POPULISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

VOLUME 2

Politics, Social Movements and Extremism

EDITED BY GREGOR FITZI,
JÜRGEN MACKERT AND BRYAN S. TURNER

‘In times of crises, representative democracies are challenged, and with them the established conceptions of the people. As in the past, a Great Recession triggers the development of right-wing populism, with the spreading of xenophobic ideologies that, when successful in the electoral arena, bring about hybrid regimes, limiting pluralism and freedom. To which extent, progressive forces can resist the threats of a Great Regression, spreading inclusive definition of the people and participatory forms of democracy is an open question that this collection of essays helps addressing through new ideas and original data’.

Donatella della Porta, *Professor, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy*

‘It is vital that progressive academics engage with the rise of populism in Western liberal-democracies, in research and teaching. Freedom to think and research, and therefore education itself, is threatened by populism. Wide-ranging in scope and full of interesting case studies, this collection is a great addition to crucial debates over populism today’.

Kate Nash, *Professor, Department of Sociology, Goldsmiths University of London, UK*

‘This is an important and timely book, which offers a rich collection of well-written case studies and theoretical essays on one of the most important subjects of this era. As such, it is also one of the best available introductions to this subject’.

Koen Vossen, *Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands*

‘The book goes beyond questions of definition and normative judgments to analyze the impact of populist politics on party systems, language, media, the law and political subjectivities. In doing so, the authors make a genuine contribution to the understanding of one of the most relevant political topics of our time’.

Francisco Panizza, *Professor, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK*

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Populism and the Crisis of Democracy

The contributions to this volume *Politics, Social Movements and Extremism* take serious the fact that populism is a symptom of the crisis of representation that is affecting parliamentary democracy. Right-wing populism skyrocketed to electoral success and is now part of the government in several European countries, but it also shaped the Brexit campaign and the US presidential election. In Southern Europe, left-wing populism transformed the classical two parties systems into ungovernable three fractions parliaments, whereas in Latin America, it still presents an instable alternative to liberal democracy.

The varying consequences of populist mobilisation so far consist in the maceration of the established borders of political culture, the distortion of legislation concerning migrants and migration and the emergence of hybrid regimes bordering on and sometimes leaning towards dictatorship. Yet, in order to understand populism, innovative research approaches are required that need to be capable of overcoming stereotypes and conceptual dichotomies which are deeply rooted in the political debate.

The chapters of this volume offer such new theoretical strategies for inquiring into the multi-faceted populist phenomenon. The chapters analyse its language, concepts and its relationship to social media in an innovative way, draw the contours of left- and right-wing populism and reconstruct its shifting delimitation to political extremism. Furthermore, they value the most significant aftermath of populist mobilisation on the institutional frame of parliamentary democracy from the limitation of the freedom of press, to the dismantling of the separation of powers, to the erosion of citizenship rights. This volume will be an invaluable reference for students and scholars in the field of political theory, political sociology and European Studies.

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Introduction

Political populism as a symptom of the great transformation of democracy

Gregor Fitzi

Populism and democracy represent two sides of the same coin as neither of them can subsist without referring to the 'sovereign people'. Yet, the question arises how the boundary between democracy and demagogy can be set. Following Dahrendorf (2003), the concept of populism provides the marker to draw this line. Democracy and demagogy characterise two opposed ways of addressing 'the people', either by accepting the challenge of modern societal complexity or by oversimplifying the problems in order to generate strong emotions that can be capitalised politically. The success of populist parties and movements, however, always bears witness to the crisis of political representation, first and foremost of parliaments as *the* essential institutions of modern democracy. In the wake of globalisation, the recent finance crisis, and the following austerity policies, the departure of political decision into extra-parliamentary bodies provokes the erosion of the parliaments' power and exacerbates the crisis of democratic representation (Crouch, 2005; Mair, 2013). Consequently, a democratic vacuum arises that can be occupied by populist political entrepreneurs, offering a substitute of representation grounded on simplifying narratives with Manichean character (Berezin, 2009). Democracy's endeavours to react to its representational crisis can only succeed if they are fostered by an understanding of what constitutes the attractiveness of political populism. Yet, this exercise seems to be anything but self-evident and calls for a thorough investigation of populism by social and political sciences.

It has to be stated that until now there is no consensual definition for the analytical concept of populism. The long lasting debate about this topic (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969; Moffit, 2016; Müller, 2016), however, does not really seem to affect the research on what populism represents as a genuinely political phenomenon. Since the rise of mostly right-wing populist parties and movements in the first decade of the twenty-first century, research on political populism is flourishing, and different strategies have been adopted to operationalise the category of populism: either by delimiting the scope of research, or by proceeding to a comparative assessment of its manifold occurrences or by systematically classifying populist movements and parties. The most efficient typological work to date grounds on the definition of populism as a political ideology (Hauch, Hellmuth & Pasteur, 2002; Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).

This approach adopts a classical taxonomic classification pattern. It defines the smallest common denominator of all political phenomena that come under the concept of populism, then distinguishing between their specific ideological differences and characterising among others left- and right-wing populism, European, North- and Latin-American populism and so on.

Besides, however, a more decided shift from a substantial understanding of populism to an inquiry into the different ways societies construct populism as a political fact can be noted, which introduces a critical reflection about the conventional scientific assessment of the phenomenon. Since populism cannot be caught directly as a consistent social occurrence, corresponding to clear-cut typological characteristics, research treats it as a symptom of different political processes that can be assessed either as the unleashing causes or as the final consequences of populist mobilisation. Original approaches emerge that, on the one hand, imply a critical examination of the commonplaces which may still play a role in research, or that, on the other hand, initiate an inquiry into the semantics of different analytical categories that are applied in the examination of the phenomenon. Reframing political populism thereby becomes a necessary step of research and introduces different methodological reflexions, characterising the state of the art.

These developments radiate onto the studies that are collected in the present volume and that distinguish themselves by adopting some innovative research strategies, which can be classified in four major streams. (1) The necessity of a critical assessment of the monocausal explanation patterns is claimed by several authors. Neither can populism be understood as a simple consequence of particular mentalities, nor as induced by the diffusion of new communication media, nor as resulting from a single major historical event, such as the economic, political or migration crises of the last decade. The aim of populism research is seen as consisting in the capacity of catching the complex interaction between these different factors. (2) A rejection of the established dichotomies of political discourse as categories that may be adapted for analytical inquiry into populism is shared by the authors of the volume's chapters. Oppositions of, for instance, discrimination against versus openness towards minorities or women's rights, or of the predilection for statism versus one for neo-liberalism, do not help to frame populism because they may be found on either side of the cleavage. Instead, research on political populism sets out to gain some distance from societal self-interpretations and develops further analytical categories. (3) A deeper methodological reflection encourages a more articulated approach towards the framing of the populist phenomenon, reconsidering, on the one hand, its organisational forms that is considering it as being grounded on a social movement or a political party basis. On the other hand, the geographical and historical particularities characterising different forms of populism are worked out comparatively, and the different occurrences of populism are classed around the cleavage between the right-wing and left-wing political spectrum. (4) Finally, instead of describing populism directly, different contributions focus on the assessment of the major

consequences of the populist mobilisation. Accordingly, the studies in this volume elaborate the populist effects on the transformation of political culture, the modification of penal legislation, the differentiation of political systems beyond the two party alternation and eventually on its responsibility for the rise of hybrid political regimes.

Language, media and law

The appearance of populist challengers in the political competition is normally linked to an alteration of political semantics. Yet, after a first phase of disorientation and struggle against populist slogans, the established parties tend to adopt several contents of the populist mobilisation to score in electoral campaigns. The result is a lingering legitimation of xenophobic, reactionary and authoritarian political visions that lasts widely beyond the 'hot' stages of electoral campaigns. A collateral consequence of populist mobilisation is, therefore, the maceration of the established borders of democratic political culture as an institution regulating the 'control and balance' function of the public. The limits of legitimate political semantics have shifted, so that the related functions of social closure are renegotiated on an extra-parliamentary basis. New forms of exclusion negating access to citizenship and social rights for selected social groups (asylum seekers, economic migrants, welfare recipients, etc.) rapidly become accepted, constituting the ground for the restrictive legislation to come. As Ruth Wodak shows, this kind of shift in political semantics represented the crucial aspect of the campaign for the election of the Austrian parliament in October 2017. The candidate of the conservative people's party (ÖVP) could score by directly adopting the slogans of the xenophobic freedom party (FPÖ), and built a coalition with them that is going to legislate the most restrictive limitation of citizenship and social rights in Austrian history.

The success of populist movements and parties often gains momentum through the development of some kind of parallel public opinions without critical control by intellectuals and scholars. Social media in this respect played an essential role, as the Brexit campaign and the US-elections among others revealed. The specificity of social media resides in the circumstance that their research algorithms explore the web for contents that match the ones already selected by the user, so that he or she is left with the impression that reality is constituted exclusively by the 'facts' that confirm their prejudices. This contraction of social reality into the limits of the consumer's preferred contents doubtlessly constitutes the ground for the elective affinity between social media and populism. The question thus arises whether the former constitutes *the* major factor for the success of the latter. Yet, as Benjamin Moffit demonstrates, this presumption has to be considered as a monocausal reduction of the complex interaction between populism and social media. While the latter are suited to serve as a vector for messages that diffuse irrational fears and agitation, this, however, does not suffice to ensure the success of populist political appeals. The medium is not the message. Social media and the traditional channels of populist mobilisation have in common that they

offer the illusion of an 'unmediated representation' of needs and emotions, so that the use of social media adds potential to populist mobilisation, but cannot be considered the crucial determining factor of its success.

The utter consequence of the populist political programme is represented by the restrictive and anti-democratic modification of crucial aspects of legislation, regulating migrant's rights, access to social protection systems or independence of judicial power. Such glaring mutations, however, call on the plan major public debates and become the object of political struggles on a national as well as on a European level, as for instance the Polish legislation on the Supreme Court shows. Accordingly, the chances of success for the populist mobilisation are related to its capacity of winning the majority of the public for its political vision, so that similar undertakings are quite at risk. Yet, a less spectacular, but, therefore, more dangerous transformation of the basic principles of the legal structure is due to a lingering modification in the realm of penal law and thus in the way the executive authorities intervene in the field of jurisdiction. The emphasis on security and notably on the alleged growth of criminality that is instrumentally brought in relation with increasing migration flows provokes a shift from the grounding principle of modern penal law, which focusses on the rights of the person, to the rights of not adequately defined collective subjects. As Michelle Miao and John Pratt register thanks to a comparative assessment of recent amendments in criminal law, this change is the result of a progressing acceptance of the contents of populist mobilisations through the legislators, even if populist forces are not included in governments, but have snapped up the power of setting the political agenda.

Dimensions of right-wing populism

Answering the question of what populism is, also implies several difficulties because its occurrences are historically as well as geographically extremely different. In Europe, a quite self-evident identification of populism with right-wing political positions is common, because here they represent the most consistent fraction of the phenomenon, whereas in Latin America, there is a stronger association of populism with left-wing political positions. Inquiring into right-wing populism means, therefore, establishing an analytical typology of the different historical and geographical forms of populism. Dieter Rucht takes on the task of drawing this frame including the Russian Narodniki, agrarian populism in North America, Peronism in Argentina and Poujadism in France, so that he provides a backdrop against which he can classify contemporary right-wing populism. Starting from this analytical pattern, he elaborates the perceptions of deprivation, the political alienation and the cultural disorientation syndrome that foster contemporary right-wing populism in Europe. A critical assessment of the tension-fraught relationship between populism and civil society concludes his chapter. Whether right-wing populism can be valued as an expression of civil society and alternative to the established political system, or needs to be judged as a substantial turn to uncivilised social relations, depends on the underlying understanding of the phenomenon.

Explaining populism entails, furthermore, a delimitation, if possible, against the classical radical right. A reconstruction of the historical occurrences of populist movements can contribute to this purpose, but even more so a history of the transformation of the radical right-wing parties that managed to establish themselves as the representatives of the small people in different European countries. In this respect, the development of the French party *National Front* has a paradigmatic significance. Dietmar Loch's chapter analyses the reasons for its success beyond the classical boundaries of the extreme right-wing electorate in France. Economic crisis, centre-periphery conflicts and fears of downward social mobility all contribute to the increasing electoral scores of the party. Yet socio-structural explanations do not seem to be sufficient. Cultural explanations such as the 'silent counter-revolution' and the decadence of the established political culture have to be scrutinised in order to understand the convergence between radical-right populism and growing groups of the electorate.

European right-wing populism presents itself as a radical anti-elitist movement. This aversion is directed against cultivated international elites and many other groups, whom populists speak about only behind closed doors. Yet, above all, the alleged technocratic elites of the European Union serve as the preferred concept of the enemy. This attitude prompts the democratic public, and populism research, to cherish cosmopolitanism as an ideal contrasting the far right body of thought transported by the populist movements and parties. In these endeavours, however, an established dichotomy of political discourse comes into operation unreflected as an analytical frame for inquiring into populism. In this regard, Ulrike M. Vieten points out that the concept of cosmopolitanism conceals an important ambivalence stemming from its historical origins. The anti-intellectual and antisemitic polemics of the German conservatives at the end of the nineteenth century developed a negative concept of the cosmopolitan elites that comes to the fore anew. Yet, the dark side of the historical discourses on cosmopolitanism was ignored largely in the post-1990 years, rendering it highly problematic to construct an opposition between the current face of *populist territorialism* and the de-territorialised vision of a trans-national cosmopolitan democracy. Accordingly, populism research is well advised to reconsider the historical semantics of the concepts it applies to research in order to avoid reproducing long-serving ideologemes.

Regimes, party systems and political subjects

In the past decade, Europe has experienced the rise of many populist parties, some of which skyrocketed to electoral success, so that they could set the government in several countries. In opposition to the widespread idea that populists tend to abandon their extreme political purposes when they come to office, the consequence of populist mobilisation to be observed is a transformation of liberal democracies into 'hybrid regimes' as soon as populist parties conquer parliamentary majorities. Instead of simply adopting conservative politics, populist governments purge the administration and the state media, undermine the autonomy of the

judiciary and use plebiscites and referenda to weaken the remaining checks and balances. This at least is the conclusion to be drawn from the comparison by Klaus Bachmann between governmental strategies of populist parties that came to office in Belarus, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Ukraine. The rise of hybrid regimes represents the utter consequence of populist mobilisation and a starting point for the development of open authoritarianism. Consequently, only as long as populist parties are compelled to govern in coalition with classical parties, can they be considered a minor danger or even a factor of innovation for democracy. Empirical evidence shows that as soon as right-wing populist parties conquer a majority of parliamentary seats, even if they did not win the popular vote, the authoritarian transformation of the political system is launched.

Correspondingly, the question arises whether the electoral success of left-wing populist parties leads to the same kind of development. So far, in Europe only the Greek left-populist party *Syriza* won the elections and set the government, without having initiated any depletion of the constitutional separation of powers. In two further South European countries, a different development unfolded. In Spain, the newly founded party *Podemos* surprisingly became the third party of the country in the 2015 and 2016 parliamentary elections, by reaching the self-imposed goal of ending the two party regime. In Italy, the ecological and partly leftish oriented populist *Five Stars Movement* emerged, carrying the slogan of 'sending home the whole political class'. In the 2013 parliament election, it unexpectedly became the second strongest political party with some 25 per cent of the votes. Roberto Biorcio undertakes a comparison of the political strategies of the two populist parties. The survey evidences that their main impact concerns the historical transformation of the structure of the respective political systems. In both Italy and Spain, over decennia two opposite parties or party blocks alternated in power, without leaving any chance of success to the rest of the political spectrum. Yet, the weakening of political representation following the austerity policies in the wake of the financial crisis provoked the unprecedented change to a three party political system. Government now has to be formed as either a coalition of the two once opposed traditional parties, or a coalition of one of them and the populist parties – both scenarios that all the involved actors to date repudiate.

The rise of hybrid regimes and the instability of political systems that are divided into three incompatible political parties seem to constitute the most extreme results of the populist mobilisation in Europe. Regarded from a typological perspective, analysing the development of Latin American populism instead seems to raise completely different questions. Neither liberal representation nor populist mobilisation has been capable of overcoming the region's pendulum between democracy and authoritarianism. Understanding who the possible political subjects are that could lead a democratic transformation of the Latin American political systems, thus involves a more thorough analysis of the apparent opposition between the concepts of 'the citizen' and of 'the people' as the grounding principles of politics. Jenny Pearce undertakes this effort by reconstructing the Latin American debate on this matter. A complex interdependence between the competing political perspectives of liberalism and populism comes to the fore that does

not simply reflect a left-right dichotomy, but highlights the ongoing fragility of democracy, worsened by social, economic and political divides. Only a democratic participation of the poor in substantial terms could overcome this situation. Yet, what does participatory democracy mean? In order to understand the Latin American contribution to democratic thinking and practice, research should overcome the conventional, romantic and paternalist regard of its contents. Only a debate on its deeper meaning has the potential of realising a critique of the classical liberal democracy, which could in turn help to overcome its crisis in Europe.

Concluding

Research on political populism shows that there are by far more possibilities to address the topic than the simple inquiry into a shared definition of the phenomenon. Important results are achieved by developing a criticism of the conventional use of socio-political dichotomies and concepts, the semantics of which are all too often transposed into the social sciences in an unreflected way. In a diagnostic perspective, it appears to be more fruitful to assume the existence of populist mobilisation as a fact, in order to highlight its severe aftermath on the structure of mature liberal democracies as well as on political systems with different factors of instability. Typologically analysing instead of defining political populism turns out to be particularly efficient to collect descriptive knowledge concerning its different historical, geographical as well as left- and right-wing political occurrences. A certain amount of aspects characterising populism thus starts to fit into a classification that can constitute the ground for a new reflection on the essential typology of the phenomenon. The central issue at stake for the social sciences would then be to understand whether the multiplicity of developments that are addressed with the label of populism within political competition are not rather as much indicators for a transformation and a crisis of democracy, the social, economic and cultural causes of which are still insufficiently illuminated. Various suggestions in the present volume show that a more accentuated scientific attempt to gain distance from the ongoing political debate about these topics can substantially promote the capacity of social sciences to face the ongoing great transformation of our societies. In this perspective, populism can be understood as a symptom of a wider crisis of legitimation affecting democratic political systems that demands examination as to which extent its development depends on the depletion of the welfare state, the deregulation of the markets and the deconstruction of political culture that characterised the last decades.

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Part I

Language, media and the law

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1 The micro-politics of right-wing populism

Ruth Wodak

Introduction

Currently, we are experiencing, on the one hand, the continuous rise of far-right and right-wing populist parties.[1] On the other hand, we can also observe the continuous normalisation of previously tabooed arguments, topics, ideologies and political programmes. Although some journalists have already celebrated the end of such ideologies and related parties as well as movements, the agenda of the far-right have been integrated into the mainstream, for example in the Dutch national election (15 March 2017) and in the Austrian national election (15 October 2017).

In this chapter, I am concerned with the 'micro-politics' of right-wing political parties – how they actually produce and reproduce their ideologies and exclusionary politics in everyday politics, in the media, in campaigning, in posters, slogans and speeches. Ultimately, I am concerned with how they succeed (or fail) in sustaining their electoral success and why their messages resonate so well with specific audiences. Indeed, what becomes apparent is what I would like to label as the 'normalisation' of formerly tabooed expressions, prejudices and policies (Wodak, 2015b), a process which should be carefully observed and deconstructed.

In the following, I first provide some definitions of terms and proceed to my methodological approach, based in Critical Discourse Studies, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). I then elaborate the analysis of backstage performances of right-wing populist and extreme right politicians. Furthermore, I present in which manifold ways such explicit and extreme (racist and xenophobic) utterances are re-contextualised, frontstage, in different genres and across different publics. In this process, they eventually become normalised and accepted in the mainstream.

Right-wing populism as an ideology attempts to reduce social and economic structures in their complexity and proposes simple explanations for complex and often global developments (Pelinka, 2013; Wodak, 2013a, 2013b, 2015a). In doing so, populist discourses regularly draw on well-known and established stereotypes of 'the Other' and 'the Stranger', whose discursive and socio-political exclusion is supposed to create a sense of community and belonging within the supposedly homogenous 'people' or '*Volk*'. The fact that these 'strangers' may, indeed, be right

at the middle of the respective society marks populism as a pseudo-democratic battleground for internal conflicts of interest within that society. These real political and economic contradictions, however, are not often addressed directly, since populism as an ideological strategy seeks to situate social conflict not where it originates, but to obscure or externalise it.

It is thus not surprising that in 2016/2017, political rhetoric increasingly relies on the construction of a distinct dichotomy which aims to divide the people living in a country into two quasi homogenous blocs: 'the people' are juxtaposed with 'the establishment' within a specific narrative of threat and betrayal, accusing the so-called 'establishment' of having intentionally or subconsciously neglected the so-called 'people', having instead pursued only their own interests, failing to protect the people and to voice their interests, and having ignored the obvious anxieties of the people (Hochschild, 2016; Wodak, 2017a; Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018b). Indeed, this narrative arbitrarily constructs two groups via text and image in manifold ways. Such a Manichean[2] opposition portrays these two groups as vehemently opposed to each other, two epistemic communities, one defined as powerless, the other as powerful; one described as good, innocent and hard-working, the latter as bad, corrupt, criminal, lazy and unjustly privileged and so forth.

This dichotomous view of society (a merger of anti-elitism with a nativist nationalistic anti-pluralism) is part and parcel of right-wing populist ideology, alongside other salient dimensions which I have elaborated elsewhere (see Wodak, 2015a, pp. 66–67). Protecting the fatherland (or heartland, homeland) implies belief in a common narrative of the past, where 'we' were either heroes or victims of evil. Revisionist histories thus blend all past woes into success stories of the *Volk* or stories of treachery and betrayal by others, of sacrifice and victimhood. Moreover, conspiracies are part and parcel of the discursive construction of fear which frequently draws on traditional antisemitic and anti-elitist tropes. Furthermore, such parties endorse traditional, conservative values and morals (family values, traditional gender roles) and, most importantly, support common sense simplistic explanations and solutions (anti-intellectualism). Usually, a 'saviour' is appealed to – the (more or less) charismatic leader of the respective party, – who oscillates between the roles of Robin Hood and 'strict father' (Lakoff, 2004; Wodak & Forchtner, 2017). Certainly, not all right-wing populist parties endorse all the above-mentioned positions. Moreover, even if they do, the level of support for any of these typical stances depends on the specific context of a given country or even situation of speaking.

The discourse historical approach

The study of discriminatory practices necessarily implies qualitative in-depth analysis, as traditional methods of measurement encounter enormous obstacles when trying to account for racist, antisemitic or xenophobic attitudes and related exclusionary and nationalistic imaginaries and ideologies. Indeed, much research has provided ample evidence that better educated people understate their prejudiced

beliefs (Kovács, 2010); moreover, the ideological value of tolerance is widespread in contemporary capitalist societies, so that the explicit promulgation of exclusionary politics conflicts with the generally accepted values of liberalism. Hence, discriminatory utterances tend to be 'coded' in official rhetoric so as to avoid sanctions; linguistic-pragmatic devices such as insinuations, implicatures, inferences or presuppositions are frequently comprehensible only to insiders who possess the same or similar common-ground and epistemic knowledge. Indeed, the very terms 'discrimination', 'exclusion' or 'prejudice' carry a range of negative connotations. Thus, few would admit in public or when interviewed to agreeing with the exclusion of, prejudice or discrimination against minority groups. This is why opinion polls and interviews are inherently doomed to fail as adequate methods of investigation into racist belief systems. Usually, people deny these beliefs and present themselves in a positive light as they are aware that such opinions are taboo or might even be associated with extremist right-wing political affiliations. This implies studying by applying qualitative methods how discursive practices can accomplish exclusion in its many facets without the explicitly acknowledged intention of actors; exclusion has become 'normality' and thus acceptable, and has been integrated into all dimensions of our societies.

The DHA allows relating the macro- and meso-level of contextualisation to the micro-level analyses of texts. Such analyses consist primarily of two levels: the so-called 'entry-level analysis' focusing on the thematic dimension of texts and the 'in-depth analysis' which scrutinises coherence and cohesion of texts in detail. The entry-level thematic analysis maps out the contents of analysed texts and assigns them to particular discourses. The key analytical categories of thematic analyses are discourse topics, which, 'conceptually, summarize the text, and specify its most important information' (van Dijk, 1991, p. 113). The in-depth analysis on the other hand, is primarily informed by the research questions and consists of the analysis of the genre (e.g. TV interview, policy paper, election poster, political speech or homepage), the macro-structure of the respective text, discursive strategies of identity construction and of argumentation schemes, as well as of other means of linguistic realisation (Krzyżanowski, 2010; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 2009).

Most importantly, the DHA focuses on texts – be they audio, spoken, visual and/or written – as they relate to structured knowledge (discourses), are realised in specific genres, and must be viewed in terms of their situatedness. That is, many texts – including posters, speeches, comics, TV debates, postings and other web 2.0 genres – owing to their inherent ambiguities as texts, cannot be fully understood without considering different layers of context. Here, I follow a four-level model of context that includes the historical development of the respective political party (the socio-political/historical context), discussions which dominated a specific debate/event (the current context), a specific text (text-internal co-text) as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relations (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 40–41). The former two are of particular significance as they allow deconstructing intertextual and interdiscursive relations, presuppositions, implicatures and insinuations in the texts as arguments, topics and opinions as re-contextualised

from other genres or public spheres. The terminological pair interdiscursivity/intertextuality denotes the linkage between discourses and texts across time and space – established via explicit or implicit references. If text elements are taken out of their original context (de-contextualisation) and inserted into another (re-contextualisation), a similar process occurs, forcing the element in question to (partly) acquire new meaning(s) (Wodak, 2011a).

Second, the DHA views discourse as a set of 'context-dependent semiotic practices' as well as 'socially constituted and socially constitutive', 'related to a macro-topic' and 'pluri-perspective' that is linked to argumentation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89). Third, positive self- and negative other-presentation is realised via discursive strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 45–90). Here, I primarily focus on nomination (how events/objects/persons are referred to) and predication (what characteristics are attributed to them). A paradigmatic case might be the 'naming' of a protagonist or an institution metonymically (*pars pro toto*), for example Merkel for Germany, or as synecdoche (*totum pro pars*), for example the EU for all individual EU organisations. The strategy of perspectivisation realises the author's involvement, for example, via *deïxis*, quotation marks, etc.

The DHA also draws on the concept of *topos,* apart from employing and elaborating Toulmin's model (2003) when appropriate.[3] Kienpointner defines topoi as 'search formulas which tell you how and where to look for arguments. At the same time, topoi are warrants which guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion' (Kienpointner, 2011, p. 265).



Figure 1.1 A simplified model of argumentation
Source: Kienpointner (1996, p. 75)

The DHA's concept of topoi is based primarily on Wengeler (2003) and Kienpointner (1996). When considering topoi, it becomes apparent that a logical continuity exists, extending from the Aristotelian rhetorical topoi to the definitions proposed in Kienpointner's approach and the DHA (Wodak, 2015c). At this point, it is important to emphasise that topoi are not necessarily fallacious. Many examples below manifest flawed logic, but in particular contexts, arguments using a specific topos could be right: topoi are thus – neutrally speaking – a useful shortcut appealing to existing knowledge. Thus, the use of topoi in specific ways and contexts (which are often very complex), what they ignore or sidestep, *can* be fallacious and manipulative.[4]

In summary, the DHA focusses on ways in which power-dependent semiotic means are used to construct positive self- and negative other-presentations (US and THEM, the good people and the scapegoats, the pro and contra of the crisis or any other topic/event). This also captures the ability to select specific events in

Table 1.1 Selected list of content-related *topoi* in right-wing populist discourses

Topoi	*Warrant*
Topos of advantage or usefulness	If an action from a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it
Topos of the people	If the people want/do not want a specific action/policy, then this action has to be implemented/rejected
Topos of uselessness or disadvantage	If one can anticipate that the prognosticated consequences of a decision will not occur, then the decision has to be rejected
Topos of threat or danger	If there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something to counter them
Topos of humanitarianism	If a political action or decision does or does not conform to human rights or humanitarian convictions and values, then one should or should not make it
Topos of finance	If a specific situation or action costs too much money or causes a loss of revenue, one should perform actions that diminish those costs or help to avoid/mitigate the loss
Topos of reality	Because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be taken/made
Topos of numbers	If the numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should be taken/not carried out

Source: Wodak (2015a, p. 53)

the flow of a narrative as well as increased opportunities to convey messages through opening up space for 'calculated ambivalence' (Engel & Wodak, 2013). The latter is defined as the phenomenon that one utterance carries at least two more-or-less contradictory meanings, oriented towards at least two different audiences. This not only increases the scope of the audience to, for example, the Austrian people and international audiences, but also enables the speaker/writer to deny any responsibility: after all, 'it wasn't meant that way'. Finally, the power of discourse creates regimes of quasi 'normality' that is what is deemed 'normal', for example, with regard to the political messages circulating during the financial crisis in 2008 and the heated debates related to it.

The following analysis covers recent re-contextualisations and re-semiotisations of extreme-right ideology in Austria. Specifically, I provide a cross-sectional analysis of various fields of politics (party politics, part-affiliated organisations and media) (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018a). This allows tracing continuities not only historically but across fields, showing how extreme-right positions are re-contextualised from closed-door meetings, that is backstage politics (Wodak, 2014); as well as unofficial handbooks and pamphlets to election campaigns (posters, speeches, TV debates i.e. frontstage politics). The advantage of such a cross-sectional approach is that it reveals the intertextual links between party politics and other discursive fields, sometimes evident and sometimes coded. This may also be read as the penetration of extreme-right ideology into seemingly



Figure 1.2 The 'normalisation' of extreme-right ideology

other fields (education, pop-culture, legislation and so forth) as part of an ongoing process of 'normalisation'. From the latter perspective, 'normalisation' describes how specific marginalised ideologies are incorporated into the mainstream – not only of politics but of popular culture and other fields as well – through re-contextualisations and re-semiotisations, usually moving from backstage to frontstage, and across fields as well as genres.

Re-contextualising extreme-right ideology: From closed-door meetings over handbooks to election campaigns on frontstage

The backstage: Programmatic utterances and party programmes

Obviously, no public figure represents extreme-right ideology within the extreme right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) better than Johann Gudenus, head of the FPÖ's Vienna chapter and Deputy Mayor of Vienna since 2015.[5] Gudenus studied law in Vienna and Russian in Moscow, and also completed an MA at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. He maintains excellent relations with Russia, opposes the EU's sanctions against Russia and also endorses an extremely sceptical stance towards the EU. Gudenus (whose father was convicted of Holocaust denial) is well-known as one of the authors of the FPÖ's programmatic agenda; moreover, his explicit racist, nativist, antisemitic and homophobic utterances on the backstage of the party's activities have frequently been leaked to the press and caused scandals (Pollak, 2015).

Addressing closed publics, Gudenus has often voiced ideological positions in surprisingly explicit terms. This has included, for example, racial policies for the so-called 'purity of Europe': 'Europe is the cradle of the white race. We demand a Europe-wide, coordinated policy for the family and reproduction, including a commitment to the fact that Europe is white'.[6] It has included defamation of political opponents with antisemitic slurs: 'If you mix red and green together, you get yellow. And yellow is the colour of Judas, it is the colour of treachery'.[7] And it has included a denial of basic human rights ('Asylum is not a human right'[8]) as well as homophobic, conspiracy theory-based projections of a doomed nation: 'The powerful European lobby of homosexuals wants absolute equality for homosexuals and lesbians. It is hard to imagine where all this will lead'.[9] Due to his high-ranking position in Austrian politics, Gudenus' more public appearances directly re-contextualise backstage agenda into frontstage performances and policies. Should the FPÖ win the next Viennese election in 2019 (current opinion polls put the party at 32 per cent), Gudenus may indeed become the next Mayor of Vienna.

Gudenus' utterances bear a strong similarity to the party-affiliated publication *For a Free Austria* (*Für ein freies Österreich*), written by Michael Howanietz, a local FPÖ politician. Albeit not officially party doctrine, the book also closely mirrors the *Handbook* of FPÖ politics (*Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik*), drafted by the party leadership to serve as an internal guideline for party functionaries regarding key policy areas. The focus here is – just briefly – on the former

publication as it constitutes a less constrained articulation of extreme-right ideologies, free of the rhetorical limitations that even the FPÖ, as an established party, largely has to follow in its frontstage politics (for more details, see Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018a).

'For a Free Austria' is accompanied by endorsing forewords written by the FPÖ's chairman, Hans-Christian Strache, and vice-chairman, Norbert Hofer who stood as candidate for Austrian President in 2016 (see below). The text defines itself as a call for 'an autonomous, independent country' that is independent of transnational organisations, international law, international economy and the exchange of goods, which are all listed as ways in which Austria is being controlled by others (Howanietz, 2013, p. 6). Significantly, the various argumentative strands of the book – all ultimately intended to save Austria from an alleged immanent doom – are linked to the extreme right's constructions of the national body and related nativist body politics (Musolff, 2010; Wodak, 2015a). In this way, the book calls for 'an independent country that depends on its many existent strengths, its nature, its infrastructure and the productive power of its people' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 7).

The book relates this initial statement to arguments concerning the national body as 'state territory' and its 'borders', to the national body as 'landscape and nature' and to the national body as 'the core family' and 'procreation'. Indeed, the call for 'liberation' from dependency is presented as a duty to 'our children', in particular of men to their families: 'We owe it to those who come after us, our children' (Howanietz, 2013). The book is also very clear about the link between identity and the nation: 'The nation, once the main carrier of identity, has been replaced by societies and clubs and brands, weak prosthetics for the true belonging of national identity' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 15). Such true belonging or 'Heimat' supposedly still exists in the country and rural areas, manifest in higher birth rates, working with your hands as in centuries past, hardy craftsmen and 'timeless values' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 77). In this context, the author emphasises the spiritual and biological link of a people to the soil, the 'most sacred property of the community', that is the nation (Howanietz, 2013, p. 141). Equating soil and blood, to protect this 'eternal Heimat' is thus to protect one's true self (Howanietz, 2013, p. 137).[10]

In the apocalyptic worldview propagated throughout the book, migrants are perceived as a threat precisely because they have stronger identities: their 'assault' or slow invasion to 'demographically displace' the Austrian people makes the latter 'a species on the brink of extinction' (Howanietz, 2013, pp. 19–20). To be modern, to include women in the workforce, etc. is moreover seen as a form of 'self-demotion' and 'self-destruction' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 21). The battlefronts of this struggle are many: 'It starts with a few English terms, inappropriate concessions to culturally foreign [*kulturfremde*] "neo-Austrians" and years with a low birth-rate. Every unborn potential mother and father of the future accelerates the process of self-annihilation' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 22). This, of course, links directly to attacks on legal abortion (see below) and is elaborated in the FPÖ's handbook. Here, the argument is presented in the form of statistics, using the topos of

numbers: with alleged 'estimates of over 50,000 abortions per year' as opposed to '76,344 births in 2009 – that would mean that 4 out of 10 children are killed in their mother's womb. This would make the uterus the place with highest likelihood of death in our country' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 160). Such an attack on women's rights is quite similar to US American Tea parties' policies on abortion as elaborated in Wodak (2015a, p. 151 ff.) and constructs any such woman as indeed a murderer who is 'killing a child'.

The gravest threat to the nation, however, is identified in an alleged decaying national pride: *Honour and loyalty* to the community of the nation are seen as the foundation for loyalty and faithfulness in the heterosexual relationship (Howanietz, 2013, p. 31).[11] This policy proposal makes those who would weaken nationalism also conspirators against the family: '*die Familienzerstörer*', destroyers of families (Howanietz, 2013, p. 32). The book uses hyperbole and strawman fallacies to drive home this point: 'Because we are still permitted, without official permission, to have children and raise them as best we can. Independent of ideological approaches that want to tear away children from their parents immediately after birth' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 34). The alleged 'conspiracy to brainwash children and abolish natural genders' is seen as the cause for women wanting a career and financial independence, which in turn is seen as the cause for 'many young women misrepresenting the initially desired impregnation as sexist harassment' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 118) and ignoring their 'motherly brood care instincts' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 119).

The other side of this gender politics is to denounce the 'effeminate' and 'feminised' modern man, biologically destined to be 'provider and protector of the family' (Howanietz, 2013). Alternative gender constructions are constructed as a dangerous leftist conspiracy to undermine masculine ideals, with a topos of danger: 'Sportsmen are the last remaining idols who may still be regarded as "heroes", since all other traditional ideals, such as the embodiment of soldierly virtues, the ideals of chivalry, had to be sacrificed to the Zeitgeist' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 35). Blame for this decay of traditional gender roles is placed on the left, feminists, civil society, NGOs, international organisations, corporations and, most of all, the media, which the book presents metaphorically and fallaciously as 'weapons of mass destruction' when it comes to destroying the '*Volk*' (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018a). In this way, the ultimate *Feindbild* emerges: women and men who have taken the post-war changes of traditional gender roles seriously and have adopted new life styles – integrating new family patterns, mobility, diversity, career and shared child care. White male patriarchy is perceived as being at stake, simultaneously threatened by the alleged 'invasion' of the 'cultural other'. 'Fake media' (and the German '*Lügenpresse*' or '*Systempresse*', terms heavily used in Nazi propaganda to discredit first the Weimar and then international press[12]) is a constitutive notion of the contemporary extreme right in Austria (and elsewhere).

Comparing this inner weakness to the external threat identified as migrants, the book offers two alternative options for the future: the 'true' Austrian 'Volk' will, the FPÖ argues, either slowly degenerate and die off – all these threats

while employing the racist discourse about parasites , 'eaten from the inside like wasp larvae eat maggots' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 117); or current developments will lead to a violent 'civil war' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 121), thus triggering anxiety and uncertainty. The danger scenarios are manifold, fear and anger are evoked, produced and reproduced, and the fallacious arguments are provided as legitimation. The author clearly prefers the latter, arguing that like any conflict it would be 'productive' and 'awaken potential' (Howanietz, 2013, p. 113). Either way, he concludes, 'Europe will burn'.

Frontstage: The extreme-right in election campaigns

Since Heinz-Christian Strache took control of the FPÖ in 2005, frontstage activities of the party – particularly in election campaigns and social media – have seen an apparent softening of extreme-right positions and an increase of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995): displaying the Austrian flag, singing the national anthem and showing an abundance of other symbols of national pride.

As argued by Forchtner, Krzyżanowski, and Wodak (2013), the manifold patterns of media communication and the clever and ubiquitous appropriation of media agenda and frames employed in the recent success of populist right and extreme-right parties cannot be dismissed or marginalised as a mere coincidence. As Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese (2010, p. 3) illustrate, successful right-wing populist leaders have actually managed to achieve a delicate balance between, on the one hand, appearing exceptional and populist, or anti-establishment, and, on the other, authoritative and legitimate; thus they counter the élites but do not oppose the liberal democratic system per se. Frequently, this is achieved by scandalisation (Wodak, 2013a, 2013b) or by what Albertazzi labels as 'dramatisation' that is 'the need to generate tension in order to build up support for the party . . . by denouncing the tragedies that would befall the community if it were to be deprived of its defenses' (2007, p. 335). Scandalisation also implies manifold references to the allegedly charismatic leaders of such parties, who construct themselves as knowledgeable saviours, problem solvers and crisis managers, which may lead voters to have more confidence in the effectiveness of the politics of the populist right-wing. The way the tension between extraordinariness and being 'one of us' that is being 'authentic', was cleverly managed by former FPÖ leader Jörg Haider on front stage and further developed by his successor, HC Strache (as he is branded) in many different publics and genres,[13] from TV interviews to snippets caught on video while dancing in a disco, from pamphlets and manifestos to posters and comic booklets, all of which are accessible on HC Strache's homepage[14] and disseminated via Facebook.[15]

Following Alexander (2006), the symbolic dimension of 'doing politics' must be understood as central to all efforts of a politician's performance, in the media, at election rallies, in parliament, at press conferences and so forth (Forchtner et al., 2013; Wodak, 2015a). Alexander also argues that these performances must hook into the background culture, symbols, narratives and myths of the respective society in order to be successful. In other words: if such symbolic practices are

supposed to resonate, they have to draw on, and mobilise, a common cultural structure, via appeals to common knowledge of epistemic communities, to the *endoxa* by using presuppositions, insinuations and other pragmatic devices as well as specific argumentation schemes.

In terms of national identity, the symbols used by the Strache-FPÖ are linked to deeply conservative constructions of the national body, for example rural landscapes, snow-covered mountain tops, traditional agriculture and farmers and religious symbols of Christianity. In many images and aspects, the respective texts and performances feature Strache himself enacting and employing these symbols.[16]

Since these are symbols of the nation rather than the party, their re-contextualisation and re-semiotisation by the FPÖ constitutes a provocative appropriation linked to the FPÖ's claim to be the *only* party to represent 'the people' and the nation or '*Heimat*'. Indeed, with Strache's leadership came a re-branding of the FPÖ as the '*Soziale Heimatpartei*', the Social Homeland Party (a label it shares with the extreme-right NPD of Germany). Two such provocations relate to Austria's national anthem: (1) publicly refusing to sing the amended national anthem (since 2011, the lyrics include 'daughters' alongside 'sons'), thus breaking the relevant law: (2) using an alternative anthem for their campaigns, titled '*Immer wieder Österreich*'. The lyrics of this song incorporate the well-known chorus of soccer fans at games of Austria's national team – '*Immer wieder, immer wieder, immer wieder Österreich*' ('Time and again, time and again, time and again Austria') – but also appeal to the 'honesty, righteousness and loyalty' of all true Austrians and call on them to 'pledge' their loyalty to 'their country'. The accompanying video re-semiotises the lyrics of the actual Austrian anthem and alludes to the aesthetics of Nazi era films (e.g. Leni Riefenstahl's work, see Figure 1.3). Such discursive strategies of anthropomorphising, culturalising and ethnicising the national body go back many years. Indeed, the frontstage politics of the extreme-right in Austria are eminently culturalist and biologist (Wodak & Köhler, 2010, Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018a).

Figure 1.3 Still from the FPÖ's alternative anthem and election campaign song
Source: FPÖ (2016)

Despite the focus on 'islamisation' – and despite the fallacious claim that the FPÖ is 'the new Jews' or being persecuted (part of an ongoing strategy to present itself as the victim of the political establishment and mainstream media; see Stögner, 2016) – anti-Semitism remains part of extreme-right discourse. While this is usually coded on the frontstage, there are still prominent exceptions such as the 'Facebook incident' of 2012 (Wodak, 2015a). An even more prominent case is Barbara Rosenkranz, former MP and FPÖ candidate for presidency in 2010, who implicitly denied the Holocaust during her campaign (Engel & Wodak, 2013).

Vignette: The people versus the 'Schickeria'

On 15 May 2016, circa 432.000 viewers (i.e. ca 6.7 per cent of the Austrian electorate) watched an unmoderated 45-minute TV debate between the two candidates running for Austrian Presidency, the economist and former university professor Alexander van der Bellen (VdB) (Green Party), and – as mentioned above – Norbert Gerwald Hofer (NH) (FPÖ), broadcast by the private station ATV (see Wodak, 2017b for more details). Broader global and European transnational as well as national and local problems played a substantial role in this election, which has been perceived as a decisive choice between a pro-European, internationally oriented and progressive world-view on the one hand (VdB), and a nationalistic, exclusionary and conservative stance on the other (NH).

Indeed, VdB was unapologetic about his stance on welcoming refugees, his support of the EU and conviction that the Schengen treaty is a cornerstone of Europe's stability. NH, meanwhile, spoke just as clearly about what he regards as the urgency to secure and protect Austria's borders and keep the EU from encroaching too much on Austria's sovereignty, thus emphasising an EU-sceptical position. In the end, VdB won the election twice: very narrowly on 25 May 2016, and again on 4 December 2016, with more than 6 per cent difference, after the FPÖ had appealed the first result.

In this debate, NH vehemently attacked and provoked VdB by reframing topics, by interrupting him 10 times more frequently, by not replying to questions even when repeated many times, and by a range of *ad hominem* fallacies. Simultaneously, he presented his wife and his family as victims of unjustified attacks, accused VdB's followers of damaging his campaign posters and frequently switched to the interpersonal level instead of answering a question, for example claiming that VdB 'was perhaps nervous and why?' or that VdB 'seemed so aggressive?' In the course of the 45 minutes, he accused VdB of 'being part of THE system', 'being a liar', 'having been a communist', being 'utmost pedantic', 'never having really worked in business all his life', 'being supported by anti-Austrian elements', by 'retired and failed politicians' as well as by 'Brussels, i.e. Juncker', by the 'privileged class' and 'the *haute volée*', but also of 'being tired and old', 'talking (too) slowly'. Moreover, he alleged that VdB was 'being unreliable', and of 'supporting gay marriage' and the 'use of drugs'. In this way, VdB was cast as (too) old, almost senile, a liar and a leftist, part of the untrustworthy system, and

– due to his profession as university professor – 'elitist'. VdB countered with irony and sarcasm but was unable to remain aloof. Exasperated, after having repeated the same question eight times, he reacted with expressions such as 'dirty trick' and a non-verbal gesture indicating that NH be a 'complete fool'.

Other positions of NH include his membership of the *Marko-Germania Pinkafeld Burschenschaft*.[17] Moreover, at his inauguration as third President of the Parliament, he wore a blue cornflower, a symbol of the illegal Nazis before the 'Anschluss' in 1938. He also declared repeatedly that May 8 (end of WW II, celebrated everywhere as victory for democracy) could not be viewed as a joyful day of liberation from totalitarianism. He supports anti-abortionist and homophobic views.[18] Thus, Hofer maintained that any marriage of gay or lesbian couples as well as related adoption rights would destroy 'natural family structures': 'The life partnership of man and woman becomes a family only through the child. Those who raise a child on their own create a family with the children'. He also voiced his rejection of gender mainstreaming: 'The aim of "gender mainstreaming" is nothing short of creating the "new human being" that Marxists-Leninists already aspired to'. Similar to many fundamentalist US Tea Party Republicans, Hofer also rejected 'pro-choice' policies for women that is women's right to decide on abortion. In a different TV-debate, Hofer described 'the womb as the place with the highest mortality rate in our country'.[19] The media resonance to this debate was very negative. Many commentators maintained that both candidates had damaged the reputation of the Presidency and had both presented themselves as unworthy of that office.[20]

In the following, I illustrate the eristic style of argumentation and the discursive construction of 'the people' versus the 'establishment', that is the so-called *Schickeria*, with an extract taken from the very end of the debate, where NH attempts summarising 'the alleged difference' between the two candidates:

1 NH: (interrupting) well, the big difference between the two of us is that.
2 VdB: (simultaneous) you are always interrupting me. That's very difficult.
3 NH: The big difference is that. [. . .]
4 VdB: What is the big difference?
5 NH: That I will always be someone who looks out for Austria. And you won't be that. You will be indebted to your friends, Mister Juncker, Mister Schulz, but also to this fashionable society of former big shots in the ÖVP, who ruined the ÖVP. That will be your network in the Hofburg then, exactly those people.
6 VdB: That's despicable, what you are doing here.
7 NH: Don't, please no swearing.
8 VdB: Three thousand supporters/
9 NH: Please!
10 VdB: Some of whom have achieved enormous things in life, others busting their back
11 NH: (interrupting) Ah, and the 1.5 million voters who voted for me, they didn't achieve anything? [. . .]

12 VdB: There are famous people in my supporting committee and there are not at all famous people, who are barely making a living at the office, as craftsmen somewhere, um, somehow making a living, yes, those are my supporters, but that you would talk down all those people as fashionable society.
13 NH: Mhm.
14 VdB: In plain language the 'Schickeria' [in-crowd], I call that despicable.
15 NH: Yes, but you are the candidate of the Schickeria, Mister Van der Bellen, that is the big difference.
16 VdB: No one believes that.
17 NH: I am the candidate of the people. That is the very, very big difference.
18 VdB: Yesyes, my supporters are none of them people. [. . .] That should be fun, and you say you want to work for a united Austria, when all these people, and I say they are people, you deny that.
19 NH: Who is saying I deny that. They are people as well!
20 VdB: With me is the Schickeria, with you it's the people? [. . .] to have them with me as supporters, workers, craftsmen, police officers.
21 NH: Mhm.
22 VdB: . . . people from the municipal garbage collection, I am proud of that/GONG (a loud gong marks the end of the TV debate – precisely 45 minutes have past).
23 NH (talking despite the official end of the discussion): And I will be there for the Austrians, and that is the big difference. I will be a president for the Austrians and not the president of the Schickeria.

In line 1, NH claims that there is a big difference between VdB and himself, and after several attempts, he draws on the topos *of the saviour* (line 5; if elected, he will look out for the people and protect them) whereas VdB would not only be part of an upper-class network, but also depend on the EU (i.e. on the President of the European Commission, Juncker). VdB reacts angrily by exclaiming 'despicable', which NH rejects as impolite and offensive, thus turning the tables (actually having offended VdB himself; lines 6 and 7). VdB remains on the defensive and starts listing the high number of people who have signed a statement of support (3000), from all social strata ('some famous, some not'), which obviously, if one were to follow NH's argument, would all not belong to 'the people' and would wrongly be categorised as *haute volée*. In line 14, he translates the label *haute volée* into the well-known Austrian-German term *Schickeria*, a term which originally denotes jet-setting yuppies. In line 15, NH repeats the term Schickeria, and while negatively using the address term 'Mister' and spelling out VdB's full name, declares that VdB 'is the candidate of the Schickeria', whereas, in line 17, NH presents himself as necessarily the one and only candidate of 'the people'. In this way, Schickeria is both juxtaposed to 'the people' and excluded from 'the people'. In line 18, VdB makes this contradiction explicit and claims that NH's argument implies that his followers do not belong to the Austrian people, although NH has stated that he would unify 'the Austrian people'. At this point in the debate, NH has to concede that the Schickeria are also part of 'the people'.

Nevertheless, and although VdB has derailed his argument, NH emphatically repeats, in the very last minute of the programme (leaving VdB no time to react), his claim that he, if elected, would be a president for the Austrian people, whereas VdB would only be president of the Schickeria.

In this brief text extract, it becomes obvious that categorising the electorate into two allegedly homogenous groups, the real Austrians as opposed to the establishment (i.e. the Schickeria), was considered by NH and his spin doctors to be the strategically most persuasive appeal to the electorate, even more so than evoking fear of strangers (migrants and refugees) in this TV debate. The latter out-group is only implied, both intertextually (as NH and the FPÖ have continuously proposed closing the borders for refugees) and implicitly (by constructing oneself as the protector of the true Austrian people, to which neither the Schickeria nor non-Austrians would belong). Having claimed that VdB does not even have a clue of what it means to be hard-working or working in business (even though VdB held a chair for economics at the University of Vienna for many years), hard-working people would also not belong to the Schickeria. And, finally, apart from accusing VdB of being a liar, unreliable and untrustworthy, NH claims that VdB's pro-European stance implies that VdB would act not in the interests of 'the Austrian people' but only in the EU's – as if Austria as an EU member state since 1995 did not necessarily participate in all decision-making at EU level.

Conclusion

The dynamics of *everyday performances* frequently transcend careful analytic categorisations; boundaries between categories are blurred and flexible, open to change and ever new socio-economic developments. In sum, when analysing right-wing (or, indeed, left-wing) populist movements and their rhetoric, it is essential to recognise that their propaganda – realised as it is in many genres across relevant social domains – always combines and integrates form and content, targets specific audiences and adapts to specific contexts. Only by doing so, are we able to deconstruct, understand and explain their messages, the resonance of their messages and their electoral success.

In the body-politics of such ideologies, the 'national family' must preserve the traditional paternalistic order of the sexes and maintain the nation's body as white and pure. This draws on chauvinistic and fascist imaginaries as extensively investigated by Musolff (2010) and Richardson (2017) in their research on the concept of the '*Volk*' and the '*Volkskörper*' across German and British nationalistic writing since the eighteenth century. In summary, the extreme-right's salient construction of the national body and use of associated symbols shows a constant effort to mobilise feelings of national pride but equally of national emergency, of threat and danger, of the possible decay of the Western World.

In view of the analysis above, it must be emphasised that the FPÖ as the only established party in Austria which has consistently provided a home for extreme-right positions is far from homogenous. The ideological positions articulated by its leading figures range from extreme-right and pan-German nationalism to

toned-down positions, particularly on the frontstage. Indeed, the ability to alternate between 'strong' and 'soft' performances according to context and audience is a defining characteristic of the contemporary far-right in Austria.

Both allusions to and encoded references to extreme-right and Nazi ideologies are thus part of the strategy of calculated ambivalence that ensures deniability. Closely related to these strategic performances are processes of normalisation, transcending and breaking taboos through re-contextualisation and re-semiotisation as aspects of extreme-right imaginaries, moving from backstage to frontstage and from party politics to the mainstream. This process became highly evident in the Austrian national election 2017 where the Austrian People's Party under its new leader Sebastian Kurz appropriated the far-right agenda in respect to migration and asylum issues, thus normalising important elements of a far-right programme. This specific and cleverly planned and marketised election campaign deserves careful investigation in the future in order to be able to deconstruct normalising procedures in necessary detail.

Notes

1 This chapter necessarily can only briefly summarise some results of previous and ongoing projects due to space restrictions; see Rheindorf & Wodak (2018a) and Wodak (2015a, 2017b) for more details of socio-political contexts, theoretical assumptions, methodologies and the analysed data.
2 The term *Manichean* stems from a religious belief system of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages. In this sect, every phenomenon was divided into two opposing sides: light and darkness, good and evil, and so forth. Nowadays, this term has been re-contextualised to label ideologies which structure the world into dualities, without any overtones; see Klein (1991).
3 Which kind of persuasive and rhetorical means can be used depends on topic, genre and audience orientation as well as intention; these factors thus also determine which argumentation schemes seem most adequate and appropriate. In the concrete analysis, therefore, it will sometimes be Toulmin's model ([1958] 2003), sometimes Walton's practical reasoning and sometimes van Eemeren's Pragma-dialectics that make sense; see Walton (1996).
4 I am very grateful to Andrew Sayer to pointing out to me that this differentiation should be made explicit in order to avoid confusion and misunderstandings.
5 See Rheindorf & Wodak (2018a) for more details of the FPÖ's gender, identity and body politics and its success in penetrating popular culture.
6 Leaflet by the FPÖ's youth organisation '*Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend*' under chairman Johann Gudenus.
7 Johann Gudenus at a rally in 2011; reported by the FPÖ's newspaper '*Neue Freie Zeitung*', 27 October 2011.
8 Johann Gudenus, press release on 19 December 2014, available at www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20141219_OTS0076.
9 Johann Gudenus in a speech given in Moscow, 11 September 2014.
10 See Rheindorf & Wodak (2018a) for more details of the related identity politics.
11 Howanietz, *Für ein freies Österreich*, 31; '*Ehre*' and '*Treue*', the two concepts the book praises in this context, formed the core of the SS motto '*Meine Ehre heißt Treue*', which is banned under the *Verbotsgesetz*.
12 See Schmitz-Berning (1998, pp. 327). For the current use of the term, see Frindte & Dietrich (2017).

13 See Forchtner et al. (2013); Wodak (2011a) and Wodak & Forchtner (2018) for more details on the fictionalisation of politics.
14 See www.hcstrache.at/home/ (accessed 2 May 2017).
15 See Köhler & Wodak (2012); Wodak & Köhler (2010); Wodak (2013a, 2013b) for recent detailed studies and research on the FPÖ and HC Strache.
16 Heinz-Christian Strache, 'HC Strache', 27 August 2015, available on Strache's personal *Facebook* page at www.facebook.com/HCStrache (accessed 1 July 2017).
17 www.facebook.com/burschenschaft.markogermania/photos/a.956835317686478.1073741827.826760337360644/969262486443761/?type=3andtheater, (accessed 15 February 2017).
18 More information about the election itself is available at www.e-ir.info/2016/06/14/green-against-blue-reflections-on-the-2016-austrian-presidential-election/. After the FPÖ appealed to the Supreme Court that VdB's narrow victory (30,000 votes more) on 25 May 2016 was not valid due to formal and technical issues, the Austrian Supreme Court decided that the second round had to be repeated (4 December 2016).
19 Television debate hosted by the Austrian television channel ATV, 8 May 2016.
20 www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/tv-duell-der-praesidentschaftskandidaten-van-der-bellen-gegen-hofer-oesterreich-oberpeinlich-1.2994935–2; http://derstandard.at/2000037034409/Praesidentschaftsdebatte-Rhetorisches-Freistilringenim-direkten-Hofburg-Duell; www.zeit.de/news/2016–05/16/bundespraesident-tv-duellin-oesterreichbeide-blamiert-amt-beschaedigt-16095603.

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2 Populism 2.0

Social media and the false allure of 'unmediated' representation

Benjamin Moffitt

> Well, let me tell you about Twitter. I think that maybe I wouldn't be here if it wasn't for Twitter, because I get such a fake press, such a dishonest press. . . . And when I have close to 100 million people watching me on Twitter, including Facebook, including all of the Instagram, including POTUS, including lots of things – but we have – I guess pretty close to 100 million people. I have my own form of media.
>
> Donald Trump in *Cillizza*, 2017

Introduction

If there is one line of argument that seems to have crossed the hazy line dividing 'interesting opinion' from 'conventional wisdom' in the wake of the global populist surge of the mid-2010s, it is that social media is to blame for the contemporary rise of populism. Media commentators have anointed both Donald Trump and Rodrigo Duterte as 'the social media president' (Bueno, 2017; Jones, 2015); revered outlets like *The New Yorker* ask leading questions like 'did social media produce the new populism?' (Lepore, 2016) and somewhere along the way to Trump's ascendancy to the US presidency, populism became conflated with social media-adjacent topics as diverse as 'fake news', 4chan, Anonymous, trolls and the alt-right (Tait, 2016). The general gist of the argument, even if it is not explicitly stated, is that: (1) populists have utilised social media to more genuinely and 'directly' connect with 'the people', sidestepping traditional media and outmanoeuvring their more 'mainstream' competitors in the process; (2) social media's unruliness plays into populism's revolt against expertise and 'the elite' and (3) this effective harnessing of social media has ultimately led to populist success at the ballot box. More explicit is the concern that this development is a dangerous one: in sharp contrast to cyber-utopian arguments about the democratising potential of the internet of the early 2000s (Rushkoff, 2002; Shirky, 2008), the general consensus seems to be that this social media-populism nexus is something to seriously worry about. Rather than delivering a version of 'the people' that is open-ended, pluralistic and ultimately democratic, it is claimed that the Wild West of social media has instead enabled a version of 'the people' made up of an unholy mixture of racists, misogynists, white supremacists, the alt-right and other deplorables and undesirables.

There is some kernel of truth in these arguments. *Some* populist actors have indeed tended to use social media with more skill and efficacy than many of their mainstream competitors. Their Twitter feeds, Facebook pages and so forth often have more shares, likes and fans than their opponents, and are often far more entertaining and engaging as well. *Some* populist actors have indeed harnessed the energies, logics and platforms of social media to engage with their 'people' in an effective and innovative way, and in the process, challenge us to rethink how political representation operates in the contemporary political environment. However, these trends are not uniform. While social media has undoubtedly reshaped politics – and this includes populism – there is good reason to hold some reservations about the claims that have been made about the relationship between populism and social media. As the academic literature catches up with empirical developments around social media and populism, there is a need to not simply adopt these positions as 'common wisdom', but instead to assess such claims critically and think carefully about the kind of language we use when discussing populism and social media.

In this context, this chapter interrogates a number of taken-for-granted assumptions about the relationship between populism and social media, and sets out four 'traps' for studying this relationship. These traps revolve around assumptions about social media's allegedly 'direct' and 'unmediated' nature, representation and the uniformity of populist use of social media. Namely, these traps are: (1) mistaking directness for being 'in touch' with 'the people'; (2) fetishising the 'unmediated' nature of populism, thus ignoring the fact that all political representative claims are mediated; (3) assuming that populist online communication is multi-directional and (4) assuming that populist use of social media is relatively uniform. The first two traps are of a conceptual nature, while the latter two involve ignoring empirical evidence of how populist actors actually use social media, and oftentimes involve the process of generalising from prominent single cases (particularly the case of Trump) that are not representative. To remedy this, the chapter concludes by presenting a typology of populist actors' level of social media interaction, demonstrating that there is a wide variation in how populists use social media.

In order to address these traps, the chapter draws on conceptual arguments associated with the 'constructivist turn' in political representation (Disch, 2015; Saward, 2010), which pays attention to the constitutive and performative nature of representative claims; theoretical and empirical research from the burgeoning body of work on populist communications from the fields of political communications and media politics (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017); and empirical material drawn from the social media accounts of populist actors from around the globe, from those that are well-known (such as Donald Trump's Twitter usage) to examples that have been given less attention (such as Pauline Hanson's skilful use of Facebook). It should be noted that this chapter focuses exclusively on the 'top-down' social media use of populist leaders and parties – while usage of social media of the populist social movements associated with the Great Recession (such as Occupy Wall Street and the Indignados) has

been well covered in the literature (Aslanidis, 2016, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2017), this is less the case for the former group, which is somewhat surprising given the centrality of these actors to the 'social media equals populism' narrative.

Studying populism and social media: a potted history

Before getting to the traps inherent in studying social media and populism, it is worth taking a quick trip through recent empirical developments – and consequent developments in the academic literature – to understand how we arrived at the current juncture. This is, by no means, meant to be an exhaustive account, but rather a brief overview to orientate the reader. While populism is obviously not a new phenomenon, social media by comparison is quite novel, with the social media forms most usually associated with or used as shorthand for the term – Facebook and Twitter – only being launched in 2004 and 2006, respectively. There are perhaps three major 'episodes' of populists' use of social media from the late 2000s onwards we can identify in this respect. The first episode came in 2009, with the emergence of the US Tea Party, and particularly its novel usage of online forums and Facebook groups as organising platforms. This interest in social media as an opportunity for populist movements to organise outside the constraints of official party structure, bypass traditional media and effectively utilise memes and hashtags also extended to other, very ideologically different, movements, such as the Occupy and 15M movements a few years later. The second episode came with Beppe Grillo and Gianroberto Casaleggio's formation of the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), also in 2009, which posited itself as hybrid movement-party that relied heavily on social media as a platform for organisation and 'e-democracy' (Natale & Ballatore, 2014). Indeed, Grillo had promoted Meetup as a platform for his followers to use as early as 2005, and M5S has since utilised online voting for candidates, as well as the vote for which group the party should join in the European Parliament. Since then, the Spanish hybrid populist movement-party Podemos has arguably embraced social media and Web 2.0 platforms even more than M5S, with the party also using online voting platforms, experimenting with participatory platforms like Loomio, an online decision-making platform, to gauge the opinions of their members (Frediani, 2014), and embracing Reddit as a virtual 'Plaza Podemos' for online conversation. The third, and most covered and notorious episode of populist social media use, came with Donald Trump's campaign for the Republican primary nomination, launched in 2015, and eventual rise to the office of the US Presidency, which, as has been noted, has been popularly conflated with his use of Twitter, as well as the harnessing of the energies of certain movements and areas of the internet including 4chan, the alt-right, men's rights activist groups and the GamerGate movement among others.

Academic study of the relationship between populism and social media has unsurprisingly followed these developments, although often with a significant delay given the temporal realities of academic publishing and peer-review research.

Attention has also tended to coalesce around these empirical developments due to their novelty and media visibility, with all of these cases gaining widespread international coverage. As Karpf (2017, p. 198) has noted, 'major social events exert a developmental force on Internet politics research in ways both visible and invisible. . . . Our theories of digital politics are molded from a timeline of counter-intuitive social events', and the rise and subsequent success of a number of these populist parties and actors can indeed be interpreted within this 'counter-intuitive' frame. While the role of social media in these cases was certainly touched upon in individual and comparative studies (see e.g. Agarwal et al., 2014; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun, 2012; Skocpol & Williamson, 2012), these were often not in the context of *populism*; rather, these were studies of digital politics, social movements, online activism and so forth. Instead, the first concerted and comparative effort to *explicitly* track populism's relationship with social media can perhaps be identified as the UK think-tank Demos' 2011 project on 'digital populism' in Europe, which examined and profiled the Facebook supporters of populist parties in several Western European countries (Bartlett, Birdwell & Littler, 2011). More work in the following years explicitly on the populism-social media nexus came from Gerbaudo (2012, 2014, 2017), whose work on 'populism 2.0' has explored and theorised the 'elective affinity' between populism and social media, whereby social media has opened up space for populist movements to flourish, particularly due to its tendency to ferment a 'people' versus 'the elite' rhetoric. In the past couple of years, however, the topic has become far more prominent, particularly in the political communications literature, no doubt due to the rise of the prominent empirical cases mentioned above, but also because social media has proven itself not simply a trend that is going to disappear, but rather as a permanent (and important) part of contemporary politics. The edited collection, *Populist Political Communication in Europe* (Aalberg et al., 2017) is a good example of this kind of work, with the many country studies in the book exploring the use of social media by populists, while a recent special issue of *Information, Communication & Society* (Engesser, Fawzi & Larsson, 2017) on the topic of populist online communications has explicitly examined this populism-social media nexus from a number of angles, with articles ranging from theoretical explorations of the function of the internet for right-wing populists (Krämer, 2017), to empirical work on the Twitter use of Latin American populists (Waisbord & Amado, 2017), to experiments using social media to spread populist messages (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). These undoubtedly speak to a widening and maturing of the literature on social media and populism, and it is no risk to say that we will likely see far more work on the topic in the coming years.

Four traps for studying the relationship between populism and social media

As the literature on social media and populism reaches this new stage of maturity, no doubt encouraging a new wave of research on the topic, it is a good time to

take stock and think about where the literature is heading. While the work so far has been nuanced and thoughtful, as more voices join the debates, it is necessary to identify some potential pitfalls around studying the relationship between populism and social media. Identifying such traps can help us avoid unwittingly adopting media narratives and 'common wisdom' in our academic research, and encourage us to be thoughtful about the kind of conceptual language we utilise when discussing such matters. These traps revolve around assumptions about social media's 'direct' nature and how this feeds into populist notions of authenticity; misconstruing the nature of populists' 'unmediated' claims on social media and the oft-assumed homogeneity of the social media practices of populist actors, and are explained in turn below.

Mistaking the 'directness' of populists' social media use for being 'in touch' with 'the people'

Although the burgeoning literature on social media and populism outlined above is growing in its sophistication, there is still something of a tendency to overplay the 'direct' aspect of populist communication online. For example, Engesser, Ernst, Esser and Büchel (2017, p. 1110, emphasis in original) argue that '[while] the mass media adhere to professional norms and news values, social media serve as *direct linkage* to the people and allow the populists to circumvent the journalistic gatekeepers'; while elsewhere Bracciale and Martella (2017, p. 1311) claim that 'political actors have been able to speak directly "to the people", given that they use communication forms that are structurally disintermediate'. While there is nothing necessarily wrong in highlighting the shift from the 'gatekeeper' model of mass media to the far more disintermediated nature of social media (Bro & Wallberg, 2015), what we do need to be careful of here is mistaking direct *communication* with direct *representation* (Coleman, 2005; Urbinati, 2015), and thus potentially playing into populists' claims about being directly 'in touch' with 'the people'.

There are two main issues at play. The first is that 'direct' is a very loaded term when we are speaking about politics – let alone populist politics. The notion of being 'directly' in touch with the people is core to populist appeal – whether through claims to know or be directly in contact with 'the people' (Müller, 2014); or through calls for 'direct democracy' or plebiscitary mechanisms (Bowler, Denemark, Donovan, & McDonnell, 2017), in which populists draw on a 'deep revulsion against institutions that come between the people and their actions, and a craving for direct, unmediated expression of the people's will' (Canovan, 1999, p. 13). As such, the fetishising of the 'direct' nature of social media communication risks slipping into the populist playbook, and mistaking so-called direct *communication* with direct *democracy* or (in a paradoxical turn of phrase) direct *representation.* While '[populist] Twitter illustrates a preference for communication as representation rather than interaction' (Waisbord & Amado, 2017, p. 1343), researchers need not fall into the same trap, mistaking the nature of a communi-

cations platform for the nature of a political relationship between a political representative and their alleged 'people'. These are different things, and in any case, it is worth keeping in mind that Twitter, Facebook and the like are still intermediaries – they are not actually 'direct' or 'unmediated' forms of communication; rather, their mediating functioning is just better hidden than the usual mass media forms that political science has more experience dealing with (Moffitt, 2016). Those populists who communicate with 'the people' on social media are still beholden to the limits of the platform (such as Twitter's character limit), the algorithms that push certain online communications to the forefront (and hide others), the devices on which such communications are received and the distribution networks (such as follower lists, Facebook fans, Instagram followers and so on) that social media utilise.

The second issue is that social media's so-called 'direct' nature is not *automatically* correlated to populist communication. While of course it does not jibe as well with the managerial and technocratic political style adopted by some political representatives (Moffitt, 2016), there is little reason that *non*-populist actors cannot benefit from it – and this is clear from the social media success and popularity of the likes of former US President Barack Obama (Bimber, 2014), or Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. As such, the assumption that social media's 'direct' nature benefits populists exclusively seems somewhat misguided – it has ostensibly afforded the same opportunities to *all* political actors, and there is no reason that so-called 'mainstream' political actors cannot harness social media for equally effective and 'direct' communication – in this regard, social media does not discriminate. It seems that the central difference for populists is that much of their appeal relies on *the appearance of* 'directness' and being in touch with 'the people', and the tools of social media more easily play into, reinforce and amplify this appearance. Moreover, I would argue that the assumption that populists are more successful in speaking 'directly' to 'the people' is actually about the fact that populist online communication often comes across as more genuine and authentic than the online communication of their mainstream counterparts. A good illustration of the importance of this sense of authenticity can be seen in Enli's comparative study of the social media campaigns of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election: Enli talks of the 'authenticity markers' that indicated that Trump's tweets were 'real' – impoliteness, political incorrectness, the use of over-the-top capitalisation and exclamation marks – as opposed to the seemingly artificial and market-tested tweets of Clinton. The 'clumsiness' and 'amateurish' nature of Trump's tweeting seemingly paid off here:

> Compared to the Clinton campaign's innovative use of digital media, extensive use of staffers, and the Democratic Party's expertise, the Trump campaign seemed pretty amateurish. Yet, 'amateur' might strengthen the image of a candidate as authentic; the term 'amateur' refers to someone who engages in an activity for pleasure and not as a paid job. Politicians who come across as

> too professional might therefore seem calculated and cynical, while the amateur has the benefit of perhaps seeming clumsy and imperfect, but yet authentic.
>
> (Enli, 2017, p. 58)

In short, while the medium of Twitter (and other social media) may suit the passionate, soundbite-ready and emotional tone of populists, it does not *automatically* bring about their success. It is not necessarily that populists are good at using Twitter and Facebook – it seems to be the case more so that many mainstream politicians are bad at it.

Fetishising the 'unmediated' nature of populism, thus ignoring the fact that all political representative claims – whether online or offline – are mediated

Relatedly, the fetishising of the allegedly 'unmediated' and 'direct' social media communication that populists have with their followers – and the underlying assumption that this 'direct line' to their 'people' makes them more representative than other political actors – ignores the crucial fact that in contemporary mass politics, mediation is necessary to any political representative claim, whether offline or online.[1] Populism is never just about the populist leader 'directly' connecting with 'the people' – rather, it relies 'on a complex process of mediated claim-making between populist leaders, audiences, constituencies and media' (Moffitt, 2016, p. 96), in which all parties participate in the negotiation over the meaning of 'the people'.

This argument has been most forcefully argued in recent years by those authors associated with the 'constructivist turn' in the literature on political representation, which puts forth 'the idea that acts of representation do not *refer* to the represented in any straightforward way but work to *constitute* the represented as unified as (typically) as a bearer of interests and demands' (Disch, 2015, p. 490). This is particularly the case in populism: 'the people' is one of the most vague and 'empty' terms in contemporary political usage,[2] with no 'automatic constituency' acting as its signified (as opposed to e.g. talk of 'the middle class', which has a particular social base), and thus must be explicitly constructed and constituted by representatives. Laclau made this clear in his work on populism: he argued that 'political practices do not *express* the nature of social agents but, instead, *constitute* the latter' (Laclau, 2005a, p. 33, emphasis in original), and noted that the populist leader was key to this constitution, with 'the symbolic unification of the group around an individuality . . . inherent to the formation of a "people"' (Laclau, 2005b, p. 100).

Obviously, this constitution or construction of 'the people' – the offering of a particular representative claim about and on behalf of 'the people', together with judgements of acceptance or rejection from those 'people' the populist talks about (as well as the judgement of others) – needs to take place within some kind of setting. This is where mediation enters the scene. Contemporary populists such

as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage and Rodrigo Duterte do not primarily go to 'the people' via face-to-face town hall meetings and meet them 'directly' to negotiate their representative claims around 'the people' – rather, these claims take place through channels of mediation.[3] We engage with our political representatives today through mediated channels more broadly – whether old modes of mass media broadcast, such as television, newspaper or radio – or social media, such as on Facebook or Twitter. As Benjamin Arditi has argued, rather than 'real immediacy' with our representatives, we now have 'virtual immediacy', which 'coincides with the imaginary identification characteristic of populist representation – the presumption of enjoying a direct relation with the people and the imaginary identification of the latter with the leader' (Arditi, 2007, p. 68). This *feeling* of 'direct' representation and immediacy – the ability to tweet straight at Trump, 'like' and share Duterte's Facebook status, or the fact that Nigel Farage can retweet me if I have a witty enough response to a post of his – does not mean mediation disappears from contemporary populist communication or representation. Just because social media *looks* direct does not mean that it *is* direct: rather, it serves a key mediating role between 'the people' and the populist leader in the negotiation of contemporary populist representative claims. The qualitative shift that has occurred here is that 'the people' simply have more opportunities to engage in this feeling of 'direct' representation – we can like, share and react to our representatives in a semi-public way now twenty-four hours a day:

> This manifestation of approval and thus of both sides and directions of the relationship of representation (the claims of the representatives and the acclamation by the represented), is no longer confined to extraordinary circumstances (such as elections, rallies, etc.) but has been partly transformed into a more mundane phenomenon.
>
> (Krämer, 2017, p. 1298)

This shift, one can assume, has the effect of favouring those political actors who are more active on social media, thus providing an everlasting sense of being 'connected' to 'the people'.

Assuming that populist online communication is multi-directional

While social media may ostensibly offer populist actors a 'direct' line to their followers, the assumption that 'direct' communication equals reciprocity and exchange does not automatically follow. Indeed, the empirical work that has been done on the use of social media by populist leaders and parties tends to show a quite consistent pattern: populists' online communication is often one-sided, with very little interaction with 'the people' that follow their accounts. Waisbord and Amado, whose comparative study of how populist and non-populist presidents in Latin America use Twitter found that populist actors had 'limited interactivity with followers', argued that '[they] have not taken advantage of the platform to promote horizontal communication, but instead, they have utilized it to bolster their own

voice' (Waisbord & Amado, 2017, p. 1342), and that populists instead use Twitter as a broadcast medium rather than an interactive medium. The only leader who bucked the trend in their study was former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa, who sent out approximately 10 times the replies of his fellow populists per day – the rub being that these were short, blunt messages that tended to 'resemble old-fashioned brief letters responding to queries rather than dialogic situations' (Waisbord & Amado, 2017, p. 1337). Enli's study of Donald Trump's use of Twitter came to a similar conclusion, finding that he (as well as his opponent Hillary Clinton) 'used social media *primarily as a marketing tool*. . . . Even the candidate who broke all the rules, Donald Trump, kept his social media followers at arm's length and limited his engagement to retweeting selected tweets' (Enli, 2017, p. 59). Trump's (2012) characterisation of Twitter as 'like owning your own newspaper' speaks to this – it is not a medium to be used for conversation, deliberation or back and forth connection with your followers; rather, it's a top-down medium for distributing information, advertisements or propaganda. Again, it is worth emphasising that this top-down usage of social media is not particularly different to how non-populist political actors use social media (Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff & van't Haar, 2013; Stromer-Galley, 2014) – it seems that there is little to be gained electorally for anyone, populist or otherwise, by engaging with the *hoi polloi* of Twitter eggs, comment section warriors and trolls – but given populists' alleged connection to 'the people' and oft-professed hatred of mainstream mass media channels, it seems somewhat surprising that they (or their staff) equally wish to keep a distance from followers and not interact in a meaningful way, if at all.

Assuming that populist use of social media is relatively uniform

The final trap we need to be wary of is tarring all populists with the same brush when it comes to social media – that is, assuming that social media is a godsend for all populist actors, or that all populists (or their communications staff) are social media wizards whose Facebook, Twitter and Instagram nous is so impressive that they are able to utilise social media to sidestep mass media and reach previously untapped audiences who then become part of their 'people'. While this is a neat narrative to utilise – it plays nicely into fears about both the allegedly corruptive presence of populism in our democratic systems as well as the purported negative effect that social media have wrought on our social and political lives – it simply does not play out empirically. Some populists are terrible at using social media, while others use it in highly effective and innovative ways. Some use it frequently and some hardly at all. Similarly, social media is key to the public profile and political appeal of some populists actors, whereas it plays no role in the narrative around other populists. In order to add some nuance to these kinds of claims, and demonstrate the variability with which social media is utilised by populists around the globe, Table 2.1 presents a typology of populist actors' engagement with social media, along with examples of populists who fit into each category. This typology is by no means exhaustive, and the categories are permeable rather than set in stone.

Table 2.1 Typology of populist leaders' level of social media presence

Level of social media presence	*Populist leaders*
Weak social media presence	Silvio Berlusconi and Jean-Marie Le Pen
Moderate social media presence	Winston Peters, Jimmie Åkesson and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Strong social media presence	Pauline Hanson, Geert Wilders, Rafael Correa and Sarah Palin
Very strong social media presence	Donald Trump, Beppe Grillo and Pablo Iglesias

More so, for the purposes of brevity and simplicity, I have focused on populist leaders, rather than parties or movements here – not the online activities of their followers – and have mainly relied on their Facebook and Twitter usage taking into account both the frequency of posts together with the format, content and level of engagement of said posts, rather than other social media sites given their centrality in contemporary online politics.

Populists with a weak social media presence

While theoretically it would make sense for our first category to be populists who do not utilise social media at all, I could not find any example of a populist actor who is currently politically active who *literally* does not use social media. Even those populists, whose appeal could be argued to be tied to another medium or time (such as Silvio Berlusconi and television), tend to have a social media presence. This may speak less about the relationship between social media and populism and more about the ubiquity of social media in contemporary politics in general, where any political player is expected to use it as a communications channel.

As such, our first category is populists with a weak social media presence – that is, populists who rarely utilise social media. Examples here would include Silvio Berlusconi and Jean-Marie Le Pen: while the former only uses Facebook (with no official Twitter presence at the time of writing), Le Pen utilises both Facebook and Twitter. However, both of these populist leader's usage of social media is infrequent, and when they do post, it is often simply links to their official website or flattering media pieces about them. In short, the general lack of engagement with social media by these figures indicates that social media is not important to their appeal to 'the people'.

Populists with a moderate social media presence

The second, and likely most populated category, is populist leaders with a moderate social media presence. Unlike the category above, populists in this category utilise social media relatively frequently, have a social media presence across a number of platforms, and may even occasionally engage with or retweet/repost

messages from followers. What they do share with the category above, however, is that the vast majority of their social media usage will take the form of top-down 'broadcast' posts that link to their websites, official statements or media pieces. In short, these populists utilise social media much like they would use forms of mass media – as a one-sided, semi-official public relations channel. These populists are generally not viewed as 'online' or 'digital' populists – that is, information and communication technologies are not perceived to be linked strongly to their success – but at the same time, they do engage with social media in a relatively consistent manner. Examples here would include Winston Peters, Jimmie Åkesson and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Populists with a strong social media presence

The third category is populists with a strong social media presence. These populists go beyond the simple 'broadcast' model of social media, and utilise interactive tools or display a technical proficiency across different social media platforms that goes beyond their peers mentioned above. For example, while on face value, no-one would call Pauline Hanson an online guru, her 'Pauline Hanson's Please Explain' Facebook site is updated daily, includes occasional livestreams of speeches, sells branded merchandise, displays a clever usage of hashtags and goes beyond the 'broadcast' model by including (what appear to be) personal messages and videos from Hanson herself, as well as consistent engagement with and responses to her Facebook followers. The same can be said of Geert Wilders: while he is not necessarily known for his online presence, his Twitter page is updated multiple times a day, often with flashy images and slogans in both English and Dutch; the website for his Party for Freedom has experimented with interactive forums for users to lodge complaints about migrants and his anti-Islam film *Fitna* was distributed via LiveLeak. This category would also include populists who *are* better known for the social media usage, such as the likes of Rafael Correa or Sarah Palin. Correa's social media use has attracted attention not only for his frequent (yet shallow) interaction with his followers, but also for his vitriolic attacks on journalists, the mainstream press and freedom of expression organisations (Waisbord & Amado, 2017, pp. 1338–1339), as well as getting into a Twitter 'flame war' with comedian John Oliver. Palin, although obviously now a far less influential political figure than in the late 2000s, launched something of a social media empire in her political heyday, with a highly active Facebook page, an internet-only subscription channel (the Sarah Palin Channel) and other multi-media ventures (Moffitt, 2016, p. 84) that had a strong interactive and social component.

Populists with a very strong social media presence

The final category is those populists who have a very strong social media presence. This includes the likes of Donald Trump, whose seemingly non-stop Twitter usage has been popularly interpreted as core to his political success, as well as those populists who might truly be able to be called 'digital populists' – figures such as

Beppe Grillo and Pablo Iglesias, whose respective parties (M5S and Podemos) are strongly identified with innovative social and new media usage. The way that Trump uses social media is very different to the latter cases, so it is worth taking them in turn. In the first case, Trump has not been particularly responsive to his followers and has not formally experimented with social media in any particularly cutting-edge ways. Nonetheless, his masterful and consistent use of Twitter has seen him labelled as 'America's first Twitter president' (Alang, 2016); Trump himself has stated that 'I think that maybe I wouldn't be here [the White House] if it wasn't for Twitter' (Cillizza, 2017) and his former Press Secretary Sean Spicer called Twitter Trump's 'direct pipeline to the American people, where he can talk back and forth' (Blake, 2016) (even if there is little back and forth actually going on). Where Trump's real social media skills lie, and what separates him from the above category, is his ability to truly break free of the old broadcast model, and make his social media use a story in itself: his anointment as a Twitter savant stems from the sheer volume of coverage his social media use has received. As Karpf has perceptively argued:

> Trump rarely was using Twitter in order to bypass the mainstream media. Instead, he was using social media in order to set the agenda of the mainstream media [. . .] Trump's dominance of the media coverage was often driven through vitriolic tweets that seized the media spotlight away from his opponents, keeping him at the center of attention. Reporters adjusted their news routines in response to Trump's headline-grabbing behavior. Trump would also keep extend the life cycle of some stories, and decrease the longevity of others, by attacking media coverage on Twitter or by launching entirely different lines of attack. This is hybrid media behavior unlike what we have witnessed from the professional communications operations deployed by past (or concurrent) presidential campaigns.
>
> (Karpf, 2017, p. 200)

Politically quite different to Trump (and from one another) are those figures whose social media presence is also very strong, but who have been identified as 'digital' or 'online' populists in the academic literature, such as Beppe Grillo and Pablo Iglesias. Not only are these figures' profiles tied to their social media use, they also demonstrate something of an evangelical faith in the democratic potential of social media and ICTs for not only speaking to 'the people', but listening, responding and better representing 'the people', as demonstrated by their parties' serious and innovative usage of ICTs to help members of the parties participate more fully (Bennett, Segerberg & Knüpfer, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2017; Gerbaudo & Screti, 2017). To use the terminology of Deseriis (2017), these cases can be seen as examples of 'technopopulism', in that their discourse mixes populism with technolibertarianism. Their faith in the internet, transparency and the wisdom of the networked citizen means they have much in common the many Pirate Parties across the world, as well as other marginal 'technoparties' or 'internet parties'. However, where technopopulists diverge from these other kinds of parties is that the latter tend to be (or make attempts to be) 'leaderless', often advocating some

form of 'liquid democracy', whereas technopopulists represent 'a leaderist, more strictly populist, variant wherein charismatic leaders play a critical role in conferring unity and identity to their parties' (Deseriis, 2017, p. 441), and where transparency in terms of decision making is often opaque, despite their oft-stated goals to the contrary. In this regard, technopopulists find themselves in somewhat of paradoxical bind: '*as a political project* technopopulism cannot fully solve the tension between its constitutive components: the pluralistic nature of networks and the totalising tendency of populism' (Deseriis, 2017, p. 455). It is arguably this paradoxical bind that has confounded some analysts or critics of these parties, unable to place M5S on the usual political spectrum (Colloca & Corbetta, 2015) or unable to discern Podemos' commitment to pluralism and liberalism (see Seguín, 2015).

The benefits of this typology are threefold. First, as mentioned earlier, it lays waste to the claim that populism and social media necessarily go hand-in-hand – as one can see, there is wide variance in the use of social media by populists, as well as and the centrality of social media and ICTs to their appeal. Second, it provides a gradational range of categories that we can place populist actors in, and it can (and should) be amended as social media usage by populists becomes more complex and differentiated. Third, it mirrors, to some extent, the differing levels of hybridisation that can be tracked in contemporary cases of populism. Those leaders who fall in the 'less use of social media' end of the typology tend to belong to more 'traditional' parties and/or movements, with a relatively clear party structure, leadership mode and so on, whereas on the other end of the typology, we find cases of populism that are essentially 'hybrid mobilisation movements'-*cum*-parties (Chadwick, 2013), in that they blend and blur the lines between online and offline political communication, as well the lines between party and movement forms. Unsurprisingly, it is at this end of typology where the innovation in terms of social media usage is taking place.

Conclusion

It is increasingly clear that we can no longer side-line social media when it comes to examining populism. It is no longer a novelty in political life, but rather an important part of political communication and campaigning, and one that is only becoming more central. At the same time, we cannot seriously 'blame' the current rise and strength of populism across the globe on social media – while talk of echo bubbles, trolling and 'fake news' have likely played *some* role in populism's fortunes, populism's current upsurge was already taking place from before the advent of social media (Moffitt, 2016). As such, it is important to temper such claims, carefully think about the language we utilise when examining the relationship between populism and social media, and despite the temptation, avoid making sweeping statements about the alleged social media wizardry of populists across the globe. There is much work to be done in this regard: this chapter has only touched upon the usage of social media by populist leaders and parties, whereas the topic of the role of the social media use of *supporters* of

populists deserves its own lengthy exploration, especially given the online communities that seemed to have played a strong role in the success of the likes of Donald Trump (Hawley, 2017; Nagle, 2017) and Rodrigo Duterte (Gavilan, 2016), as well as the more shady practices of 'click-farms' and Facebook's news aggregators utilised by populist actors that are gradually coming to light (Fiedler, Kreil, Lehmann, Reuter, & Rost, 2017; Reuter, 2017; Silverman & Alexander, 2016).

This chapter has attempted to make a contribution to the current juncture in populism studies that seeks to examine the social media usage of populists by outlining four central traps that we should try to avoid: mistaking the kinds of 'directness' enabled by social media use by populists for genuinely being 'in touch' with 'the people'; fetishising the allegedly 'unmediated' nature of populism, and in the process ignoring the processes of mediation and construction that are at the heart of all contemporary political representative claims; assuming that populist online communication is multi-directional, whereas empirical work shows it to mostly adhere to a top-down 'broadcast' model and lastly, assuming that populist use of social media is homogenous and uniform, whereas the typology developed in the latter part of the chapter shows that there is wide variance in use of social media by populist leaders. Identifying such traps hopefully allows researchers of populism to avoid wading into murky waters in regards to mistaking populist communication for representation, shines light onto the diverse patterns of populist usage of social media and will help researchers examine populist online practices without falling into the trap of buying into populist's own claims about the 'directness' of social media and their subsequent success.

Notes

1 The view of populism as an 'unmediated' phenomenon is not just limited to work on populism and social media, but populism more generally (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 97–98).
2 Canovan has argued that '"the people" is undoubtedly one of the least precise and most promiscuous of concepts . . . "the people" cannot be restricted to a group with definite characteristics, boundaries, structure or permanence, although it is quite capable of carrying these senses' (Canovan, 2005, p. 140).
3 One could even argue that those 'direct' face-to-face rallies with 'the people' favoured by the likes of Trump are primarily designed to be reproduced and broadcast via media in order to prove the devotion of 'the people' to the populist leader.

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3 From protecting individual rights to protecting the public

The changing parameters of populist-driven criminal law and penal policy

John Pratt and Michelle Miao

Introduction

In advanced liberal democracies, criminal law and penal policy has been bound by clearly defined parameters that helped to distinguish this mode of governance from that of other – by inference at least, less worthy, less benign – social formations. One of the features of citizenship in the democracies was thus the importance given to protecting the rights of individuals caught up in the criminal justice system from excessive or arbitrary use of state power. However, from the 1980s onwards, there has been a marked shift towards protecting the public – at the expense of individual rights – from those who would otherwise put this at risk. As this has occurred, criminal law has become more punitive, regulatory and extensive. It no longer simply reacts to crime but seeks to prevent it through initiatives backed by penal sanctions, even though no crime may have been committed. In such ways, law and policy have broken out of the parameters that had hitherto bound them.

It will be argued in this chapter that the rise and influence of what is known as *penal populism* lies behind these transformations. The chapter illustrates the extent of the transformations engineered by populist influences and explains why these should have had so much purchase in this particular sector. Even though, over much the same period, crime rates in these societies (specifically here, the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have been in significant decline (Zimring, 2012; Farrell, Tilley & Tseloni, 2014), populism was able to feed on more general anxieties brought about by extensive social and economic change. One way to restore social cohesion, as well as giving the impression that government was still steering the ship of state, was to use the penal system as a receptacle for this anguish and suspicion, channelling it at those who seemed to pose the most obvious and direct threats to the well-being of the population at large: and then reconfiguring criminal law to impose new controls on those who pose such risks.

This has also meant that, as populist forces have become more influential, law and policy have become increasingly diverse and amorphous, moving into territories of control that had previously been forbidden in democratic societies, and redrawing concepts of citizenship much more narrowly along the way.

The legacy of the Enlightenment

One of the longstanding consequences of the Enlightenment was that criminal law and penal policy became subject to carefully prescribed rules and procedures to prevent them being used as tools for dictators or tyrants to subjugate and terrify their populations. To protect the rights of individuals, findings of guilt in criminal law had to be proven to the particularly high standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' rather than 'on the balance of probabilities' in civil law. Hearsay evidence was disallowed and there was a strong convention against retrospective laws that would penalise behaviour that was not a crime at the time of commission. Equally, the use of hybrid laws – civil law procedures enforced by criminal law penalties for breach – were disavowed, offending, as they did, the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings.

In much the same way, the rights of individual suspects/offenders were protected through the whole criminal justice process – from presumptions in favour of bail to parole proceedings that determined a release point from prison best suited to the applicant's rehabilitative prospects. Under these arrangements, then, criminal law became a reactive force, proscribing specific behaviours and deploying fixed and certain punishments for any infractions of its rules. Indefinite punishments invited a return to the uncertainties and abuses of the pre-modern era; as would any attempt to use punishment for purposes other than retribution (torture e.g. to reveal future criminality).

Of course, these conventions, presumptions and prohibitions did not mean that law and policy followed a linear progression thereafter. The introduction of indefinite prison sentences for 'dangerous offenders' around the turn of the nineteenth century is one illustration of the exceptions that there have been to this trajectory. Even so, the authorities always intended that these provisions would be used sparingly and would be kept at the periphery of their penal systems (Pratt & Miao, 2017). By the 1960s, most such provisions had anyway fallen into disuse or had been disavowed (Bottoms, 1977). The US sexual psychopath laws, for example, providing for indefinite detention of those so 'diagnosed' followed by punishment for their offence when 'cured' were periodically struck down as unconstitutional or fell into disuse (Tappan, 1957). The arbitrary and inconsistent use of all such indefinite provisions made their retention seem unjustifiable and their abolition inevitable (see e.g. the New Zealand Report of the Penal Policy Review Committee, 1982).

At the other end of the criminal justice spectrum, prosecution because of status, rather than one's offence, as in the US, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.[1] Vagrancy laws were struck down because they were 'too vague and archaic'.[2] The Supreme Court also upheld the rights of street people to legal

representation and jury trial.[3] Their status would no longer be sufficient grounds for them to be removed from the streets and swept into prison. Indeed, post-war revelations of Nazi atrocities had given a renewed emphasis to protecting individuals from excesses and abuses of the state's power to criminalise and punish. The UN General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 stipulated that 'everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No-one shall be deprived of his liberty [except by] the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court' (Article 5); and 'no-one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed' (Article 7). In 1950, 15 Western countries signed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In 1960, the European Court of Human Rights heard its first case, 'a leap forward in the history of human rights' (Howard & Morris, 1964, p. 153).

The subsequent British White Paper, *Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public* (Home Office, 1990) probably represents the high-water mark of the emphasis given to protecting the rights of individuals in the administration of criminal justice. With clear echoes of Enlightenment scholars such as Beccaria ([1764] 1872) and Kant ([1797] 1887), it proclaimed that

> the aim of the government's proposals is better justice through a more consistent approach to sentencing, so that convicted criminals get their "just deserts." The severity of the sentence of the court should be directly related to the seriousness of the offence.
>
> (Home Office, 1990, p. 2)

This law and policy trajectory had been largely the product of an axis of power that had evolved around government of the day and 'the liberal establishment'. Members of the latter – law professors, civil servants, corrections authorities and others involved in a professional capacity in the administration of justice – would staff Royal Commissions and other such bodies that considered and advocated criminal justice change. More informal channels of communication between these elites and government were also in place (Loader, 2006). Furthermore, public discourse on crime and punishment matters was likely to be framed by authoritative newspapers (such as *The Times* in the UK) and public broadcasting corporations (e.g. the BBC). 'Public opinion', or what passes for this, had no place in these arrangements. The British Labour Party's ground breaking report on juvenile crime and justice – *Crime: A Challenge to Us All* – acknowledged that

> [its] proposals clearly owed much to members of the Labour group, but also to the generally available sources of expertise or received wisdom – the penal services, the legal and academic communities, the various reform bodies and interest groups, and a quantity of published material.
>
> (Labour Party, 1964, p. 2)

There is no reference at all to any input from the public at large to this major policy document. Indeed, it was thought that public opinion had no such role in policy development. During a debate in the House of Lords on the final abolition of the death penalty in Britain, the Lord Bishop of Chichester opined that 'it has been said in this debate Parliament is a good deal ahead of public opinion . . . this is to a large extent true . . . *it is certainly not our business to wait for public opinion on such an important issue*' (Hansard UK, HL, 1965, vol. 268: cc.527 – authors' italics).

From protecting the rights of individuals to protecting public safety

However, these parameters encasing the development of criminal law and penal policy were already, by the time of *Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public* (Home Office, 1990), being breached. They have since continued to be breached at numerous points by procedures that give priority to public protection over individual rights (to varying degrees across these societies – there is no uniformity in these developments). Ordinances targeting 'quality of life' infractions in the US from the mid-1980s probably mark the start of this new trajectory. These have been heavily influenced by Wilson and Kelling's (1982, p. 29, authors' italics) 'broken windows' claims:

> [Many] citizens are primarily frightened by crime, especially crime involving a sudden violent attack by a stranger . . . *but we tend to overlook another source of fear . . . the fear of being bothered by disorderly people*. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.

Such symbols of disorder, of urban life apparently out of control, have led to a variety of new 'civility codes', outlawing, often in the form of hybrid measures, 'everything from urinating in public to sitting on a sidewalk and sleeping in public places' (Harcourt, 2001, p. 180).

Redrafted city ordinances have found ways round previous prohibitions on measures that punished status rather than crime. In Seattle, for example, 'vagrancy was no longer a crime but sitting or lying on sidewalk was. Loitering was not prohibited, but one could not camp in a park' (Beckett & Herbert, 2009, p. 34). Hybrid measures have been used to the same effect in UK anti-social behaviour legislation. These are needed, it has been claimed, to protect those localities where 'the community [is] represented by weak and vulnerable people who claim they are victims of [such] behaviour which violates their rights'.[4] Announcing plans for public space protection orders, the England and Wales Crime Prevention Minister promised that

> [councils] will be able to apply for an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance [from 'aggressive beggars' for example] . . . This will be a wholly civil power, with a civil standard of proof [as] a quicker way of preventing harm to communities. But a breach will still carry serious consequences – including imprisonment.
>
> (*Daily Telegraph*, 14 October 2013, p. 4)

Local applications of these measures have been rationalised on the grounds that 'rough sleepers may have rights so do other citizens, workers and businesses . . . they have the right not to be intimidated or to have to face the daily ordeal of belongings left in shop doorways':[5] and

> everyone has a right to feel safe without being faced with anti-social behaviour which has an impact on their everyday lives. . . . [we] know that street drinking has caused a big problem for the community. The public space protection order will help tackle [such] issues.[6]

In other respects, indeterminate sentences have been not only reactivated but reinvigorated as well, moving much more to the centre of local penal systems from their previous peripheral locations. The New Zealand Sentencing Act (2002, s.87) removed previous specifications regarding age barriers and recidivism requirements to the sentence of preventive detention, thereby allowing much greater use of it 'to protect the community from those who pose a significant and ongoing risk to the safety of its members'. In the UK, the Home Office (1996, p. 48) now claimed, in contrast to its previous message in *Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public*, that

> too often in the past, those who have shown a propensity to commit serious or violent sexual offences have served their sentences and been released only to offend again. . . . [The] government is determined that the public should receive proper protection.
>
> Thereafter, the England and Wales *Criminal Justice Act* (2003) gave the courts power to impose 'indeterminate sentences for public protection' on all offenders convicted of one of a range of violent and sexual offences and judged to represent 'a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission of future specified offences'.

Sexually violent predator laws in the US, first introduced in 1990,[7] allow such offenders to be detained indefinitely by way of civil commitment on completion of a fixed term of imprisonment if it is thought that they would be likely to reoffend without such containment. Despite all appearances to the contrary, the US Supreme Court has determined that this does not constitute a double punishment.[8] The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (2006) provides for similar detention of federal prisoners who have never previously been charged with a sex crime but

who, it is thought, *might* commit one if released. It was justified by the Solicitor-General because it was needed 'to run a criminal justice system that does not itself endanger the public' (Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 2006).

Similar post-prison detention measures ('public protection orders') of high-risk sexual offenders in five Australian states and New Zealand are now on the statute book. The 2003 Queensland measures were typically justified on the grounds that 'children must and will be protected by our Government . . . we're going to make sure that the protection of the community, and in particular the protection of children is paramount' (McSherry & Keyser, 2009, p. 10). Rather than understanding this as a form of double punishment, it was claimed *inter alia* in the New Zealand parliamentary debate on public protection orders that these were rehabilitative measures:

> [We] have got pathways for these detainees – pathways so they can work towards being released at some stage, if that is an option for them. Each individual will have a management plan that identifies goals that could contribute to their eventual release. An annual review will be performed on each of these public protection orders. The High Court will look at each case every five years.
>
> (Hansard NZ, 2013, p. 13484)

Furthermore, once it is determined that there is no double punishment involved, then, by similar reasoning, it cannot be a form of retrospective punishment either. This logic applies to post-prison controls on the movements of sex offenders in the community, also designed to provide public protection. US community notification procedures have been held to be constitutional because

> sex offenders' loss of anonymity is no constitutional bar to society's attempt at self-defence. The legislature chose to risk unfairness to previously-convicted offenders rather than unfairness to the children and women who might suffer because of their presence in the community.[9]

Similarly, under the provisions of the England and Wales Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014), no crime need be committed before penal control – in the form of a sexual risk order – can be imposed on those judged to be 'potentially dangerous', by virtue of them committing an act of a sexual nature (not an offence). These orders can restrict movement such as visiting parks, schools and foreign travel. Those subject to these orders and wishing to engage in (legal) sexual activity may even be required to give 24 hours notice to the police before doing so. Failure to comply with the terms of the order is a criminal offence likely to bring imprisonment. The preamble to the legislation states that 'the government is determined to do everything it can to protect the public from predatory sex offenders' (BBC News, 2011).

The overriding importance given to public protection has also reversed presumptions that are now thought to unduly favour suspects/offenders. In the New

Zealand Bail Amendment Act (2013), the defendant has to prove on the balance of probabilities that they *should be* granted bail, reflecting

> an absolute commitment to protecting the safety of the New Zealand public, particularly where a person is accused of a very serious offence or where that person has a track record that predisposes them to being at serious risk of continuing to offend.

Similarly, in the provisions of the Canadian Tackling Violent Crime Act (2008), repeat offenders with three or more convictions must prove they are *not* dangerous, rather than the prosecution proving they are, to avoid indefinite detention. In relation to parole, 'public safety [has become] the primary consideration in all decisions' (Parole Board of Canada, 2016). In New Zealand, where 'the Parole Board's paramount consideration is the safety of the community' (New Zealand Department of Corrections, 2016), hearsay evidence is now permissible at these hearings if it sheds light on risks to public safety.

These reconfigurations of law and policy have brought dramatic changes to some of the penal contours of these societies. There have been spectacular increases in imprisonment from the time when, around 1980, this sanction was widely regarded (at least in establishment circles) as a 'last resort' penal option, because of its costs and ineffectiveness. Thereafter, however, the slogan 'prison works' – based on common sense rather than any social scientific research – has come to characterise populist influences on policy. Rises in imprisonment have been heralded as successes of government policy rather than failures (see Pratt & Clark, 2005). In the US, the rate of imprisonment increased some 700 per cent from 1975 to 2012 (from 110 per 100,000 population to 762). It has come close to doubling in the UK (rising from 80 per 100,000 in 1990 to 147 in 2016); and has more than doubled in New Zealand (from 85 to 208 per 100,000 in 2015). In addition, in New Zealand, the number of prisoners serving preventive detention has increased from 12 in 1985 to 284 in 2015. One in five English prisoners in 2012 was serving indefinite sentences, dramatically undermining the previous emphasis on sentencing proportionality and consistency. The growth of imprisonment is also illustrative of the way in which prison numbers have been swollen by increasing numbers of those remanded in custody because of new bail restrictions: in New South Wales, remands in custody increased from 1490 in 2000 to 3651 in 2015; in New Zealand, from 773 to 2306 over the same period and in Canada from 6607 to 13,650.

The rise of penal populism

These reconfigurations have largely been the product of a new axis of power at work in this sector. This is one that revolves around governments and populist forces claiming to speak on behalf of 'ordinary' law-abiding people, victims of crime especially, and addressing their concerns – as opposed to the criminal justice establishment that seemed to favour law breakers, the most unworthy and undeserving of all groups. These populist forces are variously made up of victims'

rights groups, law and order lobbyists, tabloid journalists, talk-back radio hosts – and mainstream politicians themselves. The latter may use this opportunity to position themselves on the side of 'the people' to redress what Tony Blair referred to as 'a huge and growing gap between the criminal justice system and what the public expects from it' (BBC News, 2006). In so doing, they deliberately distance themselves from their own criminal justice establishment. When the British anti-social behaviour legislation was introduced in 1998, for example, it was justified by the Home Secretary as a 'triumph of community politics over detached metropolitan elites' (Hansard UK, HC, 1998, cc. 370).

The nature of this *penal populism* (Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, & Hough, 2003; Pratt, 2007) needs to be distinguished from other populist manifestations, in particular the *authoritarian populism* that Stuart Hall argued was characteristic of the Thatcher governments in Britain in the 1980s. He claimed that this involved the imposition of 'a new regime of social discipline and leadership *from above* in a society increasingly experienced as rudderless and out of control' (Hall, 1988, p. 84 – authors' italics). The thrust of penal populism, however, largely involves social movements and pressure groups campaigning *from below* for more punitive and more extensive criminal laws. It is here that agendas are set for policy development which governments, in conjunction with their establishment allies, scramble to implement. Indeed, so much has the authority of the central state been weakened and undermined (Garland, 1996) that plebiscites and referenda have come to be seen as authentic expressions of public will that also evade obfuscations and obstructions that the establishment are otherwise likely to put in the way of such influences and initiatives (Zimring, 1996). For example, a New Zealand 'law and order' citizens' initiated referendum was held at the same time as that country's 1999 general election. It asked, 'Should there be a reform of our criminal justice system, placing greater emphasis on the needs of victims, providing restitution and compensation for them and imposing minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious offenders?' The question had been drafted by the right wing, fundamentalist Christian Heritage Party, and received the support of 92 per cent of the electorate. Notwithstanding its own incoherence and contradictions, the referendum shaped the nature of public discourse on crime and punishment issues over the next decade (Pratt, 2007), with attendant consequences for the growth of imprisonment, deteriorating prison conditions and abrogations of human rights (Pratt, 2008).

Five converging factors have contributed to the rise of penal populism. These are:

1 *The decline of deference*. This helps to explain disenchantment with establishment power structures. The values and opinions of elites which had previously been accepted without question are now not only not respected but can provoke outrage and derision. Nevitte (1996) has argued that the decline of deference is a natural consequence of post-1945 social reforms that raised the living standards of the whole population. It had previously been assumed that establishment figures – in the universities, the civil service and

so on – formed a natural class of government on the basis of their lineage, education and wealth and the positions of power that these characteristics then guaranteed for them. As the reforms began to take effect, however, narrowing social divisions meant that those in government or senior positions in state bureaucracies would no longer be viewed as automatically superior to the social superiors as the rest of society, having the exclusive right to pronounce on issues of the day. Instead, they would be challenged by those previously outside such circles.

Nonetheless, the extent of this equalisation would seem debatable. Indeed, the evidence suggests that post-1980s economic liberalisation has both extended social divisions and created new ones (Standing, 2014). What is probably more pertinent in explaining the lack of respect for the criminal justice establishment is its failure to address issues of rising crime from the 1950s through to the 1980s in these advanced liberal societies. In so doing, it seemed remote and detached from the concerns and understandings of the general public. The subsequent decline in crime from the early 1990s across most of Western society could not displace the way in which rising crime, and the threat this was thought to pose to the conduct of everyday life, had by then become a taken-for-granted 'social fact' – to which the establishment had no credible answer.

2 *The decline of trust in politicians and existing democratic processes*. At the same time, the general public have become increasingly cynical of politicians' promises and guarantees of better futures. These regularly fail to materialise and the cynicism this leads to is often compounded by evidence of their own scandalous conduct, as with the revelations of extensive fraudulent expenses claims by British MPs in 2009. And rather than bringing better futures, government policies may even bring disaster to those citizens who loyally adhere to them. In the aftermath of economic restructuring, worthy citizens who had followed government advice and invested, often for the first time, on the stock market (making fortunes in this way was proclaimed as being no longer the prerogative of the already rich), were likely to have been the ones hurt most when the first of the great post-restructuring crashes occurred in October 1987.

In two respects, New Zealand provides a striking example of the consequences of the erosion of trust between electorates and governments brought about by these disasters (Pratt & Clark, 2005). First, in terms of the growth of populist politics, this country had been in the forefront of restructuring, then favoured by both left and right mainstream political parties. However, the crash and subsequent economic shocks not only led to dramatic declines in public support for them but also generated the rise of the right-wing populist New Zealand First party, feeding off the disenchantment. It promises to place 'control of New Zealand's resources in the hands of New Zealanders, by restoring faith in the democratic process', alongside 'common-sense decision-making in the best interests of all' (New Zealand First, 2014). This party is now virtually guaranteed a permanent place in parliament (and an attendant public voice) since – a further consequence of the decline in trust

– the 'first past the post' system electoral system was changed in 1996 to proportional representation. There will always be a sufficient residue of voters ready to back its anti-immigration, law and order emphasis, amidst the promise of a return to an idealised version of 1950s New Zealand to provide it with the 5 per cent of votes that is needed for this.

Second, in terms of the importance now given to voting demonstrations of the public will that bypass parliamentary processes, the reform of the electoral system simultaneously provided for citizen's initiated referenda, with important ramifications for allowing the public at large to determine the course of penal policy – as with the subsequent 1999 referendum.

More generally, the 2008 global fiscal crisis further burnt away traditional political loyalties. Attempts to repair the lack of trust between electorates and governments by extending democratic processes only seem to bring disinterest and disdain. In Britain, elections to the European parliament always had turnouts of less than 50 per cent, while its first elections in 2012 for local police commissioners saw less than a 10 per cent turnout in some constituencies. The US presidential election of 2016 (58 per cent) was lower than 2012 and 2008. In contrast, that for plebiscites, referenda and, in the US, citizens' propositions that are understood and trusted as authentic expressions of public will, remains strong. The 2016 British EU referendum had voter turnout of 72 per cent, compared to 66 per cent in the general election of 2015, and only 59 per cent in that of 2001. With this distrust of the democratic process, electorates may be prepared to give their support to aspiring politicians who claim to speak on behalf of 'the people' rather than the establishment, who present themselves as independent minded 'strong men' rather than party loyalists, and who, as with Donald Trump's success in the US in 2016, promise to 'drain the swamp' of central government and career politicians altogether rather than add more layers to the existing democratic process.

3 *The rise of global insecurities and anxieties*. The same economic restructuring has helped to make the world a much riskier, threatening place since the 1980s (Beck, 1992). Certainly, it has brought new possibilities of pleasure and fulfilment in everyday life, at least for the winners in the casino-type economies that it led to. But for both its winners and losers, everyday life has also become beset with new risks – terrorism, awareness of new kinds of cancers, cyber fraud victimisation and so on. Furthermore, at the same time that this growing awareness of risk and uncertainty has occurred, many of the old, familiar symbols of security and stability have themselves fragmented or have disappeared altogether, leaving individuals bereft of support when it is most needed. Family life has become much more tangential, with increased likelihood of divorce amidst the growth of impermanent de facto relationships. Community redevelopment and movement of labour in the consequence of restructuring has dissolved local community ties and responsibilities. And for many of the losers in the casino economy, permanent employment has become an impossibility (Standing, 2014).

Opportunities in the public sector – a previous safe haven, offering longevity and security, generous pensions and regular wage increments – have significantly diminished, especially as a result of new limits imposed on government spending post-2008 (Pratt & Miao, 2017). For most, employment in the much more uncertain private sector awaits – if anything awaits them. This 'precariousness' (Standing, 2014) has deepened the already existing distrust of establishment elites and supra-national governmental organisations, such as the IMF, EU, World Bank and so on. These are seen as either powerless to prevent the 2008 crash, or helplessly caught up in it or responsible for it: but still flourishing themselves, all the same, while the living standards of those outside such privileged circles declines or is continuously under threat. The Governor of the Bank of England, for example, has warned that 'Britain is experiencing its first "lost decade" of economic growth for 150 years [and that] real incomes had not risen in the past ten years' (quoted in *Daily Telegraph*, 6 December 2016, p. 1).

4 *The influence of the mass media*. These omnipresent anxieties have been exacerbated by another characteristic of life in modern society – Anthony Giddens refers to this as 'the sequestration of experience'. That is, 'the separation of day-to-day life from contact with those experiences which raise potentially disturbing existential questions – particularly experiences to do with sickness, madness, criminality, sexuality and death' (Giddens, 1991, p. 244). During the course of the twentieth century, this meant that most people came to rely on the mass media for information about such matters rather than their own experiences. And for much of this time, the establishment largely shaped public understandings of them – especially crime and punishment issues – in authoritative sections of the media.

From the 1980s, though, structural changes in the media have meant that this is no longer possible. Satellite television, new technology and the deregulation of broadcasting brings a much more diverse and pluralistic set of understandings about the world – at a time when the decline of organic community life has meant that individuals have become even more reliant on the news media rather than friends, family or work colleagues to inform them. These structural changes have led to news reporting becoming more simplified, more competitive, more readily available and more sensationalised. A sensational story about crime will enhance audience size and thereby generate more advertising revenue. As a consequence, the fall in crime has had little public impact. It is not newsworthy, unlike reports on the continuing, unending, insidious menace of crime, which can be easily and vividly demonstrated. One or two isolated incidents will suffice: such highly abnormal events are represented as the norm in the way in which crime news is reported (Jewkes, 2004).

As this has happened, the criminal justice establishment has found that it is no longer able to control the parameters of public knowledge and debate about crime and punishment. Indeed, the rise of Facebook in 2004 and Twitter

in 2006 has meant that individuals can even create their own news and report it as they see fit to vast audiences. This new kind of news is not bound by any ethical code and can be entirely fabricated. Such 'fake news' usually speaks to some vast web of conspiracy that the establishment is supposed to have put in place, working to entrap unsuspecting but otherwise worthy citizens in its lair. To what end remains unclear, but, again, it raises more distrust among the most vulnerable and insecure, making those whom the message is aimed at more likely to turn to political outsiders to be their saviours – outsiders who alert them to such menace and intrigue and vow to use strong measures to cleanse the body politic of them.

5 *The symbolic importance of crime victims*. The reshaping of the media has also led to much greater emphasis being given to victims' accounts of their experiences – usually at the expense of detached, objective expert analysis. In terms of newsworthiness, their personal experiences greatly outweigh statistical realities of crime. In most cases, these experiences are presented as something that could easily happen to anyone going about their everyday lives: banal beginnings such as going to school, journeying home from work and so forth become the starting point for a catalogue of horrors that was then inflicted on them – and, by implication, awaits other unsuspecting victims. When such catastrophes befall respectable, ordinary citizens, it is as if what has happened to them becomes a universal experience and a universal danger.

And then, rather than fixing the quantity of deserved punishment on the crime/proportionality scale, victims or their families or populist organisations that step in to speak for them demand action that breaches the existing parameters of punishment in modern society, often directing their emotion at the criminal justice establishment as well: it is as if these people are vicariously responsible for the victimisation that has occurred. Hence, the electoral purchase of commitments from mainstream political parties to 'rebalance the justice system'. As Tony Blair put the matter,

> the law-abiding citizen must be at [its] heart. For too long it was far from the case . . . the system seemed to think only about the rights of the accused. The interests of victims appeared only as an afterthought, if at all.
>
> (Blair, 2004, p. 5)

Populism, criminal law and policy

Crime and disorder issues have acted like a magnet for the forces underlying the rise of penal populism. These coalesce around such matters as the most obvious symptoms of a much broader array of anxieties and insecurities. As Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) demonstrate, the more social cohesion seems to be unravelling, the more likely it is that there will then be support for severe punishments and more extensive controls – not simply as a response to crime and disorder but as

a way of providing consensus and solidarity and the restoration of authority which seems to be missing elsewhere in the social fabric.

For these reasons, matters of crime and punishment also have an important utility for governments wanting to restore their weakened authority. By introducing innovative regulations, as well as legislating for more extensive and intensive punishments on those who seem to be the most obvious and direct threat to public well-being, here is a simple, commonsensical way for them to show that they have not forgotten that significant constituency that feels alienated and alone in the face of mounting insecurities. Indeed, government is prepared to speak its language of punishment, rather than that of its erstwhile experts, and to build a new axis of power with those individuals or groups who claim to represent constituency to put new protective measures into effect. Here, now, is the way to unify the population, to heal divisions and to restore social cohesion. If this is at the expense of many of the principles on which criminal justice in modern society had been built, if it is at the expense of the standing of the criminal justice establishment who had overseen it, then so be it. Now, in the name of public protection, previous barriers and restrictions on punishment can be stripped away to meet this new priority for law and policy. For example, public protection orders were thus warranted, the New Zealand Justice Minister claimed, because 'ordinary, everyday New Zealanders want to know and ensure that their safety is actually paramount in this parliament' (Hansard NZ, 2012, p. 13449).

Furthermore, in an era when governments have chosen to stand aside and let citizens resolve their own risks as best they can, or when they seem helpless against those forces that were unleashed after the decision to set risk free from its economic chains, this reconfiguration gives the message that they are ready to intervene against those thought to pose the most tangible and gravest risks to citizens. Hence, the particular focus of the new punishment, regulation and control initiatives: threats to the human body, especially the bodies of women, at the forefront of new lifestyle possibilities that beckon and entice but which are simultaneously exposed to all those who would endanger it; threats to children, whose demographic scarcity[10] now means they have become 'symbols of purity, of origin, of identity, of what preserves the border against transgression' (Hacking, 2003, p. 40), as other features of modern society that once performed these functions have faded away; and threats to 'quality of life' when, from the 1980s, this has become a much more prominent feature of public discourse, as well as a matter of regular government inquiry and measurement[11]: it has become something highly valued and sought after, but which is also put at risk by the kinds of people and behaviours that have generated the new civility codes, anti-social behaviour and public protection legislation and so on.

Even so, such attempts to bring about greater social stability and cohesion through these measures have still not been enough to sooth and curtail those sentiments that make it possible for populist politics to flourish – as seen in the 2016 referendum vote for Britain to leave the EU and the US presidential election of Donald Trump. The increasingly clear consequences of globalisation, as well as the longstanding effects of the 2008 fiscal crisis, have allowed the winners in

these societies to continue to win. The number of losers, however, has become greatly swollen due to attendant redundancies and intermittent unemployment, permanent underemployment or reductions in employment conditions for many others, alongside cuts and restrictions on welfare expenditure. The general expectations of inexorable progress associated with modernity, of betterment, of always improving living standards, have evaporated for many.

In addition to this, a new kind of victimisation has emerged in populist discourse. Now, it is as if the nation-state itself, not just its individual citizens, is seen as a victim: a victim of the way in which mass immigration is seen as corrupting its values, security and identity. Although law and order has not been a prominent issue in recent elections in these Anglophone countries (the undoubted fall in crime has no doubt reduced its purchase in that respect),[12] fear of particular types of crime seems greater than ever and has also been conflated with fear of difference, fear of otherness – qualities no longer just demonstrated by paedophiles, sexual predators and a variety of street people whose presence or conduct is regarded as threatening 'quality of life', but also strangers, foreigners, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees as well: the mere presence of these latter threatens the well-being of the nation-state. In Britain, for example, these concerns have been prompted primarily by Eastern European migrants, now allowed to move to there without restriction since their countries joined the EU in 2004 and which then became one of the driving forces of 'Brexit' which is likely to bring an end to such easy migration. In the US, it is fear of Mexican 'rapists and murderers' crossing the border in the south and Muslim (which for many Americans is synonymous with terrorism) immigration in general.

Fears such as these, periodically fuelled by terrorist outrages, draw notions of citizenship much more tightly. It becomes much more exclusive and demands still more extensive vigilance and controls to keep it protected from those who would otherwise pollute this majestic prize. These protections not only include the new para-penal measures imposed on those thought to be potential criminals or threats to it, but also the construction of physical barriers, walls and fortifications to keep the unwanted out, while border controls have been strengthened and deportation processes have been quickened. As this occurs, public confidence in supra-national organisations and establishment elites is further eroded. These are seen as weakening the nation-state by imposing foreign, alien, unwanted values and practices on it. In the UK, this is seen in the anathema towards the European Court of Human Rights, originally conceptualised as a beacon of justice that would protect the rights of individuals, but now regarded as imposing unwanted European difference on British values and understandings. It seemingly has the power to insist that Britain should be 'Europeanised' as it sees fit, with its intervention in criminal justice matters symbolising such dangerous intrusion. Notably, the Court's declaration that the British 'blanket ban' on all convicted prisoners' voting rights, regardless of the gravity and circumstances of their offenses, violates Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[13] Similarly with regard to 'whole life sentences'[14] a decision that reflected, it was claimed, a European 'rights madness', as opposed to British common sense (Hastings, 2013).

The way in which withdrawal from the jurisdiction of this court has become one of the British government's claim that it will 'take back control' of its own laws after leaving the EU, is also illustrative of the remarkable descent of members of the establishment from their previous positions of authority and esteem. The European Court's judges, barriers to the march of populism, as with UK judges who ruled that the British vote to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum had to be ratified by parliament, are denounced and vilified as 'enemies of the people'. Similarly, the 'mainstream media' in the US, for daring to challenge the 'alternative facts' associated with the Trump presidency. Meanwhile, the extra demands and responsibilities placed on criminal law and punishment in the name of public protection and at the expense of individual rights, means that these instruments have to become still more diverse and amorphous, still more preventive and not merely reactive. As this occurs, the boundaries that had previously separated them from criminal law and punishment in non-democratic societies are further eroded.

Notes

1 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 166 (1972).
3 Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
4 R [McCann and others] v. Manchester Crown Court, 1 Cr. App. R 27, Lord Steyn 32 (2002).
5 www.exeter.gov.uk/council-and-democracy/consultations-and-petitions/public-spaces-protection-order-consultation/.
6 www2.redbridge.gov.uk/cms/crime_and_public_safety/keeping_redbridge_safe/anti_social_behaviour/public_sapces_protection_order.aspx.
7 The first such law was introduced in Washington State in 1990. In 2010, 20 US states had such a law, as well as similar federal legislation.
8 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
9 Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 26 (1995).
10 Average household size has shrunk across all the main Anglophone societies from 1980 to 2015: Australia, from 2.8 to 2.6; Canada, 3.3 to 2.9; New Zealand, 3.0 to 2.7; the UK, 2.7 to 2.4 and the USA, 2.8 to 2.5. Furthermore, the percentage of 0–12 year olds in the population of Australia declined from 21.9 in 1980 to 15.3 in 2010; in Canada from 19.4 to 14.1; in England and Wales, from 17.5 to 15.3; in New Zealand, from 22.9 to 18.1; in the USA, from 19.2 to 15.9.
11 www.thurrock.gov.uk/public-space-protection-orders/overview.
12 Even in the 2016 US presidential election, 'law and order' – the need for new, tougher laws against specific forms of criminality thought to be out of control – rarely featured. Instead, much more focus was given to threats top individuals and the nation-state from unwanted, criminogenic immigrants (who were often conflated with terrorists).
13 Hirst v. UK [No. 2], 74025/01 ECHR. 681 (2005).
14 Vinter and Others v. UK, 66069/09, 130/10, 3896/10 ECHR (2013).

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Part II

Dimensions of right-wing populism

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4 Right-wing populism in context

A historical and systematic perspective

Dieter Rucht

Introduction

Populism, especially right-wing populism, is on the rise in many countries across the globe (Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012b; Heinisch, Holtz-Bacha & Mazzoleni, 2017). Accordingly, there is much excitement in the public discourse on populism. Related to this, one can observe an inflationary use of the very term populism in political controversies. As a result, the term risks to become an empty signifier. Against such a trend, it may be useful to search for analytical clarity, to systematise the concept of populism and to embed the phenomenon in a comparative historical perspective.

At any rate, the notion populism, whether in a negative, positive or neutral sense, refers to the *people* according to its etymological origin that is the Latin word *populus*. The connotations of the terms populism and populist, however, vary in different contexts. First, when used as a rhetorical or tactical device in order to prevail in a political debate, the adjective 'populist' has a pejorative meaning. It denotes an utterance (an argument, a claim or an empirical reference) that, by its simplicity or suggestive character, appeals to many people but has little substance.[1] Therefore, from the perspective of the critic, the populist utterance should not be taken seriously.

Second, the term populism (or populist) may be used as a self-description of a political group to indicate the latter's grounding or embedding in the people at large. In such a case, the populist group claims to represent or mirror the conditions of life, interests and values of the (plain) people as opposed to other groups who do not meet these criteria. The populist group feels neglected, disrespected, cheated and/or suppressed by other groups, usually identified as the elites. It seeks to overcome this situation by engaging in a struggle which can be carried out on economic, political and/or cultural grounds. Related to this dualistic view on society is the assumption of a fundamental conflict with little if any room for negotiation and compromise.

Third, in historical and social sciences, definitions of populism are mostly used as an analytical category to denote a specific kind of group, mostly a political party

or a socio-political movement, that juxtaposes 'the people' against the 'the elites' and thereby derives its collective identity (Müller, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). While the populist group describes the people, and indeed itself, as homogenous, honest, authentic, hard-working, etc., it characterises the elites as self-centred, egoistic, immoral and decadent. This juxtaposition of the people versus the elites is the key element of all scholarly definitions of populism. From the viewpoint of the analyst, populist groups are a manifestation of a real or imagined profound societal conflict that is often nourished by a sense of crisis in periods of rapid social change. In a nutshell, academic definitions of populism emphasise the coexistence of three elements: (1) an (alleged) antagonism between the people versus the elites; (2) the positive imagination of the people as a unity with homogeneous and legitimate interests and (3) the negative characterisation of the elites as self-centred, arrogant, immoral and corrupt. Besides these core elements of populism, scholars may add a range of secondary features, such as:

- the presence of a charismatic leader
- the romanticisation of the past as haven of unity, mutual trust and familiarity
- boundaries towards internal opponents or enemies, such as the left, the right, Fascists, capitalists, the undeserving, the parasites
- boundaries towards external groups, such as strangers, refugees, asylum seekers, Arabs or Muslims
- the dramatisation of a conflict or crisis combined with a call for self-help and resistance.

Analytical types of populism

From an analytical angle and depending on the primary criterion for classification, various types of populism can be identified. A first dimension is the basic social profile or background of the carriers of populism. Along this line, one can discern, for example, agrarian populism, working class populism and petit-bourgeois populism in spite of the fact that the populist groups tend to downplay their specific profiles by emphasising their status as 'the people'.

A second dimension for differentiating types of populism is the general political leaning of the populist group. So one can broadly distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism. The former is highly critical of social inequality and systemic marginalisation and exploitation. Implicitly or explicitly, its worldview is based on the class concept. Reference to the people usually implies a reference to the ordinary (or lower) class as opposed to the capitalist class (Laclau, 2005; Priester, 2012). Left populists are basically oriented towards the future in an attempt to create a new form of society. Right-wing populism also tends to be critical of social inequality but identifies the latter's source rather in terms of a personalised critique (such as immorality and greed) rather than in systemic mechanisms. Right-wing populism is essentially of a defensive nature, seeking to restore a positively

viewed and often romanticised old order in opposition to the negative trends of the present and, if not resisted, a dire future.

A third dimension, hardly to be found in scholarly literature, is the basic operational mode that is the locus of control that undergirds the populist group. In this regard, one can distinguish between populism based on a grassroots pattern, a well-structured apparatus and on charismatic leadership. Only in the first case sovereignty and power is located at the bottom. This attractiveness of this model comes from its egalitarian structure and its many opportunities for participation. The charisma-based populism is characterised by the presence of an outstanding leader who is not only recognised but admired by his followers. Even when this leader may actually rely on an apparatus, such a backing (or even dependency) remains in the shadow while the leader is perceived as the incarnation, and in full control, of the movement. By contrast, the apparatus-based populism lacks such an outstanding figure. Leadership is more hidden, diffuse or shared by several individuals who play specific roles and functions within the populist group. While the charisma-based populism has the advantage of being highly attractive and strengthening a sense of unity by its symbolic representation in one single person, it has the disadvantage of being dependent on this figure whose retreat or death may be detrimental to the group.

When combining the second and the third dimension mentioned above, one can create a six-fold table that allows to categorise empirical cases of populism (Table 4.1). The examples provided in the six boxes come more or less close to the analytical types; they are hardly clear-cut cases.

In reality, the difference between the tree types is more of a contingent than a principled matter. Depending on the circumstances, one and the same group may shift from one operational mode to the other. By contrast, regarding the basic ideological leaning, it is unlikely that a straight left-wing populist group transforms itself into a right-wing group (or vice versa). However, for quite a number of individuals the choice of joining one or the other strand may be contingent or completely arbitrary. So we should not be surprised to find that for some US

Table 4.1 Types of populism in an analytical perspective

	Political leaning	
Locus of control	*Left key category: Class*	*Right key category: The people*
Grassroots-based	Occupy (several countries) Podemos (Spain)	PEGIDA (Germany)
Apparatus-based	Movimiento PAÍS (Ecuador) Smer – SD (Slovakia)	Law and Justice (PiS) (Poland) FPÖ (Austria)
Charisma-based	Chávezism (Venezuela)	Party for Freedom (The Netherlands)
	Peronism (Argentina)	

citizens both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump were equally attractive presidential candidates. The crucial point was these candidates' critique of the establishment and their self-presentation as outsiders, whereas their political leaning towards the left or right was of only secondary importance. Besides populist movements having clearly a left of right orientation, there exist also populist movements that, from the very outset, combine elements usually associated with either the political left or right.

Historical examples of populism

According to social historians, the first manifestations of populism can be found in the second half of nineteenth century with the Russian Narodniki and populist farmers' assocations in North America. During the twentieth century, we encounter several waves of quite distinct and regionally bound forms of populism that, apart from some links to neighbouring countries, existed largely independently from each other. Only from the late twentieth century onwards, one can observe in many geographical areas a larger set of predominantly right-wing populist movements (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) that not only are aware of each other but also have begun to communicate and co-operate across national borders. In the following, I will briefly present some historical examples of populism as a basis for a rough and preliminary comparison that, however, would deserve a closer investigation in order to arrive at solid findings and conclusions.

Russian Narodniki

One strand characterised as populist are the Russian Narodniki (Friends of the People), a relatively small network primarily composed of intellectuals and other well-educated people who relied on socialist ideas and, partly, advocated a social-revolutionary strategy to address the farmers and workers (Pedler, 1927). For the most part, these intellectuals had a sentimental if not romantic vision of rural culture. They sought to overcome the Tsarist regime by creating autonomous rural communities, bypassing the stage of capitalism, as a direct way to implement socialism. Narodniki, including their representation as *The People's Party*, were clearly a left variant of populism though far from being homogenous in ideological and strategic terms. Some of the Narodniki were influenced by ideas of the Enlightenment and philanthropy. Others tended towards social change via popular protest; still others went underground and did not shy away from acts of terrorism. Ideas and practices of the Narodniki did not only inspire the important writer Leo Tolstoi but also the *Party of the Social Revolutionaries* that influenced the governmental course in the wake of the February Revolution in 1917 and, in a more radical leftist variant, the Bolsheviki-led government from November 1917 to June 1918. The Narodniki movement never succeeded in becoming a mass movement. Its public image was mostly associated with political violence so that, in retrospect, Narodniki was basically equated with terrorism.

Agrarian populism in North America

Roughly parallel to the Russian Narodniki, an important populist movement got momentum in the USA and, to lower extent, in Canada. While in Russia the farmers were rather the wanted addressees than the actual actors, small farmers in the USA were the principal agents of what was later called agrarian populism (Goodwyn, 1978; McMath, 1993; Kazin, 1995). The movement was fuelled by rapid processes of modernisation and industrialisation in the agrarian sector. This process was not only threating the economic existence of small farmers but also eroding their habits and rural culture. As a result, the North American agrarian populism had a defensive orientation in praising the model of the yeoman farmer, seeking solutions in turning back to what they perceived as the good old times. Both a moderate left-wing and a more significant right-wing variant of this agrarian populism came into existence. Contrary to the Narodniki, the North American populists did not turn violent. Instead, starting in the 1870s, they created a host of associations (most notably the *Farmers Alliance* established in 1876) of which many, in later periods, supported the *People's Party* (also called Populist Party; established in 1892). They struggled for modifications but not abolishment of the given system by requiring from the state social protection, the curbing of brutal capitalism via measures against the concentration of capital and the establishment of monopolies, against the accumulation of political power in the hands of a few. Therefore, they promoted, for example, direct elections of Senators. Also, they favoured restrictions against the influx of immigrants. While these populist groups gained some significance and influence, culminating in some electoral successes during a few decades, they gradually lost momentum and, as a political party, eventually became largely absorbed by the Democratic Party. In this way, they deviated from the *Canadian Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation* (established in 1932) that, as populist party with a clear socialist orientation, was able to occupy a more durable and significant position within the national party system. It won seats in the Canadian House of Commons in 1935 and 1940, and came in government in the province of Saskatchewan in 1944. During World War II, the party suffered from external pressure because of its socialist orientation. Nevertheless, it experienced its greatest electoral success with around 15 per cent of the votes in 1945. In later periods, support for the party declined. As a consequence, the leaders decided to ally with the *Canadian Labour Congress* in order to form the *New Democratic Party* (established in 1961) that, on the average, became the third largest party in national parliament in the subsequent years and decades. However, the populist idea element in this new party has largely vanished, and so has the influence of the farmers as its former socio-economic stronghold.

Peronism in Argentina

Peronism, named after its initial leader Juan Perón, has its roots in Argentina in the 1930s (James, 1988; Brennan, 1998). It continued to exist, though in modified forms and dubbed as neo-Peronism, until the present. In the 1930s, conservative

forces, installed by and dependent on the military leaders, ruled the country. On economic grounds, they pressed for a rapid industrialisation that favoured both a flow of landless rural Argentina workers and of poor immigrants into the emerging industrial areas. Against this backdrop, nationalist groups, partly drawing on European fascism, gained ground and, via a putsch in 1943, established a military dictatorship. As a relatively marginal figure, Perón took part in the putsch. Afterwards became in office holder in the government and shortly later vice-president. In these years, the number of industrial workers rose rapidly. This process was accompanied by a growth of trade unions that organised a large proportion of the workforce. Perón was eager to contact and eventually control the partly communist-oriented trade unions in replacing these by unions loyal to him thanks to the promise, and partly provision, of welfare benefits, higher wages and better conditions at the work place. The workers and, more specifically, the trade unions continued to be the stronghold of the Peronist movement and the *Workers' Party* as its organisational core. When Perón became more and more powerful, the military forced him to leave office in 1945. This removal provoked a public outcry culminating on wildcat strikes and mass demonstrations, eventually leading to democratic elections held in 1946 and resulting in a stunning victory of Perón. The following period until his death in 1974 was extremely stormy, marked by increasing economic problems and political turmoil, including another successful military putsch in 1955 causing Perón to live in exile (for 16 years in Francoist Spain), the move of the leftist *Movimiento Peronista Montonero* towards terrorism in the late 1960s and the 1970s, frequently changing governments, etc. Overwhelmed by these problems, the military leaders gave way to democratic elections in 1973 won by a Peronist candidate (Perón's candidature was prohibited). Due to a second electoral round in the same year, Perón became president for a third time but soon afterwards died in 1974. The fundamental cleavages of the Argentina society, especially conflicts between the political right and left, were also mirrored with Peronist movement. In his last years, Perón was moving more and more to right, seeking to establish a kind of national capitalism (Brennan & Rougier, 2009).

Unlike one would expect, the Peronist movement can be neither reduced to the ideas and policies of Juan Perón nor did it come to an end with his death (McGuire, 1997). For many of Perón's followers, also his first wife Evita Perón, who died in 1952 in the age of 33, was a key extremely popular figure and a key reference point.[2] Also, Peronism is linked to Juan's second wife Isabel Martínez de Perón who became the new president but, as her husband in earlier times, was pushed out of office in 1976 when the military once again seized power in a putsch. Peronist ideas and groups continued to be alive in various forms, including the new party *Broad Front* and a number of smaller parties that criticised the original *Peronist Justicialist Party* (PJ) for having distorted to ideas of the movement. Some Peronist ideas were also upheld by Néstor Kirchner[3] who, based on his party *Front for Victory*, became president in 2003 and remained in office until late 2007, before his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner came into office.

Because of its ambiguities, contradictions and changes of views over time, it is hard to characterise the Peronist movement in few words. In its own understanding, the movement rests on three 'three flags': social justice, economic independence and political sovereignty. It aimed to pursue a third way between capitalism and communism with a strong corporatist element, characterised by some commentators as a right-wing socialism. The majority of Peronists, include its eponym, were embracing authoritarian and nationalist principles. They can be rightly characterised as populist insofar as they positively referred to the plain people and their primary social base composed of the working class, claiming to represent and embody the beliefs and wishes of the masses. For most of its existence, the movement was torn between a left-radical and a right-radical pole. Left Peronist valued his measures on social security, medical care, free education, housing for poor, etc., but criticised him for his affinity to fascist dictators, his tolerance for capitalist exploitation and his efforts to mediate between the owners/managers and workers. Right-wingers inside and outside the movement attacked him for his modernist course, his anti-clericalism, his affinity to the trade unions and his liberal thoughts on women's rights.

Poujadism in France

The so-called Poujadism, named after the French politician Pierre Poujade, was a relatively short-lived right-wing populist movement in France in the 1950s and 1960s (Hoffmann, 1956; Souillac, 2007). Similar to the American agrarian populism, the Poujade movement was reacting to rapid economic change. However, its social basis were not so much farmers but rather petty bourgeois, especially small-scale retailers and craftspeople who gradually lost their economic basis but also felt marginalised on political and cultural grounds. The followers of Poujade were much attracted by his charismatic appearances, his performance as an ordinary man from the plain people, his attacks on the elites portrayed as bureaucrats and technocrats, his characterisation of the political system as unfair and rotten, his calls for cutting taxes and, last but not least, his rejection of immigrants involving signs of plain racism. Created in 1953, the populist party *Union de défense des commerçants et artisans* (Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans) experienced a quick rise (up to 500,000 members) and entered the French National Assembly on the basis of 11.6 per cent of the votes. In its prime time around the mid-fifties, the movement was able to mobilise about 100,000 people to take to the streets in Paris. It is worth to mention that Jean-Marie Le Pen, the youngest Member of Parliament in that time, was one of the delegates of this party. Soon, however, the party experienced a decline and was no longer able to win a seat after 1961. This decline was partly due to the fierce opposition from the left but, probably more important, to its narrow definition of its social basis that was rapidly shrinking. The xenophobic orientation of this party, however, survived in the anti-systemic *National Front* founded by Le Pen in 1972 so that the term 'poujadiste' has become a widespread denominator to characterise, in French

language, in a critical view all sorts of right-wing populist tendencies with special emphasis on their demagogic and xenophobic discourse.

Contemporary (right-wing) populism

When looking at the most recent period since roughly the 1980s and 1999s, we are confronted with a stunning rise populism in a considerably number of countries – mostly in Europe and the USA, but also in Latin America. Again, we find examples of both left-wing populism (e.g. Chavezism in Venezuela; Evo Morales' MAS in Bolivia) and, much more frequent, right-wing populism (USA, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, etc.). These populist movements differ not only in their ideological orientation but are also shaped by specific national political, economic and cultural contexts. Accordingly, they vary in terms of organisational structure and strength, presence or absence of outstanding or even charismatic leaders, incorporation or even centrality of political parties, electoral success and presence in national governments, strategic preferences and positions regarding many policy issues.

With regard to right-wing populist movements, we can identify several traits that were rather absent, or at least less, prominent, in earlier right-wing populism. Without going into detail, it seems safe to say that contemporary right-wing populism can be seen as strong reaction to a number of co-existent and partly interrelated trends such as: (1) economic globalisation and, related to this, the growing gap between the poor and rich; (2) the shift of political power to supra-national bodies and the partial dismantling of the welfare state; (3) the cultural liberalisation along with the erosion of 'traditional' values and pattern of life. In addition, the actual or potential influx of immigrants gave rise to xenophobic attitudes and activities. Based on this issue, it was possible to create a bridge between the moderate strands of right-wing populism and straight right-wing radicalism and racism. In terms of strategic venues for communication and mobilisation, right-wing populism tends to use all available means such as street protest, party and parliamentary activities, social activities on the local ground, cultural events, etc.

Comparative Notes

When comparing these selected examples of historical populism, a few more general points can be made. Obviously, the examples chosen here are confined to parts of the world only, thereby excluding, for example, Asia, Africa and Australasia. Within these confines, however, we can state that, first, populism is not bound to a particular political system, cultural context or social class. Second, it tends to gain momentum in periods of rapid socio-economic change, or even periods of crisis, when parts of the population feel economically disadvantaged or threatened, politically un- or misrepresented, and culturally alienated and disoriented. Third, in ideological terms, populism does not occupy a distinct place on the left-right scale. It can lean clearly towards the left or the right, but may also

Table 4.2 Exemplary forms of historical populism

Populist groupings	*Macrostructural context*	*(Negative) point of reference and strategy*	*Basis of collective identity*
Narodniki (Russia)	– Industrialisation – Authoritarian regime	– Feudalism – Urbanisation – Partly violent and terrorist	– Imagined rural communities – Socialist orientation
Agrarian populism (North America)	– Decline of small-scale agriculture	– Big corporations; financial capital – Urbanisation – Defensive, reform-minded	– Socio-economic sameness of farmers and rural population – Moderate right or left orientation
Peronism (Argentina)	– Rise of a politically unrepresented industrial working class	– Poverty; lacking access to resources – Political instability – Authoritarian rule; clericalism – Reform-minded	– Common interest of plain people – Nationalism – Left and right-wing variant
Poujadism (France)	– Forced industrialisation – Economic decline of retailers and artisans	– Unleashed capitalism against immigrants – Defensive; reform-minded	– Socio-economic sameness – Nationalism
Contemporary right-wing populism (Western world and Latin America)	– Decline of nation-states – Cosmopolitisation – Multiculturalism	– Globalisation – Pluralisation – Liberalisation – Immigration – Extra-parliamentary and parliamentary strategy	– Imagined unity and genetic and cultural purity of the domestic people

take an ambivalent position or shift between these poles. Fourth, populism is marked by a passionate and suggestive policy-style that sets itself apart from established politics associated with cumbersome negotiations, diplomatic language and reliance on bureaucrats and experts. Related to this is the affinity of populists to present straight and simple explanations of problems and equally simple solutions. Fifth, populism is not necessarily bound to a particular form of organisation and mobilisation. It may assume the form of a socio-political movement, hence a network of loosely coupled groups and organisations; it may be mainly represented by one single association. Quite often, however, populism also, or even mainly, crystallises as a political party which, at least temporarily, is anchored as a movement party in extra-parliamentary structures. More than associations, political parties, especially when acquiring a significant size, are offering formal positions of leadership and probably offices of state, thereby increasing the salience and potential power of single persons as prominent leaders who, as shown in the example of Poujade and Perón, even may become eponyms of distinct populist movements as a whole. Sixth, like all contemporary social movements, right-wing populists are heavily relying on modern means of communication such as the Internet and net-based social media, whereas previous populist movements were primarily communicating in direct assemblies and encounters and via print media. Partly due to the facilitated media-based diffusion of slogans, images, symbols and tactics, right populists also show a tendency to adopt protest symbols and strategies that were originally bound the political left. An attempt of overviewing and systematising the primary examples of populism presented above is made in Table 4.2.

Towards an explanation of contemporary right-wing populism

Labelling groupings as right-wing populist is a convenient practice among participants in the general political discourse. However, we should be more precise in a scholarly perspective. In such an attempt, I wish to differentiate between four spectrums on the right side of the political scale, namely conservatism (or national-conservatism), right-wing populism, right-wing radicalism and right-wing terrorism. In an analytic view, these four categories can be distinguished according to their positions vis-à-vis six reference points (see Table 4.3).

The values in this table, as far as they appear to be plausible, provide a clear and (almost) consistent picture for the categories of conservatism and right-wing terrorism. The most arbitrary picture, however, emerges in the case of right-wing populism that, with the exception of its clearly negative position towards the societal elites, is ambivalent in all other respects.[4] For example, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012a) have underlined that populists, though not rejecting liberal-representative democracy altogether, are in tension with it. Based on closer inspection of a prototypical right-populist group (named PEGIDA) in Germany (Daphi et al., 2015; Rucht, 2018), I argue that this ambivalence is neither contingent nor an expression of a transitory stage in which right-wing populism is still

Table 4.3 Positions of four strands of the political right

	Conservatism	*Right-wing populism*	*Right-wing radicalism*	*Right-wing terrorism*
Human dignity	+	+/–	–	– –
Equality	+ -	+/–	– –	– –
Nationalism and ethnocentrism	+	+/–	+ +	+ +
Liberal representative democracy	+ +	+/–	–	– –
Social elites	+ +	– –	– –	– –
State monopoly of violence	+ +	+/–	+/–	– –

Key: + + strongly in favour; + in favour; +/– ambivalent; – opposed; – – strongly opposed.

undetermined which road to take. To me, this ambivalence represents a deliberate strategy to maintain a position between the conservatives and the right-radicals that allows both to draw some boundaries (especially in public discourse and vis-à-vis mass media) while at the same time appealing to people who, for some reasons, have an affinity to these neighbouring categories but are also attracted by elements of right-wing populists (Rucht, 2017).

It seems safe to say that right-wing populists in different nations and regions, in spite of varieties on a number of more superficial traits, converge in their basic values, claims, targets and proposals. They are, for example, highly critical of mass migration and asylum rights, tend to favour instruments of direct democracy and are sceptical towards cultural pluralism. From this, we can conclude that right-wing populism is grounded in the same basic roots. This assumption seems plausible when considering that right-wing populist groupings began to flourish around the same period in many countries[5] that were quite different on economic, political and cultural grounds. So it is likely that the driving forces for the emergence and strength of right-wing populists are very broad and deeply anchored processes that both overarch particular national or regional processes but also put their stamp on these. Specific conditions may explain why right-wing populist parties emerged earlier in some countries than in others, why they differ in strength, radicalness and views on specific policy issues. The fact that right-wing populist parties, as far as Europe is concerned, are especially strong or even part of the government in several East European countries (Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria) and also stronger in East Germany than in West Germany can be read as an indicator of the general assumption derived from earlier cases of populism that rapid social and deep change is conducive breeding ground whose nature will be characterised in the following paragraphs.

When bracketing the specificities or right-wing populist movements in different contemporary contexts, including the short-lived mobilisation cycles that, in part, are also dependent on contingent factors, a fundamental question has to be

answered: How to explain the extraordinary rise of contemporary right-wing populist movements in many parts of the world? More recently, scholars have underlined the role of macro-structural background factors such as globalisation and, partly related to this, the hegemony of neoliberal thoughts and structures. While these processes privilege some groups, they disfavour many others. Right-wing populists, and even more so groups further on the right, tend to reject globalisation in principle[6] and recruit mainly from the 'losers of globalisation' (Kriesi, 2008). This process is fostered by the declining role of nation-states in an internationalised economy, the recent global financial crises, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor and the expected rise of a competition among the middle and lower classes for scarce resources such as jobs, welfare benefits and retirement pays.

Another dimension of background factors refers to far-reaching cultural developments that partly have been already mentioned above. Right-wingers tend to fundamentally question the co-existence and blending of different cultures and ways of life. This broad trend towards multi-culturalism is enhanced by a whole range of factors such as economic globalisation, globalised cultural patterns and styles, tourism, waves of refugees but also 'regular' and desired migration of work force. It manifests itself not only in abstract figures but also in daily life, for instance in parental assemblies, in foreign languages to be heard in subways and supermarkets, in mosques, public parks, restaurants, etc. Right-wing groups react to such experiences by drawing clear boundaries between 'us' and 'them', by requiring 'foreigners' to completely assimilate or to leave the country voluntarily or by force.

Three undercurrents fostering right-wing populism

I argue that the combination and interaction of three deep undercurrents provided the breeding ground for the contemporary wave of right-wing populism (see Rucht, 2018):

1 *Experiences and perceptions of (relative) deprivation*: Engagement in social movements usually rests on the perception that social and/or political conditions are unjust, unfair, threatening, illegitimate, etc. At the centre of such a perception are mostly the (expected) negative effects on the own person or group. Sometimes, engagement is also driven by a broad or even universal concernedness (e.g. of negative effects of climate change) or the deprivation of weak or marginalised groups whose situation is sought to improve by taking an advocacy role. In this case, concernedness does not result from someone's own deprivation but from empathy with others who suffer but probably have no or little means to defend their interests.

   Relative deprivation is an important motor for mobilisation. This even might work when deprivation is more imagined than real because it represents a 'social fact' in the sense of Emile Durkheim. But in the long run, it is unlikely that purely imagined deprivation can sustain defensive activities.

Rather, we can assume that some pieces of empirical evidence are motivating for action, though these hints may be exaggerated and distorted. At least, there must be expectations of a potential absolute or relative deprivation when it comes to more than a single and probably spontaneous act of (collective) protest.

With regard to right-wing movements the role of perceived deprivation is obvious. This manifests itself in numerous texts and statements, interviews and standardised surveys documenting that right-wingers feel deprived, neglected, threatened, alienated and so forth.

One important dimension is the perception of material disadvantage or discrimination, for example the fear of unemployment or decreasing retirement benefits. Alleged or actual groups to compare may be 'those above', the wealthy people in the domestic country, but also members of the lower classes that are perceived as work-shy, lazy parasites but, in comparative terms, enjoy undeserved benefits. Right-wingers characterise especially 'foreigners', asylum seekers and refugees in such ways and often claim, contrary to empirical evidence, that these groups are treated better than the domestic population. Another dimension of perceived deprivation refers to the physical integrity of the own group which is threatened by domestic enemies (e.g. the radical left) and/or 'foreigners' prone to theft and vandalism, bodily attacks including rape, imported illnesses and terrorism.

2 *Political alienation*: Although (liberal) democracy in principle is highly valued by the vast majority of the people in liberal-representative systems, various indicators suggest a growing gap between ordinary citizens and their political representatives during the last two decades.[7] Distrust in the 'political class' in general is widespread. Also distrust in various political institutions, including parliament and various executive branches, has grown – with the remarkable exception of the police, at least in some countries. One component of distrust is the perception that political leaders and office-holders do not care about the interests of ordinary people. The other component of distrust are fundamental doubts in the willingness and capacities of the political class to solve the perceived problems, most notably the widening gap between the rich and the poor, the weakening position of nation-states and, third, the 'refugee-crisis'. As various surveys in Germany have shown, distrust in established political leadership is especially high among right-populist demonstrators (Daphi et al., 2015). No wonder that voices offering simple explanations and equally simple solutions, as they are abundant among populist agitators, are attractive to those who feel alienated and neglected. Cumbersome negotiations and compromises, as they are omnipresent in mainstream politics, are met with suspicion. On the other hand, feelings of being neglected of even cheated by established politicians are accompanied by an appraisal of the virtues of direct democracy as a tool to authentically express and implement the will of the plain people.

3 *Cultural disorientation:* Besides sentiments of material deprivation and political alienation perceived deprivation refers to what is vaguely called

culture. This concerns the fear of being culturally marginalised by strange, odd or even 'perverse' cultures imported by foreigners. In this context, right-wingers criticise multi-culturalism in general and, more specifically, imported religious practices and infrastructures, for example habits of slaughtering, funeral ceremonies, gender roles, etc., claiming that gradually these practices will prevail over the own traditional culture that, in the long run, will be extinguished unless determined defence take place. On all these accounts, right-wing groups have sharpened their critique and met growing resonance in parts of the population. Typically, this critique of deprivation refers to general and vague allegations or expectations or, to the opposite, refers to very specific incidents and behaviours that are grossly inflated as a general trend. The more different and 'strange' other cultures are perceived, the more aggression they evoke among right-wingers (Art, 2011; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). Accordingly, at the end of their discriminatory attitudes and behaviours range Muslims, Arabs and sub-Sahara Africans. On the other hand, even outspoken rightist nationalists tend to support or actively create alliances with 'comrades' from other countries.

I hypothesise that people who feel affected by at least one of the three processes are part and parcel of the mobilisation potential, while those who feel affected by all three processes are likely to be hard core (right) populists, and probably activists. In other words, the most fertile breeding ground of right-wing populism – as well as right-wing radicalism – is at the intersection of these three undercurrents (see Figure 4.1).

With both right-wing populism and right-wing radicalism fed by the same undercurrents, it is no accident that the lines between these two strands are notoriously blurred. Right populists tend to be softer or more ambivalent on a number of issues (see Table 4.3), but they hardly take opposite stances vis-à-vis



Figure 4.1 Undercurrents for right-wing populism

right radicals. For example, it is not accidentally that, right populists, when asked about 'problematic' positions and activities of right radicals, say that they would not go so far but express their 'understanding' why right radicals do what they do. This brings me to some reflections on the place of (right-wing) populism with regard to civil society.

Populism and civil society

At a first glance, populism, both in its left and right variants, is a sign of a thriving civil society and a vital democracy. After all, populists take actively part in the political process. They care about public matters. Moreover, they claim to represent the interests of 'the people' and to feed these interests into the decision-making system by extra-parliamentary and, quite often, parliamentary means. But even when bracketing those groupings who were drawing on populist ideas but actually are openly anti-democratic or even resort to violence, we have to acknowledge that the alleged compatibility of populism on the one hand and civil society and democracy on the other hand depends very much on the understanding of these categories and concepts.

As long as civil society is understood as a 'neutral' concept, for example as the space beyond the state, the economy and the private sphere (of family, friendship, etc.) in the tradition of 'Third Sector' research, we can attribute to this space all sorts of non-governmental and non-profit-oriented associations. Accordingly, also an outspoken racist or fascist group resorting to violence would be part of civil society. If understood in this way, the Weimar Republic in Germany with its abundance of anti-democratic, antisemitic, aggressive and partly violent associations could be qualified as full-blown example of civil society (for a critique of such a view, see Berman, 1997). Considering the existence of such groups in many societies of the past and presence, some scholars referred to this phenomenon as the 'dark' side of civil society.[8] But why should a societal formation including such elements be called 'civil'? After all, this is definitely a normative qualification, associated with values such peacefulness, tolerance and self-control, as long as we do not refer to the analytical distinction between 'civil' and 'military'. In that line of thinking, one should not postulate a 'civil' sector in society composed of both bright and dark (i.e. uncivil) components. Rather, we should simply acknowledge the existence of a public political realm or stage that is populated by extremely different kinds of groupings in terms of worldviews, political ideology, basic values and tactics, including those who, from a humanitarian and democratic viewpoint, are considered as 'dangerous' or 'counter-productive'.

Instead of an indiscriminate qualification of a sector of society as 'civil society', I suggest (1) to broaden the reference base of civil society so that it encompasses all basic sub-systems of a society (including the state, the economy and private spheres), (2) to use the actual practice of and compliance with 'civility' as a normative yardstick in all these spheres so that (3) civil society is transformed into

a gradual concept. In other words, civil society, when applied to empirical cases, is not existent or non-existent but more or less developed, depending on the *degree of practiced* (and not only proclaimed) civility in *all* spheres and pockets of society (Rucht, 2005, 2011). From this follows that we cannot speak of a fairly advanced civil society only because it incorporates numerous good-doing NGOs while at the same time this society, to take it to the extreme, is ridden with corruption, torture in prisons and the killing of political opponents by state agents, with severe exploitation in sweatshops and other facilities and/or violence against women and children as part and parcel of daily life.

Based such the alternative perspective on civil society proposed here, we can also arrive at another conclusion with regard to the position and role of right-wing populist movements. These are, of course, part of society, though they act primarily in the specific sector of the political public. The crucial question, however, is not where to place them but rather to which extent they conform to norms of civility with respect to their claims and deeds. In this regard, the answer must be provided on empirical grounds, that is based on the study of actual groups which claiming to be or, from an analytical viewpoint, can be called populist. So depending on the specific group in a specific situation or phase, we may conclude that this group is more or less in line (or in conflict) with the principles of civility. To the extent such groups undermine or bluntly violate these principles, for example by practicing hate speech or even physically attacking other people, they are drivers of a (potential) roll back in terms of a given developmental degree of civil society. But such a behaviour is not inherent in right-wing populism. Therefore, one cannot categorically judge (right-wing) populism as detrimental to an achieved level of civility in society. Though especially right-wing populists can be hardly seen as drivers for more civility in all sectors of a society, they are legitimate political actors as long as they respect the norms of civility. Applying the same yardstick, is seems to me that most contemporary left-wing populists are rather advancing than undermining a given degree of civil society – especially when it comes to upheld cultural pluralism, to tolerate ethnic and other minorities and to support marginalised groups including refugees. This general assumption, however, only holds when radical left-wing groups refrain from violence and hence uncivil practices especially when democratic means of expressing dissent are at hand.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I wish to stress the need for (1) more conceptual clarity in defining populism, (2) taking into account significantly different historical and contemporary variants that make it difficult to promote sweeping generalisations, (3) acknowledging the inherent ambiguities of (right-wing) populism with regard to a set of core values and institutions and (4) positing populism not categorically inside or outside a static concept of civil society, but re-formulate the concept in a way that, based on empirical observations of actual group activities in their context, allows for judgements in terms of more or less instead of either/or.

Notes

1 With regard to populism as a communicative style, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) use the term 'thin populism' in contrast to the ideologically based 'thick populism'.
2 She was leading the women's section of the populist Workers' Party and was one of the major drivers to establish women's suffrage.
3 Before becoming a national figure, Kirchner was a local leader of a left-populist Peronist party (*Partido Justicialista*) in his home district Santa Cruz.
4 As an indicator of this ambivalence, one and the same speaker of the populist PEGIDA group in Dresden may make contradictory statements, thereby appealing to both the more moderate and radical followers. Also, one can observe in this context banners of both right-radical groups and the generally left-oriented trade union IGM (Industriegewerkschaft Metall) of the German metal workers. Moreover, in some PEGIDA-related demonstrations a person may raise his arm for the salute to Hitler while another person is carrying the Israeli flag.
5 There are, however, a few exceptions. When considering Europe, there exist no significant right-wing populist movements, for example, in Spain and Portugal.
6 In this respect, they differ from left-wing populists and, more specifically, from the Global Justice Movements which reject neo-liberal globalisation, but embrace the globalisation of human rights and global solidarity.
7 Note that this is not specific for people who place themselves on the political right. Some left-leaning scholars, for example, Mouffe (2005) see a major cause for the rise of contemporary left populism in the hollowing out of representative-democratic institutions, as analysed by Crouch (2005) and others.
8 According to Carothers (1999, p. 20), 'civil society everywhere is a bewildering array of the good, the bad and the outright bizarre'. See also Dubiel (2001).

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5 Populism and the radical right in Europe

The paradigmatic case of the French Front National

Dietmar Loch

Introduction

The rise of radical right populist parties began in the 1980s in Western Europe with the French Front National (FN), the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB), the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FrP), Die Republikaner in Germany and others (Betz, 2004). With the transformation of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) after 1989 and the subsequent enlargement of the EU, political parties such as Jobbik in Hungary, the SNS, in Slovakia, Ataka in Bulgaria or the Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) in Poland joined this rise with their specific regional profile (Minkenberg, 2015). Meanwhile, radical right populist parties have established themselves in European party systems, achieving different rates of success. Gaining access to political power, they moved from a position of marginality to one of having the potential to blackmail larger parties and finally to full participation in subnational and national governments (Mudde, 2016), as the Austrian case has shown for a second time since January 2018. Even a country like Germany, long considered a special case given its historical legacy (Loch, 2001), now has a formidable radical right populist party in the form of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

These parties belong to the extreme or radical[1] right family of parties and they all adopt a populist stance. Yet, populism and the radical right are not identical – they only overlap. In fact, most of these parties are populist, but populism is not limited to the radical right. In this article, we will first introduce these two phenomena. Then, we will briefly present with regard to the French case the contemporary socio-political context, which for three decades has favoured the rise and development of these populist parties. Finally, the main part of this article will examine the French FN in order to show why it is paradigmatic in economic, cultural and political terms.

Populism: From a political style to a real ideology?

The origins of populism lie with the Narodniki movement in Russia and with the People's Party in the United States. From there, populism spread to other parts

of the world, particularly taking root in Latin America (Hermet, 2001). It really reached Europe only after World War II, impacting first France, where the authoritarian protest tradition of Bonapartism gave way to Poujadism, a movement named after its leader, Pierre Poujade, and then Denmark, where it manifested itself in the Fremskridtspartiet under Mogens Glistrup. Both can be considered as anti-taxation movements supported by the 'old middle class', merchants and craftsmen, whose mode of production was in decline due to the modernisation in the decades after World War II. It was only in the 1980s that populism became a more common phenomenon in Europe: first it manifested in the right wing parties and movements, and then spread to their left-wing counterparts.

From this historical perspective, populism is like a chameleon. It differs from country to country through its history (political culture, etc.) and structural context (political system, etc.), its ideological tendency (right-wing, left-wing or religious movements) as well as its degree of organisation and institutionalisation. It might appear in the form of charismatic leadership, as a political party or in the case of Latino-American populism even as a political regime. Yet, there are also similarities that enable populism to be viewed conceptually (Mény & Surel, 2000): *first* of all, populism develops in a context of modernisation; *second*, it may have a corrective function in liberal democracies, whose intermediary bodies thus lose efficiency that is it represents 'ordinary people' in a more plebiscitary way, when they no longer feel loyal to conventional representation. Here, populism is a political style characterised by a three step process: based on systematic appeal to the masses, populist leaders initially arrive in power by taking aim at the elites, and then, bolstered by their charisma, they finally promise change (Taguieff, 2002, p. 9). This gives populism a mediatory function by replacing the conventional intermediary bodies. This functional interpretation of populism is widely accepted in research. By contrast, a *third* similarity is the political ease with which populism aligns itself with various ideologies. But here lies the main conundrum. Does populism have its own ideological content? Is it based on a substantive core, so can it be considered a real ideology (Skenderovic, 2017)? I agree with Priester (2012), that populism has no value system of its own, but is built on a concept of relationships to other phenomena. For these reasons, it has been qualified as a thin ideology (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004; Freeden, 1996; Stanley, 2008) such as nationalism, feminism and the like, which depend on a host ideology such as liberalism or socialism. The centre of the ideology is based on four core ideas: the existence of two homogeneous groups, 'the people' (as distinct from the state) and 'the elite'; the antagonistic (and vertical) relationship between the two; the idea of popular sovereignty and a 'Manichean outlook' that combines positive valorisation of 'the people' with the denigration of the 'elite' (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015, p. 4).

This populist dilemma of incoherent form and substance also affects the relationship between right-wing and left-wing populism, as represented by Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain and the Nuit Debout movement led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France. If both leftist and rightist populists use the same political style, then the differences that remain are more ideological. In fact, both tend to

invoke the dialectical form of inclusion and exclusion. Yet whereas leftist populism stands for the inclusion of socially disadvantaged groups, right-wing populism stands for the exclusion of culturally different groups in favour of autochthonous people. Here again, the main difference lies in the opposing nature of the host ideologies on which the various types of populism depend. To sum up, because populism does not contain a strong enough ideological core, a satisfactory and useful definition cannot be formulated. Thus, we have to shift our analytical focus to the radical right and its ideological content.

Populist radical right parties

As a part of European history, the extreme or radical right emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. From the beginning, nationalism and racism were its ideological pillars. Despite all the contextual differences between the nineteenth century and contemporary societies, both have been central in its ideology up to this day: nationalism serves as protection from globalisation, and racism/Islamophobia calls for structural and systematic discrimination against migrants/Muslims (Loch & Norocel, 2015). This kind of thinking was also present in European fascism, a unique and incomparable phenomenon which would need more specific analysis as a historical movement in its own right (Nolte, 1963). Nevertheless, it was a violent expression of the extreme right in its aggressive and imperialistic pursuit of nationalism as well as its genocidal pursuit of racism, such as in the Holocaust (Wieviorka, 1998). After World War II, the extreme right was morally and politically discredited. In the decades thereafter, it only won elections in specific political contexts and types of society. In fact, during the 30 years of post-war economic growth in West European industrial societies, the extreme right was practically non-existent and interpreted as a 'normal pathology' in liberal industrial society (Scheuch & Klingemann, 1967). This view began to change with the creation and rise of political parties such as the FN or the FPÖ from the 1980s onwards. This was also the decade in which both phenomena – populism and the radical right – and the research on them began to converge into what some authors have called 'national-populism' (Taguieff, 2002, 2012, 2015) or what we might call the populist radical right or populist radical right parties.

Aside from the terminological questions in the 'war of words' (extreme right or radical right, etc.), I agree with Rydgren (2007) who defines these new nationalistic and racist parties by their substantial political ideas or ideology. First of all, this means that radical right populist parties belong to the political right. They represent rightist values, such as individual liberty, versus leftist values, such as equality, solidarity and social justice. Bobbio (1996) has shown that the fundamental values of the right and the left remain as in these new parties; only their significance varies in relation to social and political change. Second, these parties are radical, particularly with respect to their values, as they reject individual and social equality (essentially on the basis of racism) and, thus, the universalistic principles of liberal democracy.[2] Third, they all have a populist political style.

To define these parties, it is also necessary to know their organisational forms (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016) and their connection to the intellectual 'new Right', a full discussion of which would go beyond the scope of this chapter (Camus & Lebourg, 2015). Moreover, the political radical right goes beyond the idea of the party and can manifest itself in various ways: as a political party in its own right, a social movement or a subcultural phenomenon, for example, the often violent skinhead-milieu (Minkenberg, 1998). Normally, the social movement precedes the creation of a party, but populist parties generally maintain their movement's character. However, of all these forms, the political party is the dominant one.

As mentioned before, these parties are considered to have constituted a new party family. The concept of party families (Mair & Mudde, 1998) includes, on the one hand, such political aspects as ideas and programmatic positions, but also more structural and sociological factors which depend on cleavages. Cleavage theory explains how basic and conflictual developments in modern society – such as industrialisation or the formation of the nation – have led to political conflicts and, with them, entire party systems. Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) cleavage structure reflected the conflicts of the modern nation state in industrial society. However, ethnic conflicts did not exist in this 'frozen' cleavage structure and nobody foresaw the extreme or radical right. More recently, Kriesi (2008), among others, has given this factor new significance by showing the role of globalisation in cleavage formation (Loch & Heitmeyer, 2001). In terms of economic and cultural positions ranging from 'integration' to 'demarcation' or from 'open' to 'closed' positions (Perrineau, 2014), radical right parties are seen as firmly positioned at the demarcation pole. By contrast, in CEECs, other cleavages have emerged, the most important of which pits the centre against the periphery (Bafoil, 2006). This cleavage, which is related to globalisation, has also been conceptualised in terms of polarisation between 'globalists' and 'plebeians' (Lang, 2009) where the position of the radical right in CEECs is located on the periphery and 'plebeian' side. In the following section, we will concentrate on West European societies and party systems and more specifically on the French case.

The French case as a paradigm

The rise of populist radical right parties hints at fundamental problems in modern European, globalised and urbanely segregated societies. These problems are linked to social exclusion and multiple inequalities, to cultural differences and to the transformation of the nation state including its political representation crisis. In this context, the populist radical right parties have a nationalistic and racist ideological offensive (Islamophobia/antiziganism), increasingly pushing for ethnicised social welfare provisions ('welfare chauvinism'), for the defense of national sovereignty (in relation to international institutional frameworks, such as the EU) and finally for populist criticism of the political elite and representative democracy. While these parties had traditionally mobilised their voters around

cultural issues, they have, with the recent economic developments, increasingly emphasised issues linked to economic protectionism and social security, thereby becoming appealing alternatives for an electorate suffering from genuine social downward mobility or fear of it (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). The more recent 'migration crisis' in turn has propelled this strategy to the cultural core of these movements.

Against this backdrop, the FN (both the party and the national context) may be considered as paradigmatic for (Western) European radical right populism, and here are only some of the reasons why: the FN was one of the first national populist movements in Europe, and from the 1980s to the last Presidential elections it developed to one of the strongest stakeholders in the French party system. It came close to national power and has since experienced three crises: a division of the party in 1999, its decline in the 2007 Presidential elections and the recent identity crisis after the defeat of Marine Le Pen in 2017 by Emmanuel Macron. This crisis has led her to the strategy to change the name of this party, which was founded as FN in 1972 by her father Jean-Marie Le Pen. Furthermore, both the party's political discourse and the social demands of its electorate, express in their specifically French way nationalistic and authoritarian answers to similar questions and challenges in Europe concerning social exclusion, cultural recognition and political participation.

The particularities of France express a more general paradigm: an old nation state and a country of immigration with a colour-blind Republican integration model and a radical secular regime (*laïcité*). Both provide the normative framework for postcolonial immigration and, on a European scale, a relatively strong presence of Muslims and Islamophobia. Speaking socio-economically, France is a society of deep-rooted classes which, for a long time, has seen urban forms of working class integration in the 'red suburbs'. With the disintegration of this milieu and the transformation of class conflict into a conflict between neo-liberal global and protectionist economic positions, the economically generated causes of social inequality and social conflict have not disappeared but manifest themselves in a more fragmented way. Furthermore, as an old sovereign nation state, European integration has divided this country since the Maastricht treaty in 1992 into positions of European federalism versus nationalistic sovereignism. Finally, France has a strong state with a Jacobin elite recruitment model and minimal decentralised representation, which has always favoured populist protest. Nevertheless, although all these reasons have favoured populism, French political movements have always managed to prevent the radical right from reaching power, as happened yet again in 2017.

In the following section, we will discuss the development along these cleavages of the populist radical right parties and the FN according to their economic, cultural and political sphere. In each section, we will tackle this first by examining the cleavage linked to globalisation, second the parties' political manifestos, third their electorate and finally the explanations for their success (or failure).

New class politics: Why do workers vote for the Front National?

In France, the pacified class-cleavage situated in the red suburbs has transformed into the economic cleavage of 'integration' versus 'demarcation' and led to a polarisation between neo-liberal and protectionist positions which are inter alia those of the radical right. In fact, on the supply-side, there has been a shift from neo-liberalism to economic protectionism (Ivaldi, 2015). In the French case, this is strikingly obvious, as the economically protectionist and 'ethnicised' issue-positons of the FN show (Le Pen, 2012). It is true that, on the one hand, the FN advocates social measures to boost purchasing power and the preservation of the 35-hour workweek, in order to rival with left-wing positions. But these social measures added to the new reindustrialisation programmes go hand in hand with protectionist and ethnicised policies such as the reintroduction of the national currency, French companies favoured for public contracts and an additional tax for businesses employing migrants. This ethnicisation is also visible in the proposals for demographic policy that are explicitly aimed at French families.

The voters convinced by such campaigns and more generally by populist radical right parties can be qualified as 'losers of globalisation', a vague term meaning that they come from the lower classes and are less well educated than other parts of the electorate (Arzheimer, 2008; Ivaldi, 2015; Rydgren, 2013; Werts, Scheepers & Lubbers, 2013). Among the FN voters, two groups have come to light: a population of 'bourgeois' and 'petty bourgeois', politically right-wing and becoming radical in the 1980s; and a second more 'popular' group made up of workers and ordinary employees. Despite this 'proletarisation', scholars such as Mayer (1991) continue to see this ouvriéro-lepénisme as politically right-wing. Yet, this right-wing leaning has been increasingly questioned since recent elections. In fact, while in the 2012 Presidential elections 52 per cent of the 'precarious' workers voted for the left-wing candidate in the first round and 67 per cent in the second round, this had already changed in the 2015 regional elections with 60 per cent of the precarious workers voting for Marine Le Pen (Le Monde, 2017).

It is also revealing to see where these voters live in Europe. We will often find them all over Europe in or near to urban areas which have been hit by the social impact of economic decline due to deindustrialisation. In contrast to such European similarities, national particularities are more linked to specific regions with their corresponding political culture, such as Alsace in France, Thurgovia in Switzerland, Carinthia in Austria or certain Länder in former East Germany.

For the French case, the results of the 2017 French Presidential elections showed the political impact of centre-periphery inequalities between the French regions and within metropolitan areas in favour of the FN. First, there was a contrast between the French Regions of the North and Northeast, a part of the Mediterranean area and the territory between Toulouse and Bordeaux, hit by the impact of economic crises, and, on the other hand, the economically more dynamic regions of Western France. The crisis regions largely overlapped with the 'France of Exclusion' where the socio-economic indicators such as unemployment,

low youth education levels, population living under the poverty line, percentage of one parent families and so forth were the most alarming. It is exactly in these areas where the FN has obtained its best electoral results (Le Bras, 2017). By contrast, the electoral strongholds of Emmanuel Macron and, to a certain extent those of the left-wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon are to be found in the economically dynamic region of Western France.

Second, the Presidential election results showed a significant urban-rural gap between the big cities and the rest of France. While the vote for Emmanuel Macron, the new President, was an urban centre vote, the FN was the clear winner in peri-urban and rural areas. Seen historically, this confirms the shift from the FN's past 'electoral anchorage' in the banlieues, which dates back to the 1990s, to these peri-urban areas where FN voters often live feeling excluded and frustrated (Fourquet, 2014).

Finally, we need to ask why people vote for these parties. Here it is important to note that the voters in question are often considered an electorate governed by fear (de Vries & Hoffmann, 2016). In the French case, the most important voter considerations remain 'immigration' and 'crime' (Le Bras, 2015) and in the first round of the Presidential elections the FN ranked highest on 'immigration', 'terrorism' and 'crime'. How can this fear be explained?

There has been a renewed focus on socio-structural causes (Rydgren, 2013). Such demand-side explanations have a long tradition and analyse the 'breeding ground' for the populist radical right parties. They are mostly based on modernisation theory and consist of two research streams offering the sociological approach of anomia and that of relative deprivation (status politics). The aim is to explain the radical right through modified social ties or/and with respect to social structure. For instance, the rise of the FN has been interpreted as 'the political echo of urban anomia' (Perrineau, 1988, 2014, pp. 105–171). Yet, although anomia is not a recent phenomenon in the disintegrating working class milieu of the 'red suburbs', the success of the FN continues. Thus, status politics seems a more plausible explanation for the FN's electoral success. In fact, status politics attracts voters who are experiencing downward mobility. These individuals either find their desire for upward social mobility thwarted or fear losing their position. This can result in a feeling of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), because the goal to be achieved does not correspond to the social reality. The ensuing frustration can then transform itself into political behaviour (such as voting for a xenophobic party) when the political party provides a scapegoat in the form of immigrants who are blamed for people not achieving their goals. In the context of status inconsistencies, the radical right is not only present at the margins of society, but even more so at its heart.

This 'extremism of the center' thesis (Lipset, 1981) suggests that we may be seeing a shift from the 'normal pathology' of industrial society (Scheuch & Klingemann, 1967) to 'pathological normalcy'/normality in modern contemporary society, as expressed by the successes of the populist radical right (Mudde, 2010). In fact, Mudde argues that the previously marginalised radical right values

are becoming mainstream. Sociologically, research would then have to revise the concept of 'deviant' behaviour given that the radical right has become too important to be considered either marginal or deviant.

These theoretical considerations show that socio-structural explanations help us understand the relevance of socio-economic factors, but they do not seem to be sufficient to provide a full account. So why do citizens vote radical right when they are frustrated? They could also vote for other protest parties or not vote at all. Of course, on an individual, socio-psychological level, the search for security and authoritarian solutions in times of crisis would provide a comprehensive explanation. But is the voter not socialised in a cultural context which is collective? And are there historical barriers which are politically coded by a political culture which does not allow people to vote for this radical right?

Second, we cannot confirm that the voters for these parties only vote for reasons of social disintegration or/and relative deprivation. Perhaps the ideological conviction is stronger than social frustration? In the French case, the electoral support of the FN by 'prosporous workers' and later on then of the 'Lumpenproletariat' (Marx) has been explained by these socio-structural approaches. Yet the growth of ouvriéro-lepénisme has led scholars such as Perrineau (2017) to stress the importance of 'gaucho-lepénisme', although this lepénisme of left-wing provenance only explains a minority of the FN worker electorate. Though it is not really a case for totalitarianism theory, which puts far right-wing and extreme left-wing voters on the same level, it has become difficult to deny the provocative hypothesis of a partial overlapping of political left and right-wing ideas in French party and ideological history. So how should we answer the question why workers vote for the FN and other populist radical right parties? Research has shown that cultural issues and also political attitudes can be considered as a kind of identitarian filter for socio-economic problems (Rydgren, 2013).

National identity, islamophobia and fear of crime

Globalisation-related cultural issues are linked to the cleavage positions of either cultural integration or cultural demarcation, which extend the opposition between libertarian and authoritarian values (Kriesi, 2008). The latter largely overlaps with the ideology of the radical right. In fact, the very ideological core of the radical right consists of the 'rejection of individual and social equality'. The cornerstone and even justification for this ideology is racism combined with nationalism, and authoritarianism. The corresponding issues are mostly 'immigration/Islam' and 'insecurity/crime'.

The populist radical right parties claim to defend national and religious identity. Internally, national identity relates to the relationship with immigrants, which, in turn, is affected by racism in two ways, as both unequal (biological) and differentialist (cultural) attacks and allegations (Taguieff, 2012) are directed against migrants. As such, 'immigration' represents the main issue put forward by radical right parties. It defines their positions on migrants, refugees,

multicultural society and other migration issues. In Western Europe, such anti-immigration positions are increasingly turning against Muslims. Islamophobia can be considered as a particular form of racism (Betz & Meret, 2009).

In Republican France, immigration via assimilation was part of policy until the 1980s without being a topic of public debate. The FN was the first party to bring this issue to the political agenda. Since then, it has been the most radical defender of authoritarian ethnocentric positions in debates over 'the crisis' of the Republican integration model, French laïcité, Islamist terrorism and the 'migration crisis'. Although the FN-positions are no longer exclusively her own, Marine Le Pen (2017) claimed in her 2017 Presidential election manifesto 'To reverse the trend', meaning a radical reduction of immigration, the expulsion of illegals, no more naturalisation of illegal immigrants and national priority in employment. And the defense of laïcité appears Republican but is in reality a welcome pretext to exclude Muslims Islamophobically and to refuse any kind of positive discrimination policy.

Externally, national identity refers to the relationship with Europe. Here, it is important to note that nationalism is for the radical right per se not a contradiction to cultural difference in Europe. In fact, the concept of 'polycentric' nationalism allows it to see the continent in different ways. Moreover, Europe as a whole is defended on Christian and cultural grounds ('Europeanism'). 'National, linguistic and cultural identity' constitute an important part in the statements of the FN 'For a Europe of Free Nations' (Le Pen, 2012, p. 15).

Authoritarianism appears through the issues of 'security' or 'crime'. Internally, the radical right uses them to justify their position on law and order, such as tougher criminal laws for delinquent immigrant youths. The FN demands 'zero tolerance', which means radical repression policies for the whole territory, more police and the reintroduction of the death penalty. Externally, the world wide fear of terrorism is particularly instrumentalised by the radical right to broadly label Muslims as Jihadists and involved in international terrorism. In the French case, this link has been particularly obvious since the terrorist attacks in 2015.

Both immigration and security are fields that clearly show that it has become difficult to divide internal and external factors categorically. Indeed, transnational migration systematically transgresses national borders and is precisely the opposite of nationalistic community building. And the extreme example of transnational Islamist terrorism also shows how these organisations connect intern to extern groups of their closed community without being linked to the nation-state, whose importance, nevertheless, is not weakened essentially.

Those who vote for the populist radical right parties are characterised by 'strong nativist opinions' and by a 'strong emphasis on the nation state coupled with an aversion to strange others, more precisely negative attitudes against immigrants' (Rooduijn, 2016). Furthermore, voters with traditional values are closer to radical right populist parties than those of other parties (de Vries & Hoffmann, 2016, p. 22). Finally, the case of the FN shows great consistency, as 'immigration' has been the important consideration for its voters for many years. In the Presidential

elections of 2017 the strongest voter motivations of the Marine Le Pen electorate were 'immigration', 'terrorism', 'insecurity' and then 'European questions'.

Cultural explanations, such as the 'silent counter-revolution' (Ignazi, 1992), show very well how the radical right has managed since the 1980s to take advantage of its resistance to the libertarian and postmaterialist values of the 'silent revolution' (Inglehart, 1977) that has been sweeping across European societies since the 1970s. For certain groups, the values of the liberal elites and the middle class appeared to be going too far (de Vries & Hoffmann, 2016). Yet, this explicitly cultural approach has only limited historical depth. In light of the fact that 'immigration' is the central cultural core issue of the radical right, its effect may be explained by two theories: the ethnic competition thesis explains voting for the radical right on the basis of the ethnicisation of social problems (e.g. competition with migrants on the labour market). By contrast, the ethnic backlash thesis refers to the regulation of cultural differences. The latter concerns the relationship between the political and cultural inclusion of immigrants. Since neither republican colour blindness nor multicultural identity policies seems effective in mitigating ethnic conflicts, the radical right has been able to benefit politically. As a result, these parties have proved to be successful both in republican France and in multicultural Britain. Finally, national models of citizenship education do not work as well as in the past. As pragmatic approaches to conflict regulation have disappeared, urban riots based on economic dissatisfaction have appeared, as both the French and the British cases show (Loch, 2014). How can the radical right conceivably be countered when ethnic conflicts play such a prominent role in modern society?

Political culture: a code for the success and failure of the populist radical right

Political culture plays an important role here. We can use it when we want to know whether the fascist past of a country may be a plausible historical explanation for the success (or absence) of the radical right. Mudde has shown that in more than half of the European countries he selected to examine this question, there was a systematic relationship between the existence/absence of a fascist past and the presence/absence of a radical right party (Mudde, 2007, pp. 243–248). For the cases in which the fascist past is relevant, political culture has an impact on the extent to which the radical right is seen as a legitimate political actor (Winkler, Jaschke & Falter, 1996). In Germany, for instance, this threshold for the legitimation of extreme right stakeholders has always been high. This was a result of the student movement of May 1968, which publicly confronted the older generation and the students' parents for their involvement with the Nazi regime, thus institutionalising a political culture that protected Germany from the extreme right. By contrast, in Austria this part of history was largely suppressed after 1945. There, the leader of the right-wing populist FPÖ, Jörg Haider, through his political activities, helped lower the threshold for accepting the far right (Betz, 2004), thereby legitimising offensive speech and action before collective memory could develop appropriate

public awareness and a corresponding political culture. Finally, in France, in the past, political culture(s) has always succeeded in defeating fascist parties and movements. Yet, today, the threshold in Germany appears to be lowering, as indicated by the rise of the AfD, while in France the power of the FN is becoming a serious challenge to the country's political culture.

Finally, thought the economic and cultural cleavage discussed here represent the politicisation of the economic and cultural sphere in profound ways, there are narrower political issues and conflicts that matter as well. These relate to the radical right's political ideas about the institutions of the state and democracy, specifically about the sovereignty of the nation state and representative democracy.

Euroscepticism in favour of national sovereignty

Political globalisation does not seem to be an alternative to the nation-state. By contrast, political denationalisation (Zürn, 1998) in the form of European integration has become a real challenge to national autonomy. While the development of the EU has been shaped by federalist and supranational ideas, there has been a renaissance of a Europe of nation-states which destabilises the integration process all the way to Brexit.

Populist radical right parties spearhead the Eurosceptical and Europhobic criticism of the supranational regime the EU represents. In the French case, the nationalistic positions of the FN can be found since the 1990s. They range from the 'No' vote in the Maastricht referendum (1992) to that given in the EU-constitution (2005) to the Europhobic positions of Marine Le Pen against the Europhile statements of Emmanuel Macron in the debates of the presidential campaign. At their core, the national identity debates during these campaigns have centred on Europe. Furthermore, Eurosceptic criticism is not only economic and cultural, but politically speaking aims at the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. In her presidential manifesto of 2017 and already before Marine Le Pen demanded that the renegotiation of the EU treaties should be followed by a referendum which permits France to leave this supranational institution. According to this manifesto, the national sovereignty of this state should be restituted to the French people in monetary, legislative, territorial and economic respect (Le Pen, 2017).

Negative attitudes towards Europe are also widespread among the voters of the populist radical right parties, who believe that the integration process of the EU has undermined their country's sovereignty. For these reasons, there have been calls for the process of integration to be decelerated; and already before Brexit, certain countries even intended to break away altogether (Werts, et al., 2013). For the French case, it is interesting to see that the strong vote for the FN in the economically disadvantaged regions of France has, since the 1992 Maastricht referendum accompanied a clear 'No' to European integration. This can be interpreted as an expression of the economic cleavage between neo-liberal integration and protectionist economic demarcation with respect to Europe and to globalisation (Lévy, 2017). This also shows that the economic, cultural and political dimension of such closing processes condition each other.

Populism and democracy

In European nation-states, political denationalisation can be interpreted as one of the external reasons for the 'crisis' of political representation. In fact, the decreasing congruence between these nations and the democracy they promote, coupled with the partial denationalisation of the political and administrative elite, have led to a lack of democratic legitimacy in their political systems. More generally, globalisation and cultural differentiation (individualisation), social inequality combined with urban segregation, generational change and so forth are part of the external and internal reasons. More empirically, the indicators of this crisis include 'declining party membership and party identification, declining voter turnout, increasing volatility of the vote, and declining shares of voters who choose the mainstream parties' (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015, p. 2). In the French case, the gap between the political class and the citizens has always been wide and this has favoured democratic and authoritarian forms of social protest such as populism, demonstrations or urban riots. The lowered influence of traditional parties and the fragmentation of European party systems is particularly visible in France, where the quasi-disappearance of the Socialist Party and the decline of the classic right-left divide has been partly replaced by populist movements on the right (FN de Marine Le Pen) and on the left (Jean-Luc Mélenchon's Nuit debout).

Yet, although the nation and democracy are no longer congruent, national level elections remain the most important ones. This is the moment of triumph for populism, in which the elites have become the main target. The paradox is that, by showing off movement characteristics, populism criticises political parties despite being one itself. Populism appeals to voters who are dissatisfied with politics, for whom the populist radical right constitutes a credible alternative (Arzheimer, 2008; Rooduijn, 2016). The main question is whether a vote for a populist party is 'only' political protest or, more deeply, true political support? The French case shows well, that the protest explanation is superficial as the FN has enjoyed a broad core electorate for several years.

Finally, in this political process, the success of a populist party depends on several variables, such as the structure of political opportunity, the role of the populist party as a political actor (Art, 2011) and its position in its interaction with other political actors (cooperation and confrontation). Here the French case also presents significant examples. Thus, in the 1980s, the FN took advantage of the opportunity, to bring first the issue of 'immigration' into public debate and party competition, this strategy guaranteed its rise (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995); the Party's revival after the relative decline of 2007 was due to a generational change from Jean-Marie Le Pen to his daughter Marine; this change produced the Sarkozy effect that is the successful conservative copy of the FN position on 'immigration' and 'security', and on the other hand the intellectual contamination of lepenisiation; and finally, the defeat of Marine Le Pen in the last Presidential elections was an event that released existing conflicts in the Party and revealed its leader's strategy to give the Party a new name. As populism is like a chameleon, the name of the actor or even the actor can change, but the spirit remains.

Conclusion

The difference between populism and the radical right is important. In the French case, the left-wing populism of Jean-Luc Mélenchon uses populist-style mobilisation, but promotes more democratic ideas and finds its political support with a younger, more educated electorate. By contrast, the FN is closely linked to the radical right, based on nationalism and racism which has only been combined with populism since the 1980s. The explanations for the rise of this new ideological anti-system party are multiple. Deeper insight reveals the overlap of economically caused deprivation, nationalism and the racism of 'the angry white man' and the 'angry white woman' as the expression of cultural disorientation, and especially the fact or the subjective feeling of being excluded from political participation.

Initially, the rise of these parties did not require globalisation, though it has strengthened them. Economic modernisation is a necessary but not sufficient explanation. Even when the success of these parties has been linked for several years to the impact of the financial and economic crisis, the dynamic of these 'new worker parties' has always been identitarian. The 'pathological normalcy' (Mudde) of the populist radical right can be considered as the impact of globalised countermodernity (Loch & Heitmeyer, 2001). Yet, although such deep explications are also necessary, there are not less insufficient. Only short-term explanations (political opportunity structure, charismatic leadership and so forth) can explain the 'breakthrough' of these parties and movements.

The French case demonstrates both European similarities (relative deprivation, nationalism, political exclusion), and particular national characteristics. In fact, the impact of external factors such as globalisation is linked to the variations of internal reasons such as the ethnicised form of distribution conflicts, the concept of the nation, the system of intermediary bodies and so forth. We can also see that populism linked to the radical right is not only a question of style, but constitutes a threat for political culture and leads it to deliver the code for fighting against the populist radical right. Emmanuel Macron did not become French president with the support of the classes populaires (Loch, 2017), but using this code he definitely triumphed against Marine Le Pen.

Notes

1 We distinguish between 'extreme Right' and 'radical Right'. The extreme right has an historical connotation (from the nineteenth century to the end of the 1970s). Since the rise of the populist radical right, it is defined by its relationship to the constitutions of modern Western democracies. In contrast, the radical right stands for this new form of right wing party that has constituted a new family of parties since the 1980s.

2 According to Mudde (2007) and with respect to the economic, cultural and political sphere, populist radical right parties are primarily characterised by (cultural) nativism (nationalism and racism) and authoritarianism, and also by (political) populism, while their economic ambiguity (neo-liberalism and protectionism) is for Mudde a secondary criterion for the definition. Yet, this lesser importance of the economic dimension can be contested.

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6 Ambivalences of cosmopolitanisms, elites and far-right populisms in twenty-first century Europe

Ulrike M. Vieten

> Modernization theory theory. . . lies behind the widely shared view that the United States and the Soviet Union are evolving toward one another and eventually will develop very similar social systems. This is a view that suits men and women of different political persuasions: it can provide the basis for arguments about Soviet liberalization or incipient American totalitarianism.
>
> (Michael Walzer, 1980, p. 195)

Introduction

The rise of far-right populism and a return to nationalistic tunes in Europe and beyond evolved rapidly since 2008, and with a further push in 2016. This is not by chance as 2008 was the year of international economic crisis, and summer 2015 has become identified with what media and politics call, *migration crisis*. While drawing on Hay's (1996) notion of 'crisis' Sylvia Walby stresses that the meaning of crisis is 'subjectively perceived and brought into existence through narrative and discourse' (Walby, 2015, p. 17). Further she underlines the relevance of *temporality* as crisis is identified with rupture, with a state of exemption and, accordingly, contrasts with other more 'normal' times (Walby, 2015). What has become normal or *normalised* (Vieten, 2014), however, has not been *normal* only a few years ago. Attention shifted from discourses of cosmopolitanism to neo-natonalism and here, far-right populism in Europe.

In 2014, Ernst Hillebrand edited a short booklet on *Right wing populism in Europe: How do we respond?*, published with the German *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. All authors asked for an engagement with the roots of recent far-right populism endemic to the current political legitimacy crisis and social-economic transformations, in and across different European societies pushed by globalisation and Europeanisation. Anthony Painter, for example, argues:

> Evidence-based politics is lauded. Facts become the determinants of political debate rather than people. So people are told that welfare dependency isn't an issue, they should celebrate immigration, climate change is fact, the EU is good and efficient, cultural tensions are a figment of their imagination. The problem with this approach is that *perception is reality in politics* – whatever

> the truth or otherwise of these statements. So if you are silent or if your starting point is that people are wrong then good luck. And that is exactly what the populists want you to do.
>
> (Painter, 2014, p. 4 – emphasis added)

Perception plays a central role in contemporary media-democracy: Margit Feischmidt and Peter Hervik argue that media has triggered the scandalising and criminalisation of minorities and migrants; first, far-right media criminalised minorities, but then many actors in mainstream media and politics adopted this as strategy, too (Feischmidt & Hervik, 2015).

Ruth Wodak's research trajectory of years demonstrates how 'a politics of fear' (Wodak, 2015) has developed discursively in politics and media, and how racism and discourse are interwoven and constructed (Wodak, 2013). Though the role of media has been problematised in forging ideological views (Feischmidt & Hervik, 2015) it is only recently that populist anti-elite anger dominates political debates, media and public spaces. Foremost, anti-elite sentiments push the success of far-right parties in Europe and internationally.

It seems with the 2017 slogan of 'post-truth' (Ball, 2017) we need a deeper understanding how perception of 'we' and 'them' is constructed, and 'who is who' (Wodak, 2017) in this discursive battle. Here, the focus will be on the notion of elite and the way it is constructed in discourses of cosmopolitanism and of far-right populism.[1]

In the following, I will talk first about situated discourses of cosmopolitanisms with respect to two discursive ideological positions (*Weltbürger-Kosmopolit*), for example historical antisemitic and intrinsic racialising boundary drawing within discourses of cosmopolitanism, and further, reflect on the critique of cosmopolitanism as an elite project. Then second, the notion of 'elite' in contemporary far-right populism will be discussed while focusing on the British context, and also on the project of EU/European mobility as linked to notions of cosmopolitan 'elites'. Here, EU citizen freedom rights as trans-border mobility is regarded as an indicator of legal, economic and political transformation, however, as it becomes clear only activated by a relative minority of EU citizens. The chapter will conclude by arguing that we have to look more in-depth at particular elite regimes established in different countries when talking about populist anti-elite sentiments, also trying to understand to which degree nationalist counter-elites establish themselves as anti-transnational and anti-cosmopolitan, but 'communitarian' elites.

Situated cosmopolitanisms and the notion of the other

Only 10 years ago academic literature and debate was in full swing with cosmopolitanism, conviviality and multiculturalism. Today this euphoric, and as it will be seconded here, largely (middle) classed 'perception' of what the state of twenty-first century European societies might look like, turned its pages: by now it is foregrounding EU scepticism, xenophobia and social anxieties.

The London School of Economics' academics such as David Held and – associated – Ulrich Beck, as Craig Calhoun (2017, p. 63) stresses, epitomised cosmopolitan ambition and discourse of the city: urban elites, including most mainstream politicians (but also academics – U.M.V.) regarding themselves as cosmopolitan and, for example, the English 'countrymen as backward' (Calhoun, 2017).

Nigel Farage, the ex-leader of the UK Independent Party (UKIP) embodies the cliché of this kind of beer drinking English countryman; Farage, however, being also the middle class English man, who is elected member of the European parliament since 1999, confirmed in office in the last EU parliament election in 2014, and also married to a German citizen. This paradox of cherishing a 'backward' version of Englishness and an 'island view' while trying to keep the freedom rights of European citizenship (Duncan & Henley, 2017) might give some clues of the apparently contradictory though related discourses of new cosmopolitanism and contemporary far-right populism.

I will go back here to my previous work on *situated cosmopolitanisms* (Vieten, 2007, 2011, 2012) analysing discourses on cosmopolitanism before and after 9/11 2001 in publications by what I called 'mainstream' academics – among them Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck and David Held – and contrasting these texts with publications by minority or cosmopolitanism-critical scholars, such as Chantal Mouffe, Homi K. Bhabha and Hanna Behrend. While, inspired by Emanuel Levinas (1991), theoretically differentiating 'difference as plurality' and 'otherness as beyond diversity', mainstream academics advocating new cosmopolitanism were interrogated to which degree they favoured an all-inclusive cosmopolitanism or rather an ideological project of European 'cosmopolitan' identity. The latter has to be seen as particularly problematic as it addresses Islam and orthodox Muslims as positioned 'outside' the 'civilisational' cosmopolitan realm.

While analysing German and English archive material of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the study showed that in a historical Germanic discourse cosmopolitanism comes with the racist luggage of a conceptual distinction of *Weltbürger* (citizen of the world) and *Kosmopoliten.* The latter targeted Jews as 'outsiders' and addressed Jews as people without roots (*Vaterlandslose Gesellen)*. The two-tiered position of a gentile *Weltbürger* and the antisemitic label *Kosmopolit* illustrate an intrinsic construction of *racialised boundaries*. This antisemitic discourse was historically connected to German nationalism and an ideological *völkisch-ethnic* project of state building. The debates on new cosmopolitanism apparently ignored or did not grasp the meaning of this two tiered discursive social (and *legal-illegalising,* later on) categories. Ulrich Beck, Jürgen Habermas and David Held were advocating in their publications the multi-layered polity of the European Union and a new version of European cosmopolitan identity: in Calhoun's (2017) terms: the cosmopolitan 'LSE' project.

Following my in-depth text analysis of publications before and after 9/11 2001 a binary seemed to have been built into new European cosmopolitanism: the ideological project of pushing cosmopolitan European identity was associated with

the polity of the European Union while at the same time post 9/11 non-secular Muslims as minority religious and ethnic communities such as orthodox Islam, were targeted and approached as outside the European civilisational realm.

However, feminist interventions from scholars such as Hanna Behrend and Chantal Mouffe as well as post-colonial interventions from Homi K. Bhaba pinpointed that mainstream cosmopolitanism, indeed, showed a lack of engagement with intersecting angles of gender, race and class (e.g. participation of women and white working class people). But equally some of these critical writings also had to face up to a dilemma: a mundane focus on visible minorities and migrant communities, stripped of socially dividing categories, as agents of transnational and diasporic cosmopolitan activity also fell short of taking into account differentiated social positions.

While mainstream advocates of new cosmopolitanism were not taking on board a *racialised* boundary (or to put it differently: the inherent group boundary drawing as racialising otherness) with respect to the discourse of historical Germanic cosmopolitanism the long term impact of this ambivalent discourse on constructing racialised group boundaries – nationalism and cosmopolitanism – when denying this 'dark' side left speculations open when it might come up again, and how racism would look like encompassing the ideological project of European cosmopolitanism. The idea of European cosmopolitanism fitted an orientation of middle class economic social mobility, rather rejecting nationalism and seeking to encourage individual social upward mobility linked to the European Union integration goal. In what ways was new cosmopolitanism reserved to European and international mobile elites?

New cosmopolitanism and 'the elite'

Though cosmopolitanism has been critically discussed and analysed across different disciplinary fields, by scholars such as Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (1998), Cheah (2006) or by feminist academics such as Nava (2002, 2006) and Eleonore Kofman (2005) and post-colonial voices (De Souza Santos, 2010; Mignolo, 2000, 2002; Nwanko, 2005) the contrast between 'travelling elites' and 'immobile locals', as a socially explosive class parameter was mentioned, but not tackled in its political consequences. Having said that, cultural theorists such as James Clifford stressed the need to avoid 'the excessive localism of particularistic cultural relativism as well as the overly global vision of capitalist or technocratic monoculture' (Clifford, 1992, p. 108). Clifford highlighted that there has to be a mediation of local and 'global' encounters. Not unlike Werbner (1999), who followed the traces and routes of minority working class cosmopolitans, Clifford also put emphasis on the fact that not only bourgeois and privileged people were moving, travelling and becoming cosmopolitans, but less privileged groups such as female servants, domestic workers and migrants (e.g. ethnic diasporas) were part of this emerging cosmopolitan realm (Clifford, 1992, p. 108). Reflecting on 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Bhabha, 1996) Werbner argues:

> If we take vernacular cosmopolitanism to refer to a multi-centred world, beyond the West, in the sense proposed by Arjun Appadurai, it is perhaps among the elites of such cosmopolitan cities that distinctive vernacular cosmopolitanisms are created
>
> (Werbner, 2006, p. 498)

Werbner's conclusion, however, encapsulates the pitfalls of this kind of metropolitan cosmopolitanism discourse: cosmopolitanism remained largely associated with cities and urban elites, and in this reading did not appeal to vernacular experiences that might be far from the multi-cultural centre and contained in provinces. Having said that Ulf Hannerz (1990, p. 249) detailed the differences, but also dependencies between cosmopolitans and locals though underestimated that the 'national/nation-state' layer discursively and regulatory is interfering in the relationship between the local and the global or the European level, for that purpose. Some of the critiques of new and liberal cosmopolitanism, for example Mouffe (2004, 2005, 2008), clearly pinpointed the classed, for example middle classed, character of new cosmopolitanism, and linked it to global capitalist interests. Foremost, the meaning of power was contested in this regard[2] and as far as Mouffe's interventions are concerned, insisted on the importance of the political territorial container 'nation state'.

In my interpretation Mouffe was prolific in denouncing liberal cosmopolitanism as an elite project, but she takes stock from the German National Socialist lawyer Carl Schmitt while taking up his terminology of 'a pluriversum'. According to Carl Schmitt (1950) 'the world is no political unit but a political pluriversum' (cited in Hofmann, 2003, p. 7).[3] Schmitt fundamentally rejected liberal democracy and advocated a polarised view of 'the political' as the battle of 'friends' against 'enemies'.[4] According to Feischmidt and Hervik, Samuel Huntington was inspired by Schmitt's statements, cited by these authors as 'We don't know who we are, if we don't know our enemies' (Feischmidt & Hervik, 2015, p. 9).

The world of binaries also is inscribed in the discursive contrast of normative discourses of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Calhoun (2002, 2007), certainly, represents best those voices, who warned of a naïve understanding of both concepts sidelining the 'Janus face' of cosmopolitanism, and thus ignoring that both, nationalism and cosmopolitanism hold the potential to create good and bad things. This, by the way, also was the position of the late Hanna Behrend, a Jewish and East German socialist voice in Germany, who was marginalized in the German discourse of the 2000s, which was reluctant to accept any positive notion of German national identity.

According to Renisa Mawani who looked at cosmopolitanism as an ethical and political vision of living with difference, 'racisms are immanent and organizing logic manifest in the production of racial heterogeneities and differentiations upon which cosmopolitical visions depend and also generative of the cosmopolitan outlook these encounters are thought to require' (Mawani, 2012, p. 1083). Agreeing with this, we have to be cautious about the cosmopolitan 'openness' towards the

Other, and take into account that new cosmopolitanism operates with culturalist assumptions, particularly targeting non-secular and minority religious groups.

To summarise my considerations thus far: after the praise of (new) cosmopolitanism between 1990 and 2015 we are confronted with the agony of global neo-liberalism and the limits of a cultural European cosmopolitan identity project. There is an urgent need to stand up to wide spreading (far-right) populisms reminding us of the dark side of the cosmopolitan dilemma.

Mainstream academic and political debates a decade ago failed a more utopian cosmopolitan vision of global social justice rather pursuing a highly middle classed version of European cosmopolitanism. Whereas for a decade we witnessed a process of a normalisation of difference (Nava, 2007), the Other as the 'irregular' (Broeders, 2007, p. 71) migrating or 'risky' cosmopolitan was left outside a mundane notion of European cosmopolitanism. The Other was the 'migrant' or the *refugee* (Vieten, 2007) and this construction of exclusion within a discourse of liberal cosmopolitanism comes to the fore now with an extreme face of far-right populist racism, for example Anti-Muslim racism. In effect, the role of elites in pushing cosmopolitan lifestyle and culture was criticised by for example scholars such as Mouffe yet a decade ago, but it was not further interrogated how nation state based electorates of 'the people' frame and understand 'their' elites.

Next, I will look at the UK context surrounding the Brexit decision of June 2016, and ask in what ways far-right messages entered centre stage of mainstream politics, and to which degree layers of a de-territorialised understanding of cosmopolitanism and what I call 'populist territorialism' are propagated in contemporary centre right conservative politics. Thus, I will turn to the notion of elite in the discourse of centre right and far-right populism: What does *anti-elite* mean in the context of contemporary far-right populism? Calhoun (2017, p. 63) argues more recently that 'populism flourishes when people feel betrayed by elites'. In what ways do we have to distinguish between national nation-state elites though and (transnational) elites of new cosmopolitanism? Is there a cleavage between cosmopolitanism and populism?

The normalisation of far-right perspectives and anti-cosmopolitanism in Britain: Citizens, elites and 'the people'

It is debatable, indeed, to which degree Britain's history of a colonial and commercial cosmopolitanism perpetuated a very much classed society, wrapped up in hegemonic whiteness and not engaging with coloured social class (e.g. on top and intersecting with gender and ethnicity). Not only Tony Blair supporter Anthony Giddens, but those, who have been politically and economically in charge backed a mainstream UK policy that did not challenge the cultural and economic centralism of London. In 2016, the mainstream political tunes have changed drastically though.

The current British Prime Minister Theresa May denounced cosmopolitans as those without abode while alluding to 'rootless' cosmopolitan *citizens of the world*: '[If] you believe you're a citizen of the world', May said on 5 October 2016 at

the Conservative party's conference, 'you're a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what the very word "citizenship" means' (May, 2016). This short quote has to be contextualised within a larger paragraph where May is defining and explaining her notion of citizenship as embedded in a sense of community, family and traditional, territorially connoted, obligations. As cited here, May announced:

> The spirit of citizenship. That spirit that means you respect the bonds and obligations that make our society work. That means a commitment to the men and women who live around you, who work for you, who buy the goods and services you sell. That spirit that means recognising the social contract that says you train up local young people before you take on cheap labour from overseas . . . too many people in positions of power behave as though they have more in common with international elites than with the people down the road, the people they employ, the people they pass in the street. *But if you believe you're a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what the very word 'citizenship' means.* So if you're a boss who earns a fortune but doesn't look after your staff. . . . An international company that treats tax laws as an optional extra.
>
> (Sparrow, 2016)

Two things stand out in this part of May's speech: for one, her anti-cosmopolitan statement echoes antisemitic stereotypes that seemed to be off mainstream discourse and debate, previously, and second, she brings discursively together 'citizens of the world' with 'international elites' on the one hand, and by that stressing her and her conservative party as truly taking responsibility for territorially and nation-state bounded communal bonds, and the 'real' citizen, on the other.

Implied is that those, who are mobile migrants or only temporary living in a place are not and cannot be citizens; it also alludes to a transnational business and capitalist class, not paying taxes in nation states and thus undermining the redistribution of wealth.[5] On the background of a policy of austerity supported by different British labour as well as conservative governments while deregulating worker and social rights and by that pushing global liberal market capitalism the 'new start' Theresa May promises is astounding. She is constructing a narrative, which addresses sections of the UK citizen population, who are framed in terms of locally bounded and non-cosmopolitan characteristics. She allies herself and her party to this 'local' experience. Her speech is framed in populist terms and indicates that the boundaries between what the conservative Tory party has to say, and what the far-right such as UKIP might (have) push(ed), has become blurred, in only a few years. Camil-Alexandru Pârvu argues:

> There is no polar opposition, therefore, between the populist promise of a massive simplification of politics through the critique of representative institutions, impatience with the bureaucratic and procedural forms and reification of the nation-state as site of predilection for making decisions,

> and cosmopolitans' vision of a transnational democracy. Despite all the manifest differences between these two clusters of political visions, they share an underlying notion of rescuing a radical form of collective political agency from the current impasse.
>
> (Pârvu, 2016, p. 116)

Seconding some of Parvu's scepticism it has to be said that it is highly problematic to construct an opposition between the current face of *populist territorialism* and the de-territorialised vision of a trans-national cosmopolitan democracy. Both avoid answering uncomfortable questions of political and social transformations as well as democratic complexity. What we face is a crisis of political representation impacting on contemporary forms of populism (Taggart, 2000) that challenges notions of territorial representative democracy. In what ways are the characteristics of the so called 'international' elite, the cosmopolitan elite and communitarian claims, the latter made by Theresa May recently more typical of a general and shifted discourse of citizenship (obligations), *territorialist* or 're'-territorialised understandings of community, and an altered construction of 'the elite'? Next, the discourse on elites in far-right populism will be examined.

Far-right racist populism, individualism and the notion of elite

Robert S. Jansen (2015), Jose Pedro Zúquete (2015) and Cas Mudde (2015) agree that foremost, populist mood is driven by strong anti-elite anger; and further, that there is a claim to be nativist, and nativism here means, to have an inherited entitlement to the common good of a society. Nira Yuval-Davis (2011) is sceptical of the term 'nativist', and instead suggests 'autochthony' following the writings of Peter Geschiere (2009). Geschiere defines 'autochthonic politics as the global return to the local' (cited in Yuval-Davis & Vieten, 2018), which is related to different forms of racialisation as 'temporal-territorial racialization, of exclusion and inferiorization' (Yuval-Davis & Vieten, 2018) of those, who rupture the local order. Wodak (2017) interestingly, raises the issue of a similar power dynamic of claiming local space, and distinguishing between those who are 'established' and those, who are 'newcomers' when referring to Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson (1965) seminal work 'The Established and the Outsider'. Elias and Scotson' study analysed the way established families in 'Winston Parva' kept power, and how 'insider' and 'outsider' configurations operate in a local neighbourhood. A new modifying angle to the 'established-outsider' theory is proposed by Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop and Terlow (2008). They call it 'scalar strategies in local conflicts' and resume:

> [Within] the local situation, we identified a new category of people: the locally indifferent. They are residents, newcomers or locals, whose networks are *individualised* and not focused on their place of residence. These individuals did not 'elect to belong' (Savage, Bagnall & Longhust, 2005) in their local

> area, but they are still relevant in a local conflict situation as a potential power source. Established and outsiders can try to gain this power source by claiming or mobilising the locally indifferent.
>
> (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop & Terlow, 2008, p. 158)

This study is nearly 10 years old, and some of the observations might be dated, but the phenomenon of differently scaled spaces of influence, and the notion of the 'indifferent' local, who might be a cosmopolitan newcomer to the place, is relevant to the question of how cosmopolitans, locals, national and international elites are characterised in the far–right populist discourse. Ten years on, the scale and variation of incoming people, who impact on neighbourhoods and challenge collective majority communities as well as identities, have to be interpreted as a signifier of late modern mobility: it is an indicator of the glocal transformation of social-economic structures.

While referring to Seymour Martin Lipset (1960), Robert S. Jansen stresses that 'status loss is one of the most important drivers for the emergence of the radical positions within the electorate', and that '[the] rise of populist far-right parties in Europe is linked to the expansion of the European Union' (Jansen, 2015, p. 201, p. 197). The enlargement of the European Union and as a side effect of it Europeanisation (Olsen, 2002) affects the social fabric in various countries. Collective and individual rights, social welfare as well as market economy have seen ruptures partly in effect of currency dependency (e.g. austerity policy) and cultural transformations. The formation of elites, and further the notions of identity and cultural belonging across Europe are in a process of redefinition; it seems that the national order of social divisions is in turmoil.

Marko Martin wrote in the Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ), in 2015,[6] that the US American sociologist Christopher Lasch with his work on Narcissism might give hints to interpret more accurately the contemporary phenomenon of populism. According to Lasch (1979) pathological narcissism stretches into a version of normality, which might be akin to radical political movements. Though Lasch in his writings referred to the rioting and roaring 1960s, and in this respect to a left wing radical uproar, it is questionable to what degree an ego-centric entitlement vision dominates the fantasy and plain action of contemporary far-right wing populism. The phenomenon of a social fragmentation of modernity (post-modernity) might be entangled with a narcissistic version of 'native' or 'autochthonic' entitlements. 'Narcissism and sense of entitlement' are late modern aspects of individualism that shape contemporary far-right populism in a way that is different to its twentieth century emanations.

Contemporary populist rage seems to be connected to missed chances (or imagined missed opportunities) of predominantly white, male and ethno-religious majorities. It seems that an old elite (political class) did not deliver chances and the good of society, and that a new formation of nationalist elite takes over. Having said that, Theresa May gives a good example, of someone, who has been part of the previous political class and elite when serving as Home Secretary since 2010 and until 2016; supporting the previous UK Prime Minister David Cameron and

his politics. She and the Tory party only recently jumped on the globalisation and cosmopolitan critical ticket.

How does this shift in orientations of what counts as 'the elite' and who is addressed as 'the people' relate to the trans-territorial mobility rights offered to EU citizens, and how come that larger sections of different EU national societies are disenfranchised from the EU integration project?

EU freedom rights, mobility and (transnational) elites: Fact or fiction?

A special EUROBAROMETER study in April 2017 – 2 years ahead of the next European elections – examined the attitudes of citizens of the 28 European Union Member states towards the EU. The researchers found a rise in a positive identification with the EU, but also admit that the majority of interviewed Europeans regarded 'inequality between social classes as most significant' (Eurobarometer, 2017). The data gathered for EUROBAROMETER differentiated sex (men and women) and occupational groups, but did not take into account intersectional identity angles, such as ethnicity, race or religion (European Parliament, 2017). This is relevant as 'class' seems to be recognised by EU related research though a further differentiation of intersecting social positions is side-lined.

Mihaela Nedelcu (2012) argues that contemporary migrants show a specific form of cosmopolitan capacity while linking different localities through and in their transnational lives. However, the situation of visible minority citizens is very much shaped by violent ruptures and ideological barriers to 'belong'; thus, their situation might be characterised by a specific vulnerability, but also with the potential to explore altered transnational spaces. Their 'positionality marks the social situatedness of individual subjects within particular sociospatial contexts and relations to others that shape their knowledge, views, subjectivity, identity, imaginary, and conditions of existence' (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006, p. 1616), and 'also involves power relations, in the sense that uneven power is associated with the placement of individuals in social, cultural, and material space, and within nation-states and the global economy' (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006). That means that the presence of transnational migrants on the one hand 'endangers' national narratives of belonging and social cohesion and might be an 'easy' target to be discursively contrasted with the 'national community and its citizens'. When it comes to the European Union level, the 'migrant' background of visible (ethnoracial) minorities in different nation states is absorbed into a broader notion of 'migrants'. EU citizens might be categorised as EU migrants, but the crucial difference to any other grouping of migrants would be that the internal trans-border migration creates a new and distinctive stream of individual citizen rights. The effects of distinctive notions of 'migration' and 'mobility' are introduced below, and also explain in what ways these binary positions tie into the above explained discourses of culturalist European cosmopolitanism.

EU citizens seemed to be in a relatively safe legal position 10 years ago. However, the ideological change with regards anti-EU sentiments and anti-EU

Table 6.1 Migration-mobility nexus and cosmopolitanism

Mobility	*Migration*
Weltbürger – cultural(ist) term; addressing middle classes of the world	*Kosmopolit* – culturalist term; describing the racialised Other
EU citizen – legal term; addressing individual rights/*Grundfreiheiten* (fundamental freedoms)	Third Country national – foreigner/alien – legal term addressing the 'national' outsider
Global citizen – conceptual term addressing a citizen of the world; sustaining a privileged condition	Global foreigner/alien – conceptual term addressing a general outsider; creating a discriminating condition

Source: Vieten, 2007, p. 217

elites that is 'Brussels' (Wodak, 2017) and the legal-political consequences of the UK's decision to leave the EU triggering Art. 50 Lisbon Treaty[7] means that there is a redefinition of what migration in Europe means.

But in contrast to the recent scandalising of EU migration the statistics show that only a minority of citizens in all 28 EU Member States actually activate these freedom rights based on Art. 45 TFEU.[8] According to EUROSTAT in March 2017, a total of 4.7 million people immigrated to one of the EU 28 Member States during 2015, while at least 2.8 million emigrants were reported to have left an EU Member State. Among these 4.7 million immigrants during 2015, there were an estimated 2.4 million citizens of non-member countries, 1.4 million people with citizenship of a different EU Member State from the one to which they immigrated, and around 860,000 people who migrated to an EU Member State of which they had the citizenship (Eurostat, 2017).

Given that the current population of the EU is about 508 million we can see that *cross-border mobility* as migration into another EU country has not got the esteem the political and legal designers of the EU freedom rights might have had in mind, initially: the *Erasmus Mundus* programme (European Commission) celebrates this year its thirtieth anniversary, and claims more than 3 million students 'spent part time of their studies abroad' (European Commission, n.d.). Apart from Higher Education, the European Union also is investing in unemployed young people, who want to improve their qualifications while doing an internship in another EU country; this is co-funded by the European Social Foundation (Europäischer Sozialfonds) and as far as Germany is concerned, also backed by the *Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales.*[9]

All these efforts aim at enhancing cross-border mobility that might translate into individual social mobility (upward mobility), but it is also mapping out a common and more integrated trans-national future for inhabitants of the member states of the European Union. 'Europe's domestic mobility regime is regularly referred to as a model in theoretical accounts of transnational or postnational citizenship' (Thym, 2016, p. 296).[10]

Whereas migration across borders might mean subjectively the same for third country nationals and EU citizens the different constitutional scope of the

European Union makes all the difference: *mobility* as cross-border EU internal migration of citizens is at the centre of the 'community' building processes of the European Union. In consequence, we are confronted with new configurations of 'social mobility' as European 'cross border migration' transforms the meaning of migration engendering new rights for *individual citizens*. It is here where the emergence of transnational elites is competing with national elites. However, as illustrated it is a minority in proportion, who might be referred to as European transnational elite.

As part of the new world order, a multi-layered and sophisticated system of citizenship rights is constructed across the European Union: 'internal market' migration is welcomed, in principal, but the far-right populist turn to parochical positions is claiming back the nation state container. It is questionable though how internationalisation, Europeanisation and the social-economic transformations encompassed by global neo-liberal capitalism could be just reversed by blaming the EU, or worse, withdrawing social mobility rights of citizens.

The a-versions towards elites: A kind of concluding remarks

Following these considerations, I argue that far-right populism has developed into a normalised and everyday phenomenon in numerous countries, because some of the ambivalences and othering dynamics of new European cosmopolitanism were underestimated. The dark side of historical discourses of cosmopolitanism largely were ignored in the post-1990 years despite an early critique of its elitists classed, racist and gendered normative assumptions. The previously marginal extremist views of far right parties, their activists' racist programmes have entered the core of societies, step by step: far-right populism as the right of the 'native' and self-proclaimed 'autochthon' Christian Europe, for example, takes discourse and action onto the streets 'fighting' extremist fundamentalist Islam and claiming to 'save our women', particularly, if sexual violence against women is exercised by non-white and non-Christian men.[11] It seems 'communal' national(ist) 'new' elites have taken over governance in some countries, and joining a territorially based electorate in constructing themselves as belonging to 'the people'. In this discourse, minorities, EU migrants and internationals are blamed as Others not being the right kind of citizen and – going back here to old antisemitic stereotypes – targeted as *cosmopolitan* elite.

It has become difficult to draw the line exactly between centre right and far-right political parties as anti-immigration, anti-Muslim and anti-EU rhetoric are intertwined in broad populist views, and signify the common ground of mainstream national(istic) politics.

An indicator of the fluidity of (far-)right wing positions is not only the circumstances of the Brexit decision in 2016, and its political aftermath in the UK today, but also the implications of the 2017 parliament election in Austria: the right wing neo-liberal conservative and anti-refugee ÖVP (Austrian people party) and its leader, Sebastian Kurz, entered into a coalition with the far-right

FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) and its leader, Heinz-Christian Strache. Though the right wing parties here are not explicitly anti–EU they agree on (orthodox) Islam as the Other in Europe. Further legal restriction of social welfare rights for refugees from the Middle East, is already in planning. As Vieten (2016) argued:

> An important reference point of claiming that the 'we – I', was 'here' before 'the Other–stranger–them', adds to the established rhetoric of local and national territory ownership, a new dimension of culturalised and Europeanised notions of belonging: a cultural-liberal European cosmopolitanism and a mainstreamed liberal gender discourse encompassing it. This culturist Europeanism adds a new layer to what is regarded as far right populist racism and why 'gendered culturalism' has become the populist racist focus in Europe. Thus, the claim of being 'nativist European' goes beyond the local and a nationalistic anchoring, and mystifies Christian cultural heritage, at large. That said, contemporary far right populism subscribes to supra-national aspects of 'European cultural belonging' as a 'liberal' culturalism agenda; paired with a 'crusade' against Islam.
>
> (Vieten 2016, p. 624)

In hindsight it seems only the strong national welfare state of the late twentieth century was able to tame temporarily gendered class and culturalised ethno-religious conflicts in Europe: the transformation of national societies, economies, localities (e.g. austerity; lack of social solidarity) at least partially contributes to a lack of social cohesion and accelerates exclusion of underprivileged groups of society. Remarkably, 'communitarian' arguing elites as epitomised by Prime Minister Theresa May have been voted into power. Their narrative of a 'break' with previous policy and politics appeal to those who feel betrayed by the political elites, who have been previously in charge. The new 'old' rhetoric is to slam those in favour of cosmopolitan culture or blame international elites.

Supporting Rogers Brubaker's suggestion that 'Civilizationism' (Brubaker, 2017) encompasses situated populist discourses in some EU countries, it is argued here as detailed above that beyond this observation with respect to contemporary racist far-right populism civilisational superiority was yet built in a Germanic discourse of culturalist cosmopolitanism. Though 'culturalist' cosmopolitanism was a historical phenomenon in nineteenth century Germany its ideological shadow impacts contemporary fused (blended horizons) notions of new cosmopolitanism and current populism in Europe.

The central question remains how social disintegration in contemporary nation states might be challenged democratically on the European and international level. With European integration in limbo the continuity of national(ist) territorial democracy, on the one hand, and a global transformation of socio-cultural belonging, identity and solidarity, on the other, clashes and creates *populist territorialism.*

Notes

1 Radical left wing populism also contrasts 'the people' with 'the elite'. But here in this chapter, I will concentrate on far-right and racist populism. With respect to radical political mobilisation of people against 'auterity' elites – far-left (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ/Syriza) and far-right – neo-Nazi populist parties (Golden Dawn) established themselves as political parties in Greece.
2 See also Glick Schiller's (2010) critique of Beck and Sznaider's writings.
3 The notion of 'multiversum' was re-introduced in the German discourse in the 1920s and by Max Scheler linked to *Europäität* though it originated in an Anglo-American context. The philosopher William James used the term in his 1909 lecture on *A Pluralistic Universe*.
4 In 1993 and 1999, Mouffe published two articles that support Schmitt's arguments about the biased order of 'the political'. Whereas she compared the contributions of Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in her earlier article (Mouffe, 1993, p. 128, p. 129) she does not mention these social democrats in her later work of 1999. Both scholars, who were contemporaries of Schmitt, advocated a liberal and positivist Austro-Jewish and German Jewish tradition of legal-political thinking. Heller in particular can be regarded as one of the decisive intellectual figures whose intellectual legacy influenced the German principle of the welfare state (*Sozialstaatsprinzip,*) of the FRG, which still remains one of the core constitutional principals of social market democracy in Germany.
5 The so called 'Paradise Papers' illustrate the scale and in detail how the 'super' rich escape national taxations while using legal possibilities of off-shore business, www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/05/what-are-the-paradise-papers-and-what-do-they-tell-us.
6 NZZ 6.1.2015 '*Saturiertheit und Mangel an Empathie'* (Saturation and a lack of empathy).
7 See www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html.
8 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E045:EN:HTML.
9 See for example, http://network-eventberlin.de/.
10 For details on EU 'cosmopolitics', see Parker, 2012.
11 See for some of these aspects news coverage on the New Year's Eve sexual assaults on women in Cologne and Hamburg, Germany, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/germany-crisis-cologne-new-years-eve-sex-attacks; www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2016/01/how-deal-new-years-eve-sexual-assaults-cologne-and-hamburg.

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Part III

Regimes, party systems and political subjects

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7 The role of populist parties and movements in transitions to hybrid regimes in Europe

Klaus Bachmann

Introduction

With the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe in recent decades, the tension that arises between populist parties and democracy has become a major issue in political research. Some authors emphasise the threats which these parties potentially constitute for representative democracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Mastropaolo, 2008; Müller, 2016). But right-wing populist parties hardly ever challenge democracy directly – opposite to their competitors on the extreme or radical right and left. For a long time, they have respected the existing institutions of representative democracy but at the same time have promoted direct, plebiscitary democracy while undermining trust in the political establishment, of which their leaders usually form a part. They claim to speak for an imprecisely defined, but often invoked people or nation (Mair, 2002). Some authors have pointed to their often beneficial, though not necessarily deliberate, impact on representative democracy (Bachmann, 2006; Lucardie, 2008). For a long time, the relation of institutionalised populism as a threat or a stabiliser of democracy has been a predominantly theoretical discussion, based on case studies about populists as opposition parties or minor coalition partners in functional pluralist democracies. Under such conditions, populists could hardly effectively challenge the existing institutional order. Their claim to sole representation could be regarded as a mere discursive strategy to raise public attention and counterweigh the privileged access to the media and state resources which the political establishment usually enjoys when populists start to challenge it. This is no longer the case. In recent years, populist parties have won elections, entered government coalitions and themselves formed governments. In many cases, this has not shattered the institutional order of the respective country. It did neither in Austria 1999, nor in Poland 2005, nor in Slovakia under Vladimir Meciar (Heinisch, 2008, pp. 81–83; Spac, 2012; Wojtas, 2012). In some cases, like in Austria, Poland and Italy, populist participation in governments has effectively disenchanted their voters and reduced support for populism (Tarchi, 2008). Against this background, this chapter asks a narrow, empirical question, to which the answers will reveal the practical impact, populism exerts on democratic institutions. It examines the roles populist parties and movements have played in political transitions from liberal democracies to

so-called hybrid or mixed systems in Europe. Before this analysis can be carried out, several crucial concepts need to be defined. For the purpose of this chapter, the subject of the examination is narrowed down to populist parties and populist political movements. The latter notion is invoked here in order to circumvent populist parties' avoidance to appear (and sometimes even to register) as political parties. A part of the literature on party systems is busy with disentangling the radical right, the extreme right and the populist right from each other. In most articles and books, the 'extreme' label assigns a party a place in the respective party system – a party is extreme, if there is no party to their right side (Betz, 2004). This is often measured in polls by asking respondents to apply a spatial model of party competition or by analysing party manifestos and parliamentary statements of such parties. The 'radical' label is usually assigned to parties, which openly oppose the existing political and constitutional order. It describes the attitude of a party towards the existing political system. In some cases, these labels overlap: a party, which openly opposes the democratic order and promotes either a social revolution or the introduction of a dictatorship, may at the same time belong to the radical right and to the extreme right (or left). None of these features excludes such a party from being populist as long as it fulfils the above mentioned criteria of double exclusion, the 'one-leader, one-issue' requirement and the preference for direct rather than representative democracy. In the light of these definitions, a populist party or movement can, but need not necessarily be radical and/or extreme. Populist parties and movements may be situated at the centre of a country's party system, but they also may be situated at the edge or be non-extreme, but radical anti-system forces. The definition used here does not encompass radical parties, whose aim is to overthrow a political system by force or to instigate revolutions as long as they do not fulfil the above mentioned requirements of populism, for example, because they have a collective leadership, a detailed, multi-issue party programme or do not try to appeal to their followers by invoking double exclusion.[1]

Hybrid systems, mixed systems and competitive authoritarianism

The notion of 'hybrid system', often also called 'mixed system' or 'competitive authoritarianism' has emerged not only in order to describe a specific pattern of governance, but also in order to distinguish a certain kind of regime from both, representative democracy and clear-cut dictatorships. After the breakdown of the Soviet system in Europe and the fourth wave of democratisation that bolstered the normative hegemony of liberal democracy, hybrid regimes have emerged in many countries. In some, they later were replaced by pluralist multi-party democracies (Ukraine 2006 and 2014); in others, hybrid systems were resilient against internal opposition and criticism from outside as in Russia, Belarus, Hungary, Turkey, Rwanda and Venezuela. Putting so many different types of government into one basket inevitably exposes the concept to criticism (Cassani, 2014; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011). When comparing the different cases, one must

take into account, that extra-parliamentary opposition is already difficult, if not impossible, in Russia, whereas in Poland and Hungary, mass demonstrations can be organised without police interference and, as 2015–2016 in Poland, are even quite frequent (Bachmann, 2016; Nagy, Boros & Vasali 2013). In Russia, Belarus and Turkey, the central election agencies are controlled and manipulated by the government; in Poland, they remain untouched. In the European context (including Russia and Turkey), only a few transitions to hybrid regimes could be observed after the end of the communist system: Hungary under prime minister Viktor Orbán (since 2010), Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2003–2014 as prime minister and after 2014 as president), Belarus under Aleksander Lukashenko (president since 1994), Ukraine first under Leonid Kuchma (1994–2005) and then under Viktor Yanukovich (president from 2010 to 2014) and finally – a very special case – Poland after 2015. The latter case is a tricky one for several reasons: first of all, because the transition to a hybrid system has started, but is far from finished, which explains many, but not all differences with more authoritarian cases such as Belarus and Turkey. Second, Poland is governed by a populist 'one-issue, one-leader party', but opposite to all other cases, this leader does not play any official role in the state administration. Jarosław Kaczyński is neither a member of the government, nor did he assume or try to assume the office of the president or the prime minister. He is a member of the Lower House, the Sejm and the uncontested leader of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice Party, PiS), but he does not even chair the party's Sejm faction. From a theoretical perspective, populist parties and movements can be expected to contribute to the building of hybrid systems in four different ways.

As long as party competition and minimum requirements for the rule of law are safeguarded, they may become *first* the forerunners of a transition to a hybrid regime, implementing a political agenda which includes regime change and a change of the constitutional order. This is far from obvious, because populist parties hardly ever challenge democracy directly, they often act in a democratic environment and base their campaigns on commitments to make democracy more inclusive, 'give people a voice' and bring institutions 'closer to the citizen'. When its victory in the election already loomed large, PiS even promised its adversaries in the 2015 election campaign a 'democratic package', to be passed in parliament in order to enlarge the rights of the opposition towards the government (but did the opposite once in power). Like PiS in Poland, *Fidesz* in Hungary had previously participated in coalition governments before they started to dismantle the constitutional order of their countries. *Second*, populist parties may also jump on the bandwagon to transition, supporting the actual forerunner of hybridisation and supporting his agenda, either in a formal or informal coalition. They may do so because his agenda is at least partly consistent with their own hidden or public one. Instead, *third*, they may also compete with such a party, trying to deprive it of popular support and votes in elections, because their electorate overlaps with the electorate of such a forerunner or because they see his agenda as a threat to their own existence as an opposition party. It must be kept in mind that parties building hybrid systems are often not populist themselves, but like in Ukraine and

Russia oligarchic, openly autocratic but also pragmatic and non-ideological campaign engines whose aim is to perpetuate the rule of specific pressure groups and industrial lobbies in the political system. They are often elitist and hence, opposite of populist. *Finally*, populist parties can resist transition by joining a coalition of oppositional parties in an attempt to defend democracy and prevent regime change.

These are the scenarios that will be examined in the empirical part of this study. Of course it does not allow making conclusions about all populist parties' attitudes towards democracy or hybrid system. The above mentioned definition of populism is purely institutional and structural, it is not based on these parties' and movements' programmes or ideologies and therefore may be applicable to a lot of parties which neither had an opportunity nor an agenda to participate in the erection of a hybrid system in their country. This study only answers the question, what populist parties and movements do when they are confronted either to the possibility to erode democracy in their country or to the attempt by another party to build a hybrid system. In order to establish this relationship to democracy in the political practice of populist parties, the study focuses on the voting behaviour of those parties with regard to key systemic decisions: the change or abolition of a constitution and the passing of laws which amend the constitutional order or help a government to sideline or abolish key institutional constraints ('checks and balances') of the political system.

Populist parties as the driving force of hybridisation

Poland

Among the cases examined, in Hungary and Poland, the establishment of a hybrid system was driven by a populist party. In both cases, the respective parties, *Fidesz* and PiS, had long been actors in a multi-party democracy and their leadership belonged to the political establishment, which had emerged after 1989 and had built its political identity on the traditions of the anti-communist democratic opposition against communism. Both had a strong anti-communist edge, they had supported the screening and vetting of public employees after the collapse of the communist system and, initially, they had been rather liberal in terms of economic policy and redistribution. In Poland, PiS even ruled in a coalition of three populist parties between 2005 and 2007, but without challenging the constitutional framework of the country. In 2005, it won the presidential elections. A few months later, PiS managed to get an absolute majority of seats in both houses of parliament with only 39 per cent of the votes. The party immediately proceeded to the elimination of the main elements of Poland's system of constitutional checks and balances, starting with the Constitutional Court (CC), the main body beside the president which can nullify bills and force an absolute majority in the legislative to amend bills according to the wishes of at least a part of the opposition.[2] The Court is also the main arbiter in conflicts between the different state organs. Before the elections, the ruling coalition of *Civic Platform* (PO) and *Polish People's Party*

(PSL) had appointed five judges, although the Constitution only allowed it to pick three. PiS – still in opposition – challenged these appointments before the CC, which annulled two of them, declaring the other three appointments lawful. As soon as PiS won the election, the appetite for more judges rose. The new majority declared the decision of the former parliament nil and void (this decision was later quashed by the CC) and appointed five judges of its own nomination, who were immediately (close to midnight of the same day) driven to the presidential palace and sworn in by president Duda. At once he refused to swear in the judges who had been elected by the previous parliament. The government refused to publish the CC's verdicts that went contrary to the government's strategy. In the following months, the PiS majority in parliament passed several bills regulation the CC's functioning, all of which were declared unconstitutional by the CC, either in part or in whole. This ended after the sitting CC president's term had ended in December 2016. Against the protest of a part of the judges and in an array of poorly argued and partly self-contradictory decisions, president Duda appointed a new CC president, who immediately sent some judges into holidays and assigned a majority of reliable judges to cases related to areas of government interest, making sure, the CC would not block government decisions. Next, the parliamentary majority passed another law, which would give politicians, elected by parliament, a veto position within the High Council of the Judiciary (*Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa*), the very body which oversees and appoints judges. It contained a provision for the immediate dismissal of the current High Council members. During the time from president Duda's election on 6 August 2015 to summer 2017, PiS never had the necessary majority to amend the constitution. But by passing unconstitutional laws, which either were approved by an obedient CC chamber or implemented against a negative CC verdict, PiS managed to *de facto* change a constitution it could not change *de jure*. Following the scenario in Hungary and Turkey, president Duda declared in June 2017 to hold a 'consultative referendum' about the 'directions' in that the Constitution should be amended and to link that with the municipal elections and a referendum on whether Poland should accept refugees relocated in the framework of the EU relocation decision of September 2014. By both, bringing in the leverage of the PiS dominated parliament over the president, who was increasingly sidelined by intra-party decision making, and eliminating the CC as a potential veto player against controversial legislation, Poland turned from a parliamentary republic into one dominated by the executive, steered from behind the curtains of the official state organs by a small group of PiS party leaders (all of whom are men), among whom party leader Jarosław Kaczyński is the primus inter pares. The build-up of a hybrid regime has been underway, but at the time of writing this chapter, is not yet concluded. This process is driven first and foremost by PiS.

Turkey

The *Adalet ve Kalkınma* Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) started as a moderate, economically liberal party, opposing secularism, which until then had

always been defended by the military leadership. Thanks to its appeal among the lower classes in towns and Turkey's strongly religious rural population, the party became the most powerful player in parliamentary politics and even attracted a large part of the moderate and conservative Kurdish electorate. Under Erdogan, it managed to weaken the military elite to the extent, that it could no longer prevent the spread of political Islam, of which the AKP became the spearhead. It did so by exploiting two crucial allies: the EU, which would hardly agree to negotiate membership with a country dominated by a military junta, and the Gulen movement, whose influence in the judiciary helped to sideline the military elite through a campaign of prosecutions and trials. In addition, the Kurdish issue played into the AKP's hands. By starting peace talks with the PKK, Erdogan managed to pacify an important internal conflict and gain the support of the conservative PKK-hostile part of the Kurdish electorate throughout Turkey. During the 2002 parliamentary elections, the extremely high 10 per cent threshold, which initially had been introduced in order to keep Kurdish parties out of the legislative, prevented a couple of centre-right and centre-left parties from entering parliament and enabled the AKP to garner the mandates, which otherwise would have been distributed among them. With only 33 per cent of the votes, the AKP obtained 67 per cent of the mandates (Cagaptay, 2017, pp. 87–89). Turkey's swift economic upsurge during subsequent years made the AKP an even bigger winner 5 years later, when it managed to obtain 47 per cent of the vote. In 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces issued a memorandum against the election of Abdullah Gul, whom the AKP had nominated as president. Earlier, such memos usually triggered a government crisis and let prime ministers yield to the pressure. Erdogan ignored the memo and nothing happened. Gul became president, but the AKP still had one important player on their way to unchecked power: the judiciary, of which a large part was influenced by the network of the Gulen movement, which had heavily invested into education and acted as a kind of Islamic masonry. Erdogan and the AKP leadership utilised the Gulen movement in order to get rid of the military. Exploiting widespread rumours and conspiracy theories about the existence of a so called 'deep state', the Gulen-controlled judiciary launched a prosecution campaign against leading members of the armed forces, who were accused of belonging to clandestine networks and of having conspired against the government. The campaign lasted from 2006 to 2008 and produced a number of show trials with high ranking officers. It was supported by media outlets close to Gulen and even by some secularist newspapers. But even after the elimination of the military top brass, the judiciary remained an obstacle to the AKP. Twice the CC had banned Islamic parties and obstructed attempts to weaken the country's secularist legacy. Erdogan removed this obstacle in a similar way as PiS in Poland – by packing the CC and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors with AKP-loyalists.[3] By doing so, he clashed with Gulen supporters in the judiciary, who were furious about their loss of influence. Consequentially, Erdogan ensued a campaign against secularist and government-critical media, many of which were close to the Gulen network. It was the beginning of Turkey's descent into a full-fledged hybrid system after the 2011 elections. Part of it was the termination of the peace talks with the PKK

and the launch of military offensive against its militias in the South-East. The last stroke came after the failed coup d'état by a faction of the military on 15 July 2016, when the government launched a large-scale purge against alleged Gulen-members in the army, the police, the judiciary, the public administration and the universities, sacking tens of thousands of people over several months. In April 2017 Erdogan did, what Poland's Andrzej Duda would announce a month later – he carried out a referendum about a package of 18 constitutional amendments, which would transform Turkey from a semi-presidential parliamentary republic into a purely presidential regime, giving the president strong *de jure* leverage over the government and the judiciary, enabling him to rule by decree. The debate before the referendum took place in an atmosphere of insecurity, with state pressure on media and opposition. After the vote, when it became apparent that the No- and Yes-vote would be very close together, the Supreme Electoral Central Election Commission lifted the traditional ban on unstamped bulletins, counting them as valid votes if there were no indications of fraud. The move outraged the opposition. At the end, the Supreme Electoral Council announced a victory of the Yes-vote by 52 to 48 per cent.

Hungary

In the initial phase of Hungary's democratisation process, *Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség* (Hungarian Civic Party) had been a liberal democratic and anti-communist party and nothing forecast it could ever become a threat to democracy, not to speak about liberal democracy. The party had even been a member of the European association of liberal parties, before it changed its name and ideological orientation to a more conservative position, after a defeat in the elections of 1994. The conservative turn led to a split. In 2000 Fidesz, now with the additional name of 'Hungarian Civic Party' joined the European People's Party, to which it has belonged since then. Viktor Orbán, the party leader, participated in several coalition governments, all of which respected the constitutional order and the division of power. This changed, when in 2010, Fidesz won a landslide victory and – similar to the situation of the AKP 2002 and PiS in 2015 – gained a disproportional high share of the mandates with a relatively small majority of the votes. Due to the Hungarian voting system, less than 53 per cent of the votes gave Fidesz supremacy of 67 per cent in parliament and thus the possibility not only to rule alone, but also to amend the Constitution. Due to its majority, Fidesz could also change the voting system. After a reduction of the number of seats and constituencies and several other adjustments, Fidesz was still able to retain its two thirds majority in parliament despite obtaining only 45 per cent of the votes during the 2014 elections. Alike Kaczyński in Poland, Erdogan in Turkey and many other populist leaders, Orbán had been a member of the political establishment, but ran his campaigns on an anti-establishment platform, which idealised the 'ordinary people' and vilified not only those, who had ruled before him, but also those, who allegedly tried to rule Hungary from Brussels. This triple exclusion became apparent during his second term as prime minister, when his politics successfully

reduced support for *Jobbik* (Movement for a Better Hungary), Fidesz's extreme right-wing challenger in parliament. He then staged campaigns 'to stop Brussels' with regard to the relocation of refugees, which the Council of the EU had adopted by qualified majority in September 2014 and against refugees, foreigners and Muslims. Before, Fidesz had used its parliamentary dominance in a similar way as Kuchma in Ukraine, Erdogan in Turkey, and Beata Szydło's (PiS) government in Poland but instead of breaking the existing constitution, Fidesz replaced it by a new one, which reduced the autonomy of the CC and included several issues, which had previously been quashed by the CC, thus extracting them from its jurisdiction (Fruhstorfer & Hein, 2016; Vetter, 2017, p. 74). Thus, in the same way as Kuchma and Erdogan, Orbán used the state's leverage over businesspeople, who were media owners, in order to bring oppositional media into line or close them down. Like Erdogan and the Polish government, he purged the public media and the state administration and reformed the judiciary in order to increase the percentage of judges, on whose loyalty the government could rely. Finally, in a similar way as Lukashenko in Belarus, he also brought the Central Bank under control (Vetter, 2017, pp. 75–77).

Belarus

After Belarus' declaration of independence, its leadership was confronted to a deep financial, economic and social crisis, marked by hyperinflation, mass bankruptcies and the loss of export markets. Stanislav Shushkevich, a scientist and speaker of the parliament became formal head of the new state, but was deprived of leverage over the security sector and the army, whose officers had kept their Soviet citizenship and later often took Russian, rather than Belarusian passports. From the beginning, informal networks of Russian businesspeople, organised criminals and secret service and army officers penetrated the country. In 1994, a so far unknown director of a state-farm in the East of the country became the protagonist of such a network. He conducted a fierce anti-corruption campaign, which entirely failed to dismantle any important criminal networks and did not elucidate any major criminal affair, but effectively discredited some of the new republic's most prominent politicians, including Shushkevich. The rising star of this populist network was Alexander Lukashenko, a back-bencher with a strong populist appeal, who decided to challenge the former head of the Communist Party, Vyacheslav Kebich in the 1994 presidential elections. Opposite to the young newcomer, Kebich, an unappealing, boring apparatchik, could easily be blamed for every misfortune of the past, and he had against himself a well organised network of young affluent people in the state administration and the security services, who had a solid backing in Moscow. They kept Kebich at bay and made Lukashenko's campaign a masterpiece of demagogy and populism. Many of them later were appointed high positions in Lukashenko's administration. Lukashenko made unfounded social commitments, attacked the old communist, the new post-independence leadership and the nationalist opposition, promised to fight against corruption, privatisation and for a fuzzily defined return to Soviet times, when

wages and the rouble had been stable and were paid in time, promised to keep ties with Russia, raise income, lower taxes and improve the infrastructure (Poczobut, 2013). He presented himself as the mouthpiece of the ordinary citizen, who would fight against oligarchs and injustice. After a highly mediatised – presumably fake – assassination attempt on his campaign trail, he won a landslide victory.[4] The 1995 constitution made Belarus a presidential republic. Lukashenko started to sideline and marginalise parliament altogether using the power of his position to influence party politics, the nomination of candidates in constituencies and alliances of elected members of parliament (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011, pp. 198–211). By doing so, he managed to create favourable ad hoc majorities across the party factions, which he could use in order to weaken the influence of parliament in the institutional landscape. Lukashenko several times carried out referenda, which changed the Constitution to his favour. Like Orbán in Hungary and Erdogan in Turkey, he mixed popular issues, for which it was easy to organise a majority, concerning cultural and economic ties with Russia, which were popular among the population but contested by the nationalist opposition, with constitutional issues that would give him more power over parliament. In the first referendum, which was held together with the parliamentary elections in 1995, the referendum package included the president's right to dissolve parliament and equalising Russian and Belorussian language in status, new national symbols and closer economic ties with Russia.[5] Because closer ties with Russia where almost consensual in the country (except for the nationalist opposition), a clear majority on all four questions was obtained. In the second referendum, conducted a year later, Lukashenko mixed a whole plethora of institutional, symbolic and economic issues. Again, he won a landslide victory, which enabled him to extend his term as president until 2001, to issue laws by decree and to control the state budget. In the new parliament, which was assembled after the new constitution had been promulgated; opponents were excluded and formed their own, 'oppositional' parliament. Lukashenko's new parliament was not recognised by the international community, but nevertheless persisted, whereas the oppositional parliament slowly vanished, deprived of funds and staff. A third referendum in 2004 abolished the two-term limitations for the president and enabled him to run in future elections without limitations. He did so again in 2006, 2010 and 2015, always successfully and with high scores. Belarus is the most advanced case of a hybrid regime with the most extensive use of constitutional referendums, all of which were declared flawed by OSCE observers. It is also the farthest reaching case of a president removing institutional constraints. Lukashenko not only disempowered parliament, he also successfully used his power to subdue the CC and the National Bank of Belarus relatively early during his reign, in 1995 and 1996, together with the Central Election Council (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011, pp. 198–211). With a combination of direct intervention and the strategic use of referenda, Lukashenko managed to transform the short lived Belarusian democracy that had emerged after independence into a hybrid regime. Opposite to other authoritarian strongmen, he did not need to resort to party politics and organise parliamentary support in order to increase his power over the institutions, because the presidency ended up as the

only functional branch of power. This is also the reason, why the president – opposite to Kuchma, Erdogan and Putin – did not need to resort to the assistance of a populist party. Already during the end of the 1990s, Belarus was widely regarded a dictatorship by Western countries, non-governmental organisations and international media including many Russian media outlets. But it retained the formal institutions and procedures of a democracy: elections are carried out on a regular basis as required by the constitution, the constitution is amended through referenda and at least theoretically, Lukashenko could be voted out of office. Belarus' hybrid regime still derives its legitimacy from the populace and is eager to uphold the claim of democracy, even so hardly anyone in the world believes it to be democratic.

Populist parties jumping on the bandwagon of hybridisation

Ukraine: The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine

Just like Belarus, Ukraine emerged as a presidential republic from the ruins of the USSR. Parties aligned according to their attitude towards the president and the president used 'administrative resources' including patronage, cooptation and blackmail in order to cut out a friendly majority of the often scattered and non-transparent landscape, which the Ukrainian election rules created. Party politics and factions in the Ukrainian parliament (*Verkhovna Rada*) never reflected the interest aggregation of the population and neither did it reflect ideological cleavages as described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Despite the absence of almost all factors that had contributed to the emergence of populist parties in Western, and later Central and Eastern Europe, there was one party in Ukraine which fulfilled the criteria of populism. In 1996, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine had been created by Nataliya Vitrenko, an MP of the Socialist Party of Ukraine. Her new party was more pro-Russian, redistributive and anti-Western than the Socialist Party, which back then belonged to the centre of the Ukrainian political landscape. Vitrenko's party did not gain prominence until the 1999 elections, when president Kuchma's administration pumped money into it and promoted it in the state media in order to split the vote of the Socialist Party. This would allow the presidential administration to hoist the communist candidate, Petro Symonenko into the second round of the presidential election and thus force all moderate parties to rally behind Kuchma. Vitrenko did her best to overtake all other leftist candidates with extreme social demagogy, campaigning on an anti-elitist platform. When an assassination attempt failed at a rally that left her slightly injured, her popularity peaked and she managed to garner almost 11 per cent of the votes cast during the first round of the presidential elections, successfully eliminating the Socialist candidate, Oleksandr Moroz, from the race. As calculated by Kuchma's entourage, Symonenko ran against Kuchma in the second round and lost. The result enabled Kuchma to tighten his grip on the institutions that is on the judiciary, which already had been dependent on the Ministry of Justice. It also empowered Kuchma to move against independent media. He did it in a way as would later occur similarly in

Hungary, Russia and Turkey – through pressure on their sponsors and owners, whose businesses were vulnerable to interference from law enforcement and the tax authorities. Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party was the only case in Ukraine, in which a populist party jumped on the bandwagon, set into motion by a political force striving to introduce a hybrid regime. Other parties, before and after Vitrenko, used social demagogy and populist communication strategies, but failed to comply with the 'one-issue, one-leader' requirement. After 1999, Vitrenko's party fell into oblivion. It failed to enter the *Verkhovna Rada* in 2002 and all other subsequent elections. After the Orange Revolution, the party fought against President Viktor Yushchenko and in 2011, it joined the People's Front for Russia, a Russian nationalist umbrella which tries to support Russians abroad. In 2015, Vitrenko's party signed a common platform with Symonenko, whose party was investigated and threatened to be shut down by the new rulers of Ukraine (Gosh, 2013).

Russia: The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

Many authors date the transformation of Russia to a hybrid system to the rise of Vladimir Putin, who replaced Boris Yeltsin as president during New Year's Eve of 2000/2001. But the Russian political system had many elements of a hybrid system already long before, at least since Yeltsin decided to take the rebellious Duma by military force in 1993 and the state institutions became more and more dominated by the presidency in a way which D'Anieri (2007, pp. 16–17) labelled 'hyperpresidentialism'. The stand-off between the president and the Duma in 1993 facilitated the replacement of the old Soviet constitutional order and the introduction of the 1993 constitution, which turned Russia effectively into a presidential republic. The constitution has been formally maintained by subsequent presidents, and Medvedev and Putin formally respected it, when they switched their offices in 2008 and 2012 in order to allow Putin to run a third term in presidential elections. Russian politics were largely characterised by their non-transparent character, behind the curtain decision making and the use of 'administrative resources' in elections. By re-shaping party politics and alliances in parliament and pressure on media and candidates from one-seat majority constituencies, subsequent presidents were able to obtain the necessary majorities in the Duma. But opposite to Belarus, they never needed to eliminate the Duma or pack it with government supporters only. Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev all managed to organise their own party blocks, but they all had more characteristics of a 'party of power' than of a populist movement. They were structured according to the needs of the respective president, which makes them 'one-leader' parties, but they were not 'one-issue' parties, and appealing to anti-establishment feelings among the populace would have hardly been credible. Instead they are widely regarded as the emanation of the political establishment and draw their legitimacy and appeal from this fact. They often base their campaigns on claims about their power, suggesting to making voters feel safe and prosperous. The presidential blocks and those who joined them were the drivers of Russia's transformation to a hybrid system, but they were not populist. Nevertheless, they exploited a populist

party for various practical reasons. This outfit was the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) under Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The party (still as part of the political system of the USSR) had been created at the beginning of the 1990s. After the dissolution of the USSR, it became part of the political system of Russia, where it covered the extreme right part of the party system. In the 1993 elections, the party obtained an impressive 22.9 per cent of the votes cast and became one of the biggest factions in the Duma. But despite its populist appeal, violent anti-Semitism and extreme Russian nationalism, it often supported the presidential block in the Duma. So did the party after the violent crushing of the Duma in 1993 with regard to the new constitution. The constitution included many more human rights and civil rights safeguards than the Soviet one, but Zhirinovsky supported it because it fit into his calls for 'law and order', empowered the president and reduced the influence of the parliament (McFaul, 2015). Zhirinovsky was notorious for proposing extremely harsh and summary solutions to crime, immigration, minority problems and separatism. He promoted Russia's expansion to Asia, demanded to re-conquer Alaska and to resurrect the Soviet Union (Schmeman, 1993). Paradoxically, Zhirinovsky usually scored worse in presidential elections than his party did in parliamentary elections. After the millennium, under the presidencies of Putin and Medvedev, the LDPR's election results never reached the ceiling of the early 1990s. Opposite to Yeltsin, whose administration controlled only little more than a third of the Duma members and had to organise support for presidential policies on an ad hoc basis, Putin and Medvedev controlled a majority of the seats and managed to carry out a reform of the Duma that provided the president with a stable majority, marginalising unsecure allies like the LDPR. Therefore, the presidential camp did no longer need to support Zhirinovsky's party before elections (Shevchenko & Golosov, 2001). But Zhirinovsky never criticised any president's policies which aimed to strengthen the executive's power over the legislative and to curb opposition and dissent in the country. However, in 2005, the direct bottom-up election of regional governors was replaced by an indirect election scheme. But at that stage, the LDPR was no longer necessary to organise a majority for the president.

Turkey: The Nationalist Action Party

Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, NHP) was founded by Alparslan Türkeş in 1969 as an extreme nationalist party and a splinter party of the Kemalist Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). Türkes later managed to participate in two coalition governments, in 1973 and 1977, with Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party. In 1997, Devlet Bahceli took over as party leader. Government participation somehow moderated the nationalistic position of the party, whose militarised youth branch, the Grey Wolves, became notorious for using violence against antagonists from the left. Until today, the party is situated on the extreme right of Turkey's party system; it opposes any compromises and peace talks with the PKK, seeks to solve the Kurdish issue through forced

assimilation, but also opposes corruption by the ruling AKP. It also has criticised the AKP's drive to authoritarian methods. On the other hand, it is widely regarded as the AKP's ally of last resort in strategic matters. Its members of parliament supported the AKP in abolishing the headscarf ban in 2008. The abolition was later quashed by the CC. In 2015, it was only thanks to the MHP's members of parliament's abstention (they casted empty votes), that an AKP candidate could be elected speaker of the parliament. In 2017, when Erdogan and his party needed support in parliament in order to push through constitutional amendments (and to hold a referendum on the matter afterwards), which would effectively turn Turkey into a presidential republic, and would empower the president to issue decrees and dissolve parliament, the overwhelming majority of MHP members of parliament supported the respective AKP motions and the yes vote in the referendum. The issue was very controversial among the NHP electorate, which either had no position or was in majority against the amendments and the referendum.

Poland: Kukiz 15

The *Kukiz* movement, which later gave rise to the foundation of the election committee Kukiz 15, is the outfit of Pawel Kukiz, a famous pop- and rock musician, who acts as the party's front man. The movement consists of two kinds of political activists, one faction, whose members had been outside party politics, but for many years had campaigned for an amendment of the election rules and the replacement of Poland's mixed franchise by a strongly majoritarian system with one seat constituencies, similar to the British system, and another faction of die-hard nationalists. Together, they embraced a strongly anti-establishment platform. In 2005, Kukiz 15 scored worse in the parliamentary campaign than Paweł Kukiz himself had done in the presidential contest, but still was able to form one of the bigger Sejm factions. Kukiz' declared ambition was to get into parliament 'in order to destroy the system'. His movement supported a change of the Constitution, although it never made clear, how a new constitution should look like. After the election, his parliamentary club split into several smaller units, sometimes criticising the government and the PiS majority openly. The die-hard nationalists created a right-wing opposition against PiS, which failed to attract media attention and lacked influence in the parliamentary business. Some Kukiz 15 members tried to present themselves as mediators between the government and the opposition, but also failed, because the government did not need any mediator and the opposition did not regard them as reliable. This was also due to the internal diversity of the Sejm faction that was neither in a position to prevent PiS legislative initiatives nor to coerce the opposition into compromises with the majority. Kukiz 15 supported many of PiS controversial initiatives, including the politicisation of the High Judicial Council, the appointment of unconstitutional judges to the CC, the purges in the public administration and the public media. However, PiS never depended on Kukiz 15 support, because if Kukiz 15 had opposed PiS' actions, it would not have made any difference. PiS had the majority needed for passing

ordinary bills, and lacked a constitutional majority even with Kukiz 15 support. The party never issued any warning or criticism pointing to these measures as a threat to democracy or an element of erecting a hybrid system in Poland.

Conclusion

When the populist parties and movements examined in this chapter came into a position, in which they could effectively weaken or remove institutional constraints in the respective political system, they immediately started to undermine the autonomy of the judiciary, attacked non-governmental organisations, purged the administration and the state media and tried to use direct democracy – plebiscites and referenda – in order to weaken the remaining checks and balances that they did not entirely control at the time. All populist parties and movements, who acted as drivers of hybridisation, adopted a centralist view of their state. In order to reshape political loyalties and political cleavages, they promoted a strongly dichotomist worldview, which only knows loyalists and enemies, but does not leave any space for neutrality and mediation. In those cases, where the main drivers of hybridisation lacked important features of populism as in Russia and Ukraine, existing populist actors usually supported transition to a hybrid system. In most cases, political forces propelling hybrid systems enjoyed the support of smaller populist parties, which helped them to get parliamentary support and super-majorities for constitutional change as in the cases of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Poland. These populist parties usually came from the right side of the political spectre, only in Ukraine a radical left-wing party jumped on the bandwagon driving to a hybrid system. Populist helpers became superficial when the march to a hybrid system was in progress and the respective parliament was already unable to provide a platform for the opposition like in Belarus and Russia. As long as populist parties and movements act in a stable institutional environment or in coalitions with non-populist parties, which are committed to pluralism and representative democracy, populists may contribute to a higher acceptance of democracy, include frustrated or passive citizens in the democratic process and reduce the space for radical contestation. But once the institutional constraints on government are weakened or removed – either by populist parties or openly autocratic forces – populists can no longer be expected to stabilise the political system. Instead, they either use their leverage over intermediary institutions to undermine and subdue them or they support parties and movements that do so. In the light of these findings, it is more than unlikely we will ever see a populist party or movement fighting openly against the imposition of a hybrid system or competing with or containing a driving force of hybridisation.

Notes

1 The notion ‘double exclusion’ describes the communication between the party and its followers and the wider public, where populist parties tend to promote two kinds of dichotomist relations. They claim the existence of a deep and non-reconcilable divide between ‘ordinary citizen’ (who are usually ascribed positive features) and an ‘elite’

which they describe as alienated from the 'ordinary citizen', despising him and caring only for its own needs. The second divide, populists refer to, juxtaposes 'the nation' with 'outsiders'. Both groups are vaguely defined and populist politicians usually invoke 'common sense' when asked about the boundaries between the two, which allows them to decide about in-group and out-group adherence deliberately. Right-wing populist parties tend to define the boundaries according to ethnic and cultural lines, whereas left-wing populists stick to social and class-related divisions (Decker, 2008).

2 Under the Polish Constitution of 1997, the president can either refuse to sign a bill (forcing parliament to either abandon or pass it again with a supermajority) or submit it to the CC. If the CC nullifies the bill, the legislative process starts from zero.

3 The CC's number of judges was increased from 11 to 17, the Council membership rose from 12 to 34.

4 In the second round, Lukashenka won 80.1 per cent of votes casted against Kebich, after the other candidates, Shushkevych and BNF leader Zanon Paznyak, who received 12.9 per cent, and two other candidates had been eliminated during the first round of the presidential elections.

5 In Belarus, Russian is the dominant language and the language of upward social mobility. Belorussian, which is spoken on an every-day basis only in the Western part of the country and – as a form of cultural resistance to the influence of Russia – by members and supporters of the BNF.

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8 Populism as a challenge for party systems

A comparison between Italy and Spain

Roberto Biorcio

Introduction

The relationship between populism and the problems of representative democracy has been much debated in recent years. Populism is often regarded as a disease that can seriously damage the functioning of democratic institutions. However, movements and parties that have established themselves against the traditional parties – through appealing to the 'people' – are very different. And different are the effects their affirmations have had on the national political system.

Much of studies on populism have focused on parties and leaders belonging to the radical right, but in recent years new types of parties have been successful in Southern European countries. These are political subjects who criticise traditional parties using a rhetoric like that of populist movements, but are radically different from the populist right as their programmes and attitudes of their activists and of their voters.

In this chapter, we will specifically develop a comparative analysis of the Podemos experience in Spain and that of the Five Star Movement (FSM) in Italy. The affirmations of these two parties have had important effects on the transformation of party systems and more generally on democracy and the forms of citizens' political participation.

Populism and democracy in Europe

The use of the concept of 'populism' has been continually extended in recent years, often defined in an arbitrary and confused manner, with regard to the hosting context. On the other hand, the parties, movements and leaders defined as populists, did not produce an organic and ideologically unambiguous elaboration. The common ideas of all experiences of populist movements and parties represent one sort of conceptual matrix: an interpretative framework that places the opposition of the people and dominant elites at the centre of politics (Worsley, 1969; Mény & Surel, 2002; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). The people, imagined as a homogeneous social unity, are considered the source of positive values: 'Virtue resides in the authentic people who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population and collective traditions' (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p. 23).

In the last 30 years, this core idea has been used to elaborate different types of political and ideological proposals both on the right and the left (Laclau, 2005). The proposals can be very different based on the criteria used to clarify the fundamental concepts: that of the people as 'imagined community' and that of the potential 'enemies of the people'.

One can consider the people as 'demos', a community of unrivalled citizens – a community that, within a democratic state, its people are considered 'sovereign', who holds the political power. But also the meaning of 'ethnos' can be attributed to the idea of people. The latter implies a community limited to citizens who have common customs, cultural traits and (sometimes) a long history. In other cases, the people are also given a different meaning, limiting it to the citizens in the most modest conditions, distinct from those who have the privilege of wealth, culture and a high social status (the idea of the people as 'class').

On the other hand, ideas on the enemies of the people are also differentiated. As a rule, the 'people' opposes the dominant powers, especially the political, economic and financial oligarchs. However, if the idea of 'the people' is narrowed to that of a community defined on an ethnic (or ethno-national) basis, immigrants, foreigners and all minorities may also be subjected to prejudices and hostilities, used as scapegoats to give expression to the anger of popular classes.

Besides, there is a very close relationship between the affirmation of movements and populist parties and the problems of democracy. If the responsibility for the crisis of democracy is attributed to the populist parties, there is a curious turn-around between 'cause' and 'effect'. Very often it is the unsatisfactory functioning of representative democracies that creates the most favourable conditions for the success of populism. In general, democracy can live and work satisfactorily through the coexistence and balancing of two fundamental components: the one is the constitutional and the other is the popular sovereignty (Leca, 1996; Mény & Surel, 2000). These two components can coexist and influence each other, while respecting the sovereignty of a people subjected to legal and political authorities. If the rulers do not listen and do not meet the expectations of citizens, protests can emerge, and populist movements and parties can be formed that can win significant electoral consensus. At this stage, populist formations can play an important role in democracies: to force other parties to take account of popular claims (Canovan, 1981). All leaders, movements and populist parties are, or at least claim to be 'on the side' of the people, as opposing to the rulers who act in favour of economic and social interests of the dominant groups.

The new parties in of Southern European countries

In Europe, over the last 30 years, most of the populist parties that have emerged belong to the political right, creating a new political family that was mostly successful after World War II (Mudde, 2004, 2012). In some cases, the populist parties were new formations, in others pre-existing parties that adopted logic and rhetoric of action with a populist character.

However, in the last 10 years, in countries of Southern Europe, new types of parties have emerged that are opposed to traditional parties by proposing programmes and goals which are very different from those of the populist right. In these countries, the economic and social effects of neo-liberal globalisation were added to the already existing effects of the economic crisis that began in 2008 (Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal, 2018). Therefore, the insecurity and the difficulties for large sections of the population have increased, while the welfare systems have been challenged. The implementation of austerity policies in these countries and the protests they have generated have had a profound impact on national political systems. The main parties that were alternated at government have accepted the austerity policies imposed by the European Union. The substantial political convergence of 'neo-liberal' nature (Roberts, 2013) between centre-left and centre-right parties has raised citizens' mistrust. Protests and mobilisations against austerity policies are often linked to the struggle for renewal of political representation (della Porta, 2015). New movements as well as new types of parties have emerged, committed to defending the interests of ordinary citizens against those of political, economic and financial elites. The claims of the new political subjects were favoured by the difficulties (or abdication) of the traditional left forces to fight the austerity policies and growing social inequalities (Peterson, Wahlstrom & Wennerhag, 2015). The new parties have gained the greatest electoral consensus among young people, workers and in general the popular class.

The statements of the FSM in Italy and Podemos in Spain were particularly significant. These new parties often use a political rhetoric that is similar to the populist ones, but they present programmes and ideas that have little in common with those of the right. The processes of formation and strategies followed by the two political parties have been very different, but both have achieved significant electoral successes. The party systems and the traditional configuration of national politics that had been bipolar, characterised by the contrast between the centre-left and the centre-right political formations have profoundly altered. The FSM and Podemos have been able to influence many formerly disengaged people or those who were only active in local committees or movements, by engaging them in active political life. In these new political formations, often people joined in who had experienced a sense of neglect from traditional part of politics. This way, young people tend to be more involved in their first active participation in a political group.

Five Star Movement in Italy

In Italy, the FSM managed to receive 25.6 per cent of the total votes in 2013 election, disparaging the national political schemes which for many years had been characterised by bipolar competition between centre-right and centre-left coalitions (see Table 8.1).

The affirmation of the movement was favoured by a political, economic and social crisis, which major parties and unions had found unmanageable. The alternations between the coalitions of centre-right and centre-left in elections

Table 8.1 Votes in Italian elections of 2013 and 2008

	Elections 2013		*Elections 2008*		*Differences*
	Votes	*Percentage*	*Votes*	*Percentage*	*Percentage*
Five Star Movement	8,689,458	25.6	–	–	25.6
Democratic Party	8,644,523	25.4	12,095,306	33.2	–7.8
Left parties	1,854,597	5.5	2,718,322	7.5	–2.0
Go Italy (Forza Italia)	7,332,972	21.6	13,629,464	37.4	–15.8
Northern League (Lega Nord)	1,390,014	4.1	3,024,543	8.3	–4.2
Brothers of Italy – National Centre Right	665,830	2.0	–	–	2.0
Civic Choice (Scelta Civica)	2,824,065	8.3	–	–	8.3
Union for Christian and Centre Democrats	608,210	1.8	2,050,229	5.6	–3.8

Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (2013)

during the period from 1994 to 2008 had not resulted in any major change. The disaffection with the parties and the political class was progressively increased (Biorcio, 2015).

The FSM was founded by the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo and, for a few years, the movement was only committed to promoting mobilisations and civic lists in some cities. It had not been formed, at least initially, as a political subject able to compete at national and European institutional levels. In the past, Grillo on many occasions had used his skills and reputation in order to give voice, to citizens' protests and mobilisations from the bottom. The launch of his personal blog in 2005 had changed the mode of his political engagement. This meant that his sympathisers and supporters could intervene, become active and visible.

The formation of the movement was concretised with the emergence of the *MeetUp*,[1] a platform that allows blog visitors to get organised as local activists and keep in touch with each other (Lanfrey, 2012). The proposal achieved great success: in a short time, discussion groups were formed in many parts of Italy. A new place for meeting and interaction was created for many citizens who were potentially interested in changing Italian politics and society. In many cases, they lacked participation experience in parties, groups and organisations. This way it was possible to develop a common culture and feelings of collective identity among participants.

To show the operational potential of the *MeetUp* Network, two great mobilisations, called V-Day, were simultaneously promoted in many Italian cities. In September 2007, the first V-Day was organised with the aim of protesting the entire political class and the Italian parties. The second one was organised in April 2008 in over 400 locations. This time the aim was protesting the subordination of the main media to political and economic powers. These mobilisations enabled the movement to gain significant visibility in the national media system and public opinion, showing its entire initiative capability even outside the network (Biorcio & Natale, 2013).

In some municipalities, there were several lists referring to the movement. However, the limits of these experiences had brought about the need to build a political reference at national level. Therefore, in 2009, the FSM was founded as a simple tool for extending democracy and to help 'the totality of citizens to recognise the role of government: an orientation that is normally attributed to a few'.[2] The first programme with more than 120 points was proposed and the membership rules were defined. No organisational structures, comparable to those of the parties were created, but the web was always used for the members to express themselves on the most important decisions (Tronconi, 2015).

At its outset in regional elections of 2010, the FSM gained nearly half a million votes. In the following years, lists of the movement gained significant results in numerous municipalities and in the Sicily region. After winning the election in some cities, the visibility of the movement on the most important media (television and newspapers) became extremely high. The choice of candidates and construction of the programme for national political elections in 2013 had been made using the web, in order to enable the members of the movement to make a vow

and decide. A set of concrete proposals that highlighted the social, political and economic rights of citizens, attempting to reduce the powers of political parties and those of large economic and financial groups, were made. The selected candidates represented a radical shift in traditional parliamentary representation, due to the significant presence of women and young. In the February 2013 elections, the FSM was one of the two most voted parties in the Chamber, winning over millions of voters who often in the past voted for the centre-left or the centre-right coalition. The movement was mainly characterised by strong criticism of the parties and the political class, accusing them of having effectively deprived the people of popular sovereignty. The FSM gained a vast consensus, especially among the voters who had little confidence not only in the parties and representative Italian institutions, but also in EU and the banks. The electoral breakthrough of the movement had taken place in younger generations. They were mostly young people to take up the FSM's message and the promise of radical change in Italian politics. In 2016, the movement conquered the government of two of the most important Italian cities, Rome and Turin.

The success of the FSM had thus called into question the role of the polarisation of voters along the left-right axis, which had often driven the choices of voters between centre-right and centre-left. Many commentators criticised the FSM as a demonstration of populism in other European countries often run by right-wing political formations (Corbetta, 2017). Grillo himself polemically accepted this comparison, though reversing its meaning: his movement had been able to pick the vows that in other European countries had poured towards the populist right-wing parties. The FSM is very different from these parties mainly due to its proposed objectives that are primarily aimed at promoting participatory democracy, defending a Universalist welfare state, protecting and enhancing common goods such as basic income, defending the investments on public health and schools. The views of its voters, very clearly reflect the policy guidelines of the movement.

Podemos in Spain

In Spain, Podemos obtained 20.7 per cent of the votes in the 2016 national political elections, shaking the Spanish political system that was based on the alternation between two parties, the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE) (see Table 8.2). The new party was founded in 2014 by a group of teachers from Complutense University of Madrid. It was led by Pablo Iglesias and had managed to collect a broad electoral support in a short time.

In Spain, large sections of the population were affected by both the aftermath of the international economic crisis that had been developing since 2008 and the austerity measures implemented by the two parties alternating in the government. On 15 May 2011, a set of mobilisations were launched against government that was led by the socialist Zapatero as well as against its policies. Thus, gradually the so-called *Indignados* movement was developed.[3] The social crisis was attributed to a political-economic elite that essentially concurred with bipartisan consensus (PP and PSOE) and with private financial powers (Castaneda, 2012).

Table 8.2 Votes in Spanish elections of 2015 and 2011

	Elections 2013 (original table 2015)		*Elections 2008 (original table 2011)*		*Differences*
	Votes	*Percentage*	*Votes*	*Percentage*	*Percentage*
Podemos	5,212,711	20.7	–	–	20.7
PP (*People's Party*)	7,236,965	28.7	10,866,566	44.6	–15.9
PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party)	5,545,315	22.0	7,003,511	28.8	–6.8
Izquierda Unida	926,783	3.68	1,686,040	6.9	–3.2
Ciudadanos	3,514,528	13.9	–	–	13.9

Source: Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs (2015)

The movement mainly consisted of unemployed, low-paid workers, housewives and immigrants who were mobilised against political and economic elites. It was essentially peaceful and devoid of political interference. The social subject of the *Indignados* was not the social class, but the *citizens* (della Porta, 2015). Above all, the movement was intended to promote a more participatory democracy, which transcended the traditional conflict between the two main parties of the centre-right and centre-left. Much of the *Indignados* movement refused to position themselves along the left-right axis and took the bottom-top and citizen-elite fracture as their main reference. The media and the large national networks could not ignore the social issues advanced by such extensive mobilisations which had gained broad consensus (Antentas, 2015). A total of 80 per cent of the Spanish citizens declared that they agreed with the demands of the *Indignados*. The wide cross mobilisation had failed to transform power balance within the state in favour of the popular classes, but had resulted in significant changes in common sense and public opinion. This helped prompting demands by those social sectors affected by the management crisis caused by political and economic elites.

However, the movement, refused to take a political dimension, and stressed its detachment and extraneousness with respect to such, radically criticising all political parties. The foundation of Podemos was an independent initiative that was taken a few months before the European elections by a small group of intellectuals who had been very close to the movement without having a leading role in it. The new party revisited the words, the symbolic styles and claims of the *Indignados* to make them effective on the electoral plan (Subirats, 2015). Thus, many observers considered the new party as an institutionalisation of the movement.

A key role for the success of the new party was played by Pablo Iglesias, a university professor who participated in political talk shows on major national television channels for several years, he was well-known and appreciated at national level. Other founders of the new party, besides teachers and researchers from Complutense, also attributed great importance to the relationship between the public and the main media channels. They committed themselves to use the language of the television medium in order to translate the proposals of the movement into messages that could meet the common feeling, linking to how public opinion and society had already conceived them.

The presentation of Podemos in the 2014 European elections was a strong depiction of a leader centred approach, above all underlining the role of Iglesias, whose image also appeared on the election symbol. The figure of the leader was an effective communication tool and a source of recognition. The electoral campaign was conducted by a group of few dozen people able to use all forms of communication (especially through previous experiences of mobilisation in social movements): social networks, audio-visual production and presence in television programmes, public events and traditional propaganda (Rubino, 2015). In these elections, Podemos became the fourth Spanish political force with 8 per cent of total votes (Cordero and Montero, 2015). In 2015 national elections, the new party became the third Spanish political force with 20.7 per cent of votes.

The result of the elections made it impossible to form a government of majority; therefore, it was necessary to launch the elections anew. Also in 2016, Podemos affirmed their electoral support with 21.2 per cent of the vote (in coalition with Izquierda Unida), subsequently they took over the municipalities of some of the largest Spanish cities such as Madrid and Barcelona. The formation of a new Spanish government led by the PP was only possible with the support of PSOE.

During the campaign for the European elections, the construction of the new party was also initiated, launching an appeal for the establishment of regional and thematic circles. After the elections the circles were about 200. The subscription to the party could be done through the web portal. In the first months of 2014, about 33,000 of the 100,000 members of the portal's members took part in internal decision-making processes for European elections (voting on the programme and candidates). In the following years, the number of circles and members grew highly: the circles had become around 1000, while the members had reached and approximate 400,000 people (Martín, 2015). Podemos had achieved very significant electoral results in a short time, mainly because they often introduced themselves in a very different way from traditional political forces. After the successful experience of the Indignados movement, the founders of the new party had worked out a political proposal to build a 'transversal popular majority'. A broad process of political regeneration was proposed: a redistribution of social wealth redeeming those citizens who were impoverished by the crisis and reestablishment of a professional horizon for younger generations.

For the party to gain consensus on such proposal, it was necessary to abandon the symbols and identities of the traditional left, and as the Indignados movement had done, address a cross-sectoral majority; redefining the use of political symbols in a national-popular sense. Therefore, it was necessary for the party not only to distance itself from bipartisan system and elites but, with the same intensity, from the alternative traditional left, from its minority, its schematism and its contempt for mass culture (Iglesias, 2015). The founders had had experiences of militancy in radical left-wing parties, in social movements or both, but in the electoral campaign they used political discourses and rhetoric that were going 'beyond the right and the left', never referring to class division. Their proposals addressing the fractures that contrasted the bottom and top of the society: people–elite, citizens–caste, majority–minority, fatigue–privilege, democracy–oligarchy, new–old, continuity–change, outsiders–establishment (del Rio, 2015).

Podemos inherits another fundamental element of his argument from the Indignados movement: the rhetoric of the party that is centred on social issues and its message (as well as its programme) is mainly directed at the medium-low social strata and their needs (Torreblanca, 2015). The rhetoric and the programme mainly proposed concrete measures for a strong redistribution of resources.

The voters and organisational forms of Podemos and FSM

For a more accurate comparison between Podemos and the FSM, it may be useful to compare the social profile and the attitudes that characterise their electorate.[4]

Table 8.3 Vote intention 2014 by current occupation

	Vote for FSM	*Vote for Podemos*
Self-employed	21.7	12.2
Managers	15.0	31.7
Other white collars	19.1	32.5
Manual worker	27.0	29.4
Housepersons	20.0	8.0
Unemployed	33.3	27.1
Retired	4.7	17.9
Students	25.6	42.1
All	19.1	24.0

Source: European Election Study (2014)

The two political parties have a cross-sectoral social profile and collect votes from all social classes. In some social categories, both collect a greater share of consensus than national average: among manual workers, unemployed and students. The percentages of Podemos votes significantly increased among employees (see Table 8.3). The two new political formations collect much more electoral consensus among younger generations, while the chances of receiving votes among people over 65 are much lower. Obviously, they are more voted by students, and less by retirees.

Podemos and FSM voters refer to economic difficulties more often than other citizens: in many cases they have reported the loss of jobs within the family, or a general reduction in family income over the last 2 years. In general, the voters of the two new political formations have a far worse evaluation of their country's economic situation in the past year, comparing to those voting for other parties. Also, their forecast on future development of the national economy is generally more pessimistic. Thus, it can be said that Podemos and the FSM have been able to be representative of the opinions and demands of voters from all those social classes that mainly perceived and underwent the consequences of the economic crisis and the austerity policies implemented by national governments in Spain and Italy.

If we analyse the views and opinions expressed by the constituents of two political forces, other similarities are found regarding the views and opinions on governments and national political institutions (see Table 8.4). Criticism of national governments' conduct, is widespread among citizens. In Italy, 51 per cent of the respondents express their negative opinion on government's conduct, while in Spain critical positions are even more widespread (60 per cent). These negative assessment, however, reaches the highest levels, especially among voters of Podemos (94 per cent) and those of FSM (84 per cent).

A very similar picture emerges if we analyse the confidence expressed for national parliaments. Mistrust for these institutions is generally widespread in both

Table 8.4 Attitudes and opinions of Five Star Movement and Podemos voters in per cent

	Italy		*Spain*	
	FSM	*Other*	*Podemos*	*Other*
Compared to 12 months ago the economic situation is a lot worse	83.2	67.5	46.5	25.6
Disapprove government's record	84.0	50.6	94.3	59.5
Do not trust National Parliament	85.7	62.3	84.9	53.5
National Parliament does not take into consideration citizens' concerns	85.7	72.6	89.9	59.5
Do not trust the institutions of the EU	70.6	43.5	67.9	40.8
Disapprove actions of the EU during the last twelve months	77.3	51.6	78.6	45.1

Source: European Election Study (2014)

countries, but it reaches particularly high levels among Podemos (85 per cent) and FSM (86 per cent) voters. On the other hand, in both Spain and Italy, it is very widespread that citizens' opinions and demands are not listened to by politicians who are elected in representative institutions. Only a few among the respondents in the EES survey believe that national parliaments actually take into account what citizens think. Among the voters of the two new parties, the idea that citizens' demands will be heard by the parliamentarians is more restricted. Even with regard to the institutions of the European Union, the voters of Podemos and FSM have little confidence and very critical assessments.

In recent years, trust in the European institutions is diminished so much both in Italy and Spain. For the voters of the two new parties, the decline of confidence was much steeper. The same trend is evident if we look at the opinions on the policies implemented by the Europe during last year. The criticisms are widespread among all citizens of the Southern states of Europe, but they are even more shared among the voters of Podemos (79 per cent) and those of the FSM (77 per cent).

In general, by analysing the views of the voters of two political formations, one can say, that the two new parties have established themselves by raising and re-launching the tendencies that were most widespread in their countries: on the one hand concerns about the effects of the economic crisis and the austerity policies implemented by respective national governments, and on the other hand the growing mistrust towards national and European governments and institutions. Podemos and the FSM have proposed a radical change in political class structure and the policies implemented by traditional parties. However, unlike all the populist right-wing formations, these two new political formations have not used a campaign against immigrants, thus attempting not to limit their access within the two countries. Attention to these topics raised by Podemos and FSM has been very limited. Not surprisingly, the opinion of voters on immigration policies are averagely very similar to those expressed by all the citizens of their countries. Both Podemos and FSM are aiming to overcome the traditional distinction between left and right using programmes and proposals that should mainly address the citizens' demands.

Even if there are many similarities between the two parties, there are also considerable differences. They are mainly due to the different training processes and the different sectors of the electorate that they managed to win. The positioning of their voters in relation to a hypothetical left-right axis has significant differences. Podemos collects votes, especially among voters who place themselves on the left and centre-left positions. The FSM gains more support among voters who position themselves at the centre, or those who refuse to position themselves on left-right spectrum altogether. Both political formations attract less support among centre-right and especially among right-wing voters (see Table 8.5). Therefore, the political profile of their electorate shows significant differences from the parties of the populist right.

On the other hand, Podemos and FSM in order to start a genuine renewal of politics, have proposed to overcome the traditional forms of party organisation and sought to promote new practices to encourage the participation of their

Table 8.5 Vote intention for Five Star Movement and for Podemos by left-right self-placement

	FSM	*Podemos*
Left	12.0	30.7
Centre-left	12.8	33.9
Centre	27.7	22.0
Centre-right	10.1	1.6
Right	4.3	0.0
No answer/refused	56.8	16.7
All	19.1	24.0

Source: European Election Study (2014)

activists, sympathisers and voters. The two political formations have pledged to build organisations that are new and radically innovative from the point of view of forms of participation and communication practices. Their activists engage in territories on a number of issues that are of high importance for citizens, often environmental ones or mobilisation against the construction of large scale projects. The web has been widely used for communication and the involvement of the activists, in particular regarding the major political decisions and choices for candidates in elections. For the time being, the movement led by Beppe Grillo has refused to build organisational structures at national level, while Iglesias' party has created more executive structures like those of traditional parties. However, it is a common idea that the old parties need to leave their place to political forces that give full sovereignty to the bottom of the society, to be implemented through online voting.

Conclusions

In recent years, the electoral successes of Podemos and FSM in Spain and Italy have brought public attention to a new type of party, which cannot be easily understood according to traditional categorisations of left and right. Both political parties have achieved an unexpected share of votes at their first participation in national elections. They have also played a very important role in the following elections. In the countries of Southern Europe, the effects of the economic crisis have been coupled with a crisis of political representation, with a growing disapproval of citizens towards traditional parties and their leaders. Conflicts emerging from austerity policies have been often added to the demand for radical renewal of national politics. This is how the new political groups who responded to the demands for political change gained a foothold. The demands that was mainly emerging among the social strata with most difficulties affected by the economic crisis.

The results achieved by the FSM and Podemos in the national elections in Italy and Spain, have profoundly transformed both party systems. The two political

parties have established themselves with a political discourse which posed the central ideas of populist rhetoric again: the division of society into two antagonistic groups of the 'people' (the homogeneous and internally conflict-less vision of the 'people') and the 'corrupt elite'. Both, the FSM and Podemos reject the political representation based on the right-left dichotomy and propose to overcome it, opposing the bipolarism of the main parties. Both aim to overcome the traditional opposition of social classes, addressing the 'ordinary citizens' against the political and economic elite in a general manner. The voters who chose the two new political formations did not disperse after the first national elections, largely reaffirming their choice in subsequent elections. This is how the electorate of these two political formations was consolidated. Meanwhile networks of activists and organisational forms strengthened simultaneously.

FSM and Podemos have made an important contribution through addressing and trying to overcome the problems of democracy in Italy and Spain. They drew attention to many critical issues and problems affecting the operation of systems of representation in both countries, in particular the loss of sovereignty and powers of citizens and the growing public distrust with respect to political parties. These new political formations have sought to give voice to people's demands within political institutions, often clashing with dominant economic and financial groups as well as European Union policies. Their suggestions and experiments are not void of difficulties, problems and contradictions, but they should be considered with much attention as possible explorative ways to change politics, to overcome the constant oscillation between protest and citizens' sense of helplessness.

Notes

1 Howard The platform was successfully used by Democratic candidate Dean to encourage bottom-up participation in his campaign for primaries, getting prepared for the presidential election in 2004.
2 From the FSM Statute, www.movimento5stelle.it/programma/index.html.
3 The protest coincided with the administrative elections of 15 May 2011. For this reason, the Indignados movement was often called *Movimiento* 15-M.
4 For the sake of comparison, we will use the data collected by European Election Study (EES) in 2014. Other limited data collected from researches based on single countries is not fully comparable.

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9 'Citizens' *or* 'people'?

Competing meanings of the political subject in Latin America

Jenny Pearce

Introduction

This chapter explores the persistent tension between the idea of the 'citizen' and the idea of the 'people' in democratic practice and whether we can think beyond it. Its focus is Latin America. However, the argument is intended to contribute to debates on the contemporary expression of these competing frameworks else where in the world. Latin America is a very interesting starting point, not only because it has a well-known history of 'populisms'. The very frameworks of thought through which the meanings of democracy have been constructed in the region, have left it trapped, I would argue, between Montesquieu and Rousseau. Some have looked to Montesquieu's separation of powers and rule of law as a mechanism to protect individual liberty from the masses as well as the autocrats. Others looked to Rousseau's general will of the people as the expression of a collectivist search for a common good. This was a distinction which Pagden (1990, pp. 150–151; Leiva & Pagden, 2001) suggests was originally muddled in the mind of the Great Liberator, Simon Bolivar, himself, at the dawn of the region's independence and has haunted left and right since.

In the twentieth century, these broad points of reference continued to differentiate the varied attempts to frame the meaning of democracy in the region and struggles for change. In the mid-century, the 'people' became a discursive and actual instrument, to forge an industrialising project in the face of landed oligarch and agro exporting resistances. In the late twentieth century, in the wake of military dictatorships, there was an embrace by some Latin American political scientists (UNDP, 2004) of T.H. Marshall's conception of citizenship as the means to widen and deepen an incomplete transition to democracy. Towards the end of the century, efforts, notably in Peru, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador, to respond to the crisis of import substitution industrialisation and embrace neo-liberalism have been called 'neoliberal neopopulism' (de la Torre & Arnson, 2013). In the early twenty-first century, on the other hand, the mobilisation of the 'people' was a means to constitute an historical subject out of multiple experiences of marginality (deepened by the impacts of neo-liberalism) and capable of transforming the State. This gained momentum with Chavismo in

Venezuela, but is also associated by many, with the presidencies of Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.[1]

Yet, this chapter will argue that Latin America does not have to remain trapped between Rousseau and Montesquieu, between the 'people' and the 'citizen'. It has a third source for building its understanding of the 'political subject'. Alongside rich experiences of autonomous social organising, the region has a strong history of participatory social action and experimentation of varied kinds. While, some has been created from 'above', a great deal has also built on histories and principles of learning and independent action 'from below'. Before – and in the early stages of – the 'left turn' in Latin American politics of the twenty-first century, important participatory experiments took place in the region. These experiments, it is argued, are a source for looking past the categories of 'citizen' or 'people', towards the importance of the individual qualities, social relationships and institutional means for making participation democratic. This could also make democracy a vehicle for social and political action and change, not just a form of government. Latin America's twenty-first century participatory experiments also built on a humanist body of thinking about agency, some of which (notably that of Brazilian educationalist, Paulo Freire) has had global significance. This chapter argues that herein lies a source of revitalised thinking and practice about a 'participatory subject' with implications beyond Latin America.

The first part of the chapter will briefly discuss the way Latin America connects to the current debate on populism. It will be followed by a discussion on how neither liberal representation nor populist mobilisation have overcome the region's pendulum between democracy and authoritarianism. The result has been widespread dissatisfaction with democracy as practised and for many, democracy in principle. This section will argue that the dichotomy of 'citizen' and 'people' is in reality more complex than often appears, and rather than reflect a clear right and left spectrum, highlights the ongoing fragility of democracy itself. This fragility is, in turn, worsened by social, economic and political divides. Arguably, only the democratic participation of the poor could overcome the impacts of social and economic inequalities on democracy itself. Herein lies an authentically Latin American contribution to democratic thinking and practice. In contrast to the polarised and mostly negative debates around populism in Latin America, US democratic theorist, Archon Fung, concluded in a review essay on four studies of participatory innovations in Brazil entitled, Reinventing Democracy in Latin America:

> In the realm of political imagination, participatory democracy has plenty of romance. Perhaps for that reason alone, we wizened North Americans seldom discuss it. But perhaps we should. As we consider the polarisation, deadlock, cynicism, and outright corruption that infects the eighteenth-century machinery through which we try feebly to govern ourselves in the twenty-first, we would all do well to look beyond Alexandria.
>
> (Fung, 2011, p. 868)[2]

The populism debate in Latin America: Constituting or suppressing the democratic subject?

The emergence, retreat and re-emergence of what has come to be known generically as 'populism' is without doubt a fascinating leitmotif in the history of politics. Populism recedes and returns, but it does not disappear as a political phenomenon. The label of populist has been used to encompass political eruptions involving social groups as diverse as nineteenth century US mid-west farmers, twentieth century newly urbanised Latin American peasants and twenty-first century disaffected former factory workers in Europe. At the heart of the phenomenon, however, is the ability to transcend particularities and create a 'political subject' for varied economic and/or political projects.

Ernesto Laclau (2005, 2006) sees this as the positive benefit for a left project. By trumping differences with equivalences, or articulating multiple marginalities, such a subject can create a political rupture with the status quo which would otherwise be impossible. Jan-Werner Müller (2016), on the other hand, with a greater commitment to liberal democracy, sees populism's moral claim for the 'part' to speak for the 'whole', as effectively denying the pluralism which makes democracy democratic. Populism is not just anti-elitist, it is anti-pluralist, and often excludes minorities from the 'people' as much as it excludes elites. For Laclau (2005), however, it is precisely its ability to articulate the heterogeneous minorities who are part of an oppressed majority that gives populism its political value and enables it to embrace pluralism. Populism, it appears, can be equally understood as a source of a radical democratic impetus or of danger to democracy. Populism is in the latter sense, a 'permanent shadow of modern representative democracy, and a constant peril' (Muller, 2016, p. 11). Arditi (2004) sees populism as a 'spectre', echoing the opening lines of Ionescu and Gellner's 1970s volume on the subject (Ionescu & Gellner, 1974). It accompanies democracy but haunts it. He also sees it as a mirror, 'through which democracy can look at the rougher, less palatable edges that remain veiled by the gentrifying veneer of its liberal format' (Arditi, 2007, p. 60). Francisco Panizza, working on Latin America, chose 'mirror' and 'spectre' also. Populism reflects back to liberal democracy, weaknesses in the very articulation of liberalism and democracy:

> In common with caudillos, and in contrast with the political forms of liberal democracy based on strong institutions and checks and balances, populist leaders are a disturbing intrusion into the uneasy articulation of liberalism and democracy, and raise the spectre of a tyranny with popular support.
>
> (Panizza, 2005, p. 18)

Whether 'mirror' or the rather more prescriptive 'shadow' or more alarmist 'spectre', populism does pose a challenge to the meaning and practice of liberal democracy. Indeed, it has been argued precisely that

> [theoretically], populism is most fundamentally juxtaposed to liberal democracy, rather than to democracy per se or to any other model of democracy.

> Empirically, most relevant populist actors mobilise within a liberal democratic framework, i.e., a system that either *is* or *aspires to be* liberal democratic.
>
> (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 1–2)

Populism reflects back to liberal democracy not just a spectre to haunt it or a shadow to pursue it, but its failures and weaknesses to fulfil its promise to deliver fairness through representation. For Kenneth Roberts, 'populism is a permanent possibility where representative institutions are weak, fragile or ineffective at articulating and responding to social concerns' (Roberts, 2013, p. 38). Populism's radical potential for Laclau is precisely in its capacity to expose this failure, through the articulation and mobilisation of those excluded as a result of it. The people may not be already aware of a will to be represented. Rather, marginal sectors require the constitution of such a will. This requires representation through identification, as a *prerequisite* for their participation as political subjects of and in politics. The representative is democratic because he/she offers this point of *identification* which enables the marginal sectors to become subjects (Laclau, 2005, p. 158). The problem that Laclau also recognises, however, is the tension between the 'representative' in this sense, often a leader with the skills to connect with the 'people', and the participation of the people:

> What constitutes a legitimate question, is whether there is a tension between the moment of popular participation and the moment of the leader, (and) if the predominance of the latter might not lead to the limitation of the former. It is true that all populism is exposed to this danger, but there is no law in bronze which determines that the manifest destiny of populism is to succumb in this way.
>
> (Laclau, 2006, pp. 61–62, translation – J.P.)

Laclau, it should be acknowledged understands the 'people' as a fundamentally political category whose 'agency' is, nevertheless, contingent (Laclau, 2005, p. 224). Others turn to a more abstract and mythical 'people' in order to mobilise a subject for change. In both cases, and whether it be left or right, these processes expose how difficult change has become within liberal democratic procedures and how as a consequence, citizenship can easily end up a meaningless exercise in powerlessness. Laclau's proposition is a serious counter position, which he has argued, ultimately contributes to democracy. Democracy presupposes a democratic subject, but one whose 'emergence depends on the horizontal articulation between equivalential demands' (Laclau, 2005, p. 171). However, his concession to the dangers is also significant. At the end of the day, what ensures the democratic character of the emancipated subjects and their capacity to further democratise their societies? Given how strongly the State figures in both populist and neo-populist experiences in Latin America, is there in fact a greater tension than Laclau would admit, between the mobilisation of the people to transform the State and the mobilisation of the people to democratise the polity? At the end of the day is liberal citizenship the only guarantee of democracy and ultimately the only

democratic means by which the marginalised can find ways to participate meaningfully and transform their condition?

Many have questioned 'populism' as a category or phenomenon that can sum up all the varied experiences given that name in Latin America. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to enter into the debates on definitions, ambiguities, conceptual utility or empirical accuracy. It is rather to explore whether the debate itself does not reproduce the trap, whereby liberal democracy (citizen) and populism (people) are juxtaposed and dichotomised, without considering other potential ways of imagining the political subject and democracy. Latin America, it is argued, is a valuable source for other ways of imagining the subject. Beyond 'citizen' or 'people', arguably it is possible to think of the political subject as neither a passive liberal citizen nor a mobilised populist subject. What would it mean for democracy to think of the subject as democratically conscious, politically active and 'participatory'? However, first, we need to understand a bit more the logics behind the constructions of 'citizen' or 'people' in Latin America and the ongoing difficulties of democratisation in the region.

'Citizen', 'people' and Latin America's democratic and authoritarian pendulum

Latin America's fragmented and insecure democratic orders

If ancient and liberal republicanisms were confused in the mind of the Great Liberator, they have over time, remained persistent foundations for quite distinct political imaginations among Latin America's political actors. The juxtaposition is in reality more complex, but highlights how Latin America has never quite resolved the struggle between its democratic and authoritarian personalities.

The outcome is a somewhat eclectic and contingent combination of both in the practice of politics in the region. Whitehead (2013) calls this a 'kaleidoscope' that is best understood inductively, through exploring what governments on the ground are actually doing. His point is well taken, and draws attention to the fragmented democratic orders in which liberal democratic forms are remote from institutional practices and are associated with extreme inequality and political exclusion. On the other hand, discursive commitment to collective rights can be associated with personalistic authoritarianisms. Both emerge within institutional structures that are limited in reach, accountability and integrity, although populism is most closely associated by analysts with weakening institutions. Histories of clientelism and patronage have always undermined the claim of parties to articulate voters around programmes and policies. The ineffectiveness and outright corruption of security and justice institutions blight political participation and trust in a region which has 8 per cent of the world's population but accounts for 37 per cent of the world's homicides (Chioda, 2017, p. 1). A division between 'right' and 'left' does not capture sufficiently some of the underlying, violence reproducing problems of the political order itself. At times, this explicit division between right and left is present and certainly matters in terms of social policy, for instance. However, within the

right and within the left, there are also many significant political shades. As Whitehead (2013) notes, there are democratic as well as illiberal potentialities within as well as between these distinct conceptual umbrellas for doing politics.

Authoritarian and democratic tendencies within right and left political projects

On the right, for example, the differences between former President Uribe of Colombia (2002–2010) and his former Minister of Defence and successor President Santos (2010–2018) have been wide and deep. Uribe had populist characteristics (although he is rarely associated with populism as such, see Bejarano, 2013) in his disdain for institutions, his anti-Bogota elite rhetoric, his practice of direct communication with people and his need for an enemy (the FARC guerrillas). An eclectic former party 'liberal', populist and social conservative, he was also not adverse to tacit alliances with paramilitary armed groups. He was restrained by the progressive 1991 Constitution in Colombia, that in the wake of a Peace Process opened up politics to minority voices, recognised the value of participation (a part of the Constitution which was never implemented in the way imagined, however) and set up a Constitutional Court that prevented Uribe winning the right to stand for a third term. President Santos is precisely from that Bogota elite, and is a more classical centrist liberal, who studied at the London School of Economics and has an affection for sociologist Anthony Giddens and the 'Third Way'. His pragmatic calculations led him to collaborate with the Uribe project, but ultimately to secure a peace deal with the FARC as President in 2016. His very centrist and cerebral intellectualism, however, is also an obstacle to the sustainability of his political project as others connect better with the 'people' and the 'authoritarian citizens' (Pearce, 2017), who in the face of ongoing violence, criminality and insecurity are easily persuaded into illiberal positions.

On the left in Latin America, the differences as well as similarities among Chavez, Morales and Correa, political leaders most frequently associated with populism and other left political projects which appear closer or more distant to characteristics of populism, have been amply discussed (Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, 2010; de la Torre and Arnson, 2013; de la Torre, 2015). Attitudes towards institutions, constitutions, leadership, social movements and markets, direct and electoral democracy have been explored in an effort to find the coherent conceptual threads that differentiate the 'populist' variants of a left politics from more reforming left democratic experiments. Evo Morales in Bolivia could be said to have democratised his country through the unprecedented inclusion of indigenous voices and (to some extent) recognition of collective rights. This created an accountability to his social movement base which, however, proved problematic when it came to economic decisions affecting indigenous land and resources, leading to an increased use of executive power. Correa, however, overrode indigenous movements and their struggle to defend land from natural resource exploitation, and declared a 'Citizens Revolution' in Ecuador. In so doing, he also centralised power. Chavez consolidated his power and support after a struggle

between 2001 and 2004, and introduced experiments in communal participation aimed at building support as well as giving the poorest a voice. However, this became increasingly top-down and clientelistic, strengthening the 'leader' while enabling him to 'modify the undertaking that had first given him legitimacy' (Lopez Maya & Panzarelli, 2013, p. 266). After his death, Nicolas Maduro attempted to continue to drive through the Bolivarian revolution, but without the charisma of his predecessor or the oil revenues and in an atmosphere of increasing polarisation.

De la Torre and Arnson (2013, pp. 9–13) highlight five features that connect the three governments. They are revolutions carried out through elections, not armed struggle, they are carried out in the name of democracy, they aim to refound the nation through expanded instruments for direct and semi-direct citizen participation, they rely on state economic intervention and redistribution to address the substantive components of democracy; fifthly, they see themselves as part of a continental even worldwide movement of realignment in international politics. At the end of the day, however, the conclusion is of a deep ambiguity with democratic ideas. Yet, as Peruzzotti (2013, p. 62) points out, these are present in the notion of democracy itself.

This conclusion returns us to the theme with which this chapter opened, that of entrapment between philosophies from European classical and Enlightenment traditions that have reached Latin America in distinctly hybrid form. Leonardo Avritzer argues, that from the moment of their formation, 'Latin American societies had to face the tension between their liberal normative horizon and the impossibility of applying liberalism to their existing structures' (Avritzer, 2002, p. 71). Ultimately, these classical traditions give us only partial insights into the politics of the region. The benchmarks they imply for measuring attitudes towards democracy as well as varied democratic regimes, as outlined in the next section, record the democratic disillusionment which has crept in over the years. However, as the final section will show, this is only if Latin America's own contribution to democratic thinking and practice is not taken into account or is lumped into the 'participatory' excesses of populism. Behind the broad brush descriptions are specific processes that illustrate the imaginative democratic potential in the region. These reveal much more than a focus on the institutions and leaderships. However, they have tended to disappear as the story of democratic disillusionment has grown.

From democratic transition to democratic disillusionment: Latin America's democracies against the classic benchmarks

The great hopes for democracy in Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s gradually gave way to scepticism and disenchantment. The hopes were based on the belief that civilian rule and elected government in the wake of prolonged periods of military, dictatorial, one party and authoritarian governments would be sufficient to make the region a major player in democracy's third wave and bring political stability to the region. Among those 'from below' who had struggled against torture, extrajudicial executions and disappearance, there was also a hope that democracy would usher in new opportunities for marginal voices to achieve social

and economic justice as well as human rights and political representation. The role of collective action and civil society in bringing down authoritarian governments was recognised, but the democratic transition model was based on the restoration of formal and institutional processes and a liberal interpretation of 'civil society' as a mechanism of accountability rather than propositions, to be institutionalised rather than activated (Pearce, 1997).

As the limitations in democratic practice in the region became apparent, despite a broad adherence to the procedural minimums of Robert A. Dahl's (1972) democracy as 'polyarchy', more than one leading Latin American political scientist, turned to new ways of conceptualising the variant of liberal democracy emergent in the region. Guillermo O'Donnell, for instance, famously described it as 'delegative' that is handing power over to the executive as opposed to the classical representative model (O'Donnell, 1994). Despite vertical accountability through reasonably free and fair elections, such democracy lacked horizontal accountability, through checks on the executive, safeguards through independent courts and the rule of law and protection of minority and individual rights. In the 2000s, O'Donnell and others turned to Europe once again for a source of democratic thinking, as for example Marshall (1950) on citizenship. Marshall attracted interest in Latin America among liberal academics, because his understanding of rights brought social not just civil and political rights into the discussion and thus the question of the substantive rather than formal exercise of citizenship. At the same time, citizenship seemed to offer a potential for overcoming the deficit in horizontal accountability that they had acknowledged. This approach reinforced the discursive legacy of Montesquieu in the construction and meaning of democracy in the region, and the checks and balances it requires. The 'citizen' entered the vocabulary of democratic thinking in Latin America. However, for many, it could not quite capture lived experiences of marginality, and particularly those which took collective rather than individual form, such as indigenous rights. In the meantime, authoritarianisms persisted, and demands for indigenous rights over land and resources, for instance, were often met with repression, in the name of the liberalised economies offering progress to all 'citizens'.

The citizenship debate under the neo-liberal turn in Latin America was not the same as that of post-World War II Europe, when Marshall's influence was first felt and when a 'welfare state' emerged. The 'social question', understood as poverty, was recognised, but in relationship to the market. Privatised solutions to welfare were sought in the form of NGOs and civil society as a third leg in a partnership between civil society, state and market (Howell & Pearce, 2001). This intruded into the very concept of citizenship as an identity, giving it a consumerist rather than rights bearing character. Dagnino (2005) even talks of 'neoliberal citizenship'. This she contrasts with those creative efforts in the region to construct new social rights not only with respect to equality, but also with respect to the right to difference (Dagnino, 2005, p. 8). Neo-liberalism began to separate out the political allegiances and projects of the new millennium. Here, left and right did divide. However, in a context of great inequality and growing physical insecurity, democracy itself remained a bifurcated project, whose deepening was

an ambivalent aspiration within, as well as between, the contending constructions of the political subject as 'citizen' or 'people'.

The outcome has been a growing ambivalence also towards democracy itself. Delegative democracy was revisited years after O'Donnell's formulation, in order to explore the relationship to it of contemporary Latin America authoritarian trends. A special issue of the *Journal of Democracy* in 2016 was dedicated to the topic. Writing in the wake of a decade or more of sustained economic growth in Latin America from 2002, the concluding essay questioned the concept's emphasis on horizontal accountability (Luna & Vergara, 2016). Rather, the authors' suggested, there is also a serious problem of vertical accountability, of connections between state and citizen. They called it 'uprooted democracy'. They cite Chile and Brazil where institutions, notably political parties, which had previously aggregated, meditated and arbitrated interests and conflicts, had become ineffectual and lost legitimacy (Luna & Vergara, 2016, p. 162). The authors quote the non-identification with any political party emerging from the Latin American Public Opinion Poll Project known as Latinobarómetro, at record levels in 2014 of 77 per cent in Brazil and 87 per cent in Chile. Corruption scandals played a serious role in undermining trust in party systems which had previously been relatively robust. Trust in parties has declined everywhere, in fact.

The 2017 Latinobarómetro poll shows that on average in Latin America, political parties are at the bottom of a list of measuring trust in public institutions (church, armed forces, police, electoral institution, judiciary, government and congress). The church and the armed forces are at the top with 65 and 46 per cent respectively, while political parties are on 15 per cent and Congress on 22 per cent (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2017, p. 21). Brazil by 2017 had dropped to a 7 per cent confidence rate in its parties, with Mexico at 9 per cent. Only Uruguay's parties had the confidence of 25 per cent of the population. In this poll, the pollsters also explore the reasons for the lack of confidence and found that 75 per cent of Latin Americans believe that government is carried out to benefit a few powerful groups. In terms of general satisfaction with democracy, less than a third of the population in 10 countries expressed satisfaction, and in only 3 countries, Uruguay (57 per cent), Nicaragua (52 per cent) and Ecuador (51 per cent) was there a majority who felt satisfied. In the case of Ecuador, associated for many with the populist project of Correa, it is interesting to note that his government has been one of the few to drastically cut its homicide rate through police reform and other innovations, from 22 per 100,000 in 2011 to 8.3 in 2014 (Insight Crime, 2015). It is also interesting to note, that 78 per cent of Venezuelans still supported democracy (Insight Crime, 2015, p. 11). As a general trend, the editors speak of a 'democracy with diabetes', in a state of slow decline which is not necessarily so noticeable, but which is palpable and potentially dangerous. They also note that this trend is despite over a decade of economic growth and the emergence of a middle class in Latin America.

There are inevitably many differences between countries and explanations of trajectories that can only be explained through deep knowledge of national contexts and more ethnographic, qualitative research. For instance, it is very intriguing how

Venezuelans have not given up on democracy even though they are not satisfied with their own. However, in general, neither government in the name of the 'citizen' nor in the name of the 'people' appears to have established deep roots of commitment to regimes in Latin America. Extreme inequality (Latin America is the most unequal region in the world), government corruption, institutional ineffectiveness and the rise of organised crime, are among the factors which might partially explain the disillusionment.

However, the purpose of this chapter is to suggest that, arguably, Latin America is looking in the wrong place for a source for a democratic framework and alternative approach to relationships between state and citizen. Or at least, the way that it has imported such frameworks from Europe, have tended to leave the region with two sources of thought, each of which has proved unable to bridge the divides between individuals, collectivities and political and economic power. At the same time, these distances have enabled some states to be captured to different degrees by powerful and organised economic and political groups and interests, some of them criminal, further deepening the alienation and cynicism. While electoral politics were a progressive development after years of authoritarian rule, they have not proved a gateway to sustained democratic development. The final section explores participatory action and experiments, rooted in Latin America's own political thinking and experiences and which are mostly not recognised as such in the literature on populism and representative democracy, or else just reduced to one or other of these frameworks.

The participatory subject?

Participatory theories, practices and utopias

A great deal of the discussion on Latin American populism is driven by a scepticism towards its use of the 'people' to undermine democratic constitutionalism and institutionality and to pave the way for authoritarian leaderships that concentrate power. However, both populism and liberal citizenship could also be critiqued from the perspective of participatory thinking. From this lens, the critique counters both liberal assumptions of the 'passive' citizen–consumer–voter as much as populism's 'people', mobilised by a leader who then substitutes or suppresses popular activism as time goes by. The difficulty of using this alternative lens is that while there is quite a strong literature on participation, there is as yet no widely accepted theory of participatory democracy. In an article by renowned participatory theorist, Pateman (2012), where she revisits participatory democracy over four decades after her classic study of *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Pateman, 1970), she argues that participatory democracy is an empirical not just normative proposition. Participatory democratic theory is distinguished from the discussion on deliberative democracy, for instance, because

> it is an argument about changes that will make our own social and political life more democratic, that will provide opportunities for individuals to

> participate in decision-making in their everyday lives as well as in the wider political system. It is about democratising democracy.
>
> (Pateman, 2012, p. 10)

She turns to Latin America for her sources of empirical examples of this possibility, particularly the participatory budgeting experiments that spread from Porto Alegre to Europe and Asia in the 2000s. She notes that their expansion did not always maintain the essence of the original experiment. This, she emphasises, was not about special events attended by selected citizens nor a supplement to existing democratic institutions. Rather it was an exercise in democratising the city, including its poorest, in the decisions on key aspects of the municipal budget (Pateman, 2012, p. 11). Pateman does not, however, go into the background to Porto Alegre's participatory experiment. This would show that the capacity for participatory action and judgement does not come out of nowhere. In Brazil and other parts of Latin America, the truly innovative forms of participatory action come from histories of social movement activism, dating at least from struggles against dictatorship and militarism and sometimes earlier. These in turn have been influenced by the process of critical self and political reflexivity generated by humanistic and radical thinkers, such as Paulo Freire. In my own field visits to Porto Alegre, for instance, the influence on participants of popular education methods was clear. Additional to these influences have been multiple experiences of self-organising and generation of what Ferrero (2014) calls 'democratic subjectivities', which he studies in the Brazilian and Argentinian cases. A participatory democratic lens does not have to be a utopian fiction for envisioning alternative democracies. It can enable us to distinguish between participatory organising with democratic potential and populist mobilisation which cedes horizontal power to the vertical command of the leader.

Social movements as democratising and knowledge producing

Latin America's history of social movements does not have to be viewed as 'the myth of the people in action' behind which is hidden the 'diversity of interests, class, and ethnic positions of those who acted in the name of a unitary will' (de la Torre, 2015, p. 365). It is *potentially*, the source also of a democratic consciousness and capacity for judgement, which could make citizenship meaningful for the poorest while democratising democracy itself. Of course, social movements notoriously ebb and flow, just as more institutional participatory experiments, including participatory budgeting, do not necessarily outlast particular historical moments. The Porto Alegre experiment itself, began in 1993 as a radical grass roots initiative led by a radical Workers Party municipal government still with strong ties to the activist history. However, it was in a delicate transition by 2005–2009 to what Baierle calls a 'tool for good governance' (Baierle, 2010, p. 51). The discussion on populism recognises the role social movements have played in the coming to power of left governments in Latin America, however with some exceptions, not enough attention is paid to the role movements have played as

sources of democratic practice and knowledge. Rather, they are reduced to a 'mass' pitted against the 'elite'. Ken Roberts recognises that there are distinct debates in the literature on this and that

> whether or not they share the populist label, popular subjects that are relatively autonomous, self-constituted, and mobilised from below have different political and organisational resources than those that are stitched together around the figure of a dominant personality. The ability of the former to penetrate state institutions, shape and contest public policies, and hold leaders accountable is surely greater than that of the latter.
>
> (Roberts, 2015, pp. 145–146)

Jennifer Collins tries to bring this out empirically in her discussion of New Left Experiences in Bolivia and Ecuador, with reference to the broader debate on populism and those that focus on a leader-centric analysis. Both Morales and Correa, she points out came to power in countries already known for their powerful, organised and autonomous social movements (Collins, 2014, p. 67). Their presidencies, she argues, 'grew out of a fertile political soil enriched by years of social movement organising and protest' (Collins, 2014). This was in contrast to Venezuela, where Chavez was elected in 1998 on the wave of social unrest, but it was not organised (Collins, 2014, p. 72). These points are certainly important. However, they do not explain the actual processes of collective action that enable people to generate their own critical understanding of their world and how to change it.

There are many studies to draw on however, which do give an account of this. There are studies, for example, that show how individuals develop their sense of agency through social and collective action. Such action can generate transformative experiences of self-enlightenment and worth as well as new knowledges and readiness to cooperate with others.Such agency is not so easily manipulated by either leaders or elected representatives. Rather than a populist turn, such processes can even construct a new understanding of citizenship. Carlos Forment, for instance, has studied the Argentine factory workers movement in the midst of the worst crisis in Argentine's history at the beginning of the 2000s. He shows how

> in the process of reincorporating themselves into public life, factory workers transformed themselves into rights-bearing citizens. Prior to recuperating their firm, most of them had never engaged in acts of protest or discussed any significant issue amongst themselves, including those related to working conditions in the plant.
>
> (Forment, 2013, p. 213).

It is not that social mobilisation cannot be captured and instrumentalised. This clearly happens. It is more to say that this is contingent, it is not always the case, and those other cases are relevant and significant. Acknowledgement of these

experiences provide alternative ways of imagining the political subject, as self-constructed by intelligent and thoughtful people, with histories of impoverishment, exploitation and powerlessness but who, in certain conditions, overcome this without denying the rights of others.

Participatory experimentation and its contingent outcomes

The literature on collective action tends not to engage with the literature on participatory experimentation, although arguably these are complementary (Pearce, 2004). This is partly explained by the ambiguity for some around the meaning and purpose of these different forms of political engagement. Is collective action a radical democratic project in gestation? Or is it a mobilisation against oppression? Or is it to advance specific demands which demobilise once goals have been attained and a modified new order restored? Similarly, is participation within the prevailing institutional order, a meaningless exercise with permanent risks of cooption? Or is it an exercise in democratic practice, such as new forms of accountability (Peruzzotti & Smulowitz, 2006) which potentially transform the political arena and eventually, the socio economic structure? Is it 'only' for the poor and their access to services or also about their inclusion as citizens alongside others in society with equal rights?

Of course, in the end, all these and other goals are likely to be present in the minds of those involved. It is why Laclau's 'articulation of differences' becomes such an effective political strategy, by overcoming the many differences of experience and purpose with equivalences. One of these is to give an accelerated political direction to pent-up demands from the most excluded. However, if Laclau's own doubts about whether the leader will ultimately limit the process of peoples' participation are to be addressed, attention must be paid to how participants gain their understanding of themselves as participatory subjects. This includes how participatory spaces enable people to learn to take account of the needs and interests of others and build a responsive and effective institutional framework to replace the often corrupt and unaccountable political order that prevails in much of Latin America.

Latin America's experimentation with participatory institutionally was particularly rich in the 1990s and into the 2000s. There is no room to go into detail here, but numerous studies are available, particularly but not only, in Brazil (Nylen, 2003; Wampler, 2007; Avritzer, 2009, 2013; Selee and Peruzzotti, 2009; Pearce, 2010; Goldfrank, 2011; Baiocchi, Heller and Silva, 2011; Tranjan, 2016). Some of these studies have been comparative within Brazil and others between Brazil and other countries. Avritzer (2013), for example, concludes in his comparison between participatory experiments in Chile, Brazil and Uruguay:

> We can see not only the importance of participation to the political system, but also its importance to furthering social inclusion. Brazil in this way became one of the models for contesting liberal citizenship in South America. Its case shows that active citizenship, public participation and broad access to public

> goods can help strengthen democracy as well as the access to social services by excluded sectors of the population. This model can be reproduced in other parts of South America if other countries manage to reconstruct systems of representation and to connect it with new forms of participation, which is, at this point uncertain at best.
>
> (Avritzer, 2013, p. 235)

In my own comparative work on experiments with participation in three cities in Latin America (Porto Alegre, Caracas and Medellin) with a team of Latin American scholars (Pearce, 2010), we found a considerable variation in terms of the way the experiments were framed politically and the impacts of these variations. For instance, the original Porto Alegre experience was influenced by understandings of the Paris Commune (author's interview with Ubiritan de Sousa, September, 2006). It aimed to prevent the bureaucratisation of the process through new layers of representation. Thus, one of the principles was direct participation, along with self-organisation, budget transparency and social justice (Baierle, 2010). A more liberal governance framework under the administration which took over from the PT in 2005, emphasised Local Solidarity Governance and state–civil society partnerships, aimed at reducing dependence on the state. Its more radical predecessor had shown the importance of committed political leadership. This leadership ensured that the direct participation of the poor in the budget process and the rules of the budget process themselves, nurtured a sense that participation was worthwhile. Our own study showed how some poor regions were prepared to give up their own projects for those of other regions where the need was greatest (a Porto Alegre neighbourhood is known as a 'região' in Portuguese). This is the kind of quality of judgement that can emerge where participation is taken seriously.

In Medellin, the framework for participation, which began under the modernising Mayor, Sergio Fajardo in 2004, combined the promotion of liberal citizenship norms with a robust encouragement of participatory process from the NGO allies of the administration. Impetus for this rather strange combination lies in the particular history of this city, where the exercise of substantive rights has been severely limited by violence as well as practices of political, social and economic exclusion common to many parts of Latin America. The process of participatory planning and budgeting was an effort to build a more inclusive citizenship, which could challenge the power of intermediaries who build their power base on the exclusions of the poorer sectors of the population. People were encouraged to come together in their neighbourhoods both as individuals and members of associations and to deliberate about and negotiate the best way to prioritise spending for their area. The process was always fragile, dependent on the nature of the political commitment from the municipality (as in Porto Alegre) and undermined by the ongoing presence of violent actors who penetrated the process for their own ends in some areas over time. Nevertheless, the process did have transformatory impacts, some of which (ongoing informal conversations by the author in Medellin have shown) clearly persist in memories, if not in the actuality, among participants.

In Caracas, the participatory experiment of the Communal Councils, which began formally in 2006, were integral to Chavez's efforts to institutionalise his ideas of peoples' power. Our own research in 2008/2009 was at the beginning of the process. However, the tension between the process of embedding democratic and participatory consciousness and the agenda of building an uncritical base for the Chavista state project was apparent. An example was our work with the women activists of the participatory water committees (Mesas de Agua in Spanish) of La Pedrera, one of the poorest neighbourhoods of Caracas. These women had gone through important processes of self-realisation under Chavez. The women were all loyal to Chavez and acknowledged the sense of recognition and dignity they had gained under his Presidency. However, they were also living in an area where water infrastructure and supply was so poor that many went for 40 days without water. Improving this was one of the aims of the participatory water committees. The scale of the problem and the ability of the State to respond, however, remained highly deficient. While the women were working with the water company to install new pipes, their houses collapsed in a landslide and the government was very slow in responding. While some in the neighbourhood were preparing to march to Miraflores and protest outside the presidential palace, these women participants refused to criticise the President. As more studies have appeared on the role of the Councils, the tensions and potentialities have become more evident. A later study suggested that the Councils are neither a subordinated social movement nor a radicalised political subject, but rather illustrate the 'highly diverse ways in which grassroots actors perceive and make use of participatory initiatives' (Wilde, 2017, p. 23).

Latin America's participatory experiments do not 'prove' that participatory democracy is a non-utopian possibility. However, they are real examples of the potential of meaningful spaces for people to grow their democratic subjectivity. They also show the contingency involved, in terms of whether the outcome is ephemeral, recognisable as a democratic political shift, or in permanent risk of instrumentalisation. These variations do not, however, deny the significance of the processes for giving us insights into political subjectivity beyond the liberal 'citizen' and the mobilised 'people'.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that it is misleading to reduce Latin America's democratic trajectory to the struggle between liberal citizenship and populism. Populism can be seen as a spectre, shadow or mirror to liberal democracy. It can also be seen as a necessary rupture in political orders that represent the interests of an exclusionary minority. Liberal democracy might safeguard institutional norms and constitutional protections. It also has been shown to preserve a status quo which fails to enable the meaningful exercise of rights for many citizens. Latin America's social activism and participatory experiments cannot be reduced to either one of these frameworks for interpreting where the democratising impetus of society lies. It is argued here that they are experiences which in their own right, offer an

important lens for understanding real but contingent possibilities for democracy, in and beyond the region.

Notes

1 Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 1998, and won four elections before dying of cancer in 2011. His successor Nicolas Maduro continues the project known as 'Chavismo'. Evo Morales came to power in Bolivia in 2005, winning three elections, but losing the 2016 referendum on lifting limits to presidential terms. However, in 2017, the constitutional court eliminated term limits and Morales announced he would run in 2019. Rafael Correa was elected in 2006 and did three terms, before ceding to another candidate of the left, who won in 2017. There are many debates on the relationship of other left Presidents of the 2000s to populism.

2 Alexandria founded by Alexander the Great in 332 B.C., was a centre of ancient Greek culture and politics.

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