

50¢

THE OBJECTIVIST

Edited by AYN RAND
and NATHANIEL BRANDEN

REQUIEM FOR MAN (Part II) by Ayn Rand	1
THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DICHOTOMY (Part IV) by Leonard Peikoff	7
FROM THE "HORROR FILE"	12
OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR	15

VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 8

AUGUST 1967

THE
OBJECTIVIST

Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10001

114 12 IC 125 December

Gail Stoneman
322 Fifth St. SW
Chisholm, Minn. 55719

Second-class
postage paid at
New York, N.Y.

THE OBJECTIVIST

Formerly THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER

Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden
Editors and Publishers

Barbara Branden
Managing Editor

Elayne Kalberman
Subscription Manager

Wilfred Schwartz
Business Manager

Published monthly by THE OBJECTIVIST, Inc., at the Empire State Building, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10001.

Subscription rate in United States, its possessions, Canada and Mexico: one year, \$5; 2 years, \$9; 3 years, \$13. Other countries: one year, \$6; 2 years, \$11; 3 years, \$16.

Additional copies of this Magazine: single copy 50¢ (coins, not stamps); 10-99 copies, 25¢ each plus postage (for first-class delivery add 2¢ per copy, for third-class delivery add ½¢ per copy). (Bulk rates apply only to multiple orders of a single issue.)

Subscription Service: Include complete address and zip code no., and the code line on your address imprint, in all communications with this office regarding subscriptions.

For change of address, we require old address and zip code no. as well as new address and zip code no. Allow us four weeks to process new subscriptions or change of address.

Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

Printed in U.S.A.

Copyright © 1967 by THE OBJECTIVIST, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission prohibited.

REQUIEM FOR MAN

By Ayn Rand

(Part II of a three-part article dealing with the encyclical "Populorum Progressio")

The dominant chord of the encyclical's sense of life is hatred for man's *mind*—hence hatred for man—hence hatred for life and for this earth—hence hatred for man's enjoyment of his life on earth—and hence, as a last and least consequence, hatred for the only social system that makes all these values possible in practice: capitalism.

I could maintain this on the grounds of a single example. Consider the proposal to condemn Americans to a lifetime of unrewarded drudgery at forced labor, making them work as hard as they do or harder, with nothing to gain but the barest subsistence—while savages collect the products of their effort. When you hear a proposal of this sort, what image leaps into your mind? What *I* see is the young people who start out in life with self-confident eagerness, who work their way through school, their eyes fixed on their future with a joyous, uncomplaining dedication—and what meaning a new coat, a new rug, an old car bought second-hand, or a ticket to the movies has in their lives, as the fuel of their courage. Anyone who evades that image while he plans to dispose of "the fruit of the labors of people" and declares that human effort is not a sufficient reason for a man to keep his own product—may claim any motive but love of humanity.

I could rest my case on this alone, but I shan't. The encyclical offers more than a sense of life: it contains specific, conscious, philosophical corroboration.

Observe that it is not aimed at destroying man's mind, but at a slower, more agonizing equivalent: at enslaving it.

The key to understanding the encyclical's social theories is contained in a statement of John Galt: "I am the man whose existence your blank-outs were intended to permit you to ignore. I am the man whom you did not want either to live or to die. You did not want me to live, because you were afraid of knowing that I carried the responsibility you dropped and that your lives depended upon me; you did not want me to die, because you knew it." (*Atlas Shrugged*.)

The encyclical neither denies nor acknowledges the existence of human intelligence: it merely treats it as an inconsequential human attribute requiring no consideration. The main, and virtually only, reference to the role of intelligence in man's existence reads as follows: "The introduction of industry is a necessity for economic growth and human progress; it is also a sign of development and contributes to it. By persistent work and use of his intelligence, man gradually wrests nature's secrets from her and

AUGUST 1967

1

finds a better application for her riches. As his self-mastery increases, he develops a taste for research and discovery, an ability to take a calculated risk, boldness in enterprises, generosity in what he does and a sense of responsibility." (25.)

Observe that the creative power of man's mind (of his basic means of survival, of the faculty that distinguishes him from animals) is described as an acquired "*taste*"—like a taste for olives or for ladies' fashions. Observe that even this paltry acknowledgement is not allowed to stand by itself: lest "research and discovery" be taken as a value, they are enmeshed in such irrelevancies as "generosity."

The same pattern is repeated in discussing the subject of *work*. The encyclical warns that "it [work] can sometimes be given exaggerated significance," but admits that work is a creative process, then adds that "when work is done in common, when hope, hardship, ambition and joy are shared . . . men find themselves to be brothers." (27.) And then: "Work, of course, can have contrary effects, for it promises money, pleasure and power, invites some to selfishness, others to revolt . . ." (28.)

This means that *pleasure* (the kind of pleasure which is earned by productive work) is evil—*power* (economic power, the kind earned by productive work) is evil—and *money* (the thing which the entire encyclical begs for passionately) is evil if kept in the hands of those who earned it.

Do you see John Galt doing work "in common," sharing "hope, hardship, ambition and joy" with James Taggart, Wesley Mouch and Dr. Floyd Ferris? But these are only fiction characters, you say? Okay. Do you see Pasteur? Do you see Columbus? Do you see Galileo—and what happened to him when he tried to share his "hope, hardship, ambition and joy" with the Catholic Church?

No, the encyclical does not deny the existence of men of genius; if it did, it would not have to plead so hard for global *sharing*. If all men were interchangeable, if degrees of ability were of no consequence, everyone would produce the same amount and there would be no benefits for anyone to derive from sharing. The encyclical assumes that the unnamed, unrecognized, unacknowledged fountainheads of wealth would somehow continue to function—and proceeds to set up conditions of existence which would make their functioning impossible.

Remember that intelligence is not an exclusive monopoly of genius; it is an attribute of all men, and the differences are only a matter of degree. If conditions of existence are destructive to genius, they are destructive to every man, each in proportion to his intelligence. If genius is penalized, so is the faculty of intelligence in every other man. There is only this difference: the average man does not possess the genius's power of self-confident resistance, and will break much faster; he will give up his mind, in hopeless bewilderment, under the first touch of pressure.

There is no place for the mind in the world proposed by the encyclical, and no place for man. The entities populating it are insentient robots geared to perform prescribed tasks in a gigantic tribal machine, robots

deprived of choice, judgment, values, convictions and self-esteem—above all, of self-esteem.

"You are not making a gift of your possessions to the poor person. You are handing over to him what is his." (23.) Does the wealth created by Thomas A. Edison belong to the bushmen who did not create it? Does the paycheck you earned this week belong to the hippies next door who did not earn it? A man would not accept that notion; a robot would. A man would take pride in his achievement; it is the pride of achievement that has to be burned out of the robots of the future.

"For what has been given in common for the use of all, you have arrogated to yourself." (23.) "God intended the earth and all that it contains for the use of every human being and people." (22.) *You* are one of the things that the earth contains; are you, therefore, intended "for the use of every human being and people"? The encyclical's answer is apparently "Yes"—since the world it proposes is based on that premise in every essential respect.

A man would not accept that premise. A man, such as John Galt, would say: "You have never discovered the industrial age—and you cling to the morality of the barbarian eras when a miserable form of human subsistence was produced by the muscular labor of slaves. Every mystic had always longed for slaves, to protect him from the material reality he dreaded. But *you*, you grotesque little atavists, stare blindly at the skyscrapers and smokestacks around you and dream of enslaving the material providers who are scientists, inventors, industrialists. When you clamor for public ownership of the means of production, you are clamoring for public ownership of the mind." (*Atlas Shrugged*.)

But a robot would not say it. A robot would be programmed not to question the source of wealth—and would never discover that the source of wealth is man's mind.

On hearing such notions as "The whole of creation is for man" (22) and "The world is given to all" (23), a man would grasp that these are equivocations which evade the question of what is necessary to *make use* of natural resources. He would know that nothing is *given* to him, that the transformation of raw materials into human goods requires a process of thought and labor, which some men will perform and others will not—and that, *in justice*, no man can have a primary *right* to the goods created by the thought and labor of others. A robot would not protest; it would see no difference between itself and raw materials; it would take its own motions as the *given*.

A man who loves his work and knows what enormous virtue—what discipline of thought, of energy, of purpose, of devotion—it requires, would rebel at the prospect of letting it serve those who scorn it. And scorn for material production is splattered all over the encyclical. "Less well off peoples can never be sufficiently on their guard against this temptation, which comes to them from wealthy nations." This temptation is "a way of acting that is principally aimed at the conquest of material

prosperity." (41.) Advocating a "dialogue" between different civilizations for the purpose of founding "world solidarity," the encyclical stresses that it must be: "A dialogue based on man and not on commodities or technical skills . . ." (73.) Which means that technical skills are a negligible characteristic, that no virtue was needed to acquire them, that the ability to produce commodities deserves no acknowledgement and is not part of the concept "man."

Thus, while the entire encyclical is a plea for the *products* of industrial wealth, it is scornfully indifferent to their source; it asserts a right to the effects, but ignores the cause; it purports to speak on a lofty moral plane, but leaves the *process* of material production outside the realm of morality—as if that process were an activity of a low order that neither involved nor required any moral principles.

I quote from *Atlas Shrugged*: "An industrialist—blank-out—there is no such person. A factory is a 'natural resource,' like a tree, a rock or a mud puddle. . . . Who solved the problem of production? Humanity, they answer. What was the solution? The goods are here. How did they get here? Somehow. What caused it? Nothing has causes." (The last sentence is inapplicable; the encyclical's answer would be: "Providence.")

The process of production is directed by man's mind. Man's mind is not an indeterminate faculty; it requires certain conditions in order to function—and the cardinal one among them is *freedom*. The encyclical is singularly, eloquently devoid of any consideration of the mind's requirements, as if it expected human thought to keep on gushing forth anywhere, under any conditions, from under any pressures—or as if it intended that *gusher to stop*.

If concern for human poverty and suffering were one's primary motive, one would seek to discover their cause. One would not fail to ask: Why did some nations develop, while others did not? Why have some nations achieved material abundance, while others have remained stagnant in sub-human misery? History and, specifically, the unprecedented prosperity-explosion of the nineteenth century, would give an immediate answer: capitalism is the only system that enables men to produce abundance—and the key to capitalism is individual freedom.

It is obvious that a political system affects a society's economics, by protecting or impeding men's productive activities. But *this* is what the encyclical will neither admit nor permit. The relationship of politics and economics is the thing it most emphatically ignores or evades and denies. It declares that no such relationship exists.

In projecting its world of the future, where the civilized countries are to assume the burden of helping and developing the uncivilized ones, the encyclical states: "And the receiving countries could demand that there be no interference in their political life or subversion of their social structures. As sovereign states they have the right to conduct their own affairs, to decide on their policies and to move freely toward the kind of

society they choose." (54.)

What if the kind of society they choose makes production, development and progress impossible? What if it practices communism, like Soviet Russia?—or exterminates minorities, like Nazi Germany?—or establishes a religious caste system, like India?—or clings to a nomadic, anti-industrial form of existence, like the Arab countries?—or simply consists of tribal gangs ruled by brute force, like some of the new countries of Africa? The encyclical's tacit answer is that these are the prerogatives of sovereign states—that we must respect different "cultures"—and that the civilized nations of the world must make up for these deficits, *somehow*.

Some of the answer is not tacit. "Given the increasing needs of the underdeveloped countries, it should be considered quite normal for an advanced country to devote a part of its production to meet their needs, and to train teachers, engineers, technicians and scholars prepared to put their knowledge and their skill at the disposal of less fortunate peoples." (48.)

The encyclical gives severely explicit instructions to such emissaries. "They ought not to conduct themselves in a lordly fashion, but as helpers and co-workers. A people quickly perceives whether those who come to help them do so with or without affection . . . Their message is in danger of being rejected if it is not presented in the context of brotherly love." (71.) They should be free of "all nationalistic pride"; they should "realize that their competence does not confer on them a superiority in every field." They should realize that theirs "is not the only civilization, nor does it enjoy a monopoly of valuable elements." They should "be intent on discovering, along with its history, the component elements of the cultural riches of the country receiving them. Mutual understanding will be established which will enrich both cultures." (72.)

This is said to civilized men who are to venture into countries where sacred cows are fed, while children are left to starve—where female infants are killed or abandoned by the roadside—where men go blind, medical help being forbidden by their religion—where women are mutilated, to insure their fidelity—where unspeakable tortures are ceremonially inflicted on prisoners — where cannibalism is practiced. Are these the "cultural riches" which a Western man is to greet with "brotherly love"? Are these the "valuable elements" which he is to admire and adopt? Are these the "fields" in which he is not to regard himself as superior? And when he discovers entire populations rotting alive in such conditions, is he not to acknowledge, with a burning stab of pride—of pride and gratitude—the achievements of *his* nation and *his* culture, of the men who created them and left him a nobler heritage to carry forward?

The encyclical's implicit answer is "No." He is not to judge, not to question, not to condemn—only to love; to love without cause, indiscriminately, unconditionally, in violation of any values, standards or convictions of his own.

(The only valuable assistance that Western men could, in fact, offer to undeveloped countries is to enlighten them on the nature of capitalism

and help them to establish it. But this would clash with the natives' "cultural traditions"; industrialization cannot be grafted onto superstitious irrationality; the choice is either-or. Besides, it is a knowledge which the West itself has lost; and it is *the* specific element which the encyclical damns.)

While the encyclical demands a kind of unfastidious relativism in regard to cultural values and stressedly urges respect for the right of primitive cultures to hold any values whatever, it does not extend this tolerance to Western civilization. Speaking of Western businessmen who deal with countries "recently opened to industrialization," the encyclical states: "Why, then, do they return to the inhuman principles of individualism when they operate in less developed countries?" (70.)

Observe that the horrors of tribal existence in those undeveloped countries evoke no condemnation from the encyclical; only individualism—the principle that raised mankind out of the primordial swamps—is branded as "inhuman."

In the light of that statement, observe the encyclical's contempt for conceptual integrity, when it advocates "the construction of a better world, one which shows deeper respect for the rights and the vocation of the individual." (65.) What are the rights of the individual in a world that regards individualism as "inhuman"? No answer.

There is another remark pertaining to Western nations, which is worth noting. The encyclical states: "We are pleased to learn that in certain nations 'military service' can be partially accomplished by doing 'social service,' a 'service pure and simple.'" (74.)

It is interesting to discover the probable source of the notion of substituting social work for military service, of the claim that American youths owe their country some years of *servitude* pure and simple—a vicious notion, more evil than the draft, a singularly un-American notion in that it contradicts every fundamental principle of the United States.

The philosophy that created the United States is the encyclical's target, the enemy it seeks to obliterate. A casual reference that seems aimed at Latin America is a bit of window-dressing, a booby-trap for compromisers, upon which they did pounce eagerly. That reference states: "If certain landed estates impede the general prosperity because they are extensive, unused or poorly used... the common good sometimes demands their expropriation." (24.)

But whatever the sins of Latin America, capitalism is not one of them. Capitalism—a system based on the recognition and protection of individual rights—has never existed in Latin America. In the past and at present, Latin America was and is ruled by a primitive form of fascism: an unorganized, unstructured rule by *coup d'etat*, by militaristic gangs, i.e., by physical force, which tolerates a nominal pretense at private property subject to expropriation by any gang in power (which is the cause of Latin America's economic stagnation).

The encyclical is concerned with help to the undeveloped nations of

the world. Latin America is high on the list of the undeveloped; it is unable to feed its own people. Can anyone imagine Latin America in the role of global provider, supplying the needs of the entire world? It is only the United States—the country created by the principles of individualism, the freest example of capitalism in history, the first and last exponent of the Rights of Man—that could attempt such a role and would thereby be induced to commit suicide.

(To be concluded in our next issue.)

THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DICHOTOMY (IV)

By Leonard Peikoff

Necessity and Contingency

The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has its roots in two types of error: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological error, as I have discussed, is an incorrect view of the nature of concepts. The metaphysical error is: the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts.

This theory goes back to Greek philosophy, and was endorsed in some form by virtually all philosophical traditions prior to Kant. In the form in which it is here relevant, the theory holds that some facts are inherent in the nature of reality; they *must* exist; they are "necessary." Other facts, however, *happen to* exist in the world that men now observe, but they did not *have to* exist; they could have been otherwise; they are "contingent." For instance, that water is wet, would be a "necessary" fact; that water turns to ice at a certain temperature, would be "contingent."

Given this dichotomy, the question arises: How does one know, in a particular case, that a certain fact is necessary? Observation, it was commonly said, is insufficient for this purpose. "Experience," wrote Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise." To establish that something is a fact, one employs observation and the appropriate inductive procedures; but, it was claimed, to establish that something is a fact is not yet to show that the fact in question is necessary. Some warrant or guarantee, over and above the fact's existence, is required if the fact is to be necessary; and some insight, over and above that yielded by observation and induction, is required to grasp this guarantee.

In the pre-Kantian era, it was common to appeal to some form of "intellectual intuition" for this purpose. In some cases, it was said, one could just "see" that a certain fact was necessary. *How* one could see this remained a mystery. It appeared that human beings had a strange,

inexplicable capacity to grasp by unspecified means that certain facts not only were, but had to be. In other cases, no such intuition operated, and the facts in question were deemed contingent.

In the post-Kantian era, appeals to "intellectual intuition" lost favor among philosophers, but the necessary-contingent dichotomy went on. Perpetuated in various forms in the nineteenth century, it was reinterpreted in the twentieth as follows: since facts are learned only by experience, and experience does not reveal necessity, the concept of "necessary facts" must be abandoned. Facts, it is now held, are one and all contingent—and the propositions describing them are "contingent truths." As for necessary truths, they are merely the products of man's linguistic or conceptual conventions. They do not refer to facts, they are empty, "analytic," "tautological." In this manner, the necessary-contingent dichotomy is used to support the alleged distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Today, it is a commonplace for philosophers to remark that "factual" statements are "synthetic" and "contingent," whereas "necessary" statements are "non-factual" and "analytic."

(Contemporary philosophers prefer to talk about propositions or statements, rather than about facts; they rarely say that *facts* are contingent, attributing contingency instead to *statements* about facts. There is nothing to justify this mode of speech, and I shall not adhere to it in discussing their views.)

Observe that both the traditional pre-Kantians, and the contemporary conventionalists, are in essential agreement: both endorse the necessary-contingent dichotomy, and both hold that necessary truths cannot be validated by experience. The difference is only this: for the traditional philosophers, necessity is a metaphysical phenomenon, grasped by an act of intuition; for the conventionalists, it is a product of man's subjective choices. The relationship between the two viewpoints is similar to the relationship between Platonists and nominalists on the issue of essences. In both cases, the moderns adopt the fundamentals of the traditionalist position; their "contribution" is merely to interpret that position in an avowedly subjectivist manner.

In the present issue, the basic error of both schools is the view that facts, some or all, are contingent. As far as metaphysical reality is concerned (omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment), there are no "facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise" as against "facts which must be." There are only: facts which *are*.

The view that facts are contingent—that the way things actually are is only one among a number of alternative possibilities, that things could have been different metaphysically—represents a failure to grasp the Law of Identity. Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity, nothing in reality can occur causelessly or by chance. The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it *will* do. The Law of Causality is entailed by the Law of Identity. Entities follow certain laws

of action in consequence of their identity, and have no alternative to doing so.

Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist; i.e., all facts are "necessary." In this sense, to be *is* to be "necessary." The concept of "necessity," in a metaphysical context, is superfluous.

(The problem of epistemology is: how to discover facts, how to discover what *is*. Its task is to formulate the proper methods of induction, the methods of acquiring and validating scientific knowledge. There is no problem of grasping that a fact is necessary, after one has grasped that it is a fact.)

For many centuries, the theory of "contingent facts" was associated with a supernaturalistic metaphysics; such facts, it was said, are the products of a divine creator who could have created them differently—and who can change them at will. This view represents the metaphysics of miracles—the notion that an entity's actions are unrelated to its nature, that anything is possible to an entity regardless of its identity. On this view, an entity acts as it does, not because of its nature, but because of an omnipotent God's decree.

Contemporary advocates of the theory of "contingent facts" hold, in essence, the same metaphysics. They, too, hold that anything is possible to an entity, that its actions are unrelated to its nature, that the universe which exists is only one of a number of "possible worlds." They merely omit God, but they retain the consequences of the religious view. Once more, theirs is a secularized mysticism.

The fundamental error in all such doctrines is the failure to grasp that *existence is a self-sufficient primary*. It is not a product of a supernatural dimension, or of anything else. There is nothing antecedent to existence, nothing apart from it—and *no alternative to it*. Existence exists—and only existence exists. Its existence and its nature are irreducible and unalterable.

The climax of the "miraculous" view of existence is represented by those existentialists who echo Heidegger, demanding: "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?"—i.e., why does existence exist? This is the projection of a zero as an alternative to existence, with the demand that one explain why existence exists and not the zero.

Non-existentialist philosophers typically disdain Heidegger's alleged question, writing it off as normal existentialist lunacy. They do not apparently realize that in holding facts to be contingent, they are committing the same error. When they claim that facts could have been otherwise, they are claiming that *existence* could have been otherwise. They scorn the existentialists for projecting an alternative to the *existence* of existence, but spend their time projecting alternatives to the *identity* of existence.

While the existentialists clamor to know why there is something and not nothing, the non-existentialists answer them (by implication): "This

is a ridiculous question. Of course, there is something. The real question is: Why is the something what it is, and not something else?"

A major source of confusion, in this issue, is the failure to distinguish *metaphysical* facts from *man-made* facts—i.e., facts which are inherent in the identities of that which exists, from facts which depend upon the exercise of human volition. Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man *has* chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so; he could have chosen otherwise. For instance, the U.S. did not have to consist of 50 states; men could have subdivided the larger ones, or consolidated the smaller ones, etc.

Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation. (For a discussion of this subject, see Nathaniel Branden's "Volition and the Law of Causality" in the March 1966 issue of THE OBJECTIVIST.) Further, metaphysical facts are unalterable by man, and limit the alternatives open to his choice. Man can rearrange the materials that exist in reality, but he cannot violate their identity; he cannot escape the laws of nature. "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."

Only in regard to the man-made is it valid to claim: "It happens to be, but it could have been otherwise." Even here, the term "contingent" is highly misleading. Historically, that term has been used to designate a metaphysical category of much wider scope than the realm of human action; and it has always been associated with a metaphysics which, in one form or another, denies the facts of Identity and Causality. The "necessary-contingent" terminology serves only to introduce confusion, and should be abandoned. What is required in this context is the distinction between the "metaphysical" and the "man-made."

The existence of human volition cannot be used to justify the theory that there is a dichotomy of *propositions* or of *truths*. Propositions about metaphysical facts, and propositions about man-made facts, do not have different characteristics *qua* *propositions*. They differ merely in their subject matter, but then so do the propositions of astronomy and of immunology. Truths about metaphysical and about man-made facts are learned and validated by the same process: by observation; and, *qua* *truths*, both are equally necessary. Some *facts* are not necessary, but all *truths* are.

Truth is the identification of a fact of reality. Whether the fact in question is metaphysical or man-made, the fact determines the truth: if the fact exists, there is no alternative in regard to what is true. For instance, the fact that the U.S. has 50 states was not metaphysically necessary—but as long as this is men's choice, the proposition that "The U.S. has 50 states" is necessarily *true*. A true proposition *must* describe the facts as they are. In this sense, a "necessary truth" is a redundancy, and a "contingent truth" a self-contradiction.

Logic and Experience

Throughout its history, philosophy has been torn by the conflict between the rationalists and the empiricists. The former stress the role of logic in man's acquisition of knowledge, while minimizing the role of experience; the latter claim that experience is the source of man's knowledge, while minimizing the role of logic. This split between logic and experience is institutionalized in the theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy.

Analytic statements, it is said, are independent of experience; they are "logical" propositions. Synthetic statements, on the other hand, are devoid of logical necessity; they are "empirical" propositions.

Any theory that propounds an opposition between the logical and the empirical, represents a failure to grasp the nature of logic and its role in human cognition. Man's knowledge is not acquired by logic apart from experience or by experience apart from logic, but *by the application of logic to experience*. All truths are the product of a logical identification of the facts of experience.

Man is born *tabula rasa*; all his knowledge is based on and derived from the evidence of his senses. To reach the distinctively human level of cognition, man must conceptualize his perceptual data—and conceptualization is a process which is neither automatic nor infallible. Man needs to discover a method to guide this process, if it is to yield conclusions which correspond to the facts of reality—i.e., which represent knowledge. The principle at the base of the proper method is the fundamental principle of metaphysics: the Law of Identity. In reality, contradictions cannot exist; in a cognitive process, a contradiction is the proof of an error. Hence the method man must follow: to identify the facts he observes, in a non-contradictory manner. This method is logic—"the art of non-contradictory identification." (*Atlas Shrugged*.) Logic must be employed at every step of a man's conceptual development, from the formation of his first concepts to the discovery of the most complex scientific laws and theories. Only when a conclusion is based on a non-contradictory identification and integration of all the evidence available at a given time, can it qualify as knowledge.

The failure to recognize that logic is man's method of cognition, has produced a brood of artificial splits and dichotomies which represent restatements of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy from various aspects. Three in particular are prevalent today: logical truth vs. factual truth; the logically possible vs. the empirically possible; and the a priori vs. the a posteriori.

The logical-factual dichotomy opposes truths which are validated "merely" by the use of logic (the analytic ones), and truths which describe the facts of experience (the synthetic ones). Implicit in this dichotomy is the view that logic is a subjective game, a method of manipulating arbitrary symbols, not a method of acquiring knowledge.

It is the use of logic that enables man to determine what is and what is not a fact. To introduce an opposition between the "logical" and the "factual" is to create a split between consciousness and existence, between truths in accordance with man's method of cognition and truths in accordance with the facts of reality. The result of such a dichotomy is that logic is divorced from reality ("Logical truths are empty and conventional")—and reality becomes unknowable ("Factual truths are contingent and uncertain"). This amounts to the claim that man has no method of cognition, i.e., no way of acquiring knowledge.

The acquisition of knowledge, as Ayn Rand has observed, involves two fundamental questions: "What do I know?" and "How do I know it?" The advocates of the logical-factual dichotomy tell man, in effect: "You can't know the 'what'—because there is no 'how.'" (These same philosophers claim to know the truth of their position by means of unanswerable logical argument.)

To grasp the nature of their epistemological procedure, consider a mathematician who would claim that there is a dichotomy between two types of truth in the matter of adding columns of figures: truths which state the actual sum of a given column *versus* truths which are reached by adherence to the laws of addition—the "summational truths" vs. the "additive truths." The former represent the actual sums—which, however, are unfortunately unprovable and unknowable, since they cannot be arrived at by the methods of addition; the latter, which are perfectly certain and necessary, are unfortunately a subjective fantasy-creation, with no relationship to actual sums in the actual world. (At this point, a pragmatist mathematician comes along and provides his "solution": "Adding," he tells us, "may be subjective, but it works." Why does it? How does he know it does? What about tomorrow? "Those questions," he replies, "aren't fruitful.")

If mathematicians were to accept this doctrine, the destruction of mathematics would follow. When philosophers accept such a doctrine, the same consequences may be expected—with only this difference: the province of philosophy embraces the total of human knowledge.

(To be concluded in our next issue.)

FROM THE "HORROR FILE"

Ethics

"The initial problem in any new treatment, of course, is who should receive it when it is still too limited to be available to all? And who decides which patient shall be given a chance of life, and which patient shall be left to die?

"Physicians should be relieved of such social value decisions that are forced upon them by the unwillingness of society to accept its own respon-

sibilities,' says Leo Shatin, a Ph.D. and professor of psychiatry at the New Jersey College of Medicine. Writing in the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, Dr. Shatin proposes that the choice of patients be determined by the values that society places upon a given person, and he suggests that a scale of such values might be worked out through a public opinion survey." *Medical World News*, May 20, 1966.

* * *

"It is surprising that selfishness has not been included among the capital sins. It is evident that selfishness is responsible for many sins, especially for sins of neglect and omission, most particularly for omissions against the virtue of charity. But perhaps it is right to leave selfishness in a class by itself, a sort of super-capital sin. Ultimately all sins do have self-love at their base. . . .

"A scholar may find that pride is his greatest problem, with resultant temptations against faith or with a proneness to scorn lesser minds." Rev. Leo J. Trese, "Defenses Against Temptation," *Philadelphia Catholic Standard and Times*, January 28, 1966.

* * *

[Question] "I would like to give my life to Christ and live the Christian way, but I don't feel worthy.

[Answer] "Who does?

"If we were worthy and guiltless we wouldn't need a Savior. Jesus said, 'Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.' By this He meant that only those who are conscious of their spiritual poverty are qualified to be members of His kingdom. So, you see that your feeling of being unworthy, far from excluding you from being Christ's disciple, actually makes you eligible for that high calling. . . .

"Unworthiness, or the consciousness of it, is one of the requirements for entrance into the kingdom of God, and you are not far from the kingdom." Billy Graham, "My Answer," *Albuquerque Journal*, April 7, 1966.

Psychology

"If evolution were to do a U-turn and develop human beings that had brains more like man's ancestors, it would help cure neuroses, a San Diego State audience was told last night.

"The future may belong to 'thalamic man,' Dr. Arthur Burton, Sacramento State College clinical psychologist, said in a lecture.

"This being would have a better developed 'old brain' or thalamus than modern man, and his cerebrum—the part used for real thinking—would be less emphasized.

"Something like this change of emphasis from the thinking to the feeling part of the brain takes place when anyone takes a tranquilizer, Burton said.

"It also occurs in a prefrontal lobotomy when certain cords in the fore part of the brain are cut to relieve anxiety and make a man more like a vegetable. . . .

"Burton said that the neurotic is typically one whose life is concerned with the activities of his thinking brain to the point that he seeks to escape the realities of his life. . . . Most of all, Burton said, the neurotic individual draws into himself instead of acting out his feelings. . . .

"This overdevelopment of the cerebral cortex in man, Burton said, is really not adapting him to his environment today, but interfering with his adaptation.

"This maladaptation, he said, is what prompts him to think that the 'thalamic man' may be the next step in evolution; he would feel and act directly without complicated reactions.

"He would, Burton said, be well suited to acting out the programmed behavior of the future and fly spaceships to the moon." *San Diego Union and Tribune*, July 27, 1966.

[Man would "feel and act directly" and would toss nuclear bombs "without complicated reactions."]

* * *

"Invited to address a group of physicians, he [Masserman, a prominent American psychoanalyst] solemnly presented them with a ludicrous, sustained parody of dynamic formulations centred on the ingrowing toenail. He employed, as many analysts do, imprecise terms and formulas which could not be tested as to their validity or meaning; consequently his exposition reads like a grossly far-fetched exercise in free-wheeling interpretation, in terms of libido, cathexis, regression and sexual symbolism. To Masserman's extreme surprise, members of his audience later congratulated him on the 'analytic perspicacity with which I had derived the specific dynamic formula for the etiology and possible therapy of that hitherto unexplored psychosomatic disorder—ingrown toenail.'" (London), *The Times Literary Supplement*, April 14, 1966.

Politics

"Today's business leaders no longer reject Washington consultation as 'interference,' but actively seek guidance from the White House and then adjust corporate policies to it.

"An earlier breed of free enterprisers would have snorted at today's trend. They insisted that the marketplace was where decisions should be made, and any interference with the prerogative of a businessman to raise or lower prices was pure socialism.

"But not in Lyndon Johnson's Washington. . . .

"Johnson insists that they 'share' in the responsibility of running the government. They must put the national interest above corporate interest. . . .

"As much as business leaders appreciate their new dignity and status

as 'co-sharers' of responsibility, they are even more aware that what's good for Lyndon Johnson is good for the American corporation.

"Thus, they can give us an expansion program here or a price increase there. (There are ways of sneaking a price increase into effect without being too obvious about it, anyway.) They have discovered that it's better to play ball, adjust, adapt—but seek no head-on collisions. . . .

"All of this may sound self-serving, and it is. But the businessmen deserve credit, too. . . . More sophisticated than they were just a few years ago, they have accepted the truth of the fact that big government is here to stay, and they might as well relax and enjoy it." Rochester, Minnesota, *Post-Bulletin*, April 18, 1966.

Because of a disagreement over script control with the management of WRFM, Jeffrey St. John has resigned his position as radio news commentator. Therefore, in view of the complexities involved in gathering material, Mr. St. John will be unable, for the present, to continue his monthly column, "News In Focus," in THE OBJECTIVIST.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ On August 11, Ayn Rand appeared on Johnny Carson's "The Tonight Show," on NBC-TV. We regret that the arrangements for Miss Rand's appearance were confirmed too late for us to inform our readers about this program.

However, Miss Rand will appear again on "The Tonight Show," in October. The exact date has not yet been set. We suggest that our readers check with their local NBC stations or local newspapers for the date of Miss Rand's appearance.

■ Ayn Rand is tentatively scheduled to appear on a new TV show "Alexander H. Cohen Presents the Scene," in New York City in October or November, Channel 9. This program will be syndicated and shown in other cities; for exact date, check with local stations or newspapers.

■ On Friday, October 13, in New York City, NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE will begin its new series of "The Romantic Screen"—which will present twelve feature films selected from among the best movies in the general category of the Romantic school. (This is not a repetition of the films shown in the first series given this past spring.) The series will continue on consecutive Friday evenings, at 7:30 P.M., in the NBI Auditorium, Empire State Bldg., Lower Lobby. Tickets for the entire series

are available from NBI; price: \$30. Tickets for the individual film showings will be available at the door; price: \$3. For further details, contact NBI.

■ On Sunday, October 15, Dr. Robert Efron will speak under the auspices of The Ayn Rand Society of Detroit, in Birmingham, Mich. His subject: "Biology Without Consciousness." Time: 8 P.M. Place: Metropolitan Federal Savings Bldg., Southfield at 14 Mile Rd. Open to the public. General admission: \$3; Society members: \$2.50. For further information, contact Dr. Donald Bilinski at (313) 884-5084.

■ On Thursday, October 26, at 8 P.M., Nathaniel Branden will appear on "The Phil Lind Interview" in Chicago, WCIU-TV, Channel 26.

■ Phillip J. Smith, an NBI student who will direct the NBI THEATER production of *The Fountainhead*, has asked us to announce that he will offer an acting workshop in Los Angeles, with a limited enrollment, beginning in October. Mr. Smith, who formerly taught acting in New York, has many professional credits as actor, director and producer. Those interested should leave their names, addresses and phone numbers with Peter Crosby, 726 N. Tularosa Dr., Los Angeles, Calif. 90026; phone: NO 3-4889 (evenings and weekends)—and Mr. Smith will contact them in October.

■ NBI's Tape Transcription Division has scheduled the following starting dates: "Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology" in Montreal, Oct. 4; Ann Arbor, Oct. 23; Portland, Oreg., Oct. 24; Long Beach, Calif., Oct. 25—"Basic Principles of Objectivism" in Tampa, Oct. 10; Hartford, Conn., Oct. 27—"Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" in Dallas, Oct. 13; Los Angeles, Nov. 15—"The Psychology of Romantic Love" in Pittsburgh, Nov. 8—"Modern Philosophy" in Montreal, Nov. 15.

"Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology" began in Indianapolis on Sept. 22. (We received this information too late to be included in last month's issue.)

For further information about the above courses, contact NBI.


■ The NBI THEATER stage production of *The Fountainhead*, which was originally scheduled to be presented in Los Angeles, will be presented instead in New York City in the Fall of 1968.

—B.B.

Reports have reached us of rumors to the effect that NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE is planning to establish a college or university. NBI has no such plans, nor is it in any way connected with any such undertaking.

ATLAS SHRUGGED

SPECIAL TENTH ANNIVERSARY EDITION



October 10, 1967, is the tenth anniversary of the publication of Ayn Rand's *ATLAS SHRUGGED*. NBI Book Service is pleased to announce that, in honor of this event, Random House has issued a special deluxe tenth anniversary edition of *ATLAS SHRUGGED*, which is limited to 2,000 numbered copies autographed by Ayn Rand.

The book has a new binding of fine-quality buckram with gold stampings, an acetate cover, and an attractive slip case.

This unique collector's item is available only through NBI Book Service. Price: \$10.00.

TO ORDER BY MAIL: Send your name and address, a list of the items you are purchasing and your check or money order for the full amount to NBI BOOK SERVICE, Empire State Bldg., New York, N.Y. 10001. All material is shipped postpaid by fourth class mail. Remittance must accompany all orders. Make check or money order payable to NBI Book Service, Inc. (New York State residents add sales tax; Canadian residents add 8% foreign exchange.)