁴ Ibid.; Karel Steenbrink, "Jesuits in Indonesia, 1546–2015"; Jesuit Historiography Online (Brill, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2468-7723_jho_COM_192544.

²³⁵ Stefan Dietrich, "Flores in the Nineteenth Century: Aspects of Dutch Colonialism on a Non-profitable Island," *Indonesia Circle* 31 (1983).

²³⁶ Report by the missionary Jan Sanders (Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, 316). Some four decades later the population estimate was 200 (*ENI*).


²³⁷ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 148–9; I Putu Gde Suwita, "Perahu Pinesi di Sunda Kecil: Suatu Studi Tentang Pola-Pola Perniagaan Abad XVIII–XIX," in *Arung Samudra: persembahan memperingati sembilan windu A.B. Lapien*, ed. Edi Sedyawati and Susanto Zuhdi (Depok: PPKB LPUI, 2001). On the unique local whaling industry, see R.H. Barnes, *Sea Hunters and Fishers of Indonesia: Fishers and Weavers of Lamalera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

²³⁸ R.H. Barnes, "The Power of Strangers in Flores and Timor," *Anthropos* 103, no. 2 (2008); R.H. Barnes, "A Temple, a Mission, and a War. Jesuit Missionaries and Local Culture in East Flores in the Nineteenth Century," *BKI* 165, no. 1 (2009).

priests, like their Jesuit equivalents to the east, were less tolerant of local syncretism.²³⁹ The raja came under mounting pressure to forbid established practices, such as headhunting as “sin-offerings” to the gods. He was unable to meet the ritual expectations of the mountain people, to their anger. In 1860 about a thousand attacked the Dutch fort at Larantuka. Batavia’s reaction was to tell the raja of Larantuka that if he could not manage the inland people, then they would appoint a separate chief for the highlanders. This would have amounted to an unintentional but de facto approval of headhunting.²⁴⁰

In the mid-1850s it was noted:²⁴¹

[T]he Buginese of Ende trade with the natives of Sumba: rubber, birds’ nests, rope, fishnets, maize, kamuning wood, and slaves. Ten or fifteen paduakangs from Lombok, Bali, the Bay of Bone, Makassar and Bima take part in this trade, especially in order to procure slaves who are sent to Ende, Sapi, Sumbawa, Lombok, Bali, the Bay of Bone and the east coast of Borneo and there find ready buyers. Some thirty or so Bajau Laut or trepang fishermen take part in this trade in slaves, and very few leave the Sumbanese coast without taking some slaves with them.



Map 21 Sumba, early twentieth century²⁴²

²³⁹ Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, 84–125.

²⁴⁰ Barnes, “A Temple, a Mission, and a War.”

²⁴¹ Quoted in James J. Fox, “Notes on the Southern Voyages and Settlements of the Sama-Bajau,” *BKI* 133, no. 4 (1977): 462.

²⁴² Redrawn from maps in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, eds., *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 98–9.

The most notorious raja was Umbu Tunggu who led the allied realms of Lewa and Kambera, dominating central and east Sumba in the mid- to late nineteenth century.²⁴³ His network of marriage alliances connected him to the rulers of several domains, and gradually he extended his authority through conquest. He controlled the port of Waingapu. If traders were unwilling to pay him for permission to export their horses, he simply forbade anyone to supply them with grass, so their waiting cargoes would starve.²⁴⁴

In 1866 the first Dutch *controleur*, Samuel Roos, arrived in Sumba;²⁴⁵ Umbu Tunggu was not pleased. He refused to let Roos build a house, saying he could either remain as a horse trader, or leave. The pro-Dutch Savunese chief on Sumba had supported Dutch intervention, and the raja stated ominously that he would talk to the man when he returned from Savu. The *controleur* felt vulnerable and moved to Waingapu. Raja Umbu Tunggu refused to grant Roos any authority whatsoever. When the latter imposed harbour and anchorage dues, “The Raja forbade all horse exports, and since Waingapu could only be reached through his territory, and well-armed Sumbanese refused passage, so they [the government officials] were forced to retreat”. Batavia then decided to introduce a poll-tax, but little could be done as the raja, a “man of blood and violence, never conceded anything to the government”.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ In his extensive blog listing rajas of Sumba Tenabolo can only say that there was such a raja in Kambera; however he does identify a raja of Lewa: Umbu Tunggu Maramba Nama Paraingu (r.1874–91). Jack Tenabolo, “Kerajaan-Kerajaan di Sumba,” blog, <http://jacktenabolo18.blogspot.it/2014/12/kerajaan-kerajaan-di-sumba-masyarakat.html>.

²⁴⁴ Steve Clark and Paul Smethurst, eds., *Asian Crossings: Travel Writing on China, Japan and Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 178. D.K. Wielenga, *Soemba* (’s-Gravenhage: Zendings-studieraad, 1926), 12–7.

²⁴⁵ On Dutch relations with Sumba in the 1860s see Parimartha, *Perdagangan*, 196–7. J. de Roo van Alderwerelt, “Historische aantekeningen over Soemba, residentie Timor en onderhoorigheden,” *TITLV* 48 (1908).

²⁴⁶ Wielenga, *Soemba*, 7–17. *ENI*: “Soemba”. See also S. Roos, *Kennis van taal, land en volk op Soemba*, vol. 33 (Batavia: Bruining & Wijt, 1872).

This chapter traces the profound changes that occurred in the eastern archipelagos after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869; the journey from Europe became much shorter, lasting forty to forty-five days, less than a quarter of the late eighteenth century travel time. As steam shipping lines knit the islands together, what were once frontier regions became more tightly bound to the global economy and colonial regimes. By the late nineteenth century maritime Southeast Asia was embedded in a trading system dominated by links between Britain, British India, and China. The keys to British domination lay in steam shipping, the role of the Canal and investment in new ports.¹ Regular services linked imperial capitals with their overseas territories, while cable connections improved radically after 1870.² The value of Singapore's trade climbed from S\$39 million in 1869 to S\$71 in 1870, and had reached S\$105 million by 1879, almost trebling over a decade.³ From the 1870s to the mid-1890s international trade experienced in a "great depression", slowing economic expansion in the region.⁴

Any reader of later nineteenth-century Dutch documents soon becomes familiar with variations of the phrase "*trotseren van ons gezag*", defying our authority. It was the standard explanation for interventions that ranged from short, sharp punitive expeditions to all-out war. There has been much discussion of the reasons for the Netherlands somewhat belated but enthusiastic commitment to "pacification". One view emphasises contiguity: where colonial establishments adjoined territory under indigenous regimes, they tended to want to impose order. Allied to this is the question of prestige: the need to demand respect. The conclusion

¹ G.E. Bogaars, "The Effect of the Opening of the Suez Canal on the Trade & Development of Singapore," *Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 42, no. 1 (1969). Michael Pearson, *The Indian Ocean* (London: Routledge, 2003), 192–218.

² *Ibid.*; Stephen Dobbs, *The Singapore River: a Social History, 1819–2002* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003).

³ Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore 1819–69," *JMBRAS* (1960).

⁴ J. Thomas Lindblad, "The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery," in *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. H. Dick, V.J.H. Houben, J.T. Lindblad, and T.K. Wie (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 100–2; Booth, *The Indonesian Economy*, 29–34; Fadera, "Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy"; Benito J. Legarda, *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1999), 122, 234.

has generally been that the causes were various.⁵ Joop de Jonge identifies three factors which drove Dutch expansion: one was military confidence, the second colonial business, and the third was an administration that was committed to establishing peace and order. These diverse interests were united in a stated belief that ethical exploitation would benefit all.⁶

Britain's dominant role was questioned by Germany and the United States. Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor (1871–90) had been persuaded to join the scramble for colonies, looking to Asia and the Pacific as well as Africa. German activities in Sulu and North Borneo were of considerable concern to the British, because of potential threats to traffic passing through Singapore and Labuan and, of course, the China trade.⁷ London and Berlin pressured Madrid to open Sulu to foreign shipping, saying they would ignore the 1836 and 1851 treaties regulating Spain-Sulu relations unless this was done. Spain had to act. In 1876 Sulu finally succumbed to a powerful Spanish expedition of 11 steamers and 9,000 troops; Jolo, Maimbung and other Tausug centres were destroyed.⁸

In 1877 Spain was forced to grant “the complete liberty of direct trade and commerce for ships and subjects of Great Britain, the German Empire and the other powers, with the Sulu Archipelago”. In exchange these European powers accepted Manila's authority “in the places occupied by Spain”.⁹ Germany and Britain signed another protocol with Madrid in 1885, discounting the Sulu Sultan's interests and recognising Spanish rule over the archipelago. London thus abandoned its long-established but waning support for Sulu's independence.¹⁰ In return Spain disowned the Sultan's claims to north Borneo. Germany had also lost interest in Sulu but was still looking south. Bismarck began subsidizing shipping to the Far East and Australia in 1884. When he threatened to annex New Guinea, the English politician Joseph Chamberlain was irritated: “I don't care the least about New Guinea, and I am not afraid of German colonisation, but I don't like to be cheeked by Bismarck [sic] or anyone else”. The German New Guinea Company raised the flag over northeast New Guinea in 1884.¹¹

⁵ Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism: Colonies and Foreign Policy, 1870–1902* (New York: Berg, 1991). See also the special issue: Marieke Bloembergen and Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, “A New Dutch Imperial History: Connecting Dutch and Overseas Pasts,” *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 128, no. 1 (2013).

⁶ Joop de Jong, *De waaier van bet fortuin: De Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel 1595–1950* ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu, 1998), 337–45.

⁷ Hans-Jürgen Ohff, *Disastrous Ventures: German and British Enterprises in East New Guinea up to 1914* (Melbourne: Plenum, 2015). Janne Lahti, “German Colonialism and the Age of Global Empires,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 17, no. 1 (2016).

⁸ Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), Chapter Five. James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 122–3.

⁹ Leigh R. Wright, *The Origins of British Borneo* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), 126–82. Volker Schult, “Sulu and Germany in the late nineteenth century,” *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic* 48, no. 1 (2000).

¹⁰ Nicholas Tarling, *Sulu and Sabah: A study of British policy towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the late eighteenth century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

¹¹ Ian Chambers, *The Chamberlains, the Churchhills and Ireland, 1874–1922* (Youngstown, NY: Cambria, 2006), 49. Schult, “Sulu and Germany.”

The effective exercise of Dutch power in the Indies had been first delayed but then facilitated by the bitter Aceh War (1873–1904), which severely tested the KNIL. But the war also confirmed the trend towards military modernisation,¹² including the introduction of the Dutch Beaumont rifle (1871), the founding of the feared anti-guerrilla Maréchaussée corps (1890),¹³ and the introduction of repeating rifles after 1895.¹⁴ The eventual success of the Lombok war of 1894 revealed a heightened public taste for imperial adventures, and gave both the KNIL and the civilian administration the confidence to press home their advantages. Institutional morale and the public mood had changed.¹⁵ This new ambition was not limited to the Netherlands.

If there could only be one emblematic year marking the beginning of a new era, 1898 would be a good candidate. It was in that year that increasing Dutch impatience with the “independent native states” led to the formulation of the *Korte Verklaring*, or “Short Declaration”. Previous long contracts between rulers and chiefs had specified a range of obligations and rights, whereas the new declaration simply stated that the indigenous signatory’s territory was part of the Netherlands Indies, that he would be loyal, have no contacts with foreign powers, and would uphold all regulations decreed or recommended by the Governor General. This formula was worked out by J.B. van Heutsz, commander of KNIL forces in the Aceh War, and his advisor, C. Snouck Hurgronje, a scholar of Islam. Their sophisticated strategy of divide and rule had proved more effective than the blood-soaked campaigns of other officers.¹⁶

By the end of the 1890s both The Hague and Batavia had a taste for vigorous but righteous expansion; it was then just a matter of waiting for a favourable moment and the right excuse. The 1905 invasion of Bone was inevitable given the Netherlands new ambitions and the immediate need to control indigenous ports prior to ending Makassar’s “free” status.¹⁷ Effective revenue collection would only be possible if the native states were forcibly incorporated into the colonial tariff regime (*tolgebied*). The only eastern archipelago regions included in this were Lombok, from 1895, the Residency of Manado (including

¹² J.A. de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth-Century Indonesia,” in *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa*, ed. Jaap A. de Moor and H.L. Wesseling (Leiden: Brill, 1989); G. Teitler, “De Krijgsmacht in offensief en defensief verband,” in *Imperialisme in de marge: de afronding van Nederlands-Indië*, ed. J. van Goor (Utrecht: HES, 1986); J. van Goor, “De Lombok expeditie en het Nederlandse Nationalisme,” in *Imperialisme in de marge*, ed. J. van Goor.

¹³ The Corps de Maréchaussée was introduced as a paramilitary police force in the Netherlands in 1814; one of its key functions was border security and the suppression of revolts. The Aceh force was quite different, small mobile infantry groups capable of operating independently in difficult terrain.

¹⁴ Jaap de Moor, “Met Klewang en karabijn: militaire geschiedenis van Nederlands-Indië,” in *Met man en macht, de militaire geschiedenis van Nederland 1550–2000*, ed. Jaap R. Bruijn and Cees B. Wels (Amsterdam: Balans, 2003).

¹⁵ This confidence was new, and in part a cover for deeper fears; Harald Fischer-Tiné, ed. *Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

¹⁶ Karel E.M. Bongenaar, *De ontwikkeling van het zelfbesturende landschap in Nederlandsch Indië, 1855–1942* (Zutphen: Walburg, 2005), 300–20. Emmanuel Kreike, “Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 3–4 (2012).

¹⁷ Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1994).

Gorontalo) and Banggai, both from 1898.¹⁸ Four “keys” had to be in Dutch hands before the new regime could be imposed in south Sulawesi: Palu and Parepare on the west coast, and Palopo and Palima in the Bone Gulf. The Dutch were ready to reintroduce port duties in Makassar as early as 1904; they already had the building and personnel.¹⁹ Between 1905 and 1910 campaigns in Sulawesi and Bali imposed military dominance, although regular interventions were still required subsequently.²⁰ According to G.J. Resink it was not until 1915 that the final remnants of “the native states” were tidied away.²¹

It was also in 1898 that the Americans and the Spanish went to war over Cuba; the Spanish fleet in the Philippines was sunk. In the same year the Treaty of Paris concluded the war and granted independence to Cuba. However, the Philippine islands, Guam and Puerto Rico were transferred to the United States. This enraged the side-lined Filipino nationalists, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, who had been fighting the Spanish since early 1897.²² The Americans signed the Bates agreement with the sultan of Sulu in 1899, professing mutual respect. This was intended to keep the south as quiet as possible as US troops fought Filipino forces in Luzon. But enforcing a peace was beyond the power of any sultan, even if he had tried. Tit-for-tat violence led to larger armed confrontations and punitive expeditions, culminating in the battle (or massacre) of Bud Dajo (Jolo) in 1906. Only six survived of the 800 or more people, including women and children, who had taken shelter in a crater. This led to controversy in the US, further complicating tensions between their professed aims and imperial realities.²³ In 1904 Washington abrogated the Bates agreement; fighting decreased and civil rule was introduced in 1913.²⁴

During the later 1800s a freely competitive Philippines export economy briefly flowered and the Dutch and East Indian economies became increasingly internationalised.²⁵ By the 1880s British-flagged shipping dominated international sea traffic in the archipelagos.²⁶ Hong Kong investors were the chief financiers of Manila’s mainly British firms, while

¹⁸ G. Resink, “Inlandsche staten in den Oosterschen Archipel (1873–1915),” *BKI* 116, no. 3 (1960): 334. Gerrit J. Knaap, *Transport 1819–1940*, vol. 9 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940*, ed. P. Boomgaard (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1989), 20.

¹⁹ Nationaal Archief, The Hague, mailreport 348 in Verbaal 28 Apr. 1906 no. 28.

²⁰ Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion.” For a concise English summary of Dutch ideas, see R. Nieuwenhuis, *Mirror of the Indies: a History of Dutch Colonial Literature*, trans. E.M. Beekman (Singapore: Periplus, 1999). See also J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944).

²¹ Resink, “Inlandsche staten in den Oosterschen Archipel.”

²² Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

²³ Michael C. Hawkins, “Managing a Massacre Savagery, Civility, and Gender in Moro Province in the Wake of Bud Dajo,” *Philippine Studies* 59, 1 (2011).

²⁴ See, from bibliography: Foreman, *Philippines Islands*; Gowing, *Mandate*; Amoroso, “Inheriting the ‘Moro Problem’”; Hawkins, “Imperial Historicism.”

²⁵ Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, *The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Fadera, “Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy.”

²⁶ Knaap, *Transport*, Table 5, 66–7. Parimatha, “Perdagangan,” 188. In 1878, 17.3 per cent of international vessels flew British flags, while in 1888 that share was 67.23 per cent.

Philippine Chinese wholesalers and retailers generally relied on these British merchants for capital and commodities.²⁷ This led one Spaniard to say that “from the commercial point of view the Philippines is an Anglo-Chinese colony with a Spanish flag”.²⁸ In 1882 the corrupt and oppressive tobacco monopoly, which had done so much to sustain Madrid’s colonial finances, was finally abolished. New customs duties and direct taxes on commerce and industry were imposed. Competition increased, notably between Spanish, established and immigrant Chinese. However, powerful new business interests emerged. In 1891 the Spanish premier Cánovas del Castillo introduced a path-breaking protectionist Tariff Act. Exports from Spain to the Philippines grew, particularly in textiles.²⁹ As Sulu came under pressure, free-wheeling entrepreneurs sought raja status and profit in North Borneo.³⁰

In the Dutch East Indies economic diversification and growth was led by private enterprise on Java and Sumatra’s East Coast. The expanding business climate was accompanied by an easing of the chronically inadequate access to capital and credit; transregional migration provided labour. Since their development in the 1860s Sumatra’s East Coast tobacco plantations had become famous as “the miracle of Deli”, making fortunes for investors.³¹ Ambitious Westerners began to dream of a new Deli.

The Indies Agrarian Law of 1870 opened the door to private enterprise.³² The subsequent declaration that all unused land not in private hands was government domain allowed private individuals to enter into heritable leases (*erfpacht*). However, underlying assumptions about communal village ownership and “waste” or unused land bore little resemblance to reality outside Java, as shifting agriculture, individual and group migrations were common. Nonetheless, the regulation was extended to economically promising regions under relatively firm Dutch control: Ambon in 1872, Manado in 1877, Banjarmasin in 1875, Banda in 1879, and South and East Borneo in 1888. It was only after 1892 that bilateral agreements to regulate mining were made with 25 states, the great majority of which (21) lay in Borneo, Ternate, Sulawesi and Manado. These included places with very little contact with Europeans.³³ Commercial activities, as usual, advanced more rapidly than colonial bureaucracies or legal frameworks.

²⁷ Yoshiko Nagano, *State and Finance in the Philippines, 1898–1941: The Mismanagement of an American Colony* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2015), 61.

²⁸ Edgar Wickberg, “Early Chinese Economic Influence in the Philippines: 1850–1898,” *Pacific Affairs* 35, no. 3 (1962): 280.

²⁹ Nick Sharman, “The Long Road to Spain’s Economic Modernisation 1840–1940: Political and Economic Ideologies,” *Bajo Palabra* 17, no. 10 (2017). Fadera, “Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy,” 312–6. W. Salazar, “British and German Passivity in the Face of the Spanish Neo-Mercantilist Resurgence in the Philippines, c. 1883–1898,” *Itinerario* 21, no. 2 (1997).

³⁰ K.G. Tregonning, *A History Of Modern Sabah (North Borneo 1881–1963)* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965).

³¹ Lindblad, “Outer Islands,” 99, 103.

³² Promulgated in *Staatsblad* 1870, 118b.

³³ South and East Borneo: Pegatan, Kusan, Gunung Tabur, Bulungan; Maluku: Ternate, Tidore; Sulawesi: Majene, Pambuwang, Cenrana, Tappalang, Bone, Muton, Mamuju; Manado: Bintauna, Buol, Bolang Uki, Bolang-Itang, Tojo, Parigi, Kaidipang, Bolaang-Mongondow. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906), “Mijnbouw, Mijnwezen,” 648.

According to one trader, modern capitalism arrived in the Indies in the late 1880s. Bastiaan (Bas) Veth (1860–1922) was a young man from solid Amsterdam commercial circles. His father was a sailmaker and owner of long-distance trading vessels whose two sons had entered the Indies trade. Bas Veth became disillusioned by the changing business climate, particularly after the collapse of sugar and coffee prices triggered a wider crisis in colonial economies during the 1880s and 1890s.³⁴ Veth wrote:³⁵

People in the Indies can no longer become wealthy, extremely wealthy, as they could before 1884. European capitalism exploits the Indies inhabitants.... Indie has become the land of absenteeism. There is no capital [there] anymore. The capitalists are in Europe.... The capitalists would never live in the Indies, because life there is so miserable, just as the English lords choose not to live in Ireland, or Friesian nobles in Friesland, where their fields and pastures lie.

The profits and dividends of the Indies' banks, the Indies' trading companies, the Indies' plantations are paid out in Holland, where the tables of the directors and bosses stand in houses in the richest districts of Amsterdam and The Hague.... The capitalists now appoint agents, administrators, and license-holders, and it is exceptionally fine if the sweating employees in Indie receive a bonus.... Before, a poor boy (and only that has remained the same) could set off and succeed in Indie, becoming the head of a trading house, owner of a coffee or sugar plantation, and stay there for years, and live the high life, Oh, so high!... Almost all this has gone.

Veth also described “fiddling and fixing” (*geknoei*) in the import-export trade; this was so entrenched, he said, that “humiliated” importers had to contend with Chinese in shiftiness and dishonest commercial arrangements. He added: “It is a steeple-chase of double-dealing, and you begin to wonder, as you become better informed about the plotting and cheating of the European creditors and their lawyers, if the Chinese, who just cunningly goes bankrupt, actually takes the lead [in these practices]”.³⁶ Here Veth, while confirming the standard prejudice against the Chinese, is at least acknowledging European involvement.³⁷

Shifts in the distribution of the three main immigrant groups both reflected and shaped economic trends.³⁸ After 1880 the numbers of Europeans, Chinese and Arabs increased in Manado residency, which then extended from the Sangihe and Talaud islands in the north

³⁴ Lindblad, “Outer Islands,” 100–2. Booth, *The Indonesian Economy*, 29–34. Fadera, “Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy.” Legarda, *After the Galleons*, 122, 234.

³⁵ Bas Veth, *Het leven in Nederlandsch Indië* (Amsterdam: Kampen en Zoon, 1900), 147–8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 152–3. Veth also complained that traders were being paid less than before; Germans, he wrote, were already paid only fl.150–fl.200 a month, which was not enough to live on, so many fled to China or Singapore, as they doubted their chances in Europe.

³⁷ On Dutch-Chinese business relations in late nineteenth-century Java, Alexander Claver, “Commerce and Capital in Colonial Java: Trade Finance and Commercial Relations between Europeans and Chinese, 1820s–1942” (Vrije Universiteit, 2006), 157–250.

³⁸ Extracted from P. Boomgaard and A.J. Gooszen, *Population Trends 1795–1942*, vol. 11 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991), Table 17, 222–30.

to the Tomini Gulf in the south. Between 1880 and 1890 the Arab community in southeast Borneo more than doubled, while Sulawesi and Manado retained the largest concentrations of Chinese. Ternate, however, also saw a jump in the number of Europeans.³⁹ The numbers for indigenous inhabitants were little more than guesswork.⁴⁰

Arab commerce in the archipelagos increased with the extension of steam shipping and immigration from the Hadhramaut, often through connections with Singapore where there was a thriving Arab community. Their Muslim identity facilitated ties to Bugis networks, most notably in east Kalimantan and Sulawesi, but they were also present in Christian areas like Ambon.⁴¹ Arabs were regarded with suspicion by Dutch officials, who were wary of their religious prestige, and disapproved of their smuggling of slaves, opium and guns. By the 1870s Ternate was the eastern centre for Arab sailing enterprise. Initially they sailed square-riggers, but their expansion in the eastern archipelagos became closely associated with their use of steam shipping. In Ambon, where numbers grew from just over 50 in 1859 to almost 900 in 1907, they were involved in the clove trade, competing successfully with Chinese, but the collapse of clove prices in the 1880s hit them hard. Arab captains (recognised community heads) were appointed by the Dutch in Banda and Ambon (1878), Ternate (1881) and Gorontalo and Manado (1894).⁴² In central Sulawesi most Arabs settled in Donggala; others established a virtual monopoly on horse (and illicit slave) exports from eastern Nusa Tenggara.⁴³ Although they remained active in New Guinea and north Sulawesi, they could not match the Chinese role in the burgeoning copra trade. Arab shipping virtually collapsed at the end of the nineteenth century, but around 1900 Arabs still outnumbered Chinese in Ambon Residency (1,350 to 1,000) and Donggala (127 to 9).⁴⁴

Colonial pride and the relatively new conviction that the eastern islands would reward investment, coupled with steam shipping and capital investments, sharpened contrasts among eastern archipelago societies. By the early 1900s the coal and oil fields of east Borneo were helping fuel global industrial development. In the southeast, experienced gatherers of forest rubber in Banjarmasin's Ulu Sungai made the transition to cultivating para rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*), which became a major export by 1905.⁴⁵ Smallholders in north and south Sulawesi were producing copra, coffee, maize and rice; Bali and Timor were less significant suppliers of overseas markets. Foragers could be agents of large trading

³⁹ Ibid. "Chinese population per residency," Table 6, 122–6.

⁴⁰ "Official figures" given by the Banda Steam Shipping Company in 1880 were very round: Bali: 700,000; Lombok: 405,000; Sumbawa: 95,000; Sumba: 300,000; Flores: 250,000; Roti: 75,000; Timor: 1,840,000. See Stoomvaartrederij Banda, "Schetskaart der maandelijksche mail-lijn tusschen Palmerston en Soerabaia v.v. en der door de Stoomvaartrederij Banda voorgestelde, bij vaarplan omschreven Nieuw-Guinea en Manillalijnen" (Thieme, 1880). See also Appendix.

⁴¹ Clarence-Smith, "Economic Role."

⁴² Ibid., 35.

⁴³ Clarence-Smith, "Horse Trading." Slama, "Translocal Networks and Globalisation," 242.

⁴⁴ Clarence-Smith, "Economic Role," 36–8, 41–2.

⁴⁵ Michael Dove, *The Banana Tree at the Gate: A History of Marginal Peoples and Global Markets in Borneo* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012); J. Thomas Lindblad, *Between Dayak and Dutch: The Economic History of Southeast Kalimantan 1880–1942* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1988).

companies, or wandering bands living much as they had for centuries. Maluku, once so bitterly contested, had little to offer.⁴⁶

Commodities

The Strait Settlements (Singapore, Penang and Melaka) continued to be transit ports; their import and export commodities were much the same and remained so between 1870 and 1915. There was a rough distinction between the east-west flow on the one hand (which could also be seen as Asia-Europe) and, on the other, intra-Asian commerce, moving goods between India, China and Southeast Asia. In the 45 years after 1870 the proportion of Straits Settlement trade which was with the West remained around one-third of the total by value. The main tropical goods being exported from east to west were tin, gutta percha, pepper, rattan, copra, sugar, tapioca, coffee, and later rubber, while cotton piece goods and sarongs were the chief imports. The bulk of intra-Asian cargoes, arriving and departing, was made up of rice, fish and areca nuts. A more exotic collection of 19 other products was less significant. These were collectively known as “Straits Produce”, the gums, resins, rattan and other forest commodities typical of the islands’ traffic; Borneo was the main source. In 1870 opium had accounted for 10 per cent of all trade, exports and imports; by 1900 this had declined to 5 per cent and by 1905 to less than 1 per cent. There was shift in the relative value of the three main parties in intra-Asian traffic. The combined share of South and East Asia declined, dropping from 21.3 per cent to 14 per cent while that of Southeast Asia increased from 43.5 per cent to 52 per cent.⁴⁷

Rattan exports from the Straits peaked, in both quantity and quality, in 1900. Tobacco was important in inter-island exchange, but international exports came mainly from the Spanish tobacco monopoly (until 1883) and the big Sumatran plantations. Fashion, as well as industry, created demand for goods from more remote islands. The late nineteenth-century taste for plumed hats and mother-of-pearl buttons intensified commerce in Aru and Papua. Shells also found a ready market, increasing collection of *lola* (*Trochus niloticus*), and *kima* (giant clams, *Tridacna gigas*) as well as Burgos shells (greensnail). Although the volume taken was less than that of mother-of-pearl or turtle-shell, exploitation exceeded the limits once imposed by custom.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Jeroen Touwen, *Extremes in the Archipelago: Trade and Economic Development in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, 1900–1942* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001), 66–8, 75–86.

⁴⁷ Hai Ding Chiang, *A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 1870–1915* (Singapore: National Museum, 1978), 84–113, 117–8. I Gde Parimartha, “Opium dalam Sejarah Nusa Tenggara Barat,” in *Arung Samudra: Persembahan memperingati sembilan windu A.B. Lapien*, ed. Edi Sedyawati and Susanto Zuhdi (Depok: PPKB LPUI, 2001).

⁴⁸ Charles Zerner, “Men, Molluscs and the Marine Environment in the Maluku Islands: Imagining Customary Law and Institutions in Eastern Indonesia 1870–1992,” in *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia*, ed. Richard H. Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). E. Wood and S.M. Wella, “The Shell Trade: A Case for Sustainable Utilization,” in *The Conservation Biology of Molluscs*, ed. E. Alison Kay (Cheltenham: IUCNN, 1995).



Image 39 Toraja collecting damar resin, near Towuti Lake, Central Sulawesi, 1911⁴⁹

Private entrepreneurs began to reassess territories that had previously been exploited either by Asian traders or local authorities under European pressure. New uses were found for the gums and resins, and the wild latex or rubbers produced by related plant species. In the nineteenth century the archipelago products most in demand were forest products and, towards the end, copra. Damar or fragrant resins had long been a prized commodity, initially used for lighting, as well as for incense and medicines; Western markets used it in varnish and industrial processes. In the 1860s an informal assessment of the potential value of products from sparsely inhabited, heavily forested Buru arrived at the figure of fl. 52,000. Over 40 per cent would come from damar alone, roughly 20 per cent from exploiting other tree products, and about 30 per cent from agricultural production.⁵⁰ Gum

⁴⁹ “Een Toradja harszoeker van het Towuti-meer”. Photograph by Albert Grubauer, MVV/NMVW A83-1-104. By permission of the Museum.

⁵⁰ E.W.A. Ludeking, “Schets van de Residentie Amboina,” *BKI* 3 (1868): 120–1. He gives an extensive survey of forest products on pp.103–14, and mentions that shell collecting was a small but lucrative business; p. 117. For Buru see 120–2. Resins are extruded naturally by trees, while gums are obtained by cutting the bark and collecting the emerging liquid; damar is derived from the *Dipterocarpaceae* family of trees, gum copal from *Bur sera bipinnata*. Both have retained value even in this age of synthetics.

copal from north and east Sulawesi, Seram, Bacan and New Guinea was becoming a highly profitable commodity by the 1870s. Inland peoples responded to expanding demand by pushing deeper into wilderness areas in search of commodities.⁵¹

The water-proofing and elastic qualities of Latin American latex were well-known; this caoutchouc was commonly called natural, wild or “India” rubber. In Malaya and the Indies local equivalents were first recorded in London in 1851 and had become an important export by 1870. It was commonly obtained by felling, rather than bleeding trees. In 1900 it was the third most important export from the Straits Settlements.⁵² Jelutung (*Dyera costulata*) emerged into markets somewhat later; the trees produced copious latex but had a high level of impurities.⁵³ Forests, particularly those of Borneo, also contained commercially attractive timber, but transport problems limited exploitation until the advent of steam. During the 1880s Sandakan, in north Borneo, emerged as a major timber exporter.⁵⁴ No comparable development occurred in Dutch-governed territory, where forest products continued to be the main attraction.

In the 1870s Captain Y. Feenstra, a man from much the same commercial background as Bas Veth, sailed his bark from the Netherlands to the Indies, where he traded in the seas around northeast Sulawesi and Maluku. He was increasingly impressed by their commercial possibilities.⁵⁵ In 1880 he published a brochure extolling the land’s fertility and the abundance of forest, sea and mineral products. After a poetic opening, Feenstra described how the lifting of trade restrictions at Manado and Kema in 1848, and at Ambon, Banda, Ternate and Kayeli in 1854 had led to a blossoming of trade. Initially the main beneficiaries had been the small craft which supplied Singapore’s Chinese, Arab and European coasters. However, wrote Feenstra, “Now that regular and direct exchange between Makassar and Europe is expanding, traders throughout the east are becoming increasingly drawn to this traffic”. Makassar may have been a well-established port, but, Feenstra emphasised, Maluku’s potential remained underdeveloped, even though “the

⁵¹ Krystof Obidzinski, “Logging in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. The Historical Expedience of Illegality” (University of Amsterdam, 2003), 45–6. Esther Velthoen, “Contested Coastlines: Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion in Eastern Sulawesi, 1680–1905” (Murdoch, 2002). Henley notes that Tomori damar collectors entered previously unexploited forests from about 1870; David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 247. In the Sa’dan Toraja highlands, near the uppermost reaches of the Sadding River, with the northern Mandar coast to the west and Luwu to the east, a commercial revolution developed around the trade in coffee and slaves. Terance Bigalke, *Tana Toraja: A Social History of an Indonesian People* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2005). Roxana Waterson, *Paths and Rivers: Sa’dan Toraja Society in Transformation* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009).

⁵² Helen Godfrey, *Submarine Telegraphy and the Hunt for Gutta Percha: Challenge and Opportunity in a Global Trade* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

⁵³ Chiang, *History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade*, 116–9. Bernard Sellato, *Forest, Resources and People in Bulungan: Elements for a History of Settlement, Trade, and Social Dynamics in Borneo, 1880–2001* (Bogor: CIFOR, 2001). Joseph W. Vander Laan, *Production of Gutta-percha, Balata, Chicle and Allied Gums* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927).

⁵⁴ In 1883 there was one logging concern, in 1886, five. Sleepers were needed for the Chinese railways. Obidzinski, “Logging in East Kalimantan,” 45–6.

⁵⁵ A map showing Feenstra’s route to the Indies, with his own notes, is kept in the map collection (no. I-018) of the Fries Scheepvaart Museum.

supply of export goods has increased, and the improved situation of the population has led to a growth in imports". He added that "it is well known that the native does not gather commodities until he receives credit and an order for them ... and it is precisely in these places that agents should be placed, such as tested Chinese traders, who would buy or exchange commodities for European-made consumer goods".⁵⁶

Feenstra's hopes were justified. In 1881 he became the first director of the new Amsterdam based *Maatschappij tot exploitatie der Molukken*, better known as the *Molukse handels-vennootschap* or MHV (Maluku Trading Company). Another founder was Jan Veth, father of Bas. Despite Feenstra's optimism, the trade in rarities, the so-called "naturalia", proved far from reliable. But a successful Feenstra returned to Amsterdam, leaving a European representative in Manado. In 1883 the 20-year-old Dirk Hendrik de Vries arrived as assistant to this agent. De Vries's family had been involved in Amsterdam's tropical products trade since 1775, so a career in the Indies was not unusual.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, Dirk was not prepared for the inevitable vicissitudes. An economic crisis hit four years after his arrival, and he wrote a sombre letter home:⁵⁸

A dark cloud hangs over me: the market for Gum Copal. Recently I have shipped out large lots, and now there is a danger that prices will collapse, the news is very bad. These drugs [forest and sea products]⁵⁹ are actually hopeless, ... a supply is barely organised and the market immediately contracts, and one is stuck with the consequences. It is unfortunate that these are our main commodities. With coffee, nutmeg and mace you don't have to be afraid of over-supply, often it is profitable. But these miserable products are only in demand as long as there are no stocks, and at the least supply prices plunge. That is what it is like with Timber, Copra, Rattan, Shells etc etc. If we can get rid of the Copal without damage, I will feel a lot better.

The MHV rode out market fluctuation. Feenstra died in 1890 and was succeeded by De Vries. The MHV went on to play a key role in copra production, a much less risky proposition.⁶⁰ Vulnerability to world markets was not just a matter of price volatility, but also the increasingly real possibility of contagion for both people and plants.

⁵⁶ Y. Feenstra, *Beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van handel, cultuur en nijverheid onzer Oost-Indische Buiten-bezittingen en in het bijzonder van de Molukken* (Amsterdam: J.G. Stemler Czn., 1880). Feenstra owned at least one ship the *Minahassa*, homeport Amsterdam, 1884–87. In 1885, when the MHV was already well established in copra, the local sub-agent, a "Manilla man who could talk a little broken English", took the visiting British zoologist S.J. Hickson to a plantation on the island of Talisse, one of the Bangka islands between Sangihe and Manado. See Sydney John Hickson, *A Naturalist in North Celebes: A Narrative of Travels in Minahassa, the Sangir and Talaut Islands, with Notices of the Fauna, Flora and Ethnology of the Districts Visited* (London: J. Murray, 1889), 11. *Toelichting tot het Plan van oprichting eener maatschappij: "Molukse Handels Vereeniging"* (Amsterdam: MHV, 1881).

⁵⁷ D.H. de Vries and Ruud Wallis de Vries, *Een Amsterdamse koopman in de Molukken 1883–1901* (Baarn: Ambo, 1996).

⁵⁸ Vries and Vries, *Amsterdamse koopman*, 234.

⁵⁹ De Vries uses the term *drogerijen*, which usually means drugs, medicines, but the context makes it clear he is referring to specific exotics.

⁶⁰ When F.W.T. Hunger published his authoritative hand-book on the coconut palm, he expressed his particular gratitude to the MHV and de Vries, describing him as "the nestor of European commercial coconut cultivation in the East Indian colonies"; F.W.T. Hunger, *Cocos Nucifera: Handboek voor het kennis*

Coffee had been the first cultivated commodity in the region to be geared to world markets; copra, the dried flesh of the coconut, was the second. Coconuts had always been a source of oil and fibre for domestic use; Sangihe and Talaud, like Sulawesi's Kaili coast, were coconut oil exporters through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the mid-nineteenth century European soap-makers were buying up copra; it was also used in manufacturing explosives. Consumption in the Atlantic zone grew rapidly. However, it was the invention of margarine in 1869 and the subsequent replacement of beef fat by vegetable oils that led, from the early 1880s, to the copra boom. This coincided with the collapse of coffee growing as the rust blight spread, killing forced coffee cultivation in the Minahasa. Individual planters shifted from arabica to robusta coffee, except in a few more isolated areas, such as Central Sulawesi's Toraja territories. Coffee exports from the Indies crashed.⁶¹

Copra production was ideal for smallholders. It required little capital, was easy to grow and process and thrived on land unsuitable for other crops. Coconut growing predominated along the coasts and lowlands, where trees could be integrated with dry rice and garden cultivation. In the Indies, western archipelago farmers responded more quickly to the demand for copra than those in the east, but Makassar became the base for several companies operating in neighbouring regions, particularly North Sulawesi.⁶² The German Bauermann & Co (est.1869) pioneered the production of copra for export in Gorontalo from 1873; with Chinese help it was able to ship its first copra to Hamburg in 1877.⁶³ The Makassar-based firm exported coffee, batiks, latex, gum copal, resins and other products which were either bought up at local auctions or acquired through connections with Java, Bali, Lombok, Timor and Maluku. Most money was made in coffee trading, although gutta percha (latex) was also profitable.⁶⁴ Surabaya became the main port for copra from southeast Borneo and Nusa Tenggara, while Makassar handled shipments from Sulawesi and Maluku. Makassar surpassed West Sumatra's Padang as the main export harbour by 1895, shipping 95,959 pikul in 1895 and 142,142 in 1896. Selayar, the Minahasa, the Ambon Residency and the Sangihe islands were the main copra (and coconut oil) producing regions.⁶⁵ Some plantations were later opened; the MHV was a leader in developing these

van den cocos-palm in Nederlandsch-Indie (Scheltema & Holkema, 1920). For an account of opening a plantation in Halmahera in the early twentieth century, see H.R. Roelfsema, *Een Jaar in de Molukken: Persoonlijke ervaringen bij het vestigen eener cultuuronderneming* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1917). By 1919 the MHV also had a cotton processing plant.

⁶¹ David Bulbeck, et al., *Southeast Asian Exports Since the 14th Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee and Sugar* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1998), 155. *ENI*: "Koffie, Koffiecultuur".

⁶² Christiaan Heersink, *Dependence on Green Gold: A Socio-economic History of the Indonesian Coconut Island Selayar* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), 122–4. *ENI*: "Kalapa". For western Borneo exports since 1866, see Mary F. Somers Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the "Chinese Districts" of West Kalimantan, Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell SEAP, 2003), 151–3.

⁶³ N.A. van Horn, "Het Indische handelshuis Bauermann in de negentiende eeuw," in *NEHA-jaarboek voor economische, bedrijfs- en techniekgeschiedenis* (1997).

⁶⁴ Horn, "Bauermann." Chinese were to remain crucial local agents for European copra exporters; for Selayar see Heersink, *Dependence*, Chapter 7.

⁶⁵ Heersink, *Dependence*; *ENI*: "Kalapa."

in Maluku in the early twentieth century.⁶⁶ In 1905 and 1906 copra was second only to pearl shell in Sulu exports.⁶⁷

More traditional commodities also attracted direct foreign investment. In 1885 private companies requested Dutch permission to exploit Gorontalo's gold; a year later British and Australian firms sought pearling rights over the banks off the Aru Islands. But no-one knew for sure if control over these resources lay with the government, local chiefs, or village communities. Batavia, realizing its ignorance, called for an enquiry. This concluded in 1893 that all foreign contacts had to be handled by the government, which would recognise traditional rights, as long as there were no problems.⁶⁸ The occasional assertion of clear and direct Dutch rule eliminated obvious ambiguities, as was the case in Gorontalo in 1889. In later years officials were wearied by enthusiastic entrepreneurs who saw potential riches in places where Dutch authority was precarious.⁶⁹ In 1897 a consortium of well-connected businessmen joined together to investigate the Indies mineral wealth; sending out two qualified geologists.⁷⁰

Piracy and Shipping

Rulers, merchants and shippers in the Sulu Sea and along the northern Makassar Straits all had vested interests in the slave trade; the main sources of supply were Sulu and the Sulawesi east coast, particularly Donggala. The Sultan of Sambaliung in northeast Borneo's Berau region was related to Sulu's Datu Maninji, a recognised raider. During the 1870s Manila's blockades of Sulu and related naval activity encouraged Sulu shipping to keep to the west, hugging the northeast Borneo coast above Cape Mangkalihahat, rather than sailing to the southeast and the following the north Sulawesi littoral before entering the Makassar Straits further south. This shift, together with the disruption of normal trade, increased piracy and raiding in northeast Borneo waters.⁷¹

Persisting maritime insecurity exasperated Batavia, which began the 1870s by demanding action. Navy officials, in a rather optimistic assessment, replied that they had

⁶⁶ *ENI*: "Kalapa"; Heersink, *Dependence*. By the 1920s the main production areas were the coasts between Amurang and Manado, between Donggala and Makassar, Donggala Bay, the Tomini Gulf, the Sangihe and Taulud Islands and the Banggai archipelago. Chinese would conclude long term leases for trees and take the nuts. Copra was exported by European trading firms from Makassar, Manado and Gorontalo.

⁶⁷ Pearl shell formed 64 per cent of exports in 1907 (worth P.89,472), while copra was 12 per cent (P.35,740), in 1906 the figures were 52 per cent (P.49,542) and 21 per cent (P.60,104). Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, 141–2. By 1892 copra had become the fourth export product in the Philippines, after sugar, hemp and tobacco, but production in Sulu and Mindanao was minor, although it grew rapidly after 1911. North Borneo was a major copra exporter.

⁶⁸ Ger Teitler, "Adat Law, the Sea and the Colonial Interests: the Case of the Dutch East-Indies," *Mast* 2 (2003). Steve Mullins, "James Clark and the Celebes Trading Co.: Making an Australian Maritime Venture in the Netherlands East Indies," *The Great Circle* 24, no. 2 (2002).

⁶⁹ Lindblad, "Outer Islands."

⁷⁰ This was the *Combinatie tot Onderzoek van Vergunningen in Nederlands Oost-Indië*; J. Baks, "De Steenkolen-Maatschappij 'Poeloe Laoet' in Zuidoost-Borneo," in *Het belang van de Buitengewesten*, ed. A.H.P. Clemens and J. Th. Lindblad (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1989), 124–5.

⁷¹ J.N.F.M. à Campo, "Patronen, processen en periodisering van zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in Nederlands-Indië," *Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis* 3, no. 2 (2006).

successfully stopped the Sulu fleets, and that slavery had become incidental, carried out by opportunistic fishermen in smaller boats, such as those belonging to Sama Bajau from the islands off the Berau estuary, and from Pulau Gobang, further north in Sulu territory.⁷² The Dutch were able to impose tighter control in the course of the 1870s, as the deaths of all three Berau sultans created an opportunity to revise treaties. Increasing opportunities in legitimate traffic also encouraged some shippers to switch to less predatory voyaging, while rulers became more attuned to the relative advantages of peaceful trade. The sultans finally turned against the raiders, with the result that their own shipping was targeted, increasing local conflicts and driving them closer to the colonial regime.⁷³

During the 1880s piracy remained a threat, though it was not as destructive and systemic as it had been 40 years previously. In March and April Sulu-backed fleets still came down from the Sarangani islands off Mindanao's southern shore in their long, low vessels, each containing 50 to 70 men. After being joined by their Tobelo and Galela allies of convenience (who were also occasional enemies) they would go first to the Sula islands and Buton, then cruise the back of Buru, before proceeding to Amblau (an island near Buru), and then on to Seram. They would then turn south, heading down to Aru and across to the Southwestern islands, before doubling back to Buru. Then, in May or June, they would return with the east monsoon to Sarangani. Their predations affected the Ambon islands, Seram, Buru and Manado. In 1887 the Maluku Governor requested the right to mobilise or build a fleet of about 26 perahu, to be paid for either by Batavia or local communities. He also asked if an iron steamer could be stationed in Maluku between April and November to cruise the waters around Ambon, the Sula islands and Banda.⁷⁴ By the late nineteenth century Semporna, off the Borneo coast in the northwest Sulawesi sea, had become a rendezvous for slave traders.⁷⁵

In 1860 the slave trade in the Indies had been declared illegal, but given Batavia's weakness in the many areas where it thrived, there had been little attempt to enforce this.⁷⁶ The slave trade had always been a profitable enterprise for local shipping. Sulawesi harbours such as Donggala had long been centres of lawlessness, and also of Arab commerce. In 1889 Dutch naval officers reported:⁷⁷

⁷² Bajo Gobang was also a term for Sama Bajau from the Manado region of north Sulawesi: Christian Pelras, "Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l'archipel Nusantaraien," *Archipel* 3 (1972): 164.

⁷³ Campo, "Patronen." James F. Warren, "In the Name of Sovereignty: Spain's Tackling of Moro Piracy in the Sulu Zone, 1768–1898," in *In the Name of the Battle against Piracy: Ideas and Practices in State Monopoly of Violence in Europe and Asia in the Period of Transition*, ed. Atsushi Ota (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

⁷⁴ R.Z. Leirissa, et al., eds., *Maluku Tengah di masa lampau: gambaran sekilas lewat arsip abad sembilan belas* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1982), 112–8.

⁷⁵ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 141–3. Clifford Sather, *The Bajau Laut: Adaptation, History and Fate in a Maritime Fishing Society of South-eastern Sabah* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁷⁶ Heather Sutherland, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in South Sulawesi, 1660s–1800s," in *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 275–9.

⁷⁷ J.N.F.M. à Campo, "A Profound Debt to the Eastern Seas: Documentary History and Literary Representation of Berau's Maritime Trade in Joseph Conrad's Malay Novels," *International Journal of Maritime History* 12, no. 2 (2000). See also Norman Sherry, *Conrad's Eastern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 29–32.

The liveliest trader of slaves must be in Donggala, a Bugis colony at the entrance of Palos [Palu] Bay. Traders ... go with armed prahs to the Mandhar states, in particular Mamadjoe [Mamuju] and Tapalling [Tapalang], purchase slaves there, and bring them back to Donggala where they sell them ... some are transported [to] the north by prah along the coast, while the majority are taken to the North-East Coast of Borneo. This transport is almost exclusively carried out by the *SS Vidar* sailing under the English flag, which runs a regular service between Singapore, the Palos Bay, Berau and Bulungan. The slaves are registered there [in Donggala] as passengers or servants, which of course is only possible if the sjahbandar [harbourmaster] is in league with the traders.... The repeating rifles which are commonly exchanged for the slaves, also appear to be imported in large quantities in Donggala by the *Vidar* and they must now have become common in the Mandhar states and in Palos Bay.

Production in Berau, both in the Sultans' coal mines and in the trade in forest products, depended on slave labour. In 1894, an official informed Batavia:⁷⁸

That slavery continues to exist despite all attempts to stifle it is due to the fact that the whole east coast is thinly populated, while the exploitation of gettah, rattan and birds' nests, the assets of this territory, is dangerous work, for which slaves have been used since time immemorial. The dangerous and above all unhealthy nature of that work is responsible for the high mortality among the slaves and necessitates a steady supply.

Warren has described how a similar need for labour in Sulu, to collect marine commodities, had driven the expansion of the raiding and the slave trade.⁷⁹

Economic and military advances in the archipelagos were steam driven. After the opening of the Suez Canal the sending out of old steamers to Asia for sale became feasible. This made it easier for local Europeans, Chinese and Arabs to buy them, increasing competition.⁸⁰ By the 1880s Singapore's Wee Bin concern had 20 steamers connecting ports in China, the Melaka Straits and the eastern islands; a weekly ship linked Makassar to

⁷⁸ Quoted in Campo, "A Profound Debt."

⁷⁹ James Francis Warren, "The Sulu Zone, the World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination: Problematizing Global-Local Interconnections and Interdependencies," *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu (Southeast Asian Studies)* 35, no. 2 (1997). In a review article I contrasted the marine commodity export trade in South Sulawesi and Bone, emphasising the role of Chinese connections. Heather Sutherland, "Review Article: The Sulu Zone Revisited," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 35, no. 1 (2004). A more detailed comparison of thinly populated east central Sulawesi and Sulu is required.

⁸⁰ J.N.F.M. à Campo, "Perahu Shipping in Indonesia 1870–1914," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993). For an impression of early (steam) travel, see E.H. Boom, *Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* (Zutphen: Plantenga, 1864). The history of the iron cargo coaster *Mary Austin* was probably typical. The engine was built in Glasgow, the hull in Newcastle for a W. Austin, of South Shields on the River Tyne in 1867. It was sold three times in England over the next four years, and then went to Bacheelerie, Marseilles, France where it was renamed *L'Avener*. In 1877 it was bought by the N.V. Reederij Steamship Tromp (M. Ohl & Co., managers), Macassar and renamed the *Tromp*. In 1878 Bauermann & Co. & J.G. Weijergang & Zn of Macassar were the managers. In 1884 it was passed to Hong Kong owners and was renamed *Mary Austin*. It changed hands in Hong Kong, and then, in 1891, it went to the first of three Penang Chinese companies. It sank following a collision at Penang after 1918. Details from the Clyde Maritime Forum, posting Bill Harvey, *From Clyde Yards to the Far East*, 28 February 2012.

China and Malaya. His most profitable routes ran from Singapore directly to Makassar, Bali, Lombok and later Timor, but his ships also went to Banjarmasin and along Kalimantan's east coast. The raja of Lombok was co-owner of some vessels, while Wee Bin's Buleleng agent, "the extremely rich blind Chinese The Tion Tjioe", owned the only lighter capable of moving Bali cattle to the steamers.⁸¹ Singapore remained the dominant channel for eastern archipelago exports. Between 1870 and 1880 Singapore Chinese and Arabs established agencies in the main ports and ran fairly regular services along the coasts and up the main rivers. By 1878, 11 Chinese lines linked Singapore with the eastern Indies.⁸² The established NISM connections to Java were more expensive, so the Singapore Chinese were formidable competitors. Westermann concluded that the Chinese steamers drove the Buginese out of shipping to Singapore, first on Borneo's East Coast and then the Tomini gulf.⁸³

As steam shipping expanded the role of European rigged vessels declined; their numbers and cargo share dropped steadily. The changing ratio of steamers to sail traffic is evident in the figures for vessels visiting Singapore: in 1869, there were 99 steamers and 65 sailing ships; in 1873 the respective numbers were 185 and 63, in 1879 541 and 91.⁸⁴ This downward trend was intensified by a decree banning Western sailing ships from entering small ports, a regulation which drew complaints from the Ternate Resident. By the 1890s steam predominated on the main sea-corridors, but square-riggers and indigenous shipping survived on lesser routes. As late as 1902 the capacity of Indies sailing vessels far exceeded that of steamers.⁸⁵ Steam was particularly important to Sulawesi because of Makassar's role as a hub, but European-rigged sailing vessels, often Arab owned, remained a force in Borneo waters for some time; the number of indigenous craft increased noticeably around Bali and Lombok.⁸⁶ The post-1863 increase in traffic to lesser harbours encouraged smallholder cash crop production.⁸⁷ Many local traders refocused, becoming feeder traffic for the larger ships, bringing commodities to the harbours and distributing imports.⁸⁸ Surabaya, which handled almost twice Makassar's volume of cargo, was visited by perahu from south and east Borneo, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara.⁸⁹

⁸¹ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 362.

⁸² J.C. Westermann, "De Overwinning op den afstand: te water," in *Daar werd wat groots verricht: Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste eeuw.*, ed. W.H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1941), 239.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Liverpool-based Holt's began in 1865; A. Voogd, *De scheepvaart van Nederland op Indie en Rotterdamsche Lloyd* (Bussum: Gustav Schueler, 1824).


⁸⁵ See Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie*, 2: 11–2.

⁸⁶ Jeroen Touwen, *Shipping and Trade in the Java Sea Region, 1870–1940* (Leiden: KITLV, 2001), Tables 5K, 6K.


⁸⁷ Trends can be seen in the burgeoning trade statistics: the *Statistiek van den handel* for 1870–1906; see *Statistiek van den handel en de in- en uitvoerrechten in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Weltevreden: Visser), extracted from Djuliatu Suroyo, *Kawasan Laut Jawa dalam Abad Transisi Tahun 1870–1970 (Bagian 1 Tahun 1870–1900)* (Semarang: Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Diponegoro, 1996), Appendix 6.

⁸⁸ Campo, "Perahu Shipping."


⁸⁹ In 1902 Surabaya handled 804,100 cm of steam and sail cargo (111 vessels), and 443,966 cm of coastal freight (844); Makassar's total of 609 ships carried 627,844 cm; Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie*, 2: 49, 80.



W. Cores de Vries services, c. 1864



Steam Packet Boat Services, c. 1888



KPM services, 1891

Map 22 The development of steam shipping lines, Dutch East Indies⁹⁰

The bustling late nineteenth-century traffic of Laikang was probably typical of Sulawesi ports engaged in regional traffic. This confederate domain had united polities on South Sulawesi’s Turatea Bay since the seventeenth century. When in 1879 a new contract was

⁹⁰ Based on Knaap, *Transport*, 118–9.

signed between the ruler and the Dutch government, 38 subordinate territories were listed.⁹¹ Laikang was home harbour to some 40 to 50 larger perahu, each of which could load about 400 pikul of cargo, and some as much as 600; even the smaller could manage 300. Typical crews numbered 10 to 15 men, so these were comparable to the largest local vessels of the eighteenth century. Many voyages were coastal, to neighbouring Bantaeng and the Dutch controlled districts on the west and east coasts, but perahu also sailed to Bone and Luwu in the Bone Gulf, and as far south as Sumbawa and Lombok. Their main outward-bound cargo was salt, and on the return voyage each ship's cargo included a couple of timber beams, which they gave to the ruler.⁹² These ships faced competition from small steamers. In the 1880s the Makassar trader Bas Veth noted that some local Chinese had combined to buy a steamer with 124-ton capacity, which he deemed better suited for coastal trading than the larger Dutch-built ships.⁹³

Most local shipping in the Indies was left uncounted, but if we look at registered trade in four eastern Nusa Tenggara ports in 1884 we see that of a total of over 26,000 cubic metres of capacity, 41 per cent passed through Waingapu on Sumba, 26 per cent through Kupang, 21 per cent through Bima and 11 per cent through Larantuka. In all cases, square-riggers accounted for over 90 per cent of registered traffic. In Waingapu's case eleven European-rigged vessels provided 93 per cent of cargo volume, and forty perahu 7 per cent. The average carrying capacity of a Waingapu square-rigger was over 900 cubic metres (which would be about right for a large barque), while for perahu it was less than 20. In 1884 Kupang received one steamship, with a capacity of 238 cubic metres, while Buleleng welcomed 12, with a combined cargo space of 18,372 cm.⁹⁴ Outside the growing network of colonial towns, the familiar coastal and interregional traffic continued to carry foodstuffs, timber and local products. Perahu and larger Bugis sailing vessels supplied and distributed the cargoes carried by the steamers. There were opportunities enough for those who could find a place in the chains linking existing patterns of local production to expanding global markets.

From 1865 to 1891, the NISM dominated Indies government civilian steam traffic in the east. The Dutch were always suspicious that this fundamentally British firm would secretly work for Singapore interests, but there was no evidence of this.⁹⁵ The NISM set the conditions for the 1877 subsidy granted to the small *Stoomvaart Maatschappij Banda* (the Banda Steamship Co.) to operate the Maluku and New Guinea route. But the SMB struggled; the final blow came in 1878 when Gorom sailors at Sekar (Papua) told waiting traders that the Company's ship had sunk, and promptly took over all cargoes, leaving the delayed vessel with nothing. By 1878 English steamers linked Singapore, Surabaya, Bali and Makassar.⁹⁶

The British also played a key role in developing inter-island steam-shiping in the Philippines. An iron-hulled steamer was launched in 1868 by MacLeod and Co. a leading

⁹¹ *ENI*: "Laikang."

⁹² J. Tideman, "Het landschap Laikang," 59, no. 1 (1906).

⁹³ B. Veth, *Handelsprodukten van de Macassaarsche markt* (Macassar: Eekhout, 1883), 4.

⁹⁴ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 274–5.

⁹⁵ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 339–40. Westermann, "Te Water," 241–2.

⁹⁶ *ENI*: "Stoomvaart", 110.

trading house in Manila with connections to Cebu, Iloilo and Davao. By 1870 the company had four ships. Twenty years later the MacLeod interests and those of leading Spanish firms were consolidated into the *Compañía Marítima* to unite carriers and government. However, it remained an awkward entity, and did not survive the end of Spanish rule.⁹⁷ Most carriers were American or British, but Spanish-flagged.⁹⁸

Regional shipping companies tied local economies into Singapore-centred networks. Ships belonging to the Sabah Steamship Company and based in Sandakan or Labuan travelled up the Kinabatang River supplying tobacco estates inland and bringing tobacco, rattan and birds' nests down for transshipment to Singapore. The small boats of the allied South Philippines Steamship Company added connections to Jolo, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga; they collected local produce that was transhipped in North Borneo and again in Singapore. The Straits Steamship Co. (1890) linked the Southeast Asian mainland to Sabah and Sarawak; it also had a reciprocal arrangement with the Chinese-run Sarawak Steamship Company.⁹⁹

The consolidation of the Indies colonial state in the outer islands was largely the result of steam shipping, as J.N.F.M. à Campo has shown.¹⁰⁰ The government-backed KPM (*Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij*, Royal Packet Navigation Company, 1888–1966) was founded by the two main Netherlands shipping companies in order “to divert the export/import trade of the Outer Islands away from Singapore and Penang...[and] to ensure that, via transshipment in Indonesian ports, the services of Dutch (rather than British) shipping, warehouses, banking and insurance were utilised”.¹⁰¹ The political aim was also clear: the outer islands, particularly those in the east, were to focus on Java, not Singapore.¹⁰²

In January 1891 three of the new KPM's thirteen lines began serving Makassar.¹⁰³ From 1892 two regular if infrequent services connected Ambon with the most easterly islands, which were still in theory under Tidore. The first, from west to east, ran from Ambon, to Banda, Geser in east Seram, Sekar in the McCluer Gulf, Skroe on the coast of Papua's Kapauer region, Kei's Tual and to Dobo on Aru. This route echoed earlier proposals by the Banda Steam Shipping Company, which will be discussed below. The other line was

⁹⁷ Dick and Rimmer, *Cities, Transport and Communications*, 100–1.

⁹⁸ Howard Dick and Peter Rimmer, *Cities, Transport and Communications. The Integration of Southeast Asia Since 1850* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), 101–2.

⁹⁹ Michael B. Miller, *Europe and the Maritime World: A Twentieth Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 66–7.

¹⁰⁰ His main work is Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*. This has been translated as J.N.F.M. à Campo, *Engines of Empire: Steamshipping and State Formation in Colonial Indonesia* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002). Here the Dutch version is used. For context, see Broeze, “The International Diffusion of Ocean Steam Navigation.”

¹⁰¹ Howard Dick, “State, Nation-State and National Economy,” in *The Emergence of a National Economy: an Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 22.

¹⁰² Singgih Tri Sulistiyono, “The Java Sea Network: Patterns in the Development of Interregional Shipping and Trade in the Process of National Economic Integration in Indonesia, 1870s–1970s” (Leiden, 2003).

¹⁰³ The first called at Makassar on the voyage from Surabaya to Manado; the other two left Makassar itself, one going to Kendari, the other to the Timor Sea; two other routes started from Ambon (one to the Banda Sea, another to New Guinea), and one from Surabaya to South and East Borneo. Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 74.

less direct, going from Ambon to Wahai on north Seram, Ternate, and then to harbours in Halmahera, Raja Ampat, Cenderawasih Bay, and along Papua's north coast to end at Humboldt's (Yos Sudarso) Bay.¹⁰⁴ The ships were usually three-monthly, but this could vary. With the signing of the second KPM-government contract in 1894 connections to the east were intensified.¹⁰⁵ Four lines then connected the eastern archipelago's small ports to Makassar and Surabaya, with frequencies ranging from four to twelve weeks.



Image 40 The KPM ship *Generaal Pel*, with the *Saladin* and *Nördenskjold*, Makassar, 1893¹⁰⁶

KPM networks reinforced Makassar's role as the eastern archipelago's hub and its dominance of copra exports, particularly after direct loading of Europe-bound ships began in 1897. This replaced transshipment at Surabaya, Batavia or Singapore. Shipping costs from Makassar dropped sharply.¹⁰⁷ British shipping lines soon reacted to the challenge posed by the KPM. Alfred Holt's Liverpool-based Blue Funnel line founded two new subsidiaries; one sailed between Amsterdam and Java, while the eastern islands were served by the East India Ocean Steam Ship Company (known to the Dutch as the *Oceaan*). More Europe-based lines began calling at Makassar to collect cargoes; including the *Norddeutschen Lloyd Bremen* (est. 1857) which was awarded the German colonial mail contract for Australia

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 188.

¹⁰⁵ Edward L. Poelingomang, *Perubahan politik dan hubungan kekuasaan: Makassar, 1906–1942* (Tegalrejo, Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004), 297–8; M.G. de Boer and J.C. Westermann, *Een halve eeuw pakketvaart 1891–1941* (Amsterdam: de Bussy, 1941). A. Rasyid Asba, *Kopra Makassar: perebutan pusat dan daerah: kajian sejarah ekonomi politik regional di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007), 86–91.

¹⁰⁶ Photograph J.W. Post, 20 May 1893. MVV/NMVW nr. RV-A76-2. By permission of the Museum. The *Generaal Pel* was in KPM service from 1891 to 1906.

¹⁰⁷ Dick, "State," 18–26.

and the far East in 1885. From 1904 the company's vessels also sailed from Singapore to New Guinea, via Batavia, Makassar and Ambon.¹⁰⁸ It was joined in 1900 by the Hamburg-based DADG (*Deutsch Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellschaft*, German Australian Steamship Company, est. 1888).¹⁰⁹ Price wars followed, cutting profits all round. This issue was largely resolved in 1900 by a conference of shipping agents, the Batavia Freight Conference. This created a cargo pool (or cartel) for shipments to Europe, eliminating profit fluctuations caused by uncontrolled competition.¹¹⁰ Holt's subsidiaries continued to run three or four steamers between Sandakan in north Borneo and Singapore.¹¹¹

With its capital, capacity, special privileges and ramified network, the KPM ruthlessly challenged Singapore-based Chinese and European shipping as well as local perahu working inter-island routes. Wee Bin proved to be a particularly frustrating competitor. European firms in Ternate and Gorontalo preferred his direct link to Singapore over the KPM's meandering route along the Java coast and forced transshipment at Batavia. Wee Bin also had an impressive network of tokos linking Chinese agents with indigenous suppliers, offering credit, accumulating commodities, and distributing imports. In 1894 the KPM inaugurated a regular service on the Singapore-Surabaya-Buleleng-Ampenan-Piju (southeast Lombok)-Sumbawa-Makassar service, cutting into Wee Bin's main routes.¹¹²

Chinese itinerant traders also travelled on KPM steamers along the Sulawesi coasts, to Maluku, New Guinea and the Lesser Sundas, conducting informal "between deck" and quay-side markets at the various harbours. They received credit and goods from Makassar merchants and entrusted them to their coastal connections. These, in return, delivered products such as maize, rattan, coffee, kapok, spices and trochus-shells, which were then passed up the chain to the creditors in the main port. The larger concerns prepared and shipped them themselves, while others delivered them to processors and/or wholesale exporters.¹¹³ On a less organised level, a "mosquito fleet" of small independent vessels, the majority Chinese owned, continued to undermine Dutch attempts to close the archipelagos' commercial borders. However, by the end of the century the KPM had effectively succeeded in its aim of forcing Singapore's Chinese shipping out of the eastern islands.¹¹⁴

The KPM reshaped trading patterns along the Kalimantan coast, not just by providing regular services, but also because its agents provided access to short term commercial credit. If a trader brought goods such as rattan or dried fish on board and could provide a customs

¹⁰⁸ Norddeutscher Lloyd Bremen, *Die Entwicklung des Norddeutschen Lloyd Bremen* (Bremen: Maritime Press, 2013), 30.

¹⁰⁹ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 285–7. ENI: "Stoomvaart".

¹¹⁰ Francis E. Hyde, "British Shipping Companies and East and South-East Asia 1860–1939," in *The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in Economic History and*, ed. C.D. Cowan (London: Routledge Revivals, 2012), 97. Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 252–7.

¹¹¹ Chiang, *History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade*, 102.

¹¹² Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 172–84, particularly 176, 182; W.G. Huff, *Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

¹¹³ Ong Eng Die, *Chineez in Nederlandsch-Indië: sociografie van een Indonesische bevolkingsgroep* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1943), 141–4; G.H.C Hart, "Verslag nopens de reis van den Directeur van Economische Zaken ... naar Celebes en de Molukken, September 1935" (Batavia: Departement van Economische Zaken, 1935).

¹¹⁴ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 379. Reid, "Unthreatening."

document showing the cargoes weight and value, the first mate on the ship would provide him with credit for up to half the value of the goods. The trader used this advance when conducting business at the various ports along the way, or on the ship itself. The KPM agents would notify each other by telegraph of credit and debts. Before the goods could be finally unloaded, the loan had to be repaid with 1 per cent interest for the whole journey. It was estimated that in East Borneo 95 per cent of Chinese trading on the ships used this system, and Arabs much less, while in the south it was the other way around. Freight was charged according to value.¹¹⁵ Kutai was also served by Banjarmasin based steamers; by the early twentieth century its trade was “almost exclusively by steam”.¹¹⁶

Sulu, Mindanao and North Borneo

Manila’s blockades and search and destroy actions in Sulu escalated in the 1870s, while on Mindanao Datu Uto’s rebellion continued. Independent sea traffic, particularly in arms, continued to frustrate Manila. Datu Uto, introduced in the preceding chapter, remained the effective ruler of Buayan even after his uncle succeeded to the throne in 1872. Control of Sarangani Bay enabled him to obtain weapons from the Tausug and Maimbung Chinese, and he used these to acquire leverage over other inland chiefs.¹¹⁷ By the 1870s “two upper river datu, Utu of Buayan and the Sultan of Kabuntalan, were each reported to have several thousand slaves, apart from their followers”.¹¹⁸ In 1874 Datu Uto’s anti-Spanish alliance with Sulu galvanised Manila into military action, but it was officials’ success in persuading the rulers of Maguindanau and Tumbao to turn on him that prepared the ground for Spanish military success. A more assertive Spain took control of Sarangani Bay, depriving inland rulers of access to imports. Some abandoned Datu Uto, who surrendered in 1887, while keeping power in upriver territories. In 1891 a new fort was built between the Pulangi and the Ilanun coast, to prevent arms entering.¹¹⁹

After Uto’s defeat the most influential Mindanao chief was his protégé Datu Piang. A [Muslim] Chinese mestizo, Datu Piang had been Uto’s Minister of Lands, and was married to a datu’s daughter. He managed to obtain control of Uto’s best land, and developed a settlement close to the new Spanish fort of Reina Regente, attracting former Uto followers.¹²⁰ According to Saleeby Datu Piang became “the richest Moro in Mindanao”. An American later commented that Datu Piang “practically controls all the business of

¹¹⁵ R. Broersma, *Handel en bedrijf in Zuid-en Oost-Borneo* (’s-Gravenhage: G. Naeff, 1927), 238. The different use of KLM credit by the two communities must reflect variations in patronage and credit arrangements.

¹¹⁶ A.H.F.J. Nusselsein, “Beschrijving van het landschap Pasir,” *BKI* 58, no. 1 (1905).

¹¹⁷ Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Magindanao, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Utto of Buayan* (Manila: Anvil, 2007); Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 129–30.

¹¹⁸ Jeremy Beckett, “The Defiant and the Compliant: the Datus of Magindanau under Colonial Rule,” in *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 396.

¹¹⁹ Ileto, *Magindanao*.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 63–4; P.N. Abinales, “From Orang Besar to Colonial Big Man: Datu Piang of Cotabato and the American Colonial State,” in *Lives at the Margin: Biography of Filipinos Obscure, Ordinary, and Heroic*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000).

Cotabato, especially exports, through his Chinese agents; has complete control of the Moro productions, and [his] working with the Chinese merchants makes it practically impossible for a white firm to enter into business in the Rio Grande valley".¹²¹ By 1899 Datu Piang was the first of three leading figures described as the "Cotabato triumvirate" who were to form the core of the "collaborationist elite" who smoothed the Americans path in Mindanao.¹²² Datu Piang led the Maguindanau, the two other men represented the 600 Christian Filipinos and the Chinese community. The Americans were to discover that in Mindanao it was not possible to fight a decisive battle; each datu had to be defeated, one by one. By 1901 the 204 Chinese traders in Cotabato were exporting goods to the value of some 150,000 Mexican dollars: rice, wax, coffee, almaciga (resin) and gutta percha.¹²³ In the course of the twentieth century Mindanao was to become a new economic frontier, a source of cheap land and immigrant labour.¹²⁴

Between 1870 and 1875, as hostilities between Manila and Sulu increased, Chinese once again benefited from their willingness to undertake risky voyages between Jolo and Zamboanga. This they did with tacit Spanish approval, as Zamboanga's traders needed commodities. Official Spanish shipping followed a straight line from Manila and northern ports to Sulu and then went via Zamboanga to Cotabato, but a network of illegal lines of trade fanned out from Lalabuan harbour between Cotabato and Malabang. From there many sailed southwest, to Sulu's Jolo and Maimbung, and on to Sandakan, Labuan and Singapore. Others carried goods overland to Sarangani Bay in the southeast, from where they were taken west to Maimbung or south to Manado and Ternate.¹²⁵

By 1871 there were more than a thousand Straits Chinese in Jolo; Mindanao's overall Chinese population only reached a thousand a decade later. Between 1886 and 1887 nearly 300 Chinese arrived in Jolo, most coming from Xiamen via Singapore; the largest group were unskilled labourers (139), but some were traders: 5 foreign, 48 wholesale and 58 retail. Singapore was their main source of capital and credit; exchange between the two was worth c. 500,000 dollars p.a.; Labuan remained an important link.¹²⁶ The Spanish were aware of another, less obvious migration. Exploratory expeditions were sent to the Sarangani Islands and Davao Bay, where there was an increasing Muslim influx from western Mindanao,

¹²¹ The American, writing in 1902, is quoted by Jeremy Beckett, "The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato under Colonial Rule," *Asian Studies* 5 (1977): 57. In 1926 another American observer noted that during the "three or four decades" of Datu Piang's power he dominated the valley, surrounded by his slaves, owning 42,000 coconut trees, thousands of buffalo, "thousands of hectares of rice, land, horses, cattle, buildings, boat—to say nothing of the tithes paid him by his loyal subjects. He is also reputed to have a huge hoard of gold coins". *Ibid.*, 57–8.

¹²² The others were Datu Sinsuat Balabaran, younger brother of an anti-Uto leader, and Datu Ignacio Ortoste, a Maranao from the Lanao plateau who had been captured as a child by the Spanish, and raised in the Jesuit mission; Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), 91–3. Beckett, "The Datus," 58–9.

¹²³ Beckett, "Defiant," 402. Beckett, "The Datus," 58–9.

¹²⁴ Frederick L. Wernstedt and Paul D. Simkins, "Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1965). Paul D. Hutchcroft, ed. *Mindanao: The Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2016).

¹²⁵ Ilete, *Magindanao, 1860–1888*, map 4.

¹²⁶ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 128–34.

Sulu and the Sangihe islands. By 1870 there were thought to be about 4,000 Muslims settled along Mindanao's southern coast.¹²⁷

After the Sulu sultanate's bloody defeat in 1876 the Spanish occupied Jolo building a fortified Spanish garrison settlement. This was attacked from time to time but proved too strong. The supply of arms from Jolo to the Mindanao interior was banned, limiting Chinese traffic. The Sulu sultan withdrew to Maimbung, on the south-central coast of Jolo Island. After 1876 there was a heightened commitment to Islam, which spread from Sulu to the Mindanao interior, with increased travel to the Middle East.¹²⁸ Traditionally oriented to the south across the Sulawesi Sea, Maimbung handled much of the Labuan-Singapore traffic and continued to provide arms to the Ilanun of the Lanau coast north of Cotabato. Jolo, in contrast, tended to look towards Singapore, Zamboanga and Manila. The sultan refused to formally submit until 1878, when he signed a treaty of "peace and capitulation".¹²⁹

Warren explains that in the 1880s the two main Chinese-run trade networks continued to be the one centred on Spanish occupied Jolo and focussed on exchange with Zamboanga and Manila and the one linking Maimbung to Labuan, Elopura (Sandakan) and Singapore.¹³⁰ Europeans were also aware of the potential of such commerce. In 1872 a 22-year-old Scottish ship's engineer called William C. Cowie had been hired by Carl Schomberg & Co. to carry guns and other goods to the Sulu Sultan, running the Spanish blockade. The ruler, on request, gave Cowie permission to build a staging post on Timbang Island in Sandakan Bay. This was Schucks's Sandakan base, known as Kampung Jerman. Cowie also obtained a monopoly of rattan exports which, as a European, he was able to ship out despite the blockade. Schomberg, Cowie and J.D. Ross founded the Labuan Trading Company. They became the sultan's commercial agents, working with the chief of Samal Tawi-Tawi to export marine commodities. Schomberg & Co also exchanged opium, tobacco and foodstuffs for slaves.¹³¹

After some consideration the Spanish decided in 1887 to allow Jolo to remain a free port; the strength of the Anglo-Chinese commercial networks prevented any change:¹³²

Should there be established the embarrassing obstacles and difficulties to commerce entailed by the formalities of customs regulations, the English steamers which now carry on the trade with Singapore,¹³³ would immediately cease to visit this port and would make their destination some other port of the island, where ... no one could lawfully obstruct them

¹²⁷ Shinzō Hayase, *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), 142–7.

¹²⁸ Iletto, *Magindanao*, 33, 42.

¹²⁹ Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 122–3.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 128–31.

¹³¹ Schult, "Sultans and Adventurers"; Schult, *Wunsch und Wirklichkeit*; Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 112–6. Warren, "In the Name of Sovereignty."

¹³² Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, 220–4, 360–4.

¹³³ For information on later steam networks linking Sabah and Sulu with Singapore see Miller, *Europe and the Maritime World*: 66–7.

... so long as steamers come exclusively to this port or to that of Siasi,¹³⁴ as is the case at present, the trade can be watched easily and conveniently.... All the urban property of Jolo is in the hands of the Chinese, with so few exceptions that there are not more than three property holders who do not belong to that race. In their hands is all the commerce, with the sole exception of two Spanish houses: everything relating to business is in their power ... one must not lose sight of what might happen or rather what would immediately happen, when, by taxing the commerce of the city, the majority of the Chinamen now established here would go to Maybung, with a tendency to store their merchandise at other important points in the island, in which places our rule is, it may be said, nominal.... I consider necessary and of the highest political expediency the maintenance of the freedom of the port granted to Jolo; [and] that this franchise should be extended to Siasi.

By the end of the century Sulu was importing rice, yarn, opium, dyestuffs, food and metals; pearl shell was the main export. Saleeby comments “the principal industry of the country ... fishing is done exclusively by the natives, but the trade seems to be wholly in the hands of Chinese”. The main trading houses were all “controlled and managed by Chinese merchants”, At “the Chinese pier” they handled dried fish and hemp, as well as gum copal and gutta percha from Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.¹³⁵ Copra became a staple export. Although Jolo’s share of cargoes for distant markets diminished, Saleeby was sure it would remain a regional entrepot, because of its traditional ties with Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, China, and Luzon. These were augmented by reliable steam connections to Sandakan, Singapore, Manila, and Zamboanga. The last mentioned was also a stop on routes linking Manila, Hongkong, Singapore, and Australia.¹³⁶ Meanwhile, the Sulu Sultan in Maimbung continued to mediate between his people and the Spanish; when in 1894 the latter decided to introduce a poll tax of one real per person, the Sultan preferred to pay the 10,000 real himself.¹³⁷

This persistence in maintaining old relationships continued, even after the American occupation. Suva concludes:¹³⁸

[T]he Americans built the physical and institutional trappings of their modern state around the Tausug, reifying the cleavage between colonial and local. What resulted was ambivalence toward the modern state for its disconnection with the locality, and the persistence of an unofficial, locally driven para-state with its pre-colonial rituals fully functioning in the shadow of the colonial state.

¹³⁴ A Sulu island south of Jolo, north of Tawi-Tawi.

¹³⁵ Saleeby, *History of Sulu*: 142.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 138. For an extensive account of Sulu’s trade in the early twentieth century, see pp.139–44.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 244–5.

¹³⁸ Cesar Suva, “Nativizing the Imperial: The Local Order and Articulations of Colonial Rule in Sulu, Philippines 1881–1920” (Australian National University, 2015), 3. John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands* (London T. Fisher Unwin, 1906).




Image 41 Datu Piang, “king of Mindanao”, and American officers, 1910¹³⁹

The vagueness surrounding the relative spheres of influence of Brunei and Sulu offered opportunities to entrepreneurs. European involvement in North Borneo continued to develop in a *Boy's Own Adventure Stories* atmosphere. In January 1876 Torrey sold the American Trading Company lease to another adventurer, Gustav Overbeck. He was a former employee of the English trading house of Dent & Co. who had become the Austrian Consul in Hong Kong; he was then made a Baron in 1873 in recognition of his service. In 1877 the Brunei Sultan formally announced that Baron von Overbeck had been appointed “Datu Bandahara and Raja of Sandakan, with absolute power over life and death of the inhabitants of the country, with all the absolute rights of property over the soil of the country vested in us and the right to dispose of the same as well as the rights over the productions of the country, whether mineral, vegetable, or animal”. The new grant included part of Sulu’s north-Borneo territory, but the Brunei Sultan sold the rights regardless.¹⁴⁰

Cowie, the former blockade-runner, smoothed von Overbeck’s way to a deal with the Sulu Sultan, who still hoped that other European powers could protect him against Spain. Overbeck visited Sulu and his title was confirmed in January 1878: Dato Bendahara and

¹³⁹ From the United States, National Archives at College Park, War Department (1789–09/18/1947) Conflict 321. Sourced through Wikimedia Commons Images.

¹⁴⁰ Frank Tatu, “The United States Consul, the Yankee Raja, Ellena and the Constitution: A Historical Vignette,” *Archipel* 40 (1990).

Raja of Sandakan. He was also granted 30,000 square miles of Sulu territories in north Borneo for an annual rent of £1,000. Von Overbeck, having gained the necessary royal endorsements, transferred the lease to his former employers at Dent & Co. A Resident of the East Coast, W.B. Pryer, was appointed and based on Cowie's Timbang Island site. With his Sulu allies, Cowie saw off a Spanish force and after the German settlement was burnt out in 1879 he moved to the Sandakan Bay coast. Dent & Co managed to persuade London that the territory should become a British Protectorate.¹⁴¹ After more wheeling and dealing the chartered British North Borneo Company (BNBC) was established in 1881, with its capital at Sandakan.¹⁴² Labourers were imported from Hong Kong to grow tobacco.¹⁴³

Although the North Borneo Company was granted the same impressive feudal rights as Baron von Overbeck, the charter prohibited the Company from establishing monopolies, while it could only charge customs duties for "legitimate revenue purposes". Most income came from taxes on opium, liquor, tobacco and gambling; in 1907 these rights were leased as tax farms.¹⁴⁴ Development was left to private capital.¹⁴⁵ The views of W.H. Treacher (a friend of Cowie's who became the first Governor of North Borneo, 1881–87) were also in keeping with the times. He later wrote:¹⁴⁶

Though entitled to do so by the Royal Charter the Company has elected to engage neither in trade nor in planting, deeming that this desire to attract capital and population to their territory will be best advanced by their leaving the field entirely open to others.... I presume that the source from which shareholders are to be recouped is the surplus revenues which a wisely administered Government would ensure, by judiciously fostering colonization, principally by the Chinese, by the sale of vast acreages of "waste" or Government lands, by customs duties and the "farming out" of the exclusive right to sell opium, spirits, tobacco, etc., and by other means of raising revenue in vogue in the Eastern Colonies of the Crown. In fact, the sum invested by the shareholders is to be considered in the light of a loan to the Company—its public debit—to be repaid with interest as the resources of the country are developed.

¹⁴¹ P. J. Rivers, "The Origin of 'Sabah' and a Reappraisal of Overbeck as Maharajah," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 77, no. 1 (2004); George McT. Kahin, "The State of North Borneo 1881–1946," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1947); Schult, "Sulu and Germany."

¹⁴² An early twentieth-century description of Sandakan: "The town is built about a mile from the entrance, and contained in 1905 a population of 6000 persons, of whom 3500, or more than half, were Chinese, and 210 British. Vessels of large draught can lie along-side the pier, and supplies of all kinds are plentiful. A neat Government House dominates the anchorage; there is a club, a hotel, jail, barracks, and hospital, besides numerous stores, and jinrickshaws supply the place of cabs. Yet, little more than two decades ago, Mr. Pryer found the site an uninhabited jungle, and the bay the resort of semi-piratical Bajaus." Francis Henry Hill Guillemard, *Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel. Australasia: Malaysia and the Pacific Archipelago, Edited and Extended by A. R. Wallace*, vol. 2 (London: E. Stanford, 1908), 250–8.

¹⁴³ Tregonning, *History Of Modern Sabah*. Ada Pryer, *A Decade in Borneo*, ed. Susan Morgan (London: Leicester University Press, 2001).

¹⁴⁴ David Sunderland, *British Economic Development in South East Asia, 1880–1939*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2014), xv.

¹⁴⁵ Kahin, "The State of North Borneo 1881–1946."

¹⁴⁶ W.H. Treacher, *British Borneo: Sketches of Brunai, Sarawak, Labuan, and North Borneo* (Singapore Printing Office, 1891), 128–9.



Map 23 North Borneo¹⁴⁷

Sea and forest products were the main exports. Timber was rafted down the river to Sandakan Bay, where there were two steam sawmills. Tobacco, rattans, treasure (money), birds’ nests, and sundries were shipped out, while treasure and sundries, cloth, rice and provisions were the chief incoming cargoes. The trade might seem trifling, but it grew rapidly. The total value in 1889 was double that of 1888.¹⁴⁸ In Borneo’s south (Banjarmasin) and east (Kutai) other entrepreneurs were intensifying or opening new ways of exploiting Borneo’s resources, these will be described below.

¹⁴⁷ Based on Graham Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1967), Endmap.

¹⁴⁸ Value of Trade in British North Borneo, in Straits dollars, 1889:

Exports	Tobacco	Rattan	Treasure	Birds’ Nests	Sundries
	95,147	52,169	45,068	35,193	27,677
Imports	Treasure	Sundries	Cloth	Rice	Provisions
Value S\$	194,708	107,092	105,056	99,577	80,222

Source: British North Borneo Chartered Company, *Handbook of British North Borneo* (London: W. Clowes, 1890), 84–5.

Dutch Sulawesi: Makassar and Manado

Until the last decade of the 1800s most commodities in Makassar were bought up by Singaporean trading firms which organised their further consignment. Small steamers and perahu networks supplied Makassar's transit harbour, the city itself and overseas shipping.¹⁴⁹ Trading houses organised the collection and distribution of commodities, providing credit to their partners and their agents, who were almost always Chinese. These had their own networks of shopkeepers, small traders and itinerant peddlers. The expansion of Arab shipping in Surabaya also strengthened Sulawesi's growing Arab community.¹⁵⁰

In 1873 Makassar's imports and exports achieved their highest level since 1847, each being worth almost twelve million guilders. The depression in world trade from the 1870s to the mid-1890s also affected Makassar; there were many bankruptcies in Makassar's commercial circles. In 1880 imports were valued at over five and a half million, exports at nearly eight, for 1885 the figures were nearly five and six million respectively. In 1895 both were still well under six million, but by 1900 imports were down to 4.3 million while exports had risen to well over nine. This increase was mainly because after 1897 goods destined for European markets were increasingly shipped directly from Makassar. The port also maintained a thriving, Chinese-dominated traffic with Singapore.¹⁵¹

In 1876 the Banda steam-shiping company had opened once in the three months subsidised shipping service from Makassar which greatly expanded the south Sulawesi port's steamer connections, which had previously been restricted to the "Molukken-boat". The new service went as far as Bima and to Kutai, Parepare, Palu, Bantaeng, Bulukumba, Sinjai, Selayar and Buton. Uncultivated land along the Sulawesi coast was brought into rice production, while coffee gardens spread in the hills. Makassar was still "flooded with imports" in 1877, but during the 1880s the general trade depression, low coffee prices and persistent cholera outbreaks affected trade.¹⁵²

Since the 1880s the London publisher Edward Stanford had been issuing his *Compendium of Geography and Travel*. F.H.H. Guillemard and Alfred Russel Wallace collected and edited the material on Southeast Asia. The 1908 edition gave a typically comprehensive and factual overview of Sulawesi's economy:¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ J.N.F.M. à Campo, "Steam Navigation and State Formation," in *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880–1942*, ed. Robert Cribb (Leiden: KITLV, 1994); Howard Dick, "Perahu Shipping in Eastern Indonesia, Part I," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* II, no. 2 (1975); Heersink, *Dependence*; Heather Sutherland, "On the Edge of Asia: Maritime Trade in East Indonesia, Early Seventeenth to Mid-twentieth Century," ed. Ulbe Bosma and Anthony Webster (2015); Campo, "Perahu Shipping," 55–6; Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 249–52.

¹⁵⁰ F.J.A. Broeze, "The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820–1850," *Archipel* 18 (1979). For background, see William G. Clarence-Smith, "Entrepreneurial Strategies of Hadhrami Arabs in Southeast Asia, c. 1750s–1950s," in *The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation?*, ed. Ahmed Abushouk and Hassan A. Ibrahim (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

¹⁵¹ Tables in Poelinggomang, *Makassar Abab XIX*. Booth, *The Indonesian Economy*, 25–9. Lindblad, "Outer Islands." For Sulawesi trade in the early twentieth century, see Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost- en West-Indie* 2: 77–84. "De Handelsbeweging van Makassar," *De Indische Gids* 10, no.1 (1888).

¹⁵² "Koloniaal Verslag" ('s-Gravenhage: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1867–1923), 1872–98; 1877, 24.

¹⁵³ Guillemard, *Compendium*, 300.

The total value of the exports from Celebes in 1890 is officially stated at £564,058. This includes Sumbawa, but the trade of this island is of very little importance. By far the most valuable product is coffee....The chief exports of Southern Celebes after coffee are dammar (£53,000) and tripang (£40,000), this latter Chinese edible being a special product of the surrounding seas, as is tortoiseshell (£12,000), no other part of the archipelago producing anything like the quantity. Nut-megs are also grown largely, the export being valued at nearly £13,000, an amount which is exceeded only by Banda and the west coast of Sumatra.

The KPM succeeded in concentrating copra exports in Makassar; if in 1896 the Sulawesi port had exported 2,000,000 kg of copra to Europe and 6,500,000 to Singapore; in 1901 over 12,000,000 went to Europe and a mere 82,000 kg to Singapore.¹⁵⁴

East Indonesian commodities for European markets were usually processed at Makassar, where even the Manado-based MHV maintained an agency.¹⁵⁵ Bas Veth was particularly keen to describe how raw or half-processed goods were converted into saleable cargoes in Makassar. “Precisely that combination of industry and trade, and the unique circumstances within which it occurs, make the Makassar products trade so interesting that one is whole-heartedly committed”. Makassar, he concluded, was an “excellent school for young traders.”¹⁵⁶ He then proceeded to give an overview of commodities traded in the port. In some cases, wrote Veth, local political authorities controlled the trade. Bungi (or Toraja) Arabica coffee, for example, often passed straight from the trader-chiefs of Bungin in Enrekang to Europeans. “The Daengs or chiefs—Bungi must have an army of despots large and small—offer their coffee in person, accompanied by the necessary retinue, that carry all sorts of knickknacks such as gold betel-boxes, spittoons, etc., all called ‘state ornaments’.”¹⁵⁷

Gum copal, the second product described by Veth,¹⁵⁸ was a relatively new commodity, barely known 15 years previously. The trade had expanded rapidly. Collection was controlled by Maluku Chinese, who supplied “enormous quantities”, exchanging imports from Makassar for the resin. Veth estimated that about 20 to 25,000 pikul arrived in Makassar each year from Gorontalo and Tobungku, and 4,000 to 5,000 from Ternate.

¹⁵⁴ Chiang, *History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade*, 96.

¹⁵⁵ By 1935, apart from its chief agency at Menado, there were also branches in Makassar, Ternate, Gorontalo, Ambon, Palembang, Jambi and Bengkulu. *Handboek voor Cultuur- en Handelondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy, 1888–1940). For the history of this and other major Dutch trading companies, see Joost Jonker and Keetie Sluyterman, *At Home on the World Markets. Dutch International Trading Companies from the 16th Century Until the Present* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000). However, two Swiss brothers, sent to Makassar by their uncle, a Paris seller of exotic feathers, founded a similar, if much small, trading house, A. Schmidt. Their business eventually incorporated as the Celebes Trading Company in 1904, with an agency at Dobo (Aru), for pearling and pearl-shell. I am indebted to Andreas Zanger for this information and reference: H. Schweizer-Iten, *One Hundred Years of the Swiss Club and the Swiss Community of Singapore 1871–1971* (Singapore: Swiss Club, 1980), 321. Touwen, *Extremes*, 252–4.

¹⁵⁶ Veth, *Handelsprodukten*, 39.

¹⁵⁷ This would presumably take place at Palopo.

¹⁵⁸ Veth notes that copal was called *damar* by the Chinese and locals, as were all gums and resins, but that “true damar”, citing the type known as *mata kucing*, was not a regional product.

Most was dug out of the ground, where it had lain for many centuries. By Veth's time the sorting was no longer done at Makassar, as the Chinese, he wrote, had managed to convince Singapore traders that "native cleaned" was top quality, and no longer bothered to prepare the copal properly, as there was little price difference.¹⁵⁹

Another important commodity was the "long", "wild" or "New Guinea" nutmeg. According to Veth this trade was, like the pearl-shell business, a "survival of the early middle ages". The schooners going to New Guinea carried so many weapons they looked like arsenals; their cargo was mixed, as barter was the basis of commerce. Money was unknown. Arak was very popular, and an "amazing" number of kegs were shipped out, together with "the worst sort of cognac", red cotton, Coromandel salemपुरi cloths and beads. If the Arab and Chinese shippers handled the "savage natives" with tact, and were too well armed to attack, profitable trade was possible. Birds-of-paradise and wild nuts were still the chief Papua exports for distant markets, but massoi remained in high demand in regional markets. Almost all New Guinea commodities were brought to Makassar, but by the early 1880s some was being taken direct to Surabaya by NISM steamers. Turtle-shell was a more local product. It was the main source of income for the inhabitants of the Spermonde archipelago, where there are many Sama Bajau. The gelarang or local rulers there bought up the shell, and then sold it to Chinese. It also came from the Bone Gulf, (particularly from Bajoe) as well as Timor and many parts of Maluku.¹⁶⁰

The Manado coffee monopoly suffered the problems usual to forced cultivation. The burden on planters was such that in practice peasants only had some three months a year in which they could work for their own subsistence. Swidden rice cultivation declined while exposure to markets increased; in some areas there was famine.¹⁶¹ Coffee production had been falling since the 1860s, and there was a general sense that forced cultivation was counterproductive. Farmers were happy to produce for the higher prices offered by clandestine traders. The amount shipped from Manado was much less than Makassar's exports of smallholder coffee from Sulawesi, Bali and Timor. Towards the end of the century it was estimated that Manado only supplied about one-eighth of the 4,110 tons exported from Makassar. The writer in *Stanford's Compendium* commented: "In the Makassar district the Government have no plantations, the industry being entirely in private hands, but of the Manado crop about three-fifths belongs to the State."¹⁶² But as had been the case with spices, the debate lasted decades, and Manado's coffee monopoly finally ended in 1899.¹⁶³

The organisation of Manado's forced coffee cultivation just before its abolition was described in *Stanford's Compendium*:¹⁶⁴

The berry is of particularly good flavour, and finds its market chiefly in Russia, bringing a far higher price than that produced in Java. All the coffee thus grown by the natives has to be sold to Government at a fixed price. It is divided into two qualities, for which fourteen

¹⁵⁹ Veth, *Handelsprodukten*, 21.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Schouten, "Myth and Reality in Minahasan History: The Waworuntu-Gallois Confrontation."

¹⁶² Guillemard, *Compendium*, 300.

¹⁶³ Schouten, *Leadership*, 61–3.

¹⁶⁴ Guillemard, *Compendium*, 297–8.

and seven guilders are respectively are paid per picul of 133 lbs. This price is, however, not the actual cost to the Government, since presents have to be given to the head-men and “Majors,” and as the crop is bought on the plantation, the cost of conveyance to the coast is considerable. Should a Dutchman wish to plant coffee, he is permitted to do so, the system being only a Government monopoly so far as the natives are concerned. He is allowed to take up land at a rental of one guilder per bouw (c.0.7 of a hecare), and pays a head-tax of a dollar on his coolies. The wages of the latter are six guilders, or rather less than ten shillings, a month, and a catty (1.3 lb., 0.6 kg) of rice per diem. Every adult male is, however, compelled to give thirty-six days in the year to the service of the Government for road repair and work of a like nature, or else to provide a replacement.

The main exports of north Sulawesi, apart from coffee, were gum copal (worth c.23,000 pounds sterling, rattan (15,000), tobacco (8,000) and nutmeg and copra (each about 10,000). Some vanilla was also grown.¹⁶⁵ Cacao had been well on its way to becoming a major export crop, until the cocoa pod borer or cocoa moth arrived in mid-century.¹⁶⁶ By the late nineteenth century, Gorontalo, on the opposite coast, was thriving, but on the basis of traditional products rather than cash crops. The harbour was a meeting place for local and foreign traders handling forest and marine commodities. By 1890 Gorontalo was the most important trading port in Sulawesi after Makassar.

Sulawesi Frontiers

Despite the uncertainties generated by pirates, colonial interventions and the usual perils of trade, legitimate commerce expanded in what seemed quite wild regions. In the mid-1800s the ruler of Donggala had ordered all households to plant as many coconut trees as possible in their gardens; he also moved population groups to open up suitable land.¹⁶⁷ By the late nineteenth century smallholder coconut production was an important aspect of the local economy. Some 2,000 pikul of copra was shipped to Germany from Donggala in 1872, while copra and oil were also being sent to Makassar, Java and Singapore through local, Chinese and Dutch traders. After 1892 the area under coconuts expanded further.¹⁶⁸

Further south, the Mandar sailors were described in the early twentieth century by Blink as the “freight carriers for a large part of the archipelago”; Pмбуang (Pamboan) and Majene were their main ports. Their ships carried pearl shell, trepang, turtle-shell, plumes and timber to Sumatra and Singapore, returning with sundries, yarn, piece goods, petroleum and opium. These were taken east, to Maluku and even New Guinea. There was also lively trade with Makassar. Ships and earthenware were produced at Pмбуang, much of the latter was exported. Further north Mamuju was a busy, if more limited, harbour,

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 82–5, 93–4.

¹⁶⁷ Hans Hägerdal notes that Dutch archive sources identify a mid-nineteenth-century raja of Donggala as La Sabanawa (alias Puempuh). Personal communication.

¹⁶⁸ Purwanto, “Peasant Economy and Institutional Changes in Late Colonial Indonesia,” in *International Conference on Economic Growth and Institutional Change in Indonesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Amsterdam, 2002), 9–10.

exporting sago, trepang and rattan to obtain rice and manufactures. Blink does not mention Majene. It had probably lost traffic to Parepare where Mandarese formed a large part of the population, alongside Toraja and Bugis. A busy port, Parepare handled few forest products because of limited links to the interior.¹⁶⁹

By 1870 Tomini Gulf exports of rattan and damar from Togian and Parigi had been surpassed by those from Gorontalo. The small realm of Parigi disintegrated as steam changed trade flows. Imports to Gorontalo in 1856 were worth fl.9,862, and exports fl.25,004; thirty years later the figures were fl.1,382,312 and fl.1,359,667.¹⁷⁰ In the 1870s Arabs were bringing opium into the Tomini gulf via east Kalimantan and were also involved in the Bugis coffee trade out of Gorontalo.¹⁷¹ De Vries of the MHV was in the port organising a cargo in 1884. He wrote: "Gorontalo itself is a pleasant little place, not too large and not too small, so the Europeans form one group and are very pleasantly companionable...You should see me muddling along with the Chinese! Always alert so you don't get taken, you have to have eyes and ears both fore and aft. Here one has to be everything: warehouse boss, shipper, broker, cargo-loader etc so you learn to keep an eye on everything".¹⁷² This may have been the initial voyage of the MHV's new ship, the *Minahassa*. Despite its size (a mere 90 tons, it had weathered the 186-day journey from the Netherlands.¹⁷³

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, on the opposite, southern coast of the Gulf of Tomini, the small domain of Tojo consisted of Muslims, predominantly Buginese, settled on the coast, and Alifuru peoples in the interior; these provided the traders with damar, wax and rattan. The population of both the coast and the main settlement more than doubled in the 1890s, the former reaching more than eight thousand, the latter growing to nine hundred. Maize and rice for the shore dwellers came from the inland Toraja. The ruler of Tojo, "more a merchant than a raja", controlled the Togian Islands, and traded with "the Alfurs of the interior of his territory". He had farmed out the collection of customs duties to Chinese.¹⁷⁴ In 1899 the colonial government took over the Tojo customs, paying the raja a thousand guilders a year compensation.¹⁷⁵

In 1886, a mineral survey officially confirmed the presence of gold in north Sulawesi, attracting foreign attention. A ship arrived in Gorontalo carrying three Australians, an Englishman and a German. It was owned by a Sarawak raja and backed by the Singapore-born Hadhrami trader Sayyid Mohammed bin Ahmad al Sagof. Such international interest startled the Dutch, and Gorontalo was brought under direct Dutch rule in 1889. A gradual reorganisation of statutory labour and the renewed introduction of a head-tax followed in due course.¹⁷⁶

¹⁶⁹ Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie*, 2: 450–1.

¹⁷⁰ *ENI*: "Gorontalo," 592. Henley, *Fertility*, 192, 195–210, 227.

¹⁷¹ Clarence-Smith, "Economic Role."

¹⁷² Vries and Vries, *Amsterdamse koopman*, 104.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 158.

¹⁷⁴ *ENI*: "Todjo"; Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever*, 34, 76–7, 83–6, 227, 356.

¹⁷⁵ Henley, *Fertility*, 83, 227.

¹⁷⁶ Beurden, "Goldrush." *ENI*: "Gorontalo".

Bone's defeat had encouraged the ambitions of Sidenreng, which challenged both Luwu and Bone. Parepare was second only to Makassar in the peninsula's sea traffic; it was also a centre of Arab trade, a hajj port, a major coffee exporter and an arms distributor, handling modern rifles from Singapore.¹⁷⁷ Bugis traders had been settling in the Toraja territories inland from the Bone Gulf since at least the 1860s. They exported the highly prized Toraja or "Bungi" arabica coffee from the highlands through Luwu's port of Palopo. The coffee was gathered in inland Enrekang's district of Bungin, where traders maintained a web of credit ties with producers. Sidenreng and Luwu competed fiercely for this lucrative traffic. Batavia had signed its first contract with Luwu in 1861, but it was only after renewed pressure that the ruler agreed to act against such customs as the headhunting of shipwrecked sailors.¹⁷⁸ By the 1870s Luwu's symbiotic and bloody trade in coffee and slaves was dominated by Sayyid Ali, a locally born Arab who had married into leading Bone and Luwu families.¹⁷⁹ In 1874, Sidenreng, wary of Dutch reactions, made a trans-peninsula alliance with Wajo, another well-armed and virtually independent state. By 1895 Sidenreng was clearly stronger than Luwu. Bone despatched military expeditions in aid of Luwu in 1897 and 1898, but these could do little more than force Sidenreng's partial withdrawal back to the Massenrempulu lands of Duri and Enrekang.¹⁸⁰

The forest product trade was as important for east Sulawesi's Tomori Bay as it was for the Tomini Gulf, although no centre developed there to equal Gorontalo. Small east coast ports, such as Watambayoli, near the Samara estuary in Mori, maintained links with other harbours, including Tomini settlements like Tojo. Tobelo raiding continued to cause problems into the 1870s, but by the eighties the coast was much safer. This encouraged rattan, damar and wax collectors and local traders to come down from the forested hills and cultivated valleys to exchange their goods for textiles, glassware, pottery and now and then for cash. Bugis settlers and Chinese trading posts along the coast increased. Further inland, Mando and Balantak grew rice and good tobacco which they sent north to Gorontalo. Sama Bajau from Banggai's Peleng paid the Ternate Sultan fl.4 p.a. for the right to sail around Sulawesi and in the Tomini Gulf, where they hunted turtles, trepang and, occasionally, slaves.¹⁸¹

The east coast's increasing security was visible at Tobungku. By the late nineteenth century, it was flourishing; several Arabs had warehouses there, and Chinese from Makassar and Buginese from Kendari came regularly to trade. Iron exports were claimed by Bone.¹⁸² In 1872 Matthes visited the Bugis and Sama Bajau coastal settlement of Kendari, down to

¹⁷⁷ *Iktisar*: 278, 290–2; *Gegevens over Land en Volk van Enrekang*; Vogel, "Mededelingen betreffende Sidenrang, Rappa and Soepa." Sutherland, "Political Structure." Poelinggomang, *Makassar Abab XIX*, 87. Sutherland, "Power and Politics."

¹⁷⁸ *ENI*: "Loewoe."

¹⁷⁹ Waterson, *Paths*, 63–5.

¹⁸⁰ Bigalke, *Tana Toraja*. Waterson, *Paths*, 61–8.

¹⁸¹ Velthoen, "Pirates," 214–6. Clercq, "Ternate," 92–6. For description of east Sulawesi in the mid-nineteenth century see C. van der Hart, *Reize rondom het eiland Celebes en naar eenige der Moluksche eilanden, gedaan in den jare 1850, door Z.M. schepen van oorlog Argo en Bromo, onder bevel van C. van der Hart* ('s-Gravenhage: K. Fuhri, 1853).

¹⁸² *ENI*: "Toboengkoe." The harbour town's population was between 1,200 and 1,500. Matthes, "Eenige opmerkingen," 75–6.

the south, which then had about a hundred houses. The raja of Kendari, the preeminent figure in the Laiwui confederation, lived about five hours rowing upriver in the Buginese village of Lepa Lepa. The Kendari Bugis paid tribute to Bone. In the raja's absence the Dutch party was received by the Buginese Uwa Pati. He explained that whereas once he travelled inland to trade, by then it had become possible to stay in Lepa Lepa, as Toraja came from the interior to exchange rice and maize for cloth.¹⁸³ At the end of the century Kendari was still, in Dutch eyes, an unimpressive kampong of wooden houses, completely under water at high tide, but "a not insignificant trading place".¹⁸⁴

Southeast Borneo, the Central and Southern Makassar Straits

From 1866 Banjarmasin had been linked to Surabaya by the NISM's monthly steamer. By the 1870s most cargo was carried by steam, but four or five European-rigged vessels still sailed in each year. Over half of all imports came from Surabaya, including foodstuffs as well as machinery, bicycles, textiles etc. In imports, Surabaya was absolutely dominant, followed by Semarang while Batavia lagged behind and Singapore came a weak fourth. In 1873 80 per cent of exports also went to Surabaya, compared with 48.3 per cent in 1870. Singapore competed with Semarang for second place as an export destination, while Makassar lay fifth after Batavia. Within a decade, many steamers were leaving Banjarmasin to go directly to international destinations.¹⁸⁵ Howard Dick notes that the earliest Banjarmasin Chinese-owned steamer in Banjarmasin was a wooden bark which could use sail or steam, built in New South Wales in 1867. In 1885 another Banjarmasin entrepreneur bought a fine new steamer in Singapore.¹⁸⁶

The Norwegian explorer Carl Bock was decidedly unimpressed when he visited east Kalimantan in 1878:¹⁸⁷

Samarinda is Kutai's trading port—the most miserable place I have ever seen, the houses and their inhabitants are well matched. The population is over 10,000, and consists mainly of Buginese, who have great influence here and mostly live on the right bank of the river, while

¹⁸³ Matthes, "Eenige opmerkingen," 75–6. *ENI*: "Laiwoei."

¹⁸⁴ *ENI*: "Kendari".

¹⁸⁵ For the years 1853–55, see Pieter Bleeker, *Reis door de Minahassa en den Molukschen archipel, gedaan in de maanden september en oktober 1855* (Batavia: Lange & Co., 1856), 1: 133. Suroyo, *Kawasan Laut Jawa dalam Abad Transisi Tahun 1870–1970 (Bagian 1 Tahun 1870–1900)*, 146. In 1883 there were 8 steamers making an "international" arrival, and 20 departing to international destinations. The discrepancy is because many arrivals would have been registered as regional traffic. Surabaya's steam connections drew traffic away from Gresik, traditionally oriented towards the east and a centre of Arab shipping.

¹⁸⁶ Howard Dick, "Chinese Steamship Owners of Banjarmasin." I am grateful to him for sending me a copy of this unpublished paper.

¹⁸⁷ Carl Bock, *Reis in Oost- en Zuid-Borneo, van Koetei naar Banjerassin: Ondernomen op last der Indische regering in 1879 en 1880* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1881), 23. Earlier, the knowledgeable G.W. Earl had commented that the Dyaks of the interior were "nominally under the control of the Bugis of Coti [Kutai], who are enabled to keep them in awe in consequence of the dread which the Dyaks entertain of fire-arms, and also from the latter being dependent on the Bugis for the supply of salt"; G.W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1837), 330.

the natives and a hundred Chinese stay on the left bank.... Here everyone is a trader.... The chief export commodity is rattan, a climbing palm that grows abundantly on the banks of the numerous rivers and creeks that cut through Kutai. Apart from rattan, which arrives in great rafts, the country also provides: gutta percha, wax, edible birds' nests, some tripang and tortoiseshell. Imports consist of rice, salt, opium, gambir, coffee, coco-nuts and oil, as well as kerosene [paraffin] and large numbers of coloured, white and black cottons, etc. etc. The buyers of the country's products must pay everything in cash, while the natives always want credit, and that on the long term, for the goods they obtain. The system of credit in Kutai is subject to great dangers—at least, all the traders with whom I have spoken, complain of the formidable obstacles they encountered whenever they tried to collect on their advances in a land where there is virtually no law or government.

In the early 1880s most Samarinda ships made one annual voyage which lasted several months. Then they were beached, had their rigging removed, and stayed under cover for the rest of the year, paying the Sultan 8 guilders p.a. for the privilege. Vessels sailing into the roads had to provide gifts to the value of fl.20 to fl.30, or occasionally a corresponding amount in cash. Every house built in Samarinda had to pay a fee of fl.8 if it had more than three cross-beams (Bugis custom correlated these with status), while once a week two men were dispatched to collect betel nut and associated products from every garden.¹⁸⁸ Batavia initiated and approved the Sultan's discouragement of headhunting, slavery and the nobility's excessive tolls on river traffic. However, they disliked his friendliness to foreign entrepreneurs, as he retained the right to sign contracts and could impose either a 10 per cent tax on all forest product exports, or a head-tax.¹⁸⁹

Broersma distinguishes two eras in Kutai's later nineteenth-century economic history. The first was that of G.P. King and government coal, while the second, from 1880, was defined by the activities of the Scots entrepreneur Alexander Gray and the birth of the coal and petroleum industries.¹⁹⁰ Gray had worked as an engineer on a NISM steamer on the Singapore-East Borneo route since 1879 but decided to settle and open a saw-mill near Tenggarong. Since royal ties were necessary, two of the Sultan's sons had shares. The first returned his to Gray as a gift; the second used his to pay off his debts to a Chinese, who was bought out by Gray. The sawmill was later moved down to Samarinda, where it did well. Once labelled by Brooke the "worst place" in Borneo, Kutai's trade ties proliferated. By the late nineteenth century an Italian representative of a Hong Kong firm was providing the Sultan with goods, including two small steamers paid for with gutta percha and rattan.¹⁹¹ The sultanate was to play an unexpected role in the development of modern capitalism, as will be described in the following section.

By the 1880s steam shipping was common on Kalimantan's main rivers, coasts and across to Singapore. In early 1882, when the assistant resident of Kutai was travelling up the Berau River he was passed by two steamers: the government's *Tromp*, based in Makassar,

¹⁸⁸ S.W. Tromp, "Eenige Mededeelingen Omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetei," *BKI* 36, no. 1 (1887): 184.

¹⁸⁹ *ENI*: "Koetei."

¹⁹⁰ Broersma, *Handel*, 176–7.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 173–4.

and the SS *Vidar*, an Arab-owned vessel operating out of Singapore. The latter was towing a smaller steamer upriver for the Bulungan Arab trader Sayyid Abdullah. Meanwhile, the “Dutch East Indian Bark, the *Radja Laut*, with Captain Lingard had sailed into the Berau River the previous day, and was laboriously tacking his way up to Berau”.¹⁹² The best remembered sailor of the late nineteenth century Makassar Straits was, of course, the Pole Józef Korzeniowski, later to become known as the writer Joseph Conrad.¹⁹³ His novels and stories provide an evocative image of the eastern islands’ trade. In 1887 and 1888 he spent five months on the SS *Vidar*, trading at East Kalimantan’s Banjarmasin, Pulau Laut, Samarinda, Berau and Bulungan and Sulawesi’s Donggala.¹⁹⁴ These experiences were grist to Conrad’s mill; he was generally accurate in his depiction of Berau.¹⁹⁵ It was not until 1898 that the whole coast was taken under regular Dutch indirect rule as Borneo’s South and Eastern Division (*Zuider- en Oosterafdeling van Borneo*).¹⁹⁶

The east Borneo boom was also felt, albeit less directly, in Pasir. Here too shipping patterns changed with the advent of steam: “If, at the end of September 1887 there were still 11 European-rigged vessels with a total capacity of 1,467 tons, now [1903] there is only one, with a capacity of 78 tons”.¹⁹⁷ Pasir’s previous trade had mainly gone to Singapore and Sulawesi on seasonal Sulawesi-based sailing vessels. However, in the first nine months of 1903 it was visited by 28 steamers, 2 European-rigged vessels and 48 native-rigged, excluding the small boats (*sopit*) which sailed along the coast. Before 1900 the ruler had maintained harbourmasters and toll-collectors at the mouths of the Pasir, Telakai and Adang rivers, but Pasir was then incorporated into the colonial customs regime, with the usual annual compensation being paid to the Sultan and leading men.¹⁹⁸ By the early twentieth century commercial and administrative activity was concentrated at Tanah Grogot “one hour downstream from the seat of the ruler”, close to the Pasir’s confluence with the Seratai and not far from the delta. There the extensive and marshy coastal plains were brought under cultivation by Bugis and Malay settlers. A temporary Controleur, a detachment of armed police, and a branch of the Kutai Company followed. Tanah Grogot was opened to all trade from 1908, as the rubber industry developed.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹² Campo, “A Profound Debt.” Lingard also had a small steamer. In 1884 the Dutch consul in Singapore made a list of ten steamships which he suspected of smuggling guns into Kalimantan. The SS *Vidar*, Conrad’s own ship, was involved in both smuggling repeating rifles and the supply of slaves.

¹⁹³ Sherry, “Conrad and the S.S. Vidar”; Moore, “Slavery and Racism in Joseph Conrad’s Eastern World.”

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. The owner was Sayid Masin bin Saleh Algeaffrie (Aljoffrey). In 1883 the Sayyid owned four steamers and had trading connections with “Brow and Bulungan, and agencies at Samarang, Soerabaya, Bally, Macassar, Pulo Laut, Saigon, Penang, Galle, Karical, Aden, Jeddah and Suez”, as recorded in the Singapore and Straits Directory and quoted in Sherry, “Conrad and the S.S. Vidar,” 160; Stape, *The Several Lives of Joseph Conrad*, 50–1; Westermann, “Te Water,” 240.

¹⁹⁵ Bruyns, “A Dutch Naval Officer on the Berau River.” Hampson, “Covert Plots and Secret Trades.”

¹⁹⁶ See Appendix.

¹⁹⁷ Nusselein, “Beschrijving van het landschap Pasir.”

¹⁹⁸ 11,200 to sultan and 5,600 to the “great men.”

¹⁹⁹ Nusselein, “Beschrijving van het landschap Pasir.”

The New East Kalimantan

By the 1880s Indies private enterprise was outperforming the NHM in both production and trade, so the government-backed company turned increasingly to finance, providing credit in exchange for forest commodities. In 1883 J.W. Schlimmer, the NHM representative in Banjarmasin, took over its operations. He also bought up tracts of real estate, and eventually came to control the new Banjarmasin town market, which had 85 Chinese shops.²⁰⁰ Jelutung and gutta-percha were early exports; agencies at the river mouths bought commodities coming downriver from inland villages. In 1885 most was exported to Singapore. There were concerns about over-exploitation of both the forest and Dayak tappers, but the company easily evaded attempts at control, encouraging outside tappers to come and work.²⁰¹

Schlimmer had a virtual trade monopoly in Banjarmasin. When he converted his family business into a limited liability company in 1894, the commodities in his warehouses were worth almost half a million guilders; the following year his assets were valued at 970,000. His firm became the basis for the heavy-weight Borsumij (*N.V. Borneo Sumatra Maatschappij*, the Borneo Sumatra Trading Society).²⁰² Initially the four Borsumij offices operated independently, at Palembang in South Sumatra, Pontianak in west Borneo, Banjarmasin and Samarinda. Taken together, gutta percha and rattan comprised around 70 per cent of Banjarmasin's exports in the 1880s and 1890s. Roughly half the imports were textiles, followed by rice and such consumption goods as lamp oil, flour and tobacco. All companies depended heavily on close links with Chinese businessmen for the accumulation and distribution of commodities. In such circumstances a combination of European capital and access to Western markets with Chinese expertise and local networks could achieve a virtual monopoly over geographically restricted commodities.²⁰³

The first planters came to southeast Borneo in 1887. In less than a decade twenty-three concessions were issued; the initial focus was on tobacco and coffee, later on copra and pepper. Amuntai in the Ulu Sungei attracted the pioneers, but they had little success. Tobacco smallholders did better, but production was of necessity limited. Some Europeans tried their luck with coffee in Kutai, but again they failed. Indigenous cultivators had a "virtual monopoly" on pepper, and while copra production flourished it was never dominated by Europeans.²⁰⁴ The first small estate was established in the Tanah Bumbu lands shortly after 1900. The transformative rubber plant, *Hevea brasiliensis*, was only introduced in the early twentieth century. The virtual absence of rubber in late nineteenth-century Dutch minds is indicated by the fact that the colonial *Encyclopaedie* devotes only a couple of sentences to the topic.²⁰⁵ However, well-established patterns of latex exploitation

²⁰⁰ Lindblad, *Between Dayak and Dutch*, 15.

²⁰¹ Leslie Potter, "Commodity and Environment in Colonial Borneo; Economic Value, Forest Conversions and Concern for Conservation, 1870–1940," in *Histories of the Borneo Environment: Economic, Political, And Social Dimensions of Change and Continuity*, ed. Reed L. Wadley (Leiden: KITLV, 2005), 121.

²⁰² Post, "Trust and Status," 195. Jonker and Sluyterman, *Thuis*, 208.

²⁰³ Post, "Trust and Status." See also Claver, "Commerce and Capital."

²⁰⁴ Lindblad, *Between Dayak and Dutch*, 26–31.

²⁰⁵ "Caoutchouc-producing trees from Brazil ("Pará rubber") was introduced in Java as an experiment, initially with some success." *ENI*: "Hevea brasiliensis."

provided the basis for the successful transition to *Hevea* rubber.²⁰⁶ Smallholder production was stimulated by connections with British Malaya, and the enthusiasm of Banjarese planters and traders. As was noted earlier, the Banjarmasin war had dispersed Banjarese to the interior; by the 1860s Banjarese and Chinese controlled the intermediate trade along the river, edging out the Buginese.²⁰⁷

Banjarmasin's development was impressive, but the economic breakthrough came further north, in Kutai. The mining engineer J. Menten, who had worked in Kutai in 1862, returned after his retirement twenty years later. He was granted extraordinary prospecting rights by the sultan, covering all Kutai and lasting seventy-five years. The official basis of this was open to question, but it was formalised into a proper concession in 1886. Money from Amsterdam, Utrecht and Dordrecht established the *Steenkolen-Maatschappij Oost-Borneo* (SMOB, East Borneo Coal Company) in 1888. This took over the concession, inviting Menten to develop a modern coal mine at Batu Panggal upriver from Samarinda; policy was largely in the hands of the investors. Menten was already looking elsewhere. The SMOB was not a great success.²⁰⁸

In 1891 Menten gained new personal concessions from the sultan covering land at Sanga Sanga, Balikpapan Bay and near the mouth of the Mahakam. These included "the exclusive prospecting, development, manufacturing and selling rights to petroleum production throughout the Kutai domains", plus an exemption from all import and export taxes. There was a great outcry, from both the SMOB and Batavia. But Menten, still backed by the sultan, set off for Europe, hoping to attract investment in the as yet unproven oil resources. The time was right. In 1886 the internal combustion engine had arrived; four years later a Sumatran company had begun exporting lamp-oil, using chartered Chinese vessels.²⁰⁹ Meanwhile, in London the brothers Samuel had looked beyond their fathers shop in Houndsditch, where he sold shells and other exotica. They had seen the oilfields at Baku and sensed an opportunity in providing bulk transport; their first tanker passed through the Suez Canal in 1892.²¹⁰

Menten's search for capital led him to the Samuel brothers and in 1895 they provided money for a test well, retaining an option to buy the lease. Complex and contentious financial manoeuvres followed. In 1897 the Samuel-backed group struck oil, spectacularly.

²⁰⁶ Dove, *Banana Tree*, 85–95.

²⁰⁷ Lindblad, *Between Dayak and Dutch*, 10–7. A 1925 report concluded: "Banjarese in general, and especially the inhabitants of Ulu Sungei, are true traders. Most of the trade in Ulu Sungei is in their hands: in the whole Ulu Sungei there are only 200 Chinese! ... The Banjarese quickly saw advantage in this cultivation [rubber] and extended it greatly.... On the east coast of Borneo the Bugis is a similar type to the Banjarese: these are also hard workers with sound economic insights; numerous pepper-, coconut- and rubber-gardens along Borneo's east coast are in Bugis hands, as are many wet rice fields"; quoted in J.L. Vleming, *Het Chineesche Zakenleven in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Wetvereden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926), 265. See also Han Knapen, *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880*, Verhandelingen KITLV no. 189 (Leiden: KITLV, 2001), 77–84.

²⁰⁸ J. Thomas Lindblad, "Strak beleid en batig slot: De Oost-Borneo Maatschappij, 1888–1940," *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 48 (1985). Broersma, *Handel*, 177–84.

²⁰⁹ This was the KNMEP, the Royal Society for the Exploitation of Petroleum Sources in Netherlands India.

²¹⁰ F.C. Gerretson, *History of the Royal Dutch* (Leiden: Brill, 1953).

In the same year construction started on a new port at Balikpapan Bay. Although this remained officially part of the sultan's domains, he effectively ceded control to the oil companies in exchange for royalties. By the end of the century most of Balikpapan's inhabitants were Banjarese.²¹¹ The first cargo was sent to Singapore in August 1898. In the same year the Samuel group became the NIIHA (*Nederlandsch-Indische Industrie en Handelmaatschappij*, the Dutch Indies Industry and Trade Society). However, the NIIHM, like its Sumatran counterpart, faced stiff competition in world markets from John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co. (est.1870). The two Indies firms joined forces in 1902, forming the Shell Transport & Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, with offices in Samarinda; the name referred back to the Samuel's family shop in Houndsditch.²¹²



Image 42 Oil fields, presumably in Kutai, 1903–07²¹³

²¹¹ Burhan Magenda, *East Kalimantan: The Decline of a Commercial Aristocracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1991), 3–4. On early twentieth-century Balikpapan, see Broersma, *Handel*, 135–40.

²¹² J.P. Poley, *Eroica: The Quest for Oil in Indonesia (1850–1898)* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000), 65–77, 121–33; Arjen Taselaar, *De Nederlandse koloniale lobby ondernemers en de Indische politiek, 1914–1940* (Leiden: CNWS, 1998); S.C. Knappert, “Beschrijving van de Onderafdeeling Koetei,” *BKI* 58 (1905): 597.

²¹³ RM NG-1990-15-A-31. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.483967>. From an album depicting Borneo activities of the *Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij*, a predecessor of the *Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij* (KNPM, est.1907), the Dutch component of Shell Oil. See Broersma, *Handel*, 141–4 on the Mahakam concessions.

Reorientation to the East: Maluku, Aru and Papua

Maluku's cloves, nutmeg and mace, once so coveted, were of limited interest in the 1800s. The liberalised trade in cloves (since 1864) and nutmeg and mace (from 1873) permitted free spice production. By 1874 there were four small plantations producing coffee, cocoa and nutmeg, three in Ternate and one on Obi. The definitive end of the spice monopolies and their accompanying control apparatus permitted, or forced, the peoples of Ternate, Ambon and Banda to re-enter the eastern archipelagos' trading world, a world that Tidore's subjects had never left. *Stanford's Compendium* summarised Ternate's maritime exchange at the end of the 1800s:²¹⁴

The trade has lessened of late, but Temate is still the market of the northern Moluccas and some parts of New Guinea. The chief exports are gum-dammar and tobacco ... nutmegs ... and gum-copal. A few birds-of-paradise are exported, but most of these are taken straight from the Aru Islands and the MacCluer Gulf to Makassar. Cloves, the ancient product of the true "Malucos: Temate, Tidor, Motir, Makian, and Batjan" now form no part of the commerce; they are now grown chiefly in Celebes, Amboina, and Java.

Ternate imported textiles, yarn, crockery and glassware, rice, cattle and government opium.

There were still a few small schooners based in Ternate; they were used mainly for voyages to New Guinea to collect prized plumes, shells and other exotica. In 1865 a daughter of M.D. van Renesse van Duivenbode had married a Dutch naval lieutenant, Antonie Augustus Bruijn. He became captain commander of the sultan of Ternate's guard, no doubt on his father-in-law's recommendation. In 1867 Bruijn was discharged from the navy and became a trader in naturalia; he also delivered items to various European collectors and museums. In 1877 he sent an expedition to the New-Guinea Bird's Head to do ethnographic research and gather specimens.²¹⁵ By then the trading house had agents, known as *anakoda* (ships' captain) based near the later Manokwari, on Mansiman (an island felt to be relatively safe); Wasior, on Wandamman Bay; and Windesi on the southeastern Doberai peninsula. The agents gave guns to the Papuan hunters. After M.D.'s death in 1878 his son Constantijn Willem (C.W.) and son-in-law Bruijn took over the trading house. Bruijn, presumably still trading as van Duivenbode, sent a representative with 50 coolies inland to collect forest products, but they were driven out by people of the interior and had to continue buying from coastal groups.²¹⁶ From 1890 the KPM sent a monthly boat to Manokwari.

²¹⁴ Guillemard, *Compendium*, 322.

²¹⁵ The daughter was Adolphine Susanna Wilhelmina van Renesse van Duivenbode (b.1844). Bruyn hired a young French naturalist in 1877 and sent him three times a year to the Bird's Head and Cenderawasih bay to collect specimens. Roelof Broersma, "Koopvaardij in de Molukken," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 23 (1934): 15–6. Antonie Augustus Bruijn, *Biographical Notes of Antonie Augustus Bruijn, 1842–1890: His Life as a Marine Officer in the Dutch Navy and Lifetime as a Trader in Naturalia on Ternate, the Moluccas, Indonesia*, ed. Alfred Russell Wallace and Achille Raffray (Bogor: IPB, 2010).

²¹⁶ J. van Oldenborgh, "Verslag eener reis van Ternate naar de Noord- En Noord-West-Kust van Nieuw-Guinea, per Z.M. Stoomschip Batavia, gedurende Maart en April 1881," *Tijdschrift Bataviaasche Genootschap* 27 (1882): 428; W.C. Klein, *Handel: Overdruk uit Nieuw Guinea, deel III* ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij 1954), 510, 536, 537.

In 1892 family conflict led C.W. to leave the joint firm and unite his various business interests in trade, agriculture, mining and pearling, forming the *Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea Handel Maatschappij* (the NGHM, Dutch New Guinea Trading Company). His partner was a former ship's captain from the NISM; they employed a number of Asian (probably Chinese) agents. The NGHM immediately established a toko on Mansinam. They had four schooners, but competition forced them to buy a small steamer, which passed along the coast collecting sea and forest products. They then acquired a larger one which also supplied the Dore missionaries. Rather than shipping their cargoes to major ports themselves they sold them to Chinese in Ternate, who forwarded them to Makassar, Java and Singapore. But purchasing prices were rising, and the Company's costs began to exceed profits.²¹⁷ They also faced increased competition from Chinese tokos buying up sea and forest products.



Image 43 Chinese small trader in outrigger canoe, northeast Halmahera, c.1915²¹⁸

The fragility of the Maluku sultans' authority was sharply exposed in 1876, when Dano Baba Hasan, a descendent of the post-Nuku Raja Jailolo, announced the return of the Jailolo sultanate in Halmahera. His promises of tax exemptions and an end to corvée

²¹⁷ Broersma, "Koopvaardij," 15–7, 35. With the Company fading, some employees founded the Merauke Company in 1903; Robert Cribb, "Birds of Paradise and Environmental Politics in Colonial Indonesia, 1890–1931," in *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley (Leiden: KITLV, 1997).

²¹⁸ "Een Chinese kleinhandelaar wordt door twee mannen geholpen bij het binnenhalen van de vlerkprauw op de Sagea-rivier Halmahera". KIT/NMVW TM-10002756. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/17757>. By permission of the Museum. Published in H. R. Roelfsema, *Een Jaar in de Molukken: Persoonlijke ervaringen bij het vestigen eener cultuuronderneming* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1917); there credited to Baretta.

labour attracted the perennially restless Tobelo as well as the many who suffered from aristocratic extortion and arrogance. De Clercq wrote: “No one and nothing is safe from them [the nobility]”. His conclusion is striking: “had it not been for the intervention of the Government of the Dutch East Indies, he [Dano Baba Hasan] would have caused a major change in the political situation here”.²¹⁹ Both Maluku sultans had become marginal in a maritime world where producers could deal directly with buyers and shipping timetables ensured regular collection.

De Clercq’s late nineteenth century visit to Payahe, on the west coast of Halmahera’s southern peninsula, provides a glimpse of the new commodity-producing frontier. Payahe had long been a food supplier to Tidore, before it was lost to Ternate in 1649,²²⁰ but like most of Halmahera it was also a rich source of forest commodities. De Clercq:²²¹

The beach soon ascends at a gentle slope into the hilly terrain of the interior forests. In the dense underwood one finds in places an abandoned cooking place, where Alfurus from the interior have stayed temporarily.... The main purpose of our journey this time is to visit Payahe and to check on the collection of caoutchouc (“India rubber”). Therefore we only hurriedly inspect the extensive pinang [betel nut] forests of Maldi.... Once on shore we are welcomed by the Kalaudi, the head of the kampong and leader of fifty or sixty inhabitants, and Captain Umar of Ternate. Captain Umar has permission from the Sultan to collect caoutchouc in the vast forests. He leads us to his house, which lies about fifteen hundred meters (one paal) from the shore near a brooklet on the edge of the virgin forest.... Initially he was not able to find the tree which supplies the real jetah percah, but finally he discovered a wood-like creeper from whose bark, when an incision is made, a white sap drips. This sap is sticky and when it is boiled together with some acidic liquid it binds together in the form of disks. This is what is known in the trade as caoutchouc, and it commands a good price on the market.

Ambon’s trade remained familiar. Sago, cloves, nutmeg and timber from Seram and Kei were primarily cargoes in transit. Local planters in Amboina Residency initially focussed on cacao. Using their own capital, individual Europeans and borger mestizos from Ambon opened several plantations on Ambon, and one on Seram. Others used interest-free government loans to open gardens—14 on Ambon and 3 on Seram. Taken together they had more than 88,000 trees by 1863. Ambon alone had 50,000 in 1893. By then production on both Seram and Bali had surpassed harvests in Manado, the original cacao producer.²²² A third type of planting was on village plots; it was estimated that an average garden of c. 70 trees could produce an annual income of around fl.42.²²³ Other cash crops, including coffee and cotton, met with little success despite government support. Tobacco did become very profitable, but not on Ambon itself; it was the Alifuru of Seram’s coastal

²¹⁹ De Clercq, “Ternate,” 69.

²²⁰ Andaya, *World*, 169–70.

²²¹ Clercq, “Ternate,” 60.

²²² *ENI*: “Cacao”.

²²³ Selections from the “Kultuur Verslag der Residentie Amboina over het jaar 1863”; Leirissa, et al., *Maluku Tengah*, 139–48.

hills and in a few places on Buru who responded most eagerly. However, poor processing limited long-distance exports, though local trade expanded.²²⁴

At the end of the century the *Compendium's* diligent contributor concluded:²²⁵

The trade of Amboina is not large, as most of the Bugis who visit New Guinea and the remoter islands now carry their produce direct to Makassar or even to Singapore. Numbers of small native vessels, however, continually visit it, bringing the produce of the surrounding coasts and islands. In 1890 turtle shell to the value of £5050 was exported, and 107,107 lbs. of cloves, valued at £3179, these being the chief exports from the islands. On the giving up of the monopoly of cloves, a tax was imposed upon the heads of families of the native population. In 1893 this was changed into a tax which is levied on the whole male population above sixteen years of age.

In 1904 by far the most valuable exports from the Residency Ambon were nutmeg, mace and Aru pearl-shell.²²⁶

Slavery had been abolished in Banda, as on Java, in 1860. The initial transition to “free” labour was relatively easy, as the government supplied and paid contract labour from Java in exchange for a continued monopoly on nut purchases. During a transition phase beginning in 1864 some planters could choose to grow and sell their nutmeg and mace as they pleased, but they then had to procure their own labour and pay a land tax.²²⁷ This possibility became the rule with the end of the government monopoly in 1870. High nutmeg prices initiated a period of great prosperity, allowing the creole elite of plantation-owning families, the former *perkeniers*, to indulge their taste for luxury. Poor management, widespread debt and emigration ended this colourful era, and most plantations were taken over by the *Crediet en Handelsvereniging Banda* (Banda Credit and Trade Association) in 1886.²²⁸ The Banda archipelago’s trade was dominated by Chinese, that of the Southeast and Southwestern island by Buginese and Makassarese.

Before the 1621 destruction of the island by the VOC Banda had been a hub for the New Guinea trade as well as a nutmeg and mace producer. Creole skippers from the planter families had sustained this role under Company protection. In 1877 the Banda Steam Shipping Company (*Stoomvaartrederij Banda*) sought to revive this tradition. A regular

²²⁴ Ludeking, “Amboina,” 97–103. He explained: “The free cultivation of tobacco has produced more satisfactory results; it prefers good, clay-like soil, but even on the dry limestone ground of Wahaay it grows well. In this [Amboina] residency it is primarily grown by the Alfuren of the villages Hatusua, Kamarian, Tihule, Aspamo etc on the south and southwest coast [of Seram], and of Hatumuru, Kobi and Wehirama on Seram’s north coast, and well as a few villages on the back territory of Buru. That of Kairatu and Tuluti on Seram’s south coast, and of Nauiaroli is known as the best, and equal in quality to that of Manila.”

²²⁵ Guillemard, *Compendium*, 334–45.

²²⁶ Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie*, 2: 470–80. On the value of Ambon Residency exports: respectively: nutmeg fl.938,787; mace fl.480,878 and pearl shell fl.238,774, p. 475.

²²⁷ *ENI*: “Notenmukaat, Notenkultuur”.

²²⁸ Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being “Dutch” in the Indies: A History of Creolization and Empire, 1500–1920* (Athens and Singapore: Ohio University Press and NUS Press, 2008), 150–9; J.G.W. Lekkerkerker, *Concessies en erfpachten voor landbouwondernemingen in de buitengewesten* (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1928), 11–2; Herman Otto van der Linden, *Banda en zijne bewoners* (Dordrecht: Blusse en van Braam, 1873).

service was initiated linking Banda to the West New Guinea ports of Sekar and Skroe as well as Darwin, winning a government contract for mail. But in 1879 the Company declined to renew this contract, which passed to the NISM and, in 1891, to the KPM.²²⁹ In 1880 the Banda Steam Shipping Company published a brochure proposing a new line connecting New Guinea and Manila and extolling the eastern islands' potential.²³⁰ The proposed new route, which did not eventuate, would have reinforced existing monthly steam lines linking Hong Kong and Manila, Surabaya and Darwin, and introduced a Darwin–Hong Kong connection.

The Company's brochure described five trading zones (*handelskringen*). The first was northeast of Timor, encompassing the southwestern islands of Wetar, Kisar, Leti, Romang, Damar and Babar; the Banda Company proposed establishing a store on Romang or Leti. The second and third zones were centred on Tanimbar and Aru-Kei respectively. The plan was that an agent was to be based at Larat, an established harbour on Tanimbar's northeastern island, but would move to Dobo during the pearling season. Trading zones four and five overlapped at the McCluer Gulf; the first extended from Onin to Kowiai on the south Papua coast, the second encompassed the Raja Ampat islands and eastern Seram. The distinction between these two final zones was blurred by the fact that "Geser is already the main place for purchase for Seram, Goram and Papua traders".²³¹ The Banda Company was already earning good profits on its existing two stores on the New Guinea coast: one at Skroe on the west coast of the Bomberai peninsula, at Teluk Sebakor, and one at Sekar on the southern coast of the McCluer Gulf.²³² The brochure also provided detailed information on commodities.

The Baadilla family in Banda had prospered through their nutmeg plantations and trade; during the 1880s Abdullah Baadilla's schooners were sailing to the Southwestern and Southeastern Islands.²³³ In 1897 he started a pearling business in the Aru islands, with an agent at Dobo. But the pearl banks were not always generous, and competition increased: the first Australian-employed diver appeared in Aru waters in 1885. Dobo became a boomtown, where divers from the Philippines, Japan, and Pacific islands worked with Arab and later Australian entrepreneurs.²³⁴ Fluctuating prices and shrinking supply

²²⁹ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 188.

²³⁰ Stoomvaartrederij Banda, "Schetskaart."

²³¹ Ibid. Geser is described in R.F. Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003).

²³² Banda, "Schetskaart."

²³³ Petrus van der Crab, *De Moluksche eilanden: Reis van Z.E. den Gouverneur-Generaal Charles Ferdinand Pahud, door den Molukschen Archipel* (Batavia: Lange, 1862), 96–111. Luang could provide about 600 pikul of trepang and the same amount of tortoiseshell. Wetar was the next most important, providing 200 pikuls of wax and 25 cattles of tortoiseshell. Babar and Romang were good for 50 cattles of shell, Babar for 20, and Leti and Moa could each muster ten. Broersma, "Koopvaardij." Abdullah Baadilla, son of the Kapitan Arab, grandson of Sayyid bin Aidit, was born in 1859 at Banda Neira; Des Alwi, *Friends and Exiles: A Memoir of the Nutmeg Isles and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell SEAP, 2008), 11–3.

²³⁴ On the last, see Julia Martínez and Adrian Vickers, *The Pearl Frontier: Indonesian Labor and Indigenous Encounters in Australia's Northern Trading Network* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015). Mullins, "James Clark."

complicated trade in mother-of pearl.²³⁵ The Baadilla brothers sold their concession to the Selebes Trading Company, in 1905; this Batavia-based Australian Company paid a considerable amount, but ultimately earned a fortune.²³⁶

Seram traders used to sail to Bali, sell their sago cakes there with 40 per cent profit and buy tobacco, cheap rice, and Sumbawa onions. But from 1892 a KPM steamer visited Geser every three months, on a route linking Ambon with Seram and New Guinea ports; perahu traffic declined.²³⁷ Before 1860 the Raja of Manowoko had a large fleet sailing to New Guinea, but with the establishment of Dutch rule, the arrival of Chinese, and finally the KPM, trade moved out of indigenous hands.²³⁸ In 1882 Geser was an administrative outpost, with an estimated population of just over three hundred.²³⁹ Aru, on the other hand, was expanding.

In 1890 the talented and well-connected colonial official, G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, published a series of articles on the southeastern islands near New Guinea. He described how Aru's trade was concentrated in Chinese or Makassarese hands; almost all were agents for Makassar-based merchants. Paduwakang and small schooners came from Makassar with the west wind, in January or February, returning with the east winds in June or July. During the pearling season local traders fanned out through the villages to buy the shell, coming back to Dobo to prepare their cargoes for shipping to Makassar. But, wrote van Hoëvell, "[i]n recent years the character of trade has changed, now that the steamers of the NISM call regularly at Dobo, and the *Batavia* ... sailed straight from Makassar to Aru, Kei and Geser, most products are carried by steamers.... If in 1857 there were still 15 large Makassar paduwakang that visited Aru each year, in 1885, 1886 and 1887 there were only four ... and in 1888 just one". But small *jungkus* from Gorom still came to Dobo in their usual numbers, about 40, bringing sago cakes and small boxes decorated with shells (*tatumbu*) to sell to the incomers. The Makassarese used to bribe local women with opium, wrote van Hoëvell, but by the 1880s they had to find their wives among the creole Muslims of the coastal groups.²⁴⁰ The *Batavia* was the same ship which had taken van Oldenburgh to New Guinea in 1881, as will be described below.

Van Hoëvell wrote of Aru:²⁴¹

The price of the birds of paradise has increased greatly in the last 20 years. If Wallace paid one bottle of arak for a couple of birds, when I was in Aru in March 1888 a pair of birds cost a whole cask of arak or fifteen bottles, representing a value of fl.12, while if one paid cash the

²³⁵ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, "De Aroe-eilanden, geographisch, ethnographisch en commercieel," *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 87.

²³⁶ Alwi, *Friends and Exiles*, 11–3. Broersma, "Koopvaardij," 38.

²³⁷ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 188.

²³⁸ Broersma, "Koopvaardij," 42–4. By c.1920 Geser had only 25 sea-going perahu left, but the Manowoko raja was still an entrepreneur, with over 30,000 nutmeg trees. He also traded in timber, buying ironwood from his subjects and selling it; he also traded in shells; if he had enough freight, he would ask the KPM steamer to call in at Manowoko.

²³⁹ *ENI*: "Gisser."

²⁴⁰ Hoëvell, "Aroe," 101.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 90–1.

asking price was fl.7.50. Moreover, the birds are becoming rarer. If once they could be found on the small islands by the beach, now they only occur in the interior of the larger islands.

His comments on the birds and on excessive tree-felling (see below) were later echoed by embryonic conservation movements.²⁴²

In the 1870s the value of non-textile imports into Aru was fl.149,725, more than two-thirds of the total of all imports, which was fl.231,800. Incoming cargoes of sago, rice, tobacco, opium and coconut oil were significant; without sago there would be famine. Arak spirits, to the tune of fl.27,000 were essential to both trade and social life.²⁴³ Arak had been introduced into Amboina by VOC in the mid-1600s, and by the mid-nineteenth century it was indispensable. "Arak, 12 to 13 per cent in strength, is imported by the Chinese in vats. They reduce the strength to 6 1/2 per cent by mixing it with various plant products, which increase its intoxicating effects, but are kept secret." It was so popular that it was found in the poorest huts; the thirst of men, women and children seemed insatiable.²⁴⁴ The Dutch believed that progress in the islands could not be achieved until it was possible "to prevent them from abusing strong drink, to which most of them are very addicted".²⁴⁵ The people of Seram were also "great lovers of strong drink".²⁴⁶

With the contraction of indigenous shipping Kei carpenters had lost their work on the large Makassar sailing ships, but traders still bought the small boats needed to navigate Aru's shallow channels.²⁴⁷ Control over Kei's forest was regulated by custom, as a "certain amount of uncultivated land belongs to each village, the boundaries of which are established by the chiefs; and here, according to Captain Langen [see below], the native may cut sago-palms or timber".²⁴⁸ The only purchasers for timber before 1886 were Makassarese and Arabs, who wanted rather small planks, as the boats could not handle larger; consequently, only about half of each tree felled was actually used. These traders had an ingenious system of payment by which sellers, both chiefs and commoners, had to choose between credit (*harga barang*) and cash (*harga kepeng*). Essentially, they were charged double if they took an advance of goods for subsequent trading, rather than accepting immediate cash on delivery.²⁴⁹

Steam shipping made timber exports easier. The local Makassarese traders working for the Kapitan China of Makassar used Tual as their base, shipping timber out on the *Batavia*. By then Tual, located on a protected strait in Kei Kecil, was also an Arab stronghold. Population and shipping increased further after the arrival of the German merchant

²⁴² Cribb, "Birds of Paradise."

²⁴³ Van der Crab, *De Moluksche eilanden*, 85–93. In 1859 Aru imported Western textiles to the value of fl.39,675, archipelago textiles for fl.82,075, and other European goods (metalware, arms) totalling fl.24,825.

²⁴⁴ Ludeking, "Amboina," 80. For a description of a convivial evening on Aru, see Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (New York: Dover, 1962), 351–2.

²⁴⁵ Bleeker, *Reis door de Minahassa*, 2: 293.

²⁴⁶ "Tets over Ceram en de Alfoeren," *BKI* 5, no. 1 (1856).

²⁴⁷ For an extensive description of Kei at the turn of the century, see Guillemard, *Compendium*.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, "De Kei-eilanden," *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volenkunde* 33 (1890): 184–6.

Captain A. Langen in 1886. He had a business in Kupang but came to Kei to open several plantations and a sawmill. Although he was Lutheran, Langen joined Resident van Hoëvell in approaching the Catholic authorities in Batavia, requesting that missionaries be sent to check the spread of Islam, which had made about 1,200 converts.²⁵⁰ Arab traders greatly increased the demand for the red dyestuff *bangkudu*, so the trees (*Morinda Citrifolia*) were cut down for the bark; by the late 1880s they had disappeared from Kei's exploited areas.²⁵¹ Van Hoëvell expected that by the end of the 1800s the forests would have lost their most valuable trees. In any case, the remaining "young forest" was preferred by the locals, as it was easier to clear for gardens.²⁵² He also commented that in the Southwestern islands wax could no longer be found on Kisar, because all the large trees had been felled, so it mostly came from nearby Romang.²⁵³

Tanimbar retained its forbidding reputation. Van Hoëvell commented "Foreigners still shun these islands, and rightly so, given the uncivilised nature of the inhabitants". The only cargoes on offer were tortoiseshell, trepang and hard *kamuning* wood (*Murraya paniculata*). Just two or three smaller ships came each year, and even Makassarese only dared to visit the two main harbours, where posthouders had been appointed in 1882, at Sera and Larut. They were both Ambonese who lived in a house-office, and carried out routine tasks, tried to encourage Christianity and occasionally organised punitive raids. They were provided with a couple of armed policemen for protection.²⁵⁴

In the 1880s Tanimbar's annual exports were estimated to be worth some 5,000 guilders, while imports of textiles, earthen-, copper- and iron-ware, tusks, arak, sundries, and illicit guns and gunpowder were valued at less than 6,000.²⁵⁵ Van Hoëvell pointed out that a price comparison between Tanimbar and Makassar might suggest a profit of 100 per cent, but explained:²⁵⁶

If you consider the expenses of the paduwakang during the voyage, and also take into account that often goods have to be advanced to the local chiefs on credit with the risk that the exchange goods will only be delivered the following year, then one can only conclude that no one is going to make a fortune trading at Tanimbar and the Timor-Laut islands.

²⁵⁰ Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1900: A Documented History* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), 432–6. Van Hoëvell was also responsible for re-Europeanizing the Kisar mestizos; J.S.C. Elkington, "The 'Mestizos' of Kisar, Dutch East Indies," *The Medical Journal of Australia* (1922). In the 1850s there were already distinct Christian and Muslim communities. "De Keij eilanden, ten N.W. van de Arroee-Eilanden," *BKI* 10, no. 4 (1863).

²⁵¹ Hoëvell, "De Kei-eilanden," *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 115–6. There was also trade in fur.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 184–6.

²⁵³ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, "De Afdeeling Babar en Leti-eilanden," *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 225–6. On indigenous timber use, see Roy Ellen, "Patterns of Indigenous Timber Extraction from Moluccan Rain Forest Fringes," *Journal of Biogeography* 12(1985).

²⁵⁴ G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, "Tanimbar en Timorlaoet-eilanden," *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 179–85. Marianne van Vuuren, *Ikat From Tanimbar* (Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2014).

²⁵⁵ J.G.F. Riedel, *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua* ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1886), 288–9. The exports were c. 300 pikul of trepang, about 4 of turtle-shell, 6 of sharksfins, 60 of mother-of-pearl, and 50 of wood.

²⁵⁶ Hoëvell, "Tanimbar," 184–5.



Image 44 Tanimbar canoe off Selaru, south of Yamdema, 1903²⁵⁷

The Raja Ampat, the Berau Gulf, Onin and Dore on Cenderawasih Bay were still West New Guinea's main trading centres.²⁵⁸ Here too steamers were changing old exchange patterns. In the 1870s visiting Italians encountered Bugis ships at Onin, which stayed there from March to December, travelling to other ports to distribute and accumulate cargoes. Shippers from the North Maluku sultanates, East Seram principalities and Chinese were still trading along the coasts, but the first steamers had also arrived.²⁵⁹ Around 1890 de Clercq met an Arab trader who had come to the Indies in 1862, lived in Gresik, and had been trading at Sekar island in Berau Bay since 1880. He spent a few months there each year, buying up produce and taking it back on the mail steamer. He complained about business but had accumulated 750 sacks of "wild" nutmeg, 7 pikul of massoi, and 200 birdskins.²⁶⁰ Many Chinese also came on the steamers; they bought slaves as temporary servants and sold them on when they left. "Numerous Arab, Chinese, Buginese and Goromese" ships brought rifles, gunpowder, opium and liquor. These combustible cargoes

²⁵⁷ "Tanimbarezen in een kano in de zee bij Selaroe". KITLV, 82659. Persistent url: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:936724>. Creative Commons CC BY License.

²⁵⁸ P.J.B.C. Robide van der Aa, *Reizen naar Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea: ondernomen op last der regeering van Nederlandsch-Indie in de jaren 1871, 1872, 1875–1876 / door de heeren P. Van der Crab and J.E. Teysmann, J.G. Coorengel en A.J. Langeveldt van Hemert en P. Swaan ; met geschied- en aardrijkskundige toelichtingen door P.J.B.C. Robide van der Aa.* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1879).

²⁵⁹ Holger Warnk, "The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011): 124–5. Goods traded included massoi, trepang, damar, birds, pearls, gold, nutmeg, sago in exchange for axes, knives, swords, textiles, beads and bracelets.

²⁶⁰ F.S.A. de Clercq, *De West- en Noordkust van Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea: Proeve van beschrijving volgens de mededeelingen en rapporten van reizigers en ambtenaren en naar eigen ervaringen* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1893), 125–6.

inevitably increased violence, and after several hunters had been killed the government forbade imports of drink and opium in 1888, no doubt to little effect.²⁶¹

Even towards the end of the nineteenth century the interiors of the larger islands remained virtually unknown, as were the more remote waters east of Seram and Halmahera. The local trade of the settled inhabitants of the Biak and Numfor Islands, just north of Cenderawasih Bay, was probably typical of many areas. The men fished, hunted turtles and trepang, while the women grew root crops and peanuts in their gardens. Occasional schooners from Ternate would call to trade, but if none appeared a small group of boats would sail to Dore and exchange their goods for ironware, blue cottons and other goods.²⁶² Even so, traders' agents could turn up in the most unlikely places. When J. van Oldenburgh visited the remote Mapia atoll, well north of Manokwari, he noted that a German and some English traders had called there. One of the latter had left a representative, "Harry", who was meant to stay there for three months buying up trepang and copra. He had already been there for six months and had no idea it was Dutch territory.²⁶³

In Papua, Dore remained the centre for the trade in birds' skins and damar. Bird plumes were increasingly in demand; exports were estimated to be worth fl.200 in 1865, and fl.1,680 in 1869. By the mid-1890s thirty Ternaten hunters had to pay porters twelve times the amount they had paid in the 1880s.²⁶⁴ Van Oldenburgh revisited Dore in 1881 and explained:²⁶⁵

I was struck by how much had changed in a three-year period ... a while ago the most common dress was the loincloth (*tjikado*) and now almost everyone is dressed in a shirt, trousers and head-cloth. The place is crawling with traders from Seram and elsewhere, and the village gets steadily bigger. It is a pity that opium is so much in demand here, so the increasing growth and prosperity will not last long.

Four Ternate schooners laden with damar were waiting for a fair wind when van Oldenburgh arrived, and he had missed the NISM steamer by a couple of days. But contact with the interior remained limited; people there refused to let strangers seek birds and resins, saying "the forests are ours".²⁶⁶ Colonial authority was established in 1894 when Tidore signed a new treaty with the Dutch. The first permanent administrative posts at Fakfak (near Onin) and Manokwari (close to Dore) were established in 1898. A 1900 supplement compensated the sultan of Tidore for Batavia taking over import and export duties.²⁶⁷

²⁶¹ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 185–206.

²⁶² Oldenburgh, "Verslag eener reis," 410–33.

²⁶³ Clercq, *De West- en Noordkust*, 125–6.

²⁶⁴ Pamela Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands until 1920* (Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996), 131, 213.

²⁶⁵ Oldenburgh, "Verslag eener reis," 435.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 410–33.

²⁶⁷ Dirk Vlasblom, *Papoea: een geschiedenis* (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2004), 49–54.

Bali-Lombok

Rice continued to be the economic mainstay of Balinese-ruled Lombok.²⁶⁸ Collaboration with King and Lange in the 1830s and 1840s had facilitated the integration of Bali and Lombok into long-range Western shipping. An account of Lombok's trade revenue depicts a particularly tight system of taxes in 1884. There were thirty different farmers for exports, including thirteen for rice and five for cotton. The two most valuable imports, opium and gambir, were each leased to a single individual; together these farms brought in almost 50,000 Spanish dollars each year. Another four bandar collected tolls at minor ports. Some leaseholders also had to deliver specific goods to the ruler, particularly gunpowder and ammunition. The Chinese tobacco farmer, for example, had to provide 30 pikul of gunpowder and 40 pikul of ammunition, while the quota of the hides farmer was 20 pikul of gunpowder and 30 pikul of ammunition p.a.²⁶⁹

There was considerable competition among shippers seeking cargoes of Lombok rice. Singapore's Wee Bin had two steamers on this route, cutting into KPM profits. When the latter reduced these loss-making services, however, there was a political outcry in Batavia and The Hague at the undermining of Dutch influence. One of the Lombok ruler's key advisors was Sayyid Abdullah bin Abdulkadir Jelani, a man deeply distrusted by colonial officials. This prominent Arab trader had been born in Surabaya, to a father from Mosul, Iraq; family members were ship owners with ties to many ports, including Banjarmasin. He himself had been a bandar at Badung but came to Lombok when his situation in Bali became too precarious. He was harbourmaster of Ampenen in the 1870s, collecting anchorage fees and specific taxes not covered by tax-farms, such as the royal levy on livestock exports (fl. 25 for horses, fl.7.50 for cattle). In 1887 he replaced the KPM's agent, to the frustration of the company. Sayyid Abdullah was also an active rice exporter, textile importer, and agent for the NISM, maintaining close ties with Singapore and Buleleng. However, he was vulnerable; his killing of four runaway slaves angered the Dutch, and he fell foul of court factionalism. He was executed in 1891. Policy did not change, since he was replaced by another Arab, Sayyid Abdul Rachman Alhabshi, a favourite of the king's anti-Dutch son. By 1894 there were thought to be about thirty Arab traders active in the Lombok interior.²⁷⁰

For some 30 years Batavia had confined its Balinese interests to Buleleng and Jembrana while the other kingdoms engaged in a series of wars. But in the more aggressive colonial mood of the 1890s a cascade of crises led to Dutch intervention. In 1891 Balinese Karangasem confronted Klungkung, so the Lombok Karangasem king raised Sasak troops and sent them to fight in Bali. Muslim subjects in east Lombok rebelled, and called for Dutch assistance, so providing an excuse for the invasion of July 1894.²⁷¹ Initially the KNIL troops were unopposed, but in August they were attacked unexpectedly, with a loss of over a hundred Europeans in 24 hours, the blackest day in the history of the force. A surge of nationalism arose in the Netherlands. After a second invasion Lombok's Balinese rulers, recognising the inevitability of defeat, died in a ritualised suicidal attack,

²⁶⁸ Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 184–92.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 243.

²⁷⁰ J. van Goor, "Said Abdullah, Politicus in de marge van het imperium," in *Kooplieden, Predikanten en Bestuurders Overzee*, ed. J. Van Goor (Utrecht: HES, 1982). Parimartha, "Perdagangan," 244–51.

²⁷¹ Alfons Van der Kraan, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980).

or *puputan*. Lombok came under direct Dutch rule, as part of the Residency of Bali and Lombok. Unrest in the Sasak territories continued.²⁷² Towards the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries much of east (Karengasem, 1895) and central Bali (Bangli 1904) was taken under colonial rule without violence, but it required bloody military action to subdue Tabanan, Badung (both 1906) and then Klungkung (1908).²⁷³

The KPM had shared, indeed had encouraged, Batavia's concerns about Lombok, and did good business both during the invasions and subsequently. The government chartered vessels for the transport of troops, labourers and supplies, and the KPM received the lucrative contract to supply the new administration in Dutch Lombok. In early August the KPM replaced Sayyid Abdul Rachman Alhabshi in Ampenan with a European agent; a representative was also returned to the east coast. The Sayyid was arrested on charges of espionage.²⁷⁴

Lombok's trade was restricted to Ampenan, Labuhan Haji and Piju, where colonial duties were imposed: exports at 5 per cent, imports at 4 per cent. "Chinese" vessels—apart from those of Indies subjects—were not permitted to enter any Lombok port. Opium was brought under government control. The Major of the Buleleng Chinese lost his lease of opium imports, as well his (and Wee Bin's) virtual monopoly on livestock exports, as the Company launched its own cattle lighter. The Major himself, wrote the KPM agent, "had walked into the snare"; his house on Bali was searched and a considerable amount of illegally imported weapons had been found. The KPM was delighted at their rival's misfortunes.²⁷⁵

At the beginning of the 1900s Bali's main outgoing commodities all went to Singapore; the most valuable were copra, coffee and live cattle, carried by Chinese and Bugis shippers. Lombok's rice exports had been halted in 1894 to ensure adequate supplies on the island, but by 1904 there were modest exports. Some copra and cotton was sent to Europe. Lombok also supplied considerable amounts of tobacco as well as onions and the dye bengkudu to indigenous markets. Local and regional trade was lively; the former was almost entirely in the hands of Balinese women, while the latter was conducted by Armenians, Chinese, Arabs, Malays and Buginese.²⁷⁶

Eastern Nusa Tenggara

By the end of the nineteenth century Chinese and Arabs were displacing Bugis and Makassarese traders in eastern Nusa Tenggara. The small shops of the former provided

²⁷² Ibid. Henk Schulte Nordholt, *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics 1650–1940* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 197–200. Cees Fasseur, "De Schat Van Lombok," in *De Weg Naar Paradijs En Andere Indische Geschiedenissen* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995).

²⁷³ Willard A. Hanna and Tim Hannigan, *A Brief History Of Bali: Piracy, Slavery, Opium and Guns: The Story of an Island Paradise* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 2016). Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 120.

²⁷⁴ Campo, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*, 172–84.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 178–83.

²⁷⁶ Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie*, 2: 488–91. In 1904 Bali exports of copra were worth fl.591,928; coffee, fl.366,552; cattle, fl. 391,968. Singapore also received 265,902 kg of raw cotton.

credit and handled export and import commodities, while Arabs specialised in trading livestock, particularly horses. Registered horse exports from Timor and Sumbawa peaked in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when at least 2,000 a year were being shipped out, more than double the numbers of the 1870s.²⁷⁷ Chinese continued to dominate trade at Kupang and Atapupu, although the small Arab community's handful of shippers operated on as large a scale as the top four Chinese. Sandalwood was still exported through Kupang and Atapupu, coming mainly from Timor and Sumba, without any replenishment of the forests. Makassar's sandalwood exports were of an inferior quality; most came from the Leti islands, but some from Palu.²⁷⁸

Local Dutch officials in Kupang were unhappy. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Fokko Fokkens, (acting Resident 1898–99), summed up his frustrations in his contribution to the *ENI*: “[t]he expansion of our administration on Timor did not lead to any extension of our influence in the interior; the policy of abstention was applied too strictly, so nothing was done to advance civilisation, development and welfare outside the directly ruled area. The situation remained the same as it had for centuries before we claimed the island”.²⁷⁹ By 1907 Dutch control in Timor was well established, although opposition in the northwest continued until 1915.

A Portuguese writer on East Timor described the local economy as being in a *primitivo estado*.²⁸⁰ However, intense exploitation began towards the end of the century. Coffee production in Portuguese Timor peaked in the early 1880s, at c. 2,500 tons, and cultivation extended further east of the island. High export duties generated Portuguese profits, but military attempts to enforce compliance proved counterproductive; unrest spread. From 1894 Governor José Celestin de Silva (serving under Macau 1894–96, and as head of a separate colony, 1896–1908) pushed “pacification”. A Portuguese military commentator summarised priorities: “Without stringent punishment, without an effective and responsible occupation which subdues and disempowers the treacherous regalos [rulers]...our dominion will remain as it is now, fictitious”.²⁸¹ Artillery and troops with African experience fought rebels, particularly in the border zone.²⁸² After his official retirement in 1897 de Silva founded the *Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho* (SAPT); this private enterprise encompassed thousands of hectares in the Ermara mountains south-east of Dili. In 1899 new labour laws obliged the chiefs to deliver workers to both government and private plantations.²⁸³ The coffee boom benefited Portuguese but was hard on the Timorese growers.

²⁷⁷ Parimartha, “Perdagangan,” 205–18.

²⁷⁸ *ENI*: “Sandelhout”.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ Geoffrey C. Gunn, *History of Timor* (Lisbon: ISEG-Universidade de Lisboa, 2010), 68.

²⁸¹ Andrey Damalado, *Divided Loyalties: Displacement, Belonging and Citizenship among East Timorese in West Timor* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2018), 28. Damalado takes the quotation from K. Davidson, “The Portuguese Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850–1912” (University of New South Wales, 1994), 193.

²⁸² Damalado, *Divided Loyalties*, 27–31.

²⁸³ Christopher J. Shepherd and Andrew McWilliam, “Cultivating Plantations and Subjects in East Timor: A Genealogy,” *BKI* 169, no. 326–61 (2013): 329–33. Gerald Telkamp, “The Economic Structure of an Outpost in the Outer Islands in the Indonesian Archipelago: Portuguese Timor 1850–1975,” in *Between*

Little changed on Sumbawa and Flores, although on Sumbawa falling sandalwood supplies and markets jeopardised colonial interests. As world prices declined the Dutch government was losing money. A new contract in 1875 no longer required sandalwood deliveries but included a stringent prohibition on the Sultan granting any planting or mining concessions without Batavia's approval.²⁸⁴ Meanwhile Bima remained tied to shipping networks linking Makassar, Bone, Selayar, Bonerate, Bali, Lombok, Java, and Singapore. The main traders were Makassarese, Buginese and Arabs; the few Chinese generally stayed only a few years. The usual exports were exchanged for the usual imports; a duty of 3 per cent was levied.²⁸⁵

From the colonial point of view Flores was divided into three: the west (Manggarai) was under Bima and hence administered from Makassar; the centre, often called Ende, was virtually independent, while east Flores or Larantuka was governed from Timor. The colonial *Encyclopaedia* outlined the state of various settlements towards the end of the 1800s. Each had their own loyalties and interests; there were frequent border conflicts among the Catholic rajas of Larantuka and the less important Sikka, in the northeast and southeast respectively, and the Muslim rulers of the islands Adonara and Solor off the east end of Flores.²⁸⁶ Muslims were also well established in areas that had traditionally looked to South Sulawesi. Geliting, the main Muslim settlement on the east central stretch of the north coast, was the site of a market where the hill people could exchange cotton, tobacco, pineapples and tamarind for imports. In 1884 a Dutchman was told by Daeng Palipu that he had been appointed to lead Geliting by the ruler of Gowa.²⁸⁷ Ende on the south shore was a more considerable settlement; the coast and eponymous island were ruled by a raja, while twenty villages were governed by their own headmen. The number of inhabitants at the end of the 1800s was thought to be 15,000–19,000. They lived from the labour of their male and female slaves, who cultivated maize and wove textiles; free men worked as rowers or shippers. Trade with Bali, Singapore and above all Sumba was estimated to be worth about fl.100,000.²⁸⁸ Ende was supervised by a junior Dutch official based in Sumba, because of the close if not harmonious connections between the two.

People and Statistics, ed. Francien van Anrooij, et al. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979). Douglas Kammen, *Three Centuries of Conflict in East Timor* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015).

²⁸⁴ J. Noorduyn, *Bima en Sumbawa: Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Sultanaten Bima en Sumbawa door A. Ligvoet en G. P. Rouffaer* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1987), 129–39, 153–63. See articles 28 and 29 of the 1857 treaty, and article 12 from 1875. *ENI*: “Sumbawa.”

²⁸⁵ Imports were: textiles, silks, European yarns, earthen-iron- and copper-ware, strong drink (mainly arak and brandy), opium, gambir, salt, rattan, weapons, gunpowder, lead, Chinese copper coins, brown and white sugar, syrup, and rice from Bali and Lombok. Exports were: horses, buffalo, goats, *dendeng* (dried meat of deer or cattle), hides, wax, honey, birds' nests, trepang, tortoiseshell, *kamiri* nuts, tamarind, *jarak* and *jarak* oil (castor oil), coffee, mung beans, onions, *kasumba* (seed derived yellow dye-stuff), cotton, rice, jackfruit, copra, mats, and coarse textiles. D.F. van Braam Morris, “Nota van toelichting behorende bij het contract gesloten met het Landschap Bima op den 20sten October 1886” *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 34 (1891): 194. See also Henri Chambert-Loir, “State, City, Commerce: The Case of Bima,” *Indonesia* 57 (1994).

²⁸⁶ *ENI*: “Flores,” 525–6.

²⁸⁷ Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, 130, note 6.

²⁸⁸ *ENI*: “Flores,” 525–6.



Image 45 East Ende women (Flores) carrying rice to market, date unknown²⁸⁹

The Maumere postholder (1879) was subordinate to Larantuka to the east. Round the end of the nineteenth century Maumere, also known as *Kleine Sikka* (Little Sikka) was a complex of some 90 houses in four villages, housing about 400 people. Located on the narrowest part of the island, Maumere was only about 35 kilometres from the da Silva raja's settlement at Sikka Natar on the south coast. Maumere, which had a long history of trade, was visited by Bugis who brought cloth, bushknives (*parang*), elephant tusks, porcelain, gold and copper to exchange for tamarind and *gelo* or kemiri nuts (*Aleurites moluccana*). It became the main town of Sikka.²⁹⁰

During the 1880s investors were queuing for access to Flores, many hoping for mineral wealth. The Dutch military, guarantor of security, intervened to quell unrest in 1887, 1889 and 1890; these expeditions were primarily intended to provide security for anticipated tin production, which did not develop.²⁹¹ By the end of the 1800s the KPM steamer was visiting once a month. It was only after the 1910 introduction of a head tax that more diverse exports developed, most notably copra and other tree crops. Nonetheless, there were a series of village wars in the following years.²⁹²

²⁸⁹ "Een groep vrouwen uit Oost-Ende met rijstzakken op het hoofd op weg naar de markt". Photograph C.C.F.M. Le Roux. KIT/NMVW TM-10006065. Deeplink: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11840/214249>. CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication. By permission of the Museum.

²⁹⁰ Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, 127–31; *ENI*: "Flores," 525–6. By 1907 Maumere was a base for a military garrison base and armed police, and by 1916 it was the most important trading centre on Flores' north coast with a population of 1,272 and separate Christian and Muslim kampong. Catholic missionaries had arrived at the end of the nineteenth century.

²⁹¹ Teitler, "Adat Law."

²⁹² Joachim K. Metzner, *Agriculture And Population Pressure in Sikka, Isle Of Flores*: (Canberra: ANU, 1982), 80, 107–8, 141. Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, 84–99.

Early twentieth century exports from both Flores and Sumba were still very traditional. Cinnamon, sappan- and sandalwood, coconut oil, cotton, cotton cloths, tobacco, tamarind, birds' nests, wax, turtle-shell and trepang were the main Flores exports, while from Sumba came fine timbers, including dyewoods, as relatively untouched forests were exploited. Endenese continued to control Sumba's trade, while assorted shippers from Bima, Bugis and Makassar territories, Buton, Selayar and the Ende settlements on Sumba bartered for goods along the coasts of Flores.²⁹³

Controleur Roos was in a difficult situation on Sumba. In 1873 after an attempt was made to expel Batavia's officials he wrote to his superior that the Sumbanese only respected strength, which the Dutch clearly lacked. This problem was solved when he made an alliance with the raja of Seba (Haba) on neighbouring Savu, invoking the 1756 contract. Savunese auxiliaries were mobilised for the subsequent 1874 punitive expedition to Sumba. During the following decades they were extensively used for "disciplining" Sumba rulers and Ende traders. Batavia's strategic priority was to prevent any common cause uniting Endehnese and Savunese. Continuing insecurity led to the replacement of the Dutch controleurs by three lesser officials after 1879; a posthouder remained at Waingapu.²⁹⁴ This was still an enclave inhabited by foreigners. In 1879 the main traders were 13 Arabs and 3 others, probably Endenese. The following year the total Waingapu population was thought to be less than 500, including 70 Buginese and the same number of Endehnese, 300 Savunese, 17 Arabs and a mere 35 Sumbanese. Until 1876 the preeminent horse (and slave) trader was still Sayyid 'abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr al-Qadri; Batavia finally exiled him to Timor where he died a year later.²⁹⁵ Slaves were mainly shipped from Memboro, on the north coast. Firearms were a highly prized import; a gun could be obtained in exchange for a horse, a slave or 60 kilos of wax.²⁹⁶

In the 1880s the situation began to change, albeit slowly. The first Dutch Protestant missionary arrived in 1881.²⁹⁷ Colonial intervention became slightly more forceful, with the posthouder arresting some slave traders. Exports of slaves to Bali and Lombok were obstructed, as were weapon imports; the horse trade expanded. By 1884 the

²⁹³ Blink, *Nederlandsch Oost-en West-Indie*, 2: 494–6.

²⁹⁴ D.K. Wielenga, *Soemba*, *Onze zendingsvelden* ('s-Gravenhage: Zendings-studieraad, 1926), 7–17. *ENI*: "Soemba". See also: S. Roos, *Kennis van taal, land en volk op Soemba*, vol. 33, *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap* (Batavia: Bruining & Wijt, 1872).

²⁹⁵ Clarence-Smith, "Horse Trading," 146–7, 151, 155. Parimarta, "Perdagangan," 138, 147–8, 265. H. Kapita, *Sumba Di Dalam Jangkauan Jaman* (Waingapu: Panitia Penerbit Naskah-naskah Kebudayaan Daerah Sumba, 1980), 16–29. From 1866 to 1873 a junior Dutch official with 12 policemen was established in a less hostile Savunese settlement in order to buy horses for the Indies government, but constant unrest and insecurity led to his withdrawal; *ENI*: "Soemba."

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Janet Hoskins, "The Heritage of Headhunting: History, Ideology, and Violence on Sumba, 1890–1990," in *Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia*, ed. Janet Hoskins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

²⁹⁷ Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, 151. Steenbrink is mistaken in the 1878 date for the first controleur; that was a year of administrative restructuring, but controleurs had been precariously present since 1866. The Catholics disputed the Protestants rights to Sumba's souls, and the first priest arrived in 1889. However, the difficulties in the various bureaucracies, religious and secular, and in Sumba itself, led to the departure of the Catholics in 1898.

open shipping of slaves had almost ceased.²⁹⁸ Waingapu again became the base of the controleur, supported by postholders at Melolo and Memboro.²⁹⁹ But despite the gradually increasing colonial presence, killings continued during the 1890s, the result of competition, feuds and ritual demands. In 1890 the Dutch authorities still knew almost nothing of Sumba; the population was variously estimated at between 42,000 and a million, the number of petty states at between 10 and 35.³⁰⁰ The inhabitants were concentrated in the west, where villages of no more than 20 houses were protected by heavy palisades or rock walls, with a single, defensible entrance. Constant warfare was marked by the burning of villages and the seizing of people and livestock; settlements often disappeared “in the final act of a frequently short, but bloody, tragedy”.³⁰¹ Mountain Endenese were brought in as mercenaries. Yet Sumba produced large amounts of cotton, also tobacco, indigo, wild nutmeg and other forest commodities, valuable timbers, dyestuffs, tamarind and palm products. Weaving, mostly done by women slaves, was highly developed. Wealth was expressed in terms of horses and slaves; the rajahs of the many small domains had unbridled power.³⁰²

Raja Umbu Tunggu died in 1892; his successor, and nephew, proved equally recalcitrant. At the end of the 1800s the colonial *Encyclopaedia* noted:³⁰³

He [the Raja of Lewa] is usually accompanied on his voyages of robbery and plunder by the infamous mountain-Endenese, who still cause terrible suffering among the real Sumbanese. In particular, these Endenese play a great role in the still extant slave-trade of Sumba, which the government tries to hinder. For some time, measures have been taken to curb the immigration of Endenese as far as possible.

The conclusion was that “Sumba can only be described as a place of conflict and devastation; even in the recent past no improvement has been apparent”.³⁰⁴

In 1900 an army captain was stationed at Waingapu. When two slave weavers, fearing death for a broken thread, sought refuge with him, he sent an urgent message by steamer to Makassar. Some days later a warship with marines arrived. Savunese and Endenese auxiliaries were mobilised and the Raja of Lewa and his allies were defeated. But change was superficial; it was not until Aceh-hardened forces arrived and conquered Ende and Manggarai on Flores that the region was “pacified”; civilian administration was introduced in 1907.³⁰⁵ Sumba traditions record a number of nascent rajadoms, particularly in east

²⁹⁸ Clarence-Smith, “Horse Trading.”

²⁹⁹ Wielenga, *Soemba*, 20–2.

³⁰⁰ *ENI*: “Soemba, Tjendana of Sandelhout Eiland,” 4.

³⁰¹ *ENI*: “Soemba.”

³⁰² *Ibid.* For an account of the importance of textiles, see Jill Forshee, *Between the Folds: Stories of Cloth, Lives, and Travels from Sumba* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001).

³⁰³ *ENI*: “Soemba.”

³⁰⁴ *ENI*: “Soemba.”

³⁰⁵ Wielenga, *Soemba*, 17–23.

Sumba; these were reorganised and recognised by the Dutch in the first two decades of the twentieth century.³⁰⁶

The missionary D.K. Wielenga, who arrived in Sumba in 1904, has left a thinly veiled fictional account of Waingapu.³⁰⁷ The port was “an amazing mixture of various tribes settled on that dry, stony chalk plateau, projecting into the sea like a small cape. It was enclosed by the sea on three sides, while on the land side entry was through a broad wooden door in the middle of the cactus hedge, which was metres deep and meters high”. The capital-rich Arabs controlled the horse trade. Wielenga wrote:³⁰⁸

[There were also] a few Chinese who, in addition to their store, also sought to earn a living by buying up yellow root dye-stuff and the rare sandalwood, because there were few other export products.... Imports consisted mainly of rice and cotton cloths, petroleum and alcohol, not to mention the smuggling of opium, gunpowder and guns. Endehe and Buginese, Savunese and Rotinese, and people from islands throughout the archipelago had built their huts there and tried with all manner of intermediate trade to live at the expense of the Sumbanese.

The Dutch official lived on the highest point of the chalk rock, where he raised and lowered the flag. Every evening the Sumbanese had to leave the port area, and the gate was closed; a policeman stood guard at night. He was one of a total force of three men, armed with old guns and sabres. “Neither the Sumbanese nor the traders paid much attention to the official. They let him talk and took care that he neither heard nor saw too much.”

³⁰⁶ In east Sumba Napu was formed c. 1860, while Rende, and later Larendu and Waijelu, traced themselves back to the early 1890s; Manyili claimed a much longer heritage (seventeenth century) than Melolo and Lewa (eighteenth century). Kanatang and Kapunduk preceded Karera which claimed 1892 as its origin and was joined with Mahu (formed c.1909) in 1912. Less was recorded of Riung and Kambara. In Southwest Sumba Kodi was restructured from 1902 and signed the Short Declaration in 1913; nine small domains were brought into Wewewa, which signed in the same year; Lauli (3 sub-domains) followed in 1923. In West Sumba Lamboya (3 domains) signed in 1913, as did Anakalang. In central Sumba the realm of Tapundang (mid-nineteenth century) and Lawonda (c. 1880) signed in 1916 as did Mamboru. Jack Tenabalo, “Kerajaan-kerajaan di Sumba”: <http://jacktenabolo18.blogspot.com/2014/12/kerajaan-kerajaan-di-sumba-masyarakat.html>.

³⁰⁷ D.K. Wielenga, *Marapoe: Een verhaal uit Soemba* (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1932), 135–47.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 146–7.

I began this book because I was intrigued by the enduring juxtaposition of trans-oceanic trade and small-scale societies. The result is a narrative framed by changing systems of exchange, rather than political expansion. I suggested that in the absence of coercive polities, it was the desire for connection and commodities that forged enduring bonds. Habitual social practice preserved the knowledge that enabled trade to continue. Relationships were to be central to my story, rather than entities defined by assumed essential characteristics.

However, despite my conviction that it is misleading to attribute agency to reified entities such as ethnic groups and states, they remain implicit actors in my glimpsed histories. The sources made this inevitable; all we can do is query the assumptions that cluster around such external labels. This is no neutral matter. Post-war independent governments have regularly been confronted with issues of “representation, resources, rights and recognition”.¹ Both “tribal” societies and those with weakly institutionalised polities are still engaged in processes of self-redefinition, replacing externally imposed categorisations with new designations, such as Lumad, or seeking retrospective evidence of local state formation that might compel respect. Sumba is an example of the latter. Individuals, group movements, government agencies, local and foreign scholars are all constructing useable pasts for eastern archipelago peoples, stories that can underwrite identities and status.

Outsiders’ perceptions and priorities have also shaped the periodisation and structure of my narrative, which is cast in terms of an expanding global economy and emerging colonial states. There was little alternative, given the spatial and temporal scale of this book. For although traders, envoys and foreign officials had limited aims, their geopolitical strategies and commercial priorities made them locate their observations within relatively wide horizons. Conversely, indigenous communities’ understanding of local and regional events was richer and much more subtly differentiated. Some, albeit abstract, appreciation of basic patterns can be achieved through reference to Austronesian characteristics.

From the external perspective we can conclude that there were three main periods of accelerated transition in the eastern archipelagos. In the first, violent intrusions by the Dutch East India Company disrupted regional politics and trade in early seventeenth-

¹ Anders-Sjögren, “Territorialising Identity, Authority and Conflict in Africa: An Introduction,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 33, no. 2 (2015). See also Stephan Feuchtwang, ed., *Making Place: State Projects, Globalisation and Local Responses in China* (London: University of London College Press, 2004).

century Maluku. The spice trade was truncated and politics became less predictable as European priorities distorted regional politics. Around a hundred years later, the rising fortunes of the British in India, China's re-engagement, and the integrative role of Bugis networks reinvigorated private traffic. In the mid- to later 1800s technology was the great transformer. Steam, improved weaponry and growing European self-confidence initiated colonial consolidation in the final decade of the century.

Such transregional involvements were uneven in their impacts. The development of Portuguese networks and settlements, the VOC's destruction of the Muslim spice trade and defeat of Makassar, the expansion of China's shipping from the late Ming onwards—all shaped the lives of those involved in commodity exports. Some societies, such as those in the Banda and Ambon islands, were transformed; others relatively untouched. Effects rippled outwards. In many cases new economic opportunities were absorbed into flexible existing structures. Local circumstances refracted external influences, interpreting and adapting elements that seemed advantageous. As yet, we know too little of these societies to confidently interpret these processes or place them in a comparative context. This book is a step in that direction. The following short sections review the main lines of the narrative and the relevance of this theme in contemporary Southeast Asia. In conclusion, I consider possible benefits of this enterprise.

The Narrative

Within the eastern archipelagos basic geography ensured that certain coastal sites were particularly attractive to passing ships. Some remained mere stopovers, but relatively powerful polities tended to recur when the advantages of location were supplemented by access to commodities. Goods travelled along seaways and the "roads and passages" which connected Austronesian as well as Melanesian communities. Interior markets could be little more than regular meeting places between settlements, while beaches might be sparsely inhabited until the trading season began. Neutral ground for markets may have been marked by signs and protected by supernatural sanctions. Rivers on Borneo were spanned by cords, hung with warning signs. Maumere on the north coast of Flores developed on a spiritually important site well before the sixteenth century. Ivory, gongs and other prestige goods embodied mutual obligations and rights, while complex sets of relationships such as New Guinea's *sosolot* and *kain timur* traditions stabilised links.

Gatekeepers, skimming benefits from trade, were typical of early periods when there were few recognised and safe exchange points. The power of such figures should not be exaggerated. Most seas, shores and forests were unclaimed; states were localised and intermittent. Subsistence systems and procurement economies enhanced independence. In many of the eastern islands the basic carbohydrate was sago, which was easily obtained, transported and conserved. Swidden cultivation of tubers, rice and later maize fed inland settlements. Foragers beyond the reach of ruling elites produced prized marine and forest commodities. Both production and consumption were difficult to control, but the exchange of goods between interiors, coasts and diverse ecologies encouraged connections. Patrons received tribute and services, clients gained protection and prestige.

Successive domains did not necessarily emerge in the same place, but clustered around well-watered and safer sites where routes converged. The southern Philippines, astride

the sea corridor connecting the South China Sea with Maluku and the Banda Sea, was one such strategic zone. The eastern Java Sea, with its well-travelled waters, was another. Trade nurtured comparatively strong states along Java's northern coast, in East Java itself, in southeast Kalimantan, southwest Sulawesi and Bali. These also benefited from levies on their peasantry. Rice was available in Southwest Sulawesi, while forest products, gold, and pepper attracted shippers to Banjarmasin. Bali was a stopover on first century Java-Maluku trading routes. Ternate and Tidore were successful examples of island entrepot, benefiting from their position on the main passage connecting the South China Sea and the clove and nutmeg producing islands.

Between these strategic nodes were expansion zones, sources of foodstuffs and commodities, where commitments were provisional and exchange habitual. Northeast Borneo was Sulu's neighbouring frontier, while Maguindanau, dependent on the Pulangi basin, challenged Ternate in the Sangihe and Talaud islands and northern Sulawesi. From the late sixteenth century Ternate also asserted itself in eastern Sulawesi, leveraging its access to European allies. After its Dutch-enforced exclusion from the spice trade, Tidore's focus was on the old migration and exchange axis linking east Halmahera to the Raja Ampat and Cenderawasih Bay. Southwest Sulawesi rulers competed in the Gulf of Bone, and reached south to Sumbawa and eastern Lombok, confronting Bali. Bima in turn took tribute from West Flores, while Balinese realms claimed nearby east Java, Lombok and Sumbawa. Subordinate rulers in east Sulawesi's Banggai and Buton gained room for manoeuvre by playing Ternate, Makassar and the VOC against each other.

North Borneo's old trading centre of Brunei waned from the mid-seventeenth century on, and settlers from the Sulu Sultanate moved to neighbouring northeastern Borneo territories. Their competing coastal chiefdoms needed rice from the interior, and a system of markets called *tamu* ("guest") developed, held on neutral ground sanctified by oaths and marked by sacred stones.² More than a century later, the sea-focussed Sama Bajau who lived round Kolaka Bay in the Bone Gulf went to cyclical *pasa janci* (Malay: *pasar janji*, "promised or agreed market") to exchange foraged commodities for foodstuffs.³ These encounters unfolded according to social protocols, which mitigated the considerable risks. Exchange could "be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor", to quote Bourdieu.⁴

Typical polities were loose federations. When interests were aligned or exceptional leaders had achieved pre-eminence, concerted action was possible. On their peripheries, mobile societies warily maintained ties with traders and chiefs, kept to their own territories or opted out of negative relationships. There were very few states which could "mobilise manpower to hold and defend an advantageous position along trade routes".⁵ If upland

² D.S. Ranjit Singh, "Structure of the Indigenous Economy in Sabah in the 1860s and 1870s," in *Historia*, ed. Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur, and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Historical Society, 1984), 398.

³ Basrin Melamba, *Kota Pelabuhan Kolaka Di Teluk Bone, 1906–1942* (Denpasar: Pustaka Larasan, 2011), 128. These markets are still remembered by Sama Bajo communities in north Flores; Lance Nolde, "Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2014), 301.

⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 53.

⁵ James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale, 2009), 33.

Southeast Asians on the mainland sought to escape the state, many eastern archipelago people were barely bothered. It was nineteenth-century colonial regimes which began the paradoxical territorialisation of the high seas.⁶

Even the most powerful states tended to be agglomerations within which their constituent parts retained many of their own rights. Patron-client ties, the (re)distribution of goods, intermarriage, rituals, violence, and the astute manipulation of personal bonds shaped fluctuating levels of inter-dependence. Kin-groups and factions competed at the highest levels, regional chiefs claimed autonomy and subordinate communities defended their rights. The few relatively centralised polities kept a tight grip on their core regions. The strongest could send out military expeditions to intimidate and pillage, as when Talloq and its Sama Bajau allies sailed south, or Ternate or Tidore mobilised the hongis. These fleets may have resulted in more tribute, at least for a while, but the overlords' power would remain intermittent unless elite blood-ties were established, and migration created new settlements with enduring connections to their homelands. An alternative *modus vivendi* occurred when delegates from the centre lived alongside, and negotiated with, subordinate rajas.

From the fifteenth century increased interactions with foreigners offered new opportunities and challenges to leaders on a few strategic islands. In Ternate and Tidore there were already sultanates when the Europeans arrived; the rulers used their ties with the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch to consolidate their realms. Ultimately, they had to accept a role defined by Batavia. On Banda and the Ambon islands orang kaya provided initial points of access, but there was no single interlocutor able to deliver the goods to incoming merchants. On Dutch Ambon, the orang kaya ended up as subordinate chiefs organising production; on Banda they were simply eliminated.

Penetration by skipper-traders grew steadily in the late eighteenth century. Appetites converged to drive new commercial relationships. The West's thirst for tea, China's hunger for sea and forest products, and the eastern archipelagos' desire for imports drove supply and demand. In the late 1700s Nuku was able to defy the weakened VOC, exchanging goods and sea-borne fighting men for guns and support from the English. The expansion of commercial shipping and local crises encouraged the growth of piracy, as raiders from the Sulu Sea ravaged the archipelagos' shores. Peaceful buyers also visited once remote coasts, seeking partners to guarantee cargoes.

The intertwining of commercial networks, chiefs and producers proved very resilient, but came under increasing pressure as the range of variables requiring management increased. British, Chinese and Bugis interests converged. Ramifying ties between shippers and communities undermined indigenous leaders who lacked the contacts and sophistication to engage with the outside world. During the 1800s production of tobacco, coffee and later copra expanded. Consumption patterns also changed. The effects of more efficient weapons and tools, of changing diets, and of addictive consumption goods such as alcohol, opium and tobacco must have been pervasive and profound long before the changes of the mid-nineteenth century.

⁶ On contemporary Southeast Asia, see Edyta Roszko, "Maritime Territorialisation as Performance of Sovereignty and Nationhood in the South China Sea," *Nations and Nationalism* 21, no. 2 (2015). See also John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson, *Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017).



Image 46 Gathering giant clams and view of the Island of Oubi, from Bacan, 1779⁷

Steam and increasing cooperation between colonial powers broke the main raiding fleets in the mid-1800s. However, the Netherlands Indies colonial state was highly localised until the end of the nineteenth century. Maluku's Spice Islands had been the most striking example of early rule, but during the 1800s Manado was also forced into intensive agricultural production for overseas markets. Both remained exceptional until steamships breached the divide between effectively Dutch-controlled and nominally subject or allied regions. By the mid-nineteenth century Manila uneasily cohabited with the coastal datu of Maguindanau; Sulu's 1876 defeat remained essentially military. During the final decades of the nineteenth century extensive webs of steam shipping centred on ports such as Makassar, Surabaya and Singapore, or Manila, Zamboanga and Sandakan, replaced long-range voyaging by indigenous sailors; they also stimulated the growth of feeder routes.

Britain's industrialisation, naval power and final victory over Napoleonic France increased London's interest in "free trade"; by the 1840s mercantilist ideas had been marginalised. The weak Spanish merchant class in the Philippines was incorporated into British-led trading systems; The Hague and Madrid reluctantly and temporarily modified their protective instincts. Singapore, and later Hong Kong, functioned as new beachheads for the Anglo-Chinese alliance; this depended in turn on indigenous maritime networks. It would be a gross misjudgement to reduce these systems to examples of informal empire. Rather, they reflect symbiotic adjustments by long-established trading systems to take advantage of new opportunities.

⁷ "View of the Island of Ouby, from Freshwater Bay on Bachian". Plate 86 from Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan* (London: G. Scott, 1780). The clams (*Tridacna gigas*) are known in Indonesia as *kima*.

Ties between producers, consumers and shippers were becoming less tenuous and more institutionalised. Small Chinese shops proliferated, accumulating cargoes and distributing exports, maintaining ties with Chinese merchants or foreign firms. These were the predecessors of the ubiquitous toko of Indonesia and Philippine *sari sari* stores. In colonial harbours contracts could override mutual obligations. By the end of the century imperial borders had been settled, at least on paper. Military campaigns lasted well into the twentieth century, breaking residual opposition. Major ports and even some strategic shore-line anchorages were integrated into regular steamer routes, while colonial states strengthened representation in their peripheral territories. Yet considerable continuities remained, rooted in geography, ecology and age-old methods of exploitation.



Image 47 Pearl-shell fishermen near New Guinea, c. 1900⁸

The Past in the Present

In contemporary Southeast Asia formal political hierarchies still interact with heterarchic power centres, while influential kin-groups have privileged access to resources. Political rhetoric can mobilise primordial sentiment and gut feelings with disturbing ease.⁹ The Philippines and Malaysia contest interpretations of pre-colonial treaties, arguing over Sabah. In Mindanao insurgents fight for Islam, while even some quite small societies have

⁸ “Parelmoer vissers nabij Nieuw-Guinea”. Photographer unknown. From MVV/NMVW, RV-A359-8. By permission of the Museum. Giant clams (*Tridacna gigas*) were a source of pearl shell.

⁹ For Philippine examples, see McCoy, *Anarchy of Families*; Sidel, *Capital, Coercion and Crime*; Kreuzer, 2005. On Indonesia: Buehler, “Rise of the Clans”; Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, *Renegotiating Boundaries*.

centuries-old histories of violence.¹⁰ Local loyalties have also remained strong. During the 1950s the Indonesian government manoeuvred carefully to neutralise the old ruling families, leading to the Regional Government Law, No.1 of 1957. The introduction of regional autonomy in Indonesia (since 1999/2004) has produced many analyses of such dynamics.¹¹ One result has been the on-going creation of provinces based on claimed historical and cultural affinities. As Longgina Movadona Bayo concludes, with reference to Gorontalo, “[T]he territorialisation of identity has been paramount in the revitalisation of elite families’ political roles”.¹²

In the southern Philippines the sultans remained defiant and various claimants continue to be entangled in the Muslim rebellion in the south. Men bearing the titles of sultans of Maguindanau and Buayan were killed in 2006 and 2007.¹³ In January 2002 Maluku’s Jailolo sultan was restored, at least as a symbol; other “royal families” have re-emerged throughout the region, including those of Gowa, Ternate and Tidore.¹⁴ In Indonesia these revivals are often vanity projects, but the power associated with some ruling lineages has made them a recurring focus for political emotions, discontent and attempts at reconciliation.¹⁵ The ancient rivalries between the two Maluku sultanates were invoked again during religious conflict in Halmahera in the late twentieth century.¹⁶ Tracing these contours in politics is easier than in economic relationships, but studies of corruption, rent seeking and illegal trafficking indicate continuities enough.¹⁷

The logic of geography and history have continued to influence trade at the local level. In 1973 a special barter zone was created centred on Sulu and the Balabac Islands, straddling the sea between Palawan and Sabah. When in March 2016 Malaysia closed the border, food prices soared on both sides, and the wooden ships lay idle. The embargo

¹⁰ For example, Severino, *Where in the World*; Kreuzer, 2005; Kammen, *Three Centuries of Conflict*.

¹¹ Relevant titles include Malley, “New Rules, Old Structures”; Tyson, *Decentralization*; Aspinall and Fealy, *Local Power and Politics*; Erb and Sulistiyanto, *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?*; Schulte Nordholt and Abdullah, *Indonesia*.

¹² Longgina Novadona Bayo, “The Political Familism in Gorontalo,” in *Search of Local Regime in Indonesia: Enhancing Democratisation in Indonesia*, ed. Purwo Santoso, Longgina Novadona Bayo, and Willy Purna Samadhi (Jakarta: Obor, 2018). Other essays in the same volume discuss North Lombok, Jayapura, Ambon and Timor; all stress the importance of the local context.

¹³ “The Martyrdom of Sultan of Maguindanau and Sultan of Buayan,” <http://maguindanaosultans.blogspot.com/>; “Duterte Meets with 3 Sultanates of Mindanao”, InterAksyon, October 15, 2017, <http://www.interaksyon.com/duterte-meets-with-3-sultanates-of-mindanao/>.

¹⁴ For examples: <https://sultansinindonesieblog.wordpress.com/>; <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/551974/raja-sultan-deklarasikan-perjanjian-adat-indonesia-bersatu> and <http://buayandynasty.blogspot.nl/>, accessed 28 July 2017. See also: Gerry van Klinken, “Return of the Sultans: The Communitarian Turn in Local Politics,” in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, ed. Jamie Davidson and David Henley (New York: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁵ Birgit Bräuchler, “Kings on Stage: Local Leadership in The. Post-Suharto Moluccas,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39 (2011).

¹⁶ See Wessel and Wimhofer, *Violence in Indonesia*; Alhadar, “Forgotten War”; Wilson, *Ethno-Religious Violence*.

¹⁷ For example, Aspinall and Berenschot, *Democracy for Sale*; Aspinall and van Klinken, *State and Illegality*; Tomsa, 2015.

was soon lifted.¹⁸ In April 2018 the World Bank released a report recommending free trade be established in the *Basulta* region (Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) because of its strong shadow economy. There are also any number of accounts of smuggling in South Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia, involving timber, drugs, migrants, orchids, cockatoos and other wildlife, terrorists and turtle-shell. Since 2017 the Indonesian customs service has been running a special operation, Sea Patrols on the Wallace Line, while the Philippines National Coastal Watch System is dedicated to maritime security.¹⁹ Contemporary piracy in the TBA (tri-border area in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas) is a matter of concern.²⁰

Memories of the past are explicitly linked to modern projects. China relates its ambitious *One Belt One Road* policy to the old Silk Roads,²¹ while Indonesia's maritime strategy recalls its archipelagic maritime past.²² At his 2014 inauguration the Indonesian President Joko Widodo quoted the motto of the Indonesian Navy, the Sanskrit-derived *Jalesveva Jayamabe*: "on the sea we achieve victory". Such maritime ambitions reflect hard numbers. Sixty per cent of world trade passed through Asian waters in 2015, most between Europe and East Asia. But in contrast to Singapore on the Melaka Straits, eastern archipelago ports ranked low in world ratings of container traffic in 2018. Singapore was second, but Jakarta's Tanjung Priok was 27th and Manila number 32. The Indonesian government has been investing heavily in infrastructure. In 2017 Indonesia planned to spend \$400 billion, with special emphasis on the eastern islands, while the Philippines budget ran to \$144 billion.²³ Whether these will be any more successful than earlier Dutch efforts to defy the pull of Singapore is uncertain.

¹⁸ Chino Gaston, "Malaysia Stops Decades-Old Barter Trade in Southern Mindanao," *GMA New Online* <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/specialreports/564480/malaysia-stops-decades-old-barter-trade-in-southern-mindanao/story/> (April 29, 2016); Louise Maureen Simeon, "Mindanao Food Prices Soar as Malaysia Closes Border," *The Philippine Star*, <https://www.philstar.com/nation/2016/05/23/1585848/mindanao-food-prices-soar-malaysia-closes-border#Bx1CPxwWYiLepAEU.99>.

¹⁹ See, for example, "Chinese Traffickers Arrested for Trying to Smuggle 200kg of Turtle Shells in Indonesia," *The Straits Times* online, February 1, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/chinese-traffickers-arrested-for-trafficking-200kg-of-turtle-shells-in-indonesia>; "Lewat Operasi Patroli Jaring Wallace, Bea Cukai Gagalkan Aksi Penyelundupan di Talut Timur," *Tribunnews.com*, Nov. 30, 2017, <http://www.tribunnews.com/bea-cukai/2017/11/30/lewat-operasi-patroli-laut-jaring-wallacea-bea-cukai-gagalkan-aksi-penyelundupan-di-laut-timur> (August 1, 2018); "National Coast Watch System," Philippine government website; <http://ncws.gov.ph/ncws-center/>.

²⁰ Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia, the Coast Watch System of the Philippines* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012). See also Kleinen and Osseweijer, *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts*; Young, 2007; Liss and Biggs, *Piracy*.

²¹ Evan Laksmana, "Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum?," *CSIS: Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative*, March 23, 2017, <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>; Dylan M.H. Loh, "The 'Chinese Dream' and the 'Belt and Road Initiative': Narratives, Practices, and Sub-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 20, no. 1 (2020). See also Vibhanshu Shekhar, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).

²² Senia Febrica, *Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests and Strategies* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).

²³ Simon Roughneen, "Southeast Asian Ports Thirst for More Seaborne Trade. Lack of Adequate Transport Infrastructure Crippling Region's Competitiveness," *Nikkei Asian Review*, Sept. 7, 2017.

On Balance...


In an essay published in 2015 I suggested that a long-term history of the sort attempted here “can be modelled as layered, de-centred structures of inter-locking but open and non-territorial subsystems”.²⁴ Like most models, this can rarely be tested in historical situations, where information is sketchy. Yet the idea of interlocking political and commercial systems, rather than separate spheres, helps give coherence to fragmented data. The emphasis on adaptation in systems theory can bridge sterile dichotomies between continuity and change, between structure and agency. Breakdowns in adaptation herald structural shifts. It is similarly liberating to view states from the bottom up, identifying Austronesian wanua as constituent parts of much larger domains. Concepts of heterarchy and precedence can free us from our preoccupation with dominant hierarchies, as authority is restricted to specific domains, functional or geographic. As is the case in systems theory, heterarchy allows for adaptation and the incorporation and validation of new elements. In neither case is central direction necessary, although major shifts in the wider socio-economy can cause ruptures.

Many of the places and peoples considered here have been omitted from most histories of Indonesia, marginalised by “the enormous condescension of posterity”.²⁵ However, increasing cooperation between anthropologists, archaeologists and historians is beginning to provide both the tools and the information needed to address this imbalance. I have provided a provisional outline of context and trends, as well as illustrative examples. We still have a long way to go. I hope that more historians will be drawn to the challenging study of this complex region and undertake the writing of detailed local histories. Only then will we be able to write the narratives which do justice to the eastern archipelagos and their peoples.

²⁴ Heather Sutherland, “Pursuing the Invisible: Makassar in Context,” in *Environment, Trade and Society in Southeast Asia. A Longue Durée Perspective*, ed. David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

²⁵ E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 13.

The Administrative Territories of the Nineteenth-Century Dutch East Indies and their Populations



Map based on Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 129,4.30;130,435.

Contents

Government of the Moluccas (Maluku)

Table 1 Central Moluccas (Amboina) pre-1866

Table 2 South Moluccas (Banda) 1824–66

Table 3 Residency Amboina after 1866

Table 4 North Moluccas. Ternate before 1866

Table 5 Residency Ternate after 1866

Table 6 West New Guinea (Papua, West Papua)

Table 7 Residency Manado (1824–66)

Table 8 Residency Manado after 1866

Table 9 Gorontalo and Limboto in Manado Residency, after 1889

Government of Makassar. After 1846 Government of Celebes

Table 10 Celebes Directly Ruled Districts 1825, 1854

Table 11 Celebes under Direct Rule, after 1860

Table 12 The Indirectly Ruled Celebes Polities after 1850

Table 13 Residency of Bali and Lombok

Table 14 Residency of Timor after 1819

Table 15 Residency of South and East Borneo (Kalimantan)

The largest territorial administrative unit in the Dutch East Indies was the Governorship; below that were the Residencies (under a Resident), the Divisions (afdeling), typically under an Assistant Resident (abbreviated AR), while districts or similar lesser entities were under Controleurs (Cont.), or appointed petty representatives who were not fulltime career officials in government service: *gezaghebbers* (GH, either civilian, CG, or military, MG), or the lower *posthouders* (“place-keepers”, PH).

The Government of the Moluccas (1817–1866) was created when the British occupation ended; this extended the term Molukken to all the islands between Sulawesi and Papua, divided into three: the original Molukken became the Noord Molukken (North Moluccas) while Amboina became the Central Moluccas; the Government’s headquarters were on Ambon. The South Moluccas* encompassed Banda and the southerly islands. The Government was diminished by the formation of the independent Residencies Timor (1819) and Manado (1866); it was abolished in 1866 when the independent Ternate Residency was formed, and the rump, including Banda, was renamed the Residency of Amboina.

Table 1 Central Moluccas. Subordinate Residency of Amboina before 1866

Pre-1866 estimated population 1856, 141,064 ¹		Willer, ² 1858
Islands	Territories	Population
Ambon		29,073
Saparua		11,193
Haruko		6,370
Nusa Laut		3,248
Manipa		3,413
Ambalau		802
Buru		5,270
	Seram under Saparua	21,103
	Seram under Haruko	2,923
	Seram under Hila	1,483
	Seram under Waihai	41,186
	Seram under Banda	15,000
Total		141,064

* Not to be confused with the 1950 breakaway Republic of South Maluku (RMS) centred on Ambon, Buru and Seram.

¹ T.J. Willer, *Volkstelling in Nederlandsch Indië* (’s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1861).

² *Ibid.*

Table 2 South Moluccas. Subordinate Residency of Banda 1824–1866

Residency abolished 1866, became Division (Afdeling) of Amboina; see above. An 1840 population estimate for the main island was 5,000; ³ in 1858 the Residency had c. 76,356 inhabitants. ⁴				
Administrative areas		Estimated populations		
		Willer 1858	Mid-19th century Van Doren	Late 19th century ⁵
Banda Neira		2,104		
Banda Besar		1,446		
Ai		318		
Run		71		
Pisang		6		
Rozengain		76		
Total		4,021		
<i>Kleine Oost (Lesser East), later SE and SW islands</i>				
	Aru Islands ⁶	11,000	c.1850: 18,900	1880:14,000 1888:13,000
	Kei Islands	15,000		1880: 21,000 ⁷ 1888: 23,000
	Tanimbar Islands (or Timor Laut) ⁸	15,000		1880: 22,000 1882:12,732 1889:19,342 Larat Island 1880: 2,500
	Babar Islands	2,240		1880: 6,050
	Sermata Islands	1,950		1880: 7,600 1888: 10,000
	Nila	150		1880: 2,400 1890 island: 1,200
	Serua	–		
	Tiau	175		

³ John Crawford, *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries* (London: Bradbury & Evans, 1856).

⁴ Willer, *Volkstelling*.

⁵ Unless otherwise specified the source is *Encyclopaedie Van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1st ed., 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906); henceforth cited as ENI, according to place name.

⁶ J.B.J. van Doren, *Herinneringen En Schetsen Van Nederlands Oost-Indie En Reizen in Die Gewesten, ENI*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1857), 393. Wokan island (Tanah Besar, c. 1,500) included c. 500 Christians; Warmar (c.2,000) c. 500 Muslims; the rest, including Workey (3,000) were presumed heathen. In 1888 Wokam was thought to have c.13,000 inhabitants, including 86 Chinese, 366 Malays and Makassarese; ENI.

⁷ Early nineteenth-century estimates were Aru, 15,000; Kei, 8–10,000, Tanimbar, 20,000; Chris de Jong, *A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies: The "Little East" in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (<http://www.cgfdejong.nl/Daalder,%20BlankPage.pdf>, 2013).

⁸ The *Encyclopaedie*, drawing on official sources, was unable to give even a rough estimate of the population of Tanimbar's 66 islands, noting that there were two reliable estimates in the 1880s, one for almost 13,000, the other for more than 19,000.

Table 2 (cont'd)

	Luang Islands	500		1880: 3,600 Luang: 1885: 1,223 1888: 1,200
	Leikor Islands	810		1880: 2,000
	Moa Islands	3,110		1880: 7,300
	Leti Islands	3,000		1880: 11,380
	Kisar Islands	2,200		1880: 5,300 1888: 9,296
	Romang Islands	610		1880: 1,660
	Damar Islands	1,000		1880: 3,800 Damar Island: 1,700
	Wetar Islands	4,000		1880: 5,000
	Keffing	840		
	Geser	140		1882: 306
	Sermata Islands	1,110		
	Suruaki			
	Manowoko	1,270		
	Gorom	6,530		Gorom Islands 1890 c.6,000
	Watubela Islands	400		
	Kasiuwi	1,210		
		72,525		

Table 3 Residency Amboina, post 1866. Population 1892, 270,444

9 Divisions (<i>Afdelingen</i>)	Sub-Divisions	Comments	Late 19th century	1905 ⁹ Main town
Ambon			1880: 24,977 1890s: 30,000	Ambon: 8,328
Saparua				Saparua: 2,354
Kayeli	Includes east Buru and Ambalau			
Masarete	West Buru			
Kairatu	Includes West Seram and Manipa			
Wahai	North Central Seram			Wahai: 2,850
Amahei	South Central Seram			
Banda Islands	East Seram	Assistant Resident; a separate postholder supervised the Seram Laut; ¹⁰ Gorom and Watubela island groups	1880: 8,328	Banda Neira: 4,130

⁹ All references to 1905 towns are from A. Cabaton, *Les Indes néerlandaises* (Paris: Guilmoto, 1910).

¹⁰ Keffing, Geser, Maar, Kiliwaru, Seram Laut; the *posthouder* at Geser was supervised by the assistant resident of Banda.

Table 3 (cont'd)

9 Divisions (<i>Afdelingen</i>)	Sub-Divisions	Comments	Late 19th century	1905 ⁹ Main town
Tual: The Southeast and Southwest archipelagos	Aru Kei Tanimbar ¹¹	SE: Tanimbar, Kei, Watubela, Gorom Islands SW: Babar, ¹² Luang-Sermata, Leti, Romang, Wetar		

Table 4 North Moluccas. Subordinate Residency of Ternate before 1866

This included the self-governing Sultanates of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan, along with their territories on Halmahera, the Raja Ampat and Sula archipelagos, and eastern Sulawesi. In 1858 the Sultanates of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan were thought to have 326,068 inhabitants. ¹³ Estimated number of subjects in the 1880's were: Ternate, 270,444; Tidore, 135,084; Bacan, 3,000			
	Willer 1858	Mid-19th century Van Doren	1905 Main town
Ternate Island	6,848	1837: 5,086 ¹⁴ 1854: 5,250	
Makian Island	3,824	1837:3,930 1855:6,152	
Sula Islands	6,672	1837:6,730 1854:6,447	
Ternate lands Halmahera	20,648	1837: 18,978 1854:23,079	
Tidore & Mare Islands	7,542	1836: 5,270 1854: 8,157 ¹⁵	
Tidore lands Halmahera	4,117	1836:3,900 1854:4,316	
Papua under Tidore	250,000	1852: 28,507 ¹⁶	
Sulawesi under Ternate	25,000	1852: Banggai 1852 land: 27,000 1852: Banggai Islands: 7,024 1888: Banggai: 15,500 ¹⁷ 1853: Tobungku: 15,050 ¹⁸	
Bacan and territories	1,417		Labuha Bacan: 7,529
	326,068		

¹¹ In 1890 Tanimbar was divided into two sub-divisions.

¹² The Southwestern islands were under a *posthouder* at Tebar, Babar.

¹³ Willer, *Volkstelling*.

¹⁴ Doren, *Herinneringen*, 1, 268. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*. He gives an 1840 population of 6,710, including 1,216 Sulawesians, 581 slaves, and 412 Europeans; for Ternate's territories, 18,918.

¹⁵ Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*. Crawford's 1840 figure for Tidore island is 5,924; for Tidore's territories, 19,861.

¹⁶ Van Doren, *Herinneringen*, 2, 305. He gives 11,400 for Tidore's territories on the north coast, 3,107 on the south coast and 14,000 in the interior.

¹⁷ F.S.A. de Clercq, *Bijdragen Tot De Kennis Der Residentie Ternate* (Leiden: Brill, 1890).

¹⁸ This was the estimated population in the south, as to the territory as a whole "the chiefs could give neither the names of the [settlements] (if any exist) nor the size of the population"; Henley, 244.

Table 5 Residency Ternate after 1866

At the end of the 19thC. this included parts of East Sulawesi (Banggai, Tobungku), the Banggai and Sula Islands, Bacan, Halmahera, Obi and the Raja Ampat archipelagos. Indirect rule except on Obi group and small coastal stretches on Ternate, Bacan and New Guinea. ¹⁹				
Divisions			Late 19th century ²⁰	1905 Main town
Ternate	Under Resident	Includes Tidore and territories in Halmahera, Gebe ²¹ and New Guinea	Tidore island: 9,624	
Bacan, North and South Halmahera	3 controleurs			
Sula Islands, Banggai, Tobungku	3 PH			Banggai: 1,500
North New Guinea	AR			
West New Guinea	AR			

Table 6 New Guinea (Papua)

In 1812 part of the south coast was claimed by Tidore, the area was expanded in 1848 but there were no significant colonial interventions until the first controleurs were appointed in 1898.		
	1880: interior? Islands: 125,000 ²²	Manokwari, 119; Fak Fak, 693; Merauke, 487

Table 7 Residency Manado (1824–1866)

Before 1817 the Manado lands were directly under the Governor at Ternate, then under a Resident in Manado. In 1824 the Residency was formalised with 28 directly ruled chiefdoms united in the Minahasa or Manado alliance, plus 14 independent realms, six settlements along the Tomini Gulf coasts, and the Taulud, Sangihe, Togian and other islands formerly under Ternate. In 1866 it became an independent Residency. From the mid-1850s most Gorontalo rajas had no function; the Dutch worked through chancellors (<i>jugugu</i>).		
Direct Dutch rule	Indirectly ruled realms	Population: Henley ²³
5 Minahasa Divisions		
Manado		1821: 56,000
Tonsea		1840: 88,272
Belang		1846: 91,664
Amurang		1880: 134,362
Likupang		
	Bolaang Mogondow	1824: 12,300 1860: 12,344

¹⁹ Dutch influence extended from Cape Steenboom in central south Papua to the Bensbach river, which is now in Papua New Guinea.

²⁰ Unless otherwise specified, under place names *ENI*.

²¹ The local Tidore official (*sengaji*) of Gebe was responsible for the Sultan's New Guinea territories.

²² Willer, *Volkstelling*.

²³ Compiled from lists in David Henley, *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c. 1600–1930* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005).

Table 7 (cont'd)

	Gorontalo, Limboto	1821: 52,000 1860: 80,163 (6 realms) 1877: 95,152
	Buol	1824: 7,000 1893: 6,225
	Tolitoli	1824: 550
	South Tomini Gulf: Poso and Tojo, Ampana, Bangka	1865: 113,000
	South Tomini: Mutong and Parigi	1852: 7,200 1852: 22,000
	South Tomini general	c.1890 37,867

Table 8 Manado Residency after 1866

The Residency was divided into two Divisions (<i>afdelingen</i>) Minahasa and Gorontalo. The population of the Minahasa at the end of 1890 was estimated to be 150,000 in some 300 villages. In 1899 most independent states were taken under direct rule. District chiefs in Gorontalo were called <i>marsaoleh</i> .		
Division	Directly Ruled Sub-Division	Indirectly ruled realms
Minahasa	Manado (4 districts) Kema (2 districts) Tondano (5 districts) Amurang (5 districts) Belang (2 districts)	Bolaang Mongondow Bolang Uki Bitauana Bolang Itang Buol Sangihe and Taulud (Contr. At Taruna; 4 rajas) ²⁴
Gorontalo		Gorontalo (5 <i>marsaoleh</i>) Limboto (4 <i>marsaoleh</i>) Bone (3 <i>marsaoleh</i>) Boalemo Atinggola Posso (Contr. Posso, but Luwu ruler kept authority)

Table 9 Gorontalo and Limboto in Manado Residency, after 1889

With the exception of the 5 Tomini Gulf domains all other independent realms in Gorontalo were brought under direct rule in two Sub-divisions. At the end of 1890 Gorontalo's population was 61,229 and Limboto's 19,870. The estimated total for the five Gulf domains was c.100,000 including many Buginese and Mandarese.		
Sub-division	Districts	Independent domains Tomini Gulf
Gorontalo (under Cont.)	7	Mutung
Limboto (under Cont.)	3	Parigi
		Poso
		Sausu
		Tojo ²⁵

²⁴ The late 19th C population of the main island, Great Sangihe, was c.45,000; Siau islands 24,000 and Tagulandang Islands 5,000. The Christian population of these three was 43,354 in 1899. The total population of the smaller Taulud archipelago, subject to Sangihe, numbered c.5,000, all Christian.

²⁵ Tojo, a domain on the southern Tomini coast, had a late 19th C population of c.8,400. Its territory included the Togian Islands, under a subordinate rajas; they had a permanent population of c. 2,000. *ENI*.

Government of Makassar

Table 10 *Celebes Directly Ruled Districts 1825, 1854*

Created 1824; in 1847 became the Government of Celebes. The Makassar territory consisted of the old VOC and primarily agrarian Northern and Southern Districts as well as Bulukumba and Bantaeng, ruled by 14 chiefs, and the island of Selayar. The Government also included 6 claimed but not ruled domains, and 23 allies. The port of Parepare was taken by the Dutch in 1824 but immediately ceded to the ruler of Sidenreng. Estimated population of the government in 1880: 359,756. ²⁶ Figures in this table from archive sources.		
Directly ruled districts and their populations in 1825		
Makassar and Islands	16,000	
Northern Districts	100,000	
Southern Districts	60,000	
Bulukumba Bantaeng	25,000	
Directly ruled districts and their populations in 1854		
Makassar and Islands	33,280	In 1856 the Government abolished the Sultanate of Talloq, absorbing its territory.
Northern Districts	120,000	
Southern Districts	28,909	
Bulukumba Bantaeng	28,909	
Selayar	51,977	

Table 11 *Territories of the Directly Ruled Government of Celebes, after the Bone War (1860) to 1900*

Divisions (<i>Afdelingen</i>)	Subdivisions (<i>Onderafdelingen</i>)	Population	Main Towns 1905
Makassar			
Northern Districts		1869: 85,756	Maros 1,493
Eastern Districts (post-war)	Balangnipa Bikeru Kajang	1880: 91,913	Sinjai 3,779
Southern Districts (after 1863)	Bantaeng Binamu Bulukumba		
Takalar	Bangkala plus 8 districts, plus islands		Late 19th C Takalar 1,329
Selayar	A Controleur over 9 districts	1880: 57,143 1890: c. 75,000	
Palu (Palos Bay)	Since 1854	Late 19th C: c. 4,500	

²⁶ ANRI Mak. *Administrative Verslag 1865–1869*, Mak.9/17.

Table 12 *The Indirectly Ruled Celebes Polities after 1850*

Indirectly ruled territories		
Kaili coast; taken from Ternate 1854	Included realms of Palu; ²⁷ in the late 1800s Palu's population was c., 4,500, Donggala (3,000), Towaeli (5,000-8,000); end 19th C first Dutch official at Donggala	
Bima ²⁸	The four domains of Bima, Sumbawa, Dampo and Sanggar. The Sultanate of Bima included the Bima area of east Sumbawa, Manggarai on West Flores, and all islands between Sumbawa and Flores. Sumbawa: 1837 c.11,000 immigrants; ²⁹ population estimate 1880: 95,000. ³⁰ Bima Sultanate, end 19th C c. 74,000 subjects, 50,000 in Bima on Sumbawa island, rest on Flores.	Bima: 1,569 ³¹ Sumbawa: 1,519 ³²
Allied Lands ³³	Includes i.a. Gowa, Wajo (est. population end 1800s, 70,000), Soppeng, the Sumbawa realms, the alliances of Mandar, ³⁴ Massenrempulu ³⁵ and Ajattapparang ³⁶	
Vassals	Bone (including Lamuru), Tanette	
Independent regions	Includes the interior peoples, such as Toraja	

²⁷ Palu signed a contract with the Dutch in 1854; it included the subject realms of Palu, Donggala.

²⁸ In 1909 Bima, ie the whole of Sumbawa and lesser islands, including Komodo, were moved into the Residency of Timor.

²⁹ Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, "Sumbawa". He lists 8,000 immigrants from Sulawesi, 2,000 Malays and Balinese, 1,000 from Nusa Tenggara, 6 Chinese and 70 European civilians.

³⁰ Banda, "Stoomvaartrederij Banda." For the late 1800s the *ENI* noted that estimates for the population of the Sumbawa Sultanate ranged from 26,000 to 50,000.

³¹ The main settlement of Bima consisted of 26 kampung, 699 houses, and some 10,000 people; *ENI*.

³² A large Kampung Bugis lay between the Sumbawan capital and the coast.

³³ The status of the kingdom of Sidenreng (19,000) was left blank in the entry; *ENI*, 'Sidenreng'.

³⁴ On the Mandar coast there was a federation of seven kingdoms, with three around the Mandar Gulf (Binuwang, Balangnipa, Majene) and four to the north approaching Kaili (Pamboang, Cenrana, Tapalang, Mamuju).

³⁵ In 1890 the Dutch signed a treaty with five allied realms in Massenrempulu, "on the edge of the mountains": Maiwa, Duri, Kassa, Batulappa', and Enrekang.

³⁶ In the late 1880s five Bugis states lay "west of the lakes" (Ajattapparang): Sidenreng, Suppa, Sawitto, Alitta and Rappang, with various subordinate domains.

Table 13 Residency of Bali and Lombok

In 1839: 9 independent kingdoms. From 1849 Buleleng and Jembrana were under Dutch recognised regents from the local nobility, and six (after 1895, five) independent kingdoms. ³⁷ Population 1880: 700,000; from 1895. Population of Dutch ruled areas, 1890: 103,101; in the six states: 1,259,135.		
Two Directly ruled Divisions	Comments and Populations	Main town
Buleleng	11 districts, local nobility supervised by Europeans 3 districts	Pabean Buleleng end 1800s: 7,000
Jembrana		
After wars Lombok was incorporated in 1895. In 1897 three Divisions were created, 1880 population estimate: 405,000 ³⁸		
West Lombok	End 19th century: 81,000 ³⁹	
Central Lombok	End 19th century: 83,000	
East Lombok	End 19th century: 156,000	

Table 14 Residency Timor, since 1819

Included c.64 self-governing domains supervised in Divisions. Includes all Flores except Manggarai. The population of all Flores: 1880 250,000, ⁴⁰ Sumba was also a Division of Timor; estimated population of Sumba in 1880: 300,000. ⁴⁰ The <i>ENI</i> was unable to give any estimate of Timor's indigenous population, the closely linked islands of Savu and Rote were said to have 64,482 and 25,856 inhabitants respectively.				
Division	Sub-division			Main towns
Kupang Direct rule	Kupang	1840: Kupang district: 7,000 ⁴¹		Kupang: 3,773
	Babau			
	Amfoang			
	Belau	Includes port of Atapupu.		
Larantuka		East and North Flores, Solor, Alor. GH, Controleur. Maumere was to become an important town.		Larantuka: 4,665
Rote and Savu		18 small states, indirect rule, under 'regents', GH, and later a Controleur	Rote and Savu 1880: 75,000 end 1800s: Rote: 25,856 Savu: 64,482	Baa Rote: 1,083

³⁷ Klungkung, Bangli, Mengwi, Badung, Tabanan and Karangasem, this last was taken over by the Dutch in 1895 and placed under direct rule.

³⁸ Banda, "Stoomvaartrederij Banda."

³⁹ Estimate for the end of the 1800s; *ENI*, "Lombok."

⁴⁰ Banda, "Stoomvaartrederij Banda."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Table 14 (cont'd)

Sumba All states under indirect rule	Waingapu or Central Sumba	11 domains CG		Waingapu: 11,069
	Memboro or West Sumba	7 domains, PH Memboro PH for both West and east Sumba		
	Melolo or East Sumba	7 domains, PH Melolo		
	Ende or South Flores	9 domains, PH Ende; PH	c.15,000	

Table 15 Residency of South and East Borneo

<p>The Banjarmasin Sultanate had ceded considerable territory and power to the Dutch resident in 1826; it was “suspended” and taken under colonial rule after the war in 1860. The Sultanate of Kutai succumbed to military action and accepted a resident colonial official in 1846. However, it remained self-governing, as were the small northeast Borneo realms (the six Tidung lands; Bulungan, Gunung Tabur and Sambaliung). From 1848 both directly ruled and self-governing territories were organised in the South- and Eastern Division of Borneo; this “afdeling” covered over half the island and was comparable to a large Residency.</p>				
Divisions	Sub-divisions			Main towns
Banjarmasin		The post 1900 Division of Kandangan or Ulu Sungai lay inland from Banjarmasin and Martapura; it became a rubber producing centre.	54,377	Banjarmasin 16,708
Martapura	3		123,695	Martapura, 4,298
Kandangan	2			
Amuntai	2		364,190	
Dusun lands	2		47,000	
Dayak Lands			37,196	
Sampit, including Kota Waringen			Sampit: 25,000 Kota W: 30,000	
Pasir		State ceded to Dutch by Banjarmasin in 1827; became a separate residency c.1900. Controleur at Kota Baru, Pulau Laut; retains Pegatan, Kusun.	20,000	
Tanah Bumbu Islands		These small realms in the southeastern corner of Borneo had been ceded to the Dutch by Banjarmasin in 1817. They were immediately handed back to their rulers who retained taxation rights although they were, in theory, under direct rule. The ten lands became a separate division c.1900.		

Table 15 (cont'd)

	Pegatan, Kusun	Two states under one ruler; end 19th century Pegatan, predominantly Buginese, had a population of c. 10,000. Kusun poor. The Dutch only maintained contact with the Bugis ruler of Pegatan.	9,000	
	Pulau Laut	The ten Tanah Bumbu lands became a separate Division c. 1900.	4,300	
	Cenggal etc		2,500	
	Sampanahan		500	
	Cantong		4,000	
	Batu Licin		2,000	
	Sembamban		250	
Kutai and Northeast Coast				
	Kutai		90,000 ⁴²	End 19th century: Samarinda, c. 10,000; royal centre Tenggarong, inland, c.5–6,000
	Sambaliung		6,000	
	Gunung Tabur		10,000	
	Bulungan		35,000	Bulungan, end 19th century, c.1,000

⁴² An estimate for Kutai's population in 1875 had been 235,000 inhabitants; *ENI*.

Bibliography

- Aa, A.J. van der. *Biographisch woordenboek Der Nederlanden: Bijvoegsel*. Haarlem: J.J. van Brederode 1878.
- Aa, Pieter van der. *Naauwkeurige Versameling der Gedenkwaardigste Zee en Landreysen na Oost en West-Indien*. Leiden: van der Aa, 1708.
- Abeyasekere, S. "Slaves in Batavia: Insights from a Slave Register." In *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid, 286–312. St. Lucia, Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1983.
- Abinales, P.N. and Donna J. Amoroso. *State and Society in the Philippines*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
- Abramson, Scott F. "The Economic Origins of the Territorial State." *International Organization* 71, no. 1 (2017): 97–113.
- Acciaioli, Greg. "Distinguishing Hierarchy and Precedence: Comparing Status Distinctions in South Asia and the Austronesian World, with Special Reference to South Sulawesi." In *Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World*, ed. Michael P. Vischer. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009.
- Adhuri, Dedi Supriadi. *Selling the Sea, Fishing for Power: A Study of Conflict over Marine Tenure in Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013.
- _____. "Traditional and 'Modern' Trepang Fisheries on the Border of the Indonesian and Australian Fishing Zones." In *Macassan History and Heritage: Journeys, Encounters and Influences*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013.
- Adhuri, Dedi and Tomoya Akimichi. "Marine Resource Use in the Bajo of North Sulawesi and Maluku, Indonesia." *Senri Ethnological Studies* 42 (1996): 105–19.
- Adriani, N. *Posso*. 's-Gravenhage: Zendings-studieaad, 1919.
- Aguilar, Filomeno V. "Beyond Inevitability: The Opening of Philippine Provincial Ports in 1855." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1994): 70–90.
- Alhadar, Smith. "The Forgotten War in North Maluku." *Inside Indonesia* 63 (2000): 15–16.
- Alpers, Edward A. *The Indian Ocean in World History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Alwi, Des. *Friends and Exiles: A Memoir of the Nutmeg Isles and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2008.
- Amirell, Stefan Eklöf. *Pirates of Empire: Colonisation and Maritime Violence in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Ammarell, Gene. *Bugis Navigation*. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Program, 1999.
- Amoroso, Donna J. "Inheriting the 'Moro Problem': Muslim Authority and Colonial Rule in British Malaya and the Philippines." In *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, ed. Anne L. Foster Julian Go, 118–47. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

- Andaya, Barbara Watson. "Between Empires and Emporia: The Economics of Christianization in Early Modern Southeast Asia." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53, no. 1–2 (2010): 357–92.
- _____. "From Temporary Wife to Prostitute: Sexuality and Economic Change in Early Modern Southeast Asia." *The Journal of Women's History* 9, no. 4 (1998): 11–34.
- _____. "History, Headhunting and Gender in Monsoon Asia: Comparative and Longitudinal Views." *South East Asia Research* 12, no. 1 (2004): 13–52.
- _____. *To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993.
- _____. "Political Development between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume One, Part Two: From c.1500 to c.1800*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, 402–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Andaya, Barbara Watson and Leonard Y. Andaya. *A History of Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- _____. *A History of Malaysia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
- Andaya, Leonard Y. "The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 68, no. 1 (1995): 119–38.
- _____. "Eastern Indonesia: A Study of the Intersections of Global, Regional and Local Networks in the 'Extended' Indian Ocean." In *Reinterpreting Indian Ocean Worlds: Essays in Honour of Kirti N. Chaudhuri*, ed. Stefan C.A. Halikowski Smith, 107–40. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011.
- _____. *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
- _____. "The 'Informal Portuguese Empire' and the Topasses in the Solor Archipelago and Timor in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (2010): 391–420.
- _____. *Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009.
- _____. "Local Trade Networks in Maluku in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries." *Cakalele* 2, no. 2 (1991): 71–96.
- _____. "Massoi and Kain Timur in the Birdshead Peninsula of New Guinea, the Easternmost Corner of the Indian Ocean World." In *Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean World*, ed. Michael Pearson, 83–108. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- _____. "The Nature of Kingship in Bone." In *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, ed. A. Reid and L. Castles. Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1975.
- _____. "Nature of War and Peace among the Bugis–Makassar People." *South East Asia Research* 12, no. 1 (2004): 53–80.
- _____. "The Social Value of Elephant Tusks and Bronze Drums among Certain Societies in Eastern Indonesia." *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 172, no. 1 (2016): 66–89.
- _____. *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*. 1st ed. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993.
- Anderson, J.L. "Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750–1850: Some Economic Implications." In *Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, ed. David J. Starkey, E.S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J.A. de Moor, 87–105. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1997.
- Anderson, Kathryn Gay. "The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora." PhD dissertation, University of Hawai'i, 2003.

- Andrade, Tonio. "Asian States and European Expansion, 1500–1700: An Approach to the Problem of European Exceptionalism." In *Asian Expansions: The Historical Experiences of Polity Expansion in Asia*, ed. Geoff Wade. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.
- _____. *The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Antony, Robert J. "Piracy and the Shadow Economy in the South China Sea, 1780–1810." In *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas*, ed. Robert J. Antony. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010.
- Appadurai, Arjun. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." *Public Culture* 2, no. 2 (1990): 1–24.
- _____. "Is Homo Hierarchicus?" *American Ethnologist* 13, no. 4 (1986): 745–61.
- _____, ed. *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Applbaum, Kalman. "The Anthropology of Markets." In *A Handbook of Economic Anthropology*, ed. James G. Carrier, 275–89. London: Edward Elgar, 2006.
- Arenz, Cathrin, Michaela Haug, Stefan Seitz, and Oliver Venz, eds. *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017.
- Aritonang, Jan Sihar, and Karel Steenbrink, eds. *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
- Armitage, David and Michael J. Braddick, eds. *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Asba, A. Rasyid. "Demokrasi Yang Merana: Terbaikannya Nilai-Nilai Lokal Dalam Pengembangan Demokrasi Di Indonesia." Paper presentation, Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Politik (STISIP) Muhammadiyah, 2011.
- _____. *Kopra Makassar: Perebutan Pusat dan Daerah: Kajian Sejarah Ekonomi Politik Regional di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007.
- _____. "Mandar War 1868: Annihilation Operation Against Pirates." *Sosiohumanika: Jurnal Pendidikan Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan*. Bandung: ASPENSI, 2014.
- Aslanian, Sebouh. "The Circulation of Men and Credit: The Role of the Commenda and the Family Firm in Julfan Society." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50, nos. 2–3 (2007): 124–70.
- _____. "Social Capital, 'Trust' and the Role of Networks in Julfan Trade: Informal and Semi-Formal Institutions at Work." *Journal of Global History* 1, no. 3 (2006): 383–402.
- Aspinall, Edward and Gerry van Klinken, eds. *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011.
- Aspinall, Edward and Greg Fealy, eds. *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- Aspinall, Edward, and Ward Berenschot. *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism and the State in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019.
- Assegaff, A.S. *Sejarah Kerajaan Sadurangas Atau Kesultanan Pasir*. Tanah Grogot: Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Pasir, 1982.
- Atkinson, Jane Monnig. *The Art and Politics of Wana Shamanship*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Aubert, M., A. Brumm, M. Ramli, and T. Sutikna. "Pleistocene Cave Art from Sulawesi, Indonesia." *Nature* 514 (2014): 223–7.

- Baardewijk, Frans van. *The Cultivation System, Java 1834–1880*. Volume 14 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century Up to 1940*, ed. Peter Boomgaard. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1993.
- Bailyn, Bernard. *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Bair, Jennifer. "Analysing Global Economic Organization: Embedded Networks and Global Chains Compared." *Economy and Society* 37, no. 3 (2008): 339–84.
- _____. ed. *Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Baker, Brett. "Indigenous-Driven Mission: Reconstructing Religious Change in Sixteenth-Century Maluku." PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2012.
- _____. "South Sulawesi in 1544: A Portuguese Letter." *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 39, no. 1 (2005): 61–85.
- Baker, Chris. "Ayutthaya Rising: From Land or Sea?" *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2003): 41–62.
- Bakker, Laurens. "Community, Adat Authority and Forest Management in the Hinterland of East Kalimantan." In *Community, Environment and Local Governance in Indonesia: Locating the Commonweal*, ed. John F. McCarthy and Carol Warren, 121–44. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Baks, J. "De Steenkolen-Maatschappij 'Poeloe Laet' in Zuidoost-Borneo." In *Het belang van de Buitengewesten*, ed. A.H.P. Clemens and J.Th. Lindblad, 123–50. Amsterdam: NEHA, 1989.
- Balk, G.L., F. Van Dijk, and D.J. Kortlang. *The Archives of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Local Institutions in Batavia (Jakarta): Arsip-arsip Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) dan lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan kota Batavia (Jakarta)*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Ballard, Chris. "'Oceanic Negroes': British Anthropology of Papuans, 1820–1869." In *Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750–1940*, ed. Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard, 157–204. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008.
- Banda, Stoomvaartrederij. "Schetskaart der maandelijksche mail-lijn tusschen Palmerston en Soerabaia v.v. en der door de Stoomvaartrederij Banda voorgestelde, bij vaarplan omschreven Nieuw-Guinea en Manillalijnen." Thieme, 1880.
- Bang, Peter F. "Imperial Bazaar: Towards a Comparative Understanding of Markets in the Roman Empire." In *Ancient Economies, Modern Methodologies: Archaeology, Comparative History, Models and Institutions*, ed. Peter F. Bang, Mamoru Ikeguchi, and Harmut G. Ziche, 51–89. Bari: Edipuglia, 2006.
- Bankoff, Greg, and Sandra Swart, eds. *Breeds of Empire: The Invention of the Horse in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa 1500–1950*. Copenhagen: NIAS, 2008.
- Barendse, R.J. *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
- Barnard, Timothy P., ed. *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity across Boundaries*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004.
- _____. *Multiple Centres of Authority: Society and Environment in Siak and Eastern Sumatra, 1674–1827*. Leiden: KITLV, 2003.
- Barnes, R.H. "Alliance and Warfare in an Eastern Indonesian Principality: Kédang in the Last Half of the Nineteenth Century," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 157, no. 2 (2001): 271–311.
- _____. "Avarice and Iniquity at the Solor Fort." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 143, no. 2 (1987): 208–36.
- _____. "The Power of Strangers in Flores and Timor," *Anthropos* 103, no. 2 (2008): 343–53.

- _____. *Sea Hunters and Fishers of Indonesia: Fishers and Weavers of Lamalera*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- _____. "A Temple, a Mission, and a War: Jesuit Missionaries and Local Culture in East Flores in the Nineteenth Century." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 165, no. 1 (2009): 32–61.
- Barnes, Susana, Hans Hägerdal, and Lisa Palmer. "An East Timorese Domain: Luca from Central and Peripheral Perspectives." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 173, no. 2–3 (2017): 325–55.
- Barr, Michael. *Singapore: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2018.
- Barth, Frederic. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Differences*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969.
- Barth, Frederik. *Balinese Worlds*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- Barton, R.F. *The Kalingas: Their Institutions and Custom Law*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
- Bassett, D.K. "British Commercial and Strategic Interest in the Malay Peninsula during the Late Eighteenth Century." In *Malayan and Indonesian Studies: Essays Presented to Sir Richard Winstedt on His Eighty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. John Bastin and R. Roolvink, 122–40. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.
- _____. "British 'Country' Trade and Local Trade Networks in the Thai and Malay States, c. 1680–1770." *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 4 (1989): 625–43.
- _____. "British Trade and Policy in Indonesia 1760–1772." *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 120, no. 2 (1964): 197–223.
- _____. "English Trade in Celebes, 1613–1667." *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 31 (1958): 1–39.
- Battersby, Paul. *To the Islands: White Australia and the Malay Archipelago since 1788*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007.
- Baud, Michiel, and Willem Van Schendel. "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands." *Journal of World History* 8, no. 2 (1997): 211–42.
- Bayly, C.A. *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830*. Harlow: Long, 1989.
- _____. *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansionism, 1770–1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Bayo, Longgina Novadona. "The Political Familism in Gorontalo." In *Search of Local Regime in Indonesia: Enhancing Democratisation in Indonesia*, ed. Purwo Santoso, Longgina Novadona Bayo, and Willy Purna Samadhi, 195–221. Jakarta: Obor, 2018.
- Beaujard, Philippe. "The Indian Ocean in Eurasian and African World-Systems before the Sixteenth Century." *Journal of World History* 16, no. 4 (2005): 411–65.
- Beckett, Jeremy. "The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato under Colonial Rule." *Asian Studies* 5 (1977): 46–64.
- _____. "The Defiant and the Compliant: The Datus of Magindanao under Colonial Rule." In *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, 391–414. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982.
- Beekman, Daniel. *A Voyage to and from the Islands of Borneo, in the East Indies*. London: Dawsons, 1973.
- Belcher, Edward. *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46*. London: Reeve, Benham and Reeve, 1848.
- Bellwood, Peter. "Austronesian Prehistory in Southeast Asia: Homeland, Expansion and Transformation." In *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bellwood, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryon. Canberra: ANU Press, 2006.

- . *First Islanders: Prehistory and Human Migration in Island Southeast Asia*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2017.
- . “Hierarchy, Founder Ideology and Austronesian Expansion.” In *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather, 19–42. Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996.
- , ed. *The Spice Islands in Prehistory: Archaeology in the Northern Moluccas, Indonesia*. Canberra: ANU Press, 2019.
- Bellwood, Peter, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryon, eds. *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 1995.
- Benda-Beckmann, Franz von. “Sago, Law and Food Security on Ambon.” In *Social Security between Past and Future: Ambonese Networks of Care and Support*, ed. Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 59–90. Berlin: LIT, 2007.
- Benjamin, Geoffrey. “Egalitarianism and Ranking in the Malay World.” In *Anarchic Solidarity: Autonomy, Equality and Fellowship in Southeast Asia*, ed. Thomas Gibson and Kenneth Sillander. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 2011.
- Bentley, Jerry H. “Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks of Historical Analysis.” *Geographical Review* 89, no. 2 (1999): 215–24.
- Bentley, Jerry H., Renate Bridenbath, and Kären Wigen. *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007.
- Berg, Maxine. “In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History and British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century.” *Past and Present* 182 (2004): 85–142.
- Berg, N.P. van den. *Munt-, crediet- en bankwezen, handel en scheepvaart in Nederlandsch Indië; historisch-statistische bijdrage*. ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907.
- Berkeley, George. *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. Chicago: Open Court, 1904.
- “Beschrijving van het eiland Lombok.” *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 2, no. 1/22 (1839): 659–62.
- Bethencourt, Francisco. “Low Cost Empire: Interaction between Portuguese and Local Societies in Asia.” In *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé, 108–30. Leiden: CNWS, 2005.
- Beurden, A.I.P.J. van. “De Indische ‘goldrush’, goudmijnbouw en beleid.” In *Imperialisme in de marge: de afronding van Nederlands-Indië*, ed. Jurrien Van Goor, 179–226. Utrecht: HES, 1982.
- Bickmore, Albert Smith. *Travels in the East Indian Archipelago*. New York: Appleton, 1869.
- Bigalke, Terance. *Tana Toraja: A Social History of an Indonesian People*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2005.
- Bik, A.J. *Dagverhaal eener reis, gedaan in het jaar 1824, tot nadere verkenning der eilanden Keffing, Goram, Groot- en Klein Kei en de Aroe-eilanden*. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1928.
- Bintang, Mduobus. “Jailolo Kerajaan Tertua.” *Maluku Kie Raha* (website), 18 January 2014. <http://malukukieraha.blogspot.it/2014/01/jailolo-kerajaan-maluku-tertua.html>.
- Blair, E.H. and J.A. Robertson. *The Philippine Islands*. 55 volumes. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1903–09.
- Bleeker, Pieter. *Reis door de Minabassa en den Molukschen archipel, gedaan in de maanden september en oktober 1855*. 2 volumes. Batavia: Lange, 1856.
- Blench, Roger. “Origins of Ethnolinguistic Identity in Southeast Asia.” In *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Junko Habu, Peter Lape, John Olsen, and Jing Zhichun, 2015.
- Blink, Hendrik. *Nederlandsch Oost- en West-Indië*. 2 volumes. Leiden: Brill, 1907.

- Bloembergen, Marieke and Vincent Kuitenbrouwer. "A New Dutch Imperial History: Connecting Dutch and Overseas Pasts." *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 128, no. 1 (2013): 1–4.
- Blok, R. *History of the Island of Celebes, Continued from the Memoir of Mr. R. Blok, Governor of Makassar, and from Those of His Successors*. Translated by J. von Stubenvoll. Volume 1. Calcutta: Calcutta Gazette Press, 1817.
- Blue, Gregory. "Opium for China: The British Connection." In *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, 31–54. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Blussé, Leonard. "Chinese Century. The Eighteenth Century in the China Sea Region." *Archipel* 58 (1999): 107–30.
- _____. "In Praise of Commodities: An Essay on the Crosscultural Trade in Edible Bird's-Nests." In *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c.1400–1750*, ed. Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, 317–35. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991.
- _____. "Junks to Java: Chinese Shipping to the Nanyang in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century." In *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang, 221–58. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
- _____. "Koning Willem I en de schepping van de koloniale staat." In *Het begin van het koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, ed. Ido de Haan, Paul den Hoed, and Henk te Velde. Amsterdam: Prometheus/Bert Bakker, 2013.
- _____. "No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade." *Modern Asian Studies* 30 (1996): 51–77.
- _____. "On the Waterfront: Life and Labour around the Batavian Roadstead." In *Asian Port Cities 1600–1800: Local and Foreign Cultural Interactions*, ed. Haneda Masashi, 119–36. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.
- _____. *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*. Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986.
- _____. *Tribuut aan China: Vier eeuwen Nederlands-Chinese betrekkingen*. Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel, 1989.
- _____. *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Blussé, Leonard, and Femme Gaastra, eds. *On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.
- Blussé, Leonard, Willem G.J. Rummelink, and Ivo Smits, eds. *Bridging the Divide: 400 Years the Netherlands-Japan*. Leiden: Hotei, 2000.
- Bock, Carl. *Reis in Oost- en Zuid-Borneo, van Koetei naar Banjermassin: Ondernomen op last der Indische regeering in 1879 en 1880*. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1881.
- Boeke, J.H. *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, as Exemplified by Indonesia*. Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1953.
- Boels, Henk. "Instusschen hield ik hem door vormelijke beleefdheid in toom' James Loudon over vormen en gedrag in de politiek." In *Het persoonlijke is politiek: egodocumenten en politieke cultuur*, ed. Janny de Jong, Remieg Aerts, and Henk te Velde, 87–100. Hilversum: Verloren, 2002.
- Boer, M.G. de and J.C. Westermann. *Een halve eeuw pakketvaart 1891–1941*. Amsterdam: de Bussy, 1941.
- Boers, B.D. de Jong. "The 'Arab' of the Indonesian Archipelago: The Famed Horse Breeds of Sumbawa." In *Breeds of Empire: The 'Invention' of the Horse in Southern Africa and Maritime Southeast Asia, 1500–1950*, ed. Greg Bankoff and Sandra Swart, 51–64. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007.

- _____. "Mount Tambora in 1815: A Volcanic Eruption in Indonesia and Its Aftermath." *Indonesia* 60 (1995): 37–59.
- _____. "Sustainability and Time Perspective in Natural Resource Management: The Exploitation of Sappan Trees in the Forests of Sumbawa, 1500–1875." In *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley, 261–80. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997.
- Bogaars, G.E. "The Effect of the Opening of the Suez Canal on the Trade and Development of Singapore." *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 42, no. 1 (1969): 208–51.
- Bongenaar, Karel E.M. *De ontwikkeling van het zelfbesturend landschap in Nederlandsch Indië, 1855–1942*. Zutphen: Walburg, 2005.
- Bons, W.M. "Kinderen van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie: De levenslopen en Carrières van de in Azië geboren zonen en dochters van VOC-dienaren in de 18e eeuw." MA thesis, Leiden University, Leiden, 2015.
- Boom, E.H. *Nederlandsch Oost-Indië*. Zutphen: Plantenga, 1864.
- Boomgaard, Peter. "The High Sanctuary; Local Perceptions of Mountains in Indonesia, 1750–2000." In *Framing Indonesian Realities: Essays in Symbolic Anthropology in Honour of Reimar Schefold*, ed. Peter J.M. Nas, Gerard Persoon, and Rivke Jaffe, 295–314. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003.
- _____. "Horses, Horse-Trading and Royal Courts in Indonesian History, 1500–1900." In *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley, 211–32. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- _____. "Maize and Tobacco in Upland Indonesia, 1600–1940." In *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands: Marginality, Power and Production*, ed. Tania Li, 45–78. London: Routledge, 2002.
- _____. "Resources and People of the Sea in and around the Indonesian Archipelago, 900–1900." In *Muddied Waters. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Management of Forest and Fisheries in Island Southeast Asia*, ed. P. Boomgaard, D. Henley, and Manon Osseweijer. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005.
- _____. *Southeast Asia: An Environmental History*. Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2007.
- _____. "The VOC Trade in Forest Products in the Seventeenth Century." In *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and South East Asia*, ed. Richard H. Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan, 375–95. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Boomgaard, P., and A.J. Gooszen. *Population Trends 1795–1942*. Volume 11 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century Up to 1940*, ed. Peter Boomgaard. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991.
- Boon, Goh Chor. *Technology and Entrepôt Colonialism in Singapore, 1819–1940*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- Booth, Anne. *The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities*. London: Macmillan, 1998.
- Boquet, Yves. *The Philippines*. New York: Springer, 2017.
- Borao, José Eugenio. "The Massacre of 1603: Chinese Perception of the Spanish in the Philippines." *Itinerario* 23, no. 1 (1998): 22–39.
- Borschberg, Peter. "Chinese Merchants, Catholic Clerics and Spanish Colonists in British-Occupied Manila, 1762–1764." In *Maritime China in Transition, 1750–1850*, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin Keong, 355–72. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004.
- Bose, Sugata. *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Bosma, Ulbe. "The Cultivation System (1830–1870) and Its Private Entrepreneurs on Colonial Java." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2007): 275–9.

- Bosma, Ulbe and Remco Raben. *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolization and Empire, 1500–1920*. Athens: Ohio University Press; and Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.
- Bosscher, C. "Memorie van overgave, C. Bosscher (1859)." In *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapian, 98–249. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1980.
- _____. "Staat aantoonende der voornaamste eilanden der Aroe-groep, benevens de voornaamste negorijen en het aantal van hare bewoners en huizen." *Tijdschrift van Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 1 (1853): 323–6.
- Bougainville, Louis de. "A Voyage Round the World." Amsterdam: N. Israel, 1967.
- Bougas, Wayne A. "Bantayan: An Early Makassarese Kingdom, 1200–1600 A.D." *Archipel* 55 (1998): 83–123.
- Boulan-Smit, Marie-Christine. "We, of the Banyan Tree: Traditions of Origin of the Alune of West Seram." PhD dissertation, Australia National Univeristy, 1998.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity, 1990.
- Bowditch, Nathaniel. *The New American Practical Navigator: Being an Epitome of Navigation*. New York: E. & G.W. Blunt, 1837.
- Bowring, John. *A Visit to the Philippine Islands*. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1859.
- Boxer, C.R. *Francisco Vieira De Figueiredo: A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624–1667*. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1967.
- Boyajian, James C. *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580–1640*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
- Bräuchler, Birgit. "Kings on Stage: Local Leadership in the Post-Suharto Moluccas." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39 (2011): 196–218.
- _____. *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Bräuchler, Birgit and Maribeth Erb. "Introduction — Eastern Indonesia under Reform: The Global, the National and the Local." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39 (2011): 113–30.
- Braudel, Fernand. *Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century. Volume II: The Wheels of Commerce*. London: Fontana/Collins, 1985.
- _____. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. London: Fontana/Collins, 1975.
- _____. *Memory and the Mediterranean*. New York: Vintage, 2002.
- Brautigam, Deborah. "Local Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: Networks and Linkages to the Global Economy." In *Asia and Africa in the Global Economy*, ed. Ernest Aryeete, 106–27. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003.
- Brink, H. van den. *Dr Benjamin Frederik Matthes: zijn leven en arbeid in dienst van het Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap*. Amsterdam: Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap, 1943.
- British North Borneo Chartered Company. *Handbook of British North Borneo*. London: W. Clowes, 1890.
- Brodbeck, Frank. *Structure and Processes in Traditional Forest Gardens of Central Sulawesi*. Gottingen: Cuvillier Verlag, 2004.
- Broersma, Roelof. *Handel en bedrijf in Zuid- en Oost-Borneo*. 's-Gravenhage: G. Naeff, 1927.
- _____. "Koopvaardij in de Molukken." *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 23 (1934): 129–47, 320–50.
- Broeze, F.J.A. "The International Diffusion of Ocean Steam Navigation: The Myth of the Retardation of Netherlands Steam Navigation to the East Indies." *Economisch- en Sociaal Historisch Jaarboek* 45 (1982): 77–95.
- _____. "The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820–1850." *Archipel* 18 (1979): 251–69.

- Broeze, Frank, ed. *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th–20th Centuries*. 1st ed. Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1989.
- Bronson, Bennett. “Exchange at the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia.” In *Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography*, ed. Karl L. Hutterer, 39–52. Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1977.
- Brook, Timothy. *Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World*. New York-London: Bloomsbury Press, 2008.
- Brooke, James, Sir. *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes Down to the Occupation of Labuan from the Journals of James Brooke, Esq.* Ed. R.N. Captain Rodney Mundy. 2nd ed. 2 volumes. London: John Murray, 1848.
- Brookfield, Harold, Yvonne Byron, and Leslie Potter. *In Place of the Forest: Environmental and Socio-Economic Transformation in Borneo and the Eastern Malay Peninsula*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995.
- Brown, Warren C. *Violence in Medieval Europe. The Medieval World*. Harlow: Pearson, 2011.
- Bruijn, Antonie Augustus. *Biographical Notes of Antonie Augustus Bruijn, 1842–1890: His Life as a Marine Officer in the Dutch Navy and Lifetime as a Trader in Naturalia on Ternate, the Moluccas, Indonesia*. Ed. Alfred Russell Wallace and Achille Raffray. Bogor: IPB, 2010.
- Bruijn, Jaap R. “Facing a New World: The Dutch Navy Goes Overseas.” In *Colonial Empires Compared: Britain and the Netherlands, 1750–1850*, ed. Bob Moore and Henk van Nierop. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
- Brumund, J.F.G. *Indiana: Verzameling van Stukken van onderscheiden aard, over landen, volken, oudheden en geschiedenis van den Indischen Archipel*. 2 volumes. Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1853–54.
- Bruyns, Willem F.J. Mörzer. “A Dutch Naval Officer on the Berau River in the 1870s.” *The Conradian* 30, no. 1 (2005): 132–43.
- Bubandt, Nils. *Democracy, Corruption and the Politics of Spirits in Contemporary Indonesia*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- _____. “Malukan Apocalypse: Themes in the Dynamics of Violence in Eastern Indonesia.” *Violence in Indonesia*, ed. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer, 228–53. Hamburg: Abera, 2001.
- Bucholt, Helmut, and Ulrich Mai. “Markets, Trade and the Reproduction of Trader Households.” In *Continuity, Change and Aspirations: Social and Cultural Life in Minabasa, Indonesia*, ed. Helmut Bucholt and Ulrich Mai, 154–66. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.
- Buijs, Kees. *Powers of Blessing from the Wilderness and from Heaven: Structure and Transformations in the Religion of the Toraja in the Mamasa Area of South Sulawesi*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Buehler, Michael. “Rise of the Clans.” *Inside Indonesia* 90 (2007).
- Bulbeck, F. David. “An Integrated Perspective on the Austronesian Diaspora: The Switch from Cereal Agriculture to Maritime Foraging in the Colonisation of Island Southeast Asia.” *Australian Archaeology* 67, no. 1 (2008): 31–51.
- _____. “Economy, Military and Ideology in Pre-Islamic Luwu, South Sulawesi.” *Australasian Historical Archaeology* 18 (2000): 3–16.
- _____. “The Inside View of Makassar’s 16th to 17th Century History: Changing Marital Alliances and Persistent Settlement Patterns.” *Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 12, supplement no. 1 (2016): 143–67.
- _____. “The Politics of Marriage and the Marriage of Politics in Gowa, South Sulawesi, during the 16th and 17th Centuries.” In *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather, 283–318. Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996.

- _____. "Sacred Places in Ussu and Cerekang, South Sulawesi, Indonesia: Their History, Ecology and Pre-Islamic Relation with the Bugis Kingdom of Luwuq." In *Transcending the Culture–Nature Divide in Cultural Heritage: Views from the Asia-Pacific Region*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013.
- _____. "A Tale of Two Kingdoms. The Historical Archaeology of Gowa and Tallok, South Sulawesi, Indonesia." PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 1992.
- Bulbeck, F. David, Anthony Reid, Lay Cheng Tan, and Yiqi Wu. *Southeast Asian Exports since the 14th Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee and Sugar*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998.
- Bulbeck, F. David, and Bagyo Prasetyo. "Two Millennia of Socio-Cultural Development in Luwu, South Sulawesi, Indonesia." *World Archaeology* 32, no. 1 (2000): 121–37.
- Bulbeck, F. David and Ian Caldwell. *Land of Iron: The Historical Archaeology of Luwu and the Cenrana Valley: Results of the Origin of Complex Society in South Sulawesi Project (OXIS)*. Hull and Canberra: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull; School of Anthropology and Archaeology, Australian National University, 2000.
- Bulley, Anne. *The Bombay Country Ships 1790–1833*. Mitcham: Curzon, 2000.
- Burt, Ronald S. "The Network Structure of Social Capital." In *Research in Organizational Behavior*, volume 22, ed. R.I. Sutton and B.M. Staw, 345–423. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000.
- _____. *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1995.
- Butcher, John, and Howard Dick, eds. *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming*. London: St. Martins Press, 1993.
- Butcher, John G. and R.E. Elson. *Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2017.
- Byrne, John. "The Luso-Asians and Other Eurasians: Their Domestic and Diasporic Identities." In *Portuguese and Luso-Asian Legacies in Southeast Asia, 1511–2011. Vol 1: The Making of the Luso-Asian World: Intricacies of Engagement*, ed. Laura Jarnagin, 131–54. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.
- Cabaton, A. *Les Indes Néerlandaises* Paris: Guilmoto, 1910.
- Cain, P.J. "British Free Trade, 1850–1914: Economics and Policy." *ReFresh: Recent Findings of Research in Economic and Social History* 29 (1999): 1–4.
- Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins. *British Imperialism: 1688–2000*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014.
- Caldwell, Ian. "The Myth of the Exemplary Centre: Shelly Errington's Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 22, no. 1 (1991): 109–18.
- Caldwell, Ian and Kathryn Wellen. "Finding Cina: A New Paradigm for Early Bugis History." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 173, nos. 2–3 (2017): 296–324.
- Caldwell, Ian and Wayne A. Bougas. "The Early History of Binamu and Bangkala, South Sulawesi." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 160, no. 4 (2004): 456–510.
- Calo, Ambra. *Trails of Bronze Drums Across Early Southeast Asia: Exchange Routes and Connected Cultural Spheres*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- Calhoun, Craig. "Pierre Bourdieu in Context." SCRIBD, uploaded 14 February 2014.
- Campo, J.N.F.M. à "Asymmetry, Disparity and Cyclicity: Charting the Piracy Conflict in Colonial Indonesia." *International Journal of Maritime History* 14, no. 1 (2007): 35–62.
- _____. *Engines of Empire: Steamshipping and State Formation in Colonial Indonesia*. Hilversum: Verloren, 2002.
- _____. "Gauging Globalization: Maritime Piracy in Insular Southeast Asia in a Global Context." Working paper, international workshop, "Globalization and Creolization in World History," Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam, 21–23 March 2002.

- _____. *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij: stoomvaart en staatsvorming in de Indonesische archipel 1888–1914*. Hilversum: Verloren, 1992.
- _____. “Patronen, processen en periodisering van zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in Nederlands-Indië.” *Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis* 3, no. 2 (2006): 78–107.
- _____. “Perahu Shipping in Indonesia 1870–1914.” *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993): 33–61.
- _____. “A Profound Debt to the Eastern Seas: Documentary History and Literary Representation of Berau’s Maritime Trade in Joseph Conrad’s Malay Novels.” *International Journal of Maritime History* 12, no. 2 (2000): 85–127.
- _____. “Steam Navigation and State Formation.” In *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880–1942*, ed. Robert Cribb, 11–30. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994.
- Cannadine, David, ed. *Empire, the Sea and Global History: Britain’s Maritime World 1763–1833*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Capellen, G.A.G.P. van der “Het journaal van den baron Van der Capellen op zijne reis door de Molukko’s. Tweede gedeelte.” *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 17, no. 7–12 (1824): 355–91.
- Carroll, John Mark. *A Concise History of Hong Kong*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Carter, Paul. *Decolonising Governance: Archipelagic Thinking*. New York: Routledge, 2019.
- Casiño, Eric S. *The Jama Mapun: A Changing Samal Society in the Southern Philippines*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1976.
- Cederroth, Sven. *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah: A Sasak Community on Lombok*. Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 3. Göteborg: Vasastadens Bokbinderi, 1981.
- _____. “Traditional Power and Party Politics in North Lombok, 1965–1999.” In *Elections in Indonesia: the New Order and Beyond*, ed. Sven Cederroth and Hans Antlov, 77–110. London: Routledge Curzon, 2004.
- Cense, A.A. “Sanggalea, an Old Word for ‘Chinese’ in South Celebes.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 111, no. 1 (1955): 107–8.
- Cense, A.A., and E.M. Uhlenbeck. *Critical Survey of Studies on the Languages of Borneo*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958.
- Chabot, H. Th. *Kinship, Status and Gender in South Celebes*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Chakravarti, Ranabir. “Seafaring, Ships and Ship Owners: India and the Indian Ocean (AD 700–1500).” In *Ships and the Development of Maritime Technology on the Indian Ocean*, ed. Ruth Barnes and David Parkin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.
- Chambers, Ian. *The Chamberlains, the Churchills and Irelands, 1874–1922*. Youngstown, NY: Cambria, 2006.
- Chambert-Loir, Henri. “State, City, Commerce: The Case of Bima.” *Indonesia* 57 (1994): 71–88.
- Chambert-Loir, Henri, S. Salahuddin, and R. Maryam. *Bo’ Sangaji Kai: Catatan Kerajaan Bima*. Jakarta: Ecole française d’Extreme-Orient, Yayasan Obor, 2012.
- Chandra, Satish, and Himanshu Prabha Ray, eds. *The Sea, Identity and History: From the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea*. Singapore: ISEAS/Manohar, 2013.
- Chartier, Gary. *Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Chaudhuri, K.N. *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Chaudhury, Sushil. “Maritime Trade in the Indian Ocean, c. 1600–1800.” *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh* (2010): 1–24.

- Chen, Song-Chuan. *Merchants of War and Peace: British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017.
- Chew, Emrys. *Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Chiang, Hai Ding. *A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 1870–1915*. Singapore: National Museum, 1978.
- Chin, James K. “Junk Trade, Business Networks and Sojourning Communities: Hokkien Merchants in Early Maritime Asia.” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 6, no. 2 (2009): 157–215.
- Christie, Jan Wisseman. “State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia: A Consideration of the Theories and the Data.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 151, no. 2 (1995): 235–88.
- _____. “Under the Volcano: Stabilizing the Early Javanese State in an Unstable Environment.” In *Environment, Trade and Society in Southeast Asia. A Longue Durée Perspective*, ed. David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 46–61. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- Clarence-Smith, William G. *Cocoa and Chocolate 1765–1914*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- _____. “The Economic Role of the Arab Community in Maluku, 1816 to 1940.” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 26, no. 74 (1998).
- _____. “Entrepreneurial Strategies of Hadhrami Arabs in Southeast Asia, c. 1750s–1950s.” In *The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation?*, ed. Ahmed Abushouk and Hassan A. Ibrahim, 135–58. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- _____. “Horse Trading: The Economic Role of Arabs in the Lesser Sunda Islands, c.1800 to c.1940.” In *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s*, ed. Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein, 143–62. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- _____. “The Production of Cotton Textiles in Early Modern South-East Asia.” In *The Spinning World: A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200–1850*, ed. Giorgio Riello and Prasanna Parthasarathi, 127–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Clarence-Smith, William G., and Steven Topik, eds. *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1500–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Clarke, John. “Stuart Hall and the Theory and Practice of Articulation.” *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 36, no. 2 (2015): 275–86.
- Claver, Alexander. “Commerce and Capital in Colonial Java: Trade Finance and Commercial Relations between Europeans and Chinese, 1820s–1942.” PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, 2006.
- _____. “A Money Paradox in the Netherlands Indies: Coins, Commerce and Consumers in Late Colonial Life (1800–1942).” In *Promises and Predicaments: Trade and Entrepreneurship in Colonial and Independent Indonesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, ed. Alicia Schrikker and Jeroen Touwen, 80–100. Singapore: NUS Press, 2015.
- Claver, Alexander, and G. Roger Knight. “A European Role in Intra-Asian Commercial Development: The Maclaine Watson Network and the Java Sugar Trade c.1840–1942.” *Business History* 60, no. 2 (2018): 202–30.
- Clemente, Tina S. “Spanish Colonial Policy toward Chinese Merchants in Eighteenth-Century Philippines.” In *Merchant Communities in Asia, 1600–1980*, ed. Lin Yu-ju and Madeleine Zelin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.
- Clercq, F.S.A. de. *Bijdragen tot de kennis der residentie Ternate*. Leiden: Brill, 1890.
- _____. *De West- en Noordkust van Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea: Proeve van beschrijving volgens de mededeelingen en rapporten van reizigers en ambtenaren en naar eigen ervaringen*. Leiden: Brill, 1893. <http://pauwaweb.org/gb/clercq/1893r.pdf>.
- _____. *Het gebied der Kalana fat of vier Radja's in Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea*. Leiden: Brill, 1889.

- _____. "Ternate: The Residency and Its Sultanate, 1890." In *Bijdragen tot de kennis der Residentie Ternate*, edited and translated by Paul Michael Taylor and Marie N. Richards. Washington, DC, 1999. Smithsonian Digital Libraries Editions, <http://www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/>.
- Clulow, Adam. *Amboina, 1623: Fear and Conspiracy on the Edge of Empire*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.
- Coclanis, Peter A. "Southeast Asia's Incorporation into the World Rice Market: A Revisionist View." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 24, no. 2 (1993): 251–67.
- Collins, Robert O. and James M. Burns. *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Comyn, Tomás de. *State of the Philippine Islands: Being an Historical, Statistical, and Descriptive Account of That Interesting Portion of the Indian Archipelago*. London: Allman, 1821.
- _____. "State of the Philippines in 1819." In *The Former Philippines Thru Foreign Eyes*, ed. Austin Craig, 357–458. New York: D. Appleton, 1917.
- Connolly, Jennifer. "Christian Conversion and Ethnic Identity in East Kalimantan." In *Casting Faiths: Imperialism and the Transformation of Religion in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Thomas D. DuBois, 175–89. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Conrad, Joseph. *Almayr's Folly: A Story of an Eastern River*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Cook, Andrew S. "Establishing the Sea Routes to India and China: Stages in the Development of Hydrographical Knowledge." In *The Worlds of the East India Company*, ed. H.V. Bowen, Margarette Lincoln and Nigel Rigby, 119–36. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002.
- _____. "Surveying the Seas: Establishing the Sea Routes to the East Indies." In *Cartographies of Travel and Navigation*, ed. James R. Akerman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Coolhaas, W. Ph., J. van Goor, J.E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, and H.K. s'Jacob, eds. *Generale missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en raden aan heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 14 vols. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1960–.
- Cooper, Frederick. *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Corteseo, Armando. *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, an Account of the East from the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512–1515*. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944.
- Costa, H. de la. "Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735–1773." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 38, no. 1 (1965): 199–212.
- Costeloe, Michael P. "Spain and the Latin American Wars of Independence: The Free Trade Controversy, 1810–1820." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 61, no. 2 (1981): 209–34.
- Crab, P. van der. *De Moluksche eilanden: Reis van Z.E. den Gouverneur-Generaal Charles Ferdinand Pabud, door den Molukschen Archipel*. Batavia: Lange, 1862.
- Crawford, John. *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries*. London: Bradbury & Evans, 1856.
- _____. *History of the Indian Archipelago*. Volume 3. London: George Ramsay, 1820.
- _____. *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China*. London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830.
- Creese, Helen M. "Balinese Babad as Historical Sources; A Reinterpretation of the Fall of Gèlgèl." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkund* 147, no. 2 (1991): 236–60.
- _____. *Bali in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Ethnographic Accounts of Pierre Dubois*. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

- Cribb, Robert. "Birds of Paradise and Environmental Politics in Colonial Indonesia, 1890–1931." In *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn and David Henley, 379–408. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997.
- _____. *Historical Atlas of Indonesia*. Richmond: Curzon, 2000.
- Cribb, Robert and Michele Ford, eds. *Indonesia Beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Croft-Cusworth, Catriona. "'The Forest Belongs to the Community': Making the Call for Tenure Reform in Maluku, Indonesia." *Forests News*, CIFOR (website), 22 January 2018. <https://forestsnews.cifor.org/53571/forest-belongs-community?fnl=en>.
- Cullen, Louis M. *A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Cummings, William. "Islam, Empire and Makassarese Historiography in the Reign of Sultan Ala'uddin (1593–1639)." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2007): 197–214.
- _____. *Making Blood White: Historical Transformations in Early Modern Makassar*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002.
- _____. "'Only One People but Two Rulers': Hiding the Past in Seventeenth-Century Makassarese Chronicles." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 155, no. 1 (1999): 97–120.
- _____. "Scripting Islamization: Arabic Texts in Early Modern Makassar." *Ethnohistory* 48, no. 4 (2001): 559–86.
- Cummins, Ian, and John Beasant. *Shell Shock: The Secrets and Spin of an Oil Giant*. Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2005.
- Curtin, P.D. *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Cushman, Jennifer. *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1993.
- Daendels, Herman Willem. *Staat Der Nederlandsche Oostindische bezittingen, onder het bestuur van den Gouverneur-Generaal Herman Willem Daendels, 1808–1811*. Amsterdam, 1814.
- Dalby, Andrew. *Dangerous Tastes: The Story of Spices*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- Dale, Gareth. *Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market*. New York: Wiley, 2013.
- Dale, Stephen Frederic. *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar 1498–1922*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
- Dalrymple, Alexander. "Account of the Natural Curiosities at Sooloo." In *An Historical Collection of the Several Voyages and Discoveries in the South Pacific Ocean*, 1–21. London, 1770.
- _____. "Memoirs of Alexander Dalrymple Esq." *European Magazine* 42 (1802): 323–7, 421–4.
- _____. *A Plan for Extending the Commerce of This Kingdom: And of the East-India-Company*. London, 1769.
- Dalton, Heather, Jukka Salo, Pekka Niemela, and Simo Orma. "Frederick II of Hohenstaufen's Australasian Cockatoo: Symbol of Detente between East and West and Evidence of the Ayyubids' Global Reach." *Parergon* 35, no. 1 (2018): 35–60.
- Dalton, John. "Account of the Dyaks of Borneo." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula*, ed. J.H. Moor, 41–54. Singapore, 1837.
- _____. "Borneo. Mr Dalton's Thoughts on Coti." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago & Adjacent Countries; Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula*, ed. J.H. Moor, 64–6. Singapore, 1837.

- _____. "Mr. Dalton's Papers on Borneo c., on the Present State of Piracy, Amongst These Islands, and the Best Method of Its Suppression." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula*, ed. J.H. Moor, 15–27. Singapore: Mission Press, 1837.
- Damalado, Andrey. *Divided Loyalties: Displacement, Belonging and Citizenship among East Timorese in West Timor*. Canberra: ANU Press, 2018.
- Dampier, William. *A New Voyage Around the World*. London: James Knapton, 1697.
- Danerek, Stefan. "Construction Sacrifice in Eastern Indonesia." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 45, no. 131 (2017): 88–107.
- Das, Aditya. *Defending British India against Napoleon: The Foreign Policy of Governor-General Lord Minto*. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2016.
- Davidson, G.F. *Trade and Travel in the Far East or Recollections of Twenty-One Years Passed in Java, Singapore, Australia, and China*. London: Madden and Malcolm, 1846.
- Davidson, Jamie S. and David Henley, eds. *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*. London: Routledge.
- Davidson, K. "The Portuguese Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850–1912." PhD dissertation, University of New South Wales, 1994.
- Davidson, L.S. "Woven Webs: Trading Textiles around the Indian Ocean." *Portal* 9, no. 1 (2012): 1–21.
- Davies, Stephen. *East Sails West: The Voyage of the Keying, 1846–1855*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014.
- "De Handelsbeweging Van Makassar." *De Indische Gids* 10, no. 1 (1888): 132–3.
- "De Keij eilanden, ten N.W. van de Arroe-eilanden." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 10, no. 4 (1863): 238–9.
- De Jesus, Edilberto C. *The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines: Bureaucratic Enterprise and Social Change, 1766–1880*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980.
- Deng, Gang. *Maritime Sector, Institutions and Sea Power of Premodern China*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.
- Derks, Hans. *History of the Opium Problem: The Assault on the East, ca. 1600–1950*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Dick, Howard. "The Chinese Steamship Owners of Banjarmasin, 1880–1980." Unpublished paper, n.d.
- _____. "Perahu Shipping in Eastern Indonesia, Part I." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 2, no. 2 (1975): 69–107.
- _____. "State, Nation-State and National Economy." In *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, 9–34. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002.
- Dick, Howard, and Peter Rimmer. *Cities, Transport and Communications: The Integration of Southeast Asia since 1850*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Dickinson. "The Indian Archipelago: The Journal of Mr. Dickinson." *The Panoplist, and Missionary Herald; American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* 34 (1834).
- Die, Ong Eng. *Chineezzen in Nederlandsch-Indië: sociografie van een Indonesische bevolkingsgroep*. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1943.
- Dietrich, Stefan. "Flores in the Nineteenth Century: Aspects of Dutch Colonialism on a Non-Profitable Island." *Indonesia Circle* 31 (1983): 39–58.

- Dirkzwager, J.M. "Scheepsbouw." In *Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland: De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800–1890. Deel IV: Delfstoffen, machine- en scheepsbouw. Stoom. Chemie. Telegrafie en telefontie*, ed. H.W. Linzen, 67–102. Zutphen: Walburg, 1993.
- Dewey, Alice G. *Peasant Marketing in Java*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
- Dissel, Anita M.C. van. "Grensoverschrijdend optreden: Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in Nederlands-Indië." *Leidschrift* 26, no. 3 (2011): 151–69.
- . "Pioneering in Southeast Asia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century." In *Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600–2000*, ed. Catia Antunes and Jos Gommans. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
- Dobbs, Stephen. *The Singapore River: A Social History, 1819–2002*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003.
- Doepfers, Daniel F. *Manila 1900–1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial City*. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Monographs, 1985.
- Donahue, Mark. "Some Trade Languages of Insular Southeast Asia and Irian Jaya." In *Atlas of Languages of Intercultural Communication in the Pacific, Asia, and the Americas*, ed. Stephen Adolphe Wurm, Peter Mühlhäusler, and Darrell T. Tryon. Berlin, NY: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996.
- Donkin, R.A. *Between East and West: The Moluccas and the Traffic in Spices Up to the Arrival of Europeans*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2003.
- Donner, Wolf. *Land Use and Environment in Indonesia*. Hamburg: Hurst, 1987.
- Doren, J.B.J. van. *Herinneringen en schetsen van Nederlands Oost-Indië en reizen in die gewesten*. 2 volumes. Amsterdam: Sybrandi, 1857.
- Dormeier, J.J. "Geschiedkundige aantekeningen betreffende Banggai en Gapi." *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 102 (1943): 555–71.
- Douglas, Bronwen. *Science, Voyages, and Encounters in Oceania, 1511–1850*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Doumenjou, J. "Kora-Kora, Junks and Baroto: Insulindian Boats in Portuguese Warfare and Trade According to the Relación of Miguel Roxo De Brito (1581–1582)." *Anais de Historia de Alem-Mar* 12 (2011): 123–37.
- Dove, Michael R. *The Banana Tree at the Gate: A History of Marginal Peoples and Global Markets in Borneo*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2012.
- . "Political Ecology of Pepper in the 'Hikayat Banjar': The Historiography of Commodity Production in a Bornean Kingdom." In *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley, 341–78. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997.
- . "Theories of Swidden Agriculture, and the Political Economy of Ignorance." *Agroforestry Systems* 1, no. 2 (1983): 85–99.
- Downs, Jacques M. *The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784–1844*. Introduction by Frederic D. Grant. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014.
- Drabbe, P. *Het leven van den Tanembarees, ethnografische studie over het Tanembareesche volk*. Leiden: Brill, 1940.
- Druce, Steven Charles. "The 'Birth' of Brunei: Early Polities of the Northwest Coast of Borneo and the Origins of Brunei, Tenth to Midfourteenth Centuries." In *Brunei: History, Islam, Society and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Ooi Keat Gin, 21–45. London: Routledge, 2016.
- . "The Decentralized Austronesian Polity: Of Mandalas, Negaras, Galactics, and the South Sulawesi Kingdoms." *Suvannabhumi* 9, no. 2 (2017): 7–34.

- _____. *The Lands West of the Lakes: A History of the Ajattappareng Kingdoms of South Sulawesi, 1200 to 1600 Centuries*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009.
- Ducos, Laure. *Importance of the Traditional Land-Use and Land-Tenure Systems of Waraka, Seram Island, Maluku*. Working Paper No. 144. Bogor: CIFOR, 2014.
- Duggan, Genevieve and Hans Hagerdal. *Savu: History and Oral Tradition on an Island of Indonesia*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2018.
- Dumont, Louis. *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Duncan, Christopher R. *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and Its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Dunnebie, W. "Over de Vorsten van Bolaang Mongondow." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 105, nos. 2–3 (1949): 219–74.
- d'Urville, Jules Dumont. *Voyage au Pôle Sud et dans l'Océanie sur les corvettes l'Astrolabe et La Zélée, exécuté par ordre du Roi pendant les années 1837, 1838, 1839, 1840. Atlas pittoresque*. 2 vols. Paris: Dide, 1846.
- Dyke, Paul Arthur Van. *Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and Diplomacy on the South China Coast*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012.
- _____. *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005.
- _____. *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011.
- Earl, G.W. "An Account of a Visit to Kisser, One of the Serawatti Group in the Indian Archipelago." *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 11 (1841): 108–17. http://archive.org/stream/jstor-1797637/1797637_djvu.txt.
- _____. *The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34*. London: Wm. H. Allen, 1837.
- _____. "Letter to the Royal Geographical Society." *The Literary Gazette and Journal of the Belles Lettres* (1841): 737–8.
- _____. *The Native Races of the Indian Archipelago, Papuans*. London: Hippolyte Bailliere, 1853.
- _____. "Steam Routes through the Indian Archipelago." *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 5 (1851): 441–50.
- _____. "The Trading Ports of the Indian Archipelago." *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and East Asia* 4 (1850): 483–95.
- Earle, Timothy. "Chiefs, Chieftaincies, Chiefdoms, and Chiefly Confederacies: Power in the Evolution of Political Systems." *Social Evolution and History* 10, no. 1 (2011): 27–54.
- Edgerton, Ronald K. "Frontier Society on the Bukidnon Plateau." In *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, 361–90. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1982.
- Eghenter, Cristina. "Trading and Migration Routes in the Interior of Borneo: Physical Configurations of Economic and Social Networks." *IIAS Newsletter Online* 19 (1999).
- Eghenter, Cristina, Bernard Sellato, and G. Simon Devung, eds. *Social Science Research and Conservation Management in the Interior of Borneo. Unraveling Past and Present Interactions of People and Forests*. Jakarta: CIFOR, WWF, 2003.
- Ehrenreich, R.M., C.L. Crumley, and J.E. Levy, eds. *Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies*. Arlington: Archaeological Papers, 1995.
- Eijbergen, H.C. Van. "Aanteekeningen Op Een Reis Naar De Zuidwester-Eilanden." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 12, no. 1 (1864): 129–96.

- Eijsinga, Philippus Pieter Roorda van. *Handboek Der Land- En Volkenkunde, Geschied-, Taal-, Aardrijks- En Staatkunde Van Nederlandsch Indie*. 2 vols. Amsterdam: L. van Bakkenes, 1841.
- Eilenberg, Michael. *At the Edges of States; Dynamics of State Formation in the Indonesian Borderlands*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Ekris, A. van. "Iets over het Ceramse Kakian-Verbond." *Tijdschrift voor Indische taal-, land-, en volkenkunde*, 5th series, part 2, 16 (1867): 290–315.
- Elkington, J.S.C. "The 'Mestizos' of Kisar, Dutch East Indies." *The Medical Journal of Australia* (1922): 32.
- Ellen, Roy. "Conundrums about Panjandrums: On the Use of Titles in the Relations of Political Subordination in the Moluccas and Along the Papuan Coast." *Indonesia* 41 (1986):
- _____. "The Distribution of Metroxylon Sagu and the Historical Diffusion of a Complex Traditional Technology." In *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley, 69–106. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- _____. "Faded Images of Old Tidore in Contemporary Southeast Seram: A View from the Periphery." *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 23–37.
- _____. *On the Edge of the Banda Zone: Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan Trading Network*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003.
- _____. "Patterns of Indigenous Timber Extraction from Moluccan Rain Forest Fringes." *Journal of Biogeography* 12 (1985): 559–87.
- _____. "Pragmatism, Identity and the State: How the Nuaulu of Seram Have Re-Invented Their Beliefs and Practices as 'Religion.'" *Wacana: Jurnal Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya* 15, no. 2 (2014): 254–85.
- _____. "Trade, Environment and the Reproduction of Local Systems in the Moluccas." In *The Ecosystem Approach in Anthropology: From Concept to Practice*, ed. Emilio F. Moran. Ann Arbor: Michigan, 1991.
- Emirbayer, Mustafa. "Tilly and Bourdieu." *The American Sociologist* 41, no. 4 (2010): 400–22.
- Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*. 1st ed. 4 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1899–1906.
- Erb, Maribeth and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto. *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?: Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Erb, Maribeth, Carol Faucher, and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, eds. *Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2013.
- Erikson, Emily. *Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600–1757*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Erikson, Thomas Hylland. *Fredrik Barth: An Intellectual Biography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- Evers, Hans-Dieter. "Traditional Trading Networks of Southeast Asia." *Archipel* 35 (1988): 89–100.
- Fadera, Josip M. "The Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy: A Survey of Recent Research of the Spanish Colonial Era." *Australian Economic History Review* 44, no. 3 (2004): 307–20.
- Farram, Steven. "Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart and the British Interregnum in Netherlands Timor, 1812–1816." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 163, no. 4 (2007): 455–75.
- Fasseur, Cees. "De schat van Lombok." In *De Weg naar Paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995.
- _____. "Een koloniale paradox: de Nederlandse expansie in de Indonesische archipel in het midden van de 19e eeuw (1830–1870)." *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* (1979): 162–86.

- _____. "Een koloniale paradox: de Nederlandse expansie in de Indonesische archipel in het midden van de 19e eeuw (1830–1870)." In *De Weg naar Paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen*, 47–73. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995.
- Faure, David. *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Feblica, Senia. *Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests and Strategies*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
- Feener, R. Michael. "Shaykh Yusuf and the Appreciation of Muslim 'Saints' in Modern Indonesia." *Journal for Islamic Studies* 18–19 (1999): 112–31.
- _____. "Southeast Asian Localisations of Islam and Participation within a Global Umma, c.1500–1800." In *The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3, the Eastern Islamic World*, ed. Anthony Reid and David O. Morgan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Feenstra, Y. *Beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van handel, cultuur en nijverheid onzer Oost-Indische Buiten-bezittingen en in het bijzonder van de Molukken*. Amsterdam: J.G. Stemler, 1880.
- Ferrari, Olivier. "Borders and Cultural Creativity. The Case of the Chao Lay, the Sea Gypsies of Southern Thailand." In *From Padi States to Commercial States: Reflections on Identity and the Social Construction Space in the Borderlands of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar*, ed. Frédéric Bourdier, et al. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015.
- Feuchtwang, Stephan, ed. *Making Place: State Projects, Globalisation and Local Responses in China*. London: University of London College Press, 2004.
- Fichman, Martin. "Wallace as Social Critic, Sociologist and Societal 'Prophet'." In *An Alfred Russel Wallace Companion*, ed. James T. Costa, Charles H. Smith, and David A. Collard, 191–234. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019.
- Fichter, James R. *So Great a Profit: How the East India Trade Transformed American Capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Fischer-Tiné, Harald, ed. *Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Fitzpatrick, Matthew P. "Provincializing Rome: The Indian Ocean Trade Network and Roman Imperialism." *Journal of World History* 22, no. 1 (2011): 27–54.
- Flannery, Tim. *Throwim Way Leg: An Adventure*. London: Penguin, 1998.
- Floud, Roderick and Paul Johnson, eds. *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1: 1700–1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Flynn, Dennis O., and Arturo Giráldez. "Born with a 'Silver Spoon': The Origin of World Trade in 1571." *Journal of World History* 6, no. 2 (2001): 201–21.
- Flynn, Dennis O., Arturo Giráldez, and James Sobredo, eds. *European Entry into the Pacific: Spain and the Acapulco–Manila Galleons*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001.
- Foreman, John. *The Philippine Islands*. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906.
- Forrest, Thomas. *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: Including an Account of Magindano, Sooloo, and Other Islands; and Illustrated with Thirty Copper Plates: Performed in the Tartar Galley, Belonging to the Honourable East India Company, during the Years 1774, 1775, and 1776*. London: G. Scott, 1779.
- Forshee, Jill. *Between the Folds: Stories of Cloth, Lives, and Travels from Sumba*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.
- Forth, Gregory L. *Rindi: An Ethnographic Study of a Traditional Domain in Eastern Sumba*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981.
- Fowler, Cynthia. "Why Is Maize a Sacred Plant? Social History and Agrarian Change on Sumba." *Journal of Ethnobiology* 25, no. 1 (2005): 39–57.

- Fox, James J. "Austronesian Societies and Their Transformations." In *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bellwood, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryon, 229–45. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006.
- _____. ed. *The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Indonesia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1980.
- _____. *Harvest of the Palm: Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- _____. "Notes on the Southern Voyages and Settlements of the Sama-Bajau." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* 133, no. 4 (1977): 459–65.
- _____. "Postscript—Spatial Categories in Social Context: Tracing a Comparative Understanding of Austronesian Ideas of Ritual Location." In *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*, ed. Thomas Reuter, 365–78. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006.
- _____. "Precedence in Perspective." In *Precedence: Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World*, ed. Michael P. Vischer, 1–12. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009.
- _____. "The Transformation of Progenitor Lines of Origin: Patterns of Precedence in Eastern Indonesia." In *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather, 130–53. Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996.
- Fox, James J. and Clifford Sather, eds. *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996.
- Fraassen, Christian F. van. *Ambon in het 19e Eeuw: van wingewest tot werfdepot*. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2018.
- _____. "Historical Introduction." In *The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography*, ed. Katrien Polman, 1–58. Dordrecht: Foris, 1983.
- _____. "Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel." PhD dissertation, Leiden University, 1987.
- Frake, Charles O. "The Cultural Construction of Rank, Identity and Ethnic Origins in the Sulu Archipelago." In *Origins, Ancestry and Alliance: Explorations in Austronesian Ethnography*, ed. James J. Fox and Clifford Sather, 319–32. Canberra: ANU E Press, 1996.
- Francis, E. "Timor in 1831." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 1, no. 1 (1838): 352–369, 376–400; no. 2 (1838): 25–54.
- _____. "Van Batavia naar Timor Koepang." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 1, no. 1 (1838): 61–74.
- Freitag, U. and W.G. Clarence-Smith, eds. *Hadrami Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s*. Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Freycinet, Louis-Claude de Saulces de, Ch.H. Persoon, and C.A. Agardh. *Voyage autour du monde exécuté sur les corvettes de S.M. l'Uranie et la Physicienne ... 1817–20*. Paris: Pillet, 1829.
- Frost, Alan. *The Global Reach of Empire: Britain's Maritime Expansion in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 1764–1815*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003.
- Fry, Howard T. *Alexander Dalrymple and the Expansion of British Trade*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970.
- Furnivall, J.S. *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944.
- Gaastra, Femme S. *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline*. Zutphen: Walburg, 2003.
- _____. "Merchants, Middlemen and Money: Aspects of the Trade between the Indonesian Archipelago and Manila in the 17th Century." In *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, Laage Vuursche, the Netherlands, June 1980*, 301–15. Leiden: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1982.

- Gallagher, John and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade." *The Economic History Review*, second series, 6, no. 1–15 (1953).
- Galloway, Terrel. "Life on the Edge: A Look at Ports of Trade and Other Ecotones." *Journal of Economic Issues* 39, no. 3 (2005): 707–26.
- Gallois, J.G.A. "Korte aanteekeningen gehouden gedurende eene reis langs de Oostkust van Borneo." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 4, no. 1 (1856).
- Gardella, Robert Paul. *Harvesting Mountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757–1937*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- Garnaut, R. and P.T. McCawley, eds. *Indonesia: Dualism, Growth and Poverty*. Canberra: RSPS ANU, 1980.
- Garraty, Christopher P. "Investigating Market Exchange in Ancient Societies: A Theoretical Review." In *Archaeological Approaches to Market Exchange in Ancient Societies*, ed. Christopher P. Garraty and Barbara L. Stark, 3–32. Boulder: Colorado University Press, 2010.
- Gaspar, Karl M. "No End to Lumad Dislocation from Their Homeland: The Case of the Sarangani Manobo and B'laans in Davao Occidental." *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* (2017): 73–94.
- Gaston, Chino. "Malaysia Stops Decades-Old Barter Trade in Southern Mindanao." *GMA News Online*, April 29, 2016. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/specialreports/564480/malaysia-stops-decades-old-barter-trade-in-southern-mindanao/story/>.
- Gaynor, Jennifer L. *Intertidal History in Island Southeast Asia: Submerged Genealogy and the Legacy of Coastal Capture*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Geertz, Clifford. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Gegevens over Land en Volk van Enrekang*. Mededeeling 6 van het Encyclopaedisch Bureau van de Koninklijke Vereeniging, Koloniaal Instituut. Amsterdam: Koloniaal Instituut, 1933.
- Giersch, C. Patterson. "Across Zomia with Merchants, Monks, and Musk: Process Geographies, Trade Networks, and the Inner-East–Southeast Asian Borderlands." *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010): 215–39.
- Gelpke, J.F.J. Sollewijn. "On the Origin of the Name Papua." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 149, no. 2 (1993): 318–32.
- _____. "The Report of Miguel Roxo De Brito of His Voyage in 1581–1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf and Seram." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 150, no. 1 (1994): 123–45.
- George, Kenneth M. *Showing Signs of Violence: The Cultural Politics of a Twentieth-Century Headhunting Ritual*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- Gereffi, Gary and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds. *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.
- Gerlich, Bianca Maria. *Marudu 1845: The Destruction and Reconstruction of a Coastal State in Borneo*. Hamburg: Abera, 2003.
- Gerretson, F.C. *History of the Royal Dutch*. Leiden: Brill, 1953.
- Gibson, Thomas. *And the Sun Pursued the Moon: Symbolic Knowledge and Traditional Authority among the Makassar*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005.
- Gibson-Hill, C.A. "The Singapore Chronicle (1824–37)." *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26, no. 1 (1953): 175–99.
- Gills, Barry K. and William R. Thompson. *Globalization and Global History*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.

- Giraldez, Arturo. *The Age of Trade: The Manilla Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.
- Glete, Jan. "Cities, State Formation and the Protection of Trade in Northern Europe, 1200–1700." In *The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the North Sea and Baltic Region: In the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period*, ed. Leos Müllle Hanno Brand, 13–23. Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2007.
- Glover, Ian and Peter Bellwood. *Southeast Asia: From Pre-History to History*. Abingdon and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
- Go, Bon Juan. "Ma'i in Chinese Records—Mindoro or Bai? An Examination of a Historical Puzzle." *Philippine Studies*. 53, no. 1 (2005): 119–38.
- Godfrey, Helen. *Submarine Telegraphy and the Hunt for Gutta Percha: Challenge and Opportunity in a Global Trade*. Leiden: Brill, 2018.
- Goltenboth, Friedhelm, Kris H. Timotius, Paciencia P. Milan, and Josef Margraf, eds. *Ecology of Insular Southeast Asia: The Indonesian Archipelago*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006.
- Goodman, Grant K. *Japan and the Dutch 1600–1853*. London: Curzon, 2000.
- Goodman, Thomas E. *The Sosolot: An Eighteenth Century East Indonesian Trade Network*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006.
- _____. "The Sosolot Exchange Network of Eastern Indonesia during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." In *Perspectives on the Bird's Head of Irian, Jaya, Indonesia (Proceedings of the Conference, Leiden 13–17 October 1997)*, ed. Cecilia Odé, Jelle Miedema, Rien A.C. Dam, and Connie Baak, 21–45. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999.
- Goor, Jurrien van. "De Lombok expeditie en het Nederlandse Nationalisme." In *Imperialisme in De Marge: De Afronding Van Nederlands-Indië*, ed. Jurrien Van Goor, 19–70. Utrecht: HES, 1982.
- _____. "From Company to State." In *Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in Asia*, ed. Jurrien van Goor, 83–98. Hilversum: Verloren, 2004.
- _____. "Said Abdullah, Politicus in de marge van het imperium." In *Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders overzee*, ed. Jurrien Van Goor, 58–108. Utrecht: HES, 1982.
- Gooszen, A.J., *Population Trends 1795–1942*. Vol. 11 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991.
- Gordon, Raymond G., ed. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*. Dallas: SIL, 2005.
- Gorski, Philip S. "Introduction." In *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis (Politics, History, and Culture)*, ed. Philip S. Gorski. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
- Goudswaard, A. *De Papoea's van de Geelvinkbaai*. Amsterdam: H.A.M Roelants, 1863.
- Gowing, Peter. *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920*. Manila: New Day Publishers, 1977.
- Graaff, Bob de. *Kalm temidden van woedende golven: Het ministerie van koloniën en zijn taakomgeving 1912–1940*. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997.
- Graaf, H.J. and Th.G.Th. Pigeaud. *De eerste moslimse vorstendommen op Java: Studiën over de staatkundige geschiedenis van de 15de en 16de eeuw*. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1974.
- Graaf, Ton de. *Voor Handel en Maatschappij: Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824–1964*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2012.
- Graafland, Nicolaas. *De Minahassa, haar verleden en haar tegenwoordige toestand: eene bijdrage tot de Land- en Volkenkunde*. Rotterdam: M. Wijt en Zonen, 1867–69.
- Grabher, Gernot. "Trading Routes, Bypasses, and Risky Intersections: Mapping the Travels of 'Networks' between Economic Sociology and Economic Geography." *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 2 (2006): 163–89.

- Gramberg, J.S.G. "Ene maand in de binnenlanden van Timor." *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 36, no. 2 (1872): 161–217.
- Granovetter, Mark. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 3 (1985): 201–33.
- Graves, Elizabeth and Charnvit Kaset-siri. "A Nineteenth-Century Siamese Account of Bali with Introduction and Notes." *Indonesia* 7 (1969): 77–122.
- Greene, Jack P. and Philip D. Morgan, eds. *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Griffin, Andrew. "London, Bengal, the China Trade and the Unfrequented Extremities of Asia: The East India Company's Settlement in New Guinea, 1793–95." *Electronic British Library Journal*, 1990. <http://www.bl.uk/ebli/1990articles/article13.html>.
- Grimes, Barbara Dix. "Mapping Buru: The Politics of Territory and Settlement on an Eastern Indonesian Island." In *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*, ed. Thomas Reuter, 135–56. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006.
- Grimes, Charles E., Tom Therik, Barbara Dix Grimes, and Max Jacob. *A Guide to the People and Languages of Nusa Tenggara*. Kupang: Artha Wacana, 1997.
- Gronovius, Michael F. "The Gronovius Family Tree: Information About Diederick Johannes Van Den Dungen Gronovius." *Genealogy.com*. <http://www.genealogy.com/ftm/g/r/o/Michael-F-Gronovius/WEBSITE-0001/UHP-0520.html>.
- Grossman, Kristina. "The (Ir)Relevance of Ethnicity among the Punan Murung and Bakumpai in Central Kalimantan." In *Continuity under Change in Dayak Societies*, ed. Cathrin Arenz, Michaela Haug, and Stefan Seitz, 141–62. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017.
- Grove, Richard H., Vinita Damodaran and Satpal Sangwan, eds. *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Guillemand, Francis Henry Hill. *Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel: Australasia: Malaysia and the Pacific Archipelago, Edited and Extended by A.R. Wallace*. Volume 2. London: E. Stanford, 1908.
- Gunn, Geoffrey C. *History of Timor*. Lisbon: ISEG–Universidade de Lisboa, 2010.
- _____. "The Timor–Macao Sandalwood Trade and the Asian Discovery of the Great South Land?" *Review of Culture* 53 (2016): 125–48.
- Gupta, Ashin Das. *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat*. *Beitrage Zur Sudasienforschung*, volume 40. Heidelberg: Sudasien-Institut, Universitat Heidelberg, 1979.
- _____. "The Maritime Trade of Indonesia: 1500–1800." In *South East Asia: Colonial History Volume 1*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska and Peter Borchberg, 91–126. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Haddon, Alfred C. *The Canoes of Melanesia, Queensland, and New Guinea*. Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1937.
- _____. "The Outriggers of Indonesian Canoes." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 50 (1920): 69–134.
- Haenen, Paul. "Enkele historisch-antropologische aantekeningen omtrent het Bintuni Gebied in Irian Jaya." In *Tales from a Concave World: Liber Amicorum Bert Verhoeve* ed. Connie Baak, Mary Bakker and Dick van der Meij, 357–67. Leiden: Department of Languages and Cultures of South-East Asia and Oceania, Leiden University, 1995.
- Hageman, J. "Bijdrage tot de Geschiedenis van Borneo." *Tijdschrift voor Indische taal-, land-, en volkenkunde*, part 6, new series, volume 3 (1857): 220–46.
- _____. "Geschiedkundige aantekeningen omtrent zuidelijke Borneo." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 23, no. 4 (1861): 199–233.

- _____. "Over de Geschiedenis van Bandjarmasin, in de laatste jaren, 1857–1860." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 23, no. 2 (1861): 69–103.
- Hagen, Piet. *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië: Vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing*. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018.
- Hägerdal, Hans. "Bali in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Suggestions for a Chronology of the Gelgel Period." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 151, no. 1 (1995): 101–24.
- _____. "Colonial or Indigenous Rule? The Black Portuguese of Timor in the 17th and 18th Centuries." *IIAS Newsletter* 44 (2007).
- _____. "Expansion and Internalization of Modes of Warfare in Pre-Colonial Bali." In *Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context*, ed. Kathryn Wellen Michael W. Charney, 129–55. Copenhagen: NIAS, 2017.
- _____. "From Batuparang to Ayudhya: Bali and the Outside World, 1636–1656." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 154, no. 1 (1998): 55–94.
- _____. *Held's History of Sumbawa: An Annotated Translation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017.
- _____. *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Lombok and Bali in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2001.
- _____. *Lords of the Sea: Conflict and Adaptation in Early Colonial Timor, 1600–1800*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012.
- _____. "The Native as Exemplum: Missionary Writings and Colonial Complexities in Eastern Indonesia." *Itinerario* 37, no. 2 (2013): 73–99.
- _____. "White and Dark Stranger Kings: Kupang in the Early Colonial Era." *Moussons: Recherche en sciences humaines sur l'Asie du Sud-Est* 12 (2008): 137–61.
- [Halewijn], M.H. "Borneo. Eenige reizen in het Binnenland van dit Eiland, door eenen Ambtenaar van het Gouvernement, in het jaar 1824." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 1, no. 1/2 (1838): 1–25, 31, 81–102, 83–200, 401–13.
- Hall, Kenneth R. "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia." In *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume One, Part One: From Early Times to c.1500*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, 185–275. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- _____. *A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal Development, 100–1500*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.
- _____. "Sojourning Communities, Ports-of-Trade, and Agrarian-Based Societies in Southeast Asia's Eastern Regions, 1000–1300." In *New Perspectives on the History and Historiography of Southeast Asia: Continuing Explorations*, ed. Michael Arthur Aung-Thwin and Kenneth R. Hall, 56–74. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.
- _____. "Upstream and Downstream Unification in Southeast Asia's First Islamic Polity: The Changing Sense of Community in the Fifteenth Century 'Hikayat Raja-Raja' Pasai Court Chronicle." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44, no. 2 (2001): 198–229.
- Hamilton, Alexander. *A New Account of the East Indies: Giving an Exact and Copious Description of the Situation*. London: Argonaut Press, 1930.
- Hammarström, Harald, Robert Forkel, Martin Haspelmath, and Sebastian Bank, eds. *Malayo-Polynesian*. Glottolog 3. Jena: Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, 2017.
- Hampson, Robert. "Covert Plots and Secret Trades: Almayer's Folly, an Outcast of the Islands, the Rescue." In *Conrad's Secrets*, 27–51. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Handboek voor cultuur- en handelondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indië*. Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy, 1888–1940.

- Hanna, Willard. *Bali Chronicles: Fascinating People and Events in Balinese History*. Hong Kong: Periplus, 2004.
- _____. *Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and Its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands*. Philadelphia: ISHI, 1978.
- Hanna, Willard A. and Tim Hannigan. *A Brief History of Bali: Piracy, Slavery, Opium and Guns: The Story of an Island Paradise*. Tokyo: Tuttle, 2016.
- Hao, Yen-P'ing. *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- _____. "The Rise and Fall of the Comprador." In *Chinese Business Enterprise, Volume II*, ed. R. Ampalavanar Brown, 275–94. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Harris, Ron. The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade: The Commenda and the Corporation (3 November 2008). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1294095> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1294095>.
- Harrison, Henrietta. "Chinese and British Diplomatic Gifts in the Macartney Embassy of 1793." *English Historical Review* 133, no. 560 (2018): 65–97.
- Hart, C. van der. *Reize rondom het eiland Celebes en naar eenige der Moluksche eilanden, gedaan in den jare 1850, door Z.M. schepen van oorlog Argo en Bromo, onder bevel van C. van der Hart*. 's-Gravenhage: K. Fuhri, 1853.
- Hart, G.H.C. "Verslag nopens de reis van den Directeur van Economische Zaken ... naar Celebes en de Molukken, September 1935." Batavia: Departement van Economische Zaken, 1935.
- Harvey, Barbara Sillers. "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950–1965." PhD dissertation, Cornell University Press, 1974.
- Hasan, Farhat. *State and Locality in Mughal India, Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572–1730*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Hayden, Brian. *The Power of Feasts: From Prehistory to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Havik, Philip J. and M.D.D. Newit. *Creole Societies in the Portuguese Colonial Empire*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2015.
- Hawk, Barry. *Law and Commerce in Pre-Industrial Societies*. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- Hawkins, Michael. "Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39 (2008): 411–29.
- Hawkins, Michael C. "Managing a Massacre Savagery, Civility, and Gender in Moro Province in the Wake of Bud Dajo." *Philippine Studies* 59, no. 1 (2011): 83–105.
- Hawthorne, Walter. "States and Statelessness." In *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard Reid, 77–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Hayase, Shinzo. *Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003.
- Heekeren, H.R. van. *The Bronze-Iron Age of Indonesia*. 's-Gravenhage: KITLV Press, 1958.
- Heeres, J.E. "Eene Engelsche lezing omtrent de verovering van Banda en Ambon in 1796 en omtrent den toestand dier eilandengroepen op het eind der achttiende eeuw." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 60 (1908).
- Heeres, J.E. and F.W. Stapel. *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*. 6 vols. The Hague, 1907–55.
- Heersink, Christiaan. *Dependence on Green Gold: A Socio-Economic History of the Indonesian Coconut Island Selayar*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000.
- Heidhues, Mary F. Somers. *Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the "Chinese Districts" of West Kalimantan, Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2003.

- Heij, C.J. *Biographical Notes of Antonie Augustus Bruijn (1842–1890)*. Bogor: IPB Press, 2011.
- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Hellwig, Tineke and Eric Tagliacozzo, eds. *The Indonesia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Helms, Ludvig Verner. *Pioneering in the Far East, and Journeys to California in 1849, and to the White Sea in 1878*. London: W.H. Allen, 1882.
- Helms, Mary W. *Craft and the Kingly Ideal: Art, Trade, and Power*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993.
- _____. "Observations on Political Ideology in Complex Societies in the Tropics — and Elsewhere." *Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association* 9, no. 1 (2008): 195–200.
- _____. "The Purchase Society: Adaptation to Economic Frontiers." *Anthropological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (1969): 325–42.
- _____. *Ulysses' Sail: An Ethnographic Odyssey of Power, Knowledge, and Geographical Distance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Henley, David. "Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere." *Modern Asian Studies* 38 (2004): 85–144.
- _____. *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, c.1600–1930*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005.
- _____. "Introduction." In *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930: from Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsu to Cooperative*, ed. David Henley and Peter Boomgaard, 1–40. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- _____. "Rizification Revisited; Re-Examining the Rise of Rice in Indonesia, with Special Reference to Sulawesi." In *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley, 107–38. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- _____. "A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi." *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 39–60.
- _____. "Swidden Farming as an Agent of Environmental Change: Ecological Myth and Historical Reality in Indonesia." *Environment and History* 17, no. 4 (2011): 525–54.
- Henley, David and Peter Boomgaard, eds. *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930: From Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsu to Cooperative*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Henley, David and Ian Caldwell. "Kings and Covenants: Stranger Kings and Social Contract in Sulawesi." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 36, no. 105 (2008): 269–91.
- Hermkes, A.K. and Jaap Timmer. "Conflicting States: Violent Politics in North Maluku, Indonesia." *Etnofoor* 32, no. 2 (2011): 57–78.
- Hess, Martin. "Spatial Relationships? Towards a Reconceptualization of Embeddedness." *Progress in Human Geography* 28, no. 2 (2004): 165–86.
- "Het landschap Donggala of Banawa." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 58 (1905): 514–31.
- Heuken, A.J. "Catholic Converts in the Moluccas, Minahasa and Sangihe-Talaud." In *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, ed. Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, 23–72. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
- Hevia, James L. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Mission of 1793*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.
- Heyne, Karel. *De nuttige planten van Nederlandsch Indië*. Batavia: Ruygrok, 1927.

- Hickson, Sydney John. *A Naturalist in North Celebes: A Narrative of Travels in Minahassa, the Sangir and Talaut Islands, with Notices of the Fauna, Flora and Ethnology of the Districts Visited*. London: J. Murray, 1889.
- Higgins, David. "Textuality, Empire, and the Catastrophic Assemblage: Sir Stamford Raffles and the Tambora Eruption." In *British Romanticism, Climate Change, and the Anthropocene: Writing Tambora*, 23–53. London: Palgrave Macmillan Pivot, 2017.
- Hill, R.D. "Towards a Model of the History of 'Traditional' Agriculture in Southeast Asia." In *Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard and David Henley, 19–46. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- Hirsch, Philip, ed. *Routledge Handbook of the Environment in Southeast Asia*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Hirth, Friedrich and W.W. Rockhill. *Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-Fan-Chi*. New York: Paragon, 1966.
- Ho, Enseng. *The Graves of Tarim: Geneology and Mobility across the Indian Ocean*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
- Hobhouse, Henry. *Seeds of Change: Five Plants That Transformed Mankind*. Washington, DC: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. "What Are Institutions?" *Journal of Economic Issues* 40, no. 1 (2006): 1–25.
- Hoëvell, G.W.W.C. van. "De Afdeeling Babar en Leti-Eilanden." *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 187–232.
- _____. "De Aroe-eilanden, geografisch, ethnographisch en commercieel." *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 57–101.
- _____. "De Kei-eilanden." *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 102–59.
- _____. "Tanimbar en Timorlaet-eilanden." *Tijdschrift voor Ind. taal-, land-en volkenkunde* 33 (1890): 160–86.
- Hohendorff, Johan Andries van. "Radicale beschrijving van Banjermassing, door den Raad van Indie A. Baron Van Hohendorff, 1757." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 8, no. 1 (1862): 151–216.
- Honculada-Primavera, J. "Mangroves of Southeast Asia." Paper presented at the Workshop on Mangrove-Friendly Aquaculture, Iloilo City, 2000.
- Hoogervorst, Tom G. *Southeast Asia in the Ancient Indian Ocean World, Combining Historical Linguistic and Archaeological Approaches*. Oxford: Archaeon, 2013.
- Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. "Commodity Chains: Construct and Research." In *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, ed. Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, 17–19. Westport CT: Praeger, 1994.
- Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. "Commodity Chains in the World-Economy Prior to 1800." *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 10, no. 1 (1986): 157–70.
- Horden, Peregrine and Nicholas Purcell. *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. London: Blackwell, 2000.
- Horn, N.A. van. "Het Indische handelshuis Bauermann in de negentiende eeuw." In *Neha-jaarboek voor economische, bedrijfs- en techniekgeschiedenis* 69 (1997): 137–58.
- Horner, L. "Verslag van het geologisch onderzoek in het Zuid-Oostelijke gedeelte van Borneo." *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap der Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 17 (1839): 89–119.
- Horridge, Adrian. "The Lambo or Prahua Boat: A Western Ship in an Eastern Setting." Maritime Monographs and Reports No. 39. London: National Maritime Museum, 1979.

- _____. *The Prahu: Traditional Sailing Boat of Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- _____. *Sailing Craft of Indonesia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Horstman, Alexander and Reed L. Wadley, eds. *Centering the Margin: Agency and Narrative in Southeast Asian Borderlands*. New York: Berghahn, 2006.
- Hoskins, Janet. "The Heritage of Headhunting: History, Ideology, and Violence on Sumba, 1890–1990." In *Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia*, ed. Janet Hoskins, 216–48. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- _____. *The Play of Time: Kodi Perspectives on Calendars, History, and Exchange*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- _____. "On Losing and Getting a Head: Warfare, Exchange, and Alliance in a Changing Sumba, 1888–1988." *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 3 (1989): 419–40.
- _____. "Slaves, Brides and other 'Gifts': Resistance, Marriage and Rank in Eastern Indonesia." *Slavery and Abolition* 25, no. 2 (2004): 90–107.
- Howarth, Stephen, Joost Jonker, Keetie Sluyterman, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. *The History of Royal Dutch Shell*. 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Hudson, Alfred B. *Padju Epat: The Ma'anyan of Indonesian Borneo*. New York: Irvington, 1983.
- Huizinga, F. "Relations between Tidore and the North Coast of New Guinea in the Nineteenth Century." In *Perspectives on the Bird's Head of Irian, Jaya, Indonesia*, ed. Cecilia Odé, Jelle Miedema, Rien A.C. Dam, and Connie Baak, 385–419. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999.
- Hulsbosch, Marianne. *Pointy Shoes and Pith Helmets: Dress and Identity Construction in Ambon from 1850 to 1942*. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
- Hunger, F.W.T. *Cocos Nucifera: Handboek voor het kennis van den cocos-palm in Nederlandsch-Indie*. Amsterdam: Scheltema & Holkema, 1920.
- Hunt, John. "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia." In *Malayan Miscellanies*. Bencoolen: Sumatran Mission Press, 1820.
- _____. "Some Particulars Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of Papers*, ed. J.H. Moor, Appendix, 31–60. Singapore, 1837.
- Hussin, Nordin. *Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007.
- Hutchcroft, Paul D., ed. *Mindanao: The Long Journey to Peace and Prosperity*. Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2016.
- Hyde, Francis E. "British Shipping Companies and East and South-East Asia 1860–1939." In *The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in Economic History and Political Economy*, ed. C.D. Cowan. London: Routledge Revivals, 2012.
- Igler, David. *The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- "Iets over Ceram en ee Alfoeren." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 5, no. 1 (1856): 72–88.
- Ijzereef, Wilhelmus Theodorus. "De wind en de bladeren: hiërarchie en autonomie in Bone en Polombangkeng (Zuid-Sulawesi), 1850–1950." PhD dissertation, University of Groningen, 1994.
- Ikhhtisar keadaan politik Hindia-Belanda Tahun 1839–1848*. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1973.
- Ileto, Reynaldo C. *Magindanao, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Utto of Buayan*. Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University Press, 1971.

- _____. *Maguindanao, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Uto of Buayan*. Manila: Anvil, 2007.
- Ingold, Tim. “The Debate.” In *Key Debates in Anthropology*, ed. Tim Ingold. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Irwin, Douglas A. “Revenue or Reciprocity? Founding Feuds over Early US Trade Policy.” In *Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s*, ed. Douglas A. Irwin and Richard Sylla, 89–120. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- Irwin, Graham. *Nineteenth-Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry*. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1967.
- Israel, Jonathan I. *Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585–1713*. London: Hambledon Press, 1997.
- _____. *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- Ivanoff, Jacques. “The ‘Interstices’: A History of Migration and Ethnicity.” In *From Padi States to Commercial States: Reflections on Identity and the Social Construction Space in the Borderlands of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar*, ed. Frédéric Bourdier, et al. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015.
- Jacobs, Els M. *Koopman in Azië: De handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw*. Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2000.
- _____. *Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century*. Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006.
- Jacobson, Stephen. “Empire and Colonies.” In *The History of Modern Spain: Chronologies, Themes, Individuals*, ed. José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, 195–214. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.
- Jefferson, Sam. *Clipper Ships and the Golden Age of Sail: Races and Rivalries on the Nineteenth Century High Seas*. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Jesus, Ed. C. De. *The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines: Bureaucratic Enterprise and Social Change, 1766–1880*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980.
- Jeurgens, Charles. “Op zoek naar betrouwbare informatie: De commissarissengeneraal en de stichting van de koloniale staat.” In *Het verre gezicht, politieke en culturele relaties tussen Nederland en Azië, Afrika en Amerika*, ed. J.T.L. Lindblad and A.F. Schrikker. Franeker: AHM, 2011.
- Jobse, P. *De tin-expedities naar Flores 1887–1891: Een episode uit de geschiedenis van Nederlandse-Indië in het tijdperk van het moderne imperialism*. Utrechtse Historische Cahiers 3. Utrecht: Department of History, Utrecht University, 1980.
- Jong, Chris G.F. de. “Alexander Dalrymple en Thomas Forrest: twee Britse empire builders aan het eind van de 18de eeuw.” Unpublished paper, version 1.0, 2016. <http://www.cgfdjong.nl/f.%20Engelsen%20en%20de%20VOC%20in%20de%2017de%20en%2018de%20Eeuw.pdf>.
- _____. *A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies: The “Little East” in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Unpublished paper, version 3.1, September 2013. <http://www.cgfdjong.nl/Little%20East.pdf>.
- Jong, Joop de. *De waaier van het fortuin: De Nederlanders in Azië en de Indonesische archipel 1595–1950*. ‘s-Gravenhage: SDU, 1998.
- Jonge, Nico De, and Toos van Dijk. *Forgotten Islands of Indonesia: The Art and Culture of the Southeast Moluccas*. Singapore: Periplus, 1995.
- Jonker, Joost and Keetie Sluyterman. *At Home on the World Markets: Dutch International Trading Companies from the 16th Century until the Present*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000.
- _____. *Thuis op de wereldmarkt: Nederlandse handelshuizen door de eeuwen heen*. Den Haag: SDU, 2000.

- Joor, Johan. "The Napoleonic Period in Holland from a Dutch Historical Perspective." In *Napoleon's Empire. European Politics in Global Perspective*, ed. Ute Planert, 53–66. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Junker, Laura Lee. "The Evolution of Ritual Feasting Systems in Prehispanic Philippine Chiefdoms." In *Feasts: Archaeological and Ethnographic Perspectives on Food, Politics, and Power*, ed. Michael Dietler and Brian Hayden, 267–310. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001.
- _____. *Raiding, Trading and Feasting. The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999.
- Junker, Laura Lee and Larissa M. Smith. "Farmer and Forager Interactions in Southeast Asia." In *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Junko Habu, et al. New York: Springer, 2015.
- Kahin, George McT. "The State of North Borneo 1881–1946." *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1947): 43–65.
- Kamma, Freck Ch. "De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoese eilanden in legende en histories." *Indonesië* 2, no. 2 (1948).
- _____. *Koreri Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1972.
- Kammen, Douglas. "Queens of Timor." *Archipel* 84 (2012): 149–73.
- _____. *Three Centuries of Conflict in East Timor*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015.
- Kana, Nico L. *Dunia orang Sawu*. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983.
- Kang, David C. *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Kanumoyoso, Bondan. "Beyond the City Wall: Society and Economic Development in the Ommelanden of Batavia, 1684–1740." PhD dissertation, Leiden University, 2011. <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/17679>.
- Kapita, H. *Sumba di Dalam Jangkauan Jaman*. Waingapu: Panitia Penerbit Naskah–naskah Kebudayaan Daerah Sumba, 1980.
- Kathirithamby-Wells, Jeyamalar. *The British West Sumatran Presidency (1760–85): Problems of Early Colonial Enterprise*. Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, 1977.
- _____. "Restraints on the Development of Merchant Capitalism in Southeast Asia before c.1800." In *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid, 123–48. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- _____. "Hadhrami Projections of Southeast Asian Identity." In *Anthony Reid and the Study of the Southeast Asian Past*, ed. Geoff Wade and Li Tana, 271–302. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012.
- Kaur, Amarjit. *Economic Change in East Malaysia: Sabah and Sarawak since 1850*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Kemp, P.H. van der. *De Teruggave der Oost-Indische Koloniën 1814–1816*. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1910.
- _____. "Het Afbreken van onze betrekkingen met Banjarmasin onder Daendels en het herstelling van het Nederlandsch gezag aldaar op den 1n Januari 1817." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 49, no. 1 (1898): 1–168.
- _____. *Het herstel van het Nederlandsch gezag in de Molukken in 1817, naar oorspronkelijke stukken*. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1911.
- _____. "Het Verblijf van Commissaris van den Broek op Bali van 18 December 1817 tot 24 Juni 1818." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 50, no. 1 (1899): 331–85.

- _____. "Over de Kustvaartwetgeving in Nederlandsch-Indië van 1825 tot 1912." *De Economist* 65 (1916): 677–94.
- _____. "P.T. Chassé's werkzaamheid als commissaris voor de overneming van Makassar en onderhoorigheden gedurende September–October 1816, blijkens eenige van hem uitgegaan en nog niet uitgegeven rapporten." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 73, no. 1 (1917): 417–71.
- Keppel, Henry. *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the Suppression of Piracy: With Extracts from the Journal of James Brooke, Esq. Of Sarawak*. Volume 1. London: Chapman and Hall, 1846.
- Keppel, Henry and James Brooke. *A Visit to the Indian Archipelago, in H.M. Ship Mæander*. London: Richard Bentley, 1853.
- Keuning, J. "Ambonese, Portuguese and Dutchmen: The History of Ambon to the End of the Seventeenth Century." In *Dutch Authors on Asian History*, ed. M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, 362–97. Dordrecht: Foris, 1988.
- Kiefer, Thomas. *The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1972.
- King, Victor T. "Identities in Borneo: Constructions and Transformations." Symposium paper for *Project Southeast Asia*, Asian Studies Symposium, University of Oxford, 2013.
- Kipp, Rita Smith and Edward M. Schortmann. "The Political Impact of Trade in Chiefdoms." *American Anthropologist* 61, no. 2 (1989): 370–85.
- Klaveren, J.J. van. *The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953.
- Klein, W.C. *Handel: Overdruk uit Nieuw Guinea, deel III*. 's-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij, 1954.
- Kleinen, John and Manon Osseweijer, eds. *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
- Klekar, Cynthia. "'Prisoners in Silken Bonds': Obligation, Trade, and Diplomacy in English Voyages to Japan and China." *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 6, no. 1 (2006): 84–105.
- Klinken, Gerry van. "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites." In *Indonesia: In Search of Transition*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah, 67–106. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002.
- _____. "Return of the Sultans: The Communitarian Turn in Local Politics." In *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, ed. Jamie Davidson and David Henley, 149–69. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Klöter, Henning. *The Language of the Sangleys: A Chinese Vernacular in Missionary Sources of the Seventeenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Knaap, Gerrit J. "A City of Migrants: Kota Ambon at the End of the Seventeenth Century." *Indonesia* 51 (1991): 105–28.
- _____. "All About Money; Maritime Trade in Makassar and West Java, around 1775." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 49, no. 4 (2006): 482–508.
- _____. "Coffee for Cash: The Dutch East India Company and the Expansion of Coffee Cultivation in Java, Ambon and Ceylon 1700–1730." In *Trading Companies in Asia 1600–1830*, ed. Jur van Goor. Utrecht: HES, 1986.
- _____. "De Ambonse eilanden tussen twee mogendheden." In *Hof en handel: Aziatische vorsten en de VOC 1620–1720*, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen, 35–58. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- _____. *De 'core business' van de VOC: Markt, macht en mantaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief*. Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 2014.
- _____. "The Demography of Ambon in the Seventeenth Century: Evidence from Colonial Proto-Censuses." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1995): 227–41.

- _____. "Headhunting, Carnage and Armed Peace in Amboina, 1500–1700." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 46, no. 2 (2003): 165–92.
- _____. "Kora-kora en kruitdamp: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en vrede in Ambon." In *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, ed. Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler, 257–82. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002.
- _____. *Kruidnagelen en christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*. 2nd ed. Dordrecht: Foris, 2004.
- _____. *Memories van overgave van gouverneurs van Ambon in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw*, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicaties Kleine Serie 62. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
- _____. "Military Capability and the State in Southeast Asia's Pacific Rimlands, 1500–1700." In *Warring Societies of Pre-colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict within a Regional Context*, ed. Kathryn Wellen and Michael W. Charney, 183–200. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2018.
- _____. "Robbers and Traders: Papuan Piracy in the Seventeenth Century." In *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer, 147–77. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
- _____. "The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram): An Account of its 'Discovery' and Interpretation between about 1675 and 1950." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 149, no. 2 (1993): 250–73.
- _____. *Shallow Waters, Rising Tide: Shipping and Trade in Java around 1775*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996.
- _____. "Steamers, Freightling Contracts and Dock-Harbours Reflections on the History of the Java Sea, 1830–1930." *Itinerario* 30, no. 1 (2006): 39–58.
- _____. *Transport 1819–1940*. Volume 9 of *Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century Up to 1940*, ed. P. Boomgaard. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1989.
- Knaap, Gerrit J. and Heather Sutherland. *Monsoon Traders: Ships, Skippers and Commodities in Eighteenth Century Makassar*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- Knaap, Gerrit J., Henk den Heijer and Michiel de Jong. *Oorlogen overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat buiten Europa, 1595–1814*. Vol. 5. Militaire Geschiedenis van Nederland. Amsterdam: Boom, 2015.
- Knapen, Han. "Epidemics, Drought and Other Uncertainties in Southeast Borneo during the 18th and 19th Century." In *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley, 121–52. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997.
- _____. *Forests of Fortune? The Environmental History of Southeast Borneo, 1600–1880*. Verhandelingen KITLV No. 189. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001.
- Knappert, S.C. "Beschrijving van de Onderafdeeling Koetei." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 58 (1905): 575–654.
- Knight, G. Roger. "Neglected Orphans and Absent Parents: The European Mercantile Houses of Mid-Nineteenth-Century Java." In *Commodities, Ports and Asian Maritime Trade since 1750*, ed. Ulbe Bosma and Anthony Webster, 127–43. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- _____. *Trade and Empire in Early Nineteenth-Century Southeast Asia. Gillian Maclaine and His Business Network*. Martelsham: Boydell & Brewer, 2015.
- Kobayashi, Atsushi. "The Role of Singapore in the Growth of Intra-Southeast Asian Trade, c.1820s–1852." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 3 (2013): 443–74.
- Kolff, Dirk Hendrik. *Reis door de weinig bekende zuidelijke Molukse archipel en langs de geheel onbekende zuidwestkust van Nieuw-Guinea, gedaan in de jaren 1825 en 1826*. Amsterdam, 1828.

- _____. *Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga through the Southern and Little Known Parts of the Moluccan Archipelago during the Years 1825 and 1826*. Translated by G.W. Earl. London: James Madden, 1840.
- Koloniaal Verslag*. 's-Gravenhage: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1867–1923.
- Kops, G.F. De Bruijn. “Contribution to the Knowledge of the North and East Coasts of New Guinea.” *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 6 (1852): 303–68.
- Kraan, Alfons van der. “Bali: 1848.” *Indonesia Circle* 62 (1994): 29–59.
- _____. “Bali and Lombok in the World Economy.” *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 27, no. 1 and 2 (1993): 91–105.
- _____. *Bali at War: A History of the Dutch-Balinese Conflict of 1846–49*. Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1995.
- _____. *George Pocock King: Merchant Adventurer and Catalyst of the Bali War, 1846–49*. Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull, 1992.
- _____. *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940*. Singapore: Heinemann, 1980.
- _____. “Lombok under the Mataram Dynasty.” In *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid, 389–410. London: Macmillan, 1991.
- _____. “The Nature of Balinese Rule in Lombok.” In *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, ed. A. Reid and L. Castles, 91–107. Monographs of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS), no. 6. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1975.
- _____. “Trade, Rajas and Bandars in South Bali.” In *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming*, ed. John Butcher and Howard Dick, 103–24. London: St. Martins Press, 1993.
- Kreike, Emmanuel. “Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 3–4 (2012): 297–315.
- Kristian Kristiansen. “The Rules of the Game: Decentralised Complexity and Power Structures.” In *Socialising Complexity: Approaches to Power and Interaction in the Archaeological Record*, ed. S. Kohring and S. Wynne-Jones, 60–75. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2007.
- Krul, Matthijs. “Institutions and the Challenge of Karl Polanyi: Economic Anthropology after the Neoinstitutionalist Turn.” Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Working Papers 168, 2016.
- K[ruseman], J.D. “Beschrijving van het Sandelhout eiland.” *Oosterling: tijdschrift bij uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie* 2 (1835): 5–86.
- _____. “Beschrijving van Timor.” *Oosterling: tijdschrift bij uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie* 1 (1835): 1–41.
- Kruseman, J.D. *Verslag van den handel, scheepvaart en inkomende en uitgaande regten op Java en Madoera in het Jaar 1825*. Batavia: s' Lands Drukkerij, 1827.
- Kueh, Joshua Eng Sin. “The Manila Chinese, Community, Trade and Empire c.1570–c.1770.” PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2014.
- Kuitenbrouwer, Maarten. “Het imperialisme-debat in de Nederlandse geschiedschrijvin.” *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 113, no. 1 (1998): 56–73.
- _____. *The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism: Colonies and Foreign Policy, 1870–1902*. New York: Berg, 1991.
- Kunz, George Frederick and Charles Hugh Stevenson. *The Book of the Pearl: Its History, Art, Science and Industry*. New York: The Century Company, 1908.

- Kuo, Hwei-Ying. "Agency Amid Incorporation: Chinese Business Networks in Hong Kong and Singapore and the Colonial Origins of the Resurgence of East Asia." *Review: Fernand Braudel Center* 32, no. 3 (2009): 221–37.
- _____. *Networks Beyond Empires: Chinese Business and Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor*. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
- Kurz, Johannes L. "Boni in Chinese Sources from the Tenth to the Eighteenth Century." *International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 10, no. 1 (2014): 2–331.
- Kwee, Hui Kian. "The Expansion of the Chinese Inter-Insular and Hinterland Trade in Southeast Asia, c. 1400–1850." In *Environment, Trade and Society in Southeast Asia: A Longue Durée Perspective*, ed. David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 149–65. Leiden Brill, 2015.
- _____. "Money and Credit in Chinese Mercantile Operations in Pre-colonial and Colonial Southeast Asia." In *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930; from Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsu to Cooperative*, ed. David Henley and Peter Boomgaard, 124–42. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- _____. "Pockets of Empire: Integrating the Studies on Social Organizations in Southeast China and Southeast Asia." *Journal of Contemporary Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 27, no. 3 (2007): 616–32.
- _____. *The Political Economy of Java's Northeast Coast c.1740–1800: Elite Synergy*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Laan, Joseph W. Vander. *Production of Gutta-Percha, Balata, Chicle and Allied Gums*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1927.
- Lahti, Janne. "German Colonialism and the Age of Global Empires." *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 17, no. 1 (2016).
- Laarhoven, Ruurdje. "The Chinese at Maguindanao in the Seventeenth Century." *Philippine Studies* 35 (1987): 31–50.
- _____. "Letter from Sultan Kuda of Manguindanao (r.1699–1702) Concerning the Trading Activities of Chinese Nakhoda and the Need for Military Support, 16 November 1699." In *Harta Karun: Hidden Treasures on Indonesian and Asian-European History from the VOC Archives in Jakarta, Document 17*. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2014.
- _____. "Lords of the Great River: The Magindanao Port and Polity during the Seventeenth Century." In *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers, 161–86. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990.
- _____. *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century*. Quezon City: New Day, 1989.
- Laarhoven, Ruurdje and Elizabeth Pino Wittermans. "From Blockade to Trade: Early Dutch Relations with Manila, 1600–1750." *Philippine Studies* 35 (1985): 485–504.
- Latinis, D. Kyle, and Ken Stark. "Roasted Dirt: Assessing Earthenware Assemblages from Sites in Central Maluku." In *Earthenware in Southeast Asia*, ed. John N. Miksic, 103–35. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003.
- Laksmiana, Evan. "Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum?" Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS), website, 23 March 2017. <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>.
- Lane, Frederic C. *Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979.
- Langeler, J.W. and L.A.C.M. Doorman. "Nieuw-Guinee en de Exploratie der 'Meervlakte.'" *De Aarde en haar Volken* (1918).

- Lape, Peter V. "Chronology of Fortified Settlements in East Timor." *Journal of Island and Coastal Archaeology* 1, no. 2 (2006): 285–98.
- _____. "Contact and Colonialism in the Banda Islands, Maluku, Indonesia." *Bulletin of the Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association* 20 (2008): 48–55.
- _____. "On the Use of Archaeology and History in Island Southeast Asia." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 45, no. 4 (2002): 468–91.
- _____. "Political Dynamics and Religious Change in the Late Pre-Colonial Banda Islands, Eastern Indonesia." *World Archaeology* 32, no. 1 (2000): 138–55.
- Lapian, Adrian B. "Kata Pengantar." In *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapian, 1–17. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1980.
- _____. "Laut Sulawesi: The Celebes Sea from Center to Peripheries." *Moussons* 7 (2004): 3–16.
- Lapian, Adrian. "Orang Laut - Bajak Laut - Raja Laut: Sejarah Kawasan Laut Sulawesi Abad XIX." PhD dissertation, Gadjah Mada, 1987.
- Laporan Politik Tahun 1837 (Staatkundig Overzicht van Nederlandsch Indie)*. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1971.
- Latif, Abd. "The Conflict between Bone Kingdom and the British Authority in South Sulawesi, 1812–1816." *TAWARIKH: International Journal for Historical Studies* 5, no. 2 (2014): 145–60.
- Lechner, Frank J. and John Boli, eds. *The Globalization Reader*. 4th ed. Chichester: Blackwell, 2012.
- Lee, Poh Ping. *Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Lee, Pui Tak. "Business Networks and Patterns of Cantonese Compradors in Nineteenth Century Hong Kong." *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 31 (1996): 1–39.
- Legarda, Benito J. *After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999.
- Leirissa, R.Z. "Bugis-Makassar in the Port Towns Ambon and Ternate through the Nineteenth Century." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 156, no. 3 (2000): 619–33.
- _____. "Changing Maritime Trade Patterns in the Seram Sea." In *State and Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago*, ed. G.J. Schutte, 17–59. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994.
- _____. *Halmahera Timur dan Raja Jailolo: pergolakan sekitar laut Seram awal abad 19*. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1996.
- _____. "Lambertus Schmit De Haart, Resident of Saparua, 1817–1823." In *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, Laage Vuursche, the Netherlands, June 1980*, 211–22. Leiden: BIS, 1982.
- _____. "Social Development in Ambon during the 19th Century: Ambonese Burger." *Cakalele* 6, no. 1–11 (1995): 150–9.
- _____. "The Structure of Makassar-Bugis Trade in Pre-Modern Moluccas." *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993): 77–90.
- Leirissa, R.Z., and Djuariah Latuconsina. *Sejarah Kebudayaan Maluku*. Jakarta: P dan K, 1999.
- Leirissa, R.Z., Z.J. Manusama, A.B. Lapian, and Paramita R. Abdurachman, eds. *Maluku Tengah di Masa Lampau: Gambaran Sekilas Lewat Arsip Abad Sembilan Belas*. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1982.
- Lekkerkerker, C. "Bali 1800–1814." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 82 (1926): 315–38.
- _____. "De Baliërs van Batavia." *Indische Gids* 40, no. 1 (1918): 409–32.
- Lekkerkerker, J.G.W. *Concessies en erfpachten voor landbouwendernemingen in de buitengewesten*. Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1928.

- Lennon, W.C. "Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands under the Command of Admiral Rainier." *Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 7 (1881).
- _____. "Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands under the Command of Admiral Rainier." In J.E. Heeres, "Eene Engelsche lezing omtrent de verovering van Banda en Ambon in 1796 en omtrent den toestand dier eilandengroepen op het eind der achttiende eeuw." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 60 (1908).
- Leupe, P.A. "Beschrijvinge van de Eijlande Banda," *BKI* 3, no. 1 (1855): 73–105.
- Lewis, Angeline. "Rajah Brooke and the 'Pirates' of Borneo: A Nineteenth Century Public Debate on Sea Power." PhD dissertation, University of New South Wales, 2019.
- Lewis, Dianne. "British Trade to Southeast Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries Revisited." *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009): 9–59.
- _____. *"Jan Compagnie" in the Straits of Malacca, 1641–1795*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1995.
- Lewis, E. Douglas. *People of the Source: the Social and Ceremonial Order of Tana Wai Brama on Flores*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1988.
- _____. *The Stranger-Kings of Sikka*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010.
- Leyden, John. "Dr. Leyden's Sketch of Borneo." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries*, ed. J.H. Moor, 93–109. Singapore, 1837.
- Li, Tania Murray. "Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 1 (2000): 149–79.
- _____. "Relational Histories and the Production of Difference on Sulawesi's Upland Frontier." *Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 1 (2001): 41–66.
- _____. *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands: Marginality, Power and Production*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Lie, John. "Embedding Polanyi's Market Society." *Sociological Perspectives* 34, no. 2 (1991): 219–35.
- Lieberman, Victor. "Mainland-Archipelagic Parallels and Contrasts c.1750–1850." In *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid, 27–53. London: Macmillan, 1997.
- _____. *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800–1830. Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- _____. *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830. Volume 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Liebner, Horst. "Four Oral Versions of a Story About the Origins of the Bajo People of Southern Selayar." Universitas Hasanuddin, Makassar, 1996.
- Liedermoy, D.F. "De nijverheid op Celebes," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlands-Indië* 16 (1854): 345–72.
- Ligtvoet, A. "Beschrijving en Geschiedenis van Boeton." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 2, no. 4 (1878): 1–112.
- Lim, Ivy Maria. *Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast of China*. Amhearst: Cambria Press, 2010.
- Lim, Jason. *Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese Merchants in the Fujian–Singapore Trade, 1920–1960*. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Lindblad, J. Thomas. *Between Dayak and Dutch: The Economic History of Southeast Kalimantan 1880–1942*. Dordrecht: Foris, 1988.
- _____. "De handel in katoentjes op Nederlands-Indië, 1824–1939." *Textielhistorische Bijdragen* 33 (1993): 89–103.

- _____. "Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in Indonesia, 1870–1914." *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 1 (1989): 1–24.
- _____. "The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery." In *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia 1800–2000*, ed. Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, 82–111. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002.
- _____. "Strak beleid en batig slot: De Oost-Borneo Maatschappij, 1888–1940." *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 48 (1985): 182–211.
- Linden, Herman Otto van der. *Banda en zijne bewoners*. Dordrecht: Blusse en van Braam, 1873.
- Linn, Brian McAllister. *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
- Lintum, Chris te. *De Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij*. Amsterdam: Iepenbuur, 1914.
- Liss, Carolin, and Ted Biggs, eds. *Piracy in Southeast Asia: Trends, Hot Spots and Responses*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
- Liu, Yong. *The Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China: 1757–1781*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
- Liu, Yong, Zhongping Chen, and Gregory Blue. *Zheng He's Maritime Voyages (1405–1433) and China's Relations with the Indian Ocean World: A Multilingual Bibliography*. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
- Lobato, Manuel. "War-Making, Raiding, Slave Hunting and Piracy in the Malukan Archipelago." In *Piracy and Surreptitious Activities in the Malay Archipelago and Adjacent Seas, 1600–1840*, ed. Y.H. Teddy Sim. Singapore: Springer, 2014.
- Locher-Scholten, Elsbeth. "Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1994): 91–111.
- _____. *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism, 1830–1907*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2003.
- Lockard, Craig A. "Chinese Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia before 1850: Making Fields from the Sea." *History Compass* 11, no. 9 (2013): 765–81.
- Loh, Dylan M.H. "The 'Chinese Dream' and the 'Belt and Road Initiative': Narratives, Practices, and Sub-State Actors." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 20, no. 1 (2020).
- Lohanda, Mona. *The Kapitan China of Batavia 1837–1942*. Jakarta: Djambatan, 1996.
- Lombard-Jourdan, Anne and Claudine Salmon. "Les Chinois de Kupang (Timor), aux alentours de 1800." *Archipel* 56 (1998): 393–428.
- Lombard, Denys and Claudine Salmon. "Islam and Chineseness." *Indonesia*, no. 57 (1994): 115–33.
- López, Antonio C. Campo. "La presencia española en el norte de Sulawesi durante el siglo XVII: Estudio del asentamiento español en el norte de Sulawesi ante la oposición local y la menaza holandesa (1606–1662)." *Revista de Indias* 77, no. 269 (2017): 51–80.
- López, Ariel Cusi. "An Exploration into the Political Background of the Magindanao 'Piracy' in the Early Eighteenth Century." In *Piracy and Surreptitious Activities in the Malay Archipelago and Adjacent Seas, 1600–1840*, ed. Y.H. Teddy Sim, 121–40. Singapore: Springer, 2014.
- Lorge, Peter A. *The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Loth, Vincent C. "Pioneers and Perkerniers: The Banda Islands in the Seventeenth Century." *Cakalele* 6 (1995): 13–35.
- Ludeking, E.W.A. "Schets van de Residentie Amboina." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 3 (1868): 1–274.
- Mabee, Bryan. "Pirates, Privateers and the Political Economy of Private Violence." *Global Change, Peace and Security* 21, no. 2 (2009): 139–52.

- Mabbett, I.W. and J.G. de Casparis. "Religion and Popular Beliefs of Southeast Asia before c.1500." In *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume One, Part One: From Early Times to c.1500*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, 276–339. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Macdougall, John M. "Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok." In *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Subarto Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 281–306. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.
- Macknight, C. Campbell. "Changing Perspectives in Island Southeast Asia." In *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, ed. David G. Marr and A.C. Milner, 215–28. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1986.
- _____. "The Rise of Agriculture in South Sulawesi before 1600." *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 17, no. Winter/Summer (1983): 92–116.
- _____. "Studying Trepangers." In *Macassan History and Heritage: Journeys, Encounters, and Influences*, ed. Marshall Clark and Sally K. May, 19–40. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013.
- _____. *The Voyage to Maregè: Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1976.
- Magenda, Burhan. *East Kalimantan: The Decline of a Commercial Aristocracy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1991.
- Mai, Ulrich and Helmut Buchholt. *Peasant Pedlars and Professional Traders: Subsistence Trade in Rural Markets of Minahasa, Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987.
- Makaliwe, W.H. "A Preliminary Note on Genealogy and Intermarriage in the Minahasa Regency, North Sulawesi." *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 137, no. 2 (1981): 244–58.
- Malekandathil, Pius. *Maritime India: Trade, Religion and Polity in the Indian Ocean*. Delhi: Primus, 2010.
- Malley, Michael S. "New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Democratic Decentralisation." In *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- Maltby, William S. *The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Máñez, Kathleen Schwerdtner and Sebastian C.A. Ferse. "The History of Makassan Trepang Fishing and Trade." *PLoS One* 5, no. 6 (2010).
- Manguin, Pierre-Yves. "The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted Centres, Extended Peripheries." *Moussons: Recherche en sciences humaines sur l'Asie du Sud-Est* 5 (2002): 73–99.
- _____. "Ships and Shipping in Southeast Asia." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Asian History*, website, ed. David Ludden, published 2017. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.30.
- _____. "Shipshape Societies: Boat Symbols and Political Systems in Insular Southeast Asia." In *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries*, ed. David G. Marr and A.C. Milner, 187–214. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1986.
- _____. "Trading Ships of the South China Sea: Shipbuilding Techniques and Their Role in the History of the Development of Asian Trade Networks." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 36, no. 3 (1993): 253–80.
- _____. "The Vanishing Jong: Insular Southeast Asian Fleets in Trade and War (Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)." In *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid, 197–213. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

- Manguin, Pierre-Yves, A. Mani, and Geoff Wade, eds. *Early Interactions between South and Southeast Asia: Reflections on Cross-Cultural Exchange*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.
- Mansoben, Johsz R. *Sistem Politik Tradisional Di Irian Jaya*. Jakarta: LIPI/RUL, 1995.
- Manuhutu, W.C. "Pacifictie in praktijk. De expansie van Nederlands gezag op het eiland Ceram, 1900–1942." In *Kooplieden, Predikanten En Bestuurders Overzee*, ed. Jurrien Van Goor, 267–316. Utrecht: HES, 1982.
- Margana, Sri. "Java's Last Frontier: The Struggle for Hegemony of Blambangan, c.1763–1813." PhD diss., University of Leiden, 2007.
- Marks, Harry J. *The First Contest for Singapore, 1819–1824*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959.
- Marr, Timothy. "Diasporic Intelligences in the American Philippine Empire: The Transnational Career of Dr. Najeeb Mitry Saleeby." *Mashriq & Mahjar* 2, no. 1 (2014): 78–106.
- Marryat, Frank. *Borneo and the Indian Archipelago with Drawings of Costume and Scenery*. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1848.
- Marshall, P.J. "Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800." In *India and the Indian Ocean 1500–1800*, ed. Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson, 276–300. Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Martínez, Julia and Adrian Vickers. *The Pearl Frontier: Indonesian Labor and Indigenous Encounters in Australia's Northern Trading Network*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015.
- Maton, Karl. "Habitus." In *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, ed. M. Grenfell, 49–65. London: Acumen, 2008.
- Matos, Arturo T. de. "Timor and the Portuguese Trade in the Orient during the 18th Century." In *As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente: Actas do VI Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa: Macao and Lisbon*, ed. Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luís Filipe F. Reis Thomaz. Lisbon, 1991.
- Matsuda, Matt K. *Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Matthes, B.F. "Eenige opmerkingen omtrent en naar aanleiding van dat gedeelte van Dr. J.J. De Hollander's Handleiding bij de beoefening der land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, hetwelk handelt over het gouvernement van Celebes en onderhoorigheden." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 19, no. 1 (1872): 1–91.
- Mattulada, H.A. *Sejarah, Masyarakat, dan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan*. Makassar: Hasanuddin University Press, 1998.
- _____. "Some Notes on the Nineteenth Century Dutch Colonial System of Power Control in the South Sulawesi Region." In *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference Held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19 to 22 May 1978*. Leiden: BIS, 1978.
- Maybury-Lewis, David and Uri Almagor, eds. *The Attraction of Opposites: Thought and Society in the Dualistic Mode*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1989.
- Mazzaoui, Maureen Fennell, ed. *Textiles: Production, Trade and Demand*. Volume 12 of *An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450–1800*. Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 1998.
- McCarthy, Charles J. "On the Koxinga Threat of 1662." *Philippine Studies* 18 (1970): 187–96.
- McCoy, Alfred W., ed. *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994.
- _____. "A Queen Dies Slowly: The Rise and Decline of Iloilo City." In *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. De Jesus, 297–360. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982.

- McHale, Thomas R. and Mary C. McHale. *Early American-Philippine Trade: The Journal of Nathaniel Bowditch in Manila, 1796*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
- McKenna, Thomas M. *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- McKinnon, E. Edwards. "A Bronze Hoard from Muara Kaman, Kutei." In *Buddhist Dynamics in Premodern and Early Modern Southeast Asia*, ed. D. Christian Lammerts, 138–71. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015.
- McKinnon, Susan. *From a Shattered Sun: Hierarchy, Gender, and Alliance in the Tanimbar Islands*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
- McPherson, Kenneth. "Chulias and Klings: Indigenous Trade Diasporas and European Penetration of the Indian Ocean Littoral." In *Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Giorgio Borsa, 93–46. New Delhi: Manohar, 1990.
- McWilliam, Andrew. "Harbouring Traditions in East Timor: Marginality in a Lowland Entrepot." *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 6 (2007): 1113–43.
- _____. *Paths of Origin: Gates of Life, a Study of Place and Precedence in Southwest Timor*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002.
- Medhurst, W.H. "Short Account of the Island of Bali, Particularly of Bali Baliling." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries*, ed. J.H. Moor, 85–96. Singapore: Mission Press, 1837.
- Meilink-Roelofs, M.A.P. *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and About 1630*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
- Melamba, Basrin. *Kota Pelabuhan Kolaka di Teluk Bone, 1906–1942*. Denpasar: Pustaka Larasan, 2011.
- Menard, Claude and Mary M. Shirley, eds. *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*. Berlin: Springer, 2008.
- Menkhoﬀ, Thomas. *Trade Routes, Trust and Trading Networks: Chinese Small Enterprises in Singapore*. Saarbrücken: Breitenback, 1993.
- Metcalf, Peter. *The Life of the Longhouse: An Archaeology of Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Metzner, Joachim K. *Agriculture and Population Pressure in Sikka, Isle of Flores*. Canberra: ANU Press, 1982.
- Meyer, David R. *Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Michon, Geneviève. *Domesticating Forests: How Farmers Manage Forest Resources*. Bogor: CIFOR, 2005.
- Miclat, Evangeline F.B. and Romeo B. Trono. "One Vision, One Plan, Common Resources, Joint Management Conserving the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea." *Tropical Coasts* 15, no. 1 (2008): 4–10.
- Miedema, Jelle. *De Kebar 1855–1980: Sociale structuur en religie in de Vogelkop van West-Nieuw-Guinea*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1984.
- _____. "Trade, Migration, and Exchange: The Bird's Head Peninsula of Irian Jaya in a Comparative Perspective." In *Trade, Migration, and Exchange: The Bird's Head Peninsula of Irian Jaya in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Andrew Strathern, 121–53. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994.
- Mijer, P. "Kroniek van Nederlandsch Indie, loopende van af het jaar 1816. De jaren 1822 en 1823." *Tijdschrift voor Neerlands Indie* (1842).
- Miksic, John N. *Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea, 1300–1800*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2013.
- Milburn, William, and Thomas Thornton. *Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader's Complete Guide: Containing a Geographical and Nautical Description of the Maritime Parts of India, China,*

- Japan, and Neighbouring Countries, Including the Eastern Islands, and the Trading Stations on the Passage from Europe ... and a Description of the Commodities Imported from Thence into Great Britain, and the Duties Payable Thereon. ...* London: Kingsbury, Parbury and Allen, 1825.
- Millar, Susan Bolyard. *Bugis Weddings: Rituals of Social Location in Modern Indonesia*. Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, 1989.
- Miller, George, ed. *To the Spice Islands and Beyond: Travels in Eastern Indonesia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Miller, Michael B. *Europe and the Maritime World: A Twentieth Century History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Miller, Tom. *China's Asian Dream: Empire Building Along the New Silk Road*. London: Zed Books, 2017.
- Miller, W.G. "English Country Traders and Their Relations with Malay Rulers in the Late Eighteenth Century." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 84, no. 1 (2010): 23–45.
- Mintz, Sidney W. *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History*. New York: Viking, 1985.
- Modera, J. *Verhaal van eene Reize naar en langs de Zuid-Westkust van Nieuw-Guinea Gedaan in 1828 door Z.M. corvet Triton*. Haarlem: Vincent Loosjes, 1830.
- Mollerus, J.H.M. *Geschiedkundig overzicht van het handelsstelsel in Nederlandsch-Indie*. Utrecht: Kemink, 1865.
- Munro, J. Forbes. *Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Empire, 1823–1893*. Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2003.
- Moor, Jaap de. "Met Klewang en Karabijn: Militaire geschiedenis Van Nederlands-Indië." In *Met man en macht, de militaire geschiedenis van Nederland 1550–2000*, ed. Jaap R. Bruijn and Cees B. Wels, 199–244. Amsterdam: Balans, 2003.
- _____. "Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth-Century Indonesia." In *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa*, ed. Jaap A. de Moor and H.L. Wesseling, 50–72. Leiden: Brill, 1989.
- Moore, Clive. *New Guinea: Crossing Boundaries and History*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003.
- Moore, Gene M. "Slavery and Racism in Joseph Conrad's Eastern World." *Journal of Modern Literature* 30, no. 4 (2007): 20–38.
- Morgan, Kenneth. "Mercantalism and the British Empire." In *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914*, ed. Donald Winch and Patrick K. O'Brian, 165–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Morris, D.F. van Braam. "Nota van toelichting behorende bij het contract gesloten met het Landschap Bima op den 20sten October 1886." *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 34 (1891): 176–233.
- Morrison, Kathleen, and Laura Lee Junker. *Forager-Traders in South and Southeast Asia: Long Term Histories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Mujiburrahman. "Islamic Theological Texts and Contexts in Banjarese Society: An Overview of the Existing Studies." *Southeast Asian Studies* 3, no. 3 (2014).
- Mukherjee, Rila, ed. *Oceans Connect: Reflections on Water Worlds across Time and Space*. Delhi: Primus Books, 2013.
- Muller, Salomon. "Land-en Volkenkunde: Verhandelingen over de Natuurlijke Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche overzeesche bezittingen." Ed. C.J. Temminck Natuurkundige Commissie voor Nederlandsch-Indie. Leiden: S. en J. Luchtmans en C.C. van der Hoek, 1839.

- Mullins, Steve. "James Clark and the Celebes Trading Co.: Making an Australian Maritime Venture in the Netherlands East Indies." *The Great Circle* 24, no. 2 (2002): 22–52.
- Mundy, Rodney, ed. *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, Down to the Occupation of Labuan, from the Journals of James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, and Governor of Labuan; Together with a Narrative of the Operations of H.M.S. Iris*. London: Murray, 1848.
- Munoz, Paul Michel. *Early Kingdoms of the Indonesian Archipelago and the Malay Peninsula*. Singapore: Didier Millet, 2006.
- Nagano, Yoshiko. *State and Finance in the Philippines, 1898–1941: The Mismanagement of an American Colony*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2015.
- Nagel, Jürgen G. *Der Schlüssel zu den Molukken: Makassar und die Handelsstrukturen des Malaiischen Archipels im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert – eine exemplarische Studie*. 2 vols. Hamburg: Kovac, 2003.
- Nagtegaal, C. *De voormalige zelfbesturende en gouvernementslandschappen in Zuid-Oost Borneo*. Utrecht: Oosthoek's Uitgeverij, 1939.
- Nagtegaal, Luc. *Riding the Tiger: The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast Coast of Java, 1680–1743*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996.
- Nechtman, Tillman W. *Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- "Nederlandsch Indie in 1817." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 23, no. 5 (1861): 271–300.
- Neck, Jacob van. *Het tweede Boeck Journael oft Dag-Register... Jacob van Neck Wijbrand van Warwijck*. Amsterdam: Cornelis Claesz, 1601.
- Needham, Rodney. *Mamboru: History and Structure in a Domain of Northwestern Sumba*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- _____. *Sumba and the Slave Trade*. Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No. 31. Melbourne: Monash University, 1983.
- Neild-Basu, Susan. "The Dubashes of Madras." *Modern Asian Studies* 18, no. 1 (1984): 1–31.
- Newbold, Thomas John. *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1839.
- Newitt, Malyn. *Emigration and the Sea: An Alternative History of Portugal and the Portuguese*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Newton, John. *A Savage History: A History of Whaling in the Southern and Pacific Oceans*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2013.
- Ng, Chin-Keong. *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983.
- Nie, Hongping Annie. *The Selden Map of China: A New Understanding of the Ming Dynasty*. Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2019.
- Niel, Robert van. *Java's Northeast Coast 1740–1840: A Study in Colonial Encroachment and Dominance*. Leiden: CNWS, 2005.
- Nield, Robert. *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports*. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2010.
- Niemeyer, Hendrik E. *Batavia: Een koloniale samenleving in de 17de eeuw*. Amsterdam: Balans, 2005.
- Nierstrasz, Chris. *In the Shadow of the Company: The Dutch East India Company and Its Servants in the Period of Its Decline (1740–1796)*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- _____. "The Popularization of Tea: East India Companies, Private Traders, Smugglers and the Consumption of Tea in Western Europe, 1700–1760." In *Goods from the East, 1600–1800: Trading Eurasia*, ed. Felicia Gottmann, Hanna Hodacs, and Chris Nierstrasz. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

- _____. *Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textiles: The English and Dutch East India Companies (1700–1800)*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- “Nieuw-Guinea.” In *Berigten van de Utrechtsche Zendingsvereeniging*, 1–25. Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1862.
- Nieuwenhuis, Anton Willem. *In Centraal Borneo: Reis van Pontianak Naar Samarinda*. Leyden: Brill, 1900.
- Nieuwenhuis, R. *Mirror of the Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature*. Translated by E.M. Beekman. Singapore: Periplus, 1999.
- Nolde, Lance. “Changing Tides: A History of Power, Trade and Transformation among the Sama Bajo Peoples of Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period.” PhD diss., University of Hawai‘i, 2014.
- Nomura, Toora. “A Japanese Sailors Record of South Kalimantan in the Eighteenth Century.” *Jurnal Jabatan Sejarah University Malaya* 1 (1988): 117–40.
- Norddeutscher Lloyd Bremen. *Die Entwicklung des Norddeutschen Lloyd Bremen*. Bremen: Maritime Press, 2013.
- Noorduyn, J. *Bima en Sumbawa: Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Sultanaten Bima en Sumbawa door A. Ligthoet en G. P. Rouffaer*. Dordrecht: Foris, 1987.
- _____. “De Handelsrelaties van het Makassaarse Rijk Volgens de Notitie van Cornelis Speelman (1669).” In *Nederlands Historische Bronnen*, 97–123. ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.
- _____. “Makasar and the Islamization of Bima.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 143, no. 2/3 (1987): 312–42.
- _____. “The Wajorese Merchants’ Community in Makassar.” In *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaioli, 95–120. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000.
- Noorlander, J.C. *Bandjarmasin en de Compagnie in de tweede helft der 18de eeuw*. Leiden: M. Dubbeldeman, 1935.
- North, Douglass C. “Institutions.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112.
- _____. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- _____. “Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: the Challenge of Karl Polanyi.” *Journal of European Economic History* 6, no. 3 (1977): 703–16.
- Nuetzenadel, Alexander, and Frank Trentmann, eds. *Food and Globalization: Consumption, Markets and Politics in the Modern World*. London: Berg, 2008.
- Nusselein, A.H.F.J. “Beschrijving van het landschap Pasir.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 58, no. 1 (1905): 532–74.
- Nye, John V.C. “The Myth of Free-Trade Britain.” *The Library of Economics and Liberty*, 3 March 2003, <https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2003/Nyefreetrade.html>.
- Nye, Robert. “The Transmission of Masculinities: The Case of Early Modern France.” In *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis (Politics, History, and Culture)*, ed. Philip S. Gorski, 286–302. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
- O’Connor, Sue, Matthew Spriggs, and Peter Veth. “On the Cultural History of the Aru Islands: Some Conclusions.” In *The Archaeology of the Aru Islands, Eastern Indonesia (Terra Australis 22)*, ed. Sue O’Connor, Matthew Spriggs and Peter Veth. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007. <http://epress.anu.edu.au?p=124761>.
- Obidzinski, Krystof. “Logging in East Kalimantan, Indonesia: The Historical Expedience of Illegality.” PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2003.

- Ohff, Hans-Jürgen. *Disastrous Ventures: German and British Enterprises in East New Guinea up to 1914*. Melbourne: Plenum, 2015.
- Oka, Rahul and Chapurukha M. Kusimba. "The Archaeology of Trading Systems, Part 1: Towards a New Trade Synthesis." *Journal of Archaeological Research* 16, no. 4 (2008): 339–95.
- Okushima, Mika. "Ethnic Background of the Tidung: Investigation of the Extinct Rulers of Coastal Northeast Borneo." *The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies* (2003): 233–60.
- Oldenborgh, J. van. "Verslag eener reis van Ternate naar de Noord- en Noord-West-kust van Nieuw-Guinea per Z. M. Stoomschip Batavia gedurende Maart en April 1881." *Tijdschrift Bataviaasche Genootschap* 27 (1882): 406–37.
- Olivier, J. *Reizen in den Molukschen archipel naar Makassar, ... in het gevolg van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederland's Indië in 1824 gedaan en volgens de dagboeken en aantekeningen van ondersch. Reisgenooten beschreven*. Volume 1. Amsterdam: Beijerinck, 1834.
- _____. *Reizen in den Molukschen archipel naar Makassar, ... in het gevolg van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederland's Indië in 1824 gedaan en volgens de dagboeken en aantekeningen van ondersch. Reisgenooten beschreven*. Volume 2. Amsterdam: Beijerinck, 1837.
- Olivier, Johannes. *Land- en zeetogten in Nederland's Indië, en enige Britsche etablissementen, gedaan in de jaren 1817 tot 1826*. Amsterdam: C.G. Sulpke, 1827–30.
- Omar, Rahilah. "The History of Bone A.D. 1775–1795: The Diary of Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh Syamsuddin." PhD dissertation, University of Hull, 2003.
- Ono, Rintaro, Santoso Soegondho, and Joko Siswanto. "Possible Development of Regional Maritime Networks during the 16th to 19th Centuries: An Excavation Report of the Bukit Tiwing Site in the Talaud Islands, Eastern Indonesia." *People and Culture in Oceania* 29 (2013): 1–33.
- Oppenheimer, Clive. "Climatic, Environmental and Human Consequences of the Largest Known Historic Eruption: Tambora Volcano (Indonesia) 1815." *Progress in Physical Geography* 27, no. 2 (2003): 230–59.
- "Oprigting van Kamers van Koophandel en Nijverheid te Batavia, Semarang, Surabaija, Padang en Makassar." *Koloniale Jaarboeken* 4 (1864): 57–58.
- Ormrod, David. *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- O'Reilly, Dougald. *Early Civilizations of Southeast Asia*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- _____. "From the Bronze Age to the Iron Age in Thailand: Applying the Heterarchical Approach." *Asian Perspectives* 39, no. 2 (2000): 1–19.
- Ortner, Sherry. "Bourdieu and 'History'." *Anthropology of this Century* 8 (2013). <http://aotcpress.com/articles/bourdieu-history/>.
- Osseweijer, M. "'We Wander in Our Ancestors' Yard': Sea Cucumber Gathering in Aru, Eastern Indonesia." In *Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and Its Transformations: Critical Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. R. Ellen, P. Parkes, and P. Bicker, 55–78. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000.
- Ota, Atsushi. *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750–1830*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- _____, ed. *In the Name of the Battle against Piracy: Ideas and Practices in State Monopoly of Violence in Europe and Asia in the Period of Transition*. Leiden: Brill, 2018.
- _____. "Toward Cities, Seas, and Jungles: Migration in the Malay Archipelago, c.1750–1850." In *Globalising Migration History: The Eurasian Experience (16th–21st Centuries)*, ed. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, 180–214. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
- _____. "Tropical Products Out, British Cotton In: Trade in the Dutch Outer-Islands Ports, 1846–1869." *Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 3 (2013): 499–526.

- Paine, Lincoln. *The Sea and Civilization: A Maritime History of the World*. London: Atlantic Books, 2013.
- Pallesen, Kemp A. *Culture Contact and Language Convergence*. LSP Special Monograph, Issue 24. Manila: Linguistic Society of the Philippines, 1985.
- Palmer, Blair. "Trading Traditions: Modernist Islam and Agricultural Rituals in Buton, Indonesia." In *Faith in the Future: Understanding the Revitalization of Religions and Cultural Traditions in Asia*, ed. Thomas Reuter and Alexander Horstmann, 197–222. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Palsetia, Jesse S. *The Parsis of India: Preservation of Identity in Bombay City*. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
- Parades, Oona. *A Mountain of Difference: The Lumad in Early Colonial Mindanao*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Parimmartha, I. Gde. "Opium dalam Sejarah Nusa Tenggara Barat." In *Arung Samudra: Persembahan persembahan memperingati sembilan windu A.B. Lapien*, ed. Edi Sedyawati and Susanto Zuhdi, 105–18. Depok: PPKB LPUI, 2001.
- _____. "Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815–1915." PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, 2002.
- Parkinson, C. Northcote. *War in the Eastern Seas, 1793–1815*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954.
- Parthasarathi, Prasannan. *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Patunru, Abdurrazak Daeng. *Sedjarah Gowa*. Makassar: Jajasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, 1972.
- Pearson, Michael N. *The Indian Ocean*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- _____. "Merchants and States." In *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, ed. James D. Tracy, 41–116. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- _____, ed. *Spices in the Indian Ocean World*. Volume 11 of *An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History 1450–1800*. Aldershot: Variorum, 1996.
- _____, ed. *Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Peck, Jamie. "Disembedding Polanyi: Exploring Polanyian Economic Geographies." *Environment and Planning* 45 (2013): 1536–44.
- Pelras, Christian. *The Bugis. The Peoples of South-East Asia and the Pacific*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
- _____. "Notes sur quelques populations aquatiques de l'archipel nusantarien." *Archipel* 3 (1972): 133–68.
- _____. "Patron-Client Ties Among the Bugis and Makassar of South Sulawesi." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 156, no. 3 (2000): 393–432.
- Peluso, Nancy Lee. *Markets and Merchants: The Forest Products Trade of East Kalimantan in Historical Perspective*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Perelaer, M.T.H. *De Bonische Expeditien, Krijgsgebeurtenissen op Celebes in 1859 en 1860*. 2 vols. Leiden: G. Kolff, 1872.
- _____. "Wandeling door de benting van Kwala-Kapoeas." *Militaire spectator, tijdschrift voor het Nederlandsche leger en dat in de overzeesche bezittingen* 31 (1864): 588–99, 636–49, 774–95.
- Peristiwa Tahun Tahun Bersejarah daerah Sulawesi Selatan dari abad ke XIV s/d XIX*. Ujung Pandang: Balai Kajian Sejarah, 1985.

- Permanyer-Ugartemendia, Ander. "Opium after the Manila Galleon: The Spanish Involvement in the Opium Economy in East Asia (1815–1830)." *Investigaciones de Historia Económica — Economic History Research* 10 (2014): 155–64.
- Pfhanze, Otto. *Bismarck and the Development of Germany. Volume III: The Period of Fortification, 1880–1898*. Princeton: Princeton Legacy Library, 1990.
- Phipps, John. *A Practical Treatise on the China and Eastern Trade: Comprising the Commerce of Great-Britain and India Particularly Bengal and Singapore with China and the Eastern Islands*. London: Allen, 1836.
- Pichon, Alain Le, ed. *China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong 1827–1843*. Oxford: The British Academy for Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Pijnappel, J. "Beschrijving van het Westelijke Gedeelte van de Zuider-en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo (De Afdeeling Sampit en de Zuidkust)." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 7 (1860): 243–346.
- Platenkamp, J. "The Severance of the Origin; a Ritual of the Tobelo of North Halmahera." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 146, no. 1 (1990): 74–92.
- _____. "Sovereignty in the North Moluccas: Historical Transformations." *History and Anthropology* 24, no. 2 (2013): 206–32.
- _____. "Tobelo, Moro, Ternate: The Cosmological Valorization of Historical Events." *Cakalele* 4 (1993): 61–89.
- Platt, Stephen R. *Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018.
- Plourde, Aimée M. "Prestige Goods and the Formation of Political Hierarchy: A Costly Signaling Model." In *Pattern and Process in Cultural Evolution*, ed. S. Shennan, 374–88. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
- Poder, Thomas G. "What is Really Social Capital? A Critical Review." *The American Sociologist* 42, no. 4 (2011): 341–67.
- Poellinggomang, Edward L. "The Dutch Trade Policy and Its Impact on Makassar's Trade." *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993): 61–77.
- _____. *Makassar abad XIX: studi tentang kebijakan perdagangan maritim*. Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002.
- _____. *Perubahan politik dan hubungan kekuasaan: Makassar, 1906–1942*. Tegalrejo, Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944.
- _____. "Ports of Trade in Early Societies." *The Journal of Economic History* 23, no. 1 (1963): 30–45.
- Poley, J.P. *Eroica: The Quest for Oil in Indonesia (1850–1898)*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2000.
- Polman, Katrien. *The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography*. Dordrecht: Foris, 1983.
- Pomeranz, Kenneth. *The Great Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Post, Peter. "Trust and Status in a Dual Regional Economy: Dutch Trading Companies in Japan's Prewar Trade with Southeast Asia." In *Commercial Networks in Modern Asia*, ed. Shinya Sugiyama and Linda Grove, 182–98. Richmond: Curzon, 2001.
- "Posthouders, Civiele gezaghebbers en de marine in den Indische archipel." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 14, no. 2 (1852): 195–202.
- Potter, Leslie. "Commodity and Environment in Colonial Borneo: Economic Value, Forest Conversions and Concern for Conservation, 1870–1940." In *Histories of the Borneo Environment*:

- Economic, Political, and Social Dimensions of Change and Continuity*, ed. Reed L. Wadley, 109–36. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005.
- Pradadimara, Dias. “Modal Britania di Indonesia Masa Kolonial.” *Mozaik Humanior* 16 (2016): 123–35.
- Prager, Michael. “The Appropriation of the ‘Stranger King’: Polarity and Mediation in the Dynastic Myth of Bima.” In *The Anthropology of Values*, ed. Peter Berger, Roland Hardenberg, Ellen Kattner, and Michael Prager, 47–70. New Delhi: Longman, 2010.
- Prakasch, Om. “The Trading World of India and Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Period.” *Archipel* 56 (1998): 31–42.
- Prange, Sebastian. “A Trade of No Dishonor: Piracy, Commerce, and Community in the Western Indian Ocean, Twelfth to Sixteenth Century.” *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (2011): 1269–93.
- Prapanca, Mpu, and Stuart Robson. *Desawarnana: (Nagarakrtagama)*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995.
- Pryer, Ada. *A Decade in Borneo*. Ed. Susan Morgan. London: Leicester University Press, 2001.
- Ptak, Roderich. “China and Portugal at Sea: The Early Ming Trading System and the Estado Da India Compared.” *Revista de Cultura (Macau)* 13/14 (1991).
- _____. *China’s Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)*. Aldershot: Variorum, 1999.
- _____. “China and the Trade in Cloves, Circa 960–1435.” In *China’s Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)*, ed. Roderich Ptak. Aldershot: Variorum, 1999.
- _____. “The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea–Sulu Zone–North Moluccas (14th to Early 16th Century).” *Archipel* 43 (1992): 27–56.
- _____. “The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to China and Macao, c.1350–1600.” In *China’s Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)*. Aldershot: Variorum, 1999.
- Ptak, Roderich and Dietmar Rothermund, eds. *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c.1400–1750*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991.
- Purwanto, Bambang. “Peasant Economy and Institutional Changes in Late Colonial Indonesia.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Economic Growth and Institutional Change in Indonesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Amsterdam, 2002.
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Quiason, Serafin D. *English “Country Trade” with the Philippines, 1644–1765*. Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1966.
- Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. *Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia, the Coast Watch System of the Philippines*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012.
- Raben, Remco. “Batavia and Colombo: The Ethical and Spatial Order of Two Colonial Cities, 1600–1800.” PhD dissertation, University of Leiden, 1996.
- _____. “Cities and the Slave-Trade in Early-Modern Southeast Asia.” In *Linking Destinies: Trade, Towns and Kin in Asian History*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Dick Kooiman, and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 119–40. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008.
- Raedt, Jules de, and Janet Hoskins, eds. *Headhunting and the Social Imagination in Southeast Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Raffles, Sophia. *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S. & C., Particularly in the Government of Java 1811–1816, and of Bencoolen and Its Dependencies 1817–1824: With Details of the Commerce and Resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and Selections from His Correspondence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

- Ragsag, Anabelle. *Ethnic Boundary-Making at the Margins of Conflict in the Philippines: Everyday Identity Politics in Mindanao*. Singapore: Springer Nature, 2020.
- Rahman, Darmawan Mas'ud. "Puang dan daeng: kajian budaya orang Balanipa Mandar." Universitas Hasanuddin, 1988.
- Rahman, Nik Hassan Shuhaimi bin Nik Abdul. "The Kingdom of Srivijaya as Socio-political and Cultural Entity." In *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers, 61–82. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990.
- Raj, Kapil. "18th-Century Pacific Voyages of Discovery, 'Big Science', and the Shaping of a European Scientific and Technological Culture." *History and Technology* 17, no. 2 (2000): 79–98.
- Rao, Velcheru Narayana, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam. "A New Imperial Idiom in the Sixteenth Century: Krishnadevaraya and His Political Theory of Vijayanagara." In *Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 1500–1800*, ed. Sheldon Pollock, 19–48. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Ras, J.J. *Hikajat Banjar: A Study in Malay Historiography*. KITLV Bibliotheca Indonesica 1. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968.
- Rauschnig, Dietrich. *East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Ray, Himanshu Prabha. *The Archaeology of Seafaring in Ancient South Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Ray, Rajat Kanta. "Asian Capital in the Age of European Domination: The Rise of the Bazaar, 1800–1914." *Modern Asian Studies* 29, no. 3 (1995): 449–554.
- Reece, Bob. *The White Rajahs of Sarawak: A Borneo Dynasty*. Singapore: Didier Millet, 2001.
- Rees, W.A. van. *De Bandjermasinsche Krijg van 1859–1863*. Arnhem: D.A. Thieme, 1865.
- _____. *De Bandjermasinsche Krijg van 1859–1863 nader toegelicht*. Arnhem: D.A. Thieme, 1867.
- Reid, Anthony. "Chinese Trade and Southeast Asian Economic Expansion in the Later Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: An Overview." In *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*, ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana, 21–34. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.
- _____. "Economic and Social Change, c.1400–1800." In *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume One, Part Two: From c.1500 to c.1800*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, 116–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- _____. "Flows and Seepages in the Long-Term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia." In *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, ed. Anthony Reid, 15–50. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996.
- _____. "From Betel-Chewing to Tobacco-Smoking in Indonesia." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 44, no. 3 (1985): 529–54.
- _____. "A Great Seventeenth Century Indonesian Family: Matoaya and Pattingalloang of Makassar." In *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
- _____. "Historical Dynamics of 'Chinese' and 'Malay' Categories as Southeast Asian Creoles." Paper presented for workshop, "Globalization and Creolization in World History," Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2002.
- _____. "History and Seismology in the Ring of Fire: Punctuating the Indonesian Past." In *Environment, Trade and Society in Southeast Asia: A Longue Durée Perspective*, ed. David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 62–77. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

- _____. "Inside Out: The Colonial Displacement of Sumatra's Population." In *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the Environmental History of Indonesia*, ed. Peter Boomgaard, Freek Colombijn, and David Henley, 61–90. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997.
- _____. "Merdeka: the Concept of Freedom in Indonesia." In *Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. David Kelly and Anthony Reid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- _____. "Pluralism and Progress in Seventeenth-Century Makassar." In *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaioli, 55–71. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000.
- _____. "The Rise of Makassar." In *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid, 100–25. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
- _____, ed. *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia*. St. Lucia, Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1983.
- _____. *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
- _____. *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680. Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
- _____. "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 32, no. 3 (2001): 295–313.
- _____. "The Unthreatening Alternative: Chinese Shipping in Southeast Asia." *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 27, nos. 1–2 (1993): 13–33.
- Remijsen, Bert. *Word-Prosodic Systems of Raja Ampat Languages*. Utrecht: Landelijke Onderzoekschool Taalwetenschap, 2001.
- Rengers, D.W. van Welderen. *The Failure of a Liberal Colonial Policy Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1830*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1947.
- Resink, G. "Inlandsche staten in den Oosterschen Archipel (1873–1915)." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 116, no. 3 (1960): 313–49.
- Reuter, Thomas, ed. *Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006.
- Ricklefs, M.C. *A History of Modern Indonesia: Since c.1200*. 3rd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.
- Riedel, J.G.F. "De oorsprong en de vestiging der Boalemoërs op Noord-Selebes." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 34 (1885): 495–521.
- _____. *De sluik-en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papu*. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1886.
- _____. "De vestiging der Mandaren in de Tomini-Landen." *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 19 (1870): 555–64.
- Rivers, P.J. "The Origin of 'Sabah' and a Reappraisal of Overbeck as Maharajah." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 77, no. 1 (2004).
- Robide van der Aa, P.J.B.C. *Reizen naar Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea: ondernomen op last der regering van Nederlandsch-Indië in de jaren 1871, 1872, 1875–1876 / door de heeren P. Van der Crab and J.E. Teysmann, J.G. Coorengel en A.J. Langeveldt van Hemert en P. Swaan; met geschied- en aardrijkskundige toelichtingen door P.J.B.C. Robide van der Aa*. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1879.
- Rodenwaldt, Ernst. *Die Mestizen Auf Kisar*. Mededeelingen van den Dienst der Volksgezondheid in Nederlandsch-Indië. Batavia: Kolff, 1927.
- Rodao, Florentino. "Departure from Asia: Spain in the Philippines and East Asia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries." In *Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne*, ed. Brian D. Bunk, Sasha D. Pack, and Carl-Gustaff Scott, 103–22. Madison: Parallel Press, 2008.

- Rodil, B.R. *Minoritization of Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago*. 2nd edition. Davao City: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 2004.
- Roelfsema, H.R. *Een jaar in de Molukken: Persoonlijke ervaringen bij het vestigen eener cultuuronderneming*. Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1917. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/24468/24468-h/24468-h.htm>.
- Roeper, Vibeke and Diederick Wildeman, eds. *Om de wereld: De eerste Nederlandse omzeiling van de wereld onder leiding van Olivier van Noort, 1598–1601*. Nijmegen: Sun, 1999.
- Roever, Arend de. *De jacht op sandelhout: de VOC en de tweedeling van Timor in de zeventiende eeuw*. Zutphen: Walburg Press, 2002.
- _____. “The Warlords of Larantuka and the Timorese Sandalwood Trade.” In *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé. Leiden: CNWS, 2005.
- Roever, Arend de and Bea Brommer, *Grote Atlas van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. Vol. III, Indische Archipel en Oceanië: Malay Archipelago and Oceania*. Voorburg: Asia Maior, 2008.
- Roff, Margaret Clark. *The Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabar and Sarawak*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Roo van Alderwerelt, J. de “Historische aantekeningen over Soemba, residentie Timor en onderhoorigheden,” *TITLV* 48 (1908).
- Roos, S. *Bijdrage tot de kennis van taal, land en volk op Soemba*. Verhandelingen Van Het Bataviaasch Genootschap. Batavia: Bruining & Wijt, 1872.
- Roque, Ricardo. *Headhunting and Colonialism: Anthropology and the Circulation of Human Skulls in the Portuguese Empire, 1870–1930*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Rosenberg, C.B.H. van. “Beschrijving van eenige gedeelte van Ceram.” *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap*, part 16, 5th series, part 2 (1866): 97–182.
- _____. *Reis naar de zuidoostereilanden: gedaan in 1865 op last der regering van Nederlandsch-Indië*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1867
- _____. *Reistogten in de Afdeeling Gorontalo gedaan op Last der Nederlandsch Indische Regering*. Amsterdam: Frederick Muller, 1865.
- Rössler, Martin. “From Divine Descent to Administration: Sacred Heirlooms and Political Change in Highland Goa.” *Bijdragen Tot De Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* 156, no. 3 (2000): 539–60
- _____. “From Divine Descent to Administration: Sacred Heirlooms and Political Change in Highland Goa.” In *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. Roger Tol, Kees van Dijk, and Greg Acciaioli, 161–82. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000.
- Rossum, Matthias van. “De intra-Aziatische vaart: Schepen, ‘de Aziatische zeeman’ en ondergang van de VOC?” *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 8, no. 3 (2011): 32–69.
- _____. “Werkers van de wereld: Globalisering, maritieme arbeidsmarkten en de verhoudingen tussen Aziatische en Europese zeelieden in dienst van de VOC.” PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, 2013.
- Roszko, Edyta. “Maritime Territorialisation as Performance of Sovereignty and Nationhood in the South China Sea.” *Nations and Nationalism* 21, no. 2 (2015): 230–49.
- Roughneen, Simon. “Southeast Asian Ports Thirst for More Seaborne Trade: Lack of Adequate Transport Infrastructure Crippling Region’s Competitiveness.” *Nikkei Asian Review*, 7 September (2017).
- Rousseau, Jérôme. *Central Borneo: Ethnic Identity and Social Life in a Stratified Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- _____. “Central Borneo and Its Relations with Coastal Malay Sultanates.” In *Outwitting the State*, ed. Peter Skalnik, 41–50. London: Transaction, 1989.

- Roux, C.C.F.M. Le. "Boegineesche zeekaarten van den Indisch Archipel." *Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap*, 2nd series, vol. 52, no. 5 (1935).
- Rowe, Michael, ed. *Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State Formation in an Age of Upheaval, c. 1800–1815*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Rudner, David. "Banker's Trust and the Culture of Banking among the Nattukottai Chettiers of Colonial South India." *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 3 (1989): 417–59.
- Ruiter, P.A.C. de. *Het Mijnwezen in Nederlands-Oost-Indië 1850–1950*. Utrecht: Freudenthal Institute, Scientific Library, 2017.
- Rush, James. *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860–1910*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- Ryckbosch, Wouter. "Early Modern Consumption History: Current Challenges and Future Perspectives." *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 130, no. 1 (2015): 57–84.
- Sahlins, Marshall. "The Stranger King." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 36, no. 105 (2008): 177–99.
- Salazar, W. "British and German Passivity in the Face of the Spanish Neo-Mercantilist Resurgence in the Philippines, c. 1883–1898." *Itinerario* 21, no. 2 (1997): 125–53.
- Saleeby, Najeeb M. *The History of Sulu*. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908.
- _____. "History of Maguindanao." In *The Muslim Filipinos. Their History, Society and Contemporary Problems*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, 184–93. Manila: Solidaridad, 1974.
- Saleh, M. Idwar. "Agrarian Radicalism and Movements of Native Insurrection in South Kalimantan (1858–1865)." *Archipel* 9 (1975): 135–153.
- _____. "Pepper Trade and the Ruling Class of Banjarmasin in the Seventeenth Century." In *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference Held at Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 19–22 May 1978*, 203–21. Leiden: BIS, 1978.
- Salmon, Claudine. "The Han Family of East Java. Entrepreneurship and Politics (18th–19th Centuries)." *Archipel* 41 (1991): 53–88.
- _____. "Srivijaya, la Chine et les marchands chinois (Xe–XIIe s.): Quelques réflexions sur la société de l'empire sumatranais — Srivijaya, China and Chinese Merchants (Xth–XIIth s.)." *Archipel* (2002): 57–78.
- Salmon, Thomas. *Modern History or the Present State of All Nations, Volume 1*. London: T. Longman, 1774.
- Sand, Christophe. "Melanesian Tribes vs. Polynesian Chiefdoms: Recent Archaeological Assessment of a Classic Model of Sociopolitical Types in Oceania." *Asian Perspectives* 41, no. 2 (2002): 284–296.
- Sandeford, David S. "Organizational Complexity and Demographic Scale in Primary States." *Royal Society Open Science* 5, no. 5 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.171137>.
- Sastrawati, Nila. "Gaukang and White Coup: Dismantling of Traditional Power." *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 21, no. 2 (2017): 160–72.
- Sather, Clifford. *The Bajau Laut: Adaptation, History and Fate in a Maritime Fishing Society of South-Eastern Sabah*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- _____. "Sea Nomads and Rainforest Hunter-Gatherers: Foraging Adaptations in the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago." In *The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Peter Bellwood, James J. Fox, and Darrell Tryo. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006.
- Saunders, Graham. *A History of Brunei*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Savage, Victor R. *Western Impressions of Nature and Landscape in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1984.

- Schefold, Reimar. "Visions of the Wilderness on Siberut in Comparative Southeast Asian Perspective." In *Tribal Communities in the Malay World*, ed. Geoffrey Benjamin and Cynthia Chou. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002.
- Schendel, Willem van. *The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia*. London: Anthem, 2005.
- _____. "Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia." In *Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*, ed. Remco Raben and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 275–307. Singapore/Leiden: NUS Press/KITLV, 2005.
- Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. *From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.
- Schoorl, J. "Belief in Reincarnation on Buton, S.E. Sulawesi, Indonesia." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 141, no. 1 (1985): 103–34.
- _____. "Het 'eeuwige' verbond tussen Buton en de VOC, 1613–1669." In *Excursies in Celebes*, ed. Harry A. Poeze and Pim Schoorl. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1991.
- Schophuys, H.J. *Het stroomgebied van de Barito: landbouwkundige kenschets en landbouwvoorlichting*. Wageningen: H. Veenman, 1936.
- Schoterman, Jan A. "Traces of Indonesian Influences in Tibet." In *Esoteric Buddhism in Mediaeval Maritime Asia: Networks of Masters, Texts, Icons*, ed. Andrea Acri, 113–22. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2016.
- Schottenhammer, Angela. "Characteristics of Qing China's Maritime Trade Politics, Shunzhi through Early Qianlong Reigns." In *Trading Networks in Early Modern East Asia*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer, 101–54. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2010.
- Schouten, Maria J.C. *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677–1983*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998.
- _____. "Nineteenth-Century Ethnography in West Timor and the Wider World: The Case of J.G.F. Riedel." *Journal of Asian History* 48, no. 2 (2014): 205–25.
- Schouten, Mieke. *Minahasa and Bolaangmongondow: An Annotated Bibliography, 1800–1942*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
- _____. "Myth and Reality in Minahasan History: The Waworuntu-Gallois Confrontation." *Archipel* 34 (1987): 119–41.
- Schrauwers, Albert. *Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi Indonesia, 1892–1995*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
- _____. "Houses, Hierarchy, Headhunting and Exchange: Rethinking Political Relations in the Southeast Asian Realm of Luwu." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 153, no. 3 (1997): 356–80.
- Schrieke, B.J.O. "The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century." In *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, 1–82. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955.
- Schult, Volker. "Sultans and Adventurers: German Blockade-Runners in the Sulu Archipelago." *Philippine Studies* 50, no. 3 (2002): 395–415.
- _____. "Sulu and Germany in the Late Nineteenth Century." *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic* 48, no. 1 (2000): 80–108.
- _____. *Wunsch Und Wirklichkeit: Deutsch-Philippinische Beziehungen Im Kontext Globaler Verflechtungen 1860–1945*. Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2008.
- Schulte Nordholt, Henk. "Bali: An Open Fortress." In *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 387–416. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.

- _____. "The Mads Lange Connection: A Danish Trader in Bali in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century." *Indonesia* 32 (1981): 16–47.
- _____. *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics: 1650–1940*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996.
- Schulte Nordholt, Henk and Gerry van Klinken, eds. *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Subarto Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.
- Schulte Nordholt, H.G. *The Political System of the Atoni of Timor*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971.
- Schurz, William Lytle. "The Royal Philippine Company." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 3, no. 4 (1920): 491–508.
- Schutte, G.J., ed. *Het Indisch Sion: de Gereformeerde kerk onder de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*. Hilversum: Verloren, 2002.
- _____. *De Nederlandse patriotten en de koloniën; een onderzoek naar hun denkbeelden en optreden, 1770–1800*. Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1974.
- Schwane, C.A.L.M. *Borneo: Beschrijving van het stroomgebied van den Barito en reizen langs eenige voornamste rivieren van het zuid-oostelijk gedeelte van dat eiland in den Jaren 1843–1847*. Amsterdam: van Kampen, 1853.
- Schweizer–Iten, H. *One Hundred Years of the Swiss Club and the Swiss Community of Singapore 1871–1971*. Singapore: Swiss Club, 1980.
- Scott, James C. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
- _____. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Scott, William Henry. *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994.
- "Sejarah Daerah di Sulut: Kerajaan Bolaang Mongondow," *Tribun Manado* online, 25 June 2013. <https://manado.tribunnews.com/2013/06/25/kerajaan-bolaang-mongondow>.
- Sellato, Bernard. *Forest, Resources and People in Bulungan: Elements for a History of Settlement, Trade, and Social Dynamics in Borneo, 1880–2001*. Bogor: CIFOR, 2001.
- Sen, Tansen. "The Formation of Chinese Maritime Networks to Southern Asia, 1200–1450." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 49, no. 4 (2006): 421–53.
- Severino, Rodolfo. *Where in the World Is the Philippines?: Debating Its National Territory*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.
- Shanley, Patricia, Allan R. Pierce, Sarah A. Laird and Abraham Guillen, eds. *Tapping the Green Market: Certification and Management of Non-Timber Forest Products*. Abingdon: Earthscan, 2002.
- Sharman, Nick. "The Long Road to Spain's Economic Modernisation 1840–1940: Political and Economic Ideologies." *Bajo Palabra* 17, no. 10 (2017).
- Shekhar, Vibhanshu. *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.
- Shepherd, Christopher J. and Andrew McWilliam. "Cultivating Plantations and Subjects in East Timor: A Genealogy." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 169, nos. 2–3 (2013): 326–61.
- Sherry, Norman. *Conrad's Eastern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- _____. "Conrad and the S.S. Vidar." *The Review of English Studies* 14, no. 54 (1963): 157–63.
- "Short Account of Timor, Rotti, Savu, Solor Etc." In *Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias,*

- the Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula*, ed. J.H. Moor, 5–12. Singapore, 1837.
- Sidel, John. *Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Sillander, Kenneth. *Acting Authoritatively: How Authority Is Expressed through Social Action among the Bentian of Indonesian Borneo*. Helsinki: Swedish School of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, 2004.
- _____. "Local Integration and Coastal Connections in Interior Kalimantan: The Case of the Nalin Taun Ritual among the Bentian." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 37, no. 2 (2006): 315–34.
- Sillander, Kenneth and Jennifer Alexander. "Belonging in Borneo: Refiguring Dayak Ethnicity in Indonesia." *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 17, no. 2 (2016): 95–101.
- Sim, Teddy Y.H. "Survival of the Portuguese Estado Da Índia: Political Economy and Commercial Challenges 1700–50." *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 13, no. 3 (2012).
- Simeon, "Mindanao Food Prices Soar as Malaysia Closes Border." *The Philippine Star*, 23 May 2016. <https://www.philstar.com/nation/2016/05/23/1585848/mindanao-food-prices-soar-malaysia-closes-border#Bx1CPxwWYiLepAEU.99>.
- Singh, D.S. Ranjit. "Structure of the Indigenous Economy in Sabah in the 1860s and 1870s." In *Historia*, ed. Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali, 382–402. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Historical Society, 1984.
- Sinn, Elizabeth. "Hong Kong as an in-between Place in the Chinese Diaspora, 1839–1849." In *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*, ed. Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerde, 225–50. Leiden: Brill, 2011.
- Sjögren, Anders. "Territorialising Identity, Authority and Conflict in Africa: An Introduction." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 33, no. 2 (2015): 163–70.
- Skinner, C. *Sja'ir Perang Mengkasar (the Rhymed Chronicle of the Macassar War) by Entji' Amin*. Verhandelingen Van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde, volume 40. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1963.
- Sklair, Leslie. *Sociology of the Global System*. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995.
- Slama, Martin. "Translocal Networks and Globalisation within Indonesia. Exploring the Hadhrami Diaspora from the Archipelago's North-East." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39, no. 3 (2011): 238–57.
- Smith, Brian D. "English in Indonesia." *English Today* 26 (1991): 39–43.
- Smith, F. Andrew "Borneo's First 'White Rajah': New Light on Alexander Hare, His Family and Associates." *Borneo Research Bulletin* 44 (2013).
- Smith, Stefan Halikowski. *Creolization and Diaspora in the Portuguese Indies: The Social World of Ayutthaya, 1640–1720*. Leiden: Brill, 2011.
- "Some Notices on the Northern or Dutch Part of Celebes." In *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, ed. J.R. Logan. Singapore: J.R. Logan, 1848.
- Somer, Jan Marginus. *Vestiging, doorvoering en consolidatie van het Nederlandsche gezag in Nederlandsch Indië*. Breda: De Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1935.
- Sopher, David E. *The Sea Nomads: A Study of the Maritime Boat People of Southeast Asia*. 2nd ed. Singapore: National Museum, 1977.
- Souza, George Bryan. "Dyeing Red: S.E. Asian Sappanwood in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." *O Oriente* 8 (2004): 40–58.

- _____. "Opium and the Company: Maritime Trade and Imperial Finances on Java, 1684–1796." *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009): 113–33.
- _____. "The Portuguese Merchant Fleet at Macao in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." In *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, ed. Ernst Van Veen and Leonard Blussé. Leiden: CNWS, 2005.
- _____. *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Spalding, Mark, Corinna Ravilious and Edmund Peter Green. *World Atlas of Coral Reefs*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- Spate, O.H.K. *The Spanish Lake*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2004.
- Spengler, Johan Albert. *De Nederlandsche Oost-Indische bezittingen onder het bestuur van den gouverneur-general G.A.G.P. baron van der Capellen, 1819–1825*. Utrecht: Kemink, 1863.
- Spyer, Patricia. *The Memory of Trade: Modernity's Entanglements in an Eastern Indonesian Island*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.
- Stacey, Natasha. *Boats to Burn: Bajo Fishing Activity in the Australian Fishing Zone*. Asia-Pacific Environment Monographs Volume 2. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007.
- Stanley, H.E.J. *The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan, and China at the Close of the Sixteenth Century by Antonio De Morga*. London: Hakluyt Society, 1868.
- Stape, John. *The Several Lives of Joseph Conrad*. London: Arrow Books, 2007.
- Stapel, F.W. *Corpus diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, zesde deel (1753–1799)*. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955.
- _____. *Het Bongaais verdrag*. Leiden: University of Leiden Press, 1922.
- Stark, Ken and Kyle Latinis. "The Response of Early Ambonese Foragers to the Maluku Spice Trade: The Archaeological Evidence." *Cakalele* 7 (1996): 51–67.
- State Street Trust Company. *Old Shipping Days in Boston*. Boston: Walton Advertising & Printing, 1918.
- Stavorinus, J.S. *Reize van Zeeland over de Kaap de Goede Hoop en Batavia, naar Samarang, Macasser, Amboina, Suratte, enz.* Volume 1. Leyden: A. en J. Honkoop, 1797.
- Steenbrink, Karel. *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1900: A Documented History*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003.
- _____. "Dutch Colonial Containment of Islam in Manggarai, West-Flores, in Favour of Catholicism, 1907–1942." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 169 (2013): 104–28.
- _____. "Jesuits in Indonesia, 1546–2015." Jesuit Historiography Online. Leiden: Brill, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2468-7723_jho_COM_192544.
- Steensgard, N. *Carracks, Caravans and Companies: the Structural Crisis in European-Asian Trade in the Seventeenth Century*. Copenhagen: Studentlitteratur, 1973.
- Stern, Philip J. "Companies: Monopoly, Sovereignty, and the British East Indies." In *Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire*, ed. Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Stevens, Theo. *Van der Capellen's Koloniale Ambitie op Java: economische beleid in een stagnerende conjunctuur, 1816–1826*. Amsterdam: Historische Seminarium Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982.
- Stirling, Matthew Williams. *The Native Peoples of New Guinea*. War Background Studies, No. 9. Washington: The Smithsonian Institution, 1943.
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. "A Dominican Voyage through the Indies, ca. 1600." *Archipel* 57, no. 2 (1999): 223–42.

- _____. "Of Imarat and Tijarat: Asian Merchants and State Power in the Western Indian Ocean, 1400–1750." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, no. 4 (1995): 750–80.
- _____. *The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500–1700*. London and New York: Longman, 1993.
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay and C.A. Bayly. "Portfolio Capitalists and the Political Economy of Early Modern India." In *Merchants, Markets and the State in Early Modern India*, ed. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 242–65. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Sulandjari. "Politik Dan Perdagangan Lada Di Kesultanan Banjarmasin (1747–1787)." MA thesis, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1991.
- Sulistiyono, Singgih Tri. "The Java Sea Network: Patterns in the Development of Interregional Shipping and Trade in the Process of National Economic Integration in Indonesia, 1870s–1970s." PhD dissertation, Leiden University, 2003.
- Summerhayes, Glenn R. "Island Southeast Asia and Oceania Interactions." In *Handbook of East and Southeast Asian Archaeology*, ed. Peter V. Lape, Junko Habu, and John W. Olsen, 659–76: Springer, 2017.
- Sunderland, David. *British Economic Development in South East Asia, 1880–1939, Volume 1*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Surat-surat perdjandjian antara kesultanan Bandjarmasin dengan pemerintahan V.O.C., Bataafse Republik, Inggeris dan Hindia–Belanda, 1635–1860*. Djakarta: Arsip National Republik Indonesia, 1965.
- Suroyo, Djuliat. *Kawasan Laut Jawa dalam Abad Transisi Tahun 1870–1970. (Bagian 1 Tahun 1870–1900)*. Semarang: Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Diponegoro, 1996.
- Sutherland, Heather. "Believing Is Seeing: Perspectives on Political Power and Economic Activities in the Malay World 1700–1940." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26, no. 1 (1995): 133–46.
- _____. "By the Numbers: Makassar's Trade, Centralised Statistics and Local Realities." *Masyarakat Indonesia* 39, no. 2 (2013): 289–306.
- _____. "Contingent Devices." In *Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska, Remco Raben, and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 20–59. Singapore: NUS Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005.
- _____. "Eastern Emporium and Company Town: Trade and Society in Eighteenth-Century Makassar." In *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th–20th Centuries*, ed. Frank Broeze, 97–128. Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1989.
- _____. "The Makassar Malays: Adaptation and Identity, c.1660–1790." In *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity across Boundaries*, ed. Timothy P. Barnard, 76–106. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004.
- _____. "On the Edge of Asia: Maritime Trade in East Indonesia, Early Seventeenth to Mid-Twentieth Century." In *Commodities, Ports and Asian Maritime Trade Since 1750*, ed. Ulbe Bosma and Anthony Webster, 59–78. Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- _____. "Performing Personas: Identity in VOC Makassar." In *Contingent Lives: Social Identity and Material Culture in a VOC Settlement*, ed. Nigel Worden, 345–70. University of Capetown, Historical Studies Department, 2007.
- _____. "Political Structure and Colonial Control in South Sulawesi." In *Man, Meaning and History: Essays in Honour of H G. Schulte Nordholt*, ed. R. Schefold, J.W. Schoolr, and J. Tennekes, 230–45. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.
- _____. "Power and Politics in South Sulawesi: 1860–1880." *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 17 (1983): 161–207.

- _____. "Power, Trade and Islam in the Eastern Archipelagos, 1700–1850." In *Religion and Development: Towards an Integrated Approach*, ed. Philip Quarles van Ufford and Matthew Schoffeleers, 145–66. Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1988.
- _____. "The Problematic Authority of (World) History." *Journal of World History* 18, no. 4 (2007): 491–521.
- _____. "Pursuing the Invisible: Makassar in Context." In *Environment, Trade and Society in Southeast Asia: A Longue Durée Perspective*, ed. David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt, 133–48. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- _____. "Review Article: The Sulu Zone Revisited." *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 35, no. 1 (2004): 133–57.
- _____. "A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." In *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-chin Chang, 172–99. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
- _____. "Slavery and the Slave Trade in South Sulawesi, 1660s–1800s." In *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid, 263–85. St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1983.
- _____. "Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy." *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 34, no. 1 (2003): 1–20.
- _____. "Trade, Court and Company: Makassar in the Later Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries." In *Hof en Handel: Aziatische vorsten en de VOC 1620–1720*, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen, 85–112. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004.
- _____. "Treacherous Translators and Improvident Paupers: Perception and Practice in Dutch Makassar, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53 (2010): 319–56.
- _____. "Trepang and Wangkang: The China Trade of Eighteenth Century Makassar." In *Authority and Enterprise among the Peoples of South Sulawesi*, ed. R. Tol, K. van Dijk, and G. Acciaioli, 73–94. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000.
- Sutherland, Heather and David S. Bree. "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to the Study of Indonesian Trade: The Case of Makassar." In *Dari Babad dan Hikayat sampai Sejarah Kritis: Kumpulan karangan dipersembahkan kepada Prof. Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo*, ed. T. Ibrahim Alfian, H.J. Koesoemomanto, Dharmono Hardjowidjono, and Djoko Suryo, 369–408. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1987.
- Sutton, Jean. *The East India Company's Maritime Service, 1746–1834: Masters of the Eastern Seas*. Martlesham: Boydell & Brewer, 2010.
- Suva, Cesar. "Nativizing the Imperial: The Local Order and Articulations of Colonial Rule in Sulu, Philippines 1881–1920." PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2015.
- Suwitha, I Putu Gde. "Perahu Pinisi di Sunda kecil: Suatu Studi tentang Pola-pola perniagaan Abad XVIII–XIX." In *Arung samudera: persembahan memperingati sembilan windu A.B. Lapien*, ed. Edi Sedyawati and Susanto Zuhdi, 119–34. Depok: PPKB LPUI, 2001.
- Swadling, Pamela. *Plumes from Paradise: Trade Cycles in Outer Southeast Asia and Their Impact on New Guinea and Nearby Islands until 1920*. Baroko: Papua New Guinea Museum, 1996.
- Swartz, David. *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Szanton, David L. "Contingent Moralities: Social and Economic Investment in a Philippine Fishing Town." In *Market Cultures: Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalisms*, ed. R.W. Hefner, 257–67. Boulder: Allen & Unwin, 1998.

- Tagliacozzo, Eric. "Navigating Communities: Race, Place, and Travel in the History of Maritime Southeast Asia." *Asian Ethnicity* 10, no. 2 (2009): 97–120.
- _____. "A Necklace of Fins: Marine Goods Trading in Maritime Southeast Asia, 1780–1860." *International Journal of Asian Studies* 1, no. 1 (2004): 23–48.
- _____. "Onto the Coast and into the Forest: Ramifications of the China Trade on the Ecological History of Northwest Borneo, 900–1900 CE." In *Histories of the Borneo Environment: Economic, Political and Social Dimensions of Change and Continuity*, ed. R.L. Wadley, 25–60. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005.
- _____. *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
- Tagliacozzo, Eric, and Wen-chin Chang, eds. *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Tait's Edinburgh Magazine* 3 (1849).
- Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraj. "The Galactic Polity in Southeast Asia." In *Culture, Thought, and Social Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973.
- Tarling, Nicholas. *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780–1824*. St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1962.
- _____. *Sulu and Sabah: A Study of British Policy Towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Taselaar, Arjen. *De Nederlandse koloniale lobby ondernemers en de Indische politiek, 1914–1940*. Leiden: CNWS, 1998.
- Tatu, Frank. "The United States Consul, the Yankee Raja, Ellena and the Constitution: A Historical Vignette." *Archipel* 40 (1990): 79–90.
- Taylor, Jean Gelman. *Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia*. 2nd edition. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.
- Taylor, Paul Michael. "Western New Guinea: The Geographical and Ethnographic Context of the 1926 Dutch and American Expedition." Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Libraries, Digital Editions, 2006. <http://www.sil.si.edu/expeditions/1926/essays>.
- Teitler, Ger. "Adat Law, the Sea and the Colonial Interests: The Case of the Dutch East-Indies." *Mast* 2 (2003): 63–72.
- _____. "De Krijgsmacht in offensief en defensief verband." In *Imperialisme in de Marge: De afronding van Nederlands-Indië*, ed. J. van Goor. Utrecht: HES, 1986.
- _____. "Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Historical Comparison." *Maritime Studies* 1, no. 1 (2002): 63.
- Teitler, G., A.M.C. van Dissel, and J.N.F.M. à Campo. *Bijdragen tot de Nederlandse Marinegeschiedenis: Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in de Indische archipel (19de eeuw)*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005.
- Telkamp, Gerald. "The Economic Structure of an Outpost in the Outer Islands in the Indonesian Archipelago: Portuguese Timor 1850–1975." In *Between People and Statistics*, ed. Francien van Anrooij, Dirk H.A. Kolff, Jan T.M. van Laanen, and Gerard J. Telkamp, 71–90. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979.
- Tenabolo, Jack (blog). "Kerajaan-Kerajaan Di Sumba." 18 December 2014. <http://jacktenabolo18.blogspot.it/2014/12/kerajaan-kerajaan-di-sumba-masyarakat.html>.
- Thomaz, Luis Filipe F.R. "Malaka et ses communautés marchandes au tournant du 16c siècle." In *Marchands et hommes d'affaires Asiatiques dan l'océan Indien et la Mer de Chine 13e–20e siècles*, ed. Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin, 31–57. Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en science sociales, 1988.

- _____. "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka." In *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid, 69–90. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Thompson, E.P. *The Making of the English Working Class*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970.
- Thorn, William. *The Conquest of Java*. Singapore: Periplus, 2004.
- Tideman, J. "De Batara Gowa op Zuid-Celebes," *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* (1908): 350–90.
- _____. "Het landschap Laikang." *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 59, no. 1 (1906): 648–56.
- Tijdeman, H.W. *De Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij: Bijdrage tot hare geschiedenis en waardeering in verband met het Koloniaal beheer*. Leiden: Hazenberg, 1867.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- _____. *Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2005.
- Timmer, Jaap. "Cloths of Civilisation: Kain Timur in the Bird's Head of West Papua." *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 12, no. 4 (2011): 383–401.
- Tobias, J.H. "Memorie van Overgave, J.H. Tobias (1857)." In *Ternate*, ed. A.B. Lapien, 1–97. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1980.
- Tobing, Ph. O.L. *Hukum Pelajaran Dan Perdagangan Amana Gappa*. Makassar: Jajasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, 1961.
- Toelichting tot het plan van oprichting eener maatschappij: "Moluksche Handels Vereeniging."* Amsterdam: MHV, 1881.
- Tomascik, Tomas, Anmarie Janice Mah, Anugerah Nontji, and Mohammad Kasim Moosa. *The Ecology of the Indonesia Seas*. 2 volumes. The Ecology of Indonesia Volume 7. Hong Kong: Periplus, 1997.
- Touwen, Jeroen. *Extremes in the Archipelago: Trade and Economic Development in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, 1900–1942*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001.
- _____. *Shipping and Trade in the Java Sea Region, 1870–1940*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001.
- "Traditional Knowledge for Sustainable Forest Management and Provision of Ecosystem Services — Special Issue." *International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services and Management* 12, no. 1–2 (2016).
- Treacher, W.H. *British Borneo: Sketches of Brunai, Sarawak, Labuan, and North Borneo*. Singapore Printing Office, 1891.
- Tregonning, K.G. "American Activity in North Borneo, 1865–1881." *Pacific Historical Review* 23, no. 4 (1954): 357–72.
- _____. *A History of Modern Sabah (North Borneo 1881–1963)*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965.
- Tremml, Birgit M. "The Global and the Local: Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular Trade in Early Modern Manila." *Journal of World History* 23, no. 3 (2012): 555–86.
- Tremml-Werner, Birgit. "Spain and the Opium Trade of East Asia: A Review of 'La Participación española en la economía del opio en Asia Oriental tras el fin del Galeón' [The Spanish involvement in opium economy in East Asia after the Manila Galleon], by Ander Permanyer-Ugartemendia." *Dissertation Reviews*, 31 March 2015. <http://dissertationreviews.org/archives/10928>.
- _____. *Spain, China and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2015.

- Trocki, Carl A. "Chinese Pioneering in Eighteenth-Century Southeast Asia." In *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid, 83–102. London: Macmillan, 1997.
- _____. "A Drug on the Market: Opium and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, 1750–1880." *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 1, no. 2 (2005): 147–68.
- _____. *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- _____. *Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Tromp, S.W. "Eenige Mededeelingen Omtrent de Boegineezen van Koetei." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 36, no. 1 (1887): 167–98.
- Tsao, Tiffany. "Paradise Observed: Taxonomic Perspective in Alfred Russel Wallace's *The Malay Archipelago*." *Australasian Journal of Victorian Studies* 15, no. 2 (2010): 28–41.
- Tsing, Anna L. *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Turnbull, C.M. *A History of Singapore, 1819–1975*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Turner, Jack. *Spice: The History of a Temptation*. New York: Vintage, 2005.
- Tyson, Adam D. *Decentralization and Adat Revivalism in Indonesia: The Politics of Becoming Indigenous*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Upton, Stuart. "The Impact of Migration on the People of Papua, Indonesia: A Historical Demographic Analysis." PhD dissertation, University of New South Wales, 2009.
- Valentijn, Francois. *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiën, vervattende een naaukeurige en uitvoerige verhandeling van Nederlands mogentheid in die gewesten, enz.* Volume 1. 's-Gravenhage: H.C. Susan, 1858.
- Valentyn, François. *Beschryving van Amboina ...: Met zeer veel nette prentverbeeldingen verciert.* Volume 2. Dordrecht: Van Braam, 1724.
- Valeri, Valerio. *The Forest of Taboos: Morality, Hunting, and Identity among the Huauulu of the Moluccas*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000.
- Van der Veur, Paul W. *Documents and Correspondence on New Guinea's Boundaries*. Canberra: ANU Press, 1966.
- _____. *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: From Torres Strait to the Pacific*. Canberra: ANU Press, 1966.
- Van Imhoff, G.W. and J.E. Heeres. "Consideratiën over den tegenwoordigen staat van de Nederlandsche Oost Indische Maatschappij." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 66 (1912).
- Van Leur, J. C. *Indonesian Trade and Society*. The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Publishers Ltd., 1967.
- Vanderveest, Peter, and Nancy Lee Peluso. "Territorialization and State Power in Thailand." *Theory and Society* 24, no. 3 (1995): 385–426.
- Vanvugt, Ewald. *De schatten van Lombok.* *Honderd jaar Nederlandse oorlogsbuit uit Indonesië*. Amsterdam: Jan Smets, 1995.
- Vel, Jacqueline. "Campaigning for a New District in West Sumba." In *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Subarto Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 91–120. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.
- Velthoen, Esther. "Contested Coastlines: Diasporas, Trade and Colonial Expansion in Eastern Sulawesi, 1680–1905." PhD dissertation, Murdoch University, Perth, 2002.
- _____. "A Historical Perspective on Bajo in Eastern Indonesia." Master's thesis, Murdoch University, Perth, 1994.
- _____. "Mapping Sulawesi in the 1950s." In *Indonesia in Transition: Work in Progress*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gusti Asnan, 103–23. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003.

- _____. "Pirates in the Periphery: Eastern Sulawesi 1820–1905." In *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer, 200–21. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
- _____. "Sailing in Dangerous Waters: Piracy and Raiding in Historical Context." *IAS Newsletter* 36 (2005).
- _____. "'Wanderers, Robbers and Bad Folk': The Politics of Violence, Protection and Trade in Eastern Sulawesi 1750–1850." In *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900*, ed. Anthony Reid, 367–88. London: Macmillan, 1991.
- "Verslag van een Geologisch Onderzoek van het Zuid-Oostelijke gedeelte van Borneo." *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap der Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 17 (1839): 89–119.
- Veth, B. *Handelsprodukten van de Macassaarsche markt*. Macassar: Eekhout, 1883.
- _____. *Het Leven in Nederlandsch Indië*. Amsterdam: Kampen en Zoon, 1900.
- Vickers, Adrian. "Hinduism and Islam in Indonesia: Bali and the Pasisir World." *Indonesia* 44 (1987): 31–58.
- Villiers, John. "The Cash-Crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries." In *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. J. Kathirathamby-Wells and John Villiers, 83–106. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990.
- _____. "The Estado Da India in Southeast Asia." In *The First Portuguese Colonial Empire*, ed. M.D.D. Newitt, 37–68. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1986.
- _____. "Makassar: The Rise and Fall of an East Indonesian Maritime Trading State, 1512–1669." In *The Southeast Asian Port and Polity: Rise and Demise*, ed. Jeyamalar Kathirathamby-Wells and John Villiers, 143–59. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990.
- _____. "Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century." *Modern Asian Studies* 15, no. 4 (1981): 523–750.
- _____. "The Vanishing Sandalwood of Portuguese Timor." *Itinerario: European Journal of Overseas History* 18, no. 2 (1994): 86–96.
- Vink, Markus. "Between Profit and Power: The Dutch East India Company and Institutional Early Modernities in the Age of Mercantilism." In *Between the Middle Ages and Modernity: Individual and Community in the Early Modern World*, ed. Charles H. Parker and Jerry H. Bentley, 285–306. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.
- _____. "Indian Ocean Studies and the 'New Thalassology'." *Journal of Global History* 2 (2007): 41–62.
- Vischer, Michael P., ed. *Precedence: Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World*. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009.
- Vlasblom, Dirk. *Papoea: een geschiedenis*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2004.
- Vleming, J.L. *Het chineesche zakenleven in Nederlandsch-Indie*. Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926.
- Vogel, H. de. "Mededelingen betreffende Sidenrang, Rappa and Soepa." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 60, nos. 1–2 (1907): 175–80.
- Vollenhoven, Cornelis van. *Mr. C. van Vollenhoven's verspreide geschriften*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1934.
- Voogd, A. *De scheepvaart van Nederland op Indie en Rotterdamsche Lloyd*. Bussum: Gustav Schueler, 1824.
- Voorhoeve, C.L. "Contact-Induced Change in the Non-Austronesian Languages in the North Moluccas, Indonesia." In *Language Contact and Change in the Austronesian World*, ed. Darrell T. Tryon and Thomas Edward Dutton, 649–75. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994.

- Vos, Reinout. *Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince; the VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740–1800*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993.
- Vosmaer, J N. “Korte Beschrijving van het Zuid-Oostelijk Schiereiland van Celebes, in het bijzonder van de Vosmaers-Baai of van Kendari; verrijkt met eenige berigten omtrent den stam der Orang Badjos, en meer andere aantekeningen.” *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap* (1839): 63–184.
- Vries, D.H. de and Ruud Wallis de Vries. *Een Amsterdamse koopman in de Molukken 1883–1901*. Baarn: Ambo, 1996.
- Vuuren, Marianne van. *Ikat from Tanimbar*. Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2014.
- Wade, Geoff. “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment.” ARI Working Paper No. 31. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2004.
- Wain, Alexander. “China and the Rise of Islam in Java.” In *Islamisation: Comparative Perspectives from History*, ed. A.C.S. Peacock, 472–94. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017.
- Wallace, Alfred Russel. *The Malay Archipelago*. New York: Dover, 1962.
- _____. *On the Organic Law of Change: A Facsimile Edition and Annotated Transcription of Alfred Russel Wallace’s Species Notebook of 1855–1859*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
- Wamelen, Carla van. *Family Life onder De VOC: Een Handelscompagnie in Huwelijks-en Gezinszaken*. Hilversum: Verloren, 2014.
- Wang, Zhenping. “Reading Song-Ming Records on the Pre-Colonial History of the Philippines.” *Journal of East Asian Cultural Interaction Studies* 1 (2008): 249–60.
- Ward, Peter A. *British Naval Power in the East, 1794–1805: The Command of Admiral Peter Rainier*. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013.
- Warnk, Holger. “The Coming of Islam and Moluccan-Malay Culture to New Guinea c. 1500–1920.” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 38, no. 110 (2011): 109–34.
- Warren, James Francis. “The Structure of Slavery in the Sulu Zone in the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.” *Slavery & Abolition* 24, no. 2 (2003).
- _____. “The Balangingi Samal: ‘Pirate Wars’, Dislocation and Diasporic Identities.” *The Great Circle* 33, no. 2 (2011): 43–65.
- _____. “In the Name of Sovereignty: Spain’s Tackling of Moro Piracy in the Sulu Zone, 1768–1898.” In *In the Name of the Battle against Piracy: Ideas and Practices in State Monopoly of Violence in Europe and Asia in the Period of Transition*, ed. Atsushi Ota, 143–70. Leiden: Brill, 2018.
- _____. *Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002.
- _____. “Ransom, Escape, and Debt Repayment in the Sulu Zone.” In *Bonded Labour and Debt in the Indian Ocean World*, ed. Gwyn Campbell and lessandro Stanziani, 87–103. London: Routledge, 2013.
- _____. *The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981.
- _____. “The Sulu Zone, the World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination: Problematizing Global-Local Interconnections and Interdependencies.” *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu (Southeast Asian Studies)* 35, no. 2 (1997): 177–222.
- _____. “Volcanos, Refugees and Raiders: The 1765 Macaturin Eruption and the Rise of the Iranun.” Paper presented at Asian Studies Seminar, University of Western Australia, 2011.
- _____. “Who Were the Balangingi Samal? Slave Raiding and Ethnogenesis in Nineteenth-Century Sulu.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 37, no. 3 (1978): 477–90.
- Waterson, Roxana. *Paths and Rivers: Sa’dan Toraja Society in Transformation*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009.

- Watson, J. Forbes and John William Kaye. *The People of India: A Series of Photographic Illustrations, with Descriptive Letterpress, of the Races and Tribes of Hindustan*, vol. 8. London: India Museum, 1875. First published in 1868.
- Watusseke, F. and D. Henley. "C.C. Predigers verhandeling over het plaatselijke bestuur en de huishouding van de Minahasa in 1804." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 150, no. 2 (1994): 357–85.
- Webster, Anthony. *Gentleman Capitalists: British Imperialism in Southeast Asia 1770–1890*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998.
- _____. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization: The East India Company Charter Act of 1813." *The Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 43, no. 3 (1990): 404–19.
- _____. *The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta, 1767–1836*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007.
- _____. *The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790–1860*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013.
- Wellen, Kathryn Anderson. "Credit among the Early Modern Wajojq." In *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860–1930: From Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsì to Cooperative*, ed. David Henley and Peter Boomgaard, 80–102. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- _____. "La Maddukelleng and Civil War in South Sulawesi." In *Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia: Local Cultures of Conflict within a Regional Context*, ed. Kathryn Wellen and Michael W. Charney, 47–72. Copenhagen: NIAS, 2017.
- _____. *The Open Door: Early Modern Wajorese Statecraft and Diaspora*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014.
- Wellfelt, Emilie, and Sonny A. Djonler. "Islam in Aru, Indonesia." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 47, no. 138 (2019): 160–83.
- Wernstedt, Frederick L. and Paul D. Simkins. "Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1965): 83–103.
- Westermann, J.C. "De Overwinning op den afstand: te water." In *Daar werd wat groots verricht: Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste eeuw*, ed. W.H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk, 232–49. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1941.
- Whelley, Patrick L., Christopher G. Newhall, and Kyle E. Bradley. "The Frequency of Explosive Volcanic Eruptions in Southeast Asia." *Bulletin of Volcanology* 77, no. 1 (2015).
- White, Joyce C. "Incorporating Heterarchy into Theory on Socio-Political Development: The Case from Southeast Asia." In *Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies*, ed. R.M. Ehrenreich, C.L. Crumley and J.E. Levy. Arlington: Archaeological Papers, 1995.
- White, Hayden. *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990.
- Whitten, Anthony J., Muslimin Mustafa and Gregory S. Henderson. *The Ecology of Sulawesi*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1987.
- Wickberg, Edgar. *The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850–1898*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.
- _____. "Early Chinese Economic Influence in the Philippines: 1850–1898." *Pacific Affairs* 35, no. 3 (1962): 275–85.
- Wicks, Robert S. *Money, Markets and Trade in Early Southeast Asia: The Development of Indigenous Monetary Systems to AD 1400*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University Press, 1992.

- Widjojo, Muridan. "Papuan Raiding Enterprise in the Moluccan Waters of the 18th Century." Paper presented for TANAP Workshop, Xiamen, 2003. <https://nyen.xmu.edu.cn/info/1038/1151.htm>.
- _____. *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780–1810*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
- Wielenga, D.K. *Marapoe: Een verhaal uit Soemba*. Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1932.
- _____. *Soemba*. Onze zendingsvelden 5. 's-Gravenhage: Zendingen-studieraad, 1926.
- Wiessner, Polly, and Akii Tumu. *Historical Vines: Enga Networks of Exchange, Ritual, and Warfare in Papua New Guinea*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1999.
- Wiboldus, Jouke S. "A History of the Minahasa c.1615–1680." *Archipel* 34 (1987): 63–101.
- Wills, John E. "Contingent Connections: Fujian, the Empire, and the Early Modern World." In *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time*, ed. Lynn Struve. Leiden: Brill E Book, 2004.
- Wilson, Chris. *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Winn, Philip. "Slavery and Cultural Creativity in the Banda Islands." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (2010): 365–89.
- Wirawan, Yerry. "La communauté chinoise de Makassar (XVIII–XXe s.)." PhD dissertation, L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2011.
- Wolf, Eric R. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Wolters, O.W. *Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Śrīvijaya*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.
- _____. *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- _____. *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*. Revised edition. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Wolters, Willem G. "Managing Multiple Currencies with Unit of Account: Netherlands India 1600–1800." Paper contributed to the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, Finland, 21–25 August 2006.
- Wong, Lin Ken. "The Trade of Singapore 1819–69." *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 33, part 4 (December 1960).
- Wood, E., and S.M. Wella. "The Shell Trade: a Case for Sustainable Utilization." In *The Conservation Biology of Molluscs*, ed. E. Alison Kay, 41–52. Cheltenham: IUCNN, 1995.
- Woodard, David. *The narrative of captain David Woodard and four seamen, who lost their ship while in a boat at sea, and surrendered themselves up to the Malays, in the island of Celebes; containing an interesting account of their sufferings ..., and their escape from the Malays, ...: also an account of the manners and customs of the country*. London: J. Johnson, 1803.
- Gillen D'Arcy Wood. *Tambora: The Eruption That Changed the World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Wright, H.R.C. "The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770–1824." *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 31, no. 4 (1958): i–iv, 1–127.
- Wright, Leigh R. *The Origins of British Borneo*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988.
- Wu, Xiao An. "China Meets Southeast Asia: A Long-Term Historical Review." In *Connecting and Distancing: Southeast Asia and China*, ed. Ho Khai Leong, 3–30. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Wyhe, John van, ed. *The Annotated Malay Archipelago by Alfred Russel Wallace*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2014.
- Yen, Ching-hwang. "Chinese Coolie Emigration, 1845–74." In *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora*, ed. Chee-Beng Tan, 73–89. London: Routledge, 2013.

- _____. *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period (1851–1911)*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985.
- Yoder, Laura S. Meitzner. "Political Ecologies of Wood and Wax: Sandalwood and Beeswax as Symbols and Shapers of Customary Authority in the Oecusse Enclave, Timor." *Journal of Political Ecology* 18 (2011).
- Zakharov, Anton O. "Constructing the Polity of Sriwijaya in the 7th–8th Centuries: The View According to the Inscriptions." In *The Indonesian Studies Working Papers No. 9*. Department of Indonesian Studies at the University of Sydney, 2009.
- Zanden, Jan Luiten van. *The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy: Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.
- Zanden, Jan Luiten van and Arthur van Riel. *The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Zandvliet, Kees. *Mapping for Money: Maps, Plans and Topographic Paintings and Their Role in Dutch Overseas Expansion during the 16th and 17th Centuries*. Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1998.
- Zerner, Charles. "Men, Molluscs and the Marine Environment in the Maluku Islands: Imagining Customary Law and Institutions in Eastern Indonesia 1870–1992." In *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia*, ed. Richard H. Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Zhao, Gang. *The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684–1757*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013.
- Zheng, Yangwen. *China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Zhihong, Shi. "China's Overseas Trade Policy and Its Historical Results: 1522–1840." In *Intra-Asian Trade and the World Market, Studies in the Modern History of Asia*, ed. A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu, 4–23. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.
- Zollinger, H. "Het Eiland Lombok." *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 9, no. 2 (1847): 177–383.
- Zollinger, Heinrich. *Verslag van eene reis naar Bima en Soembawa, en naar eenige plaatsen op Celebes, Saleijer en Floris, gedurende de maanden Mei tot December 1847*. Batavia: Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1851.
- Zuhdi, Susanto and Triana Wulandari. *Kerajaan Tradisional Di Indonesia: Bima*. Jakarta: Departamen P dan K, 1997.
- Zurndorfer, Harriet. "Oceans of History, Seas of Change: Recent Revisionist Writing in Western Languages About China and East Asian Maritime History." *International Journal of Asian Studies* 13, no. 1 (2016): 61–94.
- Zwart, Pim de. *Globalization and the Colonial Origins of the Great Divergence: Intercontinental Trade and Living Standards in the Dutch East India Company's Commercial Empire*. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

Index

- Aceh, 87, 119, 172, 291, 384, 438
Alifuru (mountain people), 81, 97–8, 105, 133, 364, 414
alliances, 20, 91, 123, 128, 134–8, 140, 144, 381, 443, *see also* state formation
Alor archipelago, 6, 42, 58, 172, 245, 261, 336
Ambon, 7n21, 42, 49, 51, 69–71, 90, 101, 114, 121, 135, 152, 156–7, 163, 181–90, 196, 213, 226, 254, 263, 268–71, 290, 300–1, 318–21, 363, 386, 388, 393, 400, 422–5, 441, 443, 451, 453–4, *see also* cloves
America, American shippers, 249, 250, 254–5, 258, 260–1, 263, 336, 383, 385, 407
Amoy, *see* Xiamen
Ampenan, 42n29, 69, 243, 281, 326, 327, 344, 376–7, 402, 433, *see also* Lombok
Andaya, Leonard, 2, 132, 135, 142, 145, 162, 182, 190–1, 225
Arab traders, 118, 270, 324, 332, 357, 376, 388, 414–5, 418, 429, 430, 432
Arafura Sea, 61, 262
arak (distilled spirits), 84, 232, 271, 373, 412, 427–8
arms, weapons, 113, 131, 139, 160, 197, 219, 222, 239, 255, 294, 317, 329, 336, 341, 352
army, Dutch East Indian, *see* KNIL
Aru Islands, 19, 25, 27, 31, 45, 49, 61, 70–1, 102n115, 114, 184, 186, 188, 259–60, 269, 323, 364, 371–3, 389, 394, 422–8
arung matoa, 146, 147, 158, 193, 274, *see also* Wajo
Atapupu, 282, 284, 330, 377, 434
Australia, 251, 262, 282, 319, 383, 416, 427, *see also* Port Essington
Austronesians, 39, 56, 122–5, 134–50
Babar, 131, 365, *see also* Southwestern Islands
Babullah, Sultan, of Ternate, 182, 202
Bacan island, 6n21, 58–9, 101, 104, 107, 152, 174, 187, 191, 254, 319, 368, 391, 444, 455
Badjo, *see* Sama Bajau
Bajoe harbour, 110, 147, 200, 213, 412
Balabak Straits, 40, 294n41
Balabalagan Islands (Small Paternoster Islands), 57, 181
Balambangan, 40, 223, 247–8, 264
Balangingi, 11, 109, 111, 156, 224, 304, 339–40, 348
Bali, 6, 41–4, 55, 85, 131, 144, 155, 206, 210, 216, 243–5, 252, 260, 279–81, 297, 301, 324–9, 341, 346, 374–6, 385, 395, 397, 399, 424, 432–3, 459
Balikpapan Bay, 420–1
Banda Islands, 6n21, 35, 42, 45, 51, 60, 70–1, 121, 133–4, 152–6, 163, 174, 181–8, 192, 195, 206, 226, 228, 236, 252, 260, 266–71, 295, 301, 318–21, 342, 344, 364–5, 386, 399, 422, 425–6, 452–3, 425
Banda Sea, 36, 49, 57, 59, 70, 254, 442
Banggai, 42, 48–9, 81, 97, 108, 200–2, 217, 225, 275, 312–3, 339, 352, 367–8, 385
Bangka, 58, 214
Banjarmasin, 76, 87, 99, 105, 202–5, 212, 237–42, 276–9, 289, 315–17, 338, 359–63, 397, 416, 420
Banten, Sultan of, 157n177, 176
Barito River, 60, 63, 65–6, 76–7, 105, 202, 278, 360
barter, 82, 85–6, 352, *see also* exchange
Batavia, 43, 175–7, 211, 212, 215, *see also* Dutch East India Company, Dutch East Indies

- Batavia Freight Conference, 402
 Bay of Bengal, 4, 8, 23, 35, 41, 210, 258
 beeswax, 25, 71–2, 79, 82, 84, 89–90, 126, 179, 195, 201, 217, 228, 245, 273, 275, 282, 285, 310, 316, 330, 361–2, 415, 426n233, 429, 437
 Bekumpai Dayak, 116, 316, *see also* Dayak
 Bengkulu (Bencoolen), 209–10, 212, 214, 243–4, 248, 288
 Berau Gulf, *see* McCluer Gulf
 Berau, 63, 75, 93, 180–1, 204, 224, 241, 278, 315–6, 360–1, 395–6, 417–8
 Biak islands, 58, 61, 64–5, 105, 115, 141, 161, 191, 225–6, 431
 Bima, 8, 42, 45, 71, 96, 159–60, 191, 193–5, 197, 200, 232, 234–5, 279, 282, 284–6, 302, 308, 325, 329–30, 377, 380, 399, 401, 435
 Birds' Head (Doberai Peninsula), 58, 70, 81, 141
 birds' nests, 10, 93, 157, 197, 201, 221–2, 241, 265, 267, 269, 278–9, 316, 323, 329, 361, 379, 400, 409, 412
 birds-of-paradise, 4, 27, 65, 71, 166, 191, 269, 370–1, 412, 422, 427–8
 Blambangan, 206, 223n82, 243–4, 279, 324
 Bock, Carl, 416
 Bolaang Mongondow, 53n79, 97, 141, 189, 190, 272, 350
 Bone, 68, 78, 217, 231, 233, 274, 308–9, 341, 354, 358–9, 367, 384, 399, 457
 Bone Gulf, 48, 49, 64, 68, 90, 92, 147, 193, 237, 274, 309, 385, 399, 412, 442
 Bongenaar, Karel E.M., 337n11, 384n16
 Bontoala, 272, 274
 Boomgaard, Peter, 18, 126
 Borneo (Kalimantan), 4, 6, 38, 44–5, 51, 64–5, 118, 217, 242, 314–5, 338, 344, 353, 394, 402, 414
 Borneo Sumatra Trading Society (*Borsumij*), 419
 Bourdieu, Pierre, 3, 28, 29
 Braudel, Fernand, 3, 36, 142
 Britain in Asia, 247–9, 251–2, 254–5, 260, 262, 284, 286, 308, 335, 342, 347, 408, 444
 British trade policy, 120, 251, 254–8, 264, 287, *see also* East India Company, European rivalry
 Brooke, James 99, 147, 289, 295, 309, 335
 Brunei, 39, 63, 180, 289, 407
 Buayan, 23, 62, 100, 177, 179–80, 220, 307, 348–9, 403, 446
 Bugis commercial networks, 18–19, 21, 90, 106, 143, 146, 193, 210, 213–5, 231, 242, 248, 256, 272, 295, 301, 307, 317, 321, 353, 364–5, 430
 Buleleng (north Bali), 41, 143, 206, 243–4, 279–81, 325, 327–9, 344, 374, 376–7, 397, 399, 432–3
 Bulungan, 75, 91, 93, 180–1, 224, 316, 360–1, 396, 418
 Buru, 42, 49, 50, 56–7, 70, 97, 182, 187, 204, 295, 300, 319, 342, 363, 390–1, 395
 Buton, 42, 56, 64, 85, 97, 104–5, 112, 155, 199, 201–2, 215–6, 237, 268, 308–9, 313–4
 Canton, *see* Guangzhou
 Cape Mangkalihah, 203, 394
 cash crops, 444, *see also* individual names of main products
cassia ligna, or *lignea*, 87n41, 195, 219, 235, 305, *see also* cinnamons
 Catholic Christianity, 72, 95, 101, 119–20, 137, 163, 188, 211, 285, 300, 378–9, 429, 435
 Celebes Seas, 4, 6, 40, 47, 57, 75, 307
 Cenderawasih Bay, 47, 49, 57–8, 61, 64–5, 105, 225–6, 268, 271, 373, 430–1, 442, *see also* Dore
 Cenrana River, 72, 200, 232, 234, 275, 309, 359
 China, Chinese, 37–41, 43, 85–6, 106, 116–7, 126, 157, 169, 170, 176–7, 203, 208, 210–1, 258, 262, 267, 289, 293, 328, 347–8, 444, 447
 Christianity, 101, 134, 141, 290, 350, 429
civiele gezaghebber (civil authority), 290
 cinnamons, 87, 96, 195, 216, 219, 221, 228, 240, 379, 437
 cloves, 4, 36, 69, 163, 181, 184, 187, 196, 213, 219, 240, 247, 253, 256, 268, 319, 344, 388, 422
 cocoa, 90, 272, 301, 350, 413, 422
 coal, 262, 338, 344–5, 359, 361–2, 388, 396, 440
 coasts, coastal peoples, 47–9, 89–95, 99–105, 327–42, 135, 354
 councils, 84, 131, 134–6, 145–6
 Cochin China, 19, 116, 199, 204, 293
 cocoa, 272, 301, 350, 372, 413, 422

- coconut products, copra, 55, 68, 79, 188, 229, 232, 272, 328–9, 350–1, 363n150, 365, 379, 388–90, 392–4, 404n121, 411, 413, 419, 433, 443
- coffee, 56, 67, 86, 209, 213, 222, 248–9, 258, 269, 277, 281, 295, 301–2, 308, 310–11, 316, 321, 324, 327–9, 336, 341–2, 344, 350–2, 356, 358–9, 364, 378, 388, 393, 410–5, 419, 422, 434
- coins, currency, 82–5, 328, 362, 373
- commodities, 8, 10, 81–3, 85, 181, 389–94, *see also* forest products, marine commodities, and individual crops
- Compañia Maritima*, 400
- Conrad, Joseph, 361, 418, *see also* *SS Vidar*
- Cooper, Frederik, 22
- Cotabato, *see* Maguindanu
- Cowie, William C., 405, 408
- Daendels, H.W., 259
- Dalrymple, Alexander, 222–3, 253–4, 287, 289
- Dalton, John, 315–17, 317n159
- dalu*, 96, 195, 285
- damar*, *see* resins and gums
- datu*, 88, 123, 142
- Davao Bay, 40, 62, 90, 348, 404
- Davidson, G.F., 86, 325
- Dayak, 75, 89, 91, 98, 105, 116, 164, 180–1, 205, 239, 242, 276–7, *see also* Bekumpai, Ngaju, Pulau Petak
- de Roever, Arend, 85, 85n36
- de Vries, Dirk, 343
- de Vries, W.F.K. Cores, 344
- Dili, 173n13, 246, 282–4, 330, 344, 378, 434
- Doberai Peninsula, *see* Birds' Head
- Dobo, 25–6, 61, 372–3, 426–7, *see also* Aru
- Donggala, 52, 68, 180, 249, 352–3, 388, 394–6, 413, 418
- Dore, 61, 64, 83, 105, 157, 251, 374, 423, *see also* Cenderawasih Bay
- Dutch East India Company (*VOC*), 6, 38, 43, 56, 71, 85, 90, 113, 120, 133, 135, 137, 146, 155, 171, 174, 176, 179, 182, 187, 202, 207–8, 210–13, 215, 217, 226, 231, 238–41, 247–9, 440, 449–61, *see also* European rivalry
- Dutch East Indies, 290–1, 310, 314–5, 337, 353, 338–41, 358–9, 374, 383–4, 386, 398, 410–13, 449–6, *see also* European rivalry
- Dutch Trading Society, *see* *NHM*
- Earle, Timothy, 127–8
- Earl, George Windsor, 18, 111, 114, 132, 295, 332, 332n246
- East Borneo, *see* East Kalimantan
- East India Company, British (EIC), 20, 38, 44, 88, 120, 171, 174, 209, 210–13, 237, 238, 247–9, 251, 255, 262, 266, 287, 344
- East Kalimantan, 31, 237–42, 312–7, 345, 359–63, 403, 419–21, 460
- East Timor, 6, 23, 161, 434, *see also* Portuguese, Timor, SAPT
- eucalyptus (*kayuputih*) oil, 57, 319, 363
- Elpaputih Bay, 137, 364
- Ende, 95–6, 101, 129, 172, 193, 197, 216, 283n155, 285–6, 331–4, 378, 380, 435–6, 437–9
- European rivalry, 104, 171, 185, 209–12, 237, 243–4, 246, 248–60, 262–4, 266, 278, 282, 287–88, 300, 307, 315, 336–48, 383, 385, 402, 405, 407, 444
- exchange, 2, 8, 10, 14, 20, 17, 22, 79–89, 86, 89–95, 116, 145, 171, 212–3, 238, 257, 440
- Flores, 49–50, 72, 129, 132, 163, 172, 193–5, 197, 216, 234, 245–7, 281–6, 379–80, 435, 437, *see also* Larantuka, Sikka
- Flores Seas, 57, 69, 71, 172, 195, 279, 281, 377–81
- foragers, 7, 23, 52, 57, 59, 70, 89, 97, 99, 350, 388, 441
- forest products, 65, 86, 238, 275, 367, 389–91, 412, 415, 417, *see also* resins and gums
- Formosa, 169
- Forrest, Thomas, 107, 111, 220, 225, 247–9
- Fox, James, 122, 124
- France, 250, 252, 258, *see also* European rivalry
- Francis, Emanuel, 24, 45
- “free” trade, 120, 251, 254, 266, 287, 296, 301, 337, 341, 346, 353–5, 363, 444
- Galela, 59, 66, 104, 266–7, 313, 318, 395
- Gamkonora, 45, 47, 67, 104, 266
- Gamrange, 47, 70–1, 105, 108, 141, 191–2, 225, 266–7, 369
- Gebe island, 47, 59, 70, 105, 141, 257, 369
- Geelvink Bay, *see* Cenderawasih Bay
- Gelgel, 42, 143, 206
- Geliting, 285, 379, 435
- geography, 46–9, 50–2
- Germany, Germans, 374, 383, 393, 402, 413

- Geser, 60n114, 71, 105, 268, 371, 400, 426–7
gezaghebbers (authorities), 290, 312
 gold, 8, 18, 25, 40, 58–9, 67–8, 71, 75, 85,
 87, 90, 157, 159–61, 202, 228–9, 238,
 240, 247, 278, 308, 310–12, 316–17,
 327–8, 338, 351–2, 362, 373, 394, 414
 Goram, island of, 71, 81n12, 133, 261, 371–2,
 426
 Gorontalo, 31, 40, 42, 52, 55–6, 58, 67,
 140–1, 188, 190, 200, 202, 229, 272,
 310–12, 350, 393, 350–3, 393–4, 411,
 413–15, 446, 456
 Gowa, 23, 73–4, 87, 110, 144–6, 155, 162,
 193–200, 204, 223, 231–7, 274, 309, 358
 Gray, Alexander, 417
 Gresik, 216
 Guangzhou (Canton), 36, 172, 210–12, 214
 guilders, 377, *see also* coins
 Gunung Tabur, 75, 148n130, 316, 345, 360–1

 Hadhramaut, 118, 292, 388
 Hägerdal, Hans, 138, 155n166, 161, 194n119,
 206, 282
 Halmahera, 19, 47, 50–1, 57–8, 66–7, 70–1,
 97, 103–4, 108, 115n171, 162, 182,
 190, 192, 260, 267, 296, 300, 313, 319,
 367–9, 423–4, 442, 446, *see also* Galela,
 Gamkonora, Gamrange, Jailolo, Tobelo
 harbourmasters, 16, 17, 217, 87, 163, 204,
 241–2, 245, 326, 332, 352–3, 432
 harbours, 86–9, 129
 Hare, Alexander, 278
 headhunting, 17, 52, 99, 131, 136, 275, 380,
see also insecurity
 head-tax, 351, 413–14, 417, *see also* taxes
 heterarchy, 125, 448
 Hoamoal peninsula of Seram, 70, 135, 137,
 152, 182, 187, *see also* Seram, west
*hong*i expeditions, 157, 166, 184, 191–2,
 225–6, 313, 319, 369–70, 443
 Hong Kong, 289, 290, 298, 347–8, 385,
 408, 444
 horses, 25, 50, 68, 87, 129–30, 157, 171, 194,
 195, 247, 281, 302, 308, 327, 329, 330–1,
 333–4, 378, 381, 432, 438
 Hulu Sungai, 205, 242, 388, 419, 420n207
 Humboldt's (Yos Sudarso) Bay, 401
 Hunt, John, 88–9, 265

 Ilana Bay, 40, 62, 304
 Indian Ocean, 10, 35, 116, 119, 248, 291
 Indian textiles, 36, 171, 228, 241, 263, 412
 inland peoples, 95–9, *see also* Alifuru, Dayak,
 Toraja
 insecurity, 99, 129–32, 307, 332, 258–64,
see also headhunting
 iron, 21, 68, 71, 73, 85, 201, 219, 228, 274,
 346, 368, 415
 Islam, 6, 8, 39, 70, 95, 100–1, 143, 191, 292,
 359, 388, 405, 415, 429
 Ismail, Tuan Haji, 248
 ivory trade, 19, 140, 191, 196, 373,
see also prestige goods

 Jailolo, 71n164, 162, 267, 318,
see also Halmahera
 Jama Mapun, 349
 Japan, 38, 43, 56, 85–8, 112, 173–4, 176,
 199, 208, 211, 216, 335, 426
 Java, 4, 35, 100, 106, 209, 258, 279–82, 324
 Java Sea, 4, 41, 76, 105, 172, 243–5, 442
 Jembrana, 245, 279–80, 374, 432, 459
 Johor, 171, 214, 291
 Jolo, 44, 45, 112, 121, 149, 177, 221, 253, 264–6,
 292, 306, 348–9, 351, 383, 385, 404–6

 Kaili, 47, 68, 218, 232, 294, 314–5, 353,
see also Donggala, Palu
kain timur ("Eastern cloth") complex, 81–2
kakian alliance, *see* Saniri Tiga Air
 Kalanganang officers, 314–15, 353,
see also Donggala, Kaili
 Kalimantan, *see* Borneo, East Kalimantan
 Kanaweeha (Konoweha) river, 64, 276
 Karangasem Bali, 206, 243, 279, 327, 374, 432
 Karangasem Sasak (Lombok), 243n176, 281,
 326–7, 374, 432
 Kayeli, 51, 97n92, 187, 342, 363, 391
 Keffing, 60n114, 71, 185, 191, 323
 Kei islands, 45, 49, 50, 56, 60, 70, 99,
 102n115, 131, 166, 188, 266, 302, 323,
 364, 373, 400, 426, 428–9
 Kendari, 64, 68, 276, 313–14, 353, 415–16
kepeng (Chinese copper coins), 85, 328
 Kilwaru, 60n114, 71, 86, 267, 318, 371
 Kinabatang River, 63, 224, 400
 King, G.P., 326–7, 361, 417
 Kisar, 59n112, 102, 129, 132–3, 188, 259,
 426, 429, 429n250
 Klungkung, 206, 326–7, 374, 433
 Knaap, Gerrit, 89n53, 135, 156, 174
KNIL, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army,
Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, 269,
 340–1, 384

- Kolaka, 63, 276, 442
 Kolff, Dirk, 26, 132, 165, 323
 Konawe, *see* Kendari
 Kops, De Bruijn, 83, 373
kora kora (outrigger canoes), 107–8, 156, 184, 225, 370
 Kotawaringin, Sultanate of, 77, 240, 277–8
 Kowiai, 80–1, 127, 191, 426
koyang, 302n89
 Kuala Kapuas, 77, *see also* Pulau Petak
kulit lawang, 71n162, 87n41, 228, 364,
see also cinnamons
 Kupang, 6n21, 84n32, 172, 173n13, 207, 245, 247, 252, 259, 282–4, 330–4, 344, 377–8, 399, 434
 Kusan, 66, 363, 386n33
 Kutai, 8, 63, 75, 101, 164–5, 181, 197, 204, 233, 242, 277–8, 315–17, 344, 359–63, 362, 403, 416–18, 420–1
KPM, Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij, Royal Packet Navigation Company, 400–3, 411, 426–7, 432–3, 436
- labour, coerced, 93, 151, 260, 288, 310, 338, 343, 414, *see also* slaves, slavery
 Labuan, 223, 252, 289, 294, 335, 349, 383, 400, 404–15, 408
 Labuan Haji, 69, 245
 Laiwui, 64, 68, 276, 313–4, 416
 La Madukelleng, 147, 233–4, 238–9, 274
 Lange, Mads, 326–8
 Larantuka, 72, 96, 101, 129, 137–8, 163, 197, 207, 285, 378–80, 399, 435–6
 Lennon, Walter, 25, 255, 301
 Leti, 102–3, 173n13, 228, 365–6, 426, 434,
see also Southwestern Islands
 Lewis, E. Douglas, 140
 Lifau, 72, 137, 245, 282–3
 Limboto, 59, 67, 189, 310, 375
 Lingard, William, 361, 418
Liurai (Timor chiefs), 139, 246, 378
 Lombok, 6n19, 8, 42, 44–6, 50–1, 69, 101, 161, 171, 193, 197, 206, 243–5, 279–82, 285, 301, 324–8, 333, 344, 374–8, 380, 384, 397, 402, 432–3, 438
 Ludeking, E.W.A., 319, 390n50
 Luwu, 21, 42, 68, 73, 110, 144, 158, 274, 310, 399, 415
 Luzon, 24, 39, 42, 56, 72, 112, 116, 122, 211, 258, 265, 292, 385, 406
- Macau, 41, 44, 72, 87, 116, 119–20, 169–70, 172, 196, 204–5, 207, 215, 245, 264, 284, 307n112, 330, 347
 Malays, 28, 38, 57, 82, 91–2, 99–100, 105, 114, 145, 159, 171, 199, 205, 214, 236, 268, 278–9, 289, 292, 353, 377, 418
 McCluer Gulf, 48, 58, 64, 71, 91, 191, 400, 422, 426
 Maguindanao (Cotabato), 23, 39, 62, 89, 100, 111, 118, 177–80, 219–20, 264–6, 306–7, 313, 340, 403–4
 Mahakam River, 63, 75, 127, 202, 345, 359, 420
 Maimbung, 348, 383, 403–5
 maize, 25, 40, 54–6, 159, 302, 332, 388, 415–16
 Makassar, 31, 86–7, 106, 113–14, 145–6, 155, 169, 193–200, 202, 204, 207, 217, 230–7, 285, 287, 294–5, 308, 323, 341, 346, 353–9, 384, 410–13, 457, *see also* Gowa
 Makassar, Dutch, 86–7, 111–14, 146, 155, 169, 202, 207, 217, 376, 384
 Makassar Straits, 40–1, 63, 180–1, 197, 224, 239, 253, 275, 353–4, 394, 416–18
 Malacca, *see* Melaka
 Malays, 39, 100, 105, 205, 299
 Maluku, 36, 39, 69–70, 118, 122, 169, 179, 182–3, 186, 207, 218, 225–8, 266–8, 300, 321, 340, 363–6, 402, 451
 Maluku, trade, 70, 171, 172, 174, 213, 271, 351, 363, 392, 411, 422–31, 444
 Mamberamo River, 65
 Manado, 31, 61, 117, 188, 190, 272, 301, 350–1, 384, 393, 410–13, 444, 455–6,
see also North Sulawesi
 Mandar, Mandarese, 48, 63, 114, 180, 354
 Manggarai, 6n19, 96, 110, 195, 282, 285, 435, 438
 Manguin, Pierre-Yves, 11, 23
 Manila, 39, 42, 79, 142, 173, 211–12, 264, 299, 348–9, 394, 403, 426
 Manipa, 182, 227
 Maranao (“people of the lake”, Lake Lanao), 45, 111, 120, 265
 marine commodities, 108, 115, 215, 275, 286, 307, 367, 396
marsaoleh, 140, 312
 Martapura, 60, 76, 203, 237–8, 242, 244, 278, 359
massoi, 70, 80–1, 92, 108, 115, 190–1, 225, 228, 251, 271, 318, 321–4, 326, 371, 412, 430

- Maton, Karl, 28, 29n121
 Matthes, B.F., 158, 159n184, 357
 Maumere, 49, 115, 163, 193, 285, 378, 436, 441
 Mauritius, 119, 247, 213, 281, 300, 327, 329–31, 333
 Mekongga, 48, 63–4, 90
 Melaka, 120, 171, 207, 214–15
 Melaka Strait, 2, 35, 38–9, 118, 213, 214, 224, 250, 252, 254, 260, 264, 291, 396, 447
 Melanesia, 30, 123
 Mengwi, 143, 206, 243–4, 279, 329
 Menten, Jacobus H., 362, 420
 Merkus, Pieter (Pierre), 320, 324
MHV, Moluksche handels-vennootschap (Maluku Trading Company), 343, 391–2
 Milburn, William, 253, 266, 323, 330
 Minahasa, *see* Manado
 Mindanao, 4, 40, 44, 62, 178, 219–24, 264–6, 304, 403–9, *see also* Maguindanau, Pulangi, Sarangani, Zamboanga
 Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), 38, 169
 mobility, 36, 57–9, 65–72, 109, 111, 442
Moluksche handels-vennootschap, see MHV
 money, use of, 85–6, *see also* coins
 monsoon winds, 50–1, 59, 111, 143
- Nagarakertagama*, 42, 80
 Netherlands, The, 258, 262, 287–8, 300, 336, 346, 382, 432, 444, *see also* Dutch East India Company, European rivalry
 New Guinea, 4, 6, 44, 60, 80, 105, 115, 127, 141, 157, 164, 224, 228, 251, 257, 321–3, 367, 369, 374, 383, 391, 402, 412–14, 422, 423, 426, 441, 455
 Ngaju Dayak, 89, 105, 116, 205, 239, *see also* Dayak
NHM, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 288, 299, 328, 350, 352, 419
 North Borneo, 6, 57, 219–24, 288–9, 336, 383, 400, 403–9, 442
 North, Douglass, 13–14
 Northern Sulawesi, 40, 59, 68, 99, 101, 105, 108, 181–90, 228–30, 310–15, 350–4, 393
 Nuku rebellion, 104, 225–6, 252, 260, 266–7, 304, 370, 423, 443
 Nusa Tenggara, 6, 6n19, 39, 41–2, 50, 53, 56, 68, 69, 71, 109, 115, 118, 140, 152, 173, 184, 193, 206–7, 218, 235, 247, 285, 325, 388, 399, 433–9, *see also* the main island names
- nutmeg, 4, 35, 60, 69–70, 83, 92, 185–6, 213, 249, 251, 253, 268, 310, 320–1, 363, 365, 411–13, 422, 424–6, 430, 438
- Obi islands, 58–9, 104, 152, 189, 200, 318, 444
- oil, *see* coconut products, eucalyptus, petroleum
- Olivier, Johannes, 108, 308
 Ombai, 42, *see* Alor
- Onin, 40, 42, 48, 60–1, 64, 71, 80–1, 108, 127, 186, 191–2, 196, 192, 268, 324, 370–1, 426, 430, 432
- opium, 92, 119n192, 158–9, 161, 206, 209, 212, 215, 219, 223, 238, 241, 250–1, 254–6, 263, 266, 277, 279–80, 289, 293, 295, 297, 299, 308, 327–8, 351–2, 355, 360, 371, 374, 389, 408, 430–1, 432, 433, 439
- Opium Wars, 289, 335
orang kaya, 26, 134, 163, 165, 186
- paduwakang*, 106, 294n43, 297, 320, 331, 427, 429, *see also* ships
- Palakka, Arung, 199–200
- palm sugar, 54–5, 195, 308
- Palu Bay, 47–8, 55–6, 68, 180, 200, 218, 248, 275, 315, 351–3, 385, 411, 434, *see also* Donggala, Kaili, Parigi
- Papua (West, before 2000 Irian Jaya), *see* New Guinea
- Papuans, 25, 44n43, 60, 65n139, 81, 92, 115, 226, 267, 271, 323
- Parepare, 48, 63, 105, 147, 180, 274–5, 295, 308–9, 359, 385, 410, 414–15
- Parigi, 47, 68, 181, 218, 229, 273, 275, 311, 312n135, 352–3, 414
- Pasir, 65, 76, 204, 181, 185, 197, 204, 212, 216, 222, 233, 237, 239–42, 276–7, 316–7, 362, 418, *see also* Samarinda
- Pattingalloang, Karaeng, 204, 204n176
- pearls, pearl-shell, 217, 221, 265, 271, 295, 302, 321, 354, 372–3, 389, 394n67, 412, 427, 445
- Pegatan, 66, 240, 278, 316, 363
- Penang, 222, 250, 256, 279, 291–2, 352, 389, 400
- pepper, 41, 65, 87, 112, 151, 159–60, 196, 202–5, 209–10, 214–15, 221–2, 238–42, 249, 253, 257–8, 276–8, 315–16, 328–9, 389, 419

- petroleum, 362, 388, 413, 417, 420–1, 439
 Philippines, 40, 341, 385, 445–7,
see also Manila
 Piang, Datu, 403–4, 407
pici, 85, *see also* coins
 Pigafetta, Antonio, 72
 pikul, 330, 333, 413, 432
pinisi (*pelari*) vessels, 106, 297
 piracy, 58, 61, 104, 152, 169, 177, 209, 224,
 258, 262–3, 265, 289, 298, 303–4,
 313–15, 318, 364, 379, 338–40, 394–403
 Poelinggomang, Edward L., 401n105
 Polanyi, Karl, 3, 13–14
 Port Essington, North Australia, 284n157,
 298, 332
 Portugal, Portuguese, 41, 43, 55, 119, 132,
 169, 171–2, 182, 196, 245–6, 282, 336
posthouders, (local Dutch agents) 247, 290,
 353, *see also* Dutch East Indies
 precedence, concept of, 123–5, 448
 prestige goods, 18, 77, 181, 191, 441,
see also ivory
 Pulangi River, 40, 52, 62, 307, 348, 403,
 Pulau Laut, 66, 111, 204, 240, 277–8, 316,
 338, 339, 344–5, 418
 Pulau Petak, 53, 65–6, 77, 116, 316,
see also Dayak
- Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), 169, 176
 Quanzhou, China, 36
- Raffles, T.S., 158, 259, 261, 281, 284, 291
 Raja Ampat islands, 44, 44n39, 48–9, 54, 57,
 59–60, 64, 70–1, 80, 91, 105, 108, 115,
 127, 141, 151, 191–2, 226, 257, 266, 271,
 303, 339, 369, 426, 430, 442
reaal (Spanish dollar), 83, 85, 362,
see also coins
Real Compañía de Filipinas, *see* Royal Company
 of the Philippines (RCF)
 reefs, 49, 51, 201
 Reid, Anthony, 7, 20, 100
 religious conversion, 100–1, 103, 143,
see also Catholicism, Christianity, Islam
 Resink, G.J., 385
 resins and gums, 57, 131n5, 137, 388, 390–1,
 393, 411, 418–21, 424
 Riau, 213–14, 236, 250, 254, 275, 291–2,
 297, 346
 rice cultivation, 18, 55–6, 64, 154, 273, 280,
 364, 410, 412
 Riedel, J.G.F., 25, 83, 97
- Rivers, 59–65, 72–4, 91, 122, 224, 316, 400,
see also Barito, Berau, Cenrana, Pulangi
 Roos, Samuel, 381, 437
 Rote, 54, 84n32, 218n55, 245
 Rousseau, Jérôme, 91–2, 96
 Royal Company of the Philippines (RCF), 257,
 264, 300
 rubber, *see* resins and gums
- sago, 52–5, 59, 67, 70, 73, 83, 91, 97, 104,
 153, 187, 226, 312, 319, 365, 368, 372,
 427–8
 Sama Bajau, 20, 108, 109–11, 113, 156,
 181, 195, 233, 292, 307, 309, 412,
 415, 443
 Samarinda, 75, 121n205, 164, 242, 277, 217,
 361–2, 416–9, 421
 Sambaliung, 74–5, 148n130, 316, 360, 394
 Sandakan, 42, 63, 224, 336, 349, 391, 400,
 404–9
 sandalwood, 36, 71, 85–6, 115, 137, 157, 171,
 245, 247, 282, 329, 377
 Sangihe (Sangir) archipelago, 40, 45, 55, 59,
 101, 179, 188, 194, 200, 229, 350, 353,
 393, 405, 442
 Saniri Tiga Air, 131n45, 135–7
 sappanwood (brazil wood) 11, 36, 71, 194–5,
 221, 235
 SAPT, *Sociedade Agrícola Patria e Trabalho*,
 434, *see also* East Timor
 Sarangani Bay, Islands, 40, 59, 62, 179, 188,
 220, 266, 395, 403–4
 Sarawak, *see* Brooke
 Savu, 49–50, 54, 152, 163, 245, 247, 302,
 331, 333–4, 378–9, 381, 437–8
 Savu Sea, 6, 171, 245–7, 281–6, 377–81
 Scott, James C., 2, 2n5, 20
 seafarers, 105–16
 Selden map, 38
 Sellato, Bernard, 91, 180
 Seram, East and Seram Laut, 6n21, 60, 70–1,
 80–190, 161, 185–6, 191–2, 226, 266–7,
 269–70, 322, 324, 364, 367, 370–1, 400,
 430
 Seram, west and central, 90, 122, 136, 319,
see also Hoamoal
 shells, 65, 305, 374, 389, 444, *see also* pearl,
 pearl-shell
 ships and boats, 59, 105–9, 121, 243, 258,
 293–4, 297, 335, 338–40, 397, 399,
 418, *see also* kora kora, paduwakang,
 wangkang

- shipping, 11, 36, 40, 86, 106, 157, 210, 238, 243, 247, 251, 253, 258, 275, 281–2, 307, 339–40, 343–4, 399, 400–2, 410, 418, *see also* exchange, trade routes
- shipping, steam, 118, 121, 238, 298, 338–400, 344, 382, 388, 396–402, 410, 417, 425–6, 444
- Sidenreng, 48, 63, 92, 147, 158, 180, 234, 274–5, 295, 309, 354, 358–9, 415
- Sikka, 49, 129, 139–40, 163, 193, 246, 285, 378–9, 435–6
- Singapore, 114–15, 264, 287–8, 294–9, 307, 341, 343–4, 346, 348, 356, 373, 382, 402, 410, 444, 447
- slaves, slave trade, 52, 71, 81, 93, 99, 151, 215–17, 216, 219, 239, 245, 263, 280, 285, 312, 325, 343, 369, 394–6
- slavery, abolition of, 260, 301, 332, 338, 343, 425
- Solor archipelago, 6, 71–2, 99, 101, 127, 137, 172, 173n13, 200, 202, 207, 245–7, 282, 331–2, 336, 378–9, 435
- Sorong, 60–1, 82n15
- sosolot*, 80–1, 91, 370
- South China Sea, 4, 8, 10, 23, 39, 41, 119, 170, 291–2, 442
- Southwest Sulawesi, 8, 21, 41, 48, 68, 72–4, 112, 122, 131–2, 140, 150, 154–5, 181, 193–200, 231–7, 253, 260, 273, 218, 307–10, 341, 354–9, 378, 385, 435, 442
- Southeastern Islands, 59n112, 102, *see also* Aru, Kei, Tanimbar
- Southwestern Islands, 102, 131, 259, 323, 365, 366, *see also* Babar, Kisar, Leti
- Spain, 10, 103, 171, 173, 177, 182, 189, 211, 216, 263, 299, 307, 348, 335, 338, 348, 383, 386, 389, 405, *see also* Manila, European rivalry
- Spermonde archipelago, 49, 412
- Spice Islands, *see* Maluku
- spice trade, 35, 90, 182, 185–7, 213, 225, 266, 271, 300, 365, 367, 441, *see also* cloves, nutmeg
- Srivijaya, 28, 141–2, 157
- SS Vidar*, 396, 418
- states, 1–2, 7, 15–21, 23–4, 122, 126, 129, 132, 135, 138–66, 182, 193, 218, 250, 259, 308, 315, 339, 406, 445
- states and trade, 12–29, 72–7, 93–4
- Straits dollar, 82, 346, *see* coins
- stranger-kings, 96, 131–2
- subsistence, 52–7, *see also* foragers, swidden, rice, sago, tubers
- Suez Canal, 382, 396, 420
- Sula islands, 84n26, 97, 104, 108, 187, 189, 200, 366, 395
- Sulawesi, 45, 47, 67, 92, 106, 115, 140, 189, 213, 285, 297, 303–7, 346, 350, 410–6, *see also* Southwest Sulawesi, North Sulawesi
- Sulu, 36, 38, 40, 63, 89, 100, 112, 150n136, 151, 153, 177–8, 203, 219–24, 264–6, 289, 294, 303–7, 336, 339, 348–9, 383, 385, 394, 403–9, 444
- Sulu, and Spanish, 177, 180, 212, 349, 383, *see also* Manila
- Sumatra, 100, 203, 209, 212, 214, 343, 356, 386, *see also* Bengkulu
- Sumba, 50, 130–1, 152, 157, 194–5, 235, 285–6, 332–3, 330, 333–4, 380–1, 435, 437–9
- Sumbawa, 6n19, 8, 36, 41–2, 45–7, 50, 71, 101, 115, 171, 191, 193–4, 206, 216, 232–5, 243–4, 280, 282, 284, 302, 329–30, 377–8, 434–5
- Sunda Strait, 35, 41n25, 44
- Surabaya, 216, 259, 346, 359
- swidden cultivation, 7, 52–5, 57, 92–3, 96, 99, 150, 154, 350, 412, *see also* subsistence
- syahbandar*, *see* harbourmaster
- Szanton, David, 15, 29, 30
- Tabanio, 66, 240–1, 277–8, 316
- Talaud (Salibabu) archipelago, 40, 45, 59, 194, 200, 350, 387, 393, 441–2, *see also* Sangihe
- Talloq kingdom, 24, 31, 73–4, 110, 144–5, 154, 193, 197, 218, 232–3, 274, 282, 295, 443
- Tambora, 45–6, 193, 280, 284, 324, *see also* volcanos
- Tanah Bumbu, 66, 240, 277, 278, 362–3, 419, *see also* Kusan, Pegatan
- Tanah Grogot, 76, 418
- Tanah Laut, 66, 240, 277–8, 338
- Tanimbar archipelago, 24–5, 50, 70, 87, 99, 115, 131, 165, 173n13, 188, 228, 269, 364–5, 373, 426, 429–30
- Tanjung Redeb, 75, 361
- Tatas, 60, 88, 238–41, 278, 316
- Tausug, 91, 109, 111, 122, 156, 177, 221, 223, 224, 264, 403, 406
- Tawi-Tawi, 153, 156, 224, 304, 349, 405, 406, 447

- taxation, 18, 86–7, 154, 211, 242, 246, 272, 278, 351, 362–3, 408, 414, 417, 425
- tax farms, 158, 246, 259, 282, 325, 327–8, 432
- tea trade, 211, 214, 251, 341
- Ternate, 6n21, 23, 51, 58, 67, 70–1, 101, 103–5, 114, 135, 145, 156–7, 159, 162–3, 169, 172, 174, 177, 179–90, 193, 200–2, 217–9, 225–6, 259, 266–7, 271, 274–5, 300–1, 307, 312–13, 318–21, 337, 339, 342, 346, 353, 366–9, 388, 397, 402, 411, 415, 422
- textile trade, 36, 171, 228, 241, 263, 288, 308, 351, 354
- Tidore, 6, 23, 24, 40, 51, 56, 58, 67, 70–1, 82, 101, 103–5, 141, 156, 159, 161–4, 166, 173n13, 174, 182–3, 187, 200, 190–2, 225–6, 226, 228, 252, 260, 266–8, 300, 307, 322–4, 368–74, 431, 442–3
- Tidung, 63, 75n182, 180, 224
- Tilly, Charles, 3, 17
- timber trade, 391, 409, 417, 428
- Timor, 6, 19, 23, 36, 41–3, 45, 50, 54, 56, 71–2, 83, 85–6, 95, 99, 101, 115, 119–20, 128–32, 137–8, 161, 164, 171–3, 196–9, 207, 216, 218, 235, 245–7, 253, 270, 281–6, 301–3, 329–34, 336, 377–81, 399n40, 426, 434, 459–60
- Tiruray, 62, 89
- tobacco, 56, 84, 89, 90, 151, 280, 302, 341, 386, 389, 400, 419, 425n224
- Tobelo, 58–9, 103–4, 266–7, 304, 313–14, 340, 424
- Tobias, J., 104, 337
- Tobungku, 55, 68, 71, 187, 201–2, 229, 274–5, 312–13, 339, 367–8, 373, 411, 415
- Togian archipelago, 49, 229, 275, 312, 352–3, 367, 414
- Tojo, 92, 272, 275, 352–3, 386n33, 414–15
- Tolaki kingdom, 63, 64, 68, 90, 276, 313
- tolgebied* (colonial tariff regime), 347, 384
- Tomini Gulf, 31, 40, 47, 49, 64, 67, 68, 92, 200, 201, 220, 229, 234, 275, 307, 312, 351–3, 388, 414, 456
- Tomori, 48–9, 68, 202, 268, 275, 415
- Topasses, 137–8, 163, 207, 245–7, 282
- Toraja, 98, 414, *see also* inland peoples
- tortoiseshell, *see* turtle-shells
- trade goods, *see* commodities
- trade routes, 4, 10, 37–44, 109, 145, 238, 327, 253, 257, 397, 402, 417, 426
- trepang (sea-cucumbers), 11, 11n37, 49, 57, 61, 104, 111, 156, 186, 221–2, 228, 231–2, 241, 264, 266, 269, 271, 284, 298, 311, 313–14, 318, 323, 329, 331, 349, 352, 354, 356, 360, 362, 365, 369, 371, 373, 379–80, 413, 414, 415, 429, 431, 437
- tribute, to China, 169, 251
- tubers, consumption of, 53n79, 56, 265, *see also* subsistence
- turtle-shells, 110, 126, 181, 219, 311, 356, 389, 411
- United States of America (USA), *see* America
- Uto, Datu, 403, 349
- van den Dungen Gronovius, Diederik Johannes, 332, 332n248, 333
- van der Capellen, G.A.G.P., 259, 263, 288, 300–1, 308, 319, 344
- van Duivenbode, Renesse, 321, 374
- van Fraassen, Christiaan F., 70n157, 135, 181n54, 187n80
- van Hoëvell, G.W.W.C., 131, 427
- van Leur, J.C., 11, 208
- Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC), *see* Dutch East India Company
- Veth, Bastiaan (Bas), 387, 392, 399, 411–12
- volcanos, 44–7, 104, 280, 284
- Vosmaer, J.N., 313–14
- Waigeo, 44n39, 54, 70, 141, 151, 264, 369
- Waingapu, 12, 283–4, 331, 333, 381, 399, 437–9
- Wajo, Wajorese, 112, 113–14, 147–8, 193, 199, 213, 232–4, 240, 260, 277, 292, 294, 309, 357–9
- Wallace, Alfred Russel, 25–6, 44–5, 133, 301, 410
- wangkang* (medium size junk), 231, 277, 279, 307
- wanua*, 123, 140, 146, 149, 145
- Warren, James, 151, 177
- wax, *see* beeswax
- Wee Bin, 396–7, 402, 432–3
- West Borneo, 87, 202, 289, 303, 332, 332n248, 419
- Wicks, Robert, 85
- Wielenga, D.K., 439

Wolters, Oliver, 10, 28, 125

Woodard, David, 248–9

Xiamen, 38, 43–4, 169, 203, 209, 215, 222,
231, 264, 289, 294, 307, 330, 347, 404

Zamboanga, 40, 177, 189, 220–1, 223, 252,
264, 306–7, 335, 342, 348–9, 400, 404–6

Zanzibar, 213, 300

Zhao, Rugua (Chau Ju-Kua), 78–9

Zheng, Chenggong, 177, 182

Zheng, He, 169

