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# THE OBJECTIVIST

Edited by AYN RAND  
and NATHANIEL BRANDEN

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## SELF-ESTEEM AND ROMANTIC LOVE

By Nathaniel Branden

The two sources of greatest potential happiness for man are productive work and romantic (sexual) love.

Through the productive use of his mind, man gains control over his existence and experiences the pleasure and pride of efficacy. Through romantic love, man gains the ultimate emotional reward of his efficacy and worth—of his efficacy and worth not merely as a producer, but wider: as a person—the reward and celebration of himself and of what he has made of himself, i.e., of the kind of character and soul he has created.

The experience of romantic love answers a profound psychological need in man. But the nature of that need cannot be understood apart from an understanding of a wider need: man's need of human companionship—of human beings he can respect, admire and value as persons, and with whom he can interact intellectually and emotionally. What is the root of the desire for human companionship? Why is man motivated to find human beings he can value and love?

Virtually everyone regards the desire for companionship, friendship, love, as a self-evident primary—in effect, as an irreducible fact of human nature, requiring no explanation. Sometimes, a pseudo-explanation is offered, in terms of an alleged “gregarious instinct” which man is said to possess; but this illuminates nothing; explanation via instincts is merely a device to conceal ignorance. (See my article, “Does Man Possess Instincts?”, published as a pamphlet by NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE.) Psychologists, to date, have contributed nothing to our understanding of this subject.

Man's desire for human companionship may be explained *in part* by the fact that living and dealing with other men in a social context, trading goods and services, etc., affords man a manner of survival immeasurably superior to that which he could obtain alone on a desert island or on a self-sustaining farm. Man obviously finds it to his interest to deal with men whose values and character are like his own, rather than with men of inimical values and character. And, normally, man develops feelings of benevolence or affection toward men who share his values and who act in ways that are beneficial to his existence.

It should be apparent, however—from observation and by introspection—that practical, existential considerations such as these are not sufficient to account for the phenomenon in question; and that the desire for and experience of friendship and love reflect a distinct *psychological* need. Everyone is aware, introspectively, of the desire for companionship, for someone to talk to, to be with, to feel understood by, to share important experiences with—the desire for *emotional closeness* with another human being. What is the nature of the psychological need that generates this desire?



I shall begin by giving an account of two events that were crucial in leading me to the answer—because I believe this will help the reader to understand the issues which the problem involves.

One afternoon, while sitting alone in my room, I found myself contemplating with pleasure a large philodendron plant standing against a wall. It was a pleasure I had experienced before, but suddenly it occurred to me to ask myself: What is the nature of this pleasure? What is its cause?

The pleasure was not primarily esthetic: were I to learn that the plant was artificial, its esthetic characteristics would remain the same, but my response would change completely; the special pleasure I experienced would vanish. Essential to my enjoyment was the knowledge that the plant was healthily and glowingly *alive*. There was the feeling of a bond, almost of a kind of kinship, between the plant and me; in the midst of inanimate objects, we were united in the fact of possessing life. I thought of the motive of people who, in the most impoverished conditions, plant flowers in boxes on their window-sills—for the pleasure of watching something grow. What is the value to man of observing successful life?

Suppose, I thought, one were left on a dead planet where one had every material provision to ensure survival, but where nothing was alive; one would feel like a metaphysical alien. Then suppose one came upon a living plant; surely one would greet the sight with eagerness and pleasure. *Why?*

Because—I realized—all life, life by its very nature, entails a struggle, and struggle entails the possibility of defeat; and man desires, and finds pleasure in seeing, concrete instances of successful life, as confirmation of his knowledge that successful life is possible. It is, in effect, a *metaphysical* experience. He desires the sight, not as a means of allaying doubts or of reassuring himself, but as a means of experiencing and confirming on the perceptual level, the level of immediate reality, that which he knows conceptually.

If such is the value that a plant can offer to man, I wondered, then cannot the sight of another human being offer man a much more intense form of that experience? This is surely relevant to the psychological value that human beings find in one another.

The next crucial step in my thinking occurred on an afternoon when I sat on the floor playing with my dog—a wire-haired fox terrier named Muttник.

We were jabbing at and boxing with each other in mock ferociousness; what I found delightful and fascinating was the extent to which Muttник appeared to grasp the playfulness of my intention: she was snarling and snapping and striking back while being unfailingly gentle in a manner that projected total, fearless trust. The event was not unusual; it is one with which most dog-owners are familiar. But a question suddenly occurred to me, of a kind I had never asked myself before: Why am I having such an enjoyable time? What is the nature and source of my pleasure?

Part of my response, I recognized, was simply the pleasure of watching the healthy self-assertiveness of a living entity. But that was not the

essential factor causing my response. The essential factor pertained to the *interaction* between the dog and myself—the sense of interacting and communicating with a living *consciousness*.

Suppose I were to view Muttник as an automaton without consciousness or awareness, and to view her actions and responses as entirely mechanical; then my enjoyment would vanish. The factor of consciousness was of primary importance.

Then I thought: Suppose I were left on an uninhabited island; would not the presence of Muttник be of enormous value to me? Obviously it would. Because she could make a practical contribution to my physical survival? Obviously not. Then what value did she have to offer? Companionship. A conscious entity with whom to interact and communicate—as I was doing now. *But why is that a value?*

The answer to this question—I realized—would explain much more than the attachment to a pet; involved in this issue is the psychological principle that underlies man's desire for *human* companionship: the principle that would explain why a conscious entity seeks out and values other conscious entities, *why consciousness is a value to consciousness*.

When I identified the answer, I called it “the Muttник principle”—because of the circumstances under which it was discovered. Now let us consider the nature of this principle.

My feeling of pleasure in playing with Muttник contained a particular kind of self-awareness—and *this* was the key to understanding my reaction. The self-awareness came from the nature of the “feedback” Muttник was providing. From the moment that I began to “box,” she responded in a playful manner; she conveyed no sign of feeling threatened; she projected an attitude of trust and pleasurable excitement. Were I to push or jab at an inanimate object, it would react in a purely mechanical way; it would not be responding to *me*; there could be no possibility of it grasping the *meaning* of my actions, of apprehending my *intentions*, and of guiding its behavior accordingly. It could not react to my psychology, i.e., to my mental state. Such communication and response is possible only between conscious entities. The effect of Muttник's behavior was to make me feel *seen*, to make me feel *psychologically visible* (at least, to some extent). Muttник was responding to me, not as to a mechanical object, but as to a *person*.

What is significant and must be stressed is that Muttник was responding to me as a person in a way that I regarded as objectively *appropriate*, i.e., consonant with my view of myself and of what I was conveying to her. Had she responded with fear and an attitude of cowering, I would have experienced myself as being, in effect, *misperceived* by her, and would not have felt pleasure.

Now why does man value and find pleasure in the experience of self-awareness and psychological visibility that the appropriate response (or “feedback”) from another consciousness can evoke?

Consider the fact that normally man experiences himself as a *process*—



in that consciousness itself is a process, an activity, and the contents of man's mind are a shifting flow of perceptions, thoughts and emotions. His own mind is not an unmoving entity which man can contemplate objectively—i.e., contemplate as a direct object of awareness—as he contemplates objects in the external world.

He has, of course, a sense of himself, of his own identity, but it is experienced more as a feeling than a thought—a feeling which is very diffuse, which is interwoven with all his other feelings, and which is very hard, if not impossible, to isolate and consider by itself. His “self-concept” is not a single concept, but a cluster of images and abstract perspectives on his various (real or imagined) traits and characteristics, the sum total of which can never be held in focal awareness at any one time; that sum is *experienced*, but it is not *perceived* as such.

In the course of a man's life, his values, goals and ambitions are first conceived in his mind, i.e., they exist as data of consciousness, and then—to the extent that his life is successful—are translated into action and objective reality; they become part of the “out there,” of the world that he perceives. They achieve expression and reality in material form. This is the proper and necessary pattern of man's existence. Yet a man's most important creation and highest value—his character, his soul, his psychological self—can never follow this pattern in the literal sense, can never exist apart from his own consciousness; it can never be perceived by him as part of the “out there.” But man *desires* a form of objective self-awareness and, in fact, *needs* this experience.

Since man is the motor of his own actions, since his concept of himself, of the person he has created, plays a cardinal role in his motivation—he desires and needs the strongest possible experience of the reality and objectivity of that person, of his *self*.

When man stands before a mirror, he is able to perceive his own face as an object in reality, and he finds pleasure in doing so, in contemplating the physical entity who is himself. There is a value in being able to look and think: “That's me.” The value lies in the experience of objectivity.

Is there a mirror in which man can perceive his *psychological* self? In which he can perceive his own soul? Yes. The mirror is another consciousness.

Man is able, alone, to know himself conceptually. What another consciousness can offer is the opportunity for man to experience himself perceptually.

To a very small extent, that was the opportunity afforded me by Mutt-nik. In her response, I was able to see reflected an aspect of my own personality. But a human being can experience this self-awareness to a full and proper extent only in a relationship with a consciousness like his own, a consciousness possessing an equal range of awareness, i.e., another human being.

A man's intelligence, his psycho-epistemology, his basic premises and values, his “sense of life,” are all made manifest in his personality. “Per-

sonality” is the externally perceivable sum of all those psychological traits or characteristics which distinguish one man from another. A man's psychology is expressed through his behavior, through the things he says and does, and through the way he says and does them. It is in this sense that a man's self is an object of perception to others. When others react to a man, to their view of him and of his behavior, their reaction (which begins in their consciousness) is expressed through *their* behavior, through the things they say and do relative to him, and through the way they say and do them. If their view of him is consonant with his own, and is, accordingly, transmitted by their behavior, he feels perceived, he feels psychologically visible—and he experiences a sense of the objectivity of his self and of his psychological state; he perceives the reflection of himself in their behavior. It is in this sense that others can be a psychological mirror.

Just as there are many different aspects of a man's personality and inner life, so a man may feel visible in different respects in different human relationships. He may experience a greater or lesser degree of visibility, over a wider or narrower range of his total personality—depending on the nature of the person with whom he is dealing and on the nature of their interaction.

Sometimes, the aspect in which a man feels visible pertains to a basic character trait; sometimes, to the nature of his intention in performing some action; sometimes, to the reasons behind a particular emotional response; sometimes, to an issue involving his “sense of life”; sometimes, to a matter concerning his activity as a producer; sometimes, to his sexual psychology; sometimes, to his esthetic values.

All the forms of interaction and communication between people—intellectual, emotional, physical—can serve to give a man the perceptual evidence of his visibility in one respect or another; or, relative to a particular person, can give him the impression of invisibility. Most men are largely unaware of the process by which this occurs; they are aware only of the results. They are aware that, in the presence of a particular person, they do or do not feel “at home,” do or do not feel a sense of affinity or understanding or emotional attunement.

The mere fact of holding a conversation with another human being entails a marginal experience of visibility—if only the experience of being perceived as a conscious entity. However, in a close human relationship, with a person one deeply admires and cares for, one expects a far more profound visibility, involving highly individual and intimate aspects of one's inner life.

A significant mutuality of intellect, of basic premises and values, of fundamental attitude toward life, is the precondition of that projection of mutual visibility which is the essence of authentic friendship. A friend, said Aristotle, is another self. It was an apt formulation. A friend reacts to a man as, in effect, the man would react to himself in the person of another. Thus, the man perceives himself through his friend's reaction.



He perceives his own person through its consequences in the consciousness (and, as a result, in the behavior) of the perceiver.

This, then, is the root of man's desire for companionship and love: the desire to perceive himself as an entity in reality—to experience the perspective of objectivity—through and by means of the reactions and responses of another human being.

The principle involved ("the Muttник principle")—let us call it "the *Visibility* principle"—may be summarized as follows: Man desires and needs the experience of self-awareness that results from perceiving his self as an objective existent—and he is able to achieve this experience through interaction with the consciousness of other living entities.

In any given relationship, the extent to which a man achieves this experience depends, crucially, on two factors.

1. The extent of the mutuality of mind and values that exists between himself and the other person.

2. The extent to which his self-image corresponds to the actual facts of his psychology; i.e., the extent to which he knows himself and judges himself correctly; i.e., the extent to which his inner view of himself is consonant with the personality projected by his behavior.

1. Suppose, for example, that a self-confident man encounters a highly anxious and hostile neurotic; he sees that the neurotic reacts to him with unprovoked suspiciousness and antagonism; the image of himself reflected by the neurotic's attitude is, in effect, that of a brute advancing menacingly with a club; in such a case, the self-confident man would not feel visible; he would feel bewildered and mystified at being so grossly misperceived.

This is one of the most tragic and painful ways in which a psychologically healthy person, especially vulnerable when he is young, can be victimized by less healthy persons and given a bewilderingly irrational impression of the human realm. Not only are his virtues unrecognized and unappreciated, but worse: *he is penalized for them*. This is often one of the most vicious by-products of neurosis. The healthy person is made the innocent target for envy, resentment, antagonism—for responses from other people that bear no intelligible relationship to the qualities he exhibits—and he usually has no way to suspect that the animosity he encounters is a reaction, not to anything bad in him, but to the good.

2. Suppose a man is inclined to rationalize his own behavior and to support his pseudo-self-esteem by means of totally unrealistic pretensions. His self-deceiving image of the kind of person he is conflicts radically with the actual self conveyed by his actions. The consequence is that he feels chronically frustrated and chronically invisible in his human relationships—because the "feedback" he receives is not compatible with his pretensions.

Sometimes, in the case of interaction between two neurotics, a kind of pseudo-visibility can be mutually projected—in a situation where each participant supports the pretensions and self-deceptions of the other, in exchange for receiving such support himself. The "trade" occurs, of

course, on a subconscious level. This pattern often underlies neurotic love relationships.

The desire for visibility is usually experienced by men as the desire for understanding, i.e., the desire to be understood by other human beings. If a man is happy and proud of some achievement, he wants to feel that those who are close to him, those he cares for, understand his achievement and its personal meaning to him, understand and attach importance to the reasons behind his emotions. Or, if a man is given a book by a friend and told that this is the kind of book he will enjoy, the man feels pleasure and gratification if his friend's judgment proves correct—because he feels visible, he feels understood. Or, if a man suffers over some personal loss, it is of value to him to know that his plight is understood by those close to him, and that his emotional state has reality to them. It is not blind "acceptance" that a normal person desires, nor unconditional "love," but *understanding*.

The overwhelming majority of contemporary psychologists regard man, in effect, as a social metaphysician by nature who needs the approval of others in order to approve of himself. But it would be a gross error to confuse the motives of the social metaphysician, which are pathological, with a healthy man's desire for visibility.

A psychologically healthy man does not depend on others for his self-esteem; he expects others to *perceive* his value, not to *create* it. Unlike the social metaphysician, he does not desire approval indiscriminately or for its own sake; the admiration of others is of value and importance to him only if he respects the standards by which others judge him and only if the admiration is directed at qualities which he himself regards as admirable. If other men give authentic evidence of understanding and appreciating him, *they* go up in his estimation; his estimate of himself does not change. He desires the experience of living in a rational and just social environment, where the responses he elicits from other men are logically related to his own virtues and achievements. He knows the truth about his own character and actions, conceptually; he wants to experience it, perceptually, through and by means of its consequences in persons who share his values.

As for social metaphysicians, it is not *visibility* they seek from others, but *identity* (plus the kind of pseudo-visibility indicated above).

People who have an "act," people who assume different personalities in different encounters, sentence themselves to live with a devastating contradiction. As human beings, they cannot escape the need for visibility—but, as neurotic "role-players," they dread being understood, i.e., being perceived correctly. Often, they secretly despise those who are taken in by their act, and they long subconsciously for someone whom they will not be able to deceive. At the same time, they do everything possible to avoid the perceptive glance of the person for whom their act does not work. If a man wishes to be authentically visible to others, *he must be willing to be visible to himself*.

This last has important relevance to a more innocent kind of person



than the role-player. Consider the problem of the individual who—because of despair, or moral confusion, or self-doubt, or fear of being impractical and unrealistic—tends to repress his virtues and value-aspirations, and to submerge his own idealism. (I discussed this phenomenon in my article, “Emotions and Repression,” in the August-September 1966 issues of THE OBJECTIVIST.) Such a person does not feel visible to himself (he is *not* visible to himself)—and the protective shell of remoteness, resignation and unresponsiveness to life, under which his actual soul is hiding, makes him invisible to others. Until and unless he releases that soul—which means: until and unless he identifies his values, grants them the sanction of moral objectivity, and gives them appropriate, objective expression in action—he will inevitably experience a sense of frustration and impoverishment in his human relationships. The act of giving objective expression to his values does not guarantee that he will be visible to others, since that depends, in part, on *their* values; but the failure to give such objective expression does guarantee that he will be invisible.

The desire for visibility does not mean that a psychologically healthy man's basic preoccupation, in any human encounter, is with the question of whether or not he is properly appreciated. When a man of self-esteem meets a person for the first time, his primary concern is not, “What does he think of me?”—but rather, “What do I think of him?” His primary concern, necessarily, is with his own judgment and evaluation of the facts that confront him.

Entailed by man's desire to see his values objectified in reality is the desire to see his own values embodied in the person of others, to see human beings who face life as he faces it. That sight offers man a reaffirmation of his own view of existence.

In a relationship with a person he admires, a major source of pleasure to man is the process of communicating his estimate, making his admiration objective, projecting that the other person is visible to him. This is an important form of making his own self objective, of giving existential reality to his own values, of experiencing himself as an entity—through an act of self-assertiveness.

As was indicated above, a man can feel visible in different respects and to varying degrees in different human relationships. A relationship with a casual stranger does not afford man the degree of visibility he experiences with an acquaintance. A relationship with an acquaintance does not afford man the degree of visibility he experiences with an intimate friend.

But there is one relationship which is unique in the depth and comprehensiveness of the visibility it entails: romantic love.

(To be continued in our next issue.)

## AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO “THE MAN WHO LAUGHS”

By Ayn Rand

“In that darkness, they heard the doctor saying:

“‘Let us pray.’

“They knelt.

“It was no longer in the snow, it was in water that they were kneeling.

“They had only a few minutes left.

“The doctor alone remained standing. The falling snowflakes spangled him with white tears, making him visible against the darkness, as if he were the speaking statue of the shadows.

“The doctor made the sign of the cross, and raised his voice while he felt, under his feet, the beginning of that almost imperceptible oscillation which announces the instant when a wreck is to plunge. He said:

“‘Pater noster qui es in coelis.’

“The Provençal repeated in French:

“‘Our Father who art in heaven.’ . . .

“‘Sicut in coelo, et in terra,’ said the doctor.

“No voice answered him.

“He looked down. All the heads were under water. No one had risen. They had let themselves be drowned on their knees.

“The doctor took the flask in his right hand and raised it above his head.

“The wreck was sinking.

“While going down, the doctor was whispering the rest of the prayer.

“His chest was above water for a moment, then his head, then there was only his arm holding the flask, as if he were showing it to the Infinite.

“That arm disappeared. The deep sea closed smoothly, without a wrinkle, like a tun of oil. The snow was still falling.

“Something remained afloat, and went off with the current into the darkness. It was the tarred flask, supported by its cover.”

I have never envied other writers; but in all literature, this is the one scene I wish I had written.

To appreciate the full meaning of that scene, one has to read the rest of *The Man Who Laughs* and discover the nature, as well as the enormous consequences, of the message in that flask.

*The Man Who Laughs* is Victor Hugo's best novel. (Curiously enough, it was the one least understood by his contemporaries.) It is not a work of

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This is an Introductory Note written for the NBI PRESS edition of Victor Hugo's *The Man Who Laughs*. Available from NBI BOOK SERVICE, Empire State Bldg., 350 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10001. Price: \$5.00. (N.Y. State residents add sales tax; outside the U.S. add 15¢.)



historical fiction, as its background of eighteenth-century England suggests, but a symbolic fantasy—an abstraction enacted on a profound metaphysical level. It is a work in which Hugo's imagination, freed of lesser concerns, creates a universe built in his own image and likeness. It is a dramatization of his view of man's existence—presented in the form and the violent action of a suspense story.

This was not Hugo's conscious intention. His brief preface indicates that he regarded this novel as a social-political study. "The real title of this book," he writes, "should be *The Aristocracy*." But the conflict between his conscious ideas and his sense of life, between the thinker and the artist, runs through all his novels and reaches its peak of intensity in this one. Here, his sense of life is the dominant element that overwhelms the rest.

This novel reveals Hugo's incomparable literary genius, as well as his flaws. Like its hero's disfigured face, the novel is torn between a somber, tragic, profoundly Christian philosophy—and a radiant sense of life proclaiming, almost involuntarily, a passionate love for this earth. No matter how strongly one may be antagonized and exasperated by the philosophy, all such reactions seem irrelevant, they are swept away by the sheer drama of the story, and one feels stunned, awestruck by a single thought: What an imagination!

Gwynplaine, the hero, is obviously a metaphysical (*not* literal) image of Hugo himself—a lonely outcast whose soul is invisible to men, bewildered by the world and cut off from it by a hideously distorted mask. Ursus is Hugo's bitter, yet wistful personification of human wisdom, i.e., of man's mind (which he saw as a noble, but ultimately impotent faculty). Dea and Josiana are Hugo's symbols of the dichotomy of sacred and profane love (and if color, brilliance, intensity and irresistible persuasiveness are indications of a writer's deeper values, it is interesting to observe which side of that dichotomy represents Hugo's actual, if unadmitted, choice).

The story of *The Man Who Laughs* is the most dramatic, ingenious and tightly integrated of Hugo's plot-structures. Regrettably, it is somewhat overburdened with the lengthy historical essays which he included in all his novels. (I cannot resist saying, as a tribute to his plots, that the inclusion of these essays produces the effect of a television drama interrupted by too many commercials.) It is as if the author were attempting to anchor his story to concrete, "journalistic" reality, where it does not belong, by means of an overabundance of historical details—an unnecessary concession to naturalism, which demands patience from the reader.

It is regrettable, also, that there are no modern translations of *The Man Who Laughs*. This present volume is a reprint of the best of the old translations available, which does not do full justice to the beauty of the original's style.

That the novel's power transcends these handicaps is a measure of its greatness.

## LETTER FROM NATHANIEL BRANDEN

Readers have been inquiring about the debate between Nathaniel Branden and Albert Ellis which took place on May 26, 1967, and whether a tape recording of it will be available for purchase. No tape recording will be available, for the reasons stated in the following letter from Nathaniel Branden to Albert Ellis.

—The Editors

August 30, 1967

Dr. Albert Ellis  
45 East 65th Street  
New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Albert:

When you invited me to debate "Rational-Emotive Psychotherapy vs. Objectivist Psychology," I was reluctant to accept. I have always been skeptical of the value of debates, particularly when the basic premises of the participants are as far apart as yours and mine. However, I knew that many people do not understand the fundamentality and magnitude of the opposition between our psychological systems, and that a number of your followers, mistakenly believing that some sort of intellectual rapprochement was possible, were eager for a confrontation between us; so I decided to accept your invitation, in order to set the record straight once and for all.

I am very sorry that your behavior, at the debate, caused me to regret my decision.

Contrary to our stated understanding and written agreement, your presentation was *not* a discussion of "Rational-Emotive Psychotherapy vs. Objectivist Psychology." It was merely an attack on Objectivist Psychology—or, more precisely, on what you claim to be Objectivist Psychology. I would never have consented to a debate on the subject of "Objectivist Psychology—Pro and Con," with the defensiveness on my part that that would imply. Yet, by violating our agreement, you, in effect, tricked me into participating in such a debate.

Many members of the audience, who were curious to learn about your psychological theories, complained that they had failed to do so, that they had not heard the discussion promised them in the announcements; justifiably, they felt somewhat defrauded.

Further, we had discussed in advance and had agreed in writing that the debate was to be a serious intellectual discourse, concerned solely with our respective *ideas*, and that no form of personal invective was to be permitted. You knew that I would not consent to appear on any other terms. You breached this agreement in at least two respects.

First, you evidently believed that if you quoted from Objectivist writings in a sufficiently sarcastic and sneering manner, that would



constitute an acceptable substitute for intellectual argumentation—and you conducted the debate on that premise, thus robbing the occasion of any quality of scientific seriousness.

Second, you launched into a vitriolic, irrelevant and gratuitous attack on the unbelievability (to you) of Ayn Rand's fictional heroes—thus causing Miss Rand, who was my guest that evening, to be insulted in a context where she had no means to protest or answer you. Your comments had nothing whatever to do with my psychological theories, they were incoherent and devoid of intellectual content, and appeared to be motivated by some sudden explosion of personal hostility.

There is still another area in which you violated our agreement. You went out of your way, in advance of the debate, to stress that you did not want to discuss politics or economics. I, of course, agreed with this, since these subjects were entirely irrelevant to the occasion. However, during the debate, you felt impelled to make a number of snide comments about capitalism and the American businessman, which did not bear on our discussion in any way whatever and which, again, appeared to have been motivated by some sort of incomprehensible personal hostility.

As you know, our written agreement states that neither of us can release tape recordings of the debate for general distribution without the consent of the other. For the reasons given above, I cannot give my consent. I cannot give your performance the sanction that such consent would imply.

I will be glad to provide you with a copy of the recording for your own personal use, as agreed on, if you will assure me that that tape will not be played for anyone else, neither for your patients nor students nor colleagues. If you decline to give me such a letter, I will provide you with a tape recording of your part of the debate, but not mine.

As I understand it, the two things about my views that disturbed you the most are my conviction of the efficacy of man's reason, and my conviction of the propriety—and necessity—of passing moral judgments. You seemed especially appalled by my unqualified moral condemnation of Adolf Hitler. Perhaps you will remember angrily remarking, in one of your rebuttals, that were it not for people's "anti-humanistic attitudes," Hitler might have been salvaged psychologically. You remarked after the debate that you were glad to have the proof on public record that I was a "bigot"—my "bigotry" consisting, in your view, of my conviction that Hitler was an unqualifiedly contemptible human being. Since I do not want to deprive you of this piece of evidence against me, I am repeating it here, so that you will have it in writing.

Sincerely,  
Nathaniel Branden

## LETTER FROM A READER

Molly Bartholomew, NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE's Business Representative in Houston, sent us the following report, with the suggestion that we reprint it for the benefit of those readers who ask us "What can I do to help the spread of Objectivism?" We are pleased to comply. Observe Mrs. Bartholomew's intellectual initiative and the ingenuity of her approach; this is the kind of effort we are happy to endorse.

—The Editors

December 15, 1967

When a local Republican Women's Club asked me to give a speech on "any current National problem," I accepted their invitation and told the Program Chairman that the best source of material I had found on "current National problems" was a new book entitled, *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* by Ayn Rand, and that instead of a speech, I would like to give a review of the book.

I prefaced my book review, that night, by saying that I had been asked to speak to them on "a current National problem," and that this was indeed what I intended to do; however, this time, they would hear not only about "the problem," but also about the cause and the only possible solution. Then I passed out paper and pencils and asked them to write their definition of the word "Capitalism" and hold their answers until the end of the book review. (During the review, I kept noticing the ladies, one by one, folding the sheets of paper and putting them very carefully out of sight. Some of them showed me their answers later; others, I think, were too embarrassed.)

To stress further the necessity of their reading the book, I prepared and mimeographed a list of questions on Capitalism, which were not answered during the review, with the heading, "How Much Do You Really Know About Capitalism?" I assured the audience that they could find the correct answers to all these questions in Miss Rand's book. In addition, I took along some NBI BOOK SERVICE brochures, so that they could order the book.

The results have been overwhelming. To date, I have received twenty-three requests to give the review for various organizations, and the possibility of my giving the review for a local television program is now under discussion. Most of the requests came as a result of publicity in the newspaper which appeared before I gave the first review, but many people who attended that first night passed the word along to other organizations, and now the Houston Speakers Bureau has placed me on their list, with this book review as my topic; that list is sent to all clubs and organizations in the area.

If you are interested in giving a review of the book in your area and don't know where to begin, I suggest you call the Program



Chairmen of civic clubs and service organizations, and the local headquarters of the Republican and Democratic Parties, and tell them you are available to give the book review. Most Program Chairmen are pleased to have a new program to present to their groups.

Molly Bartholomew

## LETTER FROM OUR ATTORNEY

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An ugly by-product of the growing spread of Objectivism, is the increasing number of attempts to "cash in" on Objectivism's popularity.

One such attempt was made recently at the University of Houston, in the form of a so-called "Free University" course purporting to teach the philosophy of Ayn Rand.

As a warning to our readers and to all those who are authentically interested in acquiring some knowledge of Objectivism, we reprint the following letter, which is self-explanatory.

In addition and for the record, we must repeat the warning we gave our readers in the April 1965 issue of THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER: "Should we ever wish to endorse (fully or in part) any group, publication or activity, you will read the endorsement in this [magazine]. If you do not read it here, we have given no endorsement."

—The Editors

October 19, 1967

Royce D. Williams, Editor  
The Daily Cougar  
University of Houston  
Cullen Boulevard  
Houston, Texas  
Dear Sir:

I represent Ayn Rand in matters involving the protection of her name, reputation and intellectual property.

One such matter is raised by reports which have reached us via your paper, and from other sources, that a course allegedly presenting "Objectivism and the Philosophy of Ayn Rand" is being offered by an "Experimental College" on the campus of the University of Houston.

Please be advised that neither Ayn Rand nor her associate, Nathaniel Branden (whom I also represent), has any knowledge of or connection with any such project, that they repudiate and unequivocally disapprove of the aforementioned course and those connected with it, and that no one connected with it is a philosophical or other spokesman for or representative of them or Objectivism.

Information reaching us indicates that the promoters of this course are not qualified to teach Objectivism as, for instance, evidenced by the fact that one of them has admitted that he has never read any of Miss Rand's works.

The promoters of this course seem to be creating the impression that they are teaching Miss Rand's philosophy with her approval, and are apparently recruiting students on that basis, thus using the prestige of Miss Rand's name for their own dubious purposes. Such misrepresentation comes dangerously close to becoming a fraud on Miss Rand's public.

I am certain that you would not want to contribute to such an attempt and that you will correct that false impression by publishing this letter.

Yours truly,  
Henry Mark Holzer

## FROM THE "HORROR FILE"

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### Epistemology

"His condemnation of reason as a guide is original and explicit: 'Can reason be anything but lazy? Laziness is of its very essence, as is cowardice. Open any manual of philosophy and you will soon be convinced that reason even boasts of its submissiveness, its humility, its cowardice. Reason must "servilely" reproduce what is "given" to it, and reproaches as the greatest of crimes every attempt at free creation.' " From a review of *Athens and Jerusalem* by Lev Shestov, in *The San Antonio Light*, January 1, 1967.

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"That "advance," that "adaptation to reality" which consists in the child's learning to distinguish between the wish and the deed, between external facts and his feelings about them has to be undone, or overcome."

"Mankind, or at least Western civilization, is sick with the sickness of rationalism and cold objectivation, and must find its way back to the netherworld of its pre-conscious nature. . . .

"It is not schizophrenia but normality that is split-minded; in schizophrenia the false boundaries are integrating . . . Schizophrenics are suffering from the truth." From a review of *Love's Body* by Norman O. Brown, in *The Montreal Star*, September 17, 1966.

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"Some of his [Marshall McLuhan's] insights are so original that they evade immediate understanding; other paragraphs may forever evade explication. 'Most clear writing is a sign that there is no exploration going on,' he rationalizes. 'Clear prose indicates the absence of thought.' " *The New York Times Magazine*, January 29, 1967.



## OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Phillip J. Smith, who will direct the NBI THEATER production of *The Fountainhead*, is currently conducting acting classes in Los Angeles. Mr. Smith has asked us to announce that he plans to add another section to his acting classes; the first section, presently in session, is filled. Those interested should contact Mr. Smith at 1560 N. Laurel Ave., Los Angeles, Calif. 90046; phone: (213) 656-6461.

■ "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" by Leonard Peikoff, (originally published in five parts in the May-September 1967 issues of THE OBJECTIVIST) has been reprinted in pamphlet form. Price: 75¢. (N.Y. State residents add sales tax.)

■ "The Constitution and the Draft" by Henry Mark Holzer and Phyllis Holzer, (originally published in two parts in the October-November 1967 issues of THE OBJECTIVIST) has been reprinted in pamphlet form. Price: 50¢. (N.Y. State residents add sales tax.)

■ NBI's Tape Transcription Division has scheduled the following courses: "Basic Principles of Objectivism" in Lexington, Feb. 18; Colorado Springs, Feb. 23—"Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology" in Providence, R.I., Jan. 26; San Jose, Feb. 18—"Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" in Houston, Feb. 18. For further information, contact NBI.


■ *Reminder:* On Monday, February 12, Ayn Rand will deliver Lecture #17—"The Esthetics of Literature"—in the current NBI course on "Basic Principles of Objectivism" in New York City. Time: 7:30 P.M. Place: NBI Auditorium, Empire State Bldg. Visitor's admission: \$3.75.

On Tuesday, February 13, Nathaniel Branden's course on "Basic Principles of Objectivism" will begin in New York City. Time: 7:30 P.M. Place: Hotel New Yorker, 34th St. at Eighth Ave. Visitor's admission: \$3.75. (College and high school students: \$3.) Ayn Rand will participate in the question period which follows the lecture. For further details, contact NBI.

—B.B.

# ATLAS SHRUGGED

## SPECIAL TENTH ANNIVERSARY EDITION



October 10, 1967, is the tenth anniversary of the publication of Ayn Rand's *ATLAS SHRUGGED*. NBI Book Service is pleased to announce that, in honor of this event, Random House has issued a special deluxe tenth anniversary edition of *ATLAS SHRUGGED*, which is limited to 2,000 numbered copies autographed by Ayn Rand.

The book has a new binding of fine-quality buckram with gold stampings, an acetate cover, and an attractive slip case.

This unique collector's item is available only through NBI Book Service. Price: \$10.00.

**TO ORDER BY MAIL:** Send your name and address, a list of the items you are purchasing and your check or money order for the full amount to **NBI BOOK SERVICE, Empire State Bldg., New York, N.Y. 10001**. All material is shipped postpaid by fourth class mail. Remittance must accompany all orders. Make check or money order payable to NBI Book Service, Inc. (New York State residents add sales tax; Canadian residents add 8% foreign exchange.)