

Systems Security

Operating Systems

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**Real-world protocols
using the ideas so far**

Message Authentication Code (MAC)



Message Authentication Code

- ▶ MAC — Message Authentication Code
 - ▶ Designed for checking **integrity** and **authentication**
 - ▶ Based on the assumption that a shared secret key has already been established

MAC: the basic idea

HMAC — Hash based MAC

- ▶ Using two padding sequences — outer padding is **5C5C5C...** (in hexadecimal) and inner padding is **363636...**
- ▶ Use the XOR operation to add padding before applying the secure hash function (SHA)
- ▶ Apply the secure hash function twice



HMAC: pseudocode

```
function hmac (key, message)
  if (length(key) > blocksize) then
    key = hash(key) // keys too long are
shortened
  if (length(key) < blocksize) then
    key = key || [0x00 * (blocksize -
length(key))] // keys too short are zero-padded
  o_key_pad = [0x5c * blocksize] XOR key
  i_key_pad = [0x36 * blocksize] XOR key
  return hash(o_key_pad || hash(i_key_pad
|| message))
end function
```


Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- ▶ The older generations of the protocol are called the **Secure Socket Layer (SSL)**
- ▶ The foundation of the secure HTTP protocol, secure electronic mail, and most secure protocols in the Internet — the foundation of e-commerce!
- ▶ The most up-to-date is TLS 1.2, used in most modern web browsers
 - ▶ Considered secure against all known attacks

The TLS Handshake Protocol

- ▶ A client sends **ClientHello**
 - ▶ Highest protocol version of TLS supported
 - ▶ A random number

The TLS Handshake Protocol

- ▶ The server sends **ServerHello**
 - ▶ Chosen protocol version
 - ▶ A random number

The TLS Handshake Protocol

- ▶ The server sends **Certificate**
- ▶ The server sends **ServerHelloDone**
- ▶ The client sends **ClientKeyExchange**
 - ▶ with a **PreMasterSecret**, encrypted using the public key within the server certificate
- ▶ Both server and client generate the secret key

TLS Handshake Protocol

- ▶ The client sends **ChangeCipherSpec**
 - ▶ “Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated and encrypted.”
- ▶ The client sends **Finished**, which is authenticated and encrypted

TLS Handshake Protocol

- ▶ The server sends **ChangeCipherSpec**
 - ▶ “Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated and encrypted”
- ▶ The server sends **Finished**, which is authenticated and encrypted

The choice of MAC

- ▶ After the session is established using the TLS handshake protocol, HMAC with **SHA-256** is used for MAC

User authentication in OS

Authentication with passwords

- ▶ Something that a user **knows** — extremely common
- ▶ Problems are plenty —
 - ▶ More passwords are better, but a user won't like it
 - ▶ How easy it is to guess a password?
 - ▶ How easy it is to obtain a password without guessing?
 - ▶ sniffing and phishing are common techniques

Guessing passwords

```
LBL> telnet elxsi
ELXSI AT LBL
LOGIN: root
PASSWORD: root
INCORRECT PASSWORD, TRY AGAIN
LOGIN: guest
PASSWORD: guest
INCORRECT PASSWORD, TRY AGAIN
LOGIN: uucp
PASSWORD: uucp
WELCOME TO THE ELXSI COMPUTER AT LBL
```

Storing passwords

- ▶ The system must store passwords in order to perform authentication
- ▶ How can passwords be protected?
 - ▶ Rely on file protection and store them in protected files
 - ▶ compare typed password with stored password
 - ▶ Rely on encryption
 - ▶ store them encrypted — **in readable files?**
 - ▶ use one way function (cryptographic hash)

Example: PHP website

- ▶ A website must store **sensitive** information, such as user passwords, in encrypted form

```
function get_password_hash($password)
{
    global $dbc;

    return mysqli_real_escape_string
        ($dbc, hash_hmac('sha256', $password,
            'c#haRl891', true));
}
```

Storing passwords in Unix

- ▶ Password file: **/etc/passwd**
 - ▶ It's a world readable file!
- ▶ **/etc/passwd** entries
 - ▶ User name, password (encrypted), user id, group id, home directory, shell preference, name

Dictionary attacks

- ▶ If encrypted passwords are stored in world readable files and you see that another user's encrypted password is the same as yours
 - ▶ Their password is also the same!
- ▶ If the encryption method is well known, attackers can —
 - ▶ Encrypt an entire dictionary
 - ▶ Compare encrypted dictionary words with encrypted passwords until they find a match

Salting passwords (Morris and Thompson, 1979)

- ▶ The salt is a random number combined with the password prior to encryption
 - ▶ It changes when the password is changed
 - ▶ The salt is stored with the encrypted password
- ▶ Different user's with the same password see different encrypted values in **/etc/passwd**
- ▶ Dictionary attack requires time-consuming re-encoding of entire dictionary for every salt value


Challenge-Response Authentication

- ▶ Simple: Ask a list of questions that only the authentic user knows the answers to
- ▶ More complex — used by SSH
 - ▶ The user generates a public-private key pair
 - ▶ The public key is stored on the remote server
 - ▶ The private key is stored in main memory, or generated on-the-fly when the user is prompted a “passphrase”
 - ▶ The private key is used to authenticate the user with the public key on the server

Best practice: **two-factor authentication**

Common attacks

Buffer overflow attacks



Example C program

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buffer[256];
    if (argc < 2) return -1;
    else {
        // correct version is
        // strncpy(buffer, argv[1], 255);
        strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
        return 0;
    }
}
```

Defeating Buffer Overflow Attacks

- ▶ Fixing buffer overflow bugs one at a time
- ▶ Hardware solutions
 - ▶ CPU includes the ability to mark a page non-executable
 - ▶ NX feature in AMD and Intel x86 CPUs
 - ▶ Linux and Windows XP SP2 support the feature

That's it for this course

Thank you