Street Citizens

What are protest politics and social movement activism today? What are their main features? To what extent can street citizens be seen as a force driving social and political change? Through analyses of original survey data on activists themselves, Marco Giugni and Maria T. Grasso explain the character of contemporary protest politics that we see today; the diverse motivations, social characteristics, values and networks that draw activists to engage politically to tackle the pressing social problems of our time. The study analyzes left-wing protest culture as well as the characteristics of protest politics, from the motivations of street citizens to how they become engaged in demonstrations to the causes they defend and the issues they promote, from their mobilizing structures to their political attitudes and values, as well as other key aspects such as their sense of identity within social movements, their perceived effectiveness, and the role of emotions for protest participation.

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Street Citizens

Protest Politics and Social Movement Activism in the Age of Globalization

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Foreword

Between 2009 and 2012 the three of us were leading the CCC project ("Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contention"). Together with colleagues in six countries (later in fourteen countries), and on a quite massive scale, we surveyed participants in numerous demonstrations dealing with various issues. Marco Giugni and Maria Grasso were part of the initial CCC team and co-designed and co-fielded the study in respectively Switzerland and the UK. CCC was successful in that it produced, as far as we can tell, the largest database on individual protest demonstrators available till today. As we speak, the entire CCC catalogue now encompasses answers from more than 22,000 individual demonstrators participating in 109 distinct events in 14 countries. Most of these data are freely obtainable for any researcher interested in studying protest participants. *Street Citizens* draws on this database, and on the efforts of all country teams involved in this endeavor.

Street Citizens is exactly what we hoped the CCC project would lead to: a book-length and in-depth treatment of the intriguing phenomenon of people taking the streets to vent their discontent. The book makes full use of the strengths of CCC. While conceiving the project, we discussed for hours and hours about the exact questions we were going to ask, we had endless discussions about how to sample protesters and demonstrations, and in meeting after meeting we debated the numerous contextual data that we thought might be interesting. The main motivation for this long – and to be honest, often tedious – process was our quest for standardization. We wanted to devise an instrument and a method that allows comparing across protesters, demonstrations, and nations. After all, social science *is* comparison. We are truly happy that (finally) a book exploits the comparative strengths of CCC. Our painful discussions about a common approach paid off.

Of course, there have been numerous earlier CCC publications. CCC members have published papers in various journals, some of them leading in their discipline. Two special issues in journals formed another notable spin-off from CCC. A collective volume consisting of CCC chapters saw the light. But until

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Street Citizens there was no integrated monograph about the protesters we so closely surveyed over the years. Previous outputs all dealt with specific and limited research questions, and often only a small part of the data was mobilized. This book uses the full breadth of the data and sketches an integrated picture of protesting at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

As godmother and godfathers we are also proud this book puts CCC's key aim center stage: to analyze, in a comparative fashion, who the people are who protest, why they do so, and how they have been brought to the streets. We always believed that protest and protesters can only be sensibly studied *in context*. Naturally, some things we know about protest participants seem to apply to all protests, irrespective of the context in which they happen or the issues they tackle. But the differences across protest events and across nations are substantial. The heterogeneity of a practice that Charles Tilly described a long time ago as a repertoire or a display following certain rules, is striking. Anti-austerity protesters in Italy are different from LGBTQ+ march participants in Sweden. They may employ basically the same ritual to express themselves, but who they are, what drives them, and how they are recruited varies. This book pays homage to this unity in diversity of protest.

Street Citizens is a well-conceived and strong contribution to social movement and protest scholarship. The authors show convincingly that protest and protesters vary across issues and nations and, most importantly, that these variations are not random but patterned. Differences can be explained by existing and novel accounts of protest incidence and participation. Protests on economic and cultural issues, for example, are populated by different population segments. They have a lot in common as well but, still, the analyses show that there are significant differences with regard to all the variables – cultural, structural, and cognitive – Giugni and Grasso look at. The question is whether the borders between these two distinct types of protest are becoming increasingly blurred; the authors suggest that this could be the case but we have to wait for further longitudinal evidence to be sure. The book also nicely testifies to how the deep crisis hit Southern Europe in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Italy and Spain stand out as countries with distinct protest potentials, and with protesters who differ markedly from those in the North European countries in the sample. At least on the streets, there seems to be a divided Europe with very different street contentions in North and South.

Apart from highlighting challenging differences across nations and issues, *Street Citizens* also shows that some persisting myths about protest should now be discarded. The fable of the alienated and anti-political protester, for example, does not hold up. Protesters are highly interested in politics; they identify with political parties, think they can influence politics, and take part as well, in a complementary fashion, in conventional forms of participation. Protesters are not political outsiders: they are insiders; although that also varies across issues and countries. Further, the myth of the new social media fundamentally changing mobilization and recruitment and many other things in

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the field of protest, is debunked. Most protesters, as before, are members of organizations and are recruited through formal or informal networks. Finally, also the idea that the economic crisis led to a renewal of the class base of protest and made the precarious protest can be discarded based on the evidence presented in *Street Citizens*. Socially, culturally, and financially stronger groups still overwhelmingly dominate the streets.

In sum, *Street Citizens* innovates with its comparative approach and deepens our insight into protest and protest participation. At the same time, it presents strong evidence to help settle a series of long-standing debates in the field.

Bert Klandermans
Jacquelien van Stekelenburg
Stefaan Walgrave
Amsterdam & Beauvechain
February 2018

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In addition to the funding agencies, a number of people need to be acknowledged, starting with Bert Klandermans, who acted as convener of the ESF collaborative project. Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Stefaan Walgrave have also had a leading role in the collaborative project. We thank all three of them as well as their collaborators in the "Ground Control" and "Data Handling" teams for their organizing and managing the research during several years.

We would also like to warmly thank all the researchers involved in the project and above all in the collection of the data. They are too numerous to be mentioned individually, but we are grateful to all of them for having made the research possible. This includes national team leaders and principal investigators, research assistants, students helping with handling questionnaires at demonstrations, and any other collaborators who, in one way or another, have been part of this collaborative effort.

A special thank you also goes to Donatella della Porta and Doug McAdam. Their encouragement and suggestions made the task of writing this book easier, keeping our motivation high even when some doubts emerged in the process of writing it. This kind of support by two leading social movement scholars has been very beneficial to us.

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Last but not least, we are indebted mostly to the thousands of demonstrators in the seven countries covered by our study who responded to our survey and sent the questionnaire back. Without them, this book obviously would not have been written. We thank them not only for their contribution to our research, but above all for reinvigorating democracy through their political engagement. Democracy is not simply a matter of rights and duties; it is also made of people actively participating in politics, not only through voting, but also in non-electoral political activities such as demonstrations. It is to those street citizens that this book is ultimately dedicated.

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1

Protest Politics and Social Movement Activism in the Age of Globalization

This book is about citizens, and it is about protest. It is about citizens – in the broader meaning – protesting in the streets against policies enacted or proposed by governments as well as against or in favor of certain issues: street citizens. This chapter introduces the main issues addressed in the book, presents its main argument, and describes the data and methods used in the analyses. *Street Citizens* explains the character of contemporary protest politics by analyzing through original survey data on activists themselves the diverse motivations, social characteristics, and values that draw them to engage politically to tackle the pressing social problems of our times such as economic fairness and climate change. We ask what are protest politics and social movement activism today, what are their main features, and to what extent can street citizens be seen as a force driving social and political change. In the age of globalization, characterized by a crisis of political responsibility and widespread disaffection from institutional politics, including nationalist and populist parties gaining popularity across the globe, it seems that left-libertarian protest politics faces great challenges in actualizing its potential for wider political change and social transformation. Caught between the dominance of financial markets, the forces of globalization, and the rise of right-wing populism, the Left today is confined to a minority position and increasingly at pains to become the driver of social and political change. This is in turn reflected in the features of protest politics as it is practiced in the streets and in the values of its key protagonists today. In this context, the book analyzes left-wing protest culture as well as the characteristics of protest politics, from the motivations of street citizens to how they become engaged in demonstrations to the causes they defend and the issues they promote, from their mobilizing structures to their political attitudes and values, as well as other key aspects such as their sense of identity within social movements, their perceived effectiveness, and the role of emotions for protest participation.

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STREET DEMONSTRATIONS: A MODULAR AND NORMALIZED FORM OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

Citizens have at their disposal various instruments to express their discontent in the context of liberal democracies today: from voting in elections to directly contacting public officials, from signing petitions to refusing to buy certain products for political reasons, from engaging in community action groups to participating in street demonstrations, and so forth. This "repertoire of contention" has evolved in the course of the past centuries. As Tilly (1986, 1995) has masterfully shown, the two large-scale processes consisting in the emergence of capitalism and state formation – the industrial revolution and the national revolution, to use Rokkan's (1970) terminology – have led to a major transformation of the repertoires of contention. A local (territorially and politically), patronized (by local elites), and reactive (aiming to preserve existing rights and privileges) repertoire was replaced by a national, autonomous, and proactive repertoire. Social movements, in this perspective, were born out of this transformation and the street demonstration became part and parcel of the new repertoire, along with the strike, the public rally, and the election (Tilly 1986).

Tarrow (1998: 30) has aptly summarized this idea as follows: "In the 1780s, people knew how to seize shipments of grain, attack tax gatherers, burn tax registers, and take revenge on wrongdoers and people who had violated community norms. But they were not yet familiar with acts like the mass demonstration, the strike, or urban insurrection on behalf of common goals. By the end of the 1848 revolution, the petition, the public meeting, the demonstration, and the barricade were well-known routines, employed for a variety of purposes and by different combinations of social actors." This excerpt also stresses a key feature of this form of mobilization today: the street demonstration, along with the petition and the internet call-to-action, have become today "modular performances," or "generic forms that can be adapted to a variety of local and social circumstances" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 17). No longer attached to a specific objective and group – like it was for example for anti-tax riots, revolts against conscription, subsistence riots, and grain seizures in the old repertoire of contention – demonstrations are used by different actors, on different issues, and for different purposes. As such, they also reflect Tilly's (1994: 7) definition of the social movement as "a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness." And what better means are there for showing numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness than taking to the streets with other people to protest?

While Tilly's argument about changing repertoires of contention refers to long-term changes over centuries, the role of protest – and, more specifically, of the demonstration – has also changed in the shorter run. In this regard, scholarship has shown that, in spite of ebbs and flows, the number of demonstrations

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as well as the number of people taking part in them has increased considerably in recent decades, with new postmaterialistic concerns developing alongside older socioeconomic issues leading to a general increase in issues generating protest (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). This growing importance of peaceful protests was paralleled by an increased legitimacy accorded to such actions by both citizens and the state, which has led to a normalization of protest behavior (Dalton 2008; Fuchs 1991; Marsh and Kaase 1979; Topf 1995; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001) and demonstrations have become one of the major channels of public voice and participation in representative democracies (Norris et al. 2005).

Some have argued that, to some extent, this normalization of protest has also led to a normalization of protesters, as a broader spectrum of protesters coming to reflect more closely the features of average citizens (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The normalization of protest, the most common and widespread form of participation beyond voting and beyond certain other forms, suggests that it is no longer confined to union militants, progressive intellectuals, and committed students so that "on the street we are all equal" (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The rise of "emotional mobilizations" is further seen to contribute to normalization. Having become so central in contemporary politics, street demonstrations are an appropriate object of study particularly if one wishes to examine who participates in protest activities, for what reason, and how they are mobilized. Demonstrations are the most typical form of contentious politics, they are used by different types of people to protest on a variety of issues, and they have become increasingly popular among different social strata.

Yet, not everybody takes part in demonstrations. First of all, as Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) noted, the less well educated, the socially vulnerable, and the needy remain less likely to take to the streets, showing once again the powerful mobilizing impact of education for political participation (Berinsky and Lenz 2011). Additionally, regardless of the level of education, the propensity to take to the street and engage in protest politics is not the same on the left and on the right of the political spectrum. While leftists assign a greater importance to protesting in the streets, rightists tend to privilege more institutional channels (Kriesi 1999). These different attitudes vis-à-vis protest politics reflect a cultural difference between the Left and the Right. People on the Left usually belong to the "civil rights coalition," stressing direct action as well as bottom-up and participatory forms of democracy, whereas people on the Right are more akin to the "law and order coalition," prioritizing top-down intervention and representative democracy (della Porta 1996). It should therefore come as no surprise that most of the demonstrations we observe in a given context – including those analyzed in this book – are left-leaning, whether they address moral and cultural or social and economic issues. We will further discuss this distinction later on, but now it is time to set the stage for the analysis presented in this book by discussing some important changes occurring in the

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recent past which might have influenced the ways in which people engage in street demonstrations.

PROTESTING IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Van Aelst and Walgrave's (2001) argument about the normalization of protesters (see further Norris et al. 2005) – in addition to the widely accepted thesis of a normalization of protest, in terms of both frequent usage and public acceptance – is a general one, but the ground upon which the authors draw the empirical evidence supporting it is situated both in space and in time. While showing selectively also data from other countries, their analysis nevertheless draws mainly on information about protests and demonstrations in Belgium. This country, as the authors maintain, may reflect a tradition of street protest which is largely consistent with that of most other Western European countries. Yet, generalizing their conclusions to the latter can only be speculative. Furthermore, their study covers a period prior to the year 2000. This means that they miss two important large-scale waves of contention of the recent past, namely those carried by the global justice and the anti-austerity movements (Ancelovici et al. 2016; della Porta 2007a, 2015; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Giugni and Grasso 2015). Furthermore, and in relation to the latter, they also miss one of the deepest economic crises ever faced by Europe, starting from 2008. We believe that these developments are key for understanding contemporary social protest and its features. Let us briefly sketch why.

The global justice movement – also variously known as the no-global movement, anti-globalization movement, alter-globalization movement, or movement for a globalization from below, just to mention the most common labels – broke into the world scene in the late 1990s and arguably formed the major wave of contention of the past decades. Although its seeds go back to a few years earlier, the public breakthrough of the movement is commonly equated with what is often referred to as the "battle of Seattle," when a series of protests were staged against the World Trade Organization conference held in November 1999. This event was followed by a series of contentious gatherings and campaigns taking basically two forms: protests – often violent, in particular when the so-called "black bloc" of radical young protesters was part of them – against G7/8 summits and similar governmental meetings, on the one hand, and countermeetings represented by the social forums – most notably the World and European Social Forums – on the other.

Reflecting a common definition of social movements, the global justice movement was defined as a "loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality and even including political parties) and other actors engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of shared goals of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe" (della Porta 2007b: 6). The important point

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for our present purpose is that this is an encompassing movement bringing together a broad range of actors, networks, and coalitions, from traditional "old" ones such as parties at the "left of the left," trade unions and labor organizations, to "new" kinds of actors such as environmental, peace and solidarity organizations, but also students' associations, radical youth groups, and still many others. This may be seen as blurring the boundaries between traditional movements and new social movements, leading, at least to some extent, to a homogenization of the movements of the Left in terms of the social composition and values orientations of the constituencies mobilized (Eggert and Giugni 2012). In other words, the global justice movement brought together, under the common "master frame" (Benford 2013b; Snow and Benford 1992; Tarrow 1992) of the fight against neoliberalism as well as social and economic injustice on the global scale, different strands of "single-issue" movements that previously had tended to mobilize on their own, hence contributing to a rapprochement of "old" and "new" issues and movements.

Then, from 2008 onward, came the Great Recession, one of the deepest economic crises Europe had faced so far. The crisis brought with it a wave of anti-austerity protests and movements in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Epitomized by large-scale and mediatic events such as the 15M demonstration held by the *Indignados* movement in Madrid in May 2011 or the Occupy Wall Street protest that took place in New York in September of the same year, anti-austerity protests grew rapidly soon after the start of the crisis in 2008, peaking between 2011 and 2012 (Cinalli and Giugni 2016a). These protests and movements were a direct response to the economic crisis, but even more so to the austerity policies – basically consisting in severe cuts in budgets, most notably spending in the social sector – enacted by many European states and supported by the so-called "Troika" of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

While the political reactions to the Great Recession were probably associated less with the economic crisis itself and more with government initiatives to cope with its negative repercussions (Bermeo and Bartels 2014: 4), tough economic conditions can be seen as having generated grievances which people, under certain conditions, may seek to redress through protest. This may open up the political space for new social groups and constituencies to get involved in protest activities in order to improve their own situation or to fight against what are perceived to be unjust patterns of wealth distribution in advanced capitalist democracies and to draw attention to the fact that not all sectors of society bear the costs of economic crisis evenly (Grasso and Giugni 2016a). In this regard, scholars have emphasized the importance of the "precariat" as the new agents of protest in times of austerity (della Porta 2015; Martin 2015), hence stressing the progressive potential of new cleavages brought about by globalization – such as the division between winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012) – as opposed to the reactionary potential for xenophobic and anti-immigrant claims.

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Related to the mobilization of a new constituency, the economic crisis and the anti-austerity protests spurred by government measures to tackle it have also brought about new grievances. Even more so, they revamped old grievances and issues that have been somewhat sidelined by new social movements focusing on lifestyle, especially in countries where the pacification of the traditional class cleavage provided a larger space for such issues to become a basis for political mobilization (Kriesi et al. 1995). These relate to questions of inequality and the distribution of resources in advanced industrial societies (della Porta 2015). Thus, anti-austerity protests appear to have shifted the focus from wider, moral and cultural issues, back to more bread-and-butter, redistributive concerns (della Porta 2015). In this sense, participants in anti-austerity demonstrations share more characteristics with old issue demonstrators (Grasso and Giugni 2016b). They are less well-educated and middle class than new issue demonstrators. They are also more resource-poor than the usual suspects attending protests around new issues. At the same time, they are less organizationally embedded than those at old issue protests. They are also are more likely to be drawn from younger generations, and to be students. Furthermore, just like the global justice movement, anti-austerity movements have displayed innovative forms of organizing and mobilizing, such as an extensive use of online social networks (Anduiza et al. 2014) and experiencing various forms of deliberative-participative democracy (della Porta and Rucht 2013). As such, participants in these movements may be expected to be less institutionalized and embedded in organizational networks, and have fewer experiences of previous extra-institutional participation.

More broadly, this book rests on the assumption that the contours of protest participation – and, more specifically, participation in street demonstrations – have changed as a result of large-scale processes and structural changes brought about by globalization and, more recently, catalyzed by the economic crisis as well as by the politicization of such processes and changes by recent social movements. In this perspective, the global justice movement has contributed to creating the space for a broader participation of citizens in demonstrations as well as to bringing together "old" bread-and-butter and redistributive issues with "new" lifestyle, moral and cultural issues. The recent deep economic crisis has brought back to the fore inequality and the class cleavage as a basis for political mobilization on traditional issues. Relatedly, anti-austerity protests have further contributed to repoliticizing and remobilizing that cleavage and have brought those issues to the fore.

To be sure, our aim is not to prove that this diagnosis is correct. We aim to show that there is a very strong rationale for analyzing participation in demonstrations cross-nationally and with empirical data in the current juncture. Moreover, this allows us to develop a compass that will guide our analysis throughout the chapters in this book. In this regard, we would like to suggest that these processes and changes bring with them the seeds of potential transformations in the landscape of protest politics in the age of

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globalization and – at least potentially – have created the conditions for a different sort of participation – whether permanently or only temporarily. More specifically, these developments may have had manifold effects on participation in street demonstrations: they may have brought back capitalism and the class cleavage into protest politics; they may have altered the relationship between protest politics and electoral politics as well as that between different forms of participation; they may have brought to the fore new channels of mobilization, including online social networks, downplaying the role of more traditional channels and networks; they may have led to new attitudes and predispositions towards political actors and objects, in both their cognitive and affective dimensions; and they may mean a renewed emphasis on grievances, interests, values, identities, and motivations underpinning protest participation. Our endeavor in this book will be to detect and describe such effects through a micro-analysis of participation in street demonstrations.

A MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION IN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS

The literature on social movements and contentious politics has flourished in the past 50 years or so. At least since the wave of protests in both Europe and the United States in 1967–68, scholars have inquired into the origins, development, and outcomes of social movements. While students of social movements have been mostly interested in the collective dimension of protest, that is, in movements as collective actors, research has also focused on the micro or individual level of analysis in an attempt to understand who participates in protest activities, for what reason, and how they are mobilized. This is also the aim of the present volume: we will focus on individual participants in demonstrations and examine a number of aspects allowing us to better understand who they are, why they participate, and through which channels and mechanisms they do so. To this end, we draw from a variety of research traditions and literatures: from scholarship on social movements to the literature on political participation in political science, from structural to social psychological accounts of protest participation, from cultural to rational choice approaches to contentious politics, and still others.

We provide an analysis of the social and attitudinal profile of demonstrators, their mobilizing structures, their motives, as well as variations thereof, making sense of which factors differentiate novel and more experienced protesters and how this varies across countries as well as across protest issues. In this respect, our account follows a logic according to which the who, why, and how people take part in street demonstrations are influenced by a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the mobilizing context of participation as well as microstructural and social psychological dynamics. Figure 1.1 illustrates the conceptual framework of the book graphically, also indicating which chapter addresses each specific aspect.

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

FIGURE 1.1. *Conceptual framework of the book with reference to chapters*

We conceive of the dynamics of participation in demonstrations as three interrelated layers of factors. The first layer refers to the mobilizing context of participation in street demonstrations. The mobilizing context can be described in terms of demand, supply, and mobilization (Klandermans 2004). The demand side refers to the potential of protesters in a given society; the supply side refers to the characteristics of the social movement sector in that society; and mobilization refers to the techniques and mechanisms that link demand and supply (Klandermans 2004). Here we focus more specifically on the protest potential. A demand for protest begins with levels of grievances in a society (Klandermans 1997). The protest potential reflects such grievances and consists in the readiness of citizens to protest. This can be seen in the propensity of citizens to engage in different kinds of political activities, most notably in protest activities. Such a propensity is likely to vary across countries as well as over time, yielding a measure of the protest potential – and, more

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specifically, of the potential to participate in demonstrations – in a given country at a given time.

While our aim is not to explain participation in demonstrations, we consider the mobilizing context as channeling the microstructural and social psychological dynamics of participation in demonstrations. In turn, we suggest that the microstructural dynamics precede the social psychological dynamics as they are part of the micromobilization context of protest participation. Finally, the microstructural dynamics contribute to shape the motivations one has to take part in demonstrations.

A long-standing tradition in social movement research stresses the importance of the structural dimension of movement participation. Accordingly, the second layer of factors discussed in this book pertains to the microstructural dynamics of participation in demonstrations. Here we pay special attention to three aspects. The first aspect refers to social class and, more generally, to the social bases of protest. While this is a key concept in sociology and political science in general, it is somewhat of a neglected aspect in the social movements literature (but see Eidlin and Kerrissey 2018). Yet, scholars have examined the role of social class for movement participation (Eder 1993, 2013; Grasso and Giugni 2015; Hylmö and Wennerhag 2015; Kriesi 1989; Maheu 1995). New social movement theory, in particular, has stressed the fact that the new issues and movements that arose in the 1970s and 1980s were the sign of the mobilization of "middle class radicals" (Parkin 1968). More recently, protests in the context of the economic crisis and against austerity measures have led scholars to reconsider the role of class, arguing that the latter plays an increasingly important role in social movements and protest behavior (della Porta 2015). This leads us to take into account the role of class for participation in demonstrations today and whether the ideology and values of demonstrators still rest on class-based cleavages or whether class and values are increasingly disconnected from each other.

The second microstructural aspect relates to institutional politics or, better, the relation between protest and institutional politics. Students of social movements have become increasingly aware of the intimate relationship between electoral and non-electoral politics, between institutional and contentious politics, suggesting thus that we should combine the study of political parties and voting with the analysis of social movements and protest (Císař and Navrátil 2015; della Porta et al. 2017; Goldstone 2003; Heaney 2013; Heaney and Rojas 2015; Hutter et al. 2018; Kriesi 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012; McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013; Norris et al. 2015). While the supply of protest usually concerns the characteristics of the social movement sector in a society – such as its strength, diversity, and contentiousness – institutional actors and politics also contribute to provide opportunities for protest (Kriesi 2004). Furthermore, the ways in which citizens relate to institutional politics allow us to unveil how processes of mobilization bring a demand for protest together with a supply of protest opportunities.

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One of the most consistent findings of research on micromobilization is that individual participation in social movements rests on people's previous embeddedness in social networks (Corrigall-Brown 2013). Accordingly, a third aspect pertaining to microstructural dynamics deals with what students of social movements have called mobilizing structures. These refer to the collective vehicles through which people mobilize and engage in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996). They include above all social networks and ties that support and facilitate mobilization (Diani 2004). The mobilizing structures lie at the very heart of the study of social movements, at least since resource mobilization theory made clear that protest is more likely when resources and organizations create the conditions for translating grievances into collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). We therefore examine the extent to which participation in demonstrations is due to such mobilizing structures and through which channels people are recruited to this form of protest.

Just as scholarship has stressed the microstructural dynamics of protest participation, it also paid a great deal of attention to the social psychological factors facilitating or preventing participation (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). The third layer of factors therefore refers to the psychological dynamics of participation in demonstrations. This includes a variety of aspects such as identity (Hunt and Benford 2004), ideology (Snow 2004), emotions (Goodwin et al. 2004), motivations (Klandermans 2015), commitment (Erickson Nepstad 2013), and still others. Here we address all these aspects, but we group them along two main lines of inquiry. The first looks at the impact of predispositions. While this concept has a long and authoritative history in the electoral behavior research, it has not made a strong breakthrough in the literature on social movements, at least not explicitly so or, if so, with a rather vague and loose meaning. Traditionally – as proposed in the Columbia or sociological model of voting – political predispositions referred to those variables relating to an individual's socioeconomic, religious and residential status influencing a person's propensity to vote for a given party (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948). The so-called "index of political predisposition" was supposed to allow researchers to capture these aspects in the prediction of vote choice. Here we use the concept of predispositions in a broader meaning, referring to those cognitive and affective predispositions of people towards a given object. This leads us to inquire into the role of political attitudes (cognitive predispositions) and emotions (affective predispositions) for participation in demonstrations. While the former are at the core of standard explanations of political participation (Brady et al. 1995; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978, 1995), the latter have gained importance in recent years in the study of social movements (Flam and King 2005; Goodwin et al. 2000, 2001; Jasper 1998; see Flam 2014, 2015, Goodwin et al. 2004, and Jasper 2011 for reviews). Following works on both electoral and protest participation, we examine how political attitudes and emotions combine among demonstrators.

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The second line of inquiry relating to social psychological dynamics looks at the motives of people who participate in demonstrations. This is a key aspect as it most closely explains the underlying reasons why people participate. Scholarship has stressed a variety of motivations to get involved in social movements. The literature often distinguishes between three types of motives (Klandermans 2013): to change their circumstances (instrumentality), to act as members of their group (identity), or to express their views (ideology). We examine a number of motivations to take part in demonstrations, including defending interests, expressing solidarity, and feeling a moral obligation. These are often referred to in the literature as different kinds of incentives: selective incentives (Oliver 2013), social and solidary incentives (Passy 2013), and moral incentives (van Stekelenburg 2013). We also look at the role of ideology and the political values of demonstrators. We look in particular at the role of left–right and libertarian–authoritarian value orientations. Given the types of demonstrations we study, we expect most participants to have a strong left-libertarian value orientation. However, we also expect variations both in the relative weight of leftist and libertarian values and in the way they relate to participation in demonstrations.

MICROMOBILIZATION IN CONTEXT: CLEAVAGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND PROTEST TRADITIONS

Micromobilization does not occur in a vacuum; it is context-dependent (van Stekelenburg et al. 2009). The types of participants, the reasons why they participate, and the mobilization channels tend to vary across contexts. Scholarship on social movements has traditionally shown the importance of the national context. The conditions for political mobilization can vary significantly across European countries. The scholarly literature stresses a variety of factors that may account for such variations: the structure of national cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970), the resources available for collective action (Tilly et al. 1975), different political opportunity structures (Hutter 2014a; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995), historically embedded protest cultures and traditions (della Porta and Diani 2006; della Porta and Mattoni 2013; Fahlenbrach et al. 2016), and so forth. In this way, the national context influences the mobilizing context of protest – the demand, supply, and mobilization – as well as the features of demonstrations and their participants. Here we focus on three main aspects which we believe contribute to molding the context for protest behavior and therefore to shaping the features of demonstrations and their participants: the national protest traditions, the importance of the class cleavage, and the political opportunity structures for the mobilization of social movements, in particular the formal institutional structures as captured by the strength of the state. In this section we briefly discuss how the seven countries covered in our study are characterized according to these aspects in an attempt to describe the historically embedded cultural and institutional

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conditions for protest in those countries that might inform the analyses in the following chapters.

Different countries may be seen as being characterized by different protest traditions (della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Grasso 2016). This also applies to the seven countries covered by our study. In broad strokes, we can say that our countries cluster in four "groups" in this respect. Italy and Spain, the two Southern European countries, have a long-standing protest tradition, especially on the Left, which has been reinvigorated by the mobilization of the global justice movement in the early 2000s (della Porta 2007a). These two countries have also witnessed particularly radical confrontations in the streets, leading at some point to the rise of leftist as well as rightist terrorism in Italy and regionalist political violence in Spain. Furthermore, mobilizations based on the traditional cleavages – in particular, the class cleavage – and redistributive issues have been predominant, leaving little space for the emergence of protest based on new lines of conflict. At the same time, perhaps more than in the other countries, protest is part of the leftist culture in Italy and Spain.

The Netherlands and Switzerland, in contrast, can be seen as belonging to the group of consociational countries where the labor movement has been largely integrated in neo-corporatist procedures (Esping-Andersen 1990), hence opening up the space for the mobilization of other movements and on other issues. The large share of the new social movements, at least in the Netherlands and Switzerland, are witness to this type of protest tradition (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Belgium could also be linked to this group given its consociational nature. The labor movement, however, plays a greater role in Belgium, also due to the key role unions have in taking care of unemployment benefits within the Ghent system. The very same system is also applied in Sweden. Sweden, moreover, is characterized by a weak protest tradition which privileges conventional means (Peterson 2016).

Finally, the UK can be considered as a case on its own in this respect. The fragmented and pluralist nature of the union system typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries makes organized mobilization by the labor movement difficult, encouraging rather small-scale protest addressing specific companies and issues. In addition, the new social movement sector only saw the emergence of limited and sometimes radical activism by "middle class radicals" in the UK (Parkin 1968), often focusing on specific issues such as nuclear power and animal rights.

Political conflicts are ultimately rooted in structural and cultural cleavages. At the most fundamental level, therefore, political mobilization rests on existing cleavages. Inspired by the seminal work of Rokkan (1970) as well as Lipset and Rokkan (1967), but also that of Bartolini and Mair (1990), Kriesi et al. (1995) have shown how the mobilization of social movements depends on the structure of national cleavages. More specifically, they maintain that the pacification of traditional cleavages – including and perhaps most notably the

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left–right class cleavage – opens up a space for the emergence of movements and protests resting on new lines of conflicts. Such a new cleavage may then become politicized and hence made available for political mobilization, forming the basis for the rise of new movements and protests. In contrast, when traditional cleavages remain salient, there is less space for the mobilization of new movements and protests. Thus, for example, they show how the persistent saliency of the class cleavage in France accounts for the lower share of protests carried out by the new social movements, as compared to Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, the other three countries they studied. Italy and Spain in this sense would fit more closely with the French model relative to the other countries included in our study which most closely resemble the second group.

This line of reasoning is relevant for us in light of recent calls for greater attention to the role of social and political cleavages for the rise and mobilization of social movements (della Porta 2015; Hutter 2014a; Kriesi et al. 2012). In this perspective, scholars have recently called for more attention to capitalism in social movement theory (della Porta 2015; Hetland and Goodwin 2013) as we witness ever-growing inequality across the globe. This leads us to give highest consideration to the traditional left–right class cleavage, which is the main dividing line underlying political conflicts relating to capitalism. Following Kriesi et al. (1995), the pacification of traditional cleavages goes a long way towards explaining the relative strength of new social movements as compared to movements mobilizing on traditional dividing lines. We believe that this line of reasoning can also be applied to the features of protest activities and, more specifically, demonstrations. We may expect certain features of demonstrations to be influenced by the traditional class cleavage. Previous work suggests, for example, that the social composition of demonstrations and the value orientations of demonstrators depend on the relative strength of the class cleavage (Eggert and Giugni 2012, 2015). Here, however, we believe that what matters most is not so much the strength of the class cleavage as its salience and availability for political competition (Bartolini and Mair 1990).

To rank our seven countries according to the historical importance of the traditional class cleavage in the twentieth century we can use the data developed in the seminal work of Bartolini and Mair (1990: 92) on the stabilization of the European electorate between 1885 and 1985. They show the percentage of elections held during this period characterized by high class competitiveness and high class cleavage salience in thirteen European countries, including six of the seven covered by our study. We can see this as an historical indicator of the importance of the class cleavage for political – in their case, electoral – competition. According to their figures, Sweden has by far the highest availability of the class cleavage, followed at a distance by the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands, which are all very close, then by Belgium, and finally Switzerland. Spain is not included in their study. As a Southern European country where the religious

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cleavage has traditionally played an important role in structuring political conflicts, we can place Spain close to Italy.[1]

Since Bartolini and Mair's (1990) study refers to a period ending before the Cold War, this is a measure of the historical tradition of the importance of the class cleavage in our seven countries. Here we are interested in locating our countries with respect to long-term indicators of protest traditions, cleavage structures, and, as we discuss below, political opportunity structures. This ranking of the countries is also reflected in Kriesi et al.'s (1995) characterization of the four countries they study according to the salience of the traditional class cleavage. As they maintain, the latter is rather low in the Netherlands and Switzerland, also due to the integration of the social democrats in coalition governments throughout large parts of the post-World War II period and to the pacified and fragmented nature of the union systems as well as their lack of distinct collective class identities (Kriesi et al. 1995). Although they do not include Belgium in their study, with its consociational nature as well as the presence of coalition governments, this country can be seen as being close to this situation.

Kriesi et al. (1995) include cleavages among the components of the political opportunity structures influencing the mobilization of social movements, showing how different national cleavage structures lead to a varying space for the mobilization of certain movements. Most social movement scholars, however, prefer to focus on other institutional aspects. These can be subsumed under four main dimensions (McAdam 1996): the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression.

While variations in political opportunities have mostly been used to account for the rise and fall of social movements, their action repertoires, and also less commonly their outcomes at the aggregate level, they may also be seen as influencing protest behavior at the individual level (Cinalli and Giugni 2011, 2016b; Morales 2009). It is not our aim in this book to systematically connect variations in political opportunities to differences in the features of demonstrations in our seven countries. However, in the chapters to come we will selectively refer to differences in the contextual aspects discussed here to inform our analysis of the results of protest survey data. Here we adopt the political opportunity framework to map the seven countries and therefore contextualize the further analyses of the protest survey data.

The seven countries covered by our study present different political opportunity structures in all their components. Let us look at the two aspects Kriesi et al. (1995) define as the general structural settings for political mobilization: the formal institutional structure, on the one hand, and the informal procedures and prevailing strategies, on the other.[2] In their perspective, the former defines the degree of openness (weak states) or closedness (strong states) of the state towards challengers. The latter may be either exclusive (repressive, confrontational, polarizing) or integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative).

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With regard to the formal dimension, based on the strength or weakness in the parliamentary, administrative, and direct-democratic arenas, Kriesi et al. (1995: 37) characterize the UK and Sweden (the Scandinavian countries) as examples of strong states, while Italy and Switzerland are two examples of weak states – perhaps the most typical one, in the case of Switzerland – and the Netherlands as an intermediate case. In addition, we may place Spain on the weak-state pole of the continuum. A certain degree of decentralization due to historical fragmentation in Italy and the importance of regionalism – including the development of a separatist violent organization – in Spain and high levels of corruption have undermined the capacity of the state to get things done in these two countries. In addition, the strong legacy of the Catholic Church has delayed the consolidation of the Italian and Spanish states and the years of fascist rule have stopped its development for some time. Finally, Belgium, with its sociological and territorial federalist structure, can be seen as an example of a rather weak state in the European context.

Patterns are slightly different when examining the prevailing strategies. The latter reflect an overall higher propensity for repression in the exclusive countries and a lower one in the inclusive ones, other things being equal. Again following Kriesi et al. (1995), we can consider the UK the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland as examples of inclusive prevailing strategies, while Italy is seen as a case of exclusive prevailing strategies. Belgium is likely to be closer to the inclusive pole, while Spain may also be placed close to Italy as an example of a country characterized by exclusive prevailing strategies. The legacy of fascist rule in these two countries has arguably favored the development of a comparatively higher repressive stance of the state towards challengers.

We can make an attempt at mapping our seven countries by means of a simple typology that combines cleavage availability and the strength of the state, that is, a societal dimension concerning the politicization of social and cultural oppositions, respectively, an institutional dimension relating to political opportunity structures. Figure 1.2 shows the location of the countries within this typology. Other things being equal, we may expect demonstrators to vary in terms of their class composition, mobilizing structures and social networks, value orientations, political attitudes, and motivations depending on the specific combination of the strength of the state and the availability of the class cleavage. However, as discussed earlier, we should not forget that protest traditions also play a role, just as many other aspects of the mobilizing context (Klandermans 2004). Protest behavior is a complex phenomenon that can hardly be explained simply by a two-by-two typology, especially when one is looking at several different aspects as we do in this book. This typology, therefore, simply has heuristic purposes, and our approach is not geared towards testing hypotheses drawn from it. The situation of the seven countries with regard to the contextual factors discussed here only informs the analyses in the following chapters.

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

FIGURE 1.2. *Classification of the countries covered by the study*

DISAGGREGATING PROTEST: ISSUES AND DEMONSTRATORS

That not all demonstrations and all demonstrators are alike is a truism. Both the social movement sector in a given context and the group of participants in a single demonstration are heterogeneous entities. Most obviously, demonstrations are held on a variety of topics, issues, and concerns. Furthermore, demonstrations – as much as movements – vary in terms of size, social composition, how radical they are, and still other features. Similarly, within a given demonstration we can find participants from different social backgrounds, moved by different aims and motives, with different degrees of commitment, and so forth. Our analysis takes this heterogeneity seriously, acknowledging that the factors accounting for protest vary across issues and constituencies (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

The literature reports various attempts to categorize different types of movements. Earlier efforts – especially in the collective behavior research tradition, but also more recently – have stressed the general aim or orientation of different movements. The most recurrent distinction in this regard is that between reform and revolutionary movements (Blumer 1946; Goodwin 2001), depending on how much of a change they want to introduce. The former aims to make gradual change, while the latter "seeks, at a minimum, to overthrow the government or state" (Goodwin and Jasper 2009: 4). Closely related to this distinction is that, most often adopted, between moderate and radical movements (Haines 1984). Similarly, some distinguish between progressive, conservative, and reactionary movements, depending on the direction and rate of social change (Killian 1973).

The problem with these typologies or classifications is that they tend to reify social movements and hide the fact that a movement's goals may change over

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time. As Goldstone (1998) has maintained, reform and revolution might be two different outcomes of the very same kind of movement, depending on how circumstances evolve. Closer to our own perspective, others have distinguished between different types of movements according to their issues. In this perspective, some have linked the characteristics of social movements to the underlying cleavage that gave rise to them. For example, in an attempt to retrace the development of social movements over history and link them to the prevailing line of social conflict, Raschke (1985) has proposed to distinguish between three main paradigms that have succeeded in the course of European history: the authority, distribution, and lifestyle paradigms. Each paradigm can be seen as being characterized by a prevailing movement or type of movement, focusing respectively on political, economic, or cultural issues (Kriesi 1988a): ethnic and regionalist movements (authority), labor movements (distribution), and new social movements (lifestyle). Kriesi (1988a) has proposed a typology crossing this threefold distinction with that between movements and counter-movements. The former challenge the established authorities, while the latter defend the established rights and privileges against those challenges.

Raschke's (1985) distribution and lifestyle paradigms largely overlap with that which is by far the most famous distinction in the social movements literature between "old" and "new" social movements. New social movement theory has stressed the inherently different nature of new movements as compared to old movements (see Buechler 1995 and Pichardo 1997 for reviews). In terms of their issues, old movements – often reduced to labor movements – deal with "material" economic equality, redistribution, and welfare, whereas new movements are more concerned with "non-material" – or "postmaterial" – cultural and lifestyle issues. Peace, ecology, women's, LGBTQ+ but also squatters and solidarity movements, are the most prominent examples of new social movements stressed in the literature (Kriesi et al. 1995). The old/new movements distinction, in turn, reflects to a large extent Inglehart's (1977) well-known theory of postmaterialism, whereby participants in old movements should be closer to materialistic values, while participants in new movements should be overrepresented among people who have postmaterialistic values, although some doubts have recently been raised about the relevance of this distinction today (Eggert and Giugni 2012, 2015).

Research has tended to treat demonstrations as all the same and privilege instead their differences as compared to other kinds of political activities. As Norris et al. (2005: 203) have pointed out, however, "[c]onsidering all demonstrations as equivalent phenomena is a category mistake. The social characteristics, systems support, motivational attitudes, and behavioral characteristics of demonstrators varied by the type of event." In this book we therefore look systematically at differences across types of demonstrations when analyzing our data.

Demonstrations may vary depending on a number of aspects. For example, they can be more or less ritualized – like for example the May Day

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demonstrations are – peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, and both the organizers and the participants vary across demonstrations (van Stekelenburg et al. 2012). They may also vary in terms of the issues they address. Issue politics has become a dominant feature in research on electoral behavior, in particular in the context of economic models of voting (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmeier 2000, 2007 for reviews). Issues, however, have not always been focused on by students of social movements, at least not explicitly so. Of course, studying different movements also means looking at issues, as movements are also defined – content-wise – by their issues. In this regard, the old/new movement distinction is relevant. Yet, little work has been done in terms of developing the expectations about how different types of protest issues affect the characteristics of movements and, more specifically, their constituencies, motivations for participating, and the mechanisms underlying such participation (Grasso and Giugni 2015, 2016b).

In one of the rare attempts to explicitly categorize demonstrations, Verhulst (2011) also focuses on issues. He proposes a typology of protest issues crossing two dimensions. The first dimension refers to the distinction between old and new issues, but adds a third category, namely consensual issues. While both old and new issues may be considered as position issues – that is, they divide the opinions between pros and cons – consensual issues are akin to valence issues (Stokes 1963) upon which everybody agrees, such as prosperity and corruption for example (we can assume that almost everybody is for prosperity and against corruption). The second dimension focuses on the way and extent to which an issue appeals and activates relevant publics, and distinguishes between universalistic and particularistic issues. The former are "issues that have no specific reference to a well-defined social group," while the latter "are intrinsically related to specific social groups" (Verhulst 2011: 55). In other words, universalistic issues concern an entire population, while particularistic issues are tied to specific groups. Most importantly, in the author's view, different protest issues affect the composition of the event as well as the motivation and mobilization trajectories of the participants: "[d]ifferent people are affected by different issues leading to different motivations and often also to different ways in which they end up demonstrating" (Klandermans et al. 2014: 499).

In this book we follow previous research that has stressed the role of protest issues (Grasso and Giugni 2015, 2016b; Kriesi et al. 1995; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Verhulst 2011) and consider this as a key factor discriminating between different types of demonstrations. In previous publications (Grasso and Giugni 2015, 2016b) we have relied on the distinction between old, new, and anti-austerity protests to investigate the impact of issues on the constituency of demonstrations and the extent to which anti-austerity movements differed from both old and new movements (see further Peterson et al. 2015). We found that anti-austerity movements were most similar to old movements, albeit for a few features linked to the current neoliberal context. As such, in this book

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we distinguish between demonstrations focusing on cultural issues and those focusing on economic ones. This distinction largely overlaps with that between old and new issues as "many old issues tend to focus on socioeconomic factors, such as inequality, social security, and industrial relations while newer issues often deal with moral, cultural, and lifestyle issues such as gender, sexual orientation, abortion, animal rights, and peace and war issues" (Klandermans et al. 2014: 498–499). However, we prefer to refer to them as economic and cultural issues, respectively, for several reasons. To begin with, protesting culture and economics is what best characterizes the space of contention in Europe today (Hutter 2014a). The deep economic crisis that hit many European countries during the last decade has brought both social and economic issues back as major objects of contention, setting them apart from more culturally based issues. The survey upon which our analysis rests has been carried out in the midst of the economic crisis. Furthermore, speaking of old and new issues or movements has a somewhat misleading connotation, conveying the idea that labor movements belong to another era in the past, whereas new movements characterize the contemporary times. While, historically, the latter preceded the former, both types of movements – and demonstrations – on economic and cultural issues still coexist today. Finally, speaking of old and new movements risks giving the wrong impression that we follow or take issue with new social movement theory. It should also be noted that, in the set of demonstrations that we cover, we have quite a few anti-austerity protests. These mainly have economic goals and therefore we categorize them under economic issues.

Just as demonstrations are heterogeneous and can be categorized according to certain criteria, so can demonstrators. Students of social movements typically focus on the most strongly committed activists, including people who are ready to engage in high-risk activities (McAdam 1986). Yet, while the study of differential recruitment – that is, why different people get involved in social movements – has a long-standing tradition in social movement research (Snow et al. 1980; see Barkan and Cohn 2013 for a review), that of differential participation – that is, why some people participate more intensively than others do – has been less often tackled with only a handful of studies to date (Barkan et al. 1995; Klandermans 1997; Kriesi 1993; McAdam 1986; Oliver 1984; Passy and Giugni 2001; Saunders et al. 2012; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991).

Recent studies on participants in street demonstrations have zoomed in on subsets of demonstrators who display different degrees of engagement, suggesting that different types of protesters would be characterized by different factors. For example, Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) have focused their attention on first-time participants, while Verhulst and Van Laer (2008) have looked at what they call "die-hards," that is persistent protesters. In their study of first-timers, Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) found that novices are more biographically available and emotionally different from other protesters as they face considerably higher barriers in their passage from non-protester to protester than an experienced protester does in attending yet another protest. Furthermore,

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they found that demonstrations staged just after or during a protest wave, as well as large demonstrations and demonstrations of old or new emotional movements are attended by a relatively larger share of first-timers. In an attempt to fill the gap between the study of novices and that of people more deeply involved in protest, Saunders et al. (2012) examined four types of protesters, distinguished by varying involvement, which they call novices, returners, repeaters, and stalwarts. Their analysis suggests that we should avoid treating protesters as a homogeneous group and stresses the importance of assessing the contributions of diverse factors for sustaining protest politics.

Inspired by this body of literature, in this book we examine the relevance of distinguishing between occasional and more regular participants. The criteria we use to distinguish between these two types of demonstrators is the frequency of participation: the former are less committed and participate more sporadically, whereas the latter are more strongly committed people who more often take part in demonstrations In the remainder of the book we will call them occasionals and activists, respectively. The survey upon which our analyses are based, which we describe in more detail below, includes a question asking the number of times respondents had taken part in a demonstration, both ever and in the past 12 months. Our operationalization of occasional demonstrators and activists relies on the "past 12 months" measure, as this allows us to avoid a bias against the younger participants. More specifically, we define as occasional demonstrators all those who said they had not attended other demonstrations additional to the one at which they were surveyed in the past 12 months; all other respondents who had participated in at least two demonstrations in the last 12 months were classed as activists. This means that we compare people who have only attended one demonstration to those who have taken part in at least two or more in that year.

SURVEYING PROTESTERS

The field of social movement studies is characterized by methodological pluralism (della Porta 2015). Qualitative and quantitative research have both contributed to deepen and broaden our knowledge of the subject matter. Spurred by the seminal work of Tilly and co-authors (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tilly et al. 1975) and later by Tarrow (1989), protest event analysis has become quite popular in recent years (see Hutter 2014b, Koopmans and Rucht 2002, and Olzak 1989 for reviews) for the analysis of the ebbs and flows of protest. When it comes to individual participation in social movements and protest activities, surveys have proven to be a valid and reliable tool.

Most of the existing studies of the determinants of participation in social movements and protest activities rely on survey data. The most well-known example of this is arguably the seminal study by Barnes and Kaase (1979). Pre-existing general survey data are also often used for this purpose. For example, Schussman and Soule's (2005) analysis rests on the American Citizen Participation Survey. Similarly, many existing accounts of protest behavior in

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Europe rely on European Social Survey (ESS) or other general survey data (Grasso 2016; Quaranta 2015, 2016).

The use of survey data from general population surveys has a number of both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that general population surveys yield information about both participants and non-participants, therefore allowing for testing hypotheses about the determinants of participation in social movements and protest activities. This kind of data, however, has also several important shortcomings. Three of them are worth mentioning as they lead to two major analytical obstacles from an empirical point of view. First, general population surveys rely only on declared rather than actual behavior, and often only on intentions to participate. While this might not be so problematic if one assumes a – rather unlikely – systematic bias across the sample of respondents, it still is an important limitation for certain kinds of analysis as intentions to participate are weak predictors of actual participation (Klandermans and Oegema 1987).

Second, even if we trust responses, since the number of people who engage in protest and, more specifically, demonstrations, is usually quite limited, general population surveys usually yield relatively small samples of protesters. This makes detailed analyses by subgroups very challenging if not impossible due to the low sample numbers.

Third and perhaps most importantly, general population surveys measure participation in general terms, that is, by asking whether people have, for example, attended a mass demonstration or engaged in other kinds of political activities during the past 12 months or in their entire lives (Grasso 2016). They do not, however, generally show for which issues or in which movements people participate. In other words, they abstract from the goal and issue of the specific type of participation. Even if questions were asked in this respect, the small sample numbers of demonstrators would lead to the same issues as with point two above, that disaggregated analyses by group and issue would not have enough cases at hand.

In order to focus on protesters and understand the differences within this population in more detail, in the past few years, students of social movements have increasingly relied on protest survey data to analyze protest participation more closely (della Porta 2009; della Porta et al. 2006; Fillieule et al. 2004; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Walgrave and Rucht 2010). This method consists in studying and surveying protesters caught in the act of protesting in the field rather than by asking them about their past or potential participation in general population surveys. Surveying protesters as a method of inquiring into the determinants and dynamics of participation in social movements has been developed since the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s by different research teams. In Europe, a francophone team of researchers have developed the so-called INSURA (individual surveys in rallies) methodology (Fillieule and Blanchard 2010). In its more specific and recent form, however, this method was further developed, tested, and refined by Walgrave and his team (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Walgrave and Verhulst 2011).

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Except for Chapter 2, which employs ESS survey data on the general population to map the contentious potential of European citizens, this book is entirely based on protest survey data retrieved in the cross-national collaborative CCC project (*Caught in the Act of Protesting: Contextualizing Contestation*), launched and coordinated by Bert Klandermans, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, and Stefaan Walgrave in 2009.[3] This project spanned the years between 2009 and 2012 in several European countries. Funded by the respective national funding agencies and coordinated through the European Science Foundation EUROCORES scheme, the project initially covered six countries: Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. These were joined by other countries – namely the Czech Republic, Italy, and Mexico – as other national teams have entered the enterprise and applied the methodology. As mentioned earlier, in this book we focus on the Western European context and as such on the first seven countries that were part of the project for the most part and have surveyed a similar number of demonstrations in the same period (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK). More on the project, including discussions of the methodological approach, can be found in Klandermans et al. (2014) and van Stekelenburg et al. (2012).

Our sample covers demonstrations that occurred in the seven countries included in the study between 2009 and 2013. The sampling strategy means that the demonstrations covered had to be "sizable" – in the context of a given country – so that very small events with only a handful of participants were excluded. As such, the sample of demonstrations covered in each country is not a perfect sample of all demonstrations, but it is a good sample of all larger demonstrations in that country. Within this sample, we ended up surveying demonstrations dealing with different issues, in particular "old" socioeconomic issues as well as "new" issues bearing on moral, cultural, or lifestyle issues. Given the higher inclination of the Left to make use of protest and go to the streets, while the Right often tends to privilege institutional channels (Kriesi 1999), our sample includes an overwhelming majority of "left-wing" demonstrations. Furthermore, we excluded the only "right-wing" demonstration that was surveyed in Spain against abortion in order not to create an inconsistent sample. In most countries, all large protest events in the research period were covered.

The data on protesters were collected employing two techniques which aimed to obtain a random sample of demonstrators attending a given demonstration (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). The first technique aims to guarantee that every protester in the area where the protest event takes place has an equal chance of being selected by one of the interviewers with the request to fill in a postal survey. First, the size of the protest is estimated allowing pointers – or expert team leaders – to calculate the number of rows that should be skipped to cover the entire protest. Second, pointers select the individual that each interviewer should interview, minimizing bias since interviewers were found to be more likely to approach subjects similar to themselves in previous studies. In this way, interviewers are sent out every nth number of rows to conduct a

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face-to-face survey and/or hand out a postal survey to a specific protester. The second technique is a device to control for non-response. In addition to the postal survey, short face-to-face interviews were conducted with every 1 in 5 interviewees prior to handing out the survey. The response rates for the face-to-face interviews were close to 90 percent. Thus, the face-to-face interviews can serve to assess possible biases due to non-response (see Walgrave et al. 2016 for more details).[4] For each demonstration, face-to-face interviews were conducted with approximately 200 participants who also received postal survey questionnaires. In total, postal survey questionnaires were handed out to approximately 1000 participants (800 without the face-to-face interview preceding it). The return rates of the postal questionnaire range between 15 and 50 percent or higher, depending on the country and demonstration. The overall sample used in the analysis shown in Chapters 3 to 7 covers 71 demonstrations distributed roughly evenly between our seven countries. The Appendix shows the list of all the demonstrations covered.

Versions of this methodology have been applied in a number of studies, such as the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001 and the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence (della Porta et al. 2006), the cross-national analysis of demonstrations against the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Walgrave and Rucht 2010), the survey of participants in the protest against the 2003 G8 summit in Evian in 2003 (Fillieule et al. 2004), and the one about participants in the 2006 European Social Forum in Athens (della Porta 2009), just to mention a few.

The CCC project specifically has also developed various publications, including dedicated issues of the journals *Mobilization* (Klandermans 2012) and *International Sociology* (Klandermans et al. 2014) as well as several chapters in an edited volume on protest and austerity (Giugni and Grasso 2015). The present volume, however, is unique in its aim to provide a detailed and comprehensive account of participation in street demonstrations across Western Europe.

A number of caveats concerning the data and its usage are in order. While it has a number of advantages as compared to standard survey techniques and it has proven its validity and robustness (van Stekelenburg et al. 2012), as any other methodology, the protest survey method also has its limitations and should be used with caution, especially when comparing protest events across issues (Walgrave et al. 2016). One such limitation deserves special attention: while in standard surveys the respondents include both participants and non-participants – the latter usually outnumbering the former when it comes to protest activities – in protest surveys one only interviews people who do participate. The data can therefore not be used to test hypotheses about the determinants of participation in demonstrations as there is no baseline on which we can compare protesters with non-protesters. However, we can compare proportions where variables are reflected in the ESS to compare demonstrator characteristics with those of the general population and, above all, we can zoom in on the specific features of people participating in street demonstrations.

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As such, in this book we focus on the characteristics of demonstrators, their sociodemographic profile, their mobilizing structures, their ideology and values, their attitudes and emotions, and their motivations, and how all this varies across countries, types of demonstration, and types of demonstrator. Moreover, we examine how all these features impact on different levels of commitment to take to the streets among demonstrators.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

Our account of the dynamics of participation in demonstrations in Europe unfolds in six substantive chapters in addition to the present introductory chapter and a concluding chapter summarizing the main findings of the book, placing them within a broader perspective. The content and order of the chapters reflect the conceptual framework outlined in Figure 1.1 earlier.

Chapter 2 refers to the mobilizing context. It sets our analysis in the broader context of the potential for political mobilization – the demand side of mobilization (Klandermans 2004) – in the seven countries, using ESS data. We aim to assess the degree of contentiousness of European citizens and how this varies both across countries and over time. In addition, we examine a number of aspects pertaining to the mobilizing structures, political values, and political attitudes of European citizens, forming the backdrop against which we can compare the characteristics of our sample of demonstrators in the analyses to follow in subsequent chapters.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 refer to the microstructural dynamics of participation in demonstrations. Chapter 3 addresses the class bases of protest and how they link up to ideology among demonstrators. More specifically, we examine to what extent social class underpins participation in demonstrations and plays a role in different countries, in demonstrations on cultural and economic issues, and among occasional demonstrators and activists. To do so, we look at the occupational status of demonstrators as well as their positioning on the left–right scale. Furthermore, we analyze the role of ideology and political values for participation in demonstrations, also as related to class and unemployment. We confront the political values of demonstrators from different social backgrounds to analyze whether individuals in different social locations hold different sets of values and if precarity is forming a new class basis for protest. We focus in particular on left–right and libertarian–authoritarian values and how they range across demonstrators in different countries as well as across the cultural/economic issue and the occasional/activist divides.

Chapter 4 deals with the relationship between protest politics and institutional politics. We look both at the link between different forms of participation as well as that between protest and voting. We examine two hypotheses about this relationship: the hypothesis that protesting and voting are a zero-sum game, one excluding the other, and the hypothesis that they are complementary, mutually reinforcing each other. The aim is to

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address questions pertaining to the linkages between different types of institutional and extra-institutional forms of activism in Western Europe and to follow the calls for studies analyzing the links between parties and protest. We also look at differences across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators.

Chapter 5 is about the mobilizing structures of demonstrators and their impact on the strength of motivation to participate in demonstrations. We focus in particular on the channels of participation in demonstrations. We examine the role of direct (interpersonal networks) as well as indirect (media) channels and whether they differ depending on the national context, the issue of demonstrations, and the type of demonstrators. Concerning interpersonal networks, we look at whether demonstrators were asked to participate through different types of networks. More generally, we confront two competing views of recruitment to social movements: a view assuming that demonstrators make an independent choice based on their motivation to become active and a view maintaining that they are brought to protest mainly by other actors.

Chapters 6 and 7 refer to the social psychological dynamics of participation in demonstrations. Chapter 6 looks at the cognitive and affective dispositions of demonstrators. More specifically it addresses the role of political attitudes and emotions as well as how they relate to each other. We examine in particular to what extent demonstrators are interested in politics, satisfied with democracy, trust the political institutions, and have the feeling they can change things through their engagement. We also look at how political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy vary across countries, depending on whether demonstrations address cultural or economic issues, and between occasional demonstrators and activists. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between political attitudes of demonstrators and four primary emotions (anger, worry, fear, and frustration) which may be expected to combine with political attitudes and to influence in different ways individuals' motivation to participate in demonstrations. With respect to political attitudes and emotions, we assess two accounts of commitment among demonstrators – a cognitive account based on political attitudes and an affective account stressing the role of emotions – and how these two types of factors combine.

Chapter 7 focuses on the motivations of demonstrators, but also takes stock of the analyses conducted in the previous chapters by addressing the role of citizens in contentious politics. We ask whether demonstrations today are made up of an aggregation of isolated individuals rather than being part of genuine social movements based on networks and identification. In other words, to what extent can we speak of street citizens? Furthermore, we link this question to an examination of the motivations of demonstrators, looking at what motivates people to take to the streets. In this regard, we distinguish between six different kinds of motivations: defending interests, expressing solidarity, expressing views, pressuring politicians for change, raising public awareness, and feeling a moral obligation. We examine to what extent these motivations vary across countries as well as how they differ depending on the issues of demonstrations and the type of demonstrators.

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Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings of the book and draws the main lessons from the analyses of participants in demonstrations for the present and future of protest politics. It goes back to the issues discussed earlier in this chapter and reassesses them based on the book's findings. In particular, we discuss the role of left-wing protest politics in the age of globalization. Who are the demonstrators today? What do they want? Do they proactively pursue objectives of political change and social transformation or are they more reactively responding to certain threats? We also discuss the relationship between protest politics and institutional politics. We end with a reflection about the future of protest politics in Europe.

Notes

1. It should be noted, as Bartolini and Mair (1990: 95) do, that figures are somewhat different when one focuses on the 1918–95 period and ranks the countries according to the percentage of elections in which class is the main dimension of competition. In particular, the UK goes up to nearly 18 percent, more than Sweden, and Italy and Switzerland down to 0.
2. These are the two aspects of political opportunity structures that are more stable over time, along with the structure of national cleavages if we consider this aspect as being part of political opportunity structures. Alliances structures and the configuration of power and alliance structures, in contrast, are subject to short-term shifts.
3. See www.protestsurvey.eu for more detailed information on the CCC project as well as the people involved. The project website also makes available a "Manual for Data Collection on Protest Demonstrations" to any researchers who wish to engage in this kind of data collection using the same methodology (Klandermans et al. 2010).
4. This comparison shows a systematic refusal bias only for age and education, while differences between countries and protest issues are small (Walgrave et al. 2016).

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2

Contentious Europeans?

The chapters that follow will examine the features of demonstrations and the characteristics of demonstrators in the seven countries covered by our study, following the outline sketched in Chapter 1. Before we move on to focus more specifically on demonstrators in Chapters 3 to 7, in this chapter, we assess the contentious potential of European citizens and how this varies cross-nationally. As such, this chapter allows us to set the scene for contextualizing the analyses to follow. In so doing, we provide an overview of the potential for political mobilization and other key attitudinal aspects within the general population in the seven countries of our study by using the established, general population European Social Survey (ESS).[1] We consider in particular four aspects: the potential for the political mobilization of Europeans, their mobilizing structures (most notably, in terms of associational involvement), their political values (particularly, left-libertarian and right-authoritarian value orientations), and their political attitudes (more specifically, political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy). This will form the backdrop against which we can compare the characteristics of our sample of demonstrators in the analyses in subsequent chapters.

PROTEST POTENTIALS IN EUROPE: HOW CONTENTIOUS ARE EUROPEANS?

How contentious are European citizens and more specifically the citizens in of the seven countries included in our study? There are two key ways in which this question can be answered. On the one hand, we can look at aggregate levels of mobilization. This was done in a number of existing studies of single countries as well as in comparative analyses of protest behavior using the method of protest event analysis (Beissinger 2002; Hutter 2014a; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow

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1989) or by cataloging "contentious gatherings" (Tilly 1995). On the other hand, one can focus on the individual level and ask people about their past or future participation in a variety of political activities based on survey data (Barnes and Kaase 1979). Here we follow the latter approach with the aim of mapping the potential for mobilization in our seven countries.

Table 2.1 shows the share of people in the seven countries who said that they had taken part in various forms of political participation. They include, in addition to electoral turnout, some of the most common ways citizens have at their disposal to make their voice heard: contacting politicians or government officials, working in political parties or action groups, working in other kinds of organizations or associations, wearing or displaying campaign badges or stickers, signing petitions, taking part in demonstrations, and boycotting certain products.[2] In addition, like all of the others in this chapter, this table shows distributions pertaining to several points in time, using the cumulative dataset that includes seven rounds of the ESS data.[3] This confers robustness to the findings, as a single survey wave could be subject to some specific contingent event affecting the data, but it also allows us to show trends over time in the patterns of participation and other aspects considered in this chapter.

The top section of the table shows that, when compared to the other forms, voting is by far the most widespread means through which citizens make their voice heard. While these figures are likely to overestimate actual turnout due to the well-known phenomenon of social desirability in surveys, they point to the key role voting has in contemporary democratic societies. In all seven countries, at least two-thirds of the respondents declared they have voted in the last national election. This pattern, moreover, is rather stable over time, in spite of long-term trends showing a steady decline in turnout both among established democracies and in other countries (Blais 2007). At the same time, there are quite important differences across the seven countries, with Belgium and Sweden showing higher levels relative to the UK and Switzerland. Explaining such differences is beyond the scope of this analysis. They depend on a variety of structural (e.g. national political culture, type of electoral system, compulsory voting) as well as more contingent (e.g. salience of a given election) factors.[4] What matters here for our present purpose is that the potential for electoral participation varies in important ways across countries. This is a relevant piece of information as we know that electoral politics and protest politics – ballots and barricades, to use Aminzade's (1993) apt formulation – are related to each other (McAdam and Tarrow 2010), as we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 4.

The political activity that interests us most, however, is obviously participation in demonstrations. The latter is viewed as "modular protest" (McPhail 2013) or part of a "modular repertoire" (Tarrow 2011), inasmuch as it is used for different purposes by different people. As such, and in spite of the increasing importance of online activism and digital politics (Bennett and

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TABLE 2.1. *Potential for political mobilization, 2002–2014 (percentage of people who have done the political activities listed in the last 12 months)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Voted in last national election (%)								
Belgium	85.2	91.5	92.9	92.1	88.6	89.3	90.4	89.9
Italy	89.5	87.2	–	–	–	80.6	–	86.2
Netherlands	86.3	82.4	84.0	86.1	84.1	83.8	78.7	83.7
Spain	77.7	81.8	79.1	81.9	83.5	76.7	80.8	80.2
Sweden	87.0	89.1	89.0	91.1	93.9	90.5	91.7	90.2
Switzerland	69.0	67.0	66.6	64.5	63.0	66.3	67.4	66.4
UK	72.4	68.1	71.7	70.3	71.6	70.7	70.9	70.9
Contacted politician or government official (%)								
Belgium	17.8	13.5	18.5	15.3	11.7	16.1	14.4	15.4
Italy	12.0	13.6	–	–	–	15.5	–	13.6
Netherlands	14.5	13.8	14.5	14.1	17.0	14.3	17.6	15.1
Spain	12.0	12.6	12.1	10.0	13.4	13.3	16.4	12.7
Sweden	16.5	14.3	14.9	14.8	16.3	16.3	19.5	16.0
Switzerland	17.4	14.4	13.3	12.0	15.7	14.8	14.7	14.6
UK	18.2	15.0	16.7	16.9	14.8	15.2	19.4	16.6
Worked in political party or action group (%)								
Belgium	5.4	3.9	5.8	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.7
Italy	3.0	4.0	–	–	–	5.4	–	4.0
Netherlands	3.4	3.8	4.0	3.4	3.4	3.5	4.1	3.6
Spain	6.1	7.4	5.1	2.9	6.9	7.9	8.4	6.2
Sweden	5.0	3.3	5.0	4.4	3.6	4.4	6.3	4.6
Switzerland	7.8	7.0	6.0	4.9	5.8	6.4	5.8	6.3
UK	3.4	2.2	2.5	2.2	1.7	2.0	3.1	2.4

(*continued*)

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TABLE 2.1. (*continued*)

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Worked in another organization or association (%)								
Belgium	23.2	15.2	25.8	21.1	19.6	18.4	19.4	20.4
Italy	7.6	8.9	–	–	–	12.6	–	9.4
Netherlands	23.1	17.2	24.3	26.2	23.4	25.7	33.7	24.8
Spain	16.7	17.7	14.0	9.5	17.6	22.1	22.0	16.7
Sweden	24.6	24.3	26.8	27.0	28.3	34.3	36.0	28.7
Switzerland	17.3	13.3	13.7	13.1	13.6	17.4	16.5	14.9
UK	9.2	8.0	9.1	6.6	6.1	7.7	8.6	7.9
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker (%)								
Belgium	7.4	5.2	9.6	7.0	7.0	6.5	6.6	7.0
Italy	7.3	8.2	–	–	–	10.9	–	8.6
Netherlands	3.8	5.4	3.9	5.1	3.9	3.8	5.3	4.4
Spain	9.8	11.6	7.7	4.7	10.0	10.8	11.5	9.2
Sweden	10.7	12.8	16.3	18.4	19.5	20.0	19.2	16.5
Switzerland	9.4	8.5	6.1	6.9	4.8	5.6	6.0	6.9
UK	9.8	7.5	9.3	5.6	6.2	6.0	8.9	7.6
Signed petition (%)								
Belgium	33.9	22.0	30.4	27.6	20.6	20.6	23.1	25.5
Italy	17.4	13.5	–	–	–	23.2	–	17.3
Netherlands	22.4	23.5	20.5	23.5	26.2	22.1	28.6	23.8
Spain	24.2	24.7	22.5	17.0	26.5	33.2	32.5	25.4
Sweden	40.8	48.7	44.3	47.2	37.2	43.6	43.6	43.8
Switzerland	39.4	38.2	35.6	37.7	31.8	34.1	33.2	36.0
UK	40.0	35.5	40.6	38.2	28.5	32.1	40.1	36.4

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Taken part in demonstration (%)								
Belgium	8.4	6.5	7.6	7.4	6.4	5.2	7.2	7.0
Italy	11.0	11.6	–	–	–	17.3	–	12.8
Netherlands	2.9	4.4	3.0	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.1
Spain	17.5	34.0	17.8	16.0	18.3	25.9	23.2	21.4
Sweden	6.4	7.6	4.8	6.5	4.9	7.3	11.0	6.9
Switzerland	7.9	8.8	7.2	7.7	3.9	4.4	5.5	6.7
UK	4.4	3.7	4.4	3.8	2.4	3.1	5.7	3.9
Boycotted certain products (%)								
Belgium	12.8	9.9	10.5	11.2	9.2	11.3	15.1	11.4
Italy	7.6	7.1	–	–	–	12.0	–	8.5
Netherlands	10.4	8.3	9.3	9.4	10.1	12.1	14.6	10.6
Spain	8.0	14.0	10.1	7.9	11.6	17.5	17.2	12.1
Sweden	32.5	34.8	30.6	37.3	35.6	42.8	47.5	37.2
Switzerland	31.4	24.9	28.5	25.0	27.4	28.2	28.5	27.7
UK	26.1	20.6	23.7	24.2	19.3	18.5	24.0	22.3

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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Segerberg 2013; Earl and Kimport 2011; Gerbaudo 2012; Trottier and Fuchs 2015), demonstrations can be considered as the archetypical form of contentious politics today, the one that most typically characterizes the activities of social movements throughout the globe and historically over time.

Participation in demonstrations varies strongly from one country to another, as is also shown when looking at measures based on protest events (Kriesi et al. 1995). If we look at the average percentages over the entire period, Spain is clearly the context in which this form of protest is most often adopted by citizens, followed by Italy. The Spanish situation is noteworthy in this respect: one Spaniard out of five has taken part in a demonstration during the 12 months prior to the interview. On the opposite end, British and Dutch citizens are the least contentious as far as this form of participation is concerned: less than 4 percent of citizens declare that they have attended a demonstration in the previous year. Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland stand somewhere in between with similar figures, but closer to the lower levels of protest of the British and Dutch than to the contentious Spanish and Italians. This yields a relatively clear pattern whereby we observe three groups of countries, from the most to the least contentious: Italy and Spain at the top; Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland in the middle; and the UK, and the Netherlands at the bottom.[5] These differences more or less reflect common understandings of the extent and popularity of protest behavior in these countries. Again, it is not our purpose here to explain such differences in participation cross-nationally. The crucial point is that results point to varying protest potentials cross-nationally, and this factor will be taken into consideration when analyzing our data in the following chapters.

It is also relevant to examine how participation in demonstrations has evolved over time. Overall, there are no dramatic changes during the 12 years covered by the data, as the proportions and the ranking of the countries remain more or less the same at the start and at the end of the period. However, we also observe some trends and shifts over time. For example, in Belgium and Switzerland participation seems to have declined, whereas in the UK Spain, and especially Sweden it has increased and in the Netherlands it has remained rather stable (the missing rounds prevent us from extrapolating trends for Italy). Furthermore, the Spanish case is characterized by some important fluctuations, such as a strong increase in 2004 and also in 2012. This increase may be related to the protests against the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Walgrave and Rucht 2010) and as a response to the economic crisis and austerity measures in 2011 and 2012, including the emergence of the *Indignados* movement (Calvo 2013; Castañeda 2013; Romanos 2013).

The patterns of participation in demonstrations reflect the different protest traditions, but also varying political opportunity structures, in those countries. Yet, while mass demonstrations play a key role in the contemporary repertoires of contention (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1986, 1995), other forms of participation are also available to citizens. Four of them seem particularly

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relevant today: contacting the political elites, working in some kind of political organization (including parties) or campaigning for some political cause, signing petitions, and engaging in political consumerist activities such as boycotting certain products. The potential for mobilization should be assessed not only with respect to participation in demonstrations, but also in these other forms which may be used in conjunction or in substitution. Let us briefly discuss each of them.

Contacting is quite a popular political activity in all seven countries as, on average, about 15 percent of the respondents declare having done this kind of activity in the 12 months prior to the interview. Furthermore, cross-national variations are quite small, suggesting that context does not influence this form of participation as much as it does, for example, for demonstrations. There seems to be a hard core of people committed to using this channel which is available in all liberal democracies. Yet, the inclination to use this form is higher in the countries characterized by a lower participation in demonstrations suggesting that whereas some systems are more likely to encourage contentious behavior, others favor participation through more institutional means.

Three specific kinds of activities – working in a political party or action group, working in another organization or association, and wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker – can be considered as belonging to the same underlying mode of participation, namely group or party activities. These are rather institutional forms of participation that are used at very different rates in different contexts. Only a small share of the population is involved in party or action group activities, ranging from less than 3 percent in the UK to little more than 6 percent in Switzerland (where the existence of cantonal sections of parties might facilitate engagement). Many more are involved in work for other organizations or associations. Again, we observe important cross-country variations: while a sizable share of the population in Belgium, the Netherlands, and especially Sweden has been involved in these kinds of activities, less than a tenth have done so in the UK and Italy. We shall consider this aspect further in the next section on associational involvement. Finally, wearing or displaying campaign badges or stickers is particularly popular in Sweden and much less so in the Netherlands.

Signing petitions is quite a popular political activity. Sometimes it can be conducive to mobilizing large shares of the population. A prominent example of this is the people's petition which, back in the 1980s, was launched by the Dutch peace movement to protest against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands and which was signed by nearly four million people (Kriesi 1988b). In fact, petitions are the most frequently used political activity after voting. This is in part explained by the low degree of commitment that this form of participation requires: you just need to sign the petition. Of course, it requires that activists and campaigners do the necessary preparatory work and go out to get signatures. Yet, for people to participate in this

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action they do not need to do much beyond signing for a given cause. The use of this activity varies in important ways across countries, ranging from the lowest – 17 percent in Italy – to the highest – 44 percent in Sweden. British and Swiss citizens also make frequent use of this form.[6]

Finally, boycotting certain products is a mode of action that is becoming increasingly important today. Along with buycotting – that is, buying certain products for political reasons – this is part of a mode of political action known as political consumerism (Micheletti 2003; Stolle and Micheletti 2013). The latter may be defined as the "consumer choice of producers and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices" (Micheletti et al. 2004: xiv). As we can see, there are huge variations across countries in the use of this form of political participation. Northern and central European countries, which are more sensitive to environmental issues and ethical consumption, display larger shares of political consumerist actions than Southern European countries. We observe in particular a high amount of people who said they have boycotted certain products in the 12 months prior to the interview in the UK, Switzerland, and especially Sweden. This, along with the cross-national differences in other forms of participation, suggests that citizens in different countries place specific emphasis on certain forms of participation rather than others, privileging particular ways of making their voice heard to oppose certain policies, or promote various political causes.

MOBILIZING STRUCTURES: ARE EUROPEANS INVOLVED IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS?

Students of social movements have long stressed the key role played by formal and informal organizations as well as by pre-existing networks ties as conditions increasing the likelihood that citizens will engage in protest (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Resource mobilization theory, in particular, has put this kind of factor very much at center stage (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004 for a review). They form the mobilizing structures supporting protest behavior and contentious politics more generally (McAdam et al. 1996, 2001). Such a micromobilization context – particularly, pre-existing social networks – provides the frame for the collective interpretation of the large-scale social and cultural transformations affecting individuals in their everyday lives (through a process of collective attribution and the creation of collective identity), a rudiment of organization necessary to translate the interpretations into concrete action (through the role of leadership, communication technology, etc.), and solidary incentives to participate (through the creation of gratification relating to participation, hence allowing for the overcoming of the well-known free rider problem) (McAdam et al. 1988).

Unfortunately, the ESS does not include the standard question used to measure associational involvement. This consists in asking whether one is a member

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of or has participated in activities promoted by different sorts of voluntary associations, which may have a more or less political nature (e.g. political parties, unions, peace organizations, environmental organizations, women's organizations, and so forth). So, apart from party and union membership, we must resort to a proxy consisting of a question asking how frequently one is involved in work for voluntary or charitable organizations (with answers ranging from "never" to "at least once a week").[7] Table 2.2 shows the distributions for these three indicators of associational involvement.

The figures concerning party membership reflect in part those relating to working in a political party or action group discussed earlier. Overall, only a relatively small share of the population is a member of a party. At the same time, we observe sizable differences across countries. Thus, while more than 7 percent of Swedish and Swiss citizens are members of a party, less than 3 percent of the British and Spanish are. Of course, the type of party system might explain to some extent these differences as multiparty systems such as in Sweden and Switzerland offer more opportunities to get involved in parties. Furthermore, while we do not have data for 2012 and 2014, there is a slight generalized declining trend in party membership which reflects an increasing detachment of citizens from institutional politics in recent years (Grasso 2016; van Biezen et al. 2012). We shall come back to this aspect below, when we discuss trends in political attitudes.

The share of people who are members of trade unions or similar organizations is much higher than that of party members.[8] In spite of a declining trend in the last few years, Sweden exhibits the highest levels in this respect, followed by Belgium. As is well known, Scandinavian countries, but also Belgium, have adopted the Ghent system that grants unions a key role in welfare provision – in particular, unemployment benefits – and display higher rates of unionization relative to other countries (Visser 1992). In contrast, in countries like Spain and Switzerland, but also the UK and Italy, people are much less likely to be members of trade unions or similar organizations. This reflects the relative weakness of unions in these countries.

Finally, involvement in work for voluntary or charitable organizations similarly displays important cross-national variations. Unfortunately, we only have at our disposal two rounds of the ESS, namely 2006 and 2012, which prevents us from ascertaining the in between trends over time. Even with only these two points in time, however, we can see how in certain countries a large share of the population – nearly one-third in the Netherlands and Switzerland – declare that they volunteer on a regular basis (at least once a month). In all the other countries, on average, this proportion ranges somewhere between 12 and 18 percent. This is still a good deal of people, yet much less than in the two former countries. The larger share of people involved in volunteering in certain countries, of course, might also depend on a broader supply of organizations in those countries, particularly those organizations that put grassroots participation at center stage.

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TABLE 2.2. *Associational involvement, 2002–2014 (percentages)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Member of a party (%)								
Belgium	7.2	6.7	6.9	4.8	6.0	–	–	6.3
Italy	4.0	4.1	–	–	–	–	–	4.0
Netherlands	4.8	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.3	–	–	5.2
Spain	3.2	4.1	2.5	1.3	2.0	–	–	2.5
Sweden	8.2	6.8	6.4	6.7	7.3	–	–	7.1
Switzerland	8.8	7.4	7.4	6.1	6.9	–	–	7.4
UK	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.4	1.9	–	–	2.4
Member of trade union or similar organization (currently) (%)								
Belgium	29.5	31.5	32.5	34.0	32.6	31.0	31.6	31.8
Italy	15.2	12.4	–	–	–	14.1	–	13.7
Netherlands	20.8	20.1	18.3	16.8	19.2	17.1	16.8	18.5
Spain	7.8	7.5	8.4	7.0	9.1	–	9.5	8.2
Sweden	57.7	57.8	55.8	49.3	49.4	45.6	47.9	52.1
Switzerland	12.5	11.5	11.7	10.1	10.0	9.5	9.4	10.8
UK	18.2	14.5	16.1	15.4	14.0	13.0	15.2	15.2
Involved in work for voluntary or charitable organization (at least once a month) (%)								
Belgium	–	–	14.3	–	–	13.8	–	14.0
Italy	–	–	–	–	–	14.4	–	14.4
Netherlands	–	–	28.3	–	–	32.7	–	30.5
Spain	–	–	10.8	–	–	18.3	–	14.6
Sweden	–	–	11.7	–	–	13.3	–	12.5
Switzerland	–	–	31.0	–	–	30.9	–	31.0
UK	–	–	17.0	–	–	19.8	–	18.3

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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POLITICAL VALUES: ARE EUROPEANS LEFT-WING OR RIGHT-WING, LIBERTARIAN OR AUTHORITARIAN?

Value orientations, beliefs, and ideology are the main drivers of human behavior (Rokeach 1973). More specifically, although most people do not necessarily think ideologically (Converse 1964), political values have been shown to affect political behavior and participation in important ways (Almond and Verba 1963; van Deth and Scarbrough 1995; see Halman 2007 for a review). Values set the frame for and influence action, including political action.

Students of political behavior and, more specifically, voting behavior have examined a variety of value orientations. Four of them have played a particularly central role in the literature. The first two can be seen as composing the traditional political space. Left–right orientations are by and large the most often studied value dimension (see Mair 2007 for a review). This refers to the opposition between a more leftist view stressing the planned allocation of resources and a rightist one emphasizing the spontaneous allocation of resources (Kitschelt 1994). The first supports egalitarianism and social justice whereas the second sees inequality as an incentive for spurring competition in the "free market." More concretely, this distinction refers to the traditional cleavage between left and right in the socioeconomic realm and has been historically linked to the role of social class for political behavior (see Knutsen 2007 for a review). The second traditional value orientation opposes authoritarian and libertarian values (see Esmer and Pettersson 2007 for a review). Here traditional and exclusionary values are opposed to more secular, open, and tolerant values. Authoritarians believe that women should have a secondary role in society, they oppose immigration, and have a strong belief in law and order. They are against equal rights for, and the integration of, minorities. On the other hand, libertarians believe in freedom and open social values supporting the equal recognition and standing of all groups in societies and allowing for opportunities for each to express themselves and live freely.

These value orientations – and their underlying social and political cleavages – have been challenged and developed by scholars who have stressed the emergence of new cleavages and related value orientations. Two of them deserve to be mentioned here. The materialist–postmaterialist value orientations have been popularized by the works of Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997; see further Scarbrough 1995). In Inglehart's view, thanks to the growth of the welfare state that has made materialistic goals less crucial, and through the replacement of older cohorts with new ones, the post-World War II context in Western Europe has witnessed the rise of postmaterialist values stressing self-expression and self-realization, emancipatory and identity goals, subjective well-being, quality of life, and so forth. This view has played an important role within new social movement theory (see Buechler 1995 and Pichardo 1997 for reviews). More recently, scholarship has stressed another new line of conflict linked to what is broadly referred to as the process of globalization or, more

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narrowly and perhaps accurately, denationalization (Zürn 1998). This is most often referred to as the integration–demarcation cleavage, the universalism–particularism dimension, leading to a new value cleavage opposing the winners and losers of such a process (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012).

Here we refer mainly to the left–right and libertarian–authoritarian value orientations (Evans et al. 1996; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Knutsen 1995). Kitschelt (1994, 1995) has focused on these two dimensions in his work, particularly in his definition of the competitive political space in contemporary Western Europe, crossing the opposition between socialist and capitalist politics on the one hand with the opposition between libertarian and authoritarian politics on the other hand. In terms of ultimate values, ideology, and forms of social order, Kitschelt (1994) opposes, on the former dimension, the planned allocation of resources (socialist politics) to the spontaneous allocation of resources (capitalist politics) and, on the latter dimension, fraternity with equality and liberty (libertarian politics) to fraternity without equality and liberty (authoritarian politics). In his view, the rise of the new social movements can be ascribed to a diagonal shift in the main axis of political conflict from the horizontal traditional left–right opposition to the new antinomy between left-libertarian politics and right-authoritarian politics, forming also the basis for the rise of the new radical right (Kitschelt 1995).

Where do European citizens locate themselves in the space formed by these two dimensions? In other words, how left-libertarian or right-authoritarian are they on average? Unfortunately, the ESS provides only a few measures of these value orientations. Here we use two questions, one for each dimension. The ESS questionnaire first asks people to position themselves with regard to the question whether the "government should reduce differences in income levels" (left–right dimension) and then asks whether "gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish" (libertarian–authoritarian dimension).[9]

The overall and cross-national distributions are shown in Table 2.3. Figures represent the percentages of respondents who either agree or agree strongly with the statement. Overall, most respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement concerning left–right value orientations. Most importantly, this dimension yields rather a clear pattern: many more Italians and Spaniards believe that the state should intervene to reduce income differences than their counterparts in the other countries. In other words, in the aggregate, Italy and Spain are much more leftist than the other countries. On the opposite end, the Netherlands comes last in this ranking, with the remaining four countries standing somewhere in between. These differences have remained rather stable over time.

The pattern is somewhat more blurred for libertarian–authoritarian value orientations. Again, overall most respondents either agree or agree strongly with the statement capturing this dimension and referring to gay and lesbian rights. In terms of variations, however, we do not observe clear-cut clusters as the country differences are relatively small. The Dutch appear as the most

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TABLE 2.3. *Left-libertarian and right-authoritarian values, 2002–2014 (percentages)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Government should reduce differences in income levels (agree or agree strongly) (%)								
Belgium	70.5	65.7	68.2	69.8	70.2	71.3	71.2	69.5
Italy	79.0	80.7	–	–	–	83.0	–	80.8
Netherlands	58.7	55.6	57.7	54.8	57.1	55.8	56.2	56.6
Spain	79.6	79.7	84.0	80.0	81.0	83.6	86.2	82.0
Sweden	68.7	66.7	67.6	64.0	63.5	68.9	67.1	66.8
Switzerland	64.6	65.2	69.9	67.0	68.1	67.6	58.5	65.9
UK	62.0	59.2	56.8	58.3	61.2	64.2	62.8	60.6
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (agree or agree strongly) (%)								
Belgium	80.3	79.3	80.0	84.7	87.2	85.6	86.8	83.4
Italy	72.0	64.4	–	–	–	73.4	–	69.2
Netherlands	87.9	89.2	88.5	90.9	92.8	92.5	91.9	90.4
Spain	72.2	74.0	77.3	78.3	81.5	82.6	88.8	79.5
Sweden	81.7	83.7	86.4	86.8	90.2	88.3	91.9	86.8
Switzerland	80.4	75.5	77.4	82.0	82.6	78.3	82.6	79.6
UK	75.7	75.9	78.8	81.4	84.8	83.8	85.1	81.0

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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libertarian, followed by the Swedish, Belgian, British, Spanish, Swiss, and finally Italian citizens. The latter clearly are the least libertarian in this respect. However, given the deep Catholic traditionalism in Italy and the fact that we need to rely only on this one item, religious values are likely to play a role here, leading to a more conservative stance with regard to LGBTQ+ rights. In addition, these value orientations display less stability over time than the left–right orientations. We observe in particular an increase in aggregate-level libertarian values in all the countries, but especially so in the UK, Spain, and Sweden. In brief, while European citizens have remained more or less equally leftist or rightist in the last 15 years or so – with a few exceptions such as Spain and Switzerland, yet in different directions – they have become at the same time clearly more libertarian, at least as far as these limited measures are concerned.

Immigration is undoubtedly one of the most salient political issues today, one which is at center stage in the political agendas of political parties, most notably right-wing ones. Authoritarians are more likely to oppose immigration, whereas libertarians tend to support open borders and the free movement of peoples. Today, the large-scale transformations brought about by globalization or denationalization have made immigration one of the main cultural issues referring to the once religiously connotated libertarian–authoritarian dimension of the political space (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). In addition to the two aspects considered above, we therefore also look in Table 2.4 at two indicators of value orientations more specifically referring to the place and role of immigration. The first is based on a question asking people to position themselves with regard to whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy, whereas the second asks whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants. Since the response items for these two questions consisted of 0–10 scales, we show means by country and year.

Clearly, Switzerland is the country where citizens, on average, are most inclined to believe that immigration is good for the economy, whereas Belgium stands on the opposite end. The UK and Sweden also display higher means, followed by Spain and, lastly, by Italy and the Netherlands. In terms of changes over time, we observe a certain stability in some countries (Belgium, the Netherlands), an increasing trend in some others (the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland), and a decreasing trend in still others (Spain), with the pattern in Italy being more difficult to ascertain due to the lack of data for certain years. As to the cultural side of immigration, Sweden stands out as the most open country, followed at a distance by the Netherlands and Switzerland, then Belgium and Spain. The UK and Italy are the more closed in this respect. In sum, just as general left–right and libertarian–authoritarian values provide a varying setting for participation in protest activities – including demonstrations – more specific immigration-related values show different mobilizing contexts in the seven countries under study.

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TABLE 2.4. *Values on immigration, 2002–2014 (means)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Immigration bad or good for country's economy (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.59	4.35	4.66	4.80	4.53	4.57	4.48	4.57
Italy	5.32	4.66	–	–	–	5.18	–	5.01
Netherlands	4.82	4.59	5.14	5.36	5.19	5.22	4.87	5.02
Spain	5.40	5.57	5.66	5.17	4.97	5.21	4.98	5.27
Sweden	5.46	5.02	5.37	5.48	5.95	5.60	5.78	5.51
Switzerland	5.86	5.58	5.88	6.16	6.12	6.10	6.13	5.95
UK	4.39	4.60	4.54	4.67	4.54	4.50	4.84	5.59
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	5.83	5.66	5.80	5.85	5.52	5.77	5.73	5.74
Italy	5.27	4.75	–	–	–	5.61	–	5.14
Netherlands	6.06	5.83	6.08	6.15	6.13	6.26	6.05	6.08
Spain	5.86	5.93	5.82	5.71	5.91	6.21	6.01	5.91
Sweden	7.10	6.97	6.91	6.99	7.16	6.97	7.28	7.05
Switzerland	6.24	6.08	6.04	6.21	6.00	6.09	6.01	6.10
UK	5.15	5.02	4.79	4.90	4.95	5.10	4.97	4.98

Note: 0–10 scales where 0 stands for "bad for the economy" or "cultural life undermined" and 10 stands for "good for the economy" or "cultural life enriched." Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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POLITICAL ATTITUDES: ARE EUROPEANS POLITICALLY DISINTERESTED, DISSATISFIED, DISTRUSTFUL, AND POWERLESS?

Political values inform the political attitudes which are the more directly observable predispositions towards politics and political objects. Here we focus on four kinds of attitudes: political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy. These have all been shown to be strong predictors of participation in politics in general and protest activities in particular in previous research (Almond and Verba 1963; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Brady et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978, 1995). In this case, we are more overtly interested in looking at trends over time, in addition to comparing percentages and means across countries, as these attitudes are important indicators of the underlying malaise that many scholars have noted, including an increasing alienation and detachment of citizens from politics (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Grasso 2016; Hay 2007; Mair 2006). In this section we examine in particular to what extent Europeans have become uninterested in politics, dissatisfied with democracy, distrustful of political institutions, and see themselves as powerless in the sense of having become increasingly disillusioned about their political efficacy.

Political interest is obviously linked to participation and is routinely included in models of political participation, whether electoral or non-electoral. Table 2.5 shows the percentage of citizens in our seven countries who declared to be either quite or very interested in politics. We observe sizable variations both across countries and over time. In terms of country differences, clearly Spanish citizens are the least interested in political affairs on average, followed by Italian and then Belgian citizens. In all three countries, less than half of the respondents said they are either quite or very interested in politics. In the other four countries, in contrast, there are more people politically interested than not. The Dutch are the most interested, followed by the Swedes and the Swiss.

The Spanish and Italian cases are quite telling in terms of citizens' disaffection with politics. There are more than twice as many people interested in politics in the Netherlands compared to Spain. Moreover, such a difference becomes even larger if we look at the data for 2002, when the ratio becomes more than one to three. This points to another important aspect regarding political interest: the important increase observed in some countries, namely Spain and Italy – as far as we can judge from the scattered data on the latter country – but also in Sweden to some extent. We also observe a significantly higher share of people interested in politics in 2014 as compared to 2002 in Belgium and the UK but here it looks like it is more a matter of ebbs and flows than a genuine trend. In contrast, the Netherlands and Switzerland display a more stable trend. Thus, in spite of the evidence that people are becoming less and less attached to politics, the spread of tertiary education and perhaps also the rise of social media could be seen to be linked to a rise in political interest to some extent. This could also be an effect of a remobilization during the years of the economic crisis and the anti-austerity protests.

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TABLE 2.5. *Political interest, 2002–2014 (percentage of people who are quite or very interested in politics)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Political interest (quite or very interested) (%)								
Belgium	44.9	43.3	44.8	48.4	46.1	45.1	47.7	45.7
Italy	32.5	35.3	–	–	–	48.7	–	37.9
Netherlands	66.0	61.2	63.1	66.8	65.5	63.7	63.4	64.3
Spain	21.4	28.9	25.8	26.2	28.4	34.6	41.0	29.4
Sweden	57.5	57.4	61.8	58.7	61.5	58.0	67.6	60.2
Switzerland	60.6	59.1	56.6	57.9	58.9	62.0	61.4	59.4
UK	52.1	47.3	52.1	56.5	52.7	48.4	57.6	52.5

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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Be that as it may, the important point here is that, in many cases, European citizens seem more interested in politics today than they were about 15 years ago.

Attitudes towards democracy are seen as an important component of political culture, particularly so in the civic culture and social capital research traditions (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). Although the nature and direction of the relationship is far from clear, the degree and direction of satisfaction with democracy has been shown to affect participation (Farah 1979). Many studies show that countries in which citizens express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy also tend to display higher levels of voter turnout in national elections (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). However, one could also argue that being satisfied with the way democracy works may lead to political apathy as one does not see the need to act to change the current state of affairs. In this vein, some have found that over-time increases in citizens' satisfaction with democracy are associated with significant decreases in voter turnout in national elections (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). At the same time, dissatisfaction with democracy can be seen as providing a set of grievances leading people, under certain conditions, to engage in collective action and protest behavior. In the end, it might all depend on what kind of participation one is analyzing, whether electoral or non-electoral (Farah 1979). This reiterates once again the need to distinguish between different forms of participation as well as their determinants.

Table 2.6 shows the degree of satisfaction of citizens with the way democracy works in their country in our seven countries as expressed in means on a 0–10 scale, where 0 means "extremely dissatisfied" and 10 means "extremely satisfied." There is a great degree of variation in satisfaction levels across countries: the highly satisfied Swiss contrast in particular with the low satisfaction Italians, who are much more negative in this respect. The Swedes and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch are also fairly satisfied, while Belgians, British, and Spanish display lower levels of satisfaction. When we look at changes over time, we discover a twofold trend: some countries – most notably, Sweden and Switzerland, but to some extent also in the UK and the Netherlands – show an increase in satisfaction, while others – in particular, Italy and Spain, but to some extent also Belgium – point in the opposite direction. Thus, once again, the situation we find in recent years should be qualified by taking into account the evolution occurring since the early 2000s.

Perhaps even more than diminishing levels of political interest and satisfaction with democracy, discussions about citizens' political alienation have referred to a loss of political trust and to declining feelings of political efficacy (Norris 2011). On the one hand, trust in political institutions has long been seen as fundamentally linked to understandings of the legitimacy of such institutions and the political system more generally (Almond and Verba 1963; Schumpeter 1942). On the other hand, when citizens lack the feeling that their actions can have an impact and become cynical with regard to politics, this may lead to political apathy (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). However, much depends on whether we focus on institutional and electoral politics or whether we are

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TABLE 2.6. *Satisfaction with the way democracy works in country, 2002–2014 (means)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Satisfaction with democracy (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	5.52	5.56	5.49	5.17	5.20	5.86	5.30	5.45
Italy	5.01	4.78	–	–	–	4.11	–	4.67
Netherlands	5.85	5.66	6.08	6.23	6.18	6.31	6.00	6.03
Spain	5.70	6.07	5.93	5.83	5.10	3.98	4.24	5.26
Sweden	6.12	5.91	6.35	6.47	6.75	7.01	6.80	6.47
Switzerland	6.60	6.39	6.90	6.93	7.07	7.39	7.35	6.90
UK	5.08	5.14	4.93	4.88	4.97	5.58	5.17	5.10

Note: 0–10 scales where 0 stands for "extremely dissatisfied" and 10 stands for "extremely satisfied." Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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dealing with non-conventional forms of participation. Indeed, citizens who are mistrustful and disillusioned by institutional and electoral politics might indicate a critical stance towards them and become much engaged in non-conventional forms of participation (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Research has shown that political trust is positively associated with institutional participation, but negatively associated with non-institutional participation (Hooghe and Marien 2013).

Yet, for trust to become instrumental for political participation, people must also have a sense of efficacy. Students of social movements have often stressed the important role played by individual and collective feelings of efficacy for engagement in protest activities (Opp 2013). Previous research has found this factor to be a key predictor of differential participation in social movements along with individual embeddedness in pre-existing social networks (Passy and Giugni 2001). Thus, the combination of trust and efficacy may be decisive in this respect (Andretta et al. 2015; Gamson 1968; Hooghe and Marien 2013; Seligson 1980; Watts 1973). As Andretta et al. (2015: 131) have put it, "[w]hen mistrust is not coupled with this sense of collective efficacy, it may indeed express a sense of alienation and frustration and bring about disaffection toward democratic politics." We shall come back to this point in Chapter 6 as these authors have inquired into the combination of these aspects using the same data that we are using in this book. For now, we analyze trust and efficacy separately.

Table 2.7 shows means on 0–10 scales of trust in a variety of political institutions, where 0 means "no trust at all" and 10 means "complete trust." The most relevant items for our present purpose are probably the first (trust in country's parliament), fourth (trust in politicians), and fifth (trust in political parties), that is, those referring to the national political system and their protagonists. Once again, we find variations both across countries and over time. Trust in the country's parliament is highest in Sweden and Switzerland and lowest in the UK and Italy, but it is also low in Spain, while Belgium and the Netherlands stand somewhere in between. Most importantly, the very same countries display different patterns of change over time: levels of trust have declined in Italy, Spain, and to some extent also in the UK, increased in Sweden and Switzerland, while they have remained rather stable in Belgium and the Netherlands. Interestingly, such a decline in political trust in some countries does not only concern the national legislative power, but is also reflected in diminishing levels of trust in the European Parliament. This suggests that we are dealing with a more generalized trend towards disaffection with politics at all levels.

We observe similar patterns when it comes to trust in politicians and political parties. Again, in both cases, Swedish and Swiss citizens rank highest on the level of trust. Here, however, the Dutch are even more trusting. At the opposite end, Italy and Spain, but to some extent also in the UK, display much lower levels of trust in politicians and political parties. What is most striking here are the

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TABLE 2.7. *Political trust, 2002–2014 (means)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Trust in country's parliament (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.99	4.68	4.99	4.57	4.46	5.02	4.84	4.80
Italy	4.83	4.41	–	–	–	3.16	–	4.21
Netherlands	5.22	4.67	5.34	5.57	5.37	5.29	5.24	5.24
Spain	4.83	5.09	5.00	5.02	4.29	3.42	3.67	4.48
Sweden	5.92	5.35	5.62	5.74	6.28	5.93	6.23	5.85
Switzerland	5.75	5.52	5.76	5.83	5.80	6.14	6.21	5.83
UK	4.68	4.29	4.20	4.32	4.11	4.28	4.34	4.31
Trust in politicians (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.28	4.24	4.36	4.04	3.86	4.31	4.14	4.18
Italy	3.54	3.23	–	–	–	1.95	–	3.00
Netherlands	4.87	4.69	5.04	5.22	5.25	5.12	4.89	5.00
Spain	3.37	3.68	3.50	3.26	2.74	1.91	2.23	2.95
Sweden	4.72	4.19	4.46	4.62	5.04	4.74	4.97	4.66
Switzerland	4.93	4.77	4.94	4.93	5.01	5.21	5.25	4.99
UK	3.79	3.59	3.41	3.56	3.43	3.66	3.48	3.55
Trust in political parties (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	–	4.29	4.36	3.99	3.85	4.23	4.13	4.14
Italy	–	3.24	–	–	–	2.00	–	2.77
Netherlands	–	4.80	5.12	5.20	5.26	5.07	4.86	5.05
Spain	–	3.67	3.46	3.21	2.71	1.88	2.21	2.86
Sweden	–	4.40	4.62	4.77	5.11	4.86	5.10	4.79
Switzerland	–	4.64	4.77	4.68	4.81	4.99	5.06	4.81
UK	–	3.68	3.53	3.63	3.52	3.69	3.53	3.59

(continued)

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TABLE 2.7. (*continued*)

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Trust in the European Parliament (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.88	4.98	5.15	5.14	5.03	5.12	4.83	5.02
Italy	5.54	4.88	–	–	–	4.33	–	4.95
Netherlands	4.72	4.61	4.78	5.07	4.94	4.82	4.49	4.77
Spain	4.82	5.05	5.03	4.95	4.46	3.91	3.85	4.58
Sweden	4.02	3.95	4.49	4.66	4.96	4.71	4.72	4.48
Switzerland	4.81	4.61	4.76	4.83	4.56	4.66	4.51	4.68
UK	3.64	3.55	3.49	3.60	3.36	3.43	3.15	3.43

Note: 0–10 scales where 0 stands for "no trust at all" and 10 stands for "complete trust." Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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very low levels, particularly in the two Southern European countries. This has surely something to do with domestic reasons, but it is also indicative of a more general trend that might be related to the economic crisis as well. The trends over time are also similar to those concerning trust in the country's parliament. In particular, we see a strong decrease of trust in Italy and Spain, but to some extent also in the UK and increasing levels of trust in Sweden and Switzerland. Recurring corruption scandals in the two Southern European countries, but to some extent also the expenses scandal in the UK are probably not alien to this decline in political trust in those countries.

Finally, we can take a look at how European citizens score with regards to political efficacy or, better, feelings of political efficacy. Political scientists usually distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. The former refers to the belief that one can understand politics and therefore participate in politics, while the latter relates to whether one believes that the government will respond to one's demands (Balch 1974). A lack of external efficacy is sometimes also referred to as political cynicism (Agger et al. 1961). Here we use two indicators of internal efficacy: one referring to the extent to which people believe that politics is too complicated to understand and another concerning the degree of difficulty for making up one's mind about political issues.

Table 2.8 shows the percentages of people in our seven countries who consider politics to be too complicated to understand, respectively who find it either difficult or very difficult to make up their mind about political issues. In both cases, higher percentages indicate lower levels of internal political efficacy. Unfortunately, data are missing for the 2010–14 period. Yet, the available data are sufficient to see that, in terms of finding politics too complicated, the British, Italians, and Spanish citizens feel the most powerless – in the sense of displaying a lower level of political efficacy – while the Swedes and the Swiss, but also the Belgians and the Dutch, show a higher level of political efficacy. The distributions and ranking are slightly different when it comes to making up one's mind about political issues, but Italy and Spain – and, here, also Belgium and to some extent Sweden – show once again lower political efficacy, while the Netherlands and Switzerland – and, here, also the UK – are characterized by higher political efficacy. Given the missing data for the more recent period, we do not consider trends over time here.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have sketched a portrait of European citizens with a focus on their potential for mobilization in different forms of political participation, mobilizing structures, political values, and key political attitudes. Such a portrait shows important cross-national variations as well as certain common patterns. In particular, the two Southern European countries seem to stand out when we look at the protest potential and other key aspects by means of the ESS data. First, Italian and Spanish citizens show a larger protest potential than their

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TABLE 2.8. *Internal political efficacy, 2002–2014 (percentages)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Politics too complicated to understand (regularly and frequently) (%)								
Belgium	36.1	37.0	33.1	40.0	–	–	–	36.5
Italy	40.1	41.4	–	–	–	–	–	40.8
Netherlands	32.2	36.5	34.2	32.0	–	–	–	33.7
Spain	42.2	43.2	41.3	39.1	–	–	–	41.2
Sweden	27.4	29.7	24.4	28.1	–	–	–	27.4
Switzerland	28.9	30.7	32.2	29.1	–	–	–	30.2
UK	40.7	42.5	41.6	39.5	–	–	–	41.0
Making up mind about political issues (difficult and very difficult) (%)								
Belgium	44.2	47.4	43.8	48.2	–	–	–	45.9
Italy	55.1	47.8	–	–	–	–	–	51.0
Netherlands	34.3	38.5	37.0	32.6	–	–	–	35.6
Spain	39.6	42.2	49.1	44.3	–	–	–	44.0
Sweden	40.3	44.4	41.1	39.9	–	–	–	41.4
Switzerland	26.1	33.4	33.8	32.8	–	–	–	31.4
UK	29.6	35.2	33.0	31.4	–	–	–	32.2

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

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counterparts in the other countries, especially when it comes to participating in demonstrations, while they are less active in less confrontational political activities such as petitioning or more innovative ones such as boycotting i.e. political consumerism. Second, Italy and Spain also display the strongest support for leftist values and at the same time systematically lower levels of political interest and trust, as well as a narrower satisfaction with democracy, relative to the other countries, suggesting a higher degree of alienation from the political system. Furthermore, Italians and Spaniards have become increasingly alienated from institutional politics in recent years, while citizens in other countries – Switzerland above all – have remained more attached or have become even more satisfied with democracy and trusting of their political institutions.

The described patterns and trends should be taken with a grain of salt, however. As comparativists are well aware of, concepts do not always travel easily from one country to another. In other words, descriptive cross-national comparisons like the one conducted in this chapter face the well-known problem of equivalence (van Deth 1998): the same concept might have different meanings in different contexts. Likewise, the meaning of the indicators we examined here may vary across countries suggesting that similarities or variations observed could be at least in part the product of varying interpretations. However, the ESS is an internationally recognized survey and the questions analyzed here have all been validated and used many times previously by numerous studies in the political science literature, and as such these concerns should be minimal here. Moreover, these issues are further reduced by the fact that we are considering seven countries that belong to a relatively homogeneous space: they are all Western European democracies, most of which belong to the European Union, except for Switzerland. We therefore trust that the patterns and trends we observed reflect real similarities and differences, and therefore form a strong basis for informing the analyses of the protest survey data shown in the chapters to follow.

Notes

1. See www.europeansocialsurvey.org for further details on the data.
2. While we are considering each on its own terms, research on political participation often sees these specific political activities, and others, as items composing broad forms of participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2008; Milbrath 1965; Teorell et al. 2007; van Deth 2016). In this vein, Teorell al al. (2007) distinguish between five main forms depending on whether they are exit-based or voice-based, representational or extra-representational, and targeted or non-targeted: voting, party activities, contacting, consumer participation, and protest activity.
3. The ESS is conducted every two years and the data are available for the years from 2002 to 2016 inclusive. Here, however, we only include data up to 2014, as our sample covers demonstrations occurring between 2009 and 2013. In some cases a given question was not included in certain rounds. Most importantly, Italy did not take part in most of the rounds, so that we only have data for 2002, 2004, and 2012 for this country.

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4. The lower turnout in Switzerland may also be explained by the traditionally consensual character of Swiss politics and by the presence of instruments of direct democracy (popular initiatives and referenda), which may strip national elections of a part of their relevance, hence leading to lower electoral participation (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010; but see Ladner and Fiechter 2012 for opposite evidence).
5. It should be noted that the missing data for the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2014 rounds of the ESS might lead to an underestimation of the protest potential in Italy.
6. It should be noted that the figures for Switzerland might overestimate the actual usage of this form of participation as direct democratic instruments also require signing in much the same way as for petitions, only with a binding effect on political authorities that petitions do not have.
7. Here we chose to show the percentages for these two categories of possible answers: at least once a month and at least once a week. We consider this to reflect a strong involvement.
8. Unfortunately, this is a rather poor indicator of membership as it is unclear what is meant by "similar organizations." So, one does not know whether this refers to other labor movement organizations or to something else. Yet, given the figures, chances are high that most of the respondents have interpreted this as referring to labor movement organizations.
9. We should stress that, by definition, values cannot be observed directly through survey questions as they are non-observable conceptions of the desirable engaging moral considerations (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995). The use of the two direct questions, however, is sufficient for the purpose of the present chapter.

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3

Bringing Capitalism Back In

In his classic piece "Protest as a Political Resource" Michael Lipsky (1968: 1144) noted how "[t]he frequent resort to protest activity by relatively powerless groups in recent American politics suggests that protest represents an important aspect of minority group and low income group politics." Indeed, historically, protest and other forms of contentious politics such as strikes, picket lines, and barricades evolved from other "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1987) and provide a means for otherwise voiceless, resource-poor groups to make claims in the political arena (Piven and Cloward 1977). Scholars of social movements have for a long time studied the social bases of protest. While historically social movements were linked to the struggle of labor against capital and therefore to the working class and militant left, increasingly, with the emergence of new movements and new groups from the 1960s onwards, the class bases of social movements have widened to include middle-class professionals and individuals supporting centrist or even conservative parties. In particular, scholars studying new social movements have noted how the middle classes and particularly the sociocultural professional sections were particularly active in these movements (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Kriesi 1989). Most recently, however, scholars have argued that in the wake of the recurrent economic crises of late neoliberalism, grievances and socioeconomic and structural developments should become once more central and that capitalism needs to be brought back into the study of social movements (della Porta 2015; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Hetland and Goodwin 2013). Heeding this call, this chapter examines the social bases of protest. In particular, it examines the role of social class in contemporary protest politics, including subjective class identification and political values on both the economic left–right and social libertarian–authoritarian dimensions. We examine to what extent social class and other sources of political inequality such as gender, generation, and education underpin participation in demonstrations and how this varies across countries,

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issues, and types of demonstrators. More specifically, we examine the extent to which protest today remains a resource of the most powerless and whether the increasing precarization may become a new base for protest.

THE CHANGING SOCIAL BASES OF PROTEST

Charles Tilly (1986: 2) defined a repertoire of contention as the "whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals." These are constrained by time and space and "people tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of the existing forms" (Tilly 1986: 390). For instance, the public march derived from electoral banqueting whereas barricades emerged from the practice of using chains to block access to neighborhoods at night or during times of trouble (della Porta 2013). Repertoires of contention, as Tilly (1986: 392) showed, were linked to specific characteristics of the historical process, including industrialization and the emergence of the nation-state which signalled the shift from parochial, local protests relying on patronage and "appealing to immediately available powerholders to convey grievances or settle disputes, temporarily acting in the place of unworthy or inactive powerholders only to abandon power after the action." In contrast, the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a national repertoire of contention including strikes, electoral rallies, public meetings, petitions, demonstrations, and so forth (della Porta 2013). This repertoire was described by Tilly (1986: 391–392) as autonomous since, "instead of staying in the shadow of existing power holders and adapting routines sanctioned by them, people using the new repertoire tend to initiate their own statements of grievances and demands." Moreover, modernity and industrialization processes fragmented traditional communities and politics became increasingly national. In turn, this led on to the creation of national permanent associations to represent particular interests, namely those of social classes.

One of these emerging particular interests was the industrial working class. In the classical conception of Karl Marx (1852), only those classes achieving political consciousness of themselves and their bounded interests as a class would become classes for themselves (*für sich*), that is, those engaging politically in pursuit of their common interests. On the other hand, classes that did not develop this political subjectivity would remain simply classes in themselves (*an sich*), such as the peasants of France at the time, which he likened to "a sack of potatoes." Compared to the peasant class, the industrial working class was coming together in the cities to work in factories and thus experiencing exploitation as a group, socially. Its struggle against capital was the emerging class conflict defining the industrial age and this meant that this class would spearhead social movements, pushing for social change with the ultimate aim of socialist revolution.

The emphasis on the working poor as agents for social change has been characteristic of the work of many other scholars since Marx (Piven and

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Cloward 1977). However, since the rise of new social movements from the 1960s, scholars have argued that it is rather the mobilization of the middle classes that has underpinned this new effort at social change (Eder 1993; Kriesi 1989). Against this, others have argued that the dissolution of class and rising social differentiation mean that any analysis of the class bases of social movement engagement in the current context is futile (Pakulski 1993; Pakulski and Waters 1996a, 1996b). While in Marxist thinking social movements are the expression of the interests of the exploited class, evidence shows that also those in higher social classes have increasingly become involved in collective action. The emergence of cultural issues in particular has acted as a spring bringing individuals from cross-class coalitions to protest together in the name of more open social values and more inclusive conceptions for democracy, for example (della Porta 2015).

This shift has been understood by some as a move from the politics of redistribution to the politics of recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003). Particularly since the 1960s and 1970s there has been a well-documented rise in the mobilization of well-off sociocultural professionals from the middle classes over issues of social injustice which can be framed as altruistic social movement engagement (Kriesi 1989). Indeed, Marx himself had argued that in the class conflict, certain sections of the bourgeoisie that were more detached from the processes of exploitation and production such as the intelligentsia or intellectuals, would choose to side with the working class identifying in them the best interests of society as a whole and in their emancipation the emancipation of humanity. However, social movements focusing on cultural issues have tended to be linked to the idea of recognition and identity politics so that the goal has become less one of changing society but rather for different social groups to be acknowledged in their own right. To this extent, class, and by extension, its link to inequality ceased to be the major motivating factor for collective action in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Indeed, the classical accounts of political participation consistently suggest that more resourceful individuals, including the better educated and those with higher socioeconomic status, are more likely to have the means to participate (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995). On the other hand, grievance theories and social breakdown theories explaining the emergence of collective action linked participation to social strain and deprivation (Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962). Historically, the latter view in social movement studies has been in abeyance as other factors linked to movement resources, strategy, framing and political opportunities were seen as more promising for explaining mobilization (Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 2011). Sociocultural specialists are more engaged in protest activities than unskilled workers who tend to favor more institutional modes of engagement (Kriesi 1989).

In this context, since the crisis of 2008, a growing opposition to austerity measures in the global North has emerged within a preexistent crisis of political

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responsibility (della Porta 2015). Many movements have emerged in the last ten years increasingly emphasizing economic aspects and problematizing gross inequalities while also contesting both austerity measures and the "morally bankrupt" neoliberal economic model including the perceived breakdown of democratic institutions. Calls for greater social justice have been accompanied by the critique of a corrupt political system, including both the political elites (e.g. framed as a self-serving, privileged group also known as *la casta*) and financial corporations (e.g. those avoiding taxation through various offshore schemes) including their protection of their economic interests. Della Porta (2015) describes a placard of one of the Spanish *Indignados* displaying the words "They call it democracy, but it is not" (*Lo llaman democracia y no lo es*) and calling for *Democracia Real Ya*. Real democracy, understood in this way, involves the radical reorganization of both the political and economic systems so that they can guarantee both popular political involvement in decision-making and the socioeconomic ability to live a life of dignity that allows one the abilities and resources to actually do so.

Anti-austerity protests took place across Europe, including in the countries covered by this book as well as many others across the globe, such as Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Egypt, Tunisia, and the United States. In these contexts, many protesters blamed the corruption of political and financial elites for the growing economic crisis and particularly highlighted the fact that while the crisis originated with banks and other financial institutions, it was the public that had to shoulder the bill through higher taxation and cuts to their public services. In particular, these cuts to public services were seen as signaling how morally bankrupt the neoliberal economic system had increasingly become since it inflicted greater deprivation on the most marginalized and poor sections of society.

In the face of these waves of protests, several scholars have argued that the analysis of capitalism, grievances, and socioeconomic and structural developments should become more central in social movement studies (della Porta 2015; Hetland and Goodwin 2013). As noted above, Marxist approaches suggest that the study of class should be central to social movement research and applied to make sense of these emergent mobilizations linked to new grievances generated by neoliberalism including rising inequality and immiseration. These problems are further exacerbated in their dire human costs by the decreased spending in social security and greater precarization and causalization of the workforce. Public service cuts and contractions in social welfare further hit the already-deprived which led protesters to criticize the inhumanity and moral bankruptcy of an economic system that makes the poorest pay for the mistakes of the richest sectors of society and their political mismanagement. All these grievances in the context of austerity further deepened the feelings of anger against perceived corrupt elites covering for their allies in the economic sector. Given this context, it is not surprising that questions of class and left–right values have come back in the study of social movements.

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STRUCTURE AND THE SOCIAL BASES OF CONTEMPORARY PROTEST

While in the past the study of class in political action tended to focus on the manual working class and then moved on to the "new middle class" in the 1960s and 1970s, today, scholars are increasingly focusing their analyses of the social bases of protest on "a new class," that is, "the social precariat, young, unemployed or only part-time employed, with no protection and often well-educated" (della Porta 2015: 4). In his book *The Precariat*, Guy Standing (2011) argues that the precariat is distinguished from the middle class salariat in having minimal trust relative to capitalism or the state and from the proletariat in virtue of not having the same social contract relationship of welfare in exchange for subordination. This leads to a situation in which the precariat, made up of the unemployed and those in casual contracts, experiences profound economic and labor market insecurities which feed into a wider existential anxiety. This is because individuals have no clear or stable career path or occupational identity and lack any security to plan for the future. In turn, these conditions are understood to lead to the development of a series of grievances such as anger, anomie, anxiety, and alienation. However, as Marx noted long ago in his distinction between class in itself and class for itself, while individuals may belong in the same social location, they need to be conscious of themselves as a group coming together and acting politically in order to be a class in the political sense. As such, while the precariat might exist in social-structural terms, it remains an empirical question whether they actually constitute a self-conscious class in the political sense: identifying as a political unit and acting collectively for shared objectives. Indeed, on one level the precariat's social conditions mean that it should be in practice very difficult for them to become conscious of themselves as a class in a political sense. Unlike the urban working class, for example, they do not come together working in factories thus allowing for the development of their class consciousness as they realize their shared exploitation and the exploitative nature of the capitalist system as a whole.

Given all these considerations, studying the relationship between social structure, class, and values is a key part of the investigation for making sense of what underpins political activism and what distinguishes committed activists from more occasional demonstrators in the age of globalization. Kerbo (1982) had already noted how movements sparked by crises such as economic scarcity or unemployment tended to attract mainly those affected, with protests being more spontaneous and violent, whereas movements that existed outside of these crises would be more focused on questions of moral values, more organized and less violent. Research on the recent anti-austerity protests suggests that the movements behind these events were also involved in previous waves of national and transnational protest such as the global justice movement while also adopting innovations towards greater deliberative participation (della Porta and

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Mattoni 2014). In particular, the experience of the global justice movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s showed that there is potential for organizing broad-based coalitions between "white- and blue-collar workers, unemployed and students, young and old generations" (della Porta 2015: 16) and that this might have led to a blurring of the differences between movements addressing cultural or economic issues (Eggert and Giugni 2012, 2015).

However, such broad-based coalitions also bring with them the challenge of developing a collective identity binding all members of the movement with a clear idea of political objectives. These problems are still very much present when we discuss the current wave of protests. Do activists agree among themselves on political objectives and do they share the same values and ideals? As della Porta (2015: 23) notes, rather than a return to working-class politics or the emergence of the precariat as a new class base we rather witness in anti-austerity movements "coalitions of various social actors which tend to identify themselves as belonging to the lower classes. Together with students and precarious workers, industrial workers as well as public employees provided a varied social basis to the protests." Moreover, while "liquid" identification processes (Bauman 2000) have been seen as hampering mobilization processes and recent research has emphasized the emergence of the radical populist Right, the Left remains characterized by postmaterialist, libertarian, and cosmopolitan values typical of the new social movements. Della Porta (2015: 25) notes how the anti-austerity movement has been able to "sensitize public opinion but also to socialize to democratic politics a large number of citizens, restoring dignity to those who have suffered from the indignity produced by neoliberalism." Only time will tell if the anti-austerity movement can foster the development of a "counter-democracy" (Rosanvallon 2008) for our times.

As we know, the Great Recession was linked to depressed consumption and the end of the "private Keynesianism" solution keeping demand and profits high caused by the debt crisis (Streeck 2014). The patched-up solutions relying on consumer indebtedness and the move from "bubble to bubble" (Wallerstein 2010) eventually gave way to the hard hitting economic crisis in 2008 and particularly so in the weaker, and most indebted, Southern European democracies, but also deepening inequality in the stronger economies linked to a small proportion of "winners" from globalization and an increasing pauperization of the working classes and proletarianization of the middle classes (della Porta 2015; Stiglitz 2012). In turn, the economic inefficiencies of late neoliberalism linked to low growth, high unemployment, high inequality, stagnating wages, and social benefits in steady decline are said to be reflected in the social bases of the protests (della Porta 2015: 28), so that they "tend increasingly to involve precarious youth, but mostly in coalition with other social groups that have lived a sort of precarization."

Tilly (1986) had traditionally linked social movements with capitalism and the development of the nation-state since protests could challenge both state power and capitalist development at the state level. In this way, economic

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changes impacted on political opportunities (Kousis and Tilly 2005; Tilly 1986) and the move from capitalism and relationships of production reflected in the class structure to a certain set of political arrangements, while state organizations occurred through struggle (Tilly 1990). Polanyi (1944: 107) identified the first great transformation, the first wave of economic liberalism as characterized by a "double-movement" where the market expanded but the countermovement, organized around "the principles of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization" kept its expansion in check. The post-war Fordist model later required relatively high wages and state intervention for mass consumption of mass production. However, already by the 1970s, the post-Fordist neoliberal turn had commenced the dismantling of the welfare state and the rise of inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). Low interest rates were employed in what has been termed a "private Keynesianism" to support demand in the face of increasing inequalities in turn fueling various bubbles and ultimately the 2008 financial crisis (Streeck 2014). In the Southern European countries in particular, the initially cheap capital credit supported the growth of housing bubbles, but then could not deal with the ensuing problems on the eve of the crisis since national bodies could no longer employ their traditional monetary and exchange rate instruments for macroeconomic intervention (Scharpf 2011). Particularly in the European Union, as welfare cuts increased, inequalities rose among and within member states (Scharpf 2011). In turn, the drive towards austerity further negatively impacted on demand thus deepening the crisis (Stiglitz 2012).

While governments made cuts to public services, unemployment increased rapidly with as many as a quarter of citizens out of work in Southern European countries and over half of young people, meaning that even more citizens actually needed social services that were now cut. Rhetoric against wasteful welfare spending was accompanied by a rise in precariousness, particularly among young citizens out of work, in turn fueling anti-austerity mobilizations championed by alliances between the pauperizing working classes and proletarianizing middle classes (della Porta 2015: 35). Of course, the social movement literature had already previously noted how "in a society in which the traditional social cleavages were supposedly pacified, specific components of the middle class seemed to take the lead in contentious forms of politics" (della Porta 2015: 42). In particular, the new middle class were seen to be constituted from the service sector and as a result of their technical and cultural competence including their economic-functional position were regarded as more likely to mobilize in the new conflicts around social issues (Kriesi 1989).

Other than class and precarious employment conditions, a number of other factors have been stressed as forming the social bases of protest. Studies have tended to argue that men are more active (McAdam 1999; Paulsen 1991; Verba et al. 1995). McCarthy and Zald (1973) suggest that those free from employment such as students and the unemployed should be more likely to engage. However, it is less clear whether people in employment are more or less

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likely to become involved in protest (McAdam 1986; Erickson Nepstad and Smith 1999). The biographical availability approach has also tended to emphasize that younger generations should have more time and energy to become involved in protests (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991). However, research has also shown that the 1960/1970s generation is particularly politicized and has been called "the protest generation" (Grasso 2014). Moreover, older generations can also be said to be biographically available as their children have left home (Erickson Nepstad and Smith 1999). Education has also been shown to have an important positive effect on participation, though more so in some countries than others (Grasso 2013). Research has consistently shown that individuals with a higher socioeconomic standing and higher education levels are more likely than others to participate (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995). Education can be important for a number of reasons, for example since it signals attentiveness and heightened political knowledge allowing people the basic skills and comprehension to engage politically.

THE CULTURAL SIDE: CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL VALUES

Social class reflects the structural bases of political behavior and protest, which also has a cultural side represented by ideology and political values. In the Marxist tradition, class consciousness refers to the awareness of the working class of themselves as the exploited class under capitalist social relations. This awareness of their exploitation and their collective strength would signal revolution and the radical reorganization of society. Many Marxist thinkers since have tried to explain why the revolution did not occur and of course today the working class, or individuals in manual occupations, no longer make up the majority of citizens in advanced industrial societies, leading some to argue that we are witnessing a New Class War of exclusion of the working class from politics (Evans and Tilley 2017). For Marx, class consciousness and the identification of the proletariat with others in their class were linked to the movement from objective classes in themselves to subjective classes for themselves. In turn, this awareness is understood to lead to political activism for radical social change.

Marx also saw the development of class consciousness as dialectical and linked to the crisis tendencies of capitalism (Crossley 2013). The tendencies of prices to fall due to competition between capitalists means that these latter need to drive wages down, while overproduction and underconsumption compound these problems, often driving smaller firms to go bankrupt and making workers redundant and thus further intensifying the overproduction and underconsumption crises by driving down demand (Crossley 2013). This is precisely what we have seen in the latest economic crisis. In turn, this leads to bigger firms buying out smaller firms and thus adding to the monopolistic tendencies of capital and these crisis tendencies polarize classes by depressing wages and concentrating capital

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thus driving up inequality (Crossley 2013). Moreover, according to Marx, as the working class become employed by the same few employers they come together more often and as such find it easier to recognize their exploitation as a common problem they experience as a class. The deteriorating living conditions emerging from these processes mean the workers will have nothing to lose but their chains and will become radicalized.

While for Marx the development of class consciousness is almost spontaneous and emerges from within the ranks of the working class in their experiences of capitalist crisis and deteriorating economic conditions – the idea that capitalism creates its own gravediggers – this was not so for other thinkers aiming to explain why this had not yet taken place (Crossley 2013). For Lenin (1902), class consciousness should thus be injected from outside by a highly trained and committed revolutionary party composed of the most outstanding members of the working class and the revolutionary bourgeois intelligentsia which could identify the interests of society with those of the end of proletariat exploitation, in other words the transcendence and abolition of the capitalist mode of production and its social relations. For Lenin (1902), the issue was that in and of itself the working class would not be able to develop a truly revolutionary class consciousness simply emerging out of their structural conditions but would only develop trade union consciousness (Crossley 2013). There was a deeper need for political work and ideological development for injecting class consciousness. The job of fostering ideological commitment to the principles of socialism and redistribution by linking theory and practice and thus the experience of exploitation with an understanding that the only means to end it would be the transcendence of the entire productive system and not merely reforms to ameliorate living conditions was seen as the task of the revolutionary party.

In Marxist thinking, ideology is a very important underlying factor explaining radicalization. It has been seen also as a predictor of participation in social movements (Klandermans 2004; Snow 2004). One's beliefs play a crucial role for determining one's decision to become involved in protest activity and more radical forms of social action. Historically, individuals have risked their lives for social goals which they understood as higher than themselves and pressing needs of social change for entire societies. These activists that so valiantly sacrificed themselves did so because they believed in powerful ideas such as justice, equality, of ending exploitation, and so forth. Traditionally, protest has been seen as the preserve of resource-poor groups, of leftists and social progressives pressing for social change (Dalton et al. 2010). However, following the rise of the new middle class and identity politics, most recently there has also been a rise in religious, populist right-wing, and conservative protest movements.

Ideology is normally understood as a system of beliefs including values that reinforce each other (Halman 2007). Political values have been a mainstay of studies of political action since the classic *Civic Culture* study by Almond and Verba (1963). Values are normally understood as prior to attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and other orientations or predispositions, which we examine in

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Chapter 6. There is a general understanding of values as deeply rooted orientations guiding attitudes, norms, and opinion, in turn informing action (Halman 2007). Political values can be seen as ideas of what would be desirable in terms of the structuring of society (van Deth 1995). Political values relate to conflicts between equality and inequality, freedom and authoritarianism and to class conflict in terms of the cleavage between labor and capital in particular (Halman 2007). As was discussed also in the previous chapter, the concepts of Left and Right have generally been linked to the economic dimension in terms of support for greater equality versus inequality whereas other values tend to be more closely linked to the social dimension of support for freedom versus authoritarianism in issues such as immigration, abortion, euthanasia, the role of women in society, criminal punishment, and so forth (Halman 2007). In general, left-libertarians tend to be associated with taking the side of the poor, the disadvantaged, and minorities (della Porta and Diani 2006). The social dimension is very much linked to the emergence of "new" issues and the discussion over rising postmaterialism (Kitschelt 1988). In particular, it is argued that individuals who are particularly libertarian espouse a "new" politics agenda linked to issues relating to the environment and LGBTQ+ rights which makes them particularly likely to support new social movements and therefore to participate in movements and protests around cultural issues (Kriesi 1989).

THE SOCIAL BASES OF PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS

As we have mentioned earlier, scholarship has stressed the importance of a number of sociodemographic characteristics as determinants of participation in protest activities. These include social class – our main focus in this chapter – but also other aspects such as gender, generation, and education. What is the composition of our sample of participants in demonstrations when it comes to their sociodemographic profile and more specifically in terms of gender, generation, education, and class? To what extent do they identify with certain classes? And how does their sociodemographic profile, including both the structural and subjective attitudinal correlates of social class belonging, vary across countries, demonstration issue, and types of demonstrators? Table 3.1 allows us to answer these questions by showing the social bases of participation in demonstrations in our data and how they vary across the seven countries included in our study as well as across types of demonstrations (cultural and economic) and across types of demonstrators (occasional demonstrators and activists). In addition to the structural and objective component of social class (occupation), the table also shows its subjective attitudinal correlates, namely class identification and the related political value dimensions (left–right and libertarian–authoritarian). Regarding the latter we analyze in this descriptive section both the specific items for each dimension and a combined left-right values scale and another for libertarian–authoritarian values.

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TABLE 3.1. *Sociodemographic profile and political values of demonstrators by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages and means)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Gender (male) (%)	58.0	48.3	55.2	57.0	43.6	42.0	50.4	45.2	56.7***	50.5	51.9***
Cohorts (%)											
Post-WWII generation	9.9	4.9	6.8	5.9	12.2	8.0	9.4	8.8*	7.5	8.1***	6.0
1960s/1970s generation	27.9	25.2	30.1	22.6	20.5	23.3	21.6	23.0	26.2***	22.9	24.6
1980s generation	27.4	23.1	24.5	25.7	12.8	25.0	20.5	21.4	24.3***	24.5*	22.4
1990s generation	16.6	17.4	12.5	26.3	16.6	18.3	19.3	18.2	17.7	18.1	18.3
2000s generation	18.2	29.4	26.2	19.6	37.9	25.3	29.3	28.6***	24.0	28.4*	26.6
Education (%)											
Secondary school or lower	56.7	37.4	35.6	34.6	30.7	40.1	18.6	31.7	39.6***	32.6	35.6**
BA or equivalent	11.5	17.6	30.3	17.0	1.9	24.0	40.4	23.6***	20.0	25.2***	20.6
MA or higher	31.8	45.0	34.1	48.5	67.4	35.9	41.0	66.2***	57.8	65.7***	62.1
Occupation (%)											
Salariat	55.9	39.9	55.3	58.1	44.4	57.5	60.4	57.1***	52.3	57.5**	53.9
Intermediate professions	20.2	10.2	14.2	17.4	11.3	14.1	14.3	14.5	15.3	15.2	14.7
Working class	11.7	6.8	9.6	9.9	8.4	5.6	5.6	6.0	10.7***	5.6	9.1***
Unemployed	5.7	21.7	3.3	5.4	9.3	10.0	4.4	7.3	6.6	5.1	6.9***
Students	6.6	21.4	17.7	9.2	26.5	12.9	15.3	15.0	15.1	16.5	15.3
Class identification (%)											
Upper class/Upper middle class	30.0	16.6	47.6	15.4	22.5	32.2	18.7	30.8***	24.1	40.3***	23.7
Lower middle class	40.2	50.3	24.5	25.9	43.3	45.4	38.1	40.4***	33.0	34.3	37.8***
Working class	18.8	17.2	19.4	51.8	24.0	10.6	22.8	13.9	33.8***	14.6	26.8***
Other/no class	11.0	15.9	8.4	6.9	10.2	11.8	20.4	14.8***	9.2	10.7	11.7

(*continued*)

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TABLE 3.1. (*continued*)

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Left–right values (mean 1 right – 5 left scale)											
Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off	3.97	4.40	3.87	4.16	4.40	4.00	4.26	4.08	4.17***	3.73	4.27***
Even the most important public services are best left to private enterprise (reversed)	4.15	4.23	4.22	4.23	4.60	4.49	4.52	4.37**	4.32	4.15	4.42***
Scale: Left–right values (mean 1 right – 5 left)	4.06	4.32	4.05	4.19	4.49	4.24	4.39	4.23	4.24	3.94	4.34***
Libertarian–authoritarian values (mean 1 auth. – 5 libertarian scale)											
Children should be taught to obey authority (reversed)	2.54	3.34	2.68	2.76	3.39	3.05	2.96	3.03***	2.81	2.67	3.02***
People from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live in it permanently	3.32	4.04	3.25	3.72	4.10	3.61	3.73	3.70***	3.58	3.28	3.78***
Scale: Libertarian–authoritarian values (mean1 auth. – 5 libertarian)	2.92	3.70	2.96	3.24	3.75	3.33	3.35	3.37***	3.20	2.97	3.40***

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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Concerning gender, research tends to argue that men have traditionally been more likely to protest than women for a series of reasons, including differences in socialization into politics as something that is "not for girls" and the fact that women have for a long time been relegated to the private sphere of the home whereas men have traditionally been seen as the breadwinners engaging in the public sphere of politics and the outside social world (Schussman and Soule 2005). Examining the results by country we can see that the theorizing on gender from the literature bears out empirically only in three cases, namely in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. In the other countries men and women are about equally represented, such as in the UK and Italy, or women form a higher proportion, such as in Sweden and Switzerland. This could be linked to the fact that in Belgium and Spain trade unions and the labor movement are particularly important as organizers of demonstrations and there tend to be more men employed in manual occupations. On the other hand, in Sweden and Switzerland there is a more active new social movement sector and the women's movement is particularly strong in these countries, explaining the greater participation of women in terms of the wider supply of protests on women's issues that they could attend.

There is a developing literature on generational differences in participation with studies in the United States in particular highlighting the generation coming of age in the 1960s and 1970s as "the protest generation" (Jennings 1987). Examining results for the generational dimension of participation, we can see that in all the countries except Spain and Switzerland the 1960s and 1970s generation is either the most or second-most active political generation. As such, it appears that still today the events of their highly politicized context of youth impacts on their heightened political activism in social movements (Grasso 2014). In all the countries except Belgium and Spain the youngest generation coming of age in the 2000s in the time of the crisis is also the first or second most politicized. These results strongly support the idea that the political context of socialization impacts on the participation patterns of distinct political generations: the generations that came of age in the particularly politicized contexts of the 1960s and 1970s as well as of the current economic crisis are the most represented (Grasso 2016). In Belgium and Spain only the youngest generation is not more politicized than the 1980s and 1990s generations – generations normally seen as more politically passive – standing out as more active than in other countries. This could be linked to nation-specific protest movements that were particularly popular in these countries in this period – the 1980s in Belgium and the 1990s in Spain – providing impressionable experiences on the cohorts coming of age in this period.

The literature emphasizes the central role of education for political action (Berinsky and Lenz 2011). This is for several reasons, and primarily because it tends to be associated with higher resources and skills for making sense of information spurring people to political action (Grasso 2013). Looking at cross-national differences in education levels of participants, we can see that

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in all countries except Belgium, the vast majority of demonstrators tend to have at least a university degree. This suggests that in the current contest most demonstrators are actually quite resource-rich individuals at least with respect to education. While traditionally protest was seen as the preserve of the working classes with very low education levels required for manual occupations, today instead protest is much more practiced by highly educated middle classes (Kriesi 1989). This is not surprising if one considers the classic theories of participation which stress how critical education is for allowing people the knowledge and skills to make sense of political issues, the political interest to become engaged and to strongly believe in given political values, and also feelings of political efficacy, that is, that one's participation can actually matter. Protesters are particularly highly educated in the UK and Sweden, but also in Italy and Spain.

Our main interest in this chapter, however, lies in analyzing the role of social class and occupation, in both its structural and subjective components. As we have seen, research has highlighted the role of the precariat, or young unemployed or underemployed, as forming a new base for anti-austerity protest in the recent period. Research from Greece and Spain, but also the United States, appears to emphasize the role of precarious youth (Calvo 2013; Gitlin 2012; Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013). However, they were not the only ones to mobilize against austerity but were "met in the streets by other social groups, especially among those most hit by austerity policies" (della Porta 2015: 52). While on the one hand unemployment can be seen as signaling lower resources, on the other hand research has shown that some unemployed can be resource-rich (Dunn et al. 2014). Moreover, the current context of economic crisis and the steep toll it is exerting particularly in terms of widening inequality and rising youth unemployment can be clearly theorized as precipitating factors driving unemployed and precarious youth to join the ranks of social movements and to take to the streets to contest unjust social arrangements and political repercussions of crises which they did not help to create.

The results for cross-national differences clearly show that in most countries demonstrations tend to be a highly middle-class affair. In all countries except for Italy and Sweden a majority of participants belong to the salariat. The next largest occupational group in most countries comprises students or the intermediate professions. The middle class is notably overrepresented and the working class notably underrepresented across countries. Examining ESeC (European Socio-economic Classification) estimates for the percentage of the population employed in skilled or unskilled manual occupations (Bihagen et al. 2014), we can see that these gaps between national population statistics and representation in the sample are particularly large in the Southern European countries, amounting to a little less than 25 per cent in Italy and Spain.

There is also a sizable proportion of unemployed across countries, outnumbering even working-class members in Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland. Comparing to levels of absolute unemployment in our countries in 2010, we

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can see that the unemployed are overrepresented in demonstrations relative to national statistics in the same three countries, while they are underrepresented in Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, and Spain. In this sense, at least in Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, the argument that precarization is stimulating a new social base for protest seems to hold some sway. However, in the other countries the unemployed are underrepresented relative to their proportions in the population and protest remains a predominantly middle-class and student affair. As such, our results provide mixed support for the biographical availability thesis (McAdam 1986), in that students do tend to be quite ubiquitous at demonstrations, whereas unemployed people tend to be overrepresented only in a few countries.

Class identification or consciousness is a particularly relevant variable in Marxist thinking on the factors that would lead to radical participation. As we can see, the proportion of individuals identifying with the working class is notably higher than the percentage objectively located within this class occupationally. This is particularly true in the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, where the proportion is larger than both the objective proportions of the working class and unemployed based on objective criteria. This suggests that identification with the working class among individuals that are not objectively working class could be a spur to radical political action in these countries. This finding suggests that individuals who are not in manual occupations but are perhaps in lower-service routine jobs or whose parents are or were working class and originated from working-class communities still hold a strong sense of identification with the working class, and this in turn could be an important spur to political action. As such, while objectively in and of itself class does not link with greater engagement since the working classes are found to be underrepresented, subjectively, identifying with the working class may be more important. In turn, this shows that the subjective component is also likely to be important for mobilization as argued by many scholars and that on their own, grievances do not spontaneously stimulate individuals to political action. The relevance of subjective identification with the working class suggests that having more leftist and libertarian political values is also more likely to matter for mobilization.

Political values are fundamental for understanding why people get involved in political action (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995). Previously we noted how the belief in the value of socioeconomic equality, and opposition to oppression and exploitation, have been motivating ideas for many generations of activists. More specifically, leftist political values such as support for redistribution and public ownership have historically been very closely linked with working-class politics and the labor movement. Additionally, the social dimension became increasingly important, with tolerant and libertarian social values closely aligned to the new politics that stressed freedom and autonomy and authenticity along with equality and the struggle against economic exploitation. In this sense, the fight against oppression was understood to be one that emphasized liberation in both the economic and social spheres of control.

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In terms of cross-national differences, we can see that all countries score quite high in terms of leftist beliefs on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means strongly disagree and 5 means strongly agree. Demonstrators in the UK, Italy, and Sweden stand out in this regard in particular. Italian and Swedish demonstrators are particularly supportive of redistribution, while the British, Swedish, and Swiss demonstrators are the most supportive of public services, opposing privatization. All three countries have experienced privatization and cuts to public services and this may have led to an emphasis on these issues in these countries in particular. In the UK, the defense of public services and the opposition to welfare cuts were a key aspect of anti-austerity demonstrations. Support for libertarian values is also, as expected, high among demonstrators, but not as high on average as with leftist values. In particular, there is the highest support for encouraging independence in children rather than simply blind obedience to authority in Italy and Sweden. Once more, demonstrators in these two countries are the most extreme in their libertarian views as they were in their support for redistribution. There is very high support for immigration and free movement also in Italy and Sweden in particular, but means are relatively high also among demonstrators in the UK, Spain, and Switzerland.

One of the advantages of our data is that it allows us not only to zoom in on demonstrators and have large enough samples to analyze their characteristics cross-nationally, but also to discriminate between demonstrations on different issues. From the results presented in Table 3.1 we can see differences in terms of our key sociodemographic aspects, including class, highlighted. Historically, the traditional labor movement has tended to be focused on questions of redistribution and socioeconomic equality whereas the movements that have emerged since the 1960s and 1970s have tended to emphasize other aspects such as women's rights, LGBTQ+ rights, environmental protection, and so forth. The results for gender and demonstration issue show that women are more likely to attend demonstrations on cultural issues relative to men who, on the other hand, are more active in those on economic themes. This is potentially due to the fact that labor organizations tend to have more men as members and therefore are more likely to recruit men to attend demonstrations.

Given that the oldest and youngest generations are the most likely to be out of employment and therefore to be less likely to be preoccupied with labor struggles, they would be more likely to be involved in cultural demonstrations, whereas the middle 1960/1970s and 1980s and 1990s generations should in theory all be more likely to be involved in demonstrations over economic issues. The oldest generation and the youngest generation coming of age in the 2000s indeed tend to be more likely to attend demonstrations over cultural issues as opposed to economic ones. These generations are more likely to engage on cultural issues including the environment, women's rights, and so forth, though similar proportions are also involved in demonstrations over economic issues. On the other hand, while the 1960/1970s and 1980s generations do in fact

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tend to be more likely to attend economic demonstrations, the 1990s generation is equally likely to attend either kind.

More highly educated protesters are more likely to become engaged in demonstrations on cultural issues, whereas the least highly educated were more likely to engage in demonstrations on economic issues. These findings can be explained in terms of the different movements people engage in. On the one hand, individuals with lower education levels are more likely to be in manual occupations and therefore to be affiliated with trade unions and other labor organizations that are more likely to recruit participants to demonstrations over economic issues. On the other hand, individuals with higher education levels are more likely to be involved, to know someone who is involved in new social movement organizations, or to be members of groups or parties which are more likely to recruit to demonstrations over cultural issues.

As expected by theories on the new middle class, the salariat tend to be more involved in demonstrations on cultural issues, whereas individuals in the working class are more likely to be involved in demonstrations focusing on the economy. Individuals in intermediate professions, the unemployed, and students are equally likely to attend cultural and economic demonstrations. Unsurprisingly, individuals who are more likely to identify with the working class are also more likely to attend demonstrations on economic issues, whereas individuals in other classes prefer cultural ones. Individuals who identify with the lower middle class or with other or no classes are equally likely to attend demonstrations over cultural and economic issues. In terms of values and demonstration issue, we can see that with the leftist values that pattern is not as uniform as one might have expected. While support for redistribution is closely linked to participation in economic demonstrations over cultural issue protests, support for public services tends to be marginally more likely to be linked to participation in cultural demonstrations over economic ones. This is possibly linked to the fact that many demonstrations over cultural issues are linked also to questions over education, health services, childcare, and other public services. On the other hand, support for libertarian social values is very clearly aligned with a greater prominence of protest over cultural issues for both support for immigration and anti-authoritarianism and for the overall scale.

The other major dimension of comparison in our study is that between occasional and activist protesters. Results presented in Table 3.1 show that men are more likely to be seasoned demonstrators as opposed to more occasional protesters. This could be due to a number of reasons. For example, biographical availability theory highlights that having children might depress participation, and since women are more likely to have dependants this could explain these gender differences, allowing men fewer barriers to attend more demonstrations. Moreover, since these descriptive results do not discern by age or generation, it is likely that they reflect compositional issues with trade union and labor movement male activists more likely to attend given types of protests.

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The oldest and youngest generations are most likely to include occasional participants, whereas the 1980s and 1990s generations tend to include more activists than occasional demonstrators and the 1960s/1970s generation has equal proportions of both. These findings suggest that, among the oldest generation coming of age in the post-World War II period, before the rise of protest and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it is most likely that there are occasional protesters. Perhaps these were demonstrations over the environment or development issues attracting pensioners through religious organizations or churches. Moreover, given the younger age of the youngest generation and their lower levels of experience with protest, it makes sense that there would be a greater number of more occasional demonstrators relative to activists within this group. In the 1960s/1970s generation – a generation that has been known for its political proclivity – there were equal proportions of seasoned activists as well as individuals protesting more occasionally showing that amongst members of this generation coming of age in the heyday period of radicalism and protest movements, the "protest generation" has remained open to political participation and political engagement even in its older years. The same is true for the generation coming of age in the earlier years of the global justice movement. On the other hand, the generation coming of age in the 1980s has been seen as more apolitical, and here we find more occasional demonstrators than activists.

The findings for education level and activism are interesting. For a long time, the literature has shown that education has a powerful effect for promoting political participation (Brady et al. 1995). This could be for a number of reasons such as the fact that being more educated tends to be associated with greater political sophistication and interest thus providing the bedrock for activism. Moreover, the literature on inequalities in political participation clearly shows important gradients by education as well as class (Grasso 2018). If this were a simple linear relationship therefore, we would expect to find that more highly educated protesters should be more likely to be activists than occasional demonstrators and less educated protesters the opposite. However, the results show that, among those individuals with the lower education level (with secondary education or lower educational qualifications), we are more likely to find demonstration activists than occasionals demonstrators. Among the more educated groups (those with a BA or equivalent and those with MA or higher qualifications), there are more occasional demonstrators than activists. This suggests that, since among the lower educated barriers to participation and particularly political activism are higher – as we know from studies showing the important impact of education for differentiating between participants and non-participants – there is a greater tendency for the more committed individuals from the lower education group to become participants, therefore explaining why a higher proportion among them are activists.

Also reflecting previous results for education, the more resource-poor groups such as individuals belonging to the working class, or unemployed, tend to be more likely to be activists than occasional demonstrators, which once more supports the argument that individuals with higher levels of engagement among these

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more resource-poor groups are those that are able to surpass the barriers to participation. On the other hand, there are more occasional demonstrators in the middle classes since here participation costs are lower and individuals with greater resources are more likely to have the political sophistication and political interest requisite for mobilization on an individual level and thus needing fewer pulls through organizations such as trade unions or deep value commitment to socialist or other egalitarian principles. We also find more activists among those identifying with the working class and lower middle class, whereas those identifying with the upper class or upper middle class have more occasional demonstrators. Once more, this reflects the idea of those with greater class consciousness as being members of lower social classes and being more likely to be activists.

Turning to leftist and libertarian values, we can see that across both the redistribution and privatization items on the one hand, and the anti-authoritarianism and immigration items on the other, in all cases, activists are more strongly ideologically convinced, with higher values on the mean scales than occasional demonstrators on all six measures (the individual items and two combined scales). These differences are particularly large for redistribution and support for immigration and suggest that one of the major differences between individuals who engage in frequent activism and those who instead only protested once is the intensity of their beliefs in both egalitarian and libertarian principles. This ideological component of belief is particularly important for making sense of what motivates individuals to become activists and attend many demonstrations compared to the occasional protester.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE, POLITICAL VALUES, AND COMMITMENT

Thus far, we have looked at how the social bases and related political values of demonstrators vary across countries, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators. This already pointed to some important findings on the fact that resource-poor groups are underrepresented among demonstrators but that those that do participate tend to be more likely to be activists involved in social movements struggling over economic questions such as redistribution and inequality. We now turn to the analysis of the impact of sociodemographic variables – more specifically, social class – and the two value dimensions on commitment, or the determination to take to the streets as measured by the response "very much" to the question "How determined were you to participate in the demonstration?" This type of analysis will allow us not only to ascertain the extent to which sociodemographic characteristics account for variations in people's commitment to make sacrifices and bear costs on behalf of the cause, but it will also provide a more solid answer to the question of whether precarity could be a new basis for protest as well as to the question of the role of class identification which is so central in Marxist discourse. We do so by means of a series of logistic models regressing commitment on the variables discussed earlier, whereby we analyze the effects of both objective

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social-structural and subjective class identification as well as political values predictors of commitment.

Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression analysis aimed at ascertaining the effect of the covariants of commitment. It shows six models. Each model includes gender, generation, and education and the three key comparative variables (country, demonstration issue, and demonstrators' type). Model 1 tests for the effects of gender, generation, and education. Model 2 includes class. Model 3 adds class identification. Model 4 includes economic values. Model 5 includes social values and Model 6 includes three important controls often included in models of participation (political interest, political efficacy, and organizational membership) to see if these variables account for the other effects. The table presents results as odds ratios, which are more easily interpretable than logit coefficients.

The odds ratios in Model I show that men were on average less committed than women to attend the demonstration. As such these results show that women's stronger commitment allows them to overcome their greater, on average, barriers to participation. Relative to the 1960s/1970s generation, the older, post-World War II generation demonstrators are more committed, suggesting that for this older generation's members to take to the streets they need to be a strongly committed bunch. On the other hand, for the younger 1990s and 2000s generations, commitment is lower relative to the "protest generation" suggesting that they have greater opportunities to demonstrate so that higher levels of commitment are not as necessary to get them to the streets. Individuals that are more educated are less determined to participate relative to individuals in the lowest educational group. This further shows that the higher levels of commitment among the lower educated group allow them to overcome the greater costs and barriers to participation relative to more resourceful individuals who do not need such high levels of commitment to protest.

Turning to the results from Model 2, we can see that including occupation, the unemployed are less committed relative to the working class. This suggests that belonging to the working class heightens commitment to protest at least relative to those who are not in employment, going some way towards supporting Marxist thinking that the social nature of exploitation among manual workers contributes to their class consciousness and politicization. Including occupation does not weaken the effect of gender, cohort, and education, suggesting that their effect is independent from occupation.

The inclusion of class identification in Model 3 shows that, confirming Marxist thinking, this variable is particularly important for engagement, with individuals identifying with one of the lower classes or no class being more likely to be committed than those identifying with the upper class or upper middle class. This is particularly pronounced among the working class as would also be expected. Moreover, the inclusion of class identification removes the earlier effect for class, suggesting that class identification explains the effect

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TABLE 3.2. *Logistic regression models on commitment (odds ratios)*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Gender (male)	0.75***	(0.03)	0.74***	(0.03)	0.73***	(0.03)	0.73***	(0.03)	0.74***	(0.03)	0.67***	(0.03)
Cohorts												
Post-WWII generation	1.23*	(0.10)	1.24*	(0.11)	1.26**	(0.11)	1.26**	(0.11)	1.27**	(0.11)	1.22*	(0.11)
1960s/1970s generation (ref.)												
1980s generation	0.91	(0.06)	0.91	(0.06)	0.90	(0.06)	0.91	(0.06)	0.91	(0.06)	0.93	(0.06)
1990s generation	0.65***	(0.04)	0.64***	(0.04)	0.63***	(0.04)	0.64***	(0.04)	0.64***	(0.04)	0.66***	(0.04)
2000s generation	0.60***	(0.04)	0.58***	(0.04)	0.58***	(0.04)	0.60***	(0.04)	0.59***	(0.04)	0.60***	(0.04)
Education												
Secondary school or lower (ref.)												
BA or equivalent	0.77***	(0.05)	0.78***	(0.05)	0.82**	(0.05)	0.79***	(0.05)	0.78***	(0.05)	0.76***	(0.05)
MA or higher	0.66***	(0.03)	0.68***	(0.04)	0.73***	(0.04)	0.70***	(0.04)	0.69***	(0.04)	0.64***	(0.04)
Occupation												
Salariat			0.86	(0.07)	0.93	(0.08)	0.91	(0.08)	0.91	(0.08)	0.88	(0.08)
Intermediate professions			0.87	(0.08)	0.91	(0.09)	0.90	(0.09)	0.90	(0.09)	0.88	(0.09)
Working class (ref.)												
Unemployed			0.79*	(0.09)	0.83	(0.10)	0.82	(0.10)	0.82	(0.10)	0.80	(0.10)
Students			0.91	(0.09)	1.00	(0.11)	0.99	(0.10)	0.97	(0.10)	0.95	(0.10)
Class identification												
Upper class/Upper middle class (ref.)												
Lower middle class					1.12*	(0.06)	1.09	(0.06)	1.08	(0.06)	1.13*	(0.06)
Working class					1.43***	(0.10)	1.34***	(0.09)	1.32***	(0.09)	1.38***	(0.09)
Other/no class					1.19*	(0.09)	1.15	(0.09)	1.14	(0.09)	1.21*	(0.10)

(*continued*)

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TABLE 3.2. (*continued*)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Economic values (left-wing)							1.21***	(0.04)	1.18***	(0.04)	1.08*	(0.03)
Social values (libertarian)									1.10***	(0.03)	1.05	(0.03)
Political interest											1.75***	(0.08)
Political efficacy											1.17***	(0.05)
Organizational membership											1.14*	(0.08)
Activist	1.87***	(0.09)	1.86***	(0.09)	1.81***	(0.09)	1.71***	(0.09)	1.67***	(0.09)	1.55***	(0.08)
Economic issue	1.37***	(0.07)	1.36***	(0.07)	1.32***	(0.07)	1.32***	(0.07)	1.34***	(0.07)	1.33***	(0.07)
Country												
Belgium	1.19*	(0.10)	1.20*	(0.10)	1.26**	(0.11)	1.36***	(0.12)	1.42***	(0.13)	1.53***	(0.14)
Italy	1.02	(0.11)	1.04	(0.11)	1.07	(0.11)	1.10	(0.11)	1.10	(0.11)	1.26*	(0.13)
Netherlands	0.81**	(0.07)	0.81**	(0.07)	0.85	(0.07)	0.90	(0.08)	0.94	(0.08)	1.02	(0.09)
Spain	1.10	(0.10)	1.11	(0.10)	1.06	(0.09)	1.15	(0.10)	1.18	(0.11)	1.39***	(0.13)
Sweden (ref.)												
Switzerland	1.12	(0.10)	1.13	(0.10)	1.19*	(0.10)	1.23*	(0.11)	1.26**	(0.11)	1.31**	(0.12)
UK	0.94	(0.07)	0.94	(0.08)	0.93	(0.07)	0.95	(0.08)	0.98	(0.08)	1.00	(0.08)
Constant	1.44***	(0.13)	1.66***	(0.20)	1.32*	(0.17)	0.61**	(0.11)	0.51***	(0.09)	0.35***	(0.08)
Log-likelihood	−6492		−6490		−6475		−6454		−6448		−6358	
N	10,024		10,024		10,024		10,024		10,024		10,024	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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of class on commitment: the higher class identification of the working class as a group relative to the unemployed is likely what leads to their being more committed to protest in the name of the cause. This empirical finding casts further doubt, additionally to the empirical objections raised earlier, on the idea that the precariat can form a new class basis for protest. While structurally it is true that individuals in precarious occupations are in situations of inequality and exploitation, it would appear here that is the subjective component of class identity which is particularly relevant for making sense of activism for social change.

Including left–right economic values in Model 4 shows that this variable explains part of the effect of class identification but that it is important in its own right and also that working-class identification remains an important variable for political commitment even net of left–right values. This means that, while working-class identifiers share support for egalitarianism and economic redistribution, there is something more to their identification as a class than just shared support for egalitarianism that leads them to be committed to protest. This could be understood in terms of collective identity and social ties between activists as well as an oppositional culture against capitalism.

Similarly, in Model 5 we include social libertarian values, which are also shown to be linked to heightened political commitment. They very slightly reduce the effect of working-class identification and of leftist values, suggesting that working-class identifiers tend to be libertarian but their commitment is not explained solely through these value commitments and that leftists are also libertarian to some extent but that the two value dimensions are largely independent contributors to protest commitment in their own right.

Finally, including the standard predictors of participation (political interest, political efficacy, and organizational embeddedness) in Model 6 shows that the effect of all three is significant and also that, while the effect of libertarianism is no longer significant – suggesting that these individuals may be more embedded in political organizations and have more skills sustaining their commitment – left–right values and class identification remain important predictors of commitment.

In sum, the results from the regression models show that women's stronger commitment allows them to overcome their greater, on average, barriers to participation. Relative to the 1960s/1970s generation, the older, post-World War II generation demonstrators are more committed. On the other hand, for the younger 1990s and 2000s generations commitment is lower relative to the "protest generation," suggesting that they have greater opportunities to demonstrate so that higher levels of commitment are not as necessary to get them to the streets. Moreover, higher levels of commitment among the lower educated group allow them to overcome the greater costs and barriers to participation. The unemployed were also found to be less committed relative to the working class. This suggests that belonging to the working class heightens commitment to protest at least relative to those who are not in employment, going some way towards supporting Marxist thinking that the social nature

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of exploitation among manual workers contributes to their class consciousness and politicization. Confirming Marxist thinking, class identification with the working class or lower middle class is found to be particularly relevant for commitment. Moreover, the inclusion of class identification removes the effect for class, showing that class identification explains the effect of class on commitment. This finding thus problematizes the idea that the precariat can form a new class basis for protest. Many classes have been exploited through history that did not rise up to defend their interests. The specific conditions of the urban working class allowed them to come together to realize their exploitation as a political fact that could be redressed and not as an immutable characteristic of life as it would have appeared to a feudal peasant, for example. As such, for precarization to form a new momentum for social change there is a need for political work and the building of collective identity and ideological critique of present economic conditions and sociopolitical arrangements. Exploitation on its own does not spontaneously lead to identity formation and political action for social change. Importantly, while left–right economic values explain part of the effect of class identification, it remains important in its own right for political commitment. In other words, there is more to identification as a class than just shared support for egalitarianism. Social libertarian values reduced somewhat the effect of working-class identification, suggesting that working-class commitment is not explained solely through value commitments.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed the extent to which protest has remained a resource of relatively powerless groups through an investigation of the social bases of participation in street demonstrations. Results show that today street demonstrations tend to overrepresent the middle classes and underrepresent the working classes. In some countries, however, the unemployed were overrepresented – namely in Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland – suggesting that precarization could potentially become a new base for protest. We found confirmation of the arguments in the literature that men tend to be overrepresented in many countries and that the more highly educated resource-rich individuals are more active. Results also confirmed that the 1960/1970s generation is still the most active in most countries, although the 2000s generation socialized in the current period of crisis was also very active.

Our analysis bears out the idea that the social bases have widened considerably since the times of the working-class labor movement of Marxist imprint to include middle-class professionals. As scholars studying new social movements have noted, the middle classes and particularly the sociocultural professional sections were particularly active in these movements (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Kriesi 1989). We do not find much evidence here, however, that in the wake of the recurrent economic crises of late neoliberalism, grievances and

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socioeconomic deprivation have become once more central to the social bases underpinning social movements. Individuals from resource-poor groups tend to be underrepresented. Furthermore, one of the key findings of this chapter is that more resource-poor groups tend to be more likely to engage in demonstrations over economic issues and also that, in order to overcome the higher barriers to participation, those individuals from these groups that do engage end up being particularly committed.

Left-wing values and class identification – particularly with the working class – also tend to be important predictors of sustained activism. As such, while in objective terms individuals in the working class are less likely to turn out in the streets than rich, educated middle classes, those who do so are a particularly self-selected and committed group. This raises important issues in terms of the equality of political voice. Studies have shown how today individuals in the working class are most likely to be politically disengaged *tout court* (Evans and Tilley 2017). On the other hand, middle-class individuals are more likely to be engaged and participatory suggesting the existing inequalities in resources are compounded by the greater likelihood that their demands are the ones that will be heeded. However, the highly committed activist working-class members and identifiers that are strongly politically committed might find a way to politicize and engage other members of their social class.

Economic contexts characterized by deteriorating economic conditions could be seen to provide fertile ground for the development of wider societal grievances particularly among the most deprived groups which we know have also been hit the hardest. These deteriorating economic contexts open up the space for politicization and the realization that private economic troubles are actually social and political economic problems linked to capitalism's tendency to crisis, and in turn this could spur mobilization to action by wider sections of the working class and other resource-poor groups such as the unemployed who are the most likely sufferers from austerity and economic downturns (Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b). One way in which this politicization could happen is through activism in institutional and extra-institutional politics as well as through engagement in political parties. It is to examining this aspect that we now turn.

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4

Protest and Institutional Politics

This chapter deals with the relationship between protest politics and institutional politics. We look at the link between different forms of participation as well as that between protest and voting. Some scholars have suggested a substitution thesis of specialization, in other words, that individuals are moving to protest activism from more conventional modes of participation (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Norris 2002). On the other hand, social movement scholars have urged to bridge the literature on protest politics with that on electoral behavior (Císař and Navrátil 2015; della Porta et al. 2017; Heaney 2013; Heaney and Rojas 2014; Hutter et al. 2018; Kriesi 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012; McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013; Norris et al. 2015). Political parties, particularly those on the Left, can be seen as the natural allies of social movements. In this chapter we build on these insights to examine the individual-level dynamics linking party identification and attachment to institutional and extra-institutional – including social movement – activism. While most scholarship aiming to link electoral and protest politics to date has focused on movement–party interactions (Císař and Navrátil 2015; della Porta et al. 2017; Heaney 2013; Heaney and Rojas 2014; Hutter et al. 2018; Kriesi 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012; McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013; Norris et al. 2015), we focus on the individual-level perspective by examining the extent to which individuals with different party allegiances as well as institutional and extra-institutional participation levels engage in protest. The aim is to address questions pertaining to the linkages between different types of institutional and extra-institutional forms of activism in Western Europe and follow the calls for studies analyzing the links between parties and protest. Scholars have suggested that crises can provide fertile conditions for widening mobilization and for the increased interaction between parties and protest and the potential for wider societal mobilization leading to social change (della Porta 2015; della Porta et al. 2017). Accordingly, this chapter addresses the linkages between different types of institutional and extra-institutional participation among demonstrators to clarify the participatory

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dynamics underlying these processes. Consistent with what we did in the previous chapter and will do in subsequent chapters, we also look at differences across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators.

THE CRISIS OF RESPONSIBILITY, INSTITUTIONAL, AND EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

Institutional participation is understood in the literature as involvement in those political activities mediated by the traditional organs of participation, including membership of these organizations, such as trade unions and political parties (Dekker et al. 1997; Mair 2006; Morales 2009). These types of activities are seen to be in decline. According to some, we are witnessing the transformation of party democracy into "audience democracy" (Manin 1997). For others, whilst politics used to "belong to the citizen and something in which the citizen could, and often did, participate in," today it has instead become "an external world which people watch from outside: a world of political leaders, separate from that of the citizenry" (Mair 2006: 44). Many related analyses of falling political involvement in Western Europe focus on declining party membership and turnout (Dekker et al. 1997; Morales 2009). However, scholars studying unconventional political participation claim that participation is actually going up (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Norris, 2002). They argue that demonstrations and other forms of extra-institutional political participation originally associated with the rise of new social movements and the new politics in the late 1960s, and more recently the rise of consumer politics, are now commonplace (Norris 2002, 2004; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). By 1978, Tilly argued that protest had become another way of mobilizing public opinion and influencing governmental agendas. Dalton (2008) further argued that protest had become common among the educated and politically sophisticated middle classes. Modern demonstrations were no longer seen as spontaneous outbreaks aimed at overthrowing the status quo, but were rather consciously organized by social movements to influence the political agenda.

As della Porta and Diani (2006: 1) point out, the political events of the 1960s are not just the stuff of history textbooks but they have important implications for the study of political participation today since, while "the excitement and optimism of the 1960s may be long gone … social movements, protest actions, and, more generally, political organizations unaligned with major political parties or trade unions have become permanent components of Western democracies. It is no longer possible to describe protest politics, grassroots participation, and symbolic challenges as 'unconventional'." Several other studies have argued that political participation has changed over time and that people today are more likely to be involved in protest politics and social movement

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activism (Inglehart 1990; Norris 2004; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). For Inglehart, this is a positive change: "the institutions that mobilized political participation in the late 19th and 20th centuries – labor union, church, and mass political party – were hierarchical organizations in which a small number of leaders or political bosses led a mass of disciplined troops ... A newer elite-directing mode of participation expresses the individual's preferences with far greater precision and in much more detail than the old" (Inglehart 1990: 339).

Electoral politics and social movements have traditionally been studied separately by different groups of scholars. However, both voting and joining in demonstrations are forms of participation aimed at influencing political decision-making, allowing citizens to have their say in the democratic running of political affairs. Moreover, the literature clearly shows that parties and movements regularly influence each other. Parties become involved in movements and movements influence parties, and many individuals become involved in parties and conventional politics as well as movements and unconventional action. Governments face a crisis of responsiveness (Mair 2006) as well as a crisis of representation (Giugni and Lorenzini 2018), or what della Porta (2015: 111) aptly calls a crisis of responsibility, that is, "a drastic drop in the capacity of government to respond to citizens' requests." If anti-austerity movements are understood in this sense as responding to this "crisis of responsibility," this suggests that their participants are unlikely to be active through conventional means and less so than participants in protests surrounding cultural issues. As Polanyi (1944: 139) noted long ago, the idea of the invisible hand was always an illusion and "laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state." Streeck (2014) further points out how the twin principles of regime allocation of democratic capitalism visibly come into conflict in the crisis of neoliberalism: social need versus marginal productivity. At the same time, the presentation of political and economic decisions as depoliticized denies the normative and deliberative nature of what should be democratic politics (Hay 2007). The presentation of market forces as dictating to European governments what political and economic steps they should be taking can be seen to further weaken the idea that governments could act for and in the name of citizens.

Since conflicts over redistribution no longer play out as they used to do in the arena of institutional politics through parties and other conventional organizations, they have moved into extra-parliamentary protest, so that the "underlying deficit reflects reification of communicatively structured domains of action that will not respond to the media of money or power" (Habermas 1987: 392). At the same time, while some parties espousing "new" issues, such as the Greens, were founded, they never reflected the structuring ability of the communist and socialist parties with respect to the class cleavage (della Porta 2015; Diani 1995). Whereas those political agencies that tended to reflect the political interests of marginalized groups in the political sphere have weakened and broken down, the processes of de-industrialization and migration in particular have meant that "the size of social groups which lack full access to

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citizenship and its entitlements has grown … the sense of general instability has been further reinforced by the growth of individual mobility, principally horizontal … the (re)emergence of ethnicity or gender-based lines of fragmentation within socioeconomic groups have made it more difficult to identify specific social categories" (della Porta and Diani 2006: 39). As such, there are two contrasting tendencies in the current political juncture: there is a growing social basis of marginalized and deprived "losers of globalization" (Kriesi et al. 2012), while at the same time we see the absence of political parties and political organs capable of representing their interests. This suggests that the extra-institutional domain should become increasingly more relevant, unless new "movement parties" (della Porta et al. 2017) can take the center stage politically, and indeed parties such as *Syriza*, *Podemos*, and the *Movimento 5 Stelle* have all had major electoral gains in recent years. As such, it seems that institutional politics could be reinvigorated by new or reformed parties offering alternatives to the centrist mainstream consensus or alternatively, social democratic parties that have moved to the center could splinter and realign themselves on the Left to provide voice and hope for the dispossessed and precarious citizens clamoring for social change today.

BRIDGING INSTITUTIONAL AND EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

As noted above, recently there have been several attempts by students of social movements to bridge the literature on protest politics with that on electoral behavior (della Porta 2015; Hutter 2014a; Kriesi et al. 2012; McAdam and Tarrow 2010). Political parties, and particularly those on the Left, can be seen as the natural allies of social movements. However, in some contexts and under certain circumstances, they could also become enemies. Times of crisis are times of shifting alignments where leftist governments in particular can be seen as under pressure as they navigate the conflicting demands of being responsive to their core constituencies, and also balancing the budget sheets and fulfilling the expectations of supra-national bodies and financial markets. As social democratic parties have moved to the center ground and espoused centrist policies, this has opened up political space for populist right and other types of institutional and extra-institutional challengers. In various works, authors (Hutter 2014a; Kriesi et al. 2012) have argued that the populist right turn has brought to the fore a new cleavage around integration–demarcation issues.

As illustrated by Kitschelt (1988), the left-libertarian turn had shifted the major axis of competition to encompass social issues, but competition around these issues had largely aligned itself to the major class cleavage so that libertarian social values had come to be associated with leftist economic positions, whereas rightist economics were associated with more conservative social values. More recently, the integration–demarcation cleavage is understood to have increasingly gained prominence, and vulnerabilities brought about by the crisis

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and wider processes of globalization are understood to have widened the support bases for populist right parties. In this context, Kriesi et al. (2012) focus on the cleavage between winners and losers of globalization to explain support for these new contenders. While national characteristics are understood to have an influence on the extent to which the integration–demarcation cleavage rises to prominence, it could be argued that this dimension has become most prominent where the economic dimension of class has increasingly been underplayed by social democratic parties striving for centrist positions.

Whereas in the past the working classes tended to support the Left en bloc, the decline of discourses around socioeconomic inequality means that the Left is no longer the obvious voting choice for individuals in manual occupations and other socially deprived groups in increasingly unequal societies. Kriesi (1989) argued that sociocultural specialists within the middle class had become the most likely group to struggle for social change during the left-libertarian turn of the late 1960s to early 1980s. However, since sociocultural specialists could now be considered to be the "winners" from globalization trends, they could in theory also become less likely social change activists. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter 3, della Porta (2015) has shown how, with rising austerity, some theorists have seen in the rise of the precariat a potentiality for "bringing capitalism back in" to protest in the sense that this new cleavage could lead to a new class conflict between the modern "haves" and "have nots," in turn spurring renewed efforts at social change.

Moreover, recent scholarship inquiring into the complex relationships between social movements and party politics argues that social movements conceive political parties as "hierarchical organizations, self-insulated, remote from the citizenry and inattentive to social change" (Piccio 2016: 263). Regardless of this, many social movements have historically worked with parties on common causes. Moreover, at their origins many major parties were movements or had very close links with movements. Social movements are understood as loosely connected informal networks of individuals, groups, and organizations (della Porta and Diani 2006; Diani 1995). This heterogeneity, in turn, suggests that individuals within movements or movement organizations may themselves hold quite diverse positions on issues. While some movements may refuse to work with political parties, by and large the success of social movements in enacting social change is intimately linked to their successful influencing of political parties and their backing by political allies that are system insiders and are willing to fight for the movement's goals within institutional settings (Kriesi et al. 1995). And yet, while the link between social movements and parties is clearly fundamental for understanding patterns of activism and the trajectories of social change, the social movement literature has generally remained silent on the topic of political parties (Piccio 2016). Most recently, there have been attempts at filling this lacuna, for example in recent studies on "movement parties" struggling against the economic crisis (della Porta et al. 2017).

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Studies have shown that the relationship between protest and electoral politics is reinforcing on the Left but substitutive on the Right (Hutter 2014a). By and large, the work on the relationship between protest and parties has focused on movements and has tended to argue that, if parties articulate a certain discourse, then that reduces the political space for movements and there is less need for mobilization on that issue (Tarrow 1996; Tilly 1999). The literature has noted how political space delimits patterns of mobilization by actors. Research on the extreme Right has shown that, where established or moderate right-wing parties articulate a radical agenda, the space for radical parties becomes smaller with support moving to the established party (Giugni et al. 2005; Koopmans 1996; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). Research has further shown that the interaction of party and protest fields needs to be understood in terms of both Left and Right, but also needs to take into account the importance of secondary conflict axes that are rising in prominence. In this respect, Hutter (2014a) shows that for the political Right success in formal politics decreases protest, whereas the Left in government reinforces protest of allied movement forces. McAdam and Tarrow (2013) found congruence for both Left and Right in the United States, so that governments of either stripe opened up opportunities for their movement allies. On the other hand, there is evidence of countervailing tendencies for Eastern Europe, where right-wing governments stimulate protest, whereas leftist governments do not (Císař and Navrátil 2015).

Political process theorists have historically considered the broader context of mobilization central for understanding social movement activism. Factors such as the degree of openness of the political system, the configuration of political alignments (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 2011), and the presence of institutional allies (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1978) or favorable discursive political opportunity structures (Koopmans et al. 2005) were seen as central factors for understanding mobilization. However, despite this, there has been little examination of the ways in which parties and protest relate to each other at the individual level. Based on previous research, three types of factors in particular can be understood to explain under what circumstances party members might support or become involved in social movement activities: ideology, network, and strategy (Piccio 2016). First, party members may share a social movement's goals (ideology). In this respect, research has shown that for reasons of identity coherence individuals will tend to participate in social movement activities when these match their goals. Thus, party members will be more likely to participate in movements that have a closer ideological positioning to their own (Kriesi et al. 1995). Second, other party members may be involved in social movement activities (network). The literature has noted that participation in political parties and social movement organizations are not mutually exclusive but rather more likely to be cumulative than substitutive (Norris 2002). In this respect, then, party

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members are more likely to get involved in social movement activities since they are more likely to get information and to become recruited through their wider networks (Schussman and Soule 2005). Third, party members may feel that their party would benefit from supporting social movements (strategy). In this respect, vulnerability in the parties' electoral environment has been seen as favoring interaction with social movements since parties are understood to employ strategies that are beneficial for their organization, that is, to gain electoral support (Goldstone 1991; Kriesi and Wisler 1996). In particular, electoral competition on the Left has been shown to be an important leverage for social democratic parties to become more supportive of new social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995). However, this might vary for different types of movements.

INSTITUTIONAL AND EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION AMONG DEMONSTRATORS

In Chapter 2 we have shown the involvement of citizens in a range of political participation forms in the seven countries covered by our study. We observed different levels both across countries, owing to a variety of historical and institutional reasons, and across forms, some political activities being more popular than others. Here we examine the extent to which people who participate in street demonstrations also make use of other forms of participation, whether institutional or extra-institutional. To what extent do demonstrators also engage in other forms of participation? Do they limit themselves mainly to other extra-institutional forms, as the substitution thesis would have it, or are they also committed to institutional politics? Do we observe a difference in this regard with the more general population? And how do the participation patterns of demonstrators vary across countries, types of demonstrations, and types of demonstrators? We can answer these questions by looking at Table 4.1, which shows how the involvement of demonstrators in different forms of political participation varies across countries, cultural and economic issues, and occasional demonstrators and activists. Although the specific forms are not always exactly the same, while looking at these findings we should keep an eye on the distributions shown in Chapter 2 among the general population. If, as we believe, the thesis of the substitution between institutional and extra-institutional engagement does not hold, we should observe higher levels of institutional engagement among demonstrators.

Examining differences in the mean scale of institutional activism, we can see that the UK stands out as having the highest mean, with most individuals having completed about three out of four activities. This is followed by the rest of the countries, where demonstrators have on average achieved only about two out of four institutional activities, in the following order: Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. We can get a better grasp on this by looking in more detail at the specific forms of participation. The highest levels of reported turnout among participants in demonstrations are to be found in

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TABLE 4.1. *Institutional and extra-institutional participation of demonstrators by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages and means)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Institutional participation (%)											
Voted in last national election	93.0	88.0	90.7	88.6	91.4	78.8	84.0	87.2	88.4*	87.6	87.9
Contacted politician or official	34.2	25.5	23.2	28.9	39.3	28.1	64.3	38.2***	32.2	21.2	40.9***
Donated money to political cause	39.3	23.6	32.6	32.7	52.5	63.7	57.2	51.1***	35.6	30.8	48.8***
Worn/displayed badge or sticker	50.4	58.3	27.6	50.6	57.1	55.6	62.6	54.2***	46.4	25.9	59.8***
Scale (mean 0–4)	2.18	1.96	1.75	2.01	2.41	2.27	2.70	2.32***	2.03	1.65	2.37***
Extra-institutional participation (%)											
Signed a petition/public letter	75.4	80.6	74.1	74.5	78.0	87.3	89.1	83.8***	75.7	69.7	85.2***
Boycotted certain products	43.8	63.6	39.6	44.1	73.9	75.9	67.2	67.1***	46.8	46.2	62.1***
Bought products	66.7	66.5	53.4	56.9	84.7	83.2	77.5	79.5***	58.4	64.5	72.5***
Joined a strike	34.8	62.6	11.9	50.7	4.9	9.2	12.1	13.1	35.7***	6.2	31.4***
Taken part in direct action	16.7	23.9	8.0	23.5	10.1	15.4	18.3	14.2	17.8***	2.6	21.1***
Used violent forms of action	0.8	1.8	0.8	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.3	1.3	1.6	0.6	1.8***
Scale (mean 0–6)	2.38	2.99	1.88	2.52	2.53	2.73	2.65	2.59***	2.35	1.90	2.74***
Party identification (party family) (%)											
Communist	2.4	36.2	0.1	1.9	0.4	2.6	1.3	4.5	5.2	1.0	6.2***
Socialist/New Left	12.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	41.2	9.2	7.4	12.7***	5.7	3.7	11.4***
Social democratic/center-left	19.1	23.5	15.3	1.4	26.0	29.0	26.0	19.3	19.5	16.7	20.2***
Green	30.2	0.9	14.3	0.0	20.7	30.6	29.2	31.2***	5.7	20.0*	18.2
Liberal	5.8	10.3	4.2	0.0	1.7	3.5	16.0	9.4***	2.5	9.0***	4.9
Right/Christian Democratic	7.9	1.0	3.0	0.0	1.2	1.0	3.0	2.4	2.5	3.5*	2.1

(*continued*)

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TABLE 4.1. (*continued*)

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Other	17.8	0.1	0.5	5.3	5.7	1.2	0.3	4.1	4.3	3.4	4.3*
Prefer not to say/no party	4.5	27.2	62.6	91.4	3.1	22.9	17.0	16.3	54.5***	42.9***	32.5
Party attachment (%)											
Very closely	17.5	15.2	8.4	16.2	39.5	20.9	21.6	20.5***	17.7	10.3	22.7***
Quite closely	41.4	41.4	35.2	36.6	44.2	50.1	39.7	44.0***	37.0	38.1	41.9***
Not very closely	29.3	18.7	49.3	19.2	12.5	9.9	23.5	22.3	27.7***	39.5***	20.7
Other	11.8	24.7	7.1	28.0	3.8	19.2	15.3	12.7	17.6***	12.1	14.8***

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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Belgium. This is not surprising given that this country has enforced compulsory voting. But turnout levels are high in all the countries, with the partial exception of Switzerland, where they are a bit lower. If we compare these figures with those shown in Chapter 2, we can see that, in all cases, among demonstrators there are higher reported levels of turnout than those found among the general population and, as such, the idea that protest substitutes for electoral participation does not hold sway: clearly, institutional participation is higher among demonstrators than among the general population. If protest was replacing institutional engagement, then we should see lower levels among those that are most likely to engage in protests. This provides evidence that individuals that take part in one form of participation such as protest are in fact not less but more likely to also participate in other modes such as voting, regardless of whether different activities come from the institutional or extra-institutional repertoire and that this pattern is repeated cross-nationally. While some scholars have argued that the decline of participation in electoral politics is not such a concern since individuals are simply turning to other forms of extra-institutional politics such as protest (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Norris 2002), our results would instead warn caution.

We know from Chapter 2 and also from other studies (Grasso 2016) that the number of people involved in protest activities in any given period is quite small. This means that the potential for protest to provide an alternative avenue of participation is potentially limited and that in general there is less advocacy than students of social movements often tend to think (Burstein 2014). As such, it is unlikely that those people that are shying away from voting are turning to protest instead. We would expect that those individuals who are not voting are much more likely to join the ranks of the politically inactive rather than of the protest activists. Indeed, we know from several studies that individuals with fewer resources have traditionally been and still today continue to be less likely to participate in general (Grasso 2018; Verba et al. 1995). The results presented here provide further evidence to show that protest becomes an additional resource in the toolkit of individuals who are already engaging politically through both institutional and extra-institutional means.

Important variations can also be observed in the other modes of conventional participation. For example, we can see that contacting a politician – for example, writing to MPs – is a particularly popular activity among demonstrators in the UK, where about three-quarters of the respondents said they do so, whereas this is much less so in the other six countries. The Westminster or majoritarian electoral system arguably encourages a strong link between the elected and their constituency. Most importantly for our present purpose, we can see that, compared to the results for the general population reported in Chapter 2 (where no country reported over 20 percent participation), these are much higher reported levels among demonstrators. Once more, we find that the substitution thesis does not hold sway: individuals who are engaged in unconventional modes

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of action – in this case, street demonstrations – are more engaged than the average citizen in conventional modes of participation as well. Therefore, institutional and extra-institutional politics intersect and are combined by activists to achieve their political ends. An individual may join a demonstration on a certain issue and also write to their MP on the same topic, pressuring them by different means to change things or prevent changes from taking place.

Donating money to a political cause – another widespread institutional form of participation – is particularly popular among demonstrators in Switzerland, but also the UK and Sweden, where over half of the respondents said they have engaged in this form, while only a quarter of them have done so in Italy. Those countries where the new social movement sector tends to be strongest are also those where we see the highest levels of donating money. Indeed, if one considers the political philosophies behind different types of movement organizations, we can see that charity would be most related to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) linked to new social movements, whereas leftist radical organizations or even communist and socialist parties would tend to emphasize political commitment to bring about social change to unfair and economic and social systems rather than ameliorating things through small patches or cures making capitalism more humane.

In all the countries under analysis except for the Netherlands, over half of the demonstrators said they have worn or displayed a badge or sticker. This level is highest in the UK followed by Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, and finally, far below the level of the other countries, the Netherlands. Once again, if we compare to the results in Chapter 2, these levels are significantly higher than those reported in the general population.

Thus far we have looked at institutional forms of participation. What about extra-institutional political activities, which most typically are adopted by social movements? Italy, followed by Switzerland, the UK, Sweden, and Spain, stands out as the country with the highest extra-institutional participation, with on average individuals having participated in three out of six of the activities. Belgium and the Netherlands register lower averages of two out of six activities. As we shall see in more detail below, Italy and Spain tend to be more radical, whereas the UK Sweden, and Switzerland are more oriented towards consumerism and low-risk activism.

As we saw in Chapter 2 for the general population, signing petitions is among the most popular extra-institutional forms of political participation. This is all the more true when we look at the figures for participants in demonstrations, as we can see that signing a petition attracts very large proportions of respondents across countries, ranging from nine individuals out of ten having signed a petition in the UK and Switzerland to three out of four in Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands. These proportions are much higher compared to the results for the general population, confirming once more that demonstrators are a particularly politically active group.

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Reflecting the trends observed among the general population, boycotts and buycotts are also very popular among the narrower circle of demonstrators. Indeed, political consumerism has become a widespread form of political contestation in recent years (Micheletti 2003; Stolle and Micheletti 2013). This kind of political engagement is most often used by demonstrators in Sweden and Switzerland, but is also popular in the UK and Italy, while it is less often adopted in the other three countries. Once more, compared to the results for the general population in Chapter 2, we can see that reported levels among demonstrators are much higher.

Strikes are one of the most typical forms of action in the repertoire of contention of modern social movements (Tilly 1986; Tilly et al. 1975). They have in particular been part of the repertoire of labor movements. The results for striking show very large cross-national differences in the extent to which demonstrators take up this activity. This can give us clues into the character of protest in different countries. In some countries, the much higher strike levels among protesters would suggest that striking – for example, general strikes – remains part of the wider repertoire of political contention as historically tied to strong labor movement traditions. Italy, followed closely by Spain and more remotely by Belgium, stand out as the countries with high strike participation, with the other countries showing much lower levels. Various historical and institutional reasons might be evoked to explain this, including the persisting salience of the class cleavage, the structure of the union system, and, in the Belgian case, the particular involvement of unions in the welfare state system. Interestingly, the countries where political consumerism is most popular are also those where striking is the lowest. It is also lowest in those countries where the new social movement sector is strongest, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

Striking is a special form of direct action, one aiming to disrupt the regular functioning of labor relations. Looking at other forms of direct action, we can see that they are also marked by large cross-national differences, with levels much higher in some countries relative to others. Italy and Spain both stand out again with the highest levels, followed by the UK, Belgium, and Switzerland, and lastly the Netherlands and Sweden at the bottom end. Once more, the countries where political consumerism is more popular also tend to have lower levels of direct action. These are also those countries that tend to have a stronger new social movement sector.

Our type of protest survey data allows us to distinguish between individuals involved in protest issues and therefore to examine how the patterns of participation of demonstrators in cultural and economic-focused events differ. As we can see in Table 4.1, with the exception of voting, all the other types of institutional activities are more likely to be practiced by individuals attending cultural demonstrations, suggesting that their repertoire is more diversified. Moreover, given prominent discussions in the literature linking the decline of institutional

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activism and the substitution of it with extra-institutional activism with the emergence of new values and new politics in the cultural domain, one would have rather expected that institutional participation should be more popular among individuals involved in demonstrations and movements focused on economic issues, that is, those more closely linked to the "old politics" of class and left–right conflict focused on redistribution and socioeconomic egalitarianism.

In effect, only voting follows this pattern, an exception to the wider pattern of participants at cultural demonstrations being more likely to be active in the various institutional political activities relative to those participating in economic demonstrations. Individuals participating in economic demonstrations tend to be more likely to vote than those participating in cultural demonstrations. This suggests that there is more overlap between institutional and extra-institutional repertoires with regard to economic issues. While new social movements emerging in the 1960s and 1970s tended to be more closely linked to extra-institutional politics, struggles over labor rights and other primarily economic questions have traditionally been fought over in terms of the struggle between Left and Right politics also within the sphere of institutional party politics. As such, it is more likely that demonstrations extend these struggles within the extra-institutional spheres so that activists campaigning on these topics may already be voting for parties pushing policies in the institutional arena.

Participants in demonstrations on cultural issues are more likely to have contacted a politician than those attending demonstrations on economic issues. We know from Chapter 3 already that individuals taking part in demonstrations linked to cultural issues emerging with the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s tend to be more middle class and more resourceful than individuals engaging in demonstrations on economic issues. We also know that more resourceful individuals are more likely to engage politically across domains and repertoires such as the institutional and extra-institutional. This result can be interpreted in light of these two factors: individuals who are more resourceful are both more likely to engage in demonstrations around cultural issues and also to have engaged in a wider variety of political actions, including contacting a politician.

Donating money to a political cause is also more popular among those engaging in cultural demonstrations, which can be linked both to the above argument about movement sectors and underlying philosophies as well as to the one put forward with respect to contacting a politician linked to resources as associated both with new social movement participation and more widespread activism generally. Moreover, donating money is more likely to be associated with the politics of new social movements rather than those of more leftist radical organizations or even socialist parties, which would be more likely to emphasize the need for social change rather than small patches to ameliorate conditions for making capitalism more humane.

We also find that participants in cultural demonstrations are more likely to have worn or displayed a badge or sticker than those attending economic

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demonstrations. Once more, this shows that individuals active in cultural demonstrations are participatory pluralists to a greater degree than those attending demonstrations surrounding economic issues. This could also reflect the fact that the anti-austerity protests in this period, focusing on economic issues, may have been more likely to recruit to the street individuals that were not particularly active politically previously and, as such, that would explain why on the whole those from economic demonstrations are less active than those at cultural demonstrations in the other institutional forms of action.

We also find that, in general, participants in cultural demonstrations typical of new social movements tend to be more involved in extra-institutional participation, particularly the more low-risk modes such as petitioning and political consumerism. On the whole, for differences by demonstration issue we can see here that petitioning and consumerist activism are more closely linked to cultural issues, whereas the more radical forms of strikes and direct action tend to be affiliated with contention in the economic realm.

The literature emphasizes how the expansion of protest, including petitioning and political consumerism, since the 1960s and 1970s is closely linked with the emergence of new issues and new politics (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Given this, we would have expected individuals involved in cultural demonstrations around these "new" issues such as women's rights, the environment, LGBTQ+ rights, and so forth to be more likely to engage through these types of extra-institutional means relative to economic protesters. Indeed, as we can see, petitioning is more popular among those involved in demonstrations around cultural issues relative to those involved in demonstrations on economic issues, although the levels remain high in both cases. This is not surprising given the ubiquity of petitions today and the creation of so many online platforms and their use particularly for environmental and other types of campaigns grouped under the cultural sphere. Moreover, given the low costs incurred when performing this action, it is not surprising that so many demonstrators are involved in this activity – at levels comparable to those for voting or higher in several countries – and that levels are also quite high among the general population, as seen in Chapter 2.

Participation in boycotts and buycotts is also more popular among those involved in cultural causes. This is not surprising given the central role that these types of activities play for the environmental movement and other sustainable-living campaigns. Whereas issues surrounding the economy are more likely to need governmental action through the change of laws or policies such as the deep cuts to social safety nets and services for vulnerable groups, including disabled people, retirees, and youth, with cultural issues individual behavior change is more likely to be seen as an effective political tactic for achieving the movement's objectives, particularly if many people can be sensitized to the cause and the related issues. For example, choosing fair trade products or products from companies that have pledged to offset carbon emissions is often promoted by environmental movement activists as more direct and immediate

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means to "make a difference" every day. Moreover, companies found guilty of employing children in sweatshops or giving employees terrible working conditions, for example, can be boycotted as urged by various activist campaigns. In this sense, cultural issues appear to be more amenable to being tackled by such consumerist activities relative to wider economic goals.

Strikes have historically been the preferred mode for workers to make their demands heard. Refusing to work until working conditions and agreements were improved has historically been one of the few tools that the exploited urban working class has had at its disposal, even before it was granted the vote and suffrage was restricted only to those who owned property. As expected, striking is more closely linked to protesting around economic issues, with about a third of those involved in demonstrations in this sphere having conducted this activity, versus only little more than a tenth of those involved in cultural ones. Direct action is also more closely linked to economic issues than to cultural issues, although the difference is not very large, but here overall levels are also smaller.

On the whole, as was already the case for institutional participation above, the pattern is not at all as distinct as the literature might suggest in terms of a straightforward connection between the economic/redistribution domain and institutional activism, on the one hand, and between the cultural/social values domain and extra-institutional activism, on the other. Cultural activists are in fact more likely than economic activists to participate in most institutional activities bar voting, and economic activists are more likely than cultural activists to engage in the two more radical extra-institutional activities, namely striking and direct action. Cultural activists are more likely than economic activists to engage in the more mainstream modes of extra-institutional activism, namely petitioning and boycotting/buycotting. This reveals that economic activists are more extreme – they vote and engage in strikes and direct action on the two ends of the conventional–unconventional spectrum – the most mainstream and the most radical activities (except for violence) combined. On the other hand, cultural activists are more likely to engage in the mid-level kinds of activities from both domains.

As should be clear by now, a major aspect of comparison in our study is that based on examining the characteristics of protesters engaged in different levels of protest activism. What are the differences in the political behavior – both institutional and extra-institutional – among occasional and more seasoned protesters? As we can see in Table 4.1, activists are more likely than occasional demonstrators to have engaged in all the political activities bar voting (where there are no significant differences), suggesting that activism spills over across participatory domains and is not restricted to one repertoire over another, therefore providing additional evidence against the substitution thesis.

With respect to voting, we see that, if we compare to the general population in Chapter 2, turnout levels are higher among demonstrators across all countries. Moreover, there are no differences in turnout by activism level, so that

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irregular demonstration participants are about as likely to vote as are activists. As such, it would seem that the key issue is whether one demonstrates at all; even having demonstrated just the one time already suggests that someone will be much more likely than the average person to have also turned out to vote. After all, this makes sense, since protest participation is normally understood as a more costly and risky activity: even in mainly peaceful protests, there is a chance of containment or "kettling" today. As such, it is likely that if one is to participate politically, voting or another more mainstream activity would probably be prior to demonstrating. One can interpret these results to suggest that some individuals are more likely to be politically active than others. These individuals will be more likely to vote and also to engage in other modes of political action, including demonstrating.

The results in this chapter provide good evidence to suggest that protesters, as politically active individuals, share more in common with other individuals engaging in political activism than with the mainstream population. We can also see that activists are also more likely to have contacted a politician than occasional demonstrators. This once more suggests that individuals who are more politically active as measured by demonstration frequency also have a tendency to be more politically active through other modes of action, including those from the institutional realm such as contacting a politician. The difference between occasional demonstrators and activists for contacting is quite significant, suggesting that having engaged in more than one action significantly brings down the barriers to then engaging in more. This is in contrast to voting, as we have seen, where instead there were no distinctions in the likelihood of having conducted this action among less and more seasoned protesters, probably because costs here are lower given how ubiquitous this political activity is among the population and also the fact that it is compulsory in some countries.

With respect to differences between occasional protesters and activists for donating money to a political cause, we can see that, like contacting a politician, here there are also marked differences between the two groups: whereas almost half of the activists had donated money, this proportion falls to less than one-third among less frequent protesters. While the differences are large and significant, we can also see that even occasional protesters show markedly high levels of activism in this activity, confirming previous arguments about different types of actions supporting each other across domains rather than occurring in alternative, separate spheres. Moreover, activists are more than twice as likely as occasional demonstrators to have worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker. This suggests that being a more seasoned protester is more conducive to displaying support for a given candidate so visibly.

With respect to extra-institutional activism, it would seem to follow that individuals who are more often involved in protest would also be more likely than occasional demonstrators to be involved in the other extra-institutional actions. We find that activists were more likely to have engaged in a higher number of extra-institutional activities than occasional demonstrators. They are also more likely to have engaged in each activity, suggesting that different

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modes of political action tend to be interlinked rather than mutually exclusive. Here too, violence is more popular among more frequent than among occasional protesters. As expected given its highly costly nature, violent action is very limited, registering below 2 percent across countries even among the most politically active demonstrators. Yet, activists are more likely than occasional demonstrators to have engaged in this form of participation. These patterns further show that, while there are greater levels of participation in the easiest and less costly activities such as signing a petition, the gap between activists and occasional demonstrators widens considerably in proportional terms between the easier and harder activities.[1]

PARTISANSHIP

Political participation is but one aspect of the broader question of the relationship between protest politics and institutional politics, though a crucial one. Partisanship, that is, the degree of adherence to, or support for, political parties, is another aspect of such a relationship. To what extent do participants in demonstrations identify with certain parties or party families? To what extent do they feel attached to them? And, again, how do such identification and attachment vary across countries, issues, and demonstrator types? Table 4.1 also shows these aspects of the relation of demonstrators with institutional politics.

Starting with party identification, we can see that in Italy there is a very high proportion of demonstrators identifying with communist parties (more than one-third of them). Of course, while some of the parties born out of the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI) are no longer seen as communist today, it is interesting that so many demonstrators in Italy still strongly feel this historically fundamental identity for progressive politics in the country. Moreover, this finding is probably also reflective of the fact that hard-left parties are very important in the organization of many demonstrations and is testimony to the extent to which the institutional and extra-institutional movement sectors are interlinked, especially in some countries. Only at most 2 to 3 percent of demonstrators identify with communist parties in all other countries, with tiny proportions identifying with these parties in the Netherlands and Sweden.

On the other hand, in Sweden a high proportion of demonstrators identify with socialist or New Left parties. There is also a sizable, yet much lower, proportion identifying with this type of party in Belgium, followed by Switzerland and the UK. These parties are central to the social movement sector in most countries. While in some countries like Italy the "old" left is still very preponderant in social movements, in other countries this role has almost completely been taken over by New Left parties emphasizing libertarian social aspects, including greater tolerance and openness to various minority groups in society, and championing new issues linked to environmental concerns as well as the struggle for women's, LGBTQ+ rights, and so forth.

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Moreover, we also find that sizable proportions of demonstrators in most countries except for Spain identify with the social democratic or center-left parties, ranging from 29 per cent in Switzerland to 15 percent in the Netherlands. This shows that even centrist, mainstream social democratic parties are linked to the protest sector and their identifiers populate demonstrations. This links up to discussions over the role of allied or enemy incumbents, since in most countries it is only social democratic/center-left parties that actually have the opportunities to enter or form government. Despite the fact that some citizens in Europe may feel betrayed by centrist left parties' acceptance of neoliberal dogmas, it is interesting that so many demonstrators still feel so close to them. This suggests that those movements where many identify with centrist left parties may go into abeyance when these parties are in government, as we have seen for example in Italy in the changing strategies and reduced vociferousness of the anti-austerity movement between the Berlusconi, Monti and then the more muted tone during the Renzi and Gentiloni governments.

As for Green parties, in Belgium, the UK and Switzerland this is the most popular party identification of demonstrators and that between 31 percent in Switzerland and 14 percent in the Netherlands identify with these parties among demonstrators. Only in Italy and Spain do we find Green party identifiers not majorly populating demonstrations. As with New Left parties, Green parties can be seen as the major actors behind the burgeoning new social movement sector in many countries. While there is great variation between countries in the extent of the popularity and reach of Green parties, environmental issues have become increasingly important for leftist politics across Europe. In some countries such as Italy, ecological concerns have been included within the program of other radical left parties, which garner relatively high levels of support, whereas the single-issue Green parties are much smaller. As such, in Italy, when individuals express communist party affiliation, they are expressing affiliation to a party or parties which also include prominent ecological aspects in their program, but do so within a wider leftist progressive discourse emerging out of the social and political struggles of the PCI and its wider political tradition.

As would be expected as we move further away from the Left on the political spectrum, there are smaller proportions identifying with liberal parties across countries (but a bit higher in the UK and Italy) and there are only tiny proportions identifying with the Right or Christian democratic parties cross-nationally. Moreover, there are very sizable proportions that prefer not to say or feel attached to no party, particularly in Spain – where this importantly preceded the birth of *Podemos* and reflected demonstrators' disillusionment with all political parties and the entire political elite, including the centrist

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Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) as well as the *Partido Popular* (PP) – and also in the Netherlands, where the center-left party has become particularly centrist in recent years.

Again, our data allow us to distinguish between activists in different types of protests, namely those over cultural and economic issues. There are no differences within communist identifiers, suggesting, as was hinted above, that many ex-communist parties combine various economic and social progressivist issues such as support for immigration and equal opportunities for women within their programs, making them ubiquitous across demonstration issues and active members of the protest sectors across domains. Moreover, we can see that socialist or New Left and Green party identifiers are more likely to attend cultural demonstrations. This fits neatly with the fact that these types of parties are the main actors along with NGOs and social movement organizations (SMOs) in the new social movement sector. Moreover, we can see that liberals are also more likely to attend cultural demonstrations than economic ones, which reflects the fact that these individuals may have progressive social values, but they are less likely to support egalitarian economic principles. These patterns suggest overall that communist parties are less prominent among demonstrators in those countries where the new social movement sector is more developed. Spain should fit in this pattern like Italy, but as we see it has a high number of non-identifiers who are likely to be on the Left but do not feel that any party represents them and would have likely turned to supporting *Podemos* once this came to life in 2014.

Concerning the other key dimension of comparison – that between occasional demonstrators and activists – communist identifiers are more likely to be activists than occasional demonstrators. This finding fits in with what we found in Chapter 3 with respect to the greater ideological commitment of activists. Given the fact that communist or radical left parties are the most progressive parties and members often have to make important political commitments, this suggests that communist and hard-left party identification provides a deeper ideological base for sustained movement involvement. We also find this among the other three types of leftist parties – socialist and New Left parties – and also the centrist social democratic parties – despite their more recent mainstreaming and acceptance of many neoliberal tenets. Indeed, here the gap between activists and occasional demonstrators is proportionally smaller than among the more strongly progressive communist and socialist/New Left identifiers. On the other hand, we find that occasionals are more prevalent among Green and liberal identifiers and more right-wing parties. This suggests that committed identifiers with these parties are more likely to attend a demonstration once, (not sure) but not necessarily to commit to this type of engagement and to become seasoned protesters.

Importantly, these results show that the institutional and extra-institutional spheres are closely interlinked and individuals who identify with parties are also more likely to engage in protest, at least with respect to radical and leftist, progressive political organizations. Activists are also more diffused among

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these party identifiers as compared to occasional demonstrators. Moreover, activists tend to be concentrated among leftist identifiers and occasionals instead of the Greens, liberals, and more right-wing parties. Interestingly, the group that does not align with a party tends to be overrepresented in demonstrations on economic issues and also to be occasional demonstrators, suggesting that many first-time participants in anti-austerity demonstrations felt detached from all parties in the political arena. These individuals could be likely constituency for parties such as *Podemos*, *Syriza*, and the *Movimento 5 Stelle*.

Finally, there is some cross-national variation in the extent to which individuals feel attached to their preferred party. We can see that Sweden – a country where most demonstrators declare closest identification with socialist and New Left parties – stands out as a country where many demonstrators feel either very or quite closely attached to a party. This suggests that this type of party allows for the issues that demonstrators feel close to being channeled also in the institutional sphere, leading to a close attachment to their party among them. Indeed the creation of "movement parties" (della Porta et al. 2017) such as *Podemos*, *Syriza*, and *Movimento 5 Stelle* in recent years was enacted also with the aim of bringing an institutional voice to those issues that seemed to have been pushed to the margins and that lead citizens to perceive a crisis of responsiveness in their institutions. In the other countries most demonstrators say that they feel quite closely attached, except for the Netherlands where the highest proportion says they feel not very closely attached. There are very sizable proportions in most countries that say that they do not feel very closely attached to their party, particularly in the Netherlands as we have seen, but also in Belgium, the UK, Italy, and Spain. Both of the latter two countries saw "movement parties" emerging in this period which might have bridged this dissatisfaction gap. However, the fact that on the whole, demonstrators do feel quite closely attached to a party, suggests that the idea that protest and parties are distinct has been overemphasized in the literature. If protest really was spurred by a rejection of political parties *tout court*, then we should not be seeing such high levels of party attachment among demonstrators.

Furthermore, analyzing our other key comparative dimension, we can see that the closest attachment to parties is found among those that engage in demonstrations over cultural issues, whereas the lowest levels are found in economic protests. This might reflect the more confrontational character of demonstrations against austerity, generally targeting government and as such these types of protesters would be more likely to be dissatisfied and unhappy with parties and thus less likely to profess higher levels of attachment to the political elites, that is, those that they would be often contesting at these events. Moreover, we also find that activists are more likely to be more closely attached to parties, which further supports the earlier findings in terms of how ideological commitment to a political cause is an important element underlying differences between occasional demonstrators and activists.

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, PARTISANSHIP, AND COMMITMENT

In the previous sections we have analyzed the relationship between the institutional and extra-institutional political engagement of demonstrators. We have examined the extent to which these patterns varied by country, demonstration issue, and activism levels. In this final section we look at the impact of various indicators of institutional and extra-institutional action on political commitment, or the determination to take to the streets in defense of a political cause. This allows us to provide a more general assessment of how the various factors are interlinked and impacted on by sociodemographic and compositional characteristics in the sample as well as to more directly test the extent to which different types of institutional and extra-institutional engagement as well as party allegiances impact on commitment. To do so, we employ once again logistic regression.

Table 4.2 shows the results of the regression analysis, which follows a stepwise logic where different variables are included in subsequent models before concluding with a combined model testing for their independent effects. Each of the six models includes gender, generation, education, and occupation as well as the three key comparative variables (country, demonstration issue, and demonstrator type). Model 1 tests for the effects of institutional activism. Model 2 includes extra-institutional activism. Model 3 includes party identification. Model 4 includes party attachment. Model 5 includes all of the above variables as well as economic and social values. Model 6 includes all these variables as well as the major controls included in models of participation (political interest, political efficacy, and organizational membership) to see if these variables account for the other effects. As in all our analyses of this kind, the table presents results as odds ratios.

Starting with Model 1, we can see that a higher level of engagement in institutional activism is strongly linked to a heightened political commitment, net of the sociodemographic controls. This confirms what was already discussed in relation to the more descriptive results presented earlier, namely that there is a strong cross-over between the institutional and protest domains: those individuals that are more active in institutional activism are also more committed to their cause and to expend the time and resources necessary to take to the streets in its name. This is further evidence against the substitution thesis: protest does not replace but rather compounds institutional activism, and committed protest activists are also more likely to be committed institutional participants. As would be expected, there is also a strong link between heightened engagement in the various other types of extra-institutional activism and commitment, as shown in Model 2.

The inclusion of party identification in Model 3 confirms that ideological belief is a fundamental component of political commitment and the determination to take to the streets in the name of a cause. Indeed, we can see that, relative to communist identifiers, all other party identifiers are less committed.

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TABLE 4.2. *Logistic regression models on commitment (odds ratios)*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Gender (male)	0.74***	(0.03)	0.77***	(0.03)	0.74***	(0.03)	0.72***	(0.03)	0.73***	(0.03)	0.69***	(0.03)
Cohorts												
Post-WWII generation	1.22*	(0.11)	1.31**	(0.11)	1.26**	(0.11)	1.21*	(0.11)	1.25*	(0.11)	1.23*	(0.11)
1960s/1970s generation (ref.)												
1980s generation	0.93	(0.06)	0.90	(0.06)	0.92	(0.06)	0.92	(0.06)	0.91	(0.06)	0.93	(0.06)
1990s generation	0.67***	(0.05)	0.61***	(0.04)	0.64***	(0.04)	0.64***	(0.04)	0.65***	(0.04)	0.66***	(0.05)
2000s generation	0.62***	(0.04)	0.57***	(0.04)	0.58***	(0.04)	0.59***	(0.04)	0.59***	(0.04)	0.59***	(0.04)
Education												
Secondary school or lower (ref.)												
BA or equivalent	0.74***	(0.05)	0.75***	(0.05)	0.78***	(0.05)	0.78***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.70***	(0.04)
MA or higher	0.65***	(0.04)	0.66***	(0.04)	0.68***	(0.04)	0.69***	(0.04)	0.63***	(0.03)	0.60***	(0.03)
Occupation												
Salariat	0.83*	(0.07)	0.85	(0.07)	0.86	(0.07)	0.86	(0.07)	0.84*	(0.07)	0.82*	(0.07)
Intermediate professions	0.86	(0.08)	0.88	(0.08)	0.88	(0.08)	0.89	(0.09)	0.87	(0.08)	0.86	(0.08)
Working class (ref.)												
Unemployed	0.77*	(0.09)	0.78*	(0.09)	0.78*	(0.09)	0.76*	(0.09)	0.76*	(0.09)	0.74*	(0.09)
Students	0.94	(0.10)	0.89	(0.09)	0.91	(0.10)	0.92	(0.10)	0.92	(0.10)	0.89	(0.10)
Economic values (left-wing)									1.09*	(0.04)	1.05	(0.03)
Social values (libertarian)									1.05	(0.03)	1.03	(0.03)
Political interest											1.51***	(0.08)
Political efficacy											1.08	(0.05)

(*continued*)

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TABLE 4.2. (*continued*)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Organizational membership											0.99	(0.07)
Institutional activism	1.29***	(0.03)							1.17***	(0.03)	1.13***	(0.03)
Extra-institutional activism			1.21***	(0.02)					1.14***	(0.02)	1.13***	(0.02)
Party identification (party family)												
Communist (ref.)												
Socialist/New Left					0.86	(0.14)			0.86	(0.14)	0.87	(0.14)
Social democratic/ center-left					0.64**	(0.09)			0.74*	(0.11)	0.76	(0.11)
Green					0.69*	(0.10)			0.72*	(0.11)	0.77	(0.11)
Liberal					0.60**	(0.10)			0.79	(0.13)	0.81	(0.14)
Right/Christian Democratic					0.74	(0.14)			1.16	(0.23)	1.20	(0.24)
Other					0.66*	(0.12)			0.82	(0.15)	0.86	(0.16)
Prefer not to say/no party					0.64**	(0.09)			0.87	(0.13)	0.91	(0.14)
Party attachment												
Very closely							1.11	(0.08)	1.09	(0.09)	1.08	(0.09)
Quite closely							2.16***	(0.15)	1.84***	(0.13)	1.62***	(0.12)
Not very closely (ref.)												
Other							1.24***	(0.07)	1.18**	(0.07)	1.15*	(0.06)

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Activist	1.56***	(0.08)	1.62***	(0.09)	1.80***	(0.09)	1.72***	(0.09)	1.38***	(0.08)	1.36***	(0.08)
Economic issue	1.42***	(0.07)	1.42***	(0.07)	1.39***	(0.08)	1.39***	(0.07)	1.42***	(0.08)	1.41***	(0.08)
Country												
Belgium	1.24*	(0.11)	1.19*	(0.10)	1.25*	(0.11)	1.39***	(0.12)	1.49***	(0.14)	1.51***	(0.14)
Italy	1.17	(0.12)	0.93	(0.10)	0.99	(0.12)	1.22	(0.13)	1.11	(0.14)	1.17	(0.15)
Netherlands	0.88	(0.07)	0.84*	(0.07)	0.89	(0.08)	0.99	(0.08)	1.08	(0.11)	1.07	(0.11)
Spain	1.21*	(0.11)	1.08	(0.10)	1.24*	(0.13)	1.29**	(0.12)	1.29*	(0.14)	1.35**	(0.15)
Sweden (ref.)												
Switzerland	1.20*	(0.11)	1.11	(0.10)	1.26*	(0.12)	1.29**	(0.11)	1.30**	(0.12)	1.30**	(0.12)
UK	0.88	(0.07)	0.92	(0.07)	1.04	(0.09)	1.06	(0.09)	1.02	(0.09)	1.02	(0.09)
Constant	1.03	(0.13)	1.15	(0.14)	2.26***	(0.42)	1.19	(0.15)	0.57*	(0.14)	0.53*	(0.15)
Log-likelihood	−6298		−6321		−6355		−6297		−6218		−6181	
N	9,832		9,832		9,832		9,832		9,832		9,832	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
$^{*} p \leq .05$, $^{**} p \leq .01$, $^{***} p \leq .001$

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The inclusion of party attachment in Model 4 shows that feeling quite closely attached is linked to stronger commitment to participate. This also fits in with the theorizing on ideological belief, since individuals who feel more strongly attached to a party are more likely to feel aligned with their policies and wider world-view and, as such, this attachment provides them with a further commitment to a political cause and a greater likelihood that they will take to the streets in its support.

Model 5 shows that these effects are largely independent of each other and that the effect of party identification with the social democratic and Green parties on commitment is increased when controlling for social values, suggesting that belief in social libertarianism explains to a large extent why identifiers with these parties feel committed to take to the streets in defense of their cause. We can also see that, when both institutional and extra-institutional activism are included together in this model, their relative effects are reduced, showing their interrelationship, as argued and evidenced in detail throughout this chapter.

Finally, of the key predictors of participation from the literature included in Model 6 – political interest, political efficacy, and organizational membership – only the first one matters when considering all the other variables in our model. Moreover, party identification differences in commitment subside once these variables are taken into account, which suggests that party identification's association to commitment is largely due to organizational membership and the civic skills that party membership develops. As we have seen, these aspects are very important for participation in general and they are here also shown to matter for making sense of different levels of political commitment for a cause.

In sum, the regression analysis shows that a higher level of engagement in institutional activism is strongly linked to a heightened political commitment and, as such, that there is a strong cross-over between the institutional and protest domains. This is evidence against the substitution thesis. Moreover, there is also a strong link between heightened engagement in the various other types of extra-institutional activism and commitment. With party identification, we also see how ideological belief is a fundamental component of political commitment and the determination to take to the streets in the name of a cause. Communist identifiers are the most committed. Feeling quite closely attached is linked to stronger commitment. The effect of social democratic and Green party affiliation on commitment is mainly explained through the strong belief in social libertarianism. Finally, we find that party identification's association to commitment is largely due to organizational membership.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the relationship between protest politics and institutional politics. We aimed to address the link between different types of institutional and extra-institutional forms of participation for clarifying the

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underlying participatory dynamics for these processes. As we have seen, some scholars have suggested a substitution thesis of specialization, in other words, that individuals are moving to protest activism from more conventional modes of participation (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Norris 2002). Furthermore, social movement scholars have urged to bridge the literature on protest politics with that on electoral behavior (Císař and Navrátil 2015; della Porta et al. 2017; Heaney 2013; Heaney and Rojas 2014; Hutter et al. 2018; Kriesi 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012; McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013; Norris et al. 2015). Combining the insights from these two literatures allowed us to develop an analysis of the institutional and extra-institutional political engagement among demonstrators across countries, issues, and activism levels and also to test the impact of these variables on the extent of their political commitment to demonstrate on behalf of a cause and put their money – or actions – where their mouths – and heads – are. In this way, this chapter allowed for building on the insights of previous theories to examine the individual-level dynamics linking partisanship and participation in institutional and extra-institutional political activities.

While most scholarship aiming to link electoral and protest politics to date has focused on movement–party interactions (McAdam and Tarrow 2010; 2013), we focused on the individual-level perspective by examining the extent to which individuals with different party allegiances and institutional and extra-institutional participation levels engage in protest and more specifically in street demonstrations. We showed that, rather than being characterized by substitution, participation across domains is closely linked with activists in demonstrations also being more likely to be involved in institutional modes of engagement. It is therefore unlikely that those people that are shying away from voting are turning to protest instead. People who do protest turn out in higher numbers than non-protesters. This suggests that the decline in turnout and other modes of institutional participation is still concerning since engagement in extra-institutional is unlikely to be filling this gap. Our analysis, points to protesters and extra-institutional activists as also being institutional activists and therefore that those individuals who turn away from institutional activism are much more likely to become inactives than protesters. This is because most protest actions, bar perhaps the easiest and most ubiquitous such as signing a petition or boycotting and buycotting, are actually more costly and require greater sacrifices than institutional participation such as contacting politicians. Striking and engaging in disruptive forms of direct action are unlikely to attract the vast majority of individuals turning away from voting and other conventional means, as they pose even higher barriers and costs to entry. Therefore, we should still worry about declining engagement in the general population and not simply assume that individuals are engaging differently.

Questions of political voice and inequalities in political action are particularly important in this respect, and analyses should be further conducted

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distinguishing between different groups with different levels of resources. Our analysis provides further evidence that protest becomes an additional resource in the toolkit of individuals who are already engaging politically through both institutional and extra-institutional means. Moreover, while institutional and less costly modes of extra-institutional participation such as petitioning and consumer politics are more closely aligned with protest on cultural issues, more radical modes of action such as striking and direct action are more closely aligned with economic objectives. Some countries like Italy and Spain are more well versed in radical, strike-related labor disputes, whereas others like the UK Sweden, and Switzerland are more active in political consumerism and new issue politics. Finally, all modes of action were practiced more by activists than by occasional demonstrators, further supporting the view that activists mix and match techniques to achieve their goals and party identifiers on the left were more active than those identifying with liberal or Green or right-wing parties, who tended to be occasional demonstrators. New "movement parties" (della Porta et al. 2017) that have emerged could yet develop new progressive politics to fill the vacuum on the Left and propose alternatives beyond the neoliberal model and the xenophobic and exclusionary populism on the Right, and this could hold great promise for the future of political activism and open the door for social change. Indeed, an important finding in this chapter is that, in general, party identification among protesters is closely aligned with political commitment in the name of a cause. These findings, in turn, open up the question of how organizational membership and networks more widely play out for making sense of contemporary demonstration activism. We turn to this question in the next chapter.

Note

1. While there is less than a 10-point gap for boycotting and about 15 percent at the very high levels registered for petitioning, this gap grows to a staggering 25 percent for striking, where 31 percent of activists have performed this action against only 6 percent of occasional demonstrators, and to about 20 percent for direct action, with 21 percent against 3 percent.

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5

Were They Pushed or Did They Jump?

This chapter is about the mobilizing structures of demonstrators. They refer to "*those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action*" (McAdam et al. 1996: 3; emphasis in original). We focus in particular on the channels of participation in demonstrations. In this regard, we may broadly distinguish between direct and indirect channels. The former consists of social and interpersonal networks, whereas the latter refer to online and offline media. Here we look at the role of these two kinds of channels among demonstrators, aiming to ascertain what kind of mobilizing structures support participation in demonstrations. Additionally, we examine how mobilizing structures vary across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators. We believe that the mobilizing structures sustaining participation in different types of demonstrations depend not only on the broader national context as well as the very issues raised by demonstrators, but also on whether we are dealing with occasional demonstrators or activists. The chapter considers three key aspects: the social embeddedness of demonstrators in terms of associational involvement; the direct (networks) and indirect (media) channels of recruitment to protest; and, with reference to direct channels, the importance of being asked. Concerning the latter aspect more particularly, we examine whether demonstrators were asked through different types of networks. In this regard, we confront two competing views of recruitment to social movements: a view assuming that demonstrators make an independent choice based on their motivation to become active and a view maintaining that they are brought in to protest mainly through other actors. In other words, to paraphrase the title of a book on individual decision mechanisms in education (Gambetta 1987), we will ask whether people are "pushed" to activism or whether they "jump" into it.

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STRUCTURAL, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING PROTEST PARTICIPATION

Why people protest at all is perhaps the most fundamental question concerning social movements and protest activism. While scholars have often addressed other questions as well – such as which forms protest takes, how it varies in space and time, and what effects it may have – explaining why people engage in protest activities is the crucial question in this field of studies. From a micro-level point of view, this question has been addressed by two main research traditions: the political participation and the social movement traditions.

In the political participation research tradition, protesting is considered but one among a variety of possible ways through which people may engage in politics, ranging from the most institutionalized forms – most notably, voting – to the most contentious. Protest clearly belongs to the latter. The aim of this research tradition is not so much to explain why people engage in protest specifically, but more generally to make sense of why they get involved in politics in all its different forms. In this regard, scholars often make a distinction between three main determinants of political participation: resources, motivation, and recruitment. This trilogy is drawn from the well-known approach of Verba and collaborators in their civic voluntarism model (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995). Turning the question on its head, they famously stressed three reasons why people do not take part in politics: because they can't, because they don't want to, or because nobody asked (Brady et al. 1995: 271). In other words, people refrain from participating when they lack the necessary resources – such as time, money, and above all civic skills – (they can't), when they lack the psychological engagement with politics (they don't want to), and when they are isolated from the recruitment networks through which people are mobilized to politics (nobody asked). Although their main focus lies in the role of resources and more specifically civic skills – that is, "the communications and organizational skills that facilitate effective participation" (Brady et al. 1995: 271) – they maintain that all three factors help explain political participation. This chapter focuses on recruitment networks among demonstrators.

Works in the social movement research tradition have stressed some of the very same factors, but also pointed to others. The big difference, of course, is that students of social movements are mostly, if not exclusively, interested in explaining participation in protest activities. Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between three main approaches to account for individual engagement in social movements and protest activities from a social movement studies perspective: a structural, a social psychological, and a rational choice approach. Drawing heavily from resource mobilization theory, the structural approach has dominated a large part of the literature. It stresses the role of pre-existing network ties as factors pulling people into social movements (Lim 2008; McAdam 1986, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003; Snow et al.

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1980; see Tindall 2015 for a review). Such "mobilizing structures" (McAdam et al. 1996, 2001), or "micro-mobilization context" (McAdam et al. 1988), provide the frame for the collective interpretation of the large-scale social and cultural transformations affecting individuals in their everyday lives, a rudiment of organization necessary to translate interpretations into concrete action, and solidary incentives to participate (McAdam et al. 1988). As such, they increase the chances that social movement activism will occur.

The structural approach puts much emphasis on the "being asked" question. As Meyer (2007: 47) maintains, "[T]he best predictor of why anyone takes on any political action is whether that person has been asked to do so." In other words, recruitment is the key mechanism bringing people to protest behavior. In this vein, Schussman and Soule (2005), among others, show that being asked to protest is the strongest predictor for protest participation. They found at the same time that a number of other factors, including organizational ties, are important predictors of being asked to protest. Passy and Giugni (2001) arrive at a similar conclusion when they find that embeddedness in organizational networks is one of the strongest predictors of differential commitment to social movements. They show in particular that activists have a key structural connection role in recruiting people to become deeply involved in social movements, along with the perceived effectiveness of one's own potential contribution. Additionally, this kind of explanation also stresses the role of "biographical availability" (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 2013; McAdam 1986). As the term clearly indicates, this refers to the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities" (McAdam 1986: 70). In brief, structural availability and biographical availability are at the core of this approach.

Another major approach in the social movement scholarly tradition stresses the social psychology of protest (Gamson 1992a, 1992b; Gamson et al. 1982; Klandermans 1997; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; van Zomeren and Iver 2009; van Zomeren et al. 2008, 2012). While structural accounts stress how pre-existing network ties bring people to collective action, the social psychological perspective puts more emphasis on the thoughts, feelings and predispositions of individuals to engage. In other words, the former emphasizes "pull" factors, whereas the latter puts "push" factors at center stage. In their review of the social psychology of protest, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) stress five main sets of factors: different types of grievances (moral indignation, suddenly imposed grievances, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, experience of illegitimate inequality, and so forth); feelings of efficacy, or the individual's expectation that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest; collective identity, more specifically group identification; emotions, in particular group-based anger; and social embeddedness.[1] Given the emphasis on thoughts and feelings, this perspective is also close to so-called framing theories, which stress the ways in which people frame issues as key to understanding why they get involved in collective action (see Snow 2004 for a review).

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Finally, rational choice accounts are much less popular among students of social movements, especially in sociology, both in their narrower and more open versions (Opp 2013). However, some political scientists and also some sociologists have stressed the key role played by cost/benefit calculations not only for voting, but also for protest behavior (Opp 1989, 2009; Muller and Opp 1986). While the idea that protest is a rational expression of "politics by other means" and should be considered as a political resource (Lipsky 1968) permeates the study of social movements since at least the late 1960s, the rational choice approach has stressed certain specific factors relating to people's perceptions of reality for why they may favor participation in social movements and protest activities. Given the strong emphasis on costs/benefits ratios, the perceived effectiveness of the action – both individual and collective – plays a key role in this kind of explanation for why individuals might choose to participate (Opp 2009). As for Brady et al. (1995), the importance of the perceived effectiveness of the action and, more generally, the role of agency are also central in more sociological theories of collective action (Gamson 1992a; Jasper 2004; Piven and Cloward 1979). Furthermore, reflecting one of the central tenets of rational choice theory, different sorts of incentives take center stage in this approach (Hirsch 1990; Oliver 2013; Passy 2013). These, however, may not be limited to selective incentives strictly defined (Oliver 2013), as in pure rational choice accounts, but have been expanded to cover moral, social, solidarity, and other incentives (Passy 2013). We discuss this further in Chapter 7 on the motivations for participating in demonstrations. Moreover, it should be stressed that rational choice theorists – especially those who believe that macro–micro linkages are key to understanding human behavior – do not entirely neglect the role of other aspects stressed by social psychological accounts such as grievances or that of contextual and more structural factors such as the opening of political opportunities and network membership (Opp 2009).

In sum, while structural, social psychological, and rational choice accounts emphasize different types of explanatory factors, they all consider pre-existing network ties as an important predictor of participation in protest activities and more specifically demonstrations. Of course, this holds especially for the structural approach, but the other two approaches also recognize the central role of social embeddedness, recruitment and mobilization through organizational and other types of networks. In the next section we further discuss the role of mobilizing structures in demonstrations, which is the main focus of this chapter.

THE ROLE OF MOBILIZING STRUCTURES IN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS

Students of social movements and contentious politics have most often examined the role of mobilizing structures, social embeddedness, and pre-existing

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network ties by means of survey data (Passy and Giugni 2001; Schussman and Soule 2005). As we mentioned in Chapter 1, these data have their advantages, but also a number of shortcomings, such as very low proportions of demonstrators making disaggregated analysis challenging if not impossible, reliance on statements rather than actual observed behavior, a lack of content-specific focus or the means to differentiate between occasional and more regular protesters, and generally the absence of questions directly relevant to the characteristics of the demonstration and the activists' perceptions and opinions relative to them. In this book we use protest survey data allowing us to overcome all the above issues and, in this chapter, focus on the role of mobilizing structures for protest activism. Furthermore, we examine how such a role varies across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators.

As we mentioned earlier, structural accounts of protest participation stress the role of pre-existing network ties, and more specifically the fact of being asked to participate, as key factors leading to recruitment in social movements and protest. In other words, social networks act as mobilization channels. Research both in the political participation and social movement traditions has typically stressed the role of organizational networks (see Campbell 2013 for a review in political science and Diani 2004 for a sociological perspective). For example, Brady et al. (1995) stress the role of the workplace, organizations, and churches as non-institutional political settings where civic skills can be acquired. This line of reasoning is also underwritten in the flourishing, yet often controversial, literature on social capital. Following Putnam (1993, 2000), a number of researchers have tried to show how institutional and extra-institutional participation emerge from individuals' embeddedness in voluntary associations, both in general (Maloney and Rossteuscher 2007; Maloney and van Deth 2010; Maloney et al. 2008) and more specifically for certain groups such as migrants (Eggert and Giugni 2010; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Morales and Giugni 2011), Muslims (Giugni et al. 2014), or the unemployed (Giugni and Lorenzini 2017; Lorenzini and Giugni 2012). While a number of doubts have been raised on methodological grounds regarding the relationship found in many studies between associational involvement and political participation where reciprocal causation cannot be ruled out (Bekkers 2012), scholars tend to agree that voluntary associations matter, whether via the generation of social and political trust, civic skills and other political resources, or group consciousness and identity, or more simply through organizations' acting as agents of mobilization (Giugni and Grasso 2012).

More often than not, however, research on social movements and contentious politics has underscored the impact of interpersonal networks (Lim 2008; McAdam 1986, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003; Snow et al. 1980). Being connected to other people already involved in social movements is obviously key in this regard. Snow et al. (1980: 787), for example, found that "differential recruitment is strongly influenced by structural proximity, availability, and affective interaction with movement members." Similarly, as

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Gould (2003: 236) has argued, "[i]t is now commonplace to say that social connections to people who are already mobilized are what draw new people into protest movements, religious movements, and identity movements." In particular, as noted, scholars have repeatedly pointed to the fact that being asked by people one knows is a key determinant of participation (Meyer 2007; Schussman and Soule 2005).[2] Here, the type of network ties as well as who is asking could play a big role (Lim 2008; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003). Being asked by a strongly committed activist might have a greater effect than being recruited by someone more marginally involved (Passy and Giugni 2001). Furthermore, the very strength of the relationship might matter as well. In this regard, however, Lim (2008: 961) maintains that, "contrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature, there is little evidence that strong ties are more effective than weak ties in recruiting activists." Below, in addition to the analysis of mobilization channels, we will examine whether demonstrators are more likely to have been asked to participate by a partner or family members rather than friends, acquaintances, and other potential recruiters.

Additionally, one should consider that recruitment to social movements may also occur through indirect or mediated channels. By that we mean that people might find out about a given movement, protest, or demonstration via the media rather than through organizational or interpersonal networks or by being asked by someone to participate. In other words, the media could also be an effective mobilization channel to get involved in demonstrations, in addition or concurrently to social networks. In this vein, though on a different issue, McAdam et al. (2001) depict the process of scale shift – one of the three robust processes they identify in their influential book on the dynamics of contention – as following two distinct paths or mechanisms favoring the attribution of similarity and, eventually, a shift in the scale of contentious politics: brokerage and diffusion. The former refers to direct contacts across locales, whereas the latter hints at the indirect role played by the media. In this context, online media should play a relevant role given their increasing importance for social movement activism and protest participation (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Earl and Kimport 2014; Gerbaudo 2012; Trottier and Fuchs 2015). The rise of a personalized digitally networked politics in which diverse individuals address common problems, as depicted by Bennett and Segerberg (2013), might be replacing a more traditional network environment made of direct contacts and ties.

In the analysis of our protest survey data below we address three main aspects relating to the mobilizing structures of demonstrators that we have discussed so far. First, we examine the passive and active membership of demonstrators in voluntary associations in order to capture their prior social embeddedness. Second, we assess the role of direct (networks) and indirect (media) channels of recruitment to demonstrations. Third, we focus on social networks and look at the importance of being asked by different people for

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participation in demonstrations. Furthermore, we consider how all this may vary depending on the country where the demonstration takes place, whether the latter addresses primarily cultural or economic issues, and whether we are dealing with occasional demonstrators or activists.

THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF DEMONSTRATORS

Chapter 2 depicted a differentiated picture of the involvement of Europeans in political and non-political organizations across countries. Furthermore, we saw that membership in parties is much lower than in other kinds of associations. How do participants in demonstrations score in this respect? Are they more deeply involved, as we might expect on the basis of theories that stress the role of associational involvement for political participation? Is membership in political parties higher among demonstrators, as the idea of a mutual reinforcement between electoral and non-electoral participation would predict (Grasso 2016; Norris 2002; Schussman and Soule 2005)? Or is party membership, on the contrary, even lower, as those who believe that the two forms of political behavior are substitutive would maintain (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Norris 2002)? And how does all this vary across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators? Table 5.1 provides some answers to these questions and, more generally, shows the extent of the social embeddedness of demonstrators in terms of their pre-existing involvement in different sorts of organizations such as voluntary associations, trade unions, and parties. In addition to the single categories, we have created two overall indexes: one which includes all types of organizations and one that excludes parties and unions. The table is made of three parts: one concerning passive membership (financially supporting an organization), one about active membership (engaging with an organization and becoming involved in their activities), and another combining both forms. We also show how associational involvement varies across countries, demonstration issues, and demonstrator types.

The country distributions suggest that participants in demonstrations have strong associational involvement everywhere. More than half of the respondents – and up to three-quarters of them in Sweden – declared to be passive members of some kind of organization in all seven countries, except in Italy. Similarly, active membership ranges from a low 55 percent in Spain to a high 69 percent in Belgium and the UK. Moreover, if we consider both passive and active membership, the picture is clearly one of deep social embeddedness of demonstrators in all the countries, with no less than four out of five demonstrators belonging to some kind of organization. The percentages are lower if we exclude parties as well as trade unions and professional associations – thus showing once more that institutional and extra-institutional participation do indeed reinforce each other rather than substitute, as we showed in Chapter 4 – but they remain fairly high across the board.

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TABLE 5.1. *Associational involvement of demonstrators by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Passive membership (%)											
Church or religious organization	4.9	6.4	9.5	5.3	11.4	8.5	5.1	7.5	7.1	9.5***	6.8
Trade union or professional association	21.2	17.7	26.5	20.7	38.5	18.0	19.3	21.9	24.5***	24.2	23.5
Political party	11.7	7.8	14.9	9.2	17.4	11.4	12.9	13.1*	11.8	12.1	12.7
Women's organization	3.0	4.8	3.0	4.0	4.7	5.8	4.5	4.5	3.9	2.6	4.8***
Sport or cultural organization	7.2	9.9	7.1	11.3	11.4	6.2	5.5	7.1	9.2***	7.9	8.4
Environmental organization	17.8	16.4	23.2	17.0	16.2	16.0	11.2	24.5***	14.0	22.5***	18.6
Lesbian or gay rights organization	1.9	7.0	3.1	3.6	3.0	6.9	6.5	5.9***	3.1	3.3	4.9***
Community or neighborhood association	3.6	2.7	5.6	8.8	6.0	6.1	6.0	5.1	6.3**	4.9	6.2**
Charity or welfare organization	13.5	7.5	16.1	14.2	31.4	29.9	19.5	22.5***	15.4	19.4	19.3
Third world, global justice, or peace organization	13.3	8.6	19.0	14.8	19.6	26.4	15.8	20.1***	14.3	15.7	18.1**
Anti-racist or migrant organization	4.9	5.9	5.2	5.0	6.4	10.8	7.8	7.8***	5.2	4.3	7.3***
Human or civil rights organization	10.0	9.2	15.0	9.9	14.6	16.5	17.0	16.2***	10.8	12.0	14.5***
Other organizations	2.0	2.3	4.1	2.4	7.1	2.8	2.3	3.5	3.1	3.7	3.2
Overall	54.7	46.4	64.6	52.6	75.6	66.3	60.0	64.5***	56.6	62.4	61.4
Overall (excl. party and union or professional association)	42.1	35.7	51.3	41.5	61.2	60.7	50.6	56.3***	42.8	50.9	50.5

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	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Active membership (%)											
Church or religious organization	4.6	7.8	7.5	3.9	4.9	5.2	10.7	7.8***	5.2	7.8***	6.0
Trade union or professional association	32.9	14.4	17.8	24.8	17.5	14.3	16.3	10.1	29.2***	8.9	23.7***
Political party	17.4	12.2	10.8	11.8	25.9	15.1	18.1	15.9	15.4	6.6	19.2***
Women's organization	3.8	4.8	1.9	3.4	6.5	5.4	6.6	5.4***	3.5	1.7	5.4***
Sport or cultural organization	17.8	16.4	23.2	17.1	16.2	16.0	11.2	15.8	18.3***	19.9***	16.8
Environmental organization	17.2	9.0	25.9	9.0	19.7	33.0	16.5	13.5***	4.6	6.1	10.1***
Lesbian or gay rights organization	1.0	4.6	1.5	0.7	2.6	4.3	6.4	4.6***	1.3	1.2	3.6***
Community or neighborhood association	9.6	4.8	5.9	8.6	4.9	6.9	12.3	8.2	7.4	4.7	9.1***
Charity or welfare organization	6.8	10.1	5.9	5.2	6.3	6.5	13.9	9.1***	6.5	5.9	8.5***
Third world, global justice, or peace organization	7.7	9.0	4.2	6.8	8.9	6.9	11.1	9.2***	6.0	3.6	9.2***
Anti-racist or migrant organization	3.9	5.5	2.1	2.4	3.7	4.7	8.4	5.0***	3.7	0.7	5.6***
Human or civil rights organization	3.2	7.0	3.5	4.5	3.8	5.5	7.8	5.7***	4.3	2.1	6.0***
Other organizations	6.6	9.4	7.4	5.8	10.4	6.3	6.0	7.3	7.2	5.4	8.0***
Overall	69.2	62.3	60.1	55.0	61.6	58.9	69.2	62.0	62.5	48.7	68.4***
Overall (excl. party and union or professional association)	46.5	50.0	47.1	40.5	46.1	46.9	58.9	53.2***	43.2	41.2	51.7***

(*continued*)

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TABLE 5.1. (*continued*)

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Passive or active membership (%)											
Church or religious organization	9.6	14.2	17.0	9.2	16.2	13.8	15.8	15.4***	12.3	17.3***	12.8
Trade union or professional association	54.1	32.1	44.3	45.5	56.0	32.3	35.6	32.0	53.6***	33.2	47.2***
Political party	29.2	20.0	25.7	21.0	43.3	26.5	31.0	30.0*	27.1	18.7	32.0***
Women's organization	6.8	9.6	4.9	7.4	11.2	11.2	11.1	9.9***	7.4	4.3	10.2***
Sport or cultural organization	24.9	26.3	30.3	28.3	27.6	22.1	16.7	22.9	27.5***	27.9**	25.3
Environmental organization	26.2	16.4	32.9	13.3	28.7	41.9	33.0	38.0***	18.5	28.6	28.7
Lesbian or gay rights organization	2.9	11.6	4.6	4.4	5.6	11.2	12.8	10.5***	4.3	4.4	8.5***
Community or neighborhood association	13.1	7.5	11.5	17.5	10.9	13.0	18.3	13.3	13.7	9.5	15.3***
Charity or welfare organization	20.3	17.5	21.9	19.4	37.7	36.4	33.4	31.6***	21.9	25.3	27.8**
Third world, global justice, or peace organization	20.9	17.6	23.2	21.6	28.6	33.4	26.9	29.3***	20.3	19.4	27.3***
Anti-racist or migrant organization	8.7	11.4	7.3	7.3	10.1	15.5	16.2	12.8***	8.9	5.1	12.9***
Human or civil rights organization	13.2	16.2	18.6	14.4	18.4	21.9	24.8	21.9***	15.2	14.0	20.5***
Other organizations	8.6	11.7	11.5	8.2	17.4	9.2	8.3	10.7	10.4	9.1	11.3***
Overall	87.9	82.8	88.0	80.6	92.2	86.5	88.0	87.2	86.2	81.6	90.2***
Overall (excl. party and union or professional association)	68.0	68.5	74.3	65.8	79.8	79.2	78.7	80.0***	67.5	71.2	76.3***

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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The findings point to important variations across countries. Yet, the extent of such differences depends on whether we look at passive or active membership (or both) and whether we include or exclude parties, unions, and professional associations. The most marked differences are seen in passive membership and including all types of organizations. Here Swedish demonstrators clearly are the most embedded, followed at a distance by the Dutch and the Swiss, then by the British, by the Belgians and Spanish, and finally by the Italians, who are the least strongly embedded. If we look at active membership, however, the most deeply embedded are the Belgian and British demonstrators, while the least embedded are the Spaniards, with all other countries standing somewhere in between these two extremes. Overall – that is, considering both passive and active membership – Swedish demonstrators remain the most strongly embedded in associations, while Italian and Spanish ones are the least strongly involved. The other four countries lie somewhere in between at about the same level. Additionally, country differences are smaller here. Again, excluding parties as well as unions and professional associations leads to lower percentages and, in some cases, to a different ranking of countries. In particular, when looking at both passive and active membership combined, Swedish demonstrators remain the most strongly embedded, but the British and the Swiss ones are very close. Furthermore, while Italian and Spanish demonstrators remain on the lower end, they are joined by the Belgians.

The main difference when comparing the figures with or without parties, unions, and professional associations lies in the higher importance of these organizations in certain countries. While participants in demonstrations are strongly embedded in these intermediate organizations everywhere, party membership is especially important in Sweden and membership in trade unions and professional associations is remarkably high in Belgium (active membership in particular) and Sweden (passive membership in particular). This reflects the particular role that trade unions have in the Ghent system in the management of unemployment benefits in these two countries.

Thus, in line with accounts stressing the role of pre-existing network ties as mobilizing structures favoring participation in social movements and protest activities (Lim 2008; McAdam 1986, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003; Snow et al. 1980), the image emerging from these figures is one of a strong embeddedness of demonstrators in different types of organizations: parties, trade unions and professional associations, and various voluntary associations. At the same time, we also observe important cross-national differences, particularly when it comes to membership in parties as well as trade unions and professional associations, but also with regard to other organizations. Unfortunately, a direct comparison with the percentages shown in Chapter 2 for the general population is limited as we do not have at our disposal the same indicators. In particular, we cannot compare the overall associational involvement between participants in demonstrations in our sample and the general population. We can, however, compare the figures concerning party

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membership and those referring to union membership. With one exception – trade union membership in Sweden – the level of associational involvement in parties and trade unions is much higher among participants in demonstrations. Thus, the evidence confirms a strong connection between being involved in institutional and intermediate organizations, on the one hand, and participating in protest activities – in particular, street demonstrations – on the other: those who are members of such organizations are also more likely to attend demonstrations and vice versa. This undermines arguments claiming that protest activism substitutes declining participation in parties and other institutional means (Inglehart 1977, 1990) and that people are moving from "the politics of loyalties" to "the politics of choice" (Norris 2002). Evidence here suggests instead that loyalties support the choice to protest.

Does the relationship between associational involvement and participation in demonstrations depend on the issue as well as on the type of demonstrators? The last four columns in Table 5.1 allow us to answer this question. The strong associational involvement applies both to participants in demonstrations addressing cultural issues and to those attending demonstrations dealing with economic issues. No statistically significant difference can be observed when considering both passive and active membership and including all types of organizations, nor when looking only at active membership.[3] Passive membership, however, is significantly stronger in the case of cultural issues, in particular due to the stronger embeddedness of demonstrators in new social movement organizations such as environmental, third world, global justice, peace, and human and civil rights organizations, but also charity and welfare organizations. Furthermore, demonstrations dealing with cultural issues display a stronger degree of associational involvement of demonstrators once we exclude parties as well as unions and professional associations. This is due to the fact that participants in economic demonstrations are more strongly embedded in the latter type of organizations. It should be noted, however, that this occurs especially in the case of active membership, much less so for passive membership. In other words, participants in economic demonstrations are deeply involved in trade unions and professional associations, but such involvement takes the form of active membership rather than simply financial support. Finally, we should note that party membership is similar across the two issues.

Moreover, the two types of demonstrators are characterized by a different degree of social embeddedness, both if we include or exclude parties as well as unions and professional associations, but especially so in the former case. This different social embeddedness, however, is entirely due to active membership, while passive membership displays no statistically significant differences. As we can see in the middle part of the table, activists are much more strongly involved in political parties, but also in trade unions and professional associations, as compared to occasional demonstrators. This also applies to other

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types of organizations, but the extent of the difference between the two groups is particularly large in the case of the more institutional and intermediate organizations. As such, this deeper social embeddedness could be stimulating their heightened participation since they would have more opportunities to be asked to protest or find out about other protest events through their network ties and so forth.[4]

DIRECT AND INDIRECT CHANNELS OF RECRUITMENT TO DEMONSTRATIONS

Structural accounts of participation in social movements and protest activities put the question of recruitment at center stage. Pre-existing networks, after all, tell us nothing about the ways in which people are recruited to social movements and contentious politics. To examine this, beyond the social embeddedness of demonstrators as seen in their organizational membership, one needs to look more closely at the channels of mobilization. Through which channels are people mobilized to protest and more specifically to participate in street demonstrations? Are direct (interpersonal and organizational networks) and indirect (media) channels equally important? What about online social networks, which are becoming increasingly important in the contemporary world? What is the role of different social circles and types of interpersonal ties for recruitment, for example strong familial ties and weak workplace ones? And how does all this vary across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators?

Here we consider both direct and indirect channels of mobilization. More precisely, we distinguish between four main channels of mobilization: the media (radio or television; print and online newspapers; alternative online media; advertisements, flyers, and/or posters), interpersonal networks (partner and/or family; friends and/or acquaintances; people at school or workplace; members of an organization or association), organizational networks (an organization's magazine, meeting, website, mailing list, etc.), and online social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Table 5.2 shows the percentages of demonstrators who said they found out about the demonstration which they attended through one or more of these channels and which channel they deemed as most important, broken down by country, issue of demonstration, and type of demonstrators.

The importance of the various mobilization channels varies considerably across the seven countries, both in general and when focusing on the most important one. In all the countries, direct channels – including online social networks – seem more important than indirect ones, as seen in the lower percentages for the media as most important channel as compared to the other channels. Spain is a partial exception, insofar as demonstrators in this country have relied on the media – both traditional and alternative ones – more often than in all other countries. In this regard, Anduiza et al. (2014) have

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TABLE 5.2. *Mobilization channels by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
All channels (%)											
Radio or television	26.4	14.0	16.5	30.3	11.2	8.8	7.9	11.6	21.4***	21.7***	14.6
Newspapers (print or online)	25.4	26.0	21.4	34.9	29.7	32.4	14.8	23.0	28.5***	26.4	25.7
Alternative online media	19.3	27.7	18.8	28.6	16.2	23.9	26.0	24.3***	21.4	18.9	24.9***
Advertisements, flyers, and/or posters	14.3	18.8	23.3	29.5	26.0	31.1	20.2	20.5	26.4***	19.7	25.2***
Overall media	54.0	57.7	51.4	71.7	54.4	62.7	48.4	54.7	58.8***	57.3	57.2
Partner and/or family	11.8	13.2	9.8	18.5	18.9	18.6	9.0	14.7**	13.0	15.2*	13.6
Friends and/or acquaintances	20.5	37.0	20.7	28.1	37.5	35.7	31.5	34.0***	24.6	28.1	30.2*
People at your school or workplace	13.9	14.1	21.2	18.2	10.5	7.4	11.4	7.2	21.3***	16.6***	13.8
Members of an organization or association	42.4	41.9	32.0	29.0	30.3	29.7	30.3	27.0	39.0***	20.9	37.3***
Overall interpersonal networks	66.3	74.7	62.1	65.5	65.2	66.4	60.1	61.8	67.3***	61.3	66.4***
Organizational networks	39.0	22.2	44.4	28.9	30.8	35.2	40.4	35.7	35.5	31.1	37.8***
Online social networks	18.8	26.6	18.0	21.2	32.8	15.7	28.4	26.1***	19.4	20.0	24.4***
Most important channel (%)											
Radio or television	8.0	4.2	3.4	12.6	2.2	2.0	2.1	3.4	6.6***	7.4***	3.9
Newspapers (print or online)	6.0	8.8	6.1	11.9	11.2	11.0	3.8	7.8	8.6	9.9***	7.4

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	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Alternative online media	5.1	9.3	6.7	11.5	3.7	8.1	9.2	8.5**	7.0	7.2	8.0
Advertisements, flyers, and/or posters	2.4	4.1	4.6	6.6	7.8	8.3	5.2	5.4	5.7	5.4	5.6
Overall media	21.5	26.4	20.7	42.6	25.0	29.4	20.2	25.0	27.9***	27.4***	22.7
Partner and/or family	4.7	6.6	5.0	4.6	8.4	10.4	4.1	7.6***	4.6	8.1***	5.4
Friends and/or acquaintances	5.9	16.1	8.9	5.9	15.0	17.0	13.9	15.4***	7.4	12.3	11.1
People at your school or workplace	5.9	5.0	9.7	4.1	1.8	2.1	4.1	2.3	7.6***	8.0***	3.9
Members of an organization or association	27.0	26.0	17.6	14.3	13.8	14.9	16.0	13.3	22.8***	11.0	20.2***
Overall interpersonal networks	43.5	53.8	41.2	28.9	39.0	44.3	38.2	38.5	42.4***	36.0	36.9
Organizational networks	25.0	9.3	30.0	18.0	17.4	20.0	26.4	22.4	21.5	19.8	22.9***
Online social networks	10.0	10.6	8.0	10.6	18.6	6.3	15.2	14.1***	8.2	11.0	11.5

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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shown the importance of online social networks in the mobilization of the *Indignados* movement. Among the direct channels, interpersonal networks are by and large the most important ones, hence confirming structural accounts of recruitment to social movements. Interpersonal ties are particularly important in Italy, much less in the other countries and especially so in Spain (in terms of most important channel). In contrast, Italian demonstrators rely on organizational networks to a much lower extent than their counterparts in the other countries. It should be noted, however, that, among the interpersonal networks, being members of an organization or association is the most important channel, followed by friends and acquaintances. Finally, online social networks are more important in the UK and Sweden, whereas they matter much less in the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Thus, while showing certain commonalities, the mobilizing structures underpinning participation in demonstrations are also context-dependent. Differences in the position, credibility, and legitimacy of the media in different countries, in the importance of interpersonal relations, in the role of the organized civil society, and in the place of online social networks provide varying channels for the mobilization of people in demonstrations. Do such mobilization channels vary according to the issue of demonstrations and to the type of demonstrators? Concerning the demonstration issue, we observe a slightly more important role of the media as well as of interpersonal networks in demonstrations on economic issues, while online social networks play a greater role in demonstrations on cultural issues – and no significant difference exists for organizational networks. Larger differences, however, exist in the more specific categories. For example, traditional media such as radio, television, and newspapers are more frequent mobilization channels in economic demonstrations. Also, the specific interpersonal networks play a different role across demonstration issues: friends and acquaintances are more important in demonstrations on cultural issues, whereas people at school or workplace and members of organizations or associations are more important in demonstrations on economic issues. Fellow union members might play a key role in this respect.

As regards the type of demonstrators, we observe smaller differences than expected when we look at the four main channels. The three network variables (interpersonal networks, organizational networks, and online social networks) all display statistically significant differences, whereas the difference concerning the media variable is not significant. Interpersonal, organizational, and online social networks seem to play a greater role among activists in general (upper part of the table), but not so much when we consider the most important channel (lower part of the table). The media, however, is more often mentioned as the most important channel by occasional demonstrators than by activists suggesting that the media is a particularly popular channel for

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recruiting the former type of participants. Yet, the most important differences are seen in some of the specific categories. Two aspects are particularly relevant in this regard. First, radio and television are more important mobilization channels among occasional demonstrators, again suggesting these are useful for recruiting this type of participant. Second, members of organizations are by far more important for activists, which in turn suggests that individuals who attend more than one demonstration do so because they are involved in organizations supporting different types of social causes and this sustains their repeated participation. Thus, occasional demonstrators and activists seem to rely on partly different mobilizing channels: the former rely more often on the (traditional) media, while the latter are more often recruited to demonstrations through organizations, most notably through members of organizations or associations.

Given the key role assigned to them by students of social movements and scholars in the political participation research tradition alike, a closer look at interpersonal networks is in order. Table 5.3 details the specific interpersonal networks that brought the protesters to the streets, once again breaking down the data according to country, demonstration issue, and demonstrator type. While the previous table referred to the channels through which demonstrators got to know about the demonstration they attended (information), this one looks at the people who specifically asked the respondents to participate in that demonstration (recruitment).

Looking at the upper part of the table, we can see that the recruiting role of the various relational circles varies across countries, albeit in a somewhat random fashion. A large share of the demonstrators has been asked to participate by someone. In some of the countries, however, the proportion of those who have been asked by no one is higher. This is most notably the case in Spain. Again, this might have something to do with the importance of the *Indignados* movement and the role of online social networks as mobilizing channels for this movement and its organizations with a low degree of formal membership (Anduiza et al. 2014). Among those who have been asked by someone, friends as well as co-members of an organization of which respondents are members are the most frequent recruiters. Of course, fellow members of an organization could also be friends and, as such, the two categories might overlap to some extent, particularly among activists. The extent of their role, however, varies across the seven countries. Friends are particularly important in Italy and Sweden, while they play a smaller role especially in Belgium and Spain. Co-members are more important in Belgium, much less so in Spain and Switzerland. Additionally, we also notice the particularly large share of colleagues or fellow students as recruiters in the Netherlands, as compared to all other countries. This suggests that in some countries organizations play a much more predominant role for recruitment than in other countries, where participation is more likely to be stimulated by other types of interpersonal ties or

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TABLE 5.3. *Interpersonal recruitment by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Asked by (%)											
No one	25.5	21.1	27.7	46.1	21.7	34.1	31.3	28.7	31.8***	33.4***	29.5
Partner or family	11.3	15.1	8.8	13.5	20.0	15.7	9.1	15.1***	10.6	14.3**	12.4
Relatives	3.2	3.2	3.9	4.0	4.9	4.2	2.1	3.8	3.5	4.1	3.6
Friends	13.1	31.2	15.8	16.0	35.0	21.2	21.6	25.4***	16.8	19.2	22.3***
Acquaintances	4.7	9.9	4.3	4.7	12.1	8.0	6.5	8.2***	5.4	4.6	7.7***
Colleagues or fellow students	13.1	13.5	24.0	8.0	10.3	5.1	10.0	7.1	17.9***	15.8***	11.8
Co-members of an organization of which I am a member	36.3	25.0	28.0	19.2	23.8	20.4	30.3	23.0	29.6***	17.1	29.9***
Asked (%)											
No one	10.3	11.4	12.4	22.4	9.9	11.7	13.8	11.6	15.0***	15.6***	12.8
Partner or family	24.8	27.0	20.0	31.8	36.2	34.0	24.5	32.1***	23.4	26.1	28.8**
Relatives	12.0	8.3	10.9	14.5	12.5	11.8	10.6	12.7***	10.6	10.7	12.2*
Friends	30.0	52.8	30.7	37.6	49.6	41.3	42.4	45.4***	33.7	33.3	42.8***
Acquaintances	16.7	21.4	14.2	17.1	20.2	23.9	15.6	20.0***	16.0	12.4	20.4***
Colleagues or fellow students	24.8	26.1	32.9	21.1	20.1	13.8	20.1	15.9	30.2***	21.7	24.3**
Co-members of an organization of which I am a member	20.6	16.2	14.5	10.9	15.4	9.5	18.4	13.4	16.6***	7.3	17.9***

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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neither, suggesting that there were no direct interpersonal recruitment attempts linked to the participation.

Interpersonal recruitment also depends on the issue of demonstrations, in terms of which specific relational circle is more important. Partner or family as well as friends are more important recruiters among participants in demonstrations addressing cultural issues. Colleagues or fellow students as well as co-members of organizations of which respondents are members play a greater role for participants attending demonstrations dealing with economic issues. This reflects the higher share attending demonstrations on economic issues who have been recruited by members of an organization or association.

Differences across types of demonstrators are not very large. The share of demonstrators who have been asked by no one is more or less the same across the two groups, just a little higher among occasional demonstrators. The largest difference is the one concerning co-members of organizations of which respondents are members, who are more frequent among activists, attesting to the greater role played by organizational networks among the latter we have already seen earlier. The other differences are quite negligible, except perhaps for the larger proportion among the occasional demonstrators who said they were asked by colleagues or fellow students.

The lower part of the table reverses the question, looking at whom the respondents asked to participate in the demonstration, hence providing a different measure of recruitment. In this regard, in an interesting and rare attempt to turn the recruiter–recruited relationship upside down, based on a smaller sample of the very same protest survey data we are using here, Walgrave and Wouters (2014) have studied which prospective participants in demonstrations are most likely to ask others to participate and whom they ask. They find that activists who are committed to the demonstration's cause and who are part of participation-friendly networks are the most active recruiters, that participants tend to recruit people similar to those who have recruited them, and that participants recruited via strong ties are less active recruiters themselves.

One interesting aspect here is that the proportion of demonstrators who asked no one to participate is smaller than that of demonstrators who have been asked to participate. To put it differently, a larger amount of demonstrators have asked someone to participate than the number of those who have been asked to do so. This suggests that participants in demonstrations act more as recruiters than as recruitees. Again, this varies across countries, demonstration issues, and demonstrator types. Let us simply stress three points, one for each criterion. First, Spanish demonstrators are less active recruiters than their counterparts in the other countries. Second, demonstrations about cultural issues include a lower number of recruiters than demonstrations on economic issues, especially when it comes to colleagues or fellow students, while they recruit in particular more partners or family members as well as friends. Third, activists are more often recruiters than occasional demonstrators, especially

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when it comes to friends, acquaintances, and co-members of organizations of which they are members.

GOING TO DEMONSTRATE: WERE THEY PUSHED OR DID THEY JUMP?

Up to this point, we have examined how protesters' mobilizing structures and mobilizing channels vary according to national context, issue of the demonstration, and type of demonstrators. Similar to what we did in the previous two chapters and will do in the next two, in this last part we follow a more explanatory approach aiming at examining the relationship between associational involvement, the mobilization channels – including being asked to participate – and their commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause. To do so, we run a number of logistic regression models. Inspired by Soule and Schussman's (2005) approach, we proceed in two steps. In the first step we look at various covariants of the four mobilization channels discussed earlier, plus the "asked-by" question. The second step looks at the effect of various variables on the commitment of demonstrators – that is, their determination to demonstrate – aiming to answer our initial question, namely "Were they pushed or did they jump?"

The results of the first step are reported in Table 5.4, which shows five separate logistic regression models predicting the adoption by demonstrators of one of the four mobilization channels – media, online social networks, organizational networks, interpersonal networks – as well as the fact of having been asked by someone to participate. As in previous chapters, the table presents results as odds ratios.

We observe a significant effect of the issue of demonstration in two of the five models: the one concerning online social networks and the one referring to interpersonal networks. However, while participants in demonstrations addressing economic issues are more likely to have been recruited through Facebook, Twitter, or other online social networks, they are also more likely to have been recruited through interpersonal networks. In contrast, the other mobilization channels as well as the fact of having been asked to participate do not seem to depend on the demonstration issue.

Our main focus, however, is on the individual-level characteristics of demonstrators, in particular on the distinction between occasional demonstrators and activists. The role of this distinction for mobilization channels is clear from this analysis, as this variable is statistically significant in all five models. Reflecting and largely confirming the descriptive analysis above, the main difference is found with regard to the media channel. Activists are significantly less likely than occasional demonstrators to have been recruited through the media, while they are more likely to have been recruited through the other mobilizations channels and to have been asked to participate. Their deeper embedding

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TABLE 5.4. *Logistic regression models on mobilization channels and being asked to participate (odds ratios)*

	Media		Online social networks		Organizational networks		Interpersonal networks		Asked by	
Gender (male)	1.08	(0.05)	1.02	(0.05)	1.10*	(0.05)	0.77***	(0.03)	0.80***	(0.04)
Cohorts										
Post-WWII generation	1.06	(0.09)	0.62***	(0.08)	0.89	(0.07)	0.91	(0.07)	0.84*	(0.07)
1960s/1970s generation (ref.)										
1980s generation	0.94	(0.06)	1.27**	(0.11)	1.01	(0.06)	1.19**	(0.07)	1.14*	(0.07)
1990s generation	0.92	(0.06)	2.43***	(0.20)	0.89	(0.06)	1.36***	(0.09)	1.30***	(0.09)
2000s generation	0.91	(0.06)	4.48***	(0.37)	0.72***	(0.05)	1.81***	(0.13)	1.83***	(0.14)
Education										
Secondary school or lower (ref.)										
BA or equivalent	1.30***	(0.08)	1.15	(0.09)	1.03	(0.06)	0.91	(0.06)	0.86*	(0.05)
MA or higher	1.25***	(0.06)	1.17*	(0.08)	0.96	(0.05)	0.97	(0.05)	0.92	(0.05)
Occupation										
Salariat	1.27**	(0.10)	0.93	(0.10)	1.22*	(0.10)	0.96	(0.08)	0.99	(0.09)
Intermediate professions	1.15	(0.10)	1.06	(0.12)	1.07	(0.10)	0.93	(0.09)	1.06	(0.10)
Working class (ref.)										
Unemployed	1.26*	(0.14)	1.19	(0.17)	1.14	(0.13)	0.74**	(0.08)	0.90	(0.11)
Students	1.38**	(0.14)	1.33*	(0.15)	1.14	(0.12)	1.27*	(0.14)	1.08	(0.12)
Political interest	1.16***	(0.05)	1.39***	(0.08)	1.26***	(0.06)	0.85***	(0.04)	0.91*	(0.04)
Political efficacy	0.98	(0.04)	1.10	(0.06)	1.21***	(0.05)	0.95	(0.04)	1.05	(0.05)
Economic values (left-wing)	1.05	(0.03)	0.83***	(0.03)	1.10**	(0.04)	0.96	(0.03)	0.96	(0.03)
Social values (libertarian)	1.13***	(0.03)	1.14***	(0.04)	0.98	(0.03)	1.03	(0.03)	0.95	(0.03)
Passive organizational membership	1.14**	(0.05)	1.09	(0.06)	1.38***	(0.06)	1.00	(0.05)	0.88**	(0.04)
Active organizational membership	0.82***	(0.04)	1.03	(0.06)	1.93***	(0.09)	1.45***	(0.07)	1.29***	(0.06)

(*continued*)

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TABLE 5.4. (*continued*)

	Media		Online social networks		Organizational networks		Interpersonal networks		Asked by	
Activist	0.88*	(0.05)	1.20**	(0.08)	1.41***	(0.08)	1.19***	(0.06)	1.33***	(0.07)
Economic issue	1.08	(0.05)	0.66***	(0.04)	0.98	(0.05)	1.73***	(0.09)	1.08	(0.06)
Country										
Belgium	1.31**	(0.11)	0.82	(0.08)	1.59***	(0.14)	1.11	(0.10)	0.82*	(0.08)
Italy	1.27*	(0.13)	0.70**	(0.08)	0.74*	(0.09)	1.46***	(0.16)	1.07	(0.13)
Netherlands	0.99	(0.08)	0.79*	(0.08)	2.39***	(0.21)	0.85	(0.07)	0.82*	(0.08)
Spain	2.38***	(0.21)	0.97	(0.10)	1.06	(0.10)	0.70***	(0.06)	0.31***	(0.03)
Sweden (ref.)										
Switzerland	1.57***	(0.13)	0.43***	(0.05)	1.31**	(0.12)	1.38***	(0.12)	0.62***	(0.06)
UK	0.81**	(0.06)	0.97	(0.09)	1.65***	(0.14)	0.84*	(0.07)	0.62***	(0.06)
Constant	0.77	(0.17)	0.06***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)	1.88**	(0.43)	1.82*	(0.43)
Log-likelihood	−6825.82		−4955.12		−6425.94		−6469.56		−6108.24	
N	10,342		10,342		10,342		10,342		10,342	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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in mobilizing structures favors the recruitment of activists through different kinds of pre-existing networks, including online social networks. In contrast, the weaker social embeddedness of occasional demonstrators makes the media more important for them to get to know about a given demonstration.

Such a differential impact of direct (networks) versus indirect (media) mobilization channels is independent from the associational involvement of respondents. At the same time, of course, recruitment through social networks depends on the degree of organizational membership: the more an individual is embedded in preexisting networks, the more likely he or she is to have gotten to know about the demonstration in this way. This applies more specifically to active membership: those demonstrators who are active members of organizations are more likely to have been recruited through organizational or interpersonal networks – and to have been asked to participate – than through the media.

Other individual-level variables show statistically significant effects. Gender matters only for the traditional mobilizing structures: men are more likely than women to have been recruited through organizational networks, but less likely when it comes to interpersonal networks. They are also less likely to be asked to participate. Generation plays a role for all channels except the media. The youngest demonstrators are more likely than older ones to have been recruited through online social networks, but also through interpersonal networks as well as to have been asked to participate, whereas organizational networks seem to play a greater role for the older generations.

Education, in contrast, matters above all in the case of the media channel and online social networks: more educated demonstrators have higher odds of having been recruited through these channels. Occupation displays statistically significant effects in the case of media, online social networks, and interpersonal networks: students, in particular, are more likely than working-class demonstrators to have been recruited through these channels. Finally, we also observe a number of significant effects of the attitudinal variables we included in the models: political interest is positively associated with recruitment through media and online social networks and organizational networks, and negatively associated with recruitment through interpersonal networks and being asked to participate; political efficacy has an impact – a positive one – only on recruitment through organizational networks; leftist demonstrators are more likely to have been recruited through organizational networks and less likely to have been recruited through online social networks; libertarian demonstrators are more likely to have been recruited through both the media and online social networks.

Table 5.5 shows the results of the second step of our analysis. The goal here is twofold. On the one hand, we aim to ascertain the impact of mobilizing structures on participants in demonstrations. On the other hand, we wish to answer the question of whether participation in demonstrations is more a

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TABLE 5.5. *Logistic regression models on commitment (odds ratios)*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Gender (male)	0.67***	(0.03)	0.67***	(0.03)	0.67***	(0.03)	0.67***	(0.03)	0.66***	(0.03)	0.66***	(0.03)
Cohorts												
Post-WWII generation	1.20*	(0.10)	1.20*	(0.10)	1.20*	(0.11)	1.21*	(0.11)	1.21*	(0.11)	1.20*	(0.11)
1960s/1970s generation (ref.)												
1980s generation	0.94	(0.06)	0.94	(0.06)	0.93	(0.06)	0.93	(0.06)	0.94	(0.06)	0.94	(0.06)
1990s generation	0.68***	(0.05)	0.68***	(0.05)	0.67***	(0.05)	0.67***	(0.05)	0.67***	(0.05)	0.68***	(0.05)
2000s generation	0.60***	(0.04)	0.60***	(0.04)	0.58***	(0.04)	0.59***	(0.04)	0.60***	(0.04)	0.61***	(0.04)
Education												
Secondary school or lower (ref.)												
BA or equivalent	0.73***	(0.05)	0.73***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.04)
MA or higher	0.60***	(0.03)	0.60***	(0.03)	0.59***	(0.03)	0.59***	(0.03)	0.59***	(0.03)	0.59***	(0.03)
Occupation												
Salariat	0.83*	(0.07)	0.83*	(0.07)	0.83*	(0.07)	0.81*	(0.07)	0.81*	(0.07)	0.82*	(0.07)
Intermediate professions	0.84	(0.08)	0.84	(0.08)	0.84	(0.08)	0.84	(0.08)	0.84	(0.08)	0.84	(0.08)
Working class (ref.)												
Unemployed	0.76*	(0.09)	0.76*	(0.09)	0.76*	(0.09)	0.75*	(0.09)	0.75*	(0.09)	0.75*	(0.09)
Students	0.87	(0.09)	0.87	(0.09)	0.86	(0.09)	0.85	(0.09)	0.86	(0.09)	0.86	(0.09)
Political interest	1.71***	(0.08)	1.71***	(0.08)	1.70***	(0.08)	1.68***	(0.08)	1.67***	(0.08)	1.67***	(0.08)
Political efficacy	1.15**	(0.05)	1.15**	(0.05)	1.14**	(0.05)	1.13**	(0.05)	1.13**	(0.05)	1.13**	(0.05)
Economic values (left-wing)	1.10**	(0.03)	1.10**	(0.03)	1.11**	(0.04)	1.10**	(0.03)	1.10**	(0.03)	1.10**	(0.03)
Social values (libertarian)	1.06*	(0.03)	1.06*	(0.03)	1.06*	(0.03)	1.06*	(0.03)	1.06*	(0.03)	1.06*	(0.03)
Passive organizational membership	0.94	(0.04)	0.94	(0.04)	0.93	(0.04)	0.91*	(0.04)	0.91	(0.04)	0.91*	(0.04)

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	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Active organizational membership	1.27***	(0.06)	1.27***	(0.06)	1.27***	(0.06)	1.22***	(0.06)	1.23***	(0.06)	1.24***	(0.06)
Mobilization channel												
Media			1.01	(0.04)	1.01	(0.04)	1.03	(0.05)	1.02	(0.05)	1.00	(0.04)
Online social networks					1.12*	(0.06)	1.12*	(0.06)	1.12*	(0.06)	0.94	(0.05)
Organizational networks							1.36***	(0.06)	1.34***	(0.06)	1.35***	(0.06)
Interpersonal networks									0.89*	(0.04)	1.13*	(0.06)
Asked by											0.80***	(0.04)
Activist	1.53***	(0.08)	1.53***	(0.08)	1.52***	(0.08)	1.49***	(0.08)	1.50***	(0.08)	1.52***	(0.08)
Economic issue	1.36***	(0.07)	1.36***	(0.07)	1.37***	(0.07)	1.37***	(0.07)	1.39***	(0.07)	1.39***	(0.07)
Country												
Belgium	1.41***	(0.13)	1.41***	(0.13)	1.41***	(0.13)	1.37***	(0.12)	1.38***	(0.12)	1.37***	(0.12)
Italy	1.18	(0.13)	1.18	(0.13)	1.19	(0.13)	1.21	(0.13)	1.22	(0.13)	1.22	(0.13)
Netherlands	0.95	(0.08)	0.95	(0.08)	0.95	(0.08)	0.90	(0.08)	0.89	(0.08)	0.89	(0.08)
Spain	1.41***	(0.13)	1.41***	(0.13)	1.41***	(0.13)	1.40***	(0.13)	1.39***	(0.13)	1.32**	(0.12)
Sweden (ref.)												
Switzerland	1.24*	(0.11)	1.23*	(0.11)	1.25*	(0.11)	1.23*	(0.11)	1.24*	(0.11)	1.22*	(0.11)
UK	0.98	(0.08)	0.98	(0.08)	0.98	(0.08)	0.94	(0.08)	0.94	(0.08)	0.92	(0.08)
Constant	0.57*	(0.13)	0.56*	(0.13)	0.56*	(0.13)	0.57*	(0.13)	0.62*	(0.14)	0.69	(0.16)
Log-likelihood	-6356.02		-6355.97		-6353.72		-6330.82		-6327.69		-6317.68	
N	10,024		10,024		10,024		10,024		10,024		10,024	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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matter of recruitment (Were they pushed?) as the structural approach would maintain, individual will (Did they jump?), as psychological and rational choice accounts would have it, or perhaps both. Others before us have embarked on a similar endeavor. Let us mention three examples. Schussman and Soule (2005) have tested three main explanations of individual protest participation: biographical availability, political engagement, and structural availability. Passy and Giugni (2001), for their part, have examined the role of social networks and individual perceptions for differential participation in social movements. In a similar effort to inquire into the determinants of differential participation in demonstrations using the very same data we analyze in this book, Saunders et al. (2012) tested three models drawn from the extant literature: a structural model referring to biographic and structural availability; an agential model referring to political and psychological engagement; and a combined model combining structural and agential factors. Here we also look at the relative weight of "push" and "pull" factors, but on the commitment of demonstrators rather than the simple fact of participating (which we cannot do given the nature of our data) or differential participation. To do so, we run six separate models following a stepwise approach. Model 1 is without any mobilization channel variable. The subsequent models add, respectively, one of the four mobilization channels: Model 2 for the media, Model 3 for online social networks, Model 4 for organizational networks, and Model 5 for interpersonal networks. The final model adds the "asked-by" variable. Each model has all the variables included in the previous analysis. The table presents results as odds ratios.

Let us take the various predictors in the same order as before. Since the effects hardly vary across models, we can focus on Model 6, which includes all the variables. The two measures of associational involvement yield a clear-cut result across all the models: active organizational membership is associated with a stronger motivation to participate in demonstrations, while passive membership does not seem to matter. This is in line with structural accounts of participation in social movements and protest activities which have stressed the role of pre-existing networks (Lim 2008; McAdam 1986, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003; Snow et al. 1980). At the same time, it suggests that, at least for commitment, what really matters is to be actively involved in voluntary associations, not simply contributing to them financially. This suggests that "checkbook activism" based on contributing financially to a cause rather than actively engaging in it (Jordan and Maloney 1997) is not what characterizes deeply committed activists.

As for the other individual characteristics, both the sociodemographic and the attitudinal variables are significantly associated with commitment. Concerning sociodemographics, men are less strongly committed than women, the younger generations are less committed than the baby-boomer generation and also than the post-World War II generation, more educated demonstrators

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are less committed than those who only attained secondary school education or lower, and all the occupational statuses are less committed than those belonging to the working class. In brief, a not-so-young, not-so-educated working class woman will tend to be more committed to participate in demonstrations than a young, well-educated man belonging to other social strata. Concerning political attitudes, political interest and political efficacy are linked to stronger commitment just as leftist and libertarian values are. In brief, politically interested left-libertarians who have a strong feeling of political efficacy are more committed to participate in demonstrations.

How does commitment relate to the mobilization channels and to being asked to participate? The table includes the four mobilization channels as well as the "asked-by" variable, allowing us to answer this question. When considering all these factors together in Model 6, three of these variables display statistically significant effects: organizational networks, interpersonal networks, and being asked. The effect of the former two variables is positive, while that of the latter is negative. Thus, net of their social characteristics as well as their political attitudes and values, demonstrators who have been recruited through organizational or interpersonal networks are more likely to be strongly committed. Social networks seem to act as a powerful "pull" factor motivating people to participate in street demonstrations. This may be due to some kind of "persuasion" effect, whereby conversations about the issues of the demonstrations with potential recruiters make prospective participants more strongly committed. Being asked, however, is negatively associated with commitment, suggesting that those demonstrators who have been asked by someone to participate are less committed than those who said they were asked by no one. If an individual is less committed, he or she is also more likely to have been asked by someone to participate. In other words, if you are strongly committed, you "push" yourself into protest and do not need to be asked. In contrast, if you are not particularly committed, you need somebody to "pull" you into protest.

The complex relationship between interpersonal channels, being asked, and motivation can be seen by comparing Models 5 and 6. Here we can see that the effect of interpersonal networks changes once we include the "asked-by" variable in the model. The negative effect observed in Model 5 becomes positive in Model 6. This is since being asked overlaps with recruitment through interpersonal networks as one is usually asked to participate by people belonging to one of the various relational circles. Additionally, adding the "asked-by" variable in Model 6 makes the significant and positive effect of online social networks in Model 5 disappear, suggesting that the effect on commitment of online social networks is captured by the fact of being asked to participate. In other words, online social networks make people more committed by the fact that one is asked to participate through such a channel and their direct appeals at involvement. Finally, the media channel does not seem to play any

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role whatsoever, net of the other effects, for commitment as it is not significant in any of the models.

In sum, with regard to our initial question – "Were they pushed or did they jump?" – we may conclude that both "push" and "pull" factors play a role, lending support to both structural accounts as well as to psychological and rational choice explanations. Our analysis shows that the commitment of demonstrators depends on certain sociodemographic characteristics such as their gender, age, education, and occupation, but that they are also committed to participate by certain attitudinal traits such as their degree of political interest and efficacy as well as their political values, and by the fact that they are embedded in pre-existing networks as well as by the recruiting action of various mobilizing channels, in particular the direct channels provided by organizational and interpersonal networks. At the same time, when we include the mobilization channel variables in the models, the effects of the other variables hardly change, with the partial exception of political interest and active organizational membership. This means that the impact of individual characteristics on commitment – including associational involvement – is not mediated by the mobilization channels and the recruitment activity of various kinds of social networks, but is an independent effect.

CONCLUSION

Students of social movements have often stressed the role of preexisting networks and ties as well as that of social embeddedness for protest participation (Lim 2008; McAdam 1986, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003; Snow et al. 1980). Similarly, scholars in the political participation research tradition have emphasized the role of organizations as key locales for socializing people into politics in general and protest politics more specifically (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995). At the same time, both scholarly traditions have also pointed to the impact of individual characteristics, attitudes, and perceptions on the propensity of people to take part in protest activities. This has led to the rise of two opposing views of recruitment to social movements: a view maintaining that demonstrators are brought to them by other actors (Were they pushed?) and a view assuming that demonstrators make an independent choice based on their specific characteristics (Did they jump?). Structural accounts highlight the role of social networks and mobilization channels, whereas psychological as well as rational choice explanations stress the importance of ideology, identity, feelings of efficacy, and other individual-level factors.

Our analysis yielded two important findings for the understanding of the role of mobilizing structures for participants in demonstrations. First, demonstrators are strongly embedded in different sorts of organizations: political parties, trade unions, and professional organizations, as well as various

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voluntary associations, both as passive and as active members. Second, certain types of demonstrators are more socially embedded than others. More generally, our analysis shows a variegated picture of the mobilizing structures of demonstrators. Mobilizing structures vary across countries, the social versus economic issue of the demonstrations, and most importantly across types of demonstrators. With regard to the latter aspect, we have in particular shown the stronger involvement in parties and unions of those who demonstrate more often. Yet, occasional demonstrators are also well embedded in organizations, showing the intimate linkages between contentious politics, on the one hand, and institutional and interest-group politics, on the other.

Concerning the mobilization channels, we have shown the differential impact of various channels, both direct and indirect. More specifically, demonstrators vary in the extent to which they have been recruited through the media, online social networks, organizational networks, or interpersonal networks, and among the latter in the extent to which they have been asked by someone to participate. Again, important variations can be observed across countries, demonstration issues, and demonstrator types. The analysis has shown above all the importance of the more traditional organizational and interpersonal (direct) ties, as compared to (indirect) media channels or online social networks, especially so for the most active participants. It has also shown that, for the latter, being asked by co-members of an organization of which they are members is an important channel of recruitment to demonstrations, more so than for occasional demonstrators who rely more on the media. Finally, we have inquired into the complex relationship between mobilizing structures and commitment. In this regard, our analysis lends support both to the structural account as well as to psychological and rational choice explanations of participation in social movements and protest activities. While this chapter has taken the structural vantage point, the next chapter puts psychological engagement at center stage, focusing on the role of cognitive and affective predispositions.

Notes

1. While most of these factors – above all, grievances, efficacy, and identity – have traditionally been put forward in social psychological accounts of collective action, recent works have paid increasing attention to the role of emotions (see Jasper 2011 for a review).
2. See Zuckerman et al. (1994) for an example of the impact of social and political networks on electoral behavior.
3. The difference between the two groups in the overall measure just fails to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
4. The different degree of social embeddedness of occasional demonstrators and activists can also be seen in the active participation in organizations in the 12 months prior to the interview. While there is no difference among those who are members

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of one single organization, the share of occasional demonstrators who are involved in no organization is double the share among activists. In contrast, the latter are much more often involved than the former in two or three or even more than three organizations. As we have seen, this applies to various types of organizations, but especially so for parties as well as unions and professional associations, suggesting a strong link between involvement in institutional and intermediate organizations, on the one hand, and participation in demonstrations, on the other.

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6

Cognition and Affect among Demonstrators

This chapter examines the role of cognition and affect among demonstrators. We start from a discussion of the demonstrators' political attitudes. We focus in particular on four key attitudes that are linked to protest participation: political interest, satisfaction with how democracy works (system support), political trust (support to specific political actors and institutions), and political efficacy. Additionally, we consider the feelings of perceived effectiveness of demonstrations. We examine in particular the extent to which demonstrators are interested in politics, satisfied with democracy, trust the political institutions, and feel that they can change things through their engagement. We also look at how political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy vary across countries, depending on whether demonstrations address cultural or economic issues, and also between occasional demonstrators and activists, aiming to assess the degree of disaffection of demonstrators from institutional politics – if any – and how this varies across countries, demonstration issues, and demonstrator types. Low levels of political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy all contribute to people's disaffection from politics and to political alienation. Our analysis of ESS data in Chapter 2 has yielded the picture of fairly politically alienated European citizens, albeit with strong cross-national variations, with Italy and Spain standing out in particular in this respect. Here we examine to what extent this also applies to participants in demonstrations compared to the general population and whether the former exhibit distinct patterns in terms of their political attitudes. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between political attitudes of demonstrators and their emotions. We focus in particular on four primary emotions – anger, worry, fear, and frustration – which may be expected to combine with political attitudes and to influence in different ways individuals' commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause. Confronting political attitudes and emotions, we assess two accounts

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of commitment among demonstrators – a cognitive account based on political attitudes and an affective account stressing the role of emotions – and we examine how these two types of factors combine to explain commitment.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PARTICIPATION

Political attitudes have traditionally played a key role in explanations of political participation. This holds, for sure, for theories of voting. Two of the prevailing theories – the Columbia and the Michigan models – assign an important role to attitudes. In the Columbia school (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948) they were called predispositions – as captured notably in the Index of Political Predisposition, meant to measure the sociological variables predicting voting – which fundamentally referred to the individuals' social characteristics influencing their attitudinal stance towards politics. While this theory of voting gave priority to structural aspects such as social position in terms of socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, and place of residence, political predispositions are key to understanding vote choice in this perspective. However, it was the Michigan school (Campbell et al. 1960) that gave political attitudes a central place in explanations of vote choice. As is well known, the explanation of vote choice in this perspective revolves around the concept of party identification as well as the group memberships and the primary socialization process favoring it. Party identification or attachment can be seen as a special kind of political attitude, namely towards a party. In turn, it is seen as influencing other political attitudes, namely attitudes to candidates, policies, and group benefits (Harrop and Miller 1987).

Political attitudes also play a key role in the so-called political culture paradigm, originating in Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal study (see Fuchs 2007 for a review). Indeed, "[P]olitical culture research is characterized by an enormous diversity of studies on political attitudes" (Fuchs 2007: 162). In this approach, the macro-level aggregation of micro-level citizens' attitudes, internalized through socialization processes, forms the political culture of a country. In turn, a political culture which is congruent with the regime structure is seen as crucial for the persistence of a democratic regime.

Closer to our subject matter, political attitudes and predispositions are also central in much of the work on political participation, which focuses on why people engage in certain political activities and forms of participation. While emphasizing the role of resources and in particular civic skills – that is, communications and organizational skills that facilitate effective participation – the so-called civic voluntarism model (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995), for example, gives ample space to the role of psychological engagement as favoring people taking part in politics. This refers more specifically to interest in politics, concern with public issues, feeling of political efficacy, and consciousness of being part of a group with shared political interests (Brady et al. 1995), in brief, political attitudes.

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Most importantly for our present purpose, political attitudes are key for theories of participation in social movements and protest activities. This relevance of political attitudes for protest participation has both theoretical and empirical roots. Theoretically, scholarship has long stressed the impact of psychological engagement with politics on protest participation (Gamson 1968; Klandermans 1997; Piven and Cloward 1979; Schussman and Soule 2005). As we shall discuss in more detail below, such a psychological engagement often refers to attitudes such as political interest, trust, efficacy, and so forth. Empirically, much research on the determinants of protest participation is based on survey data, whether existing general surveys (Grasso 2016; Quaranta 2015, 2016; Schussman and Soule 2005) or tailor-made surveys (Barnes and Kaase 1979), including protest surveys (della Porta 2009; della Porta et al. 2006; Fillieule et al. 2004; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Walgrave and Rucht 2010), or a combination of both (Norris et al. 2005; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Now, a great deal of the information that can be grasped by surveying people refers to their attitudes and predispositions towards specific objects such as political actors, institutions, regimes, and politics more generally.

FOUR CORE POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Which political attitudes matter most when it comes to explaining political participation and protest participation more specifically? The extant literature points to a variety of attitudes that play an important role. Here we focus on four of them: political interest, satisfaction with how democracy works, political trust, and political efficacy. Taken together, they refer to people's predispositions towards specific political objects as well as towards politics more generally. Most importantly, they can be used as indicators of what many have depicted as an increasing alienation and detachment of citizens from politics (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Grasso 2016; Hay 2007; Mair 2006). We already addressed this matter in Chapter 2 by looking at ESS data for the general population, when we assessed the extent to which European citizens have become uninterested in politics, dissatisfied with democracy, distrusting of political institutions, and powerless. In this chapter we examine how people taking part in demonstrations score on these four core political attitudes.

Political interest is the most obvious correlate of political participation, including protest participation. It is a standard measure of psychological engagement. The prediction here is straightforward: the more an individual is interested in politics, the more likely he or she is to participate. This applies to all forms of participation, whether institutional or non-institutional. Yet, political interest is so close to activity itself, perhaps because it develops, at least in part, along with political activity, that it becomes a somewhat trivial predictor of participation (Brady et al. 1995).[1] Other political attitudes are more telling in this respect.

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Satisfaction with how democracy works in one's country is, as we mentioned earlier, a core aspect in the work by Almond and Verba (1963) and in the political culture paradigm more generally. Satisfaction, in this perspective, indicates support for a democratic regime, which is a pre-requisite for its persistence. This is also an aspect that plays an important role in Putnam's (1993) take on the civic culture debate, although here the focus is no longer the persistence of democracies, but rather their functioning as well as the responsiveness and effectiveness of institutions and governments. When it comes to political participation, the impact of this specific attitude is more ambivalent. On the one hand, research shows that there is a positive correlation between satisfaction with democracy and electoral turnout at the aggregate level: countries in which citizens express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy also tend to display higher levels of voter turnout in national elections (Franklin 2004; Hobolt 2012; Norris 2002; see Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016 for a different view). Translated at the individual level, this would support the idea that people who are satisfied with how democracy works in their country are also more likely to vote. On the other hand, however, research has also shown a negative correlation between satisfaction with democracy and turnout: over-time increases in citizens' satisfaction with democracy are associated with significant decreases in voter turnout in national elections (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). Furthermore, dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs – including dissatisfaction with how democracy works – can be considered as a specific grievance pushing people to engage in protest activities (Thomassen 1989), along with moral indignation, suddenly imposed grievances, feeling of relative deprivation, feeling of injustice, the experience of illegitimate inequality, and so forth (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). As such, dissatisfaction with how democracy works may reflect disapproval of the way the government is dealing with certain issues and capture a broader underlying dimension relating to the delegitimation of authorities on the part of citizens. As students of social movements have maintained, the lower the legitimacy granted by citizens to authorities, the greater the chances that mobilization arises (McAdam 1999; Melucci 1989; Piven and Cloward 1979).

Citizens' approval or disapproval of the government and the degree of legitimacy they grant to the powerholders are also expressed in their level of trust towards the political institutions. There is a long-standing research tradition that sees political trust as fundamental for granting legitimacy to the political institutions and system (Almond and Verba 1963; Schumpeter 1942) as well as for the process of democratization (Tilly 2007). Trust also plays a central role in social capital theory and related research (see Stolle 2007 for a review). Inspired by Putnam's (1993, 2000) work, which links the generation of social capital to the richness and density of associational life, research has shown the importance of political trust for participation (Hooghe and Marien 2013). In this perspective, higher levels of trust, stemming from a better integration of people in social networks, lead to higher levels of political participation. When

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it comes to protest, however, mistrust rather than trust may spur participation (Gamson 1968). Lower levels of political trust, especially when directed at governments and parliaments, might indicate a critical stance towards the latter, therefore leading to a stronger engagement in non-conventional forms of participation (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). The relationship between political trust and political participation is assessed in two different ways, with some arguing that trust is a prerequisite for any form of participation occurring and others considering distrust as leading to participation in non-institutionalized forms of participation (Hooghe and Marien 2013).

Students of social movements have also stressed the role of political efficacy. This is a key concept in political science (Campbell et al. 1954), used in the study of both electoral and non-electoral behavior, which is seen as important – along with political interest – for motivating people to take part in politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Kaase and Marsh 1979; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978). In this regard, political scientists usually distinguish between two types of political efficacy: internal efficacy refers to the belief that one can understand politics and therefore participate in it; external efficacy to the belief that the government will respond to one's demands (Balch 1974). In other words, the former contains a political effectiveness component, whereas the latter contains a system responsiveness component (Craig and Maggiotto 1982). A lack of external efficacy is sometimes also referred to as political cynicism (Agger et al. 1961), although the latter is a more complex concept that has different dimensions – including trust – and can be considered in relation to various objects (de Vreese 2008). Most importantly, a lack of both internal and external efficacy is seen as a sign of poor motivation and psychological engagement with politics and therefore as preventing political participation, including in protest activities.

The perception that protest can matter is seen by different strands of the social movement literature as instrumental for mobilization to arise. For example, Kriesi et al. (1995) include the (perceived) chances of success – something very close to internal efficacy – among that which they call "concrete opportunities," along with the pair reform/threat, facilitation, and repression. These are seen as motivational derivatives of the political opportunity structure that either encourage or discourage people to engage in collective action. Similarly, political efficacy is an important factor pushing people to take part in protest according to rational choice accounts (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Opp 1989, 2009, 2013) and is also emphasized in the social psychological research tradition (Gamson 1992a, 1992b; Gamson et al. 1982; Klandermans 1997; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; van Zomeren and Iyer 2009; van Zomeren et al. 2008, 2012).

Students of social movements often distinguish between individual and collective efficacy or effectiveness (Opp 2013). While this distinction partly overlaps with the one between internal and external efficacy, it refers to another important dimension and can be seen as further distinguishing between two

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forms of internal efficacy: one referring to the feeling that one's own contribution is important and another stressing the role of organized citizens more generally. Social psychologists tend to stress collective or group efficacy (Klandermans 2013; van Zomeren et al. 2004, 2010, 2013), but studies suggest that individual effectiveness might be equally, if not more, important than collective effectiveness and that the latter interacts with objective availability to predict differential participation in social movements (Passy and Giugni 2001).[2] In the analysis below, in addition to internal and external efficacy, we also look at the extent to which participants in demonstrations feel both the individual and collective effectiveness of their actions, including the feeling that the demonstration in which one participates is instrumental for achieving its goals.

Finally, we should note that various political attitudes are linked with each other. In this regard, the combination of political trust and efficacy is often seen as decisive when it comes to protest politics (Andretta et al. 2015; Gamson 1968; Hooghe and Marien 2013; Seligson 1980; Watts 1973). More precisely, when a low level of trust combines with a high level of collective political efficacy, this provides fertile ground for mobilization (Gamson 1968; see Sigelman and Feldman 1983 for a different view). This links to the discussion about political alienation. Mistrusting citizens who engage in non-institutional forms of political engagement may have a more critical stance towards the powerholders and institutional politics, rather than being politically alienated (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2004; Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999). While mistrust has long been viewed as signaling disaffection with politics (Schumpeter 1942; Almond and Verba 1963), when coupled with a sense of political efficacy – that is, with agency power – this might lead to more critical citizens who engage beyond voting (Norris 1999). In this regard, following a long-standing research tradition connecting trust and efficacy, Andretta et al. (2015) have recently suggested to distinguish between four types of protesters depending on specific combinations of trust in parliament and group efficacy and found, using a smaller sample of the very same protest survey data which we use in this book, that most of the people who take part in demonstrations belong to the category of "critical citizens," combining low trust and high efficacy. They also found relevant shares of "pessimistic" (low trust and low efficacy) and "optimistic" (high trust and low efficacy) protesters, while only a small proportion belong to the "deferent type" (high trust and low efficacy).

In sum, one may expect people taking part in demonstrations, and particularly those who are more active, to be highly interested in politics, dissatisfied with how democracy works in their country, mistrusting of the established institutions and the political system, and with a strong feeling of efficacy, both in themselves as individual participants and of collective action more broadly. In other words, the typical profile of demonstrators may well be that of a "critical citizen" – in the sense of being mistrusting of the established political institutions and conventional politics, but also dissatisfied with how democracy

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works, and having a strong sense that collective action matters – while being highly interested in politics. At the same time, the attitudinal profile of people taking part in demonstrations may vary depending on the context – in particular, the national context – as well as on the type of issue, and the type of demonstrators.

EMOTIONS IN MOVEMENTS

Scholarship on social movements has long been dominated by resource mobilization and political process theory, which have emphasized rationality and cognitive motives for protesting, including psychological engagement and political attitudes. Recently, however, research has paid increasing attention to the role of emotions and affective determinants for involvement in social movements (see Jasper 2011 for a review). In this chapter we sketch a link between political attitudes, emotions, and commitment to protest in the name of a cause. Before we do so, however, we discuss the role of emotions in the social movement literature.

Students of contentious politics have entertained a love–hate relationship with emotions. The latter have gone in and out of fashion in the study of social movements and protest behavior (Goodwin et al. 2000). Up until the 1960s, emotions were central to scholarly accounts of collective behavior. This is most clearly seen in the tradition of the analysis of the crowd, most notably in the writings of Gustave Le Bon (1895) and Gabriel Tarde (1901). Crowd behavior was seen in this tradition as something irrational, if not pathological, governed by processes of suggestion and contagion through which normally reasonable individuals come to display exaggerated emotions leading them to behave irrationally and potentially violently.

A similar line of reasoning underlies most works in the collective behavior tradition and breakdown theories of collective action. Many of these works are based on the so-called frustration–aggression hypothesis, whereby collective behavior arises from the frustration – an emotion – felt by individuals whose expectations are not met once they compare their situation either with someone else's or with their own at a previous point in time (Davies 1962; Geschwender 1968; Gurr 1970).[3] As a result of such frustrated expectations, people get together to express their anger – another emotion – collectively. Similarly, such negative emotions as frustration and anger, together with irrational moods, are key to the explanation of crowd and collective behavior in Hoffer's (1951) analysis of "true believers," Kornhauser's (1959) mass society theory, and Turner and Killian's (1957) theory of the "emergent norm," as well as in other early analyses of social movements and protest behavior (see Goodwin et al. 2000).

Underlying these attempts at studying the role of emotions in collective action are two assumptions which would be challenged by subsequent work. First, in this research tradition emotions and rationality are two separate

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entities. While the latter characterizes political action by individuals within the institutionalized arenas, the former is the realm of collective action that occurs outside normal institutions. Emotions were therefore seen as pushing people to behave in irrational, illegitimate, and often socially dangerous ways such as in crowd behavior. Second, classical approaches to emotions in collective action focus solely on negative feelings such as fear and frustration. Such negative emotions are seen as the main driving force behind collective behavior. As a result, "[i]n academic traditions like these, protest was either a mistake, a form of acting out, or a sign of immaturity" (Goodwin et al. 2000: 68).

Perhaps precisely as a reaction to such a reductionist view of emotions and their role in social movements, new theoretical perspectives began dominating the field from the 1960s onward which evacuated emotions from their explanations. A rational protester acting purposefully with political aims replaced the emotionally frustrated individual depicted by the crowd and collective behavior traditions. First resources and organization and later political opportunities became the main explanatory tools of a generation of researchers that were not at ease with what they saw as a flawed picture of people engaging in social movements and protest behavior. Since then, resource mobilization and political process theories have stressed such factors as the amount of resources, the degree of organization, internal solidarities, and political opportunities and constraints as the main focus of analysis. In so doing, however, the role of emotions was ignored, overshadowed by what some have pointed to as a structural bias in social movement theory (Goodwin and Jasper 2004).

Even the "cultural turn" first brought by new social movement theory and later by framing theory could do little to bring emotions back into the study of social movements. Particularly in the framing perspective, the cognitive dimension of culture has largely overshadowed its affective dimension. Since the seminal article by Snow and collaborators (Snow et al. 1986), collective action frames have been conceptualized as the outcome of strategic action on the part of movement leaders and organizations. This narrow perspective has been somewhat expanded later on (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004), but framing processes remain largely a matter of cognitive work, conveying an image of culture as ideas more than affects. Similarly, new social movement theory emphasizes identity formation and its relation with broader processes of social and cultural change rather than the emotions relating to involvement in social movements (Johnston et al. 1994; Melucci 1996; Touraine 1978).

Emotions have resurfaced in the 1990s and more insistently since the early 2000s, this time in a totally different perspective than in the heyday of social movement analysis. Goodwin et al.'s *Passionate Politics* (2001) represented a turning point in this regard. These authors have made a more systematic attempt to bring emotion and affect back into the study of social movements and contentious politics. This body of work shares a number of fundamental features which set it apart from earlier research. First, emotions are no longer separate from rationality. Quite the contrary, people can act rationally while

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showing strong emotions and, conversely, they can act emotionally while being fully rational. Second, a more "neutral" view of emotions in social movements has replaced a narrower focus on negative feelings and the related normative bias in considering them as something "bad" leading to deviant behavior. Scholarship today examines the role of negative (e.g. anger, fear) as well as positive (e.g. enthusiasm, joy) emotions. Third, to a restrictive view of emotions as short-term outbursts of frustration and other negative feelings, recent scholarship has opposed a broader perspective comprising both short-term, reflexive emotions (e.g. disgust, surprise) and long-term moods and affective predispositions (e.g. frustration, love).

Yet, on the one hand, as Goodwin et al. (2000: 77) have pointed out, "[m]ost of the work on emotions in social movements remains scattered and ad hoc, addressing one emotion in a single kind of setting" and "has yet to be integrated into general frameworks for studying mobilization and movements." On the other hand, "in the sociology of emotions there have been systematic efforts to develop general theories … but no one has yet figured out how to apply those theories to social movements." This statement remains valid in spite of valuable attempts at systematizing the study of emotions in social movements and contentious politics (Goodwin et al. 2004; Jasper 2011).

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND EMOTIONS IN DEMONSTRATIONS

Emotions have also been included in social-psychological accounts of protest behavior (see van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013 for a review). While students of social movements have examined a wide array of emotions, much recent work in this research tradition assigns a prominent role to anger to motivate individuals to take part in collective action (Klandermans et al. 2008; Leach et al. 2006, 2007; Mummendey et al. 1999). Indeed, anger is often seen as the prototypical protest emotion (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007).

Most importantly for our present purpose, social psychologists have looked at how emotions combine with attitudes to explain protest participation or its withdrawal. In particular, research shows that group-based anger relates to efficacy to explain involvement in collective action: "People who perceive the ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger and desire to take action; people who perceive the ingroup as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the outgroup" (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). For example, van Zomeren et al. (2004, 2012) have proposed a "dynamic dual pathway model" that sees collective action as the outcome of two distinct processes: an emotion-focused approach revolving around the experience of group-based anger and a problem-focused approach revolving around beliefs in the group's efficacy.

While works on protest politics have only recently come to take into account the role of emotions and, above all, to integrate cognitive and affective accounts, political psychologists have long included emotions in their explanations of

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political choice and shown how they may affect political attitudes and behaviors (Brader 2005, 2006; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Neuman et al. 2007; Valentino et al. 2008, 2011; Weber 2013), including specifically in relation to political efficacy (Rudolph et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2009). This body of work has in particular explored the connections between cognition and affect and their implications for political evaluation, decision, and action (Redlawsk 2006; Way and Masters 1996). These works have stressed in particular the role of anxiety as well as its distinct effect from anger (Best and Krueger 2011; Huddy et al. 2007). Marcus and MacKuen (2000) have tackled one side of such a relationship by showing the impact of affect on political sophistication (see also Miller 2011). More generally, the authors argue that generalized anxiety about politics leads people to put more effort into gathering and processing information, hence resulting in better political choice by more motivated citizens, one based on information rather than the use of heuristics and shortcuts.

One of the difficulties in the study of the role of emotions in demonstrations lies in their definition, including distinguishing them clearly from political attitudes. Take for example trust. While it is most often seen as a political attitude, some treat it as a kind of emotion (Goodwin et al. 2004). More generally, various definitions and approaches exist in the literature. Terms such as emotions, affects, feelings, sentiments, moods, passions, and so forth are adopted, sometimes interchangeably, leading to an inconsistent use of terms.

Emotions are most often defined in terms of physiological arousal, which is often combined with some kind of cognitive label (Mutz 2007). Additionally, emotions are different from attitudes, as they are relatively short-lived and highly focused (Mutz 2007). A useful distinction in this regard is that between affective predispositions – or sentiments – and emotions. While the former refer to emotional appraisals of specific situations, issues, or objects and concern the extent to which individual evaluations are affectively charged, the latter refer to emotional reactions to specific external stimuli (Deonna and Teroni 2009). In other words, emotions have a limited duration, whereas sentiments may persist over a lifetime (Frijda 2008). In the field of contentious politics, Jasper (1998) distinguishes between long-lasting affects and more short-lived reactive emotions. Similarly, Goodwin et al. (2004) distinguish between reflex emotions – such as fear, surprise, anger, disgust, joy, and sadness – which arise suddenly and accidentally, without conscious cognitive processing – and affective emotions – such as love, hate, respect, and trust – which are positive and negative commitments or investments that usually persist over a longer period of time.[4]

Here we focus on four primary emotions: anger, worry, fear, and frustration. These can be seen as affective or emotional predispositions of demonstrators towards certain political issues, namely those issues addressed by the demonstration in which they take part. These four emotions share a characteristic:

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they are all negative emotions, as opposed to positive ones such as for example enthusiasm, hope, pride, joy, or relief. This reflects the idea – most notably stressed by grievance theories as well as social-psychological accounts of collective action – that feelings such as anger and frustration spur mobilization and strengthen individuals' motivation to participate in protest activities. These four basic emotions, however, also differ in some respects. Specifically, two of them – anger and frustration – are seen as "approach" emotions, whereas the other two – worry and fear – are "avoidance" emotions (Frijda 2007). This distinction originates in avoidance-approach theories, one of the three primary theoretical approaches to emotions in political psychology, alongside appraisal theories and neural process theories (see Brader and Marcus 2013 for a review). Approach-avoidance theories describe systems that motivate behaviors in reaction to rewarding and punishing stimuli, and explain consistent patterns of individual differences in these behaviors (Corr 2013). In other words, in this perspective, affect is seen as a valence assessment of circumstances or stimuli as either punishing or rewarding and therefore helps individuals to identify stimuli as either rewarding, leading to approach, or punishing, leading to avoidance (Brader and Marcus 2013). Approach emotions are expected to strengthen motivation and lead to participation, whereas avoidance emotions are expected to weaken motivation and prevent participation.

In the analyses below we will examine the impact of both political attitudes and emotions on the commitment to protest. Thus, we will include in our models the four key attitudes discussed earlier (political interest, satisfaction with democracy, political trust, and political efficacy) as well as the four basic emotions addressed here (anger, worry, fear, and frustration). Although this is a somewhat simplistic view, we consider each group of factors as testing the impact of a cognitive versus an affective explanation of commitment. Reflecting existing studies both in social-psychological theories of protest behavior and works in political psychology, we will also examine how political attitudes and emotions combine. Before we do so, however, we provide a descriptive assessment of the degree of political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy of demonstrators.

ARE DEMONSTRATORS POLITICALLY ALIENATED?

The increasing detachment and disaffection of citizens from politics as well as their political alienation is a commonly held view today in the scholarly literature (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Grasso 2016; Hay 2007; Mair 2006). This view often sees protest politics as an indicator of such alienation, when confronted with decreasing turnout at elections: people resort to protest and go onto the streets because they are disillusioned with politics. Opposing this view, others point to the fact that protest indicates commitment to politics rather than political alienation. In Chapter 2 we provided a picture that cast

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some doubt on the very premises of the idea that citizens have generally become politically more alienated. True, most people do not participate politically – except in the canonical institutional form, that is, voting – and they often display quite low levels of political interest, trust, and efficacy, and sometimes they are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their country more generally. However, while, at least during the last decade, there are signs of increasing political alienation among the citizenry, and this might be true in some countries more than others, and also be reflected in the rise of populist parties in those countries (Kriesi and Pappas 2015), it cannot be generalized. While, in certain countries, people seem to have become increasingly alienated from institutional politics in recent years – in terms of political trust and satisfaction with how democracy works in their country – citizens in other countries have followed a different, sometimes opposed, trend. Furthermore, political participation – both electoral and non-electoral – shows varying upwards and downwards trends over time cross-nationally.

When looking simply at trends over time, the thesis of political alienation can be contested for the years preceding the recent profound economic crisis that has hit Europe since 2008 (Grasso 2016), but perhaps even more so for the most recent period, at least as far as political attitudes and participation are concerned. This observation holds for the general population. What about the more specific group of people who take part in street demonstrations? Are they politically alienated, in terms of political interest, satisfaction with how democracy works, political trust, and political efficacy? More generally, how do demonstrators score on these four key political attitudes and how do they compare to the general population in this respect? Table 6.1 allows us to answer these questions. It shows the level of political interest, satisfaction with democracy, political trust in five key political institutions and actors (national government, national parliament, the judicial system, political parties, and trade unions), and both external and internal political efficacy, including individual and collective effectiveness, as well as how they vary across countries, demonstration issues, and demonstrator types.

Demonstrators clearly display high levels of political interest. In all seven countries, no less than four respondents out of ten are either quite or very interested in politics. This can also be seen by looking at the share of people who said they discuss politics fairly or very often when they get together with friends, relatives, or fellow workers, which is an indirect indicator of political interest. High shares of the respondents often engage in political discussions. If we confront the first of the two indicators with the distributions concerning the general population shown in Chapter 2, we realize that demonstrators display a higher level of political interest: people participating in demonstrations are much more interested in politics than the general population.[5]

Just as within the general population, we observe country differences in political interest among demonstrators. National variations, however, are

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TABLE 6.1. *Political attitudes of demonstrators by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages and means)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Political interest (quite or very) (%)	84.8	85.5	85.5	80.8	95.0	88.3	91.3	88.0**	86.5	79.5	90.2***
Discussing politics (fairly often or very often) (%)	55.6	74.2	48.6	66.5	72.5	60.6	67.3	61.7	63.1	44.7	68.8***
Satisfaction with democracy (mean 0-10 scale)	4.89	2.75	5.94	3.53	5.89	5.88	3.78	4.97***	4.53	5.56***	4.49
Political trust (quite or very much) (%)											
National government	22.2	4.1	17.0	10.6	15.9	37.8	12.2	22.4***	12.3	24.1***	15.1
National parliament	25.0	6.6	25.9	10.9	37.8	29.0	15.8	25.8***	17.9	28.8***	19.6
Judicial system	35.4	47.5	58.8	12.7	55.0	53.4	41.3	49.3***	37.9	52.7***	40.7
Political parties	12.5	5.5	19.2	7.00	33.8	20.5	7.4	15.8*	14.5	15.8	15.0
Trade unions	55.3	23.7	45.3	22.1	52.6	60.6	34.5	39.1	45.0***	35.1	44.5***
Political trust scale (mean 1-5 scale)	2.87	2.34	3.04	2.24	3.10	3.20	2.65	2.90***	2.69	2.94***	2.75
Political efficacy (agree or strongly agree) (%)											
Most politicians make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything	50.9	85.4	49.7	69.4	29.5	48.4	61.2	51.3	59.7***	51.1	56.6***
I do not see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway	24.9	24.8	10.2	21.4	5.5	6.6	17.3	12.5	18.2***	14.9	15.0
External political efficacy scale (mean 1-5 scale)	3.10	2.63	3.37	2.93	3.70	3.46	3.11	3.30***	3.11	3.27***	3.20

(*continued*)

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TABLE 6.1. (*continued*)

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
My participation can have an impact on public policy in this country (individual effectiveness)	71.1	68.9	75.0	70.3	72.9	86.3	75.5	77.3***	71.9	70.5	76.4***
Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country (collective effectiveness)	86.0	79.5	77.4	85.5	81.0	90.4	84.2	84.4***	82.0	77.9	85.4***
If citizens from different countries join forces, they can have a lot of impact on international politics (collective effectiveness)	84.2	83.7	71.7	88.4	68.0	77.1	82.4	78.7	79.5	71.9	81.6***
Internal political efficacy scale (mean 1-5 scale)	3.94	3.97	3.78	4.01	4.00	4.07	3.97	3.98***	3.92	3.80	4.01***
Political efficacy scale (mean 1-5 scale)	3.66	3.53	3.63	3.58	3.81	3.83	3.67	3.73***	3.62	3.62	3.70***
Effectiveness of demonstration (quite or very much) (%)											
Demonstration effective to achieve first goal	38.3	50.7	33.9	41.8	43.3	34.2	43.1	39.7	40.3	34.0	41.3***
Demonstration effective to achieve second goal	33.9	50.4	35.1	32.4	42.4	36.8	33.5	36.1	37.7*	33.6	37.1***
Demonstration effectiveness scale (mean 1-5 scale)	3.18	3.50	3.15	3.11	3.38	3.26	3.22	3.26*	3.21	3.13	3.25***

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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smaller among the latter, also because most are politically interested (but they become larger if we focus on those who said they are only quite interested). British and Swedish demonstrators are slightly more interested than their counterparts in the other countries, especially the Spaniards, on the direct measures, while Italians and again Swedish protesters more often discuss politics, especially as compared to the Belgians, the Dutch, and partly also the Swiss. However, people participating in demonstrations are all at least fairly interested in politics. This can hardly be seen as a sign of political alienation, at least not in the sense of being detached from politics in general. Similarly, no substantial difference can be observed between demonstrations on cultural and economic issues. Participants are quite homogeneously distributed across the two types of events, on both indicators of political interest. The difference is statistically significant on political interest, but it is very small. Much larger differences exist, however, between the two types of demonstrators: activists are more interested in politics than occasional demonstrators, whether in terms of self-declared interest or actively by discussing politics. As we shall see below, this reflects a systematic pattern distinguishing the two types of demonstrators on all four political attitudes considered here, suggesting the presence of a divide among protesters.

Satisfaction with democracy shows a more heterogeneous picture across countries. We can once again compare these results with those referring to the general population shown in Chapter 2. While demonstrators are less satisfied than the general population with how democracy works in their country everywhere – hence less supportive of the political system – the difference is particularly large in certain countries, most notably the UK, Italy, and Spain. In other words, British, Italian, and Spanish demonstrators are more dissatisfied with how democracy works than their counterparts in other countries in absolute terms, but also relative to the general population. In all the other countries the difference between demonstrators and general population is smaller.

Here we also observe a difference across the two types of demonstrations: participants in events on cultural issues are more satisfied than those attending events on economic issues, attesting to a more critical stance of the latter. Given the context of the crisis and anti-austerity measures during which we conducted our survey, it is not surprising that individuals protesting against these unjust and unequal arrangements would be even more dissatisfied than those focused on more cultural issues. Most importantly, occasional demonstrators are more satisfied and therefore supportive than activists, who are more critical, and therefore this attitude could be spurring their repeated engagement.

Different levels of support – here for specific political actors and institutions – are also discernible when we look at political trust. Unfortunately, since the ESS uses a ten-point scale and the CCC survey uses a five-point scale, we cannot directly compare results across the two surveys. What we can compare, however, is the ranking of countries on specific items. For example, comparing the figures concerning trust in the national parliament, we observe two very

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similar distributions, with Swedish and Swiss demonstrators being the most trusting, followed by the Belgians and the Dutch, then the British, and finally the Italians and Spanish. This ranking largely reflects the figures for the general population seen in Chapter 2. The same pattern applies to trust in political parties, and again, with some exceptions, this broadly reflects what is observed in the general population. The very low share of people – among demonstrators, but also in the general population – who trust parliament as well as political parties in Italy and Spain is especially striking. A number of corruption and other scandals in both countries help to explain this, but levels of trust are generally found to be lower in Southern Europe, also in relation to the legacies of authoritarianism and widespread clientelism (van der Meer 2017).

Similar cross-national variations also exist with regard to trust in the judicial system and trade unions, as reflected in the overall measure of political trust grouping all five items, which also shows the generally low level of trust in all countries.[6] Again, Italian and Spanish demonstrators are clearly less trusting, while the Swedes, the Swiss, and in part also the Dutch are the most supportive. We also observe a different level of political trust between those who take part in demonstrations addressing cultural issues and those participating in demonstrations on economic issues: the former are overall more trusting than the latter and in particular with regard to trust in the national government, the national parliament, and the judicial system. In contrast, they are less so when it comes to trusting trade unions, which is easy to understand given the thematic focus of the demonstrations. Yet again, the most important difference in our perspective is the one that discriminates between occasional demonstrators and activists. Here the difference is smaller than for political interest and satisfaction with democracy, but occasional demonstrators are significantly more trusting than activists. Thus, once again, the latter have a more critical stance than the former. This critical stance expresses itself at the system level: activists are especially critical of the three key political institutions – the national government, the national parliament, and the judicial system – but are more trusting than occasional demonstrators towards trade unions, while there is virtually no difference concerning political parties, as here we observe very low levels of trust among both groups.

Moving on to political efficacy, let us focus on the combined measures first.[7] Overall, demonstrators display a fairly high level of political efficacy in all seven countries. This applies especially to internal political efficacy – that is, the feeling that participation, whether individually or collectively, matters – while levels of external political efficacy – that is, the sense of system responsiveness – are somewhat lower everywhere, but especially so in Italy and Spain. Furthermore, cross-national variations are rather limited. The Swedish and Swiss demonstrators have the highest overall feeling of efficacy, while the Italians and the Spaniards locate on the opposite end, and the other three countries are not far from them in this respect. As noted, external political efficacy is particularly low in Italy and Spain and highest in Sweden, with high

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scores in the Netherlands and Switzerland as well. This can also be read in terms of political cynicism: especially when compared to the Swedes and the Swiss, Italian and Spanish demonstrators are characterized by low levels of external political efficacy and, therefore, by high levels of political cynicism. Internal political efficacy, in contrast, is lowest in the Netherlands and highest in Switzerland, but varies only to a limited extent across countries.[8]

The analysis of political efficacy yields an interesting pattern if we confront internal and external efficacy. In some countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, both kinds of efficacy are quite high. In some others, most notably Italy and Spain, however, we observe an inverse relationship: low external efficacy but high internal efficacy. In other words, Italian and Spanish demonstrators are cynical towards the established institutions and politics, but believe that they, as citizens, can matter and make the difference, especially when acting collectively.

In the discussion above, in addition to the distinction between internal and external efficacy, we also hinted at another distinction stressed by students of social movements, namely the one between individual and collective efficacy or effectiveness. We have conceived of it as a subtype of internal efficacy. Therefore we can use the same indicators to capture it. Of the three items that capture internal efficacy, the first ("my participation can have an impact on public policy in this country") can be seen as a measure of individual effectiveness, while the other two ("organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country" and "if citizens from different countries join forces, they can have a lot of impact on international politics") grasp the idea of collective effectiveness in some way. The latter one adds a transnational dimension to collective effectiveness. Additionally, we also have at our disposal a further indicator consisting in the perception that the demonstration in which one takes part is instrumental to achieve its goals.

Overall, we observe high levels of both individual and collective effectiveness with little variation across countries, and the latter is systematically higher than the former in each country, considerably so in some, more "collectivistic" countries and only to a limited extent in other, more "individualistic" countries. Thus, joining forces is seen as a better way to influence public policy. Yet, demonstrators are much more skeptical as regards the effectiveness of the demonstration in which they took part, although three to five out of ten, depending on the country, believe the demonstration is effective to reach its goals. Italian and in part also Swedish demonstrators are somewhat more positive in this regard, but the mean on the demonstration effectiveness scale is very close in each country.

Political efficacy varies only to a limited extent across the two types of demonstrations. Participants in events focusing on cultural issues seem to have a slightly higher sense of efficacy, whether internal or external as well as overall and relative to the demonstration in which they took part. Differences are statistically significant on all four scales, but their size is rather limited, except

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perhaps for external efficacy. Thus, demonstrations on cultural issues seem to attract more trusting people, but also people who are less politically cynical and who have a stronger sense of being able to influence politics, especially so individually.

Finally, political efficacy also varies across types of demonstrators. Again, differences are not particularly large, but they are all statistically significant. As we can see, activists are more cynical than occasional demonstrators – they have a lower external political efficacy – but they have a stronger sense of being able to influence politics – they have a higher internal political efficacy – than the latter. This higher sense of effectiveness has both an individual and a collective component, including with respect to joining forces internationally. They also believe to a greater extent than occasional demonstrators that the demonstration in which they took part is effective to achieve its goals. Thus, people who participate more frequently in demonstrations seem to better reflect the image of critical citizens that are highly interested in politics, but showing little system support and trust towards established political actors and institutions, cynical about established politics, and at the same time confident that both individual and collective action can help change things. This belief in the effectiveness of individual and collective action may be one of the key motives leading them to sustained participation.

In sum, our descriptive analysis of political attitudes among demonstrators shows that people taking part in demonstrations are overall more interested in politics than the general population, that they are quite skeptical about established politics, but also that they are at the same time quite confident about the potential impact of their own political participation, both individually and collectively. Our analysis also shows that, beyond this general pattern, there are strong variations across countries – with Italian and Spanish demonstrators often behaving in a similar way, especially as opposed to the Swedish and Swiss ones – as well as, to a more limited extent, across types of demonstrations and, most importantly, across types of demonstrators. In particular, activists more than occasional demonstrators seem to correspond to the critical citizens depicted in the literature (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). How does all this relate to the emotions felt by demonstrators? We address this question next.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES, EMOTIONS, AND COMMITMENT

As discussed earlier, political scientists have examined how political attitudes and emotions combine to account for political participation (Marcus and MacKuen 2000; Miller 2011; Redlawsk 2006; Way and Masters 1996). Similarly, social psychologists have examined the role of cognition and affect for protest behavior (van Zomeren et al. 2004, 2012). Here we examine the role of emotions in demonstrations and above all how they combine with political attitudes in relation to demonstrators' commitment. Once again, we do so by means of regression analysis, whereby we confront cognitive (attitudes) and affective

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(emotions) predictors of commitment to take to the streets as well as how they combine. Before doing so, however, it is worth taking a look at how the four primary emotions included in our survey – anger, worry, fear, and frustration – are distributed among the respondents and how they vary across countries, demonstration issues, and demonstrator types. Table 6.2 does just that, distinguishing between approach and avoidance emotions. It shows the percentage of respondents who said thinking of the issues addressed by the demonstration makes them feel quite or very much angry, worried, fearful, or frustrated.

Generally speaking, demonstrators have rather strong feelings on all four emotions except for fear, as the percentage of people who said they feel fearful is much lower. Cross-national differences exist though. Some results in this respect are nevertheless worth stressing. We notice in particular a higher level of anger among Italian and Spanish demonstrators, and a significantly lower level of anger among the Dutch. At the same time, Italians and Spanish demonstrators rank low in terms of frustration. The British and the Swedes seem the most frustrated. Italian and Spanish protesters are also the most worried, together with the Swiss, while the British and the Swedes are the least worried. Thus, in both Italy and Spain, participants in demonstrations are particularly angry, but at the same time also especially worried. In other words, they have strong feelings both concerning an approach emotion, which is supposed to push people to mobilize, and concerning an avoidance emotion, which is seen as leading people to political apathy (Klandermans et al. 2008).Finally, as said, fear is much less prevalent in all seven countries, but especially so in the Netherlands, while being somewhat higher in the UK.

We also observe statistically significant differences across demonstration issues and demonstrator types. Participants in demonstrations on economic issues are angrier and more worried than their counterparts taking part in demonstrations on cultural issues, while they are slightly less frustrated and less fearful. The size of these differences, however, is quite small, although it is larger between types of demonstrators, except perhaps for worry. Activists display stronger feelings than occasional demonstrators on all four emotions: they are angrier, more frustrated, more worried, and also more fearful. Clearly, frequent attendance of protest events relates to a higher emotional charge by participants, although we cannot say whether the former explains the latter or the other way around.

Table 6.3 shows the results of the regression analysis aimed to ascertain the covariants of commitment. It shows six models. Model 1 tests for the effects of the four political attitudes discussed earlier. Since the two distinctions are strongly correlated, we cannot include internal and external efficacy along with individual and collective effectiveness. The first model therefore only includes the latter. Model 2 and the following then include internal and external political efficacy, leaving individual and collective effectiveness out. Models 3 to 6 then add the four emotions one at a time. The final model therefore includes both political attitudes and emotions, plus the controls and the three key

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TABLE 6.2. *Emotions felt by demonstrators by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Approach emotions (quite or very much) (%)											
Anger	79.1	89.2	68.6	86.8	81.1	78.3	81.4	76.6	82.8***	68.7	82.9***
Frustration	68.8	64.6	60.5	69.4	84.4	66.1	86.9	72.6	70.6**	66.9	73.0***
Avoidance emotions (quite or very much) (%)											
Worry	81.7	91.5	79.0	86.1	72.8	85.3	69.8	78.3	82.1***	77.0	80.9***
Fear	38.7	37.2	23.7	39.0	37.0	37.1	47.4	38.3	35.1***	29.9	38.3***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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TABLE 6.3. *Logistic regression models on commitment (odds ratios)*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Gender (male)	0.67***	(0.03)	0.66***	(0.03)	0.70***	(0.03)	0.74***	(0.04)	0.74***	(0.04)	0.76***	(0.04)
Cohorts												
Post-WWII generation	1.22*	(0.11)	1.21	(0.13)	1.17	(0.12)	1.16	(0.13)	1.16	(0.13)	1.16	(0.13)
1960s/1970s generation (ref.)												
1980s generation	0.97	(0.06)	0.95	(0.07)	0.93	(0.07)	0.91	(0.07)	0.91	(0.07)	0.91	(0.07)
1990s generation	0.75***	(0.05)	0.71***	(0.05)	0.71***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.71***	(0.05)
2000s generation	0.64***	(0.05)	0.64***	(0.05)	0.66***	(0.05)	0.68***	(0.05)	0.68***	(0.05)	0.66***	(0.05)
Education												
Secondary school or lower (ref.)												
BA or equivalent	0.77***	(0.05)	0.79***	(0.05)	0.79***	(0.06)	0.79***	(0.06)	0.79***	(0.06)	0.79***	(0.06)
MA or higher	0.68***	(0.04)	0.68***	(0.04)	0.68***	(0.04)	0.68***	(0.04)	0.68***	(0.04)	0.68***	(0.04)
Occupation												
Salariat	0.87	(0.08)	0.93	(0.09)	0.93	(0.09)	0.92	(0.09)	0.92	(0.09)	0.93	(0.09)
Intermediate professions	0.90	(0.09)	0.93	(0.10)	0.94	(0.10)	0.93	(0.10)	0.93	(0.10)	0.94	(0.10)
Working class (ref.)												
Unemployed	0.77*	(0.10)	0.79	(0.11)	0.80	(0.11)	0.80	(0.11)	0.79	(0.11)	0.80	(0.11)
Students	0.93	(0.10)	0.97	(0.11)	0.98	(0.11)	0.96	(0.11)	0.96	(0.11)	0.97	(0.11)
Political interest	1.72***	(0.09)	1.71***	(0.09)	1.55***	(0.08)	1.53***	(0.08)	1.53***	(0.08)	1.52***	(0.08)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.95***	(0.01)	0.96***	(0.01)	0.97*	(0.01)	0.98	(0.01)	0.98	(0.01)	0.98	(0.01)
Political trust	0.89**	(0.04)	0.92	(0.04)	1.00	(0.05)	1.00	(0.05)	1.00	(0.05)	1.00	(0.05)
External political efficacy			0.92*	(0.03)	0.94	(0.03)	0.96	(0.03)	0.96	(0.03)	0.97	(0.03)
Internal political efficacy			1.28***	(0.05)	1.25***	(0.05)	1.23***	(0.05)	1.23***	(0.05)	1.23***	(0.05)

(*continued*)

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TABLE 6.3. (*continued*)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Individual efficacy	1.08*	(0.03)										
Collective efficacy	1.13***	(0.04)										
Effectiveness of demonstration	1.41***	(0.03)	1.40***	(0.04)	1.36***	(0.03)	1.35***	(0.04)	1.35***	(0.04)	1.36***	(0.04)
Economic values (left-wing)	1.10**	(0.04)	1.09*	(0.04)	1.02	(0.04)	0.99	(0.04)	0.99	(0.04)	0.99	(0.04)
Social values (libertarian)	1.04	(0.03)	1.04	(0.03)	1.04	(0.03)	1.04	(0.03)	1.05	(0.03)	1.05	(0.03)
Organizational membership	1.15*	(0.08)	1.18*	(0.09)	1.24**	(0.09)	1.23**	(0.09)	1.23**	(0.09)	1.23**	(0.09)
Anger					2.36***	(0.12)	2.14***	(0.11)	2.12***	(0.11)	1.97***	(0.10)
Worry							1.79***	(0.09)	1.73***	(0.09)	1.69***	(0.09)
Fear									1.11	(0.09)	1.04	(0.08)
Frustration											1.37***	(0.07)
Activist	1.53***	(0.08)	1.52***	(0.09)	1.49***	(0.09)	1.49***	(0.09)	1.49***	(0.09)	1.49***	(0.09)
Economic issue	1.37***	(0.07)	1.39***	(0.08)	1.30***	(0.07)	1.34***	(0.08)	1.34***	(0.08)	1.35***	(0.08)
Country												
Belgium	1.56***	(0.15)	1.48***	(0.15)	1.65***	(0.17)	1.62***	(0.16)	1.63***	(0.16)	1.75***	(0.18)
Italy	1.02	(0.12)	0.92	(0.11)	0.97	(0.12)	0.84	(0.11)	0.85	(0.11)	0.93	(0.12)
Netherlands	1.10	(0.10)	1.05	(0.10)	1.17	(0.11)	1.09	(0.10)	1.10	(0.10)	1.17	(0.11)
Spain	1.28*	(0.13)	1.29*	(0.14)	1.40**	(0.15)	1.31*	(0.15)	1.32*	(0.15)	1.41**	(0.16)
Sweden (ref.)												
Switzerland	1.37***	(0.12)	1.30**	(0.12)	1.31**	(0.13)	1.19	(0.12)	1.20	(0.12)	1.30**	(0.13)
UK	0.93	(0.08)	0.90	(0.08)	0.95	(0.09)	0.98	(0.09)	0.98	(0.09)	0.97	(0.09)
Constant	0.18***	(0.05)	0.18***	(0.05)	0.12***	(0.03)	0.11***	(0.03)	0.11***	(0.03)	0.09***	(0.03)
Log-likelihood	−5950.08		−5390.75		−5240.09		−5171.45		−5170.48		−5152.97	
N	9,580		8,635		8,635		8,635		8,635		8,635	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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comparative variables, which are also included in the other models. The table presents results as odds ratios.[9]

Focusing on the first two models, we can see that political interest clearly is positively and strongly associated with commitment: the more committed demonstrators are also the more interested in politics. In contrast, satisfaction with how democracy works and political trust – that is, the measures of system support, respectively of support to specific political actors and institutions – are negatively, though only weakly, correlated with commitment: dissatisfied and mistrusting demonstrators are slightly less likely to be strongly committed than more supportive ones.[10] It should be noted, however, that the effect of political trust becomes non-significant in the model that includes internal and external efficacy.

As we said earlier, research has shown that political efficacy – both in its individual and collective dimensions – is a key determinant of participation in social movements and protest activities (Gamson 1992a, 1992b; Gamson et al. 1982; Klandermans 1997; Kriesi et al. 1995; Koopmans 1995; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Opp 1989, 2009, 2013; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; van Zomeren et al. 2004, 2008, 2012). Does it also matter for commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause? The answer is a qualified yes. As we can see in Model 1, net of the effect of country, issue of demonstration, and type of demonstrators – as well as of the various controls included in the models – both individual and collective effectiveness are significantly and positively associated with commitment.[11] Furthermore, consistent with previous studies, collective effectiveness seems more important in this regard. This result is strengthened by the even stronger impact of the perceived effectiveness of demonstration. What really motivates people to participate is the feeling that "together we can matter," including – and especially so – reaching the goals of the demonstration at hand.

As we can see in Model 2, internal political efficacy also displays a statistically significant effect. This effect holds after controlling for the four emotions. Demonstrators who have a stronger sense of being able to influence politics – whether individually or collectively – are more committed to participate. This is also consistent with the social movement literature. External political efficacy, in contrast, has a more limited effect. We observe a statistically significant and negative effect in Model 2, but this effect disappears once we introduce the four emotions, starting with anger in Model 3 and then the other ones in subsequent models. In other words, political cynicism does not seem to make demonstrators more committed, that is more committed demonstrators are not necessarily more cynical than less committed ones.

The next four models add each one of the four emotions. As we can see in Model 6 which includes them all, three out of four emotions are significantly associated with commitment. Other things being equal, anger, fear, and frustration all correlate strongly with the demonstrators' motivation to participate. Moreover, this correlation is a positive one: angrier, more worried,

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and more frustrated participants are also more strongly committed. While this was expected for the two approach emotions (anger and frustration), which according to the extant literature push people to protest (Klandermans et al. 2008), it is more surprising that one of the two avoidance emotions (worry) also has this effect. This would suggest that, more than a specific type of emotion, what matters is the presence of a strong emotional stance vis-à-vis a given issue. Fear, however, is not associated with commitment.

Exploiting the stepwise approach in the last four models, we can also investigate the relationship between political attitudes and emotions. When we introduce anger in Model 3, we observe a limited erosion of the effect of political interest. This suggests that the effect of political interest on commitment is partly captured by the higher level of anger, felt by demonstrators. In other words, the more interested are also the angrier, and this impacts on commitment in turn. Anger also combines to some limited extent with internal political efficacy and the effectiveness of demonstration, but in this case the erosion of the effects is negligible. This relationship between anger, on the one hand, and political interest and efficacy, on the other, is in line with works by social psychologists who have stressed the role of group-based anger for protest participation (Klandermans et al. 2008; Leach et al. 2006, 2007; Mummendey et al. 1999; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007) and how it combines with certain political attitudes (van Zomeren et al. 2004, 2012). The only other tangible sign of how political attitudes and emotions combine can be seen in the effect of satisfaction with democracy disappearing once we include worry in Model 4. This means that the effect of satisfaction is captured by the higher level of worry felt by demonstrators. In other words, the more dissatisfied are also the more worried. All other effects of political attitudes remain unchanged when we include the four emotions in subsequent models.

In sum, our regression analysis yields a number of lessons for the study of demonstrators and, more specifically, their commitment to protest. First, consistent with various strands of literature, political attitudes impact on the motivation people have to take part in demonstrations. However, not all of them have the same effect: while political interest, internal political efficacy, individual and collective efficacy or effectiveness, and the perceived effectiveness of the demonstration in which one takes part all have a significant and positive effect, satisfaction with how democracy works, political trust, and external political efficacy or cynicism do not seem to matter. Second, the emotions felt by demonstrators towards the issues addressed by the demonstration are strongly associated with commitment. Specifically, anger, worry, and frustration all have a significant and positive effect on commitment, whereas fear does not matter. Third, some types of political attitudes and some types of emotions – in particular, political interest and anger – combine in accounting for commitment to protest. As such, anger captures part of the effect of political interest and worry captures the effect of satisfaction with democracy.

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CONCLUSION

Political attitudes are central in various strands of research in political science, from vote choice theories to the political culture paradigm, from studies of political participation to works focusing on protest behavior. As such they are crucial to the understanding of protest participation, including taking part in street demonstrations. Four types of attitudes are often investigated in the political behavior literature: political interest, satisfaction with how democracy works, political trust, and political efficacy. Students of social movements and protest behavior have paid special attention to the latter as well as its combination with political trust. In this perspective, mistrust, when accompanied by a strong sense of group efficacy is seen as an ideal condition leading to mobilization (Gamson 1968), the former being a feature of critical rather than alienated citizens (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999).

Our analysis has shown that people who take part in demonstrations stand out for their particularly high interest in politics, their critical stance towards political institutions as well as towards conventional politics and how democracy works in their country, and a heightened sense of political efficacy – both internal and external as well as individual and collective. At the same time, however, we observe important differences among demonstrators: those who participate on a regular basis are more critical than those who do so more sporadically and therefore they better correspond to the critical citizens depicted in the literature (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Additionally, we also observe differences across countries as well as between demonstrations dealing with cultural and economic issues.

Activists are also more emotionally charged – angrier, more frustrated, more worried, and more fearful – than occasional demonstrators. The same is true of people participating in demonstrations on economic issues relative to those taking part in demonstrations on cultural issues as well as of demonstrators in certain countries relative to others. Most importantly, we saw that the commitment of demonstrators to participate is associated with both political attitudes and emotions, in particular with political interest and political efficacy and the perceived effectiveness of the demonstration in which they took part, on the one hand, and anger, worry, and frustration, on the other. Furthermore, political attitudes and emotions seem to combine in some way through the link between political interest and anger. Thus, cognition and affect both contribute to commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause. In the next chapter we dig deeper into the different types of motivations underlying participation in street demonstrations.

Notes

1. Brady et al. (1995) make a similar argument about political efficacy and, more generally, about psychological engagement with politics.

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2. Incidentally, beyond the strong positive effect of individual effectiveness, Passy and Giugni (2001) found that collective effectiveness is negatively associated with differential participation.
3. But see Goodwin et al. (2000) who see relative deprivation explanations as being a counter to this prevalent pejorative tone.
4. Goodwin et al. (2004) additionally define two further kinds of emotions: moods, which are modular or transportable emotions that do not take a direct object, and moral emotions, which arise out of complex cognitive understandings and moral awareness. Jasper (2011) similarly distinguishes between five kinds of emotions: urges, reflex emotions, moods, affective loyalties or orientations, and moral emotions.
5. The general population also includes participants in demonstrations and other political activities, so that the difference between politically active and non-active people is even larger.
6. Cronbach's alpha of the political trust scale (5 items) is 0.79.
7. Cronbach's alpha of the four political efficacy scales are as follows: external efficacy scale (2 items) 0.55; internal efficacy scale (3 items) 0.70; political efficacy scale (5 items) 0.63; and demonstration effectiveness scale (2 items) 0.78. The external political efficacy scale has been reversed for use in the regression analysis. This means that large percentages of agreement reflect a low efficacy (or a high political cynicism) and small percentages of agreement reflect a high efficacy (or a low political cynicism).
8. The lower levels of external political efficacy result above all from the fact that respondents believe that "most politicians make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything," while the share of people who said that "[I] do not see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway" is much smaller.
9. For political interest and the four emotions, we have created a series of dummies, whereby 1 stands for the extreme category instead of the two most extreme as in the descriptive tables. We did so because the distributions are skewed towards the highest values. Individual and collective efficacy are measured only with the first two indicators ("my participation can have an impact on public policy in this country" and "organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country"), as they are more closely comparable.
10. The effect of political trust, however, becomes non-significant in the model that includes internal and external efficacy.
11. In the analysis of individual and collective effectiveness, however, we do not control for the effect of emotions, as we focus on internal and external efficacy in doing so.

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7

Why Do People Want to Demonstrate?

Why do people participate? What reasons do people have for attending a given protest or demonstration? Particularly in the work of social psychologists, scholars have increasingly been interested in the motivations underlying protest participation (see Klandermans 2015 for a review). As Verba et al. (1995) noted, people participate because they want to, can, or are being asked. This chapter picks the first reason apart and asks: But why do they want to? What are the motives that individuals cite as pushing them to overcome the costs and barriers to participation and take to the streets? Which motivations are most important for making sense of why certain individuals are more politically committed than others? Motivations are defined as "things inside a person that move or impel him or her into action" (Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985: 12).[1] For Oegema and Klandermans (1994) they are what underlie for that individual the positive ratio of costs to benefits, leading to a specific action preparedness. To delve deeper into these questions, this chapter focuses on the motivations of demonstrators. We look at what motivates people to take to the streets. We can distinguish motivations in terms of the instrumental versus expressive as well as the individual versus collective dimensions (Klandermans 2015). Here we distinguish between different kinds of motivations, including more instrumental and more expressive types such as defending interests, expressing one's views, pressuring politicians to make things change, raising public awareness, expressing solidarity, and feeling a sense of moral obligation. Benefits of participation could be diverse – anything from socializing with friends and colleagues to an important change in policy affecting one's livelihood (Walgrave et al. 2013). We examine to what extent these motivations differ across countries as well as for different protest issues and different types of demonstrators. Relatedly, we also look at the feelings of identification of participants with others attending the demonstration as well as the organizations staging the event. Indeed, identification with other protesters and the organizations staging the demonstration

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is a major reason why people take to the streets. We also analyze when demonstrators made a firm decision to attend the demonstration, since greater commitment to participate should be linked with a more timely decision to participate.

MOTIVATIONS TO ACTION

There are three main reasons why people demonstrate or participate in movements: (a) instrumentality, the desire to change one's or one's group circumstances by influencing the social and political environments; (b) identity, the desire to be part of something bigger than oneself and to manifest this; and (c) ideology, the desire to find meaning and to express one's understanding of the world (Klandermans 2004). Participation in social movements is influenced by an assessment of relative costs and benefits (Klandermans 1984) and there is evidence that collective interests also predict movement participation (Sturmer and Simon 2004).

Klandermans (2015) further distinguishes between instrumental and expressive motives. As Walgrave et al. (2013) note, This distinction links back to that between "instrumentally rational" (*zweckrational*) and "value-rational" (*wertrational*) actions in Max Weber's well-known typology of social action (Weber 1922), also popularized in sociology through the work of Talcott Parsons (1937). Both types are rational since they are goal-oriented and conscious. However, in the first the goal is external, whereas in the second the goal is the action itself for its own sake (Walgrave et al. 2013). Therefore, protest motivations that link back to external changes are instrumental (e.g. defending interests, pressuring politicians to make things change, raising public awareness), whereas those that link to internal feelings are expressive (e.g. expressing one's views, expressing solidarity, feeling a sense of moral obligation) (Walgrave et al. 2013). Most individuals have a mix of instrumental and expressive motivations for most actions, including protest: "It would be very unusual to find concrete cases of ... social action which were oriented only in one or another of these ways" (Weber 1922: 26). Indeed, Klandermans and Oegema (1987) noted how many peace protesters in the 1980s in the Netherlands did not think that the demonstrations would have any effect. They were protesting to express their values as different from the establishment and, as such, in expressing their views, their oppositional ideology was central. In other words, these were expressive motivations for protest mainly. Of course, these demonstrators may have also felt a moral obligation to protest or that they were marching in solidarity with Vietnam, or defending their interests as part of humanity, at the same time. This point further illustrates the complementary nature of motivations. Indeed, for van Zomeren et al. (2004), instrumental motivations as well as feelings of "group-based anger" are the two main motivations for social movement participation and the latter is an expressive type of motivation, though more specific. Van Stekelenburg (2006) also highlights instrumental, identity, group-based anger, and ideological motives for protest.

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As such, these ideal type motivations are probably complementary and not mutually exclusive. Since motivations are not mutually exclusive, we must study different types side by side.

The other distinction hinted at above is that between individual and collective motivations (Walgrave et al. 2013). People can participate mainly for individual reasons or on behalf of a group. Individual motivations can be either instrumental-individual, such as defending my interests, or expressive-individual, such as expressing my views or feeling a sense of moral obligation. The same is true of collective motivations: things like pressuring politicians to make things change and raising public awareness are more instrumental-collective, whereas expressing solidarity is on behalf of a group and, as such, expressive-collective. Indeed, people can take to the streets to improve their living conditions or to fight on behalf of the living conditions of a marginalized group such as migrants.

The concept of class consciousness of Marxist imprint suggests that the understanding of problems as collective is an important precondition for achieving sustained mobilization and effective social change. Today this idea is picked up in collective identity research and work on collective action frames (Gamson 1992a) and shows that, when distinguishing between injustice, agency, and identity frames, the latter signify identity as a collective when affected by injustice or grievance. This, in turn, is key, since it leads to a strong feeling of commonality and solidarity with others affected as well as strong oppositional consciousness towards those held responsible for the injustice or grievance. For Gamson and collaborators (1990, 1992a, 1992b; Gamson and Modigliani 1989), collective identity and collective action frames are preconditions to action and, as such, fundamental in understanding motivations to protest and engage in social movement activism. However, as Wahlstrom (2016) notes, collective identity and similar collective motivations might be more relevant for demonstrations around certain issues rather than others. For example, collective identity should at least in theory be more central for demonstrations around socioeconomic issues affecting groups as a whole.

The literature on social movements has long analyzed which factors are linked to both the strength and content of identities that are shared collectively and foster mobilization in different contexts. Ever since Marx, the idea of class consciousness emphasized how politicized collective identities were fundamental for bringing about social change. Collective identification is understood to underlie an understanding of one's destiny as being linked to one's material conditions (Snow and Lessor 2013). However, identification need not only be linked to material interests, but can also be primarily moral and based on religious beliefs or other types of ideologies and allegiances (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). In particular, injustice frames are understood to be linked to the production of moral shocks motivating people to collective action (Gamson and Sifry 2013). Of course, these types of motivations are not mutually exclusive. Someone might protest in order to defend their interests as a citizen and, as such, for moral reasons in order to express their solidarity with other human

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beings in the same conditions. They might do so to raise public awareness about this problem as well as expressing their political views and, in so doing, to pressure politicians to make things change all in one instance, all with respect to a single, specific mobilization.

The sense of injustice was of critical importance for workers' movements (Tilly 1986). Moreover, it is understood that "double deprivation" at both the individual and group level fosters identity building, since this process links individual experience with a realization that one's conditions are shared with others and therefore contributes to feeling a sense of injustice which underpins mobilization (Klandermans 2015). Moreover, the allocation of responsibility is also seen as important, since it allows the sense of injustice to focus "on the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Gamson 1992a: 32). Research has shown that disruptions can push oppressed groups into actions as risks become more acceptable in the face of greater losses (Snow 2004; Snow and Lessor 2013; Snow et al. 1998, 2005). However, in order for disruptions or grievances to then move to action, identity remains key as "an act of imagination, a trope that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with our fellows and, by definition, moral boundaries against other categories" (Jasper and McGarry 2014: 3).

Social movements have also been seen as identity fields in that they foster boundary-making (Benford and Snow 2000). As such, social movements share a collective identity which is fluid and constantly developing, a shared definition of a group that comes from members' common interests and solidarity (Taylor 2013). In this way, group identification supports the linkages between individual social identification and collective identities and their politicization through blame attribution and an understanding of common problems and experiences (van Stekelenburg et al. 2013). These processes, in turn, underscore the link between individual lived experience, on the one hand, and subjective filtering of the social world and collective mobilizations for transforming society, on the other. These processes are extremely powerful, since they can underscore the radical reorganization of entire societies in the name of justice and equality.

MOTIVATIONS AND IDENTIFICATION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Research emphasized that instrumentality was not enough to make sense of why people participated in protests and that identity and identification had to be included in this process (see van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013 for a review). Many studies have shown that the more people identify with a group the more they are inclined to protest on behalf of that group (Klandermans et al. 2002; Simon and Klandermans 2001; van Zomeren et al. 2008). Identity is defined as our making sense of who we are relative to others as well as others' understandings of themselves (Jenkins 2008). This is metaphorically described as someone's spatial location in society (Simon et al.

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1998). Identity can be linked to a number of mutually competing potential identities as given by social class, gender, generation, and so forth. Individuals can have various identities in this sense, and these could all be linked to reasons for action on the basis of their memberships of social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Research on multiple identities shows how people can hold many different identities at the same time (Kurtz 2002). These, in turn, may come into conflict, such as for example with union members who need to decide whether or not to strike and put people under cross-pressure (Oegema and Klandermans 1994). Striking workers and movement activists are often accused of disloyalty against their companies and countries. González and Brown (2003) call this "dual identity" and argue that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g. ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude supraordinate entity (e.g. national identity) identification. Rather, dual identity is desirable since it means individuals feel some basic security through identification with their group while at the same time not being exclusionary thanks to the overarching identification (Huo et al. 1996). Indeed, immigrants who display, a dual identity have been shown to be more inclined to take to the streets on behalf of their group, as noted also by Klandermans et al. (2008), who show how immigrants who display a dual identification are more satisfied. However, the dissatisfied will be more likely to be protesters.

But why is identification with a collective group such a powerful reason to protest? Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) note how identification is linked to an awareness of commonalities and similarities, including shared fate and common destiny with the group. The strength of identity comes from affective aspects (Ellemers 1993), whereby the more "the group is in me" the more "I feel for us" (Yzerbyt et al. 2003), thus developing stronger motivations to participate on its behalf. Collective identification, especially politicized forms thereof, are found to intensify feelings of efficacy (Simon et al. 1998; van Zomeren et al. 2008). With shared fate, emotions, and efficacy, identification also generates obligations to be a "good" member of the group (Sturmer and Simon 2004). In other words, collective identities must be politicized to motivate individuals to social and collective action. This is evident in the example of class and links back to Marx's classic point already discussed in Chapter 3 about the distinction between objective or structural social classes in themselves and politicized, subjectively self-conscious, and organized classes for themselves. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) note how the politicization of identities begins with the awareness of shared grievances and this is then linked to blaming the external enemy for the group's problems or exploitation. The politicization of identities is understood to unfold as a sequence with the underlying power struggle (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). This is similar to the process of the development of class consciousness, where events such as the recent austerity crisis and other capitalist crises can play a radicalizing role among those affected.

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Indeed, the wave of anti-austerity protests that has characterized the period of the Great Recession has spurred the development of politicized identities among those social sectors most deeply affected by the crisis, with anger arising from a widespread crisis of legitimacy (Habermas 1975) and a lack of responsiveness on the part of elites. These factors can have important effects on motivations for protest. Faced with economic and political crises, elites in Europe have been increasingly perceived as inefficient or applying weak or perversely ineffective solutions (della Porta 2015). Rather than helping the most vulnerable sectors of society, they have been seen as complicit in enacting austerity measures and public service cuts that serve to deprive and marginalize them even further (della Porta 2015). These processes and the deprivation they have wrought in advanced industrial democracies have acted to delegitimize already weakly supported elites and governments. In this context, della Porta (2015: 6) has argued that we are witnessing a "crisis of responsibility" of late neoliberalism and that we need to redevelop an analysis of capitalism as linked to protest to make sense of current developments. She follows Streeck's (2014: 53) conceptualization of capitalism as "a social order built on a promise of boundless collective progress – as measured by the size of its money economy – coming about as a side-product of maximization of individual utility, prosperity and profit." Her argument is that given that capitalism is, as Marx defined it, a mode of production defined on the basis of the exploitation of the proletariat class by the capitalist class, then, also, following Barker (2013), "the specific forms exploitation takes during the evolution of capitalism must be expected to have an effect on the producers' mobilization" (della Porta 2015: 7).

Going back to Tilly's (1986) point about the changing repertoires of contention as discussed in Chapter 3, from the local and paternalistic to the nationalized, professionalized, and modular as linked to the centralization of national political and economic power, della Porta (2015) notes how capitalism's role for changing the nature of protest by developing particular interests and collective identification among deprived groups had already been considered in Tilly's work. Despite the criticism of resource mobilization theory as largely agnostic to historical context, history, and the mode of production, in fact the role of capitalism for identity formation and the generation of its own "gravediggers" had already been considered in some other "exceptions" in the social movement literature, but the role was limited, since "attention was focused on big historical transformations rather than on the evolution in capitalism or the swinging move between capitalist growth and crisis" (della Porta 2015: 7).

The transformation of capital and the wider socioeconomic processes of the current context that might underscore protest do not necessarily need to be restricted to the defense of individual economic interests and indeed could feed into the various types of motivations we discussed above. To make sense of

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protests in the current period and what might motivate people to action, all four dimensions would seem to matter: the instrumental-individual, the expressive-individual, the expressive-collective, and the instrumental-collective. In this way, the current socioeconomic context suggests that both more interest-based and wider collective motivations will be important for protest. This generalization of individual experience into a more generalized sense of crisis and injustice, recognizing individual problems and deprivation as wider social problems deserving political solutions, is the precondition to political action for social change.

In her analysis of social movements in times of austerity, della Porta (2015) notes how a critical milestone in social movement research for the examination of how the functioning and structure of capitalism allowed for making sense of motivations to mobilization was the research on new social movements and particularly those elements focused on the emergence of the new middle class – or a segment of it – as the new basis for protest (Eder 1993; Kriesi 1989). More specifically, the so-called sociocultural professionals, given their prioritization of autonomy and libertarian social values and greater egalitarianism in the distribution of resources, became the core carriers of a growing protest sector (Kriesi 1998). Underlying this research were claims that the Fordist framework pacified the class cleavage, thus opening up space for the emergence of postmaterialist struggles built on wider moral claims pertaining to the environment, gender issues, and so forth as distinct from earlier movements of Marxist imprint centering on redistribution and socioeconomic grievances (Melucci 1989; Touraine 1981). Della Porta (2015) notes also capitalism's role for developing motivations for action, which was examined in studies of social movements linked to Kriesi et al.'s (2012) work on the emerging cleavage between the "winners and losers of globalization," and the related focus on the exclusionary cultural protectionism of anti-immigrant discourse and nationalism rather than looking at those other "losers" on the left that still continue to espouse culturally inclusive values but that are increasingly suffering in economic terms (della Porta 2015).

While the economic structures of capitalism and its tendency to crisis create the conditions for the identification of groups that have suffered its worst effects, it is precisely the politicization of these identities that is necessary to develop motivations for action and for individuals to act upon them and mobilize against unjust social arrangements. Indeed, when discussing the contextual conditions of capitalism that might develop individual motivations to protest and thus for making sense of the link between structure and action, it must be emphasized that, while groups might experience economic or political grievances, these do not in and of themselves spontaneously lead to political action, but need to be politicized on a broader social level. In this sense, the effects of political and macroeconomic crises on citizens' experience need to

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become understood as wider social and political problems requiring collective political action for their solution (Grasso and Giugni 2016a). This understanding of wider social and political problems as amenable to change is the first step in moving from the existence – and experience – of new grievances to action. In particular, the prevalence of neoliberal ideas in advanced democracies means that, ideologically, those involved in political resistance and mobilizations also need to become involved in the creation of a new framework of ideas to contest neoliberal ideological dominance or hegemony and thus to challenge the convergence of both social democratic and moderate conservative parties on their acceptance of this framework (English et al. 2016; Grasso et al. 2017; Temple et al. 2016). Rather than leaving the space open for right-wing populists to monopolize the critique of current arrangements, "the culturally inclusive losers" behind the anti-austerity protests might be able to develop a new progressive political program for the new age which encompasses a real progressive economic alternative without retreating to nationalisms, the past, or exclusionary defenses of the welfare state, but rather embracing openness and tolerance.

Another important piece of the puzzle for making sense of how motivations are developed and the ways in which they spur protest action relates to the role of organizations such as leftist political parties and social movement organizations. These critical organizations, which have historically represented the interests of the working class and more resource-deprived groups, have themselves been undermined in the latest period. In their absence, it has also become harder to develop a narrative of collective interests and for these to be articulated in a political program. Going back to the discussion in Chapter 3 about the role of the party in Leninist theorizing on collective interests and practical political action, we can see the centrality of the role of the party in past political discourse on social change and mobilization. However, with the emphasis on prefigurative politics and the critique that truly democratic organizations and social change could not in themselves emerge from hierarchical organizations, democratic centralism and other modes of leadership in Marxist and Trotskyite parties increasingly came under fire by other innovators on the Left (Tarrow 1989).

Moreover, in the economic sphere, the changing conditions of labor – including the casualization of employment, increasing job insecurity, reduction of labor law constraints, the exclusion of unskilled workers from protected positions, thus segmenting the wage-earning class, and the increasing intensification of labor – contributed to the weakening of social critique on the part of trade unions (della Porta 2015). Unions were delegitimized, since they participated in cutting employment and generally offered exclusionary benefits to members against outsiders, thus becoming unable to articulate a progressive appeal that did not divide those in the most vulnerable social positions (whether in or outside of employment) (della Porta 2015). In this way, unions became tied to employees and other marginalized outsiders were cut out from their support. This problem

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illustrates how, in the absence of progressive leftist parties articulating convincing alternatives able to garner support across marginalized sectors, including the unemployed, precarious workers, and migrants, the trade unions on their own were unable to sustain a wider political program of social change and alternatives. Moreover, the mainstreaming of many leftist social democratic parties on the neoliberal consensus meant that there were virtually no other collective social actors present able to articulate a radical social critique.

In this context, the rise of the global justice movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s aimed to address fragmentation through "a positive emphasis on diversity, although with different characteristics: as a tolerant identity bridging a plurality of experiences in the global justice movement, or rather as an appeal to an all-encompassing people or citizenry suffering from the crisis of neoliberalism in the anti-austerity protests" (della Porta 2015: 81). While the global justice movement employed broader moral and humanitarian appeals, anti-austerity protests brought back attention to the national sphere focusing on the economic inequalities brought about through global neoliberalism, also in terms of cross-national differences (della Porta 2015: 81). However, while the global justice movement may have been successful in developing a sense of shared collectivity since it encompasses such a broad base of groups, it is much harder to see how it could develop a shared sense of collective interests which have traditionally formed the basis for successful social movement mobilization. Indeed, the global justice movement's plurality can also be seen as its weakness, and its desire to include everyone without making too many decisions in terms of forward direction meant that there was never a full program that was agreed upon that could demand or move forward any sort of radical reform (Sotirakopoulos 2016). In this sense, the global justice movement, especially when compared to the more recent anti-austerity mobilizations, can be seen as more of an expressive collectivity than as an advocate of instrumental collective interests. This, in turn, relates back to the distinction between cultural and economic protest goals and issues.

SOLIDARY AND MORAL INCENTIVES

When discussing the role of solidarity for collective action, it seems important to distinguish, as Passy (2013) does, between two different types of incentives for participation: social and solidary incentives. In his seminal *The Logic of Collective Action*, Mancur Olson (1965) had noted how, given the free rider problem, no rationally self-interested individual should even join in collective pursuits. Only selective incentives – that is, benefits that accrue only to participants – could stimulate individuals to action. This thinking highlighted how a group might not engage in collective action to defend their interests even in the face of important grievances. However, as Passy (2013) also notes, instrumental incentives are a very limited way to conceive of why individuals might become involved in protest and do not well account for practice (Whiteley and Seyd 1996, 2002).

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Clark and Wilson (1961) developed their account by adding social and purposive incentives such as coming into contact with like-minded individuals and enabling parties to realize their policy and ideological objectives. This was followed by many other studies adding other types of incentives and, as Passy (2013) notes, this "implied opening up the Pandora's box of human motives" such as purposive incentives (political goals), collective incentives (the value of the expected public good), social incentives (the expected reaction of others), solidarity incentives (searching for the company of like-minded individuals), identity incentives (searching for a community of people), or normative incentives (fairness and equity values), in other words, all those which Opp (1985) had called "soft incentives."

In this context, Passy (2013) notes how there were two major schools of thought: those scholars adapting the list of selective incentives from within a utilitarian and rational choice perspective and those working from outside this framework. In the first school, Opp (1988) emphasized social control where personal incentives incite others to participation. For the second group, on the other hand, mobilization was seen to occur through group identification, a public good's value, expectations of success, and individual norms. Moreover, some stressed social mechanisms linked to collective incentives (Klandermans 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987) – that is, intrinsic value of the collective good not for private or indivisible goods – whereas others emphasized how actions are norm-oriented (Marwell and Ames 1979). For the latter, it is convictions such as fairness, solidarity, and equity that push people to action.

As Benford (2013a) notes, solidarity can be understood to be closely linked to the concept of collective identity (Melucci 1989). However, while collective identity more expressly focuses on the continuous social construction of cognitive, moral, and emotional connection of a broader community (Polletta and Jasper 2001), solidarity is more specifically used to refer to shared feelings of a specific group. In turn, scholars have distinguished between two dimensions of solidarity: internal solidarity, which is focused on a specific group of which one is a member, and external solidarity, which refers to identification with groups one does not belong to (Hunt and Benford 2004). Social movement organizations are understood to promote feelings of solidarity, and this allows for a threat to any individual member to be understood as a threat to all members or the group so that adherents feel a sense of shared fate and common cause (Hunt and Benford 2004).

Moral incentives are also important for social movement activism (Snow and Lessor 2013). Calls to participation are frequently framed in moral terms, and certain events may be so objectionable that everyone feels the need to morally object through their participation. For example, the slogan "Not in My Name" in the UK Stop the War protests clearly signaled this feeling of moral objection for a deplorable act of aggression. In this way, the movement managed to mobilize enough supporters for one of the largest UK marches of

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all time, with over one million protesters marching through London on March 15, 2003.

However, while moral elements may be powerful means to mobilize in the streets, it would seem that, in many cases, democratic development of common goals and ideological narratives are necessary to sustain a movement and give it enough content to progress negotiations with the powers? to effect actual social change beyond a simple expression of disgust and dealignment (Snow and Lessor 2013). The power of moral appeals is also clearly linked to the idea of "moral shocks" (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). These, in particular, can be used by movements to highlight the urgency of engagement to stop certain events, such as animal testing, from occurring (Snow and Lessor 2013). It is clear that moral conviction lies at the heart of engagement in many social movement activities and is closely linked to ideology, for example in terms of ideals of equality and justice as well as feelings of solidarity with downtrodden groups. However, while moral conviction is generally tied to given beliefs about injustice and equality in the world, these tend to be underpinned by a wider ideological narrative about the way in which the world should be. In this way, the two aspects are intertwined in the minds of most activists, and when ideological belief and moral conviction occur in concomitance social movements can be particularly resilient and effective even in the face of great dangers or major initial setbacks.

Snow and Lessor (2013) noted that Moore (1978: 89–91) had described how moral conviction was the "iron in the soul" underlying the strength and resolve of many social movements even in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Indeed, history shows that most social movements that brought about fundamental social change were marked by major setbacks at the start and uphill struggles in the achievement of their goals, and yet, through the perseverance and beliefs of activists and affected peoples, these movements eventually overcame these obstacles. Related to this is the idea of "prisoners of conscience," that is, those individuals who have even accepted imprisonment for their beliefs and moral convictions (Snow and Lessor 2013). This concept illustrates the extent to which activists have historically been prepared to go to defend their ideas and the belief in their principles. Not only have prisoners of conscience accepted incarceration and imprisonment for years for the simple offense of having followed their conscience rather than orders or irrational laws, but people have through the years given up not just their freedom but their lives in the name of ideas and beliefs. Examples of prisoners of conscience in particular are Daniel and Phillip Berrigan – commonly known as the Berrigan Brothers, two Catholic priests imprisoned for their leadership in the antiwar movement in the United States during the Vietnam War for burning the records of the Maryland draft board in May 1968 (Snow and Lessor 2013).

Finally, as noted also by Snow and Lessor (2013), the concept of "conscience constituents" (McCarthy and Zald 1977) highlights those individuals acting

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solely in solidarity, for the benefit of others. They provide resources such as financial support, experience, organization, and so forth. The main reason for this type of participation is moral alignment, such as for those involved in the US civil rights movement (Snow and Lessor 2013). However, it might be argued that, if one believes in justice and equality and a fairer society, for example, one is always also acting in one's own interests when acting on behalf of others in this way, since one is at the same time creating a better, fairer, and more equal society for all, including oneself and one's children and loved ones. As such, collective goals of social change can always be seen to underscore collective instrumental motivations in that the ultimate goal is always also one of changing society for the good of all, whether rich or poor, regardless of gender, color, race or nationality, and so forth.

WHAT MOTIVATES PARTICIPANTS IN DEMONSTRATIONS?

The motivations that drive people to protest are variegated, ranging from the more instrumental and individual ones, to expressive and collective ones. We now turn to an examination of the motivations in our sample of demonstrators. What motivates people to participate in street demonstrations? Are instrumental, moral, or solidary incentives equally important or does one or the other prevail? Furthermore, to what extent do demonstrators identify with other people at the protest or with the organization staging it? And to what extent were they determined to participate, in terms of when they took a firm decision to do so? Finally, do motivations, identification, and determination vary across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators, and if so to what extent? Table 7.1 gives us some answers. First, we examine an instrumental-individual motivation for protest: "defending my interests." Then we move to examining expressive-individual motivations: "express my views" or "feeling a sense of moral obligation." Next we move on to looking at instrumental-collective motivations: "pressure politicians for change" and "raise public awareness." Finally, we examine expressive-collective motivations: "express my solidarity."

Starting with "defend my interests," we can see that this type of individual-instrumental motivation for protest among demonstrators is particularly popular in Spain, followed by Switzerland, then Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, and finally Sweden. We know of course that Spain has been particularly hard hit by the recent economic crisis, and this might contribute to why so many demonstrators in this country strongly agree that defending their interests was a major reason for demonstrating. However, the crisis was not as hard hitting in Switzerland, where also many citizens strongly agreed that they were protesting to defend their interests. Interestingly, Italy and Sweden, the countries that scored highest on support for leftist values and particularly redistribution, score lowest compared to the other countries on the idea that they were protesting to defend their interests. Perhaps, a wider leftist conception in these countries leads citizens to view protest in more collectivist terms, as a

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TABLE 7.1. *Motivations of demonstrators by country, issue of demonstrations, and type of demonstrators (percentages and means)*

	Country							Issue of demonstrations		Type of demonstrators	
	BE	IT	NL	ES	SE	CH	UK	Cultural	Economic	Occasional	Activist
Motivations (mean 1–5 scale)											
Defend my interests	3.62	3.29	3.57	4.40	3.22	4.06	3.62	3.45	3.96***	3.55	3.76***
Express my views	4.48	4.36	4.20	4.56	4.46	4.26	4.48	4.36	4.43***	4.20	4.46***
Pressure politicians for change	4.60	4.22	4.22	4.50	4.02	4.39	4.38	4.33	4.35	4.23	4.37***
Raise public awareness	4.37	4.66	3.90	4.28	4.29	4.54	4.58	4.43***	4.26	4.09	4.42***
Express my solidarity	4.59	4.48	4.46	4.29	4.56	4.61	4.53	4.51	4.49	4.36	4.54***
Felt morally obliged to do so	3.68	3.56	3.74	4.07	3.90	3.55	3.91	3.72	3.86***	3.62	3.83***
Extent identification (mean 1–5 scale)											
With people at protest	4.04	3.95	3.82	4.19	3.95	4.04	4.19	4.00	4.09***	3.81	4.09***
With staging organization	3.84	3.69	3.70	3.81	3.67	3.87	3.92	3.74	3.84***	3.47	3.89***
When firm decision to protest (%)											
The day of the protest	5.7	6.4	10.3	6.9	14.2	7.9	9.7	9.8***	7.9	13.0***	7.5
A few days before protest	33.8	25.7	34.7	31.5	21.8	26.2	31.3	29.9	29.9	40.4***	26.5
A few weeks before protest	31.6	27.0	36.1	30.0	18.1	21.7	19.4	25.6	27.9**	27.7	26.6
Over a month before protest	28.9	41.0	18.8	31.6	46.0	44.2	39.6	34.7	34.2	18.2	39.4***

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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means to change the whole of society for the better and defend the interests of the poorest groups in society rather than primarily one's own. Moreover, the question of the defense of interests through demonstrations is also linked to the way in which interests are conceived and to whether they are equally applicable as motivations across demonstration issues. It is thus unlikely that the motives for protesting are understood in terms of being a matter of defending one's interests when the demonstration is opposing violence against women and one is a man. While this could be conceived as defending one's interests in the sense that we all have an interest in living in a better society, these are not individual interests, strictly defined. Of course, one could question the very idea that one might be able to protest in defense of one's interests alone, and, indeed, protesting in and of itself could always be argued to have at least some concomitant collective motivation.

Before we move to looking at cross-national differences in collective motivations, however, we turn to analyzing patterns for an individual-expressive motivation as symbolized by agreement with the statement "express my views." This type of motivation is most popular among demonstrators in Spain, followed by their counterparts in Belgium and the UK, then Sweden, then Italy, Switzerland, and finally the Netherlands. The idea of expressing views reflects the ability of protest actions to provide a voice for the voiceless, the exploited, and the oppressed. In this sense, protests are performed as an act allowing individuals to finally speak out and say enough is enough, or to declare injustices occurring in society and ask for them to be redressed. The *Indignados* movement originating in the squares of Spain in May 2011 certainly provided a means for many Spanish citizens who felt without a voice, to finally express their views about the injustices they saw all around them and the absence of both effective economic government and real democracy. Indeed, in 2014, a new party, *Podemos*, emerged on the Left, taking up many of the issues raised by the 15M movement in response to the economic crisis and the government's handling of austerity. In Belgium and also the UK there were many demonstrations against austerity in this period, as trade unions in particular organized against the increasing spending cuts and austerity policies and protested that the weakest sectors of society were paying the highest toll for a crisis that they had not produced. Other demonstration issues too could have generated these motivations. For example, women at marches against violence would have felt that they wanted to take to the streets to tell the world that violence against women in any form is unacceptable and, in this sense, reclaiming this "voice" that has been stolen from many women by taking to the street and showing their empowerment would have been a major part of the political meaning behind the demonstration itself. Indeed, the visibility of women in the streets directly challenges the private invisibility that male violence wishes to relegate them to, through fear and intimidation.

If we turn to the other individual-expressive motivation – "feeling morally obliged to do so" – we can see that this was most popular in Spain, followed by

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the UK then Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland. In the *Indignados* movement there were strong calls in particular to defend the dignity of every citizen, and, as such, there is a sense in which feeling moral obligation to act can emerge as a need at the individual level when one witnesses injustice in society at large. This, in turn, generates a sense of moral obligation to condemn and join forces in challenging oppression and exploitation as well as highlight the fact that the costs of the crisis were disproportionately falling on the shoulders of young people and other marginalized groups in society. The *Juventud Sin Futuro* group within the 15M movement emphasized the particularly harsh toll that the crisis was having on younger generations by stealing their future. As such, a sense of moral obligation for protest and expressing indignation and opposition clearly emerged from the political and economically dire situation in Spain. In the other countries as well the crisis and cuts in public services can be seen to have led people to feel that they had a moral obligation to act, to say something to stop the destruction of public services and the suffering of the weakest sectors of society. Other demonstration issues such as climate change can of course also generate the feeling of moral obligation to protest, for example in the name of future generations or in defense of nature and the environment.

Turning to the collective side, we look first at collective-instrumental motivations such as demonstrating in order to "pressure politicians for change" or "raise public awareness." For the first, we can see the motivation to "pressure politicians for change" is most popular in Belgium, followed by Spain, Switzerland, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Clearly, one of the most important goals of demonstrating is to make change happen somehow. After all, we tend to assume that individuals engage in social and political actions such as demonstrating in order to make things happen or to prevent things from happening as one of the major motivations. Pressing for social and political change would almost appear like the archetypal motivation for political action: individuals very often participate because they want society to change for the better – to be organized more fairly, to develop new laws protecting minority and vulnerable groups, to stop governments from dismantling the welfare state and further cutting social safety nets so that they are no longer protecting even the most vulnerable sectors of society, and so forth. This desire for social change by pressuring politicians in the institutional sphere is particularly strong in Belgium, a system with powerful trade unions, and it is also very popular among demonstrators in Spain. In the wake of the economic crisis and spending cuts, it is clear that demonstrators would take to the streets in the hope of pressuring governments to do something to stop the worst consequences of the crisis or at least shield the most vulnerable social sectors from its most virulent effects.

The second collective-instrumental motivation – to "raise public awareness" – is most popular in Italy, the UK, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, and finally the Netherlands. While the previous motivation made specific reference to political elites as the intermediary agents of social change, this type of

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collective-instrumental motivation instead aims to change the minds of individuals in society at large. This is particularly important with respect to those political issues that require the consciousness and mobilization of vast sections of society for their effective resolution and enactment. If social movements wish to effect social change, surely convincing individuals in society about their causes and goals is a major and important step for the achievement of their political objectives. For some issues such as climate change, for example, raising awareness can be seen as a fundamental goal towards the behavioral change advocated by the environmental movement at the micro level.

Finally, we examine the collective-expressive motivation: "express my solidarity." Here we can see that Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, and the UK followed by Italy, the Netherlands, and finally Spain, show the highest levels of agreement with this motivation. Expressing solidarity reflects the idea that one is protesting to express support and sympathy for a group external to oneself. This can be linked to the concept of "conscience constituents" (McCarthy and Zald 1977) introduced earlier that is, those individuals that are not directly affected by the issues at hand but who feel that participation is needed in support of those who are. Presumably, those individuals feeling directly affected would be less likely to say that they are protesting in solidarity, since they would see their activism more clearly spurred by the other motivations discussed above rather than on behalf of an external group. As such, given how deep and devastating the economic crisis has been in Spain, it is unsurprising that demonstrators here were the least likely to profess this motivation for their protesting, as they would have been much more likely to feel directly impacted by the events.

As we have seen, identification with other individuals is a very important reason for why people demonstrate. Collective identity and a sense of being part of something bigger – of a larger group striving for a cause – are essential drivers for many activists to take to the streets. Table 7.1 shows that these feelings of identification were particularly strong among demonstrators in the UK and Spain, followed by the Belgians and Swiss, the Italians, and Swedes, and finally the Dutch. In the UK and Spain there were vehement anti-cuts protests, and this might have led to the development of stronger feelings of shared identity among demonstrators. While identifying with other individuals at a protest might be an important spur for action, traditionally, identification with one's organization or an organization close to one's aims has been very important for developing a sense of common identity and fostering the politicization of common interests. Traditionally, leftist parties have acted as the locus for the development of collective identities of a movement along with SMOs. Our analysis shows that, when it comes to identification with organizations staging the protest, this was most diffused in the UK followed by Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden. This suggests that, in some countries, organizations and individuals' attachment to organizations form a greater part of the reason why people attend a given

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demonstration and become mobilized. Indeed, in Chapter 5 we saw that there are important cross-national differences in this respect.

We also examine when decisions were made to attend a given demonstration, since greater motivation to participate should be linked with a timely decision to participate. In the UK, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland most people had decided to attend the protest over a month before it occurred. In Belgium and the Netherlands, however, most decided a few days to a few weeks before the event. This suggests that in the UK, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, relative to Belgium and the Netherlands, demonstrators are more likely to have strong motivations to participate and commit to protest actions further in advance. Deeper feelings of group membership, as we have seen, assert greater pressures on individuals to act as "good" group members and support the cause, and these factors might be playing out for explaining these differences.

Table 7.1 also allows us to investigate how motivations vary between protesters attending cultural and economic demonstrations. Given our previous discussion, one might expect that the more instrumental motivations such as the instrumental-individual motivation for protest "defending my interests" and the instrumental-collective motivations "pressure politicians for change" and "raise public awareness" should generally be more popular at demonstrations focusing on economic issues, given that these demonstrations tend to address problems which require above all a change of external circumstances for their solution. On the other hand, expressive-individual motivations "express my views" or "feeling a sense of moral obligation" as well as expressive-collective motivations such as "express my solidarity" should be more relevant for demonstrations on cultural issues, since here the consciousness raising and moral aspects should be more preponderant.

As we can see, while "defending my interests" was indeed a more popular motivation at economic relative to cultural demonstrations as expected, there is no difference between issue types for the instrumental-collective motivation "pressure politicians for change." Moreover, the instrumental-collective motivation "raise public awareness" is actually found to be more popular at cultural, as opposed to economic, issue events. Thus, the distinction between instrumental and expressive motivations does not map neatly onto the economic–cultural issues distinction. Indeed, we can further see that the expressive-individual motivations "express my views" and "feeling a sense of moral obligation" were both more popular at demonstrations over economic issues. The expressive-collective motivation "express my solidarity" was equally popular. This is further evidence that individuals at both types of demonstrations have different types of instrumental-expressive and individual-collective motivations and that there is no clear demarcation line between domains through protest issues.

Identification, as we have seen, is a powerful motivation for why people take to the streets on behalf of a group or a cause. Results show that individuals at

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economic protests were more likely to identify with others at the protest than those at cultural events. While individuals at economic protests were also more likely to identify with organizations than those at cultural events, on the whole the level of identification with organizations was lower than that with other people at the protest. This suggests that cultural demonstrations are more individualistic than economic ones and individuals are more likely to attend for reasons other than a sense of belonging or shared destiny with other members of their group. Moreover, the weakening of organizations developing collective identity could be further evidenced by the fact that individuals at both types of protests felt a greater affinity with other individuals attending than with the organizations themselves. This could be seen as a sign of resistance of many in this day and age to see themselves as members or supporters of collective organizations, preferring instead more fluid identities.

Looking at the timing of when individuals made a firm decision to attend the demonstration as a sign of organization – since more organized individuals would be more likely to plan ahead – but also of dedication to the cause, we can see that economic protests attract slightly more organized members relative to cultural ones as there are higher proportions deciding weeks before the event, whereas for the cultural ones there are more deciding on the day. However, there are similar proportions of those deciding over a month before and a few days before. This suggests that demonstrations over economic issues attract marginally more organized participants, which is probably linked to the fact that there are more formal organizations such as trade unions and parties behind economic protests and more loosely connected networks of SMOs and online groups behind cultural demonstrations. In fact, it is striking that differences are not wider, suggesting that today these looser types of horizontal modes of organization can be as effective as traditional structures for motivating citizens to action and getting them on the streets on the protest day.

As elsewhere in the book, a major dimension of comparison in our analysis is that between occasional demonstrators and activists. Table 7.1 shows that activists feel more strongly about all the types of motivations than occasional demonstrators. Ideological commitment and conviction in feeling that one's protest action can have an effect – both in instrumental and expressive terms – are important reasons why some individuals engage in repeated political activism while others remain only occasional participants. Moreover, there might be other, more ad hoc, reasons why people attend a protest such as accompanying friends, or being asked to attend by work colleagues that might be more preponderant among occasional demonstrators. Indeed, we find that activists are also more likely to have feelings of identification with others as well as with organizations, showing once more that the ideational component and the deeper psychological commitment of activists differentiate them from occasional demonstrators. The fact that the latter's participation might be more ad hoc is also reflected in their lower organizational levels, with their being more likely to say that they decided to participate on the day of the protest or just a few days prior. Conversely, activists were much

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more likely to have committed over a month before a protest, as nearly half of activists claimed that they had committed at this far earlier time.

MOTIVATIONS AND COMMITMENT

Beyond the description of the different motivations that lead people to engage in political activities such as demonstrations as well as their variations across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators, we are interested in how different motivations impinge upon people's commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause. Consistent with this objective and with what we have done in the four previous chapters, we conclude our analysis with a series of regression models aimed to investigate the association between the motivations and commitment, also in relation to the identification with other participants as well as the organizers of the demonstrations and with the determination to participate. Table 7.2 shows the results of this analysis, which follows a stepwise logic whereby different variables are included in turn before concluding with a combined model testing for their independent effects. It shows six models. Model 1 tests for the effects of motivations. Model 2 includes identification with people at the protest. Model 3 includes identification with organizations. Model 4 includes the timing of the decision to protest. Model 5 includes all types of motivations together as well as controlling for economic and social values. Finally, Model 6 includes all the variables as well as the major controls (political interest, political efficacy, and organizational membership) to see if these variables account for the other effects. As in the other chapters' analyses, the table presents results as odds ratios.

We start with Model 1, where all motivations were important determinants of commitment among demonstrators. This underscores what was discussed earlier, namely that the different types of instrumental-expressive and individual-collective motivations are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually interlinked and interdependent. Expressing views, an expressive-individual type of motivation, is particularly popular, followed by raising awareness as an expressive-collective motivation, pressuring politicians to make things change as an instrumental-collective motivation, feeling morally obliged to do so as an individual-expressive motivation, expressing solidarity as an expressive-collective motivation, and finally defending my interests as an instrumental-individual motivation. This shows that expressive and collective dimensions tend to be slightly more central, although all aspects matter to some extent.

Moving on to the results for identification with other individuals at a protest in Model 2, which, as we discussed earlier, is such an important feeling for developing commitment to a cause and belief in social change through mobilization, we can see that this has a very strong effect on commitment, and identification with others at the protests is more important also than identification with organizations staging a protest, as shown in Model 3. Moreover, Model 4,

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TABLE 7.2. *Logistic regression models on commitment (odds ratios)*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Gender (male)	0.82***	(0.04)	0.72***	(0.03)	0.71***	(0.03)	0.72***	(0.04)	0.75***	(0.04)	0.71***	(0.04)
Cohorts												
Post-WWII generation	1.15	(0.12)	1.14	(0.12)	1.16	(0.12)	1.25*	(0.14)	1.19	(0.14)	1.17	(0.14)
1960s/1970s generation (ref.)												
1980s generation	0.91	(0.07)	0.95	(0.07)	0.96	(0.07)	0.99	(0.07)	1.06	(0.08)	1.07	(0.09)
1990s generation	0.70***	(0.05)	0.73***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.05)	0.72***	(0.06)	0.87	(0.07)	0.88	(0.07)
2000s generation	0.70***	(0.06)	0.70***	(0.05)	0.73***	(0.06)	0.68***	(0.06)	0.92	(0.08)	0.90	(0.08)
Education												
Secondary school or lower (ref.)												
BA or equivalent	0.84*	(0.06)	0.79***	(0.05)	0.79***	(0.05)	0.78***	(0.06)	0.81**	(0.06)	0.80**	(0.06)
MA or higher	0.75***	(0.04)	0.70***	(0.04)	0.72***	(0.04)	0.72***	(0.04)	0.77***	(0.05)	0.75***	(0.05)
Occupation												
Salariat	0.93	(0.09)	0.86	(0.08)	0.89	(0.08)	0.89	(0.09)	0.89	(0.10)	0.88	(0.09)
Intermediate professions	0.92	(0.10)	0.88	(0.09)	0.90	(0.10)	0.91	(0.10)	0.96	(0.11)	0.94	(0.11)
Working class (ref.)												
Unemployed	0.84	(0.12)	0.78	(0.11)	0.79	(0.11)	0.71*	(0.10)	0.75	(0.11)	0.73*	(0.11)
Students	1.00	(0.12)	0.93	(0.11)	0.96	(0.11)	0.99	(0.12)	1.06	(0.14)	1.02	(0.13)
Economic values (left-wing)									0.99	(0.04)	0.95	(0.04)
Social values (libertarian)									1.09*	(0.04)	1.07	(0.04)
Political interest											1.42***	(0.08)
Political efficacy											0.98	(0.05)

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	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Organizational membership											0.83*	(0.07)
Motivations												
Defend my interests	1.12***	(0.02)							1.07**	(0.02)	1.07**	(0.02)
Express my views	1.48***	(0.05)							1.38***	(0.05)	1.37***	(0.05)
Pressure politicians for change	1.26***	(0.04)							1.22***	(0.04)	1.23***	(0.04)
Raise public awareness	1.30***	(0.04)							1.21***	(0.04)	1.20***	(0.04)
Express my solidarity	1.15***	(0.04)							1.06	(0.04)	1.05	(0.04)
Felt morally obliged to do so	1.19***	(0.02)							1.15***	(0.03)	1.15***	(0.03)
Extent identification												
With people at protest			2.11***	(0.06)					1.56***	(0.06)	1.56***	(0.06)
With staging organization					1.68***	(0.04)			1.21***	(0.03)	1.20***	(0.04)
When firm decision to protest												
The day of the protest (ref.)												
A few days before protest							3.03***	(0.32)	2.44***	(0.27)	2.42***	(0.27)
A few weeks before protest							8.09***	(0.87)	6.13***	(0.70)	6.14***	(0.70)
Over a month before protest							20.79***	(2.31)	15.11***	(1.77)	15.06***	(1.77)
Activist	1.68***	(0.10)	1.68***	(0.09)	1.59***	(0.09)	1.39***	(0.08)	1.14*	(0.07)	1.12	(0.07)
Economic issue	1.39***	(0.08)	1.28***	(0.07)	1.37***	(0.08)	1.27***	(0.08)	1.27***	(0.08)	1.26***	(0.08)

(*continued*)

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TABLE 7.2. (*continued*)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Country												
Belgium	1.06	(0.10)	1.16	(0.11)	1.14	(0.11)	1.34**	(0.14)	1.36**	(0.15)	1.40**	(0.16)
Italy	1.14	(0.14)	1.08	(0.13)	1.08	(0.13)	1.05	(0.13)	1.21	(0.16)	1.26	(0.17)
Netherlands	0.88	(0.08)	0.90	(0.08)	0.77**	(0.07)	1.00	(0.10)	1.16	(0.13)	1.20	(0.13)
Spain	0.90	(0.09)	1.03	(0.10)	1.08	(0.11)	1.37**	(0.15)	1.15	(0.13)	1.20	(0.14)
Sweden (ref.)												
Switzerland	1.04	(0.10)	1.03	(0.10)	0.99	(0.09)	1.00	(0.10)	0.97	(0.11)	0.99	(0.11)
UK	0.78**	(0.07)	0.82*	(0.07)	0.84	(0.07)	1.04	(0.10)	0.82	(0.09)	0.82	(0.09)
Constant	0.01***	(0.00)	0.09***	(0.02)	0.24***	(0.04)	0.26***	(0.04)	0.00***	(0.00)	0.00***	(0.00)
Log-likelihood	−5179		−5299		−5381		−4900		−4413		−4394	
N	8,664		8,664		8,664		8,664		8,664		8,664	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

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which includes when participants made a firm decision to attend the demonstration, shows that those who had decided a month before the protest were more than 20 times more likely to be committed than those who had decided to attend on the day. This suggests that these individuals would have probably also been more likely to be embedded in organizations and, therefore, to have received the information sooner to be able to make such advanced plans. Model 5 shows that, when controlling for the other variables, the effect of all the motivational variables decreased in size, suggesting that these motivational factors are interlinked with one another and compound their effects on commitment. When all motivational variables are included, the effect of each motivational type declines and expressing solidarity no longer becomes significant when controlling for identification with others at the demonstration, showing how solidarity clearly links up with identification with fellow demonstrators with whom one wants to show solidarity through protest engagement. Moreover, the fact that all other effects decline as well shows that all motivations are to some degree associated with feelings of identification with fellow protesters or the organizations staging the protest.

Controlling for political interest, political efficacy, and organizational membership in Model 6 does not fundamentally modify the effect of the motivational variables. Two of these three controls are statistically significant. Specifically, the higher the political interest, the stronger the commitment to protest. Conversely, the more embedded demonstrators are in different kinds of organizations, the less committed they are. Political efficacy, in contrast, does not matter. Most importantly, as said, these controls leave the effect of the various types of motivations basically unaltered.

In sum, the regression analysis shows that motivations are important determinants of commitment among demonstrators. Far from being mutually exclusive, different types of instrumental-expressive and individual-collective motivations are interlinked and interdependent. Expressive and collective aspects tend to be slightly more central, although all aspects matter to some extent. Identification with other individuals at a protest has a strong effect on commitment, and identification with others at the protests is more important also than identification with organizations staging a protest. Moreover, those who decide earlier to participate are more committed than those who decide to attend on the day of the event. Finally, when controlling for the other variables, the effect of the various motivations decreases in size, suggesting that these motivational factors are interlinked with one another and compound their effects on commitment.

CONCLUSION

Scholars have been interested in the motivations underlying protest participation (Klandermans 2015). This chapter has addressed the motivations of demonstrators and asked what motivates people to take to the streets.

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In this regard, we distinguished between different kinds of motivations, including more instrumental and more expressive types. We examined to what extent these motivations differ across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators, and we looked at the impact of different types of motivations on commitment, also in relation to the moment when demonstrators made a firm decision as well as the feelings of identification of participants with others attending the demonstration and the organizations staging the event.

Our analysis showed that, across countries, expressing views, pressuring politicians for change, and expressing solidarity were the most popular motivations and most people identified with others at the protest more than the organizations staging the demonstration. Moreover, the regression analysis showed that expressing views, an expressive-individual type of motivation, was particularly popular, followed by an expressive-collective motivation such as raising awareness, an instrumental-collective motivation such as pressuring politicians to make things change, an individual-expressive motivation such as feeling morally obliged to do so, an expressive-collective motivation such as expressing solidarity, and finally an instrumental-individual motivation such as defending my interests. This suggests that expressive and collective motivations tend to be slightly more central, although all aspects matter to some extent. Our analysis also showed how the latter is clearly underscored by identification with others and also with others in organizations that one is a member of as well as the organizations themselves. This shows the central role of organizations for commitment.

More generally, our analysis of the motivations of participants in street demonstrations confirms theorizing in the literature about the central role of collective identity, collective identification, and politicized identities for underpinning individual motivations to engage in protest actions (van Stekelenburg et al. 2013). Moreover, results show that identification with those at the demonstration is closely linked to identification with those individuals that are members of organizations staging the process, that is, fellow members of these political organizations most likely. So, commitment is clearly underscored by identification with others and also with organizations, albeit to a lesser degree. This again supports views about the importance of organizations for commitment and protest for social change.

Note

1. While motives and motivations are sometimes used to indicate different aspects, here we use these two terms interchangeably.

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8

Protest Politics and Social Movement Activism in Perspective

Today, street demonstrations are one of the most important means for ordinary people to make their voice heard and challenge powerholders and elites. Demonstrations and protest marches, along with elections, petitions, strikes, and other types of direct action – including, increasingly, those enacted through information and communication technology – are all part of the modern repertoire of contention (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1986). The demonstration, in particular, is a powerful means insofar as it is modular, that is, it can be used by different people and for different purposes (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Demonstrations have witnessed a "normalization of the unconventional" (Fuchs 1991) insofar as protest has become both more important and legitimate, leading to what some have called a "social movement society" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Demonstrations, furthermore, offer fertile ground for what some have called a "normalization of protesters" (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001), suggesting that street citizens should increasingly reflect the make-up of society. This book has been entirely devoted to protest. Drawing from a variety of research traditions and literatures from political science, sociology, and social psychology, we have proposed a micro-level analysis of street demonstrations resting on a unique dataset consisting of a survey of participants in demonstrations and covering seven countries, several dozens of demonstrations, and thousands of demonstrators. This allowed us to stress the main features of what we have called "street citizens," with the broader aim of characterizing protest politics and social movement activism in the age of globalization. We examined who they are, why they participate, and through which channels and mechanisms. This concluding chapter summarizes the main arguments of the book as well as the main findings of the analyses presented in the previous chapters. After an overview of the key results, we discuss how participation in demonstrations depends on the country where it takes place, the issue addressed (whether cultural or economic), and the type of demonstrator (occasional or more regular

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participants, or activists). We then address the question of commitment to take to the streets and how it is associated with the various aspects addressed in the book. Furthermore, we take a broader look at the implications of our analysis for protest politics and social movement activism in the age of globalization, before concluding with a prospective look based on a reflection on the role of citizens and more particularly activists for social and political change.

OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS

Our micro-level analysis of street citizens has followed the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1). According to this framework, the who, why, and how of people taking part in street demonstrations are influenced by a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the mobilizing context of participation, particularly the available protest potential; microstructural factors, most notably the social-structural bases of participation, its relationships with institutional politics, and the mobilizing structures of participants; and social psychological dynamics, namely, the cognitive and affective predispositions as well as the motivations of participants. Each aspect has been dealt with in a separate chapter. Let us briefly summarize the main lessons to be drawn from each chapter before we further develop our discussion of the overarching arguments and broader outlook of the book.

Chapter 2 set the analysis of our protest survey data in a broader context by assessing the degree of contentiousness of European citizens and how this varies across countries. To do so, we provided a descriptive overview of the potential for political mobilization and other key attitudes among the general population in the seven countries covered by our study using the ESS data. Such an overview has formed the backdrop against which we could compare the characteristics of the general population, where comparable data was available, with those of our sample of demonstrators shown in subsequent chapters. This overview yielded both important cross-national variations as well as certain common patterns. It showed in particular that Italy and Spain seem to stand out in terms of protest potential as well as other key aspects. The protest potential is larger in these two countries than in the other countries included in our study. This is particularly true when we examine the overall proportions participating in demonstrations. Italian and Spanish citizens also have lower levels of political interest and trust, as well as a lower sense of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their country. As such, these two countries seem characterized by a particularly high degree of political alienation among the general population. Such a political alienation, furthermore, has increased in recent years, whereas other countries display a more stable trend or even increasing levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust.

Chapter 3 examined the question of the social bases of protest. It showed that, while some scholars have urged for a capitalist-analytical or political-economic turn in social movement studies, the class bases of protest continue

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to reflect the profile of the new social movement protesters, namely highly educated professionals, who are overrepresented among demonstrators. The working classes and manual occupations, who, historically, have been the main actors of the traditional labor movement, in contrast, are underrepresented, compounding problems of political voice and inequality in political access in society. Furthermore, it is not clear that precarity forms a new basis for protest as some have argued in the wake of the Great Recession, since the unemployed are less likely to protest. The latter, however, are overrepresented among protesters in Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, where there are also more unemployed than working-class street citizens. We also found a strong effect of class identification on commitment. As such, while the manual skilled and unskilled are underrepresented among demonstrators cross-nationally, identifying with the working class is a strong driver of commitment to protest. This shows that working-class identification allows for overcoming the steeper barriers for participation among this more resource-poor group. However, our analysis also suggests that, unlike in its infancy, protest is not the mainstay of resource-poor groups, but rather appears to be today mainly another tool for the well-off and educated middle classes to campaign for their political ends, at least in the West European context. Despite the recent economic crisis and the rise of anti-austerity movements emphasizing socioeconomic issues such as increasing inequality and the social costs of financial inefficiencies, our analysis still supports this trend.

Chapter 4 looked at the relationship between institutional and extra-institutional politics. It showed that these two political arenas are clearly linked for participants in demonstrations, who often combine both institutional and extra-institutional means to campaign for their goals. This is particularly true of the more committed activists. Moreover, they are attached to political parties and support parties from across the political spectrum, including more centrist parties and not simply radical left ones. This supports the idea that protest belongs to a wider toolkit of political actions available to activists for supporting a cause. These results can be seen to undermine the idea of a substitution thesis: protesters are not disaffected with conventional means, but rather extend their institutional political reach through extra-institutional means. As such, protest appears to be linked to the crisis of democratic accountability. Since democracies are unresponsive, those individuals that are politically committed to a cause might perceive their institutional political participation as insufficient to achieve their political ends and, as such, supplement it with extra-institutional means. In other words, street citizens are highly political critical citizens who, in the face of the perceived ineffectiveness of their institutional participation alone, attempt to make their voices heard by the powerholders and elites by further engaging in protest activism and other modes of institutional and extra-institutional engagement, including sometimes disruptive direct action. In this way, they extend their political activism across the spectrum of political activities to achieve their political ends.

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Chapter 5 examined the mobilizing structures of demonstrators, with a focus on the direct (networks) and indirect (media) channels of participation in demonstrations. It showed that demonstrators are strongly embedded – both passively and actively – in different sorts of organizations such as political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, and voluntary associations. At the same time, we also observed important variations across countries, issues, and types of demonstrators. Activists, in particular, are more strongly involved in parties and unions than occasional demonstrators, who are however also well embedded as compared to the general population, further attesting to the strong connection between institutional and extra-institutional politics. Our analysis also showed important variations in the extent to which demonstrators have been recruited through the media, online social networks, organizational networks, or interpersonal networks (including the extent to which they have been asked by someone to participate). Yet, the more traditional organizational and interpersonal ties seem to remain more important than media channels or online social networks (especially for the most seasoned participants). Finally, looking at commitment and trying to answer the question of whether demonstrators "were pushed" or "jumped," our analysis lends support to both structural accounts and psychological and rational choice explanations of participation in social movements and protest activities.

Chapter 6 has examined the cognitive (attitudes) and affective (emotions) predispositions of street citizens. It showed that, compared to the general population, street citizens stand out for their particularly high interest in politics, their critical stance towards mainstream political institutions and how democracy works, and a heightened sense of political efficacy. More seasoned activists, in particular, clearly correspond to the idea of critical citizens depicted in the literature. Activists as well as participants in demonstrations on economic issues are also more emotionally charged than respectively, occasional demonstrators and participants in demonstrations on cultural issues. Finally, our analysis showed that street citizens' commitment to protest is linked to their attitudes such as political interest and efficacy as well as to their understandings of the perceived effectiveness of the demonstration in which they took part and also to specific emotions: anger, worry, and frustration. Moreover, we showed how attitudes and emotion combine to heighten a sense of commitment. In particular, we found that political interest and anger combine, suggesting that cognition and affect both contribute to political commitment and therefore that they are not mutually exclusive as early accounts of social movements had it in their reductionist view of protests as the irrational outbursts of out-of-control crowds.

Chapter 7, finally, investigated the different motivations that lead people to demonstrate. It showed how street citizens are driven by a wide array of instrumental and expressive as well as individual and collective motivations to protest and that these types of motivations overlap and is not mutually exclusive. Our analysis also showed that, while identification with both the organization

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staging the demonstration and fellow demonstrators is important, the bonds to other human beings active in the name of the same political cause are particularly strong. Furthermore, we showed that most demonstrators commit to participating well in advance of the demonstration date, displaying a rational and pre-planned, organized desire to be there. The analysis also showed how the motivations driving street citizens are complex and that feelings of collective identity are an important factor explaining why they participate. Street citizens have strong feelings of identification with fellow protesters and also with the organizations staging the demonstration, and these are both clearly linked with a heightened commitment to protest. These findings thus underlie both the rational and collective character of protest as forms of collective action aimed at either solving an individual or collective problem or expressing one's political voice as a form of political identity or on behalf of a wider social group. Moreover, they show that street citizens are committed and politically active in a deeply conscious and complex manner, embracing a multiplicity of meanings and ends for the expression of their political dissent.

VARIATIONS IN PARTICIPATION IN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS: COUNTRIES, ISSUES, AND TYPE OF DEMONSTRATORS

Chapters 3 to 7 all present two types of analyses of the protest survey dataset. The first type consisted in descriptive analyses aimed at showing how the different factors we focused on vary across the seven countries covered by our study, how they vary between demonstrations on cultural and economic issues, and how they vary between occasional and activist demonstrators. The second type of analyses employed have been multivariate regressions examining the links between the various factors and commitment to protest. This section discusses the key findings with respect to variations in terms of countries, issues, and demonstrator types. The next section will then deal with what our key findings with respect to commitment tell us about street citizens as well as the nature of protest politics and social movement activism in the age of globalization.

Research has long shown that social movements and protest vary in important ways across countries, both at the individual (Barnes and Kaase 1979) and collective (Kriesi et al. 1995) levels. A variety of factors have been stressed to account for such variations, including different configurations of political opportunities (Hutter 2014a; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995) and historically diverse protest cultures and traditions (della Porta and Mattoni 2013; della Porta and Diani 2006; Fahlenbrach et al. 2016). The analyses in this book provide added evidence for those arguing that micromobilization is context-dependent (van Stekelenburg et al. 2009) and, more specifically, that it owes much to the specific features of the national context. The key question in this respect is: Can we discern consistent patterns to make sense of these cross-national variations? In Chapter 1 we proposed a typology as a general framework, combining a

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societal dimension concerning the politicization of social and cultural oppositions (cleavage availability) and an institutional dimension relating to political opportunity structures (strength of the state), in which we placed the seven countries covered by our study. By including different countries, we aimed above all to ensure the external validity of our findings and show that they hold across different contexts. Aiming to explain cross-national variations in all of the various aspects we have considered is beyond the scope of this section. However, one may expect the more structured patterns to be found in the relation of demonstrators to other forms of participation and to institutional politics, in their political attitudes or predispositions, and in their mobilizing structures. Political opportunity theorists, in particular, have repeatedly shown such relationships at the macro and meso levels (Kriesi 2004). Furthermore, the impact of political opportunities on political participation has also been shown to hold at the micro level (Cinalli and Giugni 2011, 2016b; Morales 2009). However, the structuring role of political opportunities and, more generally, of the broader context, has received much less attention by scholars.

We can identify some general cross-national patterns from the results of our investigation. The two Southern European countries – Italy and Spain – show consistent commonalities, for example in the lower degree of embeddedness in organizational networks of Italian and Spanish demonstrators as well as in the related smaller importance of organizational networks as mobilization channels, or in their particularly low levels of political trust and external political efficacy – and thus higher political cynicism – or even in the higher level of anger felt by demonstrators. These are the most consistent patterns we found in terms of country variations, in line with our typology. However, Spain is also found to differ from Italy in other respects. Additionally, we find some signs of what we might call "Swedish exceptionalism," which is also consistent with the location of this country within the typology. For example, Sweden stands out in terms of the sociodemographic composition of demonstrators – younger, particularly well educated, and often students – and partly also insofar as they are more libertarian than their counterparts in other countries (but not so much more than the Italians). Swedish demonstrators are also closer to leftist parties, more often members of parties and unions as well as other professional associations (but, concerning the latter, not so different from the Belgians), more often mobilized through online social networks (but not so much more than the British), and more likely to feel frustrated (but less than the British). These are the strongest and more consistent patterns yielded by our analysis as far as cross-national variations are concerned. The key lesson emerging from our cross-national comparison is that context matters indeed and that, as a result, the micromobilization dynamics of participants in street demonstrations owe much to the broader cultural and institutional context of protest that characterizes a given country. However, we leave the task of explaining systematic variations to other researchers, as this was not our main focus and would require a more thorough analysis.

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At the same time, we also found a number of common trends. Net of cross-national differences and other variations, street citizens share a number of characteristics. Two common traits stand out in particular and deserve to be mentioned. At the social-structural level, to begin with, as we showed in Chapter 3, demonstrators often belong to the generations that came of age in the particularly politicized contexts of the 1960s and 1970s (Grasso 2016) as well as of the Great Recession. Most importantly, they are also better educated than the average citizen and more likely to be middle class. As such, the bulk of those who participate in demonstrations continue to largely comprise those sociocultural, highly educated professionals that were identified in the literature as the core constituency of the new social movements (Kriesi 1989). Street citizens strongly espouse leftist and libertarian values, and this reflects Melucci's (1989) argument that new social movements are the results of an identity conflict within the middle classes between those belonging to the public sector opposing the values of the middle classes in power.

Additionally, demonstrators are united by their predispositions towards politics. As we have seen in Chapter 6, participants in demonstrations are very interested in politics but also share a critical view of institutional politics and representative democracy. At the same time, they are characterized by a strong sense of political efficacy and, therefore, the belief that things can be changed, in particular through political engagement and collective action. If we compare these traits with those found among the general population in Chapter 2, which we have seen is increasingly detached and disaffected with politics, we can see that protesters form a group of critical citizens who are far from being politically alienated (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Moreover, protesters are a group of citizens who share particularly strong emotions towards certain political issues. To be sure, this is a heterogeneous group, but still united by the belief that, more often than not, intervening directly in political matters is better than simply leaving them in the hands of representatives who are increasingly seen as having little legitimacy to speak on behalf of ordinary citizens.

While the idea that protest varies across countries is now well-established among students of social movements, that it also varies across issues is less often acknowledged. Beyond the now classical distinction between old and new social movements, little research has looked at how the features of demonstrations vary depending on the issues they address (Grasso and Giugni 2015, 2016b; Verhulst 2011). We took this aspect into account by systematically investigating how the various micromobilization aspects we have addressed impinge differently on demonstrations on cultural or economic issues. Given the clear-cut division between these two types of protest issues traditionally made by students of social movements, one may expect participants in cultural and economic demonstrations to display different characteristics and to behave differently. However, recent studies have pointed to the fact that, also in relation to the rise of global justice and anti-austerity movements which

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mobilize on both cultural and economic issues, such a distinction has become fuzzier than it was or was thought to be (Eggert and Giugni 2012, 2015).

We believe that our analysis supports both views to some extent. On the one hand, we found cultural and economic demonstrations to be distinct in many respects. They differ in terms of their sociodemographic composition and value orientations. For example, participants in cultural demonstrations tend to be younger, more well-educated, and more often middle class, while those attending economic demonstrations are more often men and – both objectively and subjectively – working class. They also differ in the degree of links with institutional and extra-institutional political activities as well as in their degree of partisanship and, more broadly speaking, in their relation to institutional politics. People who take part in cultural demonstrations tend to be more strongly involved in both institutional and extra-institutional forms of participation and are also more strongly attached to New Left and Green parties, while those attending economic demonstrations most often do not identify with a specific party. Their mobilizing structures and mobilization channels are also distinct on a number of counts. For example, participants in cultural demonstrations more often mobilize through new technologies such as online social networks, while demonstrators on economic issues are more deeply embedded in trade unions or other professional associations and more likely to have been recruited through interpersonal networks. Furthermore, in spite of all demonstrators being politically interested and sharing a sense of political efficacy, but at the same time being distrusting of (mainstream) political institutions and not particularly satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries, participants in cultural demonstrations tend to have an even higher level of political interest and feeling of efficacy, while those who attend economic demonstrations tend to be even more distrusting and unsatisfied. We also found significant differences in the degree of emotional charge among demonstrators: participants in cultural demonstrations tend to be more frustrated and fearful when thinking about the demonstration issue, while those attending economic demonstrations tend to be angrier and more worried. Finally, the motivations driving people to take part in demonstrations and their degree of identification with other people at the protest or with the staging organization also display some differences across the two groups, and participants in cultural demonstrations are more often driven by the need to raise public awareness, while those attending economic demonstrations are more often instrumentally but also morally driven. Often these differences, while statistically significant, are not very large. All in all, however, our study has shown that issues matter when it comes to accounting for the characteristics and behaviors of participants in street demonstrations.

In addition to variations across countries and across issues, a third key discriminating factor we have considered in our study consists in comparing strongly engaged people who often take part in demonstrations, whom we called activists, with less committed demonstrators who participate more

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sporadically, whom we called occasional demonstrators. There is relatively scarce research examining differential participation in social movements and protest activities, that is, the reasons why people commit to different degrees (Barkan et al. 1995; Klandermans 1997; Kriesi 1993; McAdam 1986; Oliver 1984; Passy and Giugni 2001; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991). This aspect was taken up again for example in Saunders et al. (2012) and we have made it a key feature of this book. In this context, we wanted to show that explanatory factors and micromobilization dynamics play out differently depending on the level of activism of participants in demonstrations.

Here, too, we found a number of differences across the two groups, and these were often larger than those between demonstrators protesting on different issues. First, activists and occasional demonstrators differ in terms of their social bases and value orientations. In particular, activists tend to be less well educated than occasional demonstrators, and they are more often working class or unemployed, whereas the latter are more likely to come from the salariat; activists more often identify with the lower middle class or above all with the working class; occasional demonstrators tend to have an upper-class or upper-middle-class identification. Furthermore, activists are both more leftist and more libertarian than occasional demonstrators. Second, the two groups differ in their relation to other forms of politics. Quite unsurprisingly, activists are more deeply involved in any other form of political engagement than occasional demonstrators except voting. They are also closer to leftist parties, whereas occasional demonstrators are more often attached to Green or centrist parties. Third, the two types of demonstrators also display different mobilizing structures and channels of mobilization. Activists are much more deeply embedded in pre-existing networks, namely in organizational networks, and primarily with respect to active membership. This is especially visible when we look at membership in parties and unions or other professional associations, that is, the more traditional and institutionalized kinds of organizations. Furthermore, activists tend more often to be recruited through interpersonal and, above all, organizational networks – but also online social networks – whereas occasional demonstrators are more often mobilized through other media channels, although the existence and importance of these differences depend on whether we consider all channels or only the most important one. The greater importance of organizational networks for activists, moreover, can also be seen in the fact that, when recruited through interpersonal networks, such recruitment occurs overwhelmingly thanks to co-members of an organization of which they are part. Fourth, the two groups of demonstrators also display marked differences concerning their cognitive and affective predispositions to protesting. People taking part in demonstrations are overall more interested in politics, have a higher feeling of being able to effect change if they engage, while being more mistrusting of mainstream political institutions and more unsatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. All these characteristics are accentuated amongst activists compared

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to occasional demonstrators. In brief, those people who regularly take part in demonstrations better reflect the image of the critical citizen depicted in the literature (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999) relative to those who only participate sporadically or have just begun their "career" as demonstrators. Furthermore, activists also feel stronger emotions such as anger, frustration, worry, or fear relative to occasional demonstrators, suggesting that not only cognitive predispositions, but also affective ones, are linked to political commitment. Fifth, activists have stronger motivations to participate across all types – instrumental and expressive, collective and individual. Moreover, they more strongly identify with the people at the protest and with the staging organizations, and their decision to attend the demonstration is generally taken very well in advance of the demonstration date, whereas occasional demonstrators tend to decide much closer to the time.

COMMITMENT TO PROTEST: STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND RATIONALITY

As we pointed out in Chapter 1, given that our sample is made up of protesters, we aimed to examine what factors distinguished them in terms of their commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause. Here we summarize the main findings with respect to this aspect of our study, therefore returning to our micro-level analysis of participation – that is, commitment to participate – in street demonstrations. The underlying question which we have addressed throughout the book and more directly in Chapter 7 can thus be reframed in these terms: What are the sources of commitment to protest in the name of a cause? Where does the determination to engage in protest activities such as street demonstrations come from?

To be sure, the ultimate motivation to get involved in protest politics and social movement activism lies in the grievances one has developed. The latter, however, may be considered as a necessary but insufficient condition for participation. Beyond the level of individual grievances – and beyond the presence of favorable political opportunities that allow for grievances to be translated into action (Kriesi 2004) – the literature stresses a number of other factors that lead people to become politically engaged. As we mentioned in Chapter 5, these can be grouped into two main kinds of explanations: "push" factors stressing the role of the individuals' motivations, predispositions, and resources, and "pull" factors pointing to the role of recruitment channels and recruiters. While the latter are underwritten by structural accounts of participation emphasizing mobilizing structures made of pre-existing networks as well as other mobilization channels (McAdam 1996; Tindall 2015), among the former one may further distinguish, as we did in Chapter 7, between three kinds of motives for why people participate in social movements: instrumentality, identity, and ideology (Klandermans 2013). We can reframe and rename these different reasons along the lines of Lichbach and Zuckerman's (1997) distinction between the

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three main research paradigms in comparative politics: structure, culture, and rationality.

We found evidence that structure, culture, and rationality all matter to some extent. Therefore, the motivation to participate in demonstrations – and, more broadly, in protest activities – cannot be reduced to a single factor or even a small subset. Structural factors surely have a strong impact, but not always as expected. As we showed in Chapter 3, the social bases of protest are associated with commitment. However, this applies above all to gender, age, and education. Objective social class, in contrast, does not seem to matter as much for commitment. Thus, while accounts of protest activism and social movement participation traditionally stress the role of social class (Eder 1993, 2013; Kriesi 1989, 1993), the latter does not seem to be associated with higher levels of commitment. Since our regression models aimed to explain commitment among demonstrators and not to test what distinguishes demonstrators from non-participants, this simply means that class does not impact on commitment. On the other hand, what does seem to matter in this respect is subjective class identification, as those who identify in particular with the working class and lower middle class, but also those identifying with other or no class, are more strongly committed than those identifying with the upper class and upper middle class. Thus, it is the political and subjective side of class linking with the formation of collective identity and group-level politics that matters for political commitment and not so much the objective structural facts per se. There is nothing spontaneously more radical about being working class in and of itself, but when working-class individuals identify with their class, they are more politically committed to take to the streets in the name of a given cause.

Among the structural factors, pre-existing networks and ties are clearly prominent. Consistent with structural accounts of social movements which have placed mobilizing structures at center stage (McAdam 1996; Tindall 2015), we found in Chapter 5 that this kind of factor played out in two distinct ways. On the one hand, those demonstrators who are more strongly embedded in organizational networks are also those who are more highly committed, in particular when they have an active role in the organizations to which they belong. On the other hand, social networks also play a mobilizing role insofar as the most committed people tend to be brought to the demonstration through either organizational or interpersonal networks, as compared to less strongly committed participants. Thus, at least for the most committed, traditional – structural – channels are still more important than either media channels or new modes of political communication such as online social networks.

Structural accounts of social movements have been dominant for a long period – particularly so in the form of political opportunity theory – but have since become the target of criticism. The severe critique by Goodwin and Jasper (2004), along with the defense by some of the most important proponents of the political opportunity approach in the same volume, clearly illustrate the terms of the contention. One of the key sources of criticism was the alleged structural

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bias of political opportunity theory and, more broadly, that of the political process approach to social movements. Since then, culture has increased its scope within the social movement field – even though it was never entirely neglected, as represented for example by framing theory (Benford and Snow 2000) as well as by the key role assigned to identity (Hunt and Benford 2004), ideology (Snow 2004), values (Rochon 1998), and more recently emotions (Goodwin et al. 2004) in explanations of protest politics and social movement activism.

Our study shows that culture, indeed, matters when it comes to explaining commitment to attend a demonstration. This can be seen through the impact of class identification. Moreover, it is also reflected in the fact that commitment is related to certain value orientations. Economic (left–right) and social (libertarian–authoritarian) values were included in all our analyses and showed that generally people with stronger libertarian and leftist values tend to be more strongly committed. This is in line with the idea of the class bases of protest continuing to reflect the profile of the new social movement protesters. The role of culture, furthermore, is also seen in the relationship between emotions and commitment. As we have seen in Chapter 6, highly committed demonstrators are also more emotionally charged, especially in terms of anger, worry, and frustration.

Ultimately, political engagement is a deliberate and rational decision to act. Rational choice accounts of social movements have obviously stressed this point very much (see Opp 2013 for a review). Consistent with previous research on the microdynamics of protest participation, we found a number of political attitudes – which we have called political predispositions in Chapter 6 – to impinge upon commitment to demonstrate. The latter, of course, is linked to political interest. Most importantly, we found that commitment is linked to internal political efficacy – that is, the feeling that participation matters – as well as the perceived effectiveness of the demonstration. In other words, those demonstrators who believe that their own involvement may have an impact and that the demonstration in which they take part is instrumental in producing the desired change are also those that are more strongly committed to participate.

BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN AND BEYOND PROTEST POLITICS

Beyond showing differences and similarities across countries, issues and types of demonstrators, and gauging the impact of microstructural as well as social psychological dynamics on commitment to demonstrate, our micro-level analysis of participation in street demonstrations has brought to the fore a number of broader issues linked to protest politics and social movement activism in the age of globalization. Three of them deserve special attention: the "pluralization" of protest politics, the weakening of the separation between cultural and economic protests, and the connection between protest politics and

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institutional politics. In addressing these three aspects, we can see the blurring of boundaries that have traditionally been understood to create distinctions between protesters, different protest issues, and the institutional and extra-institutional protest domains.

Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) posited that, along with the normalization of protest – that is, the fact that protest has become both more legitimate and widespread – a normalization of the protesters had also taken place to some extent, meaning that the characteristics of protesters would increasingly come to reflect those of the average citizen. Their statement, however, was based on data on a single country, namely Belgium. We believe that, in part, our study confirms their assessment insofar as a wide range of different social groups and generations is represented among the respondents of the survey upon which this book rests. At the same time, as we said earlier, we also found, as they did, that not everybody protests and, in particular, that demonstrating is still associated with the typical new social movement constituency – socioculturally highly educated professionals – whereas the less well educated, the socially vulnerable, and the needy remain less likely to take to the streets. Yet, while certain people are still overrepresented among the core group of protesters, the range of people who, even if only once, demonstrate is far from narrow. For example, we have seen that individuals identifying with the upper middle class do take to the streets, as do identifiers of right-wing and centrist parties. Although, of course, these groups are not prevalent, this yet signals change in that we are witnessing a "pluralization" of protest politics.

Such a "pluralization," furthermore, is not only seen in the range of people who participate in protest activities, but also in the wide variety of mobilization channels through which people get involved in demonstrations and in the range of different motives that they express for doing so. While, in previous epochs, interpersonal and organizational networks were the main, or perhaps even the only, means through which people were recruited to protest, today the range of mobilization channels is clearly much wider. To be sure, traditional social networks remain fundamental, but the media have taken on increasing importance and new technologies have added additional channels, most notably in the form of online social networks. Both the traditional and the new media channels are particularly important for younger demonstrators who come to protest for the first time.

Another sign that protest politics is becoming fuzzier resides in the increasing overlap between different protest issues, leading in particular to a weakening of the separation between cultural and economic protests. In spite of a lack of attention to how social movements addressing different protest issues might be governed by different dynamics, scholarship has traditionally pointed to the existence of separate movements mobilizing on distinct issues. The most well-known of such distinctions is that between old and new social movements and issues (Kriesi et al. 1995). While traditional movements focused on issues concerning economic redistribution – the latter, of course, being the main

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battleground of the labor movement – the new social movements brought to the fore cultural and lifestyle issues. As such, researchers have tended to compartmentalize the sectors of social protest. Following previous analyses along these lines (Eggert and Giugni 2012, 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2015, 2016b), we believe that such a separation between old and new issues and movements is largely overstated. We suggest that global justice movements and, later, anti-austerity movements have contributed to blurring this distinction. These movements were characterized by a rather heterogeneous spectrum of actors and issues, emphasizing both cultural and economic aspects. However, in the context of the Great Recession, several scholars have recently stressed that economic and redistributive issues should be more central for the study of protest politics, leading to a call for more attention to the role of capitalism in social movement studies (della Porta 2015; Hetland and Goodwin 2013). This question, addressed in Chapter 3, was brought to the fore by research on anti-austerity movements. However, while anti-austerity movements have emphasized economic aspects such as gross inequalities and the inefficiencies of capitalist systems that make the weakest sections pay for the mistakes of the richest few, they also contain a more cultural component emphasizing democratic values and the need for addressing the crisis of political responsibility and responsiveness of current elites.

While there are some linkages between the two protest sectors, and we see a blurring of distinctions as outlined above, our study also suggests that protests on cultural and economic issues continue to be marked by different micro-level dynamics. As we said earlier, we observed significant differences in the social composition of cultural and economic demonstrations, the relationship of demonstrators with different forms of political participation as well as their degree of partisanship, their mobilizing structures and channels of mobilization, their cognitive and affective predispositions, and their motivations. However, while substantial, these differences are not always very large. This leads us to believe that the gap separating cultural and economic issues is smaller than some have claimed and will perhaps continue to shrink further in the future. Further research should aim to continue to tackle this question.

The "pluralization" of protest politics and the rapprochement between cultural and economic issues concerns a blurring of the traditional theoretical boundaries in the study of protest politics. A further aspect emphasized in our study looks at the linkages between protest politics and institutional politics, and here too we can see a blurring of traditional boundaries. There was a time when scholars considered voting as the only legitimate political means for ordinary citizens to make their voice heard, while protest was understood as an apolitical, if not irrational and deviant, action conducted by frustrated and aggressive out-of-control crowds as conceived in various breakdown theories of collective action (see Buechler 2004 and Useem 1998 for reviews). Since the rise of solidarity theories – resource mobilization and political process theories – it has, however, become clear that "high," institutional and electoral

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politics are strongly connected to "low," extra-institutional and protest politics. Our study provides further confirmation of such a connection. Far from being socially isolated and highly frustrated individuals who engage in undefined collective behavior in order to diminish their level of stress as depicted by breakdown theories, we find that street citizens are strongly integrated and politically conscious and rationally choose protest politics among a range of other means. Most importantly, involvement in demonstrations or other extra-institutional political activities does not occur to the detriment of institutional participation. Quite the contrary, demonstrators often are highly engaged in both institutional and extra-institutional means.

These findings speak to recent work in the social movement literature stressing the need to combine the study of political parties and voting with the analysis of social movements and protest (Císař and Navrátil 2015; della Porta et al. 2017; Goldstone 2003; Heaney 2013; Heaney 2013; Heaney and Rojas 2015; Hutter et al. 2018; Kriesi 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012; McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013; Norris et al. 2015). As McAdam et al. (2001) have made clear, the relevant distinction today is not that between institutional and extra-institutional politics, but rather that between different forms of contentious politics. This means that institutional actors may be part and parcel of protest politics, and indeed they becoming are increasingly so. It also means, that what matters is not so much who is involved in protest activities – albeit this is also an interesting question in itself – but rather why and how they get involved.

To be sure, there remain gray areas. Not everyone takes part in protest activities. Quite the contrary, protesters – and, more specifically, demonstrators – remain a minority of the population. Furthermore, as our study has shown, protests on cultural and economic issues are still characterized to a large extent by different constituencies with different sets of grievances and sometimes adopting different action repertoires. For example, we found that strikes were much more popular among activists in economic demonstrations relative to those on cultural issues. Moreover, protest politics remains a specific means – or set of means – to make one's voice heard, to contest existing policy measures or proposals thereof, or to sensitize public opinion on a given issue and raise awareness. Yet, there are signs that a broader range of actors today have become what we have called street citizens and that the border between cultural and economic issues has become fuzzier, just as the one between institutional and extra-institutional politics has become less clearly defined. These can both be understood as further consequences – or at least as signals – of what Baumann (2000, 2007) has called "liquid modernity," including the resulting uncertainty of this age of globalization.

STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

On a broader level and in terms of a prospective outlook to conclude our book, our study calls for a reflection on the role of street citizens and more

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specifically activists for social and political change. To what extent can protest be seen as carrying within it the seeds for wider political change? As we have seen, major scholars today have stressed that the Great Recession and anti-austerity movements signal the return of economic issues and inequality to center stage in social movement discourse. Certainly, the Great Recession has brought to the fore the question of the inefficiencies of the capitalist economic system. Will protest movements be able to develop the critical mass to persuade and mobilize public opinion and the wider public to their cause? Research has shown that neoliberal ideology is pervasive particularly among those generations coming of age during the latter stages of the Cold War (Grasso et al. 2017). Will the new generation socialized in times of crisis and the rise of anti-austerity movements come to develop a wider social movement able to challenge existent social and political arrangements and present progressive alternatives to reestablish a more just and fair society? Our study has shown that the 1960s–1970s generation is still the most active in most countries, although the 2000s generation socialized in the current period of crisis is also very active. The "protest generation" of the 1960s–1970s had a deep impact on society and changed societal behavioral patterns and norms much more widely, beyond those participants directly impacted by the political events of the time (McAdam 1999). However, in many ways this protest generation was not able to establish institutions that would crystallize the progressive left-libertarian values of the age, so that now we are witnessing a strong resurgence of right-wing authoritarian and populist xenophobic and exclusionary values, as seen for example in the strong opposition to immigration. Can contemporary protest still bring about real social change and popularize progressive libertarian and tolerant values throughout contemporary society or has it merely become a means for the affirmation of alternative lifestyle choices and oppositional cultural values? Can contemporary social movements, spearheaded by the younger generations, develop new progressive answers for contemporary problems beyond neoliberal models and right-wing exclusionary politics?

Only the future will be able to provide answers to these questions. Our study has argued that the current economic context characterized by deteriorating economic conditions could be seen to provide fertile ground for the development of wider societal grievances, particularly among the most deprived groups which have also been hit the hardest. Deteriorating economic contexts can be seen to open up the space for politicization and the realization that private economic troubles are actually social and political economic problems, and, in turn, this could spur mobilization by wider sections of society including resource-poor groups. Our study shows that today protest tends to overrepresent the middle classes and underrepresent the working classes. In some countries, however, the unemployed were overrepresented, suggesting that precarization could potentially become a new base for protest. One of the key findings of this book, however, is that more resource-poor group tends to be more likely to engage in demonstrations over economic issues and also that, in

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order to overcome the higher barriers to participation, individuals from these groups are particularly committed. Left-wing values and class identification, particularly with the working class, were important predictors of commitment to take to the streets in the name of a cause. These highly committed street citizens, particularly those from the younger generations, could be the key to politicizing and engaging others more widely into protest politics and developing a critical mass able to usher in real social change and restructure the current system to make it more democratic, fair, and humane.

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Appendix

List of demonstrations surveyed by each country team in the project
C = cultural protests; E = economic protests

Belgium

1 Antwerp, 1st of May March (2010): E
2 Brussels, Climate Change (2009): C
3 Brussels, March for Work (2010): E
4 Brussels, No to Austerity (2010): E
5 Brussels, No Government, Great Country (2011): C
6 Brussels, Not in Our Name (2011): C
7 Brussels, Non-Profit Demonstration (2011): E
8 Brussels, We Have Alternatives (2011): E
9 Brussels, Fukushima Never Again (2012): C

Italy

10 Assisi, Marcia Perugia-Assisi (2011): C
11 Bologna, Gay Pride (2012): C
12 Firenze, Semi di giustizia, fiori di corresponsabilità (2013): C
13 Florence, May Day (2011): E
14 Florence, General Strike (2011): E
15 Florence, Florence 10+10/Joining Forces for another Europe (2012): E
16 Milan, Euromayday (2011): C
17 Niscemi, No Mous (2013): C
18 Rome, No Monti Day (2012): E

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The Netherlands

19 Amsterdam, Student Demonstration 1 (2010): E
20 Amsterdam, Culture Demonstration Amsterdam (2010): E
21 Amsterdam, Stop Racism and Exclusion (2011): C
22 Amsterdam, Anti-Nuclear Demonstration (2011): C
23 Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Occupy Netherlands (2011): E
24 Haarlem, Pink Saturday Parade Survey (2012): C
25 Rotterdam, Retirement Demonstration (2009): E
26 The Hague, Together Strong for Public Work (2011): E
27 The Hague, Student Demonstration 2 (2011): E
28 The Hague, Military Demonstration (2011): E
29 The Hague, Stop Budget Cuts (Care & Welfare) (2011): E
30 Utrecht, Climate Demonstration (2009): C
31 Utrecht, Culture Demonstration Utrecht (2010): C

Spain

32 Barcelona, Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (2010): E
33 Barcelona, Self-Determination is Democracy (2010): E
34 Barcelona, We Are a Nation, We Decide (2010): E
35 Barcelona, 1st May, Labor Day (2010): E
36 Madrid, Against Labor Law (2010): E
37 Madrid, Real Democracy Now! We Are Not Good in the Hands of Politicians and Bankers! (2011): E
38 Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against Language Decree (2010): E
39 Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against the New Labor Law (2010): E
40 Vigo, Celebration May Day (2011): E
41 Vigo, For Employment, Not Capital Reforms. Defend Our Rights (2011): E

Sweden

42 Copenhagen (mostly Danish & Swedish respondents), Climate March (2009): C
43 Gothenburg, May Day (Left Party) (2012): C
44 Gothenburg, May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (2012): E
45 Gothenburg, Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ+ festival) (2012): C
46 Malmö, May Day (Left Party) (2011): C
47 Malmö, May Day (SAP/LO) (2011): E
48 Stockholm, May 1 March, Left Party (2010): C

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49 Stockholm, Against Racist Politics (2010): C
50 Stockholm, May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (2010): E
51 Stockholm, Anti-Nuclear Demonstration (2011): C

Switzerland

52 Bern, World March of Women (2010): C
53 Beznau, Anti-Nuclear Manifestation (2011): C
54 Geneva, Gay Pride Geneva (2011): C
55 Geneva, Women Demonstration Geneva (2011): C
56 Geneva, May 1st Demonstration 2011 (2011): E
57 Mühleberg, Anti-Nuclear Demonstration (2012): C
58 Zurich, May 1st Demonstration (2010): E
59 Zurich, Pride Demonstration (2012): C

United Kingdom

60 London, National Climate March (2009): C
61 London, May Day Labour March (2010): E
62 London, Take Back Parliament (2010): C
63 London, No to Hate Crime Vigil (2010): C
64 London, Unite Against Fascism National Demonstration (2010): C
65 London, Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (2010): E
66 London, National Climate March 2010 (2010): C
67 London, Second Student National Demonstration (2010): E
68 London, Million Women Rise (2011): C
69 London, TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (2011): E
70 London, Occupy London (2011): E
71 London, London Pride Parade (2012): C

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