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Martin J. Sklar

On the Proletarian Revolution and the End of Political-Economic Society

I. Historical Consciousness: the Archetypal and the Social

For the most part, modern U.S. intellectuals, and particularly those who most claim to be critically conscious, to be rigorously and steadily engaged in developing their understanding, are devoid of a serious conception of the destiny of man. To put it more precisely, they are devoid of a conception of a nature peculiar to man as an historical self-producing species. With respect to the possibility of their living, which means behaving and acting as well as thinking, in accordance with their ostensible principles, ideals, and hopes, this quality is their chief characteristic. It is, indeed, the quality that chiefly characterizes their mode of feeling and thought, their mode of acting in their day-to-day lives.

Several different abstract definitions of man have been in the recent past, and some still are, current among U.S. intellectuals and in the public discourse, definitions associated with such terms as Industrial Man, Post-Industrial Man, Political Man, Psychological Man, Religious Man, Secular Man, Linear Man, Media Man, Technical Man, Global-Village Man, One-Dimensional Man. All these modestly state the denial or nonconceptualization of a human-rooted destiny as a dimension of man's historical reality. The denial of or aversion to a concept of man's destiny in terms of man's historical nature, is the way modern U.S. intellectuals acknowledge the renunciation of history as the study of a necessary process of man's development, as a science of laws of man's social development, their inability or unwillingness to conceptualize history as such a science of laws and act upon that conceptualization. It is the way in which they withdraw 'purpose' from history, which itself is only a conception of history held by men who withdraw themselves from creating, affirming, and laboring to actualize a purpose in history, who acquiesce in acquiring a prescribed purpose rather than fashion a purpose for themselves. It is the characteristic of the consciousness of apparently purposeless but more or less solidly functioning men, whose purposelessness is only an unacknowledged mode of their primarily living out a purpose which they have not created and chosen for themselves but which others, from the past and in the present, have created and chosen for them.

Variously, such men complain of, or detachedly comment upon, the anomie and malaise of modern society and modern life, yearn abstractly for Community, identify glibly purposefulness with totalitarianism, and celebrate the obsolescence of 'ideology' in the unmediated joy of feeling relieved of the burden of a self-imposed purpose. Such men, that is particularly those most avowedly critical and most rigorously and steadily engaged in developing their understanding, if not their reason, those most vociferous in denouncing 'mindless

acts' and demonstrative disruptions by the youth, or in short, the generally of intellectuals, neither exercise control over the dominant institutions of their society, no less the immediate institutions within which they labor, nor place themselves in active opposition, rebellion, or insurrection against them. Their overtly unteleological, indeed anti-teleological, sophisticated and up-to-date style of thought merely faithfully expresses their purposeless mode of life, that is, their prescriptively purposeful mode of life. For them, blind fate, alias predetermination by 'objective conditions', replaces destiny. Or for the more patriotic carriers of this view among them, national destiny abstracted in terms of technology, wealth, and power, stands in for an historical human destiny.

The educated individual in modern U.S. who feels disaffected from his society, on the other hand, by and large neither comprehends a transhistorical destiny nor feels at home in his own world, in his own society. He feels no homogeneity with the society of his own times, and retreats into a pseudo-privatization or into supra-historical, formally rationalistic abstractions or mystifications. He can neither identify his estrangement or disaffection with a future rooted in a revolutionary comprehension of, and action transforming, the past society in its present form, nor revolutionize his society with his estrangement or disaffection. His disaffection, no less than the accommodation of his more conventional counterpart, stands as the hallmark of his loss of control over his own social life, and hence also his own personal life. It stands, that is, as the hallmark of his alienation from his fellow man and from himself. He glorifies his alienation from his fellow man and from himself. He glorifies his alienation, as he despises it, just as he glorifies his circumscribed personality in outward contrivances, as he despises his ineffectual personality, because he can neither struggle against his alienation nor comprehend, shape, and control his social relations and himself: he is acquiescing in his reduction to virtually a total object of 'social forces', of 'objective conditions'. In some cases he may seek a false escape from his own purposelessness by directly serving those who have power and who exercise it purposively -- in corporations, the state, policy-forming groups, etc.: The modern stoic resigning himself to objective reality, i.e., to serving Caesar, or, less ambitiously, to serving time. Yet, you'll often hear him clucking of freedom and human dignity.

This modern educated individual in the U.S. - accommodated and disaffected alike - shocking or flattering as it may seem to him, stands as the positive denouement of the outlook of those men who long ago expressed and personified revolutionary bourgeois liberty willfully disrupting established social relations in the name of republicanism, democracy, freedom, equality, fraternity. For what our modern intellectual would regard as sheer metaphysics, namely 'destiny', is only the consciousness of man's essential quality as a self-producing being elaborating his infinite potentialities in a developmental process of becoming, a consciousness that resided centrally though not adequately formed within bourgeois liberty in its revolutionary phase and from which it faded away as bourgeois society developed.

For bourgeois liberty in its revolutionary phase, the meaning of man coincided, not with a supra-mundane conception, nor with an historical conception, but with a particular societal conception, or conception of a particular society. This conception itself abstractly expressed, in ahistorical thought, and from the standpoint of the early bourgeoisie, the social relations of capitalism emerging from, and breaking up, the soil of the medieval world. The society it affirmed purported to validate the self-controlling, self-determining, self-mastering man, -- self-dependent for his means of life in economic activity, which in turn guaranteed the free expression of his personality as producer and appro-

priator of his material world and as participating citizen vigilantly safeguarding the eternal existence of the conceived societal type.

The revolutionary bourgeoisie, in other words, brought the archetypal freedom-concept out of the realm of literary myth and theological mystery, into the mundane world of social life: The Greek Prometheus and the Protestantized Christian god-man became the bourgeois citizen in the conceptualized bourgeois society. It was this intersecting of the archetypal and the social that powerfully inspirited the Puritan, the French, and the American bourgeois revolutionaries with the purposiveness, or sense of destiny, with which they reshaped their societies. But that intersecting no more proved durable than did the reshaping they found themselves engaged in corresponded with their expectations and intentions.

Bourgeois liberty itself both in theory and in fact constituted an all too historically constricted, and hence altogether inadequate, form of the self-mastering man; while at the same time, the societal conception corresponding to revolutionary bourgeois liberty, comprehended less and less of concrete historical reality the more bourgeois society developed along the lines of capitalist industrialization. First, ostensibly, the societal conception affirmed a mode of production (petty-proprietorship) and a political system (republic or parliamentary monarchism) as the means of the realization of the self-mastering personality. But the self-mastering personality itself resided, in this case, in the narrow confines of the bourgeois work-property system, wherein individuality and personality became virtually synonymous with wealth accumulation and appropriation. So that in the very essence of bourgeois liberty, the end and the means continuously underwent inversion, until that inversion became irreversible: that is, from a certain kind of man or personality as the end validated by a particular mode of production and societal type as the means, to a mode of production of wealth and a society conforming to it as the end, and man as the means. The inversion constantly erupted at the outset and can be observed in what appears as the inconsistencies or 'realistic' opportunism in the writings and political actions of, e.g., Locke and Jefferson. It found much less equivocal expression in the classical political-economic thought of the mercantilists, the physiocrats, Smith, Ricardo: from the health of man, to the wealth of nations.

Second, with the development of bourgeois liberty in real history, the condition of self-mastery for some became of necessity the condition of proletarianization for the many, who become reduced to the position of dependent 'factors' of production, employed as means by other men, the capitalists; and even the self-employed entrepreneur found that his self-directed activity resulted in social and economic consequences which did not remain the object of his control, but reacted upon and conditioned his activity as external forces estranged from his effective understanding, intentions, and will.

The more bourgeois society developed, the more the archetypal image, expressing more or less clearly man's essential nature as an historically developing being, expressing man's purpose or 'destiny', split off from social theoretical thought, just as in bourgeois reality, capital and the means of production split off from labor, and individual men became a means subordinate to the production of wealth as the end. The archetypal image increasingly receded to the realm of unactualized thought, especially to the sphere of aesthetics, divorced from effective social theory and practice, at best reproaching and denouncing the historical world. Social theory, on the other hand, became increasingly abstract and uncomprehending of real historical society in so far as it sought to portray capitalist society as validating the archetypal image. Or, where social

theory purported to be 'realistic', it surrendered the archetypal image altogether; it made 'objective society', or 'objective spirit', the subject of history, evolving 'naturally' in its fixed capitalist form according to 'laws' of technico-economic development, the imperatives of which determined men's social and individual behavior like unalterable laws of nature. The meaning of man underwent a reified reduction to correspond with functions made necessary by and accommodated to the specific structure of capitalist society, now made synonymous with history and indeed displacing man as the transhistorical being -- functions such as nation (and race), vocational specialization, consumption, divisions of production, mental and manual labor, etc., or romantically, as transcendent poet, rebellious mystic, 'free-floating' or critical intellectual, these too regarding man in terms of special function rather than as whole human being and citizen.

Bourgeois social theory denatured man and naturalized capitalist society, losing all sense of history as the development of self-producing human beings. This was the essence of positivism as it became the predominant current of social thought by the latter part of the 19th century and extending into the 20th to the present time. Comte's 'Religion of Man' quickly fell away as the husk it was, revealing the weed beneath -- the adulation of wealth in its abstract money form, technology, and national power alias 'advanced civilization', spreading to every corner of the world in imperialist domination.

The chief characteristic, referred to earlier, of the modern U.S. intellectuals is rooted in the demoralization, the dehumanization of social theory, attending the divorce of historical consciousness from archetypal consciousness, i.e., most especially from aesthetic consciousness, of social theory from ethical theory of man's creativity and self-determination (freedom), which sets in and fully develops with the evolution of capitalist industrial society. Lincoln Steffens once reported the traction magnate Patrick J. Calhoun to have remarked that U.S. workers were not working-class conscious but ruling-class numbed; in so far as this has been true, it only remains to observe that the numbness has never stopped with the industrial worker but has always spread to, and to a large extent from, the professionals, the sophisticated scholars and intellectuals, and sad to say many of the self-proclaimed socialists and Marxists themselves.

In a sense, then, we have come to a full, though unclosed, circle: from ahistorical rationalism of the 18th century to ahistorical positivism (or structural-functionalism) of the 20th century -- to the positive denouement of revolutionary bourgeois liberty in the shape of the generality of modern U.S. intellectuals, who stand, as it were, in a limbo of consciousness, neither sacred (archetypal) nor humanly profane.

But wherever the archetypal intersects with the social in a real unity, rather than a temporary rendezvous, the numbness wears off and historical consciousness rooted in man as self-determining, self-controlling, self-mastering doer and thinker floods in. Understood properly, this is the meaning of the archetypal -- it 'eternally recurs' because man is transhistorical while social systems are historically specific and ephemeral forms of man's development. As Marx put it, when 'peeled away', the 'narrow bourgeois form' of wealth, the production and accumulation of which appears as the end to which man is subordinated as a means, reveals itself as 'the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc., of individuals, produced in universal exchange... the full development of human control over the forces of nature -- those of his own nature as well as those of so-called "nature"... the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions, without any preconditions other than

antecedent historical evolution which makes the totality of this evolution -- i.e. the evolution of all human powers as such, unmeasured by any previously established yardstick -- an end in itself... where man... produces his totality... (and) does not seek to remain something formed by the past, but is in the absolute movement of becoming... this complete elaboration of what lies within man,' which in capitalist society 'appeals as the total alienation and... as the sacrifice of the end in itself to a wholly external compulsion.' (1)

Once the bourgeoisie brought the archetypal back into the social world, the positive denouement in predominant bourgeois positivist thought inexorably followed, but equally so the negative denouement in Marxian and communist thought, that is, in historical consciousness rooted in the nature of man as the being capable of conscious self-production, self-control, self-mastery. It is this negative outcome that fills the gap of the unclosed circle of bourgeois consciousness, and that is swelling ever larger in the present era as the aesthetic consciousness once again increasingly begins to intersect with social consciousness, and as social theory increasingly returns to history centered upon transhistorical man. Here, unlike predominant U.S. social theory and historiography, we want to begin to reconceptualize and comprehend the modern era from the standpoint of such historical consciousness, -- i.e., as C. S. Peirce might have put it, from the standpoint of human purpose, or 'destiny', as the effective dimension of historical reality.

II. The Essence of Corporate-Capitalism: from Accumulation to Disaccumulation and the Crisis of Political-Economic Society

World history has involved more than the contours of politics and economy and state power. But throughout the history of civilization, i.e. throughout the history of society based on labor exploitation, politics and economy and state power have imposed their contours upon and commanded everything else. We want to transform our political, economic, and state system, not merely acquiesce in its ongoing change proceeding without reference to our particular activity or inactivity. We want, that is, to give our command to politics and economy, and the state, so that the 'everything else', that is, man purposively creating and recreating his social existence, can come into his own concretely as the shaper of history, and before which political-economy itself, as a system of man's domination and exploitation of man expressed in class division and conflict, may be retired to the peripheries of harmless memory and of arcane studies in social pathology.

The question is, Is this possible? and, In our time?

What we are also asking, at another level, is, Can we change our social existence deliberately and in accord with our conceived intentions? To affirm that we can, assumes that we can satisfactorily conceptualize the object of our attempt (ourselves, our society) in such a way as to reveal the possible changes its nature allows as well as the changes its nature requires. It also assumes that among the possible and required changes immanent in the nature of the 'thing' (in this case, present-day men as the subjects of the historical social process), some correspond with our intentions. If none do, then 1) we may resign ourselves to frustration and suffering, or 2) we may pragmatically

recast our intentions and proceed afresh, or 3) we may simply reconceptualize our object to make its nature seem to encompass possibilities corresponding with our intentions. All these courses express alienated forms of surrendering the struggle to reunify the transhistorically human (archetypal) and the social. The first of the three alternatives is what most men in most times ultimately do (otherwise known variously as 'growing up', 'maturing', 'accepting responsibilities', 'adjustment', 'joining the rat race', 'acculturation' or 'socialization', 'thanking god for his blessings' -- or small favors, etc.). The second is the usual course of reformers and conservatives; the third that of utopians and visionaries and mystics. In practical life the devotees of the second and third can be found, albeit unwittingly, shuttling back and forth from one standpoint to the other. The blending of the second and third, however, into an entirely diferent world-outlook, in the struggle against the frustration and suffering inhering in the first alternative, is the way of revolutionaries -- it is their art, their science, which expresses their comprehension of the dialectic of man's historical and transhistorical existence, their comprehension of the interpenetration of permanence and change, of freedom and necessity, of desire and restraint, of subject and object, of thought and instinct, of reason and history.

As revolutionaries, engaged upon the struggle of transforming our social existence and conforming it to our intended conception of the human, we must state our conception of that social existence in its concrete historical reality, objectify it in language that we and all men may critically regard it, and in so doing deny or affirm or modify it. At the same time, and in the course of this, we will also engage in reappraising, and denying, affirming, or modifying, our conception of the human in its present historical form. As the physicist begins by defining his object in terms appropriate to it, such as energy and mass, the revolutionary begins by defining his object in appropriate terms, which object, being human, is historical in essence and rooted in the real production and reproduction of material and social human life; and this means, in terms of the past mode of this production as it has emerged in its present form, and the future it embraces, that is, in terms of historical human development identified as epoch.

This is the starting point from which we must begin: to conceptualize our epoch is to come to grips broadly with what we conceive our social existence to be, what we conceive man, historically, to be in a developmental way, at the specific historical juncture of our own times, and what man is about to become. It is the basis of self-critically appraising our intentions, our conception of the human, and it is the mark of taking our intentions seriously enough to hazard their affirmation, denial or modification in the deliberate attempt at achieving their realization.

1.

U.S. historians have invariably been able to view the relation of the U.S. to world history from the particular standpoint of the U.S. as they have understood it, but seldom have they been able to view the U.S. from the standpoint of general world history. With this in mind, Louis Hartz has made the judgment - and he is right in this respect - that 'the American historian at practically every stage has functioned quite inside the nation: he has tended to be an erudite reflection of the limited social perspectives of the average American himself'; with the result that 'our current historical categories reflect but they do not analyze the American political tradition': our historians, on the left no less than those in the middle and on the right, 'have not produced a study of American political thought: they have produced a replica of it.' (2) That was

written about 15 years ago. It is still accurate today, and applies not only to U.S. political history and thought but to all phases of U.S. history. The historians, in short, have only replicated the U.S. in different ways; the task remains to comprehend it. And to comprehend it means, as Marx observed, to change it in an intended way -- from the standpoint of an historical consciousness unifying the transhistorical with the social theoretical. It is precisely this standpoint of which our historians, like most other U.S. intellectuals, are totally devoid -- with a rare exception here and there such as William A. Williams, but becoming less and less rare in present times. (3)

U.S. historians accordingly, by and large view U.S. history as a 'thing in itself', as 'fact speaking for itself' as it were, whose relevance to world history is essentially a matter of contingencies such as the accidents of geography and transportation, or of specific economic 'interests' or political 'moralists', or of 'vacuums' in other parts of the world sucking flustered yankee statesmen in, along with armies, taxpayers' money, missionaries, businessmen, and the like. By the same token, they view the relevance of U.S. history to man's transhistorical nature as really not worthy of professional notice -- but as belonging to the metaphysical realm of poets, novelists, philosophers, speculative anthropologists, psychologists, existentialists, mystics and weirdos and at the outside, of that strange inelegant breed of 'intellectual historians'. (Hence sophisticated historians assure themselves that Williams' work is essentially 'religious', not professional history -- good for Sunday reading but not for the seminar and 'serious' business.) The U.S. historians' characteristic methodology amounts, on the one hand, to a high-grade though often second-hand, journalism, as they periodize and conceptualize U.S. history in terms of the current headlines and notions which the newspapers, magazines, and people of the time in question entertained and purveyed about themselves and events. Hence, we get categories expressed in such rubrics as Liberal, Conservative, Radical, New Freedom, New Deal, Normalcy, Age of Jackson, Cold War, Progressive Era, etc., parading about as analytical or explanatory terms which, however, though 'replicating' perhaps everything, analyze and explain nothing. On the other hand, and especially in more recent times, their methodology has 'expanded' to an eclectic - and revealing - appropriation from the social sciences, of positivistic categories expressing an ahistorical view of society and social relations as 'objective' mechanisms or systems engulfing, shaping or shaking men, who are viewed as either passively adjusting and submitting to the objective process or risking the fall into irrationality and even the forfeit of survival.

The one approach U.S. historians characteristically have not systematically applied in their study of U.S. social development, is precisely that which comprehends U.S. history as a particular form of man's social production and reproduction in its bourgeois, capitalist-industrial phase, and conforming therefore, like other nations undergoing the same bourgeois phase of development, to certain common general laws of socio-economic metamorphosis integrally related to developments in the political, cultural, and intellectual spheres. Again, it is precisely the approach that at the same time comprehends the capitalist-industrial epoch as a certain point in man's transhistorical development, that is, man as a self-producing being capable of self-determination and self-mastery. In this respect, our historians no less than most Americans, are like the lost souls in the Open Theater's play, The Serpent, who are in 'the middle' and can neither remember man's beginning nor imagine man's future end.

It is this neglected approach with which, here, we seek to comprehend the epoch

the people of the United States are presently passing through. In so far as we discover about the U.S. something new or 'exceptional', we find it in the universally human-historical, not as with most U.S. historians who tend to translate real or imagined American peculiarities into something universally human or, more often than not, superhuman.

2. ACCUMULATION AND DISACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL

We start from Marx's theory of capitalist development in general as it flows from his theory of value and surplus value. Understood properly, far from being 'obsolete' or no longer 'relevant', it is indispensable to the comprehension of the modern epoch, because it is directed at understanding society, not from the standpoint of an abstract or external Nature, technology, money, price-system, etc., etc., but from that of human activity in the production and reproduction of material and social life, -- its attributes, metamorphoses, and development at a specific stage of man's history.

More particularly, we start from Marx's theory of the capital accumulation process, and its outcome in the disaccumulation process, which is implicit in Marx's stated theory, and which at points in Capital, III, Theories of Surplus Value, and the Grundrisse, Marx explicitly anticipated. At the same time, and again more concretely, we start from Marx's accumulation theory because, from the class standpoint of the proletariat struggling to realize for its members their human essence as self-determining associated individuals, it expresses the comprehension of the capitalist-industrial epoch as the social-historical form par excellence of man's immersion in the development of the material means of production. But this is still only part of it. Marx's theory of capital accumulation simultaneously comprehends that process as corresponding with the highest, i.e. last, historical stage of man's immersion in the immediate goods-production process, in the sense that the outcome of that process is man's increasing release from engagement in the immediate production and reproduction of the material means of life, and the emergence of society whose basis can no longer comprise immediate relations of men in the goods-production process as the directly effective determinant of general social relations. This comprehension, embraced by Marx's theory, underlay his diagnosis that capitalism represented the last of men's social forms resting upon antagonistic relations of production, upon labor exploitation, and his prognosis that as such it must, short of self-destruction or decay, give birth to a society where men, no longer necessarily preoccupied with and immersed in the immediate goods-production process, could realize the more fully human course of directly engaging in the self-conscious production and reproduction, the shaping and reshaping, of their socio-cultural reality. In other words, capitalism constituted the emergence and development of the political-economic society, which by the very nature of its development results in the end of political-economic society, the demise ultimately finding expression in the proletariat's revolutionary struggle to establish socialism in place of capitalism, as the basis for further evolution toward communism.

Here, I do not propose to present the theory of accumulation and disaccumulation as it flows out of Marx's value theory, nor the application of the theory to the concrete development of historical events; I am undertaking this in a separate piece. I merely want to indicate the central relevance of capitalism's transition from accumulation to disaccumulation, to the comprehension of the modern epoch. In the following pages, therefore, I propose to present a general description of the broader movement involved and its revolutionary implica-

tions for our times, and then to offer preliminary empirical evidence of ways in which this movement concretely expressed itself in the social relations and consciousness of Americans, including, on the one hand, evidence concerning those Americans expressing the standpoint of the capitalist ruling class, and, on the other, those expressing the standpoint of anti-capitalist intellectuals.

In the process of capitalist industrialization, capital accumulation denotes a certain relationship among men in the production process, involving the ratio between the labor-time represented by men exercising labor-power, and the social labor-time embodied in the means of production -- or between living labor and past, 'dead' labor. Without referring now to the capitalists' appropriating role within the process, which must always be understood as integral to it, the relationship is one of capital accumulation so long as an increased production and operation of means of production requires an increased employment of living human labor-power measured in man-hours of socially necessary labor. For example, in a society undergoing capital accumulation in the course of industrialization, the expansion of manufactured goods-production entails the expansion of the labor-force in the production and operation of the means of production in manufacturing. At the point where there is no such increased employment of labor-power in the production and operation of the means of production, that is, where the production and operation of the means of production results in expanding production of goods without the expansion of such employment of labor-power, capital accumulation has entered the process of transformation to disaccumulation. In other words, disaccumulation means that the expansion of goods-production capacity proceeds as a function of the sustained decline of required, and possible, labor-time employment in goods-production.

Properly understood, therefore, the terms 'accumulation' and 'disaccumulation' refer not to concentration of production facilities in itself, though this is involved, nor to quantity of money values in itself, but to the relation of present living labor to past-produced means and materials of goods production, and to the consequent social relations of men in the production of society's goods. By implication, the period of the passage from the accumulation phase of capitalist industrialization of goods-production, to the disaccumulation phase, coincides with the partial and progressing extrication of human labor from the immediate goods-production process. This is as true of agriculture as it is of industrial manufacturing. In consequence, and increasingly, human labor (i.e. the exercise of living labor-power) recedes from the condition of serving as a 'factor' of goods production, and by the same token, the mode of goods-production progressively undergoes reversion to a condition comparable to a gratuitous 'force of nature': energy, harnessed and directed through technically sophisticated machinery, produces goods, as trees produce fruit, without the involvement of, or need for, human labor-time in the immediate production process itself. Living labor-power in goods-production devolves upon the quantitatively declining role of watching, regulating, and superintending. With the passing of the production process into the disaccumulation phase, the hitherto necessary contradiction, in the absolute sense, of the necessity of deferring immediate consumption as the condition of expanded production capacity, falls away. In profound contrast with the condition of industrialization in the accumulation phase (e.g., in Western Europe, Britain, U.S., Japan, in the 19th and early 20th centuries), expansion of production capacity and the decline, in a direct proportion, of immediate consumption-deferral, may thenceforth go hand in hand, and, short of the malfunctioning or underutilization and perverted utilization of production capacity, must go hand in hand. (4) As it turns out historically, given capitalism as the socio-economic system within which this

technical-labor phase of the production process transpires, though the contradiction, in the absolute sense, between production-expansion and immediate consumption deferral no longer pertains, the class-determined contradiction between private appropriation and social productive forces, sustains and reinforces the former contradiction in practical social reality, resulting precisely in the malfunctioning, underutilization, and perverted utilization of production capacity.

Let us cosider the same process from a somewhat different approach. In the accumulation phase, the expansion of goods-production capacity requires the allocation of an absolutely increasing quantity of aggregate social labor-time to the production and operation of the means of production. Expanded reproduction therefore entails restriction of immediate consumption in two senses: 1) The added labor force in the means-of-production sector must be supplied with consumer goods which thereby comprise a deduction of consumer goods available to the labor force in the consumption-goods sector. 2) Income revenues (whether profits, interest, rent, or, with savings banks and secondary exploitation through the price and tax system, wages too) must be withheld from circulation as immediate consumer demand and directed instead into the purchase of producer goods over and above those required for replacement of depreciated, worn-out, or obsolete producer goods.

In the disaccumulation phase, on the other hand, expansion of production capacity proceeds as a function of, in effect, simple reproduction and increasingly of negative reproduction (or, replacement), rather than through net additions of aggregate labor-time to the production and operation of the means of production. To say that the previous contradiction, in the absolute sense, between immediate consumption deferral and expansion of production capacity drops away, means in essence that surplus-value loses its 'investment' function in the expansion of goods-production capacity -- though, as already indicated, as long as capitalism persists, the capitalist class retains its social function of appropriating surplus-value both as its source of income and as the relation essential to sustaining its domination of the labor force and labor system.

Shorn of its capitalist integument, the process that appears under capitalism as disaccumulation, means the ongoing net release of labor-power, measured in aggregate social labor-time, from goods-production. In particular, it means that less and less labor-power is required for the production of the goods necessary for sustaining and reproducing physical and social life. The people are increasingly freed to apply their labor, or life-time, to other pursuits and fields of endeavor.

This process, however, is not to be understood in terms of 'scarcity' and 'abundance', which comprise an all too abstract and essentially false approach to the social reality in question. 'Scarcity' itself is a bourgeois ideological concept applied to economic apologetics for profit on the one side and deprivation and poverty on the other. 'Abundance' is an entirely relative category which depends for concretization as much on prevailing conceptions and customary habits of living standards and on the simple matter of an area's resource endowment as on technology and social relations of production. The real question involved here is the extent to which technico-economic development has brought society beyond relations of goods-production as the necessary focus and direct determinant of social organization for the mass of the people; and, related to this, the extent of the people's conscious control of their own life-activity in those fields of work involving the production of the very social relations and forms of social consciousness themselves, as well as in the tra-

ditional goods-production and related areas of work -- the extent of this social self-control as life-activity is progressively extricated from engagement in the immediate production process.

In this connection, it is fundamentally false, and probably demagogic, to hold that disaccumulation cum socialism puts an end to necessary work: there will always be necessary work in man's interchange with the natural environment, and in man's satisfying the imperatives of sustaining, reproducing, and transforming the existing system of social relations. The objective of socialism and communism is a society where men increasingly express their freedom -- recognize, realize, transmute, their talents and capacities -- in dealing with necessity, and where they open greater and greater areas for discretionary, voluntary life-activity; a society, moreover, where no men are doomed to narrow specialization as a class or subsection of a class to one particular function or restricted set of functions, where the social organization for executing society's necessary tasks and for developing discretionary pursuits is not that in which one class organizes, dominates, exploits, the labor of another class, but that in which the people discharge that execution and development as freely associating equals, and in which every person is increasingly educated for universal competence in the broad range of society's activities.

Finally, the question of 'abundance' vs. 'scarcity' resolves itself essentially into this, that in so far as social labor-time is not significantly required for goods-production, such goods acquire no value (materialized labor-time), and the conditions are established for severing work as such from income, or (what is the same thing) from access to a share of society's goods, so that work may increasingly become an activity valued and pursued for itself, however necessary or discretionary, instead of a means to a portion of the material means of life -- a means to a means which tends to become transmogrified into a prescribed end in itself. Nevertheless, though the market-money-income system will be eliminted as the principle governing the distribution of goods (and services, which themselves are analyzable into goods-components), some governing principle will be necessary. The communist theory is, essentially, that a social-ethical principle will supplant the bourgeois economic principle; that an actualized conception of needs (both 'natural' and 'artificial', material and socio-cultural) will supplant the system determined by labor abstracted into a commodity and bought and sold at its exchange-value. To put it another way, under the economic scheme of things, quantitative measurements, proportions, standards, dictate the 'quality of life'; under a genuine communist social-ethical scheme of things, qualitative standards will dictate to quantitative distribution, proportions, measurements, standards.

It is from this standpoint seeking to unite the transhistorical with the specifically historical social reality, that we may begin to reassert a critical comprehension of the modern epoch. In these terms we may understand the current epoch of U.S. history to comprise the emergence, development, and decomposition of the Imperialist Corporate-Capitalist order, as the historical mode of the United States' passage from accumulationist industrialization to industrialized disaccumulation as the condition of production-expansion; and on the basis of this, and to the extent that the emerging revolutionary movement succeeds, the historical mode of passage from society organized around and dominated by relations of goods-production to society gone beyond relations of production as determining and dominating social relations; from society imposing work as a means of subsistence and comfort to society redefining work as self-determining expression of life.

We can begin to comprehend 'Corporate-Liberalism' as the response of the bourgeoisie in general, and of high industrial and finance capital in particular, to the disaccumulation process -- a response suited to sustaining the existence and power of a profit-appropriating social class where such appropriation no longer bears a necessary relation to expansion of production capacity, and increasingly devolves upon the parasitic engrossment of social wealth -- a response expressed in the following decisive ways:

1. The extension of the employer-employee, enterprise-for-profit system beyond the sphere of goods-production, finance, distribution, and exchange, to all other social spheres, or the subordination of other social spheres to the imperatives of that system; this extension being necessary to sustaining capitalist class domination of the labor system and labor force as a whole, thereby extending the proletarianization of labor to virtually all other spheres of work, and pre-empting the possibility of those spheres expropriating for their own respective uses the capitalists' surplus-value appropriated in the goods-production sphere.

2. The capitalist class's intercession against the uninhibited operation of the disaccumulationist tendency through action in the production-investment system, the price-system, and the state's tax and fiscal system, involving monopolistic control of production, price, and investment schedules, coercive establishment of markets for superfluous goods through taxation and imperialism, and expressed in secular inflation, consumer-debt financing, subsidization of production-inefficiency, under-utilization of production capacity, and chronically rising unemployment except in time of sufficiently large-scale war. Accordingly, what appears as a blundering imposition of 'artificial scarcity', comprises in essence the capitalistically planned allocation of production capacity and goods to uses outside the domestic civilian market -- most crucially in production of the means of destruction and in aggressive imperialist expansion of the sphere of capitalist enterprise (both of these undergoing their most dramatic, remarkable, and inextricably interrelated increases since about 1940-45, dwarfing all previous records).

3. The indispensable role of the state, and its control by the corporate-capitalist class, in enforcing this 'capitalization of inefficiency' (Veblen), this system of labor domination, this system of restricted and perverted production.

Historically, the transition from accumulation to disaccumulation in the United States occurred in the period about 1907-1929, and disaccumulation first asserted itself forcefully and in a sustained way from bout 1919 to 1929, resulting, in the immediate case, in the great collapse of 1929-1940. (5) What Marxists have called 'the general crisis of capitalism' since World War I, and what Keynesians have referred to as 'stagnation' or 'the stationary state', centers in capitalism's passage from acumulation to disaccumulation. Similarly, what everyone refers to as the 'welfare state' (or 'welfare-warfare state'), and what the New Left now refers to as Corporate-Liberalism, comprises in general the corporate-bourgeoisie's class-determined response to disaccumulation.

III. The 1920s: the Swing Period

1. THE UNITARY CHARACTER OF THE POST-1900 ERA

Although the period from about 1907 to about 1929 as a whole registered the first signs of impact of the disaccumulation process upon the political-economy, upon the policy considerations, and upon the intellectual life of the United States, this impact was muted by the First World War. It was not until the 1920s, therefore, that it may first be observed as having registered its effects in a sustained and indelible manner. Hence, although peculiarly discerning historians have characterized the 1920s as an 'Age of Normalcy', leading figures in business, labor, political, and intellectual circles of the 1920s saw their own period as a 'New Era', and felt about it an exhiliration and expectancy auguring a break with old ways and a leap into an unprecedented future fulfilling the dreams of what had previously been regarded as utopian fancy. With profound differences regarding the conclusions and implications to be drawn from it, this broad feeling, nevertheless, was common to a wide diversity of people, from Corporate-Liberals such as Herbert Hoover and Samuel Gompers, Gerard Swope and Owen D. Young, to such anti-capitalist Young Intellectuals as Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Harold Stearns, Waldo Frank, and Lewis Mumford.

Corresponding with the substantial force of the impact referred to here, a wide range of characteristic political, economic, social and ethical questions assumed a prominent place in the public discourse of the decade and impinged significantly upon the attention and active concern of policy-makers and intellectuals alike. Briefly, these questions included:

unemployment in the midst of 'prosperity';
the conquest of scarcity and the challenge of abundance;
'pockets' of poverty;
wage and price stabilization;
controlling the business cycle to insure full employment;
the need to increase effective market demand to meet the nation's prodigious productive capacity;
technological disemployment;
the stabilization or decline of the labor force in the goods-production sector of the economy, in the midst of substantial rises in productivity and production;
the sharply rising labor force in the services sector;
the shift of investment funds from production- to consumer-financing, attended by installment selling, market research, and advertising;
the shape of the cities and urban planning;
the 'quality of life';
social cooperation and national interest versus narrow self-interest;
men's right to participate in the shaping of their own destiny (or social reality);
the need for a 'vision' as a standard by which men might fashion their existence rather than confining their vision to the extant shape of their existence; and so on.

The economic collapse of 1929, issuing in the prolonged depression of the 1930s, and the Second World War and its aftermath with their colossal destruction,

and equally colossal reconstruction, of productive forces in Europe and Asia, submerged, obscured, or rendered apparently irrelevant all of these questions either entirely, or in the particular form they had assumed in the 1920s. But it is only a matter of easy observance that after the depression, the war, and the war's aftermath had run their course, all of these questions re-emerged as central matters of policy and intellectual inquiry, to a certain extent in the late 1950s, and in full force in the 1960s. Seen in this way, there is a fundamental bond of continuity and kinship between the 1920s and 1960s, as well as between the 1920s and the previous years of the 20th century.

Viewed from this perspective, the period from the turn of the century through the 1920s (and up to the present time) possesses a unitary character, not merely in an abstract sense of impersonal 'objective conditions', but also in the sense that central developments in the socio-political history and in the cultural and intellectual history of the nation, were significantly related to the emerging phase of disaccumulation. Such developments may be fruitfully viewed in terms of the responses and adjustments of people, and more particularly in terms of the responses and adjustments of the different social classes comprising capitalist society, to conditions characterizing that society's passage from the phase of industrializing accumulation to the phase of industrialized disaccumulation, taking social relations into the 'post-industrial' era and into the maturing crisis of political economic society.

The political-economic and the literary writings of the period 1915-1930 offer evidence at two essential levels: 1) They offer direct empirical evidence of the changes in production processes and social relations connected with the declining requirement of human labor-power in the production of goods. 2) They offer evidence of the ways in which men were perceiving and responding to those changes, as well as evidence that they were perceiving and responding to those changes. With respect to the political-economic sphere, a very brief indication of the nature, and the availability, of such evidence, follow.

2. HERBERT HOOVER'S CONFERENCES AND REPORTS

The President's Conference on Unemployment, which convened at Washington, D.C., in 1921, under Warren G. Harding's auspices and the initiative of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Clark Hoover, established several continuing research committees. Among them, the Committee on Recent Economic Changes, with Hoover as chairman, conducted an examination of the national economy in cooperation with the National Bureau of Economic Research, and published its final two-volume report in 1929. The significance of the Report lies on several levels: its very conception at the outset of the decade; the scope and depth of its inquiry and findings; the businessmen, political leaders, farm organization and trade union officers, and scholars involved in its preparation; (6) the valuable information about and analysis of the trends of the national economy and their implications; and the general orientation of its framers toward subjecting a more fully understood economy to certain kinds of effective controls and rationalized management.

It is of particular significance that although the Report displayed no lack of awareness of the remarkable economic and technical developments of the 1920s, it characterized them not so much as new or dramatic departures, but as accelerations and culminations of trends already established at the turn

of the century, and as representing a continuity, rather than a break, with developments of the recent, pre-World War I, past.(7) These developments included the increased supply and wider uses of electric power in industry, on the farm, and in the home; 'the multiplication by man of his strength and skill through machinery'; and the division and organization of work in mines and factories, on the farms, and in the trades, 'so that production per man hour of effort has risen to new heights.(8)

Among the consequences of these trends, the Committee specified the growing production capacity of the nation's economic plant with less labor, and accordingly the shift of labor from goods production to services; the problem of technological unemployment; the adjustments necessary to sustain a pace of market demand commensurate with the growth of production; and the release afforded by production technique from the living patterns, anxieties, and constraints of the traditional 'scarcity' regimen dictated by previous production technique.(9)

By comparison with over-all growth rates in gross production in the past, the Committee observed, those of the 1920s were not in themselves remarkable. But no past period had 'shown such a striking increase in productivity per man-hour.' Reductions of hours of labor proceeded steadily in the 1920s, while per capita productivity by 1929 exceeded by 60 per cent that at the close of the 19th century. In manufacturing, a 60 per cent increase in horsepower from about 22.3 million in 1914 to about 35.8 million in 1925, and from 3.3 to 4.3 per worker in that period, matched a 35 per cent increase in per capita productivity in the four-year period of 1922-1925 alone.(10) In agriculture, 'the productivity of farm workers has increased at a rate never before equaled.' With 1919, a good crop year, representing the index number of 100, physical crop production rose to 102 in 1922, 104 in 1925, and 106 in 1927. On a per capita basis, 'the rates of increase would be decidedly greater,' for 'the smaller numbers of workers left on the farms, cultivating less land,' were responsible for these increases.(11) As these comments indicate, the rising productive capacity rested 'largely upon the fact that our productive machinery is not only time saving in character but labor saving also'; so that the general tendency was to 'reduce the number of employees producing the same, or an increased quantity of production.'(12) The developments in manufacturing and agriculture ran along similar lines, those in agriculture being considerably more dramatic. 'So far as reduction in number of workers goes, there is a close parallel between the record of farming and manufacturing.' (13) In the seven-year period, 1920-1926, the cumulative loss in farm population amounted to over 3,000,000 people. In manufacturing, between 1919 and 1925, among the traditional industrial states, the New England area recorded a decline in the number of manufacturing establishments of 11.7 per cent and a decline of wage-earners in manufacturing of 16.7 per cent; the corresponding figures for the mid-Atlantic area were 17.5 per cent and 13 per cent.(14) In the country as a whole, the absolute number of factory wage-earners reached its peak in 1919-1920, at about 9 million, and steadily declined during the 1920s in the midst of rising production, to an average annual figure of about 8.5 million for the three-year period 1927-1929.(15)

Concerning the long-term secular trend, President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends observed that while in 1870, 77 per cent of the gainfully employed persons in the United States were 'engaged in transforming the resources of nature into the objects of usable form through manufacturing, mining, and agriculture,' in 1930 only 52 per cent were so engaged. With respect to the second two decades of the 20th century more specifically, the Committee noted that 'until 1910 the decline of agricultural employment was rela-

tive only, owing to the more rapid growth of other industries, but since 1910 the numbers engaged in farming have decreased absolutely as well as relatively.' In manufacturing occupations, the number of persons 'has declined relative to the total gainfully occupied population between 1920 and 1930.' During the 1920s, 'the trend of actual employment in manufacturing industry was downward for the first time in our history. This was likewise true of steam railroads.' The failure of factory and railroad employment to advance, the Committee noted, was 'especially significant', since the gainfully employed population increased in those years from 42,600,000 to 48,800,000 (or by about 14.5 per cent). (16)

The Report on recent economic changes assumed it to be 'a sign of progress when a given economic result can be achieved with fewer workers.' But accordingly, the 'constant accompaniment of progress in modern industry' consisted in the shifting of labor 'called technological unemployment', (17) or what the Committee on Recent Social Trends subsequently referred to as 'the terror of unemployment.'(18) Describing the process of technological unemployment, the Report noted that 'the output per man constantly increases and this, coupled with the changes due to the introduction of time-saving apparatus, tends to unemployment without reference to good or bad times.' In this sense, technological unemployment was not only 'as old as the present industrial system', and 'nothing new', but it was 'inherent in the system.' But in the 1920s the phenomenon had been increasing in magnitude, so that it had become a new social problem in kind. Unemployment remained steadily high during the 1920s not only when compared with the bouyant prosperity of the era, but also when compared with previous periods. The supply of new jobs 'has not been equal to the number of workers plus the old workers displaced,' with the result that there 'has been a net increase of unemployment, between 1920 and 1927, which exceeds 650,000 people.'(19) Accordingly, while cyclical unemployment had not been prominent in the 1920s, the Committee noted, 'it has become evident that unemployment can arise as a result of industrial efficiency as well as of inefficiency.' Inefficiency produces 'seasonal or intermittent unemployment'; efficiency produces 'what has come to be known as "technological" unemployment resulting from the introduction of new machinery and processes.' The Committee's findings indicated, therefore, 'that the time has come to devote continuing attention not only to the problems of cyclical unemployment but also to this newer problem of "technological" unemployment if we are to forestall hardship and uncertainty in the lives of the workers.' The absorption of workers in 'the newly expanded service industries which create and serve leisure' has prevented 'much more serious unemployment' from the effects of 'the acceleration of technological shifts in production and consumption.'(20)

In spite of persistent unemployment, considerable poverty, and unprosperous conditions in agriculture, coal mining, and many light industries, the Report concluded from its data on productivity and production advances that 'as a people we have become steadily less concerned about the primary needs -- food, clothing, and shelter,' as the economic system moved from the age-old condition of relative scarcity to a new one of general abundance. 'We have long since lost all fear concerning our food supply, and so we no longer look on food as a luxury or as a primary source of pleasure... and the slogan of the "full dinner pail" is obsolete... Our wants have ranged more widely and we now demand a broad list of goods and services which come under the category of "optional purchases".' Not itself new, the expansion of consumer wants had been 'going on since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution,' and was not, except in degree, a phenomenon of the post-war period. 'But it is this de-

gree of economic activity, this almost insatiable appetite for goods and services, this abounding production of all things which almost any man can want, which is so striking a characteristic of the period covered by the survey.'(21)

'Insatiable' as the 'appetite' for goods and services may have become, however, effective consumer purchasing power proved persistently insufficient to satisfy it, and at any rate, production capacity continuously outran effective market demand. Since at least the 1890s, a reverse Malthusian doctrine of production 'naturally' outrunning population pervaded the business mind, and in large part the political also, in the United States. Imperialist expansion emerged as one response to this situation. In the 1920s, modern advertising and consumer financing through installment debt, took their place along with imperialism as another response. As the Committee on Recent Social Trends put it, 'manufacturers and merchants had to teach masses of men and women new tastes and ways', resulting in 'an enormous increase in the thought and money lavished upon selling, and an enormous intensification of the attack upon the consumer's attention.(22) If in earlier times, occasional aggressions and catastrophes helped to keep demand from pressing too closely upon supply, in modern times an enormous and sustained aggressiveness was required to keep supply from spurting too far ahead of demand.

Nevertheless, advertising, sales organization, and consumer financing, not to mention imperialism, failed to allay the difficulty of using to optimal extent the growing production capacity afforded by advancing technique in the fabric of the capitalist investment system. The inability to market all that was produced, no less all that could be produced, had appeared as a major and constant industrial problem in the United States since the late 19th century, and it relates in a crucial way to the disparity between the relatively less rapid rate of advance of actual production than of productivity. Even during World War I, when it might be assumed that the war stimulus primed the pump of national production, in reality physical production, in the midst of substantial increases in production capacity and rising prices, remained about the same or declined during the years of America's participation in the war, with output in key basic industries (including in agriculture) lower in 1918 than in 1916.(23) Similarly, less than optimal capacity utilization of productive plant remained a serious problem throughout the 1920s.(24)

In the late 19th century, relatively high levels of net investment in new plant and equipment accompanied underutilization of plant. After about 1907, however, the secular trend toward declining net investment as a per cent of total national income set in to aggravate employment and market dislocations. In the boom of the 1920s, average annual net investment as per cent of national income remained lower than that in the previous 20th century period, which in turn had dropped from the levels of the depression years of the 1890s. In the 1930s, net investment virtually disappeared, with 'negative investment' (net capital consumption) actually the case in some sectors of industry.(25) In more concrete terms, declining net investment meant the employment of less labor in the production of new plant and equipment, as it also expressed the declining labor requirement in the production of new plant and equipment and of more goods generally, both in agriculture, and, especially as electro-chemical processes increasingly displaced mechanical processes, in industry. Net investment therefore came not only to mobilize less labor, but also to result in the further increase of production capacity with less labor required for its production and operation, resulting generally in dislocating previous employment-investment relationships and employment patterns, and further exacerbating the imbalance between the capital-goods and consumer-goods sectors of pro-

duction, and between production capacity and effective demand.

This general process, involving declining net investment and the increasing extrication of living labor-power from goods-production both relatively and absolutely - this process of disaccumulation - operated forcefully upon the American socio-political scene in the early 20th century, and with particularly powerful impact in the 1920s, reaching a first culmination, as it were, with the collapse of 1929 and the subsequent long depression. The movement in the American political economy toward increasing corporate reorganization of the industrial and banking system, and toward increasing government intervention in the economy, the movement identified at least in the latter respect in popular discourse and in predominant American historiography alike, with modern liberalism, comprised in essential respects the response of the corporate-bourgeoisie to the process of disaccumulation. Without at this point going into the details of this response, suffice to say that in the private sector, trade associations, agricultural cartel arrangements (cooperatives), and corporate consolidation, and in the public sector, government intervention with credit and subsidies to agriculture and transportation, export financing and promotion, public works, and money and credit management, all tracing back to the Wilson period, were continued and elaborated further in the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations. As Secretary of Commerce and President, Hoover, along with prominent men from large industrial, commercial, and financial corporations such as Charles G. Dawes, Owen D. Young, Dwight W. Morrow, Julius Rosenwald, Howard E. Coffin, Gerard Swope, Theodore N. Vail, and Daniel Willard, warmly supported and worked for the adoption of measures along these lines. They viewed it a government responsibility to ameliorate unemployment with public works, to facilitate and protect imperialist corporate enterprise abroad, and to stabilize the investment cycle by appropriate subsidy, price-support, and credit measures designed to encourage the advance of productivity and hence profitable investment opportunities, while restricting the volume of products thrown onto the domestic market. They spoke glowingly of the era of 'abundance', but warned and took action against too much of it, which in their view would disastrously derange the private market economy and throw the whole system of employment-for-income and private discretionary investment into hopeless disarray. Their approach amounted to government-fostered production restriction, secular inflation, and aggressive imperialist expansion, to sustain the flow of profitable investment and the capitalist domination of the labor force within the framework of the corporate-industrial system.(26)

It is important to understand Hoover and such like-minded business leaders as mentioned above in this sense, rather than as representing some sort of recidivistic laissez-faire individualism and free-market conservatism, for a more accurate comprehension of the political-economic development of the 1920s.(27) Political leaders like Hoover, and large corporation executives whose policy outlook corresponded with his, represented what today is, and what at that time was, identified as Liberalism in national politics, as against the 'conservatism' particularly of smaller businessmen (but not excluding other large-business leaders) and their political and ideological compatriots. The Young Intellectuals rejected and acutely criticized this liberalism no less than they did laissez-faire and individualistic conservatism.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF A NON-ACADEMIC INTELLIGENTSIA

With the disaccumulation of capital comes the accelerated accumulation of intellectuals and other mental workers. During the accumulation phase of industrialization, the ranks of professional and intellectual occupations increase,

but with the disaccumulation phase their quantitative increase becomes such as to result in a qualitative change within the social system. At that phase, Education becomes not only a significant social formation within society, but a necessary component of the productive and socio-economic system. Education becomes an industry. Secondary schools and institutions of higher learning become the place of training and work for rising numbers of men and women and youth whose labor is no longer immediately required in the production system at large. Educational institutions also become a growing outlet for investment of money-capital, as the requirements for capital and the opportunities for its profitable investment in the sphere of production decline. Colleges and universities proliferate and grow. They turn out 'capital goods' in the form of more teachers for the expanding industry, who work up, fashion, and refine the increasing flow of raw materials in the form of information and students. And they turn out other finished products - books and study materials, technicians, professionals, and intellectuals - in demand by other sectors of society and the economy, such as manufacturing and commerce, government agencies and civil service, advertising and publishing. At this point, it begins to become possible to speak of an academic community as a significant social formation in society by virtue of its size and function, without regard to 'intrinsic' or ethical value: an academic community with progressively expanding claims upon the loyalties, good will, and revenues, of businessmen and corporations, politicians and government, professionals and intellectuals.

In the process, however, the number of college-produced intellectuals who want to be writers and artists, but prefer neither to return to education as teachers nor to offer themselves to the demand of other industries as professional employees, begins to rise. To their number may be added youths who, entering neither college nor the labor market, also aspire to be writers and artists, as well as those who may be in the labor market but view writing and art as their true vocation. Just as the academic community emerges, so too, in sustained and increasing flow, the non-academic intelligentsia -- the free-lancers, the detached artists and writers, the professional critics, radicals, and revolutionaries, the 'superfluous men', and the 'men without qualities', the men and women without a productive or market function traditional to economic society. They emerge over and above, and functionally distinct from, professionals performing services long recognized as auxiliary to the socio-economic society, e.g. lawyers, clergy, teachers, engineers, doctors, although the number of such latter professionals grows also. They are neither leisured wealthy aristocrats or bourgeoisie spending free time in writing and the arts, nor singular artists or men of letters attached to men of wealth in a patronage relationship, nor, typically, so exceptional as to become independently wealthy from the consumption of their works by a mass readership; nor are they foot-loose, uneducated destitute peasants or proletarians finding apostacy as wandering bards or such. They are by and large from families deriving their income from small or moderate business enterprise, or the professions, though they include individuals from every social stratum, and increasingly (though in relatively smaller numbers) from the working class and farmers. Above all, they must make a living from their writing and art if they are to practice it as a full-time vocation, and if they do not they resent their having to engage in other labor or accept family handouts or other charity. They characteristically think in terms of jealously guarding the integrity of their writing and art. But they must sell their work on a market to individual and corporate buyers or publishers who may require compromises of or deviations from their own standards and values. On the whole, seeking other occupations than in traditional market and professional functions, in effect they comprise a 'middle' stratum continuously caught, like farmers and small businessmen of late 19th and early 20th century America, between resisting proletarianization and falling into the the condition of proletarians. They are in the nation, but also outside it. They

present themselves as the nation's conscience, as humanity's conscience, or as the conscience of the singular individual against the herd.

It was in the late 19th century, but more especially in the first two decades of the 20th century, when growing numbers of youth were entering college instead of the market, and when this non-academic intelligentsia emerged in the proportions suggested here, that also appeared 'democratizing' college reforms and social work agencies; that appeared a growing Socialist party and press, and big business in daily newspapers; mass circulation magazines, and muckraking journalism; bohemian neighborhoods, and the 'little' magazines. Just as in industry, large-scale production requires not only a mass market, the means of distribution, and a regularly frequent turn-over of capital, but also in the first place an assured and sufficiently large supply of materials and labor, so in publishing, production on a large business scale of daily newspapers and weekly and monthly magazines, and even production on a smaller scale of regularly published journals, require not only a mass readership but also an assured and sufficiently large supply of writers and artists and the materials they deliver.

Some specific quantitative data may help to visualize more concretely the developments referred to here. Between 1875 and 1900, the number of college students in the United States more than doubled, compared with a doubling of total population. But in the period 1890 to 1924, the number of college students increased 352 per cent (more than quadrupled) compared with a 79 per cent increase of total population. Between 1900 and 1930, the number of college students multiplied five-fold, while population rose by only 62 per cent.(29)

It was not until the last quarter of the 19th century that graduate schools and graduate students became established social phenomena in the United States. Their appearance accompanied the rise of state universities and colleges and the change in American colleges from their traditional religious to their modern secular founding and orientation. In 1871-72, there were only 198 graduate students in America; by 1890 there were 2,382, and by 1900, 5,832. The number doubled in each decade from 1890 to 1920, and it tripled in the decade 1920 to 1930, reaching 47,255.(30)

Indicative of the trend away from traditional market occupations and toward the professions, of 18,936 recipients of Bachelor's degrees at the University of Chicago from 1893 to 1930, 62 per cent went into professional occupations, and 32 per cent into business, commercial, and proprietary occupations, though 24 per cent of the recipients' fathers were professionals, and 40 per cent were businessmen.(31) With respect to the trend toward the professions, for further example, the first school of journalism was established in 1908, and by the period 1915-1920, journalism schools were graduating on the average of 1,000 students per year.(32)

Corresponding with the rise in college attendance, from 1900 to 1930, there occurred an eight-fold increase in high school enrollments, which brought to 50 per cent the proportion of high school age students actually attending high school.(33)

In the meantime, the numbers of teachers and professors also rose sharply. While throughout the period 1870-1930, the rate of increase of total population, and the rate of increase in total gainfully employed, rose at relatively similar paces, the rate of increase in the number of teachers and professors was dis-

similarly, and substantially, higher. From 1870 to 1900, the number of teachers and professors rose by 251 per cent (more than tripled), from 127,000 to 464,000, while population and the gainfully employed each about doubled. From 1900 to 1930, the number of teachers and professors rose by 152 per cent (more than doubled), from 464,000 to 1,125,000; while population increased by 62 per cent, from about 76 million to about 123 million, and the total gainfully employed rose by about 78 per cent, from about 27 million to about 48 million. In the decade of 1920 to 1930 alone, the number of teachers and professors rose by 41.5 per cent, while the total gainfully employed rose by 18 per cent, and total population by 16 per cent. Acordingly, for every one teacher or professor in 1870 there were ten in 1930; compared with four gainfully employed persons in 1930 for every one such person in 1870. Similarly, for every one newspaperman in 1870, there were ten in 1930. The number of artists recorded by the Census rose from 4,000 in 1870, to 25,000 in 1900, and to 57,000 in 1930. As was the case with newspapermen, the 1920s witnessed an especially large rise in the recorded number of artists, from 35,000 to 57,000. As the Committee on Recent Social Trends reported, with reference to the 1920s, 'artists of various kinds are increasing more rapidly than the general population'; and it noted 'the enlistment of art and artists by commerce and industry as an aid to sales.' (34)

Concerning the non-academic writers and artists of the early 20th century, and their social psychology, a note should be made about the rise of the 'little' magazines. Their appearance was a post-1910 phenomenon, the term 'little' with reference to magazines first coming into general usage during the World War I years. (35) Though there had been 'little' magazines in the 19th century, neither in number nor in literary significance did they compare with the flood of such magazines and the role they played from about 1912 onward. In this respect, 'The first decade of the twentieth century seemed as barren as any decade of the nineteenth.' (36) But from 1912 to the mid-1940s, the little magazines, as against the commercial publishing houses and journals, 'introduced and sponsored every noteworthy literary movement or school' in the United States, and they first published about 80 per cent of America's leading critics, novelists, poets, and storytellers, and of poets about 95 per cent. (37) Characterizing the social psychology of the typical little magazine editor and writer, Hoffman notes:

> ...Such a man is stimulated by some form of discontent -- whether with the constraints of his work or the negligence of publishers, at any rate with something he considers unjust, boring, or ridiculous. He views the world of publishers and popularizers with disdain, sometimes with despair. If he is a contributor and wishes to be published, he may have to abandon certain unorthodox aesthetic or moral beliefs. Often he is rebellious against the doctrines of popular taste and sincerely believes that our attitudes toward literature need to be reformed or at least made more liberal. More than that, he generally insists that publication should not depend upon the whimsy of conventional tastes and choices.
>
> Certainly one of the great values of the little magazine for us, who are anxious to know more about the cultural history of our time, lies in its spirit of conscientious revolt against the guardians of public taste...
>
> ...In summary... little magazines have been founded for two reasons: rebellion against traditional modes of expression and the wish to experiment with novel (and sometimes unintelligible) forms; and a desire to overcome the commercial or material difficulties which are

caused by the introduction of any writing whose commercial merits have not been proved.

...When there is money for contributors, promises of payment are made triumphantly, always as though such payment is to be made in spite of, rather than because of, the bourgeois system of values.(38)

The little magazine, and the social psychology to which they gave expression, comprised an important part of the Young Intellectuals' milieu. Brooks, Bourne, Mumford, Frank, and Stearns edited or contributed to, and significantly participated in defining and articulating the general outlook and specific concerns of, such magazines. The role and significance of the little magazines and the writers and artists connected with them, when taken together with the other foregoing observations, permit the positing of certain generalizations regarding traits widely common to the class of non-academic intelligentsia of the early 20th century, whatever the other many diferences among them. They comprised the increasing numbers of college-educated (sometimes self-educated), articulate, and creative men and women who were seeking to forge life-patterns apart from the market relations of production and distribution of goods, and apart from the characteristic employment relations of the market. They viewed their work as carrying a value in itself and as not to be measured by money or market considerations, and as not to be pursued as primarily a means to making money in order to subsist. As will become apparent in the discussion to follow, their style of life and their values suggested to them the desirability of a society characterized by the involvement of all the people in the kind of work which could have value in itself, and incited their disdain for, or outrage at, the market-dominated society. The high regard they held for their own endeavors contrasted in a humiliating manner with the low esteem accorded them by the predominant market-oriented mentality of most other persons in their society, and especially by most of those persons who comprised the dominant class in their society, the businessmen. To the extent that, in order to pursue their chosen work and also earn a living, they found themselves obliged to assume an employee condition, serving an external authority and other people's purposes, or act as merchants of their wares, their critical distaste for the society grew and deepened.

In 19th century America, only a comparative handful of such professional, artistic, and literary people appeared; in the first decades of the 20th century their numbers swelled, issuing in a multifarious intellectual movement of social criticism, political dissent, and literary disaffection, expressed by a new social formation of non-academic intelligentsia who institutionalized, as it were, their particular style of life and its expression in communities and publications of their own;(39) a movement which expressed the writers' and artists' response to their condition, to their relation to their society, and to the society that they viewed as having produced and necessitated that condition and that relation.

Many of the characteristics attributed here to these intellectuals, with respect to their surrounding circumstances and their attitudes, were not entirely new to them: they bring to mind the German and French romantics, and the Russian intellectuals, of the late 18th and early and mid-19th century, as well as other intellectuals in Europe and the United States throughout the 19th century. Indeed, these early 20th century American writers and artists strongly identified with their past European counterparts. But what was new, or different, was the particular circumstances out of which these intellectuals emerged in early 20th century America - circumstances related to the disaccumulation phase of capitalist industrialization - or what was referred to earlier as the

tail-end of the age of work. For while the thought of these intellectuals shared important similarities with that of their predecessors, it also departed from the previous thought in significant ways corresponding with the particular conditions prevailing in America at the time and with the transformation of those conditions then being wrought by the disaccumulation process.

IV. The Young Intellectuals contra the American Ideology

The aesthetic voice of despair:

'In the last analysis, what is the significance of life? If we divide mankind into two great classes, we may say that one works for a living, the other does not need to. But working for a living cannot be the meaning of life, since it would be a contradiction to say that the perpetual production of the conditions for subsistence is an answer to the question about its significance...'

-- Kierkegaard, Either/Or, I.

The aesthetic voice of defiance:

'To be, to feel oneself, a 'victim' is not in itself to be an artist, for it is the nature of the artist to live, not in the world of which he is an efect, but in the world of which he is the cause, the world of his own creation.'

-- Van Wyck Brooks, 1922.

Sometime between 1915 and 1922, D. H. Lawrence wrote that 'the true myth of America' was: 'She starts old, old, wrinkled and writhing in an old skin. And there is a gradual sloughing of the old skin, towards a new youth.'(40) R. W. B. Lewis refers to this as the American Adamic Myth which saw 'life and history as just beginning,' a new order of things in a new world, 'a divinely granted second chance for the human race, after the first chance had been so disastrously fumbled in the darkening Old World.' America represented life and society liberated from 'a long historical process', separated from the past and connected only with the future.(41) However mythic, this view of America as the scene and occasion of man's liberation from the past, ran deeply through American ideological reality, from Puritanism, to Jeffersonianism, to frontierism (as symbolic metaphor and as the mentality of a tangible life-style), to Populist and Progressive reformism.(42) Americans could thrive and prosper in the present, secure that the future would remplify the present progressively improving, by applying their practical reason, naturally bestowed by a beneficent Maker, to their specific tasks and concrete enjoyments; and this precisely because, being Americans and being in America, they were free of 'metaphysical' ideas and hindering institutions of all the historical past.

So deeply has this mythic self-conception moved through the American consciousness that, in its various manifestations, it may be uniformly identified and referred to as The American Ideology. In the 19th century, it not only powerfully shaped political ideology, but also served as the richest native source upon which leading American poets, novelists, and writers drew for 'a fresh definition of experience and a fresh contribution to the culture.'(43) In so far, however, as its content and historical tenacity represented 'repeated efforts to

revert to a lost childhood and a vanished Eden,' the myth of the American Adam represented 'a kind of resistance in America to the painful process of growing up.' But where, on the contrary, it entered the writer's consciousness as an 'awareness of the American habit of resistance to maturity', the writer's effort invariably evidenced a tendency toward 'cultural maturity'.(44) Such an awareness definitively shaped the outlook of the intellectuals under discussion here. America, for them, had not escaped history but had only replicated a particularly deformed version of history; America had never in reality offered mankind the hope of a fruitful new beginning, whatever its ideal pretensions; and America had yet to grow to maturity, culturally or otherwise, by mustering the strength to acknowledge the difference between its mythic pretensions and its historical reality. What historians refer to as 'the end of American innocence', which marks the second decade of the 20th century as the intellectual beginning of our own times (45), involved at its core the articulation of this historically conscious critique of America by a relatively larger number of writers exerting a greater and more lasting intellectual impact than ever before in America in a comparable span of time. The Young Intellectuals comprised, in effect, a vanguard in the formulation and relentless expression of this critical approach to American life.

The historical dimension assumed a central place in the outlook of these intellectuals. It, though not it alone, distinguished their thought from that of 18th century rationalistic naturalism as well as from the evolutionary positivism and pragmatic instrumentalism of their own time. They neither believed in the ahistorical rationalist doctrine of natural rights, nor valued or credited the theory of supra-rational evolution of existing institutions and its corollary of expert adjustments of those institutions or of men within them.(46) They saw themselves as living within an historical continuum, but affirmed the imminence of, or their hope for, its disruption. To transfer this hope into an actionable intention, to actualize an historical imminence, it was necessary, in their view, to become conscious of, and understand, the historical continuum in which they found their lives unwillingly caught; it was necessary to know of what the existing continuum consisted, and why they were estranged from it and opposed to it, as the condition of their disrupting it and reconstructing a new continuum in accordance with their will. They viewed their research of the American past, therefore, as integral to the process of discovering and therein creating the future America. In formulating and defining their own consciousness - their own world outlook, their own personal view - they saw themselves as embarking upon the rediscovery and reconstruction of America. The merging of their biography with America's future history comprised the condition for ending the situation where their biography appeared to them sundered from the history of the American past and present. But that meant projecting their biography, their style of life, their outlook, their aspirations and desires, onto the nation's historical reality, and making the two coterminous and identical. It was from this perspective that they rejected dualistic modes of thought which posed fact against value, intellect against desire, reality against ideals, actuality against dreams. Their approach, they believed, embraced an historical and ethically responsible realism, while all those approaches that acquiesced wittingly or unwittingly in existing reality, as they perceived it, devolved upon an ethically irresponsible and barren idealism. Against affirming and idealizing the real, they raised the slogan: Realize the Ideal.

In this approach lay the general basis for the declarations of revolt sounded over and over again by younger intellectuals in these years. 'We are in revolt,' Waldo Frank proclaimed in 1919, 'against the academies and institutions which would whittle America down to a few stale realities current fifty years ago... But we are in revolt as well against that organized anarchy today expressed

in Industrialism which would deny to America any life - hence any unity at all - beyond the ties of traffic and the arteries of trade...'(47) Or, more succinctly: 'the younger generation... is in revolt... (against) the type of people dominant in our present civilization, the people who actually "run things"...'(48)

The Young Intellectuals, then, wanted and anticipated a new beginning. This was very American. It resembles the Adamic mythos. But the resemblance should not obscure the essence. The desire for a new beginning, for a disruption of the historical continuum, and for a future different from and negating the past, is not in itself identical with the escape-from-history Adamic mythos, and the two should no more be confused for their similarities than should 18th century rationalism with Marxism. It makes all the difference, what kind of a new beginning, what kind of an historical disruption, and what kind of a future th

future, their protagonists desire and conceptualize. The new beginning which these young intellectuals wanted, and the way of achieving it which they prescribed, comprised a break with, and so distinguished their outlook from, the American Adamic tradition. And this is also to say that their outlook represented at the same time a break with and departure from traditional, prevalent American conceptions of progress, of the relationship between consciousness and reality, of political economy, of work and character, of freedom and individualism, and of America's world significance. In short, their outlook comprised a critique of, and break with, The American Ideology.

Whereas older liberal reformers during and after World War I, such as John Haynes Holmes and Frederick C. Howe, found to their disillusionment that America was like Europe after all(49), the younger intellectuals, not so much found as they took for matter of fact, that America combined the worst features of being like Europe with the worst features of being unlike Europe and a world unto itself -- a view much like the theory of combined underdevelopment applied by Trotsky to pre-revolutionary Russia; a conception which in both cases animated its advocates to a comprehensive critique and rejection of their respective existing societies, and to a sense of unbounded possibilities for the future. America combined classic European capitalism and imperialism, an unvarnished and stupendous material exploitation and human wastage, with the virtual absence of classical or any other non-bourgeois sources of culture, philosophy, and ideas. A non-bourgeois culture, in their view, lay in the future; but for its unfolding, the dominant American past, as rendered by the scholars and historians, provided no source. They had one immediate native source at their disposal for the conceptualization and construction of the future, themselves: their own desires and creative capacities, and, drawing upon those desires and capacities, their own reconstruction of the American past through which, by the possible rediscovery of elements overlooked and suppressed by the conventional scholars and historians, they might supply themselves with a modicum of sustenance abiding in their native soil. In this two-fold resort to consciousness - artistic consciousness and historical consciousness - they made themselves their own source; they conceived themselves the future in embryo. Their emphasis upon the re-examination of American history, upon the search for a 'usable past', distinguishes their outlook from traditional American outlooks defining the future in terms of a present divorced from the past. They did not ignore, or repudiate, history: they sought to come to terms with American history. They repudiated that American history, and that scholarly replication and celebration of it, which represented America as a nation acting and thinking as if it had itself escaped from history. Their repudiation proclaimed an escape from an escape: a reimmersion in history and the forging of an historical consciousness.(50) Their creative capacities and desires, they believed, could take root and bear fruit only upon a sufficiently fertile

historical ground, without which those capacities and desires would remain mere compensatory dreams and fantasies contorted into nightmares of still-born conceptions never to grow into living social organisms.

The belief in the interconnection of art and history, or perhaps more precisely, the belief in the intersecting of art and science upon the creation of historical consciousness and the construction of an intended and desired historical reality, lay at the heart of the young intellectuals' outlook. If their thought places them among the executioners of the American age of innocence and the procreators of our own times, then we must understand that by 'our own times' we mean the throbbing in our consciousness of those conceptions flowing from the heart of the young intellectuals' outlook. But there is for us the glaring incongruity, that 'our own times' is no longer ours, if it ever was. The expression of experience in America, says R.W.B. Lewis, 'has been clearest and most rewarding' when it has evoked the dialectic between past and future involving the Adamic myth. 'Only recently has the dialogue tended to die away. For only recently has the old conviction of the new historical beginning seemed to vanish altogether, and with it the enlivening sense of possibility.' (51) The young intellectuals' 'dream' and 'promise' of a new historical beginning and their enlivening sense of possibility appear to us today defunct, unredeemed, or beyond redemption, like Czarist bonds or Imperial Chinese treasury notes. 'Our own times' seems already an antiquity, and each yesterday appears to have been long ago. Each today seems so much another unwanted future, every tomorrow so much a replication upon replication of the same old 'new beginnings', that the sense of possibility, the anticipation of a future, to which our own consciousness and desires make a difference, appears pre-empted and benumbed and futile before the onward rush of the past in its present form. If we say, then, that the young intellectuals were the procreators of 'our own times', it must be understood provisionally if it is to be understood at all with a meaning that rings true. For 'our own times' is something since them but not yet, or sometime since us and yet to be retrieved, or somewhere within and among us and yet to be articulated and achieved. To say this, however, is to occupy a frame of mind, which though somewhat different from, is yet closely intimate with, that of the young intellectuals.

As the medium of dialogue between past and future, the young intellectuals supplanted the Adamic mythos with artistic and historical consciousness. To take liberties with a now familiar maxim, their present was the medium, their present developing consciousness re-evaluating the past and projecting into the future. And with it, the younger intellectuals demystified and detheodicized America as well as the American veneration of scientific-rationalist manipulation of environment in the service of capitalism, otherwise known as yankee practicality. If, in this project they recognized only themselves as an immediate native source, they nevertheless enjoyed access to numerous contemporary and bygone foreign sources. They had at their disposal, drew upon, and in varying degrees identified their own thinking with, the broad and vigorous movement of European thought reacting against abstract rationalism and scientific and evolutionary positivism, including the works of a whole range of diverse philosophers, artists, poets, and political theorists from Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, to Dostoevsky, Proust, and Cezanne, to Bergson, Simmel, and Sorel. The Americans were also able to, and did, draw upon, Marx, for his critique of the capitalist political economy, and Freud, for his critique of bourgeois morality.

If social history unfolds, as positivism seemed to prescribe, according to objective processes of evolution independent of the will of men, then men can not intercede against, interdict, or supplant those processes, but merely learn what

they are, and adjust, accordingly, to their necessity. In effect, the social system becomes, in this view, the historical subject, and man the object, the one the seat of rationality, the other the fount of irrationality unless firmly held to a 'scientific method' of faithfully reflecting and registering the indefeasible processes of development. Against this, a multitude of European thinkers who in other respects differed widely, reasserted the indispensable role of human consciousness and will in shaping personal and social existence. They reasserted man as the creating subject, and social existence as the moldable object. They argued that men come to know their world not simply by passive perception (or miror reflection), which turns out to be only the current dominant conceptions and deceptions, but by seeking consciously, deliberately, and intentionally to change or fashion it: men learn about their existing reality in the process of mastering and creating a new reality. Within this perspective avant-garde art and revolutionary politics converged upon the attack against positivism and the affirmation of the creative, responsible, transforming, and willful human subject as the agent of human and historical destiny. Within this mainstem of thought, however, the Europeans formed themselves into two subsidiary branches, sometimes at first mutually complementary and congenial, later increasingly antagonistic. The one insisted that men should affirm and actualize their desires, place their reason, intellect, and way of life at the service of desire, and fashion thereby, in their personal life-activity or in discrete sub-communities, a counter-reality to the existing society. The other emphasized the role of consciousness in transforming the existing society in such a way as to actualize its immanent possibilities: consciousness discovers the historically possible and actively proceeds to transform it into the actual. In Europe, the House of Consciousness Resurrected divided: revolutionary art and revolutionry politics embarked upon a parting of ways: the spires of art and aesthetics on the one side, the fortresses of politics and history on the other, glowered at one another across a spiritual abyss in a mutual stand-of.

The outlook of the young intellectuals in America represented a particular expression of the larger mainstem of thought which had emerged so forcefully and subdivided in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century. But the young intellectuals did not draw upon this general body of European thought in the manner of intellectual and spiritual expatriates, or brokers of imported notions. 'The importation of radical ideas and the ferment of (imported) radical ideas,' as Brooks wrote, '...scarcely touch... the center of the American problem. So far as we are concerned, the sea-crossing, to begin with, has a very dampening effect on the gunpowder contained in them. Transplanted they have at once the pleasing remoteness of literature and the stir of an only half-appreciated actuality; they become admirably safe, they become even delightful.' In America, Nietzsche and A. C. Benson, 'the lion and the lamb', lay down 'quite peacefully together, chewing the cud of culture.' The more 'arduous' and 'inspiriting' task was to 'get civilization out of the Yankee stock'. The signs that this was possible and already in process appeared 'anything but obvious', but if one kept 'quite still' and held his 'ear close to the ground', he might hear 'the sap stirring and the little half-inconsequential voices that whisper and breathe in the intervals of bombast and business.'(52) The emergent America was like Huck Finn on the Mississippi: 'the unceasing elemental march of a vast life, cutting a continent, feeding its soil. And upon the heaving surface of this flood, a human child: ignorant, joyous and courageous. The American soul like a midge upon the tide of a world.'(53)

In other words, European ideas might bring aid and comfort, but for defining and attaining their objectives, the young intellectuals regarded the American historical reality, in its actuality and potentiality, and their own consciousness,

as fundamental. Taking this view, these Americans brought into momentary synthesis the branches of thought that in Europe tended to diverge into mutually antagonistic world-outlooks. A dualistic opposition of desire and reason, of ideals and reality, or art and social relations, was precisely the condition they defined as the pathology of American thought and society, the sickness they set themselves to heal. For them, desire was integral to consciousness, and consciousness to historical reality; the diremption of desire from the historical existent meant that men had defaulted upon the active exercise of consciousness and had submitted to the domination of the past; it meant that they had let themselves become crippled, fragmented specimens of human being. If historical society represented necessity, necessity nevertheless included consciousness, and in translating their consciousness into historically existent social relations and styles of life, men could thereby transform desire into necessity. Necessity could become the fulfillment of desire, rather than its nemesis. If, therefore, freedom meant the recognition of necessity, understood in this way, it meant nothing else than man's recognition of himself, writ whole, in the world of historical reality. Everyman therefore, given the fulfillment of this outlook, was involved in the creation of the historical world and of himself; everyman was the whole man as artist; each artist was everyman as whole man. America, then, could become a scene of the emergence of universal man. As yet, the turmoiled giant's eyes 'wander about the clouds: his feet are sunk in the quicksands of racial and material passion. One hand grasps the mountains, and the other falls bruised and limp upon the lowlands of the world.' But his 'need' was great 'and what moves across his eyes is universal.'(54)

If the Adamic outlook presented the American as the negation of European man, the young intellectuals' outlook brought the Adamic to a new level of meaning, transforming by transcending it, a negation of the negation, projecting the American as potentially the universal man, the portent of another new beginning, not by a supposed escape or departure from culture and historical society, but through the integration of art and history. As noted earlier: an escape from an escape.

The bourgeoisie, in the Young Intellectuals' view, constituted the nation; so the history of the nation recorded the various stages of development of the American bourgeoisie: The bourgeois as Puritan had become the bourgeois as pioneer, and he in turn had become the captain of industry and the plutocrat. Puritan, pioneer, and plutocrat, encapsulated one within the other, comprised the three-layer psyche and life-style of the 20th century American bourgeoisie, who presented themselves culturally as philistines. Puritan, pioneer, plutocrat, philistine, were for the young intellectuals as much interchangeable terms describing the various types, often interbred, of the one species bourgeois, as each bourgeois was essentially interchangeable with every other. And the society of uniformity and interchangeable parts was the society the bourgeoisie had only naturally made in its own image. It really misses the point to berate the young intellectuals for having misrepresented the true character of the Puritans of 17th century America(55), for their concern was not a characterization of the Puritans as such, but a critique of, and justification of their antipathy to, bourgeois America. Sometimes deliberately, sometimes unawares, they utilized terms such as puritan and pioneer in effect as metaphorical and analogical references to the traits of the bourgeoisie they opposed, and they did so creatively, effectively, and within that frame of understanding, validly.(56)
Had the young intellectuals' view of the national history gone no further than an apprehension such as this, it is unlikely that their outlook would have been different from the prevailing European dualism of art versus history. But their

own experience so informed their historical understanding as to bring the latter to an emphasis upon another aspect of the social relations inhering in national development under bourgeois auspices, which inscribed upon their consciousness a dimension that decisively shaped their outlook. They were aware that if America were indeed the most thoroughly bourgeois of all nations, this had left the bourgeois political economy virtually free of social hindrance to bring its productive forces to so advanced a stage of development, with so prodigious an output capacity, as to set in motion the processes of the bourgeoisie's own obsolescence. The bourgeoisie had brought industrialization from its accumulation to its disaccumulation phase, or, as the young intellectuals perceived the situation, it had brought the human economy from the phase of 'scarcity', which had characterized all previous history, to the historically new phase of 'abundance'. While there may have been, during the frontier era and the earlier phases of material development, an ethical and social justification for the bourgeoisie's, and hence the entire nation's, absorption in material production, and for exploitation for profit as the incentive for such absorption, everyone now knew that the age of the frontier was gone, and that intrepid capitalist enterprise had turned the nation, if not into a land flowing with milk and honey for all to drink as they pleased, then at any rate into a veritable corporate cornucopia of abundant goods available beyond effective demand and otherwise glutting the warehouses or overflowing to foreign markets.

The bourgeois system of production had developed to the point, moreover, where in its normal course of operation, more and more goods could be, and by the 1920s, visibly were being, produced with less and less labor, relatively and absolutely. This meant that less and less were men and women required as either laborers, or as entrepreneurs or capitalists, in the production process proper, a trend accelerated and made all the more irrevocable by the concentration of the production process in ever larger units and their ownership and control by fewer corporate entities. It also meant, and the young intellectuals themselves were living empirical evidence for their own apprehension of this, that the labor of increasing numbers of young men and women was no longer required in the production process, nor claimed by market demand, and that accordingly rising numbers of people found themselves released from the sheer necessities of producing the primary material means of life, to choose and try to fashion other kinds of careers and life-styles. But more than this, it meant that the old bourgeois ethic and regimen of work for production's sake, of production for the sake of more production, of production as the aim of man instead of man as the aim of production, of withholding from engagement in immediately gratifying and self-expressing activity for the sake of earning the means of subsistence and ease, of deferring desire to necessity and the present to the future, appeared to increasing numbers of young men and women, no longer to comprise a self-evident, natural way of life; no longer appeared, and no longer was, an unalterable necessity. On the contrary, with the release of what would ultimately become the great mass of the people from relations of production, the life of desire could, and properly should, become the life of necessity.

As the young intellectuals perceived it, however, the bourgeoisie sustained its domination of the American society by turning all these trends to their perversion, by constricting them within the limitations of its own ethical and socio-political regimen, instead of bringing these trends to their conversion into a new society. Given its particular values, and its inability, no less than its unwillingness, to depart from and leave behind its social system and way of life, which was suited if at all to the 'frontier' and 'scarcity', or accumulation, phase of industrialization, the bourgeoisie could respond in only one way to the consequences of its own material success: by extending into all areas

of endeavor outside the area of material production and exchange, the same relations and ethic, of work, employment, enterprise for profit, accumulation and deferral, that had weaned it, and within which it flourished, in the sphere of relations of production and exchange. The bourgeoisie appeared furthermore determined to extend its sway over all the other spheres of life to protect the way of life its members enjoyed in the sphere of production and commerce, from the threat of rivalry by a growing and attractive alternative mode of life, and to assure thereby the conformity of the entire nation to the only pattern of life with which they felt familiar, in which they felt themselves confident and at home, and over which they felt themselves and in reality were the masters. The bourgeoisie could not be expected to react and do otherwise; all the more reason that the young intellectuals and increasing myriads like them should not be expected to confine their own growth, potentialities, and imaginative horizons to the stunted, atavistic, and obsolescent life-style and psychic boundaries of the bourgeoisie.

It was precisely this monochromatic, and at the same time, this genetic, view of the nation they were in but not of, that inspired the young intellectuals to project themselves as the emergent counter-nation in embryo, to interrelate art and aesthetics with history and politics, to 'discover in the historical continuum the conditions of its disruption and renewed resumption, to reintrude their biography upon the nation's history. Their declaration of revolt was accordingly systemic, not partial, in essence and reach. Directed against the bourgeoisie and the nation interchangeably, it encompassed an opposition to the whole of the dominant past and present social reality, and to each of its parts from top to bottom, ranging from the general organization of the political economy, to the academies, to the middle class family and the 'restricted reality of their fathers.'

Since the young intellectuals themselves, and their outlook, had emerged as the outcome of the successful workings of the bourgeois system, they could regard themselves as representing the historically legitimate alternative to the bourgeois system, and as therefore the rightful heirs to leadership over the entire nation. They could view their aesthetic ethic as coinciding with historical possibility, capable of translation into principles defining the basic relationships of the future historical society. By conceiving the current social reality in terms of a clear bipolarization between the bourgeoisie and themselves, they could view their opponent as representing a now 'useless' past and a decrepit present, and themselves and their consciousness as representing the young, dynamic, and indubitable future. Their monochromatic view of the society they opposed nourished their equally monochromatic view of themselves as representing the future society, and this in turn facilitated identifying their own outlook, not with an exclusive minority or elite in society, superior to, standing above, and aloof from, a benighted masses, but with, potentially, the entire American people. In breaking with the bourgeois past, the young intellectuals were also, then, keeping faith with, and rejuvenating, the traditional American democratic professions; they could regard themselves as redeeming the democracy from its abasement and mockery at the hands of a plutocratic domination enthroned by the bourgeois system of economics and politics. The young intellectuals presented themselves, therefore, as aesthetic democrats, not as aesthetic aristocrats, elitists, or snobs, and this all the more reinforced their view that their outlook and the nation's historical development were interrelated and must ultimately merge to become the dominant America.

In still another way, their emergence from a bourgeois historical reality

tended to reinforce their view. They affirmed a work ethic, and in their rhetoric used terms common to bourgeois social relations, but they endowed that ethic and filled those terms with different meanings. No less than bourgeois moralists, they deprecated idleness and voluntary unemployment. But they insisted upon the right of all persons to engage in directly self-expressing and self-fulfilling work, and upon the principle that work, properly, constituted not a means to life, but one of the more important expressions of life. They argued that the bourgeoisie, however, was not in the market for such work, and left those who sought it involuntarily unemployed. The only effective alternative, therefore, was the abolition of the bourgeoisie as society's arbiter of work opportunities, and its displacement by nothing less than civilization itself. The young intellectuals, accordingly, projected the transformation of the employer from what was now a specific class in society, with its own limited interests, to the society as a whole. But in that case, the values and interests of society, as employer, must necessarily coincide with the values and interests championed by the young intellectuals.

In this way, art and history would converge upon the reconciliation of the individual and society, of the particular will and the general will, of desire and necessity. Rousseau, Blake, Hegel, Marx, Freud and other such kindred souls might then walk the land as fellow countrymen along with the American everyman in the new world the young intellectuals proposed to build.

Bourgeois society and its ideology of bourgeois liberty joined together in the unwanted procreation of socialist political movements, their ideology of socialist democracy and, short of abortion, miscarriage, or prior parental mortality, socialist society. The bourgeois image of the free man, exercising self-mastery and independence with respect to the means of production and with respect to the disposal of his life-time and the ownership of his own labor-power and its fruits, dissolved in the historical unfolding of bourgeois society -- in the continuous dispossession and proletarianization of growing numbers of people, in the cleavage between capital and labor, necessarily consequent upon the free play of bourgeois liberty. Bourgeois liberty initially embodied, ultimately negated, the principle of self-mastery. But bourgeois society made the belief in the principle the ideological property of countless numbers of its members, and hence made it into an irrevocable driving force of historical reality. Locke gave the principle its paradigmatic articulation; Rousseau reasserted, against the contrary social reality, the universal claim to the principle by all men as an indefeasible right by virtue simply of their human birth, a claim already implicit in the natural rights doctrine lying in Locke's formulations. Marx transcended the contradiction between the image of the free man contained in bourgeois liberty and the principle of self-mastery: he preserved the principle, the transhistorical human kernel wrapped in bourgeois liberty, by bringing to systematic consciousness the negation of abstract individualized self-mastery in the realm of economic activity and its restitution initially through socialist democracy, and enduringly through socialized self-mastery. Recalling classical antiquity's concept of freedom as residing in the realm of leisure (*schola*), Marx completed the negation by positing the ultimate extrication of the principle of self-mastery from the realm of immediate production, on the basis of the development of the productive forces begun with, but fettered by, capitalism, and brought to higher development and relegated to the periphery of social life under socialism. Locke and Rousseau and Newtonian mechanics produced their negation inMarx, bourgeois democracy and the steam-powered factory system their antithesis in socialist consciousness and socialist politics, as inexorably as the dyspeptic oyster produces the pearl, more of kin, less of kind -- to draw on Shakespeare and amortize Hegel. As

for the Old World, so for the New World, only more completely so, in words Marx liked to quote: de te fabula narratur est.

The rise and growth of the socialist political movement in the United States in the late 19th century and first two decades of the 20th century, represented the emergence to social consciousness and historical substantiality of bourgeois liberty's negating progeny responding to the accumulationist phase of capitalist industrialization. It represented the growing recognition by Americans of the obsolescence of the principle of self-mastery in its Jeffersonian image, as well as its incompatibility with capitalism. As such the socialist political movement expressed the passage by some Americans beyond the vain attempts to restore bourgeois liberty in response to proletarianization, to the demand for the social reunification of productive means and labor, and the right of men to exercise social control over the disposal of their life-time in the production process. The appearance, on the other hand, of the outlook expressed by the young intellectuals in the period of about 1915 to 1930, represented the somewhat later but partially concomitant, and wholly interrelated, emergence to social consciousness of the theoretical negation of bourgeois liberty and bourgeois society, in the early phase of capitalist disaccumulation.

Though sharing a common source and a common antagonist in bourgeois society, and though sharing a common general objective in the self-disposal of life-time along lines of endeavor constituting ends in themselves, the people caught up respectively in these two phases, historically, more often than not, have appeared in distinct, if not wholly estranged, spheres of social life and consciousness: the first in the realm of political-economy, as the predominant element in socialist political thought, the second in the realm of art and intellect, as a major current of aesthetic and philosophical avant-gardeism. This division has been central to the separation, in anti-bourgeois circles, of history and politics on the one side from art and aesthetics on the other. It helps to explain why from the point of view of avant-garde artists and intellectuals, the political socialists have often appeared as 'primitives', as only another variant of the bourgeois, immersed as the socialist movements and their constituencies still were in the realm of production and necessity-compelled labor; and why from the standpoint of political socialists, the avant-garde artists and intellectuals have often appeared as abstract idealists,utopians, and only another variant of the bourgeois individualist, unconcerned as they were, in a serious systematic way, with the ways and means of achieving the collective reunification of labor and the means of production, as the material and social basis for realizing the commonly held grand objectives repressed by bourgeois society. This division has been central, accordingly, to the failure, in the western industrial nations, of the socialist political movements and the avant-garde artists and intellectuals to unite their resources and efforts in their shared desire for a revolutionary transformation of bourgeois society, and bring to realization a consciousness appropriate to a society passing beyond relations of production. The inability to overcome this division was decisive to the ultimate failure of the young intellectuals, in their own terms, to overcome the dualism of ideas and reality in American life, to actualize their consciousness in the predominant social relations of America, to achieve their stated objectives and dreams, and permanently to lay to rest the American Adamic mythos.

But, if only temporarily, rudimentarily, and gropingly, yet nevertheless certainly, the outlook the young intellectuals expressed in the period of about 1915 to 1930, represented an elemental though unstable synthesis of the two phases of consciousness otherwise associated with and most systematically developed by Marx. In this further important sense, it represented the emergence to a significant and relatively widespread social consciousness in America, of a

world-view comprising a break with, and a transcending negation of, The American Ideology and its Jeffersonian and Adamic image of America and the American man.

Accordingly, and more specifically, the outlook of the young intellectuals expressed their response, on the immediate plane, to the extension of bourgeois liberty with its values and social relations from the sphere of production and exchange into spheres related to their own life-activity; their response as well, therefore, to proletarianization of their own working conditions and social status. Less immediately, and by corollary, their outlook also expressed their response, in broad philosophical and ethical principles, to bourgeois society and proletarianization in general. In terms of this outlook, the young intellectuals were conscious of themselves as a distinct group arrayed against the bourgeoisie, its ideology, its values, and its society, which they viewed as depriving of self-mastery in access to the means of life and ease, and more important in the disposal of their life-time. They experienced and comprehended that deprivation in three basic and interrelated ways: 1) the reduction of themselves and other artists and intellectuals to the position of, in effect, employees whatever the formal or ostensible status; 2) their being forced to place their art and intellect at the service of antipathetic purposes represented by their employers, publishers, universities, patrons, alias the market; 3) their conception of those purposes as essentially bourgeois in character, i.e., oriented to the exploitation of the American people's deprived needs and starved desires, and serving to sustain the existence of externalized men and their exploitative social system rather than upsetting, perturbing, challenging, and changing them. In responding against their own proletarianization, and against proletarianization in general, they also rejected any aspiration to become property-owning enterpreneurs or employers of labor themselves, as well as regarding such aspiration in others as immoral, psychologically regressive, and socially deleterious.

Abstractly at first, and increasingly in more specific political terminology, the young intellectuals identified with the industrial proletariat and with the dispossessed generally. They presented themselves as partisan, in varying degrees, to socialism; partisan, that is, to a democratically governed social system which would extricate production and distribution of goods from private or corporate ownership and control, which would reduce the production technique to means of general welfare for society collectively and for each individual personally, which would thereby release society from the all-pervasive domination by the production sphere, and which would therefore require depriving the bourgeoisie of social, economic, and political leadership by installing in such leadership workers, intellectuals, artists, and professionals, seeking these objectives. The young intellectuals' outlook assumed that working men and women, and especially the young among them, given the opportunity, would recognize and assert the same objectives as their own, a fuller, richer, deeper personal and social life where work might increasingly become a self-expressive activity, and where the techniques of production and the corresponding social and political relations might serve people as a means to their self-determined ends, rather than operating as ends whose requirements and perpetuation people must serve as means: in short, where the condition for the development of each is the condition for the development of all.

The young intellectuals could therefore preoccupy their writings to a large extent with their own immediate situation and their own role as intellectuals and artists in their society, and could write about their society from the perspective of their own situation and role, as the manner of criticizing the existing society and projecting the outlines of the new society. They could criticize

society with reference to their self-image, an image that embraced both their current condition denying what they thought they ought to be as artists, intellectuals, and whole men and women, and their anticipated condition in a society transformed to honor and actualize it. In this way, they could view themselves as seeking to create the new society in their own image, which for them meant the negation of bourgeois values, or the transvaluation of values, and a society shaped by and expressing the transvaluation. Their outlook, accordingly, projected their own needs, interests, aspirations and values, as those of the entire society and, since they represented, inchoate, man and society passed beyond production-inhibited social relations, a passage made possible by the development of productive technique in the bourgeois epoch, they did so with a compelling substantiality and historical realizability approaching that of the outlook of revolutionary bourgeois movements of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and of the revolutionary proletarian movements of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The Young Intellectuals' outlook of the 1920s approached, but had not yet reached historical realizability. They had yet to unite their transhistorical consciousness with a social-theoretical consciousness concretely comprehending their own specific historical reality. This was due decisively to their emergence at an early phase of the disaccumulation process, from within which they were still unable clearly to grasp U.S. social relations and their own position within them.

As mental workers, their number was still relatively small and their class position still ambiguous. It was only later in the U.S., to a degree by the latter 1950s, but more forcefully by the latter 1960s, that the proletarian class character of mental workers had become firmly established in real social relations -- in the media, educational systems, professions and technical pursuits, government bureaucracies, advertising, etc. -- and increasingly clarified in consciouness. That is, it was only later as the disaccumulation phase and its consequences matured that mental workers, as a sufficiently numerous sector of the proletariat, divorced from control over the conditions and purposes of their work and forced to sell their labor, no less than manual workers, for wages or salaries, could begin viewing themselves and their own historical needs and potentialities in terms of the broader class of the proletariat, of which they now comprised an integral and substantially large component.

In the 1920s, and until more recently, mental workers, including 'intellectuals', still characteristically viewed themselves from the standpoint of special function, or quasi-interest group, rather than from that of class -- as a 'middle-class' stratum or 'intellectual class', dangling or floating in the interstices of the larger and socially, politically, and economically more powerful class formations of society. Even for those intellectuals who identified with the proletariat, therefore, their transhistorical outlook still remained parochial, limited, and insufficiently world-historical -- still insufficiently historically class-conscious, and so disabling them for class-directed socio-political action effective for realizing their own revolutionary aspirations. They were unable, in short, fully to comprehend their society and themselves from the standpoint of their own immediate situation and their own role as intellectuals and artists, so long as that comprehension remained at the level of functionalism (however self-exalted the function), rather than of class. Their consciousness, that is, still remained substantially alienated from their own broader, and historically concrete, humanity. They were caught in an historical situation where they could not make the passage from apparently declassed radicals to class-conscious revolutionaries. In the immediate outcome, accordingly, the Young Intellectuals by and large in the later 1920s and afterward either reverted to embracing the Adamic mythos and the American Ideology to one degree or another, or

they surrendered their transhistorical consciousness to a narrow functional chauvinism, or kept it stowed away and compartmentalized in the special sphere of aesthetics, literature, philosophy, etc., apart from effective participation in politics.

On the other hand, the proletarian class in the U.S., given the phase of capitalist development reached in U.S. society, could not come to a full consciousness of its historical significance and transforming potential, until it had more completely absorbed to itself, side by side and intermingling with manual labor, its mental-labor component; so that within itself the proletarian class could overcome the previously enforced class-division between mental and manual labor, and comprehend itself as self-sufficiently representative of the entire society moving into its next world-historical epoch. By the late 1960s, this comprehension, expressing the maturing social class reality, has emerged in growing force, manifesting itself in the swelling movement for revclutionary socialism of the variegated proletariat against the oligarchic, parasitic and increasingly devitalized corporate-bourgeoisie -- a movement of the modern universal class to transmute that universality from its constricted class, to its more fully human, form.

The proletariat can not realize its historical mission on the plane of its individual members' particular aims, 'interests', 'needs', but only on the plane of a universal world-outlook. This is because the proletariat can not socially satisfy its individuals' needs through the use of a particular external property form, the immediate use of which (as with the bourgeois owner) establishes a universal order to which each member adjusts himself. The mode of bourgeois existence is rational calculation in submission to irrational 'laws' and circumstances set in motion by the bourgeois individuals' use of their privately owned property. It is different with the proletariat: it must from the outset, in order to free itself from the domination of bourgeois rule, in order to reappropriate its own humanity, establish a new universality consciously -- rooted in the only 'property' proletarians have, namely their human capacities, talents, and potentials as social beings. The proletariat does not assume to power, therefore, by asserting its established existence - as did the bourgeoisie - but by negating it. Or put a different way, the only essence waiting to be realized in the proletariat, beneath its existent servile position, is its existence as freely developing humanity, freely developing, self-determining associated human beings. The proletariat is the first class in history with the capability of reshaping society, whose universal principle is not latent in, and does not unfold from, the particularized aims of its individual members as proletarians -- as against the bourgeoisie whose universal principle is latent in and unfolds from the particularized aims of its individual members as bourgeoisie -- but for whom the individual aims of its members lie latent in and depends upon the realization of its universal human principle -- that is, for whom the transhistorical must be brought into unity with the historical. Upon the actualization or the proletariat's self-negating universal principle, the individual particularizes and actualizes the universal in his concrete personality, rather than merely as before with both bourgeois and proletarian existing as a mutilated, fragmented, and particular function, an 'external' universality.

The outlook and action of class struggle are the only viable grounds upon which proletarians may realize their humanity as self-determining, self-mastering men and women at home in their own world. The psychological barrier to recognizing, affirming and acting upon proletarian historical class-consciousness may, for some, reside in a gnawing idea that it is unworthy of us: given the material wealth and advanced technology of the industrial nations, some of us may feel in our bones that we should have long ago passed well beyond class-

conflict theory to the 'truly human' or 'truly revolutionary' mentality of people shaping and changing and controlling their own social and personal lives; that we are still in need of an 'old' theory seems to stand as a devastating self-reproach: we should have brought the capitalist system to an end long ago. It reminds us of our failure; it is something like facing an ordeal, a labor of agony, we thought or wished or dreamed we were finished with, only to find that in fact we have not so much as begun. Some of us may prefer the 'ideology of the future' -- it is incomparably more 'human' and intelligent. True, but it does not come cheaply -- we have not yet earned the right to it: it has no real political force because it is the consciousness of a post-political era; our thoughts and dreams may lie in the future, but we live in a political society dominated by the economic past, whose accounts can be settled only by a consciousness still rooted in that past. For it is only by this settlement that present society can be released from the grip of the dominating moribund past and transformed into the theater of the future -- and then, but not before, the 'ideology of the future' may become the expression of practical affairs. We cannot get to the future conceptions of progress by bypassing the old ideologies and concepts of progress, but by transforming them; for this is only another way of saying that we can not bypass the old society to get to the new, but must transform the old into the new; that we can not bypass our present selves to get to our new selves, but must confront ourselves as we are, express ourselves as we are, and in so doing transform ourselves into what we will become. Right now the duty of every person dedicated to making humanity prevail is to mount the class struggle. Capitalism, imperialism, the profit system, exploitation of man by man -- not some external Carthage -- delenda sunt!

FOOTNOTES

1. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed., E. J. Hobsbawm, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1964.

2. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, Harvest Book, N.Y., 1955, pp. 29, 101, 174.

3. Williams' works stand as a monumental achievement in bringing into U.S. historical writings, so far as I know for the first time, the revolutionary consciousness uniting the transhistorical (archetypal) and the social theoretical. He is a giant among historians, and given the parochial state of the historical profession especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, a giant among men. And this, regardless of the differences many younger radicals may otherwise have with him. Those differences should not deter revolutionaries from reading, studying, and reading and studying again, his works -- reading, studying, discussing, and learning from his works, and learning also their disagreements with his works as well as their agreements. Keep their disagreements with him as they may, the point is for them to 'dig' his works -- deeply, just as, not accidentally, he dug deeply the works of Marx.

4. For related statistical and theoretical material available in more conventional economic writings, which acknowledge and attempt to come to grips, though not adequately, with the process indicated here, see, most conventionally, Anatol Murad, 'Net Investment and Industrial Progress', and Martin Bronfenbrenner, 'Some Neglected Implications of Secular Inflation', in Kenneth Kurihara, ed., Post-Keynesian Economics, Rutgers U Press, New Brunswick, 1954, pp. 227-250, and 31-58, respectively. Also, T. C. Cochran, The American Business System, Harper Torchbooks, N.Y., 1962.

5. This was the U.S.'s first and so far only disaccumulationist depression; as such the depression of 1929-1940 differed significantly from the previous capitalist accumulationist depressions of the 19th and early 20th centures. I cannot go into this here, but it is included in the other work I am presently engaged in, on the theoretical elaboration of the disaccumulation phase of capitalism and its meaning for the concrete historical development of U.S. society.

6. Recent Economic Changes in the United States, Report of the Committee on Recent Economic Changes, of the President's Conference on Unemployment, Herbert Hoover, Chairman, published for the National Bureau of Economic Research, by McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1929, 2 volumes. The Committee's members were: Herbert Hoover, chairman, Walter F. Brown, Renick W. Dunlap, William Green, Julius Klein, John S. Lawrence, Max Mason, George McFadden, Adloph C. Miller, Lewis E. Pierson, John J. Raskob, Arch W. Shaw, Louis J. Taber, Daniel Willard, Clarence M. Woolley, Owen D. Young, Edward Eyre Hunt. The NBER's Directors-at-Large were: Matthew Will, Harry W. Laidler, George O. May, Elwood Mead, Thomas W. Lamont, George Soule, N. I. Stone. The NBER's research staff members were: Edwin F. Gay, Director, Wesley C. Mitchell, Director, Willford I. King, Leo Wolman, Frederick C. Mills, Willard L. Thorp, Harry Jerome, Simon Kuznets, Frederick R. Macauley, Walter F. Willcox.

7. 'Acceleration rather than structural change is the key to an understanding of our recent economic developments... the distinctive character of the years from 1922 to 1929 owes less to fundamental change than to intensified activity... the novelty of the period...rested chiefly in the fact that developments such as formerly affected our old industries have been recurring in our new industries. The changes have not been in structure but in speed and spread... But the breadth and scale and "tempo" of recent developments give them new importance.' Ibid., I, p. ix.

8. Ibid., pp. ix-x.

9. The term, 'technique', is used here in the broad sense as well as in the more specific application to the modern industrial apparatus, following Jacques Ellul's definition in his The Technological Society, A A. Knopf, N.Y., 1965: See Ch. 1. In effect, the Committee utilizes essentially the same concept, since it stresses organization as well as machine technology in characterizing the trends in question.

10. Recent Economic Changes, I, pp. xv, 87, 91. In different terms, the value of output per worker in manufacturing increased from $1,600 in 1900 to $7,500 in 1919, the increment remaining substantial after allowing for price inflation. The ratio of the value of products to capital investment rose about 35 per cent from 1.04 in 1890 to 1.4 in 1919. Ibid., p. 88.

11. Ibid., pp. I, xv; II, 881.

12. Ibid., I, 91, 92.

13. Ibid., I, 471. The net decrease in farm population in 1922 alone was estimated at 460,000, in 1923 at an unspecified larger number, in 1924 at 182,000, in 1926 at 479,000. Ibid., II, 880.

14. Ibid., I, 591.

15. Recent Social Trends in the United States, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, with a Foreword by Herbert Hoover, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y. 1933, one-volume edition; from Table 11, p. 312. With 1920 representing the index number 100, the average annual index number of factory wage-earners for 1927-29 stood at 93.4. The figures for the number of steam railroad wage-earners are similar: they stood at a peak of about 2 million in 1920, and at an average annual number of 1.7 million in 1927-29; the index number, with 1920 as 100, stood at about 85 for 1927-29. (In the autumn of 1929, President Hoover appointed Wesley C. Mitchell to undertake and supervise the study. The members of the Research Committee were Mitchell, Chairman, Charles E. Merriam, vice-chairman, Shelby M. Harrison, Secy-Treas., Alice Hamilton, Howard W. Odum, and William F. Ogburn.)

16. Ibid., pp. xxvii, 283, 311-312.

17. Recent Economic Changes, II, p. 594, and I, p. 95.

18. Recent Social Trends, p. xxxvi.

19. Recent Economic Changes, I, 92, II, 878-879. The unemployment figures, 1922, 12.1%

in percentages, for 1920-1927, from II, Table 8, p. 879, are: 1920, 5.1%; 1921, 15.3%; 1922, 12.1%; 1923, 5.2%; 1924, 7.7%; 1925, 5.7%; 1926, 5.2%; 1927, 6.3%. The Report emphasizes that due to hidden and unreported unemployment, these figures underestimate the real extent of unemployment, and if anything 'minimize the seriousness of unemployment'.

20. Ibid., I, p. xvi.

21. Ibid., I, p. xv.

22. Recent Social Trends, p. xxxvii.

23. Recent Economic Changes, II, Table 1, p. 851; see also George Soule, Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917-1929, Rinehart & Co., N.Y., 1947, pp. 54-56.

24. See Donald Streever, Capacity Utilization and Business Investment, U of Illinois Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 55, March 1960, p. 64; E. G. Nourse, et al, America's Capacity to Produce, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1934; and Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 1965, pp. 237, 242; Murad, op. cit., 242.

25. See Cochran, The American Business System, pp. 25-33, 49-50. Citing Simon Kuznets, National Income, NBER, 1946, p. 53, Cochran notes (p. 25) that the per cent of national income going into net capital formation declined from an average of 12.6 per cent in the period 1899-1908, to 10.2 per cent in 1919-1928, and that the rate of net capital formation declined by 20 per cent comparing 1900-1910 with 1920-1930. See also Murad, op. cit., 242, and 239 fn 36.

26. See William A. Williams, The Contours of American History, World Publishing Co., N.Y., 1961, pp. 425-438; Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression, D. Van Nostrand Co., Princeton, N.J., 1963, Ch. 8, pp. 194-211 for government agricultural policies, and Chs. 7, 9-12, pp. 167-185, 212-295 for detailed materials on Hoover and other like-minded political and business leaders; Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy: Department of Commerce, 1921-1928, U of Pittsburgh Press, 1962, esp. Chs. 1-3, pp. 3-60; Gerald Wash, 'Herbert Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation', Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (1959), pp. 455-468. See also Herbert Hoover, The New Day: Campaign Speeches of Herbert Hoover, 1928, Stanford U Press, 1929.

27. Recent students of political-economic trends in the 1920s have already pointed toward a re-evaluation of Hoover and business developments along these lines. As one historian puts it, 'Behind the bright facade of "normalcy" some perplexed Americans were awakening to a realization that normalcy would not return. Indeed, the term was peculiarly ill-fitted to years so characterized by sweeping economic and social change.' He goes on to observe that studies of the age of Franklin D. Roosevelt 'have shown how much its origins, its philosophy and its measures derive from the period presided over by Harding, Coolidge and Hoover.' Historians, he writes, are coming to view the 1920s 'not alone as an era of rampant materialism, reaction and individualism but as a troubled decade in which old and new were inextricably intermingled and confronted. It was a time of deep uncertainty and conflict: of faltering efforts to face - or sometimes to avoid - the fact of change. It was an age, as we have come to understand, not so very diferent from our own.' Morell Heald, 'Business Thought in the Twenties: Social Responsibility', Amer. Quarterly, XIII: 2, Pt. 1, Summer 1961, pp. 126-139. See also the workd cited in the previous footnote, above. The standard view of the business outlook in the 1920s is expressed in James Warren Prothro, The Dollar Decade: Business Ideas in the 1920s, Louisiana State U Press, Baton Rouge, 1954. The basic defect of Prothro's account is that he presents as the business view ideas associated with the N.A.M., that is, generally, middle range and small business. Given this approach he does not look for basic ideological differences among business men, and accordingly does not find them.

28. Cf. Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence, pp. 303-304; Frederick J. Hoffman, 'Philistine and Puritan in the 1920s', op. cit., p. 253.

29. C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America, Paine-Whitman, N.Y. 1964, pp. 51-52; Recent Social Trends, p. xlvii.

30. Mills, op. cit., 41, 44, 69.

31. Ibid., 59-60.

32. Ibid., 47.

33. Recent Social Trends, p. xlvi.

34. Ibid., Table 6, pp. 281-282, and p. liii; for the population figures, Morison and Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, Oxford U Press, N.Y., 1955, vol. I, p. 899.

35. Frederick J. Hoffman et al, The Little Magazine: A History and a Bibliography, Princeton U Press, N.J., 1946, pp. 1, 3, 7.

36. Ibid., 7.

37. Ibid., 1-2, 7-10.

38. Ibid., 3-5, 2.

39. 'Intellectuals have existed in all literate societies, but they have only recently come to constitute a kind of subculture. In fact, the word "intellectual" does not seem to have found its way into American usage much before the turn of the century. Before that, most intellectuals belonged to the middle class, and though they may sometimes have felt themselves at odds with the rest of the community, they did not yet conceive of themselves as a class apart...' Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type, A.A. Knopf, N.Y., 1965, p. x. Lasch observes that 'the intellectual class', composed of intellectuals with a 'class-consciousness' of themselves as intellectuals, 'is a distinctively modern phenomenon, the product of the cultural fragmentation that seems to characterize industrial and post-industrial societies.' As such, he places its emergence 'in the first couple of decades of the present century'. Ibid., pp. x, xi. Lasch's identification of 'the intellectual class' as 'a distinctively modern phenomenon', belonging in its origins to the early 20th century, is sound, but his explanation is questionable. First of all, to regard them as an intellectual class is only to replicate their own view of themselves and their own confusion of function with class. Second, the cultural fragmentation he refers to pre-dated the early 20th century by many decades at least. Even if it be granted that the emergence of 'the intellectual class' were a delayed product of such cultural fragmentation (itself a rather vague and imprecise term), it still remains to identify and describe the more immediate precipitating circumstances; and here the disaccumulation process is crucially pertinent.

40. D. H. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature, Doubleday Anchor Books, N.Y., n.d. (195?), p. 64. Lawrence began writing this work in 1915; it was first published in 1922. These years coincide with the period in which most of the formative works of the Young Intellectuals first appeared: Van Wyck Brooks, America's Coming-of-Age, B. W. Huebsch, N.Y., 1918; Harold E. Stearns, Liberalism in America, Boni and Liveright, N.Y., 1919, America and the Young Intellectual, George H. Doran, N.Y., 1921 (comprising essays first published in The Dial, 1918, and The Freeman, 1920, 1921), and Stearns, ed., Civilization in the United States, Harcourt, Brace & Co., N.Y., 1922; Waldo Frank, Our America, Boni and Liveright, N.Y., 1919; virtually all of Bourne's essays (1915-1918). By the first years of the 1920s, the outlook associated with the Young Intellectuals had been formed and articulated; their subsequent works through the 1920s represented the replication, application, and elaboration of the viewpoint essentially forged in the period 1915-1922.

41. R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam, U of Chicago Press (1955), Third Impression, 1961, pp. 4-5.

42. Cf. Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1961, passim, and especially pp. 3-13, 16-37, 138-164, 220-226, 291-305; Roland Van Zandt, The Mataphysical Foundations of American History, Mouton & Co., 'S-Gravenhage, The Hague, 1959; William A. Williams, 'The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy', Pacific Historical Review, XXIV, November 1955, pp. 379-395, and The Great Evasion, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1965; and David W. Noble, Historians against History: The Frontier Thesis and the National Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1838, U of Minnesota Press, 1965.

43. Lewis, op. cit., 129.

44. Loc. cit.

45. Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1964.

46. For a delineation of the doctrine of natural rights and natural liberties, and its decisive role in shaping American social thought and jurisprudence, see Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise, Mentor, N.Y., 1958, pp. 128-143. Though it is not essential to the present purpose, it may be noted that Veblen published many of his essays in the same magazines as those in which these young intellectuals published theirs, and that it is reasonable to assume that these intellectuals were acquainted with Veblen's views in this matter as well as in others (the work cited above being originally published in 1904). For a delineation of scientific and evolutionary positivism as referred to here, see H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, Vintage, N.Y., 1961, Ch. 2: 'The Decade of the 1890s: The Revolt against Positivism', pp. 33-66; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Harvest Books, n.d., pp. 120-121; Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Humanities Press, N.Y., 1954, pp. 323-388. As for pragmatic instrumentalism, the ensuing discussion will make plain its meaning as understood by these intellectuals.

47. Our America, pp. 8-9.

48. Harold E. Stearns, America and the Young Intellectuals (1921), pp. 11-12.

49. John Haynes Holmes, 'Where Are the Pre-War Radicals?' The Survey, vol. 55, 1 February 1926, pp. 564-565. Holmes recalled that the older liberal reformers like himself had 'believed passionately in America as a country unique among the nations of the earth... Then came the War -- and America was seen to be just like every other country! The America we loved was gone, and in its place, was just one more cruel imperialism. This discovery ended a movement which had for its purpose the protection and vindication of an ideal America... But America will follow where we once hoped that she would lead, and thus find her place at last in the commonwealth of man.' Id., loc. cit. Cf. Frederick C. Howe's recollection: The War 'all but destroyed my picture of America. It does not come to life again... I felt a moral obligation for our personal and political liberties... Liberty was as dear to me as another kind of patriotism was dear to other hundred per cent Americans. And when I saw liberty laid prostrate by those from whom I had expected protection, when I found my kind of Americanism under suspicion, if not denounced as criminal, when I saw my government using its power in a hysteria of fear to crush civil and political liberties, when I saw these things, much of my belief in men, in the political state and in my own America all but died. I think it died for millions of others...' F. C. Howe, 'Where Are the Pre-War Radicals? A Rejoinder', The Survey, vol. 56, 1 April 1926, p. 50.

50. Cf. Warren I. Susman, 'The Useless Past: American Intellectuals and the Frontier Thesis: 1910-1930', Bucknell Review, XI:2, March 1963, pp. 1-2, where, referring to Brooks, Frank, Mumford, and others, he notes as a 'striking fact', 'this fascination with the American past', and 'the enormous interest shown by intellectuals - not themselves professional historians or even professors - in the study of American history.'

51. Op. cit., 8-9.

52. America's Coming-of-Age, pp. 162-163. Cf. Waldo Frank, Our America, pp. 4-5: '...The problem is not to force America to speech. Such forced speech must be what most of ours has been: the parroting of foreign phrases, lip service to the maturity of England and of France -- or worse, expression of the one formed and conscious entity in American life, the world of commerce.'

53. Frank, Our America, pp. 39-40.

54. Ibid., p. 4.

55. See, e.g., Frederick J. Hoffman, 'Philistine and Puritan in the 1920s', American Quarterly, I: 3, Fall 1949, p. 247, and passim, pp. 247-263; and Hoffman's The Twenties, The Free Press, N.Y., 1965 (orig. copyright 1949), pp. 355-368; on the other hand, Hoffman recognizes the use by intellectuals in the 1920s of 'the Midwest' as a metaphor. Pp. 369-377.

56. Indeed, many of the Puritan divines themselves might have agreed with parts of the young intellectuals' critique, at least so far as it applied to their own lay brethren and to some wayward among their own colleagues. More than that, the young intellectuals' view of the Puritan epistemology and work ethic enjoyed considerable substantiation in contemporary, and even more recent, historical scholarship. See Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century, Beacon Press, Boston, 1965 (orig. pub. 1939), Ch. XVI: 'God's Controversy with New England', 463-491, and Ch. I: 'The Practice of Piety', pp. 35-63, esp. pp. 42-44, and Ch. V: 'The Instrument of Reason', pp. 111-153.

Stuart B. Ewen

Advertising as Social Production

'Mass reproduction is aided especially by the reproduction of masses... the masses are brought face to face with themselves.'
--Walter Benjamin

Proletarianization, meaning that process by which human life is implicated in the universe of bourgeois production, has always been a cultural 'offering'. Karl Marx initiated his argument for a critique of culture from the conceptual touchstone of proletarianization; as the mode of culture itself, the process of proletarianization stood at the heart of Marx's understanding of modern history. Marx argued further, in pursuit of his radical understanding, that a critique of culture was inextricably bound up in the revolutionary perception of civil society. Concommitant with any 'stage of development... of (the) material powers of production,' Marx wrote in the 'Preface to a Critique of Political Economy', specific and corresponding social formations and relations of production would arise. Thus it would appear that to focus historical attention on the study of social production - that is, on the specific means and consequences of the process of proletarianization - could hardly qualify as a methodological innovation, since Marx long ago both located and formulated its primacy. Yet few contemporary studies of emerging industrial culture deal seriously with the problem of perception; a notable exception is E.P. Thompson's brilliant essay, 'Time Work-discipline, and Industrial Capitalism', (Past and Present, pp. 38, 56-97), which views the emergence of industrial capitalism as a world-historic-shock that beyond being a significant change in the 'Material powers of production' required its participants to assume a critically altered perception of time -- of reality. Thompson concludes his essay with the instructive though implicit admonition that '...there is no such thing as economic growth which is not, at the same time, growth or change of a culture;... the growth of social consciousness...'

The emergence of bourgeois social production meant the creation of a social life style over and above a work style prescribed by the conditions of a job. While the history of 19th century social production and proletarianization seems largely informed by the boundaries of work, it should be viewed more radically as informed by a social style. Corresponding to a definite, and in our terms primitive, arrangement of the material forces of production, the social style seems precluded by the work style only when one fails to view the nature of work as exigent to a specific level of social production. To view proletarianization in early industrial America solely as the creation of 'workers' in the most colloquial sense (i.e., men to work in factories) ignores the social mode of capitalism. To isolate the work style as the sole mode of proletarianization in the 19th century is as deceptive as the work of bourgeois 'culture critics' -- work which takes issue with the character of consumption culture, branding it anomolous, while accepting the 'integrity' of our social institutions and the tenets of our political economy. Both the conceptual isolation of the work style and the writings of bourgeois culture critics extricate particular aspects of social capitalism from their totality.

Contemporary proletarianization extends far beyond the creation of workers to man the productive machinery of industry. Although the proletarianization of 19th century capitalism was - as it continued to be - a process of habituation to a social style, its limits were narowere and its focus less specific than the proletarianization of contemporary capitalism. The nature of the productive machinery and its capacity to produce (and have its products consumed) meant a very privatized and work oriented proletarianization -- a privatized level of social production. 'Worker' indicated 'wheelhorse'. The number of hours spent on the job; the introduction of a 'clock-time' oriented work day; the imposition of a routinized moderation and thrift that was bent on making an essentially non-industrial work force 'socially responsible'; and the ideological bourgoisification of religious and other cultural institutions were the often self-conscious attempts on the part of an industrial bourgeoisie to educate men to production. These aspects of industrial life must be seen as attempts not to create 14 hour-per-day workers, but proletarian men.

The development of a more highly technologized capitalism promised to disengage vast numbers of 'wheelhorse' proletarians from their previous social role. In the process of producing vast quantities - 'mass' numbers - of goods for consumption, it necessarily altered the character, although not the substance of proletarianization. Character and substance have often been confused and fused in the description of the 'beneficial' CHOICES, FREEDOMS, LEISURES and AFFLUENCE that have been attained by the modern industrial worker. Such 'gains' are generally regarded as having elevated the contemporary 'mass' above its previous proletarian status.

Yet the maintenance of the notion 'mass' should give pause to such sanguinity. CHOICE, FREEDOM, LEISURE and AFFLUENCE can not be viewed as transhistorical absolutes in the context of corporate capitalism, but rather as transvaluated elements of proletarianization -- those aspects of social style which commit the proletariat to, rather than extricate it from, the needs of bourgeois society. An appraisal of the quality and direction of CHOICE (etc.) reveals its link to commitment to the consumer market. Apparent disengagement from proletarian life represents its opposite -- a further involvement in that life. 'That which appears to be is not.'

Consumption, likewise, is not what it appears to be. Though generally considered an increasingly expanding time off from production, it is rather a modern social-economic formation that, like factory discipline, commits our TIME, our LIVES to the maintenance of the bourgeois means of production. Sebastian de Grazia pointed out the contradiction of our leisure and the substance of (alienated) pleasure when he cryptically noted that '...consumption gobbles time up alive.' (OF TIME, WORK AND LEISURE, p. 211)

During the 1920s the creation of an advanced advertising bureaucracy was an attempt to put culture to work for capitalism. While in the minds of both capital and labor early industrial proletarianization was closely associated with the productive plant and its disciplines, the intensified use of cultural technology (media) in the proletarianization process tended to obfuscate that association. While the ad industry was bureaucratically linked to the industrial machinery, its products were capitalistic art forms which publicly ignored complicity except insofar as their message implored men to consume. The advertising industry's ability to perform such an obfuscation was deliberate and historical; historical in that advanced technological art forms are conducive to being separated from their source. Walter Benjamin has noted (see 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction') that as technologically reproduced art is designed for prolific exhibition, the notion of authenticity - the

sense of an original - is lost. The essential element in each work of mechanically reproduced art is its immediacy, its every showing, rather than its ability to be located absolutely 'in time and space'. It was this sense of immediacy, the apparent lack of source, which gave advertising its particular value as an efficient means of social production. Advertising was a way of extending proletarianization from its traditional context, and correlating it to an ideological notion of pleasure.

It is with these concepts in mind that the following is presented.

I

In 1910, Henry Ford instituted the 'line production system' for 'maximum production economy' in his Highland Park (Mich.) plant. The innovation, though in many ways unsophisticated, and hardly educated as to its own implications, was the beginning of a momentous transformation in America's capacity to produce. In quantitative terms, the change was staggering. On the 1910 line, the time required to assemble a chassis was twelve hours and twenty-eight minutes. 'By spring of 1914, the Highland Park plant was turning out over 1000 vehicles a day, and the average labor time for assembling a chassis had dopped to one hour and thirty-three minutes.'

Mass production was a way of making production more economical. Through his use of the assembly line, Ford was able to utilize 'expensive, single-purpose' machinery, along with quickly trained, 'single-purpose' workmen to make a single-model, inexpensive automobile at a rate which, with increasing sophistication, continued to dwarf not only the production levels of pre-massified industry, but the output of less refined mass production systems.

By the 1920s, interest in and employment of the industrial potential of mass production extended far beyond the automobile industry. In recognition of such industrial developments, the United States Special Census of 1921 and 1923 offered a study of productive capacity which was one of the first general discussions of its kind. Consumer goods manufacturers increasingly recognized that mass production and mass distribution were 'necessary' steps toward survival in a competitive market. Edward Filene, of the Boston department store family, and a businessman founder of the consumer union movement, recognized and articulated the competitive compulsion of mass production: competition, said Filene, '...will compel us to Fordize American business and industry.'

And yet, what Filene and others meant by 'Fordizing' American industry transcended the myopic vision of Henry Ford. While Ford stubbornly held to the notion that '...the work and the work alone controls us', others in the automobile industry, and (for our purposes) more importantly, ideologues of mass industry outside of the auto industry, viewed the strategy of production in broad social terms. Before mass production, industries had produced for a limited consumer market. With a burgeoning capacity to produce, industry promised to become distended in comparison to traditional non-proletarian markets and conventional buying habits. While traditional markets had been viewed as a distinct and dependable recepticle for consumer goods, 'scientific' production promised to make the conventional notion of consumer anachronistic.

The mechanism of mass production could not function unless markets became more dynamic, growing horizontally (nationally), vertically (into social classes not previously among the consumers), and ideologically. 'Ideological' growth refers to the needs of a mass industrial capitalism to produce, change or habituate men into responding to the demands of the productive machinery. The corollary to a freely growing system of goods production was a '...systematic, nationwide plan... to endow the masses with more buying power', a freely growing system of consumer production. The modern mass producer could not depend upon an elite market to respond to his productive capacity. From a dependence upon local markets or localized markets scattered nationally, the manufacturer was forced to 'count on the whole United States if he (was)... going to manufacture a large enough quantity of goods to reduce the cost to the point where he (could)... compete with other manufacturers of the same goods,' and subsequently distribute his mass produced ware more efficiently and profitably. He was required to create an ideological bridge across traditional social gaps - section, taste, need and class, which would congeal prejudices in his favor.

Considering the quantitative possibilities of mass production, the question of 'national markets' became one of qualitatively changing the nature of the American buying public. In response to the exigencies of the productive system of the twentieth century, excessiveness replaced thrift as a social value. It became imperative to invest the laborer with a financial power and a psychic desire to consume.

By the end of the depression of 1921, '...productive machinery was so effective that even more so than before much greater markets were absolutely necessary than those provided by the existing public buying power.' As the question of expanding old and creating new markets became a function in the massification of industry, foresighted businessmen began to see themselves as social producers. It was a necessity for them to organize their businesses not merely around the production of goods, but around the creation of a buying public, men and markets correlative to such goods production. '...The changes that we shall be obliged to make in production,' noted Filene, 'will lead to pretty thorough overhauling of our machinery and methods of distribution, and, in the end, both the quantity and quality of consumption will be dictated by them.' As the 'twentieth-century industrialist... realized to a greater extent than did his predecessors, that he must understand the living world contained by his factory,' so too did he realize that he must understand, and manipulate, as part of his productive apparatus, the total world occupied by his workers. The necessity to 'influence human conduct', the knowledge that goods production meant social production, gave some businessmen's rhetoric a revealing idiom; they spoke of 'human conduct' or the 'consumer's dollar' as industrial discoveries, or as more valuable to manufacturing 'than the uses of electricity or steel'. Within an ideal of a 'scientifically managed industry raw materials and consumers were both viewed as malleable. They both would have to be shaped by the demands of the production line, pecuniary interests, and the increasingly managerial tools of capital.

As capitalism became increasingly characterized by mass production and the subsequent need for mass distribution, traditional expedients for the real or attempted manipulation of labor were transformed. While the nineteenth century industrialist coerced labor, both on and off the job, to be the 'wheelhorse' of industry, modernizing capitalism sought to change 'wheelhorse' to 'worker', and 'worker' to 'consumer', on and off the job.

To the worker on the job within modernizing industries, the movement toward

mass production had severely changed the character of his labor. The modern manufacturing plant culminated a trend of industrialism which made him a decreasingly 'significant' unit of production. 'The man who had been the more or less creative maker of the whole of an article became the tender of a machine that made only one small part of the article.' The time required to teach the worker the 'adept performance' of his 'operation on assembly work' was a matter of a few hours. This development had significant repercussions both in terms of the way in which a laborer viewed his proletarian status, and in terms of the manufacturer's need to mass distribute the mountainous fruits of mass production. The two phenomena merged in the redefinition of that proletarian status. While mass production defined labor's work in terms of monotony, and rationalized his product to a fragment, some businessmen spoke of 'economic freedom' or 'industrial democracy' as the blessing promised the worker by modern production methods. Yet the 'freedom' and 'democracy' offered by mass industry stopped short of a freedom to define the uses, or to rearrange the relationships of production. 'The industrial democracy I am discussing,' Filene assured those who might fear its anti-Capitalist implications, 'has nothing to do with the Cubist politics of class revolution.' What was meant, rather, was that modern industrial production required that workers be free to 'cultivate themselves' among the uncontestable fruits of the new industrial cornucopia.

The endowment of the masses with 'industrial democracy' was seen as a complex and involving process. Their traditional role in capitalism had afforded them neither the cash nor the conviction to be so 'democratized'. It was imperative that the worker 'desire(s) a larger share in the mental and spiritual satisfactions of the property of his daily job much more than... a larger share in the management of the enterprise which furnishes that job.'

Not only was this alleged democracy designed to define the modern worker as a smoothly running unit of industrial production, but it also tended to define protest and proletarian unrest in terms of the desire to consume, making it also profitable. By protesting for the right to be better consumers, the aspirations of labor would be profitably coordinated with the aspirations of capital. Such convictions, implicitly attempted to divest protest of its anti-capitalist content. Modern labor protest should have no basis in class antagonism.

By the twenties, the ideological vanguard of the business community saw the need to endow the masses with what economic historian Norman Ware has called the money, commodity, and psychic wages (satisfactions), correlative and responsive to the route of industrial capitalism. A major part of this endowment was the movement toward objective conditions which would make mass consumption feasible: higher wages and shorter hours. Giving official credence to such visions, Herbert Hoover noted that '...High wages (are the)... very essence of great production'. In 1923, Julius Barnes, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, spoke of the need to prevent the over concentration of wealth, which threatened the development of a 'broad purchasing market necessary to absorb our production'. Certainly the movement to higher wages preceded the twenties, but it is mainly in the literature of the twenties (and later) that this is linked to a general strategy to consumerize the worker. As early as 1914, Henry Ford had instituted the five dollar work day wage, but his innovation coexisted with a nineteenth century Protestant value system which the worker was expected to maintain. This system significantly clashed with the 'economic freedom' that, out of necessity, attempted to subvert the moderation earlier valued for the masses.

The question of shorter hours was also tantamount to offering labor the 'chance' to expand the consumer market. And yet, 'chance', as 'industrial democracy', and as 'economic freedom' were subterfuges, in as much as these alleged freedoms and choices meant a transformed version of capitalism's incessant need to mold a work force in its own image. 'As modern industry... (was) geared to mass production, time out for mass consumption becomes as much a necessity as time in for production.' The shortening of hours was seen as a qualitative as well as quantitative change in the worker's life, without significantly altering his relation to power over the uses and means of production. In addition to increasing the amount of leisure, it was hoped that shorter hours would productively determine, 'to some extent, the use of leisure and consumption...' Shorter hours and higher wages were seen as a first step in a broader offensive against notions of thrift and an attempt to habituate a national population to the exigencies of mass production. A capitalism that had previously required the worker to 'live, move, and... (have)... his being there on the job' was now, among some industries, trying to undo such notions and realities of 'the job'. Now priorities demanded that the worker spend his wages and leisure time on the consumer market. Realizing that earlier conditions had not been 'favorable to such a worker's finding in, say the sector of his home the sought-for satisfactions of forward movement and distinction,' Whiting Williams, personnel director for a steel company, and an ideologue of 'scientific' management, felt that labor had developed a 'suspicion' of such 'sought-for satisfactions'. Once again linking the rhetoric of freedom to the necessities of capitalism, Filene noted that

> modern workmen have learned their habits of consumption and their habits of spending (thrift) in the school of fatigue, in a time when high prices and relatively low wages have made it necessary to spend all the energies of the body and mind in providing food, clothing and shelter. We have no right to be overcritical of the way they spend a new freedom or a new prosperity until they have had as long a training in the school of freedom.

Within the vision of consumption as a 'school of freedom', the entry onto the consumer market was described as a 'civilizing' experience. 'Civilization' was the expanded cultural world which flowed from capitalism's broad capacity to commodify material resources. The experience of civilization was the cultural world this capacity produced.

And yet the 'school of freedom' posed various problems. The democratic terminology within which the profitable vision of consumption was posed did not reveal the social and economic realities that threatened that vision. In terms of economic development, the financial growth of industrial corporations averaged 286% between 1922 and 1929. Despite some wage hikes, and relatively shorter hours in such industries, the average manufacturing wage earner showed a wage increase of only 14% during the same period. The discrepancy between purchasing power and the rate of industrial growth was dealt with in part by the significant growth of installment selling that followed the 1921 'buyer's strike'.

Despite the initiation of a corporate credit system which offered consumers supplementary money, the growth of the productive system forced many industrial ideologues to realize the continuous need to psychically habituate men to consumption beyond the level of familiar structural change.

II

> The man with the proper imagination is able to conceive of any commodity in such a way that it becomes an object of emotion to him and to those to whom he imparts his picture, and hence creates desire rather than a mere feeling of ought.
>
> - Scott and Howard

Modern advertising must be seen as a direct response to the needs of mass industrial capitalism. Second in procession after the manager of the production line, noted Whiting Williams, 'came the leader who possessed the ability to develop and direct men's desires and demands in a way to furnish the organized mass sales required for the mass production made possible by the massed dollars.' Advertising, as a part of mass distribution within modernizing inudstries, became a major sector for business investment. Within the automobile industry, initiated by the broad and highly diversified G.M. oligopoly, distribution came to account for about one half of that investment. Among producers of smaller consumer goods, the percentage of capital devoted to product proliferation was often greater.

In the 1920s, advertising played an increasingly significant role in industry's attempt to develop a continually responsive consumer market. Although committed national corporations saw advertising as an invaluable integrant of critical economic planning, its acceptance was hardly universal. A mass advertising industry developing in concert with the mass needs of industrial corporations was continually selling itself to industry. Between 1918 and 1923, a greater percentage of articles in the advertising trade journal, Printers Ink, were devoted to ways of convincing 'ancient' corporations that advertising was a given of modern industrialism, than were devoted to advertising and merchandising techniques. During the 1920s, however, advertising grew to the dimensions of a major industry. In 1918, total gross advertising revenues in General and Farm magazines was $58.5 million. By 1920 the gross had reached $129.5 million; and by 1929, $196.3 million. Such figures do not include newspaper revenues, or more significantly, direct-to-buyer advertising which still comprised a major, though declining sector of the industry.

In an address to the American Association of Advertising Agencies (27 October 1926), Calvin Coolidge noted that the industry now required 'for its maintenance, investments of great capital, the occupation of large areas of floor space, the employment of an enormous number of people.' As the production line had insured the efficient creation of vast quantities of consumer goods, ad men spoke of their product as 'business insurance' for profitable and efficient distribution of these goods. While line management tended to the process of goods production, social management - advertisers - hoped to make the cultural milieu of capitalism as efficient as line management had made production. Their task was couched in terms of a secular religion for which the advertisers sought adherents. Calvin Coolidge, applauding their secular clericism, noted that 'advertising ministers to the spiritual side of trade'.

The reality of modern production dictated the creation of vast national markets. Although many corporations boasted of having attained national markets without the aid of Advertising, Printers' Ink, the trade journal, argued that these 'phantom national markets' were actually inefficient, unpredictable and scattered aglommerations of heterogeneous local markets. Advertising offered it-

self as a means of efficiently creating consumers and as a way of homogeneously 'controlling the consumption of a product'. The significance of the notion of efficiency in the creation of consumers lies in the fact that the modern advertising industry, like the modern manufacturing plant, was an agent of mass social production. As Ford's assembly line utilized 'expensive single-purpose machinery' to produce automobiles inexpensively and at a rate that dwarfed traditional methods, the costly machinery of advertising that Coolidge had described, set out to produce consumers, likewise inexpensively and at a rate that dwarfed traditional methods. To create that body efficiently the advertising industry had to develop universal notions of what makes people respond, going beyond the 'horse sense' psychology that had characterized the earlier industry. Such general conceptions of human instinct offered to provide ways of reaching a mass audience via a universal appeal. Considering the task of having to build a mass ad industry to attend to the needs of mass production, the ad men welcomed the work of psychologists in the articulation of these general conceptions.

The ideological vanguard of the business community found the social psychology of such men as Floyd Henry Allport useful in terms of developing a universal appeal to consumers. Such theories seem to give an ideological cohesion to much of what one sees in the advertising of the twenties. The notion of man as the object of continual and harsh scrutiny that underscored the argument of much of the ad texts of the decade (part III), found at least close companionship within the psychological professions. Explicating his notion of the way in which man develops a sense of himself from infancy, Allport asserted that 'our consciousness of ourselves is largely a reflection of the consciousness which others have of us... My idea of myself is rather my own idea of my neighbor's view of me.'

Whether or not the general conception of 'self' as propounded by Floyd Henry Allport had a direct bearing on the Weltanschauung held by advertising in the nineteen-twenties is not clear. It was generally conceded, however, that a 'knowledge of people -- human nature' was as necessary a constituent of social production as the line manager's knowledge of his raw materials was to goods production. While agreeing that 'human nature is more difficult to control than material nature', ad men nonetheless discovered in such general notions of human self-conception useful tools for advertising, given their desire to predictably control men in order to create new habits and desires for consumer products.

Beyond the search for a general conception of human nature, ad men spoke in specific terms of 'human instincts' which if properly understood could induce people 'to buy a given product if it was scientifically presented. If advertising copy appealed to the right instincts, the urge to buy would surely be excited.' The utilitarian value or traditional notion of mechanical quality was not sufficient to move products at the necessary rate and volume required by mass production.

Such traditional appeals would not change the disposition of potential markets to consumption. Instead, it would offer each product isolatedly, not in terms of the social-economic consumerization (i.e. proletarianization) of men, but through an appeal to traditional notions of quality. The advertisers were concerned with effecting a self-conscious change in the psychic economy, which could not come about if they spent all their time talking about a product, and none talking about the 'reader'. The appeal to instincts was a way of 'scientifically' controlling

mass goods production methods, increasingly spoke in terms of appeals to instinct. Anticipating later implementation, by 1911, Walter Dill Scott, psychologist/author of Influencing Men in Business, noted that 'goods offered as means of gaining social prestige make their appeals to one of the most profound of the human instincts.' Yet the instinct for 'social prestige' as well as others of a broad 'Constellation' of instincts were channeled into the terms of the productive system. The use value of 'prestige', of 'beauty', of 'acquisition', of 'self-adornment', or of 'play' was placed in the service of advertising's basic purpose -- to provide effective mass distribution of products. Carl A. Naether, an ideologue of advertising for women, demonstrated how the link might be effected between 'instinct' and mass sales.

> An attractive girl admiring a string of costly pearls just presented to her would in no few cases make the one seeing her in an advertisement exclaim: 'I wish that I, too, might have a set of these pearls and so enhance my personal appearance.' Such and similar longings are expressions of real or fancied need for what is advertised.

The creation of 'fancied need' was crucial to the modern advertiser. The transcendence of traditional consumer markets and buying habits required people to buy not to satisfy their own fundamental needs, but rather, to satisfy the real, historic needs of the capitalist productive machinery. Advertising was a way of making people put time and energy into what Calvin Coolidge referred to as their 'education' to production. The investment of time and energy in deliberation over an advertisement, as described by Scott, enacted in requisite microcosm the commitment of one's total time and energy to consumption. Advertising demanded but a momentary participation in the logic of consumption. Yet hopefully that moment would be expanded into a life style by its educational value. A given ad asked not only that an individual buy its product, but that he experience a self-conscious perspective that he had previously been socially and psychically denied. By that perspective, one was able to ameliorate social and personal frustrations through his access to the marketplace.

In light of such notions as Allport's 'social self', and other self-objectifying visions of popularity and success, a new cultural logic projected by advertising beyond the strictly pecuniary one of creating the desire to consume. The social perception was one in which people ameliorated the negative condition of social objectification through consumption, material objectification. The negative condition was portrayed as social failure derived from continual public scrutiny. The positive goal emanated from one's modern decision to armor himself against such scrutiny with the accumulated 'benefits' of industrial production. Social responsibility and social self-preservation were being correlated to an allegedly existential decision that one made to present a mass produced public face. Man, traditionally seen as exemplary of God's perfect product, was now hardly viable in comparison with the man-made products of industrial expertise. The elevation of man's works in the cosmos which had effected the half-way covenant mong New England Puritans was now being secularized into the realm of mass social production. It was felt that capitalism through an appeal to instincts - ultimately feelings of social insecurity - could habituate men to consumptive life. Such social production of consumers represented a shift in the social and political priorities of the cosmos, which has most probably characterized much of the 'life' of American industrial capitalism. The functional goal of national advertising was the creation of desires and habits. In tune with the need for mass distribution that accompanied the development of mass production capabilities, advertising was trying to produce in readers personal needs which would dependently fluctuate with the expanding marketplace.

Exposing an affirmative vision of capitalist production, Calvin Coolidge reassured the members of the ad industry in 1926, that 'rightfully applied, it (advertising) is the method by which the desire is created for better things.' The nature of this desire, and not incidentally, the nature of capitalism required an unquestioning attitude towards the uses of production. The use of psychological methods, therefore, attempted to turn the consumer's critical functions away from the product and toward himself. The determining factor for buying was self-critical and ideally ignored the intrinsic worth of the product. The Lynds, in their study of Middletown, noted that unlike ads of a generation before, modern advertising was

> concentrating increasingly upon a type of copy aiming to make the reader emotionally uneasy, to bludgeon him with the fact that decent people don't live the way he does... This copy points an accusing finger at the stenographer as she reads her motion picture magazine and makes her acutely conscious of her unpolished finger nails... and sends the housewife peering anxiously into the miror to see if her wrinkles look like those that made Mrs. X in the advertisement 'old at thirty-five' because she did not have a Leisure Hour electric washer.

Advertising hoped to elicit the 'instinctual' anxieties of social intercourse. Cutex Hand Preparations translated well prepared hands as armor for success. Hoping to prepare the psyche for such an argument, they declared in crescendo:

> You will be amazed to find how many times in one day people glance at your nails. At each glance a judgment is made... Indeed some people make it a practice of basing their estimate of a new acquaintance largely upon this one detail.

Even those whose physical appearances were marketably 'safe', who appeared to be 'the picture of health', were warned of their natural contingencies. Listerine was offered as an agent to militate against 'The Hidden Wells of Poison' that lurk and conspire against the 'program(s) of pleasure' of even the most beautiful women.

The Lynds saw advertising 'and other channels of increased cultural diffusion from without... (as) rapidly changing habits of thought as to what things are essential to living and multiplying optional occasions for spending money.' The critical analysis offered by the Lynds found unwitting support in predominant advertising theory. It was recognized that in order to get people to consume and, more importantly, to keep them consuming, it was more efficient to endow man with a critical self-consciousness in tune with the 'solutions' of the market place, than to fragmentarily argue for products on their own merit. Writing in Printers' Ink, Frederick P. Anderson spoke of the industry's conscious attempt to direct man's critical faculties against himself or his environment, 'to make him self-conscious about matter of course things such as enlarged nose pores, bad breath...'

In mass advertising, the consciousness of a selling point was precisely the theorized 'self-consciousness' of the modern consumer which had occasioned the Lynds' remarks. This consumer self-consciousness was clearly identifiable with the continuous need for product proliferation that increasingly informed mass industry. Linking the theories of 'self-consciousness' to the exigencies of capitalism, one writer in Printers' Ink commented that 'advertising helps to keep the masses dissatisfied with their mode of life, discontented with ugly

things among them. Satisfied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones.'

III

In his sympathetic book on the History and Development of Advertising, Frank Presbrey articulated the conception of a predictable, buying, national population in proud and patriotic terms. 'To National Advertising,' noted Presbrey, 'has recently been attributed most of the growth of a national homogeneity in our people, a uniformity of ideas which, despite the mixture of races, is found to be greater here than in European countries whose population is made up almost wholly of people of one race and would seem to be easier to nationalize in all respects.' Presbrey's conception of 'national homogeneity' was a translucent reference to what Calvin Coolidge saw as 'the enormous capacity for consumption of all kinds of commodities which characterize our country.'*

The idea that advertising was producing a homogeneous national character was described within the trade as a 'civilizing influence comparable in its cultural effects to those of other great epoch-making developments in history'. Yet not all of the conceptions of advertising were expressed in such epic and trans-historical terminology. Sensitive to the political and economic context of such notions as 'civilizing', 'national homogeneity', and 'capacity for consumption', William Allen White bridged the gap between 'civilization' and civil society, noting that modern advertising was particularly a formation of advanced capitalist production. Aiming his critique at internal and external 'revolutionist' threats to capitalism, White turned contemporary conceptions of revolution on their head. Reasserting the efficacy of the American Revolutionary tradition, he argued that advertising men were the true 'revolutionists'. Juxtaposing the consumer market to revolution of a socialistic variety, White presented a satirical political strategy to halt the 'golden quest' for consumer goods. 'I would cut out the advertising and fill the editorial and news pages with material supplied by communists and reds. That would stop buying -- distribution of things. It would bring an impasse in civilization, which would immediately begin to decay.' Identifying ad men with the integrity and survival of the American heritage, White numbered advertising among our sacred cultural institutions.

Through advertising, then, consumption took on a clearly cultural tone. Within governmental and business rhetoric, consumption assumed an ideological veil of nationalism and democratic lingo. The mass 'American type' which defied unity on the bases of common ethnicity, language, class or literature, was ostensibly borne out of common desires -- mass responses to the demands of capitalist production. Mass industry required a corresponding mass man,

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* My friend Paul Breines sent me this note in regard to the quote from Presbrey:
'People like (Gustav) Landauer, (Georg) Lukacs, many Marxists and conservative "culture critics" in Germany from 1910 or so all through the '20s talked a lot and with a lot of disgust of Amerikanisierung and meant by this exactly what Presbrey was excited about and lauding. To the German intellectuals (with this particular bent) Americanization (i.e. the destruction of all hierarchy, community, culture, individuality, national genius, etc., by the commodification-urbanization-industrialization, westernization, civilization)... was the quintessential expression of the "decline of the west". --The smarter ones noticed that it was the realization of the West (Adorno on Spengler).'

cryptically named him 'Civilized American', and implicated his national heritage in the marketplace. By defining himself and his desires in terms of the good of capitalist production, the worker would implicitly accept the foundations of modern industrial life. By transforming the notion of 'class' into 'mass', business hoped to create a massified 'individual' who could locate his needs and frustrations in terms of the consumption of goods rather than the quality and content of his life (work).

Advertisements aimed at transforming pockets of resistance contained the double purpose of sales and 'civilization'. Resistance to the universal type appeals of modern advertising was often dealt with in racial or national terms. In an article dealing with immigrant readers of the domestic foreign language press, a writer in Printers' Ink noted that these less American elements of the population had not yet been sophisticated to the methods of modern advertising. While other Americans were portrayed as responding to appeals to universal instinct, the author noted that 'Swedes and Germans... study the most minute detail of anything they consider buying.' It was felt that a particular form of advertising had to be developed to temporarily accommodate immigrant and other defined resistance to nationalization. While it was suggested that for immediate sales ads could be written offering extensive proof of a product's intrinsic worth, other forms of advertising assumed the task of the 'democratization' which Edward Filene had exalted. 'Antidote advertising' and other, less theoretical tactics were designed to repudiate antique beliefs which had no place in the social style of modern industrial life. Often, such ads were geared to make people ashamed of their origins and, consequently, the habits and practices that betrayed them as alien. The Sherwin Cody School of English advertised that a less than perfect mastery of the language was just cause for social ostracism. 'If someone you met for the first time made... mistakes in English... what would you think of him? Would he inspire your respect? Would you be inclined to make a friend of him? Would you care to introduce him to others as a close friend of yours?' Rather than arguing that a knowledge of the language would be helpful in conversation and effective communication, the ad argued that being distinguishable from the fabricated national norm, a part of advertising's mythologized homogeneity, was a justification for social failure.

In an attempt to massify men's consumption in step with the requirements of the productive machinery, advertising increasingly offered mass-produced solutions to 'instinctive' strivings, as well as to the ills of mass society itself. If it was industrial capitalism around which crowded cities were being built, and which had spawned much of the danger to health, the frustration, the loneliness and the insecurity of modern industrial life, the advertising of the period denied complicity. Rather, the logic of contemporaneous advertising read: one can free himself from the ills of modern life by embroiling himself in the maintenance of that life. A 1924 ad for Pompeian facial products argued that

> unless you are one woman in a thousand, you must use powder and rouge. Modern living has robbed women of much of their natural color... taken away the conditions that once gave natural roses in the cheeks.

Within such literature, the term 'modern living' was an ahistorical epithet, devoid of the notion 'Modern Industrial Society', and rent with visions of the benefits of civilization which had emerged, one would think, quite apart from the social conditions and relations to which these 'benefits' therapeutically addressed themselves. On the printed page, modern living was defined as 'heated houses, easy transportation, and the conveniences of the household'. To the reader it may have meant something considerably different: light-starved hous-

ing, industrial pollution, lacking nutrition, boredom. In either sense, modern life offered the same sallow skin and called for a solution through consumption. Within such advertisements, business called for a transformation of the critique of bourgeois society to an implicit commitment to that society.

The reality of modern goods production and distribution called for a dependable mass of consumers. The advertising which attempted to create that mass, often did so by playing upon the fears and frustrations evoked by mass society. Within a massifying culture, the ads offered mass produced visions of individualism by which man could extricate himself from the mass. While on the level of ideological consciousness, man was being offered commoditized individuality, on the level of the market place his acceptance of that individuality means an entrenchment within the dependable mass of consumers that advertising was attempting to build. The rationale was simple. If man was unhappy within mass industrial society, advertising was attempting to put that unhappiness to work in the name of that society.

In terms of the self-conscious use of language by advertisers, the idea was to 'hitch' concepts and feelings which were familiar to readers and link them to a new and profitable context, the market place. In an attempt to boost mass sales of soap, the Cleanliness Institute, a cryptic front group for the soap and glycerine producers' association, pushed soap as a 'Kit for Climbers' (social, no doubt). The illustration was a multitudinous mountain of men, each climbing over one another to reach the summit. At the top of this industinguishable mass stood one figure, his arms outstretched toward the sun, whose rays spelled out the words 'Heart's Desire'. The ad cautioned that 'in any path of life, that long way to the top is hard enough -- so make the going easier with soap and water.' In an attempt to build a responsive mass market, the Cleanliness Institute appealed to what they must have known was a major dissatisfaction with the reality of mass life. Their solution was a sort of mass pseudo-demassification.

A good deal of drug and toilet goods advertising made more specific references to the quality of industrial life. Appealing to dissatisfaction and insecurities around the job, certain advertisements not only offered their products as a kind of job insurance, but intimated that through the use of their products one might become a business success, the capitalist notion of individual success.

Listerine, whose ads had taken the word 'halitosis' out of the inner reaches of the dictionary and placed it on 'stage, screen and in the home', offered this anecdote:

> He was conscious that something stood between him and greater business success -- between him and greater popularity. Some subtle something he couldn't lay his hands on... Finally, one day, it dawned on him... the truth that his friends had been too delicate to mention.

When a critical understanding of modern production might have helped many to understand what actually stood 'between them and greater business success', this ad attempted to focus man's critique against himself -- how his body had kept him from happiness. Within the world view of a society which was increasingly divorcing men from any notion of craft, or from any definable sort of product, it was also logical that 'you couldn't blame a man for firing an employee with halitosis to hire one without it.' The contingency of a man's job was offered a non-violent, apolitical solution. It offered man as the victim of himself, the fruits of mass production as his savior. Ads constantly hammered

away at everything that was his own; his bodily functions, his self-esteem, and offered something of theirs as a socially more effective solution.

In addition to the attempt on the part of advertising to habituate men to buying as a solution to the particular realities of a growing industrial society, ad men presented products as means to what they viewed as instinctual ends. Speaking often to women, ads offered daintiness, beauty, romance, grace, security and husbands through the use of certain products. Traditional advertising had conceived of these 'ideals' as integrants of a Protestant notion of thrift and moderation. The dainty woman, a pillar of sense and temperance within the home, had been characterized as physically divorced from the market place. Increasingly, within the texts of ads in the twenties, thesefdesires are fulfilled on the market place. Thrift no longer cohabitates with daintiness, but threatens to prevent it. Positing goals such as marriage, romance, social grace, etc., ads began telling women that through the consumption of their products, those goals could be reached. Within the rhetoric of these ads, the accumulation of various products, each for a separate objectified portion of the body, was equated with the means to success. Correlative to Allport's vision of 'social self', advertising offered the next best thing to people who were unhappy or could be convinced that they were unhappy with their lives, a commodity self; an appropriate popular, stereotyped conglomeration of mass produced breath, hair, teeth, skin and feet. Each portion of the body was to be viewed critically, as a potential bauble in a successful assemblage. Woodbury's soap was offered as a perfect treatment for the 'newly important face of Smart Today'; another product promised to keep teeth white. 'A flashing smile is worth more than a good sized bank account. It wins friends.' After she has used Caro Cocoanut Oil Shampoo, a dashing gentleman informs the lady, 'I'm crazy about your hair. It's the most beautiful of any here tonight.' Within the vision offered by such ads, not only was social grace and success attainable, but also defined through the use of specific products. You don't make friends, your commoditized smile 'wins' them; your emboldened hair, and not you, is beautiful. 'Smart today' required one to compete in a social market place, though it would be gone tomorrow, yielding its momentary, though cataclysmic importance to a newly profitable 'smart today'. As the ads intimated that anything natural about the consumer was worthless or deplorable, and tried to make him schizophrenically self-conscious of that notion, they offered weapons by which even people with bad breath, enlarged nose pores, corned feet and other such maladies could eclipse themselves and 'succeed'.

As notions of failure were to be perceived within a style of self-denegrating paranoia, notions of success were likewise portrayed in purely self-involved terms. Though the victorious heroines of cosmetic advertisements always got their man, they did so out of a commodity defined self-fetishization which made that man almost irrelevant to the quality of their victory. Their romantic triumphs were ultimately the auto-erotic ones of Alban Berg's prostitute, Lulu, who declares that 'When I looked at myself in the mirror I wished I were a man -- a man married to me.' ('Als ich mich im Spiegel sah hatte ich ein Mann sein wollen... mein Mann.')

During the twenties, civil society was increasingly characterized by mass industrial production. In an attempt to implicate men and women within the efficient process of production, advertising built a vision of culture which bound old notions of Civilization to the new realities of civil society. In what was viewed as their instinctual search for traditional ideals, men were offered a vision of civilized man which was transvaulated in terms of the pecuniary exigen-

cies of society. Within a society that defined real life in terms of the monotonous insecurities of mass production, advertising attempted to create an alternative organization of life, which would serve to channel men's desires for self, for social success, for leisure away from himself and his works, and toward a commoditized acceptance of 'Civilization'.

Introduction to

THE FUTURE OF THE BOOK

The Soviet artist El Lissitsky's THE FUTURE OF THE BOOK strikes the contemporary reader with the freshness and acuity of its thought, reaching out as it does across decades to clasp the hands of American radicals who have rediscovered the power of wall posters (as in Chicago), who are making for themselves a language rooted in struggle, and who are not seduced by the mysteries of expertise which assign the task of 'communication' to 'media specialists'. Our books, too, are on our walls; our history is fastened with thumbtacks.

THE FUTURE OF THE BOOK immediately calls McLuhan to mind, and it is well to compare them; but it is crucial to consider that Lissitsky never gave seminars to advertising executives, and that he wrote and worked in the context of the Russian Revolution. Lissitsky made, for example, a critical distinction between Soviet wall posters and American bill-board advertising; the former was conceptual, the latter subliminal. (Stuart Ewen's article in this issue, which analyses the role of advertising in the process of capitalist social formation, extends the theoretical range of Lissitsky's distinction.) Soviet wall posters attempted to cut off the mediations of the media, to reunite the content with the form, to communicate directly; American advertising sought to divide men from themselves. Soviet wall posters issued from the needs of a long and arduous revolutionary struggle, and the debate of Soviet artists about their work focused on the relationship of art and its materials to the construction of a socialist society. The struggle for socialism was not imposed on the needs of 'art'; rather, revolutionary changes in Soviet Russia brought forth new expression which found itself as art, and sought to develop it.

El Lissitsky (1890-1941) was a leading figure in the theoretical debates over 'the confrontation of vanguard art and aesthetics with revolutionary politics and theory in the Soviet Union in the deacade after the Bolshevik Revolution.' (NLR, No. 41, p. 34) He was, as well, a practicing artist and important member of the Constructivists. Along with the writer Ilya Ehrenberg, Lissitsky edited the trilingual Vesch-Gegenstand-Objet, an organ of the Constructivists, which appeared from Berlin for a short time in the early twenties. He also wrote for the Dutch journal De Stijl. He designed many Soviet exhibits during his life, both internationally and in the Soviet Union; Lissitsky pioneered in integrating the objects to be exhibited with the environment which housed them. 'He was marvelously inventive,' Ehrenburg would later write, '(and) could get up a stand at an exhibit so that the paucity of the exhibits looked like superabundance and knew how to present a book in a new way. His work shows feeling for color and masterly composition.'

Examples of Lissitsky's work, both in book-design and poster art, are available in both J. P. Nettl's THE SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT (including a color print of the famous abstract poster 'Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge') and Camilla Gray's THE GREAT EXPERIMENT. THE FUTURE OF THE BOOK was first published in Gutenberg-Jahrbuch, Mainz, 1926-7. Published in an English translation by New Left Review (No. 41, Jan/Feb 1967, pp. 37-44), it

is here reprinted with the permission of the editor. The NLR translation is introduced by a short article which gives further biographical information about Lissitsky, and RA's readers are referred to it both for that information and for a brief theoretical discussion of the questions Lissitsky raises in THE FUTURE OF THE BOOK.

El Lissitsky

The Future of the Book

(reprinted by permission of NEW LEFT REVIEW)

Every artistic innovation is unique, it has no development. In time different variations on the same theme grow up around innovation, maybe higher, maybe lower, but they will rarely reach the original power of the first. This goes on until long familiarity has made the effect of the work of art so automatic that the senses no longer react to the worn means and the time is ripe for a further technical innovation. However, the 'technical' and the 'artistic' (so-called) are inseparable, so we must not lightly dispose of a profound relationship by means of a few slogans. At any rate, the first few books printed by Gutenberg with the system of movable type which he invented remain the finest examples of the art of book production.

The next few hundred years saw no basic innovations (until photography) in this field. In typography there are just more or less successful variations accompanying technical improvements in the manufacturing apparatus. The same happened with a second discovery in the visual field—with photography. As soon as we give up assuming a complacent superiority over everything else, we must admit that the first Daguerrotypes are not primitive artefacts needing improvements, but the finest photographic art. It is shortsighted to suppose that machines, i.e. the displacement of manual by mechanical processes, are basic to the development of the form and figure of a artefact. In the first place, the consumer's demand determines the development, i.e. the demand of the social strata that provide the 'commissions'. Today this is not a narrow circle, a thin cream, but 'everybody', the masses. The idea moving the masses today is called materialism, but dematerialization is the characteristic of the epoch. For example, correspondence grows, so the number of letters, the quantity of writing paper, the mass of material consumed expand, until relieved by the telephone. Again, the network and material of supply grow until they are relieved by the radio. Matter diminishes, we dematerialize, sluggish masses of matter are replaced by liberated energy. This is the mark of our epoch. What conclusions does this imply in our field?

I draw the following analogy:

Inventions in the field of verbal traffic	**Inventions in the field of general traffic**
Articulated language	**Upright gait**
Writing	**The wheel**
Gutenberg's printing-press	**Carts drawn by animal power**
?	**The automobile**
?	**The aeroplane**

I have produced this analogy to prove that so long as the book remains a palpable object, i.e. so long as it is not replaced by auto-vocalizing and kino-vocalizing representations, we must look to the field of the manufacture of books for new basic innovations in the near future, so that the general level of the epoch can be reached in this field.

There are signs to hand suggesting that this basic innovation is likely to come from the neighbourhood of the collotype. Here we have a machine which captures the subject matter on a film and a press which copies the negative of the material on to sensitive paper. Thus the frightful weight of the subject matter and the bucket of dye is omitted, so that once again we have dematerialization. The most important thing here is that the mode of production of words and pictures is included in the same process: photography. Up till now photography is that mode of expression which is most comprehensible. We have before us the prospect of a book in which exposition has priority over letters.

We know of two kinds of writing: one sign for each concept—hieroglyphic (modern Chinese); and one sign for each sound—alphabetic. The progress of the alphabetic over the hieroglyphic mode is only relative. Hieroglyphics are international. This means that if a Russian, a German or an American fixes the sign (picture) of a concept in his mind he can read Chinese or Egyptian (soundlessly), without learning the language, for language and writing are always one creation as far as he is concerned.

We may conclude that:

1 **the hieroglyphic book is international (at least potentially)**
2 **the alphabetic book is national, and**
3 **the book of the future will be non-national; for it needs the least education to understand it.**

There are today two dimensions to the word. As sound it is a function of time; as exposition, of space. The book of the future must be both. This is how to overcome the automatism of the contemporary book. A world-view which has become automatic ceases to exist in our senses, so we are left drowning in a void. The dynamic achievement of art is to transform the void into space, i.e. into a unity conceivable for our senses.

An alteration in the structure and mode of language implies a change in the usual appearance of the book. Before the War, printed matter in Europe was appropriately enough converging in appearance in every country. A new optimistic mentality laying stress on immediate events and the fleeting moment underlay the origins in America of a new form of printing. They began to modify the relation of word and illustration in exposition into the direct opposite of the European style. The highly developed technique of facsimile-electrotype (half-tone blocks) was especially important for this development; thus photomontage was born.

After the War, sceptical and stunned Europe marshalled a screaming, burning language: all means must be used to maintain and assert oneself. The catchwords of the epoch were 'attraction' and 'trick'. The new appearance of the book was characterized by:

1 broken-up setting **2 photomontage and typomontage**

These facts, which are the basis for our predictions, were already foreshadowed before the War and our Revolution. Marinetti, the siren of Futurism, also dealt with typography in his masterly manifestos. In 1909 he wrote:

'The book will be the futurist expression of our futurist consciousness. I am against what is known as the harmony of a setting. When necessary we will use three or four colours to a page, and 20 different typefaces. E.g. we shall represent a series of uniform, *hasty perceptions* with *cursive*, a **scream** will be expressed in **bold** type and so on. So a new painterly typographic representation will be born on the printed page.'

Many of today's creations do not go beyond this demand. I should like to stress that Marinetti does not call for playing with form as form, but asks rather that the action of a new content should be intensified by the form.

Before the War the notion of the simultaneous book was also proposed and, in a sense, realized. This was in the Poem of Blaise Cendrars, typographically conceived by Sonja Delaunay-Terk. It is a foldable strip of paper 5 feet long—an attempt at a new book-form for poetry. The lines of poetry are printed in colour, with colours always discontinued in the content and changed into others.

In England during the War the Vortex group published their magazine *Blast!* in a crude, elementary style, using almost only unrelieved capitals, a style which has become the token of all modern international printing.

In Germany, the 1917 Prospectus of the little *Neue Jugend* Portfolio[1] is an important document of the new typography.

The new movement which began in Russia in 1908 bound painter and poet together from the very first day; hardly a poetry book has appeared since then without the collaboration of a painter. Poems have been written with the lithographic crayon and signed. They have been cut in wood. Poets themselves have set whole pages. Thus the poets Khlebnikov, Kruchenich, Mayakovski, Asseeyeev have worked with the painters Rosanova, Goncharova, Malevich, Popova, Burlyuk, etc. They did not produce select, numbered, de luxe editions, but cheap unlimited volumes, which today we must treat as popular art despite their sophistication.

In the Revolutionary period a latent energy has concentrated in the younger generation of our artists, which can only find release in large-scale popular commissions. The audience has become the masses, the semi-literate masses. With our work the Revolution has achieved a colossal labour of propaganda and enlightenment. We ripped up the traditional book into single pages, magnified these a hundred times, printed them in colour and stuck them up as posters in the streets. Unlike American posters, ours were not designed for rapid perception from a passing motor-car, but to be read and to enlighten from a short distance. If a series of these posters were today to be set in the size of a manageable book, in an order corresponding to some theme, the result would be most curious. Our lack of printing equipment and the necessity for speed meant that, though the best work was hand-printed, the most rewarding was standardized, lapidary and adapted to the simplest mechanical form of reproduction. Thus State Decrees were printed as rolled-up illustrated leaflets, and Army Orders as illustrated pamphlets.

At the end of the Civil War (1920), we had the opportunity to realize our aims in the field of the creation of new books, in spite of the primitiveness of the mechanical means at our disposal. In Vitebsk, we brought out five issues of a magazine called *Unovis*, printed by typewriter, lithography, etching and linocut.

As I have already written: 'Gutenberg's Bible was only printed with letters. But letters alone will not suffice for the handing down of today's Bible. The book finds its way to the brain through the eyes, not through the ears; light waves travel much faster and more intensely than sound waves. But humans can only speak to each other with their mouths, whereas the possibilities of the book are multi-form.'

With the advent of the period of reconstruction in 1922, the production of books also rose rapidly. Our best artists seized on the problem of book production. At the beginning of 1922 I and the writer Ilya Ehrenburg edited the periodical *Veshch-Gegenstand-Objet* which was

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[1] The June 1917 number of *Neue Jugend* (Berlin) was described as 'Prospectus for the little Grosz portfolio', published that autumn. The typography was by John Heartfield.

printed in Berlin. Access to the most developed German printing techniques enabled us to realize some of our ideas about the book. Thus we printed a picture-book *The Story of Two Squares*, which we had finished in our productive period of 1920, and the *Mayakovski-Book* which made even the form of the book corresponding to the particular edition a functional structure. At the same time our artists were exploring the technical possibilities of printing. The State Publishing House and other printing establishments put out books which were shown, and appreciated, at several international exhibitions in Europe. Comrades Popova, Rodchenko, Klutsis, Stepanova and Gan devoted themselves to book design. Some worked directly in the print-shop with the compositors and presses (Gan, *et al.*). The growing esteem in which book design is held is indicated by the practice of listing on a special page the names of all the compositors and finishers concerned with the book. This means that there has grown up in the print-shops a stratum of workers who have developed a conscious relation to their craft.

Most of the artists produce montages, that is, lay out photographs and suitable captions together on a page which is then made into a block for printing. Thus is conceived a form of undeniable power, apparently very simple to handle and therefore easily diverted into banality, but in skilful hands extremely fruitful as a means to visual poetry.

At the outset we said that the expressive power of each artistic innovation is unique and has no development. The innovation of easel-painting made great works of art possible, but it has now lost this power. The cinema and the illustrated weekly have succeeded it. We rejoice in the new means which technique has put into our hands. We know that a close relation with the actuality of general events, the continuing heightening of the sensitivity of our optic nerves, the record-breaking speed of social development, our command over plastic material, the reconstruction of the plane and its space and the simmering force of innovation have enabled us to give the book new power as a work of art.

Of course, today's book has not found a new overall structure, it is still a single volume with a cover, a back and pages 1,2,3, . . . The same is true of the theatre. Even our most modern drama plays in a theatre like a peepshow, with the public in the stalls, in boxes and in rows in front of the curtain. But the stage has been cleared of all the paraphernalia of painted scenery, the stage-space as a painted perspective has perished. A three-dimensional physical space has been born in the same peepshow, allowing maximal unfolding of the fourth dimension, living movement. Within the book modernism may not yet have gone so far, but we must learn to see the tendency.

Notwithstanding the crisis which book production, like every other area of production, is undergoing, the avalanche of books grows with every passing year. The book is the most monumental art form today; no longer is it fondled by the delicate hands of a bibliophile, but seized by a hundred thousand hands. This illuminates the hegemony of the illustrated weekly in this transition period. We should add to the number of illustrated weeklies the flood of children's picture-books. Our children's reading teaches them a new plastic language, they grow up with a different relation to the world and space, to image and colour, so they are preparing for a new kind of book. But we shall be satisfied if we can conceptualize the epic and lyric developments of our times in our form of book.

FRANKLIN ROSEMONT

FOR LUIS BUÑUEL

One notices nothing extraordinary along the curbstones merely
the bones of dogs long dead and the silence of the
old women their hollow cheeks the empty windows
It is a day very much like any other day the children
play with their kites and hammers or an egg
which breaks on the trunk of a tree
There is an obscure message somewhere near but it must
be said that it will probably have little meaning
for the corpses
It is true that the schools have been closed it is even true
that there are some fires raging
There is moreover a certain inescapable theft
And rain which is not merely black
There is moreover a certain inescapable eye
And a night which is not merely red
Slowly the river multiplies the horses
galloping over the wooden bridge
Quickly the bridge divides its planks
and splinters among the river's fish
Someone raises a hand another speaks the moon sheds no light
there is not even a frog the lips quiver with fear chickens
run down the stairs the bulb is burned out there are
the words ARE YOU CRAZY painted on a fence
No airplane
No iron gate imprisoning a blind crow it is only
Four o'clock
The farmer is dead in his bed
No one knows that it is Sunday or Wednesday
They listen to the echoes of their footsteps they put on their
hats and take them off
They bleed
They even say hello

Chicago,
16 January 1968

FROM
The Morning of a Machine Gun

James Sorcic: ANTHEM

"after im done with this poem
im going to flip the record over
& forget about having to kill
for awhile." -Rich Krech

i cant. each poem i write
becomes a vision
of store-fronts burning.
blacks shot down
in deserted alleys.
i remember carrying
a switchblade til i was
17 - my father found it
waiting in my underwear
protection/ i told him

or last summer: age 20
& every morning for a week
i blew out my brains
w/an empty 38 pinning
blank notes to my socks
each morning/each poem
begins with the wrist:
i touch blood. the whitehouse
gutted by molotovs. johnson
& rusk gunned down in their
shower

THE RECORD IS OVER
RICH
come hear me sing
in the streets.

rbt head: SATURDAY NITE

tonight was one of those nites.
we went to see Bunuel's Exterminating Angel
and had to sit through a technicolor travelog.
i started screaming
FUCK YOU GET THAT GARBAGE OFF THE SCREEN
WE WANNA SEE THE MOVIE
people started clapping and stomping their feet
the manager and the assistant manager
and the assistant assistant manager
came over and had a little talk with me
ok who's making all that noise?
i said, it was me making all that noise and i'm gonna
keep on making all that noise until you
get that garbage off the screen.
we paid to see Bunuel's Exterminating Angel
not this garbage
you oughta pay us to watch this filth.
the manager said,
we're part of a nation-wide chain we haf to show it.
a consumer said,
you shout that word once more in front of my wife
and i'm gonna bop you one.
i said, it aint got nothing to do with your wife
it's this propoganda they're making us watch
(this wasn't altogether true
obviously it did hav sumthing to do with his wife)
they said. you better shut up,
and went back where they came from.
i started hollaring again.
the next thing i knew there was a
searchlight in my eyes and two cops
drug me out
and two cops did
what two cops do
when two cops catch
one guy alone
and there aint no goddamn witnesses.

Both poems reprinted from AMPER&AND, edited by
T. L. Kryss and R. Wolter (SF:March, 1969)

Preface to

THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PRESS

First, a brief biographical sketch. Born in Hungary in 1891, Bela (Adalbert is the German equivalent) Fogarasi participated in the intellectual and cultural revolt which erupted in the early part of this century against the mental empire of mechanistic materialism and positivism. In the years just before and during the First World War he was one of the younger members of the amazing circle of mostly Jewish intellectuals which had formed in Budapest around the aesthetic philosopher, Georg Lukacs. The circle included Karl Mannheim, the composers Bela Bartok and Zoltan Kodaly, the art historians Arnold Hauser and Friedrich Antal, and the writer Bela Balzas. In the seminars of their 'Free School of the Spiritual Sciences' these co-workers drew upon the work of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Kirkegaard, Edmund Husserl, and the mystic, Meister Eckhardt, among others. They glimpsed, in the ashes of the West's decline, the rising phoenix of cultural and human regeneration.

Fogarasi himself, whose fields of concentration were philosophy and sociology, became a close disciple of Lukacs; with his mentor he joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1918. During the Bela Kun 'soviet' regime he held the post of head of the university department in Lukacs's commissariat of public enlightenment. Following the collapse of what was essentially a communist coup d'etat, Fogarasi and Lukacs were among a number of Hungarian revolutionaries who fled to Vienna. There they began work for Kommunismus, a journal which served as the theoretical organ of the new Third International for German speaking areas of eastern and central Europe. Bolshevik, but not monolithically so, Kommunismus had informal contacts with the ultra-left, council communist formations which Lenin attacked in his Left-Wing Communism. Before ceasing publication in mid-1921, the journal voiced doubts about the beginnings of the Bolshevization of the European communist movement and fears regarding the statist and bureaucratic tendencies of the Russian Bolshevik regime and the Third International. Within the next several years, that is, after the European proletarian revolt had dissolved, the associates of Kommunismus capitulated to those same tendencies.

In the early-mid-20s Fogarasi moved about central European capitals working in the press offices of the Third International. Victor Serge, recalling his own experience in the Berlin office of the 'International Press Correspondence', has written: 'Already around 1922, the International was unwittingly modelling factotum officials who were prepared to give passive obedience.' By 1926 at the latest, Fogarasi had formally broken with his teacher, the quietly schismatic

Lukacs; he became a regular contributor to the official Comintern journal, Under the Banner of Marxism. His essays of the late 1920s, dealing mainly with the philosophical errors of Social Democracy, show him to have become a hack, Stalinist theorist. With the Nazi seizure of power, he emigrated to the Soviet Union where he managed to weather the storms, retaining a chair of philosophy in the Academy of Red Professors until his return to Hungary in 1945. Before his death in 1959 he published studies of the relationship between German culture and the struggle for democracy; Kant; Hegel; formal and dialectical logic; and a vituperative attack on Lukacs.

'The Tasks of the Communist Press' first appeared in Kommunismus (vol. 2: no. 25-26 (15 July 1921), 845-54), that is, during the tail-end of the proletarian upheavals in Europe. The essay gives expression to both the renaissance and degeneration of Marxian theory which accompanied the rise and fall of those upheavals. Thus it is worth reviewing for its shortcomings as well as its strengths, in addition to the fact that its focus on the press in relation to the problem of consciousness is of central importance today. Fogarasi's main categories - totality, structure of consciousness, reification - make his essay a satellite of Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness (1923; it consists of essays written between 1919 and 1922). For Lukacs, Fogarasi, their associate, Josef Ravai, and the German theorist, Karl Korsch, whose Marxism and Philosophy (1923) is linked to the work of the Hungarians, the central problem of revolution is the problem of revolutionary consciousness; the central struggle, the struggle against false consciousness. Behind Fogarasi's essay lies the problem posed by Lukacs in his book: the problem of why and how it happened that 'right in the midst of the fatal crisis of capitalism wide masses of the proletariat experience the bourgeois state, law, and economy as the only possible environment of their existence.'

Thus his essay, like the work of Lukacs and Korsch, is a contribution to the interpretation of a proletarian revolt that had just collapsed. The nub of the interpretation: what Marx called 'the lightning of theory' cannot ignite brains which, in Fogarasi's phrase, are 'molded like soft wax'. From the standpoint of an ideal revolutionary consciousness, Fogarasi develops a phenomenology of the typical state of the non- or false consciousness produced in part by the daily experience of reading the newspaper. In this concrete detail he anchors the whole self-perpetuating environment of capitalism and its de-mentalization of mental life.

The prescriptive section of his essay expresses the retrenchment of the communist movement following its defeat. His proposals anticipate important elements of Antonio Gramsci's call for 'struggle on the cultural front'; they arise from the same set of problems Gramsci was dealing with in the mid-20s in Italy. Certainly one of the most important aspects of the essay is its critique of the communist movement's recapitulation of the dominant 'laws of the reification' of thought and social life in capitalist society. In this regard his remarks adumbrate an obituary on the Third International, and other projects as well.

Equally instructive is the way in which Fogarasi's essay begins to express the very reification it criticizes. That is, he clearly tends to transform the goal of critical or revolutionary consciousness into an abstract totem possessing potent practical powers. Hence, his fetishizing of the correctness of communist 'ideology' and his notion that the communist party and its press must re-mold the consciousness of the masses. When critical or revolutionary theory is transformed into a thing, a commodity - that is, when it is reified - it takes the form of the Party. In some aspects, then, Fogarasi's proposals are based on manipulative and instrumentalist principles and embody a faulty theory of the relationship between revolutionary theory and the proletariat. It is worth noting here that the recent pre-occupation within American SDS with 'correct Marxist ideology', the phrase mongering of class rhetoric, and the rising sectarianism are historically and structurally similar forms of a sclerosis of the mind.

Latent in Fogarasi's perspectives - and more so in those of Lukacs and Karl Korsch - in the call for the transformation of the 'inner structure' of the consciousness of the masses, is the colossal component in Marxian theory: name-

ly, the demand that the proletarians become in fact, not in metaphor, 'heirs of classical German philosophy'; that the separated labors of mind and hand be united, not mechanistically by dialectical theorists entering the factories to work, but by proletarians becoming dialectical theorists. The minds of the masses must be free (i.e. dialectical) in order to make the revolution; minds are freed only in revolution. In revolution where, as Angelo Quattrocchi recently stated in The Beginning of the End, France, May 1968, the 'university is the factory, the factory a university'. No one returns to the 'young Marx'; it is he who keeps returning.

The objective limits of Fogarasi's essay are fairly obvious. Neither the social-political functions of radio, film, T.V., and the whole run of electronic media, nor the utter degeneration of the communist press were perceptible in 1921. This means that the specifics of his structural and organizational reform proposals require immense overhauling and supplementation. Further, Fogarasi's remark that the capitalist press would lose readers by open apologies for capitalism is no longer true; it also overlooks the character and function of advertising even in 1921. Yet these developments are largely comprehensible through the categories and insights of the essay. Numerous of his theses variously anticipate the work of both Marcuse and McLuhan, as well as the actual developments they have analysed. Fogarasi perceived 'one dimensional consciousness' in its early stages. He also glimpsed the fact that in the reified world the opponents of reification are not yet free of the object of their attack. His essay, all its shortcomings included, stands as an important moment in the unfinished history of the radical critique of 'the helpless state engendered by prolonged mental rutting'. (McLuhan, The Mechanical Bride)

Paul Breines
March, 1969

Adalbert Fogarasi

The Tasks of the Communist Press

(translated by Paul Breines)

The aim of the following discussion is exclusively practical: it will serve as a starting point of an international exchange of ideas on the ways and means of the communist press. To deal successfully with the most pressing practical tasks, however, it seems necessary to establish the viewpoint from which they can be comprehended in their total relationship to the communist movement.

I. Capitalist and Communist Press

To understand the character of the communist press - to enable it to realize its true character - we must observe it in opposition to the capitalist press. While this opposition is generally thought of in terms of a bourgeois versus a proletarian press, we shall intentionally employ different terms since there is a capitalist press written in by so-called proletarians for real proletarians; and, in addition, the communist press is not simply identical with the proletarian.

The character of the capitalist press gives rise to the following questions:

1. for whom is it written?
2. how is it written?
3. by whom is it written?

1. The capitalist press is an ideological weapon in the class struggle, employed by the ruling class in oppressing the proletariat. In its application it is manifoldly different from other instruments of the oppressive apparatus: it does not belong to the immediately brutal system of force, but serves the same ends by indirect means. On first glance the ideological function of the capitalist press is simply the strengthening of the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie -- a function actually fulfilled by the communist press.

The press (by which we mean primarily the daily press) of financial and industrial capital is not written for top financiers but for broad sectors of the population. In the major capitalist countries the 'trustification' of the press indeed makes possible the publication of papers intended for a definite class, or segment of a class. But even in such cases the main tendency of the capitalist press clearly emerges: to dominate the ideology of the ensemble of classes. Through its extensive powers and clever speculation on the needs of those sectors still unconscious of their class situation, the financial and industrial capitalist press draws extensive portions of the petit-bourgeoisie, peasantry, and even the proletariat into its readership. Matin (the French paper), for example, proudly points to the considerable number of proletarians - mostly office-workers, craftsmen, female employees, servants, etc. - who belong to its circle of readers.

2. (How the capitalist press is written) clearly expresses its character. It cannot carry out its ideological domination of the vacillating and propertyless classes in a positive sense; open apologies for capitalism would result in a rapid loss of readers. It thus strives to achieve the following: to prevent the reading masses from realizing the ideology which corresponds to their interests. Put more simply: to keep the reader in a state of ignorance. In performing this negative function the capitalist press takes account of the state of consciousness and the psychological needs of the mass of readers: it achieves the systematic advancement of ignorance in the form of communicating an abundance of knowledge and information. A more brutal form of this same effort is the suppression of the communist press, either partially through censorship, or entirely by prohibiting (or variously obstructing) publication, which because it is so blatant only intensifies the desire for knowledge among readers with even a partially developed consciousness. The capitalist press employs craftier and more effective means: it seeks to satisfy fully the reader's hunger for knowledge not only in order to perpetuate his ignorance as a lack of knowledge, information and ability to orient himself, but to mold the whole mentality of the reader into this form of ignorance.

The deepest, consciously-unconsciously pursued aim of the capitalist press is not that of producing false convictions in the reader by lies and distortions, although this is the charge most frequently made by the communists. What the capitalist press seeks is to shape the structure of the reader's consciousness in such a way that he will be perpetually unable to distinguish between true and false, to relate causes and effects, to place individual facts in their total context, to rationally integrate new knowledge into his perspective. When this aim is achieved, the reader's brain can be molded like soft wax.

In this process the reader's consciousness must be held in a state of continuous insecurity, perplexity, dizzying chaos; and the entire mechanism of the capitalist press is actually engaged in bringing about such a condition. Its refusal to make the mass of transmitted facts coherent, its pulverization of the social world into an incomprehensible, whirling jumble, do not so much meet the reader's needs and the state of his consciousness -- which, linked to the natural monism of man's understanding, tends toward a rounding out and unifying of his perception of the world -- as prevent the development of any critical control.

Diverting attention and awakening new 'intellectual' needs is another important component in this context. To avoid the danger that in following the movement of events, half-proletarian, petit-bourgeois sectors, office personnel, lesser bureaucrats, and rural and uneducated proletarian masses may become conscious of their real class interests, the consciousness of the readership is de-politicized. The sensationalist press, with its cops-and-robbers tales, its reports of crimes and adventure, works systematically in the service of such diversion. Here too it is often claimed that the reader's needs are simply being met: yet this is identical to the case of luxury and colonial goods in which the production of goods also produces the needs in order to meet them. The far-reaching influence of the capitalist on the socialist press is clearly revealed in the American socialist newspapers and in the otherwise excellent (English) Daily Herald. The latter, at the time of a recent miners' strike, printed on its first page lengthy crime reports and a story of a suicide attempt by an army officer's wife.

The anarchic state of consciousness achieved by these means is not only a most appropriate soil for the nourishment of a trusting acceptance of the bloodiest lies - which otherwise would be seen through by simple common-sense reflection - but it also helps to paralyse the impact of that minimum of genuine news which the capitalist press is forced to transmit. This minimum is not the result of ethical hesitations in the face of total falsification, but of the control exerted by the communist and, in certain instances, the oppositional and foreign press. For the credibility granted the press by the naive reader is the condition of its effectiveness, just as credit is the condition of contemporary capitalist production and must, to a certain degree, be covered.

Certainly the more farsighted representatives of the capitalist press are aware of the fact that the truth is a more powerful weapon of class-struggle, far more appropriate to the nature of human consciousness than lies. They are thus aware that their own work is constantly threatened by the very nature of human consciousness itself. Out of this perception there arises from within the capitalist press apparatus a practical, though often grotesquely sentimental yearning for -- objectivity. Thus Matin recently proclaimed: 'If only the "Associated Press" would for once not send us such completely contradictory reports!' These occasional wishes do not portend a return to the realm of truth.

3. The structure of the capitalist press apparatus requires personnel of a specific type: it needs specialists, namely, journalists. It is not the latter who have produced the capitalist press, but the other way round. Within the capitalist press there arises the same reification, the same alienation of the individual from his labor, which Marx dissected in the capitalist labor process as a whole. Just as capitalist production transforms the workers into simple accoutrements of the products of their labor, into mere things, so the press transforms the journalists. What Marx called the 'economic character masks of persons' is at work here all the more terribly as the whole process unfolds itself in

the mental sphere, where the annihilation of every human value - the essence of the capitalist system - appears in involuted form. In this context the impotence of the moral indignation which a few honest intellectuals feel over the venality and a-morality of the journalists becomes clear. Incapable of distinguishing cause from effect, they believe the whole spiritual coruption of the age is the work of journalists. Under these circumstances Kirkegaard's desparate but serious proposal for the shooting of all journalists would be of no practical value. Capitalism's impersonal mechanism would merely select replacements from the 'reserve army of journalists'.

The journalist is a specialist with unique qualifications. These do not consist in special knowledge in a specific, substantive realm of human intelligence and ability, but in the ability to write about anything. Under the journalist's pen theories, facts, opinions, counter-opinions, and news are transformed into an undifferentiated mass of printed matter -- that is, into means of ideological domination of the consciousness of the masses. The laws of reification insure that the journalist himself, as a simple personification of journalism, follows the laws, carries out his functions mechanically and unconsciously. Under his pen every intelligible structure is remade into a commodity; he not only does not notice this during his work, but is not even in a position to notice it.

This specialist in writing stands outside the real social developments; he sees a material force in his formal ability to write. Just as the bureaucracy occasionally raises itself to autonomous power, or as the officer corps can periodically wrench power from the capitalist class, so - according to its narrow caste-consciousness - can journalism acquire a modest independent power. In its view the expression becomes the essence, the means a goal. At the end of the process, journalism stands as an independent power -- next to others.

A thorough analysis of the capitalist press on the basis of historical materialist teachings on society and consciousness does not belong to the borders of this discussion. But it has been necessary to characterize the capitalist press because the above-mentioned features are of fundamental meaning for the creation of an effective communist press.

II. Character and Tasks of the Communist Press

1. The communist press is an ideological organ of revolutionary class struggle. Its tasks follow from: a) the general conditions of revolutionary class struggle and communist strategy and tactics; and, b) the specific conditions related to its particular character as one organ of struggle among others. We shall focus on the latter element and assume the former is well known to readers of this journal.

The fundamental axiom of the communist press is to awaken the communist consciousness of its readers. To reach this goal it must alter not only the content of the reader's consciousness but - like the capitalist press - the form of this consciousness, its inner structure.

Up to now the communist press has differentiated itself from the capitalist press only in terms of content, through the propagation of communist princi-

ples. In its organization, structure, and numerous specific aspects it remains under the determining influence of the capitalist pess.

The reform of the communist press means liberating it from the residue of this influence; all specific practical innovations are valuable only when they serve this larger goal.

The difference between the capitalist and communist press lies deeper than is generally assumed. While the capitalist press is forced to pursue its aims indirectly and underhandedly, the communist press can work openly toward its goal -- the awakening of the communist consciousness of the masses. In sharpest contrast to the capitalist press, which seeks to preserve and promote ignorance, the communist press stands on the only ground prescribed by its ideological position: the communist press is the historical agent of truth. Since it is only for the proletariat that social-theoretical truth and (class) ideology converge - the antagonisms within bourgeois ideology compel it toward self-dissolution - the foundation of the communist press must also be absolutely uncompromising and untrammeled truthfulness.

We do not want to be misunderstood. Truthfulness does not mean that the communists should dangle their secrets - if they have them - under the noses of the government and the bourgeoisie. Truthfulness is also not an end in itself, as it is for the moralists, but a means to the end of awakening communist consciousness. We do not deny that at present the proletariat's consciousness, including a part of the communist proletariat and many communist intellectuals, is such that truths which do not appear beneficial to the momentary state of communist revolution can create difficulties. But this only leads back to the demand that the inner structure of consciousness, the mode of thinking itself must be reformed. For what are the possible difficulties other than the result of an inadequate critical sense in estimating the importance of political and economic developments? We shall make absolutely no progress if we come out with the ugly and ungilded truths only after the proletariat is mature enough to take it. In this context, the historically unique openness with which the Russian communist politicians speak and write about the economic and political crisis in Soviet Russia is a remarkable, and prudent politics.

Truthfulness in the transmission of facts themselves and communist, that is, historically-critically true evaluations of the facts are the condition of the liberation of consciousness from the ideology diffused by the capitalist press.

To fully grasp the opposition between the capitalist and communist press, however, the standpoint of totality must be advanced. In relating the concept of truth to that of totality the critical reflection is carried out which goes beyond the naive-original meanings of the expressions 'truth' and 'truthfulness' used above. Here the naive concept of truth (in basic factual and news material) is insufficient: the criteria of truth do not lie in individual facts but in the totality of communist theory and praxis. To develop consciousness of this totality, to present information, insights, and news in a coherent context in which every aspect relates to all others, so that the most trivial news preserves its meaning through its links to the basic truths of communism and serves the continuous rejuvenation of these truths -- that is the task! Hence the inevitable 'pedantry' and 'doctrinaire didacticism' which some well-meaning writers object to in the communist press. If the capitalist press wants to scatter the reader's interest in all directions -- its symbolic heading is 'miscellany'; its symbolic sign, the question mark placed after the most insane news -- the communist press must

concentrate the reader's interest on the fundamental problems of class struggle; it must give coherence in form and content to the most diverse elements, linking them within the unified communist perspective. Obviously, this must not be done at the cost of living prose, which incidentally is not identical with an impressionistic chaos of colors.

From this it follows that the individual parts and columns in communist papers must be far more closely related than before. The largely unorganized news service must be organized and the individual news items themselves put into relationship with political and ideological articles. It will not suffice to follow the model of the capitalist press and throw together without commentary a chaotic mass of news taken partly from communist sources, partly from capitalist and official agencies. The worst aspects of this approach are found in the American socialist press, but also in the Daily Herald and even the communist paper, Humanité. Brief commentary, always oriented to the communist standpoint is a fundamental requirement of the communist press, as it represents one of the most important propagandistic methods of education (Here Fogarasi cites several examples of good and inferior communist papers.)

Another fundamental and previously neglected task of the communist press must be mentioned here: the unmasking of the capitalist press. The reader's consciousness is most rapidly liberated from the influence of the capitalist press when its deceitfulness is revealed to him. This unmasking is of the highest importance. For example: when we give constant and concrete evidence that the social democratic press, in its agitation against Soviet Russia, makes use of reports from the worst capitalist papers and news-agencies, the case is one hundred times more visible to the reading masses than when we offer general moral criticism in editorials. One thinks of the enormous agitational effect of the Daily Herald's revelations of the falsified Pravda issue in which the English secret police has its hand. Another example: Chicherin is daily compelled to deny a plethora of false reports on Soviet Russia. So long as the reader's consciousness remains uncritical, the denials are in efect sysiphian labors. If the communist press succeeded through proof and clear analyses of these reports, in shaking the reader's faith to the core, the time would soon come when denials would be unnecessary. The capitalist press speculates on the reader's ignorance, on his inability to read a paper critically. We must base our work on the reader's need for the truth and on the awakening of his critical facilities. All of this is of the greatest importance not only regarding the communist reader, which leads to a question we have had to hold aside: For whom is the communist press written?

2. The doctrinaire conception, according to which the communist press is written only for communists, must be opposed. On the contrary: the press is one of our most effective weapons in winning over the vacillating masses -- if we handle the weapon properly. As concerns essays on politics and political economy - the latter are too often neglected in favor of party politics - the masses to be won are only those whose interests rationqlly lead them to the communist camp as soon as the subjective conditions (ideological maturity) are present. Regarding the unmasking of the capitalist news reports, another important goal presents itself: shaking the faith in the capitalist press of the petit-bourgeoisie, especially its intelligentsia which is so important in forming public opinion. The correct strategy includes not only grouping one's own forces but weakening as much as possible the 'morale' of the enemy before the decisive clash. We must thus work to create a moral-psychological atmosphere which will contribute to the decomposition of the capitalist order. It must continually

be emphasized that the communist position is more promising than the capitalist because the truth and harmony with the fundamental character of human consciusness are natural needs for the former.

But the question, For whom is the communist press written?, is far from resolved even within the Communist Party since the communist readers, in terms of preparation, maturity and needs, form a heterogeneous group. Lately the demand is often heard that writing be such that all readers can understand everything, which is not identical with the demand for clearer, simpler, more understandable writing. In and for itself this is quite valid but regarding the whole communist literature it is a utopia. In this context, the necessary structure which arises in the communist movement itself also appears in the press. For example, specific financial and personal factors make possible the erection of various organs and these have to complement each other. Clearly articles which aim at developing communist theory cannot be written in a form that is accessible to all readers. But does it follow that such articles should not, therefore, be printed, that we should have no ideological workshops? Not at all. What follows is only that the various tasks of the communist press should not be confused or tossed into one pot. Here reader and writer, through objective and unbiased cooperation can overcome the difficulties. Getting the readers to work with the press is a crucial means in this regard. The reports written by workers on events in the plants which are published in Ordine Nuovo (The New Order, the Italian communist paper edited by Antonio Gramsci) represent a successful effort at transcending the untenable distance between communist reader and writer, or at least occasionally reversing the roles.

3. There remains the most difficult question, the one which is the condition of all conceivable reforms: By whom should the communist press be written?

The capitalist press is written by journalists. The issue is whether the communist press should be written by communist journalists. To this question there is but one answer: there are no communist journalists, or at least there should be none. The journalist as specialist corresponds, as mentioned earlier, to the capitalist social order and when the communist movement adopts unaltered the institution of journalism, it thereby adopts a piece of capitalist ideology.

As one among many means used by the Communist Party in leading the class struggle, the press is not autonomous but integrated with the others. Therefore the journalist as writing specialist has no place in the movement. The communist press must be written not by journalists who are also party members, but by party members who can write. Only in this way can the danger be avoided that journalism will rise, in the communist movement as in capitalist society, to an independent and isolated power. Any careful reader of the communist press can see that this danger is not an empty one. Too often the technique of writing predominates over the object; too often stylistic variations on communist slogans are substituted for a genuine Marxist standpoint and knowledge.

Naturally the communist movement cannot develop without a division of labor and it is indispensible that particularly qualified party members specialize in press activity. This does not mean that they should be specialists, like the functionaries of the capitalist press. It would be valuable to require all communist editors and writers to engage in party work outside and in addition to their special press work, as is often the case in provincial papers. The danger of journalistic reification arises most often in the large central organs where the division of labor is naturally more advanced.

Similar perspectives hold for the division of labor within the press itself. In this area today complete anarchy reigns. The communist press has such meager forces at its disposal that talk of planned selection, utilization, education and control is utopian. Nevertheless the principles must be established according to which reforms are to be oriented. Much can be done in the way of preparatory work. It is, for example, a pressing necessity to raise the level of intelligence and imagination of communist press writers. Only on the basis of the depth of his own education will an editor be able to take a genuine Marxist position on all major questions. Particularly needed is education and training in economics. Generalities about capitalist exploitation, profiteering, speculation, etc., can always be repeated, but no concrete work is thereby accomplished. Communist writers must appropriate and control real knowledge of these circumstances. Without strict discipline in this regard no progress can be expected.

We are well aware that much that has been said in this essay is self-evident to any thoughtful comrade. But here the saying that evident truths must be repeated not only until they are recognized, but until they are followed, is applicable. The practical application of these perspectives leads to a host of innovations which will be discussed in a future essay.

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