

TOWARD CRITICAL PATRIOTISM

Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China

Gregory P. Fairbrother

香港大學出版社

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— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

For my Dad

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Series Foreword

Most past research on Hong Kong has been generally aimed to inform a diverse audience about the place and its people. Beginning in the 1950s, the aim of scholars and journalists who came to Hong Kong was to study China, which had not yet opened its doors to fieldwork by outsiders. Accordingly, the relevance of Hong Kong was limited to its status as a society adjacent to mainland China. After the opening of China, research on Hong Kong shifted focus towards colonial legitimacy and the return of sovereignty. Thus, the disciplined study of Hong Kong was hindered for almost half a century, and the richness of a society undergoing dramatic economic, social and political change within the contemporary world was not sufficiently emphasized.

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Gerard A. Postiglione
Tai-lok Lui

Series General Editors

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1

Introduction

"If we accept that it is we who have to decide our future . . . we will have to strive for more active participation in politics, we will have to campaign for the allegiance of our youth, . . . we need to reform our education system." Thus wrote the author of "Has Hong Kong a Future?" in the student publication *Undergrad* in the midst of the 1967 anti-colonial riots in Hong Kong (quoted in Leung 2000, 212). This article, along with others like it appearing in student publications, represented burgeoning discussion and debate among students about their role in broader social and political affairs in Hong Kong. This increase in political consciousness and activism was in reaction to perceptions of an illegitimate colonial government which was out of touch with the local Chinese community and of the need for social and political reforms. Among the results of such discussions and rising student awareness in the 1960s were the University Reform Movement and the birth of the broader Hong Kong student movement (Leung 2000).

Twenty years later to the north in mainland China a similar situation was being played out. University students in late 1980s China were beginning to perceive that economic reforms were stalling and political reform was being postponed, that the potential of intellectuals to act as the nation's conscience and offer needed advice on China's future was going untapped, that nascent intellectual freedoms were under threat, and that the Chinese Communist Party was losing legitimacy in the face of its inability to deal effectively with corruption and economic woes such as inflation (Calhoun 1994; Hartford 1992; Lin 1994; Saich 1991; Unger

1991). Reactions to such perceptions took the form of an increasing disregard for the authorities, the rise of "salons" or discussion groups, and ultimately, the demonstrations and protest movement centered in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Among the demands during this student movement were the end of corruption; a speeding up of economic reform; freedoms of speech, publication, and assembly; the freedom to criticize and advise the government and participate in political decision-making; freedom from stifling political control; an independent judiciary; and a free press. The immediate result of the movement was, ironically, its own demise and a stifling of some of the few freedoms enjoyed prior to 1989.

These two examples of student resistance in the Hong Kong and Chinese contexts share characteristics with student political activism elsewhere (Altbach 1989). Such activism and resistance focuses attention not only on broader socio-political-ideological concerns but on issues that impinge on students themselves. There is a perception of the social, political, and economic manifestations of authoritarianism and oppression. This perception often leads to reactions of feelings of powerlessness in the face of authority, despite students' elite status in most societies. Further reactions include overt opposition to authority, struggles for the direct benefit of students as well as for idealistic causes, political activism, and protest movements. Among the varying results of these reactions are, for students themselves, a "cognitive liberation" (Leung 2000), and for society, a focusing of public consciousness on social, economic, and political problems; broader social unrest; concessions by governments; further government repression; or regime downfall.

Resistance can thus be seen as a process of perception, reaction, and result. Resistance, however, is not limited to overt group acts of opposition to state authority. The focus in this book is on the factors which lead to resistance at the individual level, in the minds, thoughts, attitudes, and dispositions of some Hong Kong and Chinese students. It traces the students' perceptions of the indoctrinating character of political education and their reactions to these perceptions in the form of critical thinking dispositions through to the result, for students themselves, of the formation of a set of critical and constructive national attitudes. As student resistance occurs in the face of state attempts to influence their attitudes toward the nation, the discussion here first turns to the origins of, and justifications for, such attempts.

Patriotism and nationalism (literally *aiguozhuyi* and *minzuzhuyi*, respectively, in Chinese) are relatively recent historical phenomena as sentiments toward the nation held by individuals in China. Despite a common cultural civilization and a state staffed by an intricate bureaucracy, it was not the nation, but rather the family, the clan lineage, and the village which formed the roots of social order in China prior to the twentieth century (Chu 1983; Dreyer 1993; Fei 1992; Johnson 1962). Confucian virtues called for loyalty to the emperor, but in practice, the loyalty of Chinese to their families and localities surpassed loyalty to the imperial ruler (Peake 1932). Although an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) may have existed in a cultural sense, actual political links between the leadership and the people were weak, a sentiment made clear in the saying, "Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away." Communication between the bureaucracy and the people, primarily in order to exact taxes and military or labor service, was top-down, and still reached only as far as the county level, beyond which bureaucrats relied on the power of village and clan leaders to maintain order (Chu 1983; Dreyer 1993; Fei 1992). These weak links between the government and the people "made it difficult for China to undertake major tasks that would require a national effort, such as large-scale economic development or concerted endeavors toward sociopolitical reform . . ." (Chu 1983, 10).

Before the twentieth century, formal education thus had a negligible role in shaping relations between the state and the populace. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the government issued regulations for the establishment of community and charity schools (Ch'u 1962; Rawski 1979), but provided no funds to the localities. The curriculum of all schools during this period focused on the Confucian Classics, using versions of varying difficulty, leading Spiller (1909, 202) to write that "not to communicate knowledge or learning, but to mould character, to instil right principles of action and conduct, is evidently the object of the Chinese common school." Aside from the establishment of schools, some attempts were made to reach the masses with moral education, by way of regular public lectures expounding the "Sacred Edicts." However, this practice extended only as far as the district seat, not reaching the bulk of the rural population (Ch'u 1962). The Sacred Edicts themselves focused on family and local relations, as well as encouraging moral behavior. There was no mention of the individual's relationship to the emperor or the state.

In response to the expanding threat of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century, the Qing government embarked on a series of state-strengthening and modernization reforms. The moves to strengthen government involvement in rural areas and to establish a modern school system were two aspects of these reforms (Duara 1988). Among the aims of the first modern school system, modeled after that of Japan, and outlined in 1903 but never fully implemented, was the development of schoolchildren's morality, public spirit, loyalty to the emperor, and patriotism (Cleverley 1985; Peake 1932). The middle school curriculum was to include the Confucian Classics, history, geography, and civics and economics.

The Revolution of 1911 brought an end to the Chinese dynastic system and launched a new era of modern government. Primary among state aims in the new environment was the creation of a body of citizens loyal to the nation, infused with modern values, and mobilized around the goal of ridding China of the threat of imperialist encroachment (Peake 1932). Nationally produced citizenship education textbooks during this period reflected the concerted efforts of the new government to cultivate loyalty to the nation over loyalty to the family and locality. In a discussion of the Five Cardinal Relationships which had governed social relations in traditional times, *Essentials of Ethics for Middle Schools* (1914) told students that the Confucian virtue of loyalty to the emperor should be substituted for loyalty to the nation, and while acknowledging the importance of one's duties to the family, the book pointed out that the family was the foundation of the nation. Students were explicitly encouraged to be patriotic and loyal to the nation in *Essentials of Ethics*.

In contrast to traditional educational techniques of concentrating students' attention on family morals and Confucian social relations through the use of historical examples, these early textbooks presented stories about the recent revolution and contemporary events. While some traces of traditionalism remained, they were often used as a contrast to modern progressive values. Some books were interspersed with quotations from Confucius and Mencius, while others quoted prominent figures in Western culture, including Washington, Lincoln, Franklin, Roosevelt, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Kant. Various values and concepts portrayed as modern appeared in the books, including liberty, equality, people's rights and freedoms, the virtues of a small family, the importance of science and of the rule of law, and the value of education for nation-building.

The concepts of patriotism and nationalism were presented in several ways in the earliest civics textbooks (Peake 1932). Students were encouraged to learn about the nation, its people, and the national government. China's unique ethics and characteristics, as well as its contributions to world culture in the form of the compass, printing, gunpowder, silk, and tea, were presented in order to instill national pride. On the other hand, China's weakness in the face of Western competition was blamed on the strength of family loyalties and people's lack of a sense of duty to the nation. A militaristic tone was apparent in several textbooks which discussed the importance of the military and soldiers in war and national defense. Anti-foreign sentiment and anti-imperialist themes, including calls to boycott foreign goods, appeared more prominently after the killing of Chinese students and civilians by foreign troops in Shanghai in 1925. Finally, there was some mention of national economic problems and policies, as well as the need for economic and industrial development.

The founding and rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Kuomintang (KMT)-ruled China of the 1920s saw the beginning of an ideological struggle which was in part played out in the educational arena. The struggle was reflected in a diminished emphasis on patriotism and nationalism in favor of more explicit KMT doctrines. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles of nationalism, people's livelihood, and people's rights began to be more aggressively promulgated throughout China by 1928, with the consolidation of power by the KMT after the drive against the northern warlords. Textbooks appearing after 1927 bore the title "The Three Principles of the People (*San Min Chu I*)," replacing "Civics," which had in turn replaced "Ethics" in 1923. While nationalistic content remained, over the next few years the proportion of textbook content devoted to the "Three Principles" and the KMT increased, and included topics related to the KMT's political program and its history, and characterizations of the KMT as the "salvation of the people" (Peake 1932, 180). Although the *New Age San Min Chu I Reader*, published in 1927, included material about both the KMT and communism, books published after this date clearly emphasized the superiority of the KMT's Principles. *Studies in San Min Chu I Education*, a teachers' guide published in 1928, declared the "enemies" of Nationalist ideology to be militarism, communism, and imperialism.

In the next two decades, education in China became increasingly politicized, reflecting the Kuomintang government's attempts to maintain and strengthen its power (Cleverley 1985). Prospective teachers were required to take courses in the "Three Principles" and anti-communism, and teachers of civics were required to obtain approval from local KMT headquarters. During the war with the Japanese from 1938 to 1945, schools in Japanese occupied areas (about 80 percent of China's educational institutions) taught Japanese language and political ideas. During the Civil War which followed, the Ministry of Education dropped the requirement for institutions of higher education to teach politics and ethics, and allowed primary and secondary schools greater freedom to determine their curricula, moves indicative of last-ditch KMT attempts to maintain popular support.

At the same time, schools in the Communist-controlled territories were operating with the objective of mobilizing the people to pursue revolutionary goals (Seybolt 1971). Political education courses in the Yan'an border region covered Border Region policies and organizations, economics and politics; the anti-Japanese war; and Communist ideology. History and geography courses emphasized modern history, politics, and economics. Mao Zedong's goal for education from this time forward was "to change man's consciousness so as to change the world in which he lives" (Seybolt 1971, 641).

The Common Program, adopted as a draft constitution in 1949, set forth new national goals for education that reflected Mao's educational philosophy that education was extremely important in serving the needs of revolutionary change:

> Article 41. The culture and education of the People's Republic of China are new democratic, that is, national, scientific, and popular. The main tasks for raising the cultural level of the people are: training of personnel for national construction work; liquidating of feudal, comprador, Fascist ideology; and developing of the ideology of serving the people. (quoted in Price 1970, 29)

In this context of ideological struggle and civil war in mainland China, there was considerable sentiment at high levels of the British colonial government, and more broadly throughout Hong Kong society, for restrictions on politics and political education in schools, in reaction to

the strong, and potentially destabilizing, political and patriotic sentiments among some of the colony's youth. In a memorandum in the aftermath of the 1925–26 anti-imperialist general strike and boycott in Hong Kong, Robert Kotewall, a senior member of the Executive Council, described views on the dangers of political activity in schools that Sweeting (1993) notes were widely shared by colonial and local Chinese elites:

> One of the most serious and significant features of the recent disturbances is the part played by schoolboys and students . . . It is necessary to learn from these events how to prevent the corruption of schoolboys in future, and particularly their attempts to interfere in politics . . . Now, let us try to trace the cause or causes of the present state of affairs. From the first year of the Chinese republic schoolboys and students in China have been arrogating to themselves the right to assist in the government of the country, and they have been encouraged by persons who had their own ends to serve. In so far as our own schools are concerned, there can be no doubt that to a very large extent the ground had been prepared for them for this trouble, as during the last two years or so very undesirable literature has been introduced into the schools, particularly the vernacular boy-schools, and some of the Chinese teachers had not been altogether innocent in this respect. (quoted in Sweeting 1993, 193)

In 1948, during the Chinese civil war, the governor, Sir Alexander Grantham again warned against politics in schools:

> There are those, and to my mind they are the most evil, who wish to use schools as a means of propaganda and poison the minds of their young pupils with their particular political dogma or creed of the most undesirable kind.
>
> This we know is what happened in the schools of Fascist States and is now happening in Communist-dominated countries. This deforming and twisting of the youthful mind is most wicked and the Hong Kong Government will tolerate no political propaganda in schools. (quoted in Sweeting 1993, 199)

Within forty years of both Grantham's statement and the promulgation of a Chinese constitution which called for education to promote an ideology of serving the people, the states in both the People's Republic of

China (PRC) and Hong Kong were faced with what scholars have called a crisis of legitimacy (Chen 1995; Cheng 1992; Ding 1994; Scott 1989). In the Mainland, successive political campaigns from the 1950s to the 1970s, and subsequently, the first steps toward a market economy, signaled a crisis of the Chinese Communist Party's Marxist-Leninist based legitimacy (Chen 1995; Domes 1990). After 1984, the crisis of the Hong Kong colonial government's already debatable legitimacy was exacerbated as it became essentially a lame-duck regime concerned with maintaining its authority and the colony's prosperity in the period leading up to the transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997.

The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been said to be based on its exclusive appropriation of a Marxist-Leninist ideology which justifies its authority to rule in the interest of pursuing the ultimate goals of a classless and egalitarian communist society in China (Chen 1995). By the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s, however, this Marxist-Leninist justificatory ideology was in crisis, leading the CCP to admit to the "crisis of three faiths" — faith in the party, socialism, and the country (Domes 1990). There were at least two reasons for this crisis, which by extension signaled a challenge to the CCP's authority and its justification to rule. First, from the early 1980s increasing political apathy and even opposition to Marxist-Leninist ideology appeared among large sectors of the population. As Domes (1990) recounts, party members themselves were increasingly no longer motivated by Marxism-Leninism; urban intellectuals were ceasing to believe in the doctrine and even expressing dissent; peasants, self-employed workers, and owners of individual enterprises were skeptical of ideology and cared more about policies which were materially beneficial to them; and youth held particularly negative and cynical attitudes toward Marxism-Leninism. Among the causes of this trend were disgust at bureaucratic corruption, resentment toward the party as a result of adverse experiences under communist rule, worsening economic conditions, increasing individualism, and increasing attraction to western influences, including capitalism.

A second reason for the CCP's crisis of legitimacy was what Chen (1995) calls a "fundamental-instrumental discrepancy," or a disparity between the CCP's pursuit of policies leading to a market economy and the basic tenets of its justificatory Marxist-Leninist ideology. The 1980s

and 1990s saw the increasing marketization of the Chinese economy and the expansion of private enterprise. At the same time, the redefinition of economic policies as leading to "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and the declaration that the nation was in the primary stage of socialism, signaled that the party was interpreting Marxism flexibly. The goal of economic development, a focus on increasing production, and the increasing use of capitalist practices began to take precedence over the ideological objectives of a classless and egalitarian society. These trends toward capitalism had the effect of undermining the CCP's claim to legitimacy based on its adherence to a justificatory anti-capitalist ideology.

This problem was compounded by the party's need to maintain the support, and address the interests of, two audiences with different priorities (Ding 1994). For access to resources controlled by the party-state bureaucracy and the military, the leadership needed to justify its legitimacy based on its original Marxist credentials. At the same time, in order to not only preserve social order and prevent disruption, but to gain the active support and cooperation of the population for the program of economic development, the party needed to justify its legitimacy on the premise that the policies it was pursuing were in the best interest of the nation as a whole.

The leadership therefore shifted toward patriotism as an ideology to justify its rule and guidance of society, while continuing to profess ultimate objectives in line with Marxist principles (Ding 1994). Patriotism was seen as not only acceptable to and capable of uniting the entire population, but as amenable to an interpretation which justified the party's legitimacy to rule. A *People's Daily* commentary noted that:

> Among patriotism, collectivism, socialism, and communism, patriotism has peculiar features and functions. Linked with age-old historical traditions and backed strongly by public opinion and social psychology, patriotism can easily be comprehended by, and gain acceptance from, the broad masses who differ in family origin, life experience, vocation, ethnic category, age, educational attainment, and level of political awareness. Patriotism is the banner of greatest appeal. (quoted in Ding 1994, 144)

In addition to its universal appeal, patriotism also provided an opportunity for the party to justify its own position in society, by equating

the nation with the party-state, stressing the party's patriotic achievements, declaring party members to be the most exemplary patriots, and claiming that the CCP was the best representative of the nation's interests. The party began a series of patriotic campaigns with the 1982 announcement of the "Three Loves" — love the party, love socialism, and love the motherland. A comprehensive action program for patriotic campaigns was promulgated in 1983, and schools were called upon to implement programs of "patriotic education," codified in 1994 with the publication of the "Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education."

The Hong Kong colonial regime has also been characterized as having experienced a crisis of legitimacy, especially after the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, by which it was agreed that Hong Kong would return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 (Cheng 1992; Scott 1989). Although the agreement made it clear that the Hong Kong government had little need for a long-term solution to the problem of legitimacy, the regime still had an interest in maintaining social order and its authority in the transition period. This task was complicated by the government's already debatable legitimacy due to its status as a colonial government whose control over Hong Kong's territory was established through a series of unequal treaties, the fact that the Hong Kong government was not party to the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future, and by China's interference on issues that straddled the handover date, such as the construction of the new airport (Lam and Lee 1993; Lau and Kuan 1988; Scott 1989).

Unlike the Chinese Communist Party's claim to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as a justification for its authority to rule, the Hong Kong colonial authorities had no systematic theoretical justification for their legitimacy as a governing power (Lau and Kuan 1988). Scott (1989) notes that following the social disturbances of 1956, 1966, and 1967, the government improved social policies, incorporated local elites into the administration, and stressed its pursuit of policies based on consultation and consent as justifications for its authority to rule. More importantly, as Lau (1982) notes, the government pursued a deliberate policy of the "depoliticization" of society, both to avoid offending the Chinese government and to preserve Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, conditions favorable to the colonial government's continued rule until 1997 and the economic development of Hong Kong society.

The Hong Kong governor, Alexander Grantham, expressed sentiment in favor of depoliticization in 1950, "We cannot permit Hong Kong to be the battleground for contending parties or ideologies. We are just simple traders who want to get on well our daily round and common task" (quoted in Lau 1982, 36). In support of this policy and "ideology," the government for the most part minimized its involvement in society, pursued essentially laissez-faire economic policies, limited its functions to preserving social order, and provided only vital goods and services, while at the same time preventing the emergence of political groups and limiting political rights and responsibilities.

Lau (1982) posits that this policy succeeded and that the government's legitimacy could be maintained because of the unique nature of Hong Kong Chinese society. On one hand, there was a Chinese Confucian cultural tradition of the avoidance of authority and political passivity. At the same time, there was the particularity of Hong Kong society, made up of self-reliant familial groups, of which many members arrived as refugees and depended upon the group for material support and economic gain in the face of a lack of government support. Because of this self-reliance, families did not need or desire interference from the government, nor were they interested in active social or political participation. Indeed, because of the experience of a good section of the population in the heavily politicized society of the Mainland, there was also a desire to avoid politics in favor of stability and a focus on material interests. This focus on economics found an equivalent in the fact that advancement in Hong Kong's international commercial society was based primarily on economic rather than political standing. These factors all contributed to a situation which allowed the government to remain non-interventionist in society and gain popular acceptance for an "ideology" of depoliticization. Unlike mainland China, where there was a shift over time in the ideological justification for the regime's legitimacy, the Hong Kong government for the most part maintained its policy of depoliticization during the transition period to Chinese rule from 1984 to 1997, despite a steadily increasing trend in the population toward more active political participation (Lam and Lee 1993).

The depoliticization of society found a corollary in the depoliticization of Hong Kong's educational curriculum (Bray and Lee, 1993; Leung, 1995). Civic education was relatively weak, especially in comparison with

political education in the Mainland. By virtue of a clause in the Education Regulations, until 1990 schools were forbidden to engage in education which was determined to be of any political nature (Education Department 1971). In light of the approaching change of sovereignty, the Curriculum Development Committee moved toward a change in this situation with the issuance of a set of *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* in 1985. Numerous studies have pointed out, however, that because implementation of the *Guidelines* was not made mandatory, a lack of resources directed toward civic education, and the lingering effects of the pre-1990 prohibition on politics in schools, civic education remained largely depoliticized in the period leading up to 1997.

Thus in both the People's Republic of China and the former British colony of Hong Kong we have states with an interest in preserving their own legitimacy and authority to rule, and the cooperation of the population in following state-defined paths to economic growth and development. In both cases, to accomplish these objectives the state adopted an ideology which had broad acceptance in society. In the Mainland, as a result of a loss of faith among sectors of the populace in the original guiding Marxist-Leninist ideology, the state adopted patriotism. In Hong Kong, while pursuing capitalist policies, the state adopted an approach, or "ideology," of depoliticization, in order to preserve a stable environment conducive to economic activity.

In both cases, there was a need to promote these ideologies throughout society, especially among the rising generation. In the PRC, the state wanted youth to have strong patriotic sentiments and to understand the importance of the interests of the nation as a whole. It attempted to achieve this objective by extending patriotic campaigns into the schools in the form of patriotic education. In Hong Kong, in the interest of social stability in the transition period, the state desired students who would show little concern for political matters, and in particular, would not hold strong, and potentially disruptive sentiments toward China. The Hong Kong government took an approach opposite to that taken by the Mainland. It promulgated a civic education curriculum which had among its objectives the preservation of social stability and the avoidance of the discussion of potentially controversial political issues such as democracy and nationality. In effect, it could be said to have been promoting a civic education which taught ambivalence toward the nation.

The following chapters focus on mainland Chinese and Hong Kong university students in the 1990s, the targets, in both instances, of state efforts to inculcate political attitudes in line with the respective state ideologies. Along a line of direct comparison, there is a concentration on the political attitudes of patriotism and nationalism, with the idea that the Mainland state desired students to be patriotic and nationalistic, while the Hong Kong colonial regime sought to create students whose patriotic and nationalistic sentiments were weak. In particular, the focus is on those *factors* which led students to hold attitudes which on the surface would appear contrary to the state's ideal intended goals: factors which led some Mainland students to hold relatively negative, neutral, or ambivalent attitudes toward the nation and factors which led some Hong Kong students to hold relatively positive attitudes toward the nation. In contrast to other studies which might interpret attitudes divergent from what the state and schools might desire as a failure on the part of schools themselves, the focus here is on students' own critical thinking dispositions, as representative of a more or less conscious form of resistance to the efforts of the state, through schooling, to influence their attitudes toward the nation. The primary goals here are therefore to build an argument for resistance as an explanation for divergent attitudes and to build a model of how resistance has played out in the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese contexts.

The objective of Chapter Two is to introduce the concept of resistance and how it emerges from a Marxist conflict perspective on society. A review of narrative on, and empirical studies of, political socialization is followed by a critique of the narrative's neglect of the idea of the state as representative of dominant groups in society; of the idea that the values promoted through schools' political socialization efforts are weighed in favor of these dominant groups; of the question of how the dominant group-defined values are presented as representative of society as a whole and how these values come to be accepted by subordinate groups; and of the question of why political socialization messages may not come to be fully accepted by their intended targets. To address these problems, the chapter introduces the concepts of the state and hegemony, as developed by the Marxist theoretician, Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci defines the state as representative of a society's dominant class and encompassing the educational institutions of civil society. Hegemony is the process by which

the objectives defined by a society's dominant group are presented to the population as universal and in the interests of the entire population, and whereby subordinate groups grant their consent to the ruling group and its direction of society. The room that Gramsci leaves for human agency and the construction of an alternative hegemony by subordinate groups has led to the development of the concept of resistance. Resistance, particularly as developed by Henry Giroux, entails the perception of dominant class hegemony among some members of subordinate groups; their reaction to this perception of hegemony and a realization of their powerlessness; and the result of this reaction in a form of self-emancipation which challenges the relations of domination. Resistance is represented here by students' dispositions to think critically, which includes skepticism, intellectual curiosity, and an openness to multiple perspectives. This study looks at how critical thinking affects students' perceptions of the political socialization process and their attitudes toward the nation. It examines the nature of resistance to state-directed hegemonic political socialization efforts in school among mainland Chinese and Hong Kong university students, and the influence of this resistance on students' attitudes toward the nation.

Chapters Three and Four provide historical background and a current context for the examination of student attitudes. They show how the colonial government in Hong Kong and the CCP in mainland China promulgated their ideologies through schooling, corresponding to the process of hegemony as described in Chapter Two. Through document and textbook analysis, Chapter Three demonstrates the depoliticization of civic education in Hong Kong in the colonial state's interest of producing a younger generation with neutral sentiment toward China. Restrictions on political education in schools from the highest policy level were accompanied by a depoliticized civic education curriculum. This took the form of discretionary guidelines which, although they included topics addressing the question of national identity, had little government support in terms of resources, and were, for the most part, not actively implemented by schools or teachers. This situation is contrasted with post-1997 Education Commission-proposed reforms which put civic education at the forefront of the education agenda and called on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government to provide active support for its implementation.

Chapter Four demonstrates shifts in the content of the Mainland state's hegemony from its establishment in 1949 through the 1990s. Sensitivity over the relative stress to be placed on Marxism-Leninism versus patriotism and nationalism as ideologies justifying the regime's rule is reflected in the content of textbooks published during the period, culminating in the 1994 release of the "Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education." In contrast to civic education in Hong Kong, patriotic education in the People's Republic of China has broad support from the central policy down to the school level. Unlike Hong Kong's non-mandatory civic education guidelines, political education policy documents direct the implementation of patriotic education in Mainland schools. Policy documents stress the important position of political education and call for the improvement and strengthening of curriculum, course materials, and teaching methods. The documents provide administrators and teachers with guidance on the definition and characteristics of patriotism and patriotic education; problems leading to the need for enhanced patriotic education; national goals to which patriotic education is expected to contribute; knowledge about and attitudes toward the nation expected of students; and the implementation of patriotic education.

The subsequent three chapters present data and analyses from interviews with 20 Hong Kong and mainland Chinese university students and a questionnaire survey administered to 535 students in fourteen universities throughout Hong Kong and mainland China. Chapter Five provides a descriptive account of the nature of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese students' attitudes toward the nation, finding that as the respective states would have wished, Hong Kong students as a group were mostly ambivalent toward China, while Mainland students tended to be considerably more patriotic and nationalistic. It provides detail on the meaning for students of each of seven theoretically-grounded dimensions of national attitudes: an emotional attachment to the nation, a sense of duty to the nation, the precedence of national over individual and regional interests, a favorable impression of the Chinese people, a perception of China's superiority over other nations, a desire for China to be a more powerful nation, and a belief in the importance of patriotism over internationalism. It further finds that despite the difference in strength on these dimensions between Mainland and Hong Kong students, students

in both societies held the strongest attitudes with relation to a desire for national power, a sense of duty to the nation, and an emotional attachment to the nation.

Chapter Six describes students' perceptions of the political socialization process, again based on data from interviews and the questionnaire survey. It finds that the largest percentage of Mainland students perceived that their secondary school education, in contrast to the university, the media, family, and friends, had been an important influence on their national attitudes, reflecting the importance given to patriotic education by school administrators and teachers themselves. By contrast, and in line with the context of a depoliticized civic education, only one-third of Hong Kong students perceived their secondary education as an influence on their attitudes toward China, although this percentage was slightly higher than that of students who perceived the university, family, or friends as an influence. The media was ranked first as a perceived influence on their attitudes toward the nation by Hong Kong students. The chapter also provides detail on individual aspects of schooling and other socialization experiences, including students' perceptions of the influence of the curriculum, extracurricular activities, and teachers' encouragement of students to form their own opinions about national affairs.

Chapter Seven introduces the critical thinking dispositions as they are developed in the literature on critical thinking and as they emerged from student interviews. Skepticism is shown to encompass perceptions of schooling about the nation as indoctrination, as inaccurate or biased, and as not corresponding with what students learn outside the school or later in university. Intellectual curiosity encompasses a desire to learn more about one's nation and to meet and share experiences with people from other parts of the country. An openness to multiple perspectives refers to students' willingness to take into consideration different perspectives in forming their attitudes about the nation. To provide detail on the meaning of these dispositions and the context of the experiences from which they emerged, the chapter presents profiles of six students, each of whom exemplifies either a particular aspect of, or, by contrast, the absence of, critical thinking. It then presents detail from the rest of the interviews and survey data to bring out more fully the meaning of each of the dispositions. In the context of a depoliticized civic education in Hong

Kong and of the perception of a number of Hong Kong students' that their secondary education had not been an important influence on their national attitudes, it was curiosity that emerged as the most striking disposition in the interviews. On average, however, Hong Kong students were equally curious about their nation and skeptical of the socialization process. It was skepticism about the political socialization process that appeared as most striking in the Mainland context of a relatively comprehensive patriotic education, but survey data showed that Mainland students were on average more curious than skeptical. The chapter also presents two related factors: students' perceptions of themselves as having a tendency to think critically about national affairs, and as making up their own minds in forming their national attitudes.

Chapter Eight shows the relative strength of the effect on national attitudes of socialization and critical thinking factors by comparing three multiple regression models. The first of these considers only the effects of socialization factors on national attitudes, to demonstrate the relative influence of schooling, the university, family, media, and friends on patriotism and nationalism in the absence of the effects of critical thinking. The second considers only the effects of critical thinking dispositions on attitudes, again to show each disposition's relative influence on attitudes in the absence of effects from socialization. The third combines socialization and critical thinking factors in one model to demonstrate their relative influence when considered together. The comparison of the first two models shows that critical thinking factors taken alone provide, in most cases, a stronger explanation for the nature of national attitudes than socialization factors taken alone. In the third model, which combined both types of factors, critical thinking factors were again the most important relative to the socialization factors, further demonstrating their strength. Furthermore, the inclusion of critical thinking dispositions and socialization factors in the same model reduces the strength of a number of socialization influences between the first and third models, suggesting that the importance of some of these socialization influences lies in the critical thinking dispositions that they foster.

Continuing this line of reasoning, Chapter Eight then examines in detail the impact of socialization factors on critical thinking, as well as the relationships among the critical thinking dispositions. It does this by presenting multiple regression analyses which take each of the critical

thinking factors as dependent variables in models which demonstrate the influence on them of the socialization and each of the other critical thinking factors. This demonstrates that in addition to any direct impact that a socialization factor may have on national attitudes, it may also have a further complementary or contradictory indirect effect on attitudes by influencing critical thinking factors. The relationships among critical thinking factors also display contradictions, especially those among skepticism, curiosity, and a tendency to think critically. For example, while skepticism has a negative effect on national attitudes, it also increases Hong Kong students' curiosity, which has a positive effect on attitudes.

Chapter Nine integrates the theoretical perspectives from Chapter Two with the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese educational contexts, and the data from student interviews and surveys, to construct a model of student resistance to the hegemonic political socialization efforts of the state and schools. Reiterating that these efforts were not uniformly successful in producing patriotic students in mainland China or students with neutral sentiments toward the nation in Hong Kong, it draws attention to students' own critical thinking dispositions as the primary reasons for the lack of success. Examining in detail the three components of resistance — perception, reaction, and result — the chapter demonstrates how resistance is played out through the interactions of key socialization and critical thinking factors. It concludes with a reconceptualization of the concept of resistance in these contexts as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes.

2

Hegemony and Resistance in Education

The previous chapter noted the interest of both the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong governments in preserving social order and their authority to rule, and the further interest of both governments in motivating populations to concern themselves with economic activity and development. These two goals are also reflected in the general literature addressing states' desires for individuals to form identifications at the level of the nation-state. On one hand is a regime's desire to preserve its own power and legitimacy, as well as political control and social order. Although coercion and the exercise of power could serve to integrate the masses and induce them to follow the state's demands, in the long run, regimes have an interest in citizens viewing the government as a legitimate authority to define societal-level goals (Bloom 1990; Kelman 1969). Individuals identifying with these goals and holding positive attitudes toward their nation and state can be expected to accept ideologies which justify the state's authority to rule, to fulfill their obligations as citizens, and to be loyal to and defend the nation in times of competition and conflict with other nations, both in national defense and military expansion (Brass 1994).

On the other hand, regimes have a desire to use their power to achieve socioeconomic objectives, mobilizing the population for political, social, and economic development. Economic growth can be seen as depending on the mobility of, and efficient communications among, the populace at the level of the nation. Social communication is enhanced if people share cultural characteristics, a national language, and view each other as

members of the same political community (Gellner 1983). To elicit active support for and participation in national projects, and to sustain this participation in times of rapid social change, regimes have a strong interest in the population identifying with the community at the level of the nation (Verba 1965).

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The process by which regimes attempt to justify their rule and motivate populations behind national goals is political socialization, whereby children are taught about, and encouraged to form attitudes supportive of, the political system and the nation. Among the foci of various empirical studies of political socialization have been political knowledge and information, issue awareness and knowledge, and ideological awareness (Denver and Hands 1990; Ehman 1980; Niemi and Hepburn 1995; Rosenberg 1985); party affiliation and views about authority (Merelman, 1972); tolerance or hostility to authority (Merelman 1986); political interest and involvement (Merelman 1972); political efficacy and participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Langton 1969); radicalism, conservatism, and democratic values (Coleman 1965; Ehman 1980); political cynicism and alienation (Ehman 1980); positive attitudes toward political ideologies (Dawson et al. 1977); and ethnocentrism, nationalism, patriotism, and commitment to national integration (Canieso-Doronila 1989; Dawson et al. 1977).

Children are unlikely to learn about such abstract concepts as the nation by themselves. Through the process of political socialization, therefore, most societies make conscious efforts to teach knowledge and shape attitudes about the nation (Easton 1965), including what the nation is, its characteristics and those of its members, its political and economic systems, and the relationship of the individual to the nation. This teaching is performed by family members, peers, and more systematically by schooling and the mass media. As they learn about other nations, children may also develop evaluative orientations toward their own country, judging it as better or worse in relation to others (Almond and Verba 1963).

Political socialization efforts carried out by agents of socialization are dependent upon the state for the content of the messages conveyed to

younger generations. What individuals learn about the nation is important in determining the nature of their attitudes toward it, and the state therefore has a crucial role to play in defining what the nation is and how its nature is presented to the socialized. One way it accomplishes this is through the construction and promotion of national symbols and myths, such as flags, emblems, anthems, and histories, which provide fodder for the development of positive attachments to the nation and contribute to citizens' feelings of commonality with fellow nationals and their uniqueness in relation to outsiders (Bloom 1990; Connor 1994). This "invention of tradition" entails the selection, transformation, and reinterpretation of culture, religion, history, philosophy, literature, and art (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). Ideologies stressing the state's sovereignty, legitimacy, authority, and position as an object of allegiance are also promoted among the population as aspects of the national identity (Katz 1965). These symbols, histories, and ideologies are imbued with emotional value and reflect positively on the state, portraying it as representative of the national family, a protector against outside threat, and a material benefactor. Histories describe golden ages of heroism as models for action, convey a sense of national dignity, and unite sub-national groups under a myth of common descent (Smith 1986).

The state provides a variety of mechanisms and channels for the dissemination of these symbols and ideologies. It promotes rituals such as flag-raising ceremonies and the observance of public national holidays in remembrance of key historical figures and events. These rituals and ceremonies are made all the more powerful by virtue of their social nature; they are conducted in public, with everyone expected to participate (Katz 1965). Their solemnity and repetition, furthermore, provide emotional conditioning to feelings of patriotism and nationalism. The state by itself, however, requires the assistance of a number of agents within society to carry out these events, activities, and other aspects of the political socialization process. Among these key societal agents are the family, the media, and especially, the more manipulable system of mass public education.

Research on political socialization has posited that the family has an important role to play in inculcating basic political attachments, attitudes and loyalties, such as patriotism, in youth (Dawson et al. 1977; Langton 1969; Merelman 1972). One way these effects are believed to be produced

is through parents prescribing or intentionally teaching particular political attitudes. On the other hand, however, children are also unintentionally exposed to political education, broadly conceived, whenever they overhear parental discussions about politics or hear family members expressing views about authority or particular political leaders (Greenstein 1969). Youth can sense their parents' political attitudes from family discussions and their parents' own political involvement. Even more fundamentally, the family indirectly influences children's political attitudes by placing them in a particular socio-economic-political context, which determines the nature and degree of their exposure to various other types of socializing agents (Beck 1977). The family, for example, may exercise control over children's exposure to the mass medium of television, which may be used by the state or other economic or political interests to convey particular political viewpoints (Merelman 1986). The media are believed to be able to shape political attitudes by providing political information, transmitting political opinions, or by creating particular images of political events and figures.

However, because of the importance of positive attitudes toward the nation in regime legitimation, political socialization is not left solely to families and the media. Instead, in nations around the world, systems of mass education have been entrusted by the state with inculcating a set of positive attitudes toward the nation in the rising generation (Coleman 1965; Fagerlind and Saha 1989; Meyer and Rubinson 1975). Schools are believed to have the power to break down local and regional identities, unite diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, and contribute to national political integration and cohesion. By requiring courses in a national language, national history and geography, civic education, and social studies, schools are believed to increase students' knowledge of, positive attitudes toward, and belief in national culture, goals, and ideologies.

Schools are believed to influence students' political attitudes by conveying knowledge and prescribing attitudes through the curriculum and textbooks, through children's participation in extracurricular and ritual activities, and through the influence of teachers on their students. Through courses such as civics, citizenship education, national history and geography, national language and literature, social studies and others, schools transmit knowledge about the nation, the political system, and

political processes. Schools are also believed to directly teach or promote particular political values, attitudes, and ideologies. In addition to the material taught from textbooks in the classroom, rituals and activities that take place at school are thought to reinforce positive attitudes toward the nation. Schools display the national flag as well as pictures and sayings of national heroes and leaders. Activities such as the raising of the flag and singing of patriotic songs, along with other activities and ceremonies emphasize the public nature of patriotism and encourage solemnity and respect (Dawson et al. 1977). Finally, some researchers have posited that teachers themselves have a potentially considerable influence on students' political beliefs. They may be perceived as authority figures deserving of respect, or as models of particular political beliefs (Dawson et al. 1977). Teachers may therefore serve to reinforce the messages of the curriculum and extracurricular activities, but they also have the potential, if they express political views contradictory to the status quo, of undercutting the school's intended socialization efforts.

Despite this view of schooling's role in fostering political attitudes, empirical research has resulted in equivocal findings on the effects of schooling on political attitudes. Although later studies questioned the validity of their results, Langton and Jennings (1969) came to doubt the effectiveness of schooling on shaping political beliefs, based on their findings of very weak correlations between attendance in American high school civic education courses and a number of political attitudes. Reviews of other empirical studies have also cast doubt upon the effects of the curriculum, teachers, extracurricular activities, and the general secondary school experience on student political orientations, views, values, attitudes, and behavior (Beck 1977; Ehman 1980; Merelman 1972; Merelman 1986; Rosenberg 1985). Other studies have also specifically demonstrated weak effects of schooling on attitudes toward the nation. Reading's 1972 study of Colombian primary school children attempted to measure the effects of schooling in creating national pride, and found that schools had failed to inculcate consistently positive attitudes toward the nation. A study among primary school students in the Philippines similarly found that students' attachment to the nation was not particularly strong (Canieso-Doronila 1989). The fact that there was no significant improvement in students' attitudes over the course of their primary schooling led the author to claim that schools were failing to accomplish

their mission of creating patriotic students. In a 1978 comparative study of Malaysian secondary schools varying on the dimensions of medium of instruction, ethnic make-up, and student social background factors, Bock found that between-school differences in students' nationalist orientation were largely accounted for not by differences in the schooling experience, but rather by differences in social background factors that were determining of students' access to the nationalist messages of the English-speaking Malaysian elite. Dougherty et al. (1992) found differences in the meaning of national identity among English and Argentine secondary school students, but attributed the differences to cultural differences in the importance of territoriality rather than any direct effect of schooling.

Several explanations for results showing the ineffectiveness of schooling in influencing student attitudes lay blame on the structures and actors of schooling itself. The explanation of redundancy asserts that by the time students reach secondary school, the political messages of the school are duplicating those which students have already encountered in earlier stages of schooling or outside the school (Beck 1977; Langton and Jennings 1969). This argument asserts that classes and activities in later years of schooling are just a repetition, albeit in more detail perhaps, of those in previous years, and furthermore, that political messages from secondary school are echoes of what students are hearing, and have already heard, from other sources such as the media, peers, and family. The result of this redundancy is that new information and political messages have a diminished impact, and their effect is not as apparent as in earlier stages of schooling. This explanation makes the important assumption of consensus among the messages that students hear from the school and other agents of socialization.

Another school-level explanation of the ineffectiveness of schools' political socialization efforts lies in the compromises schools and teachers make between the intended curriculum, often mandated by the state, and the implemented curriculum. This explanation places teachers in the position of mediators between the state and students. One strain of this explanation posits that teachers are constrained by conflicting demands and pressures from administrators, other teachers, parents, and students, and are thus unable to teach the curriculum as intended. Giving teachers the appellation "street-level bureaucrats," Weatherley and Lipsky (1977) describe the tactics teachers employ to cope not only with conflicting

demands, but also with a workload for which sufficient resources are not available. They found that teachers manage these pressures, in the absence of guidance or in the face of vague or contradictory guidelines, by "routinizing procedures, modifying goals, rationing services [and] asserting priorities" (172).

Another strain of this explanation attributes a greater degree of agency to teachers, maintaining that teachers exercise a degree of autonomy and rational choice in carrying out tasks which may include attempts to teach political attitudes. When faced with decisions about higher-level policies, such as implementing a new or reformed curriculum, teachers, as rational professionals, make judgments and decisions based on a cost-benefit type analysis (Clark and Yinger 1979; Morris 1995; Schwille et al. 1983). Schwab (1983) describes teachers as debating, deliberating, and deciding what content to cover in the classroom, a process he considers an art. "There are a thousand ingenious ways in which commands on what and how to teach can, will, and must be modified or circumvented in the actual moments of teaching" (245).

Other factors to consider in understanding the role of teacher as mediator between the intended and implemented curriculum are those of power and subjectivity. Goodlad (1984) sees teacher autonomy in instructional decision-making as a source of feelings of power in a profession where many other aspects of work, such as assignment of students to classes or budgetary responsibility, are beyond their control. Goodlad et al. (1979) point out that teachers themselves understand and interpret the intended curriculum in different ways. Teachers are faced with a need to interpret and reinterpret textbooks in order to help students make sense of material that may be vague or abstract (Morris 1995). In the final analysis, the implemented curriculum may differ substantially from that originally intended after teachers have specified "how much time will be devoted to a subject, what topics will be taught, and how well topics are to be learned" (Schwille et al. 1983).

Another explanation of the ineffectiveness of schooling in influencing political attitudes focuses on characteristics of students themselves, with some scholars pointing to the intrinsic failure of students to grasp political messages. As Hess and Torney (1967) explain, the cognitive development model of political socialization posits that children must have reached an appropriate developmental level in order to understand certain political

concepts. Accordingly, schools may fail in their attempts to teach more difficult or complex concepts to students because students have not yet developed the capability to understand them. Furthermore, differences among students in terms of mental capacity or intelligence will have limiting effects on political socialization efforts, as some students may simply not be able to understand, or may misunderstand, some political concepts presented to them in the classroom. Aside from the question of intelligence, political messages may be received differently by students based on their varying levels of interest in the subject matter. Depending on content and teaching methods, civic and political education may be ineffective because it causes boredom among students, leading them to miss or ignore the intended lesson (Dawson et al. 1977).

THE STATE, HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE

The studies and narrative which comprise the preceding review of the state's interest in individuals identifying with the nation-state and the process of political socialization can be said to come from a functionalist sociological perspective, which characterizes societies as being based on balance among social groups, order, and broad value consensus. This perspective holds that political socialization is designed to preserve this social order and consensus and to maintain the political, economic, and social status quo (Easton 1965; Morrow and Torres 1995; Parsons 1959; Paulston 1977). Failures of political socialization efforts are largely attributed to dysfunctions in the system. This view of societies, however, pays insufficient attention to several questions that are valuable in providing insight into the process of political socialization and the prospect of the state's failure to inculcate attitudes supportive of the system and the nation through schooling.

The first of these questions is that of the state representing or acting primarily in the interest of a society's dominant group, a class whose power rests in its position with regard to the forces of production. Second is the issue of conflicts of value and interest among different groups in society, and the corollary that political values and attitudes promoted by the state may be heavily weighted in favor of the values and interests of a dominant group. Third is the question of how the values promoted by the dominant

group are presented as representative of the interests of the entire community, and how these values come to be, to a large extent, accepted by subordinate groups. Fourth is the question of human consciousness, agency, and will, especially with regard to working toward an explanation of why political socialization messages may not come to be fully accepted and adopted by their targets.

The conception of the state and the concept of hegemony as developed by the Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci, and the concept of resistance, particularly as developed by Henry Giroux, are especially useful in providing insight into these four questions. The following discussion will therefore review the definition of the state and its relationship to a society's dominant class, the process and content of hegemony, and the question of human consciousness in Gramsci's writings, as a way to conceptualize the process of political socialization. This will be followed by a discussion of the concept of resistance as an explanation for the fact that attitudes desired by the state may not be altogether faithfully taken on by the objects of political socialization, its citizens.

As a first step in understanding Gramsci's definition of the state, it is necessary to define his conception of "civil society." Civil society, according to Gramsci, is "that ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private,'" (Gramsci 1971, 12) including the church, trade unions, and schools. In his writings Gramsci sometimes distinguishes between civil society and the state, or "political society" or government. He notes, however, that the equating of the state solely with political society is a conceptualization of the state "in the *narrow* sense of the governmental-coercive apparatus" (265, italics added). Elsewhere, he notes that the distinction between political society and civil society is "merely methodological" (160). Gramsci's *general* conception of the state therefore includes both political society and civil society: "the general notion of the State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society . . .)" (263). In this sense, therefore, schools, along with other social and educational institutions, become part of the state apparatus. It is also important to note that Gramsci sees the state as the "organ of one particular group, designed to create favourable conditions for the latter's maximum expansion" (182). In extending this conception, he brings out notions of importance to the current study of political socialization: "the State is the

entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" (244).

Although Gramsci was writing in a context in which it was the capitalist, bourgeois class which dominated the state and society, his opening the possibility for proletarian control of the state broadens his concepts, making them useful not only for the analysis of capitalist societies, but also for societies in which a party-dominated state attempts to consolidate socialist policies (Salamini 1981). Other scholars emphasize that his concepts are applicable not only to bourgeois or proletarian class rule, but to any form of group domination of the state and society (Mouffe 1979; Sassoon 1980). Given this caveat, it remains true that, in Gramsci's writings, the position of a ruling or dominant class in society is gained and maintained due to its dominance in the sphere of economic activity. This point is further emphasized by the assertion that a subordinate group wishing to gain control of the state apparatus must be capable of transforming society's economic base so as to further economic growth and development (Texier 1979).

Because economic development fosters the expansion of the ruling group, this group has an interest in raising the population to a "cultural and moral level" which will enable it to meet the needs of the further expansion of production (Gramsci 1971, 258). The dominant group therefore wants and needs the masses to accept not only its authority to rule, but also the "general direction [it imposes] on social life" (12). It accomplishes this through a process known as hegemony, by which the objectives of the ruling group are presented to the population as "universal" and in the interests of the entire population, rather than as solely in the interest of the dominant group itself. Hegemony is responsible for the "'spontaneous' consent" granted by the bulk of the population to the dominant group's rule and direction of society (12), and it corresponds to the function of civil society within Gramsci's definition of the state, while political society represents the exercise of coercive power to discipline those who do not award the state their consent. The state is thus also seen as "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" in the interest of the ruling class achieving its goals (263). As an organism of civil society, schooling is seen as one of the most important components of the hegemonic process.

Although the interests of the ruling class dominate, hegemony does not represent a dominant class-specific philosophy or ideology which is portrayed as common sense and imposed onto subordinate groups; it does not function as a mystification of the dominated (Mouffe 1979). This cannot be the case, given Gramsci's position that a subordinate group's rise to power is predicated upon its construction of an alternative hegemony. Rather, hegemony involves the creation of a "collective will" or a "'cultural-social' unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim . . ." (349). In other words, the ideology or world-view promoted in society through the hegemonic process will draw upon and incorporate elements of ideologies from subordinate groups. The constructed common ideology will, however, always be centered around a unifying "hegemonic principle" which is the expression of the interests of the dominant class (Mouffe 1979). The dominant group will create a successful hegemony when the hegemonic world-view includes elements from all sectors of society, allowing the group to be seen as representative of the interests of society as a whole.

Hegemony is not static; it must be continually maintained through the activities of the institutions of civil society. Furthermore, the content of hegemony is constantly adapting to changing historical circumstances (Giroux 1983). The hegemony and authority of the dominant group is the object of continuous negotiation with other groups in society, where inputs from subordinate groups are incorporated into the direction of the state, but the interests of the dominant group predominate:

> . . . . the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria . . . between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups – equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest. (Gramsci 1971, 182)

Because hegemony involves the continuous adaptation and accommodation of other groups' interests, it cannot be seen as a cohesive force (Giroux 1981). Rather, it involves contradictions that leave it open

to challenge by members of subordinate groups. Gramsci writes, "To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 'psychological'; they 'organise' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc." (377). These ideas of actors acquiring consciousness of their position and of the potential of engaging in struggle against the dominant class' hegemony have been taken up by scholars and developed into a theory of "resistance." The concept of resistance, in relation to the hegemony of the dominant group and the associated relations of domination, can be said to entail three components: Gramsci's concept of actors' acquisition of consciousness of their position, or their *perception* of dominant class hegemony; their *reaction* to this perception of hegemony and a realization of their powerlessness; and the *result* of this reaction in a form of self-emancipation which challenges the relations of domination.

One component of resistance is an individual's perception and critique of hegemony or the unequal relations of domination (Giroux 1983). For example, the students characterized as exhibiting resistance in one study were those "most likely to identify injustice in their social lives and at school . . ." (Fine 1982, quoted in Giroux 1983, 284). Perception of hegemony may arise out of situations in which students find incongruity between the political messages they are being taught in school and alternative messages from other groups or actors in society. In an ethnographic study of a French village, Wylie (1974) describes such a situation. While children read "beautiful sentences" about the nation in their civics textbooks, outside of school they constantly heard adults expressing attitudes "in direct conflict with what the children are taught in school," with adults referring to government as "a source of evil" and to officials as corrupt (207–8). Students' confusion was likely to be increased by other passages in textbooks describing popular "disdain" and "distaste" for politics, which Wylie describes as the "reality that children have witnessed" (208). Mitter (1993) describes a similar situation in Eastern Europe in which students, taught Marxist-Leninist ideologies in school, came into regular contact with alternative or contrasting values from their families, peers, religious communities, and other groups of an apolitical nature. Writing about interviewees' recollections of 1950s China, Chan (1985) notes that one student from a "petty capitalist" background adopted the negative attitudes toward the national order held by his family,

in contrast to the attitudes being transmitted to him in school. Rosen (1993) notes the gap that existed between political education in Chinese schools, and students' actual experiences, by the early 1990s. Schools competed with presentations of Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and western culture through various forms of media and entertainment, a situation which led Chinese surveyors to bemoan the growth of "national nihilism" and a decline of patriotism among students.

Situations such as these may lead students to recognize the school's, and by extension, the state's hegemonic interest in disempowering them by promoting an ideology skewed in the interests of the dominant group (Clayton 1998; McFadden and Walker 1997; Willis 1977). Students' perceptions of hegemony may then lead to a reaction including feelings of powerlessness and the idea of their being subject to domination (Giroux 1983). Giroux (1983) notes that "on one level, resistance may be the simple appropriation and display of power . . ." (285) and may be manifested in a wide variety of oppositional behaviors by students. Some studies posit that resistance reveals itself as rebellious acts of student behavior. For Foley (1991), resistance by Mexicano students to the ideologies of the dominant group, represented by Anglo schools and teachers, was exhibited by students engaging in "making-out" games to disrupt classes, thereby "outwitting teachers and slowing down the boring routines of pedagogical formalism" (545). Others interpret resistance as students' refusal to learn the basic values of dominant groups. Willis' *Learning to Labour* (1977) describes how the "lads," working class males in an English school, rejected society's dominant values by resisting the content and practices of schooling characterized by "feminine" intellectual work, constructing instead a counter-culture which gave value to manual labor. Going one step further, resistance may be enacted as rejecting schooling altogether. Munns and McFadden (2000) thus explain the high primary school drop-out rate among Australian Aboriginal people as resistance against their feelings of powerlessness in an unequal society and their perception of schooling as maintaining social inequalities. On a more conscious and active level, reactions may take the form of a challenge to dominant groups themselves. Kelly (1978), in her study of education in Vietnam during the French colonial period, writes that French-administered schools, through the curriculum, tried to restrict the aspirations of the colonized to modernity and autonomy by depriving

students of knowledge of modern political and social organization, science, and technology. Most Vietnamese, however, recognized this form of education for what it was, and some responded by forming independent self-study and self-education groups or seeking to send their children to France for a modern education.

Ironically, some of these reactions, such as dropping out of school altogether, may produce a result which serves the interests of the dominant groups (Giroux 1981). For example, by resisting and rejecting schooling, Willis' lads and the Aboriginals in Munns and McFadden's study ironically solidify their social positions by forgoing any opportunity that school might provide for upward social mobility. Giroux (1983), however, notes that resistance is not limited to this kind of result. Instead, he advises that "the nature and meaning of an act of resistance must be defined by the degree to which it contains possibilities to develop what Herbert Marcuse termed 'a commitment to an emancipation of sensibility, imagination, and reason in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity'" (290). As part of this self-emancipation, Giroux notes, a reaction of resistance should involve "critical thinking and reflective action" (291). The result of resistance for the individual, therefore, is emancipation and an enhancement of individual power in relation to dominant groups. Because of this shift in the balance of power, resistance can also be said to have the possibility of leading to a result that detracts from the interests of the dominant group.

In summary, the state can be conceived of as the government apparatus and bureaucracy, together with private institutions such as schools, representing the interests of the dominant group in society. This group owes its position to its dominance of the economy. Hegemony is the process by which the dominant group gains the acceptance of subordinate groups for its position and authority to direct society, a process that encompasses political socialization. Hegemony consists not of dominant group-specific ideologies or principles but of a "collective will" incorporating a world-view weighted in favor of the ideologies held by the dominant group, together with elements of subordinate group ideologies. Because hegemony is never complete, however, it leaves open the possibility of resistance, entailing a perception among some members of subordinate groups of the hegemony that keeps them in a subordinate position. This perception may lead to a reaction that reflects the power

of the dominated, in the form of acts of rebellious behavior or, more importantly, critical thinking which serves self-emancipation.

The potential for, and nature of, resistance formed the basis for the study described here, which attempted to inquire into the nature of resistance among mainland Chinese and Hong Kong university students to hegemony in the form of state-directed political socialization efforts in school, as well as the influence of this resistance on students' attitudes toward the nation. The study conceived of resistance as critical thinking, as recommended by Giroux (1983), and as exhibited by students in the form of the critical thinking dispositions of skepticism, intellectual curiosity, and an openness to multiple perspectives, concepts which emerged in interviews with Hong Kong and mainland Chinese students. The study also focused on the attitudes of patriotism and nationalism, with the idea that the mainland Chinese state, with an ideology of patriotism, desired students to fully develop these attitudes, while the colonial state in Hong Kong, with an "ideology" of depoliticization, preferred that students not develop strong political sentiments, especially with regard to their nation. Specifically, the study looked at relationships among students' perceptions of schooling and other agents of socialization, their critical thinking dispositions, and their national attitudes.

3

Civic Education in Hong Kong

Pre-handover Hong Kong education policy with regard to the school curriculum has been described as autocratic and top-down, and determines the range and content of school subjects, the provision of curriculum guidelines, and textbook selection (Cheng 1992; Leung 1995; Morris 1997). Curriculum policy, like other aspects of education, is governed by the Education Regulations, and new policies may only be initiated by the Executive Council, in consultation with the Education Commission and the Board of Education. Power is centralized in the Education Department of the Hong Kong government, which is headed by the Director of Education, whose actions are in turn governed by the Education Regulations. With regard to the curriculum, these Education Regulations state that "No instruction may be given by any school except in accordance with a syllabus approved by the Director" (Education Department 1971, 92(1)) and "No person shall use any document for instruction in a class in any school unless the particulars of the title, author and publisher of the document and such other particulars of the document as the Director may require have been furnished to the Director not less than 14 days previously" (Education Department 1971, 92(6)).

The Curriculum Development Council (CDC) (before 1988 the Curriculum Development Committee), carries out curriculum policy, and is responsible for designing the curriculum, producing syllabuses, and approving school textbooks. These processes take place, with the exception of the views of the public representatives who are members of the advisory Education Commission, largely without input from the

majority of teaching practitioners or the public (Morris 1992). Policy is in effect also carried out by the Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority (HKEAA), an independent statutory body which produces syllabuses for subjects examined in the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE) and Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE). HKEAA syllabuses can be seen as more influential than those produced by the CDC, although the two are unlikely to diverge to any significant extent, because they determine the content of the examinations which, due to the pressure for schools to produce good examination results, are the driving force behind the content of school subjects, textbooks, and teaching methods. Civic education has developed in this policy context since the 1930s in Hong Kong.

A DEPOLITICIZED CIVIC EDUCATION

In line with the idea of the depoliticization of Hong Kong society as described in the introduction, a number of scholars have similarly described pre-1997 Hong Kong education as depoliticized (Bray and Lee 1993; Leung 1995). This depoliticization can be seen as being a result of two major factors, the first being Hong Kong's status as a colonial territory with an insecure government of questionable legitimacy, tolerated by but still under considerable political influence from China, and dependent on her for food and water resources (Bray and Lee 1993; Morris 1997). From the time it was first developed until the 1970s, civic education was seen as a counter to first Kuomintang and later Communist ideologies, yet without presenting an ideology to substitute for them. The strategy taken by the Hong Kong government and educational authorities, therefore, was to depoliticize the curriculum. The ruling power, which had a strong interest in maintaining order and social stability, did not wish to raise the political consciousness of a populace which might question its authority (Chan and Morris 1994).

A second, and related factor, was the interest of the government, as well as business elites, in maintaining a stable environment conducive to private economic activity. Economic growth was a top government priority, and the emphasis of education was on its economic and pragmatic, not its political, value to individuals and the colony (Bray and Lee 1993).

Furthermore, Friederichs (1991) posits that business elites and their representatives in the Education Commission desired an educational system that did not encourage the formation of an informed and critically thinking student body, which might threaten their political, economic, and cultural privileges and status.

Following the 1949 victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Mainland, and the subsequent anti-British campaign in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government put the depoliticization of Hong Kong education into law. In 1952 it promulgated a new Education Ordinance which strengthened the powers of the Director of Education. Governor Sir Alexander Grantham justified this measure with reference to the need for control over politics in schools:

> The special powers conferred by Sections 37 and 38 of the Ordinance are considered necessary to safeguard the interests of individual pupils and of the community as a whole against the use of schools for political indoctrination. During the past four years this danger has arisen chiefly from Chinese Communist Party sympathizers. (quoted in Sweeting 1993, 201)

In 1971, Education Regulations further formalized restrictions on political activities in schools in the following terms:

> No instruction, education, entertainment, recreation or propaganda or activity of any kind which, in the opinion of the Director, is in any way of a political or partly political nature and prejudicial to the public interest or the welfare of the pupils or of education generally or contrary to the approved syllabus, shall be permitted upon any school premises or upon the occasion of any school activity.
>
> No salutes, songs, dances, slogans, uniforms, flags, documents or symbols which, in the opinion of the Director, are in any way of a political or partly political nature shall be used, displayed or worn, as the case may be, upon any school premises or upon the occasion of any school activity except with the permission of the Director and in accordance with such conditions as he may see fit to impose. (Education Department 1971, 98 (1)/(2))

SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIC EDUCATION PRIOR TO 1985

The Hong Kong civic education curriculum emerged and developed in such a context of depoliticization. Civics as a school subject was first introduced to Hong Kong secondary schools in the 1930s, and became a publicly examined subject in 1950 (Morris 1992).

Civics education textbooks in this early period had a distinctly apolitical character, exemplified by an absence of attempts to instill loyalty to the community or government. Only one chapter of *Civics for Hong Kong* (Yau 1950) was devoted to citizenship, and it was covered in very abstract terms, without reference to a "sense of belonging" to any particular community or nation: "Citizenship may be defined [as] the legal relationship between a permanent member of a politically organized community and that community" (Yau 1950, 1). The topic of citizenship occupied only about two percent of the content of the series of books, *Living in Hong Kong* (Tingay 1966), one of the first books published after the course entitled "civics" was changed to "economic and public affairs" (EPA) in 1965 to stress topics more relevant to Hong Kong's internal affairs. The two chapters on citizenship in *Economic and Public Affairs* (Li and Lau 1971) comprised only about three percent of the series. In discussing loyalty, the text stated, "A second quality we all should learn to develop is loyalty. Being loyal means being faithful. We should always be loyal to our family, friends, and school. After leaving school, we should be loyal to our employers and those who are working with us" (Li and Lau 1971, 41). The duties citizens were obliged to fulfill, as described in this book, were to obey Hong Kong's laws, to pay taxes, to serve jury duty, to take an interest in public affairs, to keep the city clean, and to defend the city in times of war. There was little attempt to convey a sense of loyalty or belonging to Hong Kong.

It should be noted that although there were few references to patriotism or the Chinese nation in the civics and EPA curriculum during this period, Hong Kong students were exposed to patriotic sentiment through courses in Chinese history and literature. References to patriotism, however, were limited to stories of traditional Chinese figures, and the emphasis was on an apolitical Chinese culture. A 1953 report of the Chinese Studies Committee stated that:

> In the past, Chinese studies in China tended to aim at producing ignorant and bigoted Chinese nationalists. This is not educationally sound and should be strongly discouraged in Hong Kong. Here, after having attained proficiency in their own language, literature, and history, Chinese pupils should be guided another step further to utilize this as a basis for making comparative studies of Eastern and Western thought and language. It is only through such studies that Hong Kong children can become modern Chinese, conscious of their own culture and at the same time having a liberal, balanced, and international outlook (cited in Luk 1991, 666–7).

Together with the desire to maintain stability by de-emphasizing politics in schools as exemplified in the apolitical nature of civics and history curricula, the Hong Kong government's justification for its legitimacy was also apparent from the stress in civics texts on the benefits it bestowed on the Hong Kong population. Textbooks during this period devoted a large proportion of content to the services provided by the government. *Civics for Hong Kong* (Yau 1950) described social services, public housing, public health, education, and public utilities. Forty-three percent of the content of *Living in Hong Kong* (Tingay 1966) was devoted to similar topics, and the book pointed out that the government provided assistance to refugees and the entire population by providing "food, water, roads, transport, schools, work, sanitation, health, hospitals . . . good government, and protection by the law" (Tingay 1966, 1: 10). These topics comprised 41 percent of the content of *Economic and Public Affairs* (Li and Lau 1971, 1972, 1973).

The lack of content related to politics or the nation in published syllabuses and textbooks was reinforced by the ban on discussion of politics in schools, embodied in Education Regulation 98, leading teachers to avoid any topics that might be considered sensitive or controversial. Aside from the explicit policies disallowing politics in schools, a lack of official commitment to civic education overall is evident from the fact that throughout the 1970s none of the Education Department's Annual Reports even mentioned civic education (Bray and Lee 1993).

THE 1985 *GUIDELINES ON CIVIC EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS*

The nature of civic education had the potential of being substantially altered when in 1984 Britain and China signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, beginning the 13-year transition period to the colony's reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. According to the agreement, Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China along the concept of "one country, two systems," enjoying a high degree of autonomy except in the areas of defense and foreign affairs. In the sphere of education, one response to the Joint Declaration was calls from pressure groups, the media, and legislative counselors for strengthened political education in Hong Kong's schools, in order to ensure that future citizens would have the political capacity to maintain Hong Kong's autonomy (Chan and Morris 1994). The formal syllabus for the senior secondary-level economic and public affairs course was adapted accordingly, with a greater percentage of content devoted to democratic and representative forms of government, Hong Kong's relationship with Britain and China, and Hong Kong's future as a Special Administrative Region (Morris 1992).

More importantly, the decision on Hong Kong's future resulted in the 1985 publication of *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools*. The *Guidelines* recommended an interdisciplinary approach, emphasizing civics-related content within the existing courses of Chinese, Chinese history, economic and public affairs, economics, geography, government and public affairs, history, religious education, and social studies, as well as through extracurricular activities (Curriculum Development Committee 1985). All levels of education were affected.

The stated aims of the 1985 *Guidelines* were:

1. To promote a growing understanding of the nature and workings of our community-based institutions and organisations and an appreciation of the values, dispositions and principles which are characteristic of a democratic community.
2. To shape the attitudes and behaviour of young people in preparation for an effective participating role in adult life.
3. To develop the social and political skills necessary for a rational appraisal of the basic issues which affect the life of the community and to encourage the formulation of opinions and

judgments rooted in a respect for reason and individual autonomy.

4. To offer all pupils the opportunity to gain experience and skill in discussion, debate and decision-making through participation in a variety of formal and informal situations and structures (Curriculum Development Committee 1985, 10).

The *Guidelines* further described goals for students' knowledge, attitudes, and skills to be promoted throughout the courses related to civic education. Those with particular reference to the nation, China, were:

- Sense of national identity and belonging
- Love for the nation and pride in being Chinese
- Respect for Chinese culture and tradition
- Willingness to contribute towards the economic development of China
- Appreciate the need for interdependence
- Appreciate the importance of the role of China in maintaining stability and prosperity in Hong Kong
- Appreciate the contribution of Hong Kong toward the modernisation programmes of China
- An awareness of the latest developments in China

(Curriculum Development Committee 1985, 30)

In support of the objectives of the *Guidelines*, and in what could be seen as a symbol of the government's commitment to civic education, a Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education was established in 1986, comprised of representatives from government and the community (Lee, 1999). Among its accomplishments was the subsidizing of 261 projects, producing teaching kits, and providing advisory services to teachers. The Education Department also began the publication of a quarterly *Civic Education Newsletter* and an annual *Civic Education Bulletin*. Civic Education Resource Centres were also established to provide teachers with reference materials, teaching kits, and advisory services.

Related Curriculum Changes

In addition to the publication of the civic education *Guidelines*, in the years following 1985 there were revisions to the syllabuses of related subjects, including the incorporation of more content related to China. In the subject of history, the syllabus prior to 1988 placed the overwhelming focus in Chinese history on the period before the 1949 establishment of the People's Republic of China. A substantially revised 1988 syllabus shifted to a topical treatment, including "the Opening of China and Japan," and "China from the Self-Strengthening Movement to the May 4th Movement," but without discussion devoted to specific nations in the period after the Second World War up to 1970 (Morris 1992). However, there were no significant changes in content in the separate subject of Chinese history. Similarly, although the Chinese literature syllabus was revised to incorporate a few texts written by contemporary Mainland authors, the potential political effect of this move was somewhat offset by the inclusion of a similar number of texts written by authors from Taiwan.

The junior secondary-level social studies syllabus was also revised in 1989. While there was little mention of China in the original syllabus, the revisions included a focus on the Chinese people as one of five areas of study. Topics included under this heading were the cultural heritage of the Chinese people, the structure of the Chinese government, the Chinese economy, and Chinese geography (Morris 1992). Activities suggested for pupils included collecting pictures of PRC political figures, drawing the Chinese national flag and emblem, preparing a chart to show the rise of the Communist Party, and discussing the importance of planning for a country's economic development.

A new subject, government and public affairs (GPA), was introduced at the Advanced Level in 1988 and at the Certificate level a year later. The theme of "Hong Kong and China" covered the relationship between Hong Kong and China, Chinese political institutions, and recent developments in China and their impact on Hong Kong (Morris 1992). 1996 revisions to the syllabus emphasized even more strongly an understanding of China, China's relations with the United States, and Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty (Lee and Bray 1995). Another new subject at the Advanced Supplementary Level, liberal studies,

included "China Today" as one of its six modules. This module's aims included helping students to understand the special relationship between Hong Kong and China, and the ways in which Hong Kong contributes to China's modernization. It included content on socialism, China's modernization, the legal system, the Communist Party, and the People's Liberation Army (Lee 1999).

Criticism of the Guidelines

It would appear that a good amount of progress in creating national identity and a sense of belonging to China was intended through the publication of the civic education *Guidelines* and revisions to related school subjects. However, even as late as 1995, economic and public affairs textbooks still contained negligible content related to the concept of the nation. As an example of this, although a 1995 economic and public affairs textbook, *This is Hong Kong* (Macmillan Publishers 1995a, 1995b, 1995c), included several chapters on citizenship and identity, the focus was on "personal identity" and "official identity," including subtopics on certificates, identity cards, and travel documents. An enumeration of rights and responsibilities was relevant solely to Hong Kong, aside from a section informing students that these rights would not change after 1997. Loyalty was defined as faithfulness to the family, to the school, and to the community. There was no mention of China or national identity.

Furthermore, a substantial amount of criticism surfaced in the years following the publication of the *Guidelines*, to the effect that they did not represent genuine attempts to change the *status quo*. Morris (1997) noted that the subjects targeted for revision by the *Guidelines* were unpopular, of low status, and studied by a minority of students. He writes, "EPA has declined rapidly in popularity following the introduction of Economics in 1975. GPA is studied by a handful of pupils. Social studies is officially part of the core curriculum but is offered in less than 20 percent of schools, whilst liberal studies is offered in about 10 percent of schools" (113). Leung (1995) found in a 1988 survey that only 37.4 percent of students in the arts stream and 16.1 percent of science students took economic and public affairs, leading him to decry the differential access arts and

science students had to civic education-related subjects, with science students having almost no exposure to such subjects.

The problems of student access and the popularity (or unpopularity) of subjects could have been addressed through the whole-school approach that the *Guidelines* promoted. They recommended bringing civic education-related content into play in a variety of other subjects. However, this raises the question of whether teachers of different subjects had access to the *Guidelines* and, if so, how closely they followed their recommendations. Tang and Morris (1989), on the basis of a survey of nearly 200 history teachers from 80 schools, concluded that the level of implementation of the *Guidelines* was disappointing. They write,

> The picture that emerges is that the majority of History teachers in secondary schools were not aware of, or were unclear about the Guidelines and their school policy toward civic education. The overall situation evidenced in this study is that 65% of the sample of History teachers had not attempted to implement the Guidelines. Of those 35% who had attempted implementation the level of use was low (48).

Furthermore, for several reasons it was the whole-school, interdisciplinary approach itself that contributed to the low level of implementation of the *Guidelines*. First, the nature of the civic education *Guidelines* was advisory, discretionary, and optional, leaving schools, specifically headmasters, to decide whether, and how, to implement them. The *Guidelines* themselves were vague and inconsistent on these questions (Chan and Morris 1994; Tse 1997). Because they were not mandatory, the *Guidelines* were viewed by many as an *ad hoc* and uncoordinated government action, with little subsequent support and no additional funding for resources or teacher training. Schools were expected to squeeze funds out of existing budgets, and time out of existing schedules, to implement the *Guidelines*.

Furthermore, their cross-curricular nature was in stark contrast to the mainstream curriculum subjects, for which there were set syllabuses and textbooks. Therefore, the fact that the Education Department did not mandate an independent civic education course conveyed a sense that civic education was not a very high priority. This perception was compounded by the fact that civic education content did not, to a substantial degree,

diverge from or add to that of existing subjects, apart from suggesting some teaching about China and national identity (Bray and Lee 1993; Chan and Morris 1994; Friederichs 1991). Because of this, schools devoted few resources to civic education, did not put much effort into the implementation of the *Guidelines*, and did not make significant changes to existing subject priorities. Few schools developed the recommended explicit, coordinated policy, or appointed a Civic Education Coordinating Committee to plan for civic education teaching and activities (Tse 1997).

Classroom and extracurricular activities organized by schools included discussions, group projects, guest speakers, school assemblies, form periods, patriotic rituals, field trips, Hong Kong-Mainland student exchange programs, and fund-raising programs for the Mainland (Lee n.d.; Morris 1997; Tse 1997). However, the number of schools offering such activities was limited, and they tended to involve little student participation or follow-up. Lee (n.d.) notes that the treatment of national identity in these activities was from the perspective of cultural, rather than political, identity, and that history-related activities focused on ancient rather than contemporary periods.

The low priority accorded to civic education was echoed at the teacher level. Teachers were already primarily concerned, even burdened, with teaching subjects that were publicly examined, and additional civic education was not seen as a priority (Lee, n.d.). The schools' shortage of resources translated into a lack of training for teachers who were already ill equipped in skills and strategies for teaching civics. Few teachers attended courses or seminars organized by the Education Department, visited the Civic Education Resource Centers, or even read the *Guidelines*. Many teachers who had read them still had a lack of interest in or a poor understanding of civic education concepts (Leung 1995; Tse 1997). However, even if teachers were interested in the subject, they may have felt unable to take much initiative, or nervous about dealing with politics and controversial issues, given the Education Regulations and the ban on politics in schools which remained in place until 1990 (Friederichs 1991).

These criticisms have led a number of scholars to comment that despite their publication, the civic education *Guidelines* did not substantially alter the depoliticized nature of civic education in Hong Kong. The *Guidelines* promoted consensus and harmony and did not acknowledge conflicts of interest in society. Rather than dealing with and

preparing students for change they promoted an acceptance of the *status quo*, an emphasis which is all the more striking in light of the approaching transfer of sovereignty. The introduction to the document itself even states: "There is a special need at this particular time in Hong Kong's social and political development for schools to renew their commitment to the preservation of social order and the promotion of civic awareness and responsibility . . ." (Curriculum Development Committee 1985, 1). Reminding us of the two different perspectives on political socialization discussed in the last chapter, the *Guidelines* justify their conservatism with the following conclusion:

> Socialization is usually understood as a process through which new or immature members of society are induced to accept and conform to traditionally established ways of life. To this end, civic education, with the promotion of social responsibility as its main aim, becomes a method of political socialization. However, there are those who consider that civic education should not be used in this way, claiming that its 'products' become merely passive, consenting adults all too ready to 'toe the government line.' Critics of political socialization would prefer to see young people grow up with a reforming zeal, prepared to question established authority and introduce radical changes.
>
> In light of Hong Kong's recent political development, evolution should be the watch-word and the emphasis in this guide will be on civic education as a politically socializing force for promoting stability and responsibility (9).

The *Guidelines* therefore tended to promote the avoidance of controversy and warned against taking an ideological stance. Teachers were cautioned against the introduction of ideology in the classroom with a section explaining the difference between political education and political "indoctrination." The latter, teachers were told, involved "inculcating a belief in a political proposition (or propositions) regardless of evidence" (Curriculum Development Committee 1985, 8). The *Guidelines* therefore recommended an approach of "free and informed discussion." However, given the caveats, it is not surprising that teachers tended not to encourage the discussion of controversial issues. An example of this attitude is found in Lee and Leung's (1999) study, where one teacher responded to the idea of students' expressing disagreements about government in school by

noting that: "There are many channels to air one's disagreement about the government. Students need not do this in school. We don't have this policy in our school" (22).

Lee (n.d.) notes that even the question of national identity was regarded as controversial and treated apathetically. Textbooks mentioned Hong Kong's international identity more often than national identity, and there was no provision for the discussion of national identity as an independent topic in the curriculum. On this matter, however, Morris (1997) posits that the fact that elements of national identity, patriotism, and nationalism were treated at all, in addition to the avoidance of controversy, was in the interest of appeasing Hong Kong's future sovereign. On the other hand, he notes that the *Guidelines* could also be seen as one way of contributing to the legitimacy of a government that still had twelve years to rule when they were published. He concludes that:

> . . . the state's attempts at reforms designed to promote civic education in its broadest sense are classic examples of what Cuban (1992) describes as 'symbolic action' which serves primarily as a legitimating device which demonstrates concern for the perennial dilemmas of schooling rather than an attempt to change the implemented curriculum. The outcome is a façade of change, a substantial gap between the rhetoric of policy and the reality in schools, and a general failure to achieve any significant impact on schools (p. 123).

TOWARD THE STRENGTHENING OF HONG KONG CIVIC EDUCATION

Another way to demonstrate the depoliticization of colonial era civic education is to contrast it with reforms and reform proposals immediately preceding and following the 1997 handover of sovereignty. First, calls for strengthening civic education, especially with regard to teaching about the nation, are themselves an indication of the weakness of existing civic education. Second, statements of objectives related to teaching about the nation in the civic education guidelines revised in 1996 are more specific and stronger than the 1985 *Guidelines'* objectives, which made no mention of the nation. Finally, the attention given to civic education, again with specific attention to the nation, in the overall aims of Hong Kong

education in post-1997 documents contrasts with the suggestive and discretionary nature of the 1985 cross-curricular guidelines.

The 1996 Revised Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools

The result of the continuation of a depoliticized civic education curriculum in Hong Kong, despite the existence of civic education guidelines, can be seen in the findings of the "Study on the Development of Civic Awareness and Attitudes of Pupils of Secondary Schools in Hong Kong," carried out in 1991 and published in 1995 by the Curriculum Development Council (1995). It found that students' civic knowledge was "barely satisfactory" and that it was even worse with regard to knowledge about China. It similarly found that students' attitudes toward China did not reach the positive level that their attitudes about Hong Kong and the world did. The report recommended that schools should more strongly promote an understanding of and concern about China, especially with the 1997 transfer of sovereignty on the horizon.

As 1997 approached, these recommendations were echoed by the subgroup on cultural affairs of the Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) for the future Special Administrative Region, as well as Hong Kong-based Chinese officials, who criticized the lack of patriotic and nationalistic elements in existing textbooks and civic education activities (Lee and Bray 1995). The PWC recommended that after 1997, civic education should aim to strengthen patriotism and nationalism, knowledge of the Basic Law (Hong Kong's post-1997 mini-constitution), and an appreciation of the concept of "one country, two systems." It was suggested that these goals be achieved through a more thorough teaching of geography and Chinese history. Because of these pressures, as well as those from groups aiming to enhance democratic and human rights education, a working group was set up in 1995 to review the 1985 *Guidelines*. A revised version of the *Guidelines* was published in 1996.

The general aims of this publication were more specific than the 1985 version, with respect to both national identity and Hong Kong's autonomy. In contrast to the 1985 version, whose overall objectives made no mention of teaching about the nation, the aims of the 1996 *Guidelines* were:

1. To enable students to understand how the individual, as a citizen, relates to the family, the neighboring community, the national community and the world; and to develop in them positive attitudes and values conducive to the development of a sense of belonging to Hong Kong and China, so that they are ready to contribute to the betterment of society, the state, and the world.
2. To help students understand the characteristics of Hong Kong society, and the importance of democracy, liberty, equality, human rights and the rule of law.
3. To develop in students critical thinking dispositions and problem solving skills that would allow them to analyse social and political issues objectively and to arrive at a rational appraisal of these issues (Curriculum Development Council 1996, 21).

As in the 1985 *Guidelines*, there is a section detailing appropriate knowledge, skills, and attitudes regarding the nation. The revised *Guidelines* add a section on the Chinese government as well as one on general concepts of government, including sovereignty, representative government, the electoral system, public social and political participation, and public opinion.

A significant change related to ideology apparent in the 1996 *Guidelines* is the deletion of the sections cautioning teachers against political indoctrination and education for democracy, and the addition of a section on teaching controversial issues, including different interpretations of democracy as well as the appropriate pace of democratic change. The *Guidelines* also include, for the first time, a section on the importance of understanding a nation's prevailing ideology:

> To become a participative and contributive citizen, the civic learner should understand the ideology(ies) fundamental to one's own government and culture, as well as the country's political, economic, and administrative systems. . . the specific domestic context for the Hong Kong civic learner is China. One needs to know the current ideologies the Chinese government is upholding, i.e. socialism and communism; the economic system, i.e. planned economy and socialist market economy; the administrative system, especially the fundamental mechanism of democratic centralism and the Party. Moreover, one should aim to enhance the understanding of Chinese culture and Chinese history, which is essential for developing national

identity and patriotic spirit (Curriculum Development Council 1996, 21–2).

2000 Education Commission Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong

Post-1997 proposals for the reform of the entire education system took official commitment to civic education to a higher level by making it part of the overall aim of education. The 2000 reform proposals, *Learning for Life, Learning through Life*, state that the aims of Hong Kong education for the 21st century should be:

> To enable every person to attain all-round development in the domains of ethics, intellect, physique, social skills and aesthetics according to his/her own attributes so that he/she is capable of life-long learning, critical and exploratory thinking, innovating and adapting to change; filled with self-confidence and a team spirit; willing to put forward continuing effort for the prosperity, progress, freedom and democracy of their society, and contribute to the future well-being of the nation and the world at large. (Education Commission 2000, 30)

The Commission further recommended comprehensive curriculum reform to strengthen moral and civic education. As part of this recommendation, which it based on calls from the public for a strengthening of these areas, it noted that the Curriculum Development Council was engaged in a review of the curriculum with the aim of preparing a new curriculum framework which would place moral and civic education at the top of five important learning experiences. The Commission also suggested stronger official commitment by calling upon the Education Department to strengthen its efforts in the promotion of civic education. Finally, detailing the key tasks of curricular reform, the Commission drew attention to education for a commitment to the nation, again calling for official support and for the cooperation of schools and various societal organizations:

1. Moral and civic education plays a very important part in the whole-person development of students. It covers a range of issues, including ethics, healthy living, sustainable development (such as environmental protection), and identification with and commitment to the country and the community.

3. . . . Schools may also collaborate with different service organizations, such as uniform groups, youth service organizations and cultural bodies to organize life-wide learning activities which are conducive to developing students' positive values and attitudes such as civic-mindedness and commitment to the country and the community.

4. On promoting moral and civic education, the Government should play a supporting role. Apart from providing resource support, the Government should gather and disseminate successful experiences in providing moral and civic education systematically among schools through different effective channels (such as the Internet and production of videos). The Government should also promote and facilitate co-operation among different organizations in the community in establishing support networks for education and should provide relevant information for schools to design learning activities on moral and civic education which suit the needs of the students. (Education Commission 2000, II–1)

SUMMARY

The university students who are the subjects of this study received their secondary education in the early to mid-1990s, with only the youngest of them receiving a civic education possibly informed by the 1996 *Guidelines*. The majority of them went through secondary school during a time, prior to 1997, when civic education in Hong Kong was seen by many educators and commentators as unimportant, depoliticized, conveying little knowledge of contemporary China, and for the most part making no serious attempt to positively influence attitudes toward the nation. The nature of civic education during this time can be seen as the result of an autocratic curriculum policy, which allowed little input from educators themselves, and discouraged initiative by individual teachers by preventing digressions from established syllabuses. This policy, in turn,

was influenced by an insecure colonial government. which, in tandem with business elites, was attempting to maintain its legitimacy. Its primary concern was the preservation of social stability, public order, and economic growth. The colonial government could be viewed as apprehensive of the formation of a critical thinking student body with patriotic sentiments toward China. Only immediately preceding and following the handover of sovereignty was there a stronger official commitment to strengthening education for national identity.

4

Patriotic Education in Mainland China

The previous chapter described civic education in Hong Kong, focusing on its depoliticization and relative lack of content about the nation. Civic education was de-emphasized from the highest level, the Education Regulations, which until 1990 prohibited the discussion of politics in school, to the level of teachers, many of whom neglected to effectively implement government-issued civic education guidelines. As a contrast to the Hong Kong case, this chapter presents the situation in mainland China, where political education has had strong state support and has been carried out in schools though the curriculum and extracurricular activities. Through an analysis of post-1949 textbooks and policy documents, it demonstrates the tension over the relative emphasis to be placed on patriotism, nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism as hegemonic ideologies, as well as on the shifting state-defined goals for the nation. By the 1990s, the focus of political education policy and textbooks was clearly on patriotism as the state's justificatory ideology.

Throughout the history of the People's Republic of China, schools, among other societal institutions, have been called upon to shape citizens' knowledge, attitudes, and behavior toward society, the nation, and the state through political education. Calls to emphasize, reform, and strengthen the role of the school in the formation of students' political attitudes have been made in the name of ideological-political education (*sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu*), moral education (*daode jiaoyu* or *deyu*), and most explicitly, patriotic education (*aiguozhuyi jiaoyu*). A number of scholars have reviewed trends in these forms of education in the Mainland since 1949,

drawing attention to the motivations of the Chinese government in promoting different approaches and adapting content in response to changing political circumstances or threats to its legitimacy. Martin (1975) showed how the government attempted to break with pre-1949 Confucian tradition by promoting new socialist behavior and values among schoolchildren through the content of elementary school language textbooks. Comparing similar textbooks from the early and late 1970s, Kwong (1985) drew attention to shifts in their content related to changing political leadership, political philosophy, and political culture during and after the Cultural Revolution. Meyer (1988) and Lee (1996a) also described changing goals and values in political education policy and content in the years preceding 1989, reflecting repeated ideological movements and debates. Li (1990) claimed that political education in China was a form of political indoctrination designed for the benefit of the government, and that changes in content were a reflection of changes in political leadership and policies. Meyer (1990), Price (1992), and Rosen (1993) each wrote that following the 1989 student movement, state-led political education efforts were stepped up, in the face of perceived challenges to the government's authority. Zhao (1998) demonstrated that in the early 1990s, the Chinese government, perceiving a reduction of popular faith in the guiding Marxist-Leninist ideology and in an attempt to redefine its legitimacy by emphasizing the Communist Party's patriotic credentials, launched a specific campaign to more strongly promote patriotic education.

POLITICAL EDUCATION FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S

Upon coming to power in 1949, one of the first steps undertaken by the CCP in the area of political education was the abolition of the old Kuomintang civics and party doctrine courses (Price 1992). For a brief interval in the mid-1950s, most political education courses were abandoned. A change came after the 100 Flowers Movement of 1956–1957. During this campaign, when the public was called upon to offer criticism of the Communist Party and leadership, it was the youth "who had offered among the most damning criticisms of Party policies" (Ridley, Godwin, and Doolin 1971, 29). In response, Mao Zedong in 1957 called

for a strengthening of moral-political education. *Political Knowledge*, published in 1959 by People's Education Press, was one textbook used in the new political education courses at the junior secondary level.

The stated goals of the first volume of *Political Knowledge* (People's Education Press 1959) are to teach students to be "workers with socialist consciousness and culture," and to have "the spirit of patriotism, love for the people, love for labor, love for science, and other communist moral qualities" (1: 1). The second volume of the series consists of selections of Mao's writings and party and government documents. As reflected in these books, the goals of the CCP upon its rise to power were to effect a radical transformation of Chinese society and its citizenry, consolidate its ideological and political control, and to achieve rapid economic development. The relative emphasis on these goals is evident from the breakdown of the most prominent topics in this series shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Most Prominent Topics, China (1959)

Topic	*Percentage of Content*
Revolutionary Spirit	21.5%
Morals	15.1%
Labor	10.1%
Communism	10.0%
Economic Issues	8.6%
Service to the People/Masses	8.4%
World/Societal History	5.5%
Nation/Nationalism	5.3%
International Issues	4.2%
Classes	3.7%

The goal which received primary emphasis in the text was that of transforming citizens' consciousness in order to mobilize them behind the CCP's other goals. This aim was conveyed in chapters with the themes of revolutionary spirit, communism, socialism, service to the people, and classes. Despite these revolutionary themes, the presentation of material

was along traditional lines, as in dynastic China when education took place through descriptions of the lives of role models and "moral exemplars" (Reed 1995). The vehicles for transmission of the new value of revolutionary spirit were biographies of prominent revolutionaries, including Marx, Lenin, Mao, Norman Bethune, the Second World War soldiers, Civil War soldiers, and national minority figures fighting for the Chinese revolution. These characters' spirit was exemplified by their willingness to brave danger and difficulty, and sometimes even sacrifice their own lives for the success of communist revolution and the transformation of society. In one chapter, the "Lofty Communist Soldier" had:

> sincere trust in communism, and unlimited love for the people of the motherland. He wanted his life to be useful, to have meaning . . . He wrote in his diary, ". . . a revolutionary soldier's life should have only one purpose, and that is to be of use to the people . . ." To have the Party's interest and the people's interest as one's own greatest interest, to care about the revolution, care about the collective, and care about one's comrades as one cares about oneself are the exquisite virtues that the Party teaches the people's soldiers to have (People's Education Press 1959, 1: 50–1)

The chapter "Mao Zedong's School Days" gave examples of how he used his education:

> He used the opportunity to study to seek the truth of saving the nation and the people, and assiduously trained himself to make progress toward this great goal . . . Mao, because he was dissatisfied with the current situation and held strong feelings about reforming society and the nation, had his own independent plan for his studies . . . But most fundamental was the fact that when Mao studied he had clear goals for action to reform Chinese society . . . At the same time his academic studies and his assiduous training had a common and clear starting point; that was to seek a way to resolve China's problems and liberate the people from hardship . . . (People's Education Press 1959, 1: 4–12)

A section on how education should be used in the new society asserted that:

> In socialist society, mental labor is not only to resolve problems of physical labor. Using the mind is also not only for the hands; at the same time it is to raise the entire people's political consciousness, so that the people are not confused, but have correct public opinions in order to manage the affairs of the nation. Therefore our mental labor is using the brain not only to study skills, but we also need to study politics. (People's Education Press 1959, 1: 31)

In another study, Ridley, Godwin, and Doolin (1971) noted that the prominence given to these themes was reflective of Chinese leaders' hope that the younger generation would preserve the spirit of the revolution.

The transformation of citizens along revolutionary lines extended to the moral realm as well. Although no chapters focus explicitly on particular moral virtues, by reading about the lives of heroes, students were made aware of the virtues that their government wished them to possess. Some of these virtues, including diligence, courage, thriftiness, honesty, and justice, were traditional, while others, such as love for the people, selflessness, love for labor, love for science, and simplicity, were portrayed as modern, communist morals.

These stories were also the primary vehicle for transmitting the CCP's Marxist ideology, reflecting the objective of establishing the Party's legitimacy as the new rulers of the Chinese nation. While several chapters noted the virtues of Communist Party members, others educated children about the benefits of socialism, through contrasts with the evils of "old China," the KMT, and capitalist nations. A national leader told students how fortunate they were to be growing up in socialist China:

> You probably do not understand this point, so you can go home and ask your own parents . . . what kind of life they led when they were little. Did children of that time, like you, have enough to eat, enough to wear and have books to read? Did they, like you, have the chance to study without cares and worries? . . . in today's world there are still developed and undeveloped capitalist nations; the majority of children in those nations still lead very miserable lives . . . There, millions of children, because their parents have lost their jobs or earn too little money, cannot resolve life's problems, and they are forced into child labor or to wander the streets. Many children, because they have received the poison of capitalist education, and under the influence of corrupt and degenerate ways of life, have walked down

> the road to crime, to the point that young children become serious social problems in these nations. (People's Education Press 1959, 1: 2)

Other chapters relating to communist ideology consisted of selections from Party speeches and documents illustrating the objectives, policies, and character of the Communist Party and its leadership.

As Mao had stated, the transformation of citizens' consciousness was intended to enable them to create a new society. Therefore, another goal reflected in the text was rapid economic development, a topic that comprised almost nine percent of the content of *Political Knowledge*. Published during the Great Leap Forward, *Political Knowledge* reflected the rise to power within the Communist Party of what Sautman (1991) characterizes as the "radical current" over the "bureaucratic current," and a shift toward rapid industrialization as the approach to economic development. Several chapters of the second volume were taken from speeches lauding the success of the Great Leap Forward, and encouraging citizens to continue the movement so that China could surpass capitalist nations in industrial production within 50 years. In a chapter on the Party's economic program, students were told of national priorities in the area of economic modernization:

> On the technical side, the most important duties are: systematically transform the entire national economy, including agriculture and handicraft industries, into a new economy with a technical base, and into one based on modernized productive technology . . .
>
> In order to meet the requirements of the technological revolution, we must simultaneously carry out cultural revolution, to develop cultural, educational, and sanitary enterprises for the service of economic construction. The most important duties are: eliminate illiteracy, universalize primary education, systematically expand middle school education in average areas, and expand higher education and scientific research organizations in special areas . . . (People's Education Press 1959, 2: 23)

In contrast to the strong nationalistic spirit of pre-1949 textbooks, nationalism was played down in *Political Knowledge*, comprising only about five percent of the content of the series of textbooks. Marxist ideology provided the CCP with a unique claim to political legitimacy over

the Kuomintang, but at the same time the Marxist emphasis on "internationalism" created a contradiction for the new leaders, who had also portrayed themselves as patriots. This conflict was clearly reflected in several chapters of *Political Knowledge*. The chapter on the international unity of the proletariat reflected leaders' attempts to resolve this contradiction in its explanation of the compatibility of nationalism and communism:

> Communist party members have always been sincere patriots. They understand that only when they correctly represent national interest and nationalist sentiment can they receive the trust and esteem of the masses, and only then can they effectively implement internationalist education among the masses, and effectively harmonize the various nations' nationalist sentiments and national interests.
>
> To consolidate the international unity of socialist nations, the communist parties of all socialist nations must mutually respect other nations' national interests and nationalist sentiment . . .
>
> It is also important for small nations to overcome the trend toward nationalism. Whether in small or large nations, if communist party members allow national interests and the interests of proletarian internationalism to stand in opposition to each other, using the former to oppose the latter, and do not support proletarian international unity, this is a violation of internationalism and Marxism-Leninism. (People's Education Press 1959, 2: 18–9)

Marxist ideology took precedence over nationalist, and especially ultra-nationalist, sentiment in China during this period. In another chapter, Mao Zedong further stressed the importance of internationalism over nationalism:

> We need to unite with the proletariat in all capitalist nations, unite with the proletariat in Japan, England, America, Germany, Italy, and all the other capitalist nations. Not until we do this can we strike down imperialism and liberate our nation and people, and liberate the nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, this is our way of opposing narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism. (People's Education Press 1959, 1: 34–5)

After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and from the start of the period of economic reform and openness to the outside world which began in 1978, China entered a stage of "depoliticization," in which the Party de-emphasized the role of politics in favor of economics, and shifted toward development under the principle of market socialism (Sautman 1991). The education system was similarly affected, moving from the radical egalitarian policies of the Cultural Revolution period to a more hierarchical and academic structure, intended to strengthen scientific and technological achievement in the interest of development (Cleverley 1984; Hawkins 1983). In essence, the balance in educational emphasis tipped from "red," as it had been in 1959 and during the Cultural Revolution, toward "expert." In addition, a series of changes were made to political education in the interest of re-educating the population in an attempt to make up for the ten years of "disaster" wrought by the Cultural Revolution (Meyer 1990).

The structure of the political education curriculum reflected these national-level changes. Political education courses ceased to include content related to the current political situation, and in contrast to the structure of the 1959 *Political Knowledge* courses, junior secondary students now studied three courses, entitled "Youth Self-Cultivation," "A Brief History of the Development of Society," and "Legal Knowledge." While the majority of topics covered in political education did not undergo significant change between 1959 and 1982, the proportions of several, including communism, labor, law, revolutionary spirit, socialism, and societal history changed dramatically, as shown in the Table 4.2:

Table 4.2 Change in Proportion of Selected Topics, China (1959–1982)

Topic	*Percentage of Content*	
	1959	*1982*
Revolutionary Spirit	21.5%	0.4%
Labor	10.1%	2.5%
Communism	10.0%	6.4%
Societal History	5.5%	25.1%
Socialism	0.3%	16.3%
Law	–	17.3%
Economic Issues	8.6%	3.0%

The emphasis on societal history in the 1982 *Middle School Political Knowledge* (Beijing Normal University Politics and Economics Department and Beijing Number Four Middle School Politics Department 1982) textbooks represented a shift in the method of presenting Marxist ideology. With the CCP's power established on the Mainland, the emphasis shifted from stories of revolutionary heroes toward a Marxist analysis of the development of society. The text traced the forms of society from primitive through slave, feudal, and capitalist societies; detailed the advantages of socialist over capitalist society; and highlighted the inevitable outcome of communism. This shift in the CCP's presentation of its ideological claim to legitimacy reflected the government's perception of a loss of confidence in Marxism among the youth of China following the Cultural Revolution (Rosen 1983). Government attempts to "win back" the confidence of the youth were evident not only in the nature of content comparing socialism to capitalism, but also in the fact that a quarter of the content of the series was devoted to ideology.

PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN THE 1990S

As a result of increasing concern over this loss of confidence, in the 1980s the state embarked on a series of societal campaigns to promote patriotism. At the same time, policy documents on patriotic education began to appear. Patriotic education is commonly presented as a sub-theme of a more general ideological-political education in a number of these documents (Guo 1995; see Appendix III, pp. 194–7).

The CCP, the State Education Commission, and national leaders in these 1980s and 1990s policy documents all call for patriotic education to be placed at the forefront of moral education, which is itself to take the most important place among the subjects in the curriculum. On one hand, the state's promotion of patriotic education is based partly on the view that it has been successful in creating a core of patriotic citizens. On the other hand, reform and strengthening of patriotic education is urged as a way of dealing with a number of perceived problems with society and citizens, such as "worship of things foreign," "national nihilism," a lack of understanding about the necessity of socialism in China, and the influence of "bourgeois liberalization" and "peaceful

evolution," all arising in the post-Mao period of reform and openness. While patriotic education is offered as the answer to these problems, other problems within the educational sphere are said to have limited its effectiveness. Schools are seen as having neglected or ignored moral and patriotic education, especially in the 1980s, due to the influences of "bourgeois liberalization" and the "one-sided pursuit" of higher promotion rates to university. In these policy documents, school administrators and teachers are blamed for treating moral education as simply the transmission of knowledge and not as character-shaping, and the conclusion is that problems exist with teachers, the content, and teaching methods of moral education.

The Implementation of Patriotic Education

The policy documents surveyed here (cited in Appendix III, pp. 194–7) offer a number of regulations and suggestions regarding the strengthening and implementation of patriotic education in Chinese society, especially in schools. The importance China's leaders attach to patriotic education is evident in the all-encompassing nature prescribed to the matter: actors throughout society are called upon to contribute to developing patriotism among China's youth. Support is to be provided by all departments and units responsible for propaganda, journalism, publication, film, television, and culture; all levels of party and government; city and township neighborhood organizations; village associations; women's associations; enterprises; and the military. Also having an important, and more direct, role to play are individuals (authors of tourist brochures and handouts, tour guides) involved with historical landmarks and scenic sites, important revolutionary sites, martyrs' memorial monuments, and museums. Family members are also seen as crucial to the patriotic education effort, and are to be provided with guidance through family visits, parent associations, and "parents' schools." Playing the most important role are the individuals employed in the field of education, including those in educational administration, principals, heads of guidance, party branch heads, Communist Youth League cadres, homeroom teachers, political education teachers, and teachers of other courses.

Along with the number of actors called on to contribute to patriotic

education, patriotic education documents call for a dense patriotic atmosphere in society so that all people will be influenced and nurtured by patriotic ideology in all areas of life. Schools are specifically called upon to create a physical atmosphere of patriotism, by decorating classrooms, libraries, and laboratories with pictures of the achievements of socialist construction and portraits of historical patriots. Students may also participate in the preparation of blackboard newspapers, wall newspapers, display windows, broadcasts, and various special-purpose rooms throughout school campuses. A plethora of extracurricular activities are suggested, including essay, speech, and knowledge competitions; special lectures; class, Young Pioneer, and Communist Youth League assemblies; winter and summer vacation camps; story telling, poetry reading, and singing contests; visits to museums, memorial halls, and revolutionary sites; social practice activities such as beautification and environmental protection campaigns; labor and social experience; and visits with old party members, Red Army soldiers, cadres, and workers. Regulations have been issued on required extracurricular reading materials, such as *Ten Facts About National Conditions*, *I Love You China*, and the *Reader on National Conditions*. Important holidays and anniversaries, such as the anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party, the 1911 Revolution, the Boxer Indemnity, and the September 18th Incident are to be used to promote patriotic activities. Flag-raising ceremonies are to be conducted on a weekly basis, with regulations provided on the proper protocol during the ceremony and attitudes in the presence of the flag, and the national anthem is to be sung at all important assemblies.

Patriotic education is to be infused throughout all courses in the curriculum. The most explicit vehicle for patriotic education is the politics course, but others, including current events and policies, Chinese language, history, and geography courses are also very important. Other courses such as economics and other social sciences, art, music, population education, and natural science can also emphasize patriotic content where appropriate.

In the early years of schooling children are expected to recognize and respect the national flag, national emblem, and the national anthem. The "State Education Commission Notice on Implementing the Policy of Strictly Instituting a System for Flag Raising in Primary and Secondary Schools According to the 'People's Republic of China National Flag Law'"

provides explicit directions on flag-raising ceremonies and proper ways of showing respect to this national symbol. Young children are also to be taught stories that show Chinese people's good qualities, such as intelligence, industriousness, honesty, and respect for the elderly.

Schools are also expected to carry out education in current national conditions and policies, including economic and political systems and policies, policy on reunification, nationalities policies, military affairs, foreign affairs, society, culture, population, and national resources. Students are expected to learn about China's traditional civilization, culture, customs, traditions, and philosophies. The teaching of history has an important role to play in educating students about the historical development of the Chinese people, the many difficulties, struggles, and victories of their ancestors, the strong tradition of patriotism, the glorious historical cultural and scientific accomplishments of the nationality, and China's contributions to human civilization. Through education in the history of foreign invasion and oppression, students are to learn of the bravery and resistance of the Chinese people, the important role of the Communist Party in the battle for independence from imperialism, and the fact that under socialism China will never again bow to external pressures. Patriotic education not only transmits knowledge about the nation, but is to shape attitudes as well. The most basic of these is love for the nation, specifically the People's Republic of China, and correspondingly an understanding that love for the nation, the party, and socialism are indistinguishable. Students are to develop feelings of national pride, dignity, confidence, and feelings of sentimentality for the land and culture, and to hate anything that detracts from the prestige of the nation.

In patriotic education policy, patriotism is equated with love for the socialist system and the Communist Party, and a number of objectives for students' knowledge and attitudes include upholding socialism, the leadership of the CCP, and a continuation of its basic policies. An emphasis on imperialism and foreign invasion in patriotic education not only serves to instill feelings of national pride in China's victories, but also to emphasize the important historical leadership role of the Communist Party, which is declared to be the greatest patriotic force in Chinese history by virtue of its progressivism, position as the vanguard of the proletariat, and the great sacrifices made by its members in the name of the nation.

Teachers should contrast exploitation, oppression, subjugation,

humiliation, and "the bitterness of the old society" with "the sweetness of the new society," and explain that "without the Communist Party there would be no New China." A further objective is an understanding and appreciation of the contributions and sacrifices of the older generation of revolutionaries and patriots in the struggle to create this new society, and the importance of following their example by a commitment to continue to foster the revolutionary spirit.

Students should be taught of the great accomplishments in politics, economics, science, technology, construction, culture, and education in China since the founding of the People's Republic, and especially since the adoption of the policy of reform and openness. Through comparison with capitalism and the study of the Marxist laws of the development of society, students are to learn of the necessity and superiority of the socialist system and the Communist leadership. They should appreciate that these feats could not have been achieved under any other system or without the leadership of the party. Schools should teach the basics of the party's policies and promote an understanding of the concepts of the "Primary Stage of Socialism" and the "Construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." Looking to the future, students are to understand that modernization and development will only continue unhindered under the leadership of the party continuing along the socialist path; and that China will never become fully westernized and will not forsake socialism for capitalism.

Being patriotic implies being politically conscious, and students should have correct political attitudes and have a knowledge of socialist democratic politics, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, class analysis, collectivism, dialectical and historical materialism, and the possibility of an intensification of class struggle in society. Students are expected to develop a scientific and proletarian worldview and outlook on life and the ability to use Marxist concepts and methods to observe and analyze social phenomena.

Finally, through patriotic education students are expected to learn to make correct judgments and resist unhealthy influences originating from within and outside China. While class contradictions are declared to have been basically eliminated, some traces of decadent capitalist influences remain. With the policy of openness, the philosophical influences of capitalism are finding new ways of corrupting China's youth, and these

youth are expected, through patriotic education, to learn to resist them. Most important is student vigilance against the plots of hostile domestic and international forces to subvert the government and socialist system in the name of "peaceful evolution."

In patriotic education documents, patriots are portrayed as those men and women who historically have promoted the transformation of Chinese society from dictatorship to democracy and from poverty to prosperity. These patriots have been willing to bear difficulties and brave dangers to make contributions to the good of the entire nation. They have opposed conservatism and promoted progress and reform in social, political, economic, cultural, and material life. Just as citizens are expected to carry on the traditions of upholding national unity and pride, they are also expected to put the interests of the nation before their own interests and to work together to maintain the tradition of promoting progress by contributing to China's program of modernization.

Patriotic education is expected to contribute to national development by transmitting knowledge about, and cultivating positive attitudes toward, China's Four Modernizations and the construction of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." First, students are to be taught China's actual circumstances as a developing nation with a large population and limited natural resources, and to appreciate China's advantages and disadvantages relative to other nations. They are thus to be led to understand the need for China's program of socialist modernization, and to learn about the national policies of reform and openness and other policies related to national development.

A second set of goals relates to the development of attitudes conducive to students' future contributions to nation-building. They are to learn to be positive, motivated, creative, adaptive to the environment of the socialist market economy, and to dedicate their studies and occupational goals toward the realization of national modernization. Patriotism should be apparent not only in sentiment, but also in action and behavior. Students should integrate their own interests, ideals, and futures with those of the nation and the collective. In exercising their rights and carrying out their duties as citizens, and in thinking about their own interests, they should remember that the interests of the nation come before all else. Finally, students are to share the national ideal of achieving communism.

Patriotic Education in 1990s Textbooks

A series of textbooks for the junior secondary level, *Political Ideology*, published in 1993 by People's Education Press, consisted of three books, "Citizenship," "A Short History of the Development of Society," and "Socialist Construction in China." To determine how the content of Chinese texts has changed over the years, it is useful to compare the contents of the 1959 and 1993 series, as presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 **Most Prominent Topics, China (1993)**

Topic	*Percentage of Content*	
	1959	*1993*
Societal History	5.5%	28.4%
Socialism	0.3%	10.7%
Law	–	10.5%
Morals	15.1%	7.2%
Nation	5.3%	7.1%
Economic Issues	8.6%	6.8%
Science	2.1%	4.9%
Collectivism	–	4.6%
Labor	10.1%	4.0%
People/Masses	8.4%	3.7%
Communism	10.0%	2.9%
International Issues	4.2%	2.3%
Democracy	1.6%	2.3%
Education	2.5%	2.0%
Citizenship	–	1.7%
Family	0.3%	1.1%
Revolutionary Spirit	21.5%	–
Classes	3.7%	–
Capitalism	0.2%	–

Li (1990, 166) suggests that in China "both state leaders and educators have noticed and admitted that the task of cultivating

communist successors, advocated since the 1950s, cannot be realized and that the only task which is reasonable for such a large population is cultivating qualified socialist citizens." Thus two topics in *Political Ideology*, socialism and collectivism, have increased in share of content between the earlier and later periods relative to the topics of labor, communism, and classes, considered more important for attaining the goals of earlier periods.

A related and, as presented in the textbooks, more important national goal is China's program of "socialist construction," consisting of economic, political, legal, and "spiritual" development. Taken together, content related to these themes comprises about 26 percent of the entire series of textbooks. Whereas the primary goals in earlier periods were the consolidation of political control and the transformation of citizens' consciousness, these goals have now been replaced in the curriculum by that of development, previously slighted because of other priorities.

The tone of *Political Ideology* is also much more realistic than the utopian goals expressed in the 1959 text. Whereas *Political Knowledge* had informed students that China would surpass England in industrial production within decades, *Political Ideology* states:

> Our great PRC in the last 40 years has already made the first steps toward becoming a flourishing and prosperous socialist nation. But our nation is only in the primary stage of socialism, a long stage that takes at least 100 or more years. In the process of realizing China's modernization, we have determined that all key policies must be in accordance with this basic national condition; we cannot separate ourselves from reality and skip stages. (People's Education Press 1993, 3: 1)

The remainder of the book is devoted to descriptions of China's current policies of economic modernization, socialist market economic reform, openness to the outside world, population control, political reform, legal modernization, and the construction of a "socialist spiritual civilization." The duty of every citizen is to contribute to the realization of these programs and policies.

A third goal given more attention in *Political Ideology* than in the earlier text is that of national reunification. When *Political Knowledge* was published in 1959 the Korean War had forestalled a rapid recovery of

Taiwan, and the PRC government had more pressing priorities in consolidating its control over the mainland. By 1993, however, the "one country, two systems" concept had become a concrete success with the agreements on the return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty. The hope for peaceful reunification along this principle, combined with an easing of tensions with Taiwan, account for the positive tone concerning China's reunification in the relevant section of *Political Ideology*:

> Jiang Zemin has pointed out, "Complete reunification is the fundamental interest of the Chinese people, and is the common wish of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau and all overseas Chinese." We believe that not far in the future this common wish for national reunification will be realized.
>
> In order to complete national unification, the Chinese Communist Party advocates peaceful reunification, and has come up with the "one country, two systems" concept. According to this concept, our nation's government has already signed agreements with England and Portugal for the resolution of the Hong Kong and Macau problems; they will be restored to Chinese sovereignty before the century's end. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 43)

In these books, there is substantial content devoted to Marxism, in the form of societal history. *Political Ideology* also devotes a larger percentage of content to nationalism than did *Political Knowledge* in 1959. While the change, from about five to seven percent, is not numerically large, the nature of the content differs significantly from the earlier period. The emphasis in 1959 was on internationalism and avoiding "chauvinistic, narrow nationalism." In 1993, however, the prescription is to be patriotic and to sacrifice one's rights for the interests of the nation, and emphasis is placed on national pride, especially in the face of an increase in foreign influence.

The nationalistic content has three sub-themes: sacrifice to the nation, pride in Chinese traditions, and anti-foreignism, all of which were absent from earlier texts. Students reading *Political Knowledge* in 1959 were presented with stories of individuals who sacrificed themselves for communism, for the collective, for the people, and for society. The message

in 1993's *Political Ideology* however is clearer and more direct; students are told that they should put the interests of the *nation* first. The first duty in the first chapter, entitled "How to Be a Good Citizen," is to be patriotic:

> During the period of socialist construction, the core of patriotism is the Four Modernizations and the Revitalization of China. In order to quickly change our nation's backward condition, and make our nation a rich and strong, democratic, and civilized socialist modernized nation, there have been many wonderful Chinese, anonymous, without individual benefit, who have silently contributed their whole selves.
>
> So citizens must love their own nation, because the fate of the nation and the fate of individuals are very closely linked. Without the motherland, individuals would have nothing. We should follow the example of patriots, and with the nation's interests as most important, be determined to repay the motherland. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 3–4)

Students are told that when their interests conflict with the interests of the nation, the only choice is to forego individual ambition:

> For the nation, we sometimes not only have to change our own individual ambitions, but in order to protect the entire nation's interests, we even may have to contribute our precious lives. This is the highest expression of patriotism. Many revolutionaries gave their last drop of blood for the independence of the nation and the liberation of the people. In the period of socialist construction, every Chinese child should be willing to contribute everything to socialist modernization. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 41)
>
> Repaying the nation and working for the glory of the nation is not only the concern of movement members and scientists; every citizen of the PRC should struggle hard for the revival of the nation. You should consider the ties between your present studies and the struggle for the glory of the nation to be connected . . . In this way no matter what you do in the future, you can transform your patriotic heart into patriotic actions. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 65)

Citizens' duties are also presented in more concrete terms than in the earlier period. They include the duty to observe the nation's laws, to protect public property, to work, to pay taxes, to perform military service

when needed, and to receive an education. Several other duties are more abstract, including preserving national secrets and upholding national unity. Regardless of their nature,

> Fulfilling duties is an expression of patriotism and the collective spirit. For the nation to be flourishing and the nationality to be prosperous, every citizen must put the interests of the nation and the collective first, and do all they can to fulfill their legally stipulated duties. Especially when there are contradictions between individual interests and the interests of the nation and the collective, they must think large, and put the interest of the nation and the collective first. (People's Education Press 1993, 3: 123–4)

Another aspect of nationalism absent from the 1959 political education text, but present in the 1993 version, is the attempt to instill pride in the nation's cultural heritage. In contrast to the years of denigration of traditional culture in the early years of the People's Republic and especially during the Cultural Revolution, *Political Ideology*, in a section on China's "glorious and magnificent ancient culture," tells students of China's early scientific and cultural contributions to the "progress of humankind:"

> In the motherland's long history, a developed economy, progressive scientific technology, and a magnificent culture were the embodiment of the labor and talent of generations of Chinese people. These demonstrate the great wisdom and power of the Chinese people. We should feel proud of this great motherland, and we should absorb power from it, and make our motherland even more wonderful and great. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 11)

A further difference from the internationalist spirit of the earlier texts is found in the tone of anti-foreignism in *Political Ideology*. *Political Knowledge*, the 1959 text, concentrated more on instilling a spirit of commitment to the building of a new society rather than dwelling on the details of China's recent battles against imperialism. The chapter in *Political Ideology* entitled "The Difficulties of Modern China," however, resembles early Republican texts in its couching of nationalism in a tone of anti-foreignism:

> Ancient China was so glorious and magnificent, and dazzlingly brilliant. How did it become so poor and backward and lose its original brilliance in modern times? Was it really because we Chinese people didn't struggle hard?
>
> Modern Chinese history is a history of imperialist invasion, progressively turning China into a semi-colonized, semi-feudal society. The imperialist powers in collusion with the Chinese feudal and bureaucratic capitalist powers cruelly exploited and oppressed the people, making our nation poor, causing the people to suffer, greatly humiliating the Chinese people. But the people did not submit to these powerful enemies, and they bravely struggled for independence and liberation, and finally under the leadership of the Communist Party they won a great victory against the enemies. This is the pride of the Chinese people. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 15, 17)

After providing several examples of the humiliation the Chinese people suffered at the hands of foreigners (particularly Americans), including the infamous Shanghai park sign that read "No dogs or Chinese allowed," the book states that modern Chinese will never have to stand for such treatment:

> The establishment of the PRC signaled an end to this historical shame, the sleeping tiger of the East awakened, and the Chinese people stood up. Being a citizen of this great nation, we feel incomparably proud. . . Those foreigners who in the past discriminated against the Chinese, now have no choice but to change their attitude. (People's Education Press 1993, 1: 23, 26)

In sum, there are significant differences between *Political Knowledge*, published in 1959, and 1993's *Political Ideology*. In 1959 the primary national goals, as reflected in the civics curriculum, were the development of a revolutionary consciousness along Marxist ideological lines among the citizenry and the consolidation of the CCP's political and ideological power, at the expense of stress on economic modernization. In 1993, however, the emphasis was largely on the goal of national economic construction, maintaining political control, and reunification. In 1959, Marxist ideology was presented through stories of revolutionary heroes; by 1993 the vehicle for transmitting this ideology was a Marxist interpretation of societal history. The emphasis on patriotism and

nationalism in the 1993 text was a concrete example of the shift from Marxism to patriotism as the CCP's justificatory ideology, as posited by Ding (1994).

Policy documents and textbooks are not necessarily reflective of the attitudes of the students whom they are intended to influence. However, a brief preview of the data to be presented in the following chapters is indicative of the extent of the effectiveness of patriotic education. Interviews with individual students revealed that they had much to say about their experience with patriotic education in secondary school. The survey of a larger number of students found that 72 percent of Mainland students agreed that their secondary schooling had had an impact on their attitudes toward the nation, more than agreed with the equivalent statement about university, family, the media, or friends. A multiple regression analysis revealed that schooling-related factors had a stronger impact than other socialization factors on students' national attitudes. The following chapters turn to a more detailed description of these analyses.

5

Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese Students' National Attitudes

As we have seen, while civic education in colonial Hong Kong was considerably depoliticized and weak from the policy- to the school-level, detailed policies on patriotic education, which are reflected in the curriculum and textbooks, exist in mainland China. With these contexts, this chapter examines the actual attitudes toward the nation of the products of the two education systems, Hong Kong and Mainland university students, describing their attitudes and detailing where similarities and differences between the two groups lie. As the respective states would desire, Hong Kong students were largely neutral in their sentiment toward China, while Mainland students were considerably more patriotic and nationalistic.

The political sentiments of concern here, patriotism and nationalism, have been a subject of research and theorizing in many fields, including sociology, political science, social psychology, and philosophy. Most writers on the subject agree, explicitly or implicitly, that nationalism and patriotism are multidimensional concepts. As such, they encompass an emotional attachment to the nation, a sense of community with one's fellow nationals, a sense of duty toward the nation, the idea that the nation should be valued more highly than other communities, a desire for national power, and a belief in the superiority of one's own nation relative to others.

Individuals may have strong positive feelings toward their nation, described as an affective orientation (Almond and Verba 1963) or a sentimental attachment (Kelman 1969). The relationship may involve

feelings of love, pride in the nation's accomplishments, shame at the nation's failures, and loyalty. Someone with positive affect for his or her nation may feel defensive in the face of criticism of the nation, or hostility toward outsiders or things that detract from national honor. The object of these emotions may be the homeland; the nation; national symbols such as the flag or national anthem; national values, language, history, and religion; and the political system (Feshbach 1990; Levinson 1950; Terhune 1964; Viroli 1995).

This emotional attachment, where the nation is defined in terms of its members, may extend to positive feelings toward one's fellow nationals. At the most basic level, there is a recognition that one's co-nationals are members of the same community (Bock 1978). Other authors, however, describe the relationship between the individual and his or her compatriots as a feeling of community and solidarity (Easton 1965), a "deep comradeship," (Anderson 1991), or as approaching a familial relationship, fraternity, or brotherhood (Smith 1986). This sentimental bond among members of the nation may be based on the belief in a common heritage, language, traditions, history, symbols and values, as well as feelings of loyalty to common political institutions. It may also incorporate a belief that one is engaged in cooperation with one's fellow nationals in reaching national goals (Easton 1965).

The consciousness of national goals as something in which the individual may participate extends his or her relationship to the nation from one of mere emotion to one which encompasses will, intention, or action. The individual, filled with a sense of duty or responsibility, may desire to make a contribution to the nation. He or she may be personally motivated to help the nation achieve its goals because of a perception that national goals and his or her own personal goals are interconnected (Loh 1975; Terhune 1964).

A difference in the degree of commitment to the nation, from the level of mere feelings to a willingness to participate in action, may symbolize a similar difference in the perceived importance of the nation to the individual. Some hold that the interests of the nation as a whole should take precedence over the interests not only of the individual, but of all communities below the national level, thereby requiring the individual to forsake all other duties in the interest of national duty, or to make personal sacrifices in the name of the nation (Hobsbawm 1990). This belief

may even extend into the international arena, and stress that an individual's loyalty to the nation should come before a commitment to the interests of mankind as a whole (Miller 1995). The perceived importance of one's own nation may in turn lead to a belief that it is, or should become, more powerful than other nations in the world, should exert this power to dominate other countries, or should occupy a more important position in international affairs (Feshbach 1990). Finally, if the nation is perceived as more powerful than other nations, it may be evaluated as better or superior in other aspects as well.

In sum, national attitudes can be conceived of as encompassing seven dimensions. The first dimension (Emotion) is an emotional attachment to the nation as an abstract concept, covering feelings of pride, love, and commitment to the nation and national symbols. A second dimension (People) deals with positive feelings for one's compatriots. A sense of duty to the nation represents a third dimension (Duty). A fourth (Nation First) involves the degree of importance attached to the nation above individual and local community interests. A related dimension (International) concerns the extent to which individuals believe the nation is more important than international or global interests. A sixth aspect (National Power) relates to the desire of citizens for their nation to exert more power in the international arena. The final dimension (Nation Better) concerns the extent to which individuals view their own nation as superior to others. Taken as a whole, these seven dimensions represent what shall hereafter be referred to as "national attitudes." In the following discussions, the term "patriotism" is used to describe those attitudes toward the nation and one's co-nationals without reference to other nations — the first through fourth dimensions of national attitudes. The fifth through seventh dimensions, which involve a reference to other nations and the international arena, are grouped together as representative of "nationalism," a distinction to a certain extent following Kosterman and Feshbach (1989).

The analysis of Hong Kong and Mainland students' national attitudes presented here is based on two sources of data. First, it relies on the results of a survey questionnaire administered to 260 Hong Kong and 275 Mainland university students. The questionnaire included statements that formed seven scales of attitudes toward the nation, based on the dimensions defined above. The scales that included statements about

China and the Chinese people without reference to other nations (Emotion, Duty, Nation First, and part of People) combined to form a Patriotism scale. Those which made reference to China and the Chinese with regard to other nations (Nation Better, National Power, International, and part of People) formed a Nationalism scale. The combined Patriotism and Nationalism scales represent national attitudes as a whole, as shown in Figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1 Dimensions of National Attitudes

The second source of data, in-depth interviews with ten Hong Kong and ten Mainland students, provided further insight into the meaning to these students of each of the dimensions of national attitudes. To determine whether statistically significant differences (indicating that the differences are not merely a product of chance) exist between the two groups, independent samples t-tests were performed to compare the mean scores of each group on each of the national attitude scales in the larger survey. Examples of each group's responses to several statements within each scale are also presented to further illuminate differences and similarities between groups.

GROUP COMPARISON OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES

Table 5.1 shows the results of independent samples t-tests to compare Hong Kong and Mainland students' mean scores on each of the scales. The higher the figure, on a scale from one to five, the more positive the attitudes toward China.

Table 5.1 National Attitudes (Group Means)

	MLHK	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean Difference*
National Attitudes***	HK	247	3.08	0.34	0.71
	ML	255	3.79	0.43	
Patriotism***	HK	253	3.04	0.40	0.81
	ML	261	3.85	0.51	
Nationalism***	HK	253	2.93	0.44	0.41
	ML	267	3.34	0.58	
Chinese People***	HK	257	2.88	0.44	0.54
	ML	271	3.42	0.66	
Emotion***	HK	258	3.15	0.61	1.26
	ML	272	4.41	0.50	
Duty***	HK	257	3.34	0.50	0.96
	ML	269	4.30	0.54	
Nation First***	HK	259	2.81	0.45	0.96
	ML	267	3.77	0.58	
Nation Better*	HK	258	2.92	0.56	0.13
	ML	272	3.05	0.77	
National Power***	HK	257	3.56	0.48	0.56
	ML	268	4.12	0.53	
Patriotism over Internationalism***	HK	259	2.89	0.48	0.57
	ML	272	3.46	0.61	

Differences significant at *p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.001

On all dimensions, Mainland students had more positive national attitudes than Hong Kong students, and all differences were statistically significant. Mainland students averaged 3.79 on the overall scale of

National Attitudes, nearly one point higher than the Hong Kong students. Hong Kong and Mainland students differed more on Patriotism than on Nationalism, and examining the other scale scores illuminates this difference. The greatest differences between the two groups related to an emotional attachment to the nation, the idea of national interests taking precedence over local or individual interests, and a sense of duty to the nation.

Differences between the two groups were smaller on the scales related to Nationalism, including the belief in the importance of patriotism over internationalism and the desire for China to be a more powerful nation. The area of closest agreement was a belief in China's superiority to other nations. On this scale, Mainland students were neutral, with Hong Kong students leaning toward disagreement.

Within the Mainland group, students were more patriotic than nationalistic. Their most positive attitudes were an emotional attachment to the nation, a sense of duty to the nation, and a desire for a powerful China, as shown in Table 5.2, which ranks the dimensions for each group from high to low based on their mean scores in each dimension. While still positive, Mainland students felt less strongly about the importance of patriotism over internationalism and positive feelings toward the Chinese people. They were most neutral on the idea of China's superiority to other nations. Examining the standard deviations, the highest levels of uniformity among the Mainland students were on the same attitudes where they scored highest: Emotion, National Power, and Duty, while disagreement was most apparent on Internationalism, People, and Nation Better.

Table 5.2 National Attitude Dimensions Ranked (High to Low)

Hong Kong	*Mainland*
National Power	Emotion
Duty	Duty
Emotion	National Power
Nation Better	Nation First
International	International
People	People
Nation First	Nation Better

Like their Mainland counterparts, Hong Kong students were stronger patriots than nationalists. Despite the degree of difference between them and Mainland students, on average Hong Kong students held the most positive attitudes on the same three dimensions, a desire for a more powerful China, a sense of duty, and an emotional attachment to the nation. Like the Mainland group, Hong Kong students held more neutral attitudes on internationalism and positive attitudes toward the Chinese people. However, the Hong Kong group showed the strongest disagreement with the idea that national interests should come before individual or local interests. The Hong Kong students were in closest accord among themselves with regard to a slightly negative impression of the Chinese people and the precedence of the nation over the individual. Discord among them was greatest concerning China's superiority to other nations, with the largest divergence relating to emotions, the opposite of the Mainland group.

In sum, there was a larger difference between Hong Kong and Mainland students on patriotic attitudes than on those concerning nationalism. Despite the differences, however, on average the most positive attitudes for both groups were Emotion, Duty, and National Power. Mainland students agreed amongst themselves most strongly on their emotional connection to the nation; the same dimension evoked the largest degree of discord among the Hong Kong students.

DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES

The Mainland students, on average, expressed more positive attitudes than the Hong Kong students on each dimension of National Attitudes. At the same time, as shown in Table 5.2, the seven dimensions were ranked approximately the same by both groups: The three dimensions with the highest mean scores, among both Mainland and Hong Kong students, were Emotion, Duty, and National Power. The lowest-ranked means were also common between the two groups, with the exceptions of Nation Better and Nation First. To get a better idea of the meaning of these scale scores, the discussion now turns to data from the interviews with twenty Hong Kong and Mainland students, and a more detailed examination of several questionnaire survey items. Examples from the interviews are intended

to be illustrative of the nature of students' attitudes, not to be representative of the breakdown of attitudes among larger groups, and exact percentages are not provided lest they be misleading. Furthermore, in most cases no distinction is made between Hong Kong and Mainland students in the general descriptions of the attitudes, either because students from both groups expressed the sentiments described, or because it cannot be assumed that students from either group would not share that attitude if directly questioned.

Emotional Attachment to the Nation and Its Symbols

Of the seven dimensions, Mainland students expressed most strongly an emotional attachment to the nation and its symbols. This was also the third most highly ranked dimension among the Hong Kong students. In the interviews, as one indication of an emotional attachment to the nation, all students were asked to describe what made them proud of China. Some students, from both Hong Kong and the Mainland, responded that nothing made them proud, or that they were only proud of the China of the past. Others expressed pride in China's rich history and cultural traditions, including art, architecture, language, literature, philosophy, morals, and early scientific achievements. Mainland students also described pride in China's progress and economic development in the period of reform and openness since the late 1970s, especially the devotion and unity of the Chinese people in helping with China's efforts to catch up to the developed world. Others mentioned Chinese Nobel Prize winners as representative of modern scientific advances, and Olympic gold medal winners as embodying China's sporting achievements.

Asked to describe the feeling they had when seeing the Chinese flag flying or hearing the national anthem, some students expressed no feeling at all, or no special feeling in particular. One Hong Kong student said that he felt irritated when he heard the national anthem, as he said it represented only the People's Republic of China, not Hong Kong. Others mentioned that ordinarily they felt little when seeing the flag on the street, but that they became very emotional at special occasions like flag-raising ceremonies or when watching the Olympics. Both Mainland and Hong Kong students indicated that among their feelings in these circumstances

were patriotism, a sense of belonging, self-respect, respect for the nation, dignity, pride, solemnity, happiness, and excitement.

As previously mentioned, it was on the dimension of Emotion that the means of the Hong Kong and Mainland groups most greatly differed. This is further explained by examining responses to four of the statements that made up the Emotion scale, as shown in Table 5.3. Mainland students expressed overwhelmingly positive attitudes on this dimension. The statement with the largest percentage (97.5%) of Mainland student agreement was an explicit expression of love for the country, followed by an attachment to one national symbol, the national anthem. Mainland students were also overwhelmingly proud of China's recent progress. Of the four statements, pride in Chinese culture elicited the weakest agreement among Mainland students, though three-fourths of them still agreed.

Table 5.3 Emotional Attachment to the Nation and Its Symbols

	Hong Kong $N = 260$		*Mainland* $N = 275$	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I love my country.	44.2%	10.8%	97.5%	0.7%
I am not very proud of Chinese culture.	20.8%	54.2%	12.8%	73.1%
I am very proud of the changes China has made since the beginning of reform and openness.	27.1%	31%	81.7%	3.3%
I feel very happy when I hear China's national anthem at the Olympics.	34.2%	29.3%	92.7%	1.8%

Chinese culture, however, was the greatest source of pride for the Hong Kong students, though only about half of them expressed such pride. Nearly half expressed the sentiment of love for China, but the same percentage was neutral. As a group they were generally ambivalent about China's reform and openness and attachment to national symbols, with

approximately equal groups agreeing, being neutral, and disagreeing, with these two statements. Finally, comparing the two groups, of the four statements, the greatest differences in agreement between the Hong Kong and Mainland students was on the question of sentiment about the national anthem, while the closest attitudes related to a pride in Chinese culture.

A Sense of Duty to the Nation

The dimension ranked second by both Hong Kong and Mainland students was a sense of duty and service to the nation, but the disparity between the two groups on the intensity of the feeling was the third largest among the seven dimensions. In the interviews, students were asked, "In what ways do you think citizens should serve China?" Aside from the common answers of paying taxes and military service, one group of answers dealt with contributions to society. Students felt that citizens should donate money for education in China's poor regions, contribute to flood relief, maintain a clean environment, and support the young and elderly. One student felt that it was a citizen's duty to speak out and be critical of China's problems.

Students also expressed the belief that self-improvement constituted a contribution to the nation. Going to school would help to increase one's knowledge and ability, which could in turn be utilized to perform one's own job well. Being able to support oneself was considered by these students as a contribution to national welfare. Learning about, and showing concern for the nation, would in turn allow citizens to make the best use of their knowledge and skills to meet the nation's needs.

Other responses related to upholding China's national dignity. Citizens could perform this duty by positively representing China before foreigners, not expressing displeasure about the nation in front of others, and supporting the nation in the face of criticism. More actively, they could strive for academic or other achievements to earn glory for China. A more concrete example given by one student was not buying pirated goods, as that contributed to a bad reputation for the nation.

There was a large disparity between the Hong Kong and Mainland students when discussing duty to the nation both in the abstract and in

personal terms as demonstrated by the two statements in Table 5.4. Nearly 60 percent of Mainland students expressed that it should be a citizen's duty to die for the nation, while nearly half of the Hong Kong students responded negatively to the suggestion, and about 40 percent were neutral. The difference was even greater when the statement referred to students themselves — nearly 90 percent of Mainland students felt it their duty to help China attain her goals, while less than ten percent of Hong Kong students had the same sentiment, with the largest percentage of Hong Kong students being ambivalent on the question.

Table 5.4 A Sense of Duty to the Nation

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland* N = 275	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
A citizen should be willing to sacrifice his life for his country.	11.2%	46.5%	59.1%	13.5%
I would like personally to help my country attain its goals.	9.3%	38%	88.1%	2.2%

The Precedence of National over Individual and Regional Interests

Hong Kong students recorded the lowest mean on the dimension of national interests prevailing over individual or regional ones; this is not surprising given Hong Kong's status as an autonomous Special Administrative Region of China. The difference between Hong Kong and Mainland students on this dimension was the second largest among all the dimensions. In interviews, students were asked whether they thought individual rights should be limited in the name of national interest. Despite the degree of difference in their mean scores on the Nation First scale, students in both Hong Kong and the Mainland expressed similar reasons for allowing individual rights to be limited. Some students expressed their opinion in the abstract, claiming that individual freedoms are relative, not absolute, and should not be unlimited. Others believed that personal

interests should be sacrificed in the interest of the greater number, or that the nation as a collective of citizens already represented individual interests, so that there should be no conflict. One student framed his answer in the context of the hypothetical situation that there would be chaos in China if individual rights were not subsumed to the interests of the nation. On a more neutral level, some students explained that they felt there should be a balance of individual and national rights. Those disagreeing with the question argued that people are naturally free and should enjoy the full range of human rights.

Students were also asked whether the nation's or their local region's interests should come first. Most students answered that the nation's interests should come before local interests, as the interests of the "whole" take precedence over a part of the whole. Others believed that a problem for, or threat to, the nation represented a threat to the regions as well. Some students stated that the nation was representative of all the regions. Those students voting in favor of local interests believed that the region was like "family," while the nation was a more distant "friend," and that based on the closeness of the relationship, local interests should come first. Several Hong Kong students justified their answer that Hong Kong's interests should come first by their lack of feeling for or confidence in China, saying that they felt Hong Kong was more important to the world than China as a whole.

Table 5.5 The Precedence of National over Individual and Regional Interests

	Hong Kong $N = 260$		*Mainland* $N = 275$	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
The welfare of the individual is more important than the welfare of the nation.	20%	32.3%	4.4%	75.1%
The interests of the nation should come before local regional interests.	33.6%	19.3%	87.2%	4.4%

As seen from the statements in Table 5.5, about one-third of the Hong Kong students denied that the interests of the nation should come before those of the individual or region, while the largest percentage, about half, were neutral. By contrast, three-fourths of the Mainland students felt that the welfare of the individual should be sacrificed to the welfare of the nation. Nearly 90 percent of Mainland students denied the importance of the region relative to the nation as a whole, and less than five percent supported the rights of the individual or the local region over those of the nation.

A Favorable Impression of the Chinese People

The dimension of positive national attitudes relating directly to a favorable impression of the Chinese people was ranked second to last by both Mainland and Hong Kong students, and the difference between the two groups was in the intermediate range compared to other dimensions. A number of questions in the interviews gave students an opportunity to describe what they perceived to be positive and negative characteristics of the Chinese people, as opposed to the nation as a concept. On the positive side, both Hong Kong and Mainland students felt that Chinese were patriotic, willing to make sacrifices for the nation, united and cohesive as a people, altruistic, and determined to contribute to China's development. Chinese were also described as intelligent, accomplished, possessing strong moral values, and particularly concerned about family relations. This concern was also transformed into a negative characteristic when taken to the extreme in the form of nepotism and "connections" (*guanxi*). Other negative traits included the opposites of some of the positive traits just mentioned, and Chinese were believed to be conservative, superstitious, closed-minded, selfish, materialistic, lacking in public morality, and holding a disdain for the law.

When asked their impression of the Chinese as a people, only about 20 percent of the Hong Kong students responded favorably, with a quarter holding a negative image, and more than half neutral on the question. The Mainland students were more positive, with about 45 percent agreeing that they had a positive impression and only 15 percent disagreeing, with the second largest group neutral. On one specific characteristic, however,

concordance between the two groups was high, with only about 18 percent of both Hong Kong and Mainland students agreeing that there was a high degree of unity among the Chinese as compared to other peoples. In both cases, approximately 45 percent disagreed.

Table 5.6 A Favorable Impression of the Chinese People

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I have a favorable impression of the Chinese people.	19.2%	25%	45.1%	14.6%
The Chinese people are more united than other peoples of the world.	18.4%	42.3%	17.5%	45.8%

A Perception of China's Superiority over Other Nations

Mainland students as a group felt neutral about the question of China's superiority over other nations, and it was on this dimension that their mean was lowest. This was also the dimension on which Hong Kong and Mainland students had the closest level of agreement. In interviews, students were asked whether they thought China was better or worse than other countries, and if so, in what respects. Several students gave vague answers, reasoning that nations should not be compared, that no country, or that China in particular, was better or worse than any other nation. Areas of Chinese superiority expressed by other students included Chinese culture, morals, and family relations, as well as the unity of the Chinese people. While some students expressed the belief that China should follow her own path, others were more vocal about areas in which they thought China needed to learn from other countries. These areas included multi-party democratic politics, restrictions on political power, individual freedoms and human rights, the market economy, education, and science and technology.

When speaking of China as a nation, about equal proportions of Mainland students agreed and disagreed that China was superior to all other nations. while the largest percentage were neutral, as can be seen from Table 5.7. Hong Kong students were more divided on the question, with nearly half denying China's superiority, about half neutral, and only seven percent agreeing. With regard to Chinese culture in particular, the pattern of the Hong Kong students was approximately the same, with slightly larger percentages agreeing and disagreeing about the superiority of Chinese culture and fewer students neutral. Mainland students appeared to have a lower opinion of Chinese culture than of China as a nation. While nearly a third of them believed in the superiority of Chinese culture, nearly half disagreed.

Table 5.7 A Perception of China as Better than Other Countries

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
China is the best country in the world.	7%	45.6%	29.8%	29.8%
No other nation's culture can compare to China's.	13.1%	53.5%	28.4%	45.8%

National Power

Hong Kong students expressed the strongest feelings on the dimension of a desire for China to be more powerful, which was ranked third overall by Mainland students. To flesh out this dimension, students were asked in interviews what role they felt China should play in the world. A few students expressed the idea that China should keep to herself, and not interfere in the affairs of other nations or play the role of a world "policeman," as they perceived the United States to be doing. Most students, however, felt that China, as a large nation in terms of both area and population, should play a more important role in the world, either

as mediator or as a leader representing the Third World or Asian countries. They expressed the view that China had much to contribute to global development in the form of resources and talent. One student even stated that he felt the world should again become bipolar, with China and the United States as the premier world leaders.

One statement from the survey, shown in Table 5.8, dealt directly with the question of a desire for China to have more power in the world. Nearly 70 percent of Hong Kong students expressed agreement, with about a quarter expressing neutrality. Mainland students were not at all neutral on the question, with nearly all believing China should be more powerful. With regard to the territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyutai Islands, slightly fewer students in both groups felt that China should take strong action. Overall, only a small percentage of students felt that China should reduce her involvement in world affairs.

Table 5.8 China's Quest for Power in the World

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
China should strive for power in the world.	69%	5.9%	96%	0.7%
China should take strong action in the Diaoyutai dispute.	62.7%	8.5%	84.9%	3.3%

A Belief in the Importance of Patriotism over Internationalism

One dimension ranked low by both Hong Kong and Mainland students, and one where there was a relatively small difference between them, was a belief in the importance of patriotism over internationalism. In interviews, students were asked to rate the importance of patriotism versus internationalism as a goal of education. Some students answered that the two concepts were compatible and should share equal weight, because learning about other nations and global issues would help one understand

one's own country, and that by comparing China with other nations, youth would be able to learn how to best help their own country. Some students who chose patriotism as a goal, however, gave the opposite reason, that children need to understand their own country before being able to comprehend larger international concerns. Some personalized the issue, and stated that feelings of love developed from the inside out, that students should be concerned with their own country first, and questioned how one could love other countries or peoples without first learning to love one's own country. Citing some of China's problems, several students noted that youth should be taught to make a contribution to their own society first and that only after China was stable and unified could citizens begin to be concerned about global issues.

Those believing that internationalism should take priority over patriotism fell into two groups. Some students believed that internationalism should prevail because they considered the whole world a family. Others criticized patriotism for being too narrow, for being too similar to love for the Communist Party, or for putting the nation at risk of militarism.

Table 5.9 A Belief in the Importance of Patriotism over Internationalism

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland* N = 275	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
We should strive for loyalty to our country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood.	39.6%	19.6%	75.9%	8.8%
We should teach our children to uphold the welfare of all people everywhere even though it may be against the best interests of our own country.	31.2%	18.5%	24.8%	46.8%

On the question of patriotism relative to internationalism, Hong Kong students were largely noncommittal, as shown in Table 5.9. While nearly 40 percent of them believed loyalty to one's own nation should come

before concepts of world brotherhood, about the same number were neutral, and only about 20 percent preferred internationalism. When asked if China's interests should be sacrificed to global welfare, about half of the Hong Kong students were neutral, but nearly a third felt that the interests of humanity should take precedence. Nearly half of the Mainland students, by contrast, felt that national interests should not be forsaken. About a quarter of the Mainland students expressed their support of a concern for global welfare. On the question of whether patriotism or internationalism should come first, over three-quarters of the Mainland students chose patriotism; less than ten percent voted for internationalism.

6

Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese Students' Perceptions of Political Socialization

As might be expected from the nature of patriotic education in mainland China and the depoliticization of Hong Kong civic education, Mainland students on average held more positive attitudes toward the nation than their Hong Kong counterparts. This chapter examines this relationship between education and attitudes from the students' point of view by describing their perceptions of the influence of the agents of socialization — secondary schooling, the university experience, the family, the media, and friends — on the formation of their attitudes toward the nation. Hong Kong and Mainland students' impressions of each of these factors are examined in depth using qualitative data from interviews with twenty students together with quantitative data from the survey of 535 students. Conclusions about the differences between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups are drawn on the basis of comparisons of mean scores on answers to individual questions about socializing influences.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIALIZATION AGENTS

On the questionnaire, students were asked about their perception of which agents of socialization had influenced their attitudes toward the nation, agreeing or disagreeing that secondary schooling, the university experience, family, the media, or friends had influenced them. Each agent

was dealt with in a separate question; students were not asked to rank these five socialization agents. However, by examining the answers, it is possible to get an idea of the relative perceived influence of the different agents.

Table 6.1 shows the results of independent samples t-tests comparing the means of the two groups of students' responses to statements referring to the importance of the influence of each socialization agent. The higher the mean, on a scale from one to five, the more important the group perceived the influence of that agent to be. Comparing the means revealed that there were statistically significant differences between Mainland and Hong Kong students in their perceptions of the influence of secondary school, university, family, and the media on their attitudes toward China. There was no statistically significant difference on the perception of the influence of friends.

Table 6.1 Perceived Influence of Socialization Agents (Group Means)

	MLHK	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean Difference*
Schooling***	HK	260	3.00	1.00	0.81
	ML	275	3.81	1.03	
University***	HK	260	2.89	1.02	0.45
	ML	273	3.34	0.95	
Media***	HK	260	3.40	0.91	0.56
	ML	273	2.84	1.06	
Family***	HK	259	2.85	0.97	0.48
	ML	273	3.33	0.97	
Friends	HK	259	2.93	0.85	0.05
	ML	273	2.88	0.89	

Differences significant at ***$p \leq 0.001$

The largest difference between the Hong Kong and Mainland students was on their perception of the influence of schooling on attitudes toward the nation, followed by the media, the family, and the university. Again, there was no significant difference between the two groups in rating the influence of friends. More Hong Kong students claimed they were influenced by the media than by any of the other socialization agents.

Despite the public and scholarly commentary about the ineffectiveness of Hong Kong's schools in preparing citizens, schooling was rated as an important factor that had influenced their attitudes by the second largest number of students, with friends and the university ranking third and fourth respectively. The smallest number of Hong Kong students acknowledged the family as an influence on their attitudes toward China.

While the largest group of Hong Kong students agreed that the media was an important factor influencing their attitudes, Mainland students on average perceived it as comparatively less influential. The largest groups of Mainland students perceived secondary schooling and the university as having influenced them, suggesting that the large amount of time spent on patriotic education in Mainland schools leads at least to a perception among students that it has influenced their attitudes. Education-related factors were followed by the family and friends as perceived influences on students' attitudes toward the nation. The patterns can be observed in more detail in Table 6.2, which shows the percentages of students agreeing and disagreeing as to the influence of the five agents.

Table 6.2 Perceived Influence of Socialization Agents (Percentages)

This agent had a strong influence on my attitudes toward the nation	*Hong Kong N = 260*		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
Secondary School	33.8%	31.5%	72%	14.9%
University	27.3%	38.5%	49.8%	22.2%
Media	58.5%	21.5%	34.2%	45.1%
Family	26.5%	35.3%	50.2%	23.3%
Friends	28.1%	32%	27.6%	37.1%

The Influence of Secondary School

Nearly three-fourths of the Mainland students perceived that their secondary schooling had played a major role influencing their attitudes toward China, as shown in Table 6.2. In Hong Kong, only about one-third

of the students had the same perception; about as many denied schooling's influence or were neutral. The survey results echo the interviews, where most of the Mainland students claimed that their secondary schooling played a major role in the development of their knowledge, feelings, and attitudes toward the nation. Far fewer Hong Kong students agreed.

Student interviewees who expressed that secondary schooling was an important factor in shaping their attitudes toward the nation explained that its influence was exerted through the curriculum, extracurricular activities, and the actions of teachers. These factors combined to affect both students' knowledge and attitudes. While Mainland students claimed that curricular content about the nation was found in history, politics, philosophy, and literature classes, Hong Kong students' exposure to China was limited primarily to Chinese history and geography courses, and to a lesser extent to Chinese language classes. Students in both groups felt that these courses conveyed knowledge about Chinese society and policies, while transmitting Chinese culture and morals.

Mainland students indicated that courses in the broad patriotic education curriculum stressed the importance of patriotism in society, conveyed patriotic feeling, created an impression of Chinese power, imparted positive images of the nation, and instilled a sense of pride in the nation. Students were encouraged to make comparisons between China and other countries, in order to demonstrate that Chinese political philosophy and the socialist system were superior to others. Mainland students also felt that they were encouraged to have a strong sense of responsibility toward the nation and to make contributions to its development. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, several students felt that the history curriculum tended to treat China as a foreign country. Other students mentioned that they felt a sense of shame as they learned about China's defeats by Western countries in its modern history.

Mainland students mentioned participating in a number of political education-related activities outside of class; Hong Kong students had few such experiences. Some Mainland students felt that these activities were superficial and not as important as the curriculum in conveying patriotic attitudes, while others felt that they were an important complement to the curriculum, and integrated with and reinforced content from their courses. Some students felt that activities were even more powerful than the curriculum, with the effect being felt more deeply because students

were happy, interested and participated willingly. These students felt activities made them focus their attention on the nation, fostered emotions of happiness, pride, and patriotism, and created an impression of Chinese power. Some Hong Kong students who participated in activities related to the nation mentioned that they led to enhanced feelings of closeness to the nation and to a deeper understanding of the nation and its people.

Students also commented on the influence of teachers in conveying positive attitudes toward the nation. Some Mainland students felt that the quality of teaching in politics classes had a direct influence on students' attitudes toward social problems and ideology. Teachers who appeared as models of patriotism, and demonstrated their feelings for the nation through their speech and actions, were more effective than those who simply exhorted students to be patriotic. Several Mainland students mentioned that politics teachers' use of debate and discussion in the classroom left a deep impression on them. Some Hong Kong students felt affected by teachers who expressed negative comments about China in the classroom.

Not all students, in either Hong Kong or the Mainland, felt that schooling had had a strong effect on their attitudes. Some Mainland students felt that talk about patriotism in school was superficial and "empty." While some students acknowledged that school had conveyed a degree of knowledge, they denied that schooling itself, through the curriculum or activities, was able to convey emotion. Most Hong Kong students commented that little or no knowledge about China was conveyed to them in school, and that the school was not a conducive environment for creating positive attitudes toward the nation due to lack of interest among the students themselves. Students felt there was little discussion of Chinese affairs because teachers considered the subject too sensitive.

Statements in the survey questionnaire related to secondary schooling, as shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, referred to knowledge conveyed in school, extracurricular activities, and the willingness of teachers to let students form their own opinions about national affairs. There were statistically significant differences between the Mainland and Hong Kong groups on the questions of knowledge and activities, with more Mainland than Hong Kong students responding positively that those components of the schooling experience had positively affected their attitudes toward the

nation. There was no significant difference between the two groups in their perception of teachers' openness to allow differences of opinion on national affairs. The two groups diverged more on the question of the influence of extracurricular activities than on that of the transmission of knowledge.

Table 6.3 The Influence of Secondary School (Group Means)

	HK/ML	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
I learned a lot about China in secondary school.***	HK	260	3.10	1.00
	ML	274	3.65	0.92
Activities I participated in school made me feel close to my country.***	HK	259	2.61	0.78
	ML	273	3.36	0.97
Teachers encourage students to form their own opinions about national affairs.	HK	260	2.95	0.88
	ML	275	3.06	1.03

Differences significant at ***$p \leq 0.001$

Table 6.4 The Influence of Secondary School (Percentages)

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I learned a lot about China in secondary school.	43.1%	31.2%	68.8%	15.3%
Activities I participated in school made me feel close to my country.	10%	42.3%	50.6%	18.9%
Teachers encourage students to form their own opinions about national affairs.	28%	28.9%	37.8%	29.1%

Only about 40 percent of Hong Kong students agreed that they had acquired knowledge about the nation in school, although this number was slightly larger than those who disagreed or were neutral. A majority of Mainland students claimed they had been taught a lot about their country,

while only about 15 percent denied this. In the Mainland group, the curriculum was viewed as a stronger influence than extracurricular activities, with only about half acknowledging that such activities had had a positive effect on their national attitudes. The largest group of Hong Kong students was neutral on the question of activities, and more students denied their effect than acknowledged it. Although there was no statistically significant difference between the two groups based on independent samples t-tests comparing means, a larger percentage of Mainland than Hong Kong students felt that teachers had been encouraging of diverse opinions about national affairs.

The University Experience

The university was the second most influential factor on Mainland students' national attitudes, and the fourth most important factor for Hong Kong students, according to the means test as presented in Table 6.1. University experiences were perceived by half of the Mainland students as an important influence on them. About half that number of Hong Kong students agreed, with more believing that university had had little influence on their attitudes.

From the interviews the overall experience of being in university, rather than any conscious effort through the university curriculum or professors to influence students' attitudes, appeared to be a greater factor in students' perceptions that the university had affected their attitudes. Some students denied that the university had much to do with their national attitudes, claiming that they learned nothing new about China in university or that they were too busy with their studies to be concerned with national affairs. Other Mainland students noted that content related to China in the university curriculum was basically a repetition of what they had learned in secondary school, but that their impressions and understanding of China's political philosophy and policies had deepened.

Several students felt that their attitudes toward China had changed or deepened since they had entered university, and attributed the change to the general university experience, including the influence of a heightened intellectual environment, professors, and classmates. One

Hong Kong student noted that he actually had more free time in university than in secondary school, which he spent reading more news about China, reading Chinese literature, and thinking about China's problems. Some Mainland students felt that the university exposed them to a wider variety of people and opinions than they had previously known. They mentioned that classmates from different parts of China shared stories and experiences from their own hometowns that offered different perspectives from what the students had encountered before. Hong Kong students participating in university exchange programs with students from the Mainland also mentioned that through such activities, they had come to a deeper understanding of their nation. Both Mainland and Hong Kong students also mentioned the influence of professors. Mainland students stated that some of their university professors had, during and outside of class, offered frank accounts of their experiences during the Cultural Revolution or their opinions about political events such as the Tiananmen incident. Some Hong Kong students also noted that university professors offered knowledge and perspectives that enabled them to think critically about images of China in the media.

Table 6.5 The University Experience (Group Means)

	HK/ML	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
My attitudes toward China have changed since I entered university. ***	HK	260	2.97	1.03
	ML	273	3.58	0.89
Things I have learned from classmates or professors in university have changed some of the attitudes I used to have about China.***	HK	260	2.98	0.95
	ML	273	3.38	0.88

Differences significant at ***$p \leq 0.001$

As a group, the Hong Kong students surveyed were relatively neutral on the question of whether their attitudes toward China had changed since entering university and also on the influence of classmates and professors. More Hong Kong students denied than believed that the university had changed their attitudes. As many students agreed and disagreed that people at the university had affected their attitudes, with a larger group being neutral. By contrast, over 60 percent of the Mainland students felt their attitudes had changed since arriving at university, and less than 15 percent

disagreed. More than half of the Mainlanders attributed changes in their attitudes to the influence of classmates and professors, with only about 20 percent disagreeing.

Table 6.6 **The University Experience (Percentages)**

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
My attitudes toward China have changed since I entered university.	33.9%	37.3%	63.3%	14.2%
Things I have learned from classmates or professors in university have changed some of the attitudes I used to have about China.	30.3%	30%	54.5%	19.3%

The Family

The family was ranked third by the group of Mainland students as an influence on their patriotic and nationalistic attitudes, while Hong Kong students perceived the family as the least influential, as reported in Table 6.1. Examining Table 6.2, about half of the Mainland students acknowledged the effect of the family, while only about 25 percent denied it. For the Hong Kong students, the largest percentage was neutral, followed by those who disagreed that the family had an effect on their attitudes. The family was considered an important influence by only about 25 percent.

It was apparent from the student interviews that the family's influence could be exerted both explicitly and implicitly, through teaching, modeling, and creating a particular atmosphere in the home. Several students mentioned that their parents or grandparents had provided them knowledge about China at home, introducing them to Chinese traditions, politics, and national symbols. Some Hong Kong students noted that their parents had related their own or relatives' negative experiences in the

Mainland, imparting a distrust of the Chinese government and disdain for the people. One student even noted that her parents had told her explicitly not to get involved in political discussions. Parents and relatives also more implicitly acted as models. Several students noted that their parents' patriotic attitudes affected their own. One student mentioned that his grandfather's influence was conveyed by the example of his fighting the Japanese as a guerilla in the Second World War. Hong Kong students felt influenced by their parents' negative attitudes toward China even if the parents did not explicitly discuss China with their children. Several students mentioned that their parents appeared to show concern for national affairs by reading the newspaper or watching television programs. Students also described how this example of parental concern also contributed to creating an atmosphere of either patriotism or indifference in the home. Mainland students mentioned that there were frequently magazines or newspapers covering national events in the home. Families watched significant programs together, such as the Olympic games or the Hong Kong handover ceremonies. Others, including those Mainland students with relatively uneducated parents and several Hong Kong students, noted that their families were indifferent to politics and national affairs. These students felt that the lack of a home atmosphere supportive of positive feelings toward the nation had resulted in their own lack of particularly positive attitudes toward the nation.

Of the statements relating to the different socializing influences, the only one on which Hong Kong students agreed more strongly, on average, than their Mainland counterparts was that referring to the family being critical of national affairs, as shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. Less than a third of Hong Kong students agreed with the statement, slightly lower than the number who disagreed. However, nearly 50 percent of the Mainland students felt that their families were not critical of national affairs, and only 20 percent acknowledged that they were. On the question of concern about national affairs, the situations with Hong Kong and Mainland students were almost exact opposites. About 40 percent of Mainland students felt their families showed concern for national affairs, while the same percentage of Hong Kong students said their families demonstrated a lack of concern. Only 20 percent of Hong Kong students' families showed interest in national affairs, with the same percentage of Mainland families not demonstrating such interest.

Table 6.7 The Influence of the Family (Group Means)

	HK/ML	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
My family tends to be very critical about national affairs.***	HK	259	2.94	1.00
	ML	272	2.65	0.93
My family shows a lot of concern about national affairs.***	HK	260	2.74	0.95
	ML	275	3.27	0.95

Differences significant at ***$p \leq 0.001$

Table 6.8 The Influence of the Family (Percentages)

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
My family tends to be very critical about national affairs.	31.1%	35%	20%	49.1%
My family shows a lot of concern about national affairs.	22.7%	40%	41.8%	21.5%

The Influence of the Media

Of the five agents, the media was ranked first by the group of Hong Kong students and last by Mainland students, as demonstrated by the group means in Table 6.1. The size of the difference between the means of the two groups was second only to that of schooling. As shown in Table 6.2, nearly 60 percent of Hong Kong students agreed that the media was an important influence on the way they perceived China, while only one-third of Mainland students felt the same. Of the Hong Kong students, only about 20 percent felt that they were not influenced by the media. Forty-five percent of the Mainland students denied that the media had an influence on shaping their attitudes toward their nation.

In interviews, students expressed the view that the media, including newspapers, television, and radio, contributed to the formation of their attitudes toward the nation primarily as a source of information. In the Mainland, local and national newspapers gave students knowledge of

national events. Students also pointed out that they sometimes listened to Voice of America (VOA) or British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio broadcasts. While some of them pointed out that they viewed these sources as a form of propaganda, they also agreed that they provided a different perspective on their nation than they received from the Chinese media, and that this encouraged them to think more critically. For Hong Kong students, the newspaper and television news was also considered an important source of information about China. Several Hong Kong students noted that their impression of China and the Chinese people also came from other kinds of television programs, including serials, features, and travel programs.

Two national events, as portrayed through the media, which occurred while these students were growing up, also exerted a profound influence upon their impressions of China. Hong Kong students viewed Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 in varying ways. The handover focused people's attention on the nation on a daily basis. Some students noted that before 1997 when they studied Chinese history, they felt that they were studying a separate country. After 1997, however, they said they felt a stronger sense of belonging to and ownership of their nation. Other students noted that the actual handover had little impact on their attitudes toward China, as they had grown up with the expectation of it happening. Others noted that they had always considered China as their own nation, regardless of the fact that they lived in British territory. While Hong Kong's handover had less of an impact on Mainland students, they did cite it as a source of national pride and something that no previous government had been able to accomplish.

Several Hong Kong students also noted the impact of 1989's June Fourth Tiananmen Square incident on their attitudes toward China. These students claimed that it was due to this event that they first considered themselves Chinese, and associated themselves with the Chinese people on their television screens, rather than viewing themselves only as Hong Kong people. The events created feelings of sympathy for their fellow compatriots while at the same time giving students a negative impression of the Chinese government. While the Mainland interviewees did not go into detail about the Tiananmen Square incident, several of them did consider the 1989 student democracy movement a patriotic one.

Despite the difference in their acknowledgement of the influence of the media, of the statements about the various socializing influences where there were significant differences between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups, it was on the issue of following the national news that Hong Kong and Mainland students had the closest agreement. Comparing the means of their responses to this statement, the Mainland students were only slightly higher, as in Table 6.9.

Table 6.9 The Influence of the Media (Group Means)

	HK/ML	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
I regularly read articles about China in the newspaper or watch the national news on TV.*	HK	260	3.52	0.77
	ML	273	3.69	0.97

Differences significant at *$p \leq 0.05$

As shown in Table 6.10, sixty percent of Hong Kong students claimed that they regularly read national news in the newspaper or followed it on television, about twenty percent more than stated that they learned about China in school. Only about 12 percent of the Hong Kong students did not bother with the news. A slightly larger percentage of the Mainland students did not express an interest in news about national affairs. A majority of the Mainland students, however, did follow the media's presentation of national news, slightly less than claimed they had gained considerable knowledge of China in school.

Table 6.10 The Influence of the Media (Percentages)

	Hong Kong $N = 260$		*Mainland* $N = 275$	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I regularly read articles about China in the newspaper or watch the national news on TV.	59.2%	11.9%	66.9%	14.3%

The Influence of Friends

For the group of Hong Kong students, friends were the third most influential factor, following the media and schooling, as shown in Table 6.1. The Mainland students rated friends as the fourth of five important influences on their attitudes toward the nation. There was no statistically significant difference between the two groups despite the different ranking of priority; this difference was the smallest of all five factors. In both groups roughly the same number of students agreed and disagreed that friends had an impact on their attitudes, as shown in Table 6.2. Slightly more Mainland students disagreed than agreed. In the interviews, students mentioned that friends exercised influence either as models of patriotic or unpatriotic behavior, or as a sources of information about other parts of China.

The Influence of Travel Experiences

There were no statements on the questionnaire referring to students' travel experiences, but several student interviewees mentioned their travels through China as an influence on their attitudes about the nation. They noted that travel had given them opportunities to observe other parts of the nation for themselves and to come into contact with people outside their own locality. On the positive side, some Hong Kong students' travels enabled them to observe China's economic development. Through personal contact with Mainland people, some students were able to balance previously held negative impressions of the Chinese and get beyond superficial media images. For others, travels to other parts of China and contact with the people strengthened already positive impressions. For some Hong Kong students, however, travels to the Mainland gave them a rather negative impression of their nation as unclean and underdeveloped, and of the Chinese people as uneducated and lacking in public morality. For some Mainland students, the primary impact of their travels to other parts of China was the chance for contact with other people, through which they learned more about different regions and strengthened their attachment to the nation through closer connections with their fellow compatriots.

7

Critical Thinking among Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese Students

In addition to describing their perceptions of the influence of secondary schooling, the university, the media, the family, and friends on their attitudes toward the nation, Hong Kong and Mainland students also offered evaluations of these influences. Out of these evaluations emerged the theme of critical thinking. The manifestations of critical thinking that students exhibited corresponded closely to general definitions of critical thinking in the relevant literature, definitions which incorporate reasoned reflections about one's beliefs and actions, discovery, skepticism, and the consideration of alternative viewpoints in forming one's attitudes. Ennis (1996) defines critical thinking as "Reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do" (10). Noddings (1995) notes that definitions of critical thinking "have tended to converge toward an emphasis on reasonableness, reflection, skepticism, and commitment to use one's capacities for reason and reflection" (91). In arguing for "dialogical thinking" which takes into account opposing points of view in dealing with issues and solving problems, Paul (1987) writes that critical thinking requires students to "explicate, understand, and critique their own deepest prejudices, biases, and misconceptions, thereby allowing students to discover and contest their own egocentric and sociocentric tendencies" (140). Similarly, McPeck (1981) writes that "the most notable characteristic of critical thought is that it involves a certain scepticism, or suspension of assent, towards a given statement, established norm or mode of doing things . . . it considers alternative hypotheses and possibilities" (6).

Skepticism is one of several characteristics of critical thinking that scholars term "dispositions," recognizing that critical thinking involves not only skills, but attitudes, "habits of mind," and "character traits" (Johnson 1992; Siegel 1988). Aside from skepticism, there are two other dispositions which fall appropriately within the terms of the discussion of political socialization and resistance: intellectual curiosity, representing the creative aspect of critical thinking, and open-mindedness, or what shall hereafter be called an openness to multiple perspectives in forming one's attitudes.

Skepticism can be defined as the ability and willingness to evaluate the reliability of sources (Ruggiero 1988) and to judge the relative credibility of arguments, taking into account the "vested interests" of the sources (Paul 1992, 145). It is also the ability and willingness to "question what is presented . . . as true" (Paul 1992, 152), to hold that "all beliefs are open to doubt" (D'Angelo 1971, 7), and to "reject unjustified authorities at the same time that [one] recognize[s] the contributions of justified authorities" (Paul 1992, 152). Finally, skepticism is the ability to recognize that "conclusions and beliefs inculcated in us are sometimes false or misleading . . . so we must not passively and uncritically accept what we have learned or been taught" (Paul 1992, 153).

Intellectual curiosity is one creative, constructive aspect of critical thinking. At the most basic level, it entails a desire to be well-informed (Ennis 1987), a positive attitude toward novelty, and an interest in widening one's experience (Ruggiero 1988). The curious wonder about the world and their environment (Paul 1992), seek "answers to various kinds of questions and problems," and investigate "the causes and explanations of events; asking why, how, who, what, when, and where" (D'Angelo 1971, 7).

An openness to multiple perspectives involves a serious consideration and respect for multiple, alternative points of view, treating them all alike (D'Angelo 1971; Ennis 1987; Paul 1992). Terming this disposition, "intellectual empathy," or "fairmindedness," Paul (1992) defines it as reasoning "from premises, assumptions, and ideas other than our own," and as the "ability to reason without reference to one's own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings and vested interests of one's friends, community, or nation" (153–4). Going one step further, the disposition indicates a willingness to even change or revise one's beliefs, "avoiding

steadfastness of belief, dogmatic attitude and rigidity" (D'Angelo 1971, 7).

With these definitions in mind, this chapter introduces the critical thinking dispositions in the words of students themselves, demonstrating how the concepts emerged out of students' discussions about national attitudes and political socialization. The chapter presents profiles of three mainland Chinese and three Hong Kong students, who exemplify the three critical thinking dispositions which are the focus of this study — skepticism, curiosity, and an openness to multiple perspectives. It then turns to data from the group of interviews and the larger survey to give more insight into the nature of the dispositions and the question of their prevalence among the Mainland and Hong Kong student groups.

PROFILES OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, AND CRITICAL THINKING AMONG MAINLAND CHINESE AND HONG KONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

As a segue into the concepts of critical thinking and in order to demonstrate how this theme emerged from the interviews, profiles of three mainland Chinese and three Hong Kong students are presented here. These students have been selected because they were the best examples, among all of the interviewees, of the dispositions of skepticism, curiosity, and an openness to multiple perspectives, as well as, for contrast, an apparent lack of critical thinking. In interviews students were not explicitly asked about critical thinking — they were simply asked to describe the extent to which they felt schooling and other agents of socialization had influenced their attitudes toward the nation. Therefore, these critical thinking dispositions are exemplified in the students' own thoughts and words. In order to provide a context for the dispositions for each student, their attitudes along several dimensions of national attitudes are also presented. Finally, a description of their perceptions of the socialization process highlights aspects which reveal their dispositions toward critical thinking.

"James"

Based on his responses to questions inquiring into his national attitudes and the political socialization process, "James," a student from Nanjing, did not exhibit many of the characteristics of critical thinking that several of his Mainland counterparts did. The discussion of James, as with the other students to follow, begins with details of his attitudes toward the nation, then turns to his assessment of the influence of schooling and other agents of socialization.

When asked toward the end of the interview whether he considered himself patriotic, James answered "Yes, and I am a member of the Chinese Communist Party." At the same time, he believed that people with various political beliefs and strength of belief could all be considered patriotic in their own ways:

> For example, in the recent [1998 Yangtze River] floods, a lot of Hong Kong people donated money to the flood relief efforts. This is an expression of patriotism. They want their nation to be prosperous. For this they exert their own effort, they do whatever they can. If I am strong, I can go and move sandbags; if I'm too busy at work, or if I'm too old, I can donate some money, or I can call people to encourage them to donate money, or write an article for the newspaper to urge people to donate money. These are all expressions of patriotism. On this problem there is no obvious difference because of political leanings. Of course, if you are on the Mainland, and you are a member of the Communist Party, and your patriotic feeling and character are obvious, it isn't only a matter of you having a right to be patriotic, you also have the duty. You have a responsibility to do something for your homeland, to do something for your China; this is for members of the Communist Party. They are expected to do something higher. For others, like the students abroad, they can also be patriotic; as can the people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, Jiangsu, Beijing, the old, the young, men, women, all these people can be patriotic. (Mainland Interview ML112498)

By contrast, James would consider unpatriotic someone who was indifferent to the nation's fate, even to the point of opposing national development.

On an emotional level, James felt proud of China's "long history and

glorious culture," China's successes and ability to overcome difficulties, the country's scientific progress, the rise in people's living standards, and the "lofty character" of the hardworking Chinese people. On the other hand, questioned as to what about China disappointed him, he mentioned the narrowness of the higher education curriculum and environmental problems.

The way for citizens to serve China, according to James, was to "respect the constitution and observe the laws."

> The things that the laws require you to do as a citizen, you should do. If you do something more, because your morals are higher, you can also serve China in other ways. It depends on the nation's circumstances, not really the nation requiring you to do one thing or another . . . Sometimes the nation will require people to go to Tibet. Sometimes there will be a situation like this where the nation needs you to go to another place, but this was mostly in the past. Nowadays, what the nation needs is often determined by the market. The nation's needs are the market's needs. The market's needs are the nation's needs. If the market requires people who speak English to go and do translation, then you will go and do translation. (Mainland Interview ML112498)

Asked if China should be able to limit some individual freedoms in the name of public interest, he responded:

> I haven't come across a situation like that. What do you have in mind? (*Interviewer: Like limiting freedom of speech in the name of national stability [as another student had mentioned]*). I think that we have freedom of speech in China. In the dormitory we say whatever we want to. But in an open forum, like in a graduation ceremony, you can't go up and say something bad about the president of the university. Also, I think that in university we are relatively free, in the academic arena we are quite free, and thinking is quite active and open. I think this is how it is. There aren't really any limitations on what we say. If there were, then I think it would be because the government or the Party was looking at the long term. (Mainland Interview ML112498)

Regarding China's role in the world, James felt that China should defend her normal, legal interests and defend world peace, stability, and

development. In the Diaoyutai Islands dispute with Japan, China should be "persistent" if, as a result of negotiations, it was determined that the islands in fact belonged to China. He was against war to resolve such a dispute.

In describing his perceptions of the influence of others on his national attitudes, James mentioned schooling, the family, and the university. He felt schooling had had a large impact,

> . . . because I basically grew up in school, from primary to university . . . And we studied about Chinese culture, history, novels, these kinds of things . . . School education is a good way to come into contact with patriotic sentiment. For example, in school we went to the Martyr's Monument to sweep the graves, or to the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum, or Zhou Enlai's former residence. These are all kinds of patriotic education.
>
> We often had debates, or discussion, or free talking, the teacher would give a topic and then the students would have a free discussion, raising their hand to answer questions and express themselves clearly. That kind of thing gave me a good feeling, and when we were in senior secondary we often had this kind of discussion. In university we also had this kind of discussion. (Mainland Interview ML112498)

He also felt that his parents had influenced his attitudes, and went on to comment that "If the parents are unpatriotic, then the children will probably also be unpatriotic. Or if the child doesn't know anything when he is young, he might say something like, 'Oh this Chinese government is so corrupt, all the people take money . . .' If the parents talk like this, it will influence the children" (Mainland Interview ML112498).

Finally, he provided some insight into the possible effects of the university on national attitudes: "We have Deng Xiaoping Theory class, and History of the Chinese revolution. I think in these classes, you have to memorize the books. In doing so you are repeating a lot of things you have learned before, so it deepens the impression" (Mainland Interview ML112498).

"David"

Compared to James, "David," from Sichuan, appeared to be more critical, both of some aspects of Chinese society and of the political socialization

process. At university he encountered a wider variety of perspectives about the nation than he had heard previously, and the experience appeared to lead him to reflect critically on his earlier education and other aspects of his university experience. Like James, David is a member of the Chinese Communist Party and considers himself patriotic, though he sees a distinction between the nation and the state. He considered the meaning of patriotism to be very broad:

> It's not just sacrificing yourself for the nation in a war, or resisting an invasion, or a soldier making a great contribution. Patriotism is not just exemplified in these kinds of instances. If I say that I'm patriotic, it's in my heart. Showing concern for national events, concern for national developments, or understanding national policies. Also having confidence in one's own nation. (Mainland Interview ML1013981)

By contrast, an unpatriotic person would be one who had no national pride, considered China inferior to other countries, or was unwilling to show concern for the nation's future.

Like most other students, David found pride in China's long history, a history that can engage foreigners in a lifetime of study. He was also proud of the Chinese peoples', and especially university students', sense of mission to develop China's economy. He expressed disappointment in some aspects of Chinese society that he considered unfair, such as the role that family connections, as opposed to one's own effort, played in securing employment, as well as the inability to publicly express opinions about shortcomings in the social and political systems. In fact, he considered expressing demands and raising criticism of China's policies or social or political systems as a higher expression of patriotism, in that it showed concern for China's future.

According to David, a citizen's duty to the nation is to take the nation's fate and development as one's own responsibility, and, in so doing, to strive to improve one's own abilities to make a contribution to development. He did not agree that the nation should be able to limit some individual freedoms in the name of the public interest, because he was concerned that this would lead to violations of people's rights. However, he did agree that at certain times the national interest should come first and individuals should make sacrifices. David also believed that China should use peaceful

means and not resort to war to resolve the Diaoyutai dispute, but was dissatisfied with China's role in many international situations, which he saw as ambivalent and lacking in strong principle.

David gave primary credit to schooling and the university in influencing his attitudes toward the nation. He specifically mentioned the curriculum as providing knowledge, and as a basis for forming an emotional attachment to the nation:

> [We learn] about Chinese history, culture, to try to promote a kind of national pride. Afterwards, we learn about geography, history, to let you know that China is an amazing country. Then civics, to let students learn about China's society, organizations, political system, policies. Then students learn about citizens' rights. Then we learn about law, to let students learn about China's basic laws . . . After we get to university, the classes give us a deeper understanding of some of China's policies. We also learn dialectical materialism. This has a big influence on us. (Mainland Interview ML1013981)

However, he was less impressed with activities:

> In my case, I'm not too interested in those special activities organized by the school. I feel that most of these activities are superficial. I'm a CCP member. We have some party branch activities. But what kinds of activities are these? They are like studying very empty things. And afterwards what do we do? We read some books or listen to lectures. There isn't really any practical significance. I think we should integrate these kinds of things with concrete activities, not empty talk. (Mainland Interview ML1013981)

The university appeared to directly affect David's tendency to think critically by offering him a variety of perspectives that he had not encountered before. He commented that he felt that his national attitudes changed somewhat after graduation from secondary school:

> Entering university was a big change for me. Before, when we studied it was local. The things we encountered were local. But after going to university, in my case the university I went to was very far from my home. And in China's universities, there are people from all over. And through contact with people from other parts of China, I

> understood more about China, from people bringing news or information from different parts of China. And I found out that things weren't so perfect — people told me about the actual situation in their hometowns. And the teachers also exerted a big influence. Their minds are more clear than us, because they have more experience. They also have a lot of knowledge, and their opinions about the nation are clearer. Sometimes when we are in class and they are talking about these things, they don't let us take notes, because they are afraid of making some political mistakes. But in their interactions with us, they say things that we have never heard before. (Mainland Interview ML1013981)

"Ken"

"Ken" is from Xi'an, and appears the most critical of the three Mainland students profiled here, in that he does not accept some of the things that were taught to him about the nation in school, and sees political education as a form of government control. To Ken, patriots are simply people who love their own people and their nation, and he considers himself one of them, acknowledging that though the system has certain problems, they are problems that are unavoidable in a country undergoing growth.

He feels pride in China's accomplishments since 1949:

> From the time the Mainland government was established until now, there are a lot of things that are worthy of pride. For example, in military affairs, the nuclear bomb, the hydrogen bomb, biological and aerospace technology. These things, of course, were developed with the help of the Soviet Union, but for the most part were done by the Chinese themselves. These were very successful. These things make Chinese people proud. Now, although China is in a period of reform and there are a lot of people who are not satisfied, there are still a lot of people who are very happy and proud that China has been able to develop so fast in twenty years. (Mainland Interview ML121298)

Unlike many other interviewees from both the Mainland and Hong Kong, however, Ken feels little pride in China's past:

> China has a long history, with a lot of traditions. But I don't think that Chinese nowadays should be proud of this, because 100 or so

> years ago, Western culture flowed into China with the aid of military means. This shows that China was backward compared to the rest of the world, even 100 years ago. So although we have a very long history, worthy of pride, a Chinese should not feel self-pride because of this. (Mainland Interview ML121298)

Furthermore, unlike James and David, Ken expressed disappointment in several aspects of China's political system:

> Actually, a lot of my classmates and the people I know are not very satisfied about the rights that citizens wish to have. I have just said that the Chinese leadership has established relatively sound political and legal systems, to help people to gain all kinds of rights. But because after the 1989 turmoil, the government increased control. For example, now, if you want to hold a demonstration, even one without a political goal, it is quite difficult to carry out. But according to the law, demonstrations are allowed. But in actuality, they are impermissible. Right now, because of the reforms, there are a lot of people out of work. Some people really have no way to make a living, and they have gone to the city government to petition, not to demonstrate, just to petition. They hope that the government can help them resolve some of their basic living problems. But the government went out and sent the people away. So this shows that presently the Chinese people have not realized a lot of their rights. (Mainland Interview ML121298)

Among a citizen's duties, Ken believes, are preserving the nation's rights and dignity, military service if needed, and following the law even if it limits people's rights in the name of national interests, as long as the majority of people understand the law and agree with the government's policy. Because it should be focused on national development, Ken believes that the Chinese government should not involve itself too deeply in international affairs, as he feels that many international issues are sensitive and complicated.

Although acknowledging that schooling had been an important influence on his attitudes, particularly in prescribing patriotism, Ken was for the most part very critical of the school's attempts to influence attitudes, characterizing it as a form of control and expressing the belief that there was a gap between what students were told and what the actual situation was, both in China and abroad:

School education is important. It tells us that we should love China, how we should be. But at the same time, there are a lot of things that we don't accept from school education. What we accept is the patriotism that all Chinese, regardless of whether they have been schooled or not, should have. But in Chinese political education, from primary to university, a lot more aspects are related to the government's wanting to control us, not objectively telling you what the situation in China actually is. So a lot of Chinese students don't accept that. But being patriotic, and willing to preserve national interests is something that the majority of students accept.

. . . in China, it is difficult for people to find out about the criticisms of other countries, like America and Britain, about the Chinese government, other than listening to VOA or BBC. Although what those stations say is not correct, from them we can gather that China lacks certain things, in terms of democracy and human rights. So people are aware as they grow up. But not when students are in junior secondary, because at that time children think that whatever adults say is true, what the government says is true. But in senior secondary and university, one begins to realize that there are various inadequacies in China.

The nation has been trying to influence the thinking, to control the thinking and consciousness of the youth, telling them to be patriotic, not to believe what American or British or Taiwanese stations say. But actually, although they have stressed this for so many years, almost all students understand that the actual conditions in China are not like what the government says, that Chinese democracy is not like what the government says it is. So a lot of youth in China are disappointed about rights in China. Because the government puts too much stress on politics, it has forgotten the true goal of education, which is to teach people to love the things around them.

Although the Chinese government, from 1950 to the late 1970s, . . . controlled people's thinking, telling people that the West was so terrible, that people didn't have rights, a more realistic picture of the West, through TV or from people who went abroad, has come into China. So most people think that the actual situation abroad is not like what Chinese propaganda says. So Chinese are friendly towards the West. But if foreigners criticize China without basis, or look down upon China, most Chinese would be very angry. (Mainland Interview ML121298)

"Regina"

"Regina," a Hong Kong student, exemplifies a critical thinking student in the Hong Kong context, stating that critical thinking skills and contact with different perspectives in university led her to understand and have more positive feelings toward her nation. Regina considers herself patriotic, but she does not "love" the Chinese Communist Party, and she is proud to be Chinese. She generally feels close to the Chinese people, and when she travels to the Mainland, she feels a sense of belonging. When she hears the Chinese national anthem, she feels "This is my own country's song."

She believes that there are two kinds of patriots:

> Some of them love the Party. They want China to have a higher position on the world stage, they want the whole world to respect Chinese people, and they want China to be treated as an equal in international affairs. The other kind of patriotic Chinese are more moderate and idealistic. They want life in China to be better, and want those who live under poor conditions to have an equal chance to study, to raise their living standards, and to enjoy freedom, democracy, and a certain material life. They love the land and respect ancient artifacts and cultural relics. They feel that they are the sons and daughters of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers. These are two different kinds of patriots. (Hong Kong Interview HK0820981)

On the other hand, Regina believes unpatriotic people are those who do not care what happens to China, or engage in political power struggles only to enhance their own power.

Regina feels pride in China's ancient past, the Four Great Inventions (paper, gunpowder, the compass, and movable type printing), classical literature, and the artistry of the Chinese language. She feels disappointed, however, in China's political system, the suppression of dissent, the gap between the rich and poor, and some people's immoral or selfish behavior. She believes that the duty of a Chinese citizen is to make a contribution to China's development to the best of one's ability, and to offer criticism when it is needed to promote China's progress. She believes that there should be limits on people's democratic freedoms, in that people should not necessarily be free to the extent that they impinge on the freedoms

of others. She thinks that by virtue of the size of her territory and population, China should play a much more important role in the world.

Regina gives an idea of how the history curriculum in Hong Kong did not contribute to a positive attachment to the nation:

> In secondary school I studied history from Form 1 to Form 7. But the history we studied from Form 1 to Form 3 covered the period from the Qin Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty, and it was just like listening to stories; it didn't seem realistic. But in Form 4 and 5, we learned about China's wars with the West, and the teachers told us about the treaties that China signed and that China was defeated and had to pay indemnities and give up territory. At that time I felt like "How could China lose over and over again?" And I wondered why China was so incapable. But then in Form 6 and 7, it was a bit better, because at that time we learned to analyze it better, to look at things from two sides. But because at that time Chinese History was a part of the class in Asian history, it seemed like China was another foreign country, just like Japan, India, etc. At that time I didn't think of China as my own country. (Hong Kong Interview HK0820981)

However, activities at school organized around the June Fourth incident did leave their mark:

> The first time I considered myself a Chinese was in 1989 because of the June 4th Incident. At that time all my classmates sang some Chinese songs, and we had assemblies where the teachers told us what the government did to the students. At that time I felt myself as a part of China, that I was Chinese, but it wasn't a 'political' China. At that time I didn't like those Communists, but I sympathized with the people. (Hong Kong Interview HK0820981)

The most important influence on Regina's national attitudes was the university, because of the critical thinking skills it promoted and because of the exposure to multiple perspectives that it provided through exchange activities:

> It wasn't until I got to university and thought more critically that I started to associate myself with China and to develop a kind of patriotic feeling.

> It was only after I entered university and participated in some activities that I got to know China better. Also, my professors had a substantial influence, for example when I studied economic geography, the professor explained the period between 1949 and the Cultural Revolution and asked us to consider whether all of the economic reforms that the government promoted during that time were bad . . . When he looked at the whole picture, he pointed out both the good and the bad points. After entering university and looking at the whole picture, I began to appreciate China. For example, before, especially before I went to university, I just thought the Mainland was backward and that the living conditions there were very poor. But after entering university, I realized that from 1978 until now there has been a lot of improvement in the Chinese economy, and when I saw that such a big country could accomplish this, I really began to appreciate China.
>
> After entering university, I participated in exchange activities with the Mainland, and had the chance to come into contact with teachers and students. I used to think that they had no public morality, that their clothes were old-fashioned, and could not understand why they spoke differently from us, using strange terms. At the time I had that kind of feeling, but after more contact with people from the Mainland I could see their good qualities. (Hong Kong Interview HK0820981)

"Norman"

Like Regina, "Norman's" attitudes toward China seemed to be mostly influenced by the university experience, where the atmosphere contributed to an intellectual curiosity about the nation. He loves his country, but does not consider himself a patriot as such. He would like to have an influence on China through his future work in the mass media, whereby he would report on China to draw attention to her problems, as an expression of his concern for the nation. Aside from himself, a patriotic person, according to his definition, is someone who shows concern for the development of the nation, not someone who just repeats what the Chinese Communist Party says. A sense of belonging is also important for someone to be considered patriotic.

He is proud of the Chinese language, which he considers exquisite; China's unity; the wisdom of the Chinese people, although he considers

that Chinese thought has not been conducive to technological development; and China's unique culture. At the same time, he is rather displeased with the political system, which does not allow for criticism, and with the Mainland media that only echoes the government line. He believes it is a citizen's duty to show concern for the nation — he believes that Chinese people traveling abroad should be polite and not do things that reflect poorly on China. A citizen's duties also include caring for the environment, not polluting the air or the water, and observing the law.

He would not wholly support restrictions on people's rights in the nation's interest:

> You have to first look at what the nation's interests are in doing so. If you are speaking of restrictions on freedom of expression in the name of national stability, then I would not believe that. You can have a stable country together with freedom of expression . . . You might think that this thing will influence the nation's interest, but perhaps it is just what you are thinking at the moment, it might not actually be true. There are some basic freedoms and rights that people should have. There should be no reason to restrict them. But on the other hand, these individual rights and freedoms cannot be taken to the extreme. For example, I cannot go around burning cars. I believe in the expression, "as soon as something reaches its extremity, it reverses its course." You can't go to the extreme in either direction. (Hong Kong Interview HK0717982)

Like Regina, Norman believes that because of China's size, she should be more active internationally. With regard to the Diaoyutai Islands dispute:

> I believe that China should get the islands back, but there are actually a lot of limiting circumstances. If you look at China's present circumstances and want her to get the islands back, it is not practical right now . . . The Chinese people's education levels are not so high, and education isn't universal. Under these circumstances it would be easy for things to get out of control, for the situation to become difficult and troublesome. So I think that if you announce that you want to get the Diaoyutai Islands back, it would not work. There are so many people out of work, a lot of people with nothing to do, and many people still living in poverty and difficult conditions. In these

> circumstances it is just not realistic to speak of grabbing the islands back . . . But I think that once China becomes rich and strong there will be a need to take the islands back, out of national dignity. Before, nobody spoke of taking back Hong Kong. But once China started to develop and achieved some prosperity, and China could see how important Hong Kong was, then she could speak of getting Hong Kong back. With the Diaoyutai Islands, we should take them back, but it shouldn't be the first thing on the list. (Hong Kong Interview HK0717982)

As a science student, Norman did not take the same kinds of history classes that Regina did, so he felt the influence of schooling on his national attitudes was very limited and that the secondary school offered limited opportunity to seek out information. That situation changed when he entered university:

> I do not think that schooling had much of an influence. Up to now I wonder why Hong Kong people are so indifferent to the nation and do not consider themselves Chinese. I think that this has a lot to do with education. All along, schools very seldom bring up or discuss things about China. A lot of teachers avoid talking about these things. There are ways for you to get information, but these ways are not obvious, not easy to discover. If you can discover the way, you can get the information; you have the freedom to get it. It is just that the way is not obvious. Even when you get to university. Actually I think that when I entered university, it was not until then that I started to like this nation, China. Although she has her bad points, those can be improved upon. But I have begun to consider myself a Chinese, because I really like Chinese writings, and I have started to like to read the newspaper, started to read more books, and I like reading books. In this way, I have increasingly felt myself as a Chinese. But for me, the influence of the school was very small . . . In university there is a very free atmosphere, and you can seek out information for yourself. The university does not purposely tell you to be patriotic. I also think that the university should not do much in this respect . . . But before in secondary school there was even less.
>
> I think that in university there is less homework pressure. I am studying science, and there is not very much pressure. So possibly I have more time to come into contact with different things. In secondary school we had to subscribe to the newspaper, the *Ming Pao*.

> At that time I started to read the newspaper. Since entering university, I have more time to read more, and I have been more and more exposed to the news. I think there is an atmosphere in university that increases your exposure to more kinds of thinking, and there is more time to think about things and contemplate problems. More time to read. (Hong Kong Interview HK0717982)

"Winnie"

Winnie is an example of a Hong Kong student who does not exhibit some of the critical thinking dispositions that Regina and Norman do. She does not consider herself patriotic, because, she says, "When I hear the national anthem I have no feeling. I don't like China very much, and I don't really like those people from the Mainland." Her image of patriotic people is one of sometimes extreme political activism in the pursuit of democracy for Hong Kong. She is proud of China's long history and the Four Great Inventions, but not proud of any aspect of China in modern times. She feels that China has neglected the environment, does not care about developing industry, and has not given the Chinese people freedom. She is disappointed that China is dirty, that education levels are low, and that school conditions are poor. Her explanation is that:

> The Chinese government maintains a policy of keeping the people in ignorance; it doesn't want the people to read too much or to be too smart, because if you are smart, if you read too much, you will think about things, and if you think about things you may come to oppose some of the government's policies. It's better if you are a bit stupid. So, they don't care about education, keep the teachers in a low position, and nobody wants to do that kind of work. The teachers want to go into business. In the long term, a lot of problems will appear. (Hong Kong Interview HK080398)

In Winnie's opinion a citizen's duty is to not buy pirated goods, as piracy damages China's reputation; not to litter; and to keep the country clean. She does not think that individual rights should be limited in the interest of the nation because of the issue of human rights. She feels that it would be best to let negotiations settle the Diaoyutai dispute, and thinks that China should play a balancing role in world affairs.

Although not demonstrating the curiosity of Norman or the interest in different perspectives of Regina, Winnie, while denying that schooling had influenced her attitudes toward the nation, did appear perceptive about the Hong Kong Education Department's sensitivity to politics in schools:

> The school did not have much influence. Sometimes teachers would talk about their own things while they were teaching, and the only influence might come if the teachers were very patriotic. Now we only care about whether we can be promoted to the next grade, whether we can get an "A," whether we will be able to find work, and we are very busy studying. We will not be able to think too much about these things. Also, the schools and the Education Department belong to the Hong Kong government. The Hong Kong government has to watch the Chinese government. So how could the Education Department do anything in this respect? It is very sensitive. It is very obvious from the history textbooks in primary or secondary school. There have been revisions, and parts have been deleted . . . So I do not think that Hong Kong education has had much influence, and does not bring up these issues . . . . At university we only have presentations, homework, examinations. If we have free time, we rest. (Hong Kong Interview HK080398)

CRITICAL THINKING AMONG HONG KONG AND MAINLAND CHINESE STUDENTS

The concepts related to critical thinking, as used in this study, emerged through interviews with students like these. David believed that new perspectives from classmates and professors in university led him to realize that "things were not as perfect" as he had been taught in school. Ken clearly did not accept, and saw as inaccurate, some of the things that he had been taught in school; perceived a gap between school knowledge and society; and viewed education as a form of government control. The ideas behind the various components of what are called "skepticism" and "openness to multiple perspectives" in this study arose through interviews with students like Ken and David. Regina's contact with professors who taught her to look at both sides of an issue, as well as with Mainland

students who helped change some of her previously-held conceptions of China and its people, also contributed to the concept of the importance of multiple perspectives. Norman, a science student who wanted to become a journalist, perceived a limitation of access to information in secondary school but was liberated by the university atmosphere to pursue his interest in Chinese literature and to think about China's problems. From students like him came the concept of intellectual curiosity.

However, it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of these concepts among larger groups of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese students from interviews with a limited number of students, and therefore the discussion now turns to the rest of the interview and survey questionnaire data. The rest of the interview data is presented in order to deepen the conceptions of the dispositions of skepticism, curiosity, and openness to multiple perspectives, and the results of the questionnaire survey of Hong Kong and Mainland students are then examined for the similarities and differences in their critical thinking dispositions. The discussion continues with an analysis of students' responses to one question about whether they considered themselves critical thinkers, and another about whether they considered the input of outside agents in forming their attitudes toward the nation.

Table 7.1 presents the results of independent samples t-tests of the Hong Kong and Mainland student groups on the three critical thinking scales. On all three dispositions there were statistically significant differences between the two groups. Mainland students were both more skeptical of the political socialization process and had a stronger sense of curiosity about the nation than their Hong Kong counterparts. Hong Kong students, on the other hand, were more willing to examine multiple perspectives in forming their attitudes about the nation. Mainland students themselves were more curious than skeptical or open to multiple perspectives. Hong Kong students as a group were about equally skeptical and curious, though more uniformly skeptical than curious. The largest difference between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups was on the Curiosity scale, followed by Multiple Perspectives. The closest agreement between the two groups, although statistically significantly different, was with regard to skepticism.

Table 7.1 Critical Thinking Dispositions (Group Means)

	MLHK	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean Difference*
Skepticism***	HK	257	3.29	0.35	0.19
	ML	267	3.48	0.58	
Curiosity***	HK	259	3.29	0.64	0.76
	ML	268	4.05	0.58	
Multiple Perspectives***	HK	259	3.14	0.70	0.67
	ML	273	2.47	0.82	

Differences significant at ***$p \leq 0.001$

Skepticism

In the interviews, students expressed skepticism about the political socialization process by doubting the effectiveness of conscious efforts by the school to shape their attitudes, questioning the accuracy and objectivity of the media and the school curriculum, and characterizing the school's political education efforts as a form of government control. Referring to the question of political education, some students in both the Mainland and Hong Kong felt that political attitudes such as patriotism, which encompassed various emotions, could not be consciously taught; these attitudes arose naturally in an imperceptible process of learning and maturation. Some Mainland students further characterized patriotic education courses and activities as superficial and empty, and others resented the fact that teachers and school administrators exhorted them to be patriotic, claiming that they were already so naturally. Other students felt that the school political education curriculum was inaccurate and not objective. They mentioned that some things they learned about their nation in school, including certain elements of the political system and process, were not in accordance with the real situation in Chinese society. These students felt that their rejection of at least part of what they had learned was the result of this disparity between school knowledge and social reality. Several students even went so far as to say that they considered the school political education curriculum an attempt by the government to control the political attitudes of the rising generation. These students noted that entering university and coming into

contact with differing perspectives had led to their characterization of their secondary school political education as a form of indoctrination. Hong Kong students also brought up the question of control, though less explicitly, in noting that many of their teachers avoided discussion of China in the classroom because they considered political topics too sensitive.

Three of the statements included in the Skepticism scale, as shown in Table 7.2, referred to the questions of objectivity, accuracy, and control in schooling and the media. Half of the Mainland students, and about 40 percent of Hong Kong students, felt that education about the nation in school was a form of indoctrination, while less than a quarter of the students in each group disagreed. A majority of Mainland students felt that what they had learned about the nation in school was not in accordance with their own first-hand observations, and only 13 percent disagreed. On this question, Hong Kong students were mostly (54 percent) neutral, with about one-third agreeing about a discrepancy between school and reality. On the question of the media's objectivity, the pattern was similar. Slightly over half of the Mainland students and about 40 percent of the Hong Kong students doubted the objectivity of the media in reporting about China. Only about 12 percent in each group considered the media objective, with the second largest group in both cases remaining neutral.

Table 7.2 **Skepticism**

	Hong Kong $N = 260$		*Mainland* $N = 275$	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
What we learn about China in school is a kind of indoctrination.	38%	22.3%	50.6%	23.8%
What I have observed with my own eyes is different from what they tell me about China in school.	33.6%	12%	66.1%	12.8%
The media is objective in what it tells us about the nation.	12%	40.3%	12.3%	52.4%

Curiosity

More skeptical than their Hong Kong counterparts, Mainland students also had a stronger sense of curiosity about their nation. In the interviews, however, it was several Hong Kong students who better exemplified the disposition of intellectual curiosity about their nation. Some Hong Kong students noted that they had more free time in university than in secondary school, time which they spent reading books about China, Chinese literature, and the newspaper. In light of this new knowledge they spent more time thinking about their nation and its problems. Several students were also drawn to travel in the Mainland and to exchange programs with Mainland students. The result of their curiosity, they claimed, was a better idea of the nature of their country and a stronger sense of their identity as Chinese.

Table 7.3 Curiosity

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I am eager to learn more about my country.	50.4%	14 6%	88.7%	2.9%
I would like to meet and share experiences with people from other parts of China	58.1%	8.9%	84.6%	3%

Two of the statements included in the Curiosity scale dealt with a willingness to learn more about China and to meet fellow compatriots, and the statistically significant difference between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups in the mean Curiosity scale scores is demonstrated in detail with a look at the percentage of students expressing agreement with these two statements, as shown in Table 7.3. About half of the Hong Kong students expressed an eagerness to learn more about China, but nearly 90 percent of the Mainland students expressed their curiosity in this fashion. Less than three percent of the Mainland students disagreed with

the statement, while about 15 percent of Hong Kong students appeared indifferent to learning more about their country. Nearly 60 percent of Hong Kong students expressed an interest in meeting and sharing experiences with people from other parts of China, more than were interested in general learning about China, and a smaller percentage of them professed that they did not care about such experiences. Approximately the same number of Mainland students wanted to meet compatriots from other parts of the country as were eager to learn about the nation in general.

An Openness to Multiple Perspectives

Hong Kong students scored higher than the Mainland students on the Multiple Perspectives scale, indicating that they were more open-minded and willing to adapt their opinions in the face of dissent than the Mainland students, who were on average more firm in their views about the nation. In the interviews, students said that they had come into contact with different perspectives and opinions about the nation in university, through various forms of the media, and through travel experiences. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mainland students noted that they came into contact with a wider variety of people and opinions than they had been exposed to in secondary school upon entering university. For many students, it was the first opportunity to meet people from other regions of China, who brought stories of their own experiences and news and information about their hometowns. From this information students said that they learned that conditions in Chinese society were not always as had been described in their secondary school courses. Professors at Mainland and Hong Kong universities also offered students different views on national conditions than they had heard before, in either secondary school or the media. Several Mainland students noted that they began to listen to foreign media broadcasts such as the Voice of America (VOA) or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) at university. While students considered these news sources a form of foreign propaganda, they also noted that they got the idea from them that China had problems with human rights and its political system, and noted that the VOA and BBC offered a perspective on national events different from that of China's domestic media. Finally, several Hong Kong students noted that their

experiences of traveling in China gave them a different perspective about their country than that they felt was commonly portrayed in the Hong Kong media.

The Multiple Perspectives scale attempted to capture the willingness of students to take into consideration different perspectives in forming their attitudes toward the nation. It consisted of the two items shown in Table 7.4. The first statement referred to students' willingness to adapt their views in the face of other opinions. About the same percentage of Hong Kong students were neutral on the question as expressed a willingness to change their minds. Approximately a quarter of the Hong Kong students claimed they would stand firm in their opinions in the face of other perspectives. The pattern with the Mainland students was strikingly different. Nearly two-thirds of the students surveyed said they would not adapt their own opinions, and less than 15 percent expressed a willingness to do so. The second statement referred to whether or not students had already adapted their attitudes because of what they had learned from other people. In this case, both groups were similar. Nearly 45 percent of the Hong Kong students admitted that their attitudes about China had changed because of what they had learned from others, while over 50 percent of their Mainland peers denied that this had happened. Nearly a quarter of the Hong Kong students claimed that their attitudes had remained unchanged despite the influence of other people, while slightly fewer Mainland students disagreed with the statement.

Table 7.4 Multiple Perspectives

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
No matter what people tell me, I am likely to stand firm in my opinions about China.	26.3%	35.9%	62.6%	14%
My attitudes about China have not changed because of anything I have learned from other people.	24.6%	43.8%	52%	22.2%

Tendency to Think Critically about National Affairs

On the questionnaire, students were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a statement referring to their tendency to think critically about national affairs. Table 7.5 shows that there was a significant difference between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups, with the latter considering themselves stronger critical thinkers. The detail presented in Table 7.6 reveals that two-thirds of Mainland students agreed that they thought critically about national affairs, while only about half of the Hong Kong students agreed with the same statement. Less than 15 percent of both the Mainland and Hong Kong groups claimed that they did not think particularly critically concerning issues related to their nation. In the interviews, several students mentioned explicitly that they felt that they had become better critical thinkers since entering university. The university experience had, they noted, allowed them to reflect upon their past schooling experiences and to come into contact with people who had taught them critical thinking skills.

Table 7.5 Tendency to Think Critically (Group Means)

	HK/ML	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
I tend to think critically about issues related to China.**	HK	260	3.40	0.75
	ML	273	3.61	0.88

Differences significant at $^{**}p \leq 0.01$

Table 7.6 Tendency to Think Critically (Percentages)

	Hong Kong $N = 260$		*Mainland* $N = 275$	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I tend to think critically about issues related to China.	47.3%	11.5%	67.4%	13.2%

Tendency to Make up One's Own Mind in Forming National Attitudes

Students answering the survey questionnaire were also asked to indicate their level of agreement with a statement referring to the degree to which they felt they were independent of external influences when forming their attitudes toward the nation. Table 7.7 shows that there was a statistically significant, but small, difference between the responses of the Hong Kong and Mainland students on this question. Mainland students tended to show more independence in their thinking about national affairs, while Hong Kong students were relatively neutral, judging from both the mean and the relatively equal percentages who agreed, were neutral, or disagreed, as shown in Table 7.8. A higher percentage of Mainland students, about 43 percent, agreed that they made up their own mind with regard to their attitudes toward the nation.

Table 7.7 Make up Own Mind (Group Means)

	HK/ML	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*
I usually make up my own mind about what I think about China rather than being greatly influenced by others.*	HK	260	3.02	0.91
	ML	275	3.19	0.98

Differences significant at $^*p \leq 0.05$

Table 7.8 Make up Own Mind (Percentages)

	Hong Kong N = 260		*Mainland N = 275*	
	Agree/ Strongly Agree	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*	*Agree/ Strongly Agree*	*Disagree/ Strongly Disagree*
I usually make up my own mind about what I think about China rather than being greatly influenced by others.	33.9%	33.1%	42.9%	30.2%

SUMMARY

The previous three chapters have examined similarities and differences between Hong Kong and Mainland students' attitudes toward the nation, their perceptions of the political socialization process, and their critical thinking dispositions The first part of this chapter profiled six students, and described some aspects of their national attitudes and critical thinking dispositions It is possible to make tentative statements about the relationships among schooling, the university, critical thinking dispositions, and national attitudes for each student, while comparing each student to the others

- Regina was a Hong Kong student who developed a somewhat negative impression of China from her history classes Upon entering university, however, she developed critical thinking skills and dispositions related to examining multiple perspectives Her attitudes toward China are positive, but have become so relatively recently
- Norman was a Hong Kong student who felt his secondary education had little influence on his national attitudes Upon entering university, he developed a sense of curiosity about the nation His attitudes toward the nation are positive, and also relatively recent
- Winnie was a Hong Kong student who felt that schooling and the university both had little influence on her national attitudes She did not exhibit the curiosity or interest in multiple perspectives of the other two Hong Kong students She did not consider herself patriotic, and her impressions of China and the Chinese people were negative

From these examples, it appears that for these Hong Kong students, there is a possible relationship among a lack of the influence of schooling, the development of certain critical thinking dispositions, and more positive attitudes toward the nation for those who demonstrate those dispositions than for those who do not

Turning to the mainland Chinese students

- David felt that schooling had indeed impacted his attitudes toward the nation Upon entering university, he came into contact with students and professors who challenged some of his previously-held conceptions about the nation His attitudes toward the nation were positive, but he did express some sense of disappointment

- Ken perceived that his national attitudes had been influenced by school. He had, however, developed some strong opinions about the political nature of schooling and perceived gaps between what had been taught in school and the reality of Chinese society. His attitudes toward the nation were positive, but he expressed a number of complaints.
- James had a relatively positive impression of schooling and its influence on his attitudes toward the nation. He did not mention any experiences of coming into contact with different perspectives in university, nor did he seem to perceive that what was taught in school was any different from the real situation. His attitudes toward the nation were overwhelmingly positive, and he expressed little disappointment and voiced no complaints.

From these examples, it seems that schooling contributed to positive attitudes toward the nation for the Mainland students. For some however, the fact that they perceived that they were offered a limited, and possibly inaccurate and biased perspective on the nation appeared to have left a negative impression of the political education process. Those students who described these negative impressions appeared to have more disappointments in aspects of Chinese society than the student who did not describe such impressions.

The following chapter will explore these suggestions about the relationships among perceptions of political socialization, critical thinking, and national attitudes more conclusively and in more detail. The discussion is based on statistical analysis of the survey questionnaire administered to 535 students. It first presents the results of multiple regression analyses to determine the relative, and then combined, influence of political socialization and critical thinking factors on national attitudes. It then examines more closely the interactions among socialization and critical thinking factors and their direct and indirect influences on national attitudes.

8

The Influence of Socialization and Critical Thinking on Students' Attitudes Toward the Nation

Chapter Five described how Hong Kong and Mainland university students perceived the nation, finding that along seven dimensions Mainland students had more positive attitudes toward the nation than Hong Kong students and that the difference was greater with regard to patriotism than nationalism. Chapter Six in turn described the social factors which Hong Kong and Mainland students felt had influenced their attitudes toward China. It found that although students perceived that schooling, the university experience, the media, family, and friends each had some influence, Mainland students gave primary credit to their schooling, while a large number of Hong Kong students claimed that schooling had not been a primary influence on their national attitudes. Chapter Seven, in examining students' critical thinking dispositions, found that Mainland students were more skeptical of the socialization process, and yet more curious about their nation than the Hong Kong students. The Hong Kong students, however, were more willing to examine multiple perspectives in forming attitudes about the nation.

The purpose of this chapter is to present quantitative analyses of the survey data which link national attitudes, socialization factors, and critical thinking dispositions. The first section aims to demonstrate the strength of critical thinking relative to socialization factors. It also suggests that some of the explanatory power of socialization factors is due to their relationships with critical thinking. This point is taken up further in the second section of the chapter through analyses of the direct effects of socialization on critical thinking.

INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL ATTITUDES: THREE MODELS COMPARED

This section shows that critical thinking is a more powerful explanation of students' national attitudes than socialization factors and that combining socialization and critical thinking factors in some cases reduces the strength of socialization. It does so by comparing the results of three multiple regression models. The first model looks solely at the relationship between socialization factors and national attitudes, to demonstrate the relative influence of schooling, the university, family, media, and friends on patriotism and nationalism in the absence of the effects of critical thinking. The second examines only national attitudes and critical thinking dispositions, to show the relative influence of each disposition on attitudes in the absence of the effects of socialization agents. The third model combines socialization factors and critical thinking dispositions to demonstrate all factors' relative influence when considered together. Comparing the first and second models reveals that critical thinking factors taken alone for the most part explain more of the variance in student attitudes along most dimensions than socialization factors do when taken alone. The third model reveals that critical thinking factors prove stronger explanations, relative to the socialization factors within the same model, for the strength of most dimensions of national attitudes. Furthermore, combining critical thinking dispositions and socialization factors in the same model reduces the strength of a number of the socialization influences between the first and third models, suggesting that the importance of some of these socialization influences is in the critical thinking dispositions they foster. For the sake of clarity in the following discussion, the shorthand terms presented in Table 8.1 will be used for the factors entered into the analyses. Although information regarding students' gender, fields of study, age, and year in university were obtained from the survey questionnaire, exploratory correlation analyses found that these factors had very weak or statistically insignificant relationships with national attitudes. They were therefore not included in further multiple regression analyses in favor of factors related to other socialization influences and critical thinking dispositions.

Table 8.1 Shorthand Terms for Socialization and Critical Thinking Factors

Socialization Factors	
Students' perception that secondary schooling had influenced their attitudes toward the nation	*Schooling*
Students' perception that they had learned a lot about China in school	*Knowledge*
Students' perception that their teachers had encouraged them to form their own opinions about national affairs	*Own Opinion*
Students' perception that activities in which they had participated in school had made them feel closer to their nation	*Activities*
Students' perception that their university education had influenced their attitudes toward the nation	*University*
Students' perception that their attitudes about the nation had changed since entering university	*University Changed Attitudes*
Students' perception that things they had learned from their classmates and professors had changed their previous attitudes toward the nation	*Classmates and Professors*
Students' perception that their families had influenced their attitudes about the nation	*Family*
Students' perception that their families were critical of national affairs	*Family Critical*
Students' perception that their families showed a lot of concern about national affairs	*Family Concern*
Students' parents' level of education (Socioeconomic Status)	*SES*
Students' perception that the media had influenced their attitudes toward the nation	*Media*
Students' agreement that they regularly read articles about China in the newspaper or watched the national news on TV	*News and TV*
Students' perception that their friends had influenced their attitudes about the nation	*Friends*
Critical Thinking	
Students' skepticism of the accuracy and objectivity of schooling and the media	*Skepticism*

(continued on p. 138)

Table 8.1 (continued)

Students' curiosity and eagerness to learn about their nation	*Curiosity*
Students' openness to multiple perspectives in forming attitudes toward the nation	*Multiple Perspectives*
Students' perception that they think critically about national affairs	*Think Critically*
Students' perception that they usually make up their own mind about what they think about China rather than being influenced by others	*Make up Own Mind*

Model One: Socialization Factors

This section presents the results of a series of multiple regression analyses, shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3, which allows a look at the relative influence of each of several socialization factors on national attitudes, without, for the moment, considering critical thinking. Comparisons are made between Hong Kong and Mainland students on the dimensions of Patriotism, representing a favorable impression of China and the Chinese people without reference to other nations, and Nationalism, which involves sentiments of Chinese superiority over other nations.

Mainland Students

Schooling factors had a relatively stronger influence than other socialization factors on Mainland students' attitudes, and their influence was positive. The strongest influence on Patriotism was Own Opinion, followed by School Knowledge and Activities. For Nationalism, school-related factors each had approximately the same degree of impact, but the distance between them and other socialization factors was greater than with Patriotism.

Family-related factors also influenced both Patriotism and Nationalism, each to approximately the same degree. A perception of family influence had a positive impact on Patriotism, and was the only family-related factor with a statistically significant relationship with

Table 8.2 Patriotism and Socialization Factors

Patriotism								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Schooling								
School Knowledge					0.09	0.03	0.15**	2.85
Own Opinion in Class					0.15	0.03	0.29***	5.46
Activities	0.13	0.03	0.26***	4.05	0.09	0.03	0.17**	3.07
University								
University Changed Attitudes	0.05	0.02	0.13*	2.07				
Classmates and Professors								
Family					0.08	0.03	0.15**	2.62
Family Critical								
Family Concern	0.07	0.03	0.16**	2.65	0.08	0.03	0.14*	2.48
SES	-0.03	0.01	-0.13*	-2.24	-0.04	0.01	-0.17***	-3.21
Media								
Newspaper and TV					0.09	0.03	0.16**	3.06
Friends								
Adjusted R square	0.14				0.43			
DF	243				244			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05

Nationalism. Family Concern had a positive, and Socioeconomic Status (SES) a negative, impact on Patriotism only.

University-related factors influenced Mainland students' Nationalism. The influence of Classmates and Professors was negative; the more students felt that what they had learned from these people had changed their previously held attitudes toward the nation, the less nationalistic they

Table 8.3 Nationalism and Socialization Factors

Nationalism								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Schooling								
School Knowledge					0.16	0.04	0.25***	4.35
Own Opinion in Class					0.13	0.03	0.23***	4.06
Activities	0.11	0.04	0.20**	3.13	0.13	0.04	0.22***	3.56
University	-0.15	0.04	-0.36***	-3.7	0.07	0.03	0.12*	2.04
University Changed Attitudes	0.09	0.04	0.21*	2.09				
Classmates and Professors					-0.11	0.04	-0.17**	-2.97
Family	0.06	0.03	0.13*	2.13	0.11	0.03	0.19***	3.46
Family Critical								
Family Concern								
Socioeconomic Status (SES)								
Media								
Newspaper and TV								
Friends								
Adjusted R square	0.09				0.32			
DF	243				248			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05

were. At the same time however, the more students felt the university had influenced their attitudes, the more nationalistic they were.

The media-related factor of News and TV had a positive impact only on Mainland students' Patriotism. The more they followed national affairs in these media, the more patriotic they were. Friends had no impact on Mainland students' Patriotism or their Nationalism.

Hong Kong Students

Schooling-related factors were not as influential on Hong Kong students' attitudes as on their Mainland counterparts'. The only school-related factor that proved statistically significant for the Hong Kong group was Activities, which had the strongest influence of all socialization factors on Patriotism, and also influenced Nationalism.

Compared with the case of the Mainland students, university-related factors were relatively more influential on both Hong Kong students' Patriotism and Nationalism. A perception that their attitudes had changed since entering university had a relatively weak impact on Hong Kong students' Patriotism, but a greater impact on Nationalism. A perception of university influence had the strongest influence of any other socialization factor on Hong Kong students' Nationalism, and the relationship was negative. The more students felt the university had influenced their attitudes, the less nationalistic they were.

The pattern with family-related factors repeated that of the Mainland students. The family-related factor with the strongest impact on Patriotism was Family Concern, while SES had a negative influence. A perception of family influence was the only family factor with a statistically significant relationship with Hong Kong students' Nationalism.

Highlights

There are several key findings from each of these models which will be explored more fully later. For Model One, these highlights are:

- The strength of the effect of schooling-related factors on Mainland students' relative to Hong Kong students' national attitudes.
- The strong impact of Own Opinion relative to other schooling factors on Mainland students' Patriotism.
- The strength of the effect of university-related factors on Hong Kong students' relative to Mainland students' attitudes.
- The strength of the impact of School Knowledge on Mainland students' Nationalism relative to their Patriotism.
- The stronger impact of the university-related factors on Nationalism than on Patriotism for both groups.

Model Two: Critical Thinking Dispositions

This section looks at another set of factors related to students' own critical thinking dispositions. It analyzes the results of a multiple regression analysis taking Patriotism and Nationalism as dependent variables and Skepticism, Curiosity, Multiple Perspectives, Think Critically, and Make up Own Mind as independent variables. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8.4.

Mainland Students

For the Mainland students, the only critical thinking factors with statistically significant relationships with Patriotism and Nationalism were Skepticism and Curiosity. Multiple Perspectives, Think Critically, and Make up Own Mind were not statistically significant factors. Skepticism had the strongest relationship with both Patriotism and Nationalism, and the relationship was negative. Curiosity was second to Skepticism, and the difference between the two was much greater with regard to Nationalism than Patriotism. The correlation coefficients of these two critical thinking factors were greater than any of the socialization factors in Model One.

Hong Kong Students

While statistically significant, the relationship of Skepticism to Hong Kong students' Patriotism and Nationalism was relatively weak compared to the Mainland students, being the last of the statistically significant critical thinking factors related to national attitudes. The relationship involving Curiosity also differed from the Mainland case, because it had by far the strongest relationship to Hong Kong students' Patriotism and because it was not a statistically significant factor with regard to their Nationalism. While Think Critically did not have a statistically significant relationship with Mainland students' attitudes, it had a negative influence on Hong Kong students' Patriotism and was the most important of the critical thinking factors on their Nationalism. Make up Own Mind had a negative relationship with Hong Kong students' Patriotism, while Multiple Perspectives negatively influenced their Nationalism. The more students

tended to make up their own mind about national affairs, the less patriotic they were. At the same time, the more students considered multiple perspectives in forming their attitudes, the less nationalistic they tended to be.

Table 8.4 Patriotism, Nationalism, and Critical Thinking Dispositions

Patriotism								
Critical Thinking Factors	*Hong Kong*				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Skepticism	-0.14	0.06	-0.12*	-2.17	-0.40	0.04	-0.45***	-9.47
Curiosity	0.3	0.03	0.49***	8.8	0.36	0.04	0.41***	8.63
Multiple Perspectives								
Think Critically	-0.11	0.03	-0.21***	-3.65				
Make up Own Mind	-0.06	0.02	-0.14*	-2.44				
Adjusted R square	0.26				0.45			
DF	249				252			
Nationalism								
Critical Thinking Factors	*Hong Kong*				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Skepticism	-0.18	0.07	-0.15***	-2.48	-0.44	0.05	-0.44***	-8.25
Curiosity					0.26	0.05	0.26***	4.83
Multiple Perspectives	-0.11	0.04	-0.18***	-3.03				
Think Critically	-0.13	0.03	-0.22***	-3.64				
Make up Own Mind								
Adjusted R square	0.11				0.30			
DF	249				257			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05

Highlights

- The strength of the effect of Skepticism on Mainland students' national attitudes relative to Hong Kong students'.
- The strength of the effect of Think Critically on Hong Kong students' national attitudes relative to Mainland students'.

- The strength of the effect of Curiosity on Patriotism relative to Nationalism, especially for the Hong Kong students.
- The strength of the effect of Curiosity relative to Skepticism on Hong Kong students' Patriotism.
- The effect of Multiple Perspectives only on Hong Kong students' Nationalism.

Model Three: Socialization + Critical Thinking

Models One and Two respectively treated socialization and critical thinking in isolation, not acknowledging interactions among socialization factors and individual critical thinking dispositions and their combined influence on national attitudes. The following analysis therefore incorporates both socialization and critical thinking factors into one model, to determine the relative influence of individual factors on students' attitudes toward the nation. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the results of this analysis, which shows that critical thinking factors are relatively more influential on both Hong Kong and Mainland students' attitudes than socialization factors.

Mainland Students

For the Mainland students, a critical thinking factor, Skepticism, had the strongest relationship with both Patriotism and Nationalism relative to all other critical thinking and socialization factors. A second critical thinking factor, Curiosity, also had a stronger relationship with Patriotism than any of the socialization factors, although it had a much weaker effect on Mainland students' Nationalism. The only other critical thinking factor with a statistically significant relationship in this model was Make up Own Mind, which was weak relative to socialization factors.

In this combined model, socialization factors were secondary to critical thinking, and the difference among the social factors was not large. School Knowledge was more strongly related to Nationalism than Patriotism. Own Opinion was positively related only to Patriotism, while Activities were positively related only to Nationalism. A perception of family influence was positively related to both Patriotism and Nationalism. The higher students' SES, the less patriotic they tended to be. There were

Table 8.5 Patriotism, Socialization, and Critical Thinking

Patriotism								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Socialization Factors								
Schooling								
School Knowledge					0.08	0.03	0.14**	2.92
Own Opinion in Class					0.17	0.03	0.13*	2.35
Activities	0.08	0.03	0.17***	2.88				
University								
University Changed Attitudes								
Classmates and Professors								
Family					0.07	0.03	0.13**	2.74
Family Critical								
Family Concern								
SES	-0.03	0.01	-0.13*	-2.43	-0.04	0.01	-0.17***	-3.55
Media								
Newspaper and TV								
Friends								
Critical Thinking								
Skepticism					-0.32	0.05	-0.36***	-6.78
Curiosity	-0.25	0.04	0.41***	6.92	0.26	0.05	0.29***	5.66
Multiple Perspectives								
Think Critically	-0.11	0.03	-0.21***	-3.68				
Make up Own Mind	-0.06	0.02	-0.13*	-2.28	0.05	0.02	0.09*	2.02
Adjusted R square	0.28				0.52			
DF	241				239			

Significant at ***$p \leq 0.001$, **$p \leq 0.01$, *$p \leq 0.05$

Table 8.6 Nationalism, Socialization, and Critical Thinking

Nationalism								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Socialization Factors								
Schooling								
School Knowledge	0 06	0 03	0 13*	2 09	0 13	0 03	0 21***	3 86
Own Opinion in Class								
Activities	0 09	0 035	0 17**	2 65	0 09	0 04	0 14*	2 41
University	-0 12	0 04	-0 29**	-2 98				
University Changed Attitudes	0 08	0 04	0 20*	2 08				
Classmates and Professors								
Family					0 08	0 03	0 13*	2 46
Family Critical								
Family Concern								
SES								
Media								
Newspaper and TV								
Friends								
Critical Thinking								
Skepticism					-0 37	0 05	-0 38***	-7 10
Curiosity					0 12	0 06	0 12*	2 10
Multiple Perspectives	-0 10	0 04	-0 16**	-2 72				
Think Critically	-0 14	0 04	-0 23***	-3 90				
Make up Own Mind					0 07	0 03	0 12*	-2 45
Adjusted R square	0 16				0 41			
DF	241				234			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0 001, **p ≤ 0 01, *p ≤ 0 05

no statistically significant relationships between national attitudes and university-, media-, or friends-related factors in this combined model.

The addition of critical thinking factors to the model has the effect of reducing the strength of the relationships of the socialization factors from the Socialization model as well as the critical thinking factors from the Critical Thinking model. Most significantly, critical thinking factors mediate socialization in the third model, with several effects. Own Opinion loses statistical significance on Nationalism and the strength of its relationship with Patriotism is greatly reduced. Activities fails to appear in the third model with respect to Patriotism. The university-related factors also lose statistical significance in the combined model. By contrast, all of the critical thinking factors statistically significant in the Critical Thinking model remain statistically significant in the combined model.

Hong Kong Students

Critical thinking and socialization factors had considerably different effects on Hong Kong students' Patriotism and Nationalism. The critical thinking factors of Curiosity and Think Critically had the strongest relationships with Patriotism, with Curiosity being especially stronger than socialization factors. Make up Own Mind also had a negative relationship with Patriotism. Of the socialization factors, only Activities and SES had statistically significant relationships with Patriotism in this model. Other family-related, as well as university-, media-, and friends-related factors did not have a statistically significant effect on Patriotism.

Critical thinking factors did not have the strongest relationships with Hong Kong students' Nationalism, the only case within all the models where this was so. Instead, a perception of university influence had the strongest, negative, relationship with Hong Kong students' Nationalism. However, following this factor was Think Critically, which also had a negative relationship with Nationalism. The next strongest relationship was with another university-related factor, University Changed Attitudes. Multiple Perspectives was also statistically significant. The only other socialization factors that had statistically significant relationships with Hong Kong students' Nationalism, Activities and School Knowledge, were schooling-related. Family-, media-, and friends-related factors were not statistically significant in this model.

Comparing the models, the combination of socialization and critical thinking factors into one model had effects on both types of factors from the models which considered each type in isolation. In the combined model, University Changed Attitudes lost statistical significance on Patriotism, while Skepticism failed to achieve statistical significance on both Patriotism and Nationalism. While not statistically significant in the Socialization Model, School Knowledge was a statistically significant factor in the combined model.

Finally, many of the key differences between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups were related to critical thinking factors. Skepticism had a statistically significant negative relationship with Mainland, but not Hong Kong, students' Patriotism and Nationalism. By contrast, Think Critically had a statistically significant relationship with Hong Kong, but not Mainland, students' national attitudes. Curiosity affected Mainland students', but not Hong Kong students' Nationalism. Of the socialization factors, the most striking difference between the two groups was that University was the primary influence on Hong Kong students' nationalism, but did not have a statistically significant relationship with Mainland students' attitudes. Another difference lay in the effects of schooling-related factors on Patriotism. While only Activities influenced Hong Kong students, it was Knowledge and Own Opinion that had an effect on Mainland students' Patriotism.

Highlights

- The overall strength of critical thinking factors relative to socialization factors in a model which includes both types.
- The strength of Skepticism on Mainland students' national attitudes relative to Hong Kong students'.
- The strength of Think Critically on Hong Kong students' attitudes relative to Mainland students'.
- The strength of university-related factors on Hong Kong students' attitudes relative to Mainland students'.
- The strength of family-related factors on Mainland students' attitudes relative to Hong Kong students'.
- The difference in the effects of individual schooling factors on Patriotism between the Hong Kong and Mainland groups.

- The reduced strength of Own Opinion, Activities, and university-related factors for the Mainland group when taking account of critical thinking factors.

Explanatory Power of the Three Models

The preceding discussion of the combined Socialization + Critical Thinking Model reveals that in the analysis including both socialization and critical thinking factors, it is for the most part the latter which have the strongest relationships with national attitudes. Critical thinking factors outweigh the influence of various socialization factors, with the only exception being Hong Kong students' Nationalism, an area where the university was the strongest influence. For both the Hong Kong and Mainland groups schooling-related factors followed critical thinking in having the strongest relationship with national attitudes.

Further evidence of the importance of critical thinking in explaining Patriotism and Nationalism can be found in an examination of the Adjusted R-square statistic of the three models, as shown in Table 8.7.

Table 8.7 **Adjusted R-square Statistics**

		Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Hong Kong	Patriotism	0.14	0.26	0.28
	Nationalism	0.09	0.11	0.16
Mainland	Patriotism	0.43	0.45	0.52
	Nationalism	0.32	0.30	0.41

A comparison of these statistics, which show the amount of variance in the dependent variables of Patriotism and Nationalism explained by the independent variables, shows that Model Three is the most powerful of the three. The strength of critical thinking is demonstrated by the fact that with the exception of Mainland students' Nationalism, Model Two explains more of the variance in national attitudes than Model One. The difference between the two models, and hence the enhanced explanatory power of critical thinking over socialization, was greater for the Hong Kong group than the Mainland one. Furthermore, for the Hong Kong

group, Model Two was relatively more powerful on Patriotism than Nationalism. Of particular note is the relatively stronger explanatory power of all of the models for the Mainland group rather than the Hong Kong one, as well as, for both groups, the stronger explanatory power of all of the models on Patriotism than on Nationalism.

Summary

The preceding discussion shows that in a comparison of two multiple regression models which compare the effects of socialization factors and critical thinking dispositions on positive national attitudes, critical thinking factors are a more powerful explanation of attitudes than socialization, especially for Hong Kong students. When evaluating all factors within the same model, critical thinking factors come out on top. Of these critical thinking dispositions, skepticism is more important for Mainland students, while curiosity and a tendency to think critically have the strongest influence on Hong Kong students. After critical thinking dispositions, the primary socialization influences are the university and schooling for Hong Kong students and schooling-related factors for the Mainland students.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG CRITICAL THINKING AND SOCIALIZATION FACTORS IN INFLUENCING NATIONAL ATTITUDES

This section focuses on key relationships between socialization and critical thinking factors. It shows that in addition to the direct relationship these factors may have with patriotism and nationalism, they may also work with each other to affect students' national attitudes. In other words, while a particular factor may not have a direct relationship with national attitudes, it may have a relationship with critical thinking or other socialization factors that do have direct relationships with patriotism or nationalism. Furthermore, the effects of critical thinking factors are compounded by the fact that the effects of some socialization factors on national attitudes are felt not only directly but also indirectly through

critical thinking. For example, School Knowledge has a direct positive relationship with Mainland students' patriotism, and it also contributes to students' curiosity, which in turn has a further positive relationship to patriotism. To demonstrate how critical thinking is affected by various socialization factors, the discussion presents the results of multiple regression analyses which take critical thinking factors as dependent variables and socialization factors as independent variables.

Skepticism

The results of a multiple regression analysis taking Skepticism as a dependent variable and socialization and other critical thinking factors as independent variables are shown in Table 8.8. For both Hong Kong and Mainland students, university- and school-related factors had the strongest relationships with Skepticism. For Mainland students, media and family-related factors also contributed to students' skepticism.

Only university-related factors had a positive relationship with Skepticism for both Hong Kong and Mainland students. For the Hong Kong group, the more students perceived that their university education had affected their national attitudes, the more skeptical they were of the attempts of schooling and the media to influence their attitudes. Similarly, for the Mainland students, the more students perceived that their attitudes toward the nation had changed since entering university, the more skeptical they were.

Of the socialization factors included in these models, only university-related factors made students more skeptical. Other socialization factors had a negative relationship with Skepticism; that is, they appeared to make students less skeptical. For both Hong Kong and Mainland students, two schooling-related factors, Own Opinion and Activities, had a negative effect on Skepticism. The more students perceived that teachers encouraged them to form their own attitudes about the nation, and the more they felt that activities had positively influenced their attitudes, the less skeptical they were. For the Mainland students, following the national news on television or in the newspaper also had a negative relationship with Skepticism. The more students paid attention to coverage of China in the media, the less likely they were to doubt the accuracy and objectivity

Table 8.8 Skepticism

Skepticism								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Schooling								
School Knowledge								
Own Opinion in Class	-0.07	0.03	-0.17**	-2.66	-0.19	0.03	-0.33***	-6.10
Activities	-0.08	0.03	-0.17**	-2.53	-0.14	0.03	-0.24***	-4.38
University	0.07	0.02	0.21**	3.15				
University Changed Attitudes					0.15	0.03	0.22***	4.42
Classmates and Professors								
Family								
Family Critical								
Family Concern					-0.08	0.03	-0.13**	-2.59
SES								
Media								
Newspaper and TV					-0.11	0.03	-0.18***	-3.61
Friends								
Curiosity	0.09	0.04	0.17**	2.59				
Multiple Perspectives								
Think Critically					0.12	0.03	0.19***	3.79
Make up Own Mind								
Adjusted R square	0.08				0.40			
DF	248				249			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05

of schooling and the media. Although the relationship was weaker than with other factors, Mainland students who felt that their families showed concern for national affairs also tended to be less skeptical of schooling and the media as agents of political socialization.

Curiosity

A variety of factors related to each agent had both positive and negative relationships with Curiosity for both Hong Kong and Mainland students. Aside from the relatively strong correlation between the family and Curiosity for the Mainland group, it was schooling-related factors that had the strongest relationships with this critical thinking factor relative to other factors. The results of a multiple regression analysis taking Curiosity as a dependent variable and socialization and other critical thinking factors as independent variables are shown in Table 8.9.

For both Hong Kong and Mainland students, there was a positive relationship between schooling- and university-related factors and Curiosity. For both groups, the more students felt that activities they had participated in during school had made them feel closer to the nation, the more curious they were. For the Mainland group only, School Knowledge and a perception that schooling had had an influence on their national attitudes were also positively related to Curiosity. The more students felt that they had learned about China in school, the more curious they were about the nation. For both groups of students, there was a positive relationship between University Changed Attitudes and Curiosity; the more students felt their attitudes about the nation had changed since entering university, the more curious they were.

Family-related factors had both positive and negative relationships with Curiosity. For the Mainland group, the factor with the strongest relationship to Curiosity was Family Concern. The more Mainland students felt that their families showed concern for national affairs, the more curious they were about the nation. Although there was no direct relationship between Family Concern and national attitudes, an atmosphere of positive national attitudes within the family had an indirect positive effect on students' patriotism and nationalism by fostering a sense of curiosity about the nation. Another family-related factor, Socioeconomic

Table 8 9 Curiosity

Curiosity								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Schooling					0 11	0 03	0 20***	3 38
School Knowledge					0 09	0 04	0 14*	2 51
Own Opinion in Class								
Activities	0 19	0 05	0 23***	3 87	0 13	0 03	0 21***	3 80
University								
University Changed Attitudes	0 11	0 04	0 17**	2 72	0 10	0 03	0 15**	3 02
Classmates and Professors								
Family								
Family Critical	0 11	0 04	0 17**	2 97				
Family Concern					0 16	0 03	0 26***	4 84
SES					-0 03	0 01	-0 12*	-2 25
Media	-0 11	0 04	-0 16**	-2 77	-0 08	0 03	-0 15**	-2 97
Newspaper and TV	0 14	0 05	0 17**	2 90	0 07	0 03	0 12*	2 25
Friends								
Skepticism	0 29	0 11	0 16**	2 72				
Multiple Perspectives								
Think Critically					0 07	0 03	0 11*	2 23
Make up Own Mind								
Adjusted R square	0 23				0 39			
DF	248				249			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0 001, **p ≤ 0 01, *p ≤ 0 05

Status (SES) however, had a compounded effect on Mainland students' attitudes. SES was negatively related to students' Patriotism; the more highly educated their parents were, the less patriotic the students. Furthermore, SES also had a negative effect on Mainland students' Curiosity, reducing the positive effect of Curiosity on Patriotism for those students with more highly educated parents.

While there was no relationship between Family Concern or SES and Curiosity for the Hong Kong group, another family-related factor had a positive relationship with Hong Kong students' curiosity. The more Hong Kong students felt their families were critical of national affairs, the more curious they were to learn more about the nation. It appears that a negative atmosphere toward the nation within Hong Kong students' families led them not to be disinterested in their nation, but to seek out further information about China.

As with the family, media-related factors had both positive and negative effects on both Hong Kong and Mainland students' Curiosity. The relationship between Curiosity and News and TV could work in both directions. One possible interpretation of the data is that the more students tended to regularly follow the national news in the newspaper and on television, the more curious they became. Another possibility is that the more curious students were for other reasons, the more they were drawn to seek out information about national affairs from the media. This latter interpretation may be more valid based on the negative relationship between the Media factor and Curiosity for both groups. This relationship cannot logically be interpreted from the angle of students first being curious and then attributing their attitudes to the media, so we can conclude that the more students attributed an effect on their national attitudes to what they had learned about China in the newspaper or on television, the less curious they tended to be. In this case, it could be that media coverage of different, perhaps negative, aspects of the nation led students to care less about learning more.

Multiple Perspectives

The critical thinking factor of Multiple Perspectives tended to be less complex than Skepticism or Curiosity in its interrelationships with

Table 8.10 Multiple Perspectives

Multiple Perspectives								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Schooling								
School Knowledge								
Own Opinion in Class								
Activities	-0 11	0 05	-0 12*	-2 04				
University								
University Changed Attitudes								
Classmates and Professors								
Family	-0 11	0 04	-0 15**	-2 68				
Family Critical								
Family Concern					-0 11	0 05	-0 13*	-2 44
SES								
Media								
Newspaper and TV								
Friends	0 14	0 05	0 17**	2 89	0 21	0 05	0 23***	4 11
Skepticism								
Curiosity								
Think Critically								
Make Up Own Mind	-0 30	0 04	-0 39***	-6 73	-0 32	0 05	-0 40***	-7 03
Adjusted R square	0 21				0 27			
DF	248				249			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0 001, **p ≤ 0 01, *p ≤ 0 05

socialization factors and national attitudes. For both Hong Kong and Mainland students, the socialization factor with the strongest influence on Multiple Perspectives was Friends, as shown in Table 8.10, while schooling, the media, and the university had little or no effect.

The strongest factor positively influencing students' openness to multiple perspectives in forming their attitudes about national affairs was Friends. The more students felt that their attitudes had been influenced by their friends, the more willing they were to take into consideration multiple perspectives. Unlike Friends, family-related factors had a negative relationship with Multiple Perspectives for both the Hong Kong and Mainland students. The more Hong Kong students felt their families had influenced their attitudes, and the more Mainland students felt their families showed concern for national affairs, the less open they were to multiple perspectives. Neither School Knowledge nor Own Opinion had an influence on students' openness to multiple perspectives. The only schooling-related factor that did, Activities, had a negative influence for the Hong Kong students. The more students felt that activities they had participated in had influenced their attitudes, the less likely they were to examine multiple perspectives.

There are no statistically significant relationships between Multiple Perspectives and Skepticism, Curiosity, or Thinking Critically. The only critical thinking factor with which this factor has a relationship is the tendency to make up one's own mind in developing opinions about national affairs. This is a logical negative relationship, and it is the strongest of all of those with Multiple Perspectives. The more students tend to make up their own minds, the less willing they would be to examine multiple perspectives.

Think Critically

Only family- and media-related factors influenced Hong Kong students' tendency to think critically about national affairs. None of the socialization factors discussed here had any direct relationships with Think Critically for the Mainland group, as shown in Table 8.11. News and TV had a negative relationship with Hong Kong students' tendency to think critically about national affairs. This relationship can be interpreted in both directions. It

Table 8.11 Think Critically

Think Critically								
	Hong Kong				*Mainland*			
	b	*se*	*beta*	*t*	*b*	*se*	*beta*	*t*
Schooling								
School Knowledge								
Own Opinion in Class								
Activities								
University								
University Changed Attitudes								
Classmates and Professors								
Family	-0 16	0 05	-0 22***	-3 45				
Family Critical	0 10	0 05	0 14***	2 24				
Family Concern								
SES								
Media								
Newspaper and TV	0 20	0 06	0 20***	3 37				
Friends								
Skepticism	0 30	0 13	0 15***	2 40	0 35	0 09	0 23***	3 74
Curiosity					0 24	0 09	0 16**	2 60
Multiple Perspectives								
Make up Own Mind								
Adjusted R square	0 09				0 06			
DF	248				249			

Significant at ***p ≤ 0 001, **p ≤ 0 01, *p ≤ 0 05

could be that the more students paid attention to national affairs in the newspaper and on television, the more critically they tended to think; that something about what they learned through the media drove them to think further about the issues presented. Alternatively, already having the habit of thinking critically about national affairs, students may have been driven to follow national affairs in the media to gather more information.

Family-related factors had both positive and negative relationships with Think Critically. The more critical students felt their families were about national affairs, the more they themselves tended to think critically. However, at the same time, the more students felt their families had been an influence on their attitudes, the less they tended to think critically.

The Compounded Results of Interactions among Critical Thinking Factors

As touched upon above, and as can be seen from Tables 8.8 through 8.11, critical thinking factors not only have relationships with socialization factors, but are themselves interrelated. Of particular note is that Skepticism and Curiosity are positively related, directly for the Hong Kong students, and indirectly through Think Critically for the Mainland group. Curiosity is further linked with Think Critically through Skepticism for the Hong Kong group. Similarly, Multiple Perspectives and Make up Own Mind are negatively related.

These interrelationships have important implications for the effects of socialization factors on national attitudes, in that positive and negative relationships are both counteracted. An increase in Curiosity, a decrease in Skepticism, or a decrease in the tendency to Think Critically all heighten Patriotism and Nationalism. At the same time, however, any factor which increases Curiosity also increases Skepticism and Think Critically, because the more curious students are more skeptical and tend to think more critically. Any factors which increase curiosity therefore have a direct positive relationship, and an indirect negative relationship through Skepticism and Think Critically, with national attitudes. Similarly, any factors which decrease Skepticism or Think Critically have direct positive, and indirect negative relationships, with national attitudes, because they also indirectly decrease Curiosity. The reverse of these relationships must also be taken into account.

9

Student Resistance to the Hegemonic Efforts of the State to Influence Their Attitudes toward the Nation

This chapter integrates the theoretical perspectives from Chapter Two with the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese educational contexts and the data from student interviews and surveys on perceptions of political socialization, critical thinking dispositions, and national attitudes, in order to construct a model of student resistance to the hegemonic political socialization efforts of the state and schools. The chapter first briefly addresses the nature of the state and the process and content of hegemony, then asks how successful the state's hegemonic political socialization efforts have been in fostering the desired attitudes toward the nation within the groups of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students. The chapter subsequently addresses the question of what leads some Hong Kong students to be more, and mainland Chinese students less, patriotic and nationalistic. To demonstrate that these students are exhibiting resistance to the school's political socialization efforts, it examines in detail the resistance's components of perception, reaction, and result, with a focus on how resistance is played out through the interactions of key socialization and critical thinking factors. Through this integration of theory and data, resistance is reconceptualized in the context of this study as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes.

THE STATE AND HEGEMONY IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG

The Gramscian concept of the state as an organ of a society's dominant group wishing to preserve its power finds a corollary in both the Mainland and Hong Kong cases. In the Mainland, the Chinese Communist Party dominates the state bureaucracy in the interest of preserving its own authority and promoting its direction of economic development. Similarly, the Hong Kong colonial government, with policy-making and consultative bodies weighted in favor of business interests (Leung 1990), had a strong interest in a stable social order for the pursuit of capitalist economic development and the preservation of its authority in the pre-1997 transition period. As discussed in the introduction, the Chinese Communist Party has encountered a crisis of legitimacy in the face of a loss of popular faith in Marxism-Leninism and its pursuit of economic policies of an increasingly capitalist nature. The need to preserve its authority to rule under such circumstances is accompanied by a need to enlist the active cooperative support of groups both within and outside the state in fostering the development of market socialism. The colonial Hong Kong state similarly faced a crisis of legitimacy in the transition period to 1997 in the face of its approaching loss of sovereignty, a period in which there was the possibility of increasing questioning of its authority to rule. In the absence of ideological justifications for its authority, it was concerned primarily with preserving social stability in the pursuit of capitalist economic interests.

The notions of the state as encompassing the educational institutions of civil society and of the process of hegemony account for state direction of the political socialization process in schools through policy directives, guidelines, and constraints on political education in both the Mainland and Hong Kong. In the Mainland, directives for the implementation of political and patriotic education in schools are issued from the central policy level by bodies ranging from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee itself to the State Education Commission and the Communist Youth League. These documents call for support from numerous institutions of civil society, especially schools, in implementing the patriotic curriculum and school activities such as flag-raising ceremonies. In Hong Kong, until 1990, Education Department-issued Education

Regulations specifically restricted political education and the discussion of politics in schools, a policy with potentially lingering effects on school administrators and teachers even after its repeal. The *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools,* issued in 1985, promoted a civic education for the preservation of social stability and the avoidance of controversial issues. The issuance of these guidelines has been viewed as a symbolic action on the part of the state, with their discretionary nature continuing the depoliticization of civic education in the interest of avoiding potentially disruptive political discussion and action.

The concept of hegemony is also useful in accounting for the content of the ideologies promoted through schooling not as simply dominant class-specific, but as a form of "collective will" incorporating aspects of subordinate group ideologies. In mainland China, the CCP has not only directed patriotic campaigns at society at large, but has issued specific regulations on the implementation of patriotic education in schools. This patriotism should be viewed not as simply a dominant-class specific ideology, but one that can be seen as popularly valued. Social-psychological research has demonstrated the inherent nature of group attachments, such as patriotism, in addressing individual psychological needs for a sense of belonging, an understanding of one's place in the world, security, and self-esteem (Druckman 1994; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Katz 1965; Kim and Dittmer 1993; Miller 1995; Tajfel 1978). In the case of Hong Kong, an "ideology" of depoliticization as conveyed in the government's approach to society as a whole also found a corollary in educational policy and the curriculum. As was the case in the Mainland, this ideology found a base of support among the population and cannot thus be viewed as the imposition of a ruling class-specific doctrine. Scholars have discussed at length the apathy, ambivalence, and indifference toward politics of Hong Kong people who have tended to be more focused on stability, economic goals, and material gain than on politics (Lau 1982; Lau and Kuan 1988, Leung 1990; Lee 1996b).

At the same time, challenges to dominant group hegemony, which can give rise to the possibility of resistance need to be given consideration. Ding (1994) recounts, with specific attention to the CCP's promotion of patriotism as a justificatory ideology, the appropriation and reconceptualization of Chinese patriotism as a challenge to the state by a counterelite of intellectuals throughout society. In Hong Kong, the late

1980s and 1990s saw more open discussion in society of the direction of political development, the pace of democratization, and Hong Kong's future autonomy; more active political participation; and more open dissent to government authority and policies (Lam and Lee 1993; Scott 1989).

Given the background already discussed, that the Mainland state wishes the younger generation to form patriotic attitudes, and the Hong Kong colonial state desired that students remain politically ambivalent and neutral toward their nation, the survey results presented in Chapter Five can help determine the degree to which both states have been successful in their hegemonic efforts. In Hong Kong, the stated goals of the *Civic Education Guidelines* with regard to national identity were to promote pride in, and a love of, China and a willingness to contribute to China's development. Hong Kong students, on average, had the most positive responses on the related dimensions of a desire for China to be more powerful, a sense of duty, and an emotional attachment to the nation. More significant, however, are the indications of group attitudes on the scales of Patriotism and Nationalism. On a scale from one to five, the Hong Kong student group average on the Patriotism scale was 3.04, just above neutral. On the Nationalism scale, the average was 2.93, just below neutral. This is even more striking when one notes that the largest groups of Hong Kong students expressed neutrality and ambivalence with regard to aspects of patriotism and nationalism on many of the statements constituting the scales. Therefore, to a certain extent, the depoliticization of Hong Kong civic education was successful in creating students with neutral sentiments toward China.

This is even more evident in comparison with the Mainland students, who, as desired by the state, were much more patriotic and nationalistic. As mentioned in Chapter Four, policy documents state that among the aims of patriotic education are promoting national pride and dignity and encouraging students to make a contribution to the nation. It is around these very goals that Mainland students showed the strongest sentiments in the survey: an emotional attachment to the nation, a sense of duty to the nation, and a desire for national power. On the scale from one to five, the Mainland student group average was 3.85 on Patriotism, 3.34 on Nationalism, 4.41 on Emotion, 4.30 on Duty, and 4.12 on National Power. In contrast to the Hong Kong group, there were few neutral

students, especially on the three dimensions just mentioned, where the percentage of students expressing agreement with related statements ranged from 59.1 percent to 97.5 percent. It is therefore also possible to conclude that schools in mainland China were also to a large extent successful in creating patriotic and nationalistic students, a conclusion further supported by the fact that many of these students expressed the belief that schooling had been the most important influence on their attitudes toward the nation.

In both Hong Kong and mainland China it appears that the state has to a certain extent been successful in producing the desired outcome with regard to students' national attitudes. However, in both cases there were students who held attitudes that on the surface were contrary to the states' ideal intended goals. In Hong Kong there were students who were very patriotic and nationalistic, and in the Mainland there were students who had more neutral and even negative sentiments toward the nation. One explanation for these differing sentiments could be a dysfunction of the schooling process, such as a gap between the intended and implemented curriculum, as suggested in the narrative presented in Chapter Two. Alternatively, it could be that students themselves, as conscious individuals, resisted the political socialization efforts of the school.

Although the degree of correspondence between the intended and implemented curriculum was not a subject of direct inquiry in this study, this question can be addressed briefly. According to the literature, gaps between the intended and implemented curriculum may occur due to conflicting demands and pressures on teachers from various sources, including administrators, other teachers, parents, and students, leading teachers to make choices about what they teach based on a cost-benefit type of analysis; a lack of resources for implementing the intended curriculum; and teachers' own subjective understandings and interpretations of the intended curriculum.

There is some support from the research on civic education in Hong Kong and interviews with Chinese middle school teachers (see Appendix I, pp. 189–93) for the belief that teachers were indeed faced with these pressures. In Hong Kong, where the *Civic Education Guidelines* were primarily advisory and discretionary and were not accompanied by extra resources to implement them, teachers who were already burdened by pressure to deliver on subjects that were publicly examined, viewed civic

education as a low priority. Furthermore, although the prohibition on discussion of politics in schools was repealed in 1990, it is likely that teachers remained sensitive to covering the political issues called for in the *Guidelines*. In the Mainland, some teachers mentioned that implementing patriotic education was viewed as a relatively unimportant burden because of the pressure on them and the school to prepare students for university entrance examinations. Teachers also felt pressure to give positive evaluations of students' patriotic attitudes lest they hurt students' chances of being accepted to university. Furthermore, some teachers mentioned their own conflicts regarding the patriotic education curriculum, which they perceived as too idealistic and failing to prepare students for the realities of Chinese society.

On the question of teachers' own subjective interpretation of the curriculum, in Hong Kong, the *Civic Education Guidelines* were not accompanied by clear, explicit instructions for implementation, resulting in teachers being unclear as to how to use them. Furthermore, with few resources for additional training, teachers of existing subjects may not only have been uninterested in, but also unable to fully understand some of the additional civic education concepts they were expected to teach. In the Mainland case, a number of teachers interviewed explained patriotism not in the explicitly political terms of the policy documents but on a more basic, moral level, as the belief that students should simply show concern for the people around them rather than solely for themselves.

While evidence for an explanation of a gap between the intended and implemented curriculum to account for the possibility of divergent student attitudes exists, it does not explain why the majority of students held attitudes in line with what the state might desire. The data on student perceptions and attitudes themselves can therefore lend support to the argument of resistance, on the part of some students, to the state's hegemonic political socialization efforts to influence their attitudes toward the nation through schooling. In addressing this question, it is necessary to note the characteristics that distinguish the more patriotic and nationalistic Hong Kong students from their peers who were more neutral, and those that distinguish the Mainland students who were less patriotic and nationalistic than others. This can be accomplished by examining the factors from the multiple regression analysis in the Socialization + Critical Thinking Model which had a positive impact on Hong Kong students',

and a negative impact on Mainland students', national attitudes. In Hong Kong, the primary characteristics that produced patriotic students were a sense of curiosity about the nation and a perception that school activities made students feel close to the nation. The strongest influences on nationalism were a perception that one's attitudes toward the nation had changed since entering university, school activities, and a perception of having learned about China in school. In the Mainland, the primary factors that detracted from students' patriotism were skepticism, followed by socioeconomic status. The only negative factor on students' nationalism was skepticism.

Resistance has been conceptualized as a process of perception, reaction, and result. Students exhibiting resistance perceive and critique the state's attempts to disempower them through a process of hegemony. They may react to this perception by exhibiting a variety of oppositional behaviors, including refusing to learn dominant group values, rejecting schooling altogether, or mounting a direct challenge to dominant groups. Empirical studies have tended to focus on cases where the results of resistance serve the interests of the dominant groups themselves, as in the case of school drop-outs foregoing opportunities for social advancement. Giroux (1983), however, has advised that resistance be appraised in terms of the degree to which it promotes self-emancipation and critical thinking.

In order to address this issue in the Hong Kong and Mainland contexts, it is necessary to first look at the question of perception and the extent to which students perceived the state's intentions to direct the belief systems of the younger generation. In the case of Hong Kong, it is necessary to inquire into whether students recognized depoliticization. There is evidence from interviews and survey data that some students did indeed perceive this. Aside from simply noting that they were not taught much about China in school, some students noted that their schoolteachers did not talk about China and even avoided discussion of it because the subject was considered too sensitive. Students mentioned the censorship of history textbooks, the fact that China was presented in history courses as a foreign country, and their perception that schools and the Education Department were sensitive to the possibility of antagonizing the Chinese government. Furthermore, nearly 40 percent of Hong Kong students surveyed agreed that what they learned about China in school

was a type of indoctrination. There is also evidence of such perceptions among students in the Mainland. Fifty percent of the Mainland students characterized schooling as indoctrination, and 66.1 percent believed that their personal observations of Chinese society differed from what they had been taught in school. Some students even mentioned in interviews that they believed school political education to be a government attempt to control the political attitudes of the younger generation.

Based on this evidence from Hong Kong and mainland China, there does appear to be a perception of hegemonic political socialization attempts on the part of the state among some students. In turning to the question of reaction, it is first necessary to ask what characteristics of students could be viewed as reactions. Hong Kong students mentioned being curious, wanting to learn more about China, developing critical thinking skills, interacting with Mainland students, participating in university exchange visits, traveling through China, and learning different perspectives than they had encountered before. Mainland students discussed irritation at being told what to believe and surprise or disappointment at finding that there was a disparity between what they had learned in school and what they later found to be true, and at the fact that what they learned from certain professors and classmates from other parts of China had changed their previously-held impressions of the nation. Furthermore, students who displayed skeptical attitudes toward schooling in interviews tended also to more openly express criticism of the nation and government.

These reactions are examples of the critical thinking dispositions of skepticism, curiosity, an openness to multiple perspectives, and a tendency to think critically. However, in order to interpret these critical thinking dispositions as resistance, it should be possible to claim that students came to react in some way *in response to* their perceptions of the socialization process. For the Hong Kong group, the more patriotic students were more curious. Curiosity, given a context of depoliticized civic education, could logically be seen as a reaction of resistance by Hong Kong students. Students who mentioned that they were denied opportunities to learn about their country in school (perception) took it upon themselves to seek out information on their own (reaction). However, there is no indication from the survey data that a perception of not having been taught much about China in school led directly to curiosity. At the same time, however,

some students had the critical thinking disposition of skepticism, which can be defined as perceiving schooling as inaccurate and biased indoctrination. Skepticism can therefore be taken as representative of students' perception of the intent of schools to shape their attitudes. Skepticism (perception) led to an increase in curiosity and a tendency to think critically about national affairs (reactions).

For the Mainland students, skepticism was a more direct measure of students' perception of schooling as indoctrination and an attempt by the state to mould their attitudes. In the Mainland case, as in Hong Kong, skepticism (perception) led students to think more critically about national affairs, which in turn led to a reaction of curiosity. More importantly, however, Skepticism, the perception itself, had the strongest negative effect of any factors on students' patriotism and nationalism. Given these results, it is reasonable to claim that there are Hong Kong and Mainland students whose perceptions of state attempts to influence their attitudes through schooling led to reactions related to students' own critical thinking. These critical thinking dispositions can themselves be viewed as a form of self-emancipation from the relations of domination. Furthermore, there are important interactions among critical thinking and aspects of the socialization process which further contributed to students' power in that process. The following section expands on the idea of students' reaction to perceptions of hegemony by focusing on those schooling and university factors which can be conceived of as contributing to students' own power in the socialization process, also explaining how these factors interrelate with critical thinking dispositions to affect students' national attitudes in the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese contexts. These key factors and interrelations are:

- Activities, Skepticism, and Curiosity
- Own Opinion and Skepticism
- The University and Critical Thinking
- Interactions among Critical Thinking Factors

Activities, Skepticism, and Curiosity

A perception that activities students had participated in during school had made them feel closer to the nation enhanced both Hong Kong and

Mainland students' patriotism and nationalism In addition to direct effects on national attitudes, activities also made students less skeptical and more curious In Hong Kong, the stronger relationship was between activities and curiosity Interpreted in either direction, this relationship demonstrates how students can take power from the socialization process Positive feelings toward the nation created through participation in activities could give students the initiative to seek out more information about China Conversely, students already curious about China could take fuller advantage of, participate more willingly in, and be more inclined to be positively affected by any civic or political education activities offered at school In the Mainland group, the relationship between activities and skepticism is stronger, and negative, the greater the degree to which students perceived that they had participated in activities which made them feel closer to the nation, the less skeptical they were Here, activities could be viewed as a schooling factor that might be perceived as less like indoctrination than class instruction Activities could be seen as providing a setting or forum for drawing students' attention to the nation, giving them an opportunity to focus their own thinking and emotions on the nation without being given explicit directions as to what exactly to think or learn, as would be the case with classroom lessons Furthermore, activities would be designed to be enjoyable, a time when students are with friends and classmates These characteristics of participation in civic or patriotic activities could have led students to have a positive attitude toward schooling and make them less likely to view the school as an agent of indoctrination The relationship between Activities and Skepticism could also be interpreted in the opposite direction An existing low level of skepticism could represent a generally positive attitude toward schooling and be further reflected in a receptiveness to the influence of activities designed to produce feelings of attachment to the nation The importance of the effects of activities on critical thinking factors, relative to their direct effect on national attitudes, is further demonstrated by the fact that in combination with critical thinking factors in the same multiple regression model, the direct influence of activities on national attitudes is reduced (on Hong Kong students' patriotism and nationalism and Mainland students' nationalism) or eliminated (on Mainland students' patriotism), in comparison with the Socialization Model This implies that some of the influence attributed to activities in the Socialization Model

is actually due to their effects in fostering curiosity and reducing skepticism

Own Opinion and Skepticism

When considering socialization factors alone, a perception that teachers had encouraged students to form their own attitudes about national affairs was the strongest influence on Mainland students' patriotism and the second strongest influence on their nationalism This factor is a strong indicator of the importance of students being able to take the initiative in deciding what to believe and feel about their nation, especially in a schooling atmosphere that is perceived as indoctrination, and of the direct effect that this positive feeling toward schooling had on students' attitudes toward the nation In the substantially different, depoliticized Hong Kong educational context, Own Opinion did not have any significant effects on students' national attitudes

Own Opinion, however, did have the effect of reducing both Hong Kong and Mainland students' skepticism, for the Mainland group, it had the strongest negative effect on this disposition Perceiving that their teachers had encouraged them to form their own opinions about national affairs led students to be less skeptical of the attempts of schooling to influence their national attitudes The ability to form one's own opinions reflects individual power, the perception of being told what to believe reflects powerlessness As students mentioned in interviews, they did not like being exhorted to be patriotic by school administrators and teachers, feeling that they were already naturally patriotic They also noted that open discussion in political education classes had left a deep positive impression on them Feeling free to form their own opinions about national affairs, rather than being told what to think and believe, led students to have a more positive attitude toward the process of civic and political education, and to be less likely to doubt the accuracy or objectivity of schooling's political socialization messages The reduced level of skepticism due to Own Opinion had a further positive impact on Mainland students' national attitudes

When both Own Opinion and Skepticism are included in the same Socialization + Critical Thinking multiple regression model, the effect

of Own Opinion is reduced (on Mainland students' Patriotism) or eliminated (on Mainland students' Nationalism). This indicates that some or all of the direct influence that Own Opinion has on national attitudes in the Socialization Model should be attributed to students' overall less skeptical attitudes. In other words, skepticism encompasses the idea of a recognition that teachers are *not* allowing students to form their own opinions, in addition to perceptions of the inaccuracy of schooling's messages and a gap between what is learned in school and actual Chinese society.

The University and Critical Thinking

In interviews, both Hong Kong and Mainland students portrayed the university as a more liberal atmosphere than secondary school, encouraging the pursuit of intellectual interests and critical thinking and bringing students into contact with a variety of people who shared new information and new perspectives about China. University factors had among the strongest direct positive and negative effects on Hong Kong students' national attitudes, suggesting that in the absence of inputs from secondary schooling, the university took on added importance. In the Mainland case, however, although there were direct effects of university factors on national attitudes only when considering socialization factors in isolation, these effects disappeared when combined with critical thinking dispositions. This suggests that in both the Mainland and Hong Kong, the importance of the university lies not only in its direct effect on national attitudes, but also in the fact that it provides a forum for the fostering of empowering critical thinking dispositions.

The University and Curiosity

For the Hong Kong group, there was a positive relationship between University Changed Attitudes and Patriotism and Nationalism in the Socialization Model; the more students felt that their attitudes toward the nation had changed since entering university, the more patriotic and nationalistic they were. With the addition of critical thinking factors, particularly curiosity, in the Socialization + Critical Thinking Model,

however, the factor University Changed Attitudes disappears as an influence on Hong Kong students' patriotism, suggesting that this factor represents some of the effect of curiosity. Furthermore, for both groups of students, there was a positive relationship between University Changed Attitudes and Curiosity; the more students felt that their attitudes toward the nation had changed since entering university, the more curious they were. This relationship can be interpreted in several different ways. First, it could be assumed that students were already curious about the nation based on other factors before they entered university. As curious individuals, upon entering university they could be expected to take the initiative to seek out information and experiences related to the nation. Depending on what they learned, their attitudes toward the nation would change in either direction. An alternative explanation would be that students might not have been very curious about national affairs prior to entering university. Their experience at university may have had the effect of changing their previous attitudes toward the nation. As part of this process, students may have then developed a sense of curiosity to learn more about their nation. If their attitudes had become more positive, they may have been driven to find out more information to enhance these attitudes. On the other hand, if they had developed more negative attitudes toward the nation, their curiosity may have been sparked in a search for information to counteract negative messages or to seek multiple, different perspectives.

There is evidence to suggest that both interpretations are valid for the Hong Kong students, while for the Mainland group, it is most likely that students had already developed a sense of curiosity about the nation prior to entering university with little change in this disposition once they were there. For the Hong Kong students, there was a statistically significant relationship between the level of curiosity and the level of prestige of students' universities, even when controlling for year in university ($r = 0.18$, $p \leq 0.01$). This suggests a difference in levels of curiosity prior to entering university, with students going to more prestigious schools already tending to be more curious than their counterparts at other universities. However, at the same time, there was also a positive relationship between curiosity and year in university, even controlling for prestige, with students becoming more curious as they progressed through their university education ($r = 0.21$, $p \leq 0.001$). These two relationships

do not hold for the Mainland students, however, suggesting that students had already developed a sense of curiosity toward the nation prior to entering university, and that they were rather uniform in this respect regardless of their ability to enter prestigious schools

The University and Skepticism

Students' perception that their university education had influenced their attitudes toward the nation was the strongest influence on Hong Kong students' nationalism, in both the Socialization and the Socialization + Critical Thinking Models The more students perceived that their university education had influenced them, the less nationalistic they were In the Socialization Model, University had a positive relationship with Mainland students' nationalism, but this effect disappeared in the Socialization + Critical Thinking Model

For the Hong Kong group, University was the strongest positive influence on Skepticism The more students felt that their university education had influenced their national attitudes, the more skeptical they were Similarly, for the Mainland students, University Changed Attitudes was the factor with the strongest positive influence on Skepticism The more they felt that their national attitudes had changed since entering university, the more skeptical they were For both groups, it appears that something about the university experience led students to question the influence of schooling and the media It could be that, as students mentioned in interviews, the university offered students a variety of previously unavailable experiences, such as discussing national affairs with new friends, seeing conditions in different parts of the country for the first time if they attended university outside their hometown, or having opportunities to access different varieties of mass media

This relationship between university influence and skepticism, however, could also work in the opposite direction Some students may have entered university already holding skeptical attitudes, leaving them more open to the new experiences at university mentioned above, which shaped their attitudes toward the nation in different ways One way to examine the direction of the relationship would be to look at the question of whether students became more skeptical at university, which

would be an indication that something about the university experience made them more skeptical. There is some evidence that suggests that this is the case for the Hong Kong students. When controlling for university prestige, there is a statistically significant relationship between skepticism and year in university ($r = 0.13$, $p \leq 0.05$). There were no statistically significant differences among Hong Kong students at different universities or studying different majors, other university-related factors that might suggest differences among university students in terms of skepticism.

For the Mainland group, however, there was no indication that students became more skeptical after their first year in university, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant correlation between year in university and skepticism. The positive relationship between University Changed Attitudes and Skepticism for this group is therefore better explained as different levels of pre-university skepticism, making students more open to experiences which led them to perceive a change in their national attitudes. There is some evidence of this, including the fact that students at more prestigious universities were on average more skeptical than those at less prestigious ones, with the difference being statistically significant ($p \leq 0.05$). This fact, combined with the lack of increased skepticism depending on the year at university, suggests that the difference in skepticism between students at the Mainland's prestigious and regular universities existed when they arrived at university or that students' skepticism increased during their first year of studies. This also corresponds to interview data in which students expressed the belief that by the time students were graduating from secondary school and beginning university, they had come to perceive that political education was a kind of indoctrination.

The University and Multiple Perspectives

In the Critical Thinking Model, the disposition of Multiple Perspectives had a negative relationship only with Hong Kong students' nationalism. The more Hong Kong students were willing to take multiple perspectives into consideration in forming their attitudes toward the nation, the less nationalistic they were. This relationship remained when socialization factors were also brought into consideration. For the Mainland students,

there was no direct relationship between Multiple Perspectives and national attitudes, but there was an indirect negative relationship with national attitudes through the intervening factor of a tendency to make up one's own mind about national affairs without being influenced by others. There were no direct relationships between university factors and Multiple Perspectives for either group. However, it is possible to view Make Up Own Mind as the converse of Multiple Perspectives, and claim that the negative relationship between Make up Own Mind and a perception that what students learned from their classmates and professors at university had changed their attitudes toward the nation. This could represent a positive relationship between a university-related factor and Multiple Perspectives. Furthermore, it could also be assumed that some of the friends who positively influenced an openness to multiple perspectives were friends at university, reinforcing the relationship between university and Multiple Perspectives.

In the interviews, Hong Kong students mentioned that they heard different perspectives on China from their university professors and students from mainland China than they had encountered in secondary school or in the media, and that they were led to think more critically as a result. In Mainland interviews, students stated that they had come into contact with a variety of perspectives from classmates and professors at university and that these perspectives had changed some of the attitudes that they had previously held about the nation. It is therefore interesting that there are no direct relationships among university factors, Multiple Perspectives, and national attitudes for the Mainland students. An explanation for this phenomenon lies in interrelationships among Multiple Perspectives, Skepticism, and Curiosity. An openness to multiple perspectives, when considered alone, has a negative relationship with patriotism ($r = -0.16$, $p \leq 0.01$) and with nationalism ($r = -0.15$, $p \leq 0.05$). However, when taking other critical thinking dispositions into consideration at the same time, Multiple Perspectives is eliminated from the model. This suggests that it was not the *openness* to multiple perspectives which was of primary importance, but rather that, *exposure,* while at university, to multiple perspectives and new information which contradicted what had been learned in school led students to be more skeptical, and therefore to hold less positive attitudes toward the nation.

Interactions among Critical Thinking Factors

By denying the influence of school or through the critical thinking disposition of skepticism, students exhibiting resistance recognize and evaluate the state's efforts to control their attitudes through schooling. Taking advantage of those aspects of the political socialization process which can enhance their power, these students participate in political or civic education activities, participate in class discussions in which they feel free to form their own opinions on national affairs, and participate in the intellectual life of the university together with those who surround them with different opinions and perspectives. Bringing their own critical thinking dispositions into play, these students are skeptical, curious, open to multiple perspectives, and tend to think critically. Furthermore, the interactions among critical thinking factors are important in understanding the attitudinal products of resistance: Key interactions are found among Skepticism and Curiosity, Skepticism and Think Critically, and Curiosity and Think Critically.

For Hong Kong students, Skepticism was positively related to Curiosity. One interpretation would hold that students had experiences which led them to feel skeptical and distrustful of the attempts of schooling and the media to influence their attitudes toward the nation. These students might then have developed a sense of curiosity about the nation, driven by a quest to find accurate and objective information about their nation that they did not feel they were obtaining in school or through watching television or reading the newspaper. Alternatively, a sense of curiosity about the nation may have first driven students to gather information and opinion about the nation on their own. Comparing this information that they had obtained by themselves with that presented to them in school or in the media may have led them to trust their own judgment and to be skeptical of the accuracy and objectivity of outside agents.

While there was a direct relationship between Skepticism and Curiosity for the Hong Kong students, this same relationship did not exist for the Mainland group. However, for the Mainland students, there was a direct relationship between a tendency to think critically about national affairs and Skepticism. The relationship was positive; the more students tended to think critically, the more skeptical they were of the agents of

socialization. This relationship could work in both directions. An already held skepticism, a belief in the inaccuracy of what they learned about the nation in school or from the media, could have led students to think more critically about national affairs on their own, in a search for truth. Alternatively, students who already tended to be critical thinkers may have been more likely to doubt the accuracy and objectivity of socialization messages. That this pattern resembles that of the direct relationship between Skepticism and Curiosity for the Hong Kong group is further demonstrated by the positive relationship Think Critically has with Curiosity. In other words, for the Mainland group, a relationship between Skepticism and Curiosity exists, but it is indirect, through the mediating factor of Think Critically. The more Mainland students thought critically about national affairs, the more curious they were. This could be explained as the result of students first tending to think critically for other reasons, including skepticism, and then yearning to gather more information and insight about the nation as part of the critical thinking process.

THE RESULTS OF RESISTANCE

In these cases there is what might be called a "skeptical curiosity." Rather than a simple "blind" curiosity that only leads to positive attitudes, this is a curiosity that achieves a more balanced, well-informed set of attitudes toward the nation because it engenders skepticism and critical thinking. Looking from the other side, skepticism does not simply support negative attitudes toward the nation, but rather spurs critical thinking and curiosity on to work toward a balance. These seemingly contradictory relationships among skepticism, curiosity, and a tendency to think critically are multiplied and played out repeatedly through the many interactions among socialization and critical thinking factors, as demonstrated in Chapter Eleven, and are further enriched by students' openness to multiple perspectives. As summarized in Figure 9.1, for both Hong Kong and mainland Chinese university students, the results of the interplay of the empowering aspects of schooling and the university, together with the interactions among critical thinking factors, are a set of critical and constructive national attitudes. National attitudes are *critical* to the extent that they are not blindly positive or negative but exhibit critical and



Figure 9.1 Key Aspects of Student Resistance

reflective thought This appears especially true with regard to nationalism, which encompasses the dimensions of the question of China's superiority and quest for national power, aspects which can be seen as more open to debate than the more emotional dimensions of patriotism In interviews, for example, Mainland students, while criticizing the socialization process and some aspects of China's political and social systems, on balance still maintained positive attitudes toward the nation Similarly, Hong Kong students who exhibited curiosity and said that through knowledge gained on their own they had come to love their country were still critical of China's problems Students' national attitudes are *constructive* in the sense that, as many expressed in interviews, they perceived critical attitudes as their expression of concern for the nation and of wanting to contribute to China's progress and development This was further reflected in the fact that for both Hong Kong and Mainland students, a sense of duty and a desire for China to be more powerful were among the three strongest dimensions of national attitudes

THE MEANING OF RESISTANCE

This research has demonstrated that there were, among students in both Hong Kong and mainland China, individuals who perceived and evaluated the state's attempts to influence their attitudes through schooling This perception led to reactions of skepticism, curiosity, thinking critically, and taking advantage of empowering aspects of their schooling and university experiences The result of these perceptions and reactions was a set of critical and constructive national attitudes, which were at once liberating for students themselves and at the same time beneficial to the nation These results have made it possible, in these contexts, to reconceptualize resistance to the hegemonic efforts of the state as *students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes*

SUMMARY

This chapter has brought together insights from previous chapters to build an argument for resistance as an explanation for patriotic and nationalistic attitudes among Hong Kong students in a context of a depoliticized civic education, and for relatively neutral national attitudes among mainland Chinese students coming from a context of comprehensive patriotic education. It subsequently showed how resistance was played out. In the process of achieving these goals it offered a reconceptualization of the concept of resistance. In this reconceptualization, resistance is seen as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes. This reconceptualization started from the question of the state's interest in influencing students' attitudes toward the nation. The chapter began by demonstrating that the states in both mainland China and Hong Kong promoted, through schooling, ideologies justifying their authority and direction of society. This process of political socialization took the form of patriotic education in the Mainland and a depoliticized civic education curriculum in Hong Kong, with the respective goals of fostering patriotic and nationalistic students and students with neutral sentiments toward their nation. Viewing this process as a form of hegemony used by the dominant groups, in mainland China, the Chinese Communist Party, and in Hong Kong, the colonial capitalist state, to gain popular acceptance for a "collective will" in support of their rule and direction of society left open the theoretical possibility for resistance to this hegemony.

The chapter then demonstrated that some students in both Hong Kong and mainland China, exhibiting skepticism toward the influence of schooling, recognized and evaluated the hegemonic political socialization process. Students took advantage of those aspects of the schooling experience which could be viewed as less like indoctrination, including extracurricular activities and the encouragement to form their own attitudes toward the nation, as well as the relatively free intellectual atmosphere of the university. These individual perceptions and socialization factors in turn both fostered and interacted with the critical

thinking dispositions which partially detracted from Mainland students' patriotism and nationalism and enhanced these attitudes among the Hong Kong students. However, because of complex interactions among critical thinking dispositions, the attitudes toward the nation of both groups of students were at once critical and constructive, signifying a result that, while on the surface contrary to the states' intentions, enhanced students' power and was beneficial to the nation.

10

Conclusion

The objective of the study presented in this book was to offer an explanation for the patriotic and nationalistic attitudes of some Hong Kong students, among a group of students who were for the most part ambivalent toward the nation, and the neutral attitudes toward the nation of some mainland Chinese students, within a group of students who were on average considerably patriotic and nationalistic. It found that these students' attitudes were largely attributable to their dispositions to think critically, as well as to aspects of the schooling and university experiences. As context, it took into consideration the nature of the state in Hong Kong and mainland China, the direction given by the state to schools, and the nature of political and civic education in both societies. This context, together with students' attitudes and the factors which influenced them, led to an explanation of student resistance to the efforts of the state, through schooling, to influence their attitudes toward the nation.

Each chapter has contributed to this explanation. The introduction explained the actions taken by the Chinese Communist Party in the Mainland, and the Hong Kong colonial government in colonial Hong Kong, to promulgate ideologies in their societies in support of their legitimacy to rule and their direction of society. In the Mainland, these actions took the shape of campaigns promoting patriotism — campaigns which extended into schools as patriotic education. The Hong Kong colonial state took the alternate approach of working toward a depoliticization of Hong Kong society, an approach which was also

reflected in restrictions on political education and a depoliticization of the civic education curriculum

Chapter Two, the theoretical framework, interpreted these phenomena as hegemony, or the process by which the state, an organ of society's dominant group, attempts to maintain its authority and direction of society by fostering an ideology skewed in its favor but reflecting a "collective will," contributing to the acceptance of its rule by subordinate groups The concept of hegemony leaves open the possibility for what is known as resistance on the part of actors within subordinate groups Resistance takes the form of a perception of hegemony and a reaction which challenges the relations of domination in the form of a result which shifts the balance of power in favor of the subordinated According to theorists, resistance may take the form of oppositional behaviors, but also, and importantly, the form of critical thinking

With this framework, in theoretical terms the objective of the study has been to inquire into the nature of resistance to state-directed hegemonic political socialization efforts, and to examine its effects on students' attitudes toward the nation Patriotism and nationalism were chosen as a focus of inquiry as directly comparable concepts with the idea that the Mainland state desired patriotic and nationalistic students, while the Hong Kong government desired students without strong sentiments toward their nation Critical thinking dispositions, particularly skepticism in the case of the Mainland, and curiosity in the case of Hong Kong, were utilized as representative of resistance In operational terms, the focus of the study was therefore on the effects of political socialization factors and critical thinking dispositions on patriotism and nationalism, comparing the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese cases

The next section aimed at showing the state's hegemonic efforts to influence students' attitudes toward the nation through political socialization in schools Chapter Three demonstrated in detail the Hong Kong government's attempts to depoliticize Hong Kong education through restrictions on political education in school and examined the 1985 promulgation of *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* which viewed civic education as a means of preserving social stability in the transition period and did not deal seriously with the question of national identity Chapter Four, in contrast, showed the comprehensiveness of Mainland

patriotic education through an analysis of centrally-issued policy documents and school textbooks.

The following section turned to a presentation of the nature of students' attitudes and perceptions and provided the building blocks for the argument of resistance. Chapter Five showed that, as the states would have desired, Hong Kong students were on average largely neutral and ambivalent with regard to patriotism and nationalism, while mainland Chinese students were considerably more patriotic and nationalistic. The strongest dimensions of national attitudes for both groups were a desire for the nation to be more powerful, a sense of duty toward the nation, and an emotional attachment to the nation. Despite the group averages, however, there were Hong Kong students who were also considerably patriotic and nationalistic, and Mainland students who were relatively neutral. The factors which led these students to hold these divergent attitudes were the focus of interest.

Chapter Six provided a description of students' political socialization experiences. Questions about the influence of schooling on national attitudes drew out the views of the students themselves, views which provided support for the ideas of the depoliticization and weakness of Hong Kong civic education, and the strength and effectiveness of Mainland Chinese patriotic education. Such individual student perceptions were supported and strengthened by group data showing that the largest percentage of Mainland students acknowledged schooling as an important effect on their national attitudes, while only a minority of Hong Kong students similarly agreed.

Chapter Seven demonstrated how critical thinking dispositions emerged from students' perceptions and evaluations of the political socialization process. In the context of depoliticized civic education in Hong Kong and students' perceptions that their secondary schools had taught little about the nation, the fact that Hong Kong students noted that upon reaching university they had the opportunity to pursue their own curiosity about China was particularly striking. Similarly noteworthy, in the context of patriotic education, was mainland Chinese students expressing skepticism about schooling by characterizing it as inaccurate, government control, indoctrination, and at odds with what they learned outside school or later in university. Together with other critical thinking dispositions, curiosity and skepticism appeared to represent a position of

resistance to the political socialization process. Returning to the conceptualization of resistance as perception, reaction, and result, these two dispositions represented the first two components. What remained to be seen at this point was whether critical thinking dispositions actually detracted from patriotism and nationalism, or on a higher level, resulted in a situation which gave power to students at the expense of the state.

The goal of the following section was to demonstrate that the latter result was indeed the case. Chapter Eight first showed that in most cases, critical thinking factors were as important, if not more important in explaining students' national attitudes than political socialization factors. It achieved this through a comparison of the separate effects of both critical thinking factors and socialization factors on national attitudes, and a subsequent comparison of the factors' relative strengths when examined together. The roles of curiosity in strengthening Hong Kong students' patriotism and nationalism, and skepticism in weakening Mainland students' national attitudes were particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the strength of some of the socialization factors lay in the critical thinking dispositions that they fostered. This fact was also brought out more fully in Chapter Eight, which showed the interrelationships between socialization and critical thinking factors and among critical thinking factors themselves. These complex interactions among factors meant that critical thinking did not have the simple effect of negating the direction of the attitudes toward the nation held by the majority. In other words, resistance to the political socialization process did not lead to a simple rejection of the state-desired ideologies. Curiosity not only led Hong Kong students to be more patriotic and nationalistic, but through interactions with other factors, had indirect contradictory negative effects as well. Similarly, skepticism not only detracted from Mainland students' national attitudes, but also had indirect positive effects through relationships with other factors.

The evidence accumulated in Chapters Three through Eight was brought back together with the concepts of hegemony and resistance in Chapter Nine to offer a reconceptualization of the latter concept. It was described as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into

play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes. Attention again focused on the components of resistance, and perception of hegemony was demonstrated by Hong Kong students' recognition of their not having been taught about the nation in school, while some Mainland students perceived political education as indoctrination, and as being inaccurate, and biased. Among the reactions to these perceptions were those of seeking more objective information about the nation, taking advantage of the intellectual atmosphere of the university, and discussing national affairs with fellow students and teachers. The result of this resistance and the complexity of relations between political socialization and critical thinking were attitudes that involved students' own critical and reflective thought and which were expressed most strongly in a desire to make contributions leading China to be a stronger nation. Resistance is therefore not only empowering for students themselves, it is also ultimately of benefit to their societies.

Appendices

APPENDIX I: METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

There were four major segments of data collection. First, junior secondary-level textbooks for three periods were collected and analyzed. Second, interviews were conducted with administrators and teachers in a secondary school in Nanjing, China, to gain a better understanding of the implementation of patriotic education. Third, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 Hong Kong and mainland Chinese university students. Fourth, a survey questionnaire was administered to 535 Hong Kong and mainland Chinese university students. While methods of summary and induction were used to analyze data collected from interviews, statistical methods were used to analyze the survey data.

Textbook Analysis

The analysis of textbooks for the period prior to 1949 is based on the digest of moral and civic education textbooks in Peake's *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (1932), which includes brief descriptions of 12 textbooks from 1912 to 1929. For the period after 1949, copies of 9 sets of civic education materials were obtained, as shown in Table A.1.

Two sources were obtained for Hong Kong: the first being textbooks for civic education courses entitled "Civics" before 1965, and "Economic and Public Affairs" (EPA) after 1965, and the second the *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools*. which appeared in 1985 and were revised in 1996. The

Guidelines recommend that civics be presented cross-disciplinarily, in subjects ranging from Chinese to physical education.

Analysis of these sources was both quantitative and qualitative, along the lines of Venezky's (1992) distinction between the manifest curriculum and the latent curriculum. The manifest curriculum is what is evident from textbooks' tables of contents and indexes. The latent curriculum is that which is conveyed in the body of the text, both through "commission and omission" (p. 438).

Table A.1 Textbooks Examined

China	*Hong Kong*
Political Knowledge (People's Education Press 1959)	*Civics for Hong Kong* (Yau 1950)
	Living in Hong Kong (Tingay 1966)
	Economic and Public Affairs (Li and Lau 1971, 1972, 1973)
Middle School Political Knowledge: Questions and Answers (Beijing Normal University 1982)	*Economic and Public Affairs for Today* (White and Sum 1984)
	Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools (Curriculum Development Committee 1985)
	Introducing EPA (Morris and Pong 1986, 1990, 1991)
Political Ideology (People's Education Press 1993)	*This is Hong Kong* (Macmillan 1995)
	Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools (Curriculum Development Council, 1996)

In order to determine the extent and nature of knowledge covered in the textbooks, I first conducted a quantitative analysis of themes appearing in the table of contents of each set of books. Each chapter title or subtitle for the entire series of books for the junior secondary level was assigned a category according to its primary theme, such as "education." In most cases, the number of pages devoted to each category was calculated. Where the number of pages was unclear from the table of contents or the textbook was incomplete, the number of chapters was used. In instances where there was more than one topic per page, the lines devoted to each category were counted. In other books, if a chapter had no single theme, each paragraph was coded according to its primary theme, and the number of lines calculated. These methods were standardized by calculating the percentage of the series of books devoted to

each category. A chart showing the full results of this analysis appears in Appendix II (pp. 193–4).

The quantitative method proved useful in determining emphasis on particular aspects of the curriculum. I also conducted a more in-depth qualitative analysis of sections of textbooks devoted to themes related to the nation, citizenship, and ideology in the textbooks from the early and current periods. While focusing primarily on chapters with these topics as primary themes, other sections of the books were also analyzed for similar content. I performed this analysis in order to determine the nature and tone of the actual content. This proved useful in gauging shifts in national goals and ideological justification over time.

Observations and Interviews Inquiring into the Nature of Patriotic Education in a Chinese Middle School

In order to gain a better understanding of how political education is carried out in mainland China, I spent four months residing at a secondary school in Nanjing, China, during the fall of 1998, considering the practice at this school as an example of centrally-directed political education carried out across China. The duration of stay at the school provided ample opportunity to observe the campus environment and the facilities related to patriotic education, relevant classes and patriotic education activities, and to participate in student field trips to patriotic education bases. Interviews were conducted with 21 administrators, class-teachers, and subject teachers, addressing three major issues. First, "Why does the school carry out patriotic education?" Second, "How is patriotic education carried out?" Third, "How is patriotic education evaluated?"

Student Interviews

Further data collection and analysis focused on students' attitudes and used an approach consisting of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a limited number of students. Since the objective of this stage of the research was to gain insight into the nature of students' attitudes, not to claim to be representative or to make group comparisons, the number of students interviewed, ten in Hong Kong and ten in mainland China, was just large enough to tap a range of attitudes. The instrument developed for this stage was based on theories and literature in the areas of attitudes toward the nation

and political socialization. Data were analyzed qualitatively and inductively, with interview transcripts condensed to determine relevant codes, which were in turn used together with data in an attempt to understand salient themes.

The construction of the interview schedule was determined through an analysis of previously published theoretical and empirical studies of attitudes related to the nation, from the perspectives of both psychology and sociology (Comrey and Newmeyer 1965; DeLamater et al. 1969; Ferguson 1942; Feshbach 1991; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Loh 1975; Sampson and Smith 1957; Stagner 1940; Terhune 1964). These studies demonstrated the multidimensionality of the concepts of patriotism and nationalism and suggested factors which contribute to the formation of these attitudes. A general question, "When you think of China, what image first comes to mind?" was placed first, with subsequent questions arranged in order from concrete to abstract (Sudman and Bradburn 1982). This resulted in a progression which allowed respondents to give their attitudes toward locals and nationals first, then the views toward the nation as an abstract concept, and finally those toward international issues. A final question was intended to bring respondents' attention to the attitudes they had expressed and asked them to describe what factors they felt had influenced these attitudes. The final interview schedule consisted of the 33 questions shown in Appendix IV (pp. 197–8).

Interviews were conducted in Hong Kong and Nanjing with ten Hong Kong and ten mainland Chinese students, respectively. In the attempt to gain a range of perspectives, the students interviewed ranged from final-year, university-bound secondary school students to second-year postgraduate students. The mainland students came from seven different provinces, attended seven different schools, and were majors in anthropology, engineering, computer science, Chinese literature, politics, English, and business. The Hong Kong students attended five different schools, and majored in economics, medicine, engineering, business, chemistry, physics, geography, translation, and law. Four of the Hong Kong students had completed part of their primary education in the mainland.

Survey Stage

In order to aim at group representativeness and comparison along the dimensions of national attitudes, perceptions of socializing influences, and critical thinking dispositions, a survey questionnaire which could be administered to a larger group of students was designed, based on data gathered in the interviews, together with a further review of the literature on critical thinking. This questionnaire was piloted in both Nanjing and Hong Kong, and

the resulting data were subjected to reliability and validity analyses. A final version of the questionnaire was refined and administered to a larger sample of 535 students at 14 universities in the fall and winter of 1999–2000. A profile of these students is provided in Appendix V (pp. 199–201).

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used to conduct two types of analysis. Independent samples t-tests were performed to compare means in order to determine differences between the Hong Kong and Mainland student groups in terms of their attitudes toward the nation, socializing influences, and critical thinking dispositions. Multiple regression analyses, using a stepwise method, were performed to answer the questions relating socializing influences and the critical thinking scales to the national attitude scales and to determine the factors which influenced critical thinking.

APPENDIX II: PERCENTAGE OF TEXTBOOK CONTENT BY TOPIC

	China			*Hong Kong*					
Topic	1959	1982	1993	1950	1966	1971	1984	1990	1995
Capitalism	0.2%	1.7%							
Citizenship		2.3%	1.7%	5%	1.9%	2.9%		4.2%	5.5%
Classes	3.7%	4.6%							
Collectivism		1.1%	4.6%						
Communism	10.0%	6.4%	2.9%						
Culture/Art/Media		0.3%		5%	5.2%	0.9%	3.6%	2.9%	3.0%
Democracy	1.6%	2.3%	2.3%	5%					
Economics — Domestic	8.6%	3.0%	6.8%	25%	8.3%	2.2%	18.4%	11.6%	8.2%
Economic Issues — Int'l						4.7%	5.9%	6.4%	14.2%
Education	2.5%	0.3%	2.0%	5%	5.2%	6.3%	4.6%	5.4%	6.2%
Environment								6.0%	5.3%
Family	0.3%		1.1%						
Health				5%	15.4%	9.2%	4.3%	3.3%	5.9%
International Issues	4.2%	0.3%	2.3%	5%					
Labor	10.1%	2.5%	4.0%						
Law		17.3%	10.5%		3.3%	0.9%		5.2%	4.3%
Leisure					9.1%	5.1%	3.0%	4.8%	1.6%
Local Community Affairs				10%	43.0%	40.3%	37.2%	31.4%	29.0%
Local Government				10%		9.4%	8.6%	6.2%	5.3%
Local History				5%	5.2%	2.7%	3.3%	3.5%	3.0%

(continued on p 194)

	China			*Hong Kong*					
Topic	1959	1982	1993	1950	1966	1971	1984	1990	1995
Local Population						1.8%	4.6%	5.0%	5.3%
Morals	15.1%	9.4%	7.2%						
Nation	5.3%	1.6%	7.1%					1.2%	
National Government		1.5%		5%					
Occupations				10%	3.3%	5.8%	3.0%		
People/Masses	8.4%	1.8%	3.7%						
Revolutionary Spirit	21.5%	0.4%							
Science	2.1%	1.6%	4.9%						
Social Welfare				5%		6.0%	3.6%	2.7%	3.4%
Socialism	0.3%	16.3%	10.7%						
Society	0.6%	0.7%							
World/Societal History	5.5%	25.1%	28.4%						

APPENDIX III: MAINLAND CHINESE POLITICAL EDUCATION POLICY DOCUMENTS

Documents from Guo, Qijia, ed. 1995. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Fa Quanshu *(Complete education laws of the People's Republic of China). Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press.*

1. "Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin he Jiaqiang Zhongxue Zhengzhi Ke de Yijian" (Ministry of Education opinion on improving and strengthening secondary school political education courses). 12 September 1980. Pp. 628–30.

2. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian" (Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on strengthening patriotic propaganda education). 2 July 1983. Pp. 601–6.

3. "Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi" (Ministry of Education notice on improving and strengthening the teaching of secondary school history and geography courses). 1 August 1983. Pp. 666–8.

4. "Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche 'Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian' de Tongzhi" (Ministry of Education notice on the study and implementation of the "opinion on strengthening patriotic propaganda education"). 24 August 1983. Pp. 607–8.

5. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige Xuexiao Sixiang Pinde he Zhengzhi Lilun Kecheng Jiaoxue de Tongzhi" (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee notice on reforming the teaching of ideological character and political theory curricula in schools). 1 August 1985. Pp. 630–2.

6. "Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Zhongxue Sixiang Zhengzhi Ke Gaige Shiyan de Tongzhi (Jielu)" (State Education Commission notice on further expanding the experiment in reforming secondary school ideological and political education courses (extract)). 22 April 1987. Pp. 632–4.

7. "Zhongxue Deyu Dagang (Shixing Gao)" (Outline on secondary school moral education (draft)). 20 August 1988. Pp. 596–601.

8. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi" (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee notice on reforming and strengthening primary and middle school moral education work). 25 December 1988. Pp. 588–92.

9. "Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen, Lishi, Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian" (State Education Commission opinion on strengthening the teaching of ideological and political education and education on national conditions in primary and secondary language, history, geography, and other courses). 8 November 1989. Pp. 619–21.

10. "Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Jidian Yijian" (A few opinions on further strengthening primary and secondary school moral education work). 13 April 1990. Pp. 592–6.

11. "Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Shixing 'Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoqi Fa' Yange Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Guoqi Zhidu de Tongzhi" (State Education Commission notice on implementing the policy of strictly instituting a system for flag-raising in primary and secondary schools according to the "People's Republic of China National Flag Law"). 24 August 1990. Pp. 621–2.

12. "Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan Aiguozhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian" (State Education Commission

Office opinion on further developing patriotic education activities in primary and secondary schools). 25 April 1991. Pp. 622–3.

13. "Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zhongxiaoxue Guoqing Jiaoyu Kewai Yuedu Duwu de Tongzhi" (Office of the State Education Commission notice on primary and secondary school extracurricular reading materials for education on national conditions). 1 June 1991. Pp. 649–52.

14. "Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa 'Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandaishi ji Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao' (Chugao) de Tongzhi" (State Education Commission Notice on the promulgation of the preliminary draft of the "general outline on strengthening education in modern and contemporary history and national conditions"). 27 August 1991. Pp. 623–4.

15. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Guojia Jiaowei, Wenhua Bu, Minzheng Bu, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang, Guojia Wenwu Ju Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming Chuantong Jiaoyu de Tongzhi" (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State Education Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil Administration, Communist Youth League Central Committee, and National Bureau of Cultural Relics notice on fully utilizing cultural relics in the implementation of patriotic education and education in revolutionary traditions). 28 August 1991. Pp. 624–6.

16. Zou Shiyan, "Yao Yansu er Renzhende Jinxing Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Qi Huodong de Jiaoyu" (The need to seriously and earnestly implement primary and secondary education on flag-raising activities). 17 October 1991. P. 626.

17. "Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Xiaoxue, Chuzhong Guofang Jiaoyu Gangyao (Shixing)" (State Education Commission outline on national defense education in primary and middle Schools (draft)). 19 February 1992. Pp. 770–3.

18. "Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Bangongting Yinfa 'Guanyu Zai Youeryuan Jiaqiang Ai Jiaxiang, Ai Zuguo Jiaoyu de Yijian' de Tongzhi" (Office of the State Education Commission notice on the publication of the opinion on strengthening "loving the Hometown" and patriotic education in kindergartens). 5 May 1992. Pp. 248–9.

19. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, "Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao" (Outline on the implementation of patriotic education). 8 August 1994. Pp. 117–22.

Articles from Renmin Ribao *(People's Daily)*

1. "Zhuahao Jiaoyu Shiye Zhili Zhengdun. Jiaqiang Xuexiao Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo" (Grasp the administrative consolidation of the educational enterprise: Strengthen school ideo-political work. 17 January 1990.
2. "Qieshi Ba Peiyang Shenme Ren de Wenti Jiejue Hao" (Earnestly resolve the question of what kind of people we are cultivating). 24 April 1991.
3. "Jinxing Zhongguo Jindaishi Xiandaishi ji Guoqing Jiaoyu" (Carry out education in modern history, contemporary history, and national conditions). 1 June 1991.
4. "Quan Dang Quan Shehui Dou Yao Jiji Xingdongqilai, Qieshi Jiaqiang Jinxiandaishi he Guoqing Jiaoyu" (Party and society must take positive action: Earnestly strengthen education in modern history, contemporary history, and national conditions). 2 July 1991.
5. "Shehuizhuyi Jiaoyu de yige Zhongyao Keti" (An important task in socialist education). 5 June 1991.
6. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Xuexiao Deyu Gongzuo de Ruogan Yijian" (A number of opinions of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on further strengthening and improving school moral education work). 31 August 1994.

APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (ENGLISH ORIGINAL)

1. Where are you from? Where were you born? (HK) When did you come to Hong Kong? How old are you?
2. When you think of China, what image comes first to mind?
3. In your opinion, what characteristics do you have in common with other people from Hong Kong/your hometown?
4. In general, what is your opinion of people of Hong Kong/your hometown?
5. What is your image of people from other parts of China?
6. In what ways would you consider people from Hong Kong/your hometown similar to people from other parts of China?
7. In what ways would you say that people from Hong Kong/your hometown are different from people from other parts of China?
8. What is your image of a patriotic Chinese?
9. What is your image of an unpatriotic Chinese?
10. In what ways do Chinese people differ from foreigners?

11. What are some of the things that make you proud of China or proud to be Chinese?
12. What contributions do you think that China has made to the world?
13. What things do you not quite like about China?
14. If a foreigner or foreign government criticized China, how would that make you feel?
15. If someone praised the fact that China has made a lot of progress in the last 20 years, how would that make you feel?
16. If another Chinese criticized China while abroad, how would you feel?
17. Do you think that citizens have a duty to love China?
18. Can people who disagree with government policies still be considered patriotic?
19. How do your feelings about China differ from your feelings about the Chinese government?
20. In what ways do you think citizens should serve China?
21. How do you feel when you see the Chinese national flag or hear the national anthem?
22. When thinking about your own career goals, to what extent would you say that China's needs enter into your decision-making?
23. Do you ever think of leaving your home for another country with the intention of not returning?
24. Do you think China should be able to limit some individual freedoms in the name of public interest?
25. If Hong Kong's/your hometown's interests and the interest of China as a whole were ever to conflict, whose interests would you say should take precedence? Why?
26. In your opinion, how does China compare to other nations of the world? Is China any better in any aspects?
27. Should China be more or less like other countries? In what ways?
28. What do you think China's policy should be in the Diaoyutai or other territorial disputes?
29. What do you think China's role should be in the world scene?
30. Do you think that civic/political education in schools should focus more on patriotism or on more global concerns? Why?
31. If you were planning on donating some money for humanitarian aid and there were two causes, flood relief in China and a fund to protect the world environment, how do you think you would spend your money? Why?
32. Do you consider yourself patriotic?
33. In the process of forming your attitudes about China, what role to you think your schooling had? Are there any other influences on your attitudes toward China?

APPENDIX V: PROFILE OF STUDENTS SURVEYED

Survey questionnaires were returned from 535 students, 275 from mainland China and 260 from Hong Kong. Fifty-five percent of the total number of students were women. Students in the Mainland came from eight universities in three cities, were studying four separate fields of study, and represented every municipality, province, or region except Guizhou, Tibet, and Qinghai. Approximately 75 percent of them had attended key secondary schools. Hong Kong students hailed from six universities, studying six different major fields of study. About ten percent of them were born in the Mainland.

The Hong Kong students were on the average about two years older than their Mainland counterparts, while the Mainland students were slightly farther along, on average, in their postsecondary education. Using the sum of fathers' and mothers' level of education as an indicator of socioeconomic status (SES), the Mainland students on average came from families of higher SES. Hong Kong students did not rate themselves as knowledgeable about China as the Mainlanders.

Table A.2 Gender, Secondary School Type and Location, University Type, Birthplace

Characteristic	*Hong Kong*		*Mainland*	
	N	%	N	%
Male	102	39.8	129	49
Female	154	60.2	134	51
Key secondary school	n/a	n/a	207	77.8
Non-key secondary school	n/a	n/a	59	22.2
Attended secondary school in Northern China	n/a	n/a	79	31.3
Attended secondary school in Southern China	n/a	n/a	173	68.7
Attending a normal university	n/a	n/a	107	38.9
Attending a comprehensive university	260	100	168	61.1
Born in Hong Kong	219	89	n/a	n/a
Born outside Hong Kong	27	11	n/a	n/a

Table A.3 Age, Level of Education, Socioeconomic Status

Characteristic	*Hong Kong*	*Mainland*
Mean age	23	21
Mean number of years of post-secondary education	2.04	2.67
Mean socioeconomic status (based on parents' level of education)	4.28	5.77

Table A.4 Universities Represented

University	*N*
Hong Kong University A	62
Hong Kong University B	45
Hong Kong University C	30
Hong Kong University D	91
Hong Kong University E	10
Hong Kong University F	22
Mainland University A	39
Mainland University B	36
Mainland University C	20
Mainland University D	41
Mainland University E	41
Mainland University F	47
Mainland University G	21
Mainland University H	30

Table A.5 Major Field of Study

Major Field of Study	*Hong Kong*		*Mainland*	
	N	%	N	%
Education	57	22.7	62	22.5
Social Science	64	25.5	88	32
Humanities, Arts, Language	30	12	n/a	n/a
Sciences	14	5.6	n/a	n/a
Computer Science, Math, Engineering	43	17.1	79	28.7
Business	43	17.1	46	16.7

Table A.6 Self-Rating of Knowledge about China

Self-rating of Knowledge about China	*Hong Kong*		*Mainland*	
	N	%	N	%
Very knowledgeable	24	9.4	63	23.8
Somewhat knowledgeable	137	53.5	166	62.6
Not very knowledgeable	72	28.1	34	12.8
Know very little	23	9.0	2	0.8

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