

NEW LEFT NOTES



SDS
• 1608 W. MADISON •
• CHICAGO, ILL. •

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 31

LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE

SEPTEMBER 11, 1967

what happened at the nsa congress...

SDS Counters Corporate Liberalism

Jeff Jones
SDS New York Regional Office

The National Student Association held its annual Congress at the University of Maryland August 13-25. Acting to implement the resolution adopted at the last National Convention, a delegation of about 25 SDS people from the University of Maryland chapter, Washington, and New York went to College Park to organize toward the dissolution of the NSA.

The disclosure that, for more than 10 years, the NSA had been a front for the Central Intelligence Agency was only a logical extension of the role the organization has been playing in American society in general and higher education in particular. With over 330 affiliated campus student governments, NSA claims to speak for, and represent, the best interests of American students. Recognizing this, the CIA used NSA for several purposes, among them: as a contact with radical student organizations in other countries; as a training ground for future CIA careerists (if you kept the secret of the CIA money, you were assured a position with the agency); and most important, as a form of social control over the development of political movements on American campuses. It is the last that most concerned SDS at the time of the adoption of the anti-NSA resolution, and it was mainly a desire to eliminate this politically restrictive/cooptative force from American campuses that took us to their 20 Annual Congress.

We approached the Congress with a strategy that took into consideration the degree to which NSA is an appendage to, and therefore supported by, U. S. corporate capitalism. We had to approach the organization at the very personal, life-affirming level that its source of political support negates. Any politicking in the form of resolutions for self-disbandment or international reform seemed to us doomed to failure or frustration. The real alternatives the left had to present at the time of the Congress were in the form of person-to-person experiences with the delegates. Any attempt to confront the organization at its bureaucratic level would have put us on the same political level as the NSA leadership, thereby isolating us from the delegates we were trying to reach.

Our main goal was to meet as many of the delegates as possible, engage them in conversation and learning experiences, and let the bureaucratic process go on around us, while constantly subjecting it to our personal scorn and derision.

The SDS counter-convention

To make our presence most effectively felt, i.e., to make the delegates aware of us and curious enough to relate to us, we organized a structure outside of and parallel to the NSA Congress. We asked the radical speakers who were invited by NSA to address various symposia to refuse their invitations, and speak instead under our sponsorship. In his talk at our first meeting, Andrew Kopkind stated that "the fact that there is a 'counter-conven-



The real radical caucus at the NSA Congress

tion' is more important than what we say."

The "Counter-Convention" allowed us to present a number of speakers, including Kopkind, Sol Stern, Dick Gregory, Carl Davidson, Nick Egelson, James Ridgeway, Phil Hutchings, Art Waskow; and discussions on the draft, student power, and the rebellions in the urban black communities. The effect was that the NSA staff had to recognize our presence formally, and their alternatives were to attempt to isolate us effectively from the Congress delegates, or to accept us as friends with a differing point of view and attempt to co-opt us. Choosing the latter, the NSA staff went to the extreme of offering to take up a personal collection to pay the SDS delegation's observer fees. We declined both the money and the observer status.

The NSA staff's desire to maintain a calm, and on the surface friendly, relationship with the SDS delegation worked to make our presence felt at the Congress. The danger of a free speech fight was perhaps our strongest political weapon. We published a daily newsletter, "The Spark," which carried articles about SDS, NSA, and analyses of Congress developments. Because ours was the only newsletter distributed by hand to each delegate, it received wide distribution.

As the Congress progressed, we found that remaining completely outside the NSA Congress structure was neither necessary nor politically effective. By the end of the third day, members of the SDS delegation began to receive invitations to speak at "reference groups" and other seminar situations. Some who were legally

constituted delegates from their own campuses became involved with the NSA Congress radical caucus. At one point, a group of Congress delegates, confronted by a group of people from the Detroit ghetto, became aware for the first time of the extent to which urban black communities affect the lives of their inhabitants. When they attempted to deal with the problem as students, they found that they had to move outside the NSA structure. We joined with them on an ad hoc basis.

The tone of the Congress was "dissolution." The role SDS played during the Congress was more catalytic than organizational. For many of the delegates, this was their first experience at a national level with any student organization. The existence of NSA was an accepted fact, the question of alternatives was meaningless, simply because alternatives do not exist in American higher education.

We were able to raise the question of how can an organization that is undemocratic claim to speak honestly for American students? It remained for experience with the NSA at the national level to provide the answer. On the ninth day of the Congress, a discussion was held on whether or not to accept the NSA staff's proposal on how to deal with the final severance of ties with the CIA. In question were the National Headquarters in Washington, a large brownstone, donated by the CIA. The staff proposal was to take over the mortgage on the building (over \$120,000 for the next 13 years). The Plenary Chairman spent many minutes outlining the agenda of speakers: four

The Ballad of NCNP

John Lennon, Paul McCartney, and Todd Gitlin

It was twenty years ago today
Henry Wallace taught the band to play
They've been going in and out of style
But they're guaranteed to raise a smile
So may I introduce to you
The bag you've known for all these years
William Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band.

We're William Pepper's Lonely Hearts
Club Band
We hope you will enjoy the show
We're William Pepper's Lonely Hearts
Club Band
Sit back and let the movement go
William Pepper's Lonely, William Pep-
per's Lonely,
William Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band.

It's wonderful to be here
It's certainly a thrill
You're such a lovely audience
We'd like to take you in with us
We'd like to take you in.

I don't really want to stop the show
But I thought you might like to know
That the Negro's gonna sing a song
And he wants you all to sing along
So let me introduce to you
The one and only Martin King.
William Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band

speakers for, four speakers against; eight speakers total; five minutes per speaker; total time for discussion forty minutes; motions to extend debate acceptable at that time, etc.; when the chairman called for speakers there was no response. The reaction of the average NSA delegate was that the question of the CIA was a staff problem and neither a fault nor a problem of theirs as Congress delegates. Not all the delegates recognized the significance of this feeling, but it is an example of the avenues that were open to us for the type of organizing we were attempting to do. It also spoke to the question of what type of use to make of the fact that the NSA had been a CIA front. Since the average Congress delegate did not feel like a CIA agent, we soon found it was foolish to insinuate in any way that being in NSA was synonymous with being an agent for the CIA. What wasn't foolish was to show the delegates how their organization was still being subtly controlled by the government through various agencies, like OEO, the Department of Labor, and HEW.

Remaining questions

Some questions remain after our experience at the NSA Congress. One has to do with whether our approach was the correct one, and that falls within the broader question of "How can we effectively destroy the NSA?" The second question is "What will be the effect in the future of the NSA on the development of a radical or revolutionary student move-

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LETTERS TO NLN

205 E. 7th St.
New York City
September 4, 1967

Sisters and Brothers;

It seems an odd contradiction in Don McKelvey's analysis of the Convention in the Aug. 21 New Left Notes first to plead for more coherent ideology and then to go on to dump on everybody he doesn't like by calling them "anarchists"—a rather tired gambit better left to New York Times editorial writers, who love the word so well.

The question of urban guerrilla warfare has been brought to our attention by real events happening in this society. Like any other tactic, we have to evaluate it from the point of view of whether it is useful in advancing a social revolution in America, and if so, when, where, and how it should be employed, and by what kind of organizations and/or movements. That's a long discussion. Simply to dismiss urban guerrilla warfare out of hand as "anarchism" contributes nothing.

In considering power as some kind of moral category, it becomes divorced from the real world. No conservative tries to limit his own power, although he will, in any social formation, try to limit the power of fancied or real opponents. The idea that liberalism seeks to limit power is laughable; liberalism in this society has reached its logical conclusion in the police liberalism of one Lydon Baines Johnson. In its less purulent days, liberalism sought to limit the power of unrestrained American business, in order to accomplish various token reforms, but it did so by building the power of the state as against that of the individual businessman. That's what the New Deal was all about.

Our job is to smash that state so that we can tear apart the exploitative social and economic relations it fastens on us with its guns and jails. That involves not only distribution of the wealth of the society among those who do its work, but a distribution of power as well—an equal distribution of power, not a situation where a few wise "leaders" make decisions "rightly" while the rest of us stand around and watch. The latter kind of relationship is the keystone of every kind of exploitation and oppression found on the face of the earth today.

Maximizing the power of a revolutionary society necessarily means minimizing the power of the state apparatus formally, for example: The replacement of the standing army by an armed people. All public representatives subject to short terms and instant recall. All public representatives and functionaries stripped of every shadow of privilege and every appearance of "official grandeur." All public representatives and functionaries to receive no more than the minimum workman's wage. Freely elected workers' councils. No distinction between administration and work, i.e., the conversion of representative institutions from mere debating societies into working bodies where all elected representatives themselves work, execute their own decisions, verify their results in actual life, and are held directly responsible to those whose wishes they are supposed to be carrying out.

This program is hardly original. It's

taken from the pamphlet "State and Revolution," by the well-known "anarchist" Lenin, who waged the last political battle of his life against Stalin's clique of wise leaders who sought to destroy it, and eventually succeeded, for reasons peculiar to Russian society 50 years ago. Today Stalin's "liberal" successors sell the US titanium to be used in manufacturing jet bombers.

The point is that those of us who believe that social revolution in this society is desirable and possible have got to deal with the question of revolutionary power and its organization, and develop a program that embodies the concept of power for the majority, not for old or new elites.

Best wishes.
Tom Barton

Box A-R
Rio Piedras,
Puerto Rico 00928
August 30, 1967

Estimados companeros,

I am very happy to inform you that in draft resistance we in P. R. are very well advanced and among other things have over one thousand draft-age males who signed a document refusing to be inducted and expressing solidarity with the National Liberation Front. We even had a North Vietnamese envoy here for a while, and had an ambassador in North Vietnam who is now in critical state as he got hit in a bombing. At any rate, draft resistance here is a big issue, involved with the whole colonial situation. I just came from a rather large picket in front of the induction center here in San Juan where two of our companeros refused to be inducted and sign the loyalty oath. Ten are now pending trial and several hundred of those who signed have been called and refused. Things are popping.

Marimar Benitez

NACLA PAPER

The first NACLA (North American Conference on Latin America) Research Paper is now available: The Violence of Domination: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic, by Fred Goff and Michael Locker.

The paper asserts and attempts to demonstrate that the base of Dominican power rests on economic, political, military, and social structures within the United States, not the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, crucial decisions affecting Dominican history (e.g. the overthrow of Trujillo, election of Bosch, overthrow of Bosch, U.S. military intervention, election of Balaguer) were therefore determined within the U.S. structures and were executed by North Americans, indirectly (and covertly), and were at times directly linked to the U.S. government.

The twenty-three-page paper is available on request from NACLA on the following basis:

1. Free to paid NACLA Newsletter subscribers;
2. Free to new Newsletter subscribers (a minimum of \$3.00 contribution);
3. \$1.00 charge to all others.

PRESS FOR POWER


by Tim Morearty
for Eric, Wendy, Jon, John, Marilyn,
Vicky, Geno and the NO staff

Talk about a new, more efficient press has been going on for a long time in the National Office. This fall it is a must—Bob Pardun plans 20 or more new pamphlets, some going up to 80 pages, for the next couple months and just to get these out before December or January for chapters and our regional travelers and organizers we need another, better, more efficient, more economical press NOW. In addition to printing all our literature this press can also print New Left Notes, and with a folder-collator which we need we can fold and collate it, too. Now here is the big one: the cost of the monthly payments on the press combined with the cost of the materials for four issues of New Left Notes per month is less, LESS, than what we pay each month to job out NLN. Besides saving money on NLN we can make money on printing at reduced rates for other

left organizations—and the possibilities for this are almost untapped.

Where we're at: The NAC just allocated \$3,500 for the down payment on the above press but left it up to us and the membership how we can raise the other \$3,500-\$4,000 for the folder-collator. We all feel that everyone would be willing to pay \$.50 to be able to read NLN and other SDS lit which was printed, folded, collated, not to mention edited and layed out on all SDS equipment, and by dedicated SDS personnel.

Remember, we need \$3,500. P.S. Tim McCarthy just notified me before this went to press that he will personally withhold my salary if he has to take 8,000 \$.50 checks to the bank. I asked him what amount he would be willing to take and he said he would take all those \$.50 and over and that I would have to take anything less.



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conferences

CONFERENCE ON CAMPUS MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY RESEARCH

Michael Locker
NACLA and SDS

The base of power for U.S. domination overseas lies so close to our lives that we can't even see it, let alone attack it effectively. Research essential to military and civilian programs designed to insure U.S. control over the Third World has saturated the American campus. The university budget floats on subsidies geared toward national security. Research grants permit on-site investigations for basic intelligence. Quasi-governmental institutes and centers provide extra facilities and legitimize off-campus roles as well as secrecy. Out of such "academic and scholarly" activity spring the mechanisms of domination and oppression. It is the role of student radicals to expose the sociologists, physicists, and engineers who claim academic immunity and hide behind apolitical disguises.

A program geared towards throwing military work off campus requires an examination of two other related issues: (1) the role of universities and academics in American society, and (2) the nature (i.e., goals, means, and results) of American overseas involvement, particularly in the Third World. These political issues can be dealt with concretely rather than abstractly when a chemistry professor doing research on chemical-biological weapons has his classes harassed and disrupted. The sociologist who can lecture about "scientific objectivity and neutrality" in research must be exposed as a counter-insurgency expert and his legitimacy as a spokesman from "science" must be blunted with copious quotes from his latest secret report on the newest "pacification techniques for preventing revolution".


Toward this end, NACLA, along with Students for a Democratic Society, the Radical Education Project, and possibly the University Christian Movement and other campus-based movement groups, is now in the process of planning a conference for mapping out strategies for confronting campus military opera-

tions and research. Building from past experience (e.g., at the University of Pennsylvania) and utilizing detailed knowledge of contracts and the individual recipients, the conference will attempt to spell out specific action programs leading to politicization of the campus. If North Americans are interested in developments in Latin America, they must understand the mechanisms of domination—civilian and military—that have their base of power within the confines of U.S. universities. This must be one of the foci of our attack.

At present the conference is projected for November 10-12 in Chicago. If you are interested in working on the conference or want further information, write October Conference, c/o NACLA, Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, New York 10025. Further announcements will appear in succeeding issues of this Newsletter in succeeding issues of New Left Notes.

A Conference on the draft will be held Sept. 29 to Oct. 1 in Austin, Texas. Housing is available. People arriving in Austin should call GR8-5018.

The University of Kentucky (in Lexington) volunteered at the last Convention to host a regional conference. That would include any chapters interested in the Ohio Valley Region—Southern Ohio, Southern Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia, or thereabouts. All those who are interested should contact: University of Kentucky SDS
University Station
Lexington, Kentucky 40506



new left notes

Published weekly by Students for a Democratic Society, 1608 W. Madison St., Chicago, Ill., 60612, except July and August when publication is bi-weekly. Phone 312-666-3874. Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Ill. Subscriptions: \$1 a year for members, \$10 a year for non-members. Signed articles are the responsibility of the writer. Unsigned articles are the responsibility of the editors, Beth Reisen and Marilyn Buck.

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Southern California: P.O. Box 85396, Los Angeles, Calif. 90072
New England: 39 Lee St., apt. 3A, Cambridge, Mass.
Northern California: P.O. Box 7333, Stanford, Calif. 94305

THE N.C. IS COMING

Proposed Resolutions for the N.C.

WHAT: THE FALL NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING

WHEN: October 6, 7, 8.

WHERE: Madison, Wisconsin

Our chapter contact files are completely out of date, since over the summer most contacts either move or are replaced by new contacts in the fall. Thus, the only contact we will have with you to arrange credentials will be through New Left Notes. Although we realize that many chapters have not organized themselves by this date, some attempt should nonetheless be made to send us credentials or else we will spend an inordinate amount of time at this NC fiddling with credentials...an issue which should hardly be of top priority on the agenda.

Chapters should hold meetings as soon as possible to elect the delegates. The basis of representation by delegates is one representative from each chapter with from 5 to 25 national members, and one additional representative for each additional 25 members or fraction thereof in that chapter.

CHAPTERS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DO THE FOLLOWING:

(1) The names of the delegates and the chapters they represent should be sent to the National Office as soon as possible, along with the number of members in the chapter.

(2) People who are planning to attend the NC should send their names and housing requests to the SDS office in Madison. The address there is: Bob Wieland
Dept. NC
107 State St.
Madison, Wisc.

For delegates' comfort, we have been informed that those who do not send in housing requests in advance will be housed in the lake. Specifications for housing should be broken down into individuals, couples, small children, etc. Bring your sleeping bag!

THE NC IS LESS THAN THREE WEEKS AWAY...THIS SHOULD BE DONE IMMEDIATELY!!

ON SNCC

submitted by Itzhak Epstein

Students for a Democratic Society, noting its fraternal relationship with Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and recognizing SNCC's right to develop an international position and program independently, notes with deep concern and regret SNCC's recent inclination towards racism in general and antisemitism in particular. SDS condemns all forms of racism without exception. SDS calls upon SNCC to engage with SDS in a mutual dialogue on racism and antisemitism. This dialogue might take the form of public forums in urban centers and college towns, exchange of position papers to be published both in New Left Notes and SNCC Newsletter, and joint conferences. The Interorganizational Secretary of SDS shall be charged with the implementation of this resolution.

ON A SOUTHERN AFRICA PROGRAM

submitted by Bob Speck

SDS calls for a series of continuing local demonstrations, teach-ins, debates, etc., to take place between September, 1967, and March 21, 1968, culminating in a nationwide teach-in with attendant demonstrations on March 21, 1968. (March 21 was the day when the South African government massacred Black demonstrators in Sharpeville, South Africa.)

The purpose of these demonstrations shall be to expose: (1) the totalitarian and racist nature of the governments of the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal; (2) the hypocrisy of American foreign policy toward the controlling governments of Southern Africa; (3) the neo-imperialistic role of American corporate capital investments in Southern Africa. The goal of these demonstrations is NOT to develop a lobby for the liberalization of American foreign policy toward the area of Southern Africa, but is instead to develop a base of support in America for the revolutionaries who must ultimately overthrow ALL of the governments concerned.

Argument for the Southern Africa Program

Tom Condit

Bob Speck is proposing a major national program aimed at education and action attacking US involvement with the racist regimes of Southern Africa—The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and the dependent states of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South West Africa. I want to go into the reasons I think we should have such a program, its usefulness, and the lessons to be learned from our three previous attempts at programs of this nature.

One of the positions SDS has always maintained in the peace movement is that the war in Vietnam is not an accident, but a typical consequence of American foreign policy. "Our" commercial and diplomatic policy toward Southern Africa is another example of the consequences of "business as usual"—support of racism, reaction, and naked colonialism. The tangle of American and British commercial, financial, mining, and manufacturing interests thoroughly illustrates the "stateless" nature of modern capitalism and the extent to which its dominance even in "liberal" and "democratic" nations leads to entanglement with reaction. A program attacking the U. S. role in support of these racist regimes can be one of the most effective means of exposing the role of American business and governmental agencies in the world as a whole.

There are reasons why Southern Africa is an area of particular vulnerability in our attacks on U. S. policy. The first is the direct complicity of business interests in the maintenance of the apartheid regime in South Africa—were it not for the banking consortium, the government of the Republic might well have fallen in 1960. The second is the particularly abhorrent nature of the regimes in that area. In particular, the government of South Africa is regarded by "men of good will" throughout the world with a disgust unequalled since the fall of Hitler. This means that non-establishment liberals, and in particular church youth groups, are prepared to act on this issue as on no other. In pure fact, these groups have done more than any "radicals" (except the Alexander Defense Committee) to build opposition to apartheid in this country. This means that the opportunity exists to open doors into the liberal and church communities which have been previously closed to us, and to utilize previously unavailable facilities.

The major objection which people in SDS raise to a Southern Africa program is that it would divert resources from anti-war work. This attitude is a reflection within SDS of the type of view we've been most successfully fighting within the anti-war movement: that the struggle for human liberation is neatly

separable into compartments; that there is no essential relation between domestic policy and foreign policy, or between foreign policy in Asia and foreign policy in Africa. We have always maintained that there is a central continuity and unity in the policies of the American ruling class, both at home and abroad, and that our duty was to attack them on as many fronts as possible. Do we have to wait until troops are sent to South Africa before we can begin building public opposition to American support of that foul and despotic regime?

A second argument in opposition has been the reverse of the first; that we are in danger of putting ourselves in an essentially liberal, single-issue bag; that it is not in fact possible to transcend mere goody-goody outrage at the "excesses" of South African fascism, and develop a genuine critique of imperialism in Southern Africa. I think that this argument has substance; anti-apartheid propaganda has a tendency to acquire a peculiarly moralistic tone, and to push for "reconciliation" and compromise on an essentially pacifist basis. This has been because until recently no one except pacifists and church people were concerned about South Africa. That's our fault, not theirs.

We've faced the same problem in regard to Vietnam, and had mixed success in solving it. Basically, every SDS chapter has to develop its own way of approaching this type of question. Do we support the program of South Africa big business, of enfranchising the African middle classes in order to co-opt them? How do we, in practical terms, base our program on the liberation of the African miners and the peasants of the reserves? In what way do we make clear our conviction that nothing short of revolution can resolve the grievances of the black peoples of Southern Africa? It's obvious that we do have to be clear on these points, but that no magic formula can cover the problems of clarification. This is particularly true since in many areas the success of our program will depend on our ability to cooperate honestly with people who either aren't clear on such things, or who definitely disagree with us. People have to find their own ways of doing this.

Phases of SDS programs on Southern Africa

SDS national programing on Southern Africa has gone through three phases. The first of these was the Chase Manhattan sit-in, a localized program coordinated through the national office. Within its limits this was an immensely successful demonstration—it exposed

Chase Manhattan's role in support of apartheid, mobilized both ghetto and campus people, and shook hell out of both David Rockefeller and the Wall Street cops. Its major defect was that there was no effective follow-up. We had focused attention on the operations of the banking consortium and uncovered things they would have preferred to leave in the shadows, but after that the whole thing just sort of petered out. It left behind, however, a nucleus of SDS people and contacts concerned with South Africa.

At the Southern California SDS conference in December, 1965, two large and enthusiastic workshops were held on Southern Africa, and California people left for the national meeting in Illinois ready to push for a national anti-apartheid program aimed at building a nationwide series of demonstrations, teach-ins, etc., during Sharpeville Week, 1966. The National Student Association had also come out in favor of such demonstrations, and had the backing of all the major student religious groups. The NC passed the program with little discussion and no effective workshops.

This second program wasn't an overwhelming success, and a large part of the responsibility for its failure is mine. In L. A. and later in Champaign I volunteered to act as unpaid coordinator in the N.O., and desk space was secured for me. Unfortunately, while I fed a good deal of information into NLN, and prepared a revised pamphlet on U. S. involvement in South Africa, I did very little effective coordinating. Aside from questions of my own inefficiency, I think a couple of clear lessons emerge from the Spring 1966 program. The first is that liberal groups, with the exception of the University Christian Movement, are willing to endorse programs of action against apartheid, and to participate in them, but will do very little on their own unless constantly prodded by radicals. In those areas where SDS people pushed demonstrations and teach-ins, they were held and were successful; where they did not, and left it to the liberals, the programs were either tepid or non-existent. (Again, the exception of NSCF/UCM people is pointed up by Eileen Hansen's very effective work on pressuring Congressman O'Hara in his home district.) The second is that movement people are paper-haters. This means that no piece of information has been "made available" by publishing it in NLN because everyone who wants to use it has already thrown away the issue. My prime stupidity was in getting a bunch of stuff published in NLN, then leaving Chicago on the assumption that the work was now done.

Nevertheless, a number of successful

Implementation:

The National Office of SDS shall publish the following pamphlets:

Web of Power (updated)

a list of US Corporations with investments in Southern Africa

South Africa (the Meaning of Apartheid) a bibliography on Southern Africa

In addition, NLN should publish a list of speakers, films, and tapes which chapters can use for programing within the project.

This program shall be coordinated by either the National Office or by the San Francisco Bay Area South Africa Committee (SDS).

local programs took place, the most spectacular in Lincoln, Nebraska, where Carl Davidson organized a week of activities culminating in the largest demonstration ever held there. We were successful in generating pressure for House hearings on U. S. business involvement in South Africa, but not in getting any real revelations out of them. A secondary result was the publication of the Ramparts article on Charles Engelhard, the original draft of which was written by Paul Booth and Chris Hobson. Unfortunately, Ramparts gave us neither credit nor payment (Don't Trust The Liberals), but more information became available on Engelfinger.

Before the June 1966 NC meeting, Chris Hobson and I had a number of discussions with people concerned about Southern Africa, and we brought a motion into that meeting for another national program. This time the program was to organize a series of demonstrations in the Fall aimed at demanding economic sanctions against South Africa, and timed to coincide with the World Court ruling on South West Africa. This program was a total flop—chapter delegates at Ann Arbor unanimously voted for it, and no chapter except the University of Chicago did anything. Everyone thought such a program was a great idea, if someone else would do it. Our resolution became a piece of paper just like the perennial NSA one.

Some of the blame for the failure of the third program can be laid at Stan Teplick's feet, as a major share of the fault in the second one is mine. That in itself is a lesson—that SDS is so incoherent and ill-organized that the strengths and weaknesses of single individuals determine the fate of national programs. The more a program is conceived in terms of a short-range "push," the more this becomes the case. It is clear that September is none too soon

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

continued from p. 3

to start preparing a program intended to reach a high point the following March. With the effective collapse of every regional office except New York City, and the fact that we don't have the resources to put a staff person in the N.O. onto an "African desk", it's particularly important that any program around Southern Africa be based on building up from the chapter level toward nationally concerted action.

On large demonstrations

This means breaking from a pattern of thought people have carried over from the "Woolworth" phase of the civil rights movement: regarding a demonstration or series of demonstrations as a "program" with a definite end which can be obtained through concerted effort. We've seen the disastrous results of such "mobilization" concepts in the anti-war movement: periods of intense activity and elation followed by depression and demoralization when the huge demonstration indeed exceeds all expectations, and the war indeed goes on. Similarly, if we hold a number of large demonstrations next March, the South African government will probably not fall as a consequence. Therefore, people shouldn't regard the demonstrations as the purpose of their local programs, nor consider their success or failure in organizing such demonstrations as the measure of their effectiveness. The purpose of national demonstrations is to help build a sense of solidarity and common purpose, and to focus the mass media on the question of Southern Africa. That is a secondary purpose in an educational and agitational campaign, and it may well be that circumstances will compel us to abandon the idea of nationwide demonstrations entirely. That won't invalidate the work already done, or the work yet to come.

This preoccupation with large demonstrations is a reflection of something else we're just learning to outgrow: a belief that our actions are going significantly and immediately to influence government policy. The second national program became enmeshed with the House hearings on South Africa policy, and a good deal of time (mostly Paul Booth's) and phone money was invested in long-distance calls to Washington, etc. The third program was tied to the World Court decision on South West Africa, and was explicitly intended to apply pressure for sanctions on a governmental level, long a demand of South African oppositionists. In both cases, our program became tied to a "lobbying" approach which had the dual disadvantages of being very open to pressure for accommodation with "left" elements of the establishment and of being abstracted from the real development of consciousness and commitment among ourselves and our "constituency", appearing as something totally artificial and unrelated to the interests and needs of local chapters and tied to an artificial "schedule" of no real value. The problem of how to take advantage of the very real divisions in the ruling class on this question without becoming the "tail" on some liberal kite is one we have failed to solve satisfactorily.

National and local programs

With that understood, let us look at what can be accomplished at both national and local levels. At the national level, we need two things: literature and information (bibliographies, speakers' lists, etc.). Both of these things exist, but need to be updated and reproduced. A new file will need to be opened on someone's desk at the N.O. to provide a ready reference for chapter inquiries, but it needn't be the responsibility of that person to accumulate all the necessary information. Two people who can raise their own expenses have already volunteered to travel to chapters in the Fall and work on local programs. The only major job for the N.O. to do is produce the necessary literature for chapter education programs. In December we can reconsider the desirability of and priorities for national demonstrations in March.

At chapter level, the most useful type of large meeting is probably a teach-in. African students, faculty people and outside speakers can be integrated with films, tapes, etc., to provide the necessary information from which people can draw political conclusions. In at least two areas, chapters have found it possible to get student government sponsorship and financing for such teach-ins. Where this isn't possible, a less ambitious series of meetings, leafletings, etc., should be planned. It's advisable for each chapter to have at least one member who is thoroughly familiar with the issues. You can make yourself such an "instant expert" by beginning with Franz J T Lee's "Anatomy of Apartheid in Southern Africa" (50¢ from the Alexander Defense Committee, 873 Broadway, NYC 10003), then going to the Africa Today special issue on "American Involvement in the South African Economy" (\$1 from American Committee on Africa, 211 E 43rd St, NYC 10017), and finally reading the volumes on Southern Africa in the Penguin African Library. The University of Chicago SDS pamphlet "The University, Continental Bank, and Apartheid" (5¢ from SDS lit service) should give you some ideas on how a local chapter can approach the question. Don't forget to research your university power structure for ties to banking, mining, etc. interests in Southern Africa.

I've passed the stage of argumentation for such a program and gotten into details in order to give people an idea of the possibilities and limitations. We should bear two things in mind. One is that the open hypocrisy of U. S. policy toward Southern Africa is one of the most vulnerable points of imperialist foreign policy, and the divisions within the ranks of the ruling class itself on what to do about it make them incapable of producing any coherent defense of that policy. Thus, the first evidence that the half-hearted sanctions against Rhodesia are beginning to hurt (less than one-third of this year's tobacco crop got to market) has produced a division in the State Department over whether to step them up or do away with them in the hope that no one will notice. Needless to say, substantial evidence that someone is noticing could make a very real difference. (But see my note above

NAC minutes

7 September

Members present: John Rossen, Clark Kissinger, Mike Spiegel, Jeff Segal, Tim McCarthy, Earl Silbar.

Members absent: Jean Tepperman, Bob Pardun, Marilyn Buck, Carl Davidson. Others present: John Venezia, Beth Gottlieb, Vicky Smith, Jon Dunn, Bruce Pohlman, Floyd Glasby, Denny Ankrum, Dee Jacobsen, Gene Harris.

1. The NAC hired Bruce Pohlman as Rayte Clerk.

2. The NAC decided to include a weekly financial report as part of the NAC report in NLN.

Financial report for the last two weeks:
Credits:
\$ 234.00—memberships/subscriptions
567.73—literature sales
949.50—contributions
709.50—printing
174.94—office sales

\$2635.92
5061.79—part of big contribution
\$7697.71

Debits:
\$ 869.38—printing
1152.00—subsistence for staff
60.00—exchanges
600.00—loans
358.29—miscellaneous
169.50—NLN

\$3334.17

Build not, Burn!

continued from p. 1

ment on American campuses?"

The source of strength of the NSA is not the student governments it represents, but the stronger institutions within this society that it functions to serve. Carl Davidson in an SDS pamphlet notes that "At present, the university's role in acculturation and socialization is promulgation of the utter mystification of 'corporate consciousness.' Society is presented to us as a kind of caste system in which we are to see ourselves as a 'privileged elite'—a bureaucratic man channelled into the proper bureaucratic niche. In addition to strengthening the forms of social control off the campus, the administration uses the apparatus on campus to legitimize its own power over us." Within this framework, the NSA is one of the "bureaucratic niches" into which certain types of students and student programs are channelled.

To destroy NSA then, it will be necessary to keep the organization from serving its function in this society. We can approach this in several ways. The one we applied to the Congress, and which should be applicable on individual campuses as well, is to make the students destined for NSA involvement aware of what their involvement means. We do this by pointing out the inability of NSA to deal with current social problems in any meaningful way—by showing how NSA is elitist and undemocratic—by showing how the organization is controlled by its programs which are defined by the gov-

on the problem of being co-opted by the "liberal" wing of the establishment.)

The second very important point is that the military and economic might of the racist regimes of Southern Africa is the main roadblock in the path of self-determination and economic growth on the African continent as a whole. With the resources of Southern Africa in African hands, the independence and industrialization of Africa is assured. With them in the hands of European racists tied to world imperialism, it may be indefinitely postponed. If we can do the smallest thing toward undercutting the foreign support of the apartheid regimes, it will be a great blow for democracy, self-determination, and socialism on a world scale.

ernment and private foundations, rather than by the students in the organization.

It is clear that we will not be able to radicalize all of the American students who potentially will be involved with NSA. The educative process must be joined with a political process for the most effective use of time. As we are successful in removing the radical element within NSA, we therefore strengthen the liberal element and the more conservative element. The most effective way to destroy NSA would be to isolate the liberals, leaving the conservatives all the power. Their programs would then become as inconsistent with the role defined for the organization by its supporting institutions as would a radical take-over of the organization. The goal of our organizing should become a more articulated, continued attack on that part of NSA which is clearly "liberal" in intent. For example: we should constantly make a point of the difference between a tutorial program with its middle class value system, and organizations of poor people demanding political power; physical forms of support for black power as opposed to resolution support (if black power is revolutionary, then student support must in some way be of a revolutionary nature); a demand for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia and the end of U. S. Imperialism, as opposed to a call for "Negotiations Now" among the forces fighting in South Vietnam.

Local use of the NSA

NSA is only one of many liberal institutions in a liberal society. The destruction of the NSA is clearly not as desirable as the destruction of the CIA, the Selective Service System—the corporate capitalist form of government itself. The effect of the NSA on the development of a radical student movement will depend on the role NSA plays on local campuses. Nationally, it will still be to the advantage of the U. S. Government to recognize the NSA as the spokesman for the American students. At the national level and at the local level, we should use NSA only as a tool to show individual students the difference between us and them, our program and theirs.

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3. Spiegel proposed that the NAC give to the National Guardian the names of SDS travellers who would, through a deal with the Guardian, get a 50% commission on subs they sold. Silbar opposed on the grounds that this constitutes pushing the New Working Class line which has never been adopted by national SDS. Kissinger said that previous policy has been not to favor any paper or organization. Segal moved to print the list of campus travellers in NLN, thus making it public to the Guardian and everyone else. This carried.

4. A \$200 loan, approved by the N.O. staff, was sent to Cathy Wilkerson to pay the rent for a D.C. regional office she is setting up. No D.C. regional council meeting has been held recently. Cathy stated the need for a visible locus of SDS there. The staff related that she had previously raised \$\$ in D.C.

The Boston NC last spring decided on regional office finances that their budget was to be sent to the N.O., that it could include expenses for the office and up to three regional staff. The NIC or the NC was to approve the budget and the N.O. was to pay with N.O. fund-raising rights in the region.

The N.O. is to send Cathy a note reminding her of the short-term nature of the loan.

5. The NAC discussed how to spend our recent \$12,000 gift. Three alternate proposals were discussed; it was finally decided to pay off \$3,300 in back debts and \$3,000 on the REC house, to put aside \$3,500 for a new press for the print shop, and to use the remainder for regular office operating expenses. \$12,000 can disappear very quickly!

submitted by Earl Silbar