

DOWTY

NEW LEFT NOTES

SDS · 1608 W · MADISON · CHICAGO · ILL.

VOLUME 3, NUMBER 6

LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE

FEBRUARY 12, 1968

The December National Council A Different View

by Alan Spector
New England Regional Organizer
Debbie Levenson
New England Regional Organizer; PLP
and Stuart Rose
Newton High SDS

Mike Spiegel's report on the December NC contains a number of misconceptions and inaccuracies that warrant correction. He maintains that only National Office people were thinking in national terms while local officers were concerned with their chapter-level issues, and therefore little meaningful debate took place. We disagree.

In fact a lot of discussion occurred at the educational conference and the NC dealing with national strategies which SDS as a national movement might adopt. The agenda, including suggested workshop topics, was built around the Calvert-Davidson program for "Ten Days to Shake the Empire". There was very good discussion about it and the opposing strategy in the "base-building" proposal. The difficulty in carrying on that discussion was not that looking at

"SDS as a national organization with national political responsibility... (was) comprehensible only to that minority of SDS members who work at the national level." (Spiegel, New Left Notes, January 8th, 1968)

Our experience is that chapter people, including the ones at the NC, think very seriously about the national focus of the Movement. Indeed, bad national programs do their real damage at the local level. So chapter people have to take these questions seriously. The difficulty in discussion was not chapter people's provincialism, but the failure by those who'd developed the "Ten Days" proposal to defend it. Before the NC some people had obviously liked it—NLN's pages were filled for weeks with articles by National Office people backing "Ten Days" and its "resistance" strategy. Indeed, the NC agenda was based on that strategy—for example, a workshop topic was "choosing targets".

Spiegel feels that chapter peoples' provincialism also produced their hostility toward the NO. In fact the delegates rejected the national program of "Ten Days". This showed good politics, not provincialism.

The main weakness of Spiegel's analysis is its failure to describe the key debate, between the political approach of "Ten Days" and that of "base-building".

"Ten Days" was originally put forth in NLN, and was built into the agenda, supposedly as a way to bring anti-imperialism to the anti-war movement. Its strategy of "resistance" revolves around the notion of picking key imperialist targets such as banks and corporations for demonstrations, to "deobfuscate" them. That is, we should strip them of their phony innocence through "mobile attacks", throwing steers' blood, "seizing strategic positions", and so on. These assaults will show them up as responsible for the War, and for imperialism in general. This "resistance" strategy of minority disruption of the established order was explained as follows in NLN:

"Their purpose was the disruption and obstruction BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY. Politically the occurrence of this kind of activity implies the previous dissolution of whatever legitimacy and authority the institutions being resisted may have formerly had." (New Left Notes, November 13th, 1967, Institutional Resistance, by Carl Davidson)

But, as most delegates argued, only those who already hate the system will cheer such attacks. Our job is not merely to smear "targets". To answer peoples' cynicism we have to win victories in terms of their actual conditions. To answer their confusion we must expose (not just oppose) the system in a convincing way.

The "Ten Days" proposal suggests that we change our attitude toward the bourgeois press and use it at the national level. Many people felt this meant making political decisions without involving the members.

Third, it called for unity with the Mobilization Committee. More on that later.

Along with many others, we liked the "base-building" approach much better. (Unfortunately it was never printed in NLN. In any case, while PL (Progressive Labor) members supported the resolution, it was hardly, as Spiegel claims, only a "PL resolution". It was the majority resolution from the very large national program workshop.) "Base-building" also aims at transforming the anti-war into an anti-imperialist movement. But in contrast to "Ten Days to Shake the Empire" it sees doing this by rooting the Movement in struggles against the ways imperialism screws students and working people. (The latter are barely mentioned in "Ten Days".) During these struggles, the idea is to expose the rottenness of the imperialist system (for example, universities are not neutral refuges of free thought but serve the ruling class, which, in turn, stinks.) Here are some quotes from the preamble and text of the "base-building" proposal to the December National Council:

"...the concept of 'resistance' with no strategy for victory is just another version of the pacifist, moral witness concept. We are for sharpening the struggle with US imperialism, but only on our own grounds—where we come out stronger both ideologically and numerically, and closer to the working class, not fighting it. The whole concept of the present string of 'resistance' demonstrations must lead to a series of tactical defeats. Our weakness is not one of improving our 'military tactics', but one of strategically breaking out of our isolation from the majority of both students and workers.

"The many struggles against university complicity which have taken place during the last 3 months underscore these points. Where SDS chapters have applied a base-building approach, their confrontations have strengthened and broadened anti-imperialist forces. Where they have rushed headlong into super-militant demonstrations or sit-ins, without trying to win over or neutralize the masses of students, they have weakened and isolated themselves. In fact the largest, most militant, and most victorious struggles

of recent months, such as that of Brooklyn College, have grown out of careful base-building work.

"Our strategy shouldn't be based on a cynical outlook toward the vast majority of the American people....The 'resistance' outlook holds...that the working class is apathetic, bought off, and reactionary, but...argues that if a small minority takes super-militant action the workers will follow their lead, even though we have made no attempts to reach them with our political ideas.

"A winning strategy must have two aspects:

"1) We hold that US imperialism hurts most students, both intellectually and materially. Therefore we should not aim at a minority student movement, but at one which encompasses the majority of the campus. We should build a mass anti-imperialist student movement.

"2) We further hold that the central force in defeating US imperialism is the working class, both black and white, whose interests are fundamentally opposed to imperialism. Students will play a very important role in crushing imperialism. Building strong ties between workers and students is absolutely essential for victory. This should not be done only by students becoming workers, but by building an alliance between them....

"A)...for the coming term.... Our primary focus should be an attempt to defeat the open use of the university for the War.... During one week in mid-spring, this organizing should come to a head with sharp, campus-based struggles throughout the nation, relating to the organizing needs of each chapter, including student strikes wherever possible. The national character of these actions creates the possibility that universities may be forced to retreat, giving us victories in some places and laying the basis for future actions in others.

"To prepare for these struggles, we should use this period to broaden our influence among students. We should turn classrooms into forums to debate the universities' complicity with the War, and we should participate in and raise anti-imperialist ideas within student struggles on other issues in order to win over those not yet committed to opposition to the Vietnam war."

A bad aspect of the NC was the decision to send a delegate to the Mobilization (Mob) meetings. In our estimation, the Mob leaders are not "good but confused" people whom SDS should win over. As the recent Mob conference in Chicago showed, it is thoroughly controlled by the YSA and the CP. They swamped the Mob
continued on page 3

South Carolina Black Students Attacked by Cops

3 MURDERED, 50 WOUNDED, SNCC
WORKER HELD ON \$50,000 BAIL

Orangeburg, South Carolina, February 9th: Following is the most up-to-date report available on the murderous police assault on black students at South Carolina State and Claflin Colleges.

Tuesday, February 6th: 50 black students from South Carolina State College attempted to enter a segregated bowling alley located a few blocks from their campus; 20 were illegally arrested for trespassing. Word of the arrests spread quickly, and several hours later 600 students rallied in the plaza of a shopping center near the bowling alley to demand the immediate release of the 20 students. The local cops brought the 20 to the rally site and released them. As the rally broke up, cops started to beat several female students. The crowd responded by smashing windows of white-owned stores.

Wednesday, February 7th: City and state police surrounded the schools and invaded the campuses; several students were beaten by cops. That evening local whites drove through the campus shooting at buildings, students, and campus police; in town, whites attacked black-owned stores. Local police made no attempts to protect the black students or the black residents of Orangeburg. A fire broke out in the black section of the city, and Governor Robert McNair used this as a pretext to alert the National Guard.

Thursday, February 8th: State troopers cordoned off Orangeburg; all incoming traffic was prevented from entering. Agents of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED)—a semi-secret intelligence force of the state police—poured into town and onto the campus. 6 SLED cars were parked in front of the home of Cleveland Sellers, South Carolina SNCC worker. Cleve's house is just across the road from the campus. He was alone and decided it was unsafe to remain in the house, so he went to the campus. During the day most students were on campus in a series of meetings planning protest activities. A delegation went to City Hall. Cleve reported from jail that he took virtually no part in the discussions and was an observer.

Thursday night: There was a rally on campus with a large bonfire. Over 100 state troopers, city cops, and 200 National Guardsmen were poised at the edge of the campus. When they saw the fire (there are some reports of another fire at the campus edge too) the Guardsmen led an assault onto the campus, shooting wildly at the students, who were unarmed. The police had shotguns, rifles, and M-16s. Most students were shot in the back, many while lying flat on the ground seeking cover from the gunfire. 3 black students were murdered (we just got a report

continued on p. 6

On Planting Dope In Central Pennsylvania

by Neil Buckley

State College, Pennsylvania

Federal, state, local, and University officials have begun acts of repression against Penn State SDS members here. At least 2 fronts have been opened.

Between January 15th and January 18th, FBI agents questioned at least 9 SDS and Freedom Union (the local draft counseling group) members about a captured AWOL Marine who was being held at the local county jail; the FBI intimated that SDS members had given active support to the Marine in his reported two flights into Canada. Persons questioned denounced the FBI intimations as attempts to harass the Movement.

Freedom Union members, some of whom are active in SDS, were asked specific questions about draft-refusal counseling and the leafletting of buses bound for the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania induction center. Several Freedom Union members feel the FBI is collecting information for a future bust on conspiracy charges; the questioning began 10 days after the indictment of the Boston Five.

The second front is forming rapidly around the use of dope. 3 persons were busted January 8th for possession and use of and intent to sell marijuana; 2 of the persons had no connection with SDS, while the 3rd person had been active in SDS in the past and had been convicted of disorderly conduct at an anti-war demonstration here on July 4th, 1967. (At least 9 straight people have been busted on use and possession charges during the weeks of January 8th through January 22nd. None of these busts was made public, while the SDS-related bust—especially the records of the brothers—was given much press coverage.)

On January 17th the operator of a Lutheran Student Association coffee house was told by Federal Narcotics Bureau investigators that a conscious effort was being made to plant dope in people's apartments, with the targets SDS activists. Other diffuse yet reliable sources confirm this report.

Further proof came from Robert H. Barnes, listed as a Securities Specialist at Penn State's Security Division, who told SDS member Robbie Levin that any person—faculty member or student—would be fired or expelled if dope were found on his person or premises. Robbie had been called into the offices of the Security Division, which guards the massive military research facilities on campus, for questioning about the bust of the three brothers January 8th. (Upon hearing of the bust on the night of the 8th, Robbie had rushed to the scene to act as a witness against police and narco infractions of justice.)

An underground group of local anarchists with whom we have contact issued a leaflet on January 15th warning people to beware the bust. The leaflet charged the University with using spies in addition to complicity with narcotics and fees. (After listing 7 or 8 preventive measures around dope, the leaflet ended simply with the quote "Cleanliness is next to Godliness.")

University management's response to the leaflet was massive. Vice-president for Student Affairs Charles H. Lewis issued a statement denying the use of spies by his force, which includes the offices of the Deans of Men and Women; but Lewis added "I cannot speak for Campus Security."

Yet Jim Womer, who chairs the Undergraduate Student Government's Committee on Legal Awareness, told us that at least 200 student informers were operating on campus; another estimate puts the figure at 50. With an estimated 1500 to 2500 regular dope-smokers on campus, student narc use comes as little surprise; the numbers, however, are phenomenal.

Womer, who has been conducting an investigation into illicit legal mechanisms on campus, told us that extensive wire tapping is in use involving possibly several hundred people, both political and straight people. Womer's evidence, which comes from eminently reliable sources, points to an extensive bust which we interpret as part of a wave of political oppression which will drag large numbers of non-political students in its wake.

In addition to the above, there is good evidence that the local police have the SDS communal house under 24-hour surveillance.

The most probable reasons behind the mass move against us are: 1) SDS is beginning research activities into the Penn State military research business. Penn State is an IDA member and the 10th largest recipient of DOD funds (\$10 million for Fiscal 1967). 2) The Freedom Union is starting to move on the seniors and graduate students and the forthcoming spring reclassification program. A mailing is out to all seniors graduating between March and December of 1968 advising them of alternatives to the Draft. 3) Eric Walker, Penn State's president, has a very rationally founded hatred of SDS which leads to irrational—but clever—retaliatory moves against us. Future events will allow a thorough assessment of rationales behind the more obvious modes of harassment and repression the dope massacre projects.

Yet there are none cleaner than we anywhere in the Movement. Cleanliness in this case is freedom.



JOIN THE N.O. STAFF

LEARN THE PRINTING PROCESS

FROM START TO FINISH

We want only serious people, interested in communications, aware of the power of the press, and interested in making printing a large part of their lives.

Qualifications: STABILITY, MATURITY, CAPABILITY

CALL -- WRITE

Tim or Jon, N.O. Print Shop, 1608 W. Madison, rm. 205, Chicago, Ill., 60612. 312/666-3874.

DEAR N.O.:

February 3, 1968

Dear Brothers and Sisters:

I wish to raise a question concerning the response of the NO to the Spock-Coffin indictments and the seizure of the Pueblo. My objection, in each case, is not to the NO's call for demonstrations, but to the instant analysis with which the call was garnished.

One of the Old Left's most objectionable habits was that within 24 hours of a political occurrence each sectarian mimeograph machine had produced its "correct" Marxist analysis of the event. According to the NO the reason for the Spock-Coffin indictments was to attack the most respectable liberal supporters of draft resistance so as to isolate the militants. And according to the NO the Pueblo incident should be understood as an American provocation designed to make it possible for Japanese troops to be sent to South Korea and more South Korean troops to be sent to Vietnam.

Each of these analyses may be true. But it seems to me that, in each case, equally plausible hypotheses are possible. If the Spock-Coffin indictments are to be explained in the NO manner, then why did HUAC act on precisely the opposite assumption in August 1966, that is singling out the most radical groups and individuals (PL, VDC, etc.)? Isn't the HUAC strategy more characteristic of repression? And may it not be possible, then, that some special factor was involved in the selection of Spock, Coffin, and the others? For instance, that the Government believed it had a strong enough factual case against these particular persons to ensure convictions? Or that Lyndon Johnson saw the draft-card burnings in the Arlington Street Church on television, and told Ramsay Clark to get those men?

Again, regarding the Pueblo, how does the NO know that the incident was not the result of a North Korean decision

to open up a second front, at least in the form of diplomatic crisis, on the eve of the great NLF offensive? And should that turn out to have been the case (as the National Guardian appears to believe), would it not be more than a little ridiculous for an SDS national officer to have described the Pueblo incident to the Student Mobilization Conference as the single greatest step of the United States escalation in Asia?

Where I differ from the NO is not so much in disputing the particular analyses offered (which in each case I believe to be as plausible as, but no more plausible than, a variety of alternative explanations). My objection is to the apparent assumption that responsible political action is impossible until we have made "our analysis". Were that assumption correct, then in most crisis situations the alternatives would be either 1) to act irresponsibly without an adequate analysis, or 2) to think irresponsibly by hastily throwing together an analysis without adequate facts.

In my opinion the assumption itself is false. It was perfectly possible to protest the Bay of Pigs invasion, the blockade of Cuba at the time of the "missile crisis", and the bombing of North Vietnam, even before all the facts were clear. Similarly it is possible to protest forcible recapture of the Pueblo by the United States even without knowing for certain where the boat was when seized; or, if we can assume (as I think we can) that the Pueblo was in North Korean waters, why the North Korean government chose this particular time to punish a violation of its national sovereignty. And above all it is possible to resist repression without needing first to have a definitive causal explanation of the form of action which the repressors chose.

Staughton Lynd

new left notes

Published weekly by Students for a Democratic Society, 1608 W. Madison Street, Chicago, Ill., 60612, except July and August when publication is bi-weekly. Phone 312/666-3874. Second class postage paid at Chicago, Ill. Subscriptions: \$1 per year for members, \$10 per year for non-members. Signed articles are the responsibility of the writers. Unsigned articles are the responsibility of the editor, Carol Neiman. New Left Notes is affiliated with ups and with Liberation News Service.

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY


Carl Davidson, Inter-organizational secretary, Robert Pardun, Internal Education secretary, Mike Spiegel, National secretary.
National Office: 1608 W. Madison St., rm. 206, Chicago, Ill., 60612 (312/666-3874)
New York City: 50 East 11 St., New York, N.Y. 10003 (212/674-8310)
Niagara Regional Coordinating Comm: 1504 E. Genesee St., Syracuse, NY 13210 (315/478-8239)
Southern California: PO Box 85396, Los Angeles, Calif. 90072.
New England: 102 Columbia St., Cambridge, Mass. 02139
Washington, D.C.: 3 Thomas Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Vol. 3, No. 6

let the people decide

Feb. 12, 1968

RADICAL NEWS WITH IMPACT



One explosive issue after another gets to the heart of everything from Cuban culture to ghetto repression. From the NLF to the CIA, you get in-depth stimulating coverage of the vital news in this explosive world. Bang!

Guardian independent radical newsweekly

I enclose \$ for: Ten-week trial sub—\$1. One-year regular sub—\$7. One-year student sub—\$3.50 (include name of school). Add \$1.50 for Can., Lat. Amer., \$2 elsewhere.

name—please print

address

city state zip

197 E. 4th St., New York, N.Y. 10009

A Critique of Our Critics

by Carl Davidson

In the past few weeks, an important debate has been going on within SDS. To my mind, many aspects of that debate are both instructive and constructive in relation to our future growth and radicalization. However, it is precisely for this reason that we must all be concerned with the level of quality and honesty on which these debates are conducted.

This concern is appropriate to the current debate—which has been labeled by one side in the dispute as the antagonism between the “resistance” and the “base-building” perspectives for the student movement. Identified with the “resistance” position are some (but not all) of the SDS national officers: Davidson, Pardun, Spiegel, and Calvert, to name a few. The “base-building” position has been advocated mainly by those SDS members who are also members or candidate members of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP). However, I must immediately assert that the situation is not that simple. There are non-PLP SDSers, including some Third-Camp Socialist SDS members traditionally hostile to PL, who support the “base-building” position. On the other hand, it would be misleading to identify the “resistance” position with the National Office staff or with the 11 national officers comprising the NIC. There are several people on the NO staff who disagree with the “resistance” strategy in general and the “10 days” program in particular. As for the national officers, several disagree with the “resistance” position; and at least one national officer, John Fuerst (often critical of PL, generally supports the “base-building” position.

With this partial and qualified description of the parties involved, I will

go on to make a good number of points concerning the article entitled “The December NC: A Different View” (hereafter referred to as the “S-L-R article”) by Spector, Levenson, and Rose, SDS activists and organizers in the New England Region. Debbie Levenson is also a member of the Progressive Labor Party. While this article will be the primary focus of my attention, I will also refer to other expressions of this debate, both verbal and printed.

Finally, before entering the ring, I should mention that I consider my non-attendance at the December NC (I was in Havana, Cuba covering the cultural conference for SDS) both an advantage and a disadvantage to this debate. Nevertheless, since I have been one of the main proponents of the “resistance” strategy in the past months, it is my responsibility (and opportunity) to engage in this discussion. I hope that others will follow.

1) The S-L-R article asserts that the agenda of the educational conference (EC) “...was built around the Calvert-Davidson program....” Referring to a workshop entitled “choosing targets”, the article implies that the EC and NC were structurally manipulated to insure the success of the “10 days” proposal. This charge is unwarranted. Having participated extensively in planning the EC, I would assert that the agenda was so constructed as to push for a national spring anti-war program in general, and not for any particular program. The workshop on “selecting political targets” had as its main emphasis “the increasing importance of research and careful analysis of targets....” The S-L-R position seems to think this means *de facto* a “resistance” strategy. I would hope that those individuals interested in “base-building” would be

as concerned as the rest of us in carefully researching and analyzing the targets of their political work. Put simply, one could conclude the “base-building” program as well as the “resistance” program (or any number of others) from the pre-planning of the EC. Finally, the “national”, “spring”, and “anti-war program” aspects of the EC were predetermined simply because, after consulting many members, chapters, and organizers, it was requested and required of us to do so.

2) The S-L-R article says “...chapter people think very seriously about the national focus for the Movement.” I agree that this is becoming increasingly true. However a year and a half ago, the opposite was true. One reason Egleson and I were elected at Clear Lake was because of our opposition to SDS’s having any national program. From then to the present, SDSers have often placed “local” concerns in opposition to “national” concerns (a false dichotomy). While this may seem helpful to some people, my concern is that local perspectives should be integrated with national perspectives, and vice-versa. It would be a wrong estimation, in my opinion, to assume that this “provincialism” (rather than an authentic concern for one’s locale) is still not somewhat dysfunctional at national meetings. On the other hand, the S-L-R paper remarks that a primary difficulty in discussion was “...the failure by those who’d developed the ‘Ten Days’ proposal to defend it.” From what I found out on this point, I must agree that this was a case of political irresponsibility on the part of Calvert, Pardun, and Spiegel at least. One reason (but not an excuse) given for their silence was the rumors and charges of “manipulation”. Nevertheless, I must agree that remaining silent after introducing a major program is, in fact, highly manipulative. While one may be charged with the same sin for openly pushing for one’s own beliefs, in fact that action must be considered simply legitimate political struggle and debate.

3) One aspect of the current debate is detrimental to the organization as a whole. My feeling is that the “base-building” advocates are quite wrong to refer to their opponents as “National Office people” or the “national leaders”. As mentioned earlier, not all of the national staff nor all of those who would be considered “national leaders” would identify themselves with the “resistance” strategy. This is not to say that those of us holding this position have not tried to convince others on the national level (as well as on regional and local levels) of the validity of our position. That is quite natural. However, continuing to couch the debate in a “national” versus “grass-roots” or “local chapter people” dichotomy not only obscures the politics of the debate, but serves to alienate our local members from the NO in general, regardless of what individuals or political persuasions occupy that already beleaguered whipping post. If someone disagrees with Davidson and Calvert, then he should politically attack Davidson and Calvert rather than institutionally attacking the NO, the staff, or the NIC. SDS has a less than honorable history of internal political struggles occurring under the cover of organizational or structural questions. That tradition should cease to continue.

4) The S-L-R paper argues that “the delegates rejected the national program of ‘Ten Days’.” It is certainly true that the original Calvert-Davidson proposal was never accepted, in its original form, since it was never introduced. However, the Jaffe-Fuerst-Gottlieb proposal that was accepted may certainly be referred to as a “Ten Days” program. In fact, there is little else except the 10-day provision that the NC provided clear mandate for. To quote the final resolution, “A period of action would extend over a ten-day period in April...the date shall be from April 20th to April 30th...the NIC shall choose the name for the ten days.” The S-L-R paper argues that the NC voted down naming the program “10 Days of

THE NC — A DIFFERENT VIEW

BUILDING OUR BASE

continued from page 1

conference and put through a resolution calling for 11 days of national action, during the same period as ours and announcing a national student strike, which SDS rejected at the NC and which almost all SDS members at the Mob opposed. This Mob bunch completely screws up and misleads the Left wherever it can. With almost no campus base (as opposed to SDS’s several hundred chapters), its members function through a big staff, lots of money, manipulation, and ties to the liberal wing of the ruling class. With this “power” they call big “national actions” with lots of flourish but no anti-imperialist politics, not geared to helping local base-building or developing anti-imperialist understanding. Then they co-opt SDS into doing the work—as they’ll try with their student strike—by saying the event’s on, we’ve got to make it as big as possible. When they do lead, as in the New York Stop the Draft Week demos, they get militants massacred so that these “leaders” can look militant. Their aim is to develop enough apparent strength to pressure the ruling class, siding with its so-called liberal wing. At their conference they treated SDS with utter contempt. That stands to reason, since they’re not engaged in building a serious movement against imperialism. It’s disturbing that Spiegel sees sending a delegate to the Mob as the best thing the NC accomplished.

As we said earlier, the Fuerst resolution is in no way a national program. Although no direction for the national leadership follows from it, the national leaders almost all supported it. The NO people also put forth the resolution on the Mob. Although they said we had to bring SDS pressure to bear on the Mob, they did not explain what political pressure they had in mind. This can lead to two possible outcomes. The delegate can function in the Mob (where we don’t think SDS should be in the first place) being led by the nose; or the national leadership can decide, in

the absence of national direction or a political stand on the Mob, what politics it will put forward for SDS. In any case, since no national program was established, the Mob will be able to put forth its bad leadership and bad programs as filling a vacuum and end up misleading many local SDS chapters. The way the national leaders led at the NC was a serious abdication of their responsibilities to the organization.

We should have established—in the future we must establish—general national programs to focus local base-building behind our own (anti-imperialist) political goals. With this approach, we can’t be brought to heel by the Mob. Instead, we would, as is proper for an organization with a real base and anti-imperialist politics, become the real leadership of the anti-war movement. Finally, in contrast to Spiegel, we found the Southern Caucus resolution quite good, and the developments with JOIN very healthy. When the Southern Caucus opposed the “Ten Days” strategy of “resistance”, they spoke for most of us.

Thus, instead of a few radicals splitting their heads against the system, as occurred in the New York anti-Rusk “resistance” demonstration, the “base-building” proposal for exposing imperialism is aimed at showing masses of people the necessity of truly militant action, and at developing the campus anti-imperialist movement toward an alliance between workers and students. (Thus the Boston campaign to kill a rapid-transit fare hike, which links the boss’s government with the banks it serves, has strengthened SDS at many chapters and brought students into alliance with working people around a mutual fight during which we’re raising anti-imperialist ideas. This sort of worker-student alliance is much more useful than breaking windows in a bank.) Some chapter people pointed out that the discussion around “base-building” was the first time they’d heard serious, concrete talk at a national meeting of how SDS could develop a solid base on campus,

and begin to ally the student movement with working people.

“Ten Days to Shake the Empire” is self-isolating, at best. At worst, after kids get their heads knocked in, the “practical”, pro-imperialist politics of Kennedy (or was it McCarthy?) will look attractive. So super-militant “resistance” becomes “dump Johnson, elect nicer imperialists.”

Furthermore, Spiegel is unfair to claim that “PLP immediately withdrew its proposal, thus eliminating the possibility for an in-depth discussion of the political differences between their perspective and an important sector of SDS thinking.” (Spiegel, New Left Notes, January 18th, 1968) Actually, the “base-building” proposal, which represented many delegates’ thinking, was only “withdrawn”, without any objection at all, when, after several days’ discussion, it was defeated in a straw vote. We consider the Fuerst resolution, which was adopted, no national program. It also contained fallacious “new working class” ideas. (Because it was a late-in-the-game, compromise resolution, its “new working class” approach was never seriously debated.) But it did not advocate the “Ten Days” approach. That was rejected by almost all the delegates.

Unfortunately, this clear rejection of “Ten Days” is not being reflected in NLN and at the national level in general. For example, the NC voted down a resolution to name the national action period “Ten Days of Resistance”. But the NIC has voted to call it “April Days of Resistance”. Again, shortly after the NC, the National Office issued a press release announcing that national demonstrations for Spock would be held all over the country by SDS! This was done with no political consultation with local chapters—not even with regional offices, if we in Boston are any example. (We heard about it by reading the papers.) This top-down, “political organizing through the national press” approach was rejected by most NC delegates.

continued on p. 7

The Texture of the

by Todd Gitlin

Too often the Cuban revolution is described as no more than the sum of discrete accomplishments: so many schools, so much of an increase in the standard of living, and so on. (Russia, for example, seems to offer little more than these.) To speak to Americans we feel we have to capture the revolution in those terms that make most immediate sense to Americans: material, manpower, statistics, formal civil liberties. Capturing it that way, we imprison it. There is truth, of course, in these measurements, truth never to be neglected (how well people eat, how long they live—these things we care about passionately); but it is still only a shadow of the truth we can apprehend with our senses, if we will open them.

The measurements alone miss that powerful, transfusing, distinctive tone, those qualities of the ordinary life of ordinary Cubans which simply defy description in the securely narrow categories of liberal thought. They miss fraternity; they miss ease within discipline; they miss the spirited critical consciousness at the very center of revolutionary life. Even worse, limited as we are by the ideological air we breathe, the very terms we inherit and use by default, however restlessly we squirm from underneath them, blind us to the evidence of our senses. In Cuba I learn, through my gut and my eyes, how many levels of human process are ordinarily closed to us by that unwelcome but inescapable inheritance. The tension between American norms and undeniable revolutionary reality crackles and burns. Something has to go up in smoke—the friction is too great. Once too often, liberal doubt (it is back there, undeniably) strains and buckles; it cannot encompass the enormity of the revolution; it asks the wrong or the most inane and naive questions; it points 180 degrees away from the terms within which the revolution can be recognized (I don't mean "defended" or "criticized", only apprehended), or better, it is at another level of experience altogether. You can't measure weight with a ruler.

(As an example of the naive questions referred to above, my guide, with dry half-seriousness, said she would tell all her friends about the well-meaning American who asked—because he would be asked—whether Cuban officers have exclusive clubs and get ordinary soldiers assigned to them as private servants. The question, direct from American experience, was to her laughable.)

Facing then the abyss between American and Cuban textures, a distance which reduces to an abyss between realities, in a desperate attempt to communicate a life as a whole outside the experience of our people, the movement often ends up resorting to a certain glib rhetoric: "the workers are happy there", "everyone is equal", and so forth. True or not, such phrases belittle the reality and don't touch American doubts. In our time the language of socialist celebration has been stretched to too many dark and deceitful purposes; if we are radical now, if we are even disaffected, we retain a certain healthy skepticism, necessarily so; but equally necessarily it clouds our ability to recognize the authentic revolution. The task is then to find new terms for this revelatory experience, terms we can defend, uncontaminated terms as far as possible. And then to talk about revolutionary rhetoric freshly, locating it within the density of experience, not learning it from a piece of paper.

In a space much too brief I want to sketch what seem to me, after a 23-day stay in Cuba, some of the defining tones of Cuban life, illustrating them with a scant number of the most illuminating shreds of my experience, not filling out these tones with the thoroughness they deserve. Easily I could use 5 times the space, 5 times the cases, and incomparably more richness of detail

and nuance than I have room for here. And there are many realms of the Cuban experience, many rough edges, I cannot even begin to name. My judgment here will be of the heart of the revolution, its defining qualities in the common life, through events that might be special in their intensity but are otherwise quite ordinary. May these shreds of description amount to one effort, however quick and schematic, to fix the main lines of that life, a life we grow up to ignore and stereotype and despise, later to "explain", to make allowances for, to gloss over, to oversimplify, or to remove from its history, but rarely, too rarely, to consider as a reality with its own motion and its own power.

The revolution in its 10th year is not a slogan or a strategy or an experiment or an abstract defiance; it is the tangible life and direction of a people.

I. The Typical and the Exemplary

"How do you know what you saw was typical?" "Didn't they take pains to show you the best?" Questions which precede everything else.


In the first place, of course guides tended to show the best. I take this hardly at all as an attempt to mislead, but as a natural pride; nonetheless it creates traps for the observer. I talked with as many ordinary, unselected random people as I could, on the streets, in the factories, in the countryside.

Secondly, measurable aspects of the quality of life (income, health, and so forth) can be judged by statistics. In some cases I was able to gather those statistics, in others I was not. (There are excellent economic studies in Cuba: *The Economic and Social Revolution*, edited by Dudley Seers, University of North Carolina Press, 1964; other studies in depth, by James O'Connor, Jose Yglesias, and others, are forthcoming.) But I'm writing here on the immeasurable qualities: spirit, pace, politicization, political change, morale, the way people are with each other.

Then how to generalize the spirit of the revolution from small separate experiences, the most and the least glowing? Report what you see: but conclusions would then be as episodic and partial as the experience itself.

One defining standard for the health of a society is the relation between the best and the normal. Is the best exceptional, a kind of remarkable fluke, or is it exemplary, something that the normal aspires to and considers within range of practicality? Is the direction of the society toward or away from its best qualities? And then, if the best is in fact exemplary, do institutions block the common direction toward that example, or do they speed into it? Risking a great generality, I sense that almost all the best qualities of Cuban life are exemplary, and that they have a substantial, growing base among the people, particularly among the young. (Never a universal base; the revolution never ends.) The internationalism, the spirit of common community and common ownership, the habits of critical thinking within a frame of common enterprise, the blending of discipline and individuality, the commitment to work and combat, the surpassing of money-mindedness, the treatment of the poorest and weakest: these, which compose and reveal the texture of Cuban life, set the tone for the revolution as a whole, as it works through all varieties of people.

I think too—though I will not have space to name more than a handful of the ways—that the institutions of the revolution are extraordinarily responsive to these qualities, that they flex very easily. There are exceptions, sometimes serious exceptions, but as far as I can judge the motion of the revolution works against them. And two things about these flaws (mainly the excess of rote discipline



in the schools, and the submissiveness of the older): the majority of Cubans I met admit to them, even announce them, especially the young and the 26th-of-July veterans; and, dramatically, there is only a very slight tendency to externalize the blame, to pin the failures and rigidities and inhumanities on imperialist pressure, where the problem is one of organization, skill, and values rather than, say, a scarcity of materials for which the blockade is clearly responsible. The Cubans take credit for their perennially renewed triumph; in the same spirit they generally refuse to shirk responsibility for their failures.

The exemplary and typical attitude toward the scarcity of replacement parts for US-built machines, for example, is first to curse the imperialists and then to make new parts, if possible. In the past this has been difficult; there is still trouble, for one thing, with the presses which used to print 20,000,000 copies monthly of *Readers Digest en Espanol* and now print textbooks; justice demands that the Yankis be blamed, dignity demands that the Ministry and the workers take it upon themselves to work out a new way. They usually do.

One case of the exemplary is membership in the Communist Party. Workers, peasants, students are nominated by annual general and open assembly of their co-workers; their recommendations are thrown back and forth between the assembly and the regional Party (which at this time is appointed by the Central Committee, but which rumors say will be made elective) until some sort of consensus is reached on their qualifications. My impression is that the regional Party has the final say, but wouldn't push the local assembly too far, by a sort of common law; and where the assembly is tough-minded and insistent it would probably get its way.

The foremost criterion for Party membership is hard work. Most of those who lack the discipline seem to feel

they ought to have it, and admire those who do. Party members have prestige; materially all they might gain is access to scarce cars; but in return they are expected to go on working harder than anyone else, to volunteer most promptly for agricultural work, to live in the most arduous places—all, of course, without any increase in pay.

Working harder than the others is not so routine as it may sound; standards are high. In one cigar factory, a "guerrilla factory" (one which overfills quotas), the Party secretary excused herself from our meeting: she wanted to get back to her cigar-rolling work, on this day of volunteer work during vacation time. Though she was obviously respected, none of the administrators, the union head, the workers hesitated to interrupt her (or anyone else) or to supplement her answers to our questions. There were 35 Party members in a work-force of 1064, 300 of the total giving their vacations to production. Called by duty? Of course. But unquestionably voluntary, in the sense of being free from external sanctions. 300 exemplary workers—the Party could not monopolize example if it tried—in a factory already distinguished for having over-fulfilled a quota which the workers as a body had already raised by 50% above the quota set by the central plan, and with only optional overtime pay! (There are the exemplary, and those who only overfulfill the regular quota! I suspect the quotas might be set low to start with, so that the responsibility for raising and meeting them is the workers'. This would not be Machiavellian, it would be in tune with the revolution's ethic of willed commitments.)

One of many cases in which the suspicious Yanki eye mistakes or perverts what it sees: A defaced poster read: "Our Quota: 1,000,000 Cigars." Aha! The workers are being pushed to the wall, someone struck back by sabotaging the poster. I asked. "No," said the Young Communist. "We tore those down when we revised the quota to 1,500,000." Another worker verified it. Yet our American experience teaches us to believe that workers work hard only chasing the carrot or chased by the stick.


II. A New Man, A Moral Animal

"We will make the man of the 21st Century; we ourselves." — (Che)

Brave rhetoric, another slogan that some part of ourselves as Americans is taught to discount. A little voice says, "Come on, man, get serious." But they are serious. Like many of the revolution's central processes, this seems incredible. The revolutionaries know it too, know that the incredible is the name of the game. Fidel spoke the night of January 6th dedicating a new town outside Havana, 120 homes built in 44 days for the

worst-housed small farmers, families which had lived in shacks "where it rained more inside than outside", as one peasant put it. Behind Fidel, this slogan: "When the extraordinary is converted into the everyday, then a revolution exists." The way to establish the credibility of the credible, before sour and bitter souls, is to make it happen. The incredible revolution itself established a new pattern of expectations. Then what

Cuban Revolution



seems rhetorical to Americans, whatever our sympathies, becomes a description of a visible process for the Cubans. If it happens often enough, the impossible becomes expectable, even a habit. The pace is reckless, even manic; many people say they sleep less than they did "before" (they don't have to say "before" what).

One striking, instructive, symbolically devastating sight in any of the cities: someone walks up to a coin telephone, picks up the receiver—and dials. It is extraordinary, and everyday. Local calls are free. Real income is increased by widening the range of free services (communal advancement), not by boosting money income (individual advancement). As a not unintended byproduct, an absurd bureaucracy (coin collection in this case) is swept away.

Water service, funerals, doctors, sports events, and rent in buildings constructed before 1940 are free. In the newer houses, rent is equivalent to a mortgage. You pay up to 10% of your income each month—it covers furniture also in new apartments, like some prefab concrete apartments going up to replace the worst slums in Santiago de Cuba, the equivalent of \$200/month apartments in New York City for the poorest of the poor (and of course the new is built before the old is torn down); you pay for a period of time determined by the cost of the apartment or the house, getting credit for rent paid before the revolution; then you own it. And, Fidel says, all rents will be abolished by 1970.

The point is to multiply the number of commodities which in fact and in feeling belong to a person by right (Marx's communist principle: "to each according to his needs") rather than by work. This system of rewards lies in the center of the prevailing definition of "communist consciousness", an idea much discussed especially by the young. As leaders of the Union of Young Communists (UJC) explained it, the idea is to implant everywhere a consciousness of men as producers, not consumers. (Everyone consumes, but that's not the point; it's a matter of self-definition, of purpose in life.)

At the same time, the velocity and chaos of the revolutionary process confuse the coming of the new man. Colonial man died, after all, less than a decade ago, and he still quivers. For example, in many factories, workers are only now beginning to be paid according to their skill (the socialist principle: "to each according to his ability"). In the cigar factory, the administrator (chosen by the workers) was still earning his pre-revolutionary wage of \$176 a month—less than his secretary or the scrub-lady. Doctors may still practice privately, on top of the public hospitals and clinics; they make \$700 or more a month. (The doctors have to be held that way, at least until the next generation; Cuba lost more than 2,000 doctors into exile.) Yet the communist principle is so widely discussed, becoming so deeply rooted among the young, that these momentary

rankings will certainly fade, in fact and in status. It is not lost on too many people that beloved Che, preacher of the moral incentive, lived on standard rations all his time in Cuba: again, he was not typical, but exemplary, and looked to.

The most staggering anticipation of the moneyless future is happening in the old prison-province, the Isle of Pines, now known as the Isle of Youth and under the authority of the UJC. Barely populated, undeveloped, the Isle is being settled with young volunteers, who sign up for periods of 45 days to 2 years or more of tough agricultural work (cattle and citrus) in frontier conditions. Clothes, food, movies, books are or will soon be free. Many are deciding to settle; they are considered as heroes, not enshrined in medals like astronauts, but heroes to be emulated. The spirit of hard, purposeful communal work is the opposite of superficial; it's not put on. (Last year 90% of the young of Havana volunteered for 45 days' agricultural work. It's not easy to cut sugar cane 12 hours a day under a tropical sun. Naturally the moral pull is immense, yet so is the spirit of the volunteers. The UJC leaders consider that the new man of the near future will find this pull entirely within his own self, not in the anticipated hard looks of friends. It doesn't seem incredible.)

Art students and young poets often visit the Isle to make exhibitions of paintings, read poetry, and so on—they move so eagerly into the pace of work, they ignore their responsibility as artists. Or do they? Their art has hardly suffered; they find an intimacy with their audience that strips the exclusive mystery from their creative work, and pushes them far from the twin dangers of isolation and stereotype. (Of this, more later.) In any case, this is deemed a problem. But what a problem, with what reasons! Its very terms measure the distance Cuba has come. And can we understand that from within this surge of the productive impulse in agriculture comes the most liberated art imaginable, the

most stunning poetry? Understand that the best minds are unalienated from their people—and you have understood a great deal about the Cuban revolution. (Understand that by 1926, 9 years after the Russian revolution, most of the great poets and painters were dead or in exile or discredited, and you have understood that there is no Revolution, there are only revolutions.)

The hard-talking, commanding education head of the UJC said that the breaking of the pecuniary impulse, and in a time of economic development (all the harder), "is the most difficult problem, because we have no experience from other countries." (Keep in mind that Cuba's economy would collapse without Soviet purchases of sugar. That dependence of course creates a certain fellow-feeling, a definite gratitude—also some fear—but does not touch in the least the attitude found everywhere that Cubans will do things the Cuban way.) "The so-called objective laws of socialism," says this ideologue, "we don't accept them here. Because we have done different things from what they said we could do, and nothing went wrong. So where are the objective conditions?" The orthodox Marxist would cringe at this cavalier idealism, this reckless naivete. These Cuban theorists may be naive, "crazy", but this is a popular quality they represent and did not invent. They also know what they want, and they don't like excuses based on what theoreticians hold to be impossible.

But consider this one quite objective factor. The final abolition of money, which is a policy of the revolutionary government, would require an inventory system, measuring the scarcity of a product and the demand for it and distributing it accordingly. But the necessary computers are unobtainable. The Soviet models aren't good enough. And in Western Europe over 90% of the computer industry is owned by American corporations. If you need a way to think about the American meaning for Cuba, think about that.

III. Vietnam, We Are With You

"Every man is offended when another face is slapped." — (Jose Marti)

—One of the most powerful of the Cuban documentary films (and all in all they are technically the best I have ever seen), "Hanoi, Martes 13", begins and ends with a color cartoon of the history of Vietnam. The narrative is a "Message of Solidarity with the People of Vietnam in Their Struggle Against French Colonialism"—written by Marti, 19th Century Cuban poet and revolutionary hero, in the 1880s. This is the man Cubans quote from and look to more than anyone but Fidel and that interloping Argentine doctor who once went to fight with a crazy little band in the Sierra Maestra and later died, murdered, in the hills of Bolivia.

Coming from America, whose esteem for foreigners and their cultures is well known, I was staggered by the depth and commonness of Cuban internationalism. It pre-dates the revolution; it runs so deep, though, it could not have begun only 9 years ago, even 9 years as the revolution measures time. (But in fact in 1956 Fidel made an exception for Che; he feared some Cubans might not take to too many foreigners.)

—At a special agricultural plan in the inland Las Villas province, I met a 17-year-old bulldozer driver from a nearby town.

"How long do you work?"
"Sometimes 24 hours a day." He smiled, proud without arrogance. "Today I have worked 24 hours." He showed me the headlights on his bulldozer. (Later I did

see bulldozers plowing the fields at night.)

"You don't sleep?"
"No, don't sleep." And then, matter-of-factly, without a trace of sloganeering: "The people in Vietnam don't sleep; why should we? We're doing the same work."

If I have ever heard anyone mean anything, he meant that.

—A crack agricultural brigade, soldiers who had volunteered for gigantic land-clearing and planting ventures whose progress is followed in the papers like the progress of the NLF, were offered vacations in Cuban resorts, free trips to Czechoslovakia, and so forth. They asked instead to be sent to Vietnam; the NLF gratefully declined their services.

—Hardly anyone who learned or guessed I was an American failed to take the trouble to assure me that the American people are a good people, that there is no such thing as a bad people, that it was the American system they opposed. (There were exceptions; a professor told me Fidel had had a time—and no wonder—getting this notion across in a rush of speeches after the Bay of Pigs.)

—The "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution", block clubs which the American press calls networks of informers, have as one of their functions the gathering of blood for liberation struggles around the world. (They also administer public health programs, get out the vote for the popular elections of neighborhood officials, arrange for

transportation of voluntary workers to the countryside, and so on.)

—A worker in a bus pointed at the headline "Yanki Officials Killed in Guatemala" and said in great excitement: "We did well today!"

—An airplane mechanic said he would give me his copy of the paper as soon as he finished reading the text of Regis Debray's speech of self-defense: "It's important."

—Our guide was a medical student from a wealthy home who had been thrown out of the UJC for "lack of discipline" (she had wanted to go to art school simultaneously), but is probably soon to be reinstated because those who threw her out were soon afterward thrown out themselves, for sectarianism. At the age of 14 she had been active in the 26th-of-July underground. Her independence of mind, in my experience typical of large numbers of the young, might be illustrated by the fact that when I told her an American photographer had written that Fidel's eyes are hypnotic, she came right back with: "That's bullshit."

New Year's Eve I asked her what name she would like for the New Year. She said "the Year of the Heroic Guerrilla". A government official sitting with us had different words for the same concept, but preferred her version. This had clearly been something under discussion, followed with interest, but had a line already been set the official would presumably have known it too.

On January 2nd, Fidel ended his speech to the hundreds of thousands gathered in the Plaza de la Revolution this way (I quote from the official transcript; I was there and can vouch for its accuracy; all I have cut are repetitions):

The only thing left to do today is to give a name to the year 1968. And we want you to tell us. (shouts of "The Heroic Guerrilla") ...All right, then, this year will be called 'the Year of the Heroic Guerrilla' (applause), as the name most suitable for this year, for its characteristics and for its spirit, and as a tribute of profound veneration, remembrance and love for our heroic Major Ernesto Guevara (ovation), and those heroic combatants who fell with him (applause). The imperialists have published names of Cubans killed with Major Ernesto Guevara. Well, we are not going to publish names, but we do state that, if other Cubans fell in combat with Major Ernesto Guevara, this would be in keeping with the history of this country, with its internationalist and revolutionary spirit. (applause)

And there is nothing extraordinary about it, and there could be nothing more honorable for this country than for its sons to know how to fight to the death, spilling even the last drops of their blood for the liberation of the peoples, which is the liberation of humanity....(applause)

It will sound romantic to some, but I am quite convinced that these lines, delivered in fury and anguish, contain the core and the basis of the foreign policy of Cuba; and that this policy, its elemental force and its risk, require no "stirring up of the masses" to stand as the policy of the population. If we think it has to be implanted, like somebody else's heart, we are talking about the American experience, maybe the post-war American experience; not the Cuban.

continued next page

Todd Gitlin and Carl Davidson attended the recent Cultural Congress of Havana as official representatives of SDS. They were chosen by the NIC to do this.

CUBAN REVOLUTION

IV. "We"

"In order to drink it, one must plant it."

(billboard promoting the campaign of planting coffee around Havana)

continued from page 5

However comfortable the language, it would be deadly and misleading to say that our guide "predicted" the year's name. Though the mechanism for decision in this and in much more difficult, less symbolic questions is complex and not easily described, her feeling about the matter—exemplary and typical—indicates that Cubans are involved with one another in ways so strikingly different from our expectations that we constantly joked that the entire population must be posing. (Without the joke as an unburdening of the liberal world-view, the strain would have been too great.)

In all the factories I saw (some without advance notice), I saw administrators embracing workers, and vice-versa, as a matter of course; workers displaying their work with obvious pride; gun-wearing volunteer militiamen mixing easily with civilians (or so we would call them); everyone, even the most critical, spoke of "we", "our people", "The Johnnies (US soldiers) will never stop us." The sense of common ownership, of people assuming the right to challenge each other's opinions (because "we're all in this together"), was constant, overpowering, and thick in the air. This sense must begin with the fact of having made a revolution in common. (More Cubans were involved in underground work against Batista than I had thought, but how many I could not say.) Directly afterward, the literacy campaign gave 100,000 young Cubans a common national experience in practical responsibility to the most exploited. My guess is that the sheer boldness and totality of that campaign, as much as that of the rebel army, broke the ground under old expectations, old provincialisms, by seeding the consciousness of "we" as a concrete living people. One last thing: In preserving whole and vital that sense of the nation, common institutions—particularly the army, the school system, and the voluntary agricultural brigades—and the demolition of racism would have to account for a lot; so might the fact of being only 7 1/2 million people, on an island.

—Walking around the University of Havana, we stopped to talk to a professor of psychiatry. He asked about our first impressions, and I said I was surprised to have seen so few soldiers on the streets.

Cuba Cannot Be Destroyed

The National School of Art is built on the grounds of what used to be the country club outside Havana. The space of the architecture is constantly changing as you move; they are the most exciting buildings I have ever seen, the ones any kid would most want to create in. The students—in painting, ballet, modern dance, sculpture, music—are selected by national exams and interviews, from the cities and the countryside. About the quality of the art I can say very little that anyone would believe, though photographs would verify that the volume of creativity, the products of what the kids are discovering in themselves, is barely within the bounds of even revolutionary belief (which I suppose knows no bounds). Next to the wild jagged portrait of a transfigured Che, the loving portrait of a tormented Morgan. (The critics voted Morgan the second best movie of the year,

"No, no," he said, in that unposed casual way so common and at the same time so astonishing. "I'm a soldier."

Again, there was no bluster to this rhetoric, a simple statement some part of us has been taught to cock an eye at, to file away as propaganda and cant.

—At the austere teacher's school at Minas de Frio in the Sierra, where classrooms are open-sided huts and desks are thin wooden slats and the road down is mud most of the year—the austerity is intended, so the teachers will be ready for any conditions and not grow accustomed to privilege—a group of younger workers shepherded us around with a proprietary pride and attentiveness which meant more than hospitality: it was their school, though they "only" work there.

I asked one where he would go when his work at the school was finished. "Another place, another front." The military language was natural for him, as it had been for the psychiatrist; as it was for the soldier cutting sugar cane, who waved his machete and said: "In times of peace, these are our weapons." As it was for the director of an "cultural plan" who said of the "Che Guevara" Trailblazers Brigade—volunteers who race through the countryside clearing land for cultivation so quickly we could never catch up with them—"They are the leading brigade of the war." The sense of combat is exemplary, I would even say typical. The military metaphor is more than a metaphor when it imparts to everyone's work a transcendence and a permanent value beyond the details of the moment.

—If there is a price to pay in personal integrity or rhythm for belonging to that "we", I could not detect it. I asked an engineering student in Santiago de Cuba what he wanted to do after he graduated. "Plant the seeds to develop the country." That certain abstraction is the abstraction of a soldier on duty: but a soldier who knows why he fights. He was another of the self-proclaimedly "undisciplined". Thus he was not a Young Communist. But his attitude was the unexceptional, the accepted and the exemplary one. He was serious in his duty, but not overbearing in it. "Undiscipline" would excuse no one from his calling to the service of the patria.

not—as the New York Times would prefer—as a realistic portrayal of Bourgeois Decadence, but as a great film.) A tender portrait of Ringo adorning the cafeteria. And so on.

A couple of times on earlier days, my guide had said that "Cuba cannot be destroyed." And as we left the school, she said very soberly:

"You see what I was talking about. This is what the bourgeoisie cannot forgive, that we have done this with their golf course. And this is why we can't be destroyed, even if the buildings are wiped out by bombs. The country could be bombed, but we would rebuild it. What we have made is an example, and the example cannot die."

Over the years in the Movement I have become pretty sensitive to false rhetoric and baseless bravado. This was neither: not even close.

in next week's issue...

part II of Jean Weisman's article on community-based draft resistance

"Three Weeks under Brush in South Vietnam," by Roger Pic

an article on the new drop-out counseling project, by Michele Clark

and lots more chapter news that we didn't have room for this week

South Carolina

continued from p. 1

that a 4th may have died today, Friday, February 9th). 40 to 50 students were wounded by gunfire; an unknown number were beaten. One of those murdered was an Orangeburg high school student. Delano Middleton, 17, saw a friend shot nearby and threw himself over his friend's body to shield him. The cops shot and killed Delano Middleton. Cleve Sellers was shot in the arm; he went to the school infirmary for treatment. A white nurse entered the room, stopped preparations for his treatment, and pointed Cleve out to the cops. He was arrested in the infirmary for inciting to riot and assaulting an officer. His bail is \$50,000! Cleve, who was recently sentenced to 5 years in prison for refusing induction, was reportedly beaten by the cops after his arrest, and to the best of our knowledge has not been treated for his gunshot wounds. In addition, there are reports of more than 30 other arrests, and it is feared that many of these students may be suffering from gunshot wounds or beatings.

Friday, February 9th: Orangeburg, South Carolina is occupied by 600 armed National Guardsmen and state and local police; few if any black people are allowed on the streets; the town is sealed off to incoming traffic; the black campuses and the black residential area are surrounded by troops; there is a 5 p.m. curfew.

—And the Press: What are the American people asked to believe about Orangeburg? 1) That students "attacked" hundreds of heavily armed troopers from a totally unprotected position. 2) That Cleve Sellers, billed by officials and the press as a "Black Power advocate", was "responsible" for the wanton murder of innocent black students. How? That is not answered.

black students. How? That is not answered. 3) That black students in Orangeburg had no right to protest the illegal arrest of 20 of their brothers and sisters, that they had no right to be enraged at the police beatings of female students, that they were "lawless" when they threw bottles at cars of whites shooting up their campus. In other words, we can rest assured that the slaughter continues unchallenged in the belly of the world's defender of democracy and justice.

What we must understand

1) We must understand that Orangeburg is not an isolated case of legalized murder. For example:

a) Remember Texas Southern University, spring '67? 400 cops invaded TSU campus, shot into dorms, beat students, arrested 280 young black people and then charged 5 TSU students with the 1st-degree murder of a white cop. (The cop was killed on the side of a dormitory with no windows or doors by a ricocheting bullet fired by another cop.) Their trials start March 4 in Houston.

b) Do you know about the reign of terror in Nashville, Tennessee, February 1968? Two cops were shot in a burglary earlier this month. Cops said they found "Black Power literature" in the getaway car, which was from Ohio. So...70 black people (many students from Fisk and A&I) were rounded up by the cops—taken off the streets, from their homes, out of laundromats—no warrants or arrests. What for? For brutal interrogation about their political beliefs, personal habits, and friends' politics and personal lives. Cops patrolled black residential areas of Nashville with M-16s and air rifles, broke into homes and night clubs, and beat folks. The Nashville press ran banner headlines "SNCC Kills", "SNCC Starts Murder Campaign" day after day. While this terror campaign was waged not one word in any press outside the state. Meanwhile, cops urged whites to arm themselves. Note: See how this fits into the McClellan "riot" hearings of a few months ago at which Nashville officials warned there was a "Black Power conspiracy" to "start trouble" in Nashville.

2) We must understand that the violent attacks on black people and the black liberation movement are the most virulent parts of a program to destroy by any means necessary militant opposition (black and white) to racism, to the War, to US imperialism.

3) We must understand that a key weapon in this campaign is the isolation and destruction of the strongest, most effective voices in the movement; especially black militants, and most especially SNCC.

4) We must understand that the focus on the preservation of "law and order" and "fighting crime in the streets" is an attempt to create a climate of fear that will facilitate the suppression of all dissent—a climate that will accept (and is accepting) legalized murder and the military occupation of cities and campuses. By making this a major focus for domestic unity (racist unity), this country is saying that it is being torn apart—by the War, by the revolutionary black liberation struggle, by an increasingly effective student (and adult) anti-racist, anti-imperialist movement. This is a move of desperation in many respects. The tactics being used are: co-optation, containment, punishment, imprisonment, extermination—in that order.

5) And we must clearly understand that mass slaughter—genocide—is a reality increasing daily for our black brothers.

What must be done

1) We must fight—much, much harder than ever before—on every front.
2) Right now:
a) Get this information out: to your group, to the entire movement in your area, to churches, to high school kids—to everyone you can reach.

b) Unite in your area to hold support demonstrations or educational rallies.
c) Try to cut through the press lies. (Like hold your demonstration at press offices and explain why; get folks in your area to issue statements to force local coverage; get this information to the press if you can.)

d) Raise bail money quick; send to Cleve Sellers Defense Fund, 360 Nelson Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. (Cleve and the others imprisoned may well be in danger while in jail.)

3) We must make a concerted effort to wage a renewed struggle against racism, against the suppression of black people everywhere in this country, and against the attacks on the black liberation movement.

What are your plans for your area? How will we fight this battle? (Note: Please let us know of activities and response in your area—including money raised—as well as your thoughts on the struggle against racism, 1968.)

NIAGARA REGIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE
REGIONAL CONFERENCE MARCH 8-10 IN SYRACUSE
come to 1504 E. Genesee St. Friday night
phone: 315/478-8239

continued from p. 3

Resistance". This is true. However, they claim the NIC voted to call the program "April Days of Resistance". This is simply false. The NIC has neither decided on a name nor even met to consider a name. The name will be fixed at a NIC meeting early in March. Until then, the program will be referred to as the "10 days" and/or "the April days", both derived from the text of the approved resolution. On this point the S-L-R paper is either simply wrong or trying to discredit the NO by "exposing" (composing?) a plot that never existed.

5) The S-L-R paper (and Jared Israel from Harvard SDS and PLP in an NC floor debate) make the ridiculous claim that the Davidson-Calvert proposal "...suggests we change our attitude toward the bourgeois press and use it at the national level." This is so great a distortion of our position that it can only be a deliberate attempt to mislead, or a sign of stupidity. What does the proposal say? We argue that SDS must "...develop a coherent program of inter-related activities at the local and regional level which will be accompanied by a major propaganda (emphasis added) effort at the national level." Now, under the section subtitled "Propaganda", we remark on our past "...failure to develop an effective propaganda apparatus for the dissemination of our ideas." We go on to comment on how this lack, combined with our ignoring and rejecting of the public media (we know only too well that "the bourgeois press lies") results in a failure to communicate our politics, even among ourselves. In the next section we state: "It is a sad fact that we are forced to read the New York Times to learn about the activities of our local chapters." If, for some reason, our position on the bourgeois press is still ambiguous (let alone positive), anyone would only have to examine our suggestions for dealing with our propaganda/communications problems. Do we argue for a new relationship with the bourgeois press? Quite the opposite. The proposal plainly states, "We badly need a radical news service to link our organizers and information sources and co-ordinate their work with the work of those newspapers which share our perspective (NLN, The Guardian, The Movement, etc.)." We also mentioned that Liberation News Service had made a beginning as the kind of "radical press service" we had in mind, but that it needed much more criticism and participation from us. It should be clear to anyone that the "propaganda apparatus" we wanted to construct would definitely be separate from, if not in opposition to the bourgeois press and wire services. The S-L-R paper, in addition to ignoring the nature of our proposed propaganda apparatus, also chose to ignore our provision in the proposal for its political control. They report on how "many people felt this meant making political decisions without involving the members". If our antagonists were upset, they should have simply read the restrictions of the proposal's implementation. It states, among other things, that "...the NO, under the supervision of the NIC, and within whatever guidelines are established by the NC, should proceed to...strengthen our communications and propaganda apparatus...in order to render the actions of April as effective as possible." Most sinister, most stealthy, these dealings with the "media"! So desirous were we of using the oppressor's press, we even argued for SDS to "publish a news monthly designed to propagandize our program and analysis to the largest possible audience."

6) The S-L-R paper states that the Calvert-Davidson proposal "...called for unity with the Mobilization Committee." This also is a serious distortion. After criticizing our past attitudes to the Mob, we propose that "SDS must develop a positive, although critical, view toward relating to other groups and coalitions within the anti-war movement." In dealing with these groups, we asserted, several times, the importance of developing on our own "...a clear, independent program and the apparatus needed to make that program operational. Attempt to influence; enter into working agreements when not detrimental to our own programs;

criticize, publicly and privately, all aspects of the Mob's policy not coincident with our own; and refuse to submerge our own positions in any coalition work; these are the imperatives, the a priori truths, Calvert and I openly stated in the section of our proposal concerning coalitions. A call for unqualified unity? I think not. The S-L-R paper goes on to tell us that "...the Mob leaders are not "good but confused" people whom SDS should win over. Whoever said the Mob leaders were? The position we argued always dealt with the "good but confused" folks in certain sectors of the Mob's constituency that we should reach and influence, through SDS if possible, through the Mob if necessary. We are also informed that the student Mob is "...with almost no campus base". Nationally, it is true that the student Mob's organized base is smaller than SDS. But in certain regions (Cleveland, Philadelphia, Detroit, Washington-Baltimore, etc.) the student Mob locals are as developed as, if not greater than, the local SDS base. The S-L-R paper comments on the recent student Mob conference, stating that "...almost all SDS members at the Mob (conference) opposed the call for a student strike." I didn't count hands, but I would certainly say "almost all" is misleading. A good number, if not an equal number, of local SDS people supported the strike. They go on to say that the student Mob "...treated SDS with utter contempt." This is also grossly misleading. It is probably true that those SDS members (and especially those who were also PL members or candidates) who treated the Mob, YSA, and CP people with contempt most likely got the same in return. Neither myself nor the SDS members I was associating with received this treatment—not even those who were anti-strike.

Finally, the writers of the S-L-R paper again raise the ghost of the evil NO manipulators when arguing against our "pressuring" the Mob through our delegate. First, we "...did not explain what political pressure we had in mind." Since I wasn't at the NC, I don't know whether or not this happened. Although it should not be surprising, since our usual procedure is for the NC to instruct and mandate the delegate, rather than having the delegate present a policy. Secondly, they ask a question: "...in the absence of national direction or a political stand on the Mob, what politics will it (the national leaders) put forward for SDS?" The question is phony; uninformed at best, deliberately misleading at worst. If anyone doubts or would like to know SDS's general position on the National and Student Mobilizations, he should read the quite clear and extensive mandates of both the June Convention (NLN, July 10th, 1967) and the Fall NC (NLN, October 9th, 1967 and October 16th, 1967). We certainly do have a direction and stand on the NMC and SMC specifically, not to mention our general anti-war and foreign policy mandates. Even if nothing were said at this NC on these questions, SDS neither exists in a vacuum nor in the absence of a history. If no new mandates are given, then, quite simply, the responsibility of our observer is to work for us on the basis of all past mandates.

7) The section of the S-L-R article describing the National SDS response to the Spock et al. repression would be amusing if its intent were not so destructive. Labeling our response as the "...top-down, 'political organizing through the national press' approach" is considerably less than accurate. We are told of how "...the NO issued a press release announcing that national demonstrations for Spock would be held all over the country by SDS!" This is the case, more or less, but what our brothers and sisters in New England failed to see was the truth of the matter. Several SDS chapters across the country, on their own initiative, organized Spock demonstrations, called the NO, and urged us to put out a general call. These events had already occurred before the NO had made any move whatsoever. The NO's first move was a poll and vote of the NIC on the issue, in the process conferring with SDS people located near the NIC members, as well as with several chapter

we made the news today

by Karen Gellen
Chapter Correspondent

oh boy..

compiled from letters from chapter contacts, local members, regional travellers, sds newsletters, and liberation news service.

WICHITA, KANSAS—sds at WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY demonstrated at city hall to protest the visit of 15 south vietnamese deputy provincial chiefs, as their bus pulled into wichita, these "dignitaries" saw the picketing students, read signs that called the saigon government a lackey of u.s. imperialism, etc., and panicked. to the embarrassment of the wichita mayor, his guests, fearing to go anywhere near the demonstrators, absolutely refused to get off the bus. the provincial chiefs were then driven around wichita in the bus until the mayor and the local police convinced them that they would not be killed by the demonstrators.

on february 4, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY planned to give dean rusk an honorary degree at their mid-year commencement held on the NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY campus, as rusk was planning to accept his degree in person, LOYOLA sds called for a citywide demonstration and rally at the commencement. the day before the demonstration, sds learned that rusk had cancelled his visit in order to appear on a special "meet the press" interview—the chicago area sds chapters decided to go ahead with the original plans in order to protest the nature of a LOYOLA that would confer an honor upon rusk. on the 4th, 400 people attended the rally even though the morning papers had headlined rusk's non-appearance. during the rally, which was addressed by tim mc carthy of sds, a few graduating seniors, about 30 demonstrators, and a nun were ejected from the graduation ceremonies for attempting to leaflet.

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA—more than 75 demonstrators shouted encouragement and chanted "hell no, we won't go" as SSOC organizer george vlasits entered the raleigh induction center to refuse induction. rudolph vlasits rode all night on a bus from new jersey to join the demonstration in support of his son. the demonstrators leafleted all arriving inductees, who accepted the leaflets more readily than at previous demonstrations. dormitories were leafleted and discussions were held for several days before the demonstration at the UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, DUKE UNIVERSITY, and NORTH CAROLINA STATE COLLEGE.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS—on thursday afternoon, february 1, rumors began circulating on the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO campus that a top government official was planning to make a sneak appearance there—security guards were noticed all over campus, special phone lines were being put in various buildings, and so on. by doing a quick bit of intelligence work, a few students discovered that the secret visitor was hubert humphrey himself, and that he was to attend a dinner honoring a founder of unesco. sds members immediately went through all of the dorms, libraries, and study halls announcing that humphrey was about to arrive on campus. within half an hour, 100 people had gathered outside the building where humphrey was speaking, and were loudly chanting anti-war slogans...four hours later, when humphrey left, there were 400 people outside chanting, banging on the walls of the building, and trying to climb in the windows. in order to leave, humphrey had to walk past the demonstrators as they shouted "hell no, we won't go!" at him. even with monumental plans for secrecy and security, humphrey could not visit a campus without meeting huge protest.

DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA—students at DUKE UNIVERSITY picketed and blocked the doors of a building where a dow recruiter was attempting to hold interviews. the students protested the presence of dow on campus, and the fact that DUKE owns 5,000 shares of stock in the dow chemical company. in order to gain wide support for the protest, the student committee against the war held a teach-in on vietnam on the morning of the demonstration....a group of DUKE law students have formed a student legal-action movement—they are doing work on draft counseling, and assisting a community group in bertie county.

SOUTH BEND, INDIANA—a sit-in against dow was held on the campus of NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY, with the support of students from INDIANA UNIVERSITY AT SOUTH BEND. over 200 people marched to the sit-in chanting "che!"...the demonstration, which received wide support from priests and divinity students, forced dow to cancel all scheduled interviewing.

people who had called by then, asking for and offering suggestions. In this context, the NIC appropriately instructed the NO to announce nationally the demonstrations already planned or in process, and to send out a national call, urging more of the same, along with the appropriate press releases, analyses, and literature. (All our press releases are mainly written for and sent to the radical, underground, and student publications.) Naturally, the NO complied. In addition, I would like to add, for future reference, that even if this were not the procedure followed, the NO would have been acting responsibly. I would refer my critics to the text of the resolution on repression and relations with other groups passed at this past June Convention (NLN, July 10th, 1967). To quote from the mandate: "We contend that whenever the government feels that some Left group (in the Spock case, RESIST) is so dangerous that the government must attack and destroy it, we will support that group by all means at our command, regardless of the group's political ideology. We require the national officers to take whatever steps are necessary to implement this resolution by organizing such actions as support demonstrations, defense committees, fund-raising, direct action, and publicizing the true nature of the attacks." Naturally, the more regional and local SDS people the NO can contact prior to acting in these situations, the better. Moreover, if the S-L-R nexus had criticized the NO for not contacting them in particular, I would support that criticism, to say the least. They are key individuals, and should

have been contacted. However, their general condemnation of the NO in this area is out of order.

8) The S-L-R paper argues that the Spring program proposal passed by the NC is no national program at all. In terms of mandates given the NO, there is some truth to this. We almost have a "10 days to do your thing" program. However, given local and regional sovereignty, the NO is expected to encourage SDS people to carry on certain activities between April 20th and April 30th, and to discourage certain other things.

A careful reading of the resolution reveals the following: Prior to and during the 10 days, the NO is free to suggest—through NLN, regular mailings, literature publication, and regular traveling—a wide variety of organizing drives and direct actions, both on and off the campus. We can build our suggestions around several issues, preferably those linking immediate needs with anti-imperialism.

Also, the NO can and should link and make visible the anti-imperialist content of local struggles. If requested, the NO can directly assist chapters and regions in implementing their programs.

The NO will make a major priority of producing literature on all the above. Outside the domain of local chapters and regions, the NO "can act as a catalyst" in developing anti-imperialist programs, including the development of off-campus, community-based programs supplemental to on-campus, student-based programs.

The NO can encourage and, if requested,

continued on p. 8

and still more critique . . .

continued from p. 7

assist regions in having conferences during the next 3 months to plan their specific plans for the 10 days.

The NO can co-ordinate and plan a national anti-draft program, reaching out to potential inductees on the campus and in the community. This program will be explicitly the SDS alternative to McCarthy. This program will include mass action as well as cadre recruiting, on and off campus, Spring and Summer. Plans will be made in conjunction with the desires of local groups.

With the exception of this last section on the Draft, what all the above generally means is that the NO is allowed to do what the NO is usually allowed to do without a program. What is different is the NO's mandate to "link and make visible", that is, co-ordinate and propagandize on a national level, local and regional struggles occurring and hopefully intensifying within the 10 days in April.

Despite the inadequacies of our current national program (and the debate preceding it), calling the Fuerst resolution "no program at all" is inaccurate. A better analysis would be that we have, on the national level, the form of a program, from which most of the content is either absent, or, presently, in local isolation. However, even this could add up to "no program at all", were it not for the mechanism calling for regional conferences contained in the resolution. If these regional meetings occur (some have already), their decisions will determine both the program's missing content and the missing mandates and priorities of the National Office during this period.

9) The S-L-R paper claims that Spiegel's assertion that PLP immediately withdrew its "base-building" proposal from the floor, and forestalled debate, was unfair. From what I have been able to learn about the incident, they are correct. Upon reflection, Spiegel admits an error in this interpretation as well.

10) Since I have acquired (not unwillingly) the position of "resistance strategist" within the past year or so, I have had difficulty relating to the sort of argument against my position presented in the S-L-R paper, or similar attacks such as "Bravery Is Not Enough" in Boston PL News (Winter 1968). Both articles initiate their attack of the "resistance" strategy with a common point. They carefully lift out of context a passage from my article on "Institutional Resistance" (NLN, November 13, 1967). The quote goes as follows: "Their purpose was the disruption and obstruction of certain events and actions BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY." The mistake (intentional?) of my critics lies in the assumption that this is a position of which I am an advocate, rather than a describer. The context of the quote is a description of a current wave of militant demonstrations, along with an exposition of the concurrent rationales of the participants in those actions. Far from advocating that vacuous rationale myself, I clearly stated the need of a critical evaluation of those events.

To continue, the capitalization of the final phrase ("BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY") was meant only to draw attention to the abandonment of patience and non-violence among the "new militants". Unfortunately, the editors of BPLN play with this phrase in a misleading manner, i.e., "...disruption and obstruction BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY! How should we fight to win, we ask? And the answer comes, 'BY WHATEVER MEANS NECESSARY!' Not very helpful." However, my critic is helpful, since his taunt reveals his dishonesty. Anyone who has seen the complete article he quoted from could not help but notice, 2 columns over, a list of 22 different tactics, in detailed outline, all applicable to my critic's query: "How should we fight...?"

At any rate, I offer a critique of the passage myself, in a following sentence. "Politically, the occurrence of this kind of activity implies the prior dissolution of whatever legitimacy and authority the institution being resisted may have formerly had." As a self-criticism,

I must admit the sentence does not unambiguously convey my thought, although the meaning is clear in the context of the entire article. At any rate, a clarification is due. My position on militant destructive tactics entails the pre-condition that their political success necessarily requires the prior dissolution of almost all of whatever legitimacy and authority the institution being resisted may have had.

The criticism of this position in the S-L-R paper asserts that resistance is a strategy of minority disruption of the established order, a self-isolating program at best. Yes, resistance begins with a minority, but its objective is to become a majority. Staughton Lynd remarks in "On Resistance Strategy" (NLN, November 20th, 1967): "The peculiarity of a resistance movement is to combine life-and-death struggle with reaching-out to new constituencies." On the same point, Bob Pardun states in "Direction of Resistance" (NLN, November 6th, 1967): "We cannot afford to set up barriers between ourselves and our potential allies. By that I don't mean that we should stop our radical activity because it might alienate people, but rather that we shouldn't put people in ready-made bags (e.g. frat rat, red neck) which keep us from reaching them. Those who are now hostile must be reached." Furthermore, from my "Institutional Resistance", concerning the use of militant tactics: "First, and most important, don't become ISOLATED by using tactics likely to divide the participants in the action from their present and POTENTIAL constituency." (I assume our "potential" is most, but not all.) This position sounds alien to my 2 sets of critics, both of which go to great lengths to identify "resistance" with smearing targets, throwing steers' blood, mobile tactics, "military" tactics, et al. In this respect, I would assert that it makes no sense to accept or reject any tactic in itself. Rather, "the selection of tactics naturally depends on one's (or a group's) strength relative to a particular opponent; and within the limits of the current political situation (the list of 22 suggested tactics follows: 'Institutional Resistance', NLN, November 13, 1967).

Many of the actions the "base-builders" have been denouncing lately as representing the "resistance strategy" have also been criticized by those of us advocating the resistance position. Only we label it "the new militancy", "the Left adventurers", or, simply, "the crazies". The identification of those radicals in and around SDS putting forth a viable resistance position, with the sad clowns and cops making up groups like the Revolutionary Contingent, is more than unfair.

Along these same lines, the "base-builders" have been pointing to the success of the Brooklyn College strike, as an example of what the "resisters" are supposedly opposed to. On the contrary, I stated in a "resistance" article on the student strike debate (NLN, December 18, 1967): "...students at Brooklyn College in New York won a tremendous victory against administration and police repression...the successful Brooklyn College strike points to a few crucial decisions that may have made a difference in some of the other strikes that were lost." On the other hand, the criticism of the November 14th action in the S-L-R article is inadequate. To read their account (and those of other "base-builders"), one would think the action amounted to nothing more than split heads, steers' blood, and angry workers in snarled traffic. These were the detrimental aspects of the action, agreed, but what should we make of the 4,000-odd pamphlets on the FPA, put together with excellent content by NACLA and distributed by regional SDS to all New York campuses, not to mention all the collective study sessions of the pamphlet held by several SDS chapters. Do we forget about that? Or do the S-L-R "base-builders" have so little confidence in their ability to defend their position that they must counterpose "...breaking windows in a bank" (supposedly my position) with the Boston student-worker

alliance around transit-fare increases? Better yet, the S-L-R folks win first prize for non sequiturs and oversimplification for this causal chain: "Ten Days—self-isolation and knocked heads—selling out or cashing in from despair — Bobby Kennedy and/or McCarthy."

Let us examine parts of the "base-building" resolution:

a) Resistance equals pacifism. Absurd on the face of it.

b) "sharpen the struggle with US imperialism..." in such a way that "...we come out stronger...and closer to the working class, not fighting it." Of course, we agree. The main feature of resistance is its ability to increase its militancy against the enemy concurrently with a deepening and broadening of its base among greater numbers of people. And it should be evident that we mean working people.

c) The "base-builders" are not interested in improving "military tactics". We are interested in studying tactics generally. Furthermore, the label "military" for what, by any standards, are political tactics is unwarranted and misleading.

d) The "base-builders" are for "breaking out of our isolation from the majority of students and workers." So are we.

e) "Super-militancy around university complicity equals isolation and loss of strength." If "super-militancy" means the use of unsuited tactics, then we agree. If sufficient preparatory work has been done, then we disagree.

f) "Base-builders" assert the necessity of not having a cynical attitude toward the American people. Lynd in "On Resistance Strategy" (NLN, November 20th, 1967) remarks: "It (the resistance attitude) requires a confidence that people can be reached."

g) According to S-L-R, "The 'resistance' outlook holds that the working class is apathetic, bought off, and reactionary. This is another misleading pronouncement about us. Actually, my position is that some workers are apathetic, some not; some sectors of the work force can be temporarily "bought off" in relation to others; finally, some workers are reactionary, some not; it varies. At any

rate, to quote Staughton again, "Our new concern to organize in white working-class constituencies would appear to indicate a resurgence of such confidence (as found in the resistance attitude)."

h) The S-L-R paper also accuses us of believing that "...if a small minority takes super-militant action, the workers will follow (even with) no attempts to reach them...." I know no one who believes that in this country, let alone any of the SDS resistance group. The "base-builders" are simply wrong or misleading, again.

There seem to be a good number of similarities, despite each side's claim to the contrary. Most of the agreements, however, are either general or rhetorical. In specific, limited situations, there would be disagreement. Why? What is the basis of it?

To begin with, there is one clear difference on the "off-campus" issue. "Base-builders" would like to keep radical student politics confined to the campus. On the other hand, according to Pardun in "Direction of Resistance" (NLN, November 6, 1967), "If the organizing is done seriously a base in the community as well as an expanding campus base can be established."

Does the S-L-R group favor mass protest actions by students on a city-wide basis, say against the War and the Draft? In addition to on-campus actions? It is difficult to say. Certain off-campus projects seem permissible; mainly, those called "student-worker alliances" around jointly felt economic issues, like transit-fare increases. Other than those, the "base-builders" only seem to have off-campus work for a cadre of students interested in factory-based trade-union work.

The resistance strategy, if we can separate it from all the straw men put up by the base-builders, is more flexible. Not only does it allow for mass action, on and off campus, but it allows a wide range of organizing programs in a variety of different communities and workplaces. It also appeals to a broader spectrum of people, rather than only students and workers.

In the end, it seems the tensions between the two strategies reduce to a single question: "base-building"—what kind of base and built for what ends? Even so, I will conclude with the remark that base-building is not a program. Rather, it is a basic assumption, a given, that all serious political workers are interested in, especially us "resistance" folks.

NEW LEFT NOTES
Room 206
1608 W. Madison
Chicago, Ill. 60612
RETURN REQUESTED

Second class post-
age rates paid in
Chicago, Illinois

Stuart Do wty
532 S. First Ave.
Ann Arbor Mich
4810 3

0

6 7

NAC MINUTES

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

Submitted "with revolutionary fervor" by Bernie Farber

Members present: Davidson, Farber, Gellen, Kissinger, McCarthy, Neiman, Pardun

Members absent: Silbar, Spiegel, Hank Williams

1) The Chicago Taxpayers Against the War will have a mailing sent out to our Chicago mailing list for a fee of \$10. The group is attempting to file suit to recover taxes that go for the War.

2) Chicago Student Mobilization was given use of our addressograph to run through 100 names a month, with the understanding that if it got any larger, we would begin

to charge.

3) Surrealist magazine was given the Chapter contact list for \$15. Brother Davidson thought this was just as political as or more political than the taxpayers.

4) McCarthy reported that the Treasury Department has told SDS to pay \$26 for back phone taxes or have its bank account attached. McCarthy felt this was a political decision, to be made by the NIC rather than the NAC.

5) Brother McCarthy further reported \$300 in the bank, with contributions running slow, consisting largely of memberships, and a \$400 phone bill expected in briefly.

6) Recent research into the availability of a cheap (\$2-3,000) press was discussed, but no action was taken.