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THE OBJECTIVIST

Edited by AYN RAND
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VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 7

JULY 1967

THE
OBJECTIVIST

120 East 34th Street
New York, New York 10016

114 12 IC 125 December

Gail Stonemanrk
322 Fifth St. SW
Chisholm, Minn. 55719

Second-class
postage paid at
New York, N.Y.

THE OBJECTIVIST

Formerly THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER

Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden

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Published monthly by THE OBJECTIVIST, Inc. at 120 East 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016

Subscription rate in United States, its possessions, Canada and Mexico: one year, \$5; 2 years, \$9; 3 years, \$13. Other countries: one year, \$6; 2 years, \$11; 3 years, \$16.

Additional copies of this Magazine: single copy 50¢ (coins, not stamps); 10-99 copies, 25¢ each plus postage (for first-class delivery add 2¢ per copy, for third-class delivery add ½¢ per copy). (Bulk rates apply only to multiple orders of a single issue.)

Subscription Service: Include complete address and zip code no., and the code line on your address imprint, in all communications with this office regarding subscriptions.

For change of address, we require old address and zip code no. as well as new address and zip code no. Allow us four weeks to process new subscriptions or change of address.

Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

Printed in U.S.A.

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REQUIEM FOR MAN

By Ayn Rand

(Part I of a three-part article)

In advocating capitalism, I have said and stressed for years that capitalism is incompatible with altruism and mysticism. Those who chose to doubt that the issue is "either-or," have now heard it from the highest authority of the opposite side: Pope Paul VI.

The encyclical "*Populorum Progressio*" ("*On the Development of Peoples*") is an unusual document: it reads as if a long-repressed emotion broke out into the open, past the barrier of carefully measured, cautiously calculated sentences, with the hissing pressure of centuries of silence. The sentences are full of contradictions; the emotion is consistent.

The encyclical is the manifesto of an impassioned hatred for capitalism; but its evil is much more profound and its target is more than mere politics. It is written in terms of a mystic-altruist "sense of life." A sense of life is the subconscious equivalent of metaphysics: a pre-conceptual, emotionally integrated appraisal of man's nature and of his relationship to existence. To a mystic-altruist sense of life, words are mere approximations; hence the encyclical's tone of evasion. But what is eloquently revealing is the nature of that which is being evaded.

On the question of capitalism, the encyclical's position is explicit and unequivocal. Referring to the Industrial Revolution, the encyclical declares: "But it is unfortunate that on these new conditions of society a system has been constructed which considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, competition as the supreme law of economics, and private ownership of the means of production as an absolute right that has no limits and carries no corresponding social obligation. . . . But if it is true that a type of capitalism has been the source of excessive suffering, injustices and fratricidal conflicts whose effects still persist, it would also be wrong to attribute to industrialization itself evils that belong to the woeful system which accompanied it." (Paragraph 26.)

The Vatican is not the city room of a third-rate Marxist tabloid. It is an institution geared to a perspective of centuries, to scholarship and timeless philosophical deliberation. Ignorance, therefore, cannot be the explanation of the above. Even the leftists know that the advent of capitalism and industrialization was not an "unfortunate" coincidence, and that the first made the second possible.

What are the "excessive suffering, injustices and fratricidal conflicts" caused by capitalism? The encyclical gives no answer. What social system, past or present, has a better record in respect to *any* social evil that anyone might choose to ascribe to capitalism? Has the feudalism of the Middle

Ages? Has absolute monarchy? Has socialism or fascism? No answer. If one is to consider "excessive suffering, injustices and conflicts," what aspect of capitalism can be placed in the same category with the terror and wholesale slaughter of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia? No answer. If there is no causal connection between capitalism and the people's progress, welfare and standard of living, why are these highest in the countries whose systems have the largest element of capitalistic economic freedom? No answer.

Since the encyclical is concerned with history and with fundamental political principles, yet does not discuss or condemn any social system other than capitalism, one must conclude that all other systems are compatible with the encyclical's political philosophy. This is supported by the fact that capitalism is condemned, not for some lesser characteristics, but for its essentials, which are not the base of any other system: the profit motive, competition and private ownership of the means of production.

By what moral standard does the encyclical judge a social system? Its most specific accusation directed at capitalism reads as follows: "The desire for necessities is legitimate, and work undertaken to obtain them is a duty: 'If any man will not work, neither let him eat.' But the acquiring of temporal goods can lead to greed, to the insatiable desire for more, and can make increased power a tempting objective. Individuals, families and nations can be overcome by avarice, be they poor or rich, and all can fall victim to a stifling materialism." (18.)

Since time immemorial and pre-industrial, "greed" has been the accusation hurled at the rich by the concrete-bound illiterates who were unable to conceive of the source of wealth or of the motivation of those who produce it. But the above was not written by an illiterate.

Terms such as "greed" and "avarice" connote the caricature image of two individuals, one fat, the other lean, one indulging in mindless gluttony, the other starving over chests of hoarded gold—both symbols of the acquisition of riches for the sake of riches. Is that the motive-power of capitalism?

If all the wealth spent on personal consumption by all the rich of the United States were expropriated and distributed among our population, it would amount to less than a dollar per person. (Try to figure out the amount, if distributed to the entire population of the globe.) The rest of American wealth is invested in production—and it is this constantly growing investment that raises America's standard of living by raising the productivity of its labor. This is primer economics which Pope Paul VI cannot fail to know.

To observe the technique of epistemological manipulation, read that quoted paragraph again—and look past the images invoked by the window-dressing of "greed" and "avarice." You will observe that the evil being denounced is: "the insatiable desire for more." Of what? Of "increased power." What sort of power? No direct answer is given in that paragraph, but the entire encyclical provides the answer by means of a significant

omission: no distinction is drawn between *economic* power and *political* power (between production and force), they are used interchangeably in some passages and equated explicitly in others. If you look at the facts of reality, you will observe that the "increased power" which men of wealth seek under capitalism is the power of *independent* production, the power of an "insatiable" ambition to expand their productive capacity—and that *this* is what the encyclical damns. The evil is not work, but *ambitious* work.

These implications are supported and gently stressed in a subsequent paragraph, which lists the encyclical's view of "less human" conditions of social existence: "The lack of material necessities for those who are without the minimum essential for life, the moral deficiencies of those who are mutilated by selfishness. . . . Oppressive social structures, whether due to the abuses of ownership or to the abuses of power . . ." And, as "more human" conditions: "the passage from misery toward the possession of necessities . . ." (21.)

What "necessities" are the "minimum essential for life"? For what kind of life? Is it for mere physical survival? If so, for how long a survival? No answer is given. But the encyclical's principle is clear: only those who rise no higher than the barest minimum of subsistence have the *right* to material possessions—and this right supersedes all the rights of all other men, including their right to life. This is stated explicitly:

"The Bible, from the first page on, teaches us that the whole of creation is for man, that it is his responsibility to develop it by intelligent effort and by means of his labor to perfect it, so to speak, for his use. If the world is made to furnish each individual with the means of livelihood and the instruments for his growth and progress, each man has therefore the right to find in the world what is necessary for himself. The recent Council reminded us of this: 'God intended the earth and all that it contains for the use of every human being and people. Thus, as all men follow justice and charity, created goods should abound for them on a reasonable basis.' All other rights whatsoever, including those of property and of free commerce, are to be subordinated to this principle." (22.)

Observe what element is missing from this view of the world, what human faculty is regarded as inessential or non-existent. I shall discuss this aspect later in more detail. For the moment, I shall merely call your attention to the use of the word "man" in the above paragraph (*which* man?)—and to the term "created goods." Created—by whom? Blank out.

That missing element becomes blatant in the encyclical's next paragraph: "It is well known how strong were the words used by the fathers of the church to describe the proper attitude of persons who possess anything toward persons in need. To quote St. Ambrose: 'You are not making a gift of your possessions to the poor person. You are handing over to him what is his. For what has been given in common for the use of all, you have arrogated to yourself. The world is given to all, and not only to the rich.' That is, private property does not constitute for anyone an absolute and unconditional right. No one is justified in keeping for his

exclusive use what he does not need, when others lack necessities." (23.)

St. Ambrose lived in the fourth century, when such views of property could conceivably have been explicable, if not justifiable. From the nineteenth century on, they can be neither.

What solution does the encyclical offer to the problems of today's world? "Individual initiative alone and the mere free play of competition could never assure successful development. One must avoid the risk of increasing still more the wealth of the rich and the dominion of the strong, while leaving the poor in their misery and adding to the servitude of the oppressed. Hence programs are necessary in order 'to encourage, stimulate, coordinate, supplement and integrate' the activity of individuals and of intermediary bodies. It pertains to the public authorities to choose, even to lay down, the objectives to be pursued, the ends to be achieved, and the means for attaining these, and it is for them to stimulate all the forces engaged in this common activity." (33.)

A society in which the government ("the public authorities") chooses and lays down the objectives to be pursued, the ends to be achieved and the means for achieving them, is a totalitarian state. It is, therefore, morally shocking to read the very next sentence:

"But let them take care to associate private initiative and intermediary bodies with this work. They will thus avoid the danger of complete collectivization or of arbitrary planning, which, by denying liberty, would prevent the exercise of the fundamental rights of the human person." (33.)

What are "the fundamental rights of the human person" (which are never defined in the encyclical) in a state where "all other rights whatsoever . . . are to be subordinated to this principle [the "right" to minimum sustenance]?" (22.) What is "liberty" or "private initiative" in a state where the government lays down the ends and commandeers the means? What is *incomplete* collectivization?

It is difficult to believe that modern compromisers, to whom that paragraph is addressed, could stretch their capacity for evasion far enough to take it to mean the advocacy of a mixed economy. A mixed economy is a mixture of capitalism and statism; when the principles and practices of capitalism are damned and annihilated at the root, what is to prevent the statist collectivization from becoming *complete*?

(The moral shock comes from the realization that the encyclical regards some men's capacity for evasion as infinitely elastic. Judging by the reactions it received, the encyclical did not miscalculate.)

I have always maintained that every political theory is based on some code of ethics. Here again, the encyclical confirms my statement, though from the viewpoint of a moral code which is the opposite of mine. "The same duty of solidarity that rests on individuals exists also for nations: 'Advanced nations have a very heavy obligation to help the developing peoples.' It is necessary to put this teaching of the council into effect. Although it is normal that a nation should be the first to benefit from the gifts that Providence has bestowed on it as the fruit of the labors of its

people, still no country can claim on that account to keep its wealth for itself alone." (48.)

This seems clear enough, but the encyclical takes pains not to be misunderstood. "In other words, the rule of free trade, taken by itself, is no longer able to govern international relations. . . . One must recognize that it is the fundamental principle of liberalism, as the rule for commercial exchange, which is questioned here." (58.)

"We must repeat once more that the superfluous wealth of rich countries should be placed at the service of poor nations, the rule which up to now held good for the benefit of those nearest to us, must today be applied to all the needy of this world." (49.)

If need—*global* need—is the criterion of morality, if minimum subsistence (the standard of living of the least developed savages) is the criterion of property rights, then every new shirt or dress, every ice cream cone, every automobile, refrigerator or television set becomes "superfluous wealth."

Remember that "rich" is a relative concept and that the sharecroppers of the United States are fabulously rich compared to the laborers of Asia or Africa. Yet the encyclical denounces, as "unjust," free trade among unequally developed countries, on the grounds that "highly industrialized nations export for the most part manufactured goods, while countries with less developed economies have only food, fibers, and other raw materials to sell." (57.) Alleging that this perpetuates the poverty of the undeveloped countries, the encyclical demands that international trade be ruled, not by the laws of the free market, but by the *need* of its neediest participants.

How this would work in practice is made explicitly clear: "This demands great generosity, much sacrifice and unceasing effort on the part of the rich man. Let each one examine his conscience, a conscience that conveys a new message for our times. . . . Is he ready to pay higher taxes so that the public authorities can intensify their efforts in favor of development? Is he ready to pay a higher price for imported goods so that the producer may be more justly rewarded?" (47.)

It is not only the rich who pay taxes; the major share of the tax burden in the United States is carried by the middle and lower income classes. It is not for the exclusive personal consumption of the rich that foreign goods or raw materials are imported. The price of food is not a major concern to the rich; it is a crucial concern to the poor. And since *food* is listed as one of the chief products of the undeveloped countries, project what the encyclical's proposal would mean: it would mean that an American housewife would have to buy food produced by men who scratch the soil with bare hands or hand-plows, and would pay prices which, if paid to America's mechanized farmers, would have given her a hundred or a thousand times more. Which items of her family budget would she have to sacrifice so that those undeveloped producers "may be more justly rewarded"? Would she sacrifice some purchases of clothing? But her cloth-

ing budget would have shrunk in the same manner and proportion—since she would have to provide the “just rewards” of the producers of “fibers and other raw materials.” And so on. What, then, would happen to her standard of living? And what would happen to the American farmers and producers of raw materials? Forced to compete, not in terms of productive competence, but of *need*, they would have to arrest their “development” and revert to the methods of the hand-plow. What, then, would happen to the standard of living of the whole world?

No, it is not possible that Pope Paul VI was so ignorant of economics and so lacking in the capacity to concretize his theories that he offered such proposals in the name of “humanism” without realizing the unspeakably inhuman cruelty they entail.

It seems inexplicable. But there is a certain basic premise that would explain it. It would integrate the encyclical’s clashing elements — the contradictions, the equivocations, the omissions, the unanswered questions — into a consistent pattern. To discover it, one must ask: What is the encyclical’s view of man’s nature?

That particular view is seldom admitted or fully identified by those who hold it. It is less a matter of conscious philosophy than of a feeling dictated by a sense of life. The conscious philosophy of those who hold it, consists predominantly of attempts to rationalize it.

To identify that view, let us go to its roots, to the kind of phenomena which give rise to it, in sense-of-life terms.

I will ask you to project the look on a child’s face when he grasps the answer to some problem he has been striving to understand. It is a radiant look of joy, of liberation, almost of triumph, which is unself-conscious, yet self-assertive, and its radiance seems to spread in two directions: outward, as an illumination of the world—inward, as the first spark of what is to become the fire of an earned pride. If you have seen this look, or experienced it, you know that if there is such a concept as “sacred”—meaning: the best, the highest possible to man—this look is the sacred, the not-to-be-betrayed, the not-to-be-sacrificed for anything or anyone.

This look is not confined to children. Comic-strip artists are in the habit of representing it by means of a light bulb flashing on, above the head of a character who has suddenly grasped an idea. In simple, primitive terms, this is an appropriate symbol: an idea is a light turned on in a man’s soul.

It is the steady, confident reflection of that light that you look for in the faces of adults—particularly of those to whom you entrust your most precious values. You look for it in the eyes of a surgeon performing an operation on the body of a loved one; you look for it in the face of a pilot at the controls of the plane in which you are flying; and, if you are consistent, you look for it in the person of the man or woman you marry.

That light-bulb look is the flash of a human intelligence in action; it is the outward manifestation of man’s rational faculty; it is the signal and symbol of man’s *mind*. And, to the extent of your humanity, it is involved in everything you seek, enjoy, value or love.

But suppose that admiration is *not* your response to that look on the face of a child or adult? Suppose that your response is a nameless fear? Then you will spend your life and your philosophical capacity on the struggle never to let that fear be named. You will find rationalizations to hide it, and you will call that child’s look a look of “selfishness” or “arrogance” or “intransigence” or “pride”—all of which will be true, but not in the way you will struggle to suggest. You will feel that that look in man’s eyes is your greatest, most dangerous enemy—and the desire to vanquish that look will become your only absolute, taking precedence over reason, logic, consistency, existence, reality. The desire to vanquish that look is the desire to break man’s spirit.

Thus you will acquire the kind of sense of life that produced the encyclical “*Populorum Progressio*.” It was not produced by the sense of life of any one person, but by the sense of life of an institution.

(To be continued in our next issue.)

THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DICHOTOMY (III)

By Leonard Peikoff

“Analytic” and “Synthetic” Truths (Continued)

To justify their view that some of an entity’s characteristics are excluded from the concept designating it, both Platonists and nominalists appeal to the distinction between the “essential” and the “non-essential” characteristics of an entity. For the Platonists, this distinction represents a *metaphysical* division, *intrinsic* to the entity, independent of man and of man’s knowledge. For the nominalists, it represents a *subjective* human decree, independent of the facts of reality. For both schools, whatever their terminological or other differences, a concept means only the essential (or defining) characteristics of its units.

Neither school provides an *objective* basis for the distinction between an entity’s “essential” and “non-essential” characteristics. (Supernaturalism—in its avowed or secularized form—is not an objective basis for anything.) Neither school explains why such a distinction is objectively required in the process of conceptualization.

This explanation is provided by Objectivism, and exposes the basic error in the Platonic-nominalist position.

When a man reaches a certain level of conceptual complexity, he needs to discover a method of organizing and interrelating his concepts; he needs a method that will enable him to keep each of his concepts clearly distinguished from all the others, each connected to a specific group of existents clearly distinguished from the other existents he knows. (In the early stages of conceptual development, when a child’s concepts are

comparatively few in number and designate directly perceivable concretes, "ostensive definitions" are sufficient for this purpose.) The method consists of *defining* each concept, by specifying the characteristic(s) of its units upon which the greatest number of their other known characteristics depends, and which distinguishes the units from all other known existents. The characteristic(s) which fulfills this requirement is designated the "essential" characteristic, in that context of knowledge.

Essential characteristics are determined contextually. The characteristic(s) which most fundamentally distinguishes a certain type of entity from all other existents known at the time, may not do so within a wider field of knowledge, when more existents become known and/or more of the entity's characteristics are discovered. The characteristic(s) designated as "essential"—and the definition which expresses it—may alter as one's cognitive context expands. Thus, essences are not intrinsic to entities, in the Platonic (or Aristotelian) manner; they are epistemological, not metaphysical. A definition in terms of essential characteristics "is a device of man's method of cognition—a means of classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of knowledge." (Ayn Rand, *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*.)

Nor is the designation of essential characteristics a matter of arbitrary choice or subjective decree. A contextual definition can be formulated only after one has fully considered *all* the known facts pertaining to the units in question: their similarities, their differences from other existents, the causal relationships among their characteristics, etc. This knowledge determines which characteristic(s) is *objectively* essential—and, therefore, which definition is objectively correct—in a given cognitive context. Although the definition explicitly mentions only the essential characteristic(s), it implies and condenses all of this knowledge.

On the objective, contextual view of essences, a concept does *not* mean only the essential or defining characteristics of its units. To designate a certain characteristic as "essential" or "defining" is to *select*, from the total content of the concept, the characteristic that best condenses and differentiates that content in a specific cognitive context. Such a selection presupposes the relationship between the concept and its units: it presupposes that the concept is an integration of units, and that its content consists of its units, including *all* their characteristics. It is only because of this fact that the same concept can receive varying definitions in varying cognitive contexts.

When "rational animal" is selected as the definition of "man," this does not mean that the concept "man" becomes a shorthand tag for "anything whatever that has rationality and animality." It does not mean that the concept "man" is interchangeable with the phrase "rational animal," and that all of man's other characteristics are excluded from the concept. It means: A certain type of entity, including all its characteristics, is, in the present context of knowledge, most fundamentally distinguished from all other entities by the fact that it is a rational animal. All the presently

available knowledge of man's *other* characteristics is required to validate this definition, and is implied by it. All these other characteristics remain part of the content of the concept "man."

The nominalist view that a concept is merely a shorthand tag for its definition, represents a profound failure to grasp the function of a definition in the process of concept-formation. The penalty for this failure is that the process of definition, in the hands of the nominalists, achieves the exact opposite of its actual purpose. The purpose of a definition is to keep a concept distinct from all others, *to keep it connected to a specific group of existents*. On the nominalist view, it is precisely this connection that is severed: as soon as a concept is defined, it ceases to designate *existents*, and designates instead only the defining characteristic.

And further: On a rational view of definitions, a definition organizes and condenses—and thus helps one to retain—a wealth of knowledge about the characteristics of a concept's units. On the nominalist view, it is precisely this knowledge that is *discarded* when one defines a concept: as soon as a defining characteristic is chosen, all the other characteristics of the units are banished from the concept, which shrivels to mean merely the definition. For instance, as long as a child's concept of "man" is retained ostensibly, the child knows that man has a head, two eyes, two arms, etc.; on the nominalist view, as soon as the child defines "man," he discards all this knowledge; thereafter, "man" means to him only: "a thing with rationality and animality."

On the nominalist view, the process of defining a concept is a process of cutting the concept off from its referents, and of systematically evading what one knows about their characteristics. Definition, the very tool which is designed to promote conceptual integration, becomes an agent of its destruction, a means of *disintegration*.

The advocates of the view that a concept means its definition, cannot escape the knowledge that people actually use concepts to designate *existents*. (When a woman says: "I married a wonderful man," it is clear to most philosophers that she does not mean: "I married a wonderful combination of rationality and animality.") Having severed the connection between a concept and its referents, such philosophers sense that somehow this connection nevertheless exists and is important. To account for it, they appeal to a theory which goes back many centuries and is now commonly regarded as uncontroversial: the theory that a concept has *two kinds or dimensions* of meaning. Traditionally, these are referred to as a concept's "*extension*" (or "denotation") and its "*intension*" (or "connotation").

By the "extension" of a concept, the theory's advocates mean the concretes subsumed under that concept. By the "intension" of a concept, they mean those characteristics of the concretes which are stated in the concept's definition. (Today, this is commonly called the "conventional" intension; the distinction among various types of intension, however, merely compounds the errors of the theory, and is irrelevant in this con-

text.) Thus, in the extensional sense, "man" means Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Tom, Dick, Harry, etc. In the intensional sense, "man" means "rational animal."

A standard logic text summarizes the theory as follows: "The intension of a term, as we have noted, is what is usually called its definition. The extension, on the other hand, simply refers us to the set of objects to which the definition applies. . . . Extension and intension are thus intimately related, but they refer to objects in different ways—extension to a listing of the individuals who fall within its quantitative scope, intension to the qualities or characteristics of the individuals." (Lionel Ruby, *Logic: An Introduction*.)

This theory introduces another artificial split: between an existent and its characteristics. In the sense in which a concept means its referents (its extensional meaning), it does not mean or refer to their characteristics (its intensional meaning), and vice versa. One's choice, in effect, is: either to mean existents, apart from their characteristics—or (certain) characteristics, apart from the existents which possess them.

In fact, neither of these alleged types of meaning is metaphysically or epistemologically possible.

A concept cannot mean existents, apart from their characteristics. A thing is — what it is; its characteristics constitute its identity. An existent apart from its characteristics, would be an existent apart from its identity, which means: a nothing, a non-existent. To be conscious of an existent is to be conscious of (some of) its characteristics. This is true on all levels of consciousness, but it is particularly obvious on the conceptual level. When one conceptualizes a group of existents, one isolates them mentally from others, *on the basis of certain of their characteristics*. A concept cannot integrate — or mean — a miscellaneous grab bag of objects; it can only integrate, designate, refer to and *mean*: existents of a certain kind, existents possessing certain characteristics.

Nor can the concept of an existent mean its characteristics (some or all), apart from the existent which possesses them. A characteristic is an aspect of an existent. It is not a disembodied, Platonic universal. Just as a concept cannot mean existents apart from their identity, so it cannot mean identities apart from that which exists. Existence is Identity.

The theory that a concept means its definition, is not improved when it is combined with the view that, in another sense, a concept means its "extension." Two errors do not make a truth. They merely produce greater chaos and confusion. The truth is that a concept means the existents it integrates, including all their characteristics. It is this view of a concept's meaning that keeps man's concepts anchored to reality. On this view, the dichotomy between "analytic" and "synthetic" propositions cannot arise.

(To be continued in our next issue.)

NEWS IN FOCUS: THE DEATH OF A DAILY NEWSPAPER

By Jeffrey St. John

(Part II of a two-part article)

Matt Meyer, president of the *World Journal Tribune*, stated the following on May 5: "In the first six months of our operation we had a total of 55 harassing disputes of which 18 resulted in actual work stoppages. Each precipitated by the unions to prevent us from correcting inefficiencies, reducing overtime, or reducing personnel."

With these words the final chapter was written to a five-year battle between newspaper publishers and unions. And, as a result, more than 7,000 highly skilled journalists and craftsmen were no longer drawing pay checks.

The death of five New York newspapers in five years raises the question of just how free is a free press which, although it cannot be censored out of existence by a Congressional act, can be silenced for good by the actions of one or more powerful union leaders. The demise of the *New York Daily Mirror*, *Herald Tribune*, *Journal-American*, *World-Telegram & Sun* and the *World Journal Tribune* deserves special attention because of the way one particular union chief conducted a campaign that seemed calculated to destroy New York newspaper publishing.

Since 1962, the year Bertram Powers became president of the New York Typographical Union No. 6, New York newspapers have sustained a series of long and costly strikes. Prior to the three-newspaper merger, Powers persisted in his refusal to allow automation and a reduction of personnel to promote efficiency. When the *New York Daily Mirror* folded, Powers persisted and later forced, by his actions, the merger of the *Herald Tribune*, the *Journal-American* and the *World-Telegram*. But he and other labor leaders refused to allow the new paper to start publication for 140 days until job seniority and severance pay were agreed upon. And, as Matt Meyer pointed out, Powers continued to engage in work stoppages. Why?

Powers' typographical workers, unlike other newspaper union rank-and-file, could find work outside of the newspaper business in printing plants in the Greater New York area. This important point guaranteed to Powers the solid support of his own local. But why should a labor leader consistently encourage a climate in which one newspaper after another either folded or was forced to merge?

Perhaps the answer is to be found in a significant comment that Powers made shortly after the *World Journal Tribune* ceased publication. The union leader protested that he was being unfairly accused of killing five New York newspapers, and demanded that Congress launch an investiga-

tion to determine if a *conspiracy existed* in the shutting down of the *W.J.T.*

This was cynicism, raw and naked. Powers knew that if an investigation was ever conducted (none has been launched at this writing), the political influence and lobbying muscle of organized labor on Capitol Hill would insure a finding in Powers' favor and against the publishers. And, ironically, the publishers of these five papers would have found themselves lacking a publishing instrument to present their case.

In attempting to defend his actions, Powers refused to discuss the cumulative effect of five years of strikes and costly work stoppages on those five New York newspapers. He persisted in his evasion of this issue. Therefore, if there was any cause for investigation of conspiracy, it would appear to rest with Powers himself; his actions were consistent and intransigent. Some of the executives of the *World Journal Tribune* felt that his motivation for such stubbornness was born of pride and ambition. This might have appeared to be the case were it not for a prediction that Powers himself made during the 114-day newspaper blackout in 1962-63. According to *The New York Times* of May 7, 1967, Powers asserted that the city would eventually shake down to only three newspapers. "He [Powers] made no secret of his conviction that the number of newspapers would eventually shake down to three — *The Times*, *The Daily News*, and a single survivor in the afternoon." At that time, there were still eight papers.

And Bertram Powers proceeded to make that prediction come true by a course of action that violated every principle of sound labor-management relations. It is significant that the public became angered by Powers' heavy-handed intransigence. As a result, he shifted his tactics, and instead of shutting down papers by direct strikes, he ordered work stoppages which cut deeply into advertising revenue. Thus he achieved the same result of weakening the already anemic papers.

Matt Meyer, in a farewell press conference on May 5, ticked off the costs to the *World Journal Tribune*. Stated Meyer: "Since the *World Journal Tribune* began publication . . . we contributed over \$10.5 million to keep this paper alive. In addition to this, severance payments of \$7 million were made by the three predecessor papers to former employees. Our losses are presently at the rate of \$700,000 per month. The [union's] settlement with *The Daily News* would add \$10.5 million to our present payroll costs over the three years of the contract. Mr. Powers . . . has stated that this will be the pattern for all papers. His specific language, referring to the *World Journal Tribune*, was 'All they can do is pay or shut down.'" (Italics mine.)

Powers knew, as did most observers of the newspaper scene in New York, that *The Daily News* and *The New York Times* were financially able to sustain the kind of wage settlement he was demanding. He made no effort to come to some workable formula that would help see the *W.J.T.* through its initial period. In fact, it appears that Powers did everything possible to make matters difficult.

The financial drain and the publishers' inability to derive any tax advan-

tage from further outlays of capital, compelled them to cease publication.

Powers' prediction was fulfilled.

In the public discussions of why Powers seemed so intent on a course of action that was certain to doom the weaker New York newspapers, the issue of politics was never raised. But consider the following series of what may or may not be coincidences.

During the newspaper strike of 1962-63, the *New York Post* broke ranks and settled. As a result, the resistance of the remaining publishers collapsed. John Hay Whitney of the *Herald Tribune* bitterly denounced the *Post's* decision. Yet later he took the same course of action, during the 1965 strike, in the final weeks of John V. Lindsay's mayoralty campaign. Whitney feared that the strike would prevent his paper and others from promoting his favorite, Lindsay, who was doing badly in TV debates with his two opponents. Republicans in Lindsay's camp muttered at the time that the newspaper strike was intended to prevent the overthrow of the long-time Democratic control of the city. Whitney's *Herald Tribune*, earlier, had hammered away at the Democratic machine in a series of sizzling features called "Crisis City," which Lindsay used as the cornerstone of his campaign. Today, New York is still "Crisis City," but John Hay Whitney's *Herald Tribune* is not around to report on the events.

Few observers noticed that the 114-day newspaper strike of 1962-63 came right at the tail end of the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy lifted the naval blockade off Cuba on November 22, 1962; the strike began December 1. Thus major, influential newspapers, which were highly critical of the lifting of the blockade, were silenced at a crucial time.

It should also be noted that the five papers that have disappeared from New York were, loosely and feebly, "conservative." The one remaining afternoon paper is the "liberal" *New York Post*.

It is interesting to note that while Bertram Powers refused even to consider the issue of automation on other papers, he allowed the *New York Post* to test a type-setting computer on a trial basis (which was later withdrawn). Only a few hours after the *World Journal Tribune* announced it was ceasing publication, the *New York Post* announced it was raising its advertising rates by 20 percent and would step up its press run.

This would seem innocent enough were it not for the fact that thirteen months earlier, when the *World Journal Tribune* intended to start publication, the *New York Post* filed a suit with the Department of Justice, charging that it was being put at a competitive disadvantage if the *W.J.T.* was allowed to become a monopoly by retaining all the columnists from the three papers involved in the merger. When it came time for bidding for the columnists, the *Post* refused to bid. But it secured those same columnists nine months later, when the *World Journal Tribune* ceased to exist.

In the final analysis, we shall never know the complete answer to the question: "Who killed five New York newspapers, and why?" We do know that the publishers played their part, as did the unions.

However, the death of that daily newspaper is an ominous warning, a

symptom of just how bad the profession of American journalism has become, and a sad commentary on the state of our culture. Even reporters in the Washington press corps sensed this crisis, if not its deeper philosophical and moral reasons, when they said, on learning that the *W.J.T.* had died: "Something is the matter with American journalism."

FROM THE "HORROR FILE"

Epistemology

(Integrate this with the speaker's policy of seeking more and more power.)

"President Johnson: 'We know that at the hour of decision in public and private life, faced with tormenting choices that are always a part of man's destiny, none of us can ever be certain we are right.'" *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, February 7, 1967.

Metaphysics

"Chrysler Corporation recently broke ground for its Turkish plant by having a Moslem holy man slaughter a ram on the site. Rain washed the animal's blood into the ground — a good omen, according to Chrysler." *The Wall Street Journal*, December 15, 1966.

Politics

"Rep. Wright Patman, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, has never been a great booster of the nation's commercial banks but in a recent speech his aversion carried him rather far.

"In the past five years, it so happens, commercial banks have come close to doubling their outstanding loans, granting credit to businessmen, farmers, car buyers, home purchasers and a great many other borrowers.

"The Texas Democrat nonetheless is dissatisfied. Banks, he charged, can discriminate and 'thumb their noses at the public.' As a remedy he proposes that anyone refused a loan be allowed to haul the bank into Federal court to force it to explain its refusal." *The Wall Street Journal*, March 9, 1967.

* * *

"Fifteen Omaha students, working at the Postoffice as summer vacation replacements, were fired this week.

"Why? Because they had bungled their jobs? Because they were too slow, or had caused mix-ups in the mails? No, not at all. They were asked to resign because they were not sufficiently needy. Because it had been officially determined that other applicants were poorer. . . .

"Under this year's Postoffice plan the test is not, 'What can you do?' but rather, 'How badly do you need the money?' Employment is placed on a patronage basis, the patronage of poverty." *Omaha World-Herald*, July 30, 1966.

Education

"Since 1948 the percentage of high school seniors taking physics has decreased from 29 percent to less than 20 percent. And a new gentle approach to physics education is needed to keep students in the field. . . .

"Essential to the new approach is a minimal use of mathematics, according to the Harvard group. Math is what drives most students away from physics. Instead, Watson proposes quotations from literature, examples from art and the home life of physicists." *Science News*, January 7, 1967.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ On Thursday, August 31, Dr. George Reisman will speak in Los Angeles. His subject: "Capitalism vs. Anticapitalism: Reason vs. Muscle-Mysticism." Time: 8 P.M. Place: Stanley Folb Bldg., 1800 N. Highland Ave. Open to the public. Admission: \$2.50 For further information, contact Peter Crosby at (213) 663-4889 (evenings and weekends).

■ On Thursday, September 7, Ayn Rand will begin a new half-hour radio program, "Commentary," on New York City radio station WBAI-FM (99.5 on the dial). This program will be heard on alternate Thursdays at 7:15 P.M., and will be rebroadcast on the following Fridays at 11:45 A.M.

■ On Thursday, September 7, Allan Gotthelf will speak in Los Angeles. His subject: "Living as Man: Ayn Rand and the History of Ethics." Time: 8 P.M. Place: Stanley Folb Bldg., 1800 N. Highland Ave. Open to the public. Admission: \$2.50. For further information, contact Peter Crosby, as above.

■ On Saturday, September 9, Allan Gotthelf will speak before the San Francisco Ayn Rand Society. His subject: "Living as Man: Ayn Rand and the History of Ethics." Time: 8:30 P.M. Place: Marines' Memorial Club, 609 Sutter at Mason, San Francisco. Open to the public. Admission: \$3.00. For further information, contact Paul Eisen at (415) WE 1-8326.

■ On Tuesday, September 12, NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE will begin a ten-lecture course on "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge," to be given by Dr. Leonard Peikoff in New York City. Time: 7:30 P.M. Place: NBI Auditorium, Empire State Bldg. Visitor's admission: \$3.75. For further details, contact NBI.

■ On Monday, October 9, Nathaniel Branden's course on "Basic Principles of Objectivism" will begin in New York City. Time: 7:30 P.M. Place: Hotel New Yorker, 34th St. at Eighth Ave. Visitor's admission: \$3.75. (College and high school students: \$3.00.) Ayn Rand will participate in the question period which follows the lecture. Further information about the course will be mailed to NBI's mailing list in the New York

City area. (The rest of the course will be given in the NBI Auditorium in the Empire State Bldg.)

■ NBI's Tape Transcription Division has scheduled starting dates in the following cities: "Basic Principles of Objectivism" in San Diego, Sept. 28; Los Angeles, Sept. 30; San Francisco, Oct. 3; Seattle, Oct. 5; Pittsburgh, Oct. 5; Cleveland, Oct. 6; Denver, Oct. 7; Cincinnati, Oct. 7; Boston, Oct. 13; Toronto, Oct. 25; Chicago, Oct. 27; Detroit, Oct. 29; Washington, D.C., Nov. 5 — "Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology" in Houston, Sept. 24; Phoenix, Sept. 26; Minneapolis, Oct. 28. Mr. Branden will deliver the opening night lecture in person in all the above cities, with the exception of Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Cincinnati, where Dr. Leonard Peikoff will deliver the opening lecture. (The rest of the course will be given via tape transcription.)

The following starting dates have also been scheduled: "Three Plays by Ayn Rand" in Los Angeles, Sept. 1—"The Esthetics of the Visual Arts" in Vancouver, Sept. 10—"Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" in Kansas City, Sept. 10—"The Principles of Efficient Thinking" in Warrensburg, Mo., Sept. 18—"Contemporary Theories of Neurosis" in Los Angeles, Sept. 25—"The Psychology of Romantic Love" in Toronto, Sept. 26. For further information, contact NBI.

■ "The Wreckage of the Consensus," a lecture given by Ayn Rand and recorded at the Ford Hall Forum in Boston, on April 16, 1967, is now available on a single LP record. It may be purchased from NBI BOOK SERVICE; price: \$3.75. (N.Y. State residents add sales tax.)

■ "An Introduction to Objectivism," a lecture by Nathaniel Branden, based on his essay "The Moral Revolution in *Atlas Shrugged*" in *Who Is Ayn Rand?*, is now available as a two-record LP album. In this lecture, Mr. Branden discusses the essentials of the ethical and political philosophy of Objectivism, and its relevance to the crucial problems of today's world. The album may be purchased from NBI BOOK SERVICE; price: \$7.50. (N.Y. State residents add sales tax.)

—B.B.

NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE will move to new and larger quarters in the Empire State Building on September 1. Located in the lower lobby of the world's tallest building, the INSTITUTE's headquarters will contain its own administrative offices, the administrative offices of THE OBJECTIVIST, NBI BOOK SERVICE and NBI COMMUNICATIONS, and a newly constructed lecture auditorium.

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