POPULISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

VOLUME 3

Migration, Gender and Religion

EDITED BY GREGOR FITZI,
JÜRGEN MACKERT AND BRYAN S. TURNER

'This ambitious third volume on *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy* examines populist movements through the distinct but cross-cutting perspectives of migration, gender and religion. Traversing East and West, the volume covers variants of populism arising in different national and political contexts, and documents their underlying tensions. Citizenship and belonging; cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism; gender equality versus gendered nationalism; Islamism, Islamophobia, and the Christian Right; subordinated masculinities – all are implicated in fuelling forms of populism that pose, as yet unanswered, questions for liberal democracy. A bold and important book, engaging difficult and disturbing argument.'

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'Populism is popping up everywhere as one of the most intriguing global phenomena of our times. This valuable collection of essays helps to illuminate its complex relations and synergy with global migrations, with the ongoing gender revolution and with the mobilisation of religious identities and counter-identities in the public sphere. An invaluable resource to understand our present global malaise.'

José Casanova, *Professor, Department of Sociology*
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Populism and the Crisis of Democracy

The contributions to this volume *Immigration, Gender and Religion* bring together empirically grounded and theoretically sophisticated case studies of populist responses to what are perceived to be the threats to national survival and sovereignty from 'uncontrolled' immigration. The demographic context – declining fertility rates and ageing populations – promotes the belief that high Muslim fertility rates are material evidence of an Islamic threat to the West, to national cohesion and particularly to the safety and dignity of the women of the host community.

Consequently, gender plays an important part in populist ideology, but populist attitudes to gender are often contradictory. Populist movements are often marked by misogyny and by policies that are typically anti-feminist in rejecting gender equality. The traditional family with a dominant father and submissive mother is promoted as the basis of national values and the remedy against social decline. The obsession with women in the public domain points to a crisis of masculinity associated with unemployment, the impact of austerity packages on social status, and the growth of pink collar employment.

Inevitably, religion is drawn into these political debates about the future of Western societies, because religion in general has seen the family and mothers as essential for the reproduction of religion. Christendom has been identified by populists as providing the ultimate defence of the borders of European civilisation against Islam, despite the fact that church leaders have often defended and welcomed outsiders in terms of Christian charity. Once more Christian Europe is the *Abendland* standing in defiance of a threatening and subversive *Morgenland*. This volume will be an invaluable reference for students and scholars in the field of political theory, political sociology and European Studies.

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Introduction

Demography, democracy and right-wing populism

Bryan S. Turner

In this introduction, I argue that populism and the crisis of democracy cannot be understood without an examination of the demographic transformation of modern societies. Specifically, I demonstrate that declining total fertility rates and the aging of the population are the background conditions for the populist emphasis on the threat of (Muslim) immigration, the connection between the family and the survival of the nation and the (at times curious) defence of the dignity of women. To a large degree, the principal solution to a declining population is rising rates of immigration. Religion comes into the picture in its traditional role in the legitimation of the family, heterosexuality and the domestic role of women. Although there are many varieties of populism along a continuum from the far left to the extreme right, these elements (opposition to migration, celebration of the family and an appeal to national sovereignty) are relatively common in populist ideology. Declining populations are often seen diagnostically as evidence of the national crisis brought on by modernity and secularisation.

Demographic changes have been among the most important forms of social change since the end of World War II. Of course, the idea of the demographic transition is a familiar topic in the social sciences. It describes how death rates fell as a result of improvements in the environment (essentially clean water), welfare and medical treatment. The result was a rapid growth in the size of the population. The modern theory of population was originally developed by Warren Thompson (1929) and sociologists such as Kingsley Davis (1945) described the process as a 'demographic transition' in response to public anxiety about over population. The lag between declining death rates and declining birth rates explained population growth. These early theories in fact treated population as a self-correcting social system that in the long run would establish equilibrium. However, the simple model of one demographic transition was abandoned as sociologists came to realise that the demographic tradition set in motion a series of transitions in family life, household composition, the age structure and urbanisation. In this introduction, I am also suggesting that we are seeing a politics transition associated with a further demographic constraint. It is now possible to think of a second demographic transition when population does not achieve an equilibrium. Fertility rates are now so low that many governments and their policy makers are confronted by declining and aging populations that appear resistant to correction. Many societies are now

faced by a demographic crisis, which is one component of the crisis of democracy which occupies our three volumes.

For a society to reproduce itself, it needs a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2.2 births per woman over her reproductive life time. Many societies in Europe for example Britain, Germany, Italy, Poland and Hungary are below that rate and in Asia, we find a similar pattern for example in Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The main exception in Europe is France and to take another exceptional example Iran has a TFR around 1.1. Low fertility confronts societies with specific problems but these are now compounded by aging in which a life expectancy in the high 70s is not unusual.

Government strategies towards the demographic crisis

This combination of low fertility and aging presents governments with limited and problematic choices. They can attempt to raise the fertility rate by social policies designed to ease the burden of parenthood such as lower taxes, provide educational support for children or offer paternity/maternity benefits. These policies have not been especially successful, because they typically do not outweigh the benefits of a dual income household. Singapore is a good example where generous benefits to couples did not raise the fertility rate (Kamaludeen & Turner, 2014). These problems in modern citizenship (with special reference to Sweden) were originally identified by Gunner Myrdal (1940).

Alternatively governments can attempt to improve labour efficiency by technological innovation. As the working class contracts, governments can search for labour saving technologies. This solution is the preferred option in Japan, where, apart from a South Korean minority, immigration has been steadfastly resisted in favour of national purity. There is an unresolved debate about the impact of technological innovation on employment. If technology can replace labour, then a declining population may not be catastrophic. Many semi-skilled jobs in the economy – such as driving a truck – have not yet been replaced by technological innovations. The military still requires 'boots on the ground' as wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya have tragically demonstrated. However, there are indications that driver-less vehicles and drones may replace these labour intensive activities. Insofar as these technologies have replaced traditional working class forms of employment, they have contributed to the rise of populism and to the destabilisation of democratic governments. Globalisation is often identified as the principal causal agent behind populism, but it may well be job losses through technological change that have played a more important role.

Finally, there is the option of increasing the labour force through immigration. The main problem with this option is that it inevitably increases social diversity thereby raising traditional issues about social inclusion. One might imagine that social diversity brought social benefits and many governments, such as Canada and Australia, favoured multiculturalism as a positive policy. Other societies such as Britain that had weak policies of social inclusion saw the growth of 'parallel communities' and face second generations that have low levels of commitment to

Britishness as a meaningful identity (DeHanas, 2016). With the growth of populist movements whose principal characteristic is promotion of 'we the people' and hostility to immigration, multicultural policies are on the defensive as political parties respond to the demands of the 'left behind' and what Hilary Clinton called 'the deplorables'. The presidency of Donald Trump has legitimised, however erratically, overt hostility to migrants. The decline of multiculturalism may also be the window on a deeper issue, namely the erosion of cosmopolitanism which is now seen as merely the ideology of global elites. We should however keep in mind, as Gianni D'Amato and Didier Ruedin explain in their chapter, the fact that anti-immigration platforms have not invariable resulted in electoral success. The anti-immigration sentiments behind The National Front (FN) in France and the Party of Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands did not produce dramatic electoral successes, and opposition to immigration behind UKIP in Britain appeared to evaporate after Brexit. The main exceptions, where anti-immigration has produced important political results, have been The Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The other exception is of course the electoral success of Donald Trump. Despite his election commitment to stop illegal immigration, it is unlikely, mainly for economic reasons, that a wall will be constructed along the Mexican border.

Declining populations are for the above reasons a serious issue for governments, but population decline is also accompanied by aging populations. For the burden of an aging population, there are many short term solutions – remove compulsory retirement, privatise welfare and health systems, cut back on pension entitlements or relocate aging populations to overseas locations where support systems are less expensive. There are however very few long-term solutions and because elderly citizens are entitled to vote, there may be little enthusiasm for austerity measures for old people.

This aspect of the second demographic transition has an important effect on the traditional model of citizenship that is associated with T.H. Marshall (1950) – one of the architects of social or welfare citizenship. Writing after the War, an aging population played no part in Marshall's analysis of the growth of citizenship, but in modern Britain, aging has a major impact on the cost of the National Health Service (NHS). Fear of migration and the promise of more funds for the NHS were important factors in the success of Brexit, but the demographic costs of leaving Europe played no part in the referendum. Insofar as the crisis of democracy is fundamentally a crisis of citizenship, then an aging population has, albeit indirectly, played a part in both crises. As Giorgia Bulli notes in her chapter on Italy, citizenship has remained on the fringe of the populist vocabulary, and yet it is in reality the crucial dimension as the shift from *ius sanguinis* to *ius soli* dramatically underlines.

Although, as every volume on populism routinely admits, populism is difficult to define; there is general agreement that it is based on the assumption of a clearly identifiable 'people' in opposition to an outside world. Anti-immigration is the expression of a consistent fear of this outside world. Uncontrolled immigration is seen as a threat to the integrity of the nation. The main target has been Muslim

immigration and there has been a corresponding increase in Islamophobia across Europe. A consistent theme of right-wing populism has been the threat of Muslims to jobs, the dignity of western women and the erosion of the values that have underpinned western civilisation. Islamophobia is undoubtedly an important element in contemporary populist ideology. However, as Giovanna Campani argues in her chapter, the 'other' may include Jews as well as Muslims, and furthermore in Italy, the Northern League plays on the historic division in Italian culture between North and South. Southern Italians are also included in the 'other'. In Britain, during the Brexit campaign, Polish immigrants were the target of popular hostility.

As Nira Yuval-Davis shows in her chapter, borders and bordering have become dominant markers of the psychological need for security against the threat of national decline. Paradoxically, the local and the indigenous have been enhanced and revitalised by globalisation, giving rise to the virtues of locality and embeddedness against free-floating elites, and producing the clear distinction between 'autochthones' (those that belong to the soil) and 'allochthones' (those that do not). Similarly, Rosario Forlenza in his chapter demonstrates how the ancient idea of Europe as *das Abendland* (the land of the setting sun) has been revived to articulate the clear differences between civilised Europe and the foreign and hostile 'Orient' or *das Morgenland*.

Religion and gender

The connections between the perceived negative consequences of 'uncontrolled' immigration and populism appear to be obvious; indeed the relationship can be taken for granted. But what have demography and immigration to do with religion and gender? One aspect of the answer is the family. Because the family is the traditional institution for reproduction, it is critical (or seen to be critical) to the demographic health of the nation. The family is furthermore the primary institution by which the next generation acquires the language, culture and values of the national community. Every modern populist movement has seen the instability of the family as one explanation for national decline. Unsurprisingly, various chapters in this volume (but especially Leila Hadj-Abdou and Zafer Yilmaz) examine the populist debate about the family, reproduction and national survival. A good example is provided by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) which seeks to defend the family and 'the freedom and dignity of women' against the threat of Islamisation. The FPÖ in this respect echoes the stance of other populist parties that seek simultaneously to protect the family and gender equality. Of course, Western feminism has been critical of the traditional family as the bedrock of patriarchal practices and assumptions. The promotion of both family and gender equality by populists is a somewhat strange combination, given the fact that majority of populist parties are 'Männerparteien' with distinctively conservative attitudes towards the proper role of women as mothers living in the domestic sphere rather than as equal citizens in the public realm. The ambiguity of these attitudes is well illustrated by Donald Trump's relationship to women and

reproduction especially by his view that there should be some form of punishment for women who terminate a pregnancy by abortion. Against the background threat of Islamisation, populists can reject the veil which in Islam is to protect the dignity of women and promote the idea that a woman's place is in the home where she serves the needs of men and raises children to reproduce the nation. Thus 'gendered nationalism' stands against feminism, same sex marriage, homosexuality and gay rights.

In general terms, populism is riddled with ambiguities in its relationship to women. Trump's version of populism has normalised misogyny and the allegations about his harassment of women did not deter women voters from supporting his campaign. Yet Trump's appeal to women fits into the peculiar mixture of patriarchy and misogyny that is combined with the need to protect women from the dangers of foreign migrants in our midst. Bryan Turner explains the peculiarity of Trump's appeal to evangelical Christianity in the United States in terms of the idea promoted by conservative Christians about the role of men as 'caring warriors' who may need to discipline their wives and enforce Christian standards in the household. As Haideh Moghissi convincingly shows, praise of the family as the back bone of the nation is often combined with hostility to women's control of their own bodies. Both Trump in the United States and Erdogan in Turkey have defended traditional male roles, the patriarchal home and opposition to abortion.

Austrian right-wing populism has been in electoral terms highly successful, populist support for the traditional family and the domestic role of women is not confined to Catholic Europe. Zafer Yilmaz shows clearly how the AKP in Turkey developed its policies with reference to the family as the building block of society and nation. In the modernisation process in Turkey, the family was the conduit for emotional loyalty to the new republic and the reorganisation of society around citizenship. The Turkish government came to see the family as a 'problem solver' in the national struggle against poverty, inequality and crime.

We are now in a position to state more clearly how religion fits into the web of critical institutions – marriage, family, reproduction, the domesticity of women and the survival of the nation – that forms the background to populist ideology. Religion, and here I mean Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheism, is and remains the crucial bastion of the family as the foundation not only of society in general but of religion in particular. In a rapidly changing and uncertain world, conservative religious movements have defended the traditional family, the private space of the home, the virtues of parenting and heterosexuality.

We might argue that controlling the borders of the nation and bordering women in the family are closely connected to religious beliefs and institutions. Returning to Forlenza, opposition to and fear of Islam have a long history in Europe. Islam has of course shaped European societies from Spain to Greece. 'Turks' were a menace to European and American shipping in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, while the Ottoman Empire was a powerful adversary. Modern day fear of Islam has only served to emphasise Christendom as the bastion of the West. Partly on this basis, Forlenza rejects the idea promoted by Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy (2016) that Christianity has been hijacked by populism. He also notes the

complexity of the Catholic Church's relationship to populism. While we can assume that many lay Catholics are opposed to Muslim immigration, Pope Francis and the Vatican hierarchy have been emphatic in defence of refugees and asylum seekers regardless of their religion or ethnic identity.

Masculinity

In various European societies, there is a populist theme to defend the dignity of women and simultaneously to seclude women within the domestic space. Yet ironically women have been prominent in the political leadership of populism. Marine Le Pen is the most obvious example. The emphasis on the proper place of women in the home prompts one to ask whether this defence of the dignity of women points to a crisis of masculinity as one hidden basis of populism. This is the main question behind Joshua Roose's chapter on the strong man politics of the Philippines, Russia and India.

The status and role of white working class men has declined with the disappearance of many jobs that were the exclusive preserve of men, namely ship building and manufacture in general, agriculture, mining, forestry and the military. By contrast, as the educational attainment of women has risen, there is now a pink collar stratum in which women have enjoyed social mobility and independence, namely in education, banking, secretarial work and services in general. Although there is a glass ceiling, women are beginning to enjoy success in management positions in government and the private sector. Generally speaking, marriage rates are far lower for men with low educational achievement than they are for educated middle class men. At the same time, women's movements have been critical of the traditional male in patriarchal families and the general acceptance of gay marriage is beginning to erode the hegemonic status of the heterosexual marriage.

These social and legal changes to male status are reflected in the hostility shown by Trump and his base towards feminism, women intellectuals and "crooked Hillary" during and after the presidential campaign. There was also the refusal to shake hands with Angela Merkel and the ribald comments by Trump and Nigel Farage at the expense of Theresa May. Roose highlights the rise (or return?) of strong man politics in figures such as Putin, Duterte and Modi. Whether it is from horse back or a motor cycle, their celebration of aggressive masculinity is obvious, as is the general lack of civility in their response to any opposing forces. Masculinity is the physical style that reinforces their political platform in favour of female submissiveness and domesticity.

This populist masculinity does however raise an important intellectual question as to the difference, if any, between right-wing populism and fascism. Adolf Hitler expressed his masculinity through military uniforms, martial symbols and mass parades. However, the more obvious comparison is with Benito Mussolini whose posturing emphasised his domineering masculine frame. Fascism was obviously authoritarian, nationalist and identified Jews rather than Muslims as the principal threat to German racial purity. However, as Cas Mudde and Cristobal

Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) have argued not all forms of populism are anti-democratic, whereas there is little argument that Fascism rejected and where possible destroyed democratic institutions. The connection between fascism and populism may lie in the importance of masculinity as a sign of political vigour.

Conclusion

I have drawn attention to the demographic constraints – declining fertility and aging populations – that constrain modern governments. The various policy responses to these interconnected features of a second demographic transition are limited. These policy options such as austerity measures within a neo-liberal framework often have a negative impact on the working class. Related social developments such as the decline of the family, de-industrialisation and the rise of feminist politics have often been blamed on 'globalisation' and elite indifference to the 'working man', but the related job losses and erosion of working conditions have fuelled populist ideology.

This chapter has sought to present a complex picture of the interactions between demographic change, immigration, gender and religion in modern populism, but perhaps the picture is in fact more complicated. The economic crisis that followed the crisis of financial capitalism in 2008 had negative effects on the middle class, who were mobilised by Occupy Wall Street. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has a predominantly middle class base. By contrast, the Tea Party was mobilised by fears relating to pensions, medical care and welfare entitlements of senior citizens. Specific cases of populist politics may have different combinations of ideology and recruitment. Podemos draws on the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt and is critical of the remaining legacy of Franco's fascist Spain (Booth & Baert, 2018).

Given the complexities and contradictions of populism, any predictions about future developments must be cautious and limited. What is clear is that Europe faces an uncertain democratic future being confronted by Brexit, the Catalan movement for secession, political instability in Italy, the uncertain future of Merkel's coalition in Germany and the development of anti-immigrant policies in Hungary and Poland. One can either take the view that these are the normal trials and tribulations of democratic processes, or that the post-war democratic settlement is slowly unwinding. Either view is plausible.

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Part I

Populism and migration

1 The populist representation of the people in the Italian ius soli political debate

The Lega Nord and the Movimento Cinque Stelle

Giorgia Bulli

Introduction

The debate on populism has generated long disputes about the nature of the concept and the legitimate adoption of the term 'populism' for the empirical description of different political parties and movements. However, one of the few things that is rarely disagreed upon when talking about populism is its identification as a contraposition between the people and the elite. This central element is present in numerous of the most widely accepted definitions of populism (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004). Despite the populist representation of the people as homogenous by the populist actors, the reflection on the concept has evidenced the multifaceted nature of the concept of the people. The analyses of Canovan (1999), Mény and Surel (2000) and Taguieff (2002) all evidence the complexity of the approach to the complex question of who is the people? Recent research (Dolezal, Helbling & Hutter, 2010; Helbling, 2009) sheds light on the relationship between populism and the conceptualisation of citizenship. However, the concept of citizenship tends to remain on the fringe in the political vocabulary of populists.

Yet, in times of mass migrations and governance necessities (Triandafyllidou, 2017), of confrontation with the practices of who is entitled to be a citizen and who is not (Zincone, Penninx & Borkert, 2011), the relationship between democracy and citizenship does not seem to be less important than the relationship between democracy and populism. The recent debate on the replacement of the ius sanguinis with the ius soli with regards to children born in Italy from foreign parents represents an ideal empirical example of how the issue can be approached in two completely different ways by two Italian political parties.

The party of the Lega Nord (LN, Northern League) and the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S, Five-Star Movement) are representative of different kinds of populism. The LN has been defined as the nearly ideal typical incarnation of populism (Tarchi, 2015, p. 243). The M5S, on the other hand, is the successful latecomer of the Italian populisms (Chiapponi, 2017, p. 104). The former has been considered as the typical example of a (radical) right form of populism

(Mudde, 2007). The latter has stimulated a rich debate on the chameleonic nature (Taggart, 2000) of populism. The M5S self-definition as nor right nor left (Grillo, 2013a) has been confirmed by electoral analysis (Colloca & Corbetta, 2015, p. 209). Still, a separation exists between those who are sceptical of the populist nature of the Movement founded by the comedian Beppe Grillo (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016, p. 155) and those who testify it (Chiapponi, 2017; Corbetta, 2017; Zanatta, 2013).

Immigration has represented one of the core issues of 'leghismo' since its first appearance in the late 1980s. On the contrary, M5S has never had a stable approach to this issue. The 'refugee crisis' has represented for both parties an opportunity to re-define their political positioning on this matter as a consequence of the changing opportunity structure represented by their different role in the parliamentary opposition and of the strategic decisions they were both forced to make since the beginning of the current legislature.

Given the relevance of the migration issue in the current political debate (van der Brug, D'Amato, Berkhout, & Ruedin, 2015), Italy does not represent an exception in the European landscape. The polarisation capacity of the matter has been revealed by recent surveys at national and European level. Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer, 2016, 2017) evidence that concerns about immigration represent the second most cited preoccupation for Italian citizens. The exacerbating social tension Italy has had to face following the growing fluxes of migrants and asylum seekers has occurred at a time of increasing emotivism, which is mostly due to the proximity of the Italian coasts to the Mediterranean sea, where many shipwrecks have taken place since 2013.

Recent research on the frames adopted with regards to immigration in Europe (Helbling, 2013) confirm the high level of politicisation of the issue at the central and local level in Italy (Castelli Gattinara, 2016). The politicisation of the public debate on immigration and the tensions created by the parliamentary discussion in the XVII legislature regarding the introduction of the ius soli represent an interesting stage to ask some questions: (1) Do the LN and the M5S refer to a precise notion of the people, when elaborating their argumentative strategies in the debate of the ius soli introduction? (2) Are their representation of the people able to influence the public debate on the ius soli introduction?

In order to answer these questions, we will analyse official political statements by the two parties and posts in Beppe Grillo's blog and in the LN's leader's (Matteo Salvini) Facebook and twitter pages. Attention will also be devoted to the parliamentary debate. We can assume that, due to the particular environment represented by the parliamentary discussion (Fedel, 2001; Ilie, 2003), the Members of Parliament interventions of the two parties on that matter will evidence varieties of populism that might remain hidden in the populist political communication in the front stage. Front stage and back stage of politics are differently addressed and influenced by the process of mediatisation of politics (Esser, 2013; Kriesi, 2014). These variations will also offer the opportunity to verify if organisational constraints that parties in general, and the populist parties more specifically, have to adapt to, play a role in the positioning of populist parties in specific issues.

The debate on the ius soli and the parties' positioning

Following the Law 91/1992, Italian citizenship is acquired on the basis of the ius sanguinis.[1] A child born from one (mother or father) Italian citizen(s) is automatically an Italian citizen. Children born in Italy from foreign parents can acquire the Italian citizenship either if they have been resident in Italy without any interruptions until the age of 18, stating within the day in which they turn 19 that they intent to become Italian nationals, or if their parents acquire the Italian citizenship before they turn 18.

Zincone (2011, p. 254) points at the myth of the Diaspora, which lies at the basis of the maintenance of natural linkage between citizens and their origin. The existence of the Diaspora myth is largely due to the emigration history of Italy. Italy has only recently become an immigration country (Bonifazi, 1998; Pugliese, 2002). The prevailing interpretation that 'Italian emigrant descendants mostly include people who are still culturally close to their homeland' (Zincone, 2011, p. 255) has contributed to shaping a legislation on citizenship that implicitly evokes the rights of the emigrated people to maintain a natural bond with their country.

The shift that transformed Italy from an emigration to an immigration country between the late 1980s and the early 1990s was not at all followed by a rapid modification of the citizenship legislation. On the contrary, the high level of politicisation in the policy making on immigration in its several evolution steps (Einaudi, 2007) only partially touched the principle of the ius sanguinis. Starting from the adoption of the first coherent legislation on immigration in the late 1980s (the so-called Martelli Law), the contraposition between the centre-left parties and movements (the Catholic Church included) – prone to the protection of the legal and illegal migrants' rights – and the centre-right parties – advocating 'Law and Order' practices – was evident.

The shift towards a bipolar competition that occurred in the Italian party system in the aftermath of the collapse of the so-called 'First Republic' in the early 1990s (Bull & Rhodes, 1997) made the polarisation on migration issue even more evident. In this context, the above described rise of populism represented by the LN on one side, and by Forza Italia on the other, provoked a crystallisation of mutual suspicions towards all possible forms of modification of the provisions for acquiring citizenship.

Within the centre-left, attempts to modify the Law 91/1992 were made since the late 1990s. After approving the comprehensive Law on immigration in 1998, the centre-left coalition in power since 1996 tried to elaborate a new legislation on citizenship. The draft included the possibility for children of foreigners legally living in Italy since 5 years to acquire the Italian citizenship at the age of five, if born in Italy and permanently living there. During the second term of the centre-left in power, another attempt was made in 2006 to modify the Law on citizenship. This time also the effort remained unsuccessful.

The centre-right 2001–2006 and 2008–2011 coalitions were characterised by an evident anti-immigration rhetoric, whose main interpreters were the LN and the party of Alleanza Nazionale (AN, National Alliance). These two parties mostly influenced the approval of the so-called 'Bossi-Fini' Law (from the names

respectively of the then leaders of the LN and of AN) approved in 2002. The law modified in a more restrictive sense the previous comprehensive law on immigration approved by the centre-left coalition in 1998. The prevailing anti-immigration approach characterising the LN and the AN electoral campaign became a regular component of the centre-right political communication. Data on the salience of immigration issues in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Castelli Gattinara, 2016, pp. 96–104) emerging from the press coverage evidence a clear centre-right issue ownership. In 2009, the so-called security package (Law 94/2009) was approved. The bill was promoted by the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Roberto Maroni, a leading figure of the Northern League. It introduced the crime of undocumented entry and stay. Moreover, the acquisition of citizenship via marriage was made harder (Zincone 2010, p. 4). The Law 94/2009 was widely condemned by the Italian Church, the Third Sector and the European Institutions, specifically the European Court of Justice (Colombo & Sciortino, 2004).

In this period, opinion polls evidenced the existence of a double climate of opinion. The inclusion of anti-immigration stances in the electoral campaign in the latest elections had made immigration one of the biggest constraints among Italian citizens. On the other hand, the always existing tensions and the different strategies adopted by representatives of political parties and Third Sector's actors were evident in the presence of a large proportion of the public opinion that was favourable to the introduction of less restrictive measures for foreigners in the acquisition of the Italian citizenship (Tintori, 2016). The observable transformation of the Italian schools into more and more multicultural environments (Queirolo Palmas, 2006) represented another relevant aspect. It testified the stable transformation of Italy into a country of immigration. Second generation migrants started to become a recognised phenomenon not only with regards to their difficult integration, but also with regards to their legal rights, citizenship included.

Non-partisan amendments to the law were proposed in the following years by catholic and laic associations. Their active role could be identified in the following years in the promotion of the ius soli. The failure of a bipartisan agreement[2] on the modification of the Law 91/1992 on the basis of a Law proposal presented by one MP belonging to the Partito Democratico (PD) and one MP belonging to Forza Italia in 2009 due to the LN resistance represented the end of parliamentary attempts to reach the goal.

The instability of the Italian political situation caused by the fourth Berlusconi government (2008–2011) downfall under the pressure of the economic crisis and the cabinet's failure to tackle Italy's debt (Bosco & McDonnell, 2012) downgraded the urgency of the modification of the Law on citizenship. The following technical government led by Senator Mario Monti obtained the vote of confidence of all parties, the LN excluded. Despite the inclusion in the cabinet of one of the most influential figures of the catholic Third Sector,[3] no political terrain could be found for a new Law proposal on citizenship. At the social level, however, grassroots initiatives multiplied. Among them, the most successful initiative was the collection of 200,000 signatures for the presentation of two law proposals.[4]

The XVII legislature after the elections of 2013 was everything but stable. After the failure of Bersani (the then secretary general of the PD) to create a coalition, an agreement was found between the PD and smaller parties of the centre and the centre-right, and the Letta (PD) government was inaugurated (2013). The primary elections for the choice of the new Secretary General of the PD won by Matteo Renzi in 2013 represented another instability element, which would later cause the resign of Letta, who was substituted by Renzi himself (Leonardi, 2017, p. 25). The inauguration of the government coincided with a reiterated promise with regards to the introduction of the ius soli. Numerous legislative proposals had been presented since the opening up of the new legislature (among them, one was presented by the M5S). After a long debate in the Constitutional Affair Commission, a law proposal was brought to the Chamber of Deputies for the plenary discussion in September 2015.

On 13 October 2015, the Chamber of Deputies approved a text (AS 2092) which emended the 1992/41 Law with two new provisions: the introduction of the ius soli and the introduction of the so-called ius culturae. Following the first provision (ius soli), the Italian citizenship can be acquired by birth by individuals who were born in Italy from foreign parents (at least one of them) holding a permanent residence permit or possessing the EU long-term residence permit (5 years of residence without interruption needed in both cases).[5] The reform bill can therefore be considered a moderate version of the ius soli. Following the second provision (ius culturae), the Italian citizenship can be acquired by foreign minors who were born in Italy, or have entered Italy within the 12th year of life, and who have regularly attended in the Italian territory one or more education cycles delivered by the National Education System for at least 5 years (Camera dei Deputati, 2015).

Since the passage of the text to the Senate (October 2015), many events have occurred – both in the Italian political scenery and in the wider international setting – which have provoked the slowing down of the parliamentary procedure until its resumption in the Summer 2017. The combined effect of Renzi's resignation after the rejection of the Constitutional reform through the 2016 referendum (Bull, 2017) and the exacerbation of the refugee crisis (Caponio & Cappiali, 2017) created a very tense environment. On the one hand, the condensation of the antagonism to the Referendum into one anti-Renzi front re-invigorated the parties in opposition, creating a perfect environment for the anti-establishment rhetoric of the LN and the M5S. On the other hand, the politicisation of the migrant issues due to the European failures (Bauböck, 2017) in the management of the crisis brought about an evident polarisation. This was perfectly reproduced in the debate at the Senate which started again in Summer 2017.

The proximity of the end of the current legislature has contributed to a growing contraposition between the political parties favourable to the law's approval and its fierce opponents. These tensions were particularly evident in the first debate in the Senate in the month of June 2017. On the day of the scheduled debate, around 200 members of the extreme right group CasaPound Italia gathered in front of the Senate to protest against the introduction of the ius soli. If pressure outside the Senate was severe, the tensions registered in the parliamentary chamber nearly

achieved the physical scuffle (Frignani, 2017). Banners were shown by the LN deputies containing the writing 'No to ius soli' and 'Stop to invasion'. The continuation of the debate was not possible. In the following months, the modification of the law on citizenship became so clearly synonym for the more general contraposition in the migration disputes that at the beginning of the parliamentary activity the discussion on the law proposal was not even scheduled in the official Senate programme for the following months. The instability of the government and the particular weakness of its leading party, the PD, dissuaded it to openly run a political fight in the battleground of the populist parties. The official conclusion of the Legislature (28 December 2017) coincided with the final failure of the law proposal.

In the next paragraph, official and campaign statements of the two parties will be presented. In order to depict the tensions deriving from internal organisational constraints and from exogenous influences originating from the evolution of the debate on the introduction of the ius soli, the chronical order suggested above will be followed.

The LN and the M5S in the ius soli debate: Which people?

The beginning of the XVII legislature was marked by the unexpected results of the M5S. The party won 25.6 per cent of the votes, the highest percentage ever obtained by a new political party at its first legislative elections contestation (Chiaramonte & De Sio, 2014). Beppe Grillo's comments on his blog underlined the birth of a new generation of politics. The discontinuity in terms of age and gender of the elected Five-Star MP was evidenced by Beppe Grillo with the use of the term 'Tsunami' in his political blog (Grillo, 2013b).[6] However, the real rupture with the political class of the traditional parties was expressed in the post of the post-election day:

> They will create a PDminusL – PDL super-government. We are the obstacle. They can no longer succeed against us. Let them resign themselves to that. They'll be able to keep going for 7 or 8 months and they'll produce a disaster but we'll try and keep them under control. We'll start to do what we've always said – our stars: water in public hands, schools in public hands, public health service. If they follow us they follow us. If they don't, the battle will be very harsh for them, very harsh. They cannot understand. They cannot conceive of things. They need psychiatric analysis. *They are failed people*.
>
> (Grillo, 2013c)

Here, the description of the enemies of the people is simply expressed by the use of the notion of 'failed people' with regards to the political class of the traditional parties. In terms of evocation of who the people are, the Manichean representation prevails, along with a call to the united people (Mény & Surel, 2000). The LN obtained 4.09 per cent of the votes. The party had run in centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. At the end of 2013, the new Secretary of the party, Matteo Salvini, was elected.

Salvini's reply on Facebook did not expressly mention the people, but attacked the M5S, its lack of a real project and the media:

> Grillo's triumph? I am not scared: let us wait and see if – beyond the Vaffa, the virtual politics and the Shows (pushed by television and newspapers) there will be capacities and concrete results. Luckiy The LEGA NORD has deep roots. We let the Tsunamies pass by because we have a Big (and therefore difficult) Project and thousands of people determined to realize it. BANZAI!.
>
> (Salvini, 2013 – translation G.B.)

The official positioning of the two parties during the 2013 elections could have not been more different. If immigration represents one of the LN's core issues, the uncertainties of the M5S on that matter were reflected by contrasting positions taken before and after the electoral campaign. The official programme of the LN (Lega Nord, 2013), did not reserve a specific section to the migration issue. However, commitments with regards to the fight against illegal migration and 'predatory criminality' were contained in the section 'Security'. The official programme of the M5S did not contain any reference at all to migration policies. For both parties, however, the relationship with the people cannot be restricted to the written form of party manifestos: it necessarily goes further and beyond. The intense activity of Matteo Salvini online, as well as the liquid interpretation of the online democracy by the M5S (Mosca, Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015) are coherent with the latest research on the use of populist parties of the new media and social networks (Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel, 2017).

Differences between the two parties exist with regards to the sharing of anti-immigrant positions by the leadership and by the party in public office. If total agreement between the two levels is the normal rule in the case of the LN, the same cannot be assumed with regards to the M5S. The most flagrant example of that is constituted by the internal dissent within the M5S on the case of the abolishment of the crime of illegal migration, which had been introduced in the above-mentioned 'security package' (2009).

A parliamentary initiative of two M5S members of Senate in 2013 to de-criminalise the crime of illegal migration was censored by Grillo and Casaleggio (the ideologue and co-founder of the party), who defined the two MP's action as a private initiative. The declaration of the leaders of the M5S made clear that the party did not have a clear position on this relevant issue. It also was interpreted as the further symptom of lacking internal democracy within the Movement. The political debate on both aspects of the issue quickly burnt, until Beppe Grillo's decision to invoke the voice of the people on the web calmed down the tensions.[7] The episode was not going to remain isolated. In the debate on the introduction of the ius soli, another blatant disagreement soon emerged. In 2012, Grillo stated in his blog that the idea that the citizenship should be accorded to people who were born in Italy from foreign parents 'is senseless' (Blog 23 January 2012 quoted in Tarchi, 2015, p. 344). The concept was reinforced in Grillo's blog the following year.

> [The] ius soli is a fact of life already. If one was born in Italy from foreign parents and has been living in Italy without interruption until the 18th year of life he can decide to become Italian citizen. This rule can obviously be changed, but only through a referendum where the consequences of the ius soli since one's birth are explained. A decision that might change over time the geography of the country cannot be left to a little group of Members of Parliament and politicians in a permanent campaign.
>
> (Grillo, 2013d – translation G.B.)

One month later, Members of Parliament of the M5S presented a Law Proposal (C1204 EPUB) for the modification of the ius soli. The preamble expressed criticism towards the ius saguinis as the interpretation of 'nationality as genetically determined and not transmitted through a day by day participation to the society' (Camera dei Deputati, 2015). The proposal is understood as a

> positive measure of integration promoting social inclusion as well as the recognition of the integration of . . . people of foreign origin who were born there and are willing – with the same rights and duties – to participate in the cultural, social and political life of Italy.
>
> (Camera dei Deputati, 2015 – translation G.B.)

The text proposed the acquisition of citizenship for those who were born in Italy from foreign parents, in case one of them has been a legal resident for no less than 3 years; or for those who were born in Italy from foreign parents, in case one of them was born in Italy and has been a legal resident for no less than 1 year. Luigi Di Maio, currently Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development Labour and Social Policies, was among the proponents.[8]

Following M5S's preamble, the interpretation of who the people are seems to recall the identification of the common people. The rights and duties of belonging to a same community are attributed to those who work hard for the community's wealth, apart from ethnic and cultural differentiations.

Completely dissimilar tones characterise the LN's opposition to the introduction of the ius soli during the debate at the Chamber of Deputies in June 2015. The M5S had evidenced in Grillo's blog an opposition to the ius soli principally based on the mistrust towards the political elite and the traditional political parties. The call for a referendum on the issue was in line with the populist's suspicion towards all political intermediaries, in line with Canovan's (1999) interpretation of the 'united people'. The exaltation of the virtues of the people and the request of direct democracy all contributed to the downgrading of the urgency of the decision.

On the contrary, the LN made use of a strategy built on identity-based arguments and on the exaltation of the heartland (Taguieff, 2002) reinforced by an aggressive language. In the discourse of the LN on the ius soli, we can distinguish three main identity-based topoi: (1) the rejection of multicultural societies and the exaltation of the virtues of 'our people' (Canovan, 1999); (2) the ethnic homogeneity of the Western people with the depiction of the people as ethnos and Volk (Mény & Surel,

2000) and (3) the honest people, in the sense identified by Canovan (1999, p. 5) as ordinary people. The following extract is a typical example of the first category:

> The future and mind-blowing society that you imagine envisages the annihilation of what we have been until now and the facilitation by law of a multicultural society.
>
> (Rondini, 2015a, p. 51 – translation G.B.)

The typical language of the common sense (Tarchi, 2015, p. 250) is mixed up with ironic hyperboles. Ethnic descriptions of the people go along with the qualification of citizenship intended as a duty much more than as a right. The next two quotes exemplify the second group of topoi:

> You want to make us believe that the citizenship to minors will guarantee integration. In doing that you negate the reality in Italy and in the West. Think of the children of the Muslims or of the Chinese community. In these closed communities there are laws and norms that have nothing to do with the rules of our societies. (. . .) Citizenship . . . does not represent a better means for integration. It must be the conclusion of a path: a right that is guaranteed after awareness and sharing of the fundamental rights of the communities where the immigrant asks to belong to.
>
> (Rondini, 2015b, p. 51, 48 – translation G.B.)

Further, economic arguments and the overturning of xenophobic accusations typically addressed to populist parties also are used. This is not a novelty in the argumentation logic of populist parties (see Wodak, 2015).

> We heard that it is necessary to manufacture new Italians as soon as possible because we need to pay pensions in the next 20–25 years, and Italians do not make babies any longer. We need people that come to us, work, and pay pensions: if you think about it properly, this is the last evolution of neo-colonialism.
>
> (Invernizzi, 2015a, p. 92 – translation G.B.)

Empirical research has also pointed at the existence of a recurring set of threats adopted in the narrative of populist parties towards immigration (Hogan & Haltinner, 2015, p. 528). Economic threats coexist, like in the case of the LN rhetoric, with threats to security and threats to culture.

> We can remember France, where citizenship is given as a gift also to extra-communitarian of second and third generation. And then? Where do we find these citizens? We maybe find them to perpetrate the attacks at Charlie Hebdo. They were French citizens. Still, evidently, they did not share the founding values of Europe.
>
> (Invernizzi, 2015b, p. 8 – translation G.B.)

> I invite all of you – especially the parents of those who, through the ius soli, will be able to become Italian citizens – to reflect on the possibility to do it: don't do it! Let them remain extra-communitarian citizens, because here extra-communitarian migrants are much more guaranteed than the Italian citizens!
>
> (Invernizzi, 2015b, pp. 8–9 – translation G.B.)

As regards the M5S, the party abandoned its initial favourable positioning towards the introduction of the ius soli. The limited intervention of the Five-Star deputy declaring the party's abstention does not make use of arguments directed to the potential beneficiaries of the law. The enemies of the people are represented by the political class. Political parties are guilty of losing precious time and resources that might be used to achieve real goals for the wealth of the people.

> Always someone's talking about a step forward. Actually, they are still crawling. Italy and Italians on the contrary need to run in order to reach all the important goals for the citizens that none of you ever wanted to reach: the citizenship income, the halving of the parliamentary allowance, the abolition of the public financing to the newspapers and of the annuities to condemned persons, a serious law or the conflict of interest, a strategy for the total reduction of the produced waste . . . This bill on citizenship is tangled, uselessly complicated and scrambled. You made use of it as if it was a box, staging a fight among the ones who state 'In this box there is a bomb' and the ones who say 'In this bomb there is a cake'. We opened that box, and we found it nearly empty. For this reason we will abstain.
>
> (Nuti, 2015, pp. 18–19 – translation G.B.)

Despite the polarised tones of the discussion, the Law proposal was approved by the Chamber of Deputies. Subsequently, a long phase of silence on the matter started. The tensions related to the stability of the Cabinet due to the long electoral campaign on the referendum proposal added up with the intensification of the Mediterranean crossing and the sea arrivals. Data delivered by UNHCR (2017) indicate 1,015,078 sea arrivals in 2015 (3771 was the number of dead and missing persons). The increment compared to 2014 (216,054 sea arrivals/3538 dead and missing) was impressive. Consequently, the public debate focused more and more on the management of the reception policies, as well as on the Italian situation within the European Union (Kersch & Mishtal, 2016).

The LN developed a more and more xenophobic discourse reflected not only in the media overrepresentation of the LN's leader Matteo Salvini, but also in the delivery of programmatic documents on immigration by the party. The M5S took the opportunity of local elections in Rome held in 2016 to adopt a public probity frame on immigration (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016, p. 148) denouncing the corruption scandal that involved Third Sector associations and NGOs in the

reception of refugees and migrants in Rome (the so-called "Mafia Capitale" scandal). The winning of the elections in two big cities – Rome and Turin – and the good results achieved in minor centres legitimised the immigration discourse of the party, more and more focused on the denunciation of corruption cases involving Third Sector associations and on the censure of the inappropriate role played by national and international NGOs operating in rescue actions in the Mediterranean Sea. The reduction of the number of the sea landings due to the signing of the agreement with Libya by the Italian government did not help to calm down the situation and to open up new discussion space for the ius soli introduction. The abovementioned discussion at the Senate ended up in a renewed freezing of the debate. The Five-Star blog commented as follows:

> To talk about the ius soli today will have the only consequence that the public debate on such a sensitive issue will be deviated and polluted by the basest right and left propaganda, waved like a banner to gather own troops and accuse the challengers with contrasting not meditated and irrational argumentations. . . . On the one hand, the menace of the ethnic substitution or of terrorism will be waved. On the other, the faces of children who died in the sea will be used to generate the strongest emotions. In the middle, squashed between the devil and the deep blue sea, only common sense, responsibility and intellectual honesty.
>
> (Movimento Cinque Stelle, 2017 – translation G.B)

Prime Minister's Gentiloni announcement of the postponed parliamentary discussion to an unscheduled date was triumphantly greeted by Matteo Salvini on facebook.

> IUS SOLI, Gentiloni speaks: 'We won't be able to approve the bill on citizenship within the Summer'. First VICTORY of the Lega (who more than any other opposed the law in Parliament) but mostly yours who mobilized by thousands on the web! Shall they try again, they will find us ready. Thank you and full speed ahead: STOP INVASION!
>
> (Salvini, 2017 – translation G.B.)

In August, the criticism was addressed towards the Pope, guilty not only of endorsing the law proposal, but also of constantly prioritising migrants' dignity in the public and political space.

> August 21 2017 Pope Francis: 'Yes to the ius soli'. If he wants to apply it in his ow State, the Vatican, please, go ahead. But, speaking as a catholic, I don't think Italy can accommodate and support the whole world. Render unto God the things that are God's, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's. Amen #stopinvasione.
>
> (Salvini, 2017 – translation G.B.)

The general effect of the politicisation of the issue is clearly stated by recent opinion polls. In July 2017, a 'Demos' survey revealed that 63.6 per cent of the interviewed people opposed the introduction of the ius soli (Termometro Politico, 2017). Two years before, in 2015, the same survey research centre had indicated that 72 per cent of the interviewed people was in favour of granting the Italian citizenship to the children of foreign people who were born in Italy (Osservatorio Europeo Sulla Sicurezza, 2015). The same percentage had been registered in 2012. The escalation of the disapproval has been registered by mainstream parties. The caution of their comments with regards to the real possibilities of approving the law within the current legislature hint at the concrete possibility of striking down the law proposal.

Conclusion

Italy is a new immigration country of a particular kind. Anti-immigration arguments have spread in the political system and in the Italian society long before the country's transformation into a destination for migrants and refugees. The LN anti-Southern rhetoric (Huysseuene, 2008) characterising the party's hostility towards internal southern migrants who moved to the northern regions since the 1960s is a clear indicator of the fertile ground Italy represents for populism. In the definition of Italy as a 'country of many populisms' (Tarchi, 2008, p. 84), one can read the existence of different levels of opportunity structures for populist discourse to take ground. The definition of Italy as a case of mutating populism (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2015) points at populist actors' reaction and response to the 'success and the institutionalisation of fellow populist actors' (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2015, p. 305). The case-study presented in this chapter gives evidence to the combined effect of two different kinds of populist parties competing with each other for the political representation of the people. The LN and the M5S have been playing this competition on the battleground of citizenship rights, emphasising different aspects of their appeal to the people.

The LN case evidences a coherent strategy of representation of the opposition between the people and the elite, centred on the identity-based defence of the people, mostly envisioned in an ethnic and cultural sense. Economic and security-based arguments supplement the major nativist topos, reinforced by a violent, Manichean and ironical language aimed at de-legitimising the political class, as well as the cultural and the religious elite. The renewed aggressive anti-immigration positioning of the party reflects the mutated political strategy of the LN. The regionalist and federalist strategy (Biorcio, 1997, 2010; Diamanti, 1993, 1996) which had granted the LN's success at the times of Umberto Bossi – the party founder – has been recently replaced by an exasperate nativism performed at the national level. The LN's 'ethnic conception of the collective identity' (Tarchi, 2015, p. 271), once used to describe the virtues of the Padania (Giordano, 2001) is now adopted to present the party as ready for a new season di lotta e di governo ('Lega of fight and government'). The 'Lega di lotta e di governo' (Albertazzi,

McDonnell & Newell, 2011) represents in the long run, the winning formula of the political communication of the party, able to fill the always existing gap between the rhetoric and the pragmatic level in the LN's positioning on migration issues and polices (Cento Bull, 2010). The organisation of rellies against the ius soli at the slogan of 'No to Ius Soli' in one thousand Italian squares testifies also the intention not to lose ground against the populist rival of the M5S.

The declared neither right nor left populism of the M5S rests on a conceptualisation of the people which is not comparable to the nativism of the LN. The prevailing notions adopted by the Party in the description of the people in the debate on the ius soli designate the ordinary people much more than the ethnic people. Grillo's plebiscitary picturing of the Movement's will to represent the 100 per cent of the people (Tarchi, 2015, p. 338) goes beyond a cultural meaning of who the people are. Cultural frames do certainly exist, but they are not overwhelming, at least not in the Party's positioning on the issue of the ius soli. Here, the prevailing argumentative structure can be described as a pragmatic frame (Helbling, 2013). The Party's abstention is ultimately explained as the unavailability to take part in the mainstream parties' game at the expenses of the ordinary people and of their legitimate expectations. The mixed ideological composition of both the electorate and the party in public office (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016; Corbetta, 2017) might be responsible for the contradicting positions expressed by the party on immigration in general and on the ius soli debate in particular. This has so far represented an undoubtable benefit for the party. It has permitted to the M5S to hide the most evident traits of its contradictions on a certain number of issues, immigration included.

Both parties' argumentation rests on the love for transparency and on the mistrust against mystification (Canovan, 1999, p. 6). Despite these similarities, the differences in the evocation of the people indicate the adoption of variable strategies, both at the communication and at the electoral level. The examination of the LN's discourse in the front and in back stage evidences a homogenous construction mostly based on nativist and identity-based symbols. The same arguments are performed by different speakers in variable settings, as to suggest the party's unity on the strategy decided upon by the party leader. On the contrary, the differentiated positions adopted by the M5S on the ius soli since its electoral success in the 2013 elections reflect the party's internal organisational tensions. The evolution from a favourable position to the ius soli expressed by the party in public office to the parliamentary abstention has been marked by the organisation of the political discourse around the criticism towards the political parties, guilty of hiding and neglecting the real necessities of the people. The evocation of the ordinary people against the Italian political class represents therefore the main argument of the M5S in the ius soli debate. Cultural and identity-based elements contained in Beppe Grillo's political blog are not replicated by the party's leading figures in the political debate. This is coherent with the representation of the party's ideological ambiguity (Corbetta, 2017) and with a sort of 'division of labour' (Tarchi, 2017) within the different organisational levels of the M5S.

Be it nativist or anti-establishment, the opposition between the people and the elite seems to have paid, at least with regards to the effect that populist parties have had in influencing the public debate on the ius soli introduction. The rapid decrease of the Italian citizens' agreement towards the introduction of the ius soli by birth attests the populist parties' ability of exploiting the consequences of the migration crisis, and the mainstream parties' unwillingness to face the encounter on the populists' battle field.

Notes

1 The main legislative provisions on Italian citizenship can be consulted at: www.esteri.it/mae/en/italiani_nel_mondo/serviziconsolari/cittadinanza.html. This chapter only takes into account the issue of citizenship acquirement with regards to children of foreign parents.
2 PROPOSTA DI LEGGE di iniziativa dei deputati SARUBBI (PD) and GRANATA (PDL). Modifiche alla legge 5 febbraio 1992, n. 91, recante nuove norme sulla cittadinanza (30 luglio 2009).
3 Andrea Riccardi, the founder of the Comunità di Sant'Egidio was appointed Minister without portfolio (International Cooperation, Integration), had promoted the beginning of a new legislative path for a new Law on citizenship in 2012.
4 See www.litaliasonoanchio.it/.
5 Foreign citizens are entitled to apply for EC residence permit for long-term residents if they have been legally and continuously resident in Italy for 5 years.
6 The term 'Tsunami' was used by the Movement to label the Five-Star electoral campaign.
7 Consultations were held with an online referendum on the issue. Nearly 25,000 voters among all the members of the M5S entitled to vote (80,383) participated (nearly 16,000 were the votes in favour of the depenalisation of the crime, nearly 9000 for its maintenance).
8 In the 2018 general elections the M5S obtained 32.68 per cent of the votes, while the Lega won 17.37 per cent. After months of negotiations, a coalition government was formed between M5S and Lega. The coalition is guided by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. The leader of the Lega, Matteo Salvini, is Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister; Luigi Di Maio is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development, Labour and Social Policies.

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2 The migration crisis between populism and post-democracy

Giovanna Campani

Introduction

The chapter explores the broad topic 'populism and migration' under the shadow of the European migration and refugee crisis in the context of a 'populist insurgency' – a term broadly used by world media to describe the global phenomenon of revolt against established political parties and elites in general, combined with the rise of nationalist sentiments. The European migration and refugee crisis is a long-lasting process that became more acute since 2011, when the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war broke the illusion that a 'containment' of the migratory flows directed towards the EU was possible – through externalisation of controls (Frelick, Kysel & Podkul, 2016)[1] and multilateral/bilateral agreements with North African countries.[2] The growing number of migrants and refugees and the changing migratory patterns from the Mediterranean coasts to the Balkan routes had a huge political impact on the relationships between the EU member states, the European Union (or Disunion, as it has been ironically redefined by a few newspapers) being unable to define and implement a common migration policy. The numbers of migrants and refugees arrived in the last years are certainly high, yet as Malek Kenan remarks:

> Yet, large though they are, it is worth putting into context the numbers of refugees coming to Europe. A million refugees represent not much more than 0.2% of the EU population. There are already *1.1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon* –20% of the population. That is the equivalent of Europe playing host to more than 100 million refugees. Turkey already hosts more than 3 million refugees. Pakistan and Iran each have over 1 million. And, in the space of barely a month, half a million Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar.
>
> (Kenan, 2017)

The migration and refugee crisis is not a question of numbers: it is a question of 'narratives'[3] that has to be understood in the framework of a global and European process of political, economic, social and cultural transformation. The chapter focuses on the political dimension and considers the 'populist insurgency' that is the rise of parties and/or candidates, which place themselves outside the political establishment and attack the governing elites. These ones do not just

include political and economic elites but also other perceived power-holders, such as intellectuals or journalists or other groups at the top of society (Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

As most terminology concerning populism, 'populist insurgency' is somehow vague, embracing different forces, parties and political events. Its core notion – insurgency – is however, interesting, because it includes both the rise of non-mainstream political forces/parties and the shifting positions inside traditional or 'mainstream' conservative parties: examples of the trend are the designation of François Fillon as a candidate of the conservatives during the French presidential elections expressing a far-right nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric; the nomination and the election of Donald Trump in the USA, which has been described as a sort of 'populist insurgency' inside the Republican Party (Taub, 2016) and, more recently, the Austrian 'respectable right's willingness to incorporate the populist right's vote-winning policies and rhetoric, namely in respect to immigration by forming a new government in late 2017. Moreover, the borders between conservatism and populism are extremely difficult to detect in the case of parties such as the Hungarian Fidesz of Victor Orban.

A process of 'mainstreaming' of 'right-wing populist' or 'national-populist' (Taguieff, 2012) narratives and proposals concerning migration, acceptance of cultural differences, multiculturalism would be on its way, changing not only the political landscape, but also the political architecture of the Western democracies, characterised – so far by 'liberal' values – shared both by the 'mainstream' conservatives and the social-democrats. It emerges clearly in the electoral campaigns – where migration has become a main topic even in countries where there are practically no migrants, such as the Czech Republic.[4] The 'populist' mainstreaming comes from a variety of elected Western leaders, as the already mentioned Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. Eventually, it started in Berlusconi's Italy as early as 2001 (Campani, 2016).

As a matter of fact, the themes of the 'populist insurgency' are not limited to migration: they embrace the rejection of globalisation (and of the *globalist establishment* in the terms of Viktor Orbán); the defence of 'sovereignty' ('Get back control' was one of the Brexit slogans[5]); the critics of the EU and governments' management of the 2008 economic crisis that the Western middle and lower classes paid, while the banks were saved, and to the austerity policies; the denouncing of the blurred borders between the 'right' and the 'left', which, having largely embraced a 'market-oriented' economic logic, is part of the 'establishment' and does not defend the traditional working classes but instead specific minorities such as immigrants, gays and lesbians and women; the fear of the predominance of the technocratic management over the politics, producing a shift towards the 'post-democracy' (Crouch, 2013). All these themes are rooted in concrete facts and many of them are applicable both to 'right-wing populism' and what can be defined as a 'left-oriented populism' – like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain (Laclau, 2007). In other words, populism represents as well the insurgency against neo-liberal globalisation that is applicable to far-right and left-oriented populisms. In the case of right-wing populists, economic ideas may, however be

confused, expressing both neo-liberal and protectionist proposals. Progressive populists tend to defend the welfare state and economic redistribution in the face of market forces.

The refusal to accept new incoming flows of migrants – even if they are escaping from conflicts – and the rejection of multicultural society is one of the topics in which 'right-wing populism' or 'national-populism' (Taguieff, 2012) and 'left-oriented populism' differ. In the case of populism, the cultural cleavage appears to be more important than the economic ideas. Right-wing populism tends in fact to unify 'the people' (the national or ethnic people) by scapegoating a dehumanised other, like blacks, Jews, homosexuals, immigrants, Mexicans, Muslims, depending on the given context (Lazaridis, Campani & Benveniste, 2016). Progressive groups such as Syriza and Podemos[6] tend, on the contrary, to show solidarity towards migrants and refugees, as in general being the weakest components of the society. The Five Star Movement that defines itself as neither left nor right has ambiguous positions on migration. The same 'progressive populism' may, however, be very critical of the impact of the migration processes on the economies both of the global North and the global South.

This chapter analyses how the migration and refugee crisis and the 'populist insurgency' have shaped the EU migratory policies in the midst of conflicting relationships between the EU and the member states, as among the member states themselves. The analysis will then focus on Italy, a country at the forefront of the EU border due to its geographical position, whose centre-left government, led by the Democratic Party, attempted to assume a protagonist role inside the EU and to impose a 'humanistic' narrative about migration, combined with an idea of efficiency guaranteed by the role of the military Navy – 'military-humanitarian'.

The attempt of the Democratic Party was a failure in front of the absence of a solidarity-based policy of the EU and among the member states; the lack of economic resources to implement genuine solidarity policies; the strong opposition of the Italian right-wing populist forces connected to the European ones, the negative reactions of the Italian population in the face of the arrivals. The Democratic Party was also forced to confront the ambiguities of the Five Star Movement, denouncing the corruption behind the migration management and the complicity in trafficking of the NGOs (but forgetting the role in NGOs in saving lives). A shift towards migratory policies based on the security priority followed. The failure of the Italian 'military-humanitarian' policy reveals the difficulties of the social-democratic or moderate left to impose alternative visions of migration, based on the international organisations' human rights standards, for example the ILO Agenda for fair migration,[7] when it is not capable of offering a general vision of the future – combining the solidarity with the migrants and the well-being of the national working classes.

The European migration and refugee crisis

Between 2011 and 2015, the growing migratory pressure from North Africa and the Middle East concerned mainly Southern European countries, especially Italy and Greece, while the other European governments and the EU failed to grasp the

magnitude and anticipate the consequences of the process. The absence of a common European response showed, at the same time, the absurdities of the Dublin agreement, which makes member states of first entry in the Mediterranean the sole states responsible for processing asylum applications,[8] and the lack of solidarity with the ones whose borders were not at risk of irregular entries.

2013 marked a turning point: after a series of dramatic shipwrecks shocking the world's public opinion, the Italian government launched the *Mare Nostrum* operation, defined a new type of 'military-humanitarian' policy and placed Italy as a country that had an active role in respect to migration, 'saving lives', fighting traffickers and spending money. The Mare Nostrum operation was, in fact, very costly –9 million Euros a month – a huge amount for a country suffering under austerity policies.[9] This new activism in the migration and refugee crisis became a crucial element in the negotiations between Italy and the EU (namely around the Italian debt and the flexibility in the application of the Euro-rules). In 2014, Mare Nostrum ended and its tasks were handed over to *Triton*, managed directly by the *Frontex*, the EU agency for border controls. Triton, whose budget was modest by comparison – 3.6 million Euros – was not a replacement for Mare Nostrum in the task of saving migrants' and refugees' lives but to protect the EU's external border. While Mare Nostrum was presented by the Italian government as a 'military-humanitarian' operation, the EU approach, through Frontex, focused on security (Frontex, 2013, 2014) with tragic consequences. In April 2015, a boat that may have been carrying as many as 950 people sank some 120 miles south of Lampedusa. Nearby ships were barely able to save a few dozen lives.[10] Despite the tragedy, Fabrice Leggeri, the head of Frontex, said that saving migrants' lives in the Mediterranean should not be the priority for the maritime patrols he is in charge of.

On the eve of an emergency EU summit on the immigration crisis, (Fabrice Leggeri) flatly dismissed turning the Triton border patrol mission off the coast of Italy into a search and rescue operation (Kingsley & Traynor, 2015).

In the aftermath of the tragedy, pressed by the clamour for a more humane response from Europe, the EU officials announced a 10-point proposal – a vague attempt to review the migration policy and to manage the rising migration influx, followed by the European *Agenda on Migration 2015*. Among the Agenda's positive aspects are a stronger economic support to the border countries and a relocation scheme of 120,000 people from Italy, Greece and other member states directly affected by the flows – a promise of solidarity among countries, theoretically one of the EU's constitutional principles, but hitherto absent (European Commission, 2017).

In summer 2015, massive refugee displacements through the Balkans shifted the EU borders from the peripheral areas of Lampedusa and the Greek Islands to the core countries of Central Europe – Austria, Hungary and Germany – and to the Eastern European members, whose populations faced, for the very first time, one major effect of globalisation. The changing migratory patterns and the spectacular growth in numbers (more than 1 million asylum seekers arrived in the European Union in 2015; in 2015/2016, the EU received 2.5 million first-time asylum applications) provoked deep division among the member states, some

exhibiting their generous commitment in 'welcoming refugees', as it was the case of Germany, others exhibiting a remarkably narrow-minded selfishness and egotism, materially expressed by the building of walls, as was the case in Hungary under Viktor Orbán's government. The Visegrád Group, the cultural and political alliance of four Central European states – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – rejected the principle of the relocation of the refugees among the member states. The political positions on migration became a central dimension to define the relationships between the EU member states and with the EU, along a North-South and East-West division line.

If building walls in the middle of a Europe that had suffered for years the presence of the Berlin Wall raised outrage, the central European countries do not deserve all the blame, because they followed the example of some major EU states such as the UK and France, which showed no generosity in accepting an appropriate number of asylum-seekers. The *Calais Camp* ('the Jungle'), filled with desperate people trying to cross the Channel, became a symbol of the lack of humane principles shared by various current EU politicians. In this picture, that damaged the image of Europe as a place where human values were respected, Germany, which agreed to receive 1 million refugees,[11] was an exception along with Italy, whose boats continued 'to save the lives' of people arriving at its coasts. However, German and Italian generosity had its limits that is the electoral challenges. In the aim of reducing the flows, Angela Merkel imposed a deal between Ankara and Brussels, signed on 18 March 2016 that blocked the Balkan routes for refugees, and was strongly criticised by Human Rights organisations. The externalisation of migration was again chosen by the Europeans as the best way to solve the refugees' issues. In the meanwhile, attempts to establish bilateral relations with the new Libyan government were done by Italy and the EU. In 2017, Italy finally succeeded in signing a new agreement with the Libyan government in the field of fighting irregular migration and trafficking, which has been criticised by the NGOs and Human Rights Watch.

Following the deal between Ankara and Brussels of 18 March 2016, the flows shifted again towards Italy and the Greek islands, where refugees from Syria were 'parked'.[12] The commitment, taken in 2015, to relocate up to 120,000 refugees, later revised to 98,000, from Greece and Italy within 2 years, was never implemented; by September 2017, when the relocation scheme eligibility period came to a close, EU countries had fulfilled less than a third of their asylum relocation targets (12,707 refugees were resettled from Greece into other European countries, the majority of them in 2017) (Amnesty International, 2017). In the meantime, in 2016, 181,436 migrants reached Italy and 173,450 Greece, according to the data of the UNHCR (European Commission, 2017).

Migration crisis, 'populist insurgency' and mainstream parties

The migrant and refugee crisis takes place in a political context characterised by the 'populist insurgency', linked to economic, social and political transformations in Europe and, in general, in the Western World.

It is not in the interest of our topic to re-examine the huge debate on the concept of populism and the interpretations of the characters of the 'populist' forces. Political science has been questioning and continues to question the macro-phenomenon of this 'uncomfortable host of democracy', as Tarchi (2014), one of the most acute Italian scholars in the field, defined it (Canovan, 1981; Laclau, 2007; Panizza, 2005). The term 'populism' is, in fact, an umbrella notion that covers a large number of political forces, having different ideologies and occupying very different positions in respect to government responsibilities – from the insurgent outsiders, at the fringe of the political system, to 'government' parties that eventually reject the fact of being categorised as 'populist'.

Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, broadly defined as a 'populist', always defined himself as a 'moderate'. His party's elected European Parliament's members sit in the rows of the Popular Party, together with the German Christian Democrats of Angela Merkel. When in government, the 'moderate' Berlusconi did not hesitate to leave the migratory policy in the hands of the xenophobic, populist Northern League.

Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance), the party of Viktor Orbán, compared by scholars to the French *Front National* for the positions taken on migration and asylum, defines itself as national-conservative and is also again a member of the European Popular Party. Viktor Orbán certainly shows a populist rhetoric about migrants and asylum seekers – when he states that 'every single migrant [posed] a public security and terror risk' (The Economist, 2016) and is even proud of it. In one of his most recent scandalous outbursts, Viktor Orbán told EPP (*European People's Party*) delegates meeting in Malta in 2017 for their Congress that they *'should not be afraid of being called populists'* and that the European Union should be prepared for a *looming invasion of Muslim migration*, which he described as the 'Trojan horse of terrorism, cheap labour and a great business for NGOs' (Paquet, 2016).

In the cases of *Forza Italia* and *Fidesz*, where is the border between populism and national conservatism, at least in respect to migration issues? As a matter of fact, they are just two examples of a broad process – the 'mainstreaming' of right-wing populist narratives on migration that is touching traditional conservative parties. Another case is represented by the French Republicans: during the presidential elections, François Fillon was nominated as a candidate with a strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and a restrictive immigration programme, close to the propositions of Front National. If elected, Fillon would have made family reunification harder and, borrowing from the extreme-right lexicon, would have restored France's 'migratory sovereignty' through the renegotiation of European directives.

Donald Trump is certainly the most spectacular case of a populist leader coming to power inside a mainstream party. A strong stance on migration was an important part of his electoral programme (starting from the extension and reinforcing of the wall that Mexico should have paid). Once elected, he implemented the agenda: at the end of August 2017, Trump took the decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Programme (DACA), allowing children of irregular

migrants, brought by their family to the USA at an early age, to stay in the country. With this act, Trump paid tribute to his electoral promises in respect to one main campaign topic – that is migration.

Trump's decision raised outrage among USA liberals: a *New York Times* journalist, Sylvie Kaufmann defined it as a threat to the 'Western liberal values: human solidarity, openness toward those looking for a better future, diversity as an asset' (Kaufman, 2017, p. 10). Among the other enemies of 'the Western liberal values', Kaufmann mentions Viktor Orbán and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the head of Poland's ruling party, *Law and Justice*. Nowadays, the threat against Western liberal values, Kaufmann continues, does not come from outside or from the insurgency of minority populists (domestic fringe elements or extremist political movements), but from elected leaders (Hamid, 2014):

> For the first time since World War II, these values have come under attack in the West. Not from hostile foreign powers. Not from domestic fringe elements or extremist political movements, which we have come to see as a testimony to the pluralism of our democracies. This time, the assault is coming from within and from the top – from democratically elected leaders although only a few of them. But enough to draw a line between two camps within the Western community, now divided by fundamental contradictions.
>
> (Kaufmann, 2017, p. 10)

Kaufmann joins the camp of those who consider that the West is experiencing a shift from liberal democracy towards 'authoritarian democracy', where the checks and balances of liberal democracy are reduced and traditional authoritarian values are spread (Zakaria, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2016) through the mainstreaming of populist ideas. Populist parties embrace democracy but not necessarily liberalism. In this shift towards authoritarian democracy, liberal migration policies and multiculturalism are the first victims.

Mainstreaming of populist narratives and proposals about migration

Victor Orban's, François Fillon's or Donald Trump's discourses and migration policies correspond to the 'mainstreaming' of populist discourses – narratives and proposals – inside 'traditional' conservative parties. Trump's migration policy reflects the mainstreaming of right-wing populist ideas among Republicans. As Jan-Werner Müller, interviewed by Wilkinson, points out:

> Trump did not win as the candidate of a third party committed to anti-establishment politics; rather, he became the leader of a very established party – with the blessing of very established figures such as Rudy Giuliani, Chris Christie and, especially, Newt Gingrich.
>
> (Wilkinson, 2017)

Trump's electoral victory was possible because of the 'extreme partisanship' of the Republicans, whose positions on migration are especially 'hawkish'. Similar processes are at work in Europe. Consequently, both in the USA and in Europe, right-wing populist proposals on migration do not belong just to minority populist insurgents, generally excluded from power, but concern the European political 'establishment' and the governing European parties, thereby blurring the border between them.

The question is: has populism become a new permanent political component inside the Western democracies, or even a credible alternative within 'mainstream' discourse, instead of a fringe set of ideas that could be resisted, negotiated or appropriated by 'mainstream' actors? Or are we experiencing a new wave of 'national conservatism', which incorporates right-wing populist narratives and proposals, namely about migration, in a complex moment of multiple crisis? Should we talk of 'mainstream populism' or of 'post-populist conservatism'?[13]

Given the mainstreaming of populist narratives on migration in the Western World, is an alternative narrative on migration – based on human rights, solidarity and cultural pluralism – still possible? Can the social-democratic left and the 'liberal' forces impose another approach to migration, inspired by human rights? The crisis of the social-democratic left – the historical contender to the conservatives – is the other important dimension that can complete the picture. While the conservatives incorporate populist ideas, the progressive opposition cannot propose an alternative vision for an inclusive society, capable of overcoming the divisions between the immigrants and the native working classes that find themselves politically voiceless while jobs declined, public services were dismantled, austerity was imposed, inequality rose and the old social bonds have been broken: the acceptation by the social-democratic left of the neo-liberal values, placing the market at the core of the economy, subordinating politics to it, had heavy consequences on the social fabric.

The sense of being politically abandoned has been most acute within sections of the traditional working class, whose feelings of isolation have increased as social-democratic parties have cut their links with their old constituencies. As mainstream parties have discarded both their ideological attachments and their long-established constituencies, so the public has become increasingly disengaged from the political process. The gap between voters and the elite has widened, fostering disenchantment with the very idea of politics (Kenan, 2017).

Among the recent failures of creating a progressive 'humanitarian' narrative on migration, the case of the Italian Democratic Party in Italy in the years between 2013 and 2016 illustrates the little support that exists for these proposals between European indifference and the many types of populisms.[14]

Populism, post-populism, post-democracy and migration in Italy

The anti-immigrant discourse was just a component of the populist 'patchwork narrative', combining neo-liberalism, individualism and media populism,

developed by Berlusconi, ruling between 2001 and 2006 and then between 2008 and 2011, but it was an identity issue for its allies of the Northern League, fuelling the 'othering' against Italians that did not belong to the 'North' especially immigrants and Roma (Wodak & Richardson, 2013). During the second Berlusconi government, the Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, a member of the Northern League, promulgated and put into force a 'law-decree' (*decreto legge*) on what was called a 'Roma state of emergency' (*Stato di emergenza Rom*). This decree was nothing less than what Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2005) defines as a 'state of exception', where the constitution is suspended and in this case, the central and local governments operated by law-decrees.[15]

The populist experience was followed in 2011 by what can be called an 'anti-populist' or 'post-populist' political season. The EU technocratic Monti was not elected, but legitimised by the President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano, in order to implement the austerity policies, imposed on Italy by the EU: it aimed to give an image of 'technocratic expertise' that left nothing to a 'populist' style of political communication, talking to the 'belly' of the country. Monti's political communication style was not only technocratic, but also vertical and eventually pedagogical, in order to make austerity acceptable. The Monti government experience can also be defined as 'post-democratic'. Let us recall Colin Crouch's definition of post-democratic society from an interview in 2013:

> A post-democratic society is one that continues to have and to use all the institutions of democracy, but in which they increasingly become a formal shell. The energy and innovative drive pass away from the democratic arena and into small circles of a politico-economic elite.
>
> (Crouch, 2013)

Practically, there has been an increasing shift of power from elected and accountable bodies, such as parliaments, to semi-independent bureaucratic agencies that may more or less depend upon the economic forces and upon such transnational bodies as the European Union. Liberal progressive elites at the top of mainstream political parties went along with this shift of power. They also declined to present a competing vision about the type of society people want: they accepted the post-ideological world, described by Fukuyama (1992) as 'the end of history'.

The passage of Italy from a populist to a post-democratic situation was the result of external as well as internal factors: the economic crisis, managed by the EU through technocratic governments imposing austerity policies and the specific Italian reality, characterised by a deep crisis of the political parties. Abandoning any populist rhetoric, Mario Monti formally changed the migratory policy. However, the laws voted under Berlusconi's government were not touched, but a Ministry for Immigration was created and given to Andrea Riccardi of the '*Comunità of Sant'Egidio*', an important NGO, close to the Vatican and its approach to migration. The '*Comunita' di Sant'Egidio*' is in favour of opening

'humanitarian corridors' for migrants and refugees.[16] During Monti's government, the humanitarian and fostering work for the migrants' and refugees' reception was almost entirely delegated to NGOs, mostly linked to the Catholic Church, with a clear disengagement of the state.

The Monti government was the cradle for new forms of populism (the Five Star Movement): in the political election of 2013, a new 'populist' party, the Five Star Movement, got 25.5 per cent of the Deputy Chambers and 23.8 per cent of the Senate, equalling the Democratic Party that got 25.4 per cent of the Deputy Chambers and 27.4 per cent of the Senate. The Monti List got only 8.3 per cent of the Deputy Chambers and 9.1 per cent of the Senate. This is a sign of the deep rejection of this government by the Italian population.

A humanistic approach to migration?

The Democratic Party – having failed to reach an absolute majority in the 2013 elections – formed a centre-left government with a small centre party. The Five Star Movement became the main opponent, while the 'populist' right of Berlusconi allied with the Northern League was in third place. The new government, led by Enrico Letta, opened a new season characterised by the opposition to Berlusconi's populism, in continuity with Monti's government, taking at the same time the distance from Monti's post-democratic experience with a critical approach to European austerity policies. In respect to migration, the Democrats inaugurated a humanistic and inclusive narrative, appointing a Congolese lady (a naturalised Italian citizen) Cecile Kyenge, as minister of Migration and Solidarity, with the clear task of introducing the *ius soli* in the Italian Law. Moreover, in view of the repeated shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, the government launched the already mentioned *Operation Mare Nostrum* (Our Sea) in 2013.[17] Moreover, the Italian government improved the SPAR (*Sistema protezione per richiedenti d'asilo e rifugiati* – protection system for asylum seekers and refugees), created in 2001 with a stronger responsibility of the state and the local authorities, reducing the role of NGOs.[18]

These policies were attacked by the opposition forces for their high costs (especially Mare Nostrum), the presumed encouragement to irregular migration and the lack of involvement of the EU. Obviously, the Northern League exploited migration, denouncing the high costs of Mare Nostrum and the reception policies, while Italy is suffering a never-ending economic crisis.[19]

Mare nostrum was also criticised by the radical left (a minority in the country) for the dangerous link between the 'humanitarian' and the 'military' sphere, in a sort of continuity with the Western wars of the early years of the twenty-first century proclaimed in the name of the protection of human rights. The radical left approach to the migration issue is shared by several NGOs active in the anti-racist movement that have a certain visibility, but have no influence at the parliamentary level.

Given the strong political and economic investment done by the Italian government, migration became the crucial topic that marked the Italian position

inside the EU, which can be summed up by the motto: 'we save lives, they build walls' in the words of the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, appointed in 2015. Migration became part of the confrontation with the European Union about flexibility in the implementation of the budget rules. Having reached power with a discourse against the old political establishment, the new Renzi government incorporated as well the critics of the European Union – both for the economic and the migratory policies – which were addressed by the Eurosceptic Five Star Movement and by the right-wing populists of the Northern League and Italy's Brothers (post-fascists). In a joint press conference with the Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, Renzi announced what was the narrative on migration of the Italian government:

> The idea that the Maltese premier and I have, is characterized by a common world view: Joseph and I believe that there are no alternatives to saving human lives. This cannot be discussed. And we do it together, with the limits and the problems we know . . . but we continue to do it.
>
> (La Repubblica, 2015a – translation G.C.)

On 25 September 2015, in his speech at the United Nations, Renzi praised the success of the operation 'Mare Nostrum': 'The Mare Nostrum operation saved 80,000 people, avoiding the Mediterranean from turning into a cemetery, an operation we are proud of, but that cannot be left to a single force' (La Repubblica, 2014 – translation G.C.). On 15 October 2015, during his visit to the Italian Parliament, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, paid homage 'to the Italian soldiers who saved thousands of human lives in the Mediterranean', and thanked 'the Italian population for the efforts made to welcome and assist migrants' (Zampaglione, 2015). Concluding the event Renzi affirmed: 'the Italy that welcomes you is the country of the Italian officers who became nurses to deliver babies in the ships on the Mediterranean. It is an Italy of which we are proud' (La Repubblica, 2015b – translation G.C.; see also Musarò, 2016).

The government approach found support in the local authorities: an important event representing a solidarity attitude was the pro-migrant March – *Insieme senza muri* – 'together without walls', which took place 20 March in Milan and that was opened by the city Mayor (of the Democratic Party).

The recognition of the role played by Italy in the migration and refugee crisis came as well from the European Union. During the annual event celebrating *The State of the Union European Commission*, President Jean Claude Juncker declared on 5 May 2017 in Florence:

> Italy has been doing everything possible since the first day on the migration crisis. Italy has saved and saves Europe's honor. . . . Therefore we need to be more sympathetic to both Italy and Greece who are not responsible for their geographical position. They are where they are and we must take this into account.
>
> (La Repubblica, 2017 – translation G.C.)[20]

Juncker's words did not correspond, however, to the expected measures to relocate the asylum-seekers or to the requested support to the Italian economic effort. A few months later, the new Prime Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, expressed all the Italian deception in front of the EU:

> On immigration, we must honestly say that, in spite of a few steps ahead, the speed with which the EU moves on the ground of common policies remains dramatically below the requirements of governance and management of this phenomenon. The Commission has announced an infringement procedure for the three countries that do not accept the commitments. But it does not console us with this moral satisfaction. . . . The EU tells us whether or not we have to handle it alone.
>
> (Sesto, 2017)

In conclusion, migration has become more and more a cause of strain between Italy and the rest of Europe, as also between Italy and other member states, namely Italy's neighbours that have successfully tightened their border controls to prevent migrants from crossing the Alps, with police monitoring train, road and even foot traffic and promptly sending people back to Italy. Abandoned by Europe, attacked by the populist forces – from the Northern League to the Five Star Movement – worried by the polls showing that the Italian population is becoming more and more hostile to migrants for security reasons (Politi, 2017). The Democratic Party, fearing a backlash in view of the upcoming elections in 2018, made a 180 per cent reversal of its migratory policy, assuming a 'security approach' in 2017. Italian migration policy changed towards what can be called a 'security shift'.

The security shift

In one of his first interviews early 2017, the new Interior Minister of the Gentiloni government, Marco Minniti declared that 'security' approach – in the sense of assuring protection to the people against all sorts of crime, including petty crime, is a 'leftist' idea and justified the worries of the Italian people in the face of irregular migration and terrorism. This meant that, implicitly, more control on irregular migration had to be imposed. The shift in the migratory policy was represented by a new Law, aimed to make asylum proceedings easier, creating specialised sessions by the ordinary Tribunals, closing the old detention centres, giving the asylum seekers the possibility of voluntary and unpaid work for the state. However, it also eliminated one judgement degree to oppose the asylum denials, making expulsions easier. In the meantime, Minniti toured the North African countries in order to find collaborations on migration control. On 2 February 2017, the Italian government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Libyan government of Faiez Sarraj in order to curb the flow of migrants. Rome has pledged money, training and equipment to help the Libyan government to manage its vast desert borders without too much attention to the human rights

issue. Moreover, the Libyan Coast Guards were given the rights to block the migrants' boats and to take people in custody in detention centres. On 3 February 2017, the 28 European member states met in Malta, where they have agreed on a declaration, supporting the Italy–Libya agreement just signed. The human rights organisations denounced the risks for the migrants that such an agreement represented.

The shift towards the security paradigm corresponds consequently to a growing rejection by the Italian population of what is considered a politics of the open door. As at the European level, some member states refused the relocation, so did in Italy the regional governors of the regions administrated by the Northern League or the right-wing parties, refusing to take their share of migrants, leaving all the burden on the Southern Italian regions of first arrival.

The climate of hostility has been even more heated by a 'scandal' that was discovered by the *Financial Times* in December 2016. According to the journal, a confidential report of Frontex had alluded to inappropriate contacts between the NGOs and the traffickers. As a consequence of this information, the Catania (the Sicilian town where Frontex has its offices) procurer, Carmelo Zuccaro has opened an enquiry and has declared that, according to him, some NGOs are directly financed by the traffickers. Zuccaro's words were repeated by Di Maio, vice-president of the Chambers of Deputies and one of the possible future premiers, if the Five Star Movement wins the elections. Di Maio goes even far beyond the proposals of the *Financial Times*, calling the NGOs boats that are active at the border of the Italian waters 'taxis' for migrants.

The Five Star Movement position on migration is, in fact, complex and ambiguous: there are many 'streams' – sub-groups – in the movement, but they share one core idea: while the asylum-seekers must be hosted, the ones who have no right to apply for asylum (the illegal migrants) must be expelled. Behind the spread of hostility towards migration in the movement, there is the idea that migration, as a by-product of globalisation, is a process imposed by forces on which the countries and, a fortiori, the citizens have no control. The rejection of globalisation as a process that produces uncontrolled populations movements, as part of the neo-liberal changes in the neo-liberal world, fuels hostility towards the migratory processes.[21]

The theories of reference are, for example, the ones of the Italian philosopher Diego Fusaro (2017) who places migration in the general development of neo-liberal globalised capitalism under the rule of a globalised oligarchy. Fusaro considers neo-liberal capitalism as predatory capitalism, pushing towards continuous wage reductions and loss of labour rights; immigration (in the neo-liberal context) lowers the wages of the national/local labour force, freezes the class conflict, producing a 'war among the poor' (migrants as scape-goats) and – being a sort of mass deportation – imposes a new anthropological character, the *homo migrans*, the 'Migrant Man': unemployed, up-rooted and delocalised according to the flows of capital. In this approach, the enemies are not the migrants but those who force them to migrate. However, the image of the 'Migrant Man' is far from being positive.

In this overheated political environment, the Italian government has delayed a parliamentary vote on a contentious citizenship law for the Italian-born children of immigrants after centrist members of the coalition balked, threatening the survival of the government. The failure of an old promise of the Democratic Party since 2013 – introducing some elements of *ius soli* for the 'second generation' children born in Italy, is a terrible sign of how far the mainstreaming of the populist ideas has gone in the country. The citizenship law has nothing to do with the new arrivals! The images of the boats of the everyday migrants' arrivals affect however the perception of migration in general. On 7 July 2017, having found that the Italian diplomatic efforts devoted to searching for short and long-term remedies through the European Union had not given much result, former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi called for a limit on new arrivals and, for the first time, declared that it was necessary to

> help them at home. We don't have the moral duty to receive in Italy all the people who are worse off than us. It would be an ethical, social and political disaster. (. . .) But we have the moral duty to help them. And to help them at home.
>
> (Saviano, 2017 – translation G.C.)

Conclusion

The issue of migration in Europe goes far beyond the populist/anti-populist dichotomy. The main topic in all the national elections, it defines the positions of the parties and the governments in their internal and European dimension around different narratives – that shift from two poles – saving lives and welcoming refugees versus building walls. However, these two poles are not fixed: changes are always possible, as we have seen in the case of Italy where the populist approach was abandoned for a humanitarian one to shift back again towards a security one.

Strong anti-migration stances are not any more an exclusive character of the 'fringe' populist forces, which are placed outside the mainstream parties. On the contrary, we recognise the transformation of the 'mainstream' conservative forces that have incorporated national-populist narratives and proposals on migration. This trend represents a future challenge for Europe, to cope with national conservative parties that have abandoned the consensus about 'liberal' values, on which the European Union was based.

While the conservatives are shifting towards a national conservatism, abandoning liberal values, the social-democratic left and the 'liberals' struggle to impose an alternative narrative on migration based on human rights and the 'Western values' of solidarity and respect for cultural difference. The social-democratic left parties have accepted neo-liberal values and the imperatives of the market, together with the progressive destruction of the welfare state especially after the crisis; they have supported the austerity policies, with the consequence of disrupting the solidarity mechanisms that functioned in the past; consequently,

they are not perceived by the populations – especially the working classes, the 'losers of globalisation' – as substantially different from the right-wing ones. Among the disadvantaged European social classes, both conservatives and social-democrats are responsible of a process imposed by globalisation forces that have provoked deindustrialisation, unemployment and the economic crisis to which the governments and the EU have reacted with austerity policies. Migration is perceived as part of this process. No wonder then that large segments of EU national populations react negatively towards immigration, both legal and illegal.

Notes

1 Externalisation of migration controls describes extraterritorial state actions to prevent migrants, including asylum-seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions or of making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims.

2 See two examples: the economic support given by the EU to Morocco that has been very effective to contain migration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the protocols of cooperation signed between Italy and Libya, agreed by the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Qaddafi (2008 'Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation Between the Italian Republic and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya'). The arrivals of migrants to Italy dropped from 36,951 in 2008 to 9,537 in 2009 and 4,406 in 2010 (see Fondazione ISMU, 2017). After the execution of Qaddafi, various forms of cooperation have been attempted by the EU with the new government, but since this government faces warring factions, controlling the territory's borders is difficult, creating a situation in that people smugglers can operate with impunity.

3 The term narrative evokes an emotional reaction – namely hope or fear, eventually compassion, empathy, patriotism, loyalty and other feelings of identity and belonging, anger, contempt or nostalgia. It explains the world and enables citizens to understand their place within it.

4 Like in Austria and Germany, migration became a key campaign issue in the Czech Republic, despite the marked absence of migrants and refugees. At present, the Czech Republic has accepted only 12 of the 1,600 refugees it was asked to take in over the last 2 years under the relocation scheme.

5 One of the key slogans of the campaign for Britain to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum was 'Take back control'. And for many, 'taking back control' became translated into a desire to protect borders, defend national culture and keep out immigrants.

6 Podemos is an interesting example of progressive populism, inspired by experiences in Latin America. They are on the left in terms of economic issues and progressive in terms of social issues. They searched different forms of representation being critical of the representative democracy that had fossilised the establishment power and the elites. The Italian Five Star Movement in Rome is definitely progressive in the economic agenda although approaching more authoritarian ideas in respect to migration.

7 Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Labor Organisation and the United Nations (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), 2015.

8 Recently, in October 2017, the Civil Liberties Committee approved proposals for a new Dublin regulation, whose key principles are that member states must participate and share responsibility for asylum seekers to reduce the disproportionate burden on 'frontline' members.

9 In October 2013, a shipwreck that cost the lives of 366 of migrants, pushed the Italian government, at the time headed by the Democratic Party member Enrico Letta, to

launch the Mare Nostrum Operation on 18 October 2013, as a military and humanitarian operation aimed at tackling the humanitarian emergency in the Strait of Sicily, due to the dramatic increase in migration flows. The Operation ended on 31 October 2014, coinciding with the start of the new operation called Triton, directly managed by the European Agency Frontex. A total of 32 boats took part in Mare Nostrum, with additional help from a submarine, planes and helicopters. This was a considerable military expense for a country forced to tighten its belt and make significant cuts to the overall military spending because of the austerity policies. See Ministero Della Difesa (2017).

10 After the tragedy, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi asked again for a significant European help, declaring that Italy alone could not deal with the issue of migrants.

11 As a matter of fact, by agreeing to take in refugees from Syria, Germany abdicated the Dublin convention.

12 International organisations and the global media looked at the EU's handling of the refugee crisis with a very critical eye; the same critical eye was brought on the member states that showed egoism, while the EU member states that showed solidarity were praised.

13 *Fidesz* and *Law and Justice* may arouse concern in Western Europe for their conservative nationalism, which brings them to develop anti-immigrant positions, but they are actually part of their countries' political establishments. The 'populist ideas on migration' have become 'mainstream' in these countries. The context is completely different in the case of the far right parties as Alternative fur Deutschland in Germany or even UKIP in the UK, which just at the fringe of the political landscape.

14 Since the 1990s, Italy experienced multiple faces of populism – the government 'media' populism of Silvio Berlusconi, the xenophobic populism of the Northern League (born around an ethnic idea of 'people') and the 'insurgent populism' of the Five Star Movement.

15 In order to show its effectiveness in respect to migration (even if at the time the numbers were not that important – 40,000 in 2008), the Berlusconi government made as well a deal with Libya, which gave to Libyan authorities the responsibility to control of the migrants crossing the Libyan territory. In August 2008, Berlusconi signed with the Libyan dictator Qaddafi a bilateral agreement, aimed at stemming the flow of illegal migration from Libya to Italy. The Italy-Libya agreement succeeded in reducing the arrivals of the immigrants to 4000 in 2010, at the price of violating human rights.

16 It is a pilot project carried out by the Community of Sant'Egidio, in collaboration with the Federation of Evangelical Churches and the Waldensian and Methodist Churches (see Comunità di Sant'Egidio, 2015). The main goals of this project are: (1) to avoid journeys on the boats in the Mediterranean, which have already caused a high number of deaths, including many children; (2) to avoid human trafficking, preventing the exploitation of human traffickers who do business with those who flee from wars and (3) to grant to people in 'vulnerable conditions' (victims of persecution, torture and violence, as well as families with children, elderly people, sick people, persons with disabilities) legal entry on Italian territory with humanitarian visa, with the possibility to apply for asylum.

17 *Mare Nostrum* allowed at least 150,000 migrants (according to the IOM), mainly from Africa, to reach safely the European coasts. We have seen that the operation Mare Nostrum ended in October 2014 and was superseded by the Frontex operation *Triton*.

18 There has also been an increase in the asylum locations, from the 1365 locations in 2003 to 20,752 in 2014/2015; there were totally 21,613 locations in the SPAR and in the first semester 2016, there are 27,089 locations. Distribution by regions: Sicily (first place with 20.9 per cent), Lazio (20.3 per cent), Calabria (9.8 per cent) and Puglia (8.8 per cent): in sum the 59.8 per cent of the total (the South). It is estimated to cost 4.6 million Euros.

19 As a matter of fact, the main reason that the operation Mare Nostrum was cancelled was because of the high cost (9 million Euros a month). According to the Italian Interior Minister, the total cost was about 114 million Euros (of which the European Commission provided only 1.8 million Euros from the External Borders Fund).
20 http://video.repubblica.it/dossier/immigrati-2015/migranti-juncker--in-europa-manca-la-solidarieta-l-italia-salva-l-onore-di-tutti-noi/274971/275516. www.corriere.it/cron ache/17_maggio_05/juncker-sui-migranti-italia-6b1d8e0e-317f-11e7-b2e6-a3a4d5fc 48cb.shtml.www.partitodemocratico.it/immigrazione/migranti-junker-litalia-salva-lonore-delleuropa/.
21 Faced with shifts from industrial to service economies and with the need to procure flexible and cheap workers to remain competitive with the offshore production and service provision economies of South America, China and South Asia, the United States and Europe have become increasingly dependent on migrant labour in agriculture, domestic service, hotel and food services and construction. The restructuring of major urban economies towards the financial, service, consumer, entertainment and tourism industries has similarly relied on the flexible and largely un-unionised.

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3 Immigration and populist political strategies

The Swiss case in European perspective

Gianni D'Amato and Didier Ruedin

Introduction

The mobilisation of populist anti-immigrant attitudes has probably played an important role in the recent decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, commonly referred to as Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States is also due to his stance against immigration.[1] The general elections in Germany in 2017 have further shown that even the country widely considered as the European outlier in resisting populist moods seems to have come into line with the rest of the continent, not to mention the sensitivities to anti-immigrant appeals in France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and in many Central European countries. In observing these tectonic shifts, news media and some academics have proclaimed a rise of anti-immigrant populism (Lucassen, 2017).

Particularly in one country in the heart of Western Europe, it appears that anti-immigrant populism has been a winning strategy in the past 20 years: the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC) transformed itself within the period of a few elections from a conservative right-wing party with an 11 per cent vote share in 1987 to the strongest party with 29 per cent support at the last parliamentary election in 2015. The Swiss People's Party consistently politicises immigration with a clear anti-immigrant position (Ruedin, 2013; Ruedin & Morales, 2017), and defends this issue ownership with continuous mobilising communication strategies. At the same time, the party has successfully prevented itself from becoming a single-issue party, offering to the electorate a variation of contentious topics.

Observing the electoral success of the Swiss People's Party and its ostensible winning strategy, the question arises whether such a success story can be transferred to other Western realities? If we look at the situation in France and the Netherlands, however, the situation no longer looks so clear with regard to anti-immigrant populist parties (see Brubaker, 2017). The National Front (*Front National*, FN) in France and the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV) in the Netherlands did not realise the electoral success many predicted before the elections in 2017. Similarly, while the UK Independence Party (UKIP) may have

played a large role in the Brexit referendum, it seems to have faltered after the success at the ballot. This varying success of anti-immigrant populist parties indicates that anti-immigrant populism on its own is not a sufficient condition for a continuous success story.

Here, we examine the success of the populist right, especially the Swiss People's Party in a historical perspective, in an attempt to figure out the circumstances that assure the electoral success of anti-immigrant populism. We argue that elements of anti-immigrant populism – negative politicisation of foreigners, appeals to 'the people', attempts to regulate the presence of immigrants – have been around for long, but the intensity of politicisation and its geographical reach are unprecedented. Anti-immigrant populism can be a successful strategy, but it needs to have a broader basis where communitarianism is anchored (Merkel, 2017), and with that it needs not be anti-immigrant only, but can be anti-European Union, too.

Politicisation of immigration as populism

When looking at the politicisation of immigration and anti-immigrant populism, it is important to consider different actors and how they perform on behalf of their party (van der Brug, D'Amato, Berkhout & Ruedin, 2015). Although they appear as singular actors, political parties consist of individuals who speak on behalf of the party. They may also speak as individuals while being associated with the party by the media. Agents within parties may have a crucial role in the ways the issue of immigration becomes politicised, and are able to define the organised interests of their supporters. The resulting party political position and the strategic orientation they give to issues as immigration can be observed in party manifestos and programmes (Ruedin & Morales, 2017). Indeed, across Europe immigration takes an increasing share in party politics (Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2017), which suggests that anti-immigrant rhetoric may be part of a winning strategy.

A recently published inquiry on support and opposition to migration showed that political parties play an increasing role in the politicisation of immigration (van der Brug et al., 2015). The study consisted of a systematic analysis of all political claims found in newspaper articles on a random sample of days in seven Western European countries, scrutinising two newspapers per country/language region. In Figure 3.1, we show that the share of claims by parties has increased over time. This evolution can be interpreted as increased politicisation that distinguishes the action of political parties from that of governments. Whereas the government agenda is oriented in terms to a technocratic, administrative management of policies that tries to prevent creating disturbing 'noises', political parties are addressing electoral power and are therefore divisive and controversial by nature (Carvalho & Ruedin, 2018).

Looking at the contents of party manifestos, we can see that some political parties are increasingly presenting immigration and integration issues as urgent problems that may require state action, but there is strong public and political disagreement on these salient issues. This evident politicisation of immigration is especially visible in parties already in the legislature, engaged in formal politics,

Figure 3.1 Percentage of claims on immigration by political parties, 1995–2009. The figure gives the percentage of all claims about immigration made by political parties, considering seven Western European countries at once (pooled). Each circle represents the percentage of claims by parties in a given year, while the line gives the LOESS-smoothed trend line, with a default bandwidth of two-thirds

Source: Van der Brug et al., 2015.

whereas the weight of protest parties focusing on a single issue may be less evident or only indirect when we consider public claims that appear in the newspapers as we do in Figure 3.1. Only mainstream parties have consistent access to the media and appear as claims-makers much more than smaller parties, such as anti-immigrant parties (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015).

This increasing politicisation can be viewed as evidence for populism in the political system, since anti-immigrant sentiments can be used by parties to appeal to 'the people' in order to mobilise popular support and gain parliamentary legitimacy, especially in view of anti-immigrant attitudes in the population (Morales, Pilet & Ruedin, 2015). However, just looking at the number of claims as we do in Figure 3.1 may lead to a partial picture. Government actors may make many claims, but these claims are qualitatively different from claims made by political parties. The claims by government actors tend to concern administrative acts (because immigration calls for executive actions), but governments have usually no stake in politicising immigration issues. Indeed, de-politicising the issue is much more in their interest making governmental operations easier

translatable into practice (Freeman, 1995). Recent research confirms that whereas political parties polarise, government actors are present in the political debate in mostly neutral terms (van der Brug et al., 2015; Rosenberger & Ruedin, 2017).

When parties politicise immigration and integration, they increasingly focus on religion and Islam (Berkhout & Ruedin, 2017). We argue that this increasing focus on Islam is evidence of populism – appeals to the worries of the population – given that the successful social integration of most immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries give little reason to politicise this particular group. Tellingly, for government actors, religion and particularly Islam does not appear to be an issue of increasing importance over time. Muslims are usually a relatively small population in Western Europe, their size is stable, and Muslim community leaders do not make many public claims for specific treatment and rights (van der Brug et al., 2015). Parties, by contrast, may refer to Islam in a context where international terrorism has heightened worries in the general population: focusing on Islam is about appeals to 'the people'.

In this highly contested context, the debate has shifted to a large extent from discussions about immigration and border control to civic integration of

Figure 3.2 Percentage of claims about immigrant integration, 1995–2009. Percentage of claims by political parties on any observed date that are about immigrant integration rather than border crossing. Each circle represents one of the random dates sampled, and gives the percentage of these claims that are about immigrant integration. The thick line gives the LOESS-smoothed trend line with default bandwidth of two-thirds. The same substantive pattern can be observed when claims by parties are aggregated into years rather than dates

Source: Data from van der Brug et al., 2015.

immigrants, comprising issues of cultural tensions between natives and newcomers. This shift towards cultural arguments makes it more likely for the issue of immigration to be superseded by other issues addressing a 'problematic' integration. This increased politicisation of cultural diversity can be interpreted as an anti-immigrant populist strategy focusing on boundary-making, distinguishing between insiders and outsiders (Wimmer, 2008).

Drawing on the same claims-analysis as above (van der Brug et al., 2015), in Figure 3.2 we use the distinction between immigration and immigrant integration. Each claim in the newspapers was coded whether it concerned immigration (border control, such as restricting the number of asylum seekers to a country) or immigrant integration (such as ensuring economic integration of recognised refugees resident in the country). This is a common distinction in the literature (Meyers, 2004), and relevant for considerations of anti-immigrant populism. In Figure 3.2, we show that the share of claims about immigrant integration has increased over time, especially in the second half of the 1990s. We stipulate that this trend to politicise cultural cleavages increased in the post-2009 era. There is an increasing part of the population that does not feel represented by established parties any more, particularly when it comes to immigration (Merkel, 2017).

Limited substantive impact of anti-immigrant populism

Switzerland as a case study is useful to look at actions beyond claims-making in the news, since direct democratic opportunities are central to Swiss politics. Radical right-wing populist parties in the country have played a pioneering role in Western Europe, in as much as they have been embedded in the Swiss party landscape since the l960s, and migration has been a central part of their political agenda (Skenderovic & D'Amato, 2008). These parties include the National Action (*Nationale Aktion*, NA), the Swiss Democrats (*Schweizer Demokraten*, SD) or the Freedom Party (*Freiheitspartei der Schweiz*, FPS). A look at their party manifesto makes it clear how central immigration was to these parties. For instance, 64 per cent of the 2003 manifesto of the Freedom Party referred to immigration and immigrant integration. This compares to around 5 per cent for the typical Western European party (Ruedin & Morales, 2017). While describing their positions on say education or the environment, the manifesto of the Freedom Party continuously referred to immigrants.

There are aspects of the Swiss political system provide important opportunity structures that help account for the successes of radical right-wing populist parties (Brockett, 1994; Kriesi, Lachat, Selb, Bornschier & Helbling, 2005). These include notable instruments of direct democracy, federalism and the consociational system. What is more, with a share of over 24 per cent foreign citizens, Switzerland has the third-highest foreign population of any West European country, following Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. This is partly due to the very high demand for labour migrants after World War II, in a highly industrialised though small nation-state, but also because for a long time, Switzerland had one of the

lowest naturalisation rates in Western Europe (Skenderovic & D'Amato, 2008; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013).

Referendums and popular initiatives have been used since the modern Swiss state was established in 1848, and they have been used to politicise immigration from an early time on, as is visible in Figure 3.3. Early decisions included granting freedom of religion to Jewish immigrants in 1866, but also failed attempts to extend political rights to foreign citizens in 1877. We can observe populist appeals against immigrants over a century ago, but interestingly many efforts at the turn of the century and at the beginning of the twentieth century were to force immigrants to assimilate and naturalise. The prohibition of ritual slaughter (*Shechita*) in 1893 highlights that the majority of the voters were not loath to restricting cultural practices of immigrants. At the same time, the timeline in Figure 3.3 also makes it clear that there has been an intensification in recent decades and years. There is a mountain visible at the right of the Figure, indicating the many referendums and popular initiatives particularly since the 1970s. The decline on the right of the figure may partly be due to the fact that the last two categories (2010s, 'future') are incomplete. We finally observe that while the

Figure 3.3 Popular initiatives and referendums in Switzerland, 1848–2017. The figure shows the numbers of popular initiatives and referendums concerning immigration in Switzerland, 1848 to 2017. Striped black are expansive changes supported by the majority of the voters (until 1971 women were disenfranchised), striped grey are expansive attempts not supported by the majority of the voters. Black are restrictive changes supported by the voters; solid grey are restrictive changes not supported by the majority of the voters. White are other changes that we cannot classify as expansive or restrictive. All referendums and initiatives until the end of 2017 have been considered. Initiatives and referendums under 'future' have been announced at the time of writing, but not voted on.

many referendums and popular initiatives indicate the politicisation of immigration, until the early years of the twenty-first century, most attempts to influence policy have been unsuccessful (Skenderovic & D'Amato, 2008).

Figure 3.3 makes it clear that elements of anti-immigrant populism dividing the society into two antagonistic groups, the (real) 'people' and the (dishonest) 'elite' have been around for long, and political parties have used instruments of direct democracy to ostensibly address this gap. This persistence of populist elements is also reflected in the political forms and strategies anti-immigrant parties have adopted, namely appeals to the 'people', and the sense of 'we-ness'. Such mobilisation against the presence of immigrants has persisted during the entire nineteenth and twentieth century (Skenderovic & D'Amato, 2008), although the direct impact of this action and the substantive consequences have been quite limited in Switzerland. Populist strategies are not essentially centred on changing society, but on the mobilisation of the electorate through rhetoric: populism is primarily a mobilising strategy, not an ideology. For this reason, it is not surprising to see many popular initiatives about aspects of immigration that have little impact on most immigrants in the country. For instance the ban on the construction of minarets in 2009 does not have a direct impact on the lives of most immigrants, while it sends a clear signal about who is part of the nation and the people. Similarly, while changes in asylum policy like those in 2006 have substantive consequences on asylum seekers, we need to bear in mind that asylum seekers are only a very small share of the immigrant population, and protected by principles like non-refoulement. To be clear, there may be indirect consequences, like increased uncertainty, deteriorated life conditions and negative consequences for the social integration of immigrants. In sum, the flurry of direct democratic action visible on the right of Figure 3.3 has not had much of a direct impact on the lives of most immigrants, but it is evidence of the politicisation of immigration in public debates.

Looking at immigration policies and attitudes to foreigners over time demonstrates further that the direct substantive impact of anti-immigrant populism has been somewhat limited in Switzerland. The left panel of Figure 3.4 shows Swiss immigration policy between 1848 and 2014, following the MIPEX criteria (Huddleston & Vankova, 2015; Ruedin, Alberti & D'Amato, 2015). A wide range of immigration and integration policies are considered, and coded on a scale that theoretically ranges from 0 (most restrictive) to 100 (most expansive). The left of the line is relatively flat, reflecting the fact that immigration policies have changed little before 1921. We then observe a clear trend towards more restrictive policies that continued until the oil crisis in 1974. Since then, Swiss immigration policy has become more expansive, a trend found across European countries (Helbling & Kalkum, 2017; de Haas & Natter, 2015). In the last five years or so, the trend seems to have stopped or slowed down, but clearly the increasing electoral success of the Swiss People's Party is not associated with more restrictive immigration policies. At the same time, the success of the Swiss People's Party coincides with an increasing number of changes in policies (Ruedin et al., 2015): immigration is increasingly the focus of formal politics and debated in the two chambers in addition to the media.

Similarly, the right panel of Figure 3.4 shows that the long-term trend of attitudes to foreigners in Switzerland seems to be rather stable. If anything, there is a trend towards more positive attitudes in the most recent surveys – a trend not yet visible in the smoothed trend in the figure – in line with contact theory that regards negative attitudes largely as a reflection of lack of contact between the majority population and immigrants (Hewstone & Swart, 2011). The figure draws on different surveys that ask the same question about immigrants, and only shows the standardised and smoothed trend line to avoid interpreting deviations from this trends due to say an electoral campaign or one of the referendums and popular initiatives outlined in Figure 3.3. A recent meta-analysis of ethnic discrimination in hiring came to the conclusion that there is no evidence of substantive changes over time (Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016). When aggregated across many studies, the rhetoric and increased politicisation did not appear to have created a climate more prone to discrimination of immigrants. Indeed, in a study of ethnic discrimination in Sweden, Carlsson and Ericksson (2017) show that reported attitudes and measured discrimination in hiring correspond, suggesting that anti-immigrant populism may have a limited substantive impact on the lives of immigrants if attitudes are not affected. This seems to be the case at least when it comes to impact that is readily measured and comparable over time, but may not apply for more qualitative aspects of individual lives like feeling respected and recognised – which may lead to indirect consequences we fail to capture with aggregated indicators.

In Switzerland, the apparent limited impact of anti-immigrant populism is clearly not due to a limited presence of the Swiss People's Party in the media. While in other Western European countries, anti-immigrant populist parties may not manage to have many claims in the media (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015) the situation is quite different in Switzerland, where the Swiss People's Party is the party with most claims in the news. Between 1995 and 2009 nearly 39 per cent of claims made by parties were by the Swiss People's Party (see also Udris, 2012). Other radical-right parties played a limited role, largely because the Swiss People's Party managed to incorporate these parties and their politicians (Kriesi et al., 2005). Outside of Switzerland, left-wing and mainstream right-wing parties like the social-democrats, liberals or conservatives manage to have more claims on immigration and integration in the news than radical right parties (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015), irrespective of their electoral success. We argue that the reason why the Swiss People's Party is more successful in claims-making lie in the origin of the Party and its position in the political system. While the Swiss People's Party is today a right-wing anti-immigrant party (Ruedin, 2013), it is not a radical right party in terms of its historical origin as a party of farmers and small traders. Due to the Swiss consociational political system, the Swiss People's Party has constantly been represented in the government since the early twentieth century, and since 1999 it is the largest party in parliament and heading government in many cantons.

We argue that the success of the Swiss People's Party was not only the anti-immigrant populism which clearly struck a chord with a large part of the

Swiss immigration policy

Attitudes to foreigners

Figure 3.4 Swiss immigration policy and attitudes to foreigners over time. Swiss immigration policy (left panel) is measured using the MIPEX overall measure 1848–2014, taken from Ruedin et al., 2015. There have been no substantive changes since. Higher values denote more expansive policies, with a theoretical maximum of 100. Attitudes to foreigners (right panel) are measured with a question on whether respondents are for equal chances for Swiss and foreigners. Data from several surveys asking the same question were pooled (SHP, SELECTS, SILC, VOXIT, Voto) and standardised on a common scale. Shown here is the LOESS-smoothed trend 1993–2017 with the default bandwidth of two-thirds to focus on trends rather than short-term influences like elections.

population, but also the expansion of the political repertoire to get access to more decisive positions in the political system. Parties may originally (or as part of their way to success) be defined by their anti-immigrant positions and populist appeals, but to become a credible contender rather than a protest party, they need to move beyond being defined by a single issue (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). This need to appeal to voters on different issues is probably most evident in single-member district systems like the United Kingdom. This means that the party system plays an important role in limiting the possible electoral success of anti-immigrant populist parties (Webb & Bale, 2014). We argue that an important factor in the success (or failure) of anti-immigrant populist parties lies in their ability to move beyond being defined solely by their position on immigration and embed their anti-immigrant rhetoric into a wider frame of communitarian politics (Merkel, 2017). Put differently, to be successful, anti-immigrant populist parties need not only be *anti-immigrant* and *populist*, but they also need to become proper *parties.* If they fail to do that, they disappear. This has been the case in Switzerland with National Action, the Swiss Democrats, the Freedom Party of Switzerland, and in the United Kingdom with the British National Party (BNP) and arguably the UKIP. Destroyed by internal quarrels, they lost credibility and trust in their winning strategy.

At the same time, anti-immigrant parties need not be very visible in the media to have an impact on politics and society. Indirect effects may play a role and configure some claims to be much more effective qualitatively, so that other parties have to react to them, or feel like they have to react to them. In this sense, a claims-making study on support and opposition to migration has its limitations: since the claims are from a random sample of days, and newspaper articles tend not to be detailed enough to trace claims and counter-claims effectively – making proper process tracing impossible (see Collier, 2011 on process tracing). Almost none of the newspaper articles coded by van der Brug et al. (2015) include claims that explicitly refer to claims made by other actors. Despite this, we can underscore the fact that anti-immigrant parties do not *need* to make many claims on migration, or make claims in many contexts, simply because they have a coherent position and clearly marked where their journey leads as early as the 1970s. In this sense, claims by anti-immigrant populists can cast a very long shadow indeed: they are the default position against which all other positions are measured (i.e. proper issue ownership). This includes claims that immigrants lead to overpopulation and environmental damage or fears over loss of cultural identity and traditions – in Switzerland highlighted by the National Action in the late 1960s, and still debated in the 2010s in the context of the so-called *Ecopop* initiative of 2014.

Checks and balances

One reason that these strong claims by anti-immigrant populists do not have a stronger impact on politics and society in places like Switzerland is 'checks and balances' in place, including other actors. For instance, government actors, party

politics and the media cover the entire range of possible positions on immigration and integration, which means they are the source of both positive and negative claims on immigration. The negative positions are countered by civil society, churches and in most instances labour unions that tend be much more supportive of immigrants (Rosenberger & Ruedin, 2017). These organisations are socially committed, but they are not in the arena of formal politics, and hence often less visible in the media and public debate. They play an important role as watchdogs, and ensure that the judiciary is involved to keep the balance when public litigation is polarising the debate.

The anti-poles to anti-immigrant parties, however, are not free of dilemmas and internal struggles (de Haas & Natter, 2015; Cuperus, 2017). For instance, the social-democratic left has for decades been confronted with a tension in accommodating market integration and the respect of cultural diversity with the defence of the social *acquis* gained in part through the struggles of the labour movement. The 1983 manifesto of the Swiss social democrats called both to 'drastically reduce immigration' and allowing family reunification. They call for the protection of workers from the mainstream society against immigrant labour, at the same time as they call for the protection of immigrant workers against exploitation from capitalist forces.[2] The 'classical' left confers to the state important societal duties, whereas the 'modern' left favours globalisation and free trade (Blaha, 2017). With regard to immigrants, both positions can be ambivalent: they can insist on immigration and integration that is socially and culturally compatible with the mainstream society, and asking people to leave the country otherwise.

Churches may also be divided on the presence of a visible Muslim minority. Some may feel alienated by the presence of a different religion that was the religious enemy since the *Conquista* of Spain as part the enlargement of the Ottoman Empire on the European continent. Tellingly, right-wing activists frequently refer to the Siege of Vienna in 1529 and the Battle of Vienna in 1683. Others in the churches may defend a dialogically different approach and search commonalities among those who belief in the existence of a single God for all humankind, and the need for religious expression and identity in today's world. Their approach is to construct bridges that overcome religious difference, to emphasise commonalities. Social categorisation through religion is therefore a major challenge to a plural society in which secularism plays an important role. Particularly at moments when religious pluralism is at the centre of political debates, as was the case with the voting on the ban on the construction of minarets in Switzerland in 2009. Evangelical groups and conservative Christians were leading the campaign along with the Swiss People's Party, whereas the state churches plead for a pragmatic tolerance towards Islam and the practice of its beliefs.

Despite these internal divisions and struggles, the mainstream left is generally part of the pro-immigrant anti-pole to anti-immigrant populism (D'Amato, 2017; Rosenberger & Ruedin, 2017). This may lead researchers to gloss over the struggles with internal divisions, since the anti-immigrant appeal to the 'people' has proven to influence the electorate of mainstream left parties. Particularly the challenge of anti-immigrant populist parties has highlighted and enhanced

the division between cosmopolitans and communitarians within left parties (Merkel, 2017), and their appeal to plebiscitarian forms of democracy has put the moderate left in a complex dilemma. Cosmopolitans opt – with different nuances – for an opening of borders. They wish a free circulation of goods, services, capitals, entitlements, rights and persons. Political measures should not be impeded by contingent borders. In their opinion, the multiple challenges of late modernity cannot be coordinated by single nation-states (any more), but they need a supranational entity to advance common views on managing relevant issues. Cosmopolitans tend to dispose of high human capital, prefer pluralist settings and reject immigrant assimilation, are heavily mobile – both socially and spatially. They can be considered the 'frequent flyers' of our society. Communitarians, by contrast, generally dispose of lower levels of education, lower income and a limited human capital. They tend to have no mobile perspective, reject cultural diversity and tend to be among the losers of globalisation (Merkel, 2017; Norris, 2005). For this reason they have a large interest in maintaining the protective regime of the nation-state operational.

The moderate left is strongly affected by this new cleavage between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (de Haas & Natter, 2015). We argued they are affected more than other parties, because their programmatic frame contains both cosmopolitan – in their words internationalist – and communitarian elements. The key electorate of the moderate consists of workers that share communitarian views and white-collar employees with a preference towards cosmopolitanism (Rennwald & Evans, 2014). The party leadership tends to share cosmopolitan beliefs, but may strategically opt for communitarian positions. By contrast, moderately conservative parties tend to focus more on national traditions and are sceptical towards immigration, topics that allow them to circumvent the dilemma to greater degree. As much as they try to reach the electorate at the centre, the more moderately conservative parties will share cosmopolitan positions. The so-called refugee crisis in Germany after 2015 is a perfect reflection of this dilemma: the leadership of the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union*, CDU) favoured a cosmopolitan opening of borders, the rank and file and the Christian Social Union (*Christlich Soziale Union*, CSU) favoured a traditional conservative communitarian position. Another example is the British Labour party that remained largely silent during the recent 'Brexit' referendum, aware that the rank and file in Northern England was – contrary to many in the party leadership – favouring to leave the European Union.

According to Merkel (2017), this new cleavage between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is accelerating the decline of traditional mass parties and will favour the rise of populist organisations who have established themselves across Europe. Since the end of World War II, the populist right has conquered political space historically dominated by the left, increasingly addressing cosmopolitan preferences. This is a consequence of a larger cultural evolution that occurred in Western societies. New life styles, same-sex marriages, equal opportunities and multicultural realities have become dominant discourses. At the same time, social-democratic parties have adopted neo-liberal positions with the so-called

'third way', after they have invested much in the expansion of the welfare state after World War II. The leadership of the moderate left favoured a restructuring of social policies to fit globalisation. The 'new left' was to a lesser extent defined by social rather than by societal policies. An effect of the civil rights movement was that all forms of national identification lost universal credibility, whereas the 'old left' still had an affirmative relation to the nation, as a source for claiming solidarity. At the same time, the electorate of the left changed. It is no longer dominated by unionised workers, but by university graduates – professionals and academics of the middle class (Rennwald & Evans, 2014). With that, the discourse of the 'new left' has become transatlantic hegemonic and any critique is often morally disqualified in public space. This control over the right discourse has been interpreted and is referred to by the populist right as political correctness. Their diffidence towards cultural modernity can be understood as a reaction of a less educated, perhaps predominantly male lower- and middle class, as well as of conservatives in general (see also Harteveld & Ivarsflaten, 2018). They see themselves as losers of this recent change (Bauman, 1998; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006). Anti-immigrant populist can therefore be seen as a reaction towards a cosmopolitanism regarded as too hegemonic and moralism of the better off.

Conclusion: Anti-immigrant populism is part of a winning strategy that has been around for a long time

In this chapter we have explored anti-immigrant populism as a winning electoral strategy. We have done so by unpacking the success of the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC) and taking a historical perspective. Looking at the continuing success of the Swiss People's Party, there can be no doubt that anti-immigrant populism can be a winning strategy. The elements that make anti-immigrant populism – anti-immigrant rhetoric and appeals to the 'people' – are not new elements, but the intensity of anti-immigrant politicisation and its geographical reach are unprecedented. Given the electoral success of anti-immigrant populist parties, we expect this politicisation to continue in the near future.

Underlying the success of anti-immigrant populism is a new cleavage between cosmopolitan and communitarian values that cuts across the traditional left-right to some extent (Bornschier, 2010; Merkel, 2017). This cleavage causes a dilemma particularly for the moderate left, to a large extent coinciding with the division between the so-called 'old left' and the 'new left'. Part of the success of anti-immigrant populism is its ability to appeal to new voters, workers and losers of globalisation – traditionally supporters of the left (Kriesi et al., 2006). At the same time, while anti-immigrant populism may appeal to these new voters, we argued that for sustained success anti-immigrant populist parties need to be credible contenders (compare Kitschelt, 1997; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). This means moving beyond a single issue, which can be achieved by embedding the anti-immigrant position into a wider discourse of communitarianism. With this, parties can also soften their anti-immigrant rhetoric if this is strategically beneficial as

this was probably the case for the Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) in 2017. Parties that focus solely on an anti-immigrant position may therefore be reduced to short-lived protest parties – as was the case with several radical right parties in Switzerland.

Because anti-immigrant populism is a rhetorical device, it should not be surprising to find that the direct substantive impact of anti-immigrant populist parties on the lives of immigrants and the majority population has been limited in Western Europe. From the perspective of the parties, this does not matter, because electoral success does not depend on tangible impact on policies, but on rhetoric and symbolic actions. We also highlighted the checks and balances in place in Western Europe to ensure that the direct impact of anti-immigrant populist parties is limited, both in terms of institutions and the presence of actors taking a clear anti-pole to the rhetoric of anti-immigrant populism. Such anti-poles are absent or greatly weakened in contemporary Central European countries such as Hungary or Poland, meaning that the anti-immigrant populist parties can have a substantive impact on a larger group of immigrants.

While the empirical material used in this chapter benefits from a historical perspective, unfortunately the claims-analysis does not sufficiently cover recent developments like the Great Recession after 2008 and the so-called refugee crisis after 2014. We expect these developments to have accelerated processes of the transformations leading to the cleavage between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. These are economic, technological and societal developments that increase the dilemma of the moderate left in particular, although they do not automatically translate into gains for anti-immigrant populist parties (Stockemer, 2017). What is more, these events lead to a confusion and complexity that give space for new political actors, especially actors that target this tension between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. Anti-immigrant populism is one possible outcome (Merkel, 2017), and we expect identity politics to play an increasing role in such times.

In this sense, recent developments have probably only increased the potential of anti-immigrant populism. To better understand this, however, we need a temporal extension of the work done by van der Brug et al. (2015): a systematic analysis of the claims on immigration and integration by different actors. Such an analysis would also have to include new forms of claims-making, notably social media that have gained in relevance in the past decade. On social media it may be easier to capture and model claims and counter-claims, given that explicit references are common. For instance, a message on Twitter can be generally traced to its origin, and it can be examined how actors relate to such a claim. In this way qualitative differences in claims may be more tangible than in newspaper. Similarly, an analysis of political debates in parliamentary chambers may be fruitful, especially in times where immigration is increasingly politicised – ensuring there are sufficient data to analyse. Such analysis of the discourse of formal political actors, however, may miss the importance of the anti-pole to anti-immigrant populism: the NGO, churches and civil society organisations that typically are not part of formal politics (Rosenberger & Ruedin, 2017).

Throughout the chapter, we have used a historical perspective to understand contemporary developments. This allowed us to take a less alarmist position towards the success of anti-immigrant populist parties. While these parties have a great impact on party politics, the political debate, as well as the rhetoric drawing boundaries between insiders and outsiders, the direct substantive impact on the lives of most immigrants and the majority population seems limited. This is a result of anti-immigrant populism focusing on symbolic politics and the focus on specific subgroups of the immigrant population like criminal foreigners and asylum seekers that constitute a very small proportion of the immigrant population. This may be intended to some degree, because parties on the right my face a dilemma if their opposition to immigrants affects economic liberalism in favour of free movement of qualified workers. The symbolic politics of anti-immigrant populism, however, are a play with fire, so to speak. For instance, the 2014 popular initiative 'against mass immigration' in Switzerland introducing quota regulations risked the free movement agreements between Switzerland and the countries of the European Union. In such circumstances, the presence of other actors – be this other parties, civil society organisations or the judiciary upholding principles of liberal democracy – is necessary to limit the substantive impact of anti-immigrant populism. Where such checks and balances are in place, it appears that the societal consequences of anti-immigrant populism remain manageable.

Based on the historical perspective on Switzerland, we argue that elements of anti-immigrant populism – negative politicisation of foreigners, appeals to 'the people', attempts to regulate immigrants – have been around for a long time. In the past, these elements were often not coherently organised, preventing sustained anti-immigrant populism to emerge. It is the ability to organise the different elements of anti-immigrant populism that in part leads to their electoral success. As a consequence, the intensity of the politicisation of immigrants and the geographical reach of anti-immigrant populism are unprecedented. Another part of the success story are economic and political changes that create opportunities for new actors, most notable of which are anti-immigrant populist parties. Comparing the continuous success of the Swiss People's Party with other anti-immigrant populist parties, we have argued that anti-immigrant populism is only an electorally successful strategy when parties are able to organise their anti-immigrant positions as part of a broader basis anchored in communitarianism. This means at once that anti-immigrant populism on its own is no guaranteed strategy for electoral success, and that anti-immigrant populist parties should find it easy to focus on other issues like being against the European Union: anti-immigrant populist parties need not necessarily focus on immigration, so to speak, but politicising against immigrants can indeed be electorally beneficial.

Notes

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2   See Buntenbach and Roßocha, 2017, on labour unions.

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Part II

Populism and gender

4   Autochthonic populism, everyday bordering and the construction of 'the migrant'

Nira Yuval-Davis

Introduction

Perry Anderson recently argued that

> [movements] of the right predominate over those of the left because from early on they made the immigration issue their own, playing on xenophobic and racist reactions to gain widespread support among the most vulnerable sectors of the population.
>
> (Anderson, 2017)

And indeed, when we look at the poster of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) during the campaign on Brexit in the UK,[1] we can see it playing on all these sentiments: collapsing Syrian refugees with migration from Europe, stressing the overwhelming uncontrollable nature of unlimited migration. However, Anderson does not even attempt to explain why people are more sensitive these days to xenophobic and racist reactions than they have been for many years. Moreover, can we assume with Perry Anderson that it is immigration which is at the core of the problem? As my chapter will show, my argument is more complex than that.

The structure of the chapter will be the following: first, I shall explain briefly the neo-liberal double crisis of governability and governmentality. I shall then turn to everyday bordering as a reactive government technology of control to this crisis which in its turn is contributing as well as being affected by, the rise of autochthonic political projects of belonging which I see as the predominant form of contemporary racialisations. I shall then turn to examine the roles migrants and migration play in the discourses of both everyday bordering and autochthonic populism. I argue that the centrality of issue of migration and migrants is because of their location at the intersection of discursive politics of governance and politics of belonging. However, I shall also point out that these discursive politics are also ambivalent and have produced their own politics of resistance.

The double crisis

Neo-liberal globalisation emerged in a period of global optimism after the fall of the Soviet Union and the supposed victory – the 'end of history' to quote Francis

Fukuyama (1992) – of democracy, freedom and a cosmopolitan world in which social, national and state borders are on the wane. Less than 20 years later, we find ourselves in a world in which deregulation and globalisation have been used to enhance global social inequalities, within as well as between societies, and deepening signs of neo-liberalism's multi-faceted systemic global political and economic crisis, a crisis that is central to relationships between states and societies and to constructions of subjectivity and thus needs to be seen as a double related crisis of both governability and governmentality (Yuval-Davis, 2012).

As the recent economic crisis has shown, the growing entanglement and dependency not only of local and global markets but also of local private and public institutions has meant that various states have been forced to bail out banks and large corporations for fear of total economic collapse – even though the capacity of state agencies to enforce regulation on that same private sector is extremely limited. As Murphy (2011) and others have pointed out, as a result of state policies of deregulation, and the increasing privatisation of the state (including the many forms of so-called public–private partnership), in many cases it is no longer easy to draw a clear differentiation between the public and the private. Whole locations and domains which used to be part of public space – from schools to shopping areas – are no longer public, but are rather owned by, or leased for a very long period to, a private company or consortium of companies. Moreover, since the 1990s, the proportions of global assets that are in foreign ownership continue to rise. Furthermore, the sphere that is regarded as part of 'national security', and thus as off limits for foreign ownership, is also continuously shrinking. A French company now owns a British energy company, the Chinese are building its nuclear power station and British airports are owned by a Spanish company. As Will Hutton (2012) pointed out in a *Guardian* public debate, states are becoming small fry in comparison with international markets. The GDPs of all the states in the globe when added together total about 70 trillion dollars, while the total amount of money circulating in the global financial markets is between 600 and 700 trillion.

But this is not simply a quantitative question. Or, rather, this quantitative phenomenon is simply one aspect – though a very significant one – of the problems that result from the basic legal relationship that pertains between corporations and states, whereby companies have the status of fictional citizens which enables the people who run them – through their 'Ltd' affix – to escape responsibility for the results of their corporations' actions, while retaining their ability to control the funds. In this era of increasing globalisation, the ability on the part of companies – and the people who run them – to change locations, base themselves in tax havens, and escape having to bear the social, economic, environmental and other consequences of their actions, is becoming ever clearer – in the North as well as in the South; and the rhetoric of governments on budget days has very little impact on their activities. Moreover, while states have been forced to bail out banks to avoid major economic collapse (given the growing lack of differentiation between private and public financial sectors), states themselves – such as Greece,

Ireland and others – have found themselves forced to cut their own budgets severely, against the interests of their citizens.

Thus, the crisis of governability is a result of the fact that in the time of neo-liberal globalisation, governments cannot anymore primarily represent the interests of their citizens. The crisis of governmentality follows this crisis of governability, because when people feel that their interests are not pursued by their governments – even the most radical ones, like in Greece – they feel disempowered and deprived. After a while they also stop buying the neo-liberal ideology which tells them that it is their responsibility if they fail to be healthy and wealthy, to provide for their families and become part of the incredibly rich and famous. Saskia Sassen (2015) has argued that, as a result of neo-liberal globalisation, rather than experiencing an overall weakening, the liberal state has changed internally: executive powers have strengthened at the expense of legislative branches. This is partly a direct result of the privatisation of the state, whereby a substantial number of the regulative tasks of the legislature have been lost; and it is partly because it is the executive branch that virtually exclusively negotiates with other national and supranational governance executives, such as the EU, the UN, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and with private, national and especially transnational corporations.

This is an important observation, which offers some explanation of the governmentality crisis: because of the increasing power of the executive, there is growing disenchantment and alienation from the state on the part of citizens, who accordingly begin to refrain from internalising and complying with the neo-liberal state's technologies of governance. This disenchantment is particularly important in countries where voting in national elections is solely for the election of members of parliament, rather than also for the head of the executive, although, as the recent local elections in the UK and Germany have shown, it can be evident there as well. At the same time, in parliamentary democracies the right to rule the state is dependent on formal endorsement by the electorate of particular parties; this is what gives the state legitimacy. Hence the growing worry of governments because of the lack of involvement of the electorate in these processes.

The growing securitisation and militarisation of the liberal state is directly related to the fear within ruling elites that arises from this crisis of governmentality. The forms of resistance to this crisis, however, vary widely – depending on people's intersected positionings, identifications and normative values: they can be more or less violent, more or less radical and more or less guided by primordial as opposed to cosmopolitan value systems.

This is the time in which it becomes very easy to shift responsibility to those who 'do not belong' – the migrants or anyone else who have different look, accent, culture and religion. On this background, those of us who have been working on issues of racism, nationalism and ethnic relations, find ourselves with new challenges with the combined emergence of everyday bordering as a technology of control of diversity and discourses on diversity and autochthonic populist politics of belonging in a growing number of places on the globe, to produce new forms of intersectional racist practices.

Everyday bordering

Frederick Barth (1969) and others following him, have argued that it is the existence of ethnic (and racial) boundaries, rather than of any specific 'essence' around which these boundaries are constructed that are crucial in processes of ethnicisation and racialisation. Any physical or social signifier can be used to construct the boundaries which differentiate between 'us' and 'them'. State borders are but one of the technologies used to construct and maintain these boundaries. It is for this reason that contemporary border studies largely refer to 'borderings' rather than to borders, seeing them more as a dynamic, shifting and contested social and political spatial processes linked to particular political projects rather than just territorial lines (van Houtum, Kramsch & Zierhofen, 2005). However, these borders and boundaries are not just a top-down macro social and state policy but are present in everyday discourses and practices of different social agents, from state functionaries to the media to all other differentially positioned members of society (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss & Cassidy, 2018).

Everyday bordering has been developing as technology of control of diversity by governments which have been seeking to supposedly reassert control over the composition and security of the population. Instead of borders being on the point of moving from one state to another, borders have now spread to be everywhere. All citizens are required to become untrained unpaid border guards, and more and more of us are becoming suspects as illegal or at least illegitimate border crossers. This has been a tendency that developed for quite a few years, probably since 9/11 if not before, but the 2014 and 2016 immigration Acts have clinched this. Now, every landlord, every employer, every teacher and every doctor, is responsible to verify that her or his tenants, employees, students and patients, are legally in the country and if they fail, they are legally responsible and might even go to prison for failing to do so (unlike those who are trained and paid to do this job). Thus, from a convivial multi-cultural diverse society, this technology of control is breeding suspicion, fear and sensitisation of the boundaries between those who belong and those who do not. Brexit has only enhanced this sense of differentiation and hierarchisation among people.

Autochthonic politics of belonging

Peter Geschiere (2009) defined autochthonic politics as the global return to the local. It relates to a kind of racialisation that has gained new impetus under globalisation and mass immigration and can be seen as a form of temporal-territorial racialisation, of exclusion and inferiorisation, that are the outcome of the relative new presence of particular people and collectivities in particular places (neighbourhood, region and country). The Greek word 'autochthony', which means 'to be of the soil', is used in the Netherlands and in the Francophone world, where the crucial difference is between the 'autochthones' who belong and the 'allochthones' who do not.

Peter Geschiere rightly claims that 'autochthony' can be seen as a new phase of ethnicity, although in some sense it even surpasses ethnicity (Geschiere, 2009,

pp. 21–22; Yuval-Davis, 2011). While ethnicity is highly constructed, relationally and situationally circumscribed, there are limits to these reconstructions regarding name and history. Autochthony is a much more 'empty' and thus elastic notion. It states no more than 'I was here before you' and, as such, can be applied in any situation and can be constantly redefined and applied to different groupings in different ways. It combines elements of naturalisation of belonging with vagueness as to what constitutes the essence of belonging, and thus can be pursued also by groups which would not necessarily be thought to be autochthone by others.

The notion of autochthonic politics of belonging is very important when we come to understand contemporary populist extreme right politics in Europe and elsewhere. The people who follow these politics continuously argue that they are 'not racist', although they are very much against all those who 'do not belong'. In some cases, such as in the case of the English Defence League, the organisation has formally both Jewish and Gay sections, as well as Hindu, Sikh and Afro-Caribbean supporters, something unimaginable in the older kind of extreme right organisations with neo-Nazi ideologies. In France, Marine Le Pen who is the current leader of Front National, originally led by her father, goes to great lengths to deny that her party is racist, anti-Semitic or homophobic. She claims that 'the right-left divide makes no sense anymore. Now the real division is between nationalism and globalisation'. Thus she warns of the 'dilution' and 'wiping out' of the French nation and civilisation, under threat from 'never-ending queues of foreigners' (*The Guardian*, 2011).

Autochthonic politics of belonging can take very different forms in different countries and can be reconfigured constantly also in the same places. Nevertheless, like any other forms of racialisation and other boundary constructions, their discourses always appear to express self-evident or even 'natural' emotions and desires: the protection of ancestral heritage, the fear of being contaminated by foreign influences and so on, although they often hide very different notions of ancestry and contamination.

The combined crisis of governability and governmentality at a time of growing global mobility and the further 'heterogenisation' of the local population as a result of migration, brought with it also the major crisis of multiculturalism as the technology of control of diversity and discourses of diversity which became hegemonic in the North after World War II and the flourishing of the welfare state. Schierup, Hansen & Castles (2006) claimed that multiculturalism was an ideological base for transatlantic alignment whose project was the transformation of the welfare state in late or post modernity into a pluralist state in which cultural diversity rights will be incorporated into the more traditional welfare social rights (see also Rex, 1995). However, as Brown (2009) has shown it can also be described as a technology of controlling and regulating aversion via tolerance. With the double crisis of governability and governmentality of the 2000s, this technology is gradually giving way to policies which encourage 'hostile environment' (to use the expression in the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, 1994) and which some of us call – as will be discussed below – 'everyday bordering' (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss & Cassidy, 2018).[2]

The construction of the migrants

As described above, both everyday bordering and autochthonic populist politics can be seen as forms of racialisation. The process of racialisation involves discourses and practices which construct immutable boundaries between homogenised and reified collectivities. These boundaries are used to naturalise fixed hierarchical power relations between these collectivities. Any signifier of boundaries can be used to construct these boundaries, from the colour of the skin to the shape of the elbow, to accent or mode of dress (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Murji & Solomos, 2005).

Racialisations have ultimately two logics – that of exclusion, the ultimate form of which is genocide, and that of exploitation, the ultimate logic of which is slavery. However, in most concrete historical situations these two logics are practiced in a complementary way. Since the 1980s, there has been a lot of discussion on the rise of what Martin Barker (1982) called 'the new racism' and Etienne Balibar (2005) 'racisme differentialiste'. Unlike the 'old' racism, the focus of these kinds of racialisation discourses focused not on notions of 'races' or of other kinds of different ethnic origins, but on different cultures, religions and traditions which were seen as threatening to 'contaminate' or 'overwhelm' the cultural 'essence' of 'the nation'.

Everyday bordering links racialisation formally to citizenship status, but underlying this is a mythical nostalgic imaginary in which all citizens are members of the nation, and the boundaries of civil society overlap the boundaries of the nation as well as the state. This is the same logic as that of autochthonic populism in which only those who 'belong' should have access to state and other social, economic and political resources. These forms of racialisation exist in the context of neo-liberal globalisation and *The Age of Migration* (Castles & Miller, 2009), in which a variety of ethnic and racial communities have migrated and settled, constructing pluralist multi-cultural societies and citizenships. This is especially true, of course, in the context of the EU, but has also characterised the relationship of Ireland and the UK for a much longer period.

It is for this reason that many contemporary populist imaginaries, as we have seen above, have incorporated some of this social heterogeneity as long as that social heterogeneity does not threaten hegemonic political projects of belonging and thus they can claim of 'not being racist'. Indeed, David Goldberg (2015) has linked the spread of the 'post-racial society' notion as the logic and condition that enables racism to persist and proliferate.

Migrants and migration play central roles at both the imaginaries and the policies of autochthonic politics and everyday bordering, as they seem to be outside the naturalised boundaries of both governance and belonging. They are not citizens nor are they part of the national imagined community. As such they constitute an easy scape-goat, being blamed for all that has gone 'wrong'. Using the UK as an illustrative example, it is no accident that UKIP used in its referendum campaign an unstoppable line of refugees coming to the UK from Europe, although it was a picture of Syrian refugees, not of East Europeans their propaganda talked

about. And although most migration to the UK comes from all over the world and that from Europe constituted just a small part of it, 'control over our borders' as way of reducing immigration numbers was used as a central argument by all political shades of the 'Brexiters'.

However, even when we are speaking on constructions of migration and 'the migrant' we cannot homogenise them all. Which of them can be called immigrants, migrants or transnationals, is not clear cut, let alone the populist differentiation which is often used by governments as well, between supposed voluntary and forced migration, economic migrants, asylum seekers and so forth. What is common to them all is, that while the different forms of migration are vital for the political economy of contemporary states and societies, they disturb and destabilise national 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) and the naturalised overlapping boundaries of nation, state and territory.

Of course, as I expanded elsewhere (Yuval-Davis, 2011), nationalism, while still dominant, even with its contemporary mutations, is not the only hegemonic contemporary political project of belonging. The cosmopolitan – or maybe it is better to use the term humanist, as it is anchored in the inclusive discourse of 'human rights' – political project of belonging has been co-existing with the rising autochthonic one and migrants, especially refugees, have played a central role in it as well. The notice 'Refugees Are Welcome Here' has been a mantra which aimed at shaming as well as contradicting formal and informal claims that there is 'no space available' to settle refugees and other migrants or that 'we don't want them because they are taking our jobs, our homes and our country'.

In Brexit UK, however, there is no doubt that at the moment the autochthonic discourse has the upper hand. As the journalist Garry Young at a memorial seminar to Stuart Hall[3] pointed out, this can be illustrated in 'the tale of two pictures'. The first one, which was reproduced endless times around the world, was that of the body of a small Syrian child drowned in the Mediterranean.[4] It evoked sympathy and empathy with the refugees escaping Syria and especially children. The UK was among the states that least responded to the refugees' appeal, but it did agree to receive 3,000 unaccompanied minors. However, this initiative was stopped, after less than 200 minors arrived, a few weeks after a campaign by a tabloid newspaper that many of these minors were actually adults taking advantage of the compassion of the British public.[5]

A concluding comment

In this chapter, I use the term 'autochthonic right' rather than speaking about populism per se, because it seems to me that these movements are constructed more around the notion of belonging than that of 'the people'. Moreover, I wanted to emphasise that for me, as exclusionary movements, they belong as a matter of fact to the right rather than to either the right or the left. This does not mean that there are not important contemporary social and political movements, such as in Catalonia and Kurdistan, which emphasise their specific locality, but which call for a participatory democracy which is inclusive and open to local people who are

not ethnically part of their 'people' and yet belong to their local collectivity. However, it is an open question to what extent these movements would not also fall victim to Tom Nairn's 'Janus face of nationalism' (Nairn, 1997).

In that sense, I believe, like Michael Mann (2005) in *The Dark Side of Democracy*, that the drive for homogenisation has been central in all nation-building movements and under certain circumstances tolerance for ethnic differences can be transformed into violent, and not just cultural, ethnic cleansings. This drive for homogenisation has existed throughout nationalist histories, but it has strengthened under globalisation. Arjun Appadurai (2006) described this phenomenon, somewhat poetically, as the transformation of identities under these conditions into 'predatory identities', which reject pluralist co-existence with other identities. Diverse societies, as Michael Walzer (2004) has argued, have developed most successfully under empires. In a similar vein to Mann, Walzer claims that democratic regimes are much less able to tolerate ethnic diversity than empires.

This does not mean, of course, that I am against participatory democracy, but that I follow what an old Palestinian activist has told me many years ago: if you want to judge a political movement, examine its attitude to women and to ethnic and national minorities. And I would add – to migrants and asylum seekers.

Notes

1 www.google.de/search?q=ukip+young+refugees&client=firefox-b&dcr=0&source= lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjevaO12cXYAhUCDewKHRcPAxEQ_AUIC ygC&biw=1536&bih=755#imgrc=QLy1slM1LIyLtM:
2 See also Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy (2017) and the film *Everyday Borders* (2015). The film is available on Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/126315982.
3 The seminar took place at the Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees and Belonging (CMRB), University of East London, 11 May 2017.
4 www.flickr.com/photos/136879256@N02/23354209300/in/photolist-BzJqM3-xVUP MG-xX2aG3
5 www.breitbart.com/london/2016/10/19/two-thirds-of-child-refugees-aare-adult-tory-mp-slams-naive-lilly-allen-tears/.

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5 Right-wing Western and Islamic populism

Reconsidering justice, democracy and equity

Haideh Moghissi

Introduction

The resurgence of populist politics that is sweeping Europe, the United States, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia is alarming, to say the least. Right-wing populist actors manipulate people's anger about a situation to obscure and divert attention from the real causes and material bases of that situation. The most common and wide-ranging syndrome of right-wing populism is that it promotes nativism and xenophobic nationalism, targets specific groups as its rhetorical instrument and causes social division. It thrives on paranoia, and relies on what Wodak (2015) has called 'politics of fear'. Under the pretext of empowering the *people* right-wing populist actors resort to deception, false promises, intimidation, even violence against their opponents. If succeed in gaining power, they establish authoritarian rule, resort to union busting, vilifying women's rights activists, students movements, and anti-poverty, anti-homophobia militants and go after the objectors within culture industry and the media.

My analysis here is limited to a comparative study of two contemporary right-wing populism, Western populism and Islamic populism, for their rise to prominence and their impacts expand beyond their geo-national origins, mounting a serious challenge to civility, human compassion, political and moral tolerance, democracy and many monumental achievements of the past centuries. The central claims here are that (a) despite their differing national and/or ethnic origins and their national-cum-religious specificity, the two right-wing populisms have much in common. They both have emerged as a response to the same social and economic (dis)order, neo-liberal imperialism, albeit with opposite objectives; and (b) whatever the reasons for their present day head-on collision, they have a history of shared political interests, close alliances and tight collaboration against common enemies.[1] Knowingly or unknowingly they also continue to feed each other, reinforcing and at times embracing each other. This political phenomenon, along with environmental catastrophe, which is not unrelated to the same processes, I suggest, is one of the major challenges of the twenty-first century.

I need to mention at the outset that I use the concept, populism here mindful that it is an ambiguous, multiuse term. It can denote an anti-status quo ideology,

a policy, a political agenda, or a social movement. Federico Finchelstein is right in suggesting that populism, like the term fascism has been 'inflated or conflated with anything that stands against liberal democracy' (Finchelstein, 2017, p. 4). The historical examples in different countries also do not provide a definitional manual or a pure case in terms of either the socio-political reasons for the rise and demise of populism, or its standard characteristics. The classical instances of the nineteenth century Russian Narodnik intellectuals without a mass-base, and their North American counterparts, the People's Party, and the differences of both with the twentieth century Argentinian and Iranian populisms, to mention a few, all with different types and degrees of mass support, are comparable only in their more general shared properties. As well, the concept's most popular feature, the claim of standing for common people against the established order, the privileged, the self-serving political actors, is not exclusive to populism. This particular feature can also be the attributes of the socialist, national liberation and nationalist ideologies and movements. In that sense, *people* in both, Left or Right populism, though with different objectives, is a political constructs, as Francisco Panizza (2005, p. 3) has argued, symbolically constituted through the relation of antagonism, rather than sociological categories. The populist depicts the main antagonism as that existing between the society and the *other*, the enemy. However, the manipulative, cynical use of the elusive entity, *people*, is a constant feature of right-wing populism, its function being to muddle 'class identification', to use Ernest Laclau's term (1977). Like fascism, populism makes irrelevant class struggle and class solidarity, obstructing counter hegemonic social alliances and coalition building within the civil society.

Right-wing Western and Islamic populisms compared

Despite their seemingly uncompromising animosity to each other and standing on opposite sides of many things, the two right-wing populisms in the West and the East have so much in common. Dislike of formal legal system and liberal democracy, big governments, regulations; hostility towards professional politicians and the political elites; disregard for the rights of minorities; anti-intellectualism; diminishing the chances for the working poor and the marginalised to mobilise around common interests; normalising misogynist and racist feelings and actions; bringing out the worst in common people; frightening the public with invented threats, inspiring large crowds to rally around the leader, and opening themselves to his speech, with 'orgasmic excitation' (Reich, 1970) are some of these commonalities.[2]

In addition to attacking intellectuals and the liberal artistic indulgences and moral values, particularly with regards to gender relations, the right-wing populist actors skilfully exploit ordinary people's fear of difference to construct an enemy. Their violence-inducing speeches release the worst racist, xenophobic and misogynist impulses everywhere and normalise the language of hate. The use of Islam and blood-thirsty Muslims in the West, to frighten the public to rally around the populist agenda, match the Islamist counterpart's obsession with the

omnipresent West and its ceaseless ploy to strip Muslim societies of their religion, cultural beliefs and values. During his campaign, Donald Trump addressed people by making statements like 'do you want to be ruled by men who eagerly drink the blood of their dying enemies'.[3] Ayatollah Khomeini, for his turn, found 'satanic plots' against Muslims everywhere. As Abrahamian among others has noted, he repeatedly accused Jews to be imperialist spies, 'agents and fifth columnist', and denounced Baha'is as being controlled by Israel and the United States to 'subvert the Islamic Republic' (Abrahamian, 1993, pp. 122–124), conspiring to poison the minds of the youth and violate [women's] honour (*hatk-e namous*).

The sudden increase of hate crimes against immigrants, particularly Muslims and whoever is taken to be Muslim in streets, in restaurants, in workplaces and on public transportations, tens of which are reported by the media in the United States and Europe are not coincidental. The point is that legitimising revulsion of the marginalised *other* is the usual tactic used by right-wing populists everywhere even though the targets of the provocation differ from place to place. In the United States, the Mexicans and Muslims become the outsider *other*, in Iran it is the Left and members of Baha'i faith, a large number of whom have been rounded up, murdered and put in prison. The fabricated enemy is used to divert attention from corruption, the undelivered and undeliverable promises, cut in public spending and essential state subsidies, the pressures the working poor feel for making a living amidst increasing wealth and income gaps.

Those of us who have a first-hand experience with the establishment of a right-wing populist regime in our homelands, in my case, Iran, are sometimes stounded by the similarities in mobilisation strategies of populist actors. Donald Trump almost daily complained about fake news and unfriendly journalists, picking up fights with mainstream newspapers when they occasionally revealed his inconsistencies and shortcomings. Attacking 'political correctness', and 'policing of thoughts', have unfailingly been used by other right-wing populists in England, in France and in Germany.[4] Islamist populists in Iran and Turkey also systematically and relentlessly crusade against the intellectuals, the writers and liberal journalists.

Almost immediately following the seizure of power in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini identified the liberal journalists as 'American pawns', and pressed for the closure of all independent dailies. Within a couple of months, following his infamous direct command to his followers to 'break the pens' of those who in his words, stood against Muslim people, a mob raided offices of the popular daily *Ayandegan* and arrested the journalists and its staff.[5] This was the beginning of a process that has continued to this day. Only in 2016, according to the New York-based NGO Committee to Protect Journalists, 259 Iranian journalists were jailed in Iran (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017). Political space has also shrunk dramatically for public intellectuals and journalists, by another Islamist populist in the region, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey where following the 2015 coup many newspapers and 20 TV and radio stations have been closed.

Inconsistency in politics and in stated objectives, and making undeliverable promises are also distinct features of the populist leaders. Much can be said about

gratuitous promises that populist politicians make prior to attaining office. That is universal. And after assuming power none admits the falsity of promises or the accusation made against potential contenders. Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini was an exception though. After the 1979 revolution, he boldly and shamelessly admitted that he used deception (*Khodeh*), when he said he did not want to keep the power or the government in his hands; that his job would only be guiding and directing the people;[6] that women would be 'free in the Islamic Republic to choose their activities, their future and their clothing' and that after the revolution people would not have to pay for electricity and the water they use.[7] All this deliberate deceptions were offered in the interest of Islam and Muslim people, he said. But when it suited his objectives, the Ayatollah willingly compromised with those he claimed were Islam's arch enemies. Khomeini's cooperation with Ronald Reagan in the infamous Iran-Contra affair was a case in point.

Deficiency in political education and in civic awareness, make ordinary people impressionable and receptive of the idea that their problems can be fixed only with the closure of borders against good jobs moving out, and the foreign *other* and their goods and values entering in. This is what was argued by Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, candidate Donald Trump in the United States, Alexander Gauland, the co-leader of anti-Mulsim AfD, in Germany and Sebastian Kurz in Austria. A variation of this xenophobic nationalism and anti-immigrant platform has been sold to people in Sweden, Norway and elsewhere where the population suffers from the same maladies brought on them by the sway of the business, deregulation and privatisation, retraction of government services, the brazen assaults on the environment, austerity, the extraordinary accumulation of wealth in few hands and matched by the rise of inexcusable poverty for the majority, all of which are the hallmark of neo-liberal globalisation. The unsustainability of the neo-liberal globalisation order has been acknowledged even by such people as Mark Carney, the governor of Bank of England who has conceded that globalisation has 'come to mean low wages, insecure employment, stateless corporations and striking inequalities' (Elliott, 2017).[8]

Add some anti-West, anti-imperialist, Islamic spice to this populist potion and you get Khomeinism in Iran, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Al-Nahda in Tunisia, Justice and Development Party in Morocco and AKP in Turkey. In the same manner that people in the West are told that the sources of their misfortunes are immigrants and refugees, the foreigners and the new Asian economic powers, the impoverished masses in Muslim-majority countries suffering from unemployment, loss of safety nets, growing inequality, appalling levels of poverty, and political corruption, are sold the idea that deviation from the true path of Islam and the infiltration of Western values are the main causes of their misery. In all these cases, resentments against the present and nostalgia for the past that never existed are resurrected. The catch phrase during the US presidential election was making *America great again*, and the Islamist leaders' slogan, from Ayatollah Khomeini to Taliban to Abu Bakar Baqdadi has been to make *Islam great again*, supposedly like in the times of prophet Muhamad. Both sides resent the changing

set up of the cards and want to reshuffle them according to their taste. Threatened by the breakdown of the time-honoured gender, race and age hierarchies and authority, when everyone knew her/his place, they use groundless accusations, lies and deceptive promises and do whatever in their power to shut down discussions on more substantial issues.

Targeting Muslims and migrants

Practical similarities between right-wing populists' rhetoric, however, might conceal who bears the main responsibility for the present state of affairs. That is to say, if we take the threat of Islamic terrorism, and the crisis of migration, as the two central rallying tools used by all right-wing populists in the West for mobilising support, both problems originated from or thrived as a result of the world powers' relentless pursuit of geopolitical and economic interest in the region. The politicians, who now present Islamic terrorism as a new dangerous trend, and migration as the major twenty-first century crisis, mask the fact that they themselves are to be held accountable for decades' pursuit of neo-liberal market-led economic growth that focused on profit driven, lesser state inter-vention, delivery of social service in their own societies, and its imposition on poorer nations aroused by imperialistic greed. This short-sighted strategy was complemented by adoption of a foreign policy, specifically in the Middle East and South Asia that relied on backing the corrupt regional rulers on one hand and emboldening fundamentalist Islamists on the other, as allies in the systematic assault against the internal nationalists and the left forces in these societies, aimed at countering the influence of the West's former rival power, Soviet Union. There should be no surprise then that the disfranchised masses, whose sense of dignity, economic security and hopes were taken away from them, would see populist scheme as an alternative to the established order, the political and cultural elites and the foreign enemy. A brief overview of the history and the causes of contemporary Islamist terrorism and crisis of migration, mentioned earlier, clarify further this claim.

The threat of Islamic terrorism

Nothing like fear can paralyse the faculty of judgement, power of reason and sense of justice. Granted that several traits of Islamist terrorism, as has also been pointed out by Robin Wright among others (Wright, 2017), make it distinct from past terrorist attacks, namely its missions, messages, means of mobilisation and the indiscriminate choice of its targets. The links of the West-based Islamist terrorists to transnational fundamentalist networks and/or states, their growing flexibility and liberty to choose the timing, the place and the targets (given that increasingly their links to a central command is now via internet), and their willingness to not only kill but to be killed, and become martyrs (*Shohadat*) and be rewarded in the next world, make them more frightening. Also the unbelievable cruelty of Islamist terrorists in achieving their political goals, their openly expressed

animosity to the West and Western way of life, the rigid and sexist version of the faith that they preach which justifiably terrorises ordinary citizens around the globe, sadly help corroborate preconceived ideas about Islam and Muslims.

Populist demagogues in the West then manipulate public fear and prejudices to present not only the terrorists, but all Muslims as the dangerous *other*. By using Islam as a code for terrorism, they successfully avert attention not only from the political and economic crises in their own societies. But they also cloud other important facts involved in the growth of Islamist militancy and terrorism, including the ill-conceived foreign policy and *military* adventures in the region, whose main victims, as well as its main challengers are other Muslims in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. As well, the prolonged illegal and inhumane occupation of Palestine, a politically and emotionally charged concern for overwhelming majority of people in Muslim-majority countries are conveniently ignored. Conflating Islam and terrorism muddles another fact. That terrorism is not the distinct domain of any specific religion or culture. Previous acts of terror in Europe, in Canada and the United States, in the 1970s–1980s by militant groups such as Germany's Baader-Meinhof, Italy's Red Brigades, Spain's E.T.A, Ireland's Irish Republican Army, Canada's Quebec Liberation Army, the Puerto Rican separatist groups and Jewish Defense League in the United States testify to this fact.[9]

I would suggest however the more damning difference between the past and present day terrorists is that the predominantly Muslim terrorists' crimes tap into a historical reservoirs of anti-Islam, anti-Arab hostility and Islamophobia that following 9/11, flows more freely throughout the West. But the question that I am taking up to clarify this claim is how these monstrous terrorists were conceived in the first place, and what is the link between their emergence and the uprooting of millions of asylum seekers that are knocking at European doors.

The Cold War and the Islamist allies

A brief review of the historical processes that led to the establishment of the first populist Islamist regime par excellence in the region, Iran and the chain of regional and global events it produced, may offer a response to this question.[10] But we need to go back several decades, to the post World War II anti-communist craze and the Anglo-US strategy of containing the influence of the then Soviet Union and the growth of the region's nationalist and socialist forces, that threatened the West's geo-political and economic interests. The alliance made with the Islamic clergy, with their inborn antagonism with secularism and socialism throughout the region, and the policy of strengthening Islam's social and political influences were central to the Anglo-US Cold War strategy. The support given to Muslim Brotherhood against the nationalist governments of Gamal Abdul-Nasser in Egypt, and to Feda'een Islam against Mohammad Mossadeq in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Iran is well documented.

Iran with its rich oil reserves and 1,200 miles borders with the former Soviet Union was of particular interest to the West. In fact, promoting Islamist forces in

the country as the West's reliable allies against the Left can be considered as the first steps taken in sponsoring Islamist militancy in the region.[11] In the early 1950s, the democratically elected secular government of Mohamad Mossadeq, supported by a mass nationalist movement, came to power in Iran on the platform of nationalising Iranian oil industry that was fully controlled by the British. His demand was a 50/50 share of the oil with the British. This demand was rejected, and instead, bringing down Mossadeq's government was put on the agenda of the British government. Unable to do it alone, Britain sought and obtained the United States' agreement, subject to the United States getting a sizable share of the Iranian oil. Following the agreement, the CIA orchestrated a coup d'état in 1953, removing Mossadeq from office. Subsequently, the Iranian oil was divided among the Western oil corporations (BP 40 per cent, US companies 40 per cent, Royal Dutch-Shell 14 per cent and the remaining 6 per cent went to CFP of France – now Total).

This was the first, but not the last, Anglo-US successful regime-change in the Middle East. A modernising dictatorial rule under the last Shah was re-established in the country with the help of American and Israeli military and intelligence advisors. In this story, what is important to note is that the strategy of counter-poising the ideological influences of the then Soviets and the Iranian secular nationalist and socialist forces, was achieved through promoting and reinforcing the influence of Islamist forces. This made mosques and Islamic institutions the only permitted venues for people's gathering which dramatically increased the influences of clergy. This unthoughtful strategy, however, provided the radical anti-West Islamists populists, notably Khomeini, then a mid-ranking clergy, unconstrained access to the people for political agitation and provocation. His protests against the Shah's US-advised reforms, specifically in the area of women's rights, gained him more popularity and eventually led to his exile in Iraq. In absence of the harshly suppressed left and nationalist forces, however, Khomeini's supporters continued to use the networks of the mosques and Islamic associations effectively, to mobilise support for the Ayatollah's anti-regime, anti-American politico-religious views, throughout that period leading to the 1979 Revolution. With the Ayatollah's return from exile, in a revolution that was originally initiated by secular left and liberal activists, and given the nonexistence of viable secular leaders, many of whom were physically eliminated, jailed or exiled by the Shah's regime, he succeeded to push all his opponents out of the picture, end the monarchy and establish an Islamic populist state in Iran.

The West had of course another even more reliable ally in the region already, the fundamentalist Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom that did not have any political weight beyond the peninsula before the1939 oil discovery, and had amassed substantial surplus, particularly after the early 1970s oil bonanza, became politically more significant, following the 1978 communist coup d'état in Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion of the country a year later and the Iranian revolution of 1979. The kingdom used its substantial wealth to promote Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi ideology throughout the Middle East and South Asia and joined the Anglo-US geo-political plans of bringing down the Soviet system. The Saudis supported American military operations against the Soviet and Afghan

government's forces, fought mostly by seven Islamist groups of Mujahedeen, with direct links with another United States' ally, Pakistan's Islamist general, Zia (who was backed by another brand of Islamist fundamentalists, the *Jama'at Islami*). The credit for the establishment of the fundamentalist-run Taliban schools (*Madresa*) for recruiting and training poor, orphaned Afghan children, the future pitiless misogynist Islamist terrorists, also goes to the Saudis.

Subsequent events of the period leading to the rise of other militant Islamist groups included the first invasion of Iraq against the former US ally, Saddam Hussein in 1991; The rule of Mujahedeen and later Talibans in Afghanistan, turning Afghanistan into the training ground for the Islamist militants of other countries, including Bin Laden; the September 11 attack, orchestrated from Afghanistan; the second invasion of Iraq and its total devastation in 2003; the emergence of ISIS and its expansion following the Syrian war, which soon turned into a proxy war between the United States and Russia, and their regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Iran, with devastation of cities and hundreds of thousands killed and millions displaced. Hence, the growth of the mass flight of millions of asylum seekers from Africa and the Middle East which has now turned into a powerful rallying tool for the right-wing populists throughout the West.

Crisis of mass migration

How to deal with the record number of the world's migrant and refugee populations is perhaps the most pressing concern of the receiving countries both in Europe and elsewhere, particularly that it does not look like there will be any solution to this problem in near future. Here again, the historical responsibility of the imperialist countries for uprooting millions in their colonies is conveniently erased from historical memory – the British in India, Iraq, Egypt and Palestine, the French in Lebanon/Syria and North Africa and 'Indochina', the US in South East Asia and almost everywhere else.

The unprecedented scale of population movements, internal displacement, migration and asylum seeking are surly one of the tragedies of the twenty-first century. But the consequences of the global economic system under neo-liberal fanaticism rarely enter the equation. Consider the terrible mix of intensified economic competition for access to larger and more diversified profitable economic resources and markets; pressures for lifting border controls to facilitate the flow of capital, goods and services; along with reduction in social spending, and dismantling of welfare states, that inevitably lead to the widening gap between the rich and the poor, chronic unemployment and poverty. Ecological devastations and droughts, partly natural and partly man-made, several wars and civil wars, total devastation of some nations and life in fear for others, ethnic cleansing, the brazen assaults on the environment, economic instability, the onslaught on humanity in the name of law and order and the turn to religious and cultural intolerance, all prompt the mass flights of people from country of their birth in search of a decent life and security. Add to this the post 9/11 refugee-inducing US-UK led adventures in the Middle East and Africa, mentioned earlier.

The invasion and disintegration of Libya opened a 1770 km unchecked gate to the Mediterranean and Europe, and thousands upon thousands of African and Middle Eastern youth escaping wars, economic devastations and ecological disaster risked their lives to go to Europe. Libyan disintegration, aggravated tribal conflicts and the rise of new Islamist groups, led to the neighbouring Chad, Mali and other parts of Northwest Africa, heightened asylum seeking movements. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had originated in Algeria, expanded its activities and along with other Islamists and tribal rebels created havoc in this part of the world. All this accentuated the chronic problems of the region, including economic stagnation, chronic unemployment, man-made drought and mismanagement of the economy, occasioned by the imposed neo-liberal policies. Hence, the mass migration of youth, which has expanded following the massive population flights from Syria, and other war-torn countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

The scale of the problem makes justified the UN identification of this development as 'the most devastating event in history'. A 2016 UNHCR report states that the total number of world's displaced people reached 65.3 million in 2015, 'the highest ever – surpassing even post-World War II numbers'. Today 1 in every 113 people worldwide, or approximately 1 per cent of the earth's population is either an asylum-seeker, internally displaced, or a refugee. Half of them are children (UNHCR, 2017). The UNHCR report does not include at least 19 million people separately uprooted by natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes. It estimates however that of the 12.4 million people who were displaced in 2015, 8.6 million, remained within the borders of their own country.[12] Kenya, hosts half a million in Dabaab camps alone; 1 in every 4 people in Lebanon is a refugee, Turkey hosts close to 2 million refugees already, so does Pakistan and to lesser extent Ethiopia, Jordan and Iran.

The point however is, that there are really no surprises here. Even before the massive pressure caused by the mass arrival of the displaced populations from conflict zones of the Middle East and Africa, the UN and some analysts had repeatedly warned the world of the consequences of underfunded aid efforts, and the neglect of the impending crisis, including the cuts to food subsidies for the refugees in Lebanon and Jordan by European and Canadian governments were part of the problem. The crisis of unwanted or undesired migration comes at a time when Western countries are experiencing the downturn of decades of the neo-liberal market fanaticism, favouring the corporations' ever-expanding labour-saving technologies, deregulations, outsourcing and rigorous austerity which inevitably have led to deterioration of the status of the working majority, job insecurity, stagnant wages, unemployment, the general decline in the living standards and the widening gap between the rich and poor.

The links between migration and unshakable belief in the power of market to resolve all social and economic problems, and the strong lobbies working against state regulations and public spending, and the consequential decline in the wellbeing of the general population might not seem obvious. But for the

unemployed or precariously employed individuals in Western societies, the populists' xenophobic messages can make sense that the 'alien' migrants roaming in their cities, even though working in menial jobs, are the source of the problem.

Right-wing populism and gender

It is time now to turn our attention to another important, though not sufficiently recognised points of camaraderie between the two right-wing populism discussed here, that is the issue of gender relations and women's rights. Despite different context and circumstances, right-wing populists of differing creeds and ideologies have a general contempt for women and grave resentment against the idea of gender equity. Praise for family as the backbone of the nation and promotion of traditional values, the virtues of large families and motherhood, strong reactions to women's control over their productive rights, including access to abortion, and hostility towards homosexuality for example are normally shared concerns of populists everywhere. The correlation between family and homeland, and family honour and national pride which is female citizens' responsibility to sustain is in fact a recurring theme in populist discourse which by the way is very similar to the fascist treatise. Surely, context, cultural perspectives, and circumstances define how seriously and to what extent women's rights activists are demonised and punished, legally or illegally, publically or privately as well as the possibility or prohibition of women's rights advocacy and organised campaigns. This however, does not change the reality that the regulation and control of women's body everywhere is top on the list of the right-wing populist agenda.

The sense of insecurity and discomfort that many men feel because of the legal and social advances in women's rights, and the battles they have won for access to economic resources and social justice in such areas as equal pay for equal work, sexual assault and sexual harassment in workplaces, are turning the world of many men upside down, even though some of these rights have not yet been fully materialised. Many observers have noted the increase in gender violence and domestic tensions as the outcome of the upheavals in gender and family relations (WHO, 2017).[13] Just to provide an idea about the extent of the problem, consider that according to the US Department of Defence, (as reported by Gloria Steinem) the total number of American death in the war in Iraq between 2003 and 2010 was 4424. Compare this to the total number of 10,470 women that have been killed by intimate partners in that same period, 2002–2010 (Sanders, 2014).

Which is to say that the gendered values emphasised by the populists and their disparaging, misogynist remarks should never be taken as just words. Such words reflect deeper anxieties and concerns and they directly or indirectly influence ordinary people. The dramatic growth of anti-abortion violence in United States, reported to have been higher in 2016 than it has been in 20 years (O'Hara, 2017) surely reflects the reality that the anti-choice militants are more energised by having known anti-abortion politicians in charge of the state. It is not unreasonable to assume, for example, that having as Attorney General, the authority in charge of the law enforcement bodies in the United States, someone with known

anti-abortion views, embolden aggressive anti-choice individuals and reduce the standing and the safety of pro-choice practitioners and activists.

Here again, there is a poignant similarity between the populists' language and actions on both sides of the globe. Compare, for example, Mr Trump's denouncement of women who seek abortion, as deserving 'some form of punishment', with those of Turkey's Recep Tayyeb Erdoğan who repeatedly likens abortion to murder and birth control to treason, calling women who reject motherhood as 'deficient' and 'incomplete'(Ahmadi, 2012). Or the statement made by Iran's present Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, defining family planning as an imitation of Western lifestyle, and stressing the need for doubling the country's population, followed by the enactment of a bill that outlaws abortion and voluntary sterilisation and restricts access to contraceptives (Dehghan, 2015). I must also mention that the first executive order, signed by President Trump in his first full day in office, stripping funds from any organisation that performs or actively promotes abortion was a distressing reminder of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini's rush to declare the annulment of the existing family protection act and demanding women to cover up in offices and public places, just a few weeks after the collapse of the Shah's regime, ironically, on the eve of the International Women's Day of 1979.

Many controversial statements made about women during the US presidential elections, including those made specifically against Hillary Clinton, the 'nasty woman', struck a chord with Mr Trump's conservative Christian evangelists and the Tea Party supporters, with misogynist feelings and a hidden or not so hidden disdain for independent, smart, powerful women and the feminists. One should not wonder why Sarah Palin's towing her five children to campaign sites, her praise for hockey moms and her simple mind and simple words, appealed to many, notably the 30 something per cent of Americans who supported Tea Party movement and later rallied around the new presidential candidate in 2016. Similarly despising women's changing status, dress code and conduct in the fast modernising countries in the Middle East and North Africa constitute an effective mobilising rhetoric for the Islamist populists. The middle class, educated, independent women are considered the transmitters of the anti-Islam, Western virus, and the religious duty of every believing man is the moral cleansing of the society from this virus. Ordinary working poor men, who feel the promised globalisation prosperity and economic growth have passed them by could easily relate to this rhetoric. This is particularly true of the young recruits who join militant right-wing groups and go through the process of misogynist indoctrination and acculturation.

An analysis of the personal conducts of a number of terrorists who have struck the United States and Europe, for example shows the close links between political and personal terrorism, as invariably the terrorists' first victims have been their wives. In the United States, between 2009 and 2015, 16 per cent of mass shooters had previously been charged with domestic violence (the most recent case was November 2017 in Texas). One of the London bridge killers, Rachid Redouane had repeatedly kicked and slapped his wife, and tried to make her wear the hijab;

Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, who drove a truck into crowds in Nice, had a criminal record for domestic violence. Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people in the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, reportedly would beat his wife for slightest dissatisfaction. The Westminster Bridge attacker Khalid Masood also had a history of domestic violence and coercive control (Lewis, 2017). The young Canadian man who in February 2017 shot 6 men to death and wounded 17 more in a Quebec city mosque, did not have a wife to beat but he turned out to be holding a grudge against feminists whom he called 'Feminazi' on his facebook.

In societies, where aggression, coercion and intimidation, as the governing style have desensitised people against the use of aggression and violence, in particular when women are at the receiving end, women lose more with ascendance of right-wing Islamist populists to power, as they take female body as an organising principle in the utopian Muslim society they want to rebuild. Regulating women's conduct then becomes the quintessential emblem of Muslim identity. In Turkey, for instance, a major goal of the populist government of Erdoğan's social engineering scheme has been reversing over 80 years of legal and social reforms in favour of women. Erdoğan's public pronouncements that equality between men and women 'is against nature', continuously stressing motherhood as women's main role and vilifying working women, have certainly influenced policy directions in reverse of gender equity.[14] A tragic consequence of this anti-woman strategy is the emboldening of anti-women attitudes, reflected among other things in the dramatic increase in violence committed against women and in the number of women murdered, which according to the Turkish Ministry of Justice, has increased by 1,400 per cent between 2003 and 2010 (Tremblay, 2014).

The situation is even worse in Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei, like Erdoğan, considers most important women's role to be managing the home, and he initiated policies that aim at making marriage the only life option for women with devastating consequences for women's labour force participation and increasing incidence of gender violence, including spousal abuses which according to Iran's Fars News Agency, has consistently increased, for example by 3.2 per cent in only one year since 2016.[15] Cases in point are the growing incidence of sexual pestering in streets (*Mozahemat-e Khiabani*) and other public places and the spate of acid attacks against women who are considered as not properly veiled (*bad-Hijab*) which reached its height in 2014–2015. This was happening at the time that the parliament was debating a bill to provide legal protection to individuals who volunteer to prevent 'social vice', as it has been ordered by the Ayatollah.

Under this circumstances, known advocates of women's rights throughout the region put their liberties and lives on line by challenging the gendered social and political order in their countries. In Iran, for example, where publication of feminist materials has been banned by legislation since the 1997, right now over 50 women are in prison on charges of advocacy for women's rights. A great number of feminists throughout the Middle East and North Africa lose their lives or liberties for such activities. The cases in point are the deplorable number of Algerian women murdered in the 1990s; the considerable number who have become targets of brute violence since 2003 in Afghanistan; (including three

women, Najia Siddeiqqi, Hanifa Safi and Sitara Achkzai working with Afghan government on issues of women's rights); the cold blooded murder of Human rights and women's rights activists in Libya (such as Salwa Bugaighis who was stabbed to death in 2014), the assassination of feminist activists in Iraq (such as assassination of Khoula AlTalal) and the stabbing to death of two Syrian human rights activists, Halla and Ouroba Barakat – mother and daughter – in Turkey in September 2017.

Having said all this, amidst despairing global events that may prompt pessimism about the present and the future state of human conditions, reasons for transcending pessimism are also there. The scope of the Women's March in the United State, one day after President Trump's inauguration, in March 2017, and the magnitude of global support and solidarity it received, like the September 2017 two-week peace march of thousands of Israeli and Palestinian women, organised by 'Women Wage Peace' in September 2017, should keep hopes alive. The 2017 presidential or parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, speak loudly to the fact that even when there is no room left but the conventional electoral politics for people to express their objection against the economic and political conditions of their lives, they use it to claim a breathing space for themselves by rejecting the 'greater evils' through the means still available to them. Startling as the results of September 2017 elections in Germany, where the racialising populist right, the AfD won unprecedented 13 per cent of parliamentary votes, or the election of Sebastian Kurz's People's Party in Austria in October 2017, for example are, they should be seen as the clear indication of the deep resentments that ordinary citizens feel against the free hands offered to the business, in the name of the giving the private market the power to overcome inflexibility of publically controlled assets and services.

The increasing though cautious reactions of the majority of populations in almost all Muslim majority countries against Islamist parties who rose to actual or virtual power makes the future of Islamists populism doubtful as well. Egypt's revolt against Muslim Brotherhood's President Morsi; the gains of secular forces against the ruling Islamist party Al-Nahda in Tunisia; Libyan people storming the headquarters of the Islamist militia following the killing of the US ambassador; protest rallies in Pakistan following the shooting of Malala Yousafzai and the massacre of flu shot technicians; massive street demonstrations against Jama'at-i Islami in Bangladesh; and several weeks of huge protest rallies against the Turkish 'neo-Ottoman' Justice and Development (AKP) are cases in point.

The ordinary people may passively or actively align themselves with populists' rhetoric of fairness, choice and honesty. But this is essentially a response to the failure of the left and progressive forces to offer an alternative vision beyond neo-liberal globalisations. The counter-hegemonic activities, in the form of many loosely organised grass-root groupings and alliances for opposing the right-wing agitation, deception and/or electoral victory, within or outside party politics should move us beyond alarm and fear. I, for one, keep reminding myself to have more faith in the creativity of the forces of social change in resisting the ascendance of right-wing populisms, religious and market fundamentalism and all other forces

that promote despair, resignation and defeatism. Multiple forms of communication, social networking and virtual transnational organisations that were unthinkable 30 or 20 years ago, give the forces of resistance possibilities for mobilisation that could not be quashed easily. It is to be hoped that lessons learned from the events of the last few decades would be effectively used to block the marches of the populists-cum-fascists in the West and in the Middle East.

Notes

1 For a compelling analysis of how the United State and its allies found political Islam a reliable partner during the Cold War; see Dreyfuss (2005).
2 Some of these shared characteristics have been discussed in Reich (1970).
3 *Guardian Weekly*, 3–9 February 2017.
4 Following the assault on women in Cologne, Germany, in January 2016, the chief of police complained that the left political correctness prevented him from doing his job. 'Political correctness' has become target of the conservative journalists whenever they get a chance. On the subject of the vague nemesis of political correctness see *Guardian Weekly*, 16 December 2016, pp. 34–38.
5 *Keyhan* daily (4 Khordad 1358/May 1979.)
6 Interview with *Le Monde* newspaper, Paris, 9 January 1979.
7 Interview with *The Guardian* newspaper, Paris, 6 November 1978.
8 Larry Elliott in *The Guardian* goes on to say that 'during the business cycle upswing between 1961 and 1969, the bottom 90 per cent of Americans took 67 per cent of the income gains. During the Reagan expansion, two decades later, they took 20 per cent. During the Greenspan housing bubble of 2001–2007, they got just two cents in every extra dollar of national income generated while the richest 10 per cent took the rest.
9 The United States experienced terrorism, committed mostly by white supremacists, such as the Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 people and the Unabomber, lasting for 20 years until mid-1990s, not to mention the horrifying indiscriminate shooting in Las Vegas in October 2017. Also there was the shocking terrorist violence in Norway, where a right supremacist targeted government headquarters in Oslo, and massacred a large number of defenseless teenagers at the Labour Party's annual summer youth camp in 2011. If you check the internet under the subject, terrorism, numerous acts of terror committed by left and right terrorists will appear.
10 Islamic populism is a relatively new brand of populism that uses religion as the rallying point with long-term destructive consequences. It has a large variety ranging from Hinduism (the Narendra Modi's and MGR's, called prince of populism) to Judaism (United Torah Judaism or Shas), Christianity (Protestant Evangelists, Millenarianists in the United States) and Islam with its wide Shia and Sunni varieties from Khomeini to Erdoğan. What they have in common is the literal as opposed to allegorical reading of the sources of faith that can rightly be branded as religious fundamentalism with its accompanied social conservatism.
11 Surely, Islamist fundamentalism as the ideological foundation for Islamic populism has been part of the doctrinal Islam: Ibn Hanbal (780–855); Ibn Taiemiya (1263–1328); Muhamad Abd al Wahhab (1703–1792). But it never before could turn into a massive populist movement. For example, in the late 1920s Egypt, Hassan al-Banna, established the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of fighting 'cultural imperialism' and establishing a pure Islamic order, but his movement, despite attracting many followers, could not achieve much. After his assassination, his followers, notably Sayyid Qutb, could not turn the movement into a massive populist uprising and most of the leadership was hanged by the Young Officers of the new republic, even though his obscurantist ideas, including the ideology's embedded misogyny, inspired many

Sunni fundamentalists who came to prominence at a later time. Some of these ideas were revived during the so-called Arab Spring in 2011 and its aftermath when the Islamists gained majority in their nations' legislative assemblies and won the short-lived presidency in Egypt.

12 Only 16.1 million of this huge population is under UNHCR mandate, and 5.2 million under UNRWA (UN Relief and Work Agency) protection.

13 The WHO global estimates that about 1 in 3 (35 per cent) women, worldwide, experienced physical and/or sexual violence in in their lifetime.

14 In 2014, Turkey ranked 125 out of 140 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index published annually by the World Economic Forum. In 2015, it ranked 130 in the same index. That is in only two years the country's rank was bumped further down.

15 Reported by Deutsche Welle Persian, 24 November 2017.

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6 'Gender(ed) nationalism' of the populist radical right

An extreme typicality

Leila Hadj-Abdou

Introduction

In spring 2012, just before International Women's Day, the initiative Women against Islamisation went public. Led by the Belgian populist radical right (PRR) party Vlaams Belang (VB), the initiative presented itself as a European wide enterprise. Speakers from several European countries, including the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) (OTS, 2012) took part at the launch. The initiative's aim is to defend the 'freedom and the dignity of women' in light of an increasing 'Islamisation' of Europe (Women against Islamization, 2017).

This event is paradigmatic for three intertwined developments within the PRR since the late 1990s: first, the adoption of Muslim immigrants as a major target group, second, the evolution of a common transnational political agenda, characterised by an intensified cooperation across PRR parties (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013) and consequently, the diffusion of restrictive policy ideas and a corresponding rhetoric, from one PRR party to the other (Mudde, 2007, p. 84). Third, there is also the development of a strong emphasis across different PRR parties on the issue of gender equality (Akkerman, 2015; Hadj-Abdou, 2010, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015). This last development in particular is astonishing, given that many PRR parties have been known for exhibiting explicitly conservative-nationalist gender policy positions (Amesberger & Halbmayr, 2002).

This chapter focuses on this puzzling emphasis on gender equality by the PRR, using one of the most successful European parties of the PRR, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), as a case study. The aim of this chapter is to trace this (re)positioning of the party in regard to gender over time, and to analyse this turn. First, it shows that different variants of gender(ed) nationalism exist in parallel. On the one hand, in terms of substantive policies, ultra-conservative, nationalist conceptions of gender relations prevail. On the other hand, references to gender equality and women's rights have become a core element of boundary making in the discourses of the FPÖ, establishing 'Europeanised' nationalist narratives of the 'self' and the 'other'. Second, the chapter argues that this latter evolution is strongly related to a transformation of nationalism in Europe, which having become 'Europeanised', relies on a Muslim other. In order to describe the

instrumental use of gender equality in these nationalist narratives by the PRR, the definition 'gender nationalism' is used here. This term captures not only recent developments but emphasises the centrality and historic continuity of the role of gender in exclusionary imaginations about the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997, 2011). Third, the chapter examines whether this boundary making strategy is effective, by looking at how far the FPÖ has been able to set the agenda. Has gender nationalism spread to other major political parties, and has this manifested itself in actual policies? Finally, the chapter concludes that we can speak of gender nationalism today as an 'extreme typicality', to adapt the framing of Spierings and Zaslove (2015, p. 170) (see Mudde, 2010). Although, from a comparative perspective, this has happened with some delay, a variant of gender nationalism promoting the exclusion of Islam and Muslim immigrants is nowadays the new normal in Austria. While the country's PRR has represented this variant of gender nationalism to an intensified degree, it is thus in no way an exception any longer in doing so.

The diagnosis is particularly interesting in the Austrian context, given that it has one of the most accommodating arrangements as regards the Islamic religion in Europe (Hadj-Abdou, Siim, Rosenberger & Saharso, 2012). Claims for a prohibition of Muslim head and body-covering, for instance, have been long a taboo in this country (Hadj-Abdou et al., 2012).

While this chapter provides detailed insights about Austria and the FPÖ, it contributes to the wider debate on populism and gender. Populism has been undoubtedly one of the most researched topics in the social sciences: the relationship between gender and populism, however, remains among the most understudied issues so far (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 36). In the recent past, a series of excellent research papers (e.g. Akkerman, 2015; Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Brubaker, 2017; De Lange & Mügge, 2015; Fekete, 2006; Meret & Siim, 2013; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015; Vieten, 2016) have been published which have significantly raised our knowledge on this issue. In particular, their systematic, comparative perspective has contributed to the understanding of the peculiarities of the PRR party family as regards its position on gender. This chapter builds upon these works, and seeks to provide some context and in-depth perspectives on the FPÖ, to contribute to these already existing studies. The analysis of the rhetoric and the policy positions of the FPÖ as regards gender relations is based on a qualitative content analysis of party material (party programmes, electoral manifestos, party handbooks and press releases) from 1999 onwards.

The chapter is structured in five parts: in the following section, an overview of the FPÖ will be provided. The section describes the electoral strength of the party, and its electoral strategies over time. It also looks at the gender dimension, as regards the electorate as well as party representatives. In the next section, the party's policy positions over time on the issues of gender and women will be discussed. Then the use of gender equality references as a boundary making strategy will be analysed. The last section of the chapter discusses the efficacy of the party's gender nationalism in terms of its impact on the political centre parties and policy outputs.

The FPÖ – A Männerpartei, with multiple, thin ideologies

Austria has been often described as the 'heartland' (Bale & Gruber, 2014, p. 6) of the PRR, given that the FPÖ emerged earlier and has been more successful than most of its fellow PRR parties in Europe. From 2000 to 2006 the Austrian PRR has been also part of the national government. In the last general election in October 2017, the FPÖ obtained nearly 26 per cent of the vote. In December 2017 the party entered national government in coalition with the Conservative Party (ÖVP). The electoral strength of the party is also indicated by the 2016 presidential elections, in which the party's candidate Nobert Hofer reached 46.2 per cent of the vote (2,124,661 votes).

Shifting and co-existing nationalisms as a vote maximising strategy

In contrast to many newly founded PRR parties, the party belongs to a second group of PRR parties which emerged as a result of the transformation of an established party into a PRR party (Helms, 1997). Its transformation from a German nationalist fringe party into the Western PRR success model started in 1986, when Jörg Haider took over the leadership of the party.

At its foundation in 1949, the goal of the FPÖ's predecessor party, Federation of Independents (VDU), was to attract former National Socialists and war returnees (Luther, 2000, p. 427), or as the VDU framed it to serve as the 'respected and un-incriminated representatives of the interests of registered National Socialists'

Table 6.1 FPÖ national election results (including splinter party BZÖ)

Year	Votes	Percentage	Seats	Rank
2017	1,316,442	25.97	51	3
2013	962,313 (FPÖ)	20.5	40	3
	165,746 (BZÖ)	3.5	–	7
2008	857,029 (FPÖ)	17.5	34	3
	522,933 (BZÖ)	10.7	21	4
2006	519,598 (FPÖ)	11	21	4
	193,539 (BZÖ)	4.1	7	5
2002	491,328	10.0	18	3
1999	1,244,087	26.9	52	2
1995	1,060,377	21.9	41	3
1994	1,042,332	22.5	42	3
1990	782,648	16.6	33	3
1986	472,205	9.7	18	3
1983	241,789	5.0	12	3

Source: Federal Ministry of Interior, 2017; own compilation.

(cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 304). In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the party went through a liberal phase, while maintaining a strong ideological orientation towards German nationalism at the grass roots level (Bailer & Neugebauer, 1998). In the 1990s, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the party adopted the 'thin' ideology of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6) to turn itself into a highly successful political force. This type of thin ideology claims to represent the people, understood as an entity. Populism stands in stark contrast to a pluralistic, interest guided understanding of democratic politics (Müller, 2016). It is about constructing and exploiting the binary of the (pure) people versus the (corrupt) elites (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Taggart, 2000). Haider attached to populism the (also rather thin) ideology of Austrian nationalism, paired with a strong anti-immigrant agenda. A commitment to 'Austrian patriotism' was eventually inserted in the party manifesto in 1997 (Luther, 2006, p. 379). Rather than reflecting a political conviction of the party, let alone a clear rejection of German nationalism, the adoption of Austrian patriotism was a vote maximising strategy (Luther, 2006). German nationalism did not resonate with the electorate. In the late 1980s, only 6 per cent of the Austrian population still thought of themselves as Germans (Brückmüller, 1998, p. 16).

Under the leadership of Heinz Christian Strache, who has chaired the party since 2005, the type of nationalism propagated by the FPÖ has shifted again. To be more precise, the ideological foundation of the nationalism propagated by the FPÖ nowadays has several layers, each layer addressing a distinct electorate. Strache strengthened anew the branch of the party ideologically attached to German nationalism, after Haider had previously significantly reduced it (Weidinger, 2017). In 2011, the party also reintroduced the commitment to the German ethnic and cultural community into its party programme (*Deutsche Volks- und Kulturgemeinschaft*) (Weidinger, 2017, p. 127). This German nationalism targets party members and sympathisers of the political spectrum of the extreme right. The party at the same time continued to exhibit an Austrian patriotism, seeking to address the conservative (and often nativist) Austrian electorate. Finally, a third, complementary layer of nationalism has evolved, which will be discussed more in-depth later in this chapter. This is a 'Europeanised' version of nationalism, which operates with strong references to gender equality. This latter move can be interpreted as an attempt to appeal to 'nativist modernists' (Spierings, Lubbers & Zaslove, 2017), a group of the electorate which, while nativist, endorses certain liberal values.

The FPÖ – still a 'Männerpartei'?

Does this imply that the party has also 'modernised' itself in the sense that it distinguishes itself from a typical PRR 'Männerpartei'? There is actually little evidence for this diagnosis. With the exception of 2002, the party never passed the 25 per cent mark in terms of female members of parliament. However, from 1986 to 1994 and in 1999, the conservative People's Party (ÖVP) had actually a smaller share of female representatives in the national assembly than the FPÖ

(Steininger, 2000). It is also noteworthy that the first female vice chancellor was a member of the Freedom Party (Susanne Riess-Passer, 2000–2003). The second woman to serve as one of the presidents of parliament in the Second Republic was also a member of the FPÖ (Heide Schmidt, 1990–1994). So while the party had a couple of female leading figures, and the 'gender gap' of representatives is not a unique trait of the PRR, in overall numbers, there is a clear under-representation of female MPs in the FPÖ. From the 40 parliamentary seats won in the 2013 general election, for instance, only 7 were held by women. During this legislative period, the female ratio of 18 per cent was smaller than in any other parliamentary party. In contrast to the other major parties, which have either female quotas in place (SPÖ, Greens), or have women's sections that have advocated at some point for quota arrangements (ÖVP) (Die Presse, 2017), the FPÖ – including its women's section – has been consistently, and strictly, against any female quotas.

In terms of the electorate, we also find a clear gender gap. The FPÖ electorate has been substantially male dominated (Forum Politische Bildung, 2006; Plasser & Ulram, 2000). While in the 2017 general election this gap became actually smaller compared to the previous election, a significant gender gap persists over time. In 2013, polls showed that 29 per cent of male voters opted for the FPÖ, whereas only 16 per cent of women voted for them (SORA, 2013). At the 2017 elections in turn 22 per cent of women voted for the FPÖ as opposed to 29 per cent of men (SORA, 2017).

As Spierings and Zaslove (2015) remind us, though, there is scarcely any difference between men and women in terms of anti-immigrant attitudes. This holds true also for Austria (Friesl, Renner & Wieser, 2010, p. 18). This consequently suggests that the female electorate provides a significant potential of growth for PRR parties such as the FPÖ. However, their research (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015) also suggests that the populist ideology might be one of the explanatory factors, in addition to the different professional profiles of men and women, as to why women are less likely to vote for the PRR. Harteveld, van der Brug, Dahlberg, and Kokkonen (2015) come to a similar conclusion. However, Mayer (2013) in turn has shown, as regards the French Front National that increasing the female electorate is a viable path for the PRR, particularly under a female leader.

As for now, based on its electorate and on the gender composition of it representatives, the FPÖ clearly qualifies as a 'Männerpartei'. But this does not necessarily imply a poor substantive representation as well (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015). Scholarship (Celis, 2008, p. 86) has taught us that there is actually no clear-cut link between numerical female representation and substantive representation. In order to make any judgements on the substantive representation of women, we have to look at the policy agenda of the FPÖ, to see whether the character of a 'Männerpartei' is actually mirrored in a wide array of policy positions of the FPÖ. As will be shown in the next section, ultra-conservative positions in the field of gender relations are a constant over time. The low numerical representation thus correlates with low substantive representation.

FPÖ's policy position on women and gender equality

The issue of women has become a prominent issue for the party since the mid-1990s, as the FPÖ was attempting to increase its female vote. In 1996, the 'Initiative of freedomnite women' (*Initiative freiheitlicher Frauen*) was founded under the leadership of Jörg Haider (Hauch, 2000, p. 79). At the beginning of the national electoral year in 1999, the party proclaimed a political repositioning and a programmatic shift of policies to children, women and family, in order to attract new female voters, with 'soft issues' as Haider put it (Hauch, 2000, p. 75). These policies primarily conceptualised women as mothers. Beyond this role as mothers women were addressed to a very limited extent.

Family and reproduction

The position of the party as regards the role of women (and family) in society has remained stable over the years, this is reflected in all the party material analysed since 1999. The heterosexual family is seen as the foundation of society. Policy proposals for women are basically equated with family policies. In the 2013 party handbook, family is accordingly defined as the core (literally: nucleus) and the glue (*Keimzelle und Klammer*) of a functioning society (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 131). While the party currently discursively emphasises 'freedom of choice', between being a working mother or a stay-at-home mother, the clear (policy) prioritisation is on the stay-at-home mother (FPÖ, 2002, p. 37, 2013a, p. 134). In sum, women are predominantly and foremost conceptualised as mothers. Family policy is essentially based on a model of male breadwinners and female caregivers, as expressed through policies such as taxation benefits for sole earners (Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer, 2014, p. 257). This concept of women as mothers is, in turn, based on ultra-conservative, statist ideas of gender relations, as the following statements (FPÖ, 2013b, p. 32) make clear:

> The man who has been thrown from his throne as the head of family is longing in an unchanged manner for a partner . . . whose brood care instinct outweighs imposed ambitions of self-realization. The . . . woman is still longing in an unchanged manner for a solid man, who provides her with all emotional and economic security needed by a young mother in order to dedicate herself fully and without any great worries, to her offspring. Both desires are not met [today].
>
> (FPÖ, 2013b, p. 32 – translation L.H.A.)

The party's focus has been continuously on a variety of policy measures that stimulate an increase of reproduction within native families, which are supposed to serve 'the survival of the nation' (*Überleben unseres Volkes*) (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 47). This nation is seen as endangered by immigration (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 31). Measures in support of maintaining the role of women as mothers are thus (more or less implicitly) seen as a matter of keeping the nation 'pure'. In this line of

thought, the nation is not only a community of spirit: it is a community whose spirit is transferred biologically from one generation to the next.

These visions also correspond to a restrictive policy position on the issue of abortion, which started to become a major focus of the party from the mid-2000s. Before that, restrictive claims had not been placed prominently on the party's agenda. In 1999, a FPÖ parliamentarian tried to abolish the right to abortion, but was met with resistance by the rest of the party at the time (ORF, 2012). This policy shift can be seen as a rapprochement with the nativist, Catholic electorate (Hadj-Abdou, 2016, p. 43).

Abortion today is conceptualised by the FPÖ as being responsible for many psychological and physical illnesses of women (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 134). In response, various measures (such as the establishment of a foundation for the protection of human life, or the introduction of nationwide statistical documentation about abortion) are called for by the FPÖ, aimed at preventing abortions. Referring to numbers of aborted foetuses in the country, the party described the uterus as the space with the highest probability of dying (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 160). The issue of abortion, especially, suggests that the party did undergo a certain radicalisation in their programmatic under the leadership of Strache.

Marriage and adoption for homosexuals are rejected (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 142) by the FPÖ as well. This restrictive position was upheld during the party's participation in national government, and was lately confirmed anew after the Austrian Green Party's attempt to introduce marriage equality in a parliamentary motion in June 2017 (FPÖ, 2017).

Another indicator of the ultra-conservative position as regards gender relations is the current approach of the party to domestic violence. The right to evict a man from his home in cases of domestic violence is portrayed by the party as being misused by women. The party, hence, calls for a softening of this protective provision. It demands the cutting down of the current period of up to 6 months of possible eviction to half of that time (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 159). Most notably, a local head of party has also repeatedly called for the abolishment of women's shelters. As some FPÖ politicians claim, women's shelters are contributing significantly to the destruction of marriages and partnerships (Auinger, 2017, p. 37).

Opposing the 'gender' threat

Instruments such as gender mainstreaming are seen as ideologically driven, that are based on the – in the perception of the FPÖ – misguided idea that gender is socially constructed, and these policy instruments are thus firmly rejected. In the 2002 electoral manifestation (FPÖ, 2002, p. 42), in a period when the FPÖ participated in government, the party still emphasised that it had contributed to the establishment of an intergovernmental working group on Gender Mainstreaming. Today, the dissolution of conservative and static, 'natural' gender roles, which is seen as driven by measures such as gender mainstreaming, is portrayed as the reason for 'child abuse', 'hatred against men or women', and even feelings

of 'aggression leading to rampages' (FPÖ, 2013b, p. 113). This behaviour according to the party is a reaction to compensate for the societal 'abnormalities' of gender ideas (Auinger, 2017, p. 27; FPÖ, 2013b, p. 32). In sum, the responsibility for aggressive, hateful and abusive behaviour is ascribed to the spread of ideas about gender as being socially constructed. Thus, (male) perpetrators are turned into victims.

In line with its populist anti-establishment attitude, gender mainstreaming is seen by the party as being pushed through top down, in an entirely undemocratic manner (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 136). According to the party, gender mainstreaming carries the hidden 'totalitarian' agenda of destroying identities 'in cultural and societal' terms, wanting to create 'the new human [being]' without any gender identities (FPÖ, 2013a, p. 136). The promotion of the idea of the constructed nature of gender is thus seen as an attempt to 'manipulate' the people, a common project of communism and capitalism (FPÖ, 2013a). Policy measures and concepts such as gender mainstreaming are consequently labelled as an 'ideological gender reassignment' (FPÖ, 2013a). The reference to a leftist or capitalist project or even a conspiracy, which acts against the interests of the people, is a well-known populist strategy. Even in the case that populists are themselves powerholders as Jan-Werner Müller (2016, pp. 68–69) reminds us, the reference to corrupted elites that supposedly hold control in the background, is a powerful instrument to reify the legitimacy of populists. Karin Stögner (2017, p. 154) identifies this strategy of combining the antagonistic ideologies of communism and capitalism as an anti-Semitic pattern, reminding us that this has been a common rhetorical strategy and othering process against Jewish people (*the capitalist, bolshevist Jew*).

In overall terms, we see a continuous equation of women's policies with pro-family policies. We can see moreover a more pronounced, radical position as regards gender relations from the middle of the first decade in the twenty-first century onwards, when Strache took power within the party. Most notably, as a result, nowadays, the FPÖ includes a more explicit 'anti-gender' position, opposing anti-essentialist understandings of gender relations. The rhetoric of the FPÖ was more moderate during its participation in government, as the party was aiming to exhibit a more liberal appearance. This does not necessarily imply however that the ideological convictions of the FPÖ were fundamentally different during their participation in government. On the contrary, it is worth noting that the first FPÖ/ÖVP coalition (2000) did actually abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs. This action was as a highly symbolic and value-laden measure. In place of the Women's Ministry, a department for men was established within the Ministry for Generations and Social Security, led by a male FPÖ minister.

The classification of women as primarily mothers and the perspective on gender mainstreaming as a threat to identity (socially and culturally) reveal a deep connection to classical nationalist conceptions of gender relations. It is the women who reproduce the nation culturally, and secure its existence across generations (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Gender and instruments such as gender mainstreaming are hence not simply rejected because they do not correspond to conservative ideas

of family life; they are rejected because they are seen as a betrayal and a threat to the nation. The policy positions of the FPÖ are, thus, not merely conservative, but are deeply entrenched in nationalism, an ideology which has never been gender neutral, but always gendered. Imagining the bodies of women and their reproductive powers as the saviours of the nation have been central instruments of nationalist ideologies throughout history (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

The party is to some extent also characterised by a misogynist discourse, as is for instance reflected in their policies on women's shelters. This misogynist discourse of the FPÖ finally might be a peculiar phenomenon of the Austrian PRR, given that Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015) find that in Northern Europe, populists do not exhibit an explicitly sexist discourse.

In more than one way, the party exhibits a deeply gendered nationalism. As a part of this gender(ed) nationalism, we also see a pronounced anti-gender position, which has been in recent years also a growing concern of restrictionist social movements that aim to halt or revert social change. Such movements include the right extreme identitarian (*Die Identitären*) movement (see Mayer et al., 2014) or the French 'Protests for Everyone' (*Manif pour tous*) movement (Sauer, 2017), who advocate against rights for homosexuals. This anti-gender attitude, thus, enables and strengthens potential alliances, with actors of the political right-extremist spectrum. While officially the party avoids presenting itself openly as an ally of these types of social movements, regular informal exchanges and engagements of members of the identitarian movement in FPÖ organisations have been reported (DÖW, 2016).

Using gender equality as a boundary making strategy

The 'classical' gendered nationalist agenda of the FPÖ has been combined since the middle of the first decade in the twenty-first century with a second type of gender(ed) nationalism, expressed through an explicit gender equality rhetoric, which is closely linked to an anti-Islam and anti-Muslim agenda. Research on the PRR has found that this type of gender nationalism is common within many Western European PRR parties since the mid-1990s (Vieten, 2016, p. 624). In that regard, the FPÖ is a latecomer. References to gender equality only emerged with the take-over of the leadership by Heinz Christian Strache. As suggested before, this delay can be partly explained by the fact that in 2000, the party entered national government, and had to tone down its anti-immigrant rhetoric, given also the heightened attention by the international community and the European Union at the time (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013). To give an example of this moderate public appearance, in 2004, the FPÖ did not utter any form of public protest when the Minister of Education (ÖVP) issued a decree that the wearing of the headscarf by pupils is regulated as a religious right that cannot be restricted by any institution (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013, p. 152).

After the split of the party in 2005 into ideologically nearly identical parties (the BZÖ and the FPÖ), the new FPÖ under Strache successfully used the issue

of Islam to distinguish the party from its competitor (Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013, p.153), catching up with the developments in other PRR parties across Western Europe. At the core of this anti-Islam-agenda was the portrayal of Islam and Muslims as a culture that oppresses women. Already in spring 2001, the Haider-FPÖ had held a discussion on female genital mutilation (FGM), underlining that immigration had brought FGM to Europe. It was however stated that this social practice is condemned by Muslim scholars and the Quran (OTS, 2001). This differentiated line of argumentation has now faded away, and has been substituted by a clear discursive formation of binary opposition between pre-modern Islam which oppresses women and a modern European *Leitkultur*, characterised by liberal core values such as gender equality. This new pattern emerged first in the framework of the FPÖ debate on the accession of Turkey to the EU in 2004 and has been intensified from 2005 onwards.

Oppressive Muslim practices were put in the spotlight, in order to point to alleged irreconcilable cultural differences and backwardness of Muslim immigrants. For instance, in the national electoral campaign of 2006, one of the main slogans used was 'free women instead of forced veiling' (*Freie Frauen statt Kopftuchzwang*). The main goal of these continuously recited narratives was basically the restriction of immigration (Fekete, 2006) and the reproduction of a nationalist tale of 'us' versus 'them'. This discursive legitimisation of restrictive immigration regulations is also highlighted by the fact that these gender equality references were rarely ever accompanied by policy proposals for migrant women, other than the restriction of Muslim practices (Akkerman, 2015, p. 53).

From the late 2000s onwards, the issue of security started to be linked with the gender equality discourse. The theme of sexualised crimes committed by Muslims had started to emerge and intensify. This line of argumentation was boosted by the sexual assaults incidents during the New Years' celebrations in the German city of Cologne in 2015/2016, which have been widely met in the public sphere with racialised notions about sexual violence. Consequently, sexual crimes towards native Austrian women committed by asylum seekers were among the main foci of the party in 2016 and 2017. The Muslim, asylum seeking rapist is today a powerful image in the public discourse: an image relied on by the FPÖ.

These othering processes, which are a core discursive strategy of not only the FPÖ but many PRR parties today, have to be situated into a wider context. First, we have to relate these developments to a shift from questions of economic distribution to those of identity and values (Fraser, 1995) in a post-1989 Europe. This shift is not a mere expression of PRR politics, but lies at the very heart of the emergence and growth of the PRR.

Second, this development was also accompanied by a new understanding of immigrant integration. Integration politics, in the past decades have 'burst out of their specific policy domain and entered the civic sphere, where the conditions and nature of belonging are negotiated' (Uitermark, 2010, p. 6). Integration hence became a battlefield of nationalism and a core arena for the 'dirty work' (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 204) of boundary making and maintenance. The message 'work, pay tax, don't hit your children and show respect for equal rights between the

sexes', for instance, which the Danish Ministry of Integration displayed in 2006 on its webpage (Fekete, 2006, p. 3) captures this trend in a nutshell.

Third, post-1989 European nation-states have become increasingly Europeanised as a result of the European integration process. The very fact that nationalist narratives rely on references to gender equality, which is framed as a European value, and the trope of the Muslim 'other' suggest that nationalism actually underwent a certain Europeanisation.

As Matti Bunzl (2005) has poignantly captured it, modern anti-Semitism is a product of the nineteenth century and was closely related to nationalism and the emergence of the nation-state, whereby the Jewish 'other' served primarily as a marker of who did or did not belong to the national community. The construction of the 'Muslim other' in contrast defines who belongs and who does not belong to Europe. As Bunzl (2005, p. 502) notes, those that mobilise against the 'Muslim other' are not concerned whether 'Muslims can be good Germans, Italians or Danes'; rather, they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Gender nationalism hence functions not exclusively or primarily in the interest of national, ethnic purification, but also as an instrument to legitimise the tightening of European borders in the face of international (to a great extent Muslim) migration. This migration, moreover, is characterised nowadays to a large extent by family reunification, and so the focus on migrant women and gender relations, hence seems plausibly also connected to this changing pattern of immigration (Akkerman, 2015).

This emergence of 'civilizationalism', as Brubaker (2017) has recently framed it, as a boundary making strategy thus represents a relatively new form of gender(ed) nationalism, which distinguishes itself from other variants of gender(ed) nationalisms through the reference to liberal values. This type of nationalism, however, certainly is not a PRR invention nor is it an entirely novel product. The topos of the oppression of women was also used in colonialist discourses to legitimise colonial rule, as has been shown by Leila Ahmed (1992) in her seminal work on women and gender in Islam. The practice of Muslim veiling was seen by the colonisers in the Middle East as proof of the 'quintessential otherness and inferiority of Islam' (Ahmed, 1992, p. 149) and a symbol of the oppression of women. Those who were the fiercest advocates against the oppression of women in the colonies, however, were at the same time advocates against women's rights at home, as demonstrated for instance by the cited example by Ahmed of the British Lord Cromer, who unveiled Egyptian women but at the same time opposed female suffrage in Britain (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 152–153). The gender nationalism of the FPÖ is a modern variant of this colonial pattern, though, as noted before, today it does not serve the justification of colonial power but to legitimise tighter immigration controls.

This 'new' type of gender nationalism co-exists with the more classical type of gender nationalism. The rhetorical commitment to gender equality in this new variant of gender nationalism seems to contradict the one that relies on an ultra-conservative understanding of gender relations. However, actually these two variants of gendered nationalism complement each other, in the sense that they

speak to two different audiences: modernised nativists including women, at the one end, and conservative nativists at the other. Although contradictory in content, they do not stand in each other's way. While, the 'classic' variant of gender(ed) nationalism is accompanied by substantive policy proposals, the second one remains largely rhetorical.

Another potential reason why these two contradictory variants of gender(ed) nationalisms are compatible and seem moreover to resonate with a wider electorate is the conceptualisation of gender equality within this electorate. Although there is indeed a strong commitment to gender equality, this commitment remains to some extent abstract. A total of 64 per cent of Austrians surveyed, for instance, view equality between men and women as a fundamental right (Eurobarometer, 2015, p. 31). However, when asked whether inequality between man and women has to be tackled, only 49 per cent of the Austrian respondents fully agree (Eurobarometer, 2015, p. 32). Both, the FPÖ's use of gender equality as a marker of identity as well as its conservative concept of gender relations, thus, seem to be to some extent in tune with the Austrian public attitude.

Gender nationalism of the radical right – An extreme typicality

Having detected the presence of different types of gender nationalisms as part of the FPÖ's repertoire to appeal to the electorate, in this final section, we will now turn to question, if the party was able to have a wider impact in terms of the establishment of restrictive policies (be it restrictive immigration policies or restrictions on Muslim practices). Indeed, it has to be noted that gender-nationalism targeting Muslims has been also adopted by other parties, most notably the ÖVP, and this can be interpreted as a result of the intensive FPÖ anti-Islam discourse.

In the national election campaign of 2008, the ÖVP, for instance, claimed that 'immigrants from other cultures have to accept that women in Austria are emancipated. . . . Zero tolerance for cultural setback' (ÖVP Vienna, 2008). In the same year the then interior minister, also of the ÖVP called for the enshrining of the term 'culture crimes' (*Kulturdelikte*) in the Austrian penal code to distinguish criminal acts such as 'honour killings' from other supposedly culturally neutral types of murder (that is murders committed by natives) (Falter, 2008).

While this policy proposal was not successful at the time, we can, however, see a continuous restriction in other relevant areas, most notably in the field of immigration and asylum in Austria. These policies were adopted by the government to appease the PRR, and to win (back) the electorate from the FPÖ. Tightened immigration and border controls represent 'the normalization of securitized boundaries of nationhood, culture, and gender in response to requests and fears capitalized' (on by the PPR) (Kinnvall, 2015, p. 526).

The fact that the 'new' gendered boundary making strategy by the radical right has been successful is also suggested by the recent prohibition of full veiling in all public spaces in Austria, which came into effect in autumn 2017. Non-compliance is penalised with a fine of 150 Euros. According to estimates that

have been used by both advocates and opponents of the ban, about 150 women in Austria fully cover themselves (Wiener Zeitung, 2017). It is thus, largely a symbolic policy, reaffirming the boundaries of 'us' and 'them', rather than a substantive policy dealing with a real problem.

Another issue is the trend towards value tests for immigrants, and particularly asylum seekers. These tests are a significant component of immigration and immigrant integration policy in Austria. According to the 2017 integration law, value training courses are obligatory for recognised refugees and are coupled with social benefits. The training materials for these value courses include strong references to gender equality, and for instance 'teach' immigrants that 'women can have a job, can walk alone in public, can meet female and male friends, can have and end relationships, and can drive cars on their own', and that men are not to be regarded as the 'head of family' (*Familienoberhaupt*) (ÖIF, 2017). Gender nationalism seems to have become a sort of 'normal typicality' in Austria.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the issue of gender nationalism of the Austrian PRR that is the phenomenon that nationalist narratives are strongly gendered. To provide a context to gender nationalism in the PRR, the chapter has first described the existing gender gap in terms of political representation and within the party's electorate, underlining that in both aspects the party represents a 'Männerpartei'. It then has argued that we find a combination of different variants of gender(ed) nationalism present in the rhetoric and ideology of the Austrian populist right. The first operates with ultra-conservative notions of motherhood and a corresponding equation of women as mothers. Women are seen as the symbolic border guards of the nation. In these nationalist imaginations, the native woman reproduces the nation by giving birth, and transfers its culture and identity from one generation to the next. The second, and more recent variant of gender nationalism, in turn uses a boundary making strategy that relies on the reference to the liberal value of gender equality and female emancipation as demarcation line between the native and the alien (Muslim) 'other'. This latter variant of gender nationalism, in particular the strategic reference to gender equality, can be also interpreted as a vote maximising strategy. Indeed female voters, and/or nativist modernists provide a strong potential for further growth for the PRR. Furthermore, the rather paradoxical combination of ultra-conservative policy positions with a rhetorical reference to gender equality seems to be somewhat in tune with the attitudes of large parts of the electorate, rather than challenging them. Hence, we can expect that both variants of gender nationalism will remain central components of the strategic and ideological repertoire of the party.

Finally, the chapter has also attempted to provide some explanations for the emergence of this new gender nationalism which is operating with strong references to gender equality. It has argued that its emergence is rooted in three developments. These are: first, the shift from the politics of redistribution to those of identity; second the transformation of the policy field of immigrant integration

to a field of the contentious politics of belonging and third, a shift from exclusively 'national' nationalisms to a 'Europeanised nationalism'. The chapter has finally also discussed the wider impact of the gender nationalism used by the FPÖ. It concludes that the second Europeanised version of gender nationalism, rather than being an exceptional phenomenon of the populist radical right, has become an 'extreme typicality'.

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7 Non-Western new populism

Religion, masculinity and violence in the East

Joshua M. Roose

Introduction

The world's attention has been firmly focussed upon the emergence of populism in the West. From the election of US President Donald Trump to the politics of the Brexit and electoral success of the European far right (particularly in Poland), liberal democracy appears to be facing an existential crisis of sorts. However, considerably less attention has been paid however to the emergence of populism in the global East and in particular the extent to which organised religion and masculinities have been mobilised by populist leaders to not only build their support base, but to craft a larger national narrative based on recapturing past greatness. They reassert the central role of both religion and men to the nation and act as a salve for years of humiliation, shame and perceived emasculation as actors occupying subordinated status both within their own countries and on the world stage.

This chapter develops some preliminary considerations for understanding what is occurring in the Philippines, Russia and India; three nations whose influence on the world is growing daily. I argue that clear similarities exist in the factors shaping support for populist strong men including a declining middle class, the erosion of trust in public institutions and the changing status of men – the same challenges to citizenship and social cohesion in the West. However, I also consider the mobilisation of both masculinity and religion by populist leaders in each country and how social marginalisation and a demonstrated willingness to resort to violence are dramatically undermining democracy in each nation with potentially detrimental consequences for international security.

The new populism

Scholarship is yet to adequately grasp the dimensions of what is a new and profoundly modern form of populism. A key challenge in defining populism is considered 'at least partially due to the fact that the term has been used to describe political movements, parties, ideologies and leaders across geographical, historical and ideological contexts (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 3). Despite the conceptual challenges, contemporary scholarship and media coverage alike

has converged on key elements defining the 'new populism', including mobilisation against faceless and corrupt elites, attacks against migrants and women's rights and an imagined national community that is seeking to restore past greatness. Calhoun (2017) has noted that populism is not just a politics of interests, but is expressly directed against 'interests' that divide the people. These interests undermine the notion of meritocracy and upward mobility through hard work. John Keane claims that populism is a 'democratic phenomenon' and public protest by the demos, who feel 'annoyed, powerless and no longer "held" in the arms of society' (Keane, 2016).

Significantly, given their influence in the life of working men, contemporary scholarship has largely failed to engage with how masculinity and religion have been mobilised by the new demagogues in building their base. As importantly, comparatively little work has been written about populism outside the west. Brubaker, for example, notes 'an extraordinary pan-European and trans-Atlantic populist moment' (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1191), but does not consider the near simultaneous developments that have occurred outside Europe and the United States. This Western centrism is dangerous, not only because it overlooks a significant percentage of the world's population in rapidly growing economies with significant geo-strategic ambition, but overlooks the international inspiration that populist movements draw from one another and how an ideological kinship has the potential to reshape international politics.

The new populism and masculinity

Contemporary scholarship overlooks the relationship between masculinity and populism in both western and non-western contexts. Few studies have adequately examined the manner in which populist movements and leaders have successfully mobilised masculinity (and in particular, religion inflected masculinity) grounded in social injury, alienation, anxiety and anomie to build their support base (Standing, 2011). The work that has been done on the role of masculinity in populism is primarily sociological, with political science conspicuously absent. Carver has noted that international relations research 'barely recognises gender as an analytical concept and treats the study of masculinity as a new idea' (Carver, 2014, p. 114). He notes further:

> Hierarchies of credibility in international politics are hierarchies of masculinities played out through weaponry, wealth and war. Without a gender lens attuned to this situation, the day to day struggles of competitive and boastful males, and often mutually destructive performances of masculinity, are not going to get the serious consideration they deserve.
>
> (Carver, 2014, p. 124)

Similarly, Blanchard has argued the necessity of understanding how masculinity influences international security and that 'masculine political culture is a resource for leaders looking to characterise the threat posed by other states (Blanchard, 2014, p. 72). The concept of masculinity offers considerable promise to scholars

– and indeed policy makers and diplomats alike – addressing the question of how social influences shape political action by leaders operating within a male dominated international paradigm, allowing us to move beyond stereotypes to understand the complexities of the enactment of masculinity in different contexts. The concept of 'hegemonic masculinity' is helpful in understanding why and how men might act with and without power in the public sphere. R.W. Connell and James W. Messerschmitt note that

> [hegemonic] masculinity was distinguished from other masculinities, especially subordinated masculinities . . . [Hegemonic masculinity] embodied the currently most honoured way of being a man; it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it.
>
> (Connell & Messerschmitt, 2005, p. 832)

A subordinated masculinity, particularly among the most disempowered, may be expressed in a highly performative manner, emphasising a 'hyper' masculinity through displays of 'physicality' and 'toughness'. Greg Noble (2007) understands such displays as the result of a lack of 'honourable recognition' and a lack of respect from wider society. Linda McDowell frames such performativity as a ' "protest masculinity" as an aggressive "macho" stance in which the positioning of the working class male body in space is used to threaten and challenge perceived "others" ' (McDowell, 2003, p. 12). As will become clear, this speaks directly to the physical bravado and language adopted by the new populists as they seek to build their base of support.

Importantly, there is a dearth of scholarship on non-western masculinities. Connell, Hearn and Kimmel have argued that research on men and masculinities remains a 'first world enterprise' (Kimmel, Hearn & Connell, 2004, p. 9). Similarly, Chie Ikeya has noted that only a small number of studies in South and South East Asian studies address 'the historical construction and evolution of masculinities in the region and even fewer offer in-depth inquiries into the extent to which historical forms of masculinity governed social relations' (Ikeya, 2014, p. 243). Michael S. Kimmel has argued the existence of a 'global gender order' to outline the resistance of non-western men to western masculinities as they 'secure their local masculinities against encroachment' (Kimmel, 2010, p. 75). Kimmel has explored how for Islamist groups including the Taliban, a key element of their political ideology revolved around seeking to recover their manhood from the 'devastatingly emasculating politics of globalisation' (Kimmel, 2010, p. 158). This appears to correlate with the concept of 'subordinate masculinities', with such actors seeking to re-empower themselves in the face of a more powerful 'other'. Yet despite the potential of such approaches, few have applied them to the new demagogues and populism in the developing world.

Religion and the new populism

The role of religion is also an overlooked dimension of the new populism. This could be considered to be reflective of mainstream marginalisation of religion

in the academy. However, Cas Mudde (2016) has referred to knowledge on the relationship between religion and populism as 'an important black spot'.

Of the few works exploring the relationship between the new populism and religion, the edited collection *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion* (Marzouki, McDonnell & Roy, 2016) is most notable for the breadth of coverage and argument. A comparative work focused on the European context, its core (cumulative) argument is that Christianity in Europe has been appropriated (and indeed, held hostage) by populists to develop their anti-Islam and anti-Muslim narrative and that the faith and theological dimensions of Christianity remain abstracted from populist identity politics. However, as Forlenza (2017) has noted, this deprives those drawn to populist narratives who actively identify as Christian of the possibility that they may experience the emotions of fear, anger and resentment related to the notion of an existential threat to their faith and identity, no matter how imaginary this threat might be. Furthermore, that book fails to engage with denominational differences (and competition) and the broader political manoeuvring of Christian Churches across Europe and the United States as they engage with or challenge populist leaders and movements to enhance their social and political standing. The political and solidaristic dimensions of religion thus tend to be dismissed as illegitimate (Morieson, 2017).

It may be argued that on the one hand, religion has been politicised as an identity marker by the new populists. However on the other, that organised religion is far from passive in the current political climate. Any attempt to understand populism must take account of the strategies and tactics employed by the leadership of different churches, denominations and faiths in the competition for adherents and political influence, even if this is interpreted as conducted in the service of the faith.

New populism in the East

The Philippines, Russia and India, cumulatively constitute over 20 per cent of the world's population, with all three nations projected to feature in the world's largest nations by population by 2050 with India (1), Philippines (9) and Russia (14) cumulatively totalling almost 2 billion persons (UN World Population Prospects, 2011). Two of these nations are members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Association of emerging economies, with the third, the Philippines recently expressing a desire to align more closely with China and Russia (Bevins, 2017). Price Waterhouse Coopers estimate that by 2050 India (3) and Russia (6) will feature in the world's top 10 economies while the Philippines (19) will show the second greatest economic growth of any nation (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2017).

Importantly in the context of contemporary populism, these nations are constitutionally secular, however the majority of their populations identify with globally significant religions. The Philippines is the third largest Catholic nation on earth (and sixth largest Christian nation), Russia is the largest Eastern Orthodox nation (and fifth largest Christian country) and India has largest Hindu population

(the world's third largest religion) with the world's largest Muslim minority (the world's second largest religion). Importantly, it is estimated that this Indian Muslim minority will be the world's largest Muslim population (irrespective of minority status) by 2050 (Pew Research Center, 2017). References to populism or variants thereof from western scholars largely overlook these nations which are set to play an increasingly important role in the world economy and shaping global religion.

Democracy and populism

A key question emerging from recent studies of populism then is whether these developments have the potential to undermine the basis of democracy and rule of law in current democracies to the extent that the state shifts from democratic to authoritarian. The concept of the 'dyadic democratic peace' – that democracies do not tend to go to war with one another – has played an important role in international relations theory and practice for the best part of a century. The proposition is most developed in its application to western liberal democracies, however comparatively under theorised and researched in its application to new democracies in the developing world. Problematically, much like Islam has spread successfully through adaptation to local custom and context (*urf*), democracy has been adapted to local contexts and circumstances to the extent that western liberal democracy may not even be the ideal model. This raises significant challenges to the notion of the democratic peace. Prior to examining the new populism in the Philippines, Russia and India in greater depth, it is valuable to consider how various global indexes frame democracy in each nation.

The politics of these indexes it should perhaps be noted is an area of study in itself. The Polity and Freedom House indexes for example use different measures. The Polity index is concerned with rule of law issues including constraints on political elites while the Freedom House index is more focussed on issues of citizenship-based individual rights and freedoms (Gunitsky, 2015). Other indexes such as that of the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) have similar dissimilarities grounded in philosophical differences about the key aspects of democracy. Cumulatively these indexes provide a broad perspective on the current state of play of democracy in the countries examined.

It is valuable to consider where the Philippines, Russia and India are ranked globally on the respective scales. This reveals important insights into the dimensions of local manifestations of the new populism and the extent to which they may bring these nations into political, economic and military conflict with other self-proclaimed democracies.

Apart from revealing the often significant measures utilised to assess the strength of democracy in different contexts, Table 7.1 also provides insights into how populism may take shape in different contexts, where the line between authoritarianism and democracy is not as distinct.

Importantly, the table raises questions as to whether developments in Russia may be considered as populist at all. While currently considered as at best a mix

Table 7.1 Democracy in the Philippines, Russia and India

	Polity Index 2015	*Freedom House 2017*	*Economist Intelligence Unit (2017)*
The Philippines	8 (Democracy)	63/100 (Partly Free)	6.94/10 (Flawed Democracy)
Russia	4 (Open Anocracy)*	20/100 (Not Free)	3.24/10 (Authoritarian Regime)
India	9 (Democracy)	77/100 (Free)	7.81/10 (Flawed Democracy)

Open Anocracy considered to feature an 'authority regime with an incoherent mix of both democratic and autocratic traits'.

of democratic and autocratic practices, Russia has previously ranked as high as 6 on the Polity Index 2003–2008 (Polity, 2004), as 'partly free' on the Freedom House Index (1999–2003) and 5 denoting a 'hybrid regime' on the EIU index (2006). While populist rhetoric continues to emanate from Russia's president, Russia may also be considered a 'post-populist' state, indicating the potential for populist leaders to supplant the rule of law and strengthen their power. With the different manifestations of democracy in mind, it is timely to consider local circumstances and how the intersection of masculinity and religion are shaping local variants of the new populism.

The Philippines

Emerging from two decades (1965–1986) of dictatorship under President Marcos, from 1987 the Philippines instituted a new constitution, introduced elections and moved slowly towards the reestablishment of rule of law centred on an independent judiciary. However, significant social challenges have remained consistent since the adoption of a democratic constitution, contributing to the necessary base for the new populism. The Pew Research Forum defines 'middle class' as annual household income of two thirds to double the annual median income. There has been a failure in the Philippines to develop a middle class – just 15 per cent of the population fit this definition (Pew Research Center, 2015). Regionally by comparison, the Indonesian middle class stands at 30 per cent (and growing), Malaysia at 40 per cent (with 79 per cent identifying as middle class) and Vietnam at 36 per cent and growing (with 96 per cent identifying as middle class). Accompanying this is a significant loss of trust in public institutions. Public trust has been eroded in all three branches of Philippine governance, with corruption considered a significant issue, alongside nepotism. Transparency International rated Philippines as 59th in the world for government accountability and transparency alongside Mexico, while the 2014 Philippine Trust Index revealed that just 11 per cent of Philippine citizens trusted government, 12 per cent trusted NGO's and 13 per cent Business. This stands in strong contrast to the 75 per cent

expressing their faith in churches (non-denominational) and 53 per cent in academics (EON, 2014). It is in this context and a backlash against economic globalisation and the inequalities of wealth that it has created (Heydarian, 2018, p. 40) that the Mayor of Davao city in Mindanao, Rodrigo Duterte was able to ride a wave of public support to win the 2016 presidential election.

Durterte's 'belligerent warrior masculinity'

Duterte's election victory speech foreshadowed his war on what he framed as the enemy within, corruption by faceless elites and drugs:

> There are many amongst us who advance the assessment that the problems that bedevil our country today which need to be addressed with urgency, are corruption, both in the high and low echelons of government, criminality in the streets, and the rampant sale of illegal drugs in all strata of Philippine society and the breakdown of law and order. True, but not absolutely so. For I see these ills as mere symptoms of a virulent social disease that creeps and cuts into the moral fibre of Philippine society.
>
> (Duterte, 2016)

Duterte has been described in the Manila Times as displaying a 'belligerent form of warrior masculinity' (Reyes, 2016). McCargo has noted that authenticity, challenging the high class backgrounds of his opponents and a masculinity 'flaunting his crudeness as a marker of his maleness' are key interwoven themes in the Duterte persona (McCargo, 2016, p. 189). The Manila Times same reporter has noted that Duterte 'uses words that are intended to hurt, offend, abuse and insult . . . Vulgarity and debasing the language of diplomacy and political rhetoric are looking like the Duterte hallmark' (McCargo, 2016, p. 189). Examples of such rhetoric, aimed at establishing himself as an anti-elite man of the people include comparing himself to Hitler stating he would like to slaughter 3 million drug addicts (BBC News, 2016), Duterte has personally admitted to killing suspects while the Mayor of Davao city. He stated:

> In Davao I used to do it personally. Just to show to the guys [police] that if I can do it why can't you . . . And I'd go around in Davao with a motorcycle, with a big bike around, and I would just patrol the streets, looking for trouble also. I was really looking for a confrontation so I could kill.
>
> (BBC News, 2016)

Duterte has also publically labelled President Obama the 'son of a whore', attacked the European Union, threatened to expel European ambassadors critical of his 'war on drugs' (BBC News, 2016), publically threatened to close US military bases – and praised the makers of Viagra. In doing so, Duterte has sought to align himself with a newly invigorated Philippine masculinity that is not only asserting itself against criminals and corrupt politicians, but perhaps as importantly,

challenging traditional notions of the Philippines as colonised and dependent upon powerful patron states for defence.

In light of a publically approved programme of extrajudicial killings, realignment from western nations to communist China and vitriolic statements about opponents, it is important to consider the role of the largest non-state actor within the Philippines, the Roman Catholic Church and the actions of their competitors in the local religious landscape in the form of evangelical Christian churches.

Duterte and the Philippine Catholic Church

The history of the Philippines has been punctuated by the legacy of settlement from colonial powers ranging from Spain to the United States and Japan. The Catholic Church played a significant role in the Spanish colonisation, due to the number of converts. Rafael has argued that 'through the clergy, the Crown validated its claims of benevolent conquest. Colonization was legitimized as the extension of the work of evangelization' (Rafael, 2005, pp. 22–23). Thus while the Catholic Church enjoys significant influence in the Philippines, the relationship of the Roman Catholic Church to nationalist currents has been marked by conflict.

Here we see the emergence of an important paradox between the Church, which plays a significant role in the daily lives of many Filipinos and a brash, avowedly anti-church populist figure with a catalogues of statements that might be considered brutally critical of the Church. Such statements include labelling the Catholic Church as 'Full of Shit' and as womanisers, child abusers and corrupt stating that the church are busier counting their money than going to the neighbourhoods (Salaverria, 2017), telling Catholics to go to 'join me in hell' (Rauhala, 2017), labelling Pope Francis the 'son of a whore' for causing traffic congestion during his visit (BBC News, 2016) and telling the Catholic Church 'not to fuck with me' (Agence France-Presse, 2016). As Mayor of Davao in 1989 in reference to the rape and murder of an Australian nun he stated he was 'mad she was raped because she was so beautiful' and that he, as mayor, should have been first (BBC, 2016). Instructively, Duterte has also stated that he was molested by a Catholic priest (Lacorte, 2015).

However, revealing his awareness of the power of the Church, Duterte further stated that he has 'priest friends', is a member of the Catholic Church and in July 2016 met with Cardinal Tagle, tipped by many within the Catholic Church as a potential future Pope. He has previously voiced his interest in an official visit to the Vatican to meet with the Pope to 'build bridges' (Buckley, 2016) though has paradoxically also supported same sex marriage (Romero, 2017), birth control and a reproductive rights bill opposed by the Catholic Church (Domonoske, 2017). In the face of often contradictory messages, the Catholic Church response to Duterte has publically been one of 'vigilant collaboration' as stated by Catholic Bishops Conference Chairman Archbishop Socrates Villegas:

> The greatest promise the Church can offer any government is vigilant collaboration, and that offer we make now. We will urge our people to work

with the government for the good of all, and we shall continue to be vigilant so that ever so often we may speak out to teach and to prophesy, to admonish and to correct – for this is our vocation.

(Orendain, 2016)

According to David Buckley, Vigilant Collaboration presents opportunities to renew Catholicism's place as a moral voice of the Philippine people. This would occur through 'preservation of the instruments of democracy in the Philippines, a renewed dedication to the sanctity of life and furthering peace and development to the Island of Mindanao' (Buckley, 2016).

Despite this initial optimism, the Church is facing a challenging time. It has so far mounted an ethical and moral, rather than political resistance to Duterte, though this has been largely measured. Momentum is growing among Catholics for a more rigid stance, building on pronouncements by the Bishops conference about the sanctity of life. However, the Bishops Conference will be wary of open political conflict with Duterte. Catholic Bishops Conference Chairman Archbishop Socrates Villegas has stated 'we should not look for another Cardinal Sin (Archbishop of Manila who led the 1986 protests against Marcos), because he died already' (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2017).

The Church is operating in an increasingly competitive space. Well-funded evangelical Christian Churches including the Gideon's have publically supported Duterte (Genalyn, 2017) Speaking in August 2016, the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC) expressed their support for Duterte's 'laudable determination to eradicate the widespread illegal drugs trade, which is destroying countless lives that include the youth of our beloved nation' (GMA News, 2016). While expressing concern about extrajudicial killings, the Council stated their acceptance of Duterte's word that these would be investigated. Muslim leaders have also supported the President, from Mindanao a site of Muslim rebellion, in the hope that he will bring peace to the region.

It may be considered that, in the field of power, marginalised religious groups have identified the opportunity to seize a greater share of political power and to grow their base. While the Catholic Church is opposed to key elements of the Duterte agenda, he has successfully appealed to working men and women, embracing a hyper masculinity emphasising virility, strength and uncompromising violence against groups he blames for causing societal issues – in particular drug dealers and users. The Catholic Church in the Philippines faces the difficult question as to whether to mobilise the faithful, as they have done previously or to continue to oppose Duterte on purely ethical grounds.

The Philippines constitutes an important example of the interplay of both masculinity and religion in the new populism. Duterte's brash hyper masculinity has proven popular in a country that simultaneously faces significant economic and social challenges and that seeks to overcome a colonial legacy that has undermined the countries development as a mature contributor to the community of nations. The Catholic Church, which forms a moral standpoint stands opposed to Duterte, has, far from being hijacked, displayed a strategic posture centred

on maintaining as much political influence over the government as possible, particularly important in the context of competition from evangelical churches known for their aggressive proselytisation.

Russia

The collapse of Soviet Empire simultaneously created a vacuum of both power and a national ideology. For nationalists it led to a national humiliation as the superpower crumbled in status and influence. Immense corruption has resulted in the stripping of state assets and the empowerment of the oligarchical class with a subsequent detrimental impact on the Russian middle class. This group, estimated at 28 per cent of the population by Pew Research Center (2015), has significantly contracted in the context of a struggling economy. Importantly, Russian men have witnessed the disintegration of both the labour market and consequently, their role within traditional Russian society as breadwinner.

Putin: The mobilisation of masculinity and the Eastern Orthodox Church

Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent, came to power as Prime Minister (1999–2000) and then as President (2000–2008 and again since 2012) shortly after the 1997 law protecting the Orthodox Church as a 'traditional religion'. Putin, similarly to Duterte, has embraced an image of the 'strong man' and a masculinist populism, whether it be riding bareback and shirtless through the woods or displaying his Karate black belt. In contrast to the Philippines and Duterte however, Putin has sought to bridge the divide between the Russian Orthodox Church (alternatively known as the Moscow Patriarchate) and the State, a relationship characterised by communist state repression from 1917 to 1997.

The Russian Orthodox Church is considered fifth in the order of precedence in the Eastern Orthodox Church behind the four ancient Greek patriarchs (Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem). It has approximately 150 million followers across Russia and its satellite states making it the second largest Christian denomination after Catholicism. There are three primary groups, the fundamentalists, liberals and traditionalists, with the latter in the ascendancy.

Putin has embraced Russian Orthodox Christianity as a key element of a new national ideology, utilising it to contribute to what Payne (2010) has called Russia's 'spiritual security'. For Putin, it is argued, the Orthodox Church, with its emphasis on traditional values fills the ideological void created the decline of soviet communism on the one hand and blocks incursions by western liberalism and the proselytisation of evangelical churches on the other. This has included a strong resistance to LGBTIQ rights.

Domestically, Putin has appointed Orthodox aligned politicians into key positions as the Minister for Education and Minister for Children's Rights. The 2016

Legislation known as the Yarovaya Law (374-FZ and 375-FZ) amended counter terrorism laws to include increased regulation of evangelical activity, building on 2013 laws banning 'gay propaganda' and 'insulting religious feelings'.

Putin has also utilised the Orthodox Church as an instrument of foreign policy, supporting efforts to regain properties and churches across Europe that were abandoned in 1917. A more notable example of this mission has been the purchase of an incredibly expensive plot of land close to the Eiffel Tower in Paris by the Russian government in order to build a Russian Orthodox Church. In contrast to notions that their faith has been 'hijacked', the Russian Orthodox Church, under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow have actively sought to exploit their rejuvenated relationship with the Russian State after 80 years of ostracism and indeed, persecution. It is in this context that Stoeckl (2016) has labelled the Church a 'moral norms entrepreneur' creating a 'new cognitive frame' called traditional values.

In a fragmented society facing economic crisis, a rapidly contracting middle class and unemployment, Russian men have been understood as 'in crisis' and 'domestically marginalised', particularly at the lower end of the economic spectrum (Ashwin and Lytkina, 2014). They are unable to meet the expectations of traditional soviet conceptions of men as providers and head of the family. The suicide rate for Russian men is remarkably high, standing at three times higher than the world average, with alcohol abuse playing a significant role (Pridemore, 2006). Perhaps patently aware of the displacement of traditional gender roles, Putin has sought to 'rehabilitate Russian masculinity' (Vlaeminc, 2016), with laws criminalising homosexuality and legalising forms of domestic abuse. He has sought, with the Russian Orthodox Church to contribute to the reinvigoration of a virile and normative heterosexual and hegemonic masculinity targeting men occupying subordinate masculinities. Both Putin and the Church seek to foster a return to traditional values where men embrace their former role as 'bread winner', with women prioritising motherhood. Putin is, in effect, mobilising both religion and masculinity in the service of a reinvigorated sense of Russian national identity.

India

In contrast to Russia, India has experienced significant economic growth. However, like Russia, this has been concentrated in the hands of an extremely wealthy elite. India is facing growing inequality between such urban elites and the rural poor. Lukas Chancel and Thomas Picketty (2017) have found for example, that the share of income accruing to the top 1 per cent of income earners in India is at its highest level since the creation of the Indian Income Tax in 1922. Optimistic estimates suggest that the middle class is expected to grow from its current estimate of 267 million (roughly a quarter of the country) to double this by 2025 (Pew Research, 2015). However, the authors note that the wealth has been concentrated in the top 10 per cent of the population rather than the middle 40 per cent band (Chancel & Picketty, 2017, p. 34).

Accompanying these developments, lack of upward social mobility due to corruption and economic stagnation has stunted the aspirations of this rapidly growing new class. India for example, is ranked 79th for transparency and accountability on the Transparency International corruption perceptions index (Transparency International, 2016). This same organisation found that India has the highest level of bribery in Asia with almost 70 per cent of Indians accessing public services having paid a bribe. Importantly, 58 per cent of Indians had paid bribes to access public schools and 59 per cent, to access public health services (Transparency International, 2017).

In this context of inequitable growth, India has also seen rapidly shifting gender roles. There has been a rapid growth of women as an important aspect of both the economy and consumer culture, with shifting gender roles in the workplace. Indian masculinity has increasingly been represented in mainstream media as predatory and anti-women. The internationally publicised 2012 Delhi gang rape case has cast a light on an endemic culture of sexual violence directed towards women in India, prompting considerable legislative reform and introspection.

Narendra Modi

It is in this context that Narendra Modi, a right wing Hindu nationalist representing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was swept to power in 2014. Formerly the Chief Minister of Gujarat where he implemented economic reforms but was also allegedly complicit in the 2002 Gujarat riots that resulted in the killing of up to 2000 Muslims, Modi has enjoyed broad popular appeal nationally and internationally, among the Indian diaspora. His 2016 New Year's Eve address stated:

> With time, the distortions of badness creep in. People feel suffocated in a bad environment, and struggle to come out of it. Corruption, black money, and counterfeit notes had become so rampant in India's social fabric that even honest people were brought to their knees.
>
> (Modi, 2016)

According to the Pew Research Center (2017) 88 per cent of Indians (89 per cent men and 86 per cent women) have a favourable or very favourable view of Modi (unlikely to be Muslims). Importantly, speaking to his emphasis upon improving social mobility, 95 per cent of tertiary educated Indians compared to 85 per cent of primary school educated Indians fall in this category. Importantly, 70 per cent of the country approve of the manner in which Modi is addressing corruption, 72 per cent approve of his unemployment strategy and 72 per cent approve of policies addressing poverty. Modi has also garnered the support of corporate India, due to his embracing of the neo-liberal free market strategy of development and emphasis upon public–private partnerships to stimulate the economy and build infrastructure.

'Modi-masculinity' and Hindu nationalism

Modi has 'deployed traditional masculinity politics' as a significant electoral strategy. One Indian blogger described this as 'an intoxicating cocktail of hyper masculinity, virility and potency' (Gopinath, 2012). With a carefully cultivated public image, including constant reference to his '56 inch chest' throughout the campaign, Modi has self-consciously sought to epitomise an Indian hegemonic masculinity that reasserts the place of Indian men in society. Sanjay Srivastava refers to this as 'Modi-masculinity' stating:

> It gestures at and seeks to overturn historical 'emasculation' – the social inability to deal with internal and external 'threats' and the economic inability to be seen as 'global' through disenfranchisement from the world of consumption . . . through discourses of gendered power. . . . Modi-Masculinity not only offers the possibilities of worldliness but also the promise that men might continue to maintain their hold on both the home and the world. . . . Masculine anxieties over female consumption – the woman as the sacrificing figure who facilitated male consumption rather than consumed herself has been a long-standing cultural discourse – are, in effect, assuaged through Narendra Modi's strong masculinity.
>
> (Srivastava, 2015, p. 336)

This assertive and hegemonic display of masculinity is intricately tied in with the expression of Hindu nationalist masculinities. Examining the role of Hindu nationalism in Indian politics, Arvind Rajagopal states 'religion is a surrogate category of political discourse used to mobilise recruits of the nationalist cause' (Rajagopal, 2001, p. 83). Displays of exaggerated masculinity have been a core element of Hindu nationalism. Thomas Blom Hansen (1996) has noted that the recuperation of masculinity is 'a common deep-running theme in Hindu nationalist discourses and organisations'. He argued further, that the:

> recuperation of masculinity, the overcoming of emasculation lies at the heart of the quest for national strength and national self-confidence which has been a persistent theme in Hindu nationalist movements for a century . . . the metaphorical condensation of a myth or loss, or theft, of masculinity on part of Hindu males constitutes a critical substratum of Hindu nationalist discourse.
>
> (Hansen, 1996, p. 138)

Hansen makes the ominous observation that a vital element of Hindu nationalist forms of organisation and mobilisation strategies are driven to overcome a perceived 'effeminisation' through 'expunging the Muslim 'other' (1996, p. 83). Sikata Banerjee (2005, p. 81, p. 92) notes that within the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, (RSS), the largest and most prominent of the Hindu nationalist social organisations, India's loss of manhood is seen as the result of a long history of aggression and that Islam (represented by Pakistan), China, Christianity

and the West (Britain in the past and America in the future) remain India's greatest threat.

Masculinity and religion

An examination of populism in the Philippines, Russia and India reveals important insights into the interplay between populist masculinity and religion in these contexts: In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte has been deliberately antagonistic towards the Catholic Church and its leadership, mobilising a caustic and vulgar hyper masculinity to distinguish him from the highly globalised and wealthy establishment and using incendiary rhetoric to criticise its status in society, accusing its leadership of corruption. Yet Duterte finds himself in the paradoxical situation that the Catholic Church is the most trusted institution in the Philippines and the only group that has historically been able to mobilise sufficient support to remove undemocratic leaders, as it did with Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. In a context where evangelical churches have stated their public support for Duterte, the Catholic Church has adopted a strategy of 'vigilant collaboration', refusing to tackle the human rights abuses of Duterte head on. This stands in stark contrast to the depiction of religion as having been 'hijacked' by populists, with the Catholic Church actively navigating a complex course to ensure the maintenance of their social standing.

While similarly projecting a populist hyper masculine image, Vladimir Putin has adopted an entirely different approach to the Eastern Orthodox Church, bringing it back into Russian political life after its expulsion in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. His purpose in doing so has been to both rehabilitate a Russian masculinity that he perceives as having been crushed by the demise of communism and loss of traditional values and to simultaneously utilise it as a weapon of Russian foreign policy, invoking long lost claims to land and power across Europe. Again, in contrast to notions of religion as strictly faith based and as hostage to populist movements exploiting them for political gain, the Moscow Patriarchate actively embraced this new reinvigorated role in Russian life and worked closely with Putin to re-establish their monopoly on the spiritual lives of Russians.

It is in India that the relationship between religion and masculinity is arguably most clearly defined. Exploiting the same alienation from and anger with the political situation that formed the base of support for Duterte and Putin (before his autocratic turn), Modi has drawn on a deep wellspring of Hindu nationalist masculine sentiment aimed directly at recuperating a national strength and self-confidence shattered by the legacy of colonialism and reasserting the central role of men in doing so. Importantly, this masculinity is relational and contrasted with that of Muslim and Western (historically hegemonic) masculinities. In contrast to anti-Western tropes however, India's Muslim population live side by side with those that resent their existence. Masculinity and religion in India are inextricably linked and will continue to shape the evolution of both the Modi government and national politics into the future.

The new populism: Hyperbole or violent potential?

The implications of these case studies go beyond mere economic, demographic and political factors outlined above. Hyper masculine populism and religion are a profoundly volatile mix that combines to contribute to an aggressive nationalistic posture, very often grounded in religious fervour or against a religious minority (and sometimes both). In the above cases, it is important to consider whether these leaders are merely utilising hyper masculinity as a rhetorical device to bolder their popularity or have exhibited the potential to carry out extreme acts of violence and revenge against those they perceive have caused them harm.

It may be readily established that in all three cases, these leaders have a demonstrated willingness to use violence to achieve favourable outcomes. Duterte as noted, has publically authorised the killing of over 7000 of his own citizens and admitted to murdering suspects himself. While Putin has been in office there have been a number of apparently state sponsored assassinations of dissidents and journalists, though these are, for obvious reasons, difficult to link directly to Putin himself. More telling has been the 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of the Ukraine, acts of Russian unilateral aggression that signal a willingness to use military force to aggressively advance Russian interests. In India, Modi has been accused of tacitly, and some argue, openly, supporting the 2002 Gujarat riots by Hindus targeting Muslims, resulting in over 2000 deaths. As Martha Nussbaum stated,

> [there] is by now a broad consensus that the Gujarat violence was a form of ethnic cleansing, that in many ways it was premeditated and that it was carried out with the complicity of the state government and officers of the law.
>
> (Nussbaum, 2007, p. 51)

It will be increasingly important to monitor both the democracy indexes and citizenship rights closely. The distinct moves towards authoritarianism caught by the various democracy indexes in Russia coincided with both the end of election cycles and displays of military aggression. A degradation of democratic conditions and citizenship rights in the Philippines and India may very well lead to a greater willingness of their leaders to use state violence against perceived enemies. The relative economic and numerical size of these nations suggests that this will have a significant detrimental impact on international security.

It is equally important then to consider the relationships between the new demagogues. Russia has developed significant military and weapons deals with both India and the Philippines while economic cooperation between the nations is also on an upward trajectory. It has been reported that populist US President Donald Trump has met with the leaders of all three nations and established 'transactional' relationships devoid of democratic principle with Duterte, Putin and Modi. However, the extent to which this might entice the Philippine and Indian leaders back to engagement in a western-led world order that they have gained political capital out of critiquing, is arguably, doubtful.

In this sense, it is important to consider that in the first instance at least, that these leaders have been voted for precisely because they represent a return to past national glory and restore a sense of collective masculinity and empowerment in the face of an unrelenting process of globalisation that has seen massive wealth disparities, undermining the necessary conditions for democratic citizenship and foiling the hopes and ambitions of those at the margins. This hyper-masculine nationalism becomes all the more potent when mobilised through religious frames stressing existential struggle in the name of God. While scholars are rightfully concerned with the new populism in the West, to look at it in isolation form international developments and to fail to see the interconnected nature of many of the complaints that have contributed to the emergences of the new demagogues, would be to mischaracterise the global nature of the threat we currently face.

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Part III

Populism and religion

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8 '*Abendland* in Christian hands'

Religion and populism in contemporary European politics

Rosario Forlenza

Introduction

This chapter examines the relationship between religion and right-wing populist politics in contemporary Europe, particularly as manifested in public reaction to migration from Muslim countries. More specifically, it focuses on the central trope of European right-wing populist discourse: the defence of Europe's Christian identity from the 'Islamisation' of the continent.

Right-wing populist parties and movements come from different political and ideological traditions. Their socio-economic, cultural and political views differ greatly. Some are the ultimate heirs of the interwar fascist and anti-democratic right. Others emerged in the 1980s and in the 1990s combining anti-immigration and anti-EU themes. Some promote a libertarian socio-cultural and economic agenda, ethical values, human rights and liberal democracy. Still others champion a kind of socialist or social-democratic agenda, and assume the role of defender of national welfare state (for a classification of right-wing populism see Pelinka, 2013). They also differ quite widely from one another according to the different social, cultural and political situations in the countries in which they are based.

For all their differences, however, they all share the opposition to Islam and to Muslim migration, identified as the fundamental threat to Europe's Christian roots, values and tradition. To right-wing populist parties, movements and politicians the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers from Muslim countries is a threat to Christian European civilisation, not dissimilar to the Arab (in the seventh and eighth centuries) and the Ottoman (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) invasions. The dominant line of argument of right-wing populism is to position Christianity as the cultural heritage and value system on which Europe is (said to be) based, and which must be defended against foreign domination and the alien religion, culture and way of life threatening Europe and its Christian identity: in short, against the Islamisation of the continent. Christianity and Islam function as

devices to construct the opposition between the self and the other, the good and the evil, us and them.

In this context, right-wing populists in Germany, Austria and Switzerland have re-semanticised a once common term: *das Abendland*. The term is included in the name of the notorious grass-roots movement PEGIDA, an acronym that stands for *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* ('Patriotic European Against the Islamisation of the West'). Pegida was born in October 2014 as a Facebook group and soon became a street movement that, appropriating the 1989 anti-socialist regime chant *Wir sind das Volk* ('We are the People'), organised rallies and demonstrations in opposition to Islam and to Muslim migrants in Dresden first, and then in other places in Saxony and across Germany. The term has also emerged in texts, speeches and visual propaganda of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), which has time and again called for '*Abendland* in Christian hands', for the defence of Christian culture and values against Islam and against the Islamisation of Christian Austria and Christian Europe.

The word *Abendland* was used by Oswald Spengler in his landmark work of German culture pessimism, a theory of history and civilisation in terms of biological morphology, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (Spengler, 1922/1923) (weakly rendered as *The Decline of the West*) in the aftermath of World War I. The *Abendland* was originally the medieval notion of Europe-as-Christendom: a spiritual, political and cultural rather than geographical entity and the mighty realm created by Charlemagne (*rex*, *pater Europa*). Translated rather imprecisely as 'the Occident' or the 'West', the literal translation of *Abendland* it quite poetic: 'the Evening Land', or the place where the sun sets. The right-wing populists use the term as a synonym for Europe and its Christian identity. The word *Abendland* is distinguished from the English concept of the West in its implicit opposition to the counterpart, *Morgenland*, 'the Morning Land', the place where the sun rises, the East, or more specifically the land of Islam. The simple use of *Abendland* by right-wing populists evokes notions of justice, order, prosperity and political stability. Islamisation, instead, means becoming like the *Morgenland*, the Orient, perceived as a domain of unjust sharia legislation, political despotism, poverty, chaos and civil war.

Outside German-speaking Europe no other parties, movements or politicians refer directly and consciously to the word *Abendland*. Yet, everywhere in Europe, right-wing populist reference to Europe's Christian roots and the spiritual foundation of the continent that must be defended from the political, civilisational and existential threat of Islam are reminiscent and profoundly imbued with the symbolism of the *Abendland*. The fight for Christian Europe against the Islamic threat is cast in broad 'civilisational' rather than narrow national and ethnic term. This 'civilisationalism' accounts for the distinctiveness of European, vis-a-vis the north-Atlantic, right-wing populism (Brubaker, 2017).[1]

In what follows, I will propose a first and necessarily provisional analysis and interpretation of this important and somewhat puzzling connection between right-wing populism, religion and religious identity – which can be defined as 'religious populism' (Halliday, 1982).

The religious turn

References to religion and to the defence of Europe as a Christian civilisation have become increasingly central in the narrative of European right-wing populism in the last 10–15 years, and more evidently in the last few years. Until the late 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s, right-wing populism was imbued with paganism, secularism, anti-clericalism – and sometimes with anti-Catholicism, anti-Christianity and atheism. It focused primarily on strictly political, social and economic themes. The French National Front was founded by conservative traditionalist Catholics, but also by neo-pagans who celebrated and extolled the splendour, the strength and the vigour of pre-Christian Europe. The FPÖ (founded in the 1950s) remained profoundly anti-clerical until the 1990s when, with the leadership of Jörg Haider, adopted a pro-Christian stance (Hadj-Abdou, 2016). In the 1990s, the Italian Northern League promoted neo-pagan 'Celtic' feasts and rituals alternative to Catholic liturgy and sacraments. This culminated in the deification of the river Po, whose water would reputedly make the people of the north of Italy 're-born' (McDonnell, 2016, pp. 17–18).

The turn or conversion to religion since the beginning of the 2000s, went hand and hand, with the embracement of the anti-migration, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic agenda. Thus, FPÖ replaced the generic term 'immigrant', which was included in its older narrative, with 'Muslim', shifting from nationalistic and anti-establishment rhetoric to Islamophobia (Hadj-Abdou, 2016; Krzyzanowski, 2013). The Northern League shifted its focus from the lazy (Italian) 'southerners' and thieving secular elite based in Rome (the central government), profiteers of the productive and hard-working northerners, to Muslim immigrants as 'dangerous others' (McDonnell, 2016, p. 27). Elsewhere in Europe, in the last 15 years, right-wing populists have fully embraced the religious symbolism and injected 'nativism' with a religious dimension, by calling for the defence of the Christian roots and identity of the continent against the political, civilisational and existential threat from Islam (Betz & Meret, 2009, pp. 315–319; Mudde, 2007, p. 19).

Over time – with speeches, posters and slogans – right-wing populists have constructed a semantic field in which various aspects of Islam have been elaborated through various genres and represented in entirely negative light. Islam has been depicted and demonised as an omnipresent threat. The arguments have been constantly constructed via the topoi of imminent danger and urgency. This narrative, at the textual and visual levels of political communication, has conveyed the idea of an antagonism as a matter of principle, which functions as follows: Islam is incompatible with Europe and its Christian identity. References to Christianity and to the need to defend Europe's Christian roots of Europe – understood as a repertoire of cultural traditions and habits – have multiplied (Betz, 2013, Betz & Meret, 2009, pp. 327–328, Kryzanowsky, 2013, pp. 142–143; Liebhart, 2016, Weidinger, 2014, Wodak, 2015, pp. 143–144). The image of Islam as a threat to Europe and its Christian values has served as a central carrier of meaning. Islam has been treated into a monolithic entity, a cohesive whole. In other words, right-wing religious populism does not allow for diversity:

contradictions and semiotic tensions are ignored. After all, the homogenising, ethnocentric template of otherness assumes that there is only one interpretation of 'them'. 'They' is essentialised Islam unchanging in his primitive, culturally specific beliefs and practices, utterly incompatible with the Christian culture of Europe, which in turn is ontologically distinct from Islam.

Against Islam, for the defence of Christian Europe

It is on the base of the religious narrative that right-wing populist parties and movements have advanced ideas, demands and policy that would impede and prevent the integration of Muslims in Europe. Right-wing populists have time and again started campaigns against the headscarf and the burqa and to ban the construction of minarets, mosques and cultural centres (Betz, 2013; Kallis, 2013). Building a mosque means first and foremost visibility within the public space, and transmits the message that the new community is 'here to stay' (Eade, 1996, p. 223; Saint-Blancat & Schmidt di Freibnerg, 2005, p. 1101). For right-wing populists, mosques and minarets are the 'aggressive' symbols of 'Islamic power' and 'conquest', and thus the signal of an impending 'parallel' society threatening the survival of Christian Europe (Betz & Meret, 2009, pp. 325–326; Liebhart, 2016, p. 678). The aim of the anti-mosque and minarets campaigns is to render Islam invisible and halt the flourishing and the spread of the parallel, alien society.

In the narrative of right-wing populism, Muslims pose a special threat because Islam does not separate religion from politics, mosque from State. Hence, Islam is seen and represented as a 'totalitarian ideology', in which religious radicalism easily transmogrifies into political radicalism, and ultimately in the 'Trojan horse' of Islamic fundamentalism, inevitably culminating into terrorism (Betz & Meret 2009, pp. 319–320; De Lange & Akkerman, 2012, p. 35; see also Mudde, 2007, p. 84). For the same reason, right-wing populists see Islam as a backward religion and culture incompatible not only with Christian Europe but also with liberal democracy and with quintessential secular European values such as free will, the rights of women, gender equality and freedom of expression (Betz & Meret, 2009, pp. 322–324). This somewhat paradoxical combination might be explained with the ambivalent, confused and complex discourse of right-wing populism which has mixed the defence of Christianity with libertarian socio-cultural views, as in the case of the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), or with the Jewish and Humanist tradition, or, in the case of the French National Front, with the traditional defence of *laicité* as one of the cornerstone of France's republican political culture (Roy, 2016a; Schmidt, 2006). The crucial point here is that right-wing populists make little distinction between Christianity and the secular culture of contemporary Europe. For some of them, secular liberalism is the extension and the consequences of the historical evolution of Christianity in the context of Europe.

The same religious undertone has sustained and underlined the right-wing populist opposition to Turkey's access to Europe. The FPÖ launched a referendum in 2006 on the question of 'Turkey's EU membership' using the image of a

woman wearing the European flag as a full veil. In relation to the questions of whether Turkey (and its migrant community) belongs to Europe, the FPÖ made strong reference to Austria's historic past as a Christian bulwark against the Ottoman Empire. The perceived threat of a looming third Turkish siege, invoking the collective memory of the occupation of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 by the Ottoman Empire, became a central theme of the party's rhetoric (Hadj-Abdou, 2016, p. 38). In their case against Muslims and against Turkey, other right-wing populist parties have evoked historical events where Christian Europe threw Islam 'back where it came from, on the other side of the Mediterranean', such as the famous battle of Lepanto (1571), that pitted 'the cross against the crescent moon'. The explicit message of this narrative is that the same battle for the defence of Christian Europe must be fought in the present.

Migration, terrorism and religious populism

With the recent massive waves of migrations and refugees from Muslim countries and as a reaction to the terrorist attacks that have struck Europe in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (Paris, Berlin, London, Manchester and Brussels, to cite just a few) right-wing religious and anti-Islam populism has further radicalised. A few examples can illustrate this point.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) has called for the complete closure of Europe's borders to Muslim migrants, to avoid the 'slow cultural extinction' that Angela Merkel's welcoming culture is allegedly triggering. AfD and other right-wing populists in Europe have also invited citizens to shoot at migrants trying to enter the country illegally. In the summer 2015, the government of Poland decided to select refuges from the Middle East on the basis of their Christian faith. Other countries followed the same line, applying a 'Christian test' to migrants and discriminating against individuals and groups that had no obvious Christian heritage. Other countries, that lie on the main route of migration such as Hungary, have erected razor-wire fences or have closed their borders to defend themselves and Europe from what they perceive as the civilisational threats of a Muslim invasion.

Politicians such as Jaroslaw Kaczyński in Poland and Viktor Orbán in Hungary (perhaps one of the most vociferous example of the narrative insisting that refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are undermining, and will eventually destroy Europe's Christian roots) have put forth a noxious ideological mixture reminiscent of interwar Europe: anti-materialism (i.e. anti-capitalism and anti-communism) combined with a Catho-nationalism that determines who is really Pole or Hungarian. Between 2016 and 2017, in a series of local or national elections, Marin Le Pen in France, the Swiss People's Party, the FPÖ leader Norbert Hofer and the Northern League have once more called for the defence of the 'Christian roots' of Europe, the 'cultural Christendom' which has shaped the 'European worldview' (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1198, Mazzoleni 2016, p. 50; McDonnell, 2016).

To summarise, the form of religious populism that is sweeping Europe has multiple dimensions: descriptively, refers to the indigenous community invaded by Muslims, depicted holistically (Islam) and antagonistically as violent, retrograde and backward; explicatively it accuses the corruption of political elites and progressive leftist culture who reputedly have encouraged or tuned a blind eye on the infamous Muslim immigration. Prescriptively, it advocates the restriction of religious rights for Muslims, the restoration of Christian roots and the closure of the borders. Analytically it exploits passions and emotions, and it is pro-foundly anti-modernist because, as with other forms of religious populism, it rejects pluralism, and the quintessential trait of contemporary progressive thought, namely that it is 'the right to be different', ethnically, linguistically, sexually and religiously (Arditi, 2007, p. 5).

God save the people: Populists as hijackers of religion

Why have religion and religious identity become central in the political discourse of right-wing populism? Do right-wing and far-right politicians really believe that they are protecting Europe's Christian culture and identity? Or by appealing to Christianity, are they cynically seizing upon European's fear of Islam and attempting to translate uneasiness with difference into electoral gain? And, most importantly, why does the narrative of the defence of the Christian roots of Europe (the *Abendland*) resonate through multiple constituencies of Europe's social fabric further fostering the appeal and success of right-wing populist politics?

In what it is perhaps the first book entirely devoted to explaining the connection of religion and right-wing politics, *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion* (Marzouki, McDonnell & Roy 2016), the central thesis is that, despite their use of religious rhetoric, populist parties, leaders and movements are not genuinely Christian and only hijack religion for a political purpose. In this reading, right-wing populists' references to religion is a political-electoral, a vote maximising strategy, a tool to stir up anti-immigrant sentiment and legitimise claims for restriction of immigration. In short, right-wing religious populism, as it has been written in relation to the Austrian Freedom Party, is 'a predominantly instrumental approach' that draws on religion 'as a carrier medium' and 'means of justification' for a 'xenophobic agenda' (Wodak, 2015, p. 144).

For this scholarship, right-wing populism is better understood as a form of secular identity politics based on nostalgia for an imagined Christian past and a virulent hatred and fear of Islam. It is a 'largely secular movement' that 'retains an interest in religion' only because 'it considers it as one of national identity's core components' (Camus, 2013, p. 119). Hence, Christianity as invoked by right-wing populism is not a substantive Christianity but rather a series of shared values that have nothing to do with religion and with religious beliefs and practices. It is a 'secularized Christianity-as-culture' (Mouritsen, 2006, p. 77), a civilisational and identitarian Christianism, a matter of belonging rather than believing, a way of defining 'us' versus 'them'. Such an 'identitarian' Christianity is understood

as the derivation of the civilisational concerns with Islam. The definition of the other in civilisational terms means a characterisation of the self along the same line. The concern with Islam calls forth a corresponding and explicit concern with Christianity, understood not as a religion, but as a civilisation co-extensive with Europe, or what was once called Christendom. We are, and must be Christian, because they are Muslim, without implying that 'we' must be religious (Brubaker, 2017, p. 2014, Roy, 2016b). And without implying a complete alignment with the Catholic Church and with Christian churches, but rather creating an ambivalent, if not antagonist, relationship between populists and religious leaders and institutions. This 'culturalisation' is considered one of the consequence of 'the ongoing erosion of Christianity as doctrine, organization, and ritual', that 'makes it easy to invoke Christianity as a cultural and civilisation identity' (Beckford 1994, p. 167; Brubaker, 2017, p. 1199; see also Joppke 2015, pp. 181–182). Hence, the different paradoxes associated with current right-wing populism: a secularist posture, a philo-Semitic stance, the adoption of a liberal rhetoric by parties often characterised as 'illiberal', the increasing salience of a Christian identity in what is considered the most secularised region of the world, a place where religious practices are dramatically declining. The only important exception to this pattern is Britain, one of the most secularised places in Europe, where appeals to religious sympathies have had diminishing returns. Britain represents an infertile ground for populist wishing to use religion to advance their causes. The UKIP (the United Kingdom Independent Party), Britain's most successful populist party, does not use explicit appeals to religious voters and its official criticism of the 'religious other' is limited to 'extremist Muslims'. The British National Party (BNP) has tried to exploit the issue of religion, especially in terms of how it defines 'the other'. Yet, the party retains a rather secular basis and does not easily define the people as Christian (Peace, 2016)[2].

The civilisational perspective articulated and advanced by right-wing populist parties everywhere in Europe, with the exception of Britain, appears to scholars as the re-articulation of Orientalism (Said, 1978). The distinction between Christianity and Islam rests on developmental time and on political, cultural and geographic space. Further, it is mapped onto a series of 'normatively charged' opposition: liberal and illiberal, individualist and collectivist, democratic and authoritarian, West and East, modern and backward and secular and religion (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1200).

Do they really believe?

These interpretations and approaches have their points and reasonable arguments, but also substantial weaknesses and problematic aspects. First, they assume a clear-cut and simplistic division between 'active' producers and generators of images and narratives, and 'passive' common people, recipient of discourses that inevitably come from above. On the theoretical level, an important tradition of scholarship has shown the 'circulation' of images and narratives between the different cultures and constituencies of a political community (Febvre, 1982;

Ginzburg, 1982). On the empirical level, at least some of the right-wing populist movements that have embraced the religious narrative are largely leaderless, as in the case of PEGIDA (Dostal, 2015, p. 520). Largely leaderless are also, across Europe, the number of initiatives of small communities, often joined by priests or (local) religious institutions, against Muslim immigrants in the name of the defence of Europe's or nation's or even the community's Christian identity.

Second, linked to this, and equally untenable, is the assumption that there is nothing genuinely Christian or religious about right-wing contemporary populism. Religious politics, and the use and manipulation of religion for political and instrumental purposes, is a fact of history which is difficult to deny. Yet, to dismiss the religious dimension of populism on the base of textual and visual discourse analysis leads to a great deal of simplification. To frame populist religious rhetoric as fundamentally non-Christian and secular, some interpretations make references to data showing the decline of religious practices or the lack of churchgoers among the supporters of right-wing populists (van Kessel, 2016, p. 73), or point to the difficult relationship between religion and politics, or to the antagonism between populist movements and churches. Yet, when it can be shown, as in the case of Italy, that churchgoers (mainly Catholic) do indeed support right-wing populist parties, the data are framed in such a way as to show that this support, if not an expression of religious behaviour but rather a political-secular behaviour, is linked to a wider cultural identity and sense of belonging, not of believing (McDonnell, 2016, pp. 23–27).

More detailed research on, for example, letters of readers of Catholic and Christian magazines or call-in programmes of station radio such as the notorious Radio Maria, as well as surveys, interviews and ethnographic analysis could reveal – to the disappointment and dismay of many commentators, observers and scholars, including the author of this chapter – that at least some of the right-wing politicians, activists and followers really think that they have a duty to protect Christian values. They mean it for real. They oppose Islam to protect the Christian roots of Europe, to defend religions and to follow the words of the Gospel. We cannot simply reduce right-wing religious politics to an electoral strategy, or to a propaganda tool that superficially injected political mobilisation with religious symbolism, disregarding the content of religion and the historical time in that such a politics emerged. Insofar as sociologists, political scientists and historians do not share such a view, their analyses will remain flawed if they do not take this essential fact into consideration. Of course, I am not suggesting that all answers are simply to be found in what people say. But the analysis of right-wing religious populism should account for the way in which a religious ethic or a religious identity has been 'seized' by people, politicians and community in a time profoundly marked by a crisis of political representation.

Many European citizens lack confidence in the ability of the political system to secure future prosperity and large constituencies of the middle class are overwhelmed by socio-economic and cultural change. People fear that large-scale migration might further decrease their prospects and social status. The focus on Islamisation and the defence of the Christian roots of Europe must be rather read

as the symbolic expression of a larger crisis in European politics, society and culture. In short, religious populism might be analysed as a figuration that has a historically contingent process of meaning-formation and as a symbolisation of experience, or as an attempt to make sense of the political, cultural and existential uncertainty that is sweeping European societies.

Politics and religion between de-secularisation and re-sacralisation

Dominant approaches to religious populism typically formulate an arbitrary and top-down understanding of what counts as valid religion, of what religion means. To them, religion is a form of private belief, a spiritual feeling and a series of moral precepts. In this reading, thus, the political aspect of religion and the way religion creates a sense of identity and belonging are dismissed as illegitimate and essentially non-religious. Canny populists, this line of research explains, hijack religion from their owners, the religious elites, who then need to 'regain' it (Roy, 2016b, p. 199). However, social scientists have come to view religion as a variable mix of values, identity and rituals, and count as religious even those attracted by any or only one of the three elements. Thus, it is problematic to frame, as *Saving the People* does, a value-based version of religion as the only legitimate one simply because it is the version supported by religious institutions and elites.

To understand the use of religious rhetoric by right-wing populists, it is perhaps necessary to consider current global phenomena such as the post-secular blurring of the boundaries between the religious and the political, the resurgence of religion and its return in the public realm (Casanova, 1994; Demerath, 2007, p. 57), and the 'de-secularisation' (Berger, 1999) or 're-sacralisation' of the world (Demerath, 2007, p. 66). Right-wing religion populism is better understood in this global context, rather than as a pathological deviation from the norm. It is also for this reason that right-wing religious populism – initially confined to a few marginal constituencies – seems to have been increasingly 'mainstreamed' from the periphery of the political spectrum to the pro-establishment and central segment of it (Kallis, 2013). On issues such as Islamic headscarves, the building of mosques and minarets or Turkey's never-ending EU accession story, the mainstream public discourse is profoundly imbued with a religious dimension, one that is adopted not only by religious authorities such as the former Pope Benedictus XVI but also by liberal-conservative and centre-left politics. For example, one of the leader of the Dutch Liberal Conservative Party (VVD; People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), Frits Bolkestein warned that Turkey's accession in Europe would open the way to the 'Islamisation of Europe' and its 'loss of identity', and expressed his fear that the 1683 relief of Vienna might be 'in vain'.[3]

Finally, the mix between religion and politics that pervades populism – and their claim that there is no distinction between Christianity and the secular culture of Europe's present – must be placed in the context of post-secularism as discussed by Jürgen Habermas. In a memorable public debate with cardinal Ratzinger, who then became Pope Benedictus XVI, Habermas acknowledged, against the most

canonical secular thesis, the role of religion within the modern world (Habermas & Ratzinger, 2006). To Habermas, post-secularism is the outcome of a 'change in consciousness' in secularised people, increasingly aware of the non-universality of their own religious and ideological position. Having recognised the relativity of their secularism, while becoming aware of the increasing importance of religion in the public sphere – precisely in the historical moment marked by growing presence of Muslim in the continent – Europeans begin to understand that secularism cannot be abruptly cut from Europe's Christian heritage (Habermas, 2008; Mavelli & Petito, 2014, pp. 1–2; Morieson, 2017, pp. 93–94).

The *Abendland* tradition

One serious weaknesses of the scholarship on right-wing populism is the separation of politics from religion and from culture. Religion as understood by populists – this scholarship maintains, is only about 'belonging' rather than 'believing', and thus is simply a marker of identity. Yet, this is what precisely Christianity has been in the *longue durée* of European history, a marker of identity and not simply a set of rituals and beliefs. To put it differently, Christianity and religion are two crucial aspects of European cultural memory.

As Jan Assmann (2011) and Aleida Assmann (2011) have suggested, cultural memory is the arsenal or 'storage' of symbolic forms, images, myths, sagas and legends that, beyond the individual and the collective, live, languish in a state that at the margin come close to disappearance and oblivion, yet becomes accessible across millennia, as it can be reactivated in the treasure store of the people. Cultural memory, its symbols and its texts define the identity and the cohesiveness of a community, structure the world within which communication takes place and foster the consciousness of unity and sense of belonging, reproducing a character and sustaining the group's identity and self-image through and beyond the generations.

It is tempting to reduce politics and political discourse to a set of rational strategies and to a symptom of the present, isolated from large pattern of historical understanding and deprived of unconscious meanings and symbolic underpinning, as well as of Europe's long history which has shaped culture memory, mentalities and traditions. Likewise, it is tempting to reduce right-wing religious politics to a simple oppositional ideology, and its cultural productions and expressions to strategic devices aimed at achieving clear-cut political aims. Yet, religious populism cannot be understood only in a presentist perspective. Contemporary forms of political discourse and mentality are rooted in not always rational and conscious symbols that belong to a community's cultural memory.

One of the most pervasive symbols of European self-understanding is the *Abendland*, the notion that Europe is a political, cultural and religious entity with Christian roots, whose identity was always built, and challenged, in opposition to the world at its own Southern and Eastern periphery, Islam. British historian Denis Hay explained in 1957 that European unity began with the concept exemplified by the *Song of Roland* of Christendom in inevitable opposition to

Islam. This concept culminated in the Crusades. Generations of European have learned through texts, images, school curricula, oral history or lived experiences, mediated and transmitted by communicative memory, that the defence of European Christian roots in opposition to Islam has been the most significant, remarkable and defining 'adversity' at the basis of the diverse and various identification of Europe throughout its history.[4] This adversity has made Islam Europe's 'constitutive outside', to borrow a concept form Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985).[5]

Historians have extensively written on the link between the emergence of Europe under Charlemagne to the Islam challenge; or on how, especially through the medieval experience, Europe developed out of the opposition of the Christian self (or the *res publica Christiana*) and the Muslim other; or on how Europe as a political culture and civilisation began, if only momentarily, first when the Frankish realm under Charles Martel defeated the army of the Umayyad Caliphate led by Abdul Rahmna Al Ghafiqui (governor general of Al-Andalus) in the Battle of Poitiers in 732 (or, for Arab sources, the battle of the Palace of the Martyrs), marking the high tide of the Muslim advance into Europe, turning it around and beginning the *Reconquista* (Cardini, 2000; Chabod, 1967; Hourani, 1991; Nexon, 2006; Rich, 1999).

Subsequently, the political-existential threat of Islam took the shape of the Ottoman Empire. Crucial, defining moments of the long history of Europe in opposition to Islam in the name of the defence of the *Abendland* include the strenuous resistance of Vienna in 1529, the battle of Lepanto in (when the Holy League arranged by Pope Pius V and funded by the Spanish Empire defeated the powerful Ottoman navy), and finally the victory of the multinational army led by the Polish King Johann III Sobieki against Ottoman troops in 1683, ending the siege of Vienna.

The religious division between Catholic and Protestant undermined and shattered the idea of the Christian roots of Europe, and thus the model of a single and united continent and political-cultural-religious entity. There were ambiguities in the attitude of Luther towards Islam, insofar as it was represented by Turks and the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes Luther was less critical of the Turks than the Pope (to him, the anti-Christ) or even the Jews. However, in his notorious 1518 Explanation of the *Ninety-Five Theses*, he argued against resisting the Turks, seen as a scourge intentionally sent by God to punish the Christian sinners. With the Turkish advance becoming ever more threatening in the following decades he became clearly aware of the danger and, with his 1528 *On War against the Turk* and 1529 *Sermon against the Turks*, he wrote in support of Christians responding to the threat by violent military means – and encouraged the German people and Emperor Charles V to resist invasion.

With the Turks and the Ottoman Empire losing ground, and with the loosening of the Islamic threat at the Southern and Eastern border of Europe, the *Abendland* trope took on a new meaning. After the French Revolution, Catholic counter-reactionary intellectuals such as Novalis, Chautebriand and De Maistre resorted

to the *Abendland* tradition as opposed to Europe, for the latter denoted Protestantism, nationalism and the twin idea of sovereignty: sovereignty of the individual over his/her conscience; and sovereignty of the nation-state as opposed to the unity of the medieval *res publica Christiana*, engendered by a contract, or a constitution, between atomised and free individual.

The term *Abendland* became a political catchword after World War I, with the publication of Oswald Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. Spengler came from a Protestant background. Yet, the *Abendland* was appropriated by a group of German Catholic thinkers to re-imagine an organic order in a European framework, from which could radiate a restored civilisational movement. What these thinkers had in mind was a neo-Carolingian reconstitution of Europe, a sort of pre- or anti-modern and anti-individualist utopia based on the timeless religious values of medieval Christendom. The medieval opposition to the East and to the South (Byzantium, Islam, the Turks) could be redeployed in opposition to Eastern Bolshevism and the spiritual emptiness of materialist America.

This German-Catholic *Abendland* trope proved influential in shaping the vision of Europe promoted in the 1950s by Christian Democratic politicians at the start of the project of European integration. The *Abendland* tradition not only survived the Nazi horror but could also be revamped quite readily to fit the circumstances of the early Cold War. It was in fact an excellent solution to the problem of European nationalism; in addition to this, it permitted the reinvention of the Carolingian Empire as a bulwark against the old semi-oriental east, now appearing in the shape of the enormously extended State-Bolshevism (Forlenza, 2017). Crucially, the post-totalitarian political culture of Christian Democracy, mixing religious and conservative or even anti-liberal views with a sincere commitment to democracy and to defence of human dignity (Forlenza & Thomassen, 2016a, 2016b, pp. 181–186, 2017; Moyn, 2015), silenced no longer and even racist acceptable components of the *Abendland* tradition, taming its most exclusionary and reactionary view. This was also possible because World War II fragmented the perception of the *Abendland*, allowing part of it to percolate into the nascent conceptualisation of a supranational Europe.

In principle, the *Abendland* was not a ready-made symbol that could be exploited by Christian Democrats in the post-war period without risk. In fact, it was a potentially polluted and polluting symbol, whose ideological nucleus, its boldest language and imagery contained anti-liberal and reactionary features. A re-articulation and re-adaptation of the *Abendland* was only possible because Europe underwent through a critical juncture in history, and symbols and structures were loose and open to scrutiny and re-negotiation.

The *Abendland* today

Fast forward to the present. The age of Christian Democracy, the 30 years after World War II that constituted its heyday as a political force, has ended. The Soviet collapse and the letting loose of what in bad metaphorical language were called its satellites have called into question once again where Europe begins and

what it may mean. What is Europe and what it means to be 'European' is no longer clear. Once again, the *Abendland* has been altogether more successful. It has survived Christian Democracy and the Cold War and still slumbers at the bottom of European cultural self-understanding. It functions as a condition of possibility for the definition of 'Europe' through Islam. In other word, the *Abendland* tradition has operated under the veneer and the external, institutional, administrative sphere of politics as a "social" 'organism in gestation' (Wydra, 2007) generating symbols and meaning that have remained alive in representations, discursive patterns, political symbolism and performative ritual actions. Thus, history (the past and cultural memory) still shapes current political affairs and discourses (the present), through habitus, the invisible hand of socially culturally inherited dispositions. Habitus is not easily changed, reformed, prevented or interrupted by rational public debate, and this articulates the limits of contemporary political liberalism.

Conclusion

To understand the growing appeal of right-wing Islamophobia and religious narrative, it is necessary to turn to Europe's symbolic borders as shaped by its long history and considers ancient and medieval periods as forerunners to contemporary forms of discourse. In times of crisis, marked by primarily Muslim refugees, immigrants and terroristic attacks as well as deep uncertainty about the social and economic situations, old ideas of Europe arise from the slumber. To put it differently, the uncertainty of the present has resurrected old ideas about Europe as the *Abendland*, a vision of the continent that sees it as a Christian-Catholic entity, a spiritual and cultural community and a fortress to be defended, as the Christian European realm of Charlemagne, from the external challenge of Islam. Ironically, the demise of Christian Democracy has much to do with the rise of right-wing religious politics. With Christian Democracy reigning or playing a much stronger role, this kind of making use of Christianity had been either off the table or very marginal.

Facing a deep liminal period of socio-political, cultural and existential crisis, many Europeans search for certainty drawing from long-standing stereotypes and for roots in the past which can reconstruct a meaningful, and necessarily simplistic, worldview. The recovery of the *Abendland* tropes and symbolism is a symptom of the need to redefine oneself and one's own culture. It is also the need to assuage the uncertainty of the present, precisely countering this uncertainty with the search for roots in the past.

Yet, the term *Abendland* and the notion of Europe's Christian roots and identity are not forever poisoned and not inevitably destined to feed right-wing populist religious politics. The history of Christian Democracy shows that institutions and pedagogy can reform and reshape cultural memory and habitus. The popularity and the strong evocative power of terms such as *Abendland* and Christian Europe on the far-right and right-wing of the political-ideological spectrum also reveal the dimension of the fight that is playing out in Europe. It is not a fight to defend

Europe, but a fight over what Europe means. *Abendland* and Christian Europe do not have to mean exclusion and xenophobia. After all, this is yet another moment in which structures as setting loose and meanings and symbols are open to scrutiny and recognition. If right-wing politics have taken hold of the *Abendland* for the moment that just means it is time for their opponent to take it back.

Notes

1 Charles Taylor (2006, p. 286) has defined civilisational identity the notion 'people have that the basic order by which they live, even imperfeclty, is good and (usually) is superior to to the ways of life of outsiders'.
2 The case of the Respect Party, which actively cultivated support from British Muslims, shows that left-wing populism can also be tempted to make strategic use of religion. The party, however, has been weakened by defections and resignations, most notably that of its founder, Salma Yaqoob, who quit in September 2012; see Peace (2016).
3 *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004; see also Yegenoglu (2012, p. 101).
4 This notion of the history of adversity as the one and only thing that remains unvarying in discourse, representation and self-representation of Europe from the foundations to the present has been highlighted by Delanty (1995); see also Yegenoglu (2012, pp. 101–102) and White (2000, p. 74).
5 On borders and constitutive other, and on continuity in the history of creating borders against the outside, see also Anidjar (2009).

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9 The AKP and the new politics of the social

Fragile citizenship, authoritarian populism and paternalist family policies

Zafer Yılmaz

Introduction

Family policies have always been a significant instrument in changing the direction of both the state and society in Turkey. This feature of family policies is directly related to the strong connection between family life and the organisation of society. Regulation of family life has been a medium for imposing certain lifestyles, building modern citizenship, producing a desired outcome or governing the desires and souls of people through conservative, reactionary or modernist social and political forces. Therefore, family policies have always emerged as a nexus that binds different sets of motivations, interests and desires. This character of family policies allows the imposition of macro-ideology into the micro-foundations of society. The roles attributed to family, in ordering society and building the social power of the state, gain significance, especially in times of crises and severe ideological struggles. Social, economic and political crises have always been described as crises of families in Turkey. Hence, crisis conditions have always been assessed as an opportunity to penetrate the capillary of society via restructuring, reproducing and strengthening family structures, especially in right-wing circles.

Despite the family's peculiar role in shaping Turkish society and politics, social and political analyses of family policies are a neglected issue that requires further discussion from a critical perspective.[1] To fill this gap, this chapter discusses the link between authoritarian populism, family policies and paternalism in the context of modern Turkey.[2] However, discussing current family policies and authoritarian populism brings another exigency into the social science agenda. Most of the literature on populism emphasises the discursive dimension of populism and neglects how recent authoritarian populist discourse has also been supported by public policies. These policies target families and individuals, and this populist discourse has been delivered to political subjects via meso-level institutions such as family, civil society institutions and social networks (Yabancı, 2016).[3] By focusing on the recent escalation of strengthening and protecting family policies,

we can gain insight into and better understand of how populism constructs both its subject and the political community, which the authoritarian populist framework constantly conceptualises around an 'us/them' division.

To discuss this aspect of authoritarian populism, I will assert that family policies pave the way for constructing authoritarian populism at the micro-level and make possible the imposition of its conservative worldview by providing an affective dimension in the Turkish context. This affective dimension has direct repercussions on educational, social and reproductive policies, which target families and primarily appeal to women, mobilising them in favour of building the AKP's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) conservative and Islamist hegemony in society. However, it should also be noted that family policies cannot be understood as a unilineal imposition of conservative lifestyles and Islamism. Rather, they are formulated as a response to multidimensional problems such as crises of masculinity, inadequacy of welfare arrangements for responding to social and economic problems, rise of new threats to the traditional gender regime, constant war of hegemony between opposition and Islamist power blocks over the future of society. Additionally, family policies remain at the crossroads of diverse areas, including the construction of national belonging, building the social power of the state, producing modern citizens, transforming lifestyles and embedding specific gender regimes, which are biased against women in social, economic and political life. Hence, any critique of the current rise of family policies involves an investigation of different lines of control, variable power strategies and techniques of power, which overlap to shape family oriented policies. In line with the genealogical method of analysis, this chapter aims to underline the historical and political background of these policies, analysing the connection between these policies and authoritarian populism in the current context.[4]

Therefore, a more comprehensive framework is necessary to understand how diverging social and political forces converge in targeting the family to embed a specific authoritarian and conservative political rationality at the micro-level of society. In pursuit of such an alternative genealogical framework, the following questions will be addressed: how and in what way have recent family-centred social policies been preparing the necessary affective dimension for the authoritarian populism of the AKP? How does the AKP use and abuse family policies to impose extremely conservative political views on lifestyles in Turkey? In what ways do family policies become a key instrument in organising the fragile regime of citizenship in Turkey? How do family policies solidify the pastoral-paternal father state/leader image and materialise this image in specific policies that target families?

To answer these questions, the chapter is organised as follows. First, the historical and political background of these policies will be discussed with reference to the tradition of 'legal paternalism' and the accompanying citizenship regime in Turkey. Recent family-centred social policies of the AKP and the reasons for escalation of these policies will also be underlined. Finally, the link between family-centred social policies (familialism) and authoritarian populism will be outlined with a focus on new paternalist political rationality and political

subject formation to delineate the micro-foundations of populism. Drawing on Nicholas Rose's emphasis that these policies aim to shape the 'wills, desires, aspirations, and interests, [as well as] the formation of subjectivities and collectivities' (Rose, 1987, p. 69), I will argue that framing society as a family in social and education policies provides a strong ground for new authoritarian populism. All in all, this short overview could provide an understanding of the new authoritarian and paternalist modes of operation of power, and of the presentation of Islamic conservative lifestyle politics under the guise of protection of family.

From 'becoming a family' to 'becoming a nation'

To construct a modern nation-state, the founders of the modern republic 'drew upon not just familiar imagery but also imagery of family' (Delaney, 1995, p. 182). It was thought that the family provides a strong context to capture the imagination of the people. Hence, the family became an indispensable object for modernising policies, targeting society in line with modern lifestyles and mentalities. As succinctly argued by Nükhet Sirman, 'imagining nation means imagining a new model for community' (Sirman, 2013, p. 152). Moreover, 'the invention of the new family and the nation as natural serves to render invisible and legitimize the power relations that are constitutive of both types of community' (Sirman, 2013). Late Ottoman and Early Republican elites believed that the family as a social institution provides a transmission belt for embedding modern lifestyles, institutionalising new emotional loyalty to the nascent republic, and reorganising society around the idea of citizenship (Yılmaz, 2015).

Moreover, these elites appealed to the symbolism of the mother and father to embody the relationship between the state, citizens and territory of the emerging nation-state (Delaney, 1995, p. 178). Turkish national identity has been conveyed through the image of the father state (*Devlet Baba*) and motherland (*Anavatan*) (Delaney, 1995, p. 177).[5] Therefore, the family became a privileged object of the modernisation project and policy debates in the late Ottoman and early Republican eras. A diverse range of actors, including nationalists, feminists, liberals and Islamists were involved in these debates and searched for the proper formula for both the gender relationship within the family and the relationship between the family and society. Therefore, the transformation of the family became a nodal point in reordering society in line with the modernist project and deploying emotions and feelings to cast the nation/people as an 'affective community' for both the Kemalist elites and later conservative politicians (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 373). Family policies not only open the way for the imposition of a new body of image, language and way of life in society, but also connect policing society with the construction of the absolute authority figure, or the pastoral father state image, which stands above and is responsible for the future and well-being of all families (see Foucault, 2009).[6] The logic of pastoral power was inscribed into the implementation of state authority and embodied in the welfare and education policies of the era, targeting the family. Hence, the enlargement and

institutionalisation of the social power of the state was projected as the 'salvation' of the nation as a family.

The process of reordering the state-society relationship, building a new nation and constructing a social power of state via the transformation of family life and structure was completed through constant legal amendments that cover everyday life, gender relationships, marriage regulations, reproduction policies and civil codes.[7] Consequently, 'the family empowers not only policy-makers acting in its name on policy discourses, but also its biological members, especially the head of the household' (Foucault, 2009). The relationship between family and state has been conceptualised as more than analogy both by the republican and conservative elites. State power was so structured that political power has functioned in a paternalistic way, as in family life. Hence, this mentality aimed to construct a homology between the power structure of the family and power structure of the state.

The role of the family both in welfare provision and in embedding specific lifestyles is directly related to the paternalist character of Turkish modernisation. As argued by Ahmet Murat Aytaç, state-oriented modernisation's aim is 'the creation of citizens equipped with the western values treated as the reference point of modernity. The focus of state policies, often enforced by legal sanctions, has become the dissemination of the cultural symbols representing these values and the diffusion of a system of pleasure and choices in the social field' (Aytaç, 2017, p. 500). Hence, republican elites appealed to the image of the family to win the heart and soul of the masses, according to their personal capacities and conducts with the moral and political principles of the modernisation project in 1930s. Since, as argued succinctly by Rose, 'the familialisation of society was a central instrument in constituting what one might call a subjectivity of citizenship' (Rose, 1987, p. 70). Instead of recognising the authority/right of the citizen, these policies aimed to impose a state mentality and state-oriented lifestyles into the everyday lives of citizens. Since the family was considered a vehicle for embedding desirable ways of being and behaving, it gained an ethical significance over and against the public (Turner, 1990, p. 129). On the other hand, 'the nation is understood as the family writ large, and the relationship between citizens and state is cast in familial terms. This analogy also allows the creation of boundaries between what is deemed public and what henceforth will be private. The private is understood as the secret, the sacred, the forbidden, as well as the deprived' (Sirman, 2013, p. 164). Additionally, the emergence of the state as the moral guardian of family life also has important consequences for the constitution of the regime of citizenship and the formation of public spaces. Instead of creating a public space, which requires contention, freedom of speech and freedom of organisation, modernist elites chose to concentrate on the private sphere to impose their vision of society. Hence, while the state was authorised as the sole source of public space, public space was also familialised. This familialisation has led to an intensification of the fragile regime of citizenship, which combines the suppression of public space with the sublimation of 'private' life of citizens. Hence, public space has been reserved for the pastoral paternalist state, which presented its action as an effort for protection of family life.

As a result, it is not an exaggeration to state that the authoritarian populism of the AKP adhered to path dependency on the issue of familial and legal paternalism to restructure Turkish society in line with Islamist and extremely conservative lifestyles.[8] Additionally, it revitalised the old pastoral paternalist father state mentality in a new form to build the hegemony of the AKP. Specifically, the Party encouraged three generation extended families both to fill the gap resulting from the decline of the social welfare function of family, and to extend their capillary power to impose, diffuse and circulate conservative politics and Islamise Turkish society (Kaya, 2015, p. 48). In this context, the policies of the Party are directly related to its conception of the social, which is permanently understood to be composed of families and religious communities. Understanding the way AKP conceptualised, the social at the policy level could provide insights on how the Party imposes of its own ideology at the micro-level. The party's conception of the social is directly related with the political constitution of the welfare regime. Hence, a short glance could also give insights into the role of the family in also governing the social.

The new politics of the social and re-educating families after the 2001 crisis

The well-known intervention of Gøsta Esping-Andersen in *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* was seen as a path breaking intervention for welfare state studies. It changed the direction of welfare state studies from an analysis of general theories of welfare to an explanation of the variations and unities of welfare states in the West. Anderson distinguished, 'three highly diverse regime types each organised around its own discrete logic of organisation, stratification and societal integration'. He defined a welfare regime as an 'institutional matrix of market, state and family forms, which generates welfare outcomes' and categorised welfare regimes into three main groups: liberal, corporatist and social democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 3).

Despite valuable insights, it is questionable whether these models can be directly used to understand countries in the South. James Midgley (2004, p. 217) emphasises that the mainstream paradigm focuses exclusively on the institutionalist framework reflecting a particularistic Western perspective. Hence, the analysis of other institutional mechanisms that contribute to the well-being of individuals, families, communities and societies as a whole is neglected in the direct application of Western-explanatory frameworks to the South, in which informal networks play an important role in the provision and redistribution of welfare, as well as in the management of the social question.[9] To produce a theoretical framework that is more sensitive to the historically specific social and political conditions of the Southern countries, we need 'a more creative conceptualisation of social protection and the range of informal as well as formal instruments' for these countries (Wood, 2004, p. 62). For this reason, new types of welfare regime, such as the Southern European model and welfare regime studies of Middle Eastern countries, have been developed to shed light on the role of the informal network, religious

organisations, communities and families, all of which play special role in social welfare provision (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, Jawad & Yakut-Çakar, 2010). This effort gains special significance when categorising the Turkish welfare regime and illuminating the role of the family in the organisation of this regime, as the family constitutes a special milieu in which the formal and the informal intertwine in the provision of welfare. This role of the family in the welfare regime is politically constructed so as to embed insecurity and dependency into the lives of citizens, so they become increasingly dependent on familial relations and the state. Hence, it aims to produce easily governable subjects, rather than independent citizens.

Therefore, the family is always fundamental to the government of the social and plays an important role in the welfare regime in the Turkish context (Candaş & Buğra, 2011). Instead of understanding society through the individual, society has always been framed as a composition of families and communities in Turkey, especially by conservative politicians. Following this imagination, they perceive family as 'the main political unit, whose interest and welfare should be prioritised and protected politically at the expense of individual citizens and their universal rights' (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 378). This perspective aims to articulate modern political mentalities with pre-modern perceptions to produce a model for the operation of social and political power. For the conservative elites and politicians, the social is not only an abstraction that makes governmental techniques possible, but it is also a template for regulating boundaries and power relations in the public and private spheres. Hence, being a member of a family and being the head of a family is always prioritised above the rights of individual citizens in social policies. It is generally believed that familialisation of society and accompanying policies would provide the necessary means 'whereby personal capacities and conducts could be socialised, shaped and maximised in a manner which accorded with the moral and political principles of [conservative ideology]' (Rose, 1987, p. 68).

In this context, the family has been conceptualised as a positive solution for regulating morality, health and most importantly, inadequacy of the social welfare system. This welfare function of the family was seen as a necessary supplement to the limited scale of social policies. However, it is a well-known fact that the welfare function of the family was seriously damaged after the 2001 economic crisis (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). The 2001 crisis instigated the emergence of an organic crisis, 'which manifests itself as a proliferation of popular demands that cannot be neutralised by the existing framework of state power. Typically, this coincides with a crisis within the power bloc itself' (Reyes, 2005, p. 103). A group of politicians (then AKP cadres) from the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) saw this crisis as an opportunity to intervene in Turkish politics to rearticulate a series of popular frustrations from below. Family thus became a nodal point in building a new hegemony, after being damaged following the 2001 crisis.

Therefore, restoring the traditional family structure and the role of the family in welfare provision has become a priority for governing parties following the 2001 crisis. However, the AKP initiated a more comprehensive policy package to support families and refurbish the welfare functioning of the family and family

structure. The AKP policy makers introduced new family-centred policies especially in three different fields: (1) social assistance system; (2) new family education programmes and (3) reproduction policies. To produce subjective commitment to the values and practices that have been promoted by the Party and to engender active engagement of individuals for the promotion of these conservative values and lifestyles, education policies on family life have been encouraged by the Party at both the local and national level.

To symbolically and boldly indicate the AKP's approach to the matter, the Party changed the name of the ministry responsible for women's and family affairs to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (MFSP) in 2011, by dropping the term 'woman' from the ministry's name. This institutional change inaugurated the transformation of almost all social policies into family policy (Yazıcı, 2012). However, educating families became the Party's first priority after assuming power in 2002. In response to newly emerging 'threats' to the Turkish family structure, the AKP government initiated several nation-wide projects and opened 'family advice centres' to reach families everywhere. In that context, 'Family Education Programmes' have been formulated to revitalise and reformat the historically strong Turkish family structure. With the direct support of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the *Ailem Türkiye* (*My Family Turkey*) project was initiated in 2005, which aimed to create awareness of the 'importance of the family' by organising education seminars around the country. After initiating the *My Family Turkey* project, the *Aile Olmak* (*Becoming a Family*) project was organised in June 2013 by the MFSP (Nas, 2016). In line with these projects, handbooks, including 'Family Law Guide', 'Family Health Guide', 'A Life on the Same Pillow' and 'Family Home Guide' have been prepared to enlighten new couples about family life, the responsibilities of women and men and raising children properly in line with the Turkish value system. MFSP deployed 1200 special trainers to give seminars, published 23 books for education programmes, prepared booklets and organised meetings at the local level in close cooperation with other ministries and the general directorate of security affairs, municipalities and NGOs (Yılmaz, 2015).

These education programmes are 'designed according to the protective and pre-emptive social policy mentality so that the awareness of families about potential problems in family life can be increased, their abilities in coping with risks can be enhanced, and effective use of resources can be provided' (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 380). For policy makers, family is the foundational unit of society, and needs to be strengthened and protected from external threats, since they believed that the relationship between family and society is highly substantial. An implicit aim of all these policies is to make the state/society more like a family and family more like the state/society. Party leaders have constantly appealed and circulated the metaphor of family in their public speeches to appeal to the people's imagination, solidifying the image of Turkish society as an organically coherent and homogenous unit like a family. In that context, the governing party began to organise politics of familialisation in a new form, both in social policies and public policies.[10]

The AKP revitalised the above-mentioned mentality of familialism by ingraining populist, neo-liberal and neo-conservative elements within it. As previously emphasised, the Party equated almost all social policies to family policies and redefined the social question in its multidimensionality (problems of inequality, poverty, crime and other aspects) as maintenance of the traditional extended family structure. As Ayhan Kaya (2015, p. 61) argues, '[the] neoliberal state of the AKP has a vested interest in portraying "the strong Turkish Family" as a "problem-solver" in the sense of resolving what would otherwise be a "burden" on the state'. By appealing to the self-regulating capacities of the family members, they aim to delegate social care services to families with the provision of minimal financial support. Hence, these policies attempt to create active subjects that are responsible for the well-being of all family members in the Turkish context. The active subject has typically been a woman, since it is believed that these 'domestic' responsibilities, including child care and elderly care, belong to women. However, the general aim of these policies is much broader than revitalising family welfare functions. It aims to embed a new paternalist political rationality, solve the emerging crises of masculinity, reproduce traditional gender roles and mobilise women, thus promoting 'desirable ways of being and behaving' in line with Islamist and conservative lifestyles on the bases of family (Larner, 2000, p. 247).

By way of these policies, 'family' was reconstituted as the anchor of the new Islamist and extremely conservative hegemony. These education policies have also been supported by a nationwide social assistance system. Although, these policies are highly restricted and minimal in nature in comparison with their Western counterparts, they have been highly efficient in mobilising poor families in favour of party.[11] They are structured in a way that the discretionary power of local authorities plays the final role in distributing assistance. Assistance policies consist in provisions and monetary aids, including education, health, heating (distribution of coal) and education assistance.[12] The General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SYDGM) is responsible for the allocation of social assistance. It funds and supervises a local administrative body, a total of 1000 Social Aid and Solidarity Foundations (*Sosyal Yardımlasma ve Dayanısma Vakıfları*, SYDV) located at the city and provincial level (Dorlach, 2015). The resources allocated by SYDTF to the SYDVs have risen steadily in the 2000s.[13] Moreover, this limited social assistance system is also complemented by a municipality-based social assistance system. Local municipalities have assumed greater responsibilities in social assistance since the 2000s (Eder, 2010, p. 177). As argued by Mine Eder, 'the enhanced power of the municipalities created ample room for patronage politics, as they were allowed to use private sector and/or wealthy organisations for various services and funding' (Eder, 2010, p. 178).

It is generally believed that this patronage-based welfare provision by municipalities lies behind the electoral success of the Party. The last pillar of these family-based assistance systems are faith-based organisations, which work in close cooperation with the government to reach poor families.[14] In all of these arrangements, the criteria for obtained support have not been clearly formulated.[15]

Each has its own notion of the 'deserving poor'. Unsurprisingly, having a family is one of the most important conditions for obtaining support either from state, municipality or faith-based organisations. Supervision of beneficiaries has been used to discipline poor families in line with conservative values too (Yılmaz, 2013). All in all, education and social policies are formulated to embody the new politics of familialisation and family, becoming a lynchpin in the construction of the Turkish Islamist hegemony. Finally, these policies have been supported by conservative discourse and policies on the issue of reproduction, since, in the eyes of so-called conservative democrats, there is a direct relation between family, reproduction policies and the strength of the nation/state.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has insisted that each family should have at least three children to protect the strength of the Turkish nation and society. He has directly promoted new politics of familialisation and several times emphasised the strong association between state, family and nation. In his words,

> nation and state exist only if family exists. . . . Therefore, we are admitting that any attack against family is an attack on humanity and we don't tolerate it in any case. Without any suspicion, this understanding exists at the base of all of our reforms that we carry out in every sphere, initially education. Strengthening the family with education, health, and social policy, strengthening the family with the economy, making politics a servant of the family, on that basis we succeeded in developing Turkey and we will continue in the same manner.
>
> (Erdoğan, 2012, p. 7)

In that context, family policies emerged once again as a crucial vehicle for embedding deeply conservative bio-political reproductive policies. As a result, public debates around reproductive policies, abortion, birth control and women's position within the family have escalated in society in addition to increasing concerns about decreasing fertility rates, ageing of the population and new demographic trends within the circles of the Party. President Erdoğan began a public campaign against abortion, caesarean sections and birth control. These policies are not just formulated to revitalise the connection between a 'strong' state and family, but they are explicitly designed to restore classical patriarchal power, and solve the crises of hegemonic masculinity that has become increasingly visible in the public sphere (Sancar, 2012, 2016). The notion of the father as the provider and head of the household has been promoted once again, to restore the so-called 'peaceful' relationship between spouses.

However, as argued by Rose, it is also highly misleading to see women as 'passive victims or duped collaborators in the family reforms of the last century. They have frequently been active campaigners for' familialisation policies (Rose, 1987, p. 71). In the Turkish case as well, women's branches of the Party are active campaigners for familialisation policies. Even if the AKP has generally side-lined women and usually mentions them only in the context of the family or the

headscarf controversy, it is a well-known fact that women are highly active in delivering party policies and messages (Çavdar, 2010, p. 344).[16] Women Branches (WB) of the AKP are highly effective in contacting people, since they organise home visits, during which they introduce the Party's objectives (Çavdar, 2010, p. 354). Family visits are a crucial vehicle for disseminating the Party's religio-conservative worldview. Fatma Sahin, the former head of WB, argues that

> [women] are pioneers; they have a unique power, which is the ability to penetrate the household. Men cannot just knock at the door and enter a home. When women do that, you reach other women, which means that you reach the entire family. This is our power. When you change women, you change the entire society.
>
> (Çavdar, 2010, pp. 354–355)[17]

On the one hand, this ability of women has always been appreciated by the AKP cadres. On the other hand, the Party is still sensitive to reproducing the traditional gender division of labour and emphasising the role of women in raising the next generation. Women's main responsibility has always been to transmit moral values to the next generation and to support the paternalist and patriarchal mentality of the Party (Çitak & Tür, 2008, p. 464). Therefore, feminist women groups are seen as marginal. Erdoğan raised his objection against women groups, who protested the proposed change in the Turkish Penal Code:

> There have been some who have marched in Ankara in the name of democracy in the recent controversy. I was truly sorry on behalf of the Turkish women when I saw some handbills that went against their traditions and moral values. We have moral values; I would never applaud those handbills in the name of the Turkish women. Because the strength of Turkish women derives from these values. There can be no such understanding that a specific marginal group represents the power of Turkish women.
>
> (Çitak & Tür, 2008, p. 461)[18]

For the AKP, women have a place in public if and only if they accept the role attributed to them either as a mother, a useful conveyer of party messages or as an active carrier of the Party's Islamist conservative ideology to the electoral base. It seems that this approach has also been internalised by female supporters of the Party so that they generally reproduce the discourse on morally upright society as well as clichés and stereotypes about women who do not wear a headscarf (Çitak & Tür, 2008, p. 464, p. 469). Hence, as argued by Rose, 'the familialisation of society operates because it has managed to command considerable subjective commitment from citizens who have come to regulate their own lives according to its term' (Rose, 1987, p. 68). It can be said that authoritarian populism successfully obtains that support of its electoral base by imposing these conservative policies.

Authoritarian populism as the guardian of family, or, family as a stronghold of authoritarianism

In line with Stuart Hall's analysis, authoritarian populism can be defined as an attempt to forge a 'reactionary common-sense' (Reyes, 2005, p. 99).[19] Populism structures the conditions of the emergence of authoritarianism in a specific way. The way political community is defined within an authoritarian populist framework has a direct effect on the functioning of democratic procedures, the balance of power within state institutions and the level of democratic participation. Current authoritarian populism switches the pendulum towards a Schmittian understanding of the political community (based on friend-foe conceptualisation) (Schmitt, [1932] 2007), it rejects any checks and balances, de-institutionalises the state structure and mobilises reactionary and de-democratising forces in Turkey. It assumes that elections are the only source of authorisation, and it directly represents and embodies the 'national will' (*milli irade*) in its policies. Family policies not only give specific moral content to an authoritarian populist agenda, but they are also instrumental in embedding political rationality and promoting authoritarian populism.

Conservative Islamists believe that family is a miniature model of Muslim society. For them, there is a unilineal structure of authority between God, the head of the state and the father (Delaney, 1995). The Turkish version of authoritarian populism is highly inspired by this model in imagining the power relationships between the state, family and people. They attribute a crucial role to the family both in the construction of a morally upright society, in raising patriotic, moral, self-scarifying Turkish Islamist subjects and in embedding the pastoral-paternalist power mentality in society. However, the importance of imagining state and society as a family goes beyond any instrumental motivations. As previously argued, authoritarian populism is a specific populist project, which appeals to and aims to constitute political communities 'as families both in a political and social sense to make its political agenda deeply hegemonic in the Turkish context. It mobilizes an amalgam of discursive and institutional arrangements so that families will be central actors of the embodiment of the transformative policies of the party' (Yılmaz, 2015, p. 377). In that context, the AKP attempts to converge different 'social and political forces so as to inject conservative ideology into the everyday life of individuals and fundamentally familialise the political support behind the conservative program of the ruling elites' (Yılmaz, 2015).

This new politics of familialisation again involves the transformation of all political concerns into personal and familial objectives. The problem with this imagination is not that it covers ethnic and religious conflicts in Turkish society, but that it reconceptualises them within the paternalist mentality as an unnecessary conflict among family members that could be easily solved if everyone accepts the necessary hierarchy and homogeneity within families. As mentioned, family is not only a metaphor and prototype of the nation, used to imagine society as a unified subject, it is also seen as the most important instrument for building a nation and group identity, thus constructing borders between 'us' and 'them' as

well. Accordingly, the authoritarian populism of the AKP also uses family metaphors to induce social and political images of the desired political community.

The AKP leadership constantly uses family metaphors to concrete the binary dualities of authoritarian populist discourse. The antagonism dividing the social and political arena between 'us' and 'them' has been reconstructed as an antagonism between Western or secular elite (the other), who do not commit to or appreciate family values, and Eastern decent Turkish Muslim people who live for their family (Yazıcı, 2012). Debates around adultery provide examples of how moral dichotomies have been established and how the family has been used to shape the 'us/them' division. For conservative writers, sexual freedom and extra marital relations are the main reasons behind the moral decline of European societies (Çitak & Tür, 2008). What differentiates Turkish society from its European counterparts is its rejection of such unacceptable social intercourses. Against this moral degeneration, Turkish society sublimates family as the fortress of morality. Ayşenur Kurtoğlu, President Erdoğan's former personal consultant in charge of women and family, states:

> Our greatest and not yet spoiled value is our family system. We should be protective towards our families. We should mostly protect and greatly care for the family institution. . . . Today, technology, television and internet are threats against the family structure. In the last three or four years the rate of divorce has increased because of economic conditions and the family life have been shaken. Economic crisis has negative influences on the family. We should talk about them. Universities, government, NGOs and local governments should cooperate and do something for solving these problems.
> (Gunes-Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008, p. 379)[20]

The AKP has focused more heavily on moral threats than economic problems to mobilise its constituency, insisting on strict penalties for adultery.[21] The party's legal amendment has been revoked owing to pressures from the EU and women organisations. However, the Party leaders and pro-AKP journalists have tried to generate an atmosphere of moral panic to engender populist mobilisation. Moralistic discourse on family life has been revitalised to promote reactionary common sense. In that context, the AKP and the leaders of the Party have been continuously presented as the sole guardian of family life. Erdoğan has been sensitive in representing party policies in his public speeches as a performance for the sake of protecting traditional family life. Erdoğan and other leaders have also been sensitive in adorning authoritarian populism with the compassionate discourse against families and 'deserving poor' that support the politics of the Party. Hence, it could be said that recent family policies are structured to prepare for replacing the pristine paternalist-pastoral image of the state with the pastoral image of the party/leader as the guardian of the family. By presenting the public policies as the manifestation of the 'protective' mentality of the AKP and its leader, these policies make possible the repersonalisation of implementations of state authority as well. Especially, family-based social assistance policies were

promoted as a direct evidence of such kind of political mentality. The AKP and the president Erdoğan were very keen on representing their activity to improve social policies in the country as a direct evidence of their particular effort to favour party's electoral base, hence, to keep an eye "on all and on each" for their salvation and subsistence. As a result, the only purpose of these policies is presented as the interest of those on whom these policies exercised. They are portrayed as proof of the sincere sensitivity of the AKP to the daily problems of poor families. Hence, the realisation of the pastoral mentality of power and paternalism in family policies have also strengthened the emotional identification between the leader and his followers, organised as families.

By rebuilding a chain of paternalism, these policies have also become instrumental in familialising the political base of the Party as an affective community, bonded together by the strict chain of paternalism. This chain of paternalism has been assembled by state institutions, faith-based organisations, municipalities and party branches. Family, faith-based organisations and local networks of the Party have been presented as institutional embodiments of the common-sense values and will to be in 'the service of' common people.

There is a strong link between the authoritarian construction of the antagonism of the pure/virtuous people versus the elite and reinforcing the moral and normative supremacy of family in society. Family is a nexus for the Party's articulation of Islamic lifestyle politics and conservative/neo-liberal hegemonic projects in that context. The Party invokes familialisation of policies to manufacture reactionary common sense, which structures the daily life of the masses around conservative policies and entrenches the position of the Party within the cultural war for hegemony. For this reason, they have deployed state power for social engineering projects to impose conservative moral and religious values into society.

Conclusion: 'Compassionate' authoritarianism and the making of the conservative family

Conservative populists in Turkey have always believed that family, with its accompanying emotional baggage, is the 'the heart of a heartless world'. For them, it symbolises the 'spirit' of the East against the materialism of the West. However, they have also complemented this substantial view of the family with a crude instrumentalist approach, since their strong emotional attributes are intrinsically related with their views of the state and society. Accordingly, the leaders of the AKP also believe that family policies will open the way for avenues of the desired Islamisation of Turkish society. As argued by Kaya (2015, p. 58), '[the] Islamisation of society and politics in Turkey is visible not only in strategies and discourses utilised by the AKP, but also in neoliberal social provisioning policies'. It is worth mentioning the role of social assistance once again in building these paternalist chains and power networks for the realisation of specific political purpose. This aspect is also related with the political community building dimension of the social welfare provision to families. The means-test-based social assistance policies have been criticised because of their discretionary/arbitrary

nature and openness to politicisation. However, it should be added that these policies are already very political in nature.

Social assistance means simultaneous recognition and affirmation of the existence of the beneficiary (Auyero, 2000). It seems that the AKP is very well aware of these two aspects of assistance practices. However, the aim of the Party is not an empowerment of the poor. These policies not only provide ground for penetration of the state/party into the micro-foundations of society but they are also structured in a way that they seem to be an endowment of the governing party. Moreover, it could also be asserted that these short-term and discretional policies aim to undo/disentangle the demos/people as a political subject in order to reconfigure it as a conglomeration of a needy subject or deserving poor, waiting for a handout from the state or voluntary donors and dependent on the guardianship of the party/leader (Brown, 2015).

Meanwhile, authoritarian populism is sensitive of adding compassion as an affective dimension for the provision of these policies. The concept of compassion is firmly ingrained as positive content in the market oriented neo-liberal mentality. This also made it possible to combine the neo-conservative mentality with neo-liberal logic in the Turkish context. It is obvious that this discourse of compassion has been borrowed from Islam and restructured to make it adaptable to the necessities of the ongoing power struggle. It has become highly efficient in creating an emotional aura for the AKP that it is acting for the sake of the poor. Pro-poor policies adorned by the discourse of compassion are also seen as crucial instruments in promoting emotional and economic investment by both men and women into 'the home' and the desired political community, whose border has been obviously marked by conservative and Islamic values.

In this context, the AKP's authoritarian and conservative agenda aims to articulate a classical conservative emphasis on the family, conservative values and a neo-liberal, market-oriented mentality in Turkish politics. On the one hand, the AKP government has institutionalised a means-test-based social assistance system, and initiated comprehensive social policies to increasingly place risk responsibility on poor families. On the other hand, charity-based understanding of poverty alleviation has been encouraged in order to manage social problems both at the national and local level. To challenge the reduction of their conservatism of free market individualism, they have placed greater emphasis on voluntary groups, charities, local societies and the family as in other cases of authoritarian neo-liberalism (Reyes, 2005, p. 108). At first glance, their neo-conservative mentality and neo-liberalism seems like a contradiction. However, as argued by Wendy Brown, 'what might appear as logical contradiction at the level of ideas to be grasped as partially and unsystematically symbiotic at the level of political subjectivity' (Brown, 2006, p. 693). Compassionate discourse with family policies has emerged as the necessary cement to compound the 'de-democratising force of these two rationalities' and to translate this specific populist agenda into a micro-foundation of society.

Finally, these policies convey a specific political rationality and produce a model of power for the governing not only of family members, but also of citizens.

The conservative Islamism of the AKP models state authority on paternal authority, as the head of the family, and aims to reconceptualise the relationship between state and citizen as a pastoral relation of the state to its flock, even though they strictly adhere to the idea that the state should be in the service of its people. This results not only in the understanding of unified rather than balanced or checked state power, but also strengthens the fragile conception of citizenship. Additionally, it aims to cultivate traditional masculinity and sublimate the pastoral-paternal image of the leader as the culmination of this masculinity to solve the ongoing crises of hegemonic masculinity and overcome emerging threats against conservative family life in Turkey. To win the war of hegemony and to impose conservative and authoritarian lifestyles on the country, family policies have been gaining significance more than any other policy. However, there is always indeterminacy about family values, family life and the organisation/distribution of power in the family. The empowerment of women has already produced strong challenges to traditional family life. Hence, it seems that the family will continue to be a battlefield for hegemony in the coming future and the debates about family life will continue to be the source of both 'docile' and 'defying' subject.

Notes

1 For analyses of relationship between family and state, see Aytaç (2007); Sancar (2012) and Sirman (2007, 2013).
2 For a discussion on paternalism and the gender regime in Turkey, see also Melis & Parmaksiz (2016).
3 For analysis of populism in that context, see Yabancı (2016).
4 For an evaluation of genealogy as a method in political science, see Jenkins (2011) and Kendall and Wickam (2003).
5 For an analysis of father image in Turkey, see Delaney (1995) and Somay (2014).
6 For comprehensive analysis of the concept see Foucault (2009). The idea of pastoral power depends on a relationship between a shepherd and his/her flock. As argued by Foucault, the essential objective of pastoral power is 'the salvation (salut) of the flock'. To realise this salvation, pastoral power is 'exercised over a flock, and more exactly over a flock in is movement from one place to another' (Foucault, 2009, p. 125). In that context, the priority of the shepherd is watching and keeping an eye 'on all and on each' to protect the flock against possible evils. Hence, power is not exercised for the interest of the city, territory or state. Rather, it is a power of care, 'with a purpose for those on whom it is exercised' (Foucault, 2009, p. 129).
7 First, the *Hukuk-u Aile Kararnamesi* (Decree of Family Law) was legalised in 1917 and then the republican government passed a new Civil Code in 1926. This new Civil Code was also adopted several times as a response to changing social and political structure (see Yilmaz, 2015).
8 However, it should also be noted that there are crucial differences between Kemalist elite's image of the ideal family and the AKP's image. For the AKP, the ideal family refers to the 'traditional' Turkish family, which includes both nuclear family members and elderlies. The ideal family should be organised on the basis of religious, national and cultural values of the Turkish people as well. More importantly, family is a religious unit for the conservative circles (see Özbay, 2014).
9 To address this problem, authors attempted to diversify the welfare regime paradigm. For instance, Gough (2004, pp. 245–248) developed the idea of an *informal security regime* so as to produce a theoretical framework that is more appropriate to the Third World country context.

10 For a general evaluation see Nas (2016); Öztan (2014); Yazıcı (2012) and Yilmaz (2015).

11 For the political background of these policies, see Yilmaz (2013).

12 For the exact numbers, see Ministry's performance reports: *2016 Yili Faaliyet Raporu*, www.aile.gov.tr/data/58b58e4c691407119c139239/2016 Faaliyet Raporu.pdf (accessed 10 August 2017).

13 For an analysis of the rise of social transfers, see Albayrak (2013).

14 For evaluations of charity and pro-poor policy in Turkey, see Göçmen (2014) and Yılmaz (2013).

15 The Ministry of Family and Social Policies started to use means tested system, but it did not remove discretionary power of authority in distributing these assistances.

16 For a comprehensive discussion about headscarf issue, see Çıtak and Tür (2008) and Günes-Ayata and Tütüncü (2008).

17 Nuriye Akman, Fatma Şahin ile Söylesi (Interwiev with Fatma Şahin), *Zaman*, 17 January 2010, quoted in Çavdar (2010, pp. 354–355).

18 Erdogan's speeches, 'Kadınlara yakısmadı' (This is not an appropriate behaviour for women), *Sabah*, 25 September 2004, quoted in Çıtak and Tür (2008 p. 461).

19 For more conceptual clarification, see Hall (1985).

20 *Zaman Daily* (21 August 2003), quoted in Gunes-Ayata and Tütüncü (2008, p. 379).

21 For an adultery debate, see Gunes-Ayata and Tütüncü (2008, pp. 378–382) and Çıtak and Tür (2008). In September 2004, during the legislation process of the new Penal Code, the JDP introduced a last-minute bill to recriminalise adultery (Çitak & Tür, 2008, pp. 460–461). The major question was 'Should people be put into prison if they have sex out of wedlock?'

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10 Trump, religion and populism

Bryan S. Turner

Introduction

Religion (or more specifically Christianity) has been thrust into the public domain as a consequence of populist opposition to Islam insofar as Muslim migrants are uniformly regarded as actual or potential jihadists. Fear of Muslim migration played an obvious role in the Trump campaign and in his early presidency, and in the Brexit vote to leave the European Union with the aim of controlling migration. This appeal to Christendom as a defining character of Britishness was muted in recent political campaigns and opposition to migration was directed against Polish nationals rather than against Muslims. Apart from the Queen's symbolic role as the head of the Church of England, religion has been largely absent from British politics in the twentieth century. Of course, in the United States religion, especially since the emergence of the Moral Majority, is never that far removed from politics. While religion played a role in the rise of the Tea Party and the presidential contest between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama, it was largely absent from or only implicit in the election campaign in 2016 between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Furthermore, surveys of support for Trump and Clinton have generally neglected the religious composition of Trump's base concentrating instead on the 'left-behind' blue collar worker and on the elderly voter. However, the early presidency of Trump has exposed important connections between Trump and religion. He is enjoying support for his anti-abortion stand (from both Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants), for his pro-Israeli stance (from orthodox Jews and evangelical Protestants) and from 'Tender Warriors' (evangelical Protestants embracing masculinity and traditional notions of the gender division of labour). Trump's overtly masculine persona (including his large hands) is an obvious attraction for men who feel dispossessed by feminism and the gay lobby of the East Coast. In this respect, there is something in common between Trump and Nigel Farage the UKIP leader who presents himself as a successful and secular beer-drinking 'lad'. Britain is an infertile ground for populism with a religious message (Peace, 2016, p. 107). The Respect Party concentrates its electoral strategy on religiously defined sectors of the population but has little voter support.

Trump now enjoys the support of diverse religious groups and has the benefit of a spiritual guide in the televangelist Paula White who affirms that he has a 'hunger for God'. Finally, Trump on National Prayer Breakfast in 2017 promised

to 'destroy' the Johnson Amendment that separated politics and pulpit for churches classified as tax-exempt charities. It appears that religion is consolidating Trump's base and increasingly acts as a dimension of American populism.

The religious dimension of populism has recently been explored in *Saving the People. How Populists Hijack Religion* (Marzouki, McDonnell & Roy, 2016), but without a chapter on religious support for Trump. However, the chapter on the Tea Party by Nadia Marzouki suggests that there are important continuities between the Tea Party and the Trump campaign. Thirty-three per cent of white Catholics and 30 per cent of white mainstream Protestants agree with the Tea Party platform. She points out correctly that populism has had a long history in the United States from the People's Party in 1892, the Women's Christian Temperance Movement of 1873, and the anti-civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. The support of right-wing white evangelical Protestant networks played a key role in the success of the Tea Party. In terms of its ideology the Tea Party presents itself as defending America as a Christian nation against the outside world that wants to destroy Christian America (Marzouki, 2016, p. 153). The Tea Party, which embraced much of the anti-elite and anti-government rhetoric of populism, appealed to the idea of America as a Christian nation to mobilise opposition to Muslims. Tea Party meetings attracted people such as Pamela Geller the co-founder with Robert Spencer of the 'Stop Islamization of America' platform and it is argued that the Tea Party as a grass-roots activist movement had a significant impact on the mid-term elections of November 2010. As a grass-roots movement, Trump's campaign continued to work with themes and issues that had been significant in Tea Party success.

Looking at the European context, the authors note that populist parties have mobilised Christianity in the face of a perceived threat to European identity by the refugee crisis spilling out of Syria and North Africa. Europe is defined in terms of Christendom specifically to assert the contrast between Western values and Islam. The general argument of the volume is that populism has 'hijacked' religion for political purposes in which 'Christendom' rather than the Christian faith becomes a marker of exclusive membership. In any case, populists are often at odds with religious leaders who have welcomed refugees as a Christian duty.

It is not my intention here to explore in any depth the meaning of 'populism'. Furthermore, there has been ample discussion in the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Atlantic* and the *Monthly Review* rejecting the idea that Trump is a populist. In Foster's 'This is not Populism', which appeared in the *Monthly Review*, part of the argument is that in his first 100 days Trump departed from most of his campaign promises and that his legislation over health care will actually damage the people who voted for him (Foster, 2017). The problem is that there is no sign that his supporters are ready to abandon him. I shall return to this issue – the enigma of populist Trump – later, but suffice it to say that support for Trump has more to do with emotions than with any rational calculation of his economic promises.

There is also ample recognition that populism is difficult to define and especially difficult to sort out left-wing and right-wing versions. There is however some

agreement that populist movements have a clear understanding of the 'other' and that the other is a threat to a particular way of life and set of values. Populists mobilise to prevent the spread and ascendency of these other values and ways of life, and at the same time feel betrayed by elites who are the architects of globalisation that has eroded their way of life and welcomed migrants, diversity and cosmopolitan values (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2007). Populist politics in these terms is a politics of resentment in which the people have been betrayed by elites. The absence of trust creates an atmosphere in which conspiracy stories and claims about fake news find an audience. Religion appears to play an important part in defining an inside world and an outside world between 'us' and 'them'.

On this minimalist definition, we can see that the Tea Party and Trump's followers in the United States, and various movements in Europe such as the Lega Nord in Italy, the National Front in France, UKIP in the United Kingdom, the People's Party in Switzerland and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have a common fear of 'the other'. However, this other is often a diverse group that is composed of Muslims, feminist women, gay men, intellectuals and migrants in general. Jews have an ambiguous place in this us – other dichotomy. Anti-Semitism occasionally features in the rejection of cosmopolitan elites. However, the West is often defined in terms of its Judeo-Christian heritage. Nevertheless, Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted by extremists, and populism raises fears of a return to the political climate of the 1930s. This religious framing of European populism is at first sight surprising given the general secularisation of the West. One explanation is that populists are defending Christendom as a cultural barrier while often being in conflict with those religious authorities that have welcomed Muslim refugees. There is, even within the Catholic Church itself, considerable ambiguity about the Pope's message of poverty, humility and respect for refugees and migrants. In short, for populist parties, 'Christianity is therefore *de facto* defined as culture, not as faith' (Roy, 2016, p. 193).

Religion in American politics

Unlike the majority of European societies, religion has and continues to have an important influence on public life and politics in the United States. However, in Europe and in the United States, there is evidence of institutional decline. Recruitment to the ministry is in decline; commitment to Christian orthodoxy has been eroded; there is a significant growth in the number of people who define themselves in terms of 'no religion'; and there is growing acceptance of homosexuality. At the same time, sex scandals in the Roman Catholic world have threatened the legitimacy of the Church as a whole. It is widely held that we are moving into an era of post-institutional religiosity or 'spirituality' in which religious life-styles are highly individualistic and in that sense private (Bender, 2010). At the same time, religion continues to play a visible and often controversial role in public life. The quiet growth of private spirituality is overshadowed by the din of public religion.

This paradox between the private and the public world of religion was perhaps best captured by José Casanova in his *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) in which, while accepting a limited version of the theory of secularisation, he drew attention to the profound impact of religion in the public/political world. His examples included the Shia Revolution (1978–1979) and the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy, the Moral Majority which was founded by Jerry Falwell in 1979, liberation theology in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s and the Solidarity Movement in Poland in the early 1980s. Casanova's argument was influenced by the transformation of Roman Catholicism after Vatican II (1962–1965) which sought to abolish the Church's support for authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy, and promoted a more positive attitude towards other religions. In short, Vatican II recognised the willingness of the Church to operate in the modern world that is as a public religion with a concern for secular politics and economics. The only area that was not modernised was the Church's teaching on family, marriage and sex. The outcome of this political modernisation of the Church was seen in a positive light by Casanova as contributing to the fall of Soviet communism and the democratisation of Latin America.

The growth of the Moral Majority was a counter-attack against the public embrace of the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the sexual revolution and protests against the Vietnam War. Although much of the motivation behind the religious right has been traced to the Supreme Court's striking down of school prayer in the early 1960s, the white evangelical churches were mainly drawn into politics over legal changes to marriage and divorce, abortion, homosexuality, the teaching of evolutionism in schools and the treatment of and response to the spread of HIV/AIDS. While President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) publicly identified himself as a born-again Christian, the religious right became significantly involved in national politics only under the Reagan presidency (1981–1989). It found rhetorical support more recently during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–2009), another self-proclaimed born-again Christian.

The notion that religion is once more a significant force in the public sphere is a common theme in mainstream sociology of religion (Clarke, 2009, p. 6), and yet in the United States virtually all of the battles associated with the Moral Majority (abortion, homosexuality or evolutionary theory in school curricula) have been or are being lost. Perhaps the most important example is the growing agreement between Democrats and Republicans to support same-sex marriage in the name of equal rights. The churches appear to be irrelevant to these debates regarding the future of marriage. Indeed, the Republican Party after the presidential election defeat of 2012 has focused exclusively on taxation and not on religion or morals (Stevenson, 2013). The number of so-called 'religious nones' has continued to grow, and it has now come to recognise that nearly one in five Americans define themselves in this manner – a remarkable increase in recent years, with white Protestant denominations, both mainstream and evangelical, experiencing the most serious erosion of membership.

Since the 1980s, the United States has seen increased partisanship in terms of religiosity – what Putnam and Campbell term the 'God gap'. This is most true for the children of the Baby Boomers – whose religiosity is more likely to identify them with Republicanism than it would be for their parents (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). This outcome is relatively predictable for the generation born during the Reagan era. With the 'God gap' in mind, one would anticipate that the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, in its core comprised of millennials with radical and anarchist leanings, would have few if any, religious sympathies. Millennials are quicker to associate religion with conservatism than were prior generations, potentially stymieing explicitly religiously oriented political messages outside the conservative milieu. However, there is considerable evidence to show that the churches offered accommodation, food and material support for protesters (Campbell, Torpey & Turner, 2015). OWS supporters developed a ritual in which the Wall Street statue of a bull became the site for protests against greed. OWS populism was short-lived and many dispute its long-term significance. However, there is some agreement that it served to put income inequality firmly on the political agenda (Gitlin, 2012).

Despite the constitutional separation of church and state, American public life is suffused with religion in a manner that would be puzzling to most Europeans. However, the importance and effectiveness of church involvement in public life may have less to do with their specific theological beliefs and general values, and more to do with their institutional capacity, their resources and their social solidarity that they bring to public issues. Churches are by definition organised, whereas social movements such as OWS, at least in their formation, are often relatively disorganised and fragmented. Spirituality without activism and organisation is unlikely to have significant political effects. Given this history of religious conservatism with its deeply held moral values with respect to Christian marriage and family, the growth of Trump's popularity with evangelical Christians at first sight looks puzzling and counter-intuitive.

The presidential campaign in 2016

During the campaign, religion was almost never explicitly invoked by the candidates. Clinton, when she referred to religion at all, read limited passages from the New Testament. Bernie Sanders spoke once in an interview about his Jewish ethnicity and inheritance. Trump made little or no overt reference to religion during his campaign, but of course his political agenda appealed indirectly rather than directly to diverse religious groups. Despite Trump's language about women and the fact that he has had three marriages, he had the support of evangelical Protestants because of his views about the Supreme Court, his opposition to abortion, his attacks on illegal Hispanic migrants who are mainly Catholic and one might add his view of women as inferior to men. The Trump victory in 2016 was paradoxically consistent with evangelical Protestantism. Protestant religion was thus an important if implicit factor in his success. By contrast evangelicals could not tolerate Clinton's liberal values and her defence

of the Supreme Court legal decision in support of the right of abortion in *Roe v Wade* in 1973.

Evangelical Christianity and the tender warrior

Much of this affinity between Trump and conservative Christians emerged after, not during the campaign. The following measures generally had evangelical Protestant support. He signed a law to let states defund planned parenthood. He overturned Obama's Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate. At the Prayer Breakfast in the Rose Garden he promised to 'totally destroy' the Johnson Amendment of 1954. This American tax code prohibited non-profit organisations from endorsing political parties. Trump claimed these changes were designed to promote 'free speech and religious liberty', and they were well received by many religious leaders including Jerry Falwell the President of Liberty University and a key figure in the growth of the Moral Majority. While many religious leaders condemned Trump's narrow nationalist agenda as incompatible with the Christian message, he receives strong and continuing support from his electoral base. His campaign slogan – 'Make America Great Again' – resonated with the evangelical equation between American values and Christian teaching. Two out of every three Trump supporters believe that being a Christian is important to being an American.

While Trump had been pro-choice, his opposition to abortion law was a key issue in gaining support from evangelicals. Specifically, *Roe v Wade* in 1973 was important in the emergence of Christian support for pluralism and Jerry Falwell admitted that the legal decision was important in his promotion of 'fundamentalism' and eventually to his belief in the urgent need for a 'moral majority'.

Trump's attitude to women and his history of divorce has not prevented this alliance between evangelical Christianity and Trump as President. The support of Paula Michelle White-Cain for Trump is perhaps indicative that evangelicals were ready to embrace Trump despite his personal history. Paula White is a Pentecostal TV evangelist who is the pastor at the New Destiny Center at Apopka Florida. She has emerged as the personal minister to Trump and chairs the Evangelical Advisor Board in his Presidential Administration.

Evangelicals ignored Trump's personal history and his attitude towards women because his political agenda supported evangelical causes. In addition, Trump's personality and attitudes are consistent with the emergence of the idea of the evangelical husband as a 'caring warrior' or 'tender warrior' who is able to fulfil his heroic potential, and able to exercise leadership with confidence. The image of Jesus as the victim of human evil has been replaced by an evangelical Christianity that celebrates a more active and aggressive masculinity. Not Jesus meek and mild, but the religious prophet who threw the money lenders out of the temple.

The new evangelical militancy has embraced a masculinity that is unashamedly patriarchal and powerful. The man has to rule at home and his woman has to be subservient and domestic. Rejecting the notion that gender is simply socially constructed, men and women are different in biological, anatomical and emotional

construction. Men get esteem by being respected; women are worthy when they are loved. Much of these values were articulated by James Dobson in his *Dare to Discipline* (1970). The correct training of boys lays the foundations of a strong America. These ideas in evangelical Christianity have emerged in opposition to feminism which is seen as a radical attack on the family and on masculinity. The Vietnam War was a defining moment in the early rise of evangelical values around American identity, masculinity and opposition to 1960s flower power and alternative cultures. Thus, evangelicals opposed the *Equal Rights Amendment* and came to see gender and gender differences as God given and not open to negotiation. The transformation of women into 'masculine women' would undermine the family and erode the foundations of Christian civilisation.

In response, Dobson launched his counter movement called the 'Promise Keepers' in support of masculine Christianity giving rise to an archetypal 'tender warrior'. Gordon Dalbey published *Healing the Masculine Soul* (1998) and in *Tender Warrior* (1993), Stu Weber argued that God had designed men to be providers for their families, protectors of their wives and children and warriors (Weber, 1993). Manhood requires men to be warriors.

The crisis of manhood deepened with the acceptance of gay men in the military, and women in combat roles. President Bill Clinton had signed in a law supporting a policy that came to be called 'Don't ask, don't tell' (DADT). Gay and lesbian women could serve in the military provided they did not reveal their sexual orientation. In 2010, two federal courts ruled that DADT was unconstitutional and subsequently President Obama signed the 'Don't ask, don't tell repeal act'. In response, evangelical books flowed from the presses telling parents how to raise their boys to avoid the decadent feminised culture of secular America. Dobson (2014) published *Bringing up Boys* in which he condemned the feminist attack on the essence of masculinity. Douglas Wilson's (2012) *Future Men* saw dominion as the foundation of masculinity. John Eldridge's (2001) *Wild at Heart* argued that God had created men to fight, and to live for adventure. Women's roles were by design passive, and yearned to be fought over, but modern society had offered men and women very confused role models. Many saw the shift in values and public recognition of gay men as undermining the military and bringing an end to masculinity (Frank, 2009). 9/11 was a dramatic if tragic event that only confirmed the evangelical message that America was weak. For evangelicals opposed to these developments, the Christian God was a God of War, and feminised men were manifestations of both secular and religious decline.

These developments help to explain why evangelicals could embrace Trump as in many respects capturing their idea of the masculine father and man of war. The election campaign therefore opposed a feminist Clinton against the epitome of the masculine man in Trump. Because evangelicals see same-sex marriage as an attack on Christian America, Trump offers the promise to restore the masculine world that has been lost under the impact of globalisation, de-industrialisation, legislation supporting equal rights for the LGBT community, the growth of pink-collar jobs and the decline of heavy industry (such as coal mining) as the arena of working men. Clinton campaigned in support of existing legislation on equal

rights and supported the legacy of *Roe v Wade* but offered nothing to unemployed men. Trump had a simple but powerful message – 'Jobs, Jobs, Jobs'.

In many respects, Trump appeals to a stratum of men whose masculinity has already been challenged by unemployment, social marginalisation, collapsing families and opioid addiction. The left-behind blue collar workers face an acute crisis of masculinity especially after 2008 when many were crippled by rising domestic debt. This is the stratum of Trump supporters whom Hilary Clinton called a 'basket of deplorables'. While Trump's attitude to women and accusations of sexual harassment horrified Clinton supporters, his obvious masculinity proved attractive to evangelicals. Let us look more closely then at the composition of Trump's base.

Trump's base

Who voted for Trump? Robert Griffin and Ruy Teixeira (2017) in *The Story of Trump's Appeal: A Portrait of Trump Voters* warn against any simple one-dimensional account of Trump's supporters. For example, Trump had a major success among voters over 65 years: 60 per cent supported Trump against 38 per cent for Clinton. There was more support for Clinton from voters with incomes over $120,000. Trump did well among white voters without a four-year college degree winning 56 per cent of that vote in the primary and 58 per cent in the general election compared to recent Republican candidates. Surprisingly, however when one considers counties with white non-college populations there are striking similarities between Trump and Clinton. Trump's support came over-whelmingly from counties with white non-college voters with low skill jobs and who are exposed to structural economic change. Trump has little following among black Americans and he draws his support therefore from older white non-college Americans. His supporters also come from the hinterland rather than from large cities. These locations typically have vulnerable populations in terms of physical health and mortality.

In terms of attitudes, the survey data support the idea that conservatives, especially evangelical conservatives, have negative views of feminist women. Trump supporters endorsed the idea that 'when women demand equality these days they are actually seeking special favours'. Sixty-one per cent of Trump supporters endorsed this statement as against 14 per cent of Clinton supporters. In summary, Trump supporters were 'hostile to Muslims, opposed to immigration, critical of modern feminism, worried about rising diversity, and unenthusiastic about free trade agreements' (Griffin & Teixeira, 2017).

Trump's support obviously varies considerably by state, especially where there has been considerable economic and social dislocation. Much of the plight of these disconnected social groups has been captured in Hochschild's (2016a) *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* which is based on five years' research among Louisiana supporters of the Tea Party and more recently of Trump. She began her work with several puzzles: why do residents of one of the poorest states vote for candidates who resist federal help?

Second why in a highly polluted state do residents vote for candidates who resist regulating polluting industries? The answer is that economic issues alone do not capture their world-view and that we need to understand the emotional not simply rational response to their circumstances. Their political engagement with Trump is a function of their sense of being marginalised, treated with scorn and abandoned by successive governments.

The following account of Louisiana by Arlie Hochschild is taken from 'Mother Jones' a non-profit organisation that undertakes independent reporting and investigation. The following draws on the report 'I spent 5 years with some of Trump's biggest fans. What they won't tell you' (Hochschild, 2016b). Louisiana is the third poorest state in the union. One in five live in poverty; a quarter of its students drop out of high school or fail to graduate on time; in 2013, 20 per cent of its 16–24 year olds were neither in school nor in work; and according to the American Cancer Society, Louisiana had the second highest incidence of cancer for men in the nation. Unsurprisingly, both Tea Party and Trump have drawn widespread support from Louisiana. Also unsurprisingly these 'deplorables' feel left behind by a distant elite. Because they are suspicious of the outside world, they are prone to conspiracy theories. For example, 66 per cent of Trump supporters think that Barak Obama is a Muslim. These angry and resentful men are drawn to Trump precisely because he is seen to be a 'manly man' in communities that have been economically and socially emasculated. They represent an audience that is sympathetic to the evangelical analysis of manhood. Hochschild's approach is useful in explaining why Trump's supporters may be slow to abandon him even when he fails to live up to his promise of restoring their jobs and making America great again. Trump may remain popular insofar as he remains committed to an agenda that offers to restore manhood, turns the tables on gay men and demanding feminists and voices their resentment against a world that left them behind.

Stephen Bannon

The other interesting aspect of the White House is the role of Stephen Bannon – a deeply conservative Catholic layman with influence over Trump's scepticism towards NATO, the European Union and his support for Brexit and other nationalist movements. Bannon played a critical role in the Trump campaign in terms of mobilising the resentment of the marginalised against the 'Washington Swamp'. Bannon has had an influence over Trump's domestic politics, but he was equally influential over foreign policy at least during the campaign and early days of the new presidency. Many feared that Trump would be a 'Breitbart President' (Abrams, 2017,p. 10). Bannon's political thought was influenced by Aleksandr Dugin (1907–1962) who held to a theory that global elites had conspired against ordinary people. Dugin had close ties with the Kremlin and the military and believed that American liberalism had to be destroyed by a world war. His main influential publication was *The Fourth Political Theory* (Dugin, 2012) in which he explained how fascism, communism and liberalism had failed. For Bannon, the solution against global elite capitalism is to revive the nation and at the same

time destroy the nation-state. Bannon supports Putin who also believes in traditional values of masculinity and recently draws support from the Russian Orthodox Church. The particular brand of populism embraced by Trump has an anti-elite theory that explains Trump's initial foreign policy against the European Union, in favour of Brexit, and the view that NATO is obsolete. The roots of Bannon's politics are his experience of Irish Catholicism and the American working class and its decline.

Bannon fell from power in April 2017 and finally left the White House in August 2017 vowing to continue 'the war'. Trump's foreign policy has subsequently looked more conventional. While Bannon believed that American military intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya had been disastrous, Trump appears to be willing to increase American troops in Afghanistan and if necessary to invade Venezuela. Despite these changes in Trump's policies, Bannon can still play an important role in keeping the populist base loyal to the president. The irony of modern populism is that it is typically led by members of the elite who promote resentment of the elite. Trump's popularity with his base will depend on specific policy promises: the wall to stop illegal migration; the rejection of global trade agreements; dismantling the Obama legacy; promoting jobs through deregulation and so forth. However his emotional appeal around masculinity with its anti-feminist logic may be the real roots of his popularity; it is in support of this legacy that Bannon's role from outside the White House may be crucial rather than his apocalyptic vision of international relations. Perhaps as further evidence of the instability of the group around Trump and within the White House, Bannon was finally dropped from Breitbart News Network in January 2018 following his criticisms of Trump's family members as reported in Michael Wolff's (2018) *Fire and Fury*. While Bannon's persona had attracted many enemies within the Republican Party, he had been critical in the mobilisation of Trump's base and in providing a radical programme for Trump's campaign.

Conclusion

Religion becomes involved in contemporary politics over two issues: the shifting status of the human body and the threat of Islam to Christian values. We have seen how evangelical Christianity has responded to changes in the legal status of the human body: abortion, homosexuality, same sex marriage and circumcision. In the twentieth century, legal recognition of changes in public opinion regarding sexuality was causally important in the rise of the Moral Majority. I have argued that conservative Christians lost most of these battles as the law courts saw equality of treatment of individuals regardless of their gender and sexual orientation as overriding Christian views of the traditional family. What we have seen however is a strong populist backlash against what we can call 'the modernisation of sex'. The backlash essentially re-asserts a traditional view of the male as strong and dominating.

In the twenty first century and specifically after 9/11, evangelical Protestants have seen the growth of a Muslim presence in the United States and in Europe.

Anxiety has focused on the idea of the 'creeping Sharia', veiling of women and mosque construction as a challenge to Christian society. Both Europe and North America have, in response to Muslim migration, defined their borders in terms of protecting Christendom (Turner & Forlenza, 2016). These two anxieties converge on the idea of a masculine crisis with gay men being accepted in the military and legal recognition of same sex marriage alongside the rise of feminism. ISIS advertises itself in specifically masculine terms in opposition to the effeminate gay men of the West. Trump's appeal is precisely to offer a populist alternative to national decline, lost masculinity, marginalisation and betrayal.

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