

SDS new left notes

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SUCKS

all power to the people

Last summer, picking up off of the siege of Columbia, with the images of France fresh in our minds, was the first time that white kids got heavy into moving in the streets in a widespread way. Columbia showed us that it was possible—necessary—to take the offensive. By the time the Democratic Convention rolled around, we had been through fights at the Boston Commons, Berkeley and the Haight, and many smaller actions in other cities.

Those experiences were our best education. We were learning that to move in a positive way we needed to work in groups, and always be prepared for the tactical situation. Getting into fighting meant digging on survival—we fight because we want to win. Learning to fight isn't easy, and a lot of people got hurt and busted in the process. But our clumsiness didn't stop us from immobilizing Pig City last summer.

'Did you go to Chicago?
'Did you see what we did there?'

This summer produced a different kind of energy. After a year of moving, kids were more pissed than ever. But there weren't a lot of big actions around turf or the pigs like last summer. Action has generally been short and tight—a park thing, a beach thing. It's been a time to tighten up, hang into groups, feel that tension

mounting inside. 'Hope you have got your thing together/ cause there's a bad moon on the rise....' Tension mounting, waiting to explode.

In Chicago the war is coming home. Last week there was action every day in the Loop. On Black Monday, 3000 members of the United Coalition for Community Action demonstrated at the Civic Center, demanding black jobs in the construction trades. On Tuesday night people marched from Lincoln Park to the Loop in the first action centering around the conspiracy trial.

Wednesday was the heaviest, when over 2000 people rallied outside the Federal Building, marched to Grant Park, and then moved out into the streets demanding that the trial be stopped. Storefronts and pig wagons were stoned. In the resulting fights 15 people were hospitalized, 10 of them pigs. 18 people were busted, 13 of whom are SDS people who have been organizing in Chicago for the national action. Three of these were arrested at gunpoint in a raid at an apartment several hours later, and four others in the following days were charged on warrants with several misdemeanors and two felonies, with bails ranging from \$5,000 to \$11,000.

But the thing is already happening. The struggle can't be put in jail. The high schools and subway stations are covered with slogans. People know that the shit is coming down again, and a lot more of them are with us. Images of last August are close.... See you on the 8th.

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What appears to be an arrow is actually a poison dart, defiantly launched by Marion Delgado from an overhanging branch. Live like him!

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SOLIDARITY WITH
LATIN AMERICA

October 8, day of
the heroic guerilla

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN URUGUAY:

TUPAMAROS

Among the many protests staged by Latin Americans to demonstrate their opposition to US policies during Governor Nelson Rockefeller's recent visit was the destruction of the General Motors offices in Montevideo, Uruguay by a commando of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN), also known as the Tupamaros. Despite extreme security measures, four men, dressed as police officers and armed with machine guns, broke into the GM office building and tied two night watchmen. They sprayed fuel in several rooms and on some six cars and set the building on fire. The pamphlets found on the scene bore the five-pointed star of the Tupamaros, and protested the visit of Rockefeller, "agent of imperialism". In July, with Uruguay under martial law, the Tupamaros killed one policeman and disarmed several in five raids.

The Tupamaros have been President Jorge Pacheco Areco's major headache since he took over the Presidency in 1967, after General Oscar Gestido died in office. They are the major guerrilla movement in Latin America today and operate in an area—urban guerrilla warfare—where all other revolutionary attempts have failed in recent years.

Since Fidel Castro and his followers overthrew Batista, many Latin American revolutionaries have become convinced that the only means to achieve power is guerrilla warfare. In certain countries, notably Venezuela, revolutionaries have tried both urban and rural warfare.

The Tupamaros have done a good deal to advance the opposite case in Uruguay. Almost at the same time that urban guerrilla warfare was abandoned in Venezuela, the Tupamaros adopted that strategy as the most adequate for the "objective conditions" existing in their country. Its population had benefited from an advanced welfare system and its predominant middle class had enjoyed a high real standard of living in comparison with the rest of the continent. In fact, Uruguay was the "Switzerland of Latin America".


By the mid-fifties, however, Uruguay's economy began to falter. Anti-inflationary measures applied by the government in the early sixties met with increasing opposition. In June 1968, after the cost of living had increased 160% in 15 months, President Pacheco Areco sought to stop inflation by establishing wage and price controls. The decision was preceded by a month of violent clashes between the police and workers, civil servants, teachers, and students (striking for more money for education and a lower bus fare). Pacheco Areco declared Uruguay under limited martial law. This state of siege did not calm the situation, and strikes went on.

The origins of the MLN are still very obscure. In a country small enough for everybody to discover the best-guarded secret, very little is known about the Tupamaros, how they came into being as a group, who the leader or leaders are. The name comes from Tupac Amaru, the 18th-century Inca cacique who led an unsuccessful rebellion against Spain.

The Tupamaros first identified themselves as a revolutionary group August 9, 1965, when shortly before midnight a high-caliber bomb exploded in front of the offices occupied by Bayer, the chemical concern. A leaflet with the following message was found nearby: "Death to Vietnam's Yankee assassins. The assassin's intervention in Vietnam must be answered by the union of all oppressed people. The common enemy must be crushed. Bayer, a Nazi enterprise, provides gas for the gringos' intervention. Viva Vietnam. Viva la Revolucion. TUPAMAROS." In September 1968, hundreds of students clashed with the police and three students were killed. In January 1969, striking civil servants clashed with the police in Montevideo. One person was killed and 32 people were injured.

On March 15, 1969, the state of siege was lifted. However, as a result of the unrest provoked by Rockefeller's visit, Pacheco Areco reinstated martial law and added one item: all news concerning the Tupamaros was to be censored.

The fundamental factor that prompted the Tupamaros to launch their strategy in the early sixties was their belief that Uruguay had entered a deep and prolonged crisis. The measures adopted to cure Uruguay's economic ills hit the middle class particularly hard. Civil servants, bank employees, and students have defied martial law and gone on strike against the rising cost of living. Some have joined the Tupamaros. The two Tupamaros arrested after a Banco de Cobranzas holdup in 1964 proved to be a professor of the Escuela Nacional de Bellas Artes and an ex-student of that institution. The police subsequently arrested an engineer who had provided the arms for the robbery. The Tupamaros boast: "Most of the people may not be ready to take part in our struggle, but at least they are not willing to get killed defending a government that harms them."



On July 31, 1963, a small group of men broke into the rifle club of Nueva Helvecia—a sleepy town in Uruguay's hinterland—and stole 31 rifles and 2 carbines, most of which had been lent to the club by the Uruguayan armed forces. At first the police attributed the robbery to common criminals, but gradually they concluded that it had been a political act, and singled out Raul Sendic as the leader. They are probably right.

The Nueva Helvecia robbery marked the beginning of a long series of attacks against arsenals. Dynamite, rifles, guns, military and police uniforms have disappeared in swift commando operations. On January 1, 1964, the customs office of Bella Union, a town on the border of Brazil, was attacked by a handful of men who escaped with 19 rifles. In February 1966, a commando broke into a theatre showing an Arnold Wesker play and stole 10 Mausers and 18 military uniforms lent by the Uruguayan armed forces for the performance.

Banks have been another target. In their last bank holdup they got away with almost \$10,000. On November 29, 1968, six men entered Montevideo's Casino Carrasco at 3:45 p.m. and left with \$25,000. On February 18, 1969, seven men dressed in the Tupamaros' favorite disguise, police uniforms, forced their way into Punta del Este's elegant Casino San Rafael and escaped with some \$200,000.

Montevideo's main radio stations have also been attacked by the Tupamaros. The sabotage of Radio Ariel, owned by Jorge Batlle, a close adviser of Pacheco Areco, was particularly effective. The station was raided a few minutes before the President was to address the nation, and the damage was so great that it had to be closed for several days. The Tupamaros escaped, taking some short-wave transmitters with them.

The most unusual Tupamaro raid was that of the "Hunger Commando". That group held up a truck owned by a food-store chain on December 24, 1963, and distributed its chickens, turkeys, and sweets to the inhabitants of a slum for their Christmas dinner.

new left notes

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WHEN YOU GET TO CHICAGO...

The central communication number for the action is 641-7133. When you get to town you should call that number, and you will be told which movement center you and your region will be working out of. Do not call or come to the National Office. For security reasons, absolutely no one but N. O. staff will be admitted into the building. Anyone else who comes to the office will not be allowed in. The National Office telephones will not be functioning as communication lines during the action. So don't call here either. Central communication number: 641-7133

PROBLEMS WITH THE PRINTED WORD...

It seems that there is a fascist in our local Greyhound Express Office, and that a lot of folks have not received their literature orders recently. When we send orders Greyhound we always send a postcard to you telling you the date we shipped the order and the invoice number of the shipping ticket. If you have received one of our postcards but not your literature, you should contact Dennis Waldman, Literature Secretary, at the National Office. All orders are insured, so that we will be able to either replace the order or refund the money you paid for it.

LIVE LIKE THEM

THE SMALLEST ARMED GROUP HAS MORE CHANCE TO BECOME A PEOPLE'S ARMY THAN THE GROUP THAT LIMITS ITSELF TO "REVOLUTIONARY POSITIONS"

The transformation of Uruguay's left-wing militants into Tupamaros took place somewhere between 1962 and 1963. That year Sendic and the Socialist Party militants who had been organizing the nonunionized workers of Uruguay's countryside decided to form a paramilitary group, independent of the official line adopted by the Socialist Party. That group was the Tupamaros, and their first holdup, at Nueva Helvecia, was carried out without the support or knowledge of the party.

The second stage in their evolution came about when the Tupamaros decided that a paramilitary group connected with a specific party was not an adequate solution. They became the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, which welcomes all militants who agree with its strategy and tactics.

The basic principle which has guided the MLN is that revolutionary action in itself—that is, the process of arming and preparing oneself, acquiring equipment and finally carrying out actions that violate bourgeois legality—generates revolutionary conscience, organizations, and conditions. Platforms and documents are important, but they are not sufficient to make a revolution. Furthermore, the principles of "a Socialist revolution have been spelled out and tried out in countries like Cuba. They cannot be discussed any longer."

Their position concerning strategy is quite clear. "Although the efforts to create a party or a mass movement before initiating an armed struggle cannot be disregarded, there is no doubt that armed struggle quickens and precipitates mass movements. Nobody can doubt any longer that the smallest armed group has more chance to become a popular army than the group that limits itself to taking 'revolutionary positions'." This rejection of the debate among numerous Latin American leftists over the role of the political party in the revolutionary process is typical of the Tupamaros and stems from their lack of dogmatism in everything except their ultimate goal, socialism. They place themselves in the Marxist-Leninist camp, consider their struggle to be part of a continental strategy aimed at creating "more Vietnams".

"Strategy valid for this day, this month, and this year... (is) to create as soon as possible an armed force capable of taking advantage of any favorable situation created either by Uruguay's crisis or by any other factor. To create consciousness in the population, through the actions of armed groups or any other means. To create bases in the cities and in the countryside. To connect ourselves with other Latin American revolutionary movements for action throughout the continent."

The Tupamaros discarded rural guerrilla warfare because Uruguay lacks the mountains or jungles where a "foco" can be organized. On the other hand, it is highly urbanized, at least 70% of its 2,560,000 inhabitants live in cities and almost half in Montevideo alone. The capital also dominates Uruguay's economic life, handles most of the international trade, consumes 75% of the electricity, and contains most of the industry. Montevideo was considered a far better setting for a guerrilla base than the flat, sparsely populated countryside.

Although police estimate that there are some 100 hard-core Tupamaros the exact number is unknown. A recent publication indicates that the total is 1,000, but with only 50 or 100 participating in commando operations. The members are divided into completely independent cells of six or seven men, coordinated through the leaders, and each Tupamaro ignores the real identity of his fellow cell members. Decisions for commando operations are put to a vote, individually or by cells. Leaders meet once a year to discuss their unit's instructions and evaluations. It is not known whether the MLN has both a military and a political leadership or whether they are united in one person.

In the last three years the police have uncovered some eleven Tupamaro bases. Several were hide-outs, others were makeshift ammunition factories, and still others provided services. In one of them, a photographer's shop, the raiders found equipment to make ID cards similar to those issued by Uruguay's police. All the

machines used in the forgeries and even the paper were legitimate and had been obtained from police headquarters. The type of equipment found in Tupamaro hide-outs has led observers to believe that the movement provided Guevara with the false Uruguayan passport he used on his way to Bolivia.

Only two Tupamaros have been killed since 1965, when the MLN stepped up its activities, but at least 20 men connected with the movement are in jail. Although some are thought to have been tortured, the information obtained by the police has not led to a major crackdown because of the cell organization. No top-ranking Tupamaro has been caught. Sendic, whose capture was ordered after the Nueva Helvecia holdup and who is believed to be one of the top members of the MLN, if not the leader, is still at large. He is thought to have led the Casino San Rafael robbery, having spent at least two months in Punta del Este before the holdup, with his wife and youngest child.

The Tupamaro intelligence service has infiltrated even the police, and the current joke in Montevideo is that if you want to find out the exact weather forecast, ask a Tupamaro. Their information on Uruguay's armed forces is voluminous. The police have captured documents which disclose a precise knowledge of the Montevideo garrisons—number of men, identity of officers, schedules, private addresses, logistics, etc. On February 7, 1969, a guerrilla deposited a package containing some 60 pounds of dynamite at the doorstep of the captain who is the Uruguayan army's armament technician. The following letter was attached to the package: "Captain Manzino: This material is in bad shape; since it is dangerous to handle it, we have decided to destroy it. We believe you are best equipped for this task. We are aware of your technical expertise. At any rate, since these boxes were ultimately going to be examined by you, we decided to avoid delays and give them to you. Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (Tupamaros)."

The Tupamaros have not attacked the government frontally, but have sought either to expose its corruption (i.e. the Monty holdup), or force it to display its weakness and respond with irrational repression. On August 7, 1968, a commando kidnapped Dr. Ulises Pereira Reverbel, president of the state-owned Electricity and Telephone Services, a close friend of President Pacheco Areco and one of the ideologues of the hard anti-labor line followed by the government. MLN issued a statement taking full credit for the kidnapping and warning the police not to search for the prisoner. Despite strenuous efforts on the part of Montevideo's police force, Pereira Reverbel was not found until he reappeared five days later, haggard, unshaven but unharmed, in a Land Rover parked near Montevideo's main football stadium. The kidnapping was not done only for publicity, like Fidel Castro's kidnapping of Juan Manuel Fangion, the Argentine racing champion. It sought to create support among the workers who had been subjected to Pereira Reverbel's anti-labor policies. In its efforts to locate him, however, the government ordered the search to include the university. The police entered some buildings without a warning and without requesting permission from the rector. Students opposed the search and violent clashes ensued.

The Tupamaros have achieved the first stages of their strategy without terrorism. They fight with the police only when they are forced. Whenever their raids might hurt civilians, they make a point of protecting them. During a bank holdup, the Tupamaros helped an elderly lady who had fainted. Afterward, even Montevideo's chief of police had to admit "the perfect organization, the good manners of the robbers and their humane behavior". On another occasion, when the Tupamaros blew up the transmission room of Radio Ariel, they first took time to warn the people in a nearby house that they might be hurt by the explosion. Consequently, Uruguayans have not been seriously harmed by the Tupamaro raids, although on occasion passers-by have been wounded. Thus to a certain extent, and without necessarily approving its goals, they admire the MLN's audacity and expertise.



The name of Regis Debray often brings a snicker to the lips of "intellectual radicals" in their university positions. This is indicative of the fact that they are merely in the "movement", not the revolution, and in reality serve only to hinder the people's struggles. A discussion of political and political, politics and politicking in Latin America has much relevance to the situation today in the mother country of imperialism.

A new revolutionary organization appears on the scene. It aspires to legal existence and then to participation in "normal" political life, in order to consolidate and make a name for itself and thus prepare the conditions for armed struggle. But lo and behold, it is gradually absorbed, swallowed up by the routine of public political life. It recruits a few members, a few activists, holds its first congress, mimeographs a newspaper and various bulletins. Then come the hundred annual assemblies, the thousand rallies, permanent representation with other organizations to be arranged, public relations to be maintained. The balance sheet is always positive: Functionaries function, printing presses print, delegates travel; leaders are always overwhelmed with work; in brief, the machine is in motion. It has cost dearly and it must be cared for. The organization is "growing stronger".

The prospects of insurrectional struggle diminish, delayed first for a few months and then for years. Time passes, with its vicissitudes, and there is an increasing tendency to view the opening of hostilities as a somewhat sacrilegious temptation, a kind of adventurism, perennially "premature". True, the militants who may get restless and demand an explanation must be pacified; then a small annual contingent of "military cadres" will be formed—a matter to be handled by the Top Leadership, but known to the organization's activists, who whisper their hopes to each other. Alas, the moment has not come; there are always unforeseen factors. The militants must understand that to enter into armed struggle at a given moment would be to destroy the sacred unity of the organization, to sabotage its legality, to provoke repressions against its leaders. In short, the political organization has become an end in itself. It will not pass over into armed struggle because it must first wait until it establishes itself solidly as the party of the vanguard, even though in reality it cannot expect recognition of its vanguard status except through struggle. This vicious circle has plagued the revolutionary struggle for years.

Consequently, it is useless to create antibodies in the heart of existing political organizations: the opportunist infection, far from being halted, will be aggravated, exacerbated. It has been proved that certain political or ideological struggles, certain public polemics, have only delayed the opening of the decisive mass struggle. The creation of one more political "foco" mobilizes only the mobilized: a number of militants and a handful of old leaders are siphoned off from one party to another, subtle internal adjustments are made within the profession, but this does not result in raising the level of the class struggle; it even tends to lower the level since the struggle is not based on genuine positions—nonexistent on both sides as far as the national reality is concerned—but on personal gossip, animosities, trivia. These changes do not interest the workers and peasants, who are in fact unaware of them; and they do not alarm the ruling class at all. Rather, they localize the focus of infection. The capital's mid-town area abounds with congresses, public lectures, bulletins, posters, all completely legal; meanwhile, in these same countries these same governments ferret out "activists", not so noisy but deemed more dangerous.

Antibodies must be created at the base, at the level of the masses, by offering them a real alternative within their reach. Only then will the existing political leaderships be changed. In most Latin American countries, it is only when the armed struggle has begun or is about to begin that the process of removing the revolution from its ghetto, from the level of academic

talk-fests, from a caste of permanent globe-trotters, can get under way. In philosophical language, a certain problematique has vanished since the Cuban revolution, that is to say a certain way of posing questions which governs the meaning of all possible answers. These "Marxist-Leninist" fractions or parties operate within the problematique which is imposed by the bourgeoisie; they are bogged down in false problems, quarrels over precedence or office-holding in left organizations, electoral fronts, trade union maneuvers, blackmail against their own members. This is what is called quite simply politicking. In order to escape it, there must be a change of terrain, in every sense of the word.

The new political organizations—all the "Marxist-Leninist" parties or groups that have been formed since the Cuban Revolution, were established, according to their own claims, for the purpose of precipitating the armed struggle which had been sabotaged by the "revisionists". They have not achieved their objective. Furthermore, in order to justify their claim to sole possession of the role of vanguard of the proletariat, these organizations have ended by sabotaging the armed struggle wherever it remains to be carried out. In their condemnation of those who have put their propaganda into practice, they sometimes find themselves on the same side as the leadership of the parties they have severed connections with—verbal adversaries but partners in fact, playing the same game. It would be too boring, too tedious, to examine the failure of the organizations or parties styling themselves, above all, "pro-Chinese". At the first stages of organization they are able to attract honest and resolute militants, thanks to their programs and their promises. Very soon, however, their method of work, the noisy opportunism of their political line, the hypocritical sabotage of their own official line on the armed struggle, lead the revolutionary strata, principally the youth, to abandon them. They then find themselves grappling with the added hostility of yet another political organization. Sad to say, in some countries, revolutionary groups which are in the midst of serious preparations for the armed struggle feel that they are under observation and are more persecuted by these "Marxist-Leninist" parties, from which many of them came, than they are even by the repressive agencies.

In Latin America, wherever an armed political vanguard exists, there is no longer a place for verbal-ideological relation to the revolution, nor for a certain type of polemic. We are on new ground; we are dealing with new issues. Wherever imperialism is actually challenged, splinter groups are re-absorbed, and revolutionaries unite on methods and objectives tied to the people's war.

No one can avoid seeing that in Latin America today, the struggle against imperialism is decisive. If it is decisive, then all else is secondary.

If the armed struggle of the masses against imperialism is capable of creating by itself, in the long run, a vanguard capable of leading the people to socialism, it cannot define itself in terms of its relations to reformism or any other existing political organization, but fundamentally in terms of its relation to imperialism. To regulate the pace of its action by comparison with the inaction of the reformists is not only to lose time, it is to paralyze the decisive in the name of the secondary.


Furthermore, the best way of putting an end to vacillations is to pass over to the attack on imperialism and its local agents wherever conditions are ripe. In this way the problem is inverted. It will be up to the conciliators to determine their position vis-a-vis the revolutionaries, not vice versa. It is they who must define themselves in terms of reality. If they join in the struggle against the Empire, so much the better for everyone; if they hold back, so much the worse for them—history will see to it that they are left by the wayside. A successful ambush, a torturer cut down, a consignment of arms captured—these are the best answer to reformist faintheartedness which may arise in one or another American country.

Since the Cuban Revolution and since the invasion of Santo Domingo, a state of emergency has existed in Latin America. The Marines shoot at anything that moves, regardless of party affiliation. For reasons of both emergency and principle, the armed revolutionary front is a must. Wherever the fighting has followed an ascending line, wherever the popular forces have responded to the emergency, they have moved into the magnetic field of unity. Elsewhere they are scattered and weak. Events would seem to indicate the need to focus all efforts on the practical organization of the armed struggle, with a view to achieving unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

Those who have taken up arms in Latin America today have rallied round this line of action. All groups that come closer to the armed struggle are also converging on this line. This encounter owes nothing to chance, still less to conspiracy. No one has given a signal, as the oligarchs pretend to think. This encounter is simply rational. In a given historic situation there may be a thousand ways to speak of the revolution—but there must be one necessary concordance among all those who have resolved to make it.

Revolution

REGIS DEBRAY two excerpts



Education in the Revolution

What is the situation in many Latin American countries today?

The guerrilla focos, when they first begin their activity, are located in regions of highly dispersed and relatively sparse population. Peasants know very well that fine words cannot be eaten and will not protect them from bombardment. The poor peasant believes, first of all, in anyone who has a certain power, beginning with the power to do what he says. The system of oppression is subtle: it has existed from time immemorial, fixed, entrenched, and solid. The army, the guardia rural, the latifundista's private police, or nowadays the "Green Berets" and Rangers, enjoy a prestige all the greater for being subconscious. This prestige constitutes the principal form of oppression: it immobilizes the discontented, silences them, leads them to swallow affronts at the mere sight of a uniform. The neocolonial ideal is still to show force in order not to have to use it, but to show it is in effect to use it.

In other words, the physical force of the police and army is considered to be unassailable, and unassailability cannot be challenged by words but by showing that a soldier and a policeman are no more bullet-proof than anyone else. The guerrillero, on the other hand, must use his strength in order to show it, since he has little to show but his determination and his ability to make use of his limited resources. He must make a show of strength and at the same time demonstrate that the enemy's strength is first and foremost his bluster. In order to destroy the idea of unassailability—that age-old accumulation of fear and humility vis-a-vis the patrono, the policeman, the guardia rural—there is nothing better than combat. Then, as Fidel tells us, the unassailability vanishes as rapidly as respect engendered by habit turns into ridicule. The very peasants who take up arms and join the guerrilla force on the same footing as the veterans begin to underestimate the enemy and take it lightly; at this stage a contrary duty devolves upon the guerrilla leadership: to concede some prestige to the enemy, so as to preclude the running of unnecessary risks.

Lastly, the absence of organized or semi-regular revolutionary forces. Armed propaganda, at least if it is geared to combat, seeks precisely to organize regular units or to expand existing units, by means of "political recruiting". Thus, villages are "stormed" to assemble the populace and hold propaganda meetings. But in reality how have the inhabitants of these villages been helped to rid themselves of their class enemies? In the course of these operations, few arms have been acquired. Even if young peasants are spurred by enthusiasm to join the guerrilleros, with what will they be armed?

Many comrades have concluded from these experiences that an ambush of a column of reinforcements or some other blow leveled at the enemy in the vicinity would have aroused more enthusiasm in a given village, attracted new recruits, given a more profound moral and political lesson to the villagers, and—most important of all—would have procured the arms so essential to a new guerrilla unit. The destruction of a troop transport truck or the public execution of a police torturer is more effective propaganda for the local population than a hundred speeches. Such conduct convinces them of the essential: that the Revolution is on the march, that the enemy is no longer invulnerable. It convinces them, to begin with, that the soldier is an enemy—their enemy—and that a war is under way, the progress of which is dependent on their daily activities. Afterwards, speeches may be made and will be heeded. In the process of such raids the fighters collect arms, reduce the enemy's military potential, acquire experience, demoralize enemy troops, and renew the hopes of militants throughout the country. The agitational

and propagandistic impact resides in this very concentration of effects. A significant detail: During two years of warfare, Fidel did not hold a single political rally in his zone of operations.

In other words, armed propaganda follows military action but does not precede it. Armed propaganda has more to do with the internal than with the external guerrilla front. The main point is that under present conditions, the most important form of propaganda is successful military action.

To consider armed propaganda as a stage distinct from and prior to military operations is, it seems, to provoke the enemy needlessly, to expose the comrades working as propagandists to assassination or the need to escape, and to expose a future or possible zone of guerrilla action.

The lack of previous experience in armed struggle under historic and social conditions peculiar to Latin America has made for imitation (perhaps unconscious) of the Vietnamese experience, torn from its context. A misreading of the Cuban Revolution—a revolution well known in its external detail but whose inner content has not yet been sufficiently studied—may also have played its part. It was perhaps wrong to link the name of foco with a people's army in the process of formation in the countryside, whose aim was the encirclement and arousal of the city population. A kind of biological interpretation has spontaneously tied the idea of a foco to that of contagion, of spontaneous generation, microbial spread to neighboring tissue, by the simple magic effect of content or proximity. A hundred men incite the mountain population with speeches; the regime, terrified, collapses to the accompaniment of jeers; and the barbudos are acclaimed by the people. In this way one confuses a military foco—motor force of a total war—with a foco of political agitation. It appears to have been simply forgotten that the "26th of July" Cubans first made a war without a single unilateral truce; that during only a few months of 1958, the Rebel Army engaged in more battles than have other American fronts during a year or two; that in two months the rebels broke Batista's last offensive; and that 300 guerrilleros repulsed and routed 10,000 men. A general counter-offensive followed.

This was a war that cost dearly in combatant casualties; a war that, although exceptionally short, required nonetheless a wealth of tactical inventiveness, mobility, and audacity—together with real soundness of strategy. It has simply been forgotten that Patria o Muerte is not a slogan with which to end speeches but a principle of conduct which the Cuban fighters followed to the letter in all their actions from the attack on the small La Plata fort in the capture of Santa Clara. Strategically they staked all, and in the end they won all.

Of course this strategic decision—to stake everything—should not lead the guerrilla forces to a tactic of undertaking decisive battles that can cost them the revolution. It is pointless to expect to win everything in one battle. In the battle of Guisa, for example, in November, 1968, Fidel, with 200 guerrilleros (of whom 100 were raw recruits), opposed 5,000 soldiers of the dictatorship, plus their tanks, planes, and artillery. But the rebels always had the possibility of withdrawing from the plains to the mountains where they could skillfully take advantage of the terrain. The battle was more important for the enemy than for the revolution since the latter had other columns elsewhere invading the island. To risk all means that having risen in the mountains, the fighters must wage a war to the death. A war that does not admit of truces, retreats, or compromises. To conquer is to accept as a matter of principle that life. To conquer is to accept as a matter of principle that life, for the supreme revolutionary, is not the supreme good.



WE ARE NOT THE ARMED BRANCH OF ANY PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION

The Liberation Armed Commandos have been in the process of formation during the past few years, but we started operations in September 1967 by simultaneously burning down Bargain Town, Carolina and three other stores owned by Yankees in the Santa Rosa, Bayamon shopping center.

WHAT ARE YOUR OBJECTIVES IN RESORTING TO THIS TYPE OF STRUGGLE?

Our actions are aimed at undermining the colonial stability and peace of the imperialist invaders; we are in the first stage of operations, and in this phase we intend to cause \$100 million worth of damages to US concerns. Our idea is to inflict such heavy losses on these enterprises that the insurance companies will have to pay out more money in indemnity than they have received in payments, thus upsetting the economy.

HAVE YOU ACHIEVED ANY PRACTICAL RESULTS?

Let me explain. When the losses amounted to \$14 million, the first crisis of the insurance companies was precipitated; they started to cancel policies taken out on fire losses by US enterprises. Furthermore, the attitude of the insurance companies forced the colonial legislature to enact a special law whereby the Government of Puerto Rico subsidizes the insurance companies. It was necessary to set up a special fund for policies on liabilities that are financially burdensome to the companies. By escalating this action, as we propose to do, the time will come when the Government will be unable to continue to subsidize these companies. So far it has only tried to patch up the situation.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF YOUR ACTIONS AGAINST US INTERESTS?

In our actions we have kept in mind the experiences of the revolutionary struggles in other countries—for instance, the Algerian experience—regarding this stage of urban struggle, but we apply this experience to the Puerto Rican reality, which has its own special—though not exceptional—characteristics; we apply in Puerto Rico whatever we can from the struggles all over the world.

YOU REFER TO THE "SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS" OF PUERTO RICO. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

Puerto Rico is a US military and economic bulwark in the Caribbean; in this appraisal we coincide with other Puerto Rican fighters for independence; it's just that they wage their struggle on the political plane, while we are waging an armed struggle. I will elaborate on this. The situation of our country implies a series of limitations, but also certain possibilities that revolutionaries in other countries do not have. Less effort is required to strike at the imperialist enemy in Puerto Rico than anywhere else.

But there's something else. Our struggle for independence will be carried out by many organizations—that is, it will manifest itself in various fronts through many different organizations.

THEN THE LIBERATION ARMED COMMANDOS CONSTITUTE THE ARMED BRANCH?

We are not the armed branch of any particular organization; we are the armed branch of the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico, although that doesn't mean that there is any formal agreement between us and the various independence organizations. In the Commandos we have some people who don't belong to any organization other than ours.

WHAT METHOD DO YOU USE FOR GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE AND SPREADING ARMED STRUGGLE?

We begin by linking our actions with the specific problems of the working class and the people in general affected by the presence of imperialism here. For instance, when the telephone workers' strike broke out last April we got ready to sabotage the telephone company, which is a branch of the IT&T monopoly, in solidarity with the workers on strike. Our actions against the telephone company prompted its running full-page ads in the local newspapers offering a substantial reward for any information leading to our arrest. In our first bulletin we showed the people how to take an active part in the war against the telephone company.

WHAT WERE CAL'S FUNDAMENTAL TASKS DURING ITS FIRST YEAR OF STRUGGLE?

First, to organize, discipline, and train the members of our organization. We have worked not only in the formation of cadres, the organization of cells, and the training of Commandos, but also in getting the necessary resources to carry on our revolutionary struggle. We took up, organized, and disciplined a spontaneous armed struggle that has been going on in Puerto Rico for the past 10 years. Naturally, this year we began to put into practice our plans for armed struggle, consisting of sabotaging the imperialist enterprises that have gradually taken over the economic life of our country.



HAVE YOU ANY PROGRAM EXPRESSING YOUR IDEOLOGY AND ASPIRATIONS?

Within the next few days we will issue a manifesto setting forth our program; we have been publishing a bulletin since last September. This is in addition to the communiques we have issued on our actions. In our bulletin we give instructions to the people on how to sabotage the imperialist enterprises and take part in the struggle to kick the Yankees out.

As a part of our armed struggle we have carried out—and will continue to carry out—operations against this Condado zone, the lair of the US gangsters and mafia and Cuban counter-revolutionaries who control the casinos of the big hotels in this area, and who have even outdone—as far as prostitution and drug peddling are concerned—the Havana of pre-revolutionary days. All these night clubs practice discrimination against Puerto Rican artists. We have declared Condado a war zone and have warned Puerto Ricans not to go through it, especially at night. Moreover, we are preparing to engage in more important operations, including confrontations, with the henchmen of imperialism.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE REPRESSION THAT HAS BEEN UNLEASHED AGAINST YOU.

Well, I'll tell you; they have brought down FBI experts and explosive experts, and increased the resources of the Criminal Investigation Corps—the police force in charge of suppressing the patriotic struggle of our people. But they have failed. Our organization has been set up so as to be impregnable, so they haven't the slightest possibility of hitting us.

WHAT ABOUT THE ARRESTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE?

That's because the pressures brought to bear by US investors and the reactionary press forced them to produce scapegoats; they look for these scapegoats among the more active independence organizations. That explains the arrest of members and even leaders of the Pro-Independence Movement (MPI). The Government offers big rewards and 24-hour-a-day police protection to all those who will testify as witnesses against these scapegoats. They also want to hit the MPI because it is the organization that gets the most people out in the streets in the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico and especially because the MPI has refused to condemn the actions of CAL. (The Independentist Party (PI) has repudiated our actions.)

Not only that, but the General Secretary of the MPI, Juan Mari-Bras, stated that "To the same extent to which they continue to limit the framework of precarious legality wherein the new struggle for independence operates, the underground armed struggle will grow in importance."

HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE EFFECTS OF YOUR ACTIONS ON INVESTORS?

We know that our actions are beginning to be felt, as we have seen their effects in various sectors that support big investment. Time magazine, US News and World Report, and The Wall Street Journal have expressed their concern. In addition to this, we know that the head of the Puerto Rico Industrial Development office in the United States, Danilo Ondina, resigned his post after failing to attract a number of companies that had already made tentative contacts with the Government to set up business in Puerto Rico.

THE DIVERGENCES IN THE SOCIALIST CAMP HAVE HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OF THE WORLD. WAS THERE ANY SUCH EFFECT IN PUERTO RICO?

These divergences have not affected us, because we are quite clear on the specific objectives of our struggle here. Such futile discussion is limited to debating circles in our country. One of the healthy effects of the creation of CAL has been the unmasking of pseudorevolutionary idle talk. Now, anyone who is not engaged in a task in the mass organization or is not a member of CAL is simply running off at the mouth.

We are aware that there is room for other kinds of work; let no one think that we attack those who participate in demonstrations, picketing, and denunciations or who struggle against the draft imposed on our youth by the US imperialists. We know that this is all part of the struggle.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE REACTION OF PUERTO RICAN BUSINESSMEN TO CAL'S ACTIONS AGAINST US ENTERPRISES?

They give us financial aid.

I DON'T WANT TO HOLD YOU HERE ANY LONGER, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ONE LAST QUESTION: WHAT MOVED YOU TO CREATE CAL?

On September 23, 1963, on the occasion of the commemoration of the Cry of Lares, all the patriotic forces signed the so-called Declaration of Lares; in it they pledged themselves to do their best to attain our independence before the Centennial—which is this year. Perhaps that was the biggest stimulus which led us to organize the Liberation Armed Commandos last year, since we considered it our duty to try to make good the Lares pledge, so that the year of the Centennial would find us already engaged in armed struggle for independence under CAL's slogan: Independence or Death!

Before leaving, I wish to express our gratitude for the solidarity offered us by revolutionaries everywhere—but, like Che Guevara in his message to the Tricontinental on the many Viet-Nams, we believe that the greatest solidarity that can be extended to revolutionaries is for everyone to develop his own struggle against US imperialism and all the other oppressors. We are striving to carry out the struggle through our own efforts, basing ourselves on the experiences gained in other parts of the world.



INSURRECTION!

BOMBINGS:

NEW YORK CITY: On September 19, the 40th floor of the Federal Building was blown up with a dynamite charge and timer. The building security force was notified just before the blast, so the building was cleared and no one was hurt. But the offices of the Department of the Army and the Selective Service were heavily damaged. This has been the fourth in a series of acts of political sabotage which have taken place around the New York City area. A United Fruit dock was offed, a grenade factory in New Jersey was blown up, and one of the large city banks was the scene of another bomb plant.

Also on September 19, one of the main stairwells of the Federal Building in Milwaukee, Wisconsin was blown up.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN: 300 people involved in a rally at Wayne State University against university expansion into the neighboring black community and against war research moved into the streets with NLF flags. Two pigs charged John Jacob (J.J.) who was carrying a flag, and a fight resulted with 5 pigs hospitalized, 2 in critical condition. Several pig cars were trashed, and it is reported that \$1,000 damage was done to campus property. Resulting charges: 2 assault on a pig (Karen Latimer and Detroit Luke), 1 felonious assault on a pig, 4 aggravated assault (Dave Chase and Steve Fitch), 1 malicious destruction (Dave Moon), and 1 anarchy (John Jacobs). The pigs, stunned by the fact that the demonstrators were fighting back, panicked, pulled their guns, and held the crowd at gunpoint while they backed their prisoners into the cars.

WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA: A National Guard armory was the target of a terrorist explosion.


MADISON, WISCONSIN:
The National Guard Armory was blown up.

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON: Twelve women sacked a ROTC building on Tuesday. They beat up two cadets, poured red paint on furnishings and files, and escaped. The FBI has been called in to locate the sisters.

CLEVELAND, OHIO: A week ago Sunday, 30 people brought the war home to the Davis Cup Tennis Tournament where the US Imperialists were pitted against the Rumanian Revisionists. The demonstrators carried a Vietcong flag to show which side they were on.

ITHACA, NEW YORK: During registration at Cornell University, 2 women offed the ROTC desk and ripped off all the literature. During the first week of classes, one woman threw a full can of paint all over the Marine recruiter, and was caught and held on \$2500 bail.

MEXICO CITY, MEXICO: A call has gone out to the people of the world for a day of Solidarity and actions on October 2, anniversary of the massacre at the Plaza of Three Cultures, in support of imprisoned Mexican students and all political prisoners. The Mexican students sending out the call have demanded that all political prisoners be freed, and stated that if the demand is not met the government and the ruling class will be subject to revolutionary justice. Two weeks ago a large public demonstration was held in violation of the general ban on political demonstrations. Mexican pigs fired on the crowd with machine guns, killing an undetermined number of demonstrators. A state of fascist repression has existed in Mexico since last October. Many leftist papers and magazines have been closed down, and the student movement has been driven farther to the left, and in many cases underground. Actions will be taken at Mexican consulates in major cities throughout the world.





INTI

VICTORY

Inti Peredo, chief of the National Liberation Army of Bolivia and one of the most outstanding of that country's fighters, who accompanied Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara in his heroic guerrilla group of Nanchahuazu, died in action in La Paz, Bolivia Tuesday, September 9.

Inti Peredo went to his death in the natural setting for his life as a revolutionary: the battle for a new Bolivia in a new Latin America, ideals of liberation to which he was linked ever since he was barely an adolescent and in which he developed as a vanguard fighter and leader until his death at the age of 32.

In 1951, when he was barely 14 years old, Inti Peredo formed part of a small group of young men who, in Trinidad, Department of El Beni, founded the Communist Party, seeking, in this organization, the vehicle for a genuine revolutionary action.

From 1954, when he was arrested together with his brother, Roberto Coco Peredo, for taking part in revolutionary activities, he knew the regime's prisons and beatings on five different occasions, but his fighting spirit never flagged. He held posts of responsibility successively in the communist youth; in the organization of the party in La Paz, of whose regional committee he was First Secretary; and in the Central Committee until his break with the vacillating treacherous line imposed by the leadership of the Communist Party of Bolivia, headed by Mario Monje.

In 1963 Inti gave his valuable internationalist aid to the People's Guerrilla Army, organized by Major Segundo, Ricardo Jorge Masetti, which carried out its operations in the province of Salta, in the northern part of Argentina.

Inti, together with Coco, Rodolfo Saldana, Jorge Vazquez Viana, and other heroic sons of the Bolivian people, was quick to understand that the leadership of the Communist Party of Bolivia was not really ready to embark upon a genuinely revolutionary course such as the country's reality and the Latin American situation demanded, but rather that it was bent on submerging the organization in paralysis, inaction, and discredit. Thus, he broke with the Party leadership.

In 1966 Inti Peredo was one of the principal collaborators of Major Ernesto Guevara in the preparation of the guerrilla force that was to have its base in the southeast of Bolivia.

Inti's development under extremely difficult conditions of struggle was described by Major Ernesto Che Guevara in a historic analysis which reveals the scope of the admiration and confidence that Inti and his brother Coco had earned from their demanding and exceptional leader. "It should be taken into account," Che pointed out, "that Inti and Coco excel ever more firmly as revolutionary and military cadres."

major Inti

With the fall of Che and his comrades, Inti became the standard-bearer and leader of the Bolivian revolutionary cause. By then more experienced in battle, more convinced of the path to be followed, he faced the dangers and the pitfalls of underground life, the constant persecution by agents of the regime and of imperialism, devoting himself entirely to the task of reorganization to once again take the glorious road to the mountains.

And, even though it is impossible to deny how severe a blow his death is to the cause of the revolution in Bolivia, it is no less true that commotions of this nature; examples such as his; selfless, courageous lives such as Inti Peredo's, devoted to the cause of the humble and exploited, immediately transform themselves into forces that spur on the struggle, into historic banners for youth, into a clarion call for duty which shakes consciences and opens up new roads for the revolution.

Today the Bolivian revolution has, instead of one less rifle and one less leader, an additional reason for victory.

There is no room, therefore, for either sadness or disappointment. That is why, today, with renewed strength and unalterable faith in the future—in universities and mines, in the fields and in the city streets, on the plateau and in the jungle—the people of Bolivia repeat, together with Inti, their song of battle:

"We will be the triumphant Vietnam that Che, romantic and heroic visionary, dreamed of and loved.

"Our banners bear crepe but will never be lowered.

"The ELN considers itself the heir to the teachings and example of Che, the new Bolivar of Latin America.

"Those who cravenly murdered him will never kill his thought and his example.

"Let the imperialists and their lackeys withhold their songs of victory, because the war has not ended, it has just begun.

"We will return to the mountains!

"Bolivia will again resound to our cry of

"VICTORY OR DEATH!"

(reprinted from Granma)

VICTORY or DEATH

EXCERPTS FROM INTI'S "WE WILL RETURN TO THE MOUNTAINS", WRITTEN SHORTLY AFTER CHE'S DEATH...

we know what we are fighting for. we are not waging war for the sake of war. we are not wishful thinkers. we are not fighting for the sake of personal or party ambition. our single and final goal is the liberation of latin america....

the time for continental revolution has come. the frantic squealing of the reactionaries and some pseudo-revolutionaries who oppose the participation of patriots from other countries in our people's liberation struggle is nothing but a reflection of their vain attempts to isolate our movement and collaborate with the enemy by creating feelings of chauvinism among the people....

faced with...brutal reality, should we be held back by the prospect of the sacrifices involved in a just war? our struggle will not demand any more sacrifices than those made by our people under this tyranny. That is why the creation of a new vietnam does not constitute a "tragedy". it is an honor and a duty we will never refuse....

for this reason, as long as there is a single honest man in latin america, guerrilla warfare will not die....

let the imperialists and their lackeys withhold their songs of victory, because the war has not ended, it has just begun. we will return to the mountains! bolivia again resound to our cry of victory or death!



ON EVE OF HIS FALL, GUIDO INTI PEREDO SENT CONDOLENCES ON DEATH OF PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

From Bolivia, field of battle in the struggle against US imperialism, the fighters of the National Liberation Army (ELN), intensifying their struggle as the best form of homage to revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh, lower their banners and join the Vietnamese people in grief.

Ho Chi Minh's physical death moves all the revolutionaries of the world.

Ho Chi Minh and the people of Vietnam are inseparable symbols of heroic, unequal struggle against US imperialism.

Ho Chi Minh and Vietnam constitute the most impressive example of the fact that when a people is ready to win or die in defense of its freedom, it cannot be conquered by anybody—not even by the most powerful imperialist force, with all its destructive power.

Ho Chi Minh was a hard working, brilliant political and military leader who knew how to organize his people and imbue it with an exemplary mystique which made it grow stronger in the face of defeats and opened up the definitive path toward a total liberation which looms nearer every day.

The National Liberation Army (ELN), founded by our Major Ernesto Che Guevara in the mountains of Nanchahuazu in the heat of the battles waged against US imperialism and its lackeys, ratifies in this hour of sorrow its unshirkable motto to create "Two, three, many Vietnams...." For Vietnam's struggle is the struggle of all the oppressed peoples of Latin America, and its example constitutes the only path to be followed by all the peoples.

The sorrow that saddens the people of Vietnam by this irreparable death is also the sorrow of the people of Bolivia and of all the oppressed peoples of the world.

The grief of the Communist Party of Vietnam is the ELN's grief.

Our homage to Ho Chi Minh is not limited to formal words. Our homage to this heroic leader of the oppressed peoples is symbolized in the determination to carry on—until Bolivia and Latin America emerge victorious—the guerrilla struggle initiated by our Major Ernesto Che Guevara.

Victory or death!

Inti Peredo