

STUDENT

SOCIAL

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By TOM HAYDEN



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STUDENT SOCIAL ACTION: FROM LIBERATION TO COMMUNITY

By Thomas Hayden

For several weeks students [at Southern University in Baton Rouge] have been demonstrating against segregation practices in the community, and recently a number of them were expelled for their part in the activities. I happened to read a copy of the letter of expulsion sent from President Felton Clark to student leader D'Army Bailey, dated January 18 of this year (1962). President Clark based the expulsion on Rule 16 in the Southern University Student Handbook. The rule reads:

Lack of University Adjustment. The University reserves the right to sever a student's connection with the University for general inability to adjust himself to the pattern of the institution.

For expelling these students whose fervor for freedom was unadjustable to the university pattern, President Clark has been sharply criticized. Indeed, the attack on Negro college presidents generally has increased since the beginning of the student direct action movement in 1960. The Negro college president, symbolized in Dr. Clark, being a recipient of state funds and therefore an agent of the racial status quo, is loudly maligned by all integrationists as a tyrant, a moral weakling, and an aggressor against the hopes of a struggling generation. One imprisoned student demonstrator, for example, has declared that the Southern University officials are working hand-in-hand with segregationists.

Curiously, the attack on Dr. Clark is concentrated upon the issue of racial integration alone, and not on the issue of education that is also involved in Rule 16. Dr. Clark's actions are symptomatic of an educational philosophy and practice quite as undemocratic, though less brutal and spectacular, as the philosophy and practice of racial superiority. What has "general inability to adjust to the pattern of the institution" to do with acquiring a higher education in a democratic system? I wonder why our stylish social reformers, many of whom are college presidents and professors, are not as critical of the paternalistic educational habits as they are of the "Uncle Tom" racial practices of President Clark.

No part of the American university system is demonstrated more lucidly by the Southern incident than the doctrine of *in loco parentis*, the doctrine that is the key to understanding the organization of our extracurricular life. What exactly is this Latin phrase? According to the volume *College Law*, published by the American Council on Education:

The power which the officers of a college may lawfully exert to restrict and control the actions of its students is based upon the fact that, in law, the college stands in the same position to its students as that of a parent—*in loco parentis* (in lieu of parents)—and it can therefore direct and control their conduct to the same extent that a parent can.

In fact, this means the university—that is, the incorporated institution run by the regents or trustees—circumscribes the form and content of student social life and academic pursuit. It is the moral guardian of the young.

The historical origins of *in loco parentis* are ambiguous, as far as my perhaps inadequate research can determine. Perhaps the doctrine evolved partly from the early English universities, where faculty ownership was customary. This form of control, as Dean Kathryn Hopwood of Hunter College suggests, is "quite at variance with the genesis of the European universities, such as the ones at Bologna or Paris, where the students employed visiting scholars to teach them."

In America, of course, ownership is removed from the hands of students and faculty and the university is either a state agency or a private corporation. If these happenings have tended to divest students of autonomy, certain other distinctly American developments led to the institutionalization of *in loco parentis*. One of these, perhaps, was the delegation of educational control to the states, an act which induced a close relationship between home and school. The fact that many early American colleges were dominated by religious orthodoxies and dedicated to specific religious ends is probably relevant, too, in considering the ascendancy of *in loco parentis*. Whatever configuration of historical events gave rise to the doctrine, we know that it has been around for a long time, and that it is deeply rooted in the American educational system. We know, for instance, that in one of the early colleges, a master beat a student with a cane and the courts were asked to decide whether canings could go on outside the school buildings as well as within; the court said that the authority of the executor—I mean, the administrator—extended beyond the limits of the classroom—a theory that is still relevant to the university and social action.

To really experience the nature of the controversy requires a yet deeper examination of the meaning and application of the doctrine itself.

First of all, *in loco parentis* is not a closed issue legally, much as many deans would like us to believe it is. One contemporary

observer of higher education, Professor Gordon Klopf, acknowledges that while most legal precedent establishes the right of universities to serve *in loco parentis* "the real testing of this issue would vary from case to case and court to court." For instance, there is some evidence that state-financed universities are not necessarily responsible for the libelous material printed by their student editors. Or again, a recent Supreme Court decision involving Alabama State sit-in leaders indicated that due process is a right students can demand; and if due process, what other constitutional rights can they seek? There are plausible grounds, furthermore, for claiming that first amendment restrictions, such as speaker bans, are not constitutional. These trends and events, I believe, help to perforate the solid legal justification of *in loco parentis*. But, more important: when and where a law is thought unjust and improper, the responsible citizens and institutions affected by the law should challenge it. That is the relevance of constitutionalism and liberal democracy. The fact that *in loco parentis* has substantial legal base is not so much an index of [its propriety as it is an index of] university and community approval of the doctrine. When a dean dismisses anti-*in loco parentis* crusades by legalisms, he is evading the moral and educational issues. As Neal Johnson points out, he is confusing the legally founded "right" of the university to act *in loco parentis* with the legally unfounded "responsibility" to do so. He is thus avoiding the fact that moral and educational decisions must be made prior to invocation of *in loco parentis*.

So much for detours into the history and legal basis of paternalism. I want now to present my criticisms of the doctrine in a somewhat organized way.

First it is paradoxically discriminatory that our vaunted "educational elite," the people that society places its best hopes upon, are subjected to greater social restrictions than most persons of comparable age, save imprisoned convicts. To go to college involves a tacit surrender of the first amendment freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and often the freedom of privacy. It means arbitrary hours for women students and compulsory functions for both sexes; it means dressing in a certain way for a cer-

tain meal that is served only at certain times; it means the "double jeopardy" of receiving punishments from the university for crimes committed in and adjudicated by the city; it means tolerating personal dossiers and students who spy for the dean of men or congressional investigating committees; it means the supervision and regulation of privacy; it means living under threat of punishment for "conduct unbecoming a student," of "inability to adjust to the university pattern." Margaret Mead has commented forcefully on the distinction between the work force and student force in the same age range:

A handful of tugboat employees or flight engineers, because of their admitted rights in a complex system in which they are working members, can hold up a city or a country until their demands are met, but in some states students are not even allowed to vote.

And, unlike parents of students not in college, parents of studying children must both support them and, correlatively, retain control of their conduct or delegate comparable control to some quasi-parental educational institution. In either case the student is treated like a dependent child.

Needless to say, student extracurricular activity in most universities is articulated by the administration in terms of either the "preparation" theory or the "privilege" theory. The first of these goes like this: college is a "preparatory" period when the student, through incubation, is equipped with the skills he will need in life later on. "Preparation" means involving the student in a make-believe laboratory world of student activities where he can safely practice being a citizen. This process is affirmed by one dean of students in these terms:

I propose a system whereby we use our decision-making processes as teaching tools, allowing students the opportunity to observe, criticize, and question, but not actually to exert direct control. The element of "let's pretend" has some value as a way of teaching.

Are we to take this as a serious educational philosophy? If we do, let us also remember that it is a feasible way to remove substance

from politics, leaving the emptiness of gesture. Let us note, too, that it neatly sterilizes the content of debate and controversy, while leaving the form intact. Let us note, finally, that it is a convenient means of preserving the university status quo, maintaining harmony with legislators, rich alumni, and worried parents. And, nicely enough, all in the name of building democracy!

But does the student really learn from making decisions that can have no certain consequences, that are posed and controlled and subject to veto by the dean of students? I think not. For any decision to constitute a useful learning experience, the individual must sense in a real way the responsibility for its consequences. And some decisions must affect the local status quo if decision making is to be distinguished from the boredom of perpetual rehearsal.

I found one of the most devastating examples of the pretend theory of learning in an article in the *University of Wisconsin Daily Cardinal* of November 17, 1961. The author, in analyzing the student government constitution, finds that "Student Senate shall . . . legislate on any matter aiding in the planning, supervision, and co-ordination of student activities *in accordance with University regulations.*" The Senate "can thus vote only to uphold University rules. It is constitutionally mandated to maintain the status quo."

This does not mean that students are shackled completely at the University of Wisconsin. It simply means that they violate the constitution every time they do something creative; this violation gives the administration a "constitutional" excuse for veto action every time an "unconstitutional" act is not to their liking. Incredibly, the government of laws coincides with the government of men. I wonder how many students in America share the mood of the student journalist's last brief paragraph:

"Rather makes the whole thing a farce."

Linked to this theory that college is a preparation for democratic life is the administrative creed that attendance at a university is "a privilege, not a right." This follows the narrow line of argument that the student chooses to attend such-and-such a

university, pays his tuition, enters a contractual relation, and must leave at the university's insistence. The student is essentially an outsider, someone who takes what he gets, or else. But if this be one's conception of the fundamental relation of the student to his academic community, then the academic community will hardly obtain certain of its social and educational ends. Socially, the ends will be thwarted by the segregation and occasional intimidation of the student population from the educational community which should be whole and integrated. Educationally, the ends are thwarted by analogizing the university to a corporation or any form of business enterprise which produces "college graduates." The ideal, and the only ultimately practical university (I hope to argue today) is composed of a host of scholars, each of them students and each of them teachers to some degree, finding unity in the common task of leading the examined life. To designate some as members by "privilege" and some as members by "right" means that the former group has only a submissive role in the general search for knowledge and values. They can search, but not too boldly; they can inquire, but not into everything; they can participate, but not in the actual governance of the community. They can be forbidden certain associations. Their academic life habits can be regulated without explanation. They can be suspended, or expelled, for at any moment they might find themselves "unable to adjust to the pattern of the university."

Having briefly examined the institutional role of the college student, I want to look more closely at the student generation emerging. Several influential studies in recent years suggest rather alarming facts about the nature of student culture. In his book, *Changing Values in College*, Philip Jacob found that 3 per cent of the students interviewed "gave top priority to being active in national affairs or being useful." Seventeen per cent expected that participating as a citizen in the affairs of the community would be one of the activities giving the "most satisfaction in life." Asked what was the university's most important function, the goal of "getting along with other people" received five times as much support as the goal of "citizenship participation." A second study, done by Dr. Edward Eddy at the University of New Hamp-

shire, concluded that most students perceive college life as a "parenthesis" enclosing something neither related nor relevant to the rest of life, except as it assured a better job. Another more recent study is contained in a 1,000-page collection of essays by social scientists, edited by Nevitt Sanford and titled *The American College*. One of the author's major concerns is the university's failure to challenge and truly educate a huge bloc of students who are fair achievers but without strong goals or commitments to anything. One of the most astonishing surveys was reported by Dr. Herman H. Remmers just a few years ago. "They play it so safe," he said, "that they've lost their feelings for the basic tenets of American democracy." He found that three of every four students believe "that what the nation needs is a strong fearless leader in whom we can have faith," 50 per cent were willing to compromise freedom of the press; 83 per cent thought it all right for the police to use third-degree tactics.

What are we witnessing here? Surely it is the decomposition of democracy in this country. People are becoming more remote from the possibility of a civic life that maximizes personal influence over public affairs. There is a deep alienation of the student from the decision-making institutions of society. C. Wright Mills suggests a widening separation between "social structure" and personal "milieu." As our major institutions expand, and science and technology generate an increased need for division of labor, expertise and specialization, and the life of nations becomes more interconnected, fewer and fewer individuals are able to perceive truly beyond their immediate and limited circles, their milieus. An even smaller number have even the semblance of an integrated understanding of social realities and social change. Take the University of Michigan: Who here has any conception of the structure of even this university, the location of authority—formal and informal, the role of the faculty in policy making, the impact of federal research funds on the education of the individual, the relations with legislators and alumni and foundations?

Less and less do we transform private troubles into public issues. For instance, the man who is sick with the commercials he sees on television tends to disconnect the set instead of complain-

ing about the capitalist system that created pseudo-needs in people—a prerequisite of mass society—so as to continue profit in times of overproduction. Similarly, the freshman in the quad-rangle does not connect the fact that he can see his girl friend in the apartment but not in the quad with the fact that the State of Michigan is politically gerrymandered so as to entrench nineteenth-century Americans like Senator Elmer Porter in the Senate and House of Representatives. The student who is upset by the idiosyncracies of the Negro cleaning lady in his corridor does not connect his upset with the fact that more than one-third of all Negro women in America are forced to be domestics or the fact that salary rates for Negroes have been, on the average, one-half of the rates for white men for the past twenty years.

As the perimeter of personal vision becomes closer, several terrible things happen. A sense of powerlessness evolves, powerlessness with regard to changing the state of affairs evoked by the ideology of "complexity," a powerlessness that is often hidden beneath joviality and complacency. To the student, things seem to happen because of a mixture of graft and manipulation by an unseen "them," the modern equivalent of "fate." To the extent that these powerless participate in public affairs, they participate with impotency, adapting themselves to the myriad of rules, initiated and imposed from without, that constitute the university game (after all, who wants to be a martyr over dress regulations?). They seek to conform their actions to what the Top People like, they just try and get by, feeling pretty content most of the time, enjoying the university's benevolent laxity about drinking regulations, building up their exam files, "playing it cool."

A recent Gallup study of youth concluded, among other things, that youth will "settle for low success [and] won't risk high failure." There is no willingness to take risks, no setting of dangerous goals, no real conception of personal identity except one made in the image of others, no real urge for personal fulfillment except to be *almost* as successful as the very successful people. Much attention is paid to the social status (meeting people, getting a wife or a husband, making good solid business contacts); increasingly much more attention is paid to academic status (get grades, get

honors, get into medical school). Still neglected generally, however, is the intellectual status, the personal cultivation of excellence of the mind. Nevitt Sanford writes: "To develop a skill in selling one's personality may appear far more important than to develop any personality worth selling." That the universities should encourage social acceptance is only natural; they are, of course, only acting *in loco parentis*.

The university and society are not just impersonal to the student. Where members of an institution are linked by the *functional* bond of being students, not by the *fraternal* bond of being people, there develops a terrible isolation of man from man only dimly disguised in the intensity of twist parties or the frightening riots that broke out at Lauderdale because the city lights wouldn't turn on the beach at night. Albert Camus' novel, *The Stranger*, creates a paradigm of the man lacking relatedness to anything at all. In one part of the novel the Stranger's mother has died and he himself goes swimming and to the movies with his girlfriend. That evening she asks him to marry her, to which he nonchalantly consents. Next she asks if he loves her, and with the same detachment he replies that he doesn't think so. In this perhaps extreme case, don't we see the contours of a generation consciously drifting *but not even prepared to commit itself to drifting*? A teacher in Austin, Texas, made this point plain to me when he joked: "Students don't even give a damn about apathy." Can we call this attitude human? Doesn't it involve a perception of life that is unreal, as articulated by one coed who said: "For the most of us, war is a great big fairy tale told by our parents. We don't believe that it can happen to us." If war in 1962 is a great big fairy tale, what meaning have life and death?

The pleasantness, the glad hand of the group in many respects, is but the conforming surface of a deeply, though perhaps unconsciously, callous personality: Callous in that these same people can drink the weekend away impervious to the fact that in Calcutta University, 100 students die each semester from starvation and malnutrition. Callous in that they scribble down "labor" in the abstract cost columns during economics lectures unmoved by the fact that 16 million Americans are still not covered by the

1961 Minimum Wage Law. Callous in that they preach to Negroes to educate themselves when the Negro college graduate in America earns on the average two-thirds the salary of the white man with the same educational background. Callous in their incredible bragging about being "better red than dead," that not only demonstrates how deeply the mass killings of the twentieth century have sterilized our respect for the sacredness of the individual, but also becomes mindless pomposity when contrasted with the hundreds of Negroes in the South who are actually nonviolently living the words of the spiritual, "Before I'll be a slave, I'll be buried in my grave."

But callousness alone does not describe this problem. Deeper and more dangerous is the near disappearance among the students of the critical faculty—that which is expected to make fine discriminations among different political ideologies and ethical statements, that which endows the moral sense with reason, and that which refines the quality of conviction. It is this human faculty which remains untouched by much of the classroom experience and largely unused in our day-to-day-response to living. Without this faculty, we become insensitive, adapting to the dull ethics that permeate our various functional roles. As Americans, for example, we cheer loudly for Virgil Grissom and John Glenn and not so loudly for the superior performances of Gagarin and Titov. Gradually the possibility of judging as a human being disappears; being a human being is distinctly not functional and, perhaps, it might be Unpatriotic.

But this is only the visible part of this student, the part he lets us scrutinize. There is a very private as well as a public life of the powerless. Isolation soon begets a privately-constructed universe, a place of systematic study schedules, two nights a week for beer, a steady girl, early marriage—a framework infused with personality, warmth, and under control, where a fellow can at least be father of the house, however incomplete and unsatisfying it may be. This strange, deeply personal and coveted (near secret) world has been illuminated best, perhaps, by the poet Rilke, who once compared twentieth century man to a stranger who from his

window looks out into the dark, abandoned street of an unfamiliar, inhospitable town. He writes:

The new city was still to me, as though denied, and the unresponsive landscape spread its darkness as though I were not there. The nearest things did not bother to reveal themselves to me. The alley climbed to a street light. I saw how alien it was. Across the way a room was warmly lighted by a lamp. It made me feel included. They sensed this, and drew the shutters.

Amidst the growing dominance of functional over personal bonds between people, this profound detachment from the cooperative and public life, this buckling down to make a safe buck and a safer life, there still seems to be flaring the human desire for a creative neighborhood of people. But, tragically, it flares less and less, and the shutters of which Rilke speaks are drawing tighter.

How distant is this condition from the best meanings of education and social democracy?

I believe education in a democracy should be threatening and renewing—threatening in that it should critically examine the deepest understandings of life, confronting taboo, habit, ritual, and personal ethics with a withering “why,” unearthing the values that society buries for security’s sake, and exposing these to the sunlight of the inquiring mind; renewing in that it transmits human culture from generation to generation and place to place, transforming some parts, modifying others, concurring with still others, yet expressing reverence for the whole.

The main concern of the university should not be with the publishing of books, getting money from legislators, lobbying for federal aid, wooing the rich, producing bombs and deadly bacteria. Nor should it be with passing along the morality of the middle class, nor the morality of the white man, nor even the morality of this potpourri we call “Western society.” Nor should it be with acting as a second household and church for the young man away from home, nor as a playground for twisters, neophyte drinkers, and pledge classes. Already, however, the parallels between the habits of the university and the habits of the society are many. I have listed some; include *with* these: the parallels be-

tween our academic and financial systems of credit, between competition for grades and for chamber of commerce awards, between cheating and price rigging, between the statements "attendance is a privilege, not a right" and "we reserve the right to refuse service to anyone."

The main and transcending concern of the university must be the unfolding and refinement of the moral, aesthetic, and logical capacities of men in a manner that creates genuine independence. What do I have in mind by "genuine independence"? A concern not with image or popularity, but with finding a moral meaning in life that is direct and authentic for the self. A quality of mind that is not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts values of the Top People, nor one which represses threats to its habits, but one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experience, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved. An intuitive alertness to that which is capable of occurring, to that which is not yet realized, and a passion for the continuous opening of human potential. These are the qualities—the weapons—that might unravel the heavy cape of impotence, the qualities that might restore the dominance of human over functional responsibilities and bring to men once more the will and the ability to exert real influence over events as citizens.

Above all, I reject the claim that only a privileged few can be independent, the view that creativity is necessarily the function of culture-preserving elites. I believe that independence can be a fact about ordinary people. And democracy, real participating democracy, rests on the independence of the ordinary people.

Some will see a contradiction in my approval of general self-determination and my depressing characterization of the state of student culture. How, it will be asked, can I reconcile my advocacy of independence and my charge of irresponsibility? This kind of criticism, I think, rests on the silent assumption that students and people generally are *innately* apathetic, that human dullness is somehow "in the nature of things." My counter-assumption is that much of our trouble is not innate and not in-

evitable, but rooted in the social structures and institutions we have created. Furthermore, in many cases it is not the internal dynamic of those institutions that makes decisive decisions today, but it is very often *men*, small knots of democratically irresponsible men.

Take the college as a limited example: An authoritarian institution does not develop independent people. An authoritarian college within a society that basically values money and power, conformity and success, established habits and the status quo, does not develop independent people. When I ask these critics how they would alter things, their response usually is to further isolate the people from decision making because the transcendent value of our times, they say, is the military and economic viability of the so-called Free World. It is usually added that the government, the churches, and the press are not fulfilling their roles as builders of public morale. I do not think this response contains a remedy at all for the problems I have tried to outline. Instead of changing, it tends to aggravate the condition of the powerless in our society. It tends to obscure the values that are supposed to be at the basis of the Cold War struggle. When it was reported that a dominating response among GI's who were asked why they fought in Korea was "That's the way the ball bounces," we should not have carried on about the decline of patriotism; we should have asked ourselves: Why are these men alienated, valueless, the apathetic pawns of circumstance? What opportunities have they had to be otherwise, in politics, in their work, in their free time? When a girl says she perceives peace and war as a fairy tale, we should not bemoan her immaturity; we should ask: Why is she so rootless? What must be changed so that she will come into the society with a real, felt concern about the continued life of man?

We must have a try at bringing society under human control. We must wrest control somehow from the endless machines that grind up men's jobs, the few hundred corporations that exercise greater power over the economy and the country than in feudal societies, the vast military profession that came into existence with universal military training during our brief lifetime, the

irresponsible politicians secured by the ideological overlap, the seniority system and the gerrymandered base of our political structure, and the pervasive bureaucracy that perpetuates and multiplies itself everywhere. These are the dominators of human beings, the real, definable phenomena that make human beings fall—victimized by undefinable "circumstance." Sadly, the university in America has become a part of this hierarchy of power, rather than an instrument to make men free.

It must be said, too, that the university situation in America is more a symptom than a basic cause of our problems. But a college is one place to embark on a movement of reform, a place with intellectual equipment and a reservoir of unused creativity, a place from which reason might make a last attempt to intervene in human affairs.

A really excellent university, I believe, would not be organized along corporate and authoritarian lines, but in a way that would truly activate the creative potential of students and faculty. These two communities share the real enterprise of learning, and as there can be no final unamendable Truth in a community of free inquiry, there can be no arbitrary authority structure for the relation of teacher and student. A company of scholars is a company of equals in the crucial sense that none has a premium on truth, though some may be wiser, more literate, more numerous, more knowledgeable than others. Because the faculty has more permanence and more educational training, theirs should be the primary responsibility for the direction of the university. Because education is not a one-way process, because faculty tradition must be balanced by the fresh eye of youth, and because democracy requires popular control over important decisions, students should share with professors in the developing university. Separate student government and faculty government should be abolished and replaced by a cooperative decision-making body. The organized university administration, as it now exists, should be eliminated. In the present form, administrations are increasingly staffed by individuals without backgrounds of significant scholarship, and without a primary interest in the edu-

cation of students. By the very nature of their constant administrative work, these men assume greater and greater—quite oligarchical—power over the everyday and long-range progress of the university. Therefore, to think of them as “equals” with the faculty and students, is not only to say that bureaucrats should have as much say as scholars, but it is to give bureaucracy an unfair advantage which inevitably leads to dominance. Instead of this system, we should acquire a bureaucracy that is really a bureaucracy: a rational apparatus meant to service the work of the intellectual community. A bureaucracy, for instance, might take care of admissions problems, parking policies, health and medical service, staffing, business management of the dormitories, public relations. All of these functions should be subject to the democratic control of the students and faculty, although they should not be so tightly controlled as to create human problems of alienation within the bureaucracy itself. The more important administrative functions—the presidency, the academic deanships, major rules and regulations, relations with the sources of funds, curriculum content, teaching methods, class sizes—should be the direct and never-delegated concern of the students and faculty. As for the regents and trustees, the present criteria for selection, e.g., wealth, political affiliation, prestige, should be subordinated to educational experience and understanding. This accomplished, regents might properly represent public interests, though with only advisory power, in university decision making.

It will be said that this activity would exhaust the scholarly community. To this I say: Better exhaustion than the present system of nearly total administrative control of the universities. It will be further said that I am being utopian and unrealistic. In response I would ask you to consider whether or not you believe that our current realisms about politics and education are solving human problems; I would then quote Norman Brown's *Life Against Death* (a psychoanalytic study of the meaning of history): “Utopian speculations . . . must come back into fashion. They are a way of affirming faith in the present moment insoluble. Today even the survival of humanity is a utopian hope.”

Third, I would suggest that without at least a vision of the ideal university, reformers will make no qualitative changes and may even adopt standards that their vision would oppose.

The university I envision will tolerate and even promote student exercise of democratic prerogatives. It will entertain all ideas and make them challenging. It will be culturally, racially, religiously, and internationally integrated. It will appreciate the educational benefits of testing ideas through real action.

In this good university of mine, *in loco parentis* will be replaced by the doctrine that man is meant to live, not to prepare for life. Instead of a system that is paternal and relatively closed, there will be an organic system, where ideas are sharply confronted so that man can comprehend, always developing in the tension between threat and renewal. The good university will be concerned with democracy, too: By its practices, it will counter democracy that depends on authority, elites, and specialization with one that depends on consent, individual participation, and the common intelligence that enables men to deal with confusion, anxiety, and the enormity of events.

Instead of discussing student "action" I fear I have paid more attention to the dominant trend of student "petrification." My hope has been to indicate my serious concern about the absence of social consciousness and action, not only within the student community but within society generally, at a time when the world needs more independently active people.

This is not to say there is no student activity on the campus. Perhaps there is more at this time than at any time during the fifties. I sense a widespread moral revival that moves in politically ambiguous directions, mostly centered among relatively creative minorities who are deeply out of phase with life in this country. The efforts I am most moved by are those of Southern Negro students who suffer day by day, fighting for America to honor its ideals. Despite the cruelties of the machines in the South, the immoral laxity of the white community in America, the agonizing splits with families, the financial and other sacrifices required,

the constance of physical danger, they go on—nearly unnoticed by the public and barely supported by the Federal Government. To be sure, they are inheritors of an historical tradition of protest, but in a real sense also they are their own leaders; they are defining the orienting policies of the struggle, they are restoring the individual personality to a creative and self-cultivating role in human affairs. Too, they are becoming one with a far more noble struggle than the degrading one between East and West; they are part of the North-South conflict between the old overdeveloped ruling elites and the masses of hungry, aspiring, utopian peoples intervening in history for the first time. I am afraid, however, that too few of us see anything exemplary about the Southern students.

Still other students—more than ever—are starting to grapple with the hard problems of war, peace, and foreign policy. Five thousand of them turned out to picket the White House and visit their Congressmen just last month, demanding American initiatives toward peace. A few hundred more participated at a high intellectual level in the First Intercollegiate Conference on Disarmament and Arms Control at Swarthmore College.

There are, finally, thousands of young conservatives who came into public significance in 1960. That I find them politically absurd does not deny the catalytic value of their social participation and the stirring they have caused among many students.

But these people are minorities; they have broken through the crust of silence. It remains for the vast majority similarly to discover that peace and war are not fairy tales, that at the midnight of Doomsday we will not turn into pumpkins (though some will be vegetating in their shelters). Every time we do not speak, we contribute to the mood of moral rigidity that grips the land. Every time we do not speak, we maintain the vacuum of public affairs. Every time we do not speak, we make harder the creation of an active public to dismantle the hierarchy of undemocratic power in America.

Do not wish to be a student in contrast to being a man. Do not study as a student, but as a man who is alive and who cares.

Leave the isolated world of ideological fantasy, allow your ideas to become part of your living and your living to become part of your ideas.

All over the world the young intellectuals are breaking out of the old, stultified order. Before you call them "communist" or "extremist" or "immature," stop a moment, let yourselves be a little more insecure, so that you can listen to what they say and perhaps feel the pulse of their challenge. Their challenge politically takes many forms, with which we may agree or disagree; but the essential challenge is far deeper. It is to quit the acquiescence to political "fate," cut the confidence in business-as-usual futures, and realize that in a time of mass organization, government by expertise, success through technical specialization, manipulation by the balancing of Official Secrecy with the Soft Sell Technique, incomprehensible destructiveness of the two wars and the third which is imminent, and the Cold War which has chilled man's relation to man, the time has come for a re-assertion of the personal.

Thomas Hayden is a staff member of the Newark Community Union Project (SDS, Economic Research and Action Project), and a past president of Students for a Democratic Society. "Student Social Action" is a transcription of a talk given at the University of Michigan in spring, 1962.

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STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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