
On the Indigenization of Academic Discourse

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The institutional and theoretical dependence of Third World scholars on Western social science has resulted in what has been referred to as the captive mind. The captive mind is uncritical and imitative in its approach to ideas and concepts from the West.¹ This state of affairs has brought forth various reactions from intellectuals in developing societies. One such reaction is the call to the indigenization of Third World social sciences. However, the call to indigenization itself is fraught with difficulties. In the following section the problem of imitation in development studies is raised and the call to indigenization is discussed. Then, I proceed with a discussion by Foucault on the relationship between discourse and power. The understanding of this relationship between discourse and power is then brought to bear upon both the problem of imitation of Western social science in developing societies as well as the problems faced in the indigenization of the social sciences in these societies. The aim here is to present an understanding of the problem of imitation and an insight into the obstacles faced by indigenization efforts in terms of the relationship between discourse and power.

Development Studies, Imitation, and the Need for Indigenization

More than thirty years ago in Cairo, Gunnar Myrdal warned against the uncritical adoption of Western theories and methodologies in developing countries. He referred to the need to remold economic theory to comply with the problems and interests of developing countries.² At a more practical level, S.H. Alatas referred to the fact that Western economic systems, methods of government, law, ideas of

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democracy, procedures of election, and conceptions of welfare have, among other things, been uncritically adopted and advocated by the elites of developing societies.³ The Indian scholar J.P. Singh Uberoi had the following to say about the problem of Western social science in Asia in general and in India in particular:

The aim and method of science are no doubt uniform throughout the world but the problem of science in relation to society is not. The problem or problems of science in a rich, technologically satiated society are different, even opposed to, its problems in a society of poverty lately liberated from colonial bondage. The two sets of problems and two situations cannot, without serious falsification, be placed upon a single continuum. It is scientism and not science which conceives of them along the single line of unilinear evolutionism. Our understanding of the proper content of science, its problems and its priorities in relation to a specific society will depend on our attitude toward this question.⁴

Uberoi was concerned with the lack of an indigenous approach in the social sciences. This is a problem that describes the state of the social sciences in much of the developing world where the social sciences are uncritically adopted or blindly imitated.⁵ Mental captivity or the phenomenon of the captive mind refers to a way of thinking that is dominated by Western thought in an imitative and uncritical manner. Among the characteristics of the captive mind are the inability to be creative and raise original problems, the inability to devise original analytical methods, and alienation from the main issues of indigenous society.⁶ The captive mind is trained almost entirely in the Western sciences, reads the works of Western authors, and is taught predominantly by Western teachers, either directly or through their works. The captive mind uncritically imitates Western social science. This is manifested in the areas of problem selection and choice of research methods, as well as the suggestion of solutions and policies. It is also manifested at metatheoretical and epistemological levels as well as at the levels of theory and substantive work.

This is not to deny that there are structures of academic dependency that link core and peripheral social scientists. Mental captivity exists within this context of dependency. Academicians in the periphery are dependent on their counterparts in the core for research and development funds. Scholarly journals are controlled mainly by academic institutions in core countries. The various aspects of academic dependency have been discussed by others.⁷ My purpose in this article

is to discuss the issues of imitation and indigenization, which, although related to academic dependency, are nevertheless distinct problems.

The call to indigenization does not simply suggest approaching specifically indigenous problems in a social scientific manner with a view to developing suitable concepts and methods, and modifying what has been developed in Western settings. It goes beyond this and refers to the idea that social scientific theories, concepts, and methodologies can be derived from the histories and cultures of the various non-Western civilizations.⁸ Such social sciences are not confined to the study of the civilizations of their origin but are extended to explain and interpret the whole world from various non-Western vantage points.

The lack of indigenous social science traditions in the non-Western world is a result of factors internal and external to these societies as is the case with other problems of underdevelopment. This lack does not allow for the transcendence of the inadequacies of current theories in the social sciences, particularly theories of development. In order to understand this, a few words must be said about these theories of development.

Modernization theory, which flourished during the 1950s and 1960s, had two main components to it—the structural and the psychological. As a structural theory, modernization theory has an evolutionary vision of social, political, and economic development. The roots of this vision are to be found in classical theory with its belief in progress and increasing complexities in the social, economic, and political spheres.⁹ Modernization theory was given its best known form by Rostow.¹⁰ From his observations of the industrialized nations, Rostow suggested that there are five stages a society must go through in order to industrialize. While these five stages were derived from the experience of industrialized nations and are even questionable in this light, Rostow's stages of economic growth were applied to underdeveloped countries.

The psychological version of modernization theory claims that Western society possesses those psychological traits required for economic success. Such traits include a high need for achievement and economic rationality. The main proponents of this view are Hagen, McClelland, and Inkeles and Smith.¹¹ According to Inkeles and Smith, contact with modern institutions produces people with modern attitudes. Among the attitudes discussed by them is the increasing secularization of society. An event such as the Iranian revolution is testimony to the fact that secularization may work against the rationale of "development." For this reason the Iranian revolution has been referred to as the ultimate blow to modernization theory¹² and the

manifestation of dissatisfaction with Western models of development throughout underdeveloped societies.

It is now generally understood that the path of development experienced by industrialized countries, whether in structural or psychological terms, is not necessarily the path that can or will be followed by underdeveloped countries. Marxist and Marxist-inspired theories offer such a critique of modernization theory. Underdeveloped countries cannot follow the same path as that of the developed countries because of the historical evolution of a highly unequal capitalist system of relations between rich and poor countries. Unequal power relationships between the core (industrialized) countries and the periphery (underdeveloped) countries do not allow underdeveloped countries to experience independent, self-sustaining development. To a great extent, underdevelopment is attributed to the policies of industrialized countries and their extensions in the form of elite groups in the periphery. Furthermore, world-system theory sees the world as constituting a single, hierarchical division of labor. These approaches are correct to criticize modernization theory for its lack of attention to the structure of the world economy and its hierarchical relationships. Nevertheless, their inadequacies are not to be denied, particularly those they share with modernization theory, of which one is neatly summed up by Walker:

They appeal to certain basic underlying forces at work:—the pursuit of power in equilibrium systems or the dynamics of economic structures. Thus, quite apart from the adequacy of each on its own terms, it is possible to question the narrow assumptions about human action on which they all depend. One may particularly question the lack of concern about those aspects of human action usually subsumed under the term “culture”—values, aspirations, creativity, language, and ideology.¹³

What is referred to here is the notion of cultural specificity that entails variations in or rejections of current theories that explain development as well as the creation of new theories that are nourished by the historical conditions and cultural practices of developing societies. This is what is meant by the indigenization of the social sciences in developing societies. In the postwar period, when most of the Third World gained formal independence, a trend began to emerge in the social sciences, often referred to as indigenization.¹⁴ Such indigenization takes the form of Indianization, Turkicization, Sinicization, Islamization, and so on. Intellectuals in various non-Western societies engage in conscious efforts to develop bodies of social scientific knowledge in which theories

and concepts are derived from their respective historical experiences and cultural practices.

The culture-specific situation of a society determines, at least in part, the concepts, theories, and methodologies that arise from tackling specifically indigenous problems. An example is the conceptualization of unemployment. Aggregate unemployment in many countries is not presented with separate figures for men and women. Thus the unemployment problem may be overstated because in many countries male unemployment presents a more serious problem than female unemployment, because there is more absorptive capacity for females than there is for males in household work. Consequently, more males than females roam the streets.¹⁵

Social scientific theories, concepts, and methodologies that claim to be indigenous need to go beyond simply tackling indigenous problems with the appropriate modification of Western concepts and theories along the way. Systematized bodies of knowledge are needed that are based on the indigenous cultures in the same way that Western social science is based on Western historical experiences and cultural practices. For example, the organic image of society that is central to functional evolutionism, which in turn informs a wide variety of theories of development, is traced back to Plato. The organic image of society is deeply rooted in Western consciousness. In a similar fashion, non-Western societies, without discarding Western social science, need to base their social sciences on indigenous philosophies, epistemologies, histories, and so on. For example, how would Ibn Khaldun's thought define a theory of development?

A concrete example of indigenous social science is given by Batra, who, in discussing the history of Iranian civilization, uses a theory of social cycle derived from Sarkar's philosophy of history. Merits aside, this theory is a fine example of an indigenous theory of social and political change because it is deeply rooted in Hindu philosophy. Society is divided into four types of people, corresponding to the four groupings of the caste system—the Shudras, Khatris, Vipras, and Vashyas. Each group reflects a type of mind, action, and outlook toward life. Society is said to evolve over time in terms of four distinct eras, each dominated by one of these four groups.¹⁶ This is an example of a theory of social change that is not confined to the study of Hindu society but seeks to understand the Iranian revolution in terms of the historical evolution of Iranian society. It is important to note that the field of application of an indigenous social science is not restricted to the society or civilization in which it was developed. The purpose of this example is to show what is meant by the cultural rootedness or cultural-specific

nature of theories. To be more specific, indigenous social science activities can be understood to be carried out at four levels:

1. At the metatheoretical level, indigenization refers to the revealing and analysis of world views, as well as the ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions underlying social scientific works. For example, how are the residues of colonial capitalism perpetuated in the thinking of postcolonial peoples? In other words, what is the sociology of postcolonial thought that would reveal how scholars in the Third World are not self-conscious of their being trapped in the categories of colonialist or neocolonialist thought?¹⁷
2. At the theoretical level, indigenization refers to the generation of concepts and theories from indigenous historical experiences and cultural practices. An example would be the work of Batra cited above and also Akiwowo's African concept of *asuwada* in connection with the development of an African sociology of knowledge.¹⁸
3. At the empirical level, indigenization refers to a focus on problems more relevant to the Third World which have hitherto been neglected. For example, corruption is a serious problem in many developing societies but there is hardly any empirical work being done in this area.
4. At the level of applied social science, indigenization refers to specifying remedies, plans, and policies, and working with voluntary organizations and other nongovernmental organizations, as well as with government in their implementation.

What is suggested here as indigenous social science must be distinguished from what has been referred to by others as nativism or orientation in reverse.¹⁹ Nativism, or reverse orientation, refers to the trend of "going native" among both Western and local scholars. Whereas interpretive social science would elevate the native's point of view to the status of the criterion by which descriptions and analyses are to be judged, nativism goes beyond this to a wholesale rejection of Western social science. Indigenization is not the rejection of Western social science but its selective adaptation to indigenous needs. Although Western social science originates in the West, it is not to be rejected on those grounds.²⁰ Rather, Western theories and concepts, taking into account their epistemological and historical presuppositions, must be encountered, modified, and combined with indigenous ones. The call to indigenization is simultaneously a call to the universalization of the social sciences. This presupposes an assumption about the cognitive

status of social science. In fact, a number of such assumptions are possible. First of all, it can be held that social science is a universal discourse and that national or civilizational versions of it are distortions. On the other hand, one could accuse Western social science of ethnocentrism and replace this with an indigenous ethnocentrism (nativism, reverse orientalism, and so on). A third position and the one adopted in this article, is to posit a universal social science that has various civilizational or cultural expressions, all contributing to the understanding of mankind. Then, indigenization of social science seeks to fill a void in this universal discourse, that is, the absence of various indigenous expressions.

What is needed in the Third World, then, is an indigenous social science tradition that transcends Marxist and other critiques of modernization theory and serves as a corrective to imitative social scientific work in the Third World.

In the following section, I will discuss Foucault on the relationship between discourse and power. In later sections this will be applied to both the problem of the imitation of Western social science discourse in the Third World and the problem of the indigenization of the social sciences.

Foucault on Discourse and Power

In this section I discuss the ideas of Michel Foucault on the relationship between discourse and power. Foucault's ideas are utilized here because he made a connection between power and knowledge. Drawing the connection between power and social scientific knowledge will be useful in placing the problems of imitation and indigenization in perspective.

In Western civilization, more than any other, language has occupied a central area of concern in the twentieth century. And this is not to be understood simply in terms of linguistics. Rather, we speak of the "partial hegemony" of linguistics vis-à-vis other fields in the human sciences. The various structuralisms that have issued from Saussure through Levi-Strauss, Barthes, and Lacan seek to explain things such as kinship systems, fashion, and the unconscious, placing linguistic concepts in new domains of application.²¹ Various systems of philosophy revolve around language. Such is true of Heidegger and the poststructuralism of Derrida and Lacan. Here, our concern with language is specifically with discourse.

What Foucault had in mind by discourse refers to the "delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of

concepts and theories."²² What Foucault had to say about discourses in general turns out to be insightful when applied to the discourses on development in the Third World, as we shall see later. Here, I shall deal briefly with Foucault's understanding of how truth is imposed and power wielded by discourses through the various procedures of the control and limitation of discourses.

Foucault shied away from language that is grounded in subjectivity and sought an ungrounded language. To elaborate on this requires an understanding of the two dimensions of meaningful objects: designative and expressive. A sign has a meaning insofar as it designates a particular object. Or it may have meaning insofar as it expresses thought, perception, or belief regarding the object. The sign is related to the thought that it expresses. The dispute in history concerns the importance of each dimension in the order of explanation. Is expressive meaning determined by designative meaning or does the reverse hold true?

For the ancient Greeks, reality was the idea of which empirical things were copies. But language was not important, words were not important; they were merely external clothings of thought. The later Augustinian view posited that the thought of God was clothed externally in creation, meaning that everything was a sign. God's creation was then understood expressively. This view set the stage for the semiological ontologies, which looked at the world as a meaningful order or text. But even here language had a marginal purpose because it was God and not man who was the expresser.²³

Medieval nominalism rejected the semiological ontologies. There are no such things as ideas, forms, or essences of things. All things exist as particulars. The universal is simply an effect of language. This view rejects the expressive theory of meaning. It refuses to see things as manifestations of the idea. Furthermore, words have meaning only insofar as they are words for things and not signs. The philosophic trend of nominalism rejected the view of the world as a meaningful order. In the seventeenth-century scientific revolution the conception of the world as consisting of objective processes naturally found an ally in the designative theory of language. The role of language was simply to designate these objective processes.²⁴

Language, as the designativists see it, is "an instrument of control in gaining knowledge of the world as objective processes."²⁵ In order to have control over objective processes, words that designate these processes must themselves be transparent. To posit that language is shaped independent of the thought of the subject and in turn shapes individual thought is to lose control.²⁶ Modern modes of thought hold with Locke that "every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words

stand for what idea he pleases."²⁷ It is in this sense that the subject is the ground of knowledge; he is a founding subject.

Foucault, recognizing this, was against the designative theory of language, noting that "Western thought has taken care to ensure that discourse should occupy the smallest possible space between thought and speech" and that it should be "no more than a certain bridging between thinking and speaking."²⁸ The founding subject "founds horizons of meaning" without needing to "pass via the singular instance of discourse."²⁹

Although it is clear that Foucault believed that a designative philosophy of language is inadequate for discussing the relationship between words and things, nevertheless, for him this was only one of the ways of eliding the reality of discourse, of the limitation, exclusion, and control of discourse. The designative theory of language is simply one procedure that serves to control, limit, and elide the reality of discourse. There are several other procedures.

First, there are the external procedures of exclusion that include prohibition, division, and rejection, and the opposition between true and false.³⁰ There are also the internal procedures of control that function as "principles of classification, of ordering, of distribution."³¹ Here, through principles such as the commentary, the author, and the discipline, discourses exercise their own control and limitation. There are also procedures of control that are neither external nor internal. These are the procedures that determine the "condition of their [discourses] application, of imposing a certain number of rules on the individuals who hold them, and thus of not permitting everyone to have access to them."³² The control, limitation, and "rarefaction" this time is of the speaking subject. No one participates in the order of discourse without being qualified or without satisfying certain requirements. Such procedures are the ritual, societies of discourse, and the doctrines.³³ The designative theory of language and the idea of the founding subject are just two themes in philosophy that have come to "correspond to these activities of limitation and exclusion, and perhaps also to reinforce them."³⁴

Let us take a closer look at the link between discourses and the exercise of power. We need to state the tasks that Foucault set for us in "The Order of Discourse." These are the four methodological requirements that must be fulfilled if the analysis of the conditions and effects of the control, limitation, and rarefaction of discourses is to be carried out.³⁵ First of all, there is the principle of reversal, requiring us to look at the "negative action of a cutting up and a rarefaction of discourses" (rather than at the positive action of creation) by such figures and systems as the author, the discipline, and the will

to truth.³⁶ Putting the principle of reversal into practice constitutes what Foucault called the critical set of analysis.³⁷ The critical set has the task of analyzing the instances of discursive control and the procedures involved. As we have seen, Foucault rejected the designative theory of language and criticized the control and limitations that it brings about. But he offered more by way of the analysis of several procedures of the exclusion, limitation, and control of the discourses referred to above.

Now we consider the other three methodological requirements that constitute the genealogical set of analysis. This set of analysis is concerned with the formation of discourses within and without the limits of discursive control analyzed by the critical set. The genealogical set puts into practice the three principles of discontinuity, specificity, and exteriority.

In the principle of discontinuity, Foucault called upon us to not

imagine that there is a great unsaid or a great unthought which runs throughout the world and intertwines with all its forms and all its events, and which we would have to articulate to think at last. Discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each other.³⁸

By unthought I understand Foucault to refer to the unarticulated pre-conceptions that are held to be necessary to and nourish thought but are nevertheless unavailable for articulation.

For Foucault, interpretation led to the normalization and disciplinary control of man. Discovering the groundlessness of texts revealed to Foucault the arbitrariness of interpretation and the imposition of interpretation by people. This leads us to relate the organization of discourses to the exercise of power. In modern society power is exercised at many sites. In Foucault's words, "It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization."³⁹ We must not assume that an overall unity of domination couched in terms of the sovereign state or law is given at the outset. Rather we need to conceive of the operations of power as extending beyond the state and its apparatus.⁴⁰ Foucault was concerned with the site of knowledge. He wished to look at power as it is wielded in the relations of knowledge rather than the relations of production. But he was not merely looking at another arena of power. He also wanted to look at another way of exercising power, a way that

requires our privileging discourse in the scheme of things rather than subordinating it to structural factors.

In the theory of the old power, Foucault maintained that power was “centered primarily around deduction (prelevement) and death, [and] it is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control.”⁴¹ Any analysis of power and domination need not be confined to taking law, prohibition, and state power as the model, for it is not only through prohibition and blockage that power is wielded. Power not only has its negative forms through prohibitions, limitations, controls, and punishments, but has positive forms as well. Positive power is also wielded through the strategies that arise from discourses. The multiplication of discourses takes place not “apart from or against power, but in the very space and as a means of its exercise.”⁴² In the theory of the new power, power is not vested in the subject. Power is not to be restricted to the subservience of citizens to the state or the domination of one group by another. It refers to more than just repression.⁴³

Let us try to understand the new power in terms of sexuality. In the nineteenth century there was a proliferation of the discourses on sex that set out to formulate the truth of sex, for it is sex that underlies conduct and existence, being a “universal secret, an omnipresent cause, a fear that never ends.”⁴⁴ This being the case, the psychoanalyst has the hermeneutic function of verifying this obscure truth. It is this verification of truth, the will to truth, to which Foucault wanted to alert us.

Referring to the principle of specificity, Foucault said,

We must not imagine that the world turns to us a legible face which we would only have to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which predisposes the world in our favor. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or, in any case as a practice which we impose on them.⁴⁵

What this means is that once a domain “susceptible to pathological processes” is identified there arises the will to look for the secret, underlying forces at work. Once the truth of sex is discovered, whatever does not conform is declared false, hence the institutions that engage in therapy and normalization.⁴⁶ This is domination, because once we are told about the truth of sex we have to adjust our lives accordingly with the help of psychoanalysis. The modern man is, therefore, an object of control and the target of policies of normalization. The

processes of normalization that seek to transform the behavior of individuals and populations are constituted by the disciplinary control of individuals effected at the discursive level by fields such as psychoanalysis, medicine, pedagogy, and a host of other technical and scientific fields.

In the principle of exteriority, Foucault said that "we must not go from discourse towards its interior hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a thought," as if there were a truth or a hidden essence to be discovered.⁴⁷ The faith in the truth or hidden essence nourishes the will to truth that brings about normalization and control.

To recapitulate, Foucault went beyond the critique of positivism that is implied by the critique of the designative theory of language. There are other procedures (external, internal, and the control of the speaking subject) by which discourses exercise control and limitation. The analyses of the procedures, together with the putting into practice of the principle of reversal, constitute the critical or archaeological set. The genealogical set of analysis, involving the principles of discontinuity, specificity, and exteriority, looks at the formation of discourses and their role in the normalization and disciplinary control of man, that is, the wielding of discursive power.

It now remains to assess the value of Foucault for understanding the relationship between discourse and power in the context of the social sciences in developing societies as far as the issue of imitation and the problems faced by indigenization are concerned.

Imitation, Power, and the Discourses on Development

The problem of imitation has led to the call to indigenization among scholars in many developing societies. But there are several obstacles to indigenization that must be analyzed, and imitation is not the least important of these.

Above, we have referred to some inadequacies of development theories. We have also referred to the problem of the uncritical adoption or imitation of Western theories of development and the need for the indigenous social sciences in the various non-Western societies. But we need to go beyond this. We need to go beyond mere recognition of the problem and call into question the concept of imitation itself. Previous conceptualizations of this problem have not adequately dealt with the notion of power and domination as they come into play with the global spread of the Western social sciences.

The problem that we have is not merely imitation. It is not sufficient to say that in the periphery the imitation of Western social science

does not allow for the comprehension of indigenous problems, or that it does not create a liberating discourse, or even that it maintains the "mechanism of imperial domination" by legitimating core/periphery exploitation.⁴⁸ In the cultural sphere, imitation alone cannot sustain core/periphery exploitation. Without linking imitation to power in the world system any statement on imitation would tend to be a weak and untenable thesis.

Furthermore, it should be clear that we are dealing with the cultural sphere, with the realm of ideas; the objective is to analyze a form of knowledge, Western social science, in terms of power and not merely in terms of how it legitimates the status quo. Structural causes do not take precedence over cultural/subjective ones. Western social science that is often disguised as universal social science is not a superstructure upon the world economy or the interstate system. Rather it intermeshes and intertwines with these structural processes. This is not to say that ideas do not legitimate ways of doing things. But here I am concerned with how ideas do much more than this. Specifically, I want to move away from the monotonous concept of imitation and instead look at the state of the social sciences in non-Western societies in terms of reification and power as it is wielded through the discourses on development.

Reification, a term associated with Lukacs, refers to the idea that man's products are believed to have a separate existence, and are coercive over and control man. "Man in capitalist society confronts a reality 'made' by himself (as a class) which appears to him to be a natural phenomenon alien to himself, he is wholly at the mercy of its 'laws.'"⁴⁹ In Marx the concept of reification comes across very clearly in the idea of the fetishism of commodities. Laborers "forget" that it is they themselves who impart to commodities their value. Instead they believe that value is inherent in the commodities they produce, or that the marketplace produces this value.⁵⁰ There is also such a thing as the fetishism of ideas or the reification of ideas. Here it is believed that there are certain objective truths to be found "out there" and that they have been discovered in Western social science. It is "forgotten" that knowledge is a reality that is socially constructed. If we consider the body of knowledge that we call Western social science (including knowledge produced by non-Western scholars) as consisting of reified ideas, then we say that it is Western social science that dominates the various civilizational expressions in the non-Western world. Just as the capitalist controls and has access to the reified structures of capitalism, so the Western scholar controls and has access to these reified ideas. But this is not enough. We need to work out the techniques by which reified knowledge realizes power.

For this we turn to the works of Foucault and his notion of power. As we have seen above, Foucault was interested in those practices that lead to the normalization and disciplinary control of man. We are, therefore, called to relate the organization of the discourses on development to the exercise of power. The concern here is with the site of knowledge, the discourses on development. We wish to look at power as it is wielded in the relations of knowledge rather than in the relations of production. But, like Foucault, we are not merely looking at another arena of the exercise of power. We also want to look at another way of exercising power, a way that requires our privileging the discourses on development in the scheme of things rather than subordinating it to the structural factors of political economy.

What this amounts to is that the Third Worlder is, therefore, an "objective of control . . . [to be] examined, measured, categorized, made the target of policies of normalization."⁵¹ In order to make the link between the uncritical adoption of development theories in the Third World and normalization it is necessary to view the problems associated with this uncritical adoption of Western development theories which is acute in the following problematic areas:

1. *Factorgenic versus actorgenic analysis.* Analysis in development studies can be factorgenic or actorgenic in orientation. Factorgenic refers to results of human action; they are, however, external to man and survive longer than an individual or group. Actorgenic refers to that which is found within the individual or group. Development studies tend to stress factorgenic at the expense of actorgenic analysis.⁵² For example, in the statement "In many developing countries, ineffective exchange rates and monetary and fiscal policies and excessive borrowing during the 1970s resulted in inflation and unsustainable balance of payments positions,"⁵³ there is a lack of attention to actors. Why were monetary and fiscal policies ineffective? Were they misused by politicians for political ends? What part does corruption play in excessive borrowing? Are all funds used for the designated purposes? Answers to such questions require the study of concrete historical individuals and groups rather than anonymous forces.

Another example of factorgenic analysis comes from the two-gap model of Chenery and Strout, according to which a country is constrained from achieving self-sustained growth by (1) the skill limitation; (2) the savings limitation, measured by the gap between domestic investment required to achieve a certain rate of growth and domestic savings; and (3) the foreign exchange limitation, measured by the gap between foreign exchange requirements needed to maintain a certain level of domestic investment and foreign exchange earnings.⁵⁴

Again, what is missing is the inclusion of historical or contemporary data surrounding actors in the various relationships that are causes and effects of these gaps.

We can say of economists of underdevelopment and of development planners that they have been, to a great extent, factorgenic in orientation.

When they discuss problems the picture which emerges is that of anonymous forces bringing about or obstructing certain changes. They discuss the absence or presence of natural resources, the size of the market, the terms of trade, institutional impediments, labour productivity per capita income, and a host of other data relevant to descriptive and introductory explanations.⁵⁵

Such descriptive and introductory explanations refer to pathologies of development that no doubt need to be identified. But there is more to underdevelopment than the factorgenic aspects referred to above. The normalizing procedures requiring injections of foreign aid, direct investment, and the like generally do not address the problems at hand although they serve other purposes. Indigenous theories of development should, therefore, correct the imbalance between factorgenic and actorgenic analysis.

2. *The redundancy of development studies.* There is a tendency for development studies to be redundant due to their extremely general nature. An example is from an article on socialist developing countries, in which several fundamental laws and constraints on development are given.⁵⁶ A country that invests too little shall not enjoy economic growth; a country that invests too much shall not enjoy economic growth; a socialist country should attempt to strike a balance between individual and collective incentives, material and moral inducements, and so on. According to Morawetz, the bad performance of socialist developing countries is due to their not taking heed of these fundamental laws and constraints. But the problem with this is that the analysis is too general to mean much. It is too general to enable us to understand the precise reasons for which socialist developing countries performed badly. On the other hand, such an analysis would call forth normalizing techniques of a very general nature that would be applicable across the board and, perhaps, easier to justify.

As another example, consider Alavi's theory of the postcolonial state. His account on the origins and bases of the postcolonial state is presented at a level too general to account for the differences between democratic and authoritarian postcolonial states.⁵⁷ In his discussion on the relative autonomy of the postcolonial state as lying in the need

and ability of the state to mediate between the contending interests of the mercantile bourgeoisie, indigenous bourgeoisie, and the landed classes, it is possible for the most part to substitute any postcolonial state for Pakistan and Bangladesh in Alavi's work without invalidating the account. After all this, the question of why certain postcolonial states are authoritarian and why others are democratic remains unanswered. This stems from the level of generality at which Alavi presents his theory.

3. *The presence of erroneous theories and concepts.* Here we are concerned with the relevance of theories and concepts even in their original Western setting. Let us consider an example from economic theory. In general terms, modernization theory is based on the assumption of an economic man. Such a model of society consists of self-interest-seeking individuals devoid of culture and ideology. This recalls Kirzner's Martian doctoral student who, for his dissertation research, focused his telescope on a certain location on Earth. He observed a set of boxes that were lined up in a row. Every morning at 7:30 smaller boxes moved past these boxes, coming to stop at one of them along the way. The smaller moving boxes swallowed bodies that emerged from the stationary larger boxes that were lined up in a row. The Martian then postulated a law based on these discoveries, the law of moving boxes and bodies.⁵⁸ In such a law, the fact that these moving boxes and bodies represent people trying to catch buses is obscured. The danger of imitating theories based on unrealistic assumptions such as that of economic man is quite clear. The result is normalization in the form of dehumanizing policies that seek to redress material problems while neglecting or even obstructing cultural and spiritual expression.

4. *The irrelevance of Western theories and concepts in the non-Western context.* Here I am referring to the idea that there are theories and concepts that may be relevant in Western societies but are not so in non-Western societies.⁵⁹ This would require looking into the possibility of indigenous alternatives. For example, concepts of authority derived from the works of Ibn Khaldun may be more relevant than those of Weber. Another example from the field of development studies concerns the concept of unemployment to which I have already referred.

5. *The inability to differentiate the universal from the particular.* There is much confusion as to what concepts are universal and what are particular. Both are subsumed under the universal.⁶⁰ Consider the concept of urbanization. In the West the city is held to be a civilizing influence and necessary for economic development. The sociological and psychological traits required for the functioning of a modern economy are bred in the city.⁶¹ However, in many non-Western countries the rural-urban dichotomy suggested in Western theories is not valid

as cities in such countries exhibit more similarities to rural areas than to Western cities.

The emphasis on urbanization in the theory of modernization is tantamount to taking a pro-urban position in the long-standing debate about rural-urban differences. It assumes a certain superiority of urban social organization (and for that matter, Western urbanism) over the rural life-style.⁶²

What is assumed is that development as embodied in urbanization is the transition from rural traditional culture to urban modern culture. Urbanization is thus understood as Westernization, the taking on of modern values as opposed to traditional values. Urbanization in this sense is seen as a universal phenomenon, one that is both beneficial and necessary. Other phenomena that are often taken to be universal when in fact they are ~~not~~ are secularization, the weakening of family ties, and indeed, that development itself. It would seem to be clear that any policies of ~~normalization~~ arising from the confusion of the universal with the particular would be tantamount to Westernization.

6. *"Negative" imitation.* Not only are theories and concepts uncritically adopted in non-Western societies, but there is also the tendency to imitate what is not being done. A very good example of this comes from India. The former Indian food minister, Chidanibara Subramaniam, discussed the problem of protein deficiency in India. In the state of Madras it was estimated that up to 40 percent of children had suffered from permanent brain damage due to protein deficiency by the time they were of school age. Thus, expensive and new school facilities were, to a large extent, wasted.⁶³ It is quite possible that because protein deficiency is not regarded as a problem in Western countries, it was similarly not seen as a problem in India.

Similar examples exist on the educational side. There are no courses on the sociology of corruption or on the sociology of imitation in non-Western universities. I am inclined to think that at least one reason for this is the absence of such courses in Western universities. The absence of such courses in non-Western universities is a reflection of ignorance or indifference toward these problems. In this case, the uncritical adoption of development theory results in the failure to identify the real as opposed to the discursively created pathologies of development.

7. *The lack of attention to issues due to methodology.* Weber referred to the importance of values in shaping scholars' interests. "To be sure, without the investigators' evaluative ideas, there would be no principle

of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality."⁶⁴

It is also true to say that in some areas of development studies, apart from values, methodology also plays a role in shaping scholars' interests. In other words, methodology is one of the factors that influences the selection of the object of inquiry. An example is the problem of corruption in underdeveloped countries. In spite of the fact that such corruption is generally perceived to be a problem, it has never been the object of inquiry among development students to the extent that other problems have. This is in part due to the fact that generally applied methods such as survey research and multivariate analysis cannot be readily applied to this problem. One cannot interview corrupt people and obtain accurate data nor can one come up easily with adequate indicators of corruption. Although some studies have been done,⁶⁵ the problem of corruption has not become the object of a well-defined field in which various theoretical perspectives have been developed and backed by empirical work. Here, too, there is a failure to identify and specify the real pathologies of development.

The discourses on development and the problems associated with their uncritical adoption in the developing world place developing world subjects under procedures of normalization. Imitation, or the uncritical adoption of Western theories of development, serves as the receptacle of normalization. Imitation results in studies in the Third World that continue to be burdened by the problems that beset development studies, some of which were listed above. Imitation perpetuates works in development studies that tend to be factorogenic, redundant, based on erroneous assumptions about the nature of man, culturally innocent, and that universalize what are specifically Western traits. Each of the problems that beset development studies discussed above and that are retained in works by Third World scholars on development prepare the Third World to undergo procedures of normalization in a number of different ways:

1. *The simplification of development.* The problems of factorogenic analyses and redundancy in development studies serve to reduce the problems of underdevelopment to general, anonymous forces such as market size, terms of trade, direct foreign investment penetration, and so forth, thereby making out the problem to be less complex than it really is. This serves to simplify the problems of underdevelopment to prepare the Third World for the procedures of normalization. To

the extent that the problems or abnormalities are presented as simple, universal, and existing across the board so are the solutions or normalizing practices, such as loans, foreign aid, direct investment, technology transfer, professional training, scholarships, population control, and so on.

2. *The misspecification of pathologies of development.* The problems of erroneous theories and concepts as well as irrelevant ones when transposed to non-Western settings result in the implementation of inadequate policies of normalization. Even where there may be real as opposed to discursively created abnormalities, inadequate policies are implemented. For example, the erroneous assumption of economic man is associated with dehumanizing economic policies that neglect spiritual and cultural concerns.

3. *The neglect of real pathologies of development.* Negative imitation results in the neglect of problems that are not considered as problems in the setting of advanced industrialized nations. Previously, the example of corruption was given.

4. *Normalization as Westernization.* The various practices of normalization are couched in terms of the process of modernization. But because of the confusion between the universal and the particular, traits particular to Western civilization are taken to be universal. The procedures of normalization, therefore, take place under the aegis of Westernization, that is, in the context of Western images of man, religion, social organization, and statehood. The uncritical adoption or imitation of the social sciences in the developing world is therefore translated into the superimposition of alien forms there to the extent that social scientists, state elites, and policymakers work hand-in-hand.

This deployment of development operates through three major strategies.⁶⁶ One refers to the incorporation of problems into the domain of development. What this requires is the creation of "abnormalities" that are to result in the creation of a field of *intervention of power*.⁶⁷ Once a domain subject to pathological processes is discovered, various techniques designed to normalize this domain can be applied. The next strategy is the professionalization of development by way of the mushrooming of fields and subfields in development studies. The goal here is a type of knowledge that seeks to identify the nature of developing societies, with a view to formulating policies and steering them in the right direction, "to produce, in short, a regime of truth and norms about development."⁶⁸ Finally, there is the strategy of the institutionalization of development. This refers to establishment of international organizations, national planning bodies, and local

development agencies that serve as the agents of the deployment of development.⁶⁹ Although these three strategies of the deployment of development have brought many benefits to the Third World in terms of the identification of problem areas and the implementation of policies and programs, they have also enabled their practitioners to maintain some degree of control and vigilance over the Third World to the extent that underdevelopment is perpetuated by the policies and actions of the advanced industrialized nations and their allies in the Third World.

The discourses on development have to be analyzed not only in terms of oppression, law, or exploitation but also in terms of the power they bring about through normalization. The discourses on development manage development, inserting it into "systems of utility." It is not only sex but whole societies that are defined as domains susceptible to pathological processes and, therefore, as objects to be normalized. These pathological processes are identified in the developing world, and an agenda of normalization is set up whether its composers are liberals or neo-Marxists. The processes of normalization that derive from the discourses on development are manifested in policy formulation and planning and provide the context within which the problem of the imitation of Western social science should be seen. The various disciplines dealing with development and their consolidation into the field of development studies are designed to speak the truth of development so that developing societies can be normalized (for example, the infusion of Western values, or how to silence tradition/religion to facilitate development).

The goals of normalization are ostensibly to raise the standard of living, increase productivity, improve the distribution of income, raise educational levels, and so on. Some of these aims are fulfilled in some areas, but the processes of normalization and disciplinary control can still be discerned. The process of normalization in the Third World affects scholars too as they undergo training in the various metropolitan establishments, thus perpetuating and reinforcing the normalization of developing societies, because rather than uncovering the discursive creation of pathologies of development, they aid in the creation of such pathologies. It is therefore crucial that the uncritical imitation of Western social science be seen in the context of such normalization.

The problems associated with the imitation of Western development theories that have been discussed above are to be seen within the context of normalization,⁷⁰ for only then can they be related to power and domination in the world economy through the social sciences.

Some Obstacles to the Indigenization of the Social Sciences in the Third World

The efforts to indigenize the social sciences face a number of obstacles as a result of the colonial encounter and the continuing tradition of Western social science in the Third World. The Western social sciences are well entrenched in much of the developing world. Western standards of scholarship, cogency, precision, and the like are the criteria by which these indigenous social sciences in their embryonic form are judged. My interest here is to apply Foucauldian theory toward understanding the problems that beset developing world attempts at the indigenization of the social sciences in their encounter with the Western social sciences.

As stated earlier, in the designative theory of meaning language becomes an instrument of control to obtain knowledge of an objective world. The world is seen to consist of objective processes. As such, the language that is used to describe such processes must itself be transparent. Language

cannot itself be the locus of mystery, that is, of everything which might be irreducible to objectivity. The meaning of words can only consist in the ideas (or things) they designate. . . . The alternative is to lose control, to slip into a kind of slavery, where it is no longer I who make my lexicon, by definitional fiat, but rather it takes shape independently and in doing this shapes my thought.⁷¹

If the world consists of objective processes and if language simply designates these processes, then language can be said to be neutral in the sense that it does not reflect the values, interests, or the cultural context of the speaker. By extension, then, the language of Western social science is also neutral, which is the same thing as saying that social science is universal. Discourse and the practitioners of discourse do not mediate between the subject and the object. They only report what is objectively out there. This is a Western social science disguised as universal. It has its own theories, concepts, and categories.

Practitioners of Western social science in the positivist and empiricist traditions, including those in the Third World, are deluded into thinking that their categories are universal.⁷² They ignore the differences in intersubjective meanings between Western and non-Western settings and persist in using Western categories. This analysis is helpful because it enables us to see how, say, Arabic, Chinese, or Indian categories would have less legitimacy in the presence of Western "objective" ones. And all this occurs because we have all become followers of the

designative view. We see how holding onto a designative view aids in the elision of the reality of indigenous discourse. From Foucault, however, we learn of several other procedures of exclusion, limitation, and control. We get this from applying the critical set of analysis.

For example, in discussing division and rejection as a procedure of exclusion as discussed earlier, Foucault refers to the opposition between reason and madness.

Since the depths of the Middle Ages, the madman has been one whose discourses cannot have the same currency as others. His word may be considered null and void, having neither truth nor importance. . . . It was through his words that his madness was recognised; they were the place where the division between reason and madness were exercised, but they were never recorded or listened to. No doctor before the end of the eighteenth century had ever thought of finding out what was said, or how and why it was said, in this speech which nonetheless determined the difference.⁷³

Foucault goes on to say that although today the doctor does listen, it is within the context of the same division referred to above. This recalls the exclusion of another voice, that of the indigenous writers in the Third World. For example, the plight of the Muslim *'alim* (pl. *ulama*), rooted in the Islamic tradition, has parallels to that of the madman. Although his words are not considered null and void, his point of view is not considered scientific and, as a result, does not have the same currency as that of one trained in the Western social sciences; a point of view is held to be more relevant because it is modern and speaks the truth. For example, the views of the *ulama* on Westernization, the social consequences of the unveiling of women and of premarital sex, and the problem of secularization were never looked at as sources of insight into an alien reality. Rather than the reality with the *ulama's* views as guides forming the basis for study, it was the *ulama's* views themselves that became the object of metaanalyses.

Apart from this—and more importantly—Muslim points of view are cordoned off in a separate area, the area studied. Thus, universities even in Muslim countries have departments of Islamic studies in which Islam becomes the object of study and not a point of view of study. Such scholars are not regarded as qualified to enter the discourses on man and society, as this is within the domain of the sociologist, political scientist, and historian. As Foucault said, “There is a rarefaction, this time, of the speaking subject; none shall enter the

order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so."⁷⁴

Beyond this, when Islam is relegated to an area study and is not considered a point of view, then the area specialist is narrowly specialized and thereby excluded from other areas of discourse. Instead of viewing the world from a Muslim stance, he views only Islam, for his object of study is not the world through the mask of Islam, but only the mask.

Another procedure of the exclusion of discourses, an internal procedure, is the organization of disciplines. Those among the indigenous social scientists who aspire to attain the level of disciplines for their craft are up against numerous obstacles, for there is more to a discipline than the "possibility of formulating new propositions ad infinitum."⁷⁵ A set of propositions that is presented as constituting Chinese sociology, for instance, needs to "fulfill complex and heavy requirements to be able to belong" to the discipline of sociology. Such requirements include an experimental-statistical methodology over which Western social science has a comparative advantage.⁷⁶ Works that seek to indigenize the social sciences in their respective societies would not generally be accepted as part of the various social science disciplines. For these works to qualify for membership, they must deal with a determinate range of objects that should be reducible to variables. Statements about these variables are true only if there is a one-to-one correspondence with objectively verified situations. In a world in which positivist social science dominates, Third World social scientists, whose epistemological validity is being denied, cannot hope to have their voices heard.

Yet another means by which discourse exerts control is by way of "fellowships of discourse." These function to reproduce discourse within a closed community, according to strict rules. The "fellowships of discourse" in the social sciences are diffuse, yet constraining.⁷⁷ An example of the workings of such fellowships would be the proliferation of terms, concepts, theories, techniques, and methods that may as well be trade secrets as far as Third World scholars are concerned, in view of the costs and other difficulties involved in keeping up with the latest journals, monographs, and computer software and hardware.

In our final example, we discuss the opposition between true and false as a system of exclusion and control of Islamic discourses. In the opposition or division between true and false, the will to truth "tends to exert a sort of pressure and something like a power of constraint . . . on other discourses."⁷⁸ Foucault gave the example of how Western literature for centuries tried to ground itself on science, that is, on "true" discourses.⁷⁹ The will to truth operates through

defining the form that discourses deploy, the plane of objects that they address, and the techniques they use.

Expression in the Muslim social sciences is governed by the will to truth (in Western social science) in two ways that correspond to two main trends in the Muslim social sciences. In the first trend, the aspiration is to return to a past logic of discovery, a rationality that was prudential rather than instrumental. The goal of such a rationality was to show man the way of an ascent from the perception of the physical world to that of the spiritual. This type of rationality comes up against a technical-economic or instrumental rationality that excludes the nontechnical as unreason. The modern positivist conception of instrumental rationality, therefore, denies as legitimate Muslim forms of thought and action.

The second trend in the Muslim social sciences is a "scientific" one in that it attempts to ground itself on positivist science as conceived in the West. I have in mind the recent attempts at "Islamic economics" that have sought to ground the discourse in a theory of wealth and distribution in very much the manner that Western economic science is grounded. Such economics is unable to solve the problems that it addresses because what it amounts to is neoclassical economics dressed and made up in Islamic terminology. Not very different from neoclassical economics, it extends a technical-economic rationality over a wide range of problems, which presupposes a view of different ends as comparable outcomes, which in turn, entails the elimination of cultural hindrances to the comparability of outcomes. The main problem with this state of affairs is that under the guise of "Islamic economics" the policies generated in industrialised capitalist centers are implemented in the Muslim world and are legitimated.

Foucault criticizes the designative theory of language, and proceeds to show us in more colorful ways the control and limitation of discourses, as we have seen from the application of the critical or archaeological set. Most of the means of control and limitation of indigenous discourses referred to above have to do with the positivist and empiricist traditions in the Western social sciences, including the prominence of experimental-statistical methods. But Western social science cannot be reduced to positivist epistemologies. There are alternative interpretive traditions in the social sciences. But attempts at indigenous social science do not necessarily find allies in interpretive social science. The encounter between indigenous and interpretive social science is no less limiting to the former if it encourages nativism.

Foucault's genealogical set of analysis is concerned with the formation of discourses both within and without the limits of discursive control analyzed by the critical set. What is important in connection with

nativism is the principle of exteriority from the genealogical set of analysis in which Foucault cautions us against proceeding toward essences, or the "hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a thought."⁸⁰

In interpretive social science the native's point of view becomes the criterion by which scholars' descriptions and analyses are judged. Nativism, however, refers to the search for "essences" of the cultures of the Other and the highlighting of differences and absolute oppositions between Western and non-Western cultures.⁸¹

The potential dangers of nativism to indigenization efforts are of two types. One is that nativist social science falls into the very same trap that it wishes to oppose, that is, the tendency to uphold and perpetuate the superiority of Western cultural and political systems. For example, let us assume that there is a situation in which the experience of the Western self is incongruous with articulations that are offered in an Islamic setting. The goal of interpretation would be to study the intersubjective and common meanings embedded in Muslim social reality. These meanings would be for Muslim society and are partly constituted by self-definitions, which can in turn be re-expressed. But there are those who may not understand a particular self-definition that is said to underlie a Muslim society. In order for them to do so they would have to change their orientation to become socialized into the Muslim way.

Although such interpretive methods represent improvements, objective social science is not entirely free of its problems. We cannot assume that the Muslims are more in touch with their reality than is an outsider. For example, a Western intellectual historian studying the phenomenon of "Islamic social science" cannot take it for granted that Muslim social scientists themselves are in touch with the processes of normalization that are going on in their own society. All he can be sure of is that Muslim social scientists are calling into question the universality of the Western social sciences and are attempting to contest the accompanying control and normalization processes. Beyond that, it is conceivable that the "Islamic social sciences," stimulated by processes of normalization in Western culture, are themselves a victim of these said processes. And in fact, this is the case to some extent.

For example, when the uninitiated attempt to study the burgeoning literature in Islamic economics, they do so by trying to identify some hidden essence of Islam that underlies this economics. This attempt to understand Islamic economics in terms of the self-understanding of the Islamic economists leads them to become as unaware as the Islamic economists are about the true conditions in their society. After all, Islamic economics is merely a branch of neoclassical economics, serving the interests of capitalist expansion by supposedly opposing

it. In attempting to ground itself on a theory of rational man and a hypothetical-deductive methodology it has merely substituted Islamic terms for neoclassical ones, retaining the assumptions, procedures, and valuations. As such, it has failed to engage in the analysis and critique of a highly unequal capitalist world-system in which the gaps are ever widening. What this shows is that the intellectual historian attempting to share the actor's point of view—in this case, that of the Islamic economists—may not necessarily understand what Islamic economics means and may miss how this supposedly anti-Western economics was coopted and made to serve those very trends that it outwardly opposes.

Second, nativist social science, in celebrating absolute opposition between Western and Eastern culture, often results in a wholesale rejection of Western thought, which is to be substituted for by indigenous thought. Consider the following view: "The fact that concerns us here most is that all the social sciences of the west reflect social orders and have no relationship or relevance to Muslims, and even less to Islam. If we learn and apply western social sciences, then we are not serious about Islam."⁸² Another case in point would be from Arab social science, which in the 1980s tended to substitute the concept of *'umran* (the Khaldunian concept of civilization) for Western notions of society.⁸³

The critique of Western social science in terms of the control and limitation exerted over indigenous attempts at social science is not to be confined to the critique of positivist epistemology, but should be extended to nativist tendencies in interpretive social science.

Conclusion

It is clear that the call to indigenization is simultaneously the call for a liberating discourse that is able to break through the regimes of power and the techniques of control and normalization. Whereas positivist social science contributes to the normalization of developing societies, interpretive methods are not necessarily able to uncover the same processes of normalization that are propagated by indigenous actors (the problem of nativism). The situation of academic dependency in which Third World scholars find themselves leaves them susceptible to the imitation and wholesale adoption of Western ideas and techniques, which in turn perpetuates this normalization. The idea, then, is to break out of this cycle with a liberating discourse. The quest for indigenous forms of discourse is simultaneously the quest for a liberating discourse because of the specific historical circumstances in which the Third World finds itself. What will the indigenization of social science projects involve at the conceptual and empirical levels?

First, it would call for studies on imitation or the uncritical adoption of Western social science in the developing world. This would require a classification of the various forms of imitation in the areas of metatheory, methodology, theory building, empirical research, and policy formulation. It would be necessary to establish a set of criteria of relevance in order to distinguish between the uncritically adopted and creatively applied or indigenized. Furthermore, the mechanisms and ways in which this uncritical adoption hinders or merely does not facilitate development must be mapped. For example, what are the implications of positivist social science for development theory and policy? To what extent is current empirical research in developing societies irrelevant to the needs of these societies? In what ways are policies simply transplanted from advanced industrialized nations without taking into account local conditions?

Second, the call to indigenization would involve the study of the strategies and techniques of normalization that have arisen from the uncritical adoption and application of development theory in the Third World. What are the development policies and programs engaged in this process of normalization? Here it would be necessary in the research to draw a distinction between genuine problems of development, on the one hand, and those creations of "abnormalities," on the other. For example, poverty is a genuine problem but the lack of a "beautiful body" is a discursively created abnormality. A related question regards the forms of the institutionalization of normalization. Advertising would be one of them. Yet another question concerns the classification of normalization. Are there different forms and manifestations of normalization, and how can they be identified?

Third, indigenous social scientific activity means the study of the various ways in which indigenous voices are elided and controlled. Some of the procedures and principles involved in this have been discussed in the previous sections with reference to Foucault. To be sure, there are other principles as well as techniques. A possible example would be journal refereeing. How and to what extent is indigenous creativity stifled by the standards, prerequisites, and valuations involved in international journal refereeing?

Fourth, there must be conscious attempts to engage in social scientific activity with a view to taking into account the world views, sociohistorical contexts, and cultural practices of the indigenous societies so that indigenous concepts and theories can be generated. Some examples of this have been presented in a previous section.

Fifth, it is imperative that such attempts at indigenous social science have their own implications for political practice, social work, policy formulation, and program implementation. But just how indigenous theories of development influence practice must be articulated. For

example, how does having an indigenous concept of unemployment affect macroeconomic policies designed to curb unemployment?

And finally, it must be stated that the call to indigenization is not simultaneously a call to nativism or reverse orientalism. This refers to the trend of "going native" among both Western and local scholars and constitutes an almost total and wholesale rejection of Western social science. Indigenization is to be seen as a simultaneous call to internationalization as long as the latter is understood not as a one-sided process but rather as one emanating from developing societies while incorporating selectively the Western social sciences.

Some would argue, as Taylor does, that Foucault blocks out "the possibility of a change of life-form which can be understood as a move towards . . . greater freedom."⁸⁴ Taylor accused Foucault of adopting a "Nietzschean-derived stance of neutrality between different historical systems of power, and thus seems to neutralize the evaluations which arise out of his analysis."⁸⁵ An example is Foucault's discussion on the classical and modern ideas on punishment. In the classical epoch punishment is a liturgy. Some crimes are looked upon as violations against the political order, which is part of the cosmic order. And so punishment is not a matter of deterrence or reparation but rather one of restoring the order.⁸⁶ Although most tend to see the modern philosophies of punishment as improvements over the classical and less barbaric, for Foucault modernity has just another system of power, a "bio-power" that normalizes and disciplines to maintain a "bio-mass." This raises the issue of how an indigenous social science tradition in the various developing societies can at the same time be a liberating discourse. Insofar as indigenous social science yields research that is relevant to the problems of developing societies, it would be a liberating discourse. But here the reference is to liberation from the hegemony of Western discourses on development. This does not mean to say that indigenous discourses themselves do not wield power through the processes of normalization and disciplinary control. But this would be a different regime of power requiring separate treatment.

Notes

1. By this I am referring to the social sciences that have come into existence and have been developed primarily in the West. There is no intention to convey the impression that such Western knowledge is of no use to the Third World. This article itself draws upon Western thinkers when discussing the problem of the uncritical imitation of the social sciences in the Third World.

2. G. Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

3. S. H. Alatas, "Some Fundamental Problems of Colonialism," *Eastern World* (November 1956).

4. J. P. Singh Uberoi, "Science and Swaraj," *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 2 (1968): 119.

5. For a statement of the problem, see S. H. Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies," *International Social Science Journal* 34, no. 1 (1972): 9-25; and S.H. Alatas, "The Captive Mind and Creative Development," *International Social Science Journal* 36, no. 4 (1974): 691-699. See also Philip G. Altbach, "Servitude of the Mind? Education, Dependency, and Neocolonialism," *Teachers College Record* 79, no. 2 (1977): 187-204.

6. S. H. Alatas, note 5, "Captive Mind and Creative Development," p. 691.

7. Priscilla Weeks, "Post-Colonial Challenges to Grand Theory," *Human Organization* 49, no. 3 (1990): 236-244. See also Altbach, note 5, "Servitude of the Mind?"

8. Hussein Fahim and Katherine Helmer, "Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries: A Further Elaboration," *Current Anthropology* 21, no. 5 (1980): 644-650.

9. A. Portes, "On the Sociology of National Development," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 1 (1976): 55.

10. W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

11. E. E. Hagen, *On The Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1962); D. C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967); A. Inkeles and D. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).

12. D. Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 7.

13. R. B. J. Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, and Hegemony," *Alternatives* 7 (1981): 210.

14. For preliminary statements on this issue, see Alatas, note 5, "Captive Mind in Development Studies"; Alatas, note 5, "Captive Mind and Creative Development"; and S. H. Alatas, "Social Aspects of Endogenous Intellectual Creativity: The Problem of Obstacles—Guidelines for Research," in A. Abdel-Malek and A. N. Pandeya, eds., *Intellectual Creativity in Endogenous Culture* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1981), pp. 462-470; Yogesh Atal, "The Call For Indigenization," *International Social Science Journal* 33, no. 1 (1981): 189-197; and Krishna Kumar, ed., *Bonds Without Bondage* (Honolulu: East-West Cultural Learning Center, 1979).

15. Alatas, note 5, "Captive Mind and Creative Development," p. 693.

16. R. Batra, *Muslim Civilization and the Crisis in Iran* (Dallas: Venus Books, 1986).

17. For a discussion of this question, see Edward Said, "Third World Intellectuals and Metropolitan Culture," *Raritan* 9, no. 3 (1990): 27-50.

18. Akinsola A. Akiwowo, "Contributions to the Sociology of Knowledge from an African Oral Poetry," in Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King, eds., *Globalization, Knowledge and Society: Readings from International Sociology* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 103-117.

19. For more on nativism and reverse orientalism, see Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989); Val Moghadam, "Against Eurocentrism and Nativism," *Socialism and Democracy* 9 (1989): 81-104; Mona Abaza and Georg

Stauth, "Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism: A Critique," in Albrow and King, note 18, *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, pp. 209-230.

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21. Charles Taylor, "Language and Human Nature," in Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 216.

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59. For more on this, see Michel Edwards, "The Irrelevance of Development Studies," *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1989): 116-135.
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61. M. A. Qadeer, "Do Cities 'Modernize' the Developing Countries: An Examination of the South Asian Experience," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 31 (1974): 266.
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63. S. H. Alatas, "Intellectual Captivity and the Developing Societies," paper presented to the 30th International Congress of the Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Mexico, August 2-3, 1976, p. 2.
64. M. Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1949), p. 82.
65. Syed Hussein Alatas, *Corruption: Its Nature, Causes, and Functions* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990); Ledivina V. Carino, ed., *Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Controls* (Quezon City: JMC Press and Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1986); Kate Gellespic and Gwen Okruhlik, "Cleaning Up Corruption in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 1 (1988): 59-82; El-Wathig Kameir and Ibrahim Kursany, "Corruption as the 'Fifth' Factor of Production in the Sudan," Scandinavian Institute of African Studies research report no. 72, Uppsala, 1985; James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
66. Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His Work to the Third World," *Alternatives* 10, no. 3 (1984-85): 377-400. For further illustrations of normalization, see Marc DuBois, "The Governance of the Third World," *Alternatives* 16, no. 1 (1991): 1-30.
- It is not my purpose in this paper to describe and analyze the processes and procedures of normalization. The various policies formulated and implemented as outcomes of the strategies of normalization serve to advance the ideal and material interests of advanced industrialized nations in the Third World. These policies and the interests behind them have been studied by neo-Marxist, dependency, and world-system theorists. My aim here is to make the link between normalization and the uncritical adoption or imitation of the social sciences in the Third World.
67. Escobar, note 66, "Discourse and Power in Development," p. 387.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 387-388.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
70. These normalization tendencies are going on everywhere. Presumably, an indigenous social science would not be free of the processes of normalization.

But the relevant distinction here is normalization effected by an alien social science tradition versus one developed indigenously. In this article I am concerned with the former. The distinction is important because the procedures and principles of the control and limitation of discourses would be different in each case.

71. Taylor, note 21, p. 226.

72. For another discussion on the alleged universal character of Western social science, see Ignas Kleden, "Social Science Indigenisation: National Response to Development Model and Theory Building," *Prisma* 41 (1986): 27-38.

73. Foucault, note 28, p. 53.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

76. Western orientations in methodology are entrenched in many Third World societies even when inappropriate. For example, experimental-statistical methods are regarded as "correct" methods even where basic and reliable data are unavailable. See Altbach, note 5, "Servitude of the Mind?" p. 197.

Admittedly, this generally applies to expensive research technologies, which favor the rich. This principle of exclusion does not necessarily apply to the fields of history, philosophy, ethnography, social theory, and so forth, to which other principles of exclusion may apply. Nevertheless, to the extent that positivist and experimental-statistical methods dominate in the social sciences, this principle of exclusion is important.

77. Foucault, note 28, pp. 63-64.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

81. Moghadam, note 19, "Against Eurocentrism and Nativism," pp. 87-88. See also Abaza and Stauth, note 19, "Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism."

82. Kalim Siddiqui, *The Islamic Movement: A Systems Approach* (Tehran: Bonyad Be'that, nd), p. 23.

83. Abaza and Stauth, note 19, "Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism," p. 220.

84. Taylor, note 51, p. 180.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 154.