

Migration and Diversity in Asian Contexts

Edited by **Lai Ah Eng, Francis L. Collins**
and **Brenda S.A. Yeoh**

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THE TUG OF WAR OVER MULTICULTURALISM

Contestation between Governing and Empowering Immigrants in Taiwan

HSIA Hsiao-Chuan

MULTICULTURALISM: TOUCHING ON THE NERVES OF NATIONAL ANXIETY?

Shortly after the world was shocked by the attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, the Taiwanese public was upset to learn that the self-confessed perpetrator and right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, made and posted a video on the Internet before going on his killing spree, in which he expresses his admiration for Taiwan, along with Japan and South Korea, as a “modern country that never adopted multiculturalism”.

When this news spread across the Internet, many Taiwanese posted Web comments expressing their resentment and saying that Taiwan was not at all like how the Norwegian murderer had described it. Government Information Office Minister Philip Yang quickly issued a statement to the media stressing that Taiwanese society had always respected a plurality

of cultures. Yang said that a democratic society should be a tolerant one in which different groups respect and appreciate one another, and that this was the kind of society that the international community generally took Taiwan to be. National Immigration Agency officials were also quick to assure the public that Breivik had never been to Taiwan. All this was supposedly to prove that Breivik’s remarks about Taiwan were a baseless misinterpretation.

I expressed my opinions on this subject in an article published on 29 July in the Chinese-language *China Times*,¹ which had invited me to write bi-weekly commentaries for almost a year. In this article, I pointed out that although Taiwan has never seen a massacre of people of an ethnic minority or migrants by right-wing extremists, our laws, policies and systems are full of discrimination against immigrants and migrant workers. I pointed out that discriminatory attitudes are often seen in the words and actions of bureaucrats, while prejudice is pervasive in society at large. The article called upon Taiwanese who really want to refute Breivik’s description of Taiwan as a monocultural society to say a resounding “no” to all words and actions that discriminate against immigrants and migrant workers. On 4 August, I subsequently received an anonymous letter containing a photocopy of a full-page report about Breivik that appeared on the Chinese-language *Apple Daily* on 25 July. The report includes a photograph of Breivik wearing a special forces diving suit and aiming a rifle at some imaginary adversary. In the blank space alongside the photograph, the anonymous letter-writer had scribbled the following shocking and hate-filled message:

When will Taiwan get a brave man like this to kill all the mangy foreign workers and trashy foreign spouses who have crawled over from Southeast Asia and other backward regions to hang around in Taiwan, along with the shameless hypocrites who wave banners and yell slogans on their behalf in the bogus name of brotherly love — people like that bloody sow Hsia Hsiao-chuan? Because of this trash and because of you, our descendants will have to live in a trash heap!

This letter is not just an isolated, random incident. I have received several threatening letters over the past year, while other people and organizations that speak up for the rights of immigrants (particularly marriage migrants) and migrant workers have also received similar letters or have been harassed in various ways. I continue to receive threatening letters whenever

the subjects of my commentaries are about issues of marriage migrants and migrant workers.

This anecdote reveals that the concept of "multiculturalism" in Taiwan is contested by many forces: non-Taiwanese (especially international communities whose perceptions about Taiwan that Taiwanese politicians and general public presume would affect Taiwan's status in international politics); the Taiwanese government; actors in the immigrant movement; and the Taiwanese people. On the one hand, both Taiwanese government and the general public consider "multiculturalism" as the norm, which is why they immediately denied Breivik's characterization of Taiwan and reassured the "international community" that Taiwan respects multiculturalism.

On the other hand, there are those who resent the existence of immigrants and migrants, particularly those from the less developed countries, and consequently are against advocacy and rhetoric promoting their rights. The fact that these people feel the need to send anonymous letters to threaten activists working for im/migrant rights reveals that the immigrant movement has had social impact, thus triggering their anxiety. Indeed, the invitation to me to write a bi-weekly column in a mainstream newspaper signals that issues and rights of im/migrants have been considered crucial by mainstream society.

In the following, I will examine how the meanings of the multiculturalism have been contested by two main forces: the actors of social movements and actors of the state. Rooted in the political development of nation-building in Taiwan since the 1980s, multiculturalism has gradually become a political rhetoric symbolizing the nationhood of Taiwan. By expanding the meaning of multiculturalism and other existent rhetoric, the immigrant movement has successfully challenged the governments' immigration policies and made the historically exclusionary model of citizenship in Taiwan more inclusive. At the same time, the Taiwan government has also struggled to maintain multiculturalism more as political rhetoric only, rather than granting more substantive and formal rights to immigrants.

CITIZENSHIP IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Discussion of citizenship in the modern era has traditionally centred on the acquisition of rights and the exercise of obligations, and how rights serve to forge attachment to a particular nation-state which is traditionally conceptualized as culturally and morally homogeneous. As the world

becomes increasingly globalized, recent writing has sought to decouple citizenship from its traditionally close association with the nation-state.

Several writers claim that national citizenship has lost its importance in the present era of globalization (Soysal 1994; Sassen 1996) and suggest that citizenship rights are irrelevant, and that labour rights and human rights should take precedence (Harris 1995; Soysal 1994). Soysal (1994, p. 1) argues that "a new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organizing and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging". Soysal's thesis for this transformation is based on the experience of "guest workers" in Europe, who live and work in a foreign country without acquiring citizenship status. Organizations representing guest workers have been able to mobilize support for the extension of basic social and civil rights, and thus the significance of citizenship has been reduced to the point where non-citizens' rights do not differ significantly from those of citizens (Soysal 1994, p. 119).

Soysal's thesis has been criticized for the following problems. First, while many guest workers might increasingly enjoy social and civic rights, they do not possess political rights. This problem of the lack of political rights is considered crucial since participation in the political realm is one of the major defining characteristics of "thick" citizenship (Faulks 2000). Without formal rights to vote or stand for office, immigrants can take little part in the formulation and implementation of policies that may impact negatively on their social entitlements and civil liberties. Faulks (2000) maintains that human rights by themselves do not ensure the development of participatory networks, which are necessary to sustain common institutions of governance and to build bridges between immigrant groups and the dominant culture within the polity. Since citizenship involves participation and responsibilities, Faulks believes that human rights cannot simply supersede citizenship, because enjoying rights without bearing responsibilities can only fuel hostility towards minorities who are perceived to benefit from public resources without playing their part in the community. For instance, in the study examining Ireland's 2004 Constitution Amendment which removes birthright citizenship from any future Irish-born children of immigrant parents, Tormey (2007) argues that one of the reasons why the amendment was passed is that migrant women are successfully constructed as "immoral citizen tourists" who have no loyalty or tangible connection to the nation and fail to fulfil the notion of reciprocity and repaying "Irish hospitality".

Critics have moreover argued that the guest worker's experience in Europe cannot be easily generalized into a widespread shift towards a post-national citizenship (e.g., Joppke 1998; Parreñas 2001; Piper and Roces 2003). The exclusionary practices of citizenship have been recognized as being ill-equipped to deal with an age of large-scale and heterogeneous migratory movements. The hope for post-national citizenship is that international human rights law would "provide a tool for sculpting a more inclusionary model of citizenship" (Lister 1997, p. 60) that would transcend nation-state boundaries. However, despite the proliferation of international conventions and human rights instruments, national citizenship, to a large extent, still determines the rights that different categories of migrants are able to exercise (Kofman et al. 2000; Castles and Davidson 2000). In practice, the international regime of rights is weak and non-existent outside of Europe (Ghai 1999). In the case of Taiwan, its exclusion from membership in the United Nations due to the one-China policy makes it a particular case where most international instruments of rights cannot apply.

Multicultural citizenship is an alternative proposed by scholars who recognize both the importance and limits of political citizenship, and is based on the idea that the nation-state contains a degree of plurality that allows migrants to retain their cultural identity provided they adhere to political norms. This pluralism does not negate the existence of a dominant culture but recognizes multiple cultures. In the political context of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (1995, p. 5) advances a theory of minority rights: "A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of their group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or 'special status' for minority cultures," because all countries have a "societal culture" that places minority groups in a position of cultural inequality vis-à-vis the majority (Kymlicka 1995, 2001).

Multiculturalism, however, is not always an entirely positive development (Kofman et al. 2000). According to Faulks (2000), the first problem with a conception of citizenship centred on group rights is ascertaining which groups can legitimately claim to be special cases and where they deserve additional entitlements not available to other members of a polity, resulting in situations which may lead to tension between groups competing for special status. Multiculturalism may also encourage and fix essentialist and static views of migrant identities (Barry 2001; Bissoondath 1994). In Sweden for example, the government, which

exerts considerable social control through the allocation of funds, tends to encourage organizations based on ethnicity at the local level, thus making it difficult to build bridges and migrant political alliances across ethnic differences. Alund and Schierup (1993, p. 140) thus speak of "prescribed multiculturalism" whereby immigrants and ethnic organizations are co-opted into the corporatist state and are politically marginalized.

Critics point out that an excessive emphasis on difference leads to a reduced focus on problems that are shared, and to a more combative anti-racist stance. For instance, the Netherlands Minorities Policy was altered in response to criticism of the government's emphasis on culture. Official rhetoric does not necessarily correspond to the reality of migrants' lives. Nor does it always correspond to any acceptance of these migrants by wider society. There has also been an increasingly vociferous critique of and disillusionment with Swedish multiculturalism, which has left migrants with unequal rights and segregated existences (Alund 1991, 1998).

Furthermore, to ask an individual to base their political position on a single fragment of their identity is a denial of their complex individuality. Multicultural citizenship thus runs the risk of essentializing and freezing as timeless cultural differences within the boundaries of homogeneous ethnic groups. Proponents of group-based citizenship tend to have a romanticized view of social groups, neglecting the fact that groups can themselves be oppressive to their members. National discourses are often used by elites to gloss over differences within the group and as an excuse for not tackling the roots of inequalities. The state and other institutions may accept cultural norms that communities have transplanted from their home society without any real considerations of the changes in their new economic and social environment. For instance, feminists have criticized the patriarchal nature of multicultural policies for not only reifying cultural differences within ethnic groups which are assumed to be homogeneous, but also supporting male leadership and the persistence of traditional values. These critics question who is really empowered to interpret and impose cultural norms in the framework of multicultural citizenship. Feminists also point out that multiculturalism may represent a more liberal tolerance of what goes on in the private sphere among different migrant groups; this can, however, still leave intact gender inequalities and repressive practices towards women. The case of domestic violence exemplifies the tolerance of practices in the private sphere on grounds of non-intervention in the customs of others (Kofman et al. 2000; Okin 1999; Yuval-Davis 1997).

As Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2008) point out, numerous Western countries appeared to embrace multiculturalism in 1990s, but by the end of the decade, observers noted governments' "retreat" from multiculturalism (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004). According to Joppke (2004), there have been changes by liberal states towards non-discriminatory immigration policies, liberalized citizenship rules and a general distancing from the old idea of assimilation. With the exception of language, the only explicit impositions on newcomers are liberal impositions, most notably a procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles. The effect of this trend is to remove the case for programmes of multicultural "recognition", because "minority rights are compensation for states' strong nationalizing practices, and weakening of these nationalizing practices remove the case for (this type) of minority rights" (Joppke 2001, p. 437).

While Europe may have more liberalized policies and laws regarding immigrants as Joppke has contended,² the immigration policies and laws of the newly emerging immigrant-receiving countries in East Asia, including Taiwan, remain largely exclusionary. Consequently, multiculturalism and the case for minority rights arise in East Asia. Furthermore, as Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2008) point out, critiques of multiculturalism often presume that the meaning and content of multiculturalism are easily identifiable and universally the same. However, multiculturalism is not a unitary concept but is elastic enough to include different aspects which may shift over time (Kofman et al. 2000). Therefore, more research needs to be done to examine the meanings and practices of multiculturalism in different times and places. This chapter aims at providing a concrete case of Taiwan regarding how the meaning of multiculturalism has been formulated and transformed by forces of the state and social movements.

By detailing the development of the rhetoric of multiculturalism from the 1980s to the present, I illustrate how the meaning of multiculturalism is a battlefield of contestation, wherein both state actors and social movement actors actively engage themselves and each other to advance their agendas. In addition to documents of relevant laws, policies and programmes, much data is based on my praxis-oriented research and long-term involvement in the empowerment of Southeast Asian women immigrating to Taiwan through marriage (Hsia 2006, 2008) and the development of the immigrant movement in Taiwan (Hsia 2008).

My research on marriage migration began in May 1994 until the present time. In 1995, I initiated a Chinese literacy programme based

on the theory of the "pedagogy of the oppressed" (Freire 1970) aiming at empowering marriage migrants. After several years and numerous experiences of trial and error, the marriage migrants empowered in the Chinese programmes collectively established a national organization, TransAsia Sisters Association in Taiwan (TASAT) in 2003. TASAT is a grassroots organization where marriage migrants are heavily involved in decision making, programme implementation and daily organizational operations. In 2003, I co-founded the Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM) to spearhead a movement to promote the rights of migrant workers and immigrants in Taiwan, of which TASAT is one of the founding and active members. AHRLIM is the first alliance in Taiwan that focuses on the rights of both immigrants and migrants and has contributed much to the changes in major immigration laws and policies.

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN TAIWAN

Taiwan's policy of incorporation, as codified in its laws of citizenship, is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, inclusive of people who can claim a common ancestral origin, real or imagined, and somewhat exclusive of people who do not share that commonality. The coupling of national identity and the political unit that was established by Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Republic of China (ROC), reflects a traditional Chinese emphasis on lineage and ancestry (Cheng 2002).

Taiwan's economic growth and democratization in recent decades have, however, raised scepticism concerning its traditional nationalist ideology, and led to a variety of alternative conceptualizations vying for dominance in a new nation-state building project currently in progress (Cheng 2002). Despite recent changes in the immigration and nationality laws, however, it remains extremely difficult for those excluded from nationality to become citizens of Taiwan, except for spouses and children of Taiwanese citizens (Cheng 2002; Tseng 2004). Prior to the changes in the Nationality Act in 1999 (effective on 9 February 2000), foreigners could not be naturalized as Taiwanese citizens except for women married to Taiwanese men who qualify for naturalization because they are seen as being able to continue Taiwanese "blood lines" through their marriages.

The Taiwanese government did not have an explicit immigration policy³ until the number of "foreign brides"⁴ became significant in Taiwan.⁵

As a researcher working on marriage migration issues since 1994, I have observed how the government's attitudes suddenly changed in late 2002. Until mid-2002, government officials at both central and local government levels were of the view that the "foreign bride" phenomenon was a short-lived "fad" that fell outside their purview. In late 2002 however, two sets of statistics dramatically shifted the government's position. According to the statistics released in 2002 by the Directorate-General of Budget, one of every four new marriages in Taiwan was between a citizen and foreigner, and the majority of foreign spouses were the "foreign brides" and "mainland brides" of Taiwanese men. More importantly, at the end of 2002, the Ministry of Education released statistics indicating that one out of eight newborn babies was born to the family of a "foreign bride". On 21 February 2003, Premier Yu Shyi-kun chaired a meeting of Commission for Women's Rights and Welfare under the Executive Yuan (Taiwan's executive branch) to deliberate on the issue of "Assessment and Action Planning on Related Problems of Foreign and Mainland Spouses". This meeting concluded that from 2004, the government would allocate a specific budget targeting foreign and mainland spouses. Since then, every Ministry began to hold meetings to discuss issues surrounding "foreign brides" and potential policies and programmes for them.

In 2003, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which was tasked with inter-ministry coordination of policies on "foreign brides", drafted the "Guidelines of Immigration Policy" and tried to rush through the establishment of the National Immigration Agency (NIA). In the first few versions of the draft guidelines, the focus was to create incentives for professional/managerial/skilled foreigners to immigrate to Taiwan, while stipulating that blue collar migrant workers were not allowed to apply for permanent residency and naturalization. The bill of Organic Act of the NIA proposed by MOI (2003a) in late 2003 showed that the main functions of NIA were to police, investigate and deport migrant workers and immigrants who are deemed by NIA officials to be illegal or dangerous, rather than to provide services for immigrants or protect their basic rights. Moreover, the legal grounds for deportation stipulated in the Immigration Act — such as "threatening national security" and "violating public interest" — were vague articulations which were potentially subject to manipulation. Under the framework of the proposed Organic Act of NIA, the human rights of immigrants and migrants were very vulnerable because this proposed agency did not provide any due process for prosecution or mechanism

under which migrants and immigrants could appeal against deportation. In the same year, the MOI (2003b) also released the "Implementation Plan for Coaching Foreign Spouses for Adaptation" as the guiding plan for related programmes. Its declared objectives included: to improve the capacity of foreign spouses to adapt to Taiwan; to create a multicultural society; to build successful families with Taiwanese nationals; and to prevent all kinds of family and social problems resulting from ill-adaptation. The plan was primarily oriented towards "assimilation" and the main concern was to improve the adaptation of foreign spouses to Taiwanese society so as to ameliorate possible family and social problems.

As the number of marriage migrants from Southeast Asia and mainland China continued to increase, the worry about the "deterioration of the quality of the next generation" became a source of national anxiety. This anxiety was based on the assumption that since the marriage migrants are from developing countries, they must lack the skills necessary to educate their own children — an argument which clearly had sexist, racist and classist overtones (Hsia 2007). This national anxiety led the government to add more barriers to citizenship for marriage migrants (Hsia and Huang 2010). They had to meet several requirements including passing several medical inspections, staying in Taiwan for a certain period of time,⁶ giving up their original nationality, submitting financial proof and passing Chinese proficiency examinations. The hurdle that troubled the marriage migrants and their families most was the financial proof requirement for the migrant's application for citizenship. Until November 2008 when the requirement was changed, each family was compelled to submit proof of financial security under very strict guidelines, including a bank statement or official receipts for income tax wherein the amount should be equal to 24 times the minimum wage (about NTD420,000 as of November 2008).

In short, citizenship in Taiwan for a long time was based on the tradition of *jus sanguinis* which also assumes homogeneity of its population. The Taiwanese government was forced to come up with immigration policies and related laws as a result of a large influx of marriage migrants. However, these immigration policies and laws were not inclusionary. Their main concerns were on ensuring effective measures to "govern" immigrants using selection principles to include "high quality" immigrants while excluding those deemed of "low quality"; the policing of immigrants as part of crime prevention; and the education of those "low quality" immigrants already living in Taiwan in order to assimilate them.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MULTICULTURALISM IN TAIWAN

While the exclusionary model of incorporation is the tradition, a version of "multiculturalism" focused on the diverse ethnic background of citizens of Taiwan has evolved. In the 1980s, after decades of dictatorial rule by the KMT (Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party), social movements aimed at toppling the KMT drew on controversies relating to the Indigenous Peoples to weaken the legitimacy of the KMT's rule. As a result of campaigns to amend the Constitution, provision for the rights of the Indigenous Peoples first appeared in 1994, declaring that the Indigenous Peoples' rights of political participation should be protected and their education, cultures, social welfare and economy improved (Lin 2000). In 1997, another Constitutional amendment resulting from political struggles led by the united front of the anti-KMT forces added more provisions declaring that "the nation recognizes *multi-cultures* and actively protects and promotes the languages and cultures of the Indigenous Peoples". One of the significant developments of this provision is the emergence of the concept of "multi-cultures". Although "multi-cultures" in this provision refer to the Indigenous Peoples (as opposed to the dominant Han people), the definition of Taiwan as a nation of "multi-cultures" provided a platform for the possibility of including diverse ethnicities (Chang 2002). According to Chang (2002), as a result of the "discursive formation" since the 1980s through various campaigns (along with the introduction of North American [especially Canadian] and Australian experiences of multiculturalism by some intellectuals and activists) "multiculturalism" gradually and unconsciously became Taiwan's basic national policy and the politically correct rhetoric.

Based on a survey of newspapers, Chang (2002) found that the word "multicultural" was almost non-existent prior to 1995. It was only from 1998 that the word appeared more frequently in the newspapers. However, it was still relatively underused at that time, considering that the concept already existed in the Constitution. After the presidential candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Chen Shui-Bien, won the election in 2000, symbols of the Indigenous Peoples and Hakka⁷ cultures suddenly became more popularly used in the activities of both central and local governments. In 2001, during the founding ceremony of the Council for Hakka Affairs, Executive Yuan, President Chen stated that the "Republic of China is a multi-ethnic and multicultural nation. It is clearly stated in the

Constitution.... This is the basic national policy of our country..." (Chang 2002). In July 2004, the highest body for cultural policies, the Council for Cultural Affairs under the Executive Yuan, announced the "Declaration of Cultural Citizenship"⁸ to emphasize the importance of multiculturalism. In October 2004, the Council organized the Conference on Ethnicities and Cultural Development and proposed its plan of action, in which new immigrants were included as one of the main "ethnic" groups⁹ whose cultures should be respected and protected. In other words, at the level of national cultural policy, the cultural needs of new immigrants were already recognized by the central government in 2004, although they remained neglected in terms of actual programmes and implementation by the Council for Cultural Affairs (Wang 2006).

In short, the concept of "multiculturalism" in Taiwan emerged out of Taiwan's nation-building experiences and processes. It first appeared in Taiwan's political arena as the result of continuous campaigns and social movements since 1980s aimed at toppling the KMT regime. As the pro-independence movement became more prevalent, especially after DPP won the presidential election for the first time in 2000, the rhetoric of multiculturalism, along with human rights and democracy, have quickly become the politically and socially accepted values. They are also presumed to be the defining characteristics of Taiwan as an independent state, as distinct from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The rhetoric of democracy and human rights serves a political function in Taiwan's nation-building project (as opposed to the presumably dictatorial PRC), while the rhetoric of multiculturalism serves as a cultural function (as opposed to the presumably Han-dominant PRC).

The original notion of multiculturalism in this nation-building project originated from the anti-KMT regime did not, however, include immigrants and migrants. Indeed, most pro-DPP labour organizations were anti-migrant workers and many discriminatory policies and laws against marriage migrants and migrant workers were passed during DPP rule (from 2000 to 2008).

To counter the increasingly hostile sentiment and discriminatory policies and laws against migrant workers and marriage migrants, AHRLIM (Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants) and its member organizations have purposefully engaged themselves with the rhetoric of multiculturalism. Through this engagement, the concept of "multiculturalism" has been gradually broadened beyond indigenous peoples to also include marriage migrants and migrant workers. In the

following section, I will illustrate how the traditionally exclusionary model of incorporation in Taiwan was gradually challenged and reformulated to become more inclusive.

MULTICULTURALISM AS STRATEGY TO DEVELOP THE IMMIGRANT MOVEMENT

Despite language and cultural differences posing major obstacles towards integration for new citizens, marriage migrants in Taiwan have demonstrated their active agency by participating in several protests against unfair treatment by various central governmental agencies.

One crucial challenge for the immigrant movement is to confront public concerns about the negative impacts of immigrants. Marriage migrants have faced enormous discrimination and are perceived as “social problems” and their increasingly significant presence has caused national anxiety in Taiwan (Hsia 2007; Hsia and Huang 2010). To gain the public’s sympathy and support, the immigrant movement needs to debunk the pervasive negative images about immigrants. To this end, AHRLIM has adopted several strategies, including the radicalization of the existent values and rhetoric of multiculturalism, and the enhancement of immigrants’ substantive citizenship through the marriage migrants’ own subjectivity and agency (Hsia 2009). The following will discuss how the concept of multiculturalism has been incorporated as a strategy to expand the social and political spaces of im/migrants’ participation, and consequently helped develop the immigrant movement’s challenge of Taiwan’s citizenship laws based on *jus sanguinis*.

Development of the Immigrant Movement in Taiwan

As mentioned earlier, the proposed framework of the NIA was very problematic because of its gaze on im/migrants as potential criminals and also because it did not provide a mechanism to protect their human rights. In order to promote their human rights, a group of concerned organizations joined together to form AHRLIM on 12 December 2003, becoming the first alliance to focus on immigrants’ rights and related laws and policies.

AHRLIM’s first action was to protest in front of the Legislative Yuan against the government’s proposal to establish the above-mentioned NIA on 24 December 2003. Additionally, AHRLIM lobbied in the Legislative

Yuan to seek the support of legislators from different political parties. After intense rounds of lobbying and protesting, the proposal was defeated. When the government’s plan to establish the NIA was temporarily halted, AHRLIM took the opportunity to examine the government’s proposed amendments to the Immigration Act and drafted its own proposal for the establishment of acceptable norms for a comprehensive immigration policy. Toward this end, AHRLIM held a series of public forums as well as took to raising public awareness of issues related to immigrants and migrants by focusing attention on various cases of human rights violation and the problems with current immigration policies and regulations.

After intense and detailed discussions and debates, AHRLIM submitted to the Legislative Yuan in March 2005 its draft of proposed amendments to the Immigration Act, with endorsements from many legislators of all political parties. After another two years of struggle, the amendment was eventually passed on 30 November 2007. Important reforms in this newly passed amendment include anti-discrimination regulations, allowing marriage migrants who have been the victims of domestic violence to remain in Taiwan even if they are divorced, and ensuring rights for assembly and rally for im/migrants. The passing of the amendment of the Immigration Act in 2007 was the first major victory of the immigrant movement spearheaded by AHRLIM.

Another significant campaign led by AHRLIM was on the issue of the financial requirement for naturalization. On 9 September 2007, hundreds of immigrant women from Southeast Asia and mainland China joined a rally protesting against the financial requirements imposed on marriage migrants for obtaining citizenship. This rally attracted much media attention because it was the first time in Taiwan’s history that hundreds of marriage migrants all over Taiwan participated in a street demonstration. As a result of continuous protests and lobbying, the financial requirement for applying for citizenship was changed in November 2008, in which applicants for citizenship only need to provide a statement declaring that the applicant or her spouse, parents or parents-in-law hold paid jobs and can provide her with financial support in Taiwan.

Radicalizing Existent Values and Rhetoric

In establishing a dialogue with the public, AHRLIM employed the strategy of gradually radicalizing existent values and rhetoric around multiculturalism along with those of human rights and democracy, so that

im/migrants are perceived as equally entitled to, rather than excepted from, enjoying these values.

Since President Chen won the election in 2000 — the first time the opposition party won the presidential election over the long-ruling KMT — “nationhood based on human rights principles” has become a very popular rhetoric among politicians. AHRLIM’s strategy was to draw upon and radicalize this rhetoric as seen in its first statement:

The Government of Taiwan, which espouses a concept of nationhood based on human rights, is always touting its human rights record, yet has consistently ignored the rights of immigrants and migrants in its actual policies... As the media stirs up fear in Taiwanese society, the Government promotes policies that actively prevent new migrants and immigrants from enjoying the same rights and benefits allowed to other residents of Taiwan even as they work and make a positive contribution to Taiwanese society. In order to promote both the Human Rights of immigrants and migrants, as well as the development of a healthy, pluralist society, a group of non-governmental organisations concerned with Human Rights, immigration policy, foreign labour, and democracy have joined with lawyers and scholars bearing a long term interest on these issues to form The Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM 2003).

Since the Republic of China is not recognized by most international institutions, one primary national anxiety is to prove to the world that Taiwan has achieved international standards in all spheres, in the hope that this will garner more support from the international community for Taiwan’s claims to recognition as an independent state. AHRLIM has strategically played on this by using international conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to push for a more inclusive immigration policy. Thus, in its first signature campaign its position was that:

Every individual enjoys basic human rights, regardless of race, colour, gender, language, religion, political or other creed, nationality, social status, wealth, place of birth, or any other social distinction. We support plural social development and the promotion of social dialogue designed to eradicate discrimination (AHRLIM 2003).

In another example, AHRLIM protested against the Council of Labor Affairs’ decision to increase medical check-ups for foreign teachers, and demanded that the government make good President Chen’s promise at his inauguration speech for his second term, when he declared that

“everyone is equal — whether you are from Tainan (his home county) or Vietnam, and should be protected for basic human rights”.

In addition to human rights issues, “democracy” has been purposely constructed as an important aspect of national identity, especially since the DPP won their first victory in the presidential campaign in 2000 (in opposition to mainland China which is presumed to be lacking in democracy). Additionally, related concepts such as “citizenship” (or citizen’s rights) and “civil participation” are also part of the common political rhetoric on the part of the government. Therefore, in one of AHRLIM’s three demands in its protest against the government’s proposal for the NIA, it framed the notion of “democracy” in terms of the active participation of the im/migrants, in line with the concept of multicultural citizenship as envisaged by Kymlicka (1995):

Taiwan is a democratic country, where people have freedom and capacity to express their opinions about various issues. However, the government’s policies and laws related to the human rights of im/migrants have never been publicly discussed, nor have they considered the rights of migrant workers, not to mention the importance of immigration policy for the prospects of Taiwan society (AHRLIM 2003).

AHRLIM argues that immigration policy is “a matter of the rights of im/migrants and their families, and what is embedded in immigration policy is what the society thinks of itself, and will influence Taiwanese people’s image of ‘citizens’ and their identity”. In this vein, it demands the expansion of “public discussions so that im/migrants and their families, and the general public can fully understand and participate” (AHRLIM 2003).

AHRLIM and affiliated organizations have also radicalized the meanings of multiculturalism to include im/migrants. As previously mentioned, ethnic issues had been critical catalysts for mobilization in the opposition movement and the DPP had successfully weakened the ruling KMT’s legitimacy by criticizing, for example, its “national language policy” which detached non-Mandarin speaking people from their mother tongues. Since DPP gained power, ethnic issues have continued to be the focus. For example, the revitalization of ethnic languages has become a commonly accepted rhetoric, which in turn helps to popularize the concept of “multiculturalism”. The DPP government has carefully employed the concept of multiculturalism to project a more democratic and progressive

image, as seen in establishing the Council for Hakka Affairs, and two national TV stations for the Indigenous Peoples and Hakka Peoples, and the use of their "multicultural images" to promote international relations, such as by employing symbols of the Indigenous Peoples for publicity in international events.

These seemingly progressive values are however often exclusionary in practice. For example, the "mother tongues" of Southeast Asian marriage migrants have been ignored and devalued. AHRLIM and affiliated organizations have therefore seized every chance to radicalize the meanings of "multiculturalism" by appealing for the inclusion of new immigrants' languages and cultures as part of Taiwanese "multicultures". In celebrating Mother's Day in 2004, AHRLIM and affiliated organizations co-sponsored an activity titled "Mother's Name — Acknowledging New Immigrants and Migrants" with the purpose of "encouraging the public to acknowledge rich cultures the new immigrants have contributed to Taiwanese multiculturalism.... and striving to make Taiwan an island filled with rich cultures, respecting each other's cultures, different voices and faces".¹⁰

Demonstrating the Values of Multiculturalism

In addition to radicalizing existent values and rhetoric, active participation of immigrants themselves is crucial to enhancing the immigrant movement. In the first protest initiated by AHRLIM, marriage migrants organized by the TransAsia Sisters Association, Taiwan (TASAT) — the first grassroots organization for marriage migrants in Taiwan and one of the founding member organizations of AHRLIM — were at the front line, voicing their dissent by performing a skit. The members of TASAT have become significantly more active after their first protest, participating in most AHRLIM activities including internal discussions about issues and amendments to laws, and speaking at AHRLIM's protests or press conferences.

Marriage migrants organized by TASAT and other organizations have also been increasingly active in advocating for and protecting their own rights. On 6 July 2005, marriage migrants living in Taipei, accompanied by many women's, workers' and human rights groups, awaited marriage migrants from Southern Taiwan who took a midnight bus with their husbands, children and Taiwanese friends, to join the protest in front of the Executive Yuan against its decision to increase obstacles to obtaining

citizenship. On 5 March 2004, dozens of marriage migrants from mainland China joined the rally organized by AHRLIM to protest against the new stipulation that spouses from mainland China should present proof of ownership of properties worth of NTD5 million. On 9 September 2007, to protest against the financial requirement in citizenship application, marriage migrants from both mainland China and Southeast Asia took to the streets to demand that the "financial requirement for citizenship" be scrapped.

The active participation of marriage migrants in advocacy and protest has gradually changed the public's perception of them. For example, a major newspaper gave significant space to reporting AHRLIM's protest on 6 July 2005, featuring a photograph of marriage migrants with steadfast looks on their faces despite a midnight bus trip with a vivid caption, "New Immigrants Fighting for Rights: To Appeal for Suspending Exams Newly Required for Naturalisation, A Group of Foreign Brides Marched to Executive Yuan with Traditional Straw Hats under Scorching Sun" (*China Times*, 2005). This scene is in sharp contrast with how "foreign brides" used to appear in the media, as helpless and shameful. This historic photograph was later widely disseminated and used in other newspaper accounts as well.

The empowerment for marriage migrants is a long process before they can actively participate in the immigrant movement, especially for those who do not speak Chinese. For marriage migrants from Southeast Asia, language barriers are the most immediate obstacles to their active participation in Taiwanese society. Looking to provide a means of increasing their participation in Taiwan societies and inspired by Freire's (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and Boal's (1979) *Theater of the Oppressed*, I had initiated a Chinese Literacy Program for the "foreign brides" on 30 July 1995 to empower these marriage migrants (Hsia 2006). It was only eight years later that marriage migrants from these Chinese programmes themselves decided to form TASAT in December 2003, and in the same year it joined in the founding of AHRLIM.

In addition to protest action, AHRLIM and its member organizations have organized various activities for marriage migrants to demonstrate their native cultures to the public. For instance, in 2004, the Department of Civil Affairs of Taipei City Government requested that I recommended some professors to teach Southeast Asian languages to Taiwanese citizens in order to create a multicultural environment. This was pushed by the Committee of Women's Rights Promotion and Development, where

several representatives of feminist organizations and I were invited to be members. I took this opportunity to convince the Taipei City Government to invite marriage migrants from Southeast Asia, rather than Taiwanese professors, to be the teachers for the Southeast Asian language programmes, arguing that these migrants are the real experts of Southeast Asian mother tongues and cultures. After a series of training sessions, marriage migrants organized by TASAT held three Southeast Asian Language programmes simultaneously, including Bahasa Indonesia, Vietnamese and Thai language courses, from 10 July to 20 September 2004. Based on this experience, TASAT initiated a semester-long course on Southeast Asian cultures which was open to the general public at the community college in Taipei County from March to July 2005. In 2005, the Council for Cultural Affairs asked me to conduct a study on how to promote Southeast Asian cultures in order to fulfil the policy objectives of promoting multiculturalism. In the policy recommendation report, I recommended that training should be available for marriage migrants who wish to become teachers for Southeast Asian languages and cultures. This recommendation was implemented and TASAT and other organizations were selected through a competitive process to receive grants to conduct training. Since then, TASAT has been actively training more marriage migrants from Southeast Asia to become teachers of their own languages and cultures. These marriage migrants have in turn been given opportunities for conducting lectures and courses in various settings.

Moreover, in September 2005, the first collection of writings, paintings and photographs by marriage migrants was published. Titled *Don't Call Me Foreign Bride*, the book caught public attention and the first print was sold out in less than a month. As this book's editor, I noticed that the most common response from readers was amazement over how talented marriage migrants were, as well as their greater appreciation of multiculturalism and awareness of their own prejudices. Additionally, marriage migrants organized by TASAT has formed a theatre group and completed a documentary film, while others have gone all over Taiwan to share their experiences and issues as marriage migrants in Taiwan via various cultural forms based on their native cultures.

In short, projecting the voices of marriage migrants into the public sphere has helped to subvert the public image of marriage migrants as submissive, problematic and incompetent. Through theatre plays, paintings, writings and other types of sharing at various forums and activities,

marriage migrants have challenged Taiwanese stereotypes of them. As a result of TASAT's active involvement, several members of TASAT have received awards. For example, the former chairperson, who still maintains her Thai nationality, received the "Life Sustainable Award 2007" initiated by a private foundation for her achievement as "Cultural Ambassador for Southeast Asian Cultures". She also received the prestigious Extraordinary Award in 2008 by the National Youth Commission of Taiwan for her public participation, especially for her involvement in TASAT and AHRLIM, in advocating immigrants' rights. This is the first time that this national award has been given to a non-Taiwanese resident.

THE DIVERSIONARY TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT

While the discourse of multiculturalism has been used effectively to advocate for immigrant rights in Taiwan, it has also reached an impasse. Although the Taiwanese government cannot negate demands for multiculturalism, it adheres to a conservative notion of the concept. Through sponsoring various cultural activities such as "traditional" Southeast Asian dances and songs, the government aims to project itself as appreciative of multiculturalism. A few instances, however, indicate that it is less receptive of a more expanded and radical version of multiculturalism. In 2004, the Council for Cultural Affairs organized several multicultural activities alongside the previously mentioned Conference on Ethnicities and Cultural Development, and TASAT was invited to perform at one of these multicultural events. When I informed the Council that TASAT could sing a song and perform a play, they were very pleased. However, upon hearing that the song and the play would be about the lives and experiences of marriage migrants, including the isolation and discrimination they face in Taiwan, they immediately asked if TASAT could perform "traditional" songs and dances instead. The Council eventually decided not to include TASAT in the programme, because they found TASAT's presentation to be too critical. Similarly, TASAT was also refused funding when other governmental agencies and private enterprises found its programmes too radical. As Wang (2006) noted, the concept of cultural citizenship in Taiwan government's policy narrowly focuses only on traditional forms of arts, neglecting other aspects such as enhancing citizens' social and political capacities. This situation echoes what Alund and Schierup (1993) have pointed out: that governments tend to determine which immigrant organizations are worth funding as

a form of social control, co-opting selected immigrant organizations into the corporatist state and in the process marginalizing them politically.

In 2003, the "Measures for Guidance of and Assistance for Foreign and Mainland Spouses" issued by MOI provided for eight priority areas: coaching for adaptation, medical and reproduction health, employment rights protection, education and culture, parenting, personal safety protection, establishing comprehensive laws and systems, and "implementing propaganda for correct concepts" (MOI 2003). These aim to serve as guidelines for programmes in the implementation of policies stipulated in the Implementation Plan for Coaching Foreign Spouses for Adaptation. Clearly, the policy orientation towards marriage migrants focuses on assimilation and accommodation — multiculturalism was not mentioned — in which marriage migrants are perceived as inferior in education and culture, thus requiring assistance in improving their parenting capabilities.¹¹ In the assessment report released in December 2003, the accomplishments under the category of "propaganda for correct concepts", "equality among ethnicities and mutual acceptance" were said to be promoted but "multiculturalism" was not mentioned (MOI 2003). Nor was the Council for Cultural Affairs included as part of the task force in the MOI measures before 2004.

"Multiculturalism" was only first incorporated in the assessment report by MOI released in May 2005. The reported accomplishments under the objective of "implementing propaganda for correct concepts" included projects "promoting positive attitudes towards different cultures and ethnicities, and providing multicultural information" through radio and TV programmes in foreign languages, which by and large means English-medium programmes such as CNN, BBC, Discovery, National Geographic, HBO, Cinemax and Disney. The project of "designing multicultural teaching materials, promoting multicultural development and positive acceptance of foreign and mainland spouses" was the only project directly dealing with issues of multiculturalism. In the assessment report by the NIA¹² (2007), among the total of 125 classes, the categories of programmes offered to immigrants included Classes for Coaching Adaptation (63 per cent), Classes for Motorcycle Licenses (12 per cent), Multicultural Participation (6 per cent), Language Learning (5 per cent), Multicultural-Sensitivity Training Workshops (for service providers, 5 per cent), Computer Classes (3 per cent), Interpreters' Training (2 per cent), Food and Cultures (3 per cent), and Parenting Education (1 per cent). Among these nine categories of programmes, seven were geared towards facilitating

immigrants' adaptation to Taiwanese society. Two of the programmes that seemed multicultural-oriented were in fact accommodation-oriented in their actual contents. "Interpreters' Training" was focused on helping interpreters provide information (e.g., on reproductive health care) that would aid migrants in their adaptation, while "Food and Cultures" trained foreign spouses to open restaurants serving Southeast Asian cuisine as a means of livelihood. The only two programmes directly targeting "multiculturalism" are multicultural participation and multicultural-sensitivity training workshops. However, reality was very different from rhetoric. The report stated that 71,926 persons benefited from (i.e., participated in) the multicultural participation programmes. In reality, 70,000 of the "beneficiaries" were participants of a job-hunting fair, where both local employers and foreign spouses attended; 600 of them attended a New Year Walk; 700 attended forums on how foreign spouses should adapt to Taiwanese society; and another 341 attended certain field trips or exhibitions as part of adaptation. The only rationale for counting these figures as "multicultural participation" is that these activities were attended by both local citizens and foreign spouses. The only programme that could be justifiably counted as promoting "multiculturalism" was the training workshop for multicultural-sensitivity, which was held only once and was attended by only twenty-three service providers. In other words, "multiculturalism" is arguably largely rhetoric and government agencies sometimes make up reports by manipulating figures and reporting programmes as "multicultural" events even if they do not qualify as "multicultural".

In the conclusion of NIA's assessment report in 2007, three targeted directions for future programmes are: supporting programmes to promote the rights and welfare of new immigrants and their families; promoting advocacy-oriented services, and promoting multicultural societies. It is too early to judge these future programmes. However, it is noteworthy that while the main objective of the first target (i.e., "supporting programs to promote the rights and welfare of the new immigrants and their families") is to help immigrants "acquire the medium to speak out to ease their emotions in Taiwan", this is likely to mean "governing" the voices and emotions of immigrants rather than to "empower" immigrants to speak out and demand rights and welfare.

It is becoming clearer that the state (as well as private corporations) can only tolerate NGOs that advocate a version of multiculturalism that is unthreatening to the status quo. Organizations such as TASAT, which

practises a form of contentious politics (Tarrow 2003) challenging existent structures (e.g. ideology and legal system), find it increasingly difficult to gain access to funding, without which the more radical organizations find it even more difficult to survive. Some NGOs are very aware of the danger of losing funds, and so are forced to comply with the demands of the state rendering issues of marriage migrants' empowerment and subjectivity somewhat secondary. The original objective to help marriage migrants has, in many cases, been replaced by the goal of obtaining funds. This can lead such organizations to consciously or unconsciously exoticize and marginalize marriage migrants. One indicator of this trend is that the NGOs most successful in raising funds in the name of helping marriage migrants have not joined AHRLIM despite having been invited to. More disturbingly, many NGOs manipulate the image of multiculturalism in order to acquire funding from governments and corporations. For instance, I once observed that, in order to convince a government agency to fund its organization, one NGO had its Taiwanese staff pretend to be Vietnamese by wearing traditional Vietnamese costumes at a proposal competition meeting at the Council for Cultural Affairs.

RETHINKING CITIZENSHIP FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

As cross-border migration increases, there is much discussion aimed at reformulating citizenship to transcend its close association with the nation-state. However, most theories of citizenship are too philosophical or ethical, and issues of *how* to transform the exclusionary regime of citizenship to a more inclusive regime have been neglected. From the perspectives of social movements, this chapter brings the issues of how to transform citizenship to the fore in Taiwan's history and context.

Unlike countries in Europe, North America and Australia, the influx of im/migrants into Taiwan is a relatively recent phenomenon. Consequently, the concept of multiculturalism may have different implications in Taiwan compared to countries with longer histories of immigration. For example, critics in Europe worry that multiculturalism aggravates social-economic and cultural distinctions, which potentially foster spatial segregation and hamper im/migrants' integration into labour markets and educational systems (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008). However, the great majority of im/migrants in Taiwan are marriage migrants who

are embedded in the households of the Taiwanese citizens and many of whom become mothers of Taiwanese citizens. Therefore, promoting multiculturalism is unlikely to lead to spatial segregation.

Under the exclusionary and patriarchal model of incorporation, Taiwan's policy of immigration for a very long time only allowed wives and children of Taiwan citizens to be naturalized. This tradition of incorporation was meant to maintain Taiwanese people as the descendants of the Chinese. Marriage migrant women from Southeast Asia have been eligible for naturalization only because of their capacity to reproduce Taiwanese children, but which in turn creates the opportunity to challenge the long tradition of citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Marriage migrants being literally part of Taiwanese families and especially as mothers of Taiwanese citizens, the government cannot deny outright that they are entitled to the right of teaching their children "mother-tongues" as well as the right to practise democracy. If the government denies these rights, it runs the risk of confounding its legitimacy because it can be easily accused of violating human rights and being undemocratic. Therefore, by radicalizing the current rhetoric of multiculturalism, human rights and democracy, the immigrant movement has successfully shaken Taiwan's long tradition of exclusionary citizenship.

Compared to migrant workers, marriage migrants have an advantage in challenging the traditional exclusionary models of citizenship, because transnational marriages involving citizens from different nation-states and their children represent living challenges to the boundaries of nation-states. If the government denies outright the right of marriage migrants to become citizens, it is likely to face a legitimacy crisis. In short, the increasing trend of marriage migration provides an unparalleled opportunity to challenge the traditional concept of citizenship closely associated with the nation-state.

Moreover, compared to countries with longer histories of immigration, Taiwan, as an emerging recipient country, lacks infrastructure for immigrants, such as interpreters in public services and ethnic media. In his critique of multiculturalism, Joppke (2001) argues that it is not clear why the adoption of another language would deprive a person of a meaningful context of choice because, unlike religion, a person can speak several languages. This may be true in the old immigrant-receiving countries. In Taiwan, however, a non-Chinese speaking person not only finds it hard to find a decent job but also runs the risks of violating laws and being

penalized unfairly, simply because most policies and regulations are only accessible to the Chinese-literate, and no proper interpretation is provided in most circumstances. Therefore, issues of languages for im/migrants in Taiwan are not just cultural, but also embedded in the basic legal, political, social and economic rights of im/migrants. By advocating multiculturalism and thus creating a social and political space where languages of the im/migrants are important, the basic rights of im/migrants can be better protected, and at the same time more job opportunities are created for them, such as those of interpreters and language teachers.

As Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999) point out, multiculturalism is a double-edged sword. While recognizing the prospects of multicultural citizenship, we should also note that multiculturalism can, however, soon be co-opted without changing the substantive rights or even formal rights of citizenship for the immigrants. This chapter illustrates how the Taiwan Government employs various diversionary tactics, such as manipulating figures, so that the policy of multiculturalism only remains largely at the level of rhetoric rather than reality.

Despite the impasse of multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship, AHRLIM and affiliated organizations have deliberately employed the government's rhetoric to advance the immigrant movement. Furthermore, as Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999) point out, the language of citizenship, despite its gendered history, provides women with a valuable weapon in the fight for human, democratic, civil and social rights. Moreover, community-level women's activism is not only a way of raising consciousness and self-confidence; it also opens up new spaces for women's voices to be heard. In other words, though the concept of multicultural citizenship can be co-opted, it is also part of a political field where the discourses of governing and empowering immigrants are constantly contested. What is crucial in this constant contestation is that it can serve as the pre-political base for social movements where immigrants and locals are politicized and gradually achieve the power to effect long-term changes in mainstream politics.

Notes

1. An English version of this ("Does Taiwan genuinely respect plurality?") translated by Julian Clegg also appeared in the *Taipei Times*, 4 August 2011, p. 8. <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/08/04/2003509871>>.

2. But some researchers have pointed out that EU citizenship is also exclusionary. Parekh (2006) for example, points out that the status of EU citizenship is only open to citizens of EU member countries and cannot be given directly to immigrants from non-European countries.
3. Though the Entry, Exit and Immigration Act was passed in 1999, it mostly stipulated regulations regarding entering and exiting Taiwan.
4. The word "foreign bride" is common parlance in Taiwan and reflects the discrimination against Third World women. I use the term in quotes to remind readers that it is an ideologically charged term. The term "marriage migrant" has been used to combat discrimination, after the International Conference on Border Control and Empowerment of Immigrant Brides, held in Taipei, in 2007. See the Introduction of Hsia (2010).
5. From 1 January 1985 to 28 February 2011, there were 446,143 foreign spouses in Taiwan, including those who have been naturalized (29.3 per cent from Southeast Asia and 64.2 per cent from Mainland China). 93.1 per cent of these foreign spouses are women. Among the women from Southeast Asia, 66.2 per cent are from Vietnam, 20.9 per cent from Indonesia, 4.4 per cent from Thailand, 5.1 per cent from the Philippines, and 3.4 per cent from Cambodia (Ministry of Interior 2011).
6. For marriage migrants from mainland China, the required period was eight years, but which was changed to six years as of 3 July 2009. For marriage migrants from other foreign countries, the required period was three years.
7. Hakka people are one of the significant ethnic minorities in Taiwan, whose ancestors migrated from the southeastern provinces of mainland China.
8. To promote multiculturalism, the Council for Cultural Affairs pronounced this Declaration, which was then followed by the National Conference on Ethnicities and Cultural Development and Multicultural Festival.
9. The four main "ethnic" groups formerly used in public rhetoric in Taiwan are the Indigenous Peoples, Hakka, Holok and Mainlanders.
10. From a pamphlet regarding the "Mother's Name" activity.
11. In the programme for medical and reproduction health, marriage migrants are even encouraged to be sterilized.
12. NIA was formally established on 2 January 2007. Since its establishment, NIA has been the primary government agency that implements the immigration policy formulated by the central government, mostly by the Ministry of Interior.

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