RADICAL AMERICA

September - October, 1967 Vol. 1 No. 2

50¢



An SDS Journal of the History of American Radicalism

RADICAL AMERICA, an sds megazine. Editors: Paul Buhle, Tom Cleaver, Henry Haslach, Jr., J.M. Mewsahw, Don Slaughter. Subscription rate: one year (six issues), $3 or $2 for sds national members in good standing. Single issue: 50¢. Bulk rates available upon request. Published by University of Wisconsin SDS free press with use of CONNECTIONS facilities. Address: %Paul Buhle, 1237 Spaight St., Madison, Wisconsin 53703.

RADICAL AMERICA grew out of a REP program begun in late 1966. The original intent was to bring about the beginnings of a learning process inside SDS ranks about the radical traditions of this country' and to provide a forum for students of American radicalism to exchange view on their field. The editors remain intent upon being relevant to the current needs and demands of SDS, and now expect that out of those problems will arise questions which lend themselves to a discussion of radicalism in earlier eras in the U.S. Most of all, we believe in shattering forever the walls between "activist" and "intellectual" members of the New Left.

In order to move beyond the cliches of most historians of American radicalism, we need the cooperation and encouragement of past activists in the American Left--whether from the 1950's, the 1940's, the 1930's or earlier periods. In the next (November-December) issue interviews of certain "Old Leftists" will appear; we hope that others, "leaders" or rank-and-file, will be encouraged to write brief memoirs or offer interviews on any subject they feel important (a significant event as yet incorrectly recorded, a forgotton but important attitude, or other concerns).

We also need financial help. Sending copies to SDS chapters on consignment and generally keeping prices low to activists will not cover our expenses. Therefore, we urgently need aid from those who can help us make up

They Didn't Suppress The Wobblies

There is a widespread misunderstanding that the government and big business suppressed the IWW during World War I. They tried. They hurt and hampered, but they did not suppress. The record is a practical subject for study by those who find themselves unpopular with those in power today.

The IWW was used to the lawlessness of "law and order" from its birth in 1905. In the summer of 1919 opposition grew fierce. The IWW faced bullpens and stockades, mass "deportation" of the Bisbee miners to the desert of New Mexico, frequent arrest by immigration authorities of anyone suspected of being a foreigner, and the intervention of federal troops. In September the federal authorities raided the national office and all branch offices, collecting five tons of evidence to use against those it named and convicted on three mass indictments in Chicago, Wichita and Sacramento. In the immediate postwar years the IWW was victimized by what the Undersecretary of Labor called the "deportation delirium," by the general rabid anti-radicalism, by a lynching raid on the lumberworkers' hall in Centralia, Washington, and subsequent manhunts, and even more by the passage of criminal syndicalism laws in various states and the arrest and trial through 1923 of far more members under these state laws than had been tried under the earlier federal enactments. One can find this story detailed in the appropriate chapters of Perlman and Taft, History of Labor in the United States, Vol. IV; in Taft's article on Federal Trials of the IWW, Labor History, Winter, 1962; or in Michael Johnson, "The I.W.W. and Wilsonian Democracy," Science & Society, Summer, 1964; also in Eldridge Foster Dowell, History of Criminal Syndicalism in the United States; and most readably in Kornbluh's

"Rebel Voices."

During all this repression the IWW grew. Its peak membership was in 1923. It sunk rapidly the following year, not from repression which had eased, but from internal disputes. And it is still in there trying.

The academic fiction that the IWW was crippled by wartime persecution rests on an overestimate of wartime strength. The IWW has never been very large. Its smallness, coupled with the mark it has made on American labor history, shows a handful enrolled in it were more effective than if they had been enrolled elsewhere. Its prewar peak in 1912, the year of the big Lawrence strike, was an average membership for the year of between eighteen and nineteen thousand. The defeat in Paterson took the last penny it could raise, and the depression that followed almost killed it in 1914. The European war helped it step up a campaign among agricultural workers in 1915, and to branch out into lumber and iron mines the following year, and to grow among copper miners and in the oil fields in 1917. It tied up copper mining and, in the northwest lumber industry shortly before the Septrmber 1917 raids.

The following calculation of membership from 1916 through 1924 is based on a percapita payment of seven and one half cents per month per member to the general organization. The periods used are those the national office used for cumulative financial statements, usually for the information of a general convention. The average dues-paying membership for any period would have been somewhat higher than that shown because some unions were always be ind on percapita, and conventions usually "excused" the non-payment so it was not made up later. (See next page for table.)

Taft, Labor History, Winter, 1962, page fifty-eight gives some figures for the five month period of April, 1917 to September,1, 1917, showing dues paid

TABLE

Period	Percapita paid	Calculated Membership
Sept. 1916-March 1919	$77,968	33,500
April 1919-March 1920	36,326	40,400
April 1920-March 1921	47,021	52,500
April 1921-Aug. 1921	9,465	23,000*
Aug. 1921-Sept. 1922	51,349	51,000
Oct. 1922-Sept. 1923	53,413	58,300
Oct. 1923-Sept. 1924	30,237	32,500**
Annual Average		42,000

*Summer 1921 figure low because of suspension of Philadelphia MTW, and period taken omits most agricultural Worker reports
**Fall 1923 through 1924: internal split developing caused withholding of percapita.

of $75,419.75. Since dues were 50¢ per month or $2.50 for the five month period, this figures out to a wartime peak of 30,168. The same source shows 32,000 members initiated in the same five months, but evidently they paid dues only for a month or so, and while adding to IWW revenue did not do much to swell membership. The statement is often made that at this time IWW membership was about 100,000, e.g. in Michael R. Johnson, Science & Society, Summer 1964, p.266: "On Sept.1, 1917, the IWW possessed between 90,000 and 105,000 paid-up members."

However, the purpose of this article is not to show how small the IWW has been, but to show that during this period of repression it actually grew. What gave the IWW this capacity to resist suppression?

Senator Borah spoke about the difficulty of jailing a mere understanding between workingmen. His oft-quoted remark gives part of the answer. The fact that the hardcore members of the IWW "knew what the score was," and were dedicated to their ideals, must be counted, too. Democracy, organized self-reliance, and local autonomy explain more--and the fact that the employers wanted these men back at work explains still more.

Had the IWW been a highly centralized organization the September 1917 raids and the arrest of its officers, staff members, editors, speakers, etc, would likely have knocked it out. They were replaced, so far as they were

replaced at all, by men direct from the point of production, who can be assumed to have sensed the feeling of the man on the job somewhat more accurately than their predecessors. Solidarity, the IWW paper, came out October 13,1917 with a long list of those arrested, but the editor who replaced the jailed Ralph Chaplin had the good judgment to run on the first page the following wire from Philadelphia: "Out last night, Nef will be out today. Rush five thousand dues stamps and two thousand dues books --Doree." From there on, there was a growing emphasis on the practical, and a discarding of leftish rhetoric, without ever losing sight of such ultimate aims as a new social order.

They proved it is very practical to provide as much local autonomy as the needs for co-ordinated effort can permit. The return to the woods in September, 1917 illustrates the point. The lumber workers had struck in early July. They were getting hungry, and weary of being run around by town bulls and federal troops and being herded into stockades. They decided to go back to the lumber camps and continue the struggle there. The outstanding demand was for the eight-hour day. Some took whistles with them, blew them at the end of eight hours, walked into camp, and, if they were fired, they switched places with men from other crews playing the same general sort of game, until they had eight hours, showers, better food, and better pay. There was no fixed pattern what to do: each crew used its own best judgment.

Neither repression nor resistance to it was uniform. The greatest efforts to get rid of the IWW came in the lumber, oil, copper and iron mining industries--places where unionism was relatively new. Where the IWW was organized in fields where unionism was more taken for granted, it continued, as on the docks of Philadelphia where it retained job control up to 1925. In the iron mines of the Mesaba Range and Michigan, its 1918 strike was met with a wage increase at the request of the government, to head off the strike. In the oil fields it fared poorest. In copper it was reduced to minority union status, but press accounts of postwar strikes assign it major influence. In the lumber

Industry its strength grew, despite Centralia and the subsequent man-hunt, up to the calling of a strike by a "militant minority" against majority judgment in September 1923. This radical disrespect for democracy in its ranks precipitated the destructive dissensions of 1924 and proved far more harmful than all the efforts at repression--and the membership soon recognized this fact.

The variation in resistance to repression should prove helpful in any full scale study of how to avoid getting suppressed. The IWW survived all this to engage in the first strike to unite all coal miners in Colorado (see McClurg in Labor History, Winter, 1963); to efforts among the unemployed in the big depression to assure that they would strengthen picket lines instead of breaking them, thus stimulating the first instance of union growth during a depression; major organization efforts in Detroit and Cleveland, with steady job control--and union contracts--in metal working plants in the latter from 1934 to 1950. Since then its membership has been largely "two-card," with recent welcome input from the young new left, and a current determination to get back to its old specialty of "conditioning the job" under its own banner.

Fred Thompson

Wobblies and Draftees: The I.W.W.'s Wartime Dilemma, 1917-1918

Ancestors are nice to have. Many people are now tracing the ancestry of the New Left to a brave and imaginative labor organization that once seemed as though it might pose a threat to the stability of American capitalism. The organization lives -- it is called the Industrial Workers of the World, just as it was in the days of its strength, between 1905 and 1917 -- but it no longer threatens anything or anyone. New Leftists are attracted to it, and many of them actually join it, primarily because it seems to offer a heritage of militant, dramatic warfare against the rulers of America. Hearing the I.W.W. songs, still available in the Little Red Song Book, and reading about their spectacular strikes and free speech fights in Lawrence, Paterson, San Diego, Everett, and elsewhere, one senses in the Wobblies a spontaneity and vitality that many feel were lacking in the American radicalism of the 1940's and '50's. When we learn that the Wobblies, with scarcely any exceptions, were genuine workers and not middle class in any sense, the desire to identify with them becomes sharper still.

Easily obscured in the glamor of the I.W.W. is the fact that it was an intensely serious organization with serious problems. Time again it found itself faced with the need to make crucial decisions on goals and tactics. Its decentralized structure did not eliminate this necessity. And nowhere was it more evident than in its policy toward American participation in World War I. For it was the war -- more precisely, the repression carried on by federal, state, and local officials and by mobs, all done under cover of the war and in the name of patriotism -- that killed the I.W.W. And what makes its fate especially tragic is that the Wobblies knew it

could happen, and tried hard to avoid it. Far from going all out in opposition to the war, the I.W.W. soft-pedaled its antimilitarism in order to deprive the government of a legitimate excuse to crush it. As it turned out, the government was not looking for legitimate excuses.

At the beginning of April 1917, when President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany, it is at best doubtful that a majority of people in the country favored going to war. In Congress itself, fifty representatives and six senators voted against the President in the showdown. But with war declared, the nation began to modify its peacetime attitudes and institutions. A reluctant Congress was persuaded to pass a sweeping conscription law by which all males between 21 and 31, with certain limited exceptions, were made subject to military service. The new law had none of the flabbiness of the "draft" that had been tried in the later stages of the Civil War. Exemptions were only for the physically unfit, workers in essential industries, and men who could prove they were needed to support dependants. Conscientious objectors were also exempt, if they were motivated by religious beliefs and if these beliefs could stand up under the rigors of CO camps run by the Army. Despite an emotional appeal by Champ Clark, the Speaker of the House, who was in tears at the end of his speech in favor of a voluntary recruiting system, conscription got large majorities in both houses and became law in mid-May.

War and conscription came at a bad time for the Industrial Workers of the World. In late 1916 and early 1917 the Wobblies seemed to be making greater progress than they ever had before in their organizing efforts. The goal of "One Big Union" of all the workers was still nowhere in sight, but the trends were hopeful. While the I.W.W. no longer had much of a base in the East, except among the Philadelphia longshoremen (mostly Negroes) and in scattered other places, its strength in the Midwest and West was clearly on the rise. A big, violent strike on the Mesabi iron range in 1916, which pitted the Wobblies against U.S. Steel, had gone very well considering the odds, and the I.W.W. was

determined to try again. The I.W.W.'s Agricultural Workers Organization had rallied the wage workers in the Midwest wheat fields to a greater extent than any other union before or since. The Wobblies were gaining footholds in two crucial western industries: Pacific Northwest lumber, and the copper mines of Arizona and Montana. The A.F. of L. Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers Union, once known as the Western Federation of Miners and, as such, briefly affiliated with the I.W.W. after its founding, was weakened by internal disputes and seemed to pose no barriers to I.W.W. organizing among the copper miners. At the time war was declared, the Wobblies' attention in the Pacific Northwest was focused on an important court trial in Seattle. Fifty-seven members had been charged with murder in the death of two vigilantes during a free speech fight in the lumber-mill town of Everett, Washington, in late 1916. Acquittal of the first defendant, Thomas F. Tracy in May 1917, led to the release of all the prisoners.

On the question of war, the I.W.W.'s stand was clear. The Wobblies were not pacifists, but believed deeply that working-class interests cut across national lines and that most wars benefitted only the capitalists while workingmen bore the cost. Once the workers in the various countries recognized this, according to the I.W.W., they would cease to fight each other and would battle instead against the capitalists. Adhesive stickers sent out by the I.W.W. national office in late 1916 read, "Don't be a soldier, be a man. Join the I.W.W. and fight on the job for yourself and your class."[1] In a similar vein, the 1916 national convention had proclaimed, "We condemn all wars, and, for the prevention of such, we proclaim the anti-militarist propaganda in time of peace, thus promoting class solidarity among the workers of the entire world, and in time of war, the general strike in all industries."[2] William D. "Big Bill" Haywood, general secretary of the I.W.W., declared soon after America's entry into the war that "All class conscious members of the Industrial Workers of the World

are conscientiously opposed to spilling the life blood of human beings, not for religious reasons, as are the Quakers and Friendly Societies, but because we believe that the interests and welfare of the working class in all countries are identical."[3]

The question was not, however, whether the I.W.W. would support the war--obviously it would not--but what priority it would assign to opposing the war. Haywood and many other I.W.W. leaders were anxious that the organizational progress that the Wobblies had been making not come to a standstill during the war. After all, it was a standard part of the I.W.W. creed that only when the working class was sufficiently well organized to stage a massive general strike could capitalism be overthrown. Although membership in early 1917 was still many times smaller than that of the moderate, pro-war American Federation of Labor, the I.W.W. seemed at that time to be making headway than ever before in making itself "One Big Union." Deflecting the I.W.W.'s energies from organizational efforts, and risking a confrontation for which the Wobblies were not yet ready, did not seem to be a good idea. In addition, the fate of the Wobblies imprisoned in Seattle may have seemed to depend on whether the I.W.W. did anything to brand itself (and its imprisoned members) as seditious enemies of society. The I.W.W. had always held to the principle expressed in its Preamble that "an injury to one is an injury to all," and no one wanted to do anything to jeopardize the Seattle defendents.

Shortly before the actual declaration of war, the I.W.W. national office held up production of adhesive stickers it had planned to distribute. These said "Why Be a Soldier?" with the last word printed in dripping red letters. At Haywood's suggestion, printing was also stopped on the pamphlet "The Deadly Parallel." This had consisted of the antiwar statement adopted at the 1916 I.W.W. convention, printed alongside a pledge of support for the war given by a special A.F. ofL. conference in March, 1917.[4]

Of the I.W.W.'s two English-language weeklies, one, the Industrial Worker, paid scant attention to the war. Published in Seattle at that time, it gave the bulk of its coverage to the Tracy murder trial and then to the I.W.W.'s increasingly successful efforts to organize the lumber industry. The other weekly, Solidarity, published out of the national office in Chicago and edited by a working-class poet and artist named Ralph Chaplin, devoted more space to the war but was still cautious in its approach. The dominant theme was that the American working class had its own war to fight at home in the United States. As Solidarity put it, "The war of the parasites is for freedom to exploit; the war of the workers is for freedom from exploitation. What are YOU going to fight for?" Or, "Workingmen, organize or perish! Join the I.W.W. and help to free yourself and your class from slavery and war. This is the only fight worth fighting!" Still, Chaplin shared the basic belief that antiwar agitation had to be seen in the perspective of the need to build a strong permanent organization. Writing at the time of the President's war message to Congress, Chaplin urged, "As much as we abhor the wars of the master class, we cannot afford to have the great work of ORGANIZATION sidetracked into an anti-militarism groove. . . .We can and will go ahead with our work as though nothing had happened." This was the basic attitude with which the I.W.W. entered the early stages of the war.[5]

As of June 5, 1917, the day set aside for the registration of all draft-age males, approached, there was great uncertainty as to whether there would be any kind of mass refusal of conscription. Although the government had made it clear that registration was not the same thing as being drafted, federal agents were alert to stop any attempts to persuade potential draftees not to take the first step. Such anti-conscription efforts as were carried on at this time were clandestine and were not associated with any national organzzations. The I.W.W. made no recommendation to its members, while the national office of the Socialist Party urged members to register and a group of prominent antiwar liberals and Socialists in New York signed a statement urging that draft

exemptions be sought only through legal channels.[6] On the other hand, the Ohio affiliate of the Socialist Party urged noncompliance; twelve Cincinnati men who distributed a pamphlet bearing this message were arrested and charged, though only briefly, with treason.[7] Socialists in many parts of the country held public meetings demanding simply the repeal of the draft law, but even these meetings were often broken up by police.[8] In Seattle, a secret No-Conscription League put out pamphlets and stickers urging noncompliance and even painted antidraft slogans on sidewalks.[9] The Socialist Party daily in New York, the Call, reported in all honesty that "Propaganda designed to discourage registration has been studiously circulated through the nation. No one seems to know who is behind it."[10] In this atmosphere of worry and secrecy, exaggerated reports were rife. Federal agents in Virginia, for example, claimed on May 28 to have uncovered a plot that involved persuading western Virginia mountaineers to resist the draft, blow up bridges and banks, kill large landowners, and divide up the land among themselves.[11] This particular plot was undoubtedly nothing more than a plot by the federal agents to get promotions. Neither in Virginia nor in the nation as a whole was there anything even remotely resembling a sustained effort to convince young men not to register for the draft.

As it happened, registration on June 5 fell several hundred thousand short of the expected ten million, but this did not lead to a confrontation between the government and the nonregistrants. Federal officials, through a series of short extensions of the deadline, brought in most of the delinquents without having to invoke the enforcement machinery of the draft law. In only two localities was there anything like a mass refusal, and in both instances I.W.W. members were prominently involved. In the Mesabi range of northern Minnesota over two hundred miners, veterans of the previous year's I.W.W.-led strike, were arrested for refusing to register. Most of these men were Finnish aliens; since they were not subject to military service, registration would have been a mere formality. I.W.W. leaders had warned them against giving the government any excuse to arrest them. As the report of the federal district attorney to his superiors in Washington indicated, the government thought it a good idea to keep these I.W.W. aliens so busy in defending prosecutinns for failure to register that they would

not have time to plot against the industrial interests of northern Minnesota."[12]

The othrr incident took place in Rockford, Illinois, and also involved primarily Scandinavian immigrants. When Clyde Hough, an I.W.W. member, and two other workers were arrested for nonregistration, a large crowd gathered to protest. Between three and four hundred men and women, eventually swelling to almost six hundred, march to the county jail and demanded either the release of the imprisoned men or the arrest of all the men in the crowd, since they too were unwilling to register. The sheriff rejected the first option but arrested 138 men--all that the jail could hold--and ordered the crowd to disperse, which it did. Within a month, 117 of the mnn had been sentenced to a year of hard labor by District Judge Kenesaw M. Landis (later the commissioner of baseball), who called them "belly-aching, whining puppies."[13] The Rockford movement did not become the rallying point for a national battle against conscription, any more than the stand taken by the Minnesota miners did. Solicarity carried reports on the Rockford affair, but the I.W.W. did not move to publicize the case or render aid to the defendants. A motion was made in the Spokane local to raise money for the Rockford men, but it was voted down, probably because of the need to concentrate on the lumber strike which broke out in July in eastern Washington.[14]

All this time, the I.W.W. as an organization had taken no stand on whether or not members should comply with the draft law. To the numerous members who wrote in asking what the I.W.W.'s position was on the draft, the national office could only reply that there was no position. In late June, therefore, a special session of the General Executive Board was convened in Chicago, but instead of resolving the issue it became hopelessly deadlocked. Haywood and several other members continued to feel that the I.W.W. should stick to industrial activities and that to challenge the draft would only be to invite repression without really making a dent in the war effort. The only point on which the Board could agree was that Ralph Chaplin should

be given the go-ahead to print a statement over his own signiture. Appearing in the July 28 Solidarity, Chaplin's statement said that members who joined military forces had always been expelled from the I.W.W. and that "The principle of the international solidarity of labor to which we have always adhered makes it impossible for us to participate in any and all of the plunder-squabbles of the Parasite class." It urged that members register for the draft but that they also claim exemption from military service by writing on the registration form, "I.W.W.; opposed to war."[15]

The one I.W.W. leader who was most willing to engage in direct conflict with the selective service system was Frank Little, part-Indian and a resourceful organizer, especially among the metal miners. Like Haywood, he had sight in only one eye; in addition, he was on crutches in mid-1917 after an accident in the copper town of Jerome, Arizona. At the General Executive Board meeting he argued vehemently for an outright antidraft position. Chaplin late quoted him as having said, "Better to go out in a blaze of glory than to give in. Either we're for this capitalist slaughterfest or we'ee against it. I'm ready to face a firing squad rather than compromise."[16] Less than a month later, Little was dead, hanged from a railroad trestle outside Butte, Montana, where he had gone to take a hand in a copper strike that had followed the death of nearly 160 workers in an unsafe mine. Little made a speech in Butte soon after his arrival there in which he attacked the use of soldiers in breaking strikes, reportedly calling them scabs in uniform; but it is probable that his killers--who of course were never identified or arrested by the authorities--were more concerned about the strike than about Little's lack of patriotism.[17]

If it was ironic that Frank Little, who wanted to fight the draft, was killed for helping lead a strike, it was cruelly ironic that Haywood and the others who wanted to concentrate on strikes were jailed for opposing the draft. In the fall of 1917 that is what happened. Following nationwide raids on I.W.W. offices in early September the Justice Department obtained indictments against 117 Wobblies, including every nationally prominent leader. Two counts of the indictment charged conspiracy to prevent delivery of war supplies by fomenting violent strikes, and conspiracy to injure citizens in the exercise of their

constitutional rights by fomenting such strikes, but both of these counts were later dropped. The two counts that stuck both related to the draft: conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act, and conspiracy to violate that part of the 1917 Espionage Act that forbade interference with the recruiting service or the spreading of "false reports" with the intent to cause insubordination in the armed services. In other words, the I.W.W., which had refused to take a stand on the draft, was charged with having conspired to disrupt it.

The main legal battle was fougt in the federal district court in Chicago, presided over by the same Judge Landis who had sentenced the Rockford defendants. It started with 117 defendants in mid-April of 1918 and, after several dismissals for sickness or lack of evidence, ended four months later with the conviction of all 100 remaining defendants. During this time somewhat smaller groups of second-line I.W.W. leaders were being held in Wichita, Omaha, and Sacramento on similar charges. At the same time, the Federal government sent soldiers into the Northwest logging camps for the purpose of insuring production and dislodging the I.W.W. from its position of strength among the loggers.

The image of the I.W.W., already bad in respectable circles before the war, worsened considerably. Groundless charges that the Wobblies were backed by "German gold" got a frecuent airing in the press. Moreover, during the period from September 1917 to April 1918, when the stunned I.W.W. was trying to bail its leaders out of prison and plan a legal defense, harrassment by federal officials was intensified. The I.W.W.'s General Defense Committee, formed to coordinate defense activities, had its mail delayed by postal authorities for periods ranging up to eight and twelve months. Alien Wobblies who handled defense literature were

detained by immigration officials. Numerous categories of I.W.W. material were barred from the mails altogether. The censorship became so tight that a copy of an I.W.W. resolution against sabotage was declared to be unmailable -- on the ground that it contained the word "sabotage."[18] When a small group of prominent liberals placed a fund-raising appeal in the New Republic, asking only that readers contribute to the defense fund in order to assure the I.W.W. defendants a fair hearing, the Post Office Department pressured the magazine into refusing to run the appeal in any subsequent issues.[19]

All accounts of the Chicago I.W.W. trial of 1918 give it an eerie, make-believe quality. The trial, starting with the selection of jurors and ending with the "guilty" verdict and sentencing, proceeded with infinite slowness throughout the late spring and summer. Judge Landis, despite his vehement dislike of radicalism was a model of courtesy and fairnes. Although he permitted the prosecution wide leeway in introducing I.W.W. materials that were written and distributed before the declaration of war, he allowed the defendants to expound at length on the aims of the I.W.W. and on the depressed living conditions of American workers. Never in American history has a left-wing group made such use of the courtroom to elucidate its basic philosophy as the I.W.W. did in 1918. At the same time, the defendants took pains to explain, and even to exaggerate, the extent to which the I.W.W. had avoided outright opposition to the war effort. Haywood denied that men had been expelled from the organization for joining the armed forces; and two soldiers, testifying for the defense, said that they had been I.W.W. members before the war, planned to rejoin, and had encountered no hostility from other Wobblies on account of their being in the army. Another defense witness testified that the local I.W.W. branch in Augusta, Kansas, had chased one of its former leaders out of town because of his talk against the draft.[20] The defense attorney, George F. Vanderveer, hammered away at the prosecution's inability to come up with any evidence specifically showing a conspiracy to obstruct the war.

For all the brilliance of their defense, however, the Wobblies might as well have been talking to themselves. David Karsner covered the trial for the New York Evening Call, the Socialist paper, and his reports were full and sympathetic. But the Call had only an infinitesimal circulation compared to that of the bourgeois press. Coverage of the trial in most newspapers was likely to consist of sensational out-of-court "disclosures" by the prosecution of material that could never have stood up if introduced as evidence. No publicity was given to the I.W.W.'s refutation of the charges in the indictment, nor to the defendants' efforts to explain what the I.W.W. was and why radical unionism was necessary. The courtroom that housed the trial was an island in a sea of anti-radical hysteria. Every day when the jurors went out to lunch they passed a movie theater whose marquee read "The Menace of the I.W.W." and "The Red Viper."[21] When the trial itself finally ended, the defendents themselves were quickly yanked back to this same reality. In less than one hour, the jury found them all guilty as charged; and then Judge Landis, dropping his amiability sentenced them to terms that ran ten or twenty years for forty-eight of the defendants and five years for thirty-three others. Haywood, Chaplin, James P. Thompson, "Red" Doran, James Rowan, and dozens of other veterans of I.W.W. organizing struggles headed for Leavnnworth.

By August 1918 the war was almost over, and in November of that year it was over. The United States had not made the world safe for democracy, but it had fought on the winning side. Domestically, the tide of pacifism and reform that had made President Wilson run for re-election with the slogan "He Kept Us Out of War" in 1916 had been dissipated. The I.W.W., which had never been attracted to Wilson at all, was in a state of acute disrepair.

Solidarity, in December 1918, published a partial listing of the number of members held as "class-war prisoners" in jails around the country. The incomplete count was 396, and included the organization's most capable leaders.[22] During the last year of the war the I.W.W.'s energies had been concentrated heavily in defending itself and its members from persecution. In this, as in its earlier effort to avoid persecution by not opposing the draft, it was unsuccessful.

FOOTNOTES

1. William D. Haywood, Bill Haywood's Book (New York" International Publishers, 1929), p. 294.

2. Cited in Solidarity, March 24, 1917.

3. Solidarity, April 28, 1917.

4. Ralph Chaplin, Wobbly: The Rough-and-Tumble Story of an American Radical (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 206.

5. Solidarity, June 16, May 12, June 22, 1917.

6. The New York Call, May 23, June 22. 1917.

7. The New York Call, June 22, 1917.

8. Nearly every issue of the Call for late May and early June, 1917, has accounts of such meetings.

9. Industrial Worker, June 2, 1917.

10. The New York Call, May 28, 1917.

11. The New York Call, May 29, 1917.

12. William Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters:: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1963), pp. 138-39.

13. Solidarity, June 16, July 7, 14, 1917.

14. Testimony of James Rowan at the Chicago I.W.W. trial, reported in The Evening Call, July 13, 1918. (The Evening Call was the same as the New York Call -- the name changed in the winter of 1917-18.)

15. Chaplin, Wobbly, pp. 208-9; Solidarity, July 28, 1917.

16. Chaplin, Wobbly, pp. 208-9.

17. H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918 (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1957), pp. 57-58.

18. Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, pp. 145-47.

19. Donald O. Johnson, Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union (Lexington: U. of Kentucky Press, 1963). p. 96.

20. The Evening Call, August 12, July 12, 29, 1917.

21. Chaplin, Wobbly, p. 247.

22. Solidarity, December 21. 1918.

American Liberalism in Transition, 1946-1949: An Annotated Bibliography

During the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, liberals were more than satisfied to nurture an appearance of unity and demonstrate an unchallenged faith in the progressive nature of American society. From 1933 to 1945 any latent intellectual tension could be hidden by a smooth facade of confidence and optimism. Consequently, few liberals realized the naivete of their political assumptions and seemed ideologically unprepared to meet their crises of 1945-46. The catastrophe of Franklin Roosevelt's death was followed bu an immediately recognizable disaster of Truman's ascendency as heir, a role many had considered as rightfully belonging to Henry Wallace. Both the acts of the Truman administration and the conservative election victories of 1946 were indications of a major political upheaval and, more fatefully, of the weakening of liberalism's internal structure. The postwar world did not provide the political and social temper for an easy philosophic consensus and it no longer made possible the indiscriminate cooperation of all left-of-center tendencies. Liberalism found itself in what it rightly perceived as an ideological crisis, and the redefinition of its place in American society was not only to reflect domestic and foreign entanglements but its own internal and historical contradictions as well. The moment had arrived for liberals to make clear their position in the American political left. As Dwight MacDonald commented, it was time to grow up.

Although never ideologically homogeneous, by 1946 the liberal community had adapted itself to include many diverse elements. The entry of the United States into the war and the acceptance of the Soviet Union as an ally had a unifying effect, smoothing the lines of disagreement between liberals and American communists. The change in the liberal "party line" and the eventual dissolution of official

Communist organizations made apparent the modification in Communist policies and paved the way for cooperation and an acceptance -- reticent, perhaps but surprisingly unguarded of Communists into liberal groups. Thus by 1946 the liberal community was swelled with an odd mixture of heterogenous factions and philosophies: with the war's end and the death of Roosevelt, the inherent contradictions found a new political climate in which to challenge the liberals' solidarity.

An earlier indication of the liberal antipathy toward communists took form in 1941 in the organization of the Union for Democratic Action. Composed mostly of socialists who had left the Socialist Party over the isolation issue, the U.D.A. distinguished itself by barring communists from membership. The organization's avowed purpose during the war years was to create a second front: to protect "democracy" at home. During the period of the "Common Front" their success in attracting liberals to their ranks was negligible, and the U.D.A. remained relatively small and insignificant. In fact, a negative response from progressive groups was more typical because of their seemingly narrow anti-communist policy. From 1941 to 1946 the U.D.A.'s pleas to liberals to come to grips with the communist issue went virtually ignored.

During the 1940's most "organized" liberals pledged their allegiance to three groups which shared a policy of welcoming as members all that would support their goals. Although nominally independent, the C.I.O-Political Action Committee, the National Citizens Political Action Committee, the National Citizens Political Action Committee and the Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions worked freely together during the war and cooperated without the technicality of a formal directorate. But

the post war tension, both domestic and foreign, found liberals sensing a need for a unified approach to policy decisions. Many felt that the death of Roosevelt had forced a search for a surrogate leader. The necessity for a reexamination of tactical procedures developed into a meeting on May 11, 1946, of these three action groups. The purpose of this Win-the-Peace Conference was to coordinate plans for the coming elections, and the result was the creation of a general policy-making committee. But the implications were much greater; in light of Truman's reactionary administration, there was a general agreement within the liberal community that an effective opposition had to be built. Whether this opposition would take form within the traditional channels of the Democratic Party or as a more radical independent force, an eventual merger of liberals was anticipated. For a report on the Conference see "Unity on the Left," New Republic, CXIV (May 13, 1946), 681.

The meeting and the implications that such a merger carried inspired a fiery letter from the national director of the U.D.A., James Loeb, Jr. With the same warning that went unheeded during the war, he addressed a call to all progressives to come to a decision on working within the same political organizations as communists. In 1946, the issue seemed finally ripe for discussion, and liberals leapt at his call and established a dialogue that was to perpetuate itself bitterly for the remainder of the decade. The immediate response was typified by a series of letters carried in the New Republic:

James Loeb, Jr., "Progressives and Communists," New Republic, CXIV(May 13, 1946), 699
Stanley M. Isaacs, "Progressives and Communists," New Republic, CXIV(May 20, 1946)733
Stephen K. Bailey, "Progressives and Communists," New Republic, CXIV(May 27, 1946), 771
Jackson Valtair, "Communists and Progressives," New Republic, CXIV(June 10, 1946), 837
Clark Foreman, "Communists and Progressives," New Republic, CXIV(June 10, 1946), 837
Roger Baldwin, "Communists and Progressives," New Republic, CXIV(June 17, 1946), 871

The debates over the issue of communist participation developed into a full-scale liberal attempt to define their philosophy in more concrete terms. The practical aspect of tactics necessarily broadened the liberals' awareness of the elusive nature of their own politics; the articles during 1946 depict an overwhelming self-consciousness and concern for their faith. Reflecting the major preoccupation with foreign policy and communism, redefinitions appeared in reference to a new program. William Chamberlain, "The Crisis of Liberalism," Progressive, X(May 20, 1946, 1-2, urged liberals to examine their faith and apply their standards to all men; the "crisis" was a compromise in their willingness to indiscrimately support a communist form of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Tragedy of Liberalism," Life, XX(May 20, 1946) 68-76, warned liberals not to become so preoccupied with Soviet imperialism that they became self-deluded about the major challenge of communism at home. At this still early stage in the reformation, the New Republic and the Nation generally held editorial policies which criticized, or at least did not encourage, this hardening of attitude toward the Soviet Union. In strong disagreement, Partisan Review, "The Liberal Fifth Column," XII (Summer 1946), 279-93, replied that liberals who were embarked on a policy of appeasement of Russia had no consistant principle except as Soviet patriots; thus they were a "fifth column" and had despoiled liberalism of its original meaning. For the reaction to this statement, see "A Discussion," Partisan Review, XIII (November-December, 1946), 617, a series of letters by prominent liberals including a congratulatory note from John Dewey.

In amore intellectual approach, Eric Goldman and Mary Paul were senior authors of an attempted

synthesis of opinions of nineteen prominent liberals with "Liberals on Liberalism," New Republic, CXV (July 22, 1946), 70-73. Contrasting views on foreign policy appeared in two parts by Joseph and Stewart Alsop and Max Lerner, "Liberals and Russia," New Republic, CXV(September 16, 1946), 321-24.

During the war years, Henry Wallace became clearly identified with a vision of a "liberal peace," that is, a commitment to cooperation between all nations. Wallace was the idealist promoting a genuine understanding toward the Soviet Union, and despite the change in political temper following the war, he never compromised his genuinely friendly regard toward the Russian people. As the liberal democrats vacillated with the climatic changes brought out by the Truman policy, Wallace was singled out for attack. The incident which crystallized his divergent tendency was Wallace's Madison Square Garden Speech, September 12, 1946; reprinted as "Way to Peace," Vital Speeches, XII(October 1, 1946), 738-41. The attack directed at Secretary of State Byrnes' foreign policies caused an unavoidable cleavage that led to Wallace's dismissal from the cabinet. The speech also brought about a clear and vigorous reaction from the liberal community itself. Robert LaFollette, Jr., "Let's Face the Issue," Progressive, X (September 23, 1946), 1-2, responded by suggesting that Wallace's challenge was a slightly refined version of the Stalin-Hitler Pact. A more typically subtle characterization of Wallace, as a fuzzy-minded progressive, was written by Mildred Adams, "Wallace: Liberal or Star-Gazer," New York Times Magazine, (September 15, 1946), 28+. Oswald Garrison Villard, "Wallace on Trial," Progressive, X (September 30, 1946), 4, questioned Wallace's character and principles as a leader, a role which he would have to fill now that he had openly denounced Truman's foreign policies. Wallace's dismissal from Secretary of Commerce post is covered by Kenneth Crawford, "Suffering World," Progressive, XI(September 30, 1946) 1-2. Wallace's reactions are stated in a letter to President Truman on relations with Russia in "The Path to Peace with Russia," New Republic, CSV(September 30, 1946), 401

The turmoil over Wallace's ouster and the divisions

over foreign policy initiated the Conference of Progressives held in late September, 1946 with the immediate objective of working for a liberal victory in the November elections. It seemed no secret that a third party would be formed for the presidential elections in 1948 with both Henry Wallace and the "communists" in control. For example, see Norman Thomas' challenge, "A New Wallace-"Progressive", Progressive, X (October 21, 1946), 8. The issue of communist participation in a liberal organization was a popular subject; Robert LaFollette, Jr., "Look Out, Liberals!" Progressive X(November 4, 1946), 1-2, warned against charlatons (who) are prostituting liberalism."

The third party rumor gained credibility with the organization of the Progressive Citizens of America in late December, 1946. Although they disavowed their independence and claimed that their immediate objective was to make the Democratic Party more "progressive," their move was interpreted as a prelude to a 1948 Wallace campaign. The movement of political currents was demonstrated again with the formation of the Americans for Democratic Action, composed of those liberals who, although dissatisfied with the Truman administration, allied themselves to "progressive" elements within the Democratic Party. For a history and explanation of purposes see Clifton Brock's Americans for Democratic Action, (Washington, D.C., 1962). The issue that clearly separated the P.C.A. from the A.D.A. was communism; the A.D.A., which followed the path of its "father" organization the U.D.A., refused membership to communists. On the founding of the A.D.A. see James Weschler's "Liberals without Reds," Progressive XI(January 13, 1947), 1-2. For a contemporary explanation of the differences between the two organizations see Helen Fuller, "The Liberals Split as Usual," New Republic, CXVI (January 13, 1947), 26-27. Robert Bendiner, "Revolt

of the Middle," Nation, CLXIV(January 18, 1947), 65-66, disclaimed the P.C.A. as a traditional popular front organization Freda Kirchway, "Mugwumps in Action," Nation, CLXIV(January 18, 1947), 61-62, urged uniting the P.C.A. and the A.D.A.

The reaction during the early months of 1947 made apparent the frustrations and the futility that a split would bring to the liberal ranks. Although an unwillingness to compromise on the divergent issues pervaded, a general theme of desire for unity was the paramount expression. Henry Wallace, "The Enemy is Not Each Other," New Republic CXVI(January 27, 1947), 22-23, defined the trouble: "Liberals...have been more willing to call each other names than to fight the reactionaries." Recognizing that a more potential and damaging threat followed with conservative tendencies, a revitalized liberal bloc was called for by James Wechsler, "Did Truman Scuttle Liberalism?" Commentary III(March 1947), 229-37. The Communists themselves called for a unity of all liberals to muster their strength to work outside of the Democratic Party in an independent political movement. William Z. Foster, "On Building a People's Party," Political Affairs, (February 1947), 109-121, urged liberals to use the wealth of political and organizational experience that the communists had gained. A similar attitude was expressed by Eugene Dennis, "The Progressives Can and Must Unite," Political Affairs, (March 1947), 195-203. The despairing attitude that accompanied the failure of New Deal Unity to continue was portrayed by John Fisher: "The Lost Liberals, Can They Find a New Road Map?" Harper's, CXIV (May 1947), 385-95. A typical middle-of-the-road compromise was suggested by Roger Baldwin: to allow communists who promised to remain open in their operations and pledge their first loyalty to the movement instead of the Party. See "Liberals vs. Communists," Progressive, XII(April 28, 1947) .

The Truman Doctrine produced a reaffirmation of foreign policy commitments within the liberal ranks. Henry Wallace again led the left-opposition in a new series of attacks: "The Fight for Peace Begins," New Republic, CXVI(March 4, 1947), 12-13. In a privately financed and published journal, Louis Adamic wrote on behalf of the Soviet-American Friendship Committee; for an example of his reaction to the "get tough" policy, see "The Enormous Distortion," Trends and Tides III(April-June 1947), 11-14. Lewis Corey promoted A.D.A. Liberalism and suggested that the American government should work with liberal-socialist governments in Europe -- to

them from falling to communism; see "Toward a Liberal Program to Prosperity and Peace," Antioch Review, VII(June 1947), 291-304. For the official statement of the A.D.A. foreign policy, see the American for Democratic Action, Toward Total Peace (Washington, D.C., 1947), and a summary and book review in "A.D.A. Policy Statement," New Republic, CXVII(December 22, 1947), 10-11. Henry Wallace wrote a parallel coverage of foreign affairs which reflected the viewpoint of the P.C.A. ; see, Toward World Peace (New York, 1948).

As 1948 approached, the issue of liberals' roles in the Democratic campaign and the third party alternative overshadowed foreign policy divisions. The split over opinion appeared in the analysis of the function of an independent political movement and whom it would serve. On the one hand, the A.D.A. liberals, who were discouraged by any prolonging of Truman's reactionary administration, were considering using a third party in terms of its traditional function, as a lever to force the major party toward a liberal compromise. But, on the other hand, the existing political cleavage offered an opportunity for a communist manipulation of a third party. The choice was outlined by James Weschler, "The Liberals' Vote and '48: What Price Third Party?" Commentary, IV(September 1947), 216-25. The predictions took shape when the P.C.A. issued a declaration of intentions to build a mass base for a third party movement beginning with the 1948 campaign. For a typical reaction to the formation of the Progressive Party see "P.C.A.'s Quixotic Politics, Nation, CLXV(December 27, 1947), 693. The movement became firmly established when Henry Wallace, who had been editor for the New Republic since his dismissal from the cabinet, relinquished his position and announced his candidacy for the presidential nomination of the Progressive Party: "Stand Up

and Be Counted," New Republic, CXVIII (January 5,1948), 5-10.

The actual formation of a third party reinvigorated the ideological battle by providing concrete issues for analysis. The earlier analysis of Wallace, such as David T. Bazelon's "The Faith of Henry Wallace," Commentary, III (April, 1947), 300-319, sketched Wallace as a politician of the populist heritage. But once his idealism became incorporated into an organized and viable political party, the candidate became clearly linked with the threat to the Democratic Party that the movement foretold. In liberal circles, the common curse was "fatal and foolish;" Freda Kirchway, "Wallace: Prophet or Politician?" Nation, CLXVI (January 10, 1948), 29-31, downgraded the threat embodied in Wallace's third party. In contrast to the oppositional role that the Nation was to pursue during the campaign, the New Republic followed a precarious course. As might be expected, since Wallace remained on the staff as contributing editor, the viewpoint was generally favorable with Wallace issuing major statements in his regularly appearing articles. However, the new editor Michael Straight, while giving official endorsement to the Progressive Party, contended that the magazine was by no means to serve as an organ for the campaign: "The New Republic and the Third Party," New Republic, CXVIII (January 19,1948), 22-23. Wallace used his position for announcing many of his official policy statements; for example, his belated reaction to the Marshall Plan was outlined in "My Alternative for the Marshall Plan," New Republic, CXVIII (January 22, 1948), 13-14. For a reaction to the third party from within labor circles, particularly the C.I.O. , see Willard Shelton, "Third-Round Politics," New Republic, CXVIII (January 26, 1948), 19-20, and "C.I.O.'s Left Cling to Wallace," Business Week, (January 31, 1948), 70-72. As within liberal political circles, the divisive issue of communist participation inaugurated rumors of an open break between the C.I.O. right and left. Max M. Kampelman's The Communist Party vs the C.I.O. (New York, 1957) is a rather crude but nevertheless historical analysis.

The Wallace campaign placed liberals in a dilemma; those who did not wish to support Truman but feared the communists saw the Progressive Party as destructive of a genuine third alternative in the immediate

future. "Cynicism and defeatism will be the product of the Wallace adventure" predicted James Wechsler in "What Makes Wallace Run?" Progressive (February, 1948), 19-20. This same feeling was restated, but the root of the problem was assigned to the failure of Roosevelt to build a unified coalition by Norman MacKenzie's "Dilemma for Liberals," New Statesman and Nation, XII (March 6, 1948), 187-88. A more idealistic interpretation was provided by Saul K. Padover, "Party of Hope," Saturday Review of Literature, (April 17, 1948), 29+. The first A.D.A. convention similarly reflected the cnnflict of motives as reported by Willard Shelton, "The A.D.A.'s Dilemma: H.S.T. or G.O.P.," New Republic, CXVIII (March 1, 1948), 9. Typically, the blame for the dilemma was given to Truman's reactionary tactics which forced a split within the Democratic Party; for example see Michael Straight, "Truman Should Quit," New Republic, CXVIII (April 5, 1948), 1-5. For another summary of complaints against Truman see "Truman as Leader," New Republic, CXVIII (May 17, 1948), 13-26. But it was equally clear that the dilemma that Truman "caused" was a demand for a decision by liberals on communist participation. An awareness of this was shown by Robert Bendiner, "Civil Liberties and the Communist," Commentary, V (May, 1948), 423-31. Louis Filler indicated liberals were taking the easy way out, that is, by following the "party line;" "The Dilemma, So-Called, of the American Liberal," Antioch Review, VIII (Summer, 1948), 131-51.

Rather than blaming the communists, he held, liberals should blame themselves for not developing their own policies. For a strangely contrasting optimistic faith in traditional liberalism (that is, Democratic liberalism) see the long-range prediction from William G. Carleton, "The Promise of American Liberalism," Antioch Review, VIII (Fall, 1948), 335-45.

As the campaign progressed, the philosophical issues developed alongside the tactical. The consensus of most liberals was expressed

by Arnall Ellis, "A Practical Program for Progressives," Nation, CLXVI (June 12, 1948), that ultimately the most effective course for progressives would be to obtain and keep control of one of the major parties. Apparently discounting predictions of total defeat, Wallace resigned from the staff of the New Republic to devote himself full-time to the Progressive Party campaign. For his final statement see "Farewell and Hail!" New Republic, CXIX (July 19, 1948), 14-18. Freda Kirchway called upon Wallace to dissociate himself from the communists, which would psssibly undo part of the damage and free dissident liberals to cast a protest vote that would not at the same time be a vote for the communists; "What Wallace Can Do," Nation, CLXVII (July 24, 1948), 87-88. Looking to more basic differences between Democratic liberals and progressives, Helen Fuller, "For a Better World Right Now," New Republic, CXIX (August 2, 1948), 11, conceived of the issue not simply as one of protest but one of redirection of foreign policy and a beginning of a long-range nationalization of basic industries. William G. Carleton, "The Dilemma of the Democrats," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIV (July, 1948), 336-53, interpreted Wallace's "captivity by the communists as an omen of defeat; the majority of liberals would retain their purity and would shy away from the communist-tainted Progressive Party. In contrast, Howard K. Smith, "Wallace Party," Nation, CLXVIII (August 7, 1948), 145-47, charged liberals with ineffectiveness in working within the Democratic Party to halt the drift toward reaction; he suggested that "they might consider abandoning the effort to recapture the Democratic Party and start trying to recapture the Progressivd Party." For an excellent summary of the usual arguments that Wallace was alienating liberals see Paul Bixler, "We Note. . .Henry Wallace and His Followers," Antioch Review, VIII (Fall, 1948),368-76.

As the climax of the 1948 campaign drew nearer, the defection of liberals from the Progressive Party ranks became more pronounced. Similarly the anti-Wallace attacks became more brutal and communism became an obsession. An indication of this tendency came with the withdrawal of support by the New Republic, Wallace's long-time promoter. Although the conflict of opinion within the staff was earlier suppressed, the actual proximity of the election forced a showdown. The editorial policy dramatically shifted in favor of Truman;

see "1948: The New Beginning," New Republic, CXIX (September 27, 1948), 32. The Nation, although not invective, predicted a failure for the Progressive Party to achieve a mass base without the support of organized labor. Freda Kirchway, "The Challenge of Henry Wallace," Nation, CLXIII (September, 1948), 13, commended Wallace for arousing Americans from their dangerous apathy to communism. Although certainly not a spokesman for liberal opinion, C. Angoff shared the pervasive mood that surrounded the Progressive campaign from all political camps: "Wallace's Communist-Front Party," American Mercury, LXVIII (October, 1948), 414-21. One of the most bitter attacks came from Irving Howe, "The Sentimental Fellow-Traveling of F.O. Matthiessen," Partisan Review, XV (October 1948), 1125-29, who described the Wallace movement as a "completely contrived creature of Stalinism" and the "most abominable totalitarian movement of our time." See also Louis N. Budenz, "How the Reds Snatched Henry Wallace," Collier's, CXXII (September 18, 1948), 14-15, and William B. Hesseltine, "Perversion of Progressives," Progressive, (September 1948). The final defection of any potential labor support came with a stiffening of Philip Murray's policy toward communists; see "C.I.O. Begins Careful Crack-down on Left-wing," Business Week, (October 23, 1948), 108-9.

One of the first accounts of the Progressive Party's failure was written by James A. Wechsler, "My Ten Months with Wallace," Progressive, (November 1948), 4-8, who interpreted the narrowing of the base of support. See also John Fisher, "Unwritten Rules of American Politics," Harper's CXCVII (November 1948), 27-36. The most complete coverage of the Progressive Party campaign by one of its participants is Curtis B. MacDougall's Gideon's Army (New York, 1965, 1966), a three volume survey. Another sympathetic analysis originated from a Ph.D. thesis: Karl M. Schmidt, Henry Wallace: Quixotic Campaign, 1948 (Syracuse 1960). A localistic study of the campaign is James T. Jones, "The Progressive Party in Illinois, 1947-48," (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Illinois, 1953). The Progressive Party in relation to communism in American life is selectively covered in

the following: Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919-1957), (Boston, 1957); David J. Saposs, Communism in American Politics (Washington, D.C., 1960); David A. Shannon, The Decline of American Communism (New York, 1959). For contrasting character studies of Henry Wallace, see James Waterman Wise's Meet Henry Wallace (New York, 1948), a campaign biography, and an extremely bitter invective written by Wallace's arch-enemy Dwight MacDonald, Henry Wallace; The Man and the Myth (New York, 1948). For a brief epitaph written by his campaign manager see C.B. Baldwin, "Henry Wallace," National Guardian (December 1965),12.

The depth of the Wallace defeat insured a decisive victory for anticommunism. The communist dilemma had been confronted and the future course of American liberalism would not be tained nor compromised from the left. The Progressive campaign and the philosophic and tactical challenge that it represented were a crucial test for the survival of liberalism. The repudiation of communism served as a rallying point for rebuilding a new coalition from the remains of the New Deal's grouping. As one happy survivor expressed it: "There exists an older and richer touchstone of American liberalism than that of anticommunism in the American past;" Lowry W. McNeil, "Wanderer's Return," Antioch Review, VIII(Winter 1948),463-68. Hearalding traditional values, the liberals began a self-conscious endeavor to chart their future course. The A.D.A., the victor in its battle with the P.C.A. for liberal hegemony, pledged itself to "independent" cooperation with the Democratic Party; "The A.D.A. in the Next Two Years," New Republic, CXIX(December 20, 1946), 6-7. See also James MacGregor Burns, "New Fighting Orders for Liberals," Antioch Review, IX(June, 1949),131-45, for a rationale of this planned political coalition. For a broader example of a practical solution to contemporary problems see "State of the Union; A Program for Liberal America," New Republic, CXX(January 10, 1949), 24 pp. insert, and Max Lerner, "The Outlook for Party Realignment," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXV(Spring 1949), 179-93, who believed such a policy could bring the "people" back into political parties. The most viable positive program took a form of a re-examination of liberal values, a re-assertion of liberalism in line with the American heritage. For the best statement of the

philosophical basis for A.D.A.-ism, see Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Vital Center (Boston, 1949). Typical of the search for an absolute value of "freedom" are Max Ascoli's The Power of Freedom (New York, 1949) and Horace Kallen's The Liberal Spirit (New York, 1948).

In the years between the organization of the Progressive Citizens of America and the formulation of a Cold War credo, American liberalism had been noticeably altered. The elimination of the communist "fellow-travelers" to liberalism narrowed its base, of course, but also did more than that. In effect, it liquidated the last myths of a New Deal coalition based upon Soviet-American friendship and forcibly put anticommunism high on the list of real American virtues. By 1946, the split was irreconcilable; by 1948 the liberals had defeated progressivism; by 1949, they were in the process of "cleaning up," from labor unions to intellectual centers, and consolidating their victory. Liberalism, in short, shifted its course to the right, put up new sails, and prepared for the shifting winds of American politics to set it in a new direction.

NOTE ON SOURCES

Since the major emphasis of the bibliography was to select and systematize examples of liberal thought, nearly all of the contemporary articles represent authors who once identified themselves with the Roosevelt legacy. Although as ideologically elusive as their faith, these writers reflect the developments and shifts in liberalism during the post-war era. Since the bibliography is limited to journals, magazines and a few books, a more precise opinion of the major divisions might be traced in their own news press: Max Lerner's PM, The ADA World published bi-weekly, The National Guardian "progressive weekly" founded during the Wallace campaign, and the Communist Party's Daily Worker. Also the editorial policies of the two major liberal weekly

magazines, the New Republic and Nation, can provide valuable background on specific issues. The editorial role of the New Republic is of particular interest because it uniquely parallels an evolution within the progressive ranks; at the political last minute, the magazine's editorial support shifted dramatically from Wallace to Truman. Typifying a more "social democratic" viewpoint, the New Leader might serve a particular need. Although the communists themselves played an active part in the Progressive Party campaign, their journals are of very limited use in reflecting upon political events: New Masses, Masses and Mainstream, and Political Affairs have numerically very few relevant articles.

NOTE: the following is an exchange of views which followed the publication of Jesse Lemisch's article, "Towards a Democratic History," as a Radical Education Project Occasional Paper late in 1966. The central argument, whether history can be written from "the bottom up" with stress upon the lower classes, is largely self-evident from the contributions. Although Professor Lemisch did not intend originally for his study to be published and circulated in its initial form, he has chosen here to defend his basic views and elaborate upon them. Copies of "Towards a Democratic History," are available for 10¢ each or at bulk rates from REP, 510 William St., Ann Arbor, Mich. 48108.

Toward History: a Reply to Jesse Lemisch

American radicals have long been imprisoned by the pernicious notion that the masses are necessarily both good and revolutionary, and by the even more pernicious notion that, if they are not, they should be. The principal task of radical historians therefore has too often been to provide the masses with historical heroes, to make them aware of their glorious tradition of resistance to oppression, and to portray them as having

> been implacably hostile to the social order in which they have been held . . . .
>
> Eugene D. Genovese, "The Legacy of Slavery and the Roots of Black Nationalism", Studies On the Left, Vol. 6, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1966, p. 3

Jesse Lemisch's paper "Towards a Democratic History" epitomizes the traditional radical history articulated by Genovese. Lemisch sees the works he reviews presenting a challenge "to some sacred myths both substantively and methodologically." But instead of pointing to the crucial significance of Thernstrom and Thompson* (to cite only two of his examples), Lemisch merely substitutes a different set of sacred myths. For him "democratic" means sympathy with the "common man"; history is the delineation of rational, good, perhaps "revolutionary" deeds.

In place of a bias favorable to elites, Lemisch would have a bias in favor of the "common man." Instead of viewing history from the perspective of rulers, Lemisch would have us look "from the bottom up." This "history" merely reverses roles: the good guys become bad guys, the bad good. This is not looking at America in a "different" or "distinctive" way; it is merely looking from the opposite direction. For the right's myth of the people as a great beast, Lemisch substitutes the left's myth of the people as glorious revolutionaries. Both myths obscure and dehumanize history.

It is misleading, as Lemisch maintains, to deny the role of the working classes; but it is equally incorrect to say that "to deny human agency is to say that history happens from the top down." Aren't elites also made up of men? Imprisoned by his sympathies, Lemisch missed one of Thompson's central points--that class is a set of historical relationships; that men's experiences, shared and disparate, unite and sep-

*Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress; Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City. Cambridge:

arate them; that neither men nor groups have existences independent of one another ("We cannot have love without lovers, nor deference without squires and laborers." Thompson,p.9); that history is the story (or the result) of interaction among real people on top and on bottom of the social order.

The task of the historian (as exemplified by Thernstrom and Thompson) is to try to understand the interaction and to explain events, not to isolate heroes and sing of their glory. Neither Thernstrom, nor Thompson writes only to prove that men are rational, that their actions, however violent, express "genuine grievances." Both seek understanding of the complex process by which ideology--whether radical or not--is formed. Thernstrom links an experience of mobility, however slight, to the acceptance of the Horatio Alger myth of America as the land of opportunity. He is careful to show that only a segment of the laboring population improved its situation and he maintains that this group did not develop a radical ideology. Similarly, though he sees in "crime and riot the fighting out of a class war," Thompson does not deny the violent, destructive, even fruitless character of Luddite outbursts. For he is attempting not to justify their every action, but to understand the process by which Luddite organization developed and declined. In this connection another comment of Genovese (a radical scholar whose work is significantly absent from Lemisch's consideration of recent historical literature) is relevant: "Advocates of the philosophy of 'burn-baby-burn,' whether on a Missippippi plantation in the 1950's or in a Northern ghetto in the 1960's, would do well to bear in mind that of necessity it is primarily the blacks who get burned." (op. cit., p.8).

Lemisch's treatment of the Harlem riots demonstrates his lack of historical understanding and his tendency to cheer on all lower class action as "revolutionary." He deems the riots "some sort of

Harvard University Press, 1961. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Pantheon Books, 1963.

rational expression" (what sort?) and rejects the description of them as "aimless violence." But is the point merely to exchange a positive label for a negative one? There is nothing radical (or democratic) about the redistribution of honorific terms. The Harlem riots were characterized by a great deal of aimless violence. This is precisely what the historian must explain. What social conditions inhibited the formation of a viable revolutionary organization in the summer of 1964? What did their actions tell of the experiences of these people--of those who rioted and those who defended order? (Perhaps that violence had become a way of life for all the partipants. Why?)

It is not radical but inhuman to welcome violence and the deaths which accompany it because they seem revolutionary. The "lesson" of the Harlem riots is that in Harlem, in 1964, outbreaks of violence expressed, but did not satisfy the Negroes' grievances. For a whole set of reasons (having to do with Negro and white experience in New York, and more complex than the frequent SDS'ers explanation that "the system was too strong") which the historian must analyze, riot did not become revolution; for very little, if anything, changed in Harlem as a result.

Lemisch's criterion of "sympathy for the common man" itself confuses what his historians set out to clarify. Thernstrom deals not with the urban workingman, but with one group (the least radical) of them. Thompson carefully distinguished between artisans displaced or threatened by new industry and new industrial workers. We know that the Luddites were weavers or stockingers desperately defending their craft from the new machines. (We could begin a moot and, in the end, irrelevant argument here about whether such actions against "progress" were revolutionary or reactionary.) Pollack's populists are farmers and not workers, unable to ally with other "common" men. What, then, other than a slogan, is the "common man"? And who in the world is he? It is not the historian's job to tell us. He must free our minds from the dehumanization of categorical thinking about men, not provide us with new categories. (Perhaps the most radical promise of historical thinking lies in its potential to free us to see men as men.)

The delineation of human relationships within any

society manifests the "love of mankind" Lemisch counsels. What could be more true to men than to attempt to depict them as they really are, as they live and change; to attempt to understand them for what they are--whether we like it or not--rather than to force them to be what we wish they were; to see class, not as a category, but (as Thompson does) as a relationship that happens. There is nothing more "anti-man" than Lemisch's reductionism which makes of different men an unreal abstraction.

Neither is there anything less historical. Lumping twentieth century poor, nineteenth century urban workers, eighteenth century seamen, and nine-century agrarian populists into a single category eliminates any sense of change over time. What is crucial for the historian is not the discovery that all good guys are good, but the differences in their situations, the process by which experience and consciousness formed and changed: the way in which some men, at certain times, acted as agencies of change and others did not.

An attempt to delineate a process involves difficult and "new" methodology. Both Thernstrom and Thompson depart from earlier working class historians by focusing on the social experience of the men whose ideologies they explore. Most earlier studies emphasize institutions and leaders as embodiments of consciousness or as steps in the "maturation" of radicalism. Thernstrom and Thompson look at unorganized as well as organized workers for the links between experience, thought, and action.

Neither the discovery of utilization of new sources, nor the social origins of these sources is as important in the work of Thernstrom and Thompson as the manner in which they are used. Their historical skepticism knows no classes. It exercises the same critical judgment of a union leader's account of a strike as of a spy's report to the police. Thernstrom uses his statistics to recreate his workers' lives. He shows that extremely materialistic values guided their actions; they used their savings to buy land and a house

rather than to further their children's educations. His aim is not to condemn this bourgeois mentality,but to show how and why it operated as it did. Thernstrom's questions were about the relationship of ideology to actuality. He used statistics as tools by which he began to answer his questions. "Neither raw statistical data nor the computer," he has said elsewhere (unpublished paper, 1965), "will speak for themselves. . . ." The questions and interpretations of the historian give otherwise inarticulate numbers their meaning. A lack of understanding of this point leads to Lemisch's inability to decide exactly what is important about Thrrnstrom's and Thompson's different sources. Instead, he resorts to his handy common denominator, "the Common man."

Not their sources, but the questions they ask of their material, unite the historians Lemisch discusses and other historians of the middle and upper classes (Genovese, Lawrence Stone, Bernard Bailyn are a few) he omits. Their approach is radical not because their substance is the "common man," but because their questions provide us with a new way of looking at history. Their radical sympathies raise radical questions about all kinds of people.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Lemisch's paper is its profoundly unhistorical nature. If the radical's study of the past is to have value; it is to provide the perspective, tools and understanding we need to render the present explicable and, ultimately, perhaps, controllable, it is incumbent upon us to view history as fully as we can. It is high time we stopped creating a fictive historical class of a fictive "radical tradition" by which to identify ourselves. (The search for a tradition to sanction present behavior and outlook is, to say the least, a rather ironical activity for radicals to engage in.) A myopic vision of the past is hardly the starting point for unddrstanding or changing the present. A radicalism which refuses to perceive men for what they are, which cannot understand how relationships among men operate and change, is doomed from the start. Blind to reality, it cannot cope with or change it. It imprisons us in a fictive world of our own, out of touch with mankind.

Joan W. and Donald M. Scott

New Left Elitism: a Rejoinder

The Scotts interpret my call for a history "from the bottom up" as an exhortation to "isolate heroes and sing of their glory," to "justify. . . every action" of the lower class," to see "the people as glorious revolutionaries." There has indeed been a historiography which has seen the struggles of noble Negroes and brave workers as such a succession of victories that we wonder why there is anything left to protest today.[1] I neither urged nor intended to urge anything of the sort, and it is a lack of discrimination of the part of the Scotts which prevents them from seeing that a history from the bottom up might be something other than the parody which they have constructed. The Scotts partially acknowledge that they are after the wrong guy when they see in my paper a "tendency to cheer on all lower class actions as 'revolutionary.'"(Emphasis added.) They said it, not I. What I did say is this: our history has been written from elite sources and has been, naturally enough, favorable to the elite. A different kind of history, often written from non-elite sources and critical of the elite, has told us that equality may not be the central theme of American history, that there have always been poor people in America, that there has been less mobility than has been supposed, and finally, "the possibility has been raised that the common man has in fact had an ideology, that that ideology has been radical, and that conditions have been objectively bad enough so that a radical critique has been a sound one." While noting that "sometimes, very often, history does happen from the top down," I said repeatedly that it can happen from the bottom up; we need a new historiography which starts with "a bias which says that his-

tory can happen from the bottom up, that the people can often act for good reasons, expressing genuine grievances. . ."

What does this mean? History, the Scotts contend, is the result of "interaction among real people on top and on bottom of the social order." The task of the radical historian is to "seek understanding of the complex process by which ideology--whether radical or not--is formed." More specifically, this means looking at "the process by which experience and consciousness formed and changed," "the relationship f of ideology to actuality." Fine words: the Scotts and I are in total agreement on these goals. But how are we to achieve them? This is the problem. The Scotts provide no viable method which would enable historians to explore the all-important connections between the ideology of the inarticulate and their activity. In order to explore that connection, in order to achieve the predictive rather than merely descriptive history to which we assume radicals aspire, in order, in the Scotts' words, "to depict / men / as they really are, as they live and change," we must have categories. (Shall we write of a New Left without reference to "radicals" and "liberals"? or of mobility without reference to "rich" or "poor"?) The trick is to find categories which describe real human beings. The Scotts cannot escape this. Rail as they do against "the dehumanization of categorial thinking about men" and against "new categories," the conflict between us is in fact not one between categories and"reality" but rather one between different kinds of categories.[2] The Scotts' categories--the main one seems to be "accomodationist"--are just as fictive and imprisoning as they claim mine are. There is no history without categories; I claim that my working assumptions and categories are, when correctly understood, liberating.

A genuine history of the inarticulate--what I have called a history from the bottom up--is a sine qua non for any understanding of "the interaction among people on top and on bottom" and the relationship between the ideology of the inarticulate and their actions. There is simply no short cut to get

around this massive obstacle; until we undertake and achieve a detailed history from the bottom up, our historiography will be uncertain and our understanding of radicalism partial. So long as we claim to understand the inarticulate without actually studying them we will deceive ourselves about them. Until we do the tremendous amount of bread-and-butter history which needs to be done we will be working on unproved assertions, a formula which claims to describe the thought of the inarticulate but which will be elitist by definition, probably inaccurate, and substituting other fictive categories for the ones we now revile. Our formula may be friendly or unfriendly, it may claim that the people whom we are not studying are noble or ignoble; whatever it is, its fruits will be fiction.

What are the assumptions of a history from the bottom up? Suppose we were simply to turn history upside down, to view it partisanly and one-sidedly from a point of view sympathetic to the victims and through their eyes? This is hardly what I proposed, and yet it does seem to me worth our serious consideration. Herbert Marcuse has suggested that a society may be most accurately judged through an examination of its worst injustices: such an approach uncovers "the deepest layers of the whole system, the structure which holds it together, the essential conditions for the efficiency of its political and economic organization."[3] Thus, says Marcuse, we "judge the totalitarian system by its conc ntration camp; that is, by its most conspicuous crime."[4] This might suggest to us an analysis of contemporare higher education solely from the point of view of the "troublemaker", of slavery solely from the testimony of slaves. Such an approach would probably bring us closer to the truth than most history as it is written today.[5] But it is more than I proposed and seems to me doomed to remain only a partial account. As Barrington Moore, Jr., has written, the kind

of history which "serves the underdog" is finally "just" cheating" and no more "objective" than "the celebration of our own society which leaves out its ugly and cruel features."[6] But while rejecting a merely oresided and partisan history, Moore has already noted that those who rule have "the most to hide about the way society works," and these are the people most favored by history and historical sources. Thus "sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skepticism about the victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology."[8] What I am proposing is that we cannot properly or adequately express the skepticism which Moore urges upon us until we know what to be skeptical about, and only the powerless themselves can tell us this.

Thus I do not go so far as Marcuse, whose position perhaps vaguely resembles the caricature of my position which the Scotts have constructed. History must be written both ways--we need a more critical history of the elite and a history from the bottom up. The latter seems to me to be especially urgent.

Basic to a history from the bottom up are the ideas that ideology can be the possession not only of the articulate and literate but also of the inarticulate and illiterate and that the ideology of the inarticulate--who, after all, do have a greater working knowledge of the society[9]--may offer a sounder critique of the society in question than the articulate. Thus I called for a history whose basic assumption is the rationality of the inarticulate, one whose "working assumption must be that groups of men act rationally"; "often," I noted, they do not, but the historian will find a "surer key to understanding" in the assumption that actions make sense and are not simply aimless. (Note that to act rationally does not mean to act successfully; it simply means to act with some self-consciousness about the connections among conditions, actions and goals.) How will we fulfill the task which the Scotts set--relating ideology to activity--

unless we start out with the assumption that there may be such a thing as ideology among the inarticulate? Take the letters J,J,A,S,O,N,D,J,F,M,A,M. If we start with the assumption that the series has no meaning, we will never find one; if, on the other hand, we start with the assumption that the letters may be connected in some meaningful pattern, then at least we leave open the psssibility of discovering that they are the initial letters of the months of the year. In other words, the only working assumption that will ever get us to the truth is the assumption that there may be a pattern. It seems to me that the fruitfulness of my working assumption of rationality is undeniable--unless it should be found that the inarticulate rarely or never perceive any connection between general social conditions and their own personal experience. Is this latter the Scotts' assumption? If so, what is their evidence? How will they know until a history of the inarticulate has in fact been written? The only way to write history is on the basis of what I have called an optimistic working assumption about the nature of man: this merely means that we do not assume irrationality a priori; we know that people can act terribly, but often they do not, and we test for the latter possibility. This certainly does not throw me into a mythic realm of brave workers and noble Negroes; as a matter of fact, I think of myself as a pretty hard-headed guy: this is what I meant when I said that "a love of mankind" may be "not simply a mystique but actually a sounder approach than the approach of moral complacency."

What are the results of the application of these assumptions? To begin with, once we get inside the mind of the inarticulate, we often find that there is more there than elitist historians have previously found. Bernard Bailyn, whom the Scotts cite as a "radical" historian," has dismissed the activities of colonial mobs before 1765 as"ideologically inert."[11] My own studies of the colonial seamen, and especially of their response to impressment, indicate a bloody and self-conscious struggle against injustice, a defense of life, liberty, and pro-

perty.[11] It all adds up to something like the "pre-political" or "sub-political" phenomena which Thompson and Hobsbawm describe, the kind of movements which the latter has urged that we seriously consider "not simply as an unconnected series of individual curiosities, as footnotes to history, but as a phenomenon of general importance and considerable weight in modern history."[12] The effect of the Scotts' endorsement of Bailyn's "radicalism" is to accept the description of much of human history as "ideologically inert" before we know that it was so.[13]

Similarly, might we not even speculate that a fuller history of slavery in America might uncover more, not less, in the way of resistance?[14] We need hardly contend that the peace movement is on the brink of seizing power today to note that a future historian who studies it from the top down--say, from the New York Times--will seriously underestimate its numbers and the diversity of its activities. Few see a proletarian revolution in America as imminent; but a historiography which deserts the study of the inarticulate is in danger of finding itself very rapidly dated, incapable of explaining acts whose antecedents it has ignored. Shall we write of Berkeley from Clark Kerr's or Lewis Feuer's papers? Shall we, to return to slavery, desert the testimony of slaves for that of masters? How will we know what accomodation is until we study resistance? Shall we suppose that the Slovak in the western suburbs of Chicago feels secure in his home because we observe that he has gone a year without stoning a Negro? "Accomomation" may be happy acceptance; it may be latent resistance. What a man does does not necessarily tell us how he feels about what he does. What most men do does not tell us what the society will not permit them to do; for that we must study the resistance. Has there been a revolution in America about which we have not yet heard? The approach which the Scotts recommend will never help us to find out about it. Perhaps, given the infantile state of historical studies of the inarticulate, it is a bit too early to surrender the field to accomodation.

The Scotts object to my rejection of the view that black riots constitute aimless violence; they suggest that it is the task of the radical historian to focus on

accomodation, on the social conditions which "inhibited the formation of a viable revolutionary organization." After all, they say, "The Harlem riots were characterized by a great deal of aimless violence. This is precisely what the historian must explain." Again, the point is simply this: how can a historiography which foreswears the study of the inarticulate decide just what constitutes aimless violence? Follow a Negro through the riot: he throws a rock, mutters, runs three blocks, stares, tries to burn a building, moves down the block, looks around, loots. How aimless is his conduct if we find that he threw a rock at the welfare office, ran harmlessly past three blocks of Negro businesses, burned a chain drug store, and looted a chain super market.[15] If we approach the pattern of destruction of contemporary riots with the optimistic assumption that it may mean something, we may find that riots are not aimless. If we assume that they are aimless and set out to explain their aimlessness we may find ourselves speculating in a factual vacuum and surrendering too soon. (In addition, it seems to me a false and blatantly elitist practice to define an activity as "aimless" because it did not succeed, as the Scotts seem to do when they note that the riots "did not satisfy the Negroes' grievances . . .little, if anything, changed. . .as a result." To say that burn, baby burn burns blacks is far from proving, as Eugene Genovese asserts, that burning amounts to "individual and essentially nihilistic thrashing about.")

In conclusion I renew my call for a love of mankind and reassert that love as the soundest basis for social science. Before we accept the idea that man is incapable of realizing democratic self-rule either because he cannot change or because he cannot change social conditions, let us undertake a fundamental re-examination of cold-war theories of the nature of man and the workings of government. Before we assert that man has in fact been ignoble and set out to explain it, let us ask him about it. Until we have gone beyond elitism and found out who man is, has been, and

might be, it is premature for debaters on the idea of proletarian mission to share on both sides a belief in the ludicrousness of the concept.[17] Just as it is grotesque to see equality as the mainstream of American history, it is equally grotesque (and somewhat Moynihanesque) to define the historian's "main problem"[18] as "to discover the reasons for . . .widespread accomodation"[18] before accomodation is in fact established. (Does the Scotts' failure to discover the inarticulate even once engaged in any activity which is not destructive, fruitless, or aimless add up to an implicit faith in the ignobility of man?) The results on man are not all in; they have hardly begun to come in. Meanwhile both humanity and science dictate sympathy with history's victims.

FOOTNOTES

1. A related historiographical tradition has seen such men as Jefferson as heroes of American radicalism while ignoring both his narrow interpretation of the phrase "all men are created equal" and the existence of a contemporary alternative in the thought and conduct of such men as Tom Paine and John Woolman. Present-day radicals have too often uncritically accepted what the Scotts might well call "a fictive. . .tradition" in which past liberals are identified as heroes, when they were in fact the enemies of our friends. For an examination of the prriod of the Americnn Revolution focusing on left alternatives available at the time, see my essay, "The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., New American History (New York: Pantheon Books, in press).

2. Conservative historians have also objected to terms

such as "liberal," "radical" and "conservative" on the same grounds--men cannot be so compartmentalized, etc.--and then have proceeded to compartmentalized them in implicit categories.

3. Marcuse's remarks (in a review in American Historical Review, LIV (April,1949), 558) were called to my attention by Norman Pollack of Wayne State University. In his The Populist Reseonse to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist Thought (Cambridge, 1962). pp. 32, 153, Pollack sees Clarence Darrow enunciating a similar standard.

4. Marcuse, American Historical Review, LIV, 558.

5. In this sense: an elite history which merely asks, what did the elite write? Can tell us truly that Jefferson wrote, "all men are created equal"; a critical elite history can suggest what Jefferson meant and did not mean when he wrote those words: a history from the bottom up tells us what is was like to live in a society in which "all men are created equal" was so defined. The last seems to be the most general and inclusive and probably the best approach to the question, how would you characterize the society?

6. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston, 1966),p.522.

7. Ibid.,

8. Ibid., p.523.

9. Compare the Junkie's knowledge of the workings of the courts with the actual statutes.

10. Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776 (Cambridge, 1965), p.582.

11. See the words of one seaman in an incident in which the impressing lieutenant died with a harpoon through his jugular: "I know who you are. You are the lieutenant of the man-of-war, come with a press-gang to deprive me of my liberty. You have no right to impress me. I have retreated from you as far as I can . . . .I and my companions are determined to stand upon our defense. Stand off." Charles Francis Adams,ed., The Works of John Adams (Boston, 1850-56), I, 318. For more on this incident and on impressment in general see my "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary A erica," William and Mary Quarterly (in press).

12. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1964), pp.55, 59, 78; E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, 1965), pp. 2, 7, 10.

13. For Bailyn's bypassing of Rude and his dependence on a more conservative source for his information on the English crowd see Bailyn, pp.581,583, 739,740; cf. George Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (New York, 1964), p.8, which sees in Bailyn's source echoes of Burke and Taine.

14. Those who have contended that Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York, 1943), overstated his case should note two of Aptheker's assertions which seem to me incontestable:". . .it is highly probable that all plots, and quite possibly even all actual outbreaks, that did occur, and that are, somewhere, on record, have not been recovered. And this subject is of such a nature that it appears almost certain that some, perhaps many, occurred and were never recorded." (p.161).

Professor George Rawick of Oakland University, who is engaged in a study of slavery using the WPA slave narratives cited in "Towards a Democratic History" sees more resistance in the "day-to-day, non-heroic, but potent ways in which the slaves built their community and prepared the way for their

own emancipation. He likens the resistance of the slave to the sabotage and underproduction of the modern American worker. George P. Rawick, "Toward a New History of Slavery in the U.S.," Speak Out, no.9 (January, 1967),pp.8-13. "The Negro," Rawick summarizes, "while certainly persecuted and oppressed was also an active participant in his own history. This is what comes out of the WPA papers"(letter to Jesse Lemisch, May 2, 1967).

15. See Rude, Crowd in History, for an analysis of pre-industrial crowds focusing on purposefulness, discipline and selectivity.

16. The Scotts quote Eugene D. Genovese, "The Legacy of Slavery and the Roots of Black Nationalism," Studies on the Left, VI (November-December 1966), p.8, where Genovese also makes his remarks about "thrashing about."

17. Oscar Berland, "Radical Chains: The Marxian concept of Proletarian Mission," ibid., VI (September-October 1966), 27-51; Ronald Aronson, "Reply," ibid., VI, 52-60.

18. Genovese, ibid., November-December,1966, p.4. Whether Genovese is right or wrong about slavery is not so much the point here as is the Scotts' desire to extend his view from a narrow application to slavery to a broader application to the many groups which I discussed in "Towards a Democratic History."

Jesse Lemisch

Articles on American Radical History, January-August, 1967

Anonymous, "The Cook Campaign," STUDIES ON THE LEFT, January-February

Michael Brook, "Annual Bibliography of Periodical Articles On American Labor History, 1965," LABOR HISTORY, Spring.

Paul Buhle, "Struggle for a Socialist USA: the 1890's," PROGRESSIVE LABOR, July-August.

Melvyn Dubofsky, "James H. Hawley and the Origins of the Haywood Case," PACIFIC NORTH WEST QUARTERLY, January.

William J. Gaboury, "From Statehouse to Bull Pen, Idaho Populism and the Coeur d'Alene Trouble of the 1890's," PACIFIC NORTH WEST QUARTERLY, January.

Gil Green, "Aptheker Campaign," POLITICAL AFFAIRS, January.

Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "Some Political Aspects of the Populist Movement in South Dakota," NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY, Winter.

John H.M. Laslett, "Socialism and the American Labor Movement: Some New Reflections," LABOR HISTORY, Spring.

Walter Linder, "Great Flint Sit-Down Strike of 1936-1937," PROGRESSIVE LABOR, February-March.

Walter Linder and Martin Stevens, "Lessons of Trade Union History: Dual Unionism," PROGRESSIVE LABOR, July-August.

Jacob C. Meyer, "Reflections of a Conscientious Objector in World War I," MENNONITE QUARTERLY REVIEW, January.

Thomas L. Pahl, "The G-String Conspiracy, Political Reprisal or Armed Revolt?" LABOR HISTORY, Winter.

Benjamin G. Rader, "The Montana Lumber Strike of 1917," PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW, May.

Robert C. Reinders, "T. Wharton Collens and the Christian Labor Union," LABOR HISTORY, Winter.

Alexander Saxton, "Caeser's Column: The Dialogue of Utopia and Catastrophe," AMERICAN QUARTERLY, Summer.

Ralph E. Shaffer, "Formation of the California Communist Labor Party," PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW, February.

Charles H. Sheldon, "Public Opinion and the High Courts: Communist Party Cases in Four Constitutional Systems," WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, June.

Art Shields, "What I Learned in the Struggles of the Northwest," POLITICAL AFFAIRS, April.

Buddy Stein and David Wellman, "The Scheer Campaign," STUDIES ON THE LEFT, January-February.

Robert Penn Warren, "Malcolm X: Mission and Meaning," YALE REVIEW, Winter.

Joel A. Watne, "Public Opinion Toward Non-Conformists and Aliens During 1917," NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY, Winter.

P.B.

A Paperback Approach to the American Radical Tradition, I

Where can one begin to study the American Radical Tradition? Investment in a hard-cover book will help, Sidney Lens, Radicalism in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966, $8.95). Staughton Lynd read the manuscript for this excellent survey of the ART. With Lens in hand, the paperback scene may be judiciously culled for gems of radical enlightenment.

Beginning with the colonial period, one can find a good summary stressing working class rebellious elements in Herbert Aptheker's The Colonial Era (New World, NW58, $1.85). More detailed and superb insights will be found in Vernon Lewis Parrington's The Colonial Mind, 1602-1800 (Harvest, HB4, $1.75). As one reads along, left-wing puritanism assumes more importance. This can be approached through William Haller's Rise of Puritanism (Torchbooks, TB22, $2.75), and his Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Tradition (Columbia, #47, $2.45). A little classic now available is Christopher Hill's The English Revolution (New World, LNW12, 95¢) which sheds much light on Diggers and Levellers, as does Eduard Bernstein's Cromwell and Communism, Socialism and Democracy in the English Revolution (Schocken, SB64, $1.95).

The radical who bridges England and America in this period is Roger Williams. His emphasis on the supremacy of conscience and personal challenge to state authority emphasized a vital part of the radical tradition. There is available on him Perry Miller's Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition (Atheneum, #6,$1.25). His contemporary William Penn, converted to non-violence, can also be studies in Catherine O. Peare's William Penn (Ann Arbor, AA120, $2.95). An anti-state revolt of this era can be examined in Robert Middlekauff's Bacon's Rebellion (Rand McNally, 6334,

75¢). A major "witch hunt" may be viewed in Marion Starkey's The Devil in Massachusetts (Dolphin, C308, $1.75).

The tribulations of radicals, and even some not-so-radicals, are set forth in Leonard W. Levy's Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History: Legacy of Suppression (Torchbooks, TB1109, $2.25); Helen H. Miller's The Case for Liberty (Chapel Hill, CHB2, $1.95); and Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan's The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution (Collier, 03528, $1.50). Three important radicals emerging at this time may be seen in Moses C. Tyler's Patrick Henry (Cornell, $2.25); John C. Miller's Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda (Stanford, SP28, $2.95); and Robert A. Rutland's George Mason, Reluctant Statesman (Virginia, $1.45).

Material on the Revolution itself is abundant. Among the most valuable to students of radicalism are two works by Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (Wisconsin,WI2,$1.65) and The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789 (Vintage, V527, $2.45). Revealing here too is Benjamin Quarles' The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, CHB3, $1.95). For a "you are there" with Vermont's guerilla warfare expert, read Ethan Allen's Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen (Citadel, AE1, $1.95).

Three major figures deserving study are: Carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (Compass C163, $2.95); Stuart G. Brown, Thomas Jefferson (Washington Square, W876, 60¢); and Philip S. Foner, ed., The Life and Major Writings of Thomas Paine (Citadel, C78, $2.45). The last mentioned especially deserves attention as Paine is the prototype of the international revolutionary. The background to three significant documents may be seen in Carl L. Becker's The Declaration of Independence (Vintage, V60, $1.45); the Constitution in

Carl Van Doren's The Great Rehearsal (Compass,C89, $1.75); and Robert A. Rutland's The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1701 (Collier; AS134, 95¢). The post-revolutionary "witch hunt," this time for sympathizers of Jefferson and the French Revolution, is well presented in James M. Smith's Freedom's Fetters: the Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Cornell, $2.95).

The nineteenth century witnessed great radical experimentation, some of which had been going on since colonial times. The best introduction to this is Alice F. Tyler's Freedom's Ferment: Phases of American Social History from the Revolution to the Outbreak of the Civil War (Torchbooks, TB1074, $2.75). Also useful for the earlier phase is Mark Holloway's Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America 1680-1880 (Dover, $1.75.) Efforts at communitarian living are vividly described by three contemporaries: Charles Nordhoff, Communistic Societies of the United States: From Personal Visit and Observation (Schocken, SB112, $2.45); John H. Noyes, History of American Socialisms (Dover, $2.75); and Lindsay Swift, Brook Farm: Its Members, Scholars, and Visitors (Citadel, AE4, $1.95).

This was also a century of treaty-breaking and genocide by the U.S. government where the American Indian was concerned. This people's "anti-colonial struggle" and "guerilla warfare" deserves attention and someday even justice. Perhaps the most readable account in paperback is by Paul Wellman, Death On the Prairie (Pyramid, R855, 50¢), and Death On the Plains (Pyramid, R865, 50¢). There is also a good study in Dale Van Every's Disinherited (Avon, 95¢), and Mari Sandoz's Cheyenne Autumn (Avon, N111, 95¢). Two leaders of stature are shown in Helen A. Howard and D.L. McGrath, War Chief Joseph (Bison, BB178, $1.65), and Mari Sandoz, Crazy Horse: The Strange Man of the Ogalalas (Bison, BB110, $1.65). For a "rank and file" view, read Thomas E. Marquis, Wooden Leg: A Warrior Who Fought Custer (Bison, BB126, $1.90). A white radical woman who stood up for the Indian, as white radicals should do today, has left a classic, Helen Hunt Jackson, Century of Dishonor: The Early Crusade for Indian Reform (Torchbooks, TB3063, $1.95). It will be remembered that the pioneer radicals Roger Williams and William Penn treated the Indians with honesty

and justice and were so treated by them.

Some of the political radicalism connected with the backers of Andrew Jackson is well presented in the unabridged version of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Age of Jackson (Little, Brown, LB18, $2.95). In part this lays a groundwork for understanding what was to be the great radical effort of the century: the destruction of slavery in America. To fully appreciate this, background is needed. It is beautifully provided in the following works of Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa (Little, Brown, LB28, $2.25), The African Slave Trade: Pre-Colonial History, 1450-1850 (Little, Brown, LB56, $2.45), and The African Past: Chronicles From Antiquity to Modern Times (Universal Library, $2.95). Especially useful for American involvement is Daniel P. Mannix and Malcolm Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade (Compass, C174, $1.85). For a necessary overview of the Negro in America see: Lerone Bennett, Jr., Before the Mayflower: A History of the Negro in America, 1619-1964 (Penguin, A856, $2.45), and Herbert Aptheker, ed., Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States, Volumes I and II (Citadel, C109, C160, $2.75 each).

Even before the century had begun, slaveholders were worried by the successful revolution in Haiti led by Toussaint L'Ouverture who became a black hero to later Abolitionists. A fine biography of him is Ralph Korngold's Citizen Toussaint (Hill & Wang, HD26, $2.25), while a penetrating analysis of the entire rebellion is C.L.R. James' Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (Vintage, V242, $1.95). Revolts in the United States are set forth in two works of Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New World, NW24, $2.25), and Nat Turner's Revolt: The Environment, The Event, The Effects (Humanities Press, $1.95). Conditions of slavery are examined and old myths demolished in Kenneth Stampp's The Peculiar Institution: (Vintage, V253, $1.95). The harassment of

radicals and plain decent people in the South is revealed in Clement Eaton's Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South (Torchbooks, TB1150, $2.95).

For an overview of the struggle from colonial times see Dwight L. Dumond's Antislavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America (Norton, N370,$2.25), and the more concise work of Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery: 1830-1860 (Torchbooks, TB3029, $2.25). The "Underground Railroad" aspect is well set forth in Henrietta Buckmaster's Let My People Go (Beacon, BP79, $1.95). Radical utterances of the time may be found in Louis Ruchames, The Abolitionists: A Collection of Their Writings (Capricorn,C101,$1.65), and Louis Filler, Wendell Phillips on Civil Rights and Freedom (Hill & Wang, AC79, $1.95).

Radical biographical portraits may be had in Fawn Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (Norton, N331,$2.45); Henry S. Commager, Theodore Parker: Yankee Crusader (Beacon, LR4, $1.75); W.E.B. DuBois, John Brown (New World, NW16, $2.25); Sarah Bradford, Harriet Tubman, The Moses of Her People (Citadel, AE7, $1.25); and Philip S. Foner, Frederick Douglass (Citadel, C161, $2.25). The great Negro leader has left a classic autobiography, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (Collier, BS74, $1.50).

It is well to recall that many of the best intellectuals of this period came into the radical camp. One can readily observe this by dipping into the following: Milton Meltzer, ed., Thoreau: People Principles, and Politics (Hill & Wang, AC64,$1.75); Alfred Kazin and Daniel Aaron, eds., Emerson: A Modern Anthology (Dell, LC116, 50¢); and George Hochfield, ed., Selected Writings of the American Transcendentalists (Signet, CQ345, 95¢).

For the role of radicals, black and white, in the Civil War, read: Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (Norton, N334, $1.75); and the Abolitionist classic, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment (Collier, AS344, 95¢). Freed slaves were aided by youthful Northern teachers in "freedom schools" to aid the war effort. This is described in Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Re-

construction (Vintage, V371, $1.95). Latter day "Tories" are also shown attempting to thwart history in Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: the Story of the Copperheads (Compass, C144, $1.65).

(Continued in the Next Issue.)

Dan MacGilvray

Minneapolis, Minn.

Sir:

The American traditional left did decline between 1920 and 1924, but the 1924 presidential election figures quoted by Mr. Aronow* cannot be used to make the point, since the Socialist Party did not run its own candidates, but was active in supprrting the LaFollette-Wheeler Progressive ticket, which won nearly five million votes. It would be very hard to determine how many of those votes were Socialist-inspired, but I am sure that they considerably outnumbered the .2 per cent which supported the Communist Foster-Gitlow ticket.

Michael Brook

*Victor Aronow, "Witchhunt, 1919," Radical America, April, 1967, p.21.

the defecit. Circulation with this issue on the first run is one thousand. We can reach many more people and greatly improve our format if money is available.

Finally, we can use any other assistance people are able to give. Articles sent to us will be fully discussed and quite possibly printed; promotion in cities, campuses and chapters will be greatly needed as circulation expands; and editorships are open to those (in the Madison area or elsewhere) who are willing to help carry the load.

***

CONTRIBUTORS

MARI JO BUHLE is a researcher at the Wisconsin State Historical Society; JESSE LEMISCH is a professor of history at the University of Chicago; DANIEL MacGILVRAY , formerly with the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, is now in library school at Rutgers; JAMES O'BRIEN and JOAN & DONALD SCOTT are graduate students in history at the University of Wisconsin; FRED THOMPSON is on the General Executive Board of the Industrial Workers of the World and is author of The I.W.W.: The First Fifty Years.

***

RADICAL AMERICA gives you MORE: see p.19 for a complete bibliography of perceptive liberal analyses of the New Left and hints on cribbage.

CONTENTS

Fred Thompson, THEY DIDN'T SUPPRESS THE WOBBLIES

James O'Brien, WOBBLIES AND DRAFTEES: THE I.W.W.'s WARTIME DILEMMA, 1917-1918

Mari Jo Buhle, AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN TRANSITION, 1946-1949: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

EXCHANGE:

Joan and Donald Scott, TOWARD HISTORY: A REPLY TO JESSE LEMISCH

Jesse Lemisch, NEW LEFT ELITISM: A REJOINDER TO THE SCOTTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Paul Buhle, SUMMARY LIST: ARTICLES IN AMERICAN RADICAL HISTORY, JANUARY-AUGUST, 1967

Dan MacGilvray, A PAPERBACK APPROACH TO THE AMERICAN RADICAL TRADITION, I